    [Senate Hearing 112-419]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 112-419

    NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSION,
                                 112TH CONGRESS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       on

                                 NOMINATIONS OF

    MICHAEL G. VICKERS; DR. JO ANN ROONEY; GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA; HON.
     LEON E. PANETTA; GEN JAMES D. THURMAN, USA; VADM WILLIAM H. McRAVEN,
     USN; LTGEN JOHN R. ALLEN, USMC; MADELYN R. CREEDON; ALAN F. ESTEVEZ;
      ADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN; GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA; GEN.
     WILLIAM M. FRASER III, USAF; GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA; ADM JONATHAN
       W. GREENERT, USN; LTG CHARLES H. JACOBY, JR., USA; HON. ASHTON B.
    CARTER; MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN; MARK W. LIPPERT; BRAD R. CARSON; AND KEVIN
                                   A. OHLSON

                                   ----------

     FEBRUARY 15; MARCH 3; JUNE 9, 28; JULY 19, 21, 26, 28; SEPTEMBER 13;
                               NOVEMBER 17, 2011

                                   ----------

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

    NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSION,
                                 112TH CONGRESS

                                                            S. Hrg. 112-419

    NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FIRST SESSION,
                                 112TH CONGRESS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       on

                                 NOMINATIONS OF

    MICHAEL G. VICKERS; DR. JO ANN ROONEY; GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA; HON.
     LEON E. PANETTA; GEN JAMES D. THURMAN, USA; VADM WILLIAM H. McRAVEN,
     USN; LTGEN JOHN R. ALLEN, USMC; MADELYN R. CREEDON; ALAN F. ESTEVEZ;
      ADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN; GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA; GEN.
     WILLIAM M. FRASER III, USAF; GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA; ADM JONATHAN
       W. GREENERT, USN; LTG CHARLES H. JACOBY, JR., USA; HON. ASHTON B.
    CARTER; MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN; MARK W. LIPPERT; BRAD R. CARSON; AND KEVIN
                                   A. OHLSON

                                   __________

     FEBRUARY 15; MARCH 3; JUNE 9, 28; JULY 19, 21, 26, 28; SEPTEMBER 13;
                               NOVEMBER 17, 2011

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/

                                   __________

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    74-537                    WASHINGTON : 2012
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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                         CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

    JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut     JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    JACK REED, Rhode Island              JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
    E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska         SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
    JIM WEBB, Virginia                   ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
    MARK UDALL, Colorado                 ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
    KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina         KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
    MARK BEGICH, Alaska                  SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
    JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia       LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        JOHN CORNYN, Texas
    KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York      DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut

                       Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director

                   David M. Morriss, Minority Staff Director

                                      (ii)
    ?

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                        CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

                                                                       Page

                               february 15, 2011

    Nominations of Hon. Michael G. Vickers to be Under Secretary of
      Defense for Intelligence; and Dr. Jo Ann Rooney to be Principal
      Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness..     1

    Statements of:

    Hon. Michael G. Vickers, Nominated to be Under Secretary of
      Defense for Intelligence.......................................     4
    Rooney, Ph.D., Jo Ann, Nominated to be Principal Deputy Under
      Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness...............     6

                                 march 3, 2011

    Nomination of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, for Reappointment to
      the Grade of General and to be Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.......    93

    Statements of:

    Reed, Hon. Jack, U.S. Senator from the State of Rhode Island.....    98
    Dempsey, GEN Martin E., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of
      General and to be Chief of Staff, U.S. Army....................   100

                                  june 9, 2011

    Nomination of Hon. Leon E. Panetta to be Secretary of Defense....   181

    Statements of:

    Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, U.S. Senator from the State of California   187
    Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from the State of California...   188
    Panetta, Hon. Leon E., Nominated to be Secretary of Defense......   190

                                 june 28, 2011

    Nominations of GEN James D. Thurman, USA, for Reappointment to
      the Grade of General and to be Commander, United Nations
      Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces-Korea; VADM William
      H. McRaven, USN, to be Admiral and Commander, U.S. Special
      Operations Command; and LtGen John R. Allen, USMC, to be
      General and Commander, International Security Assistance Force/
      Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan.............................   353

    Statement of:

    Thurman, GEN James D., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of
      General and to be Commander, United Nations Command/Combined
      Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea...............................   358
    McRaven, VADM William H., USN, Nominated to be Admiral and
      Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.....................   359
    Allen, LtGen John R., USMC, Nominated to be General and
      Commander, International Security Assistance Force/Commander,
      U.S. Forces-Afghanistan........................................   360

                                      iii
                                 july 19, 2011

    Nominations of Madelyn R. Creedon to be Assistant Secretary of
      Defense for Global Strategic Affairs and Alan F. Estevez to be
      Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel
      Readiness......................................................   505

    Statement of:

    Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from the State of Indiana...   508
    Bingaman, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from the State of New Mexico...   513
    Creedon, Madelyn R., Nominated to be Assistant Secretary of
      Defense for Global Strategic Affairs...........................   513
    Estevez, Alan F., Nominated to be Assistant Secretary of Defense
      for Logistics and Materiel Readiness...........................   515

                                 july 21, 2011

    Nominations of ADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN, for
      Reappointment to the Grade of Admiral and to be Vice Chairman
      of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA, for
      Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Chief of Staff,
      U.S. Army; and Gen. William M. Fraser III, USAF, for
      Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander, U.S.
      Transportation Command.........................................   575

    Statements of:

    Winnefeld, ADM James A., Jr., USN, for Reappointment to the Grade
      of Admiral and to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff   581
    Odierno, GEN Raymond T., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of
      General and to be Chief of Staff, U.S. Army....................   582
    Fraser, Gen. William M., III, USAF, for Reappointment to the
      Grade of General and to be Commander, U.S. Transportation
      Command........................................................   584
    Annex A..........................................................   764

                                 july 26, 2011

    Nomination of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, for Reappointment to
      the Grade of General and to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
      Staff..........................................................   783

    Statements of:

    Dempsey, GEN Martin E., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of
      General and to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff........   788

                                 july 28, 2011

    Nominations of ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, USN, for Reappointment
      to the Grade of Admiral and to be Chief of Naval Operations;
      and LTG Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., USA, to be General and to be
      Commander, U.S. Northern Command/Commander, North American
      Aerospace Defense Command......................................   909

    Statements of:

    Greenert, ADM Jonathan W., USN, for Reappointment to the Grade of
      Admiral and to be Chief of Naval Operations....................   913
    Jacoby, LTG Charles H., Jr., USA, Nominated to be General and to
      be Commander, U.S. Northern Command/Commander, North American
      Aerospace Defense Command......................................   915

                               september 13, 2011

    Nomination of Hon. Ashton B. Carter to be Deputy Secretary of
      Defense........................................................  1007

    Statements of:

    Lieberman, Hon. Joseph I., U.S. Senator from the State of
      Connecticut....................................................  1008
    Carter, Hon. Ashton, Ph.D., Nominated to be Deputy Secretary of
      Defense........................................................  1013

                               november 17, 2011

    Nominations of Michael A. Sheehan to be Assistant Secretary of
      Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict; Mark
      W. Lippert to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and
      Pacific Security Affairs; Brad R. Carson to be General Counsel
      of the Department of the Army; and Kevin A. Ohlson to be a
      Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces........  1173

    Statements of:

    Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma...  1181
    Leahy, Hon. Patrick, U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont......  1182
    Sheehan, Michael A., Nominated to be Assistant Secretary of
      Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict......  1184
    Lippert, Mark W., Nominated to be Assistant Secretary of Defense
      for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs.........................  1185
    Carson, Brad R., Nominated to be General Counsel of the
      Department of the Army.........................................  1186
    Ohlson, Kevin A., Nominated to be a Judge of the U.S. Court of
      Appeals for the Armed Forces...................................  1186

    APPENDIX.........................................................  1321

    NOMINATIONS OF HON. MICHAEL G. VICKERS TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
     FOR INTELLIGENCE; AND DR. JO ANN ROONEY TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER
                SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2011

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Webb,
    Udall, Hagan, Manchin, Blumenthal, McCain, Brown, and Ayotte.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
    Gabriella E. Fahrer, counsel; Creighton Greene, professional
    staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael
    J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling,
    counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney,
    counsel; Thomas K. McConnell, professional staff member;
    William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional
    staff member; and John H. Quirk V, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority
    staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; John
    W. Heath, Jr., minority investigative counsel; Daniel A.
    Lerner, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler,
    professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority
    counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles and Hannah I.
    Lloyd.
        Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta,
    assistant to Senator Reed; Gordon Peterson, assistant to
    Senator Webb; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall;
    Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh,
    assistant to Senator Begich; Joanne McLaughlin, assistant to
    Senator Manchin; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator
    Shaheen; Jordan Baugh and Elana Broitman, assistants to Senator
    Gillibrand; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to
    Senator Sessions; Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
    Chambliss; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown; and Brad
    Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
    meets today to consider the nominations of two senior officials
    to serve in important positions within the Department of
    Defense (DOD). Dr. Michael Vickers has been nominated to be the
    Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. He is currently
    serving in that position on an acting basis while continuing
    his duties as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
    Operations, Low Intensity Conflict, and Interdependent
    Capabilities (SOLIC&IC). Dr. Vickers has served ably in that
    position, guiding and overseeing major elements of our
    operations against terrorists and insurgents across the globe.
        Dr. Vickers has had a long and distinguished career in
    Government service, much of which is relevant to the position
    for which he has been nominated by the President.
        In his present position as Assistant Secretary of Defense-
    SOLIC, he has been deeply involved in intelligence matters
    across the Government as a policymaker, as a consumer of
    intelligence, and as a producer of intelligence. He served
    previously as a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations
    officer in multiple divisions, spanning the Near East, South
    Asia, and Latin America, and including involvement in covert
    actions. He also served as an Army Special Forces soldier and
    officer.
        Congress created the position of Under Secretary of Defense
    for Intelligence (USD(I)) in 2002 in recognition of the growing
    importance of intelligence to our military forces, especially
    in conducting operations after the events of September 11. The
    Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is the principal
    staff assistant and adviser to the Secretary and Deputy
    Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence,
    counterintelligence, security, and other sensitive matters. In
    this capacity, the USD(I) exercises the Secretary's authority
    over the intelligence components of DOD and is responsible for
    intelligence planning, programming, budgeting, policy
    formulation, and oversight.
        The USD(I) is also responsible for ensuring that DOD
    intelligence components are responsive to the direction and
    requirements of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).
    Indeed, by formal agreement between the DNI and the Secretary
    of Defense, the USD(I) is dual-hatted as the Director of
    Defense Intelligence on the DNI's staff.
        Dr. Jo Ann Rooney has been nominated to be the Principal
    Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,
    the Department's number two position for military and civilian
    personnel issues, including recruitment, retention, pay and
    benefits, health care, readiness, and the quality of life of
    the members of our Armed Forces and their families. Dr. Rooney
    comes to us from academia, where she most recently served as
    the President of Mount Ida College and has served as an
    instructor at various colleges since 1994.
        Dr. Rooney also serves on the board of trustees for the
    Jewish Hospital and St. Mary's Health Care, a nonprofit health
    care system in Louisville, KY, experience that could serve her
    well in her new position should she be confirmed.
        The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
    Personnel and Readiness position is vitally important as the
    Department and Congress continue to wrestle with many
    challenges, including vastly growing personnel and health care
    budgets and the proper size of the force. The Department is
    actively planning a reduction in its ground forces, depending
    on conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the 2012 budget
    request includes modest reductions in the Army and Navy, while
    the Department plans greater reductions in future years.
        In evaluating the size of the force, we must be mindful of
    the stress on the force, including inadequate dwell time for
    many soldiers and a deeply concerning suicide rate.
        Finally, the Department is continuing its deliberate
    progress in implementing the repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell.
        We welcome both our nominees. We thank them. We thank their
    families for their distinguished public and private service and
    willingness to serve our Nation in these important positions.
    When we call upon them for their opening statements, we will
    ask them to introduce the family members and their friends who
    are with them as they give those statements.
        Senator McCain.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

        Senator McCain. Thank you, Senator Levin. I join you in
    welcoming our nominees and their families and friends who are
    here today, especially our two youngest there [pointing to the
    audience], who have been working on paperwork in preparation
    for this hearing. We thank you for that. [Laughter.]
        Secretary Vickers has had a distinguished and storied
    record of service to this country. He served as an Army Special
    Forces soldier, as a CIA case officer, and since August 2007 as
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low
    Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities.
        Dr. Vickers, you must be prepared to streamline the size
    and cost of the organizations which you'll oversee. Secretary
    Gates has announced his initiative to cut costs, eliminate
    waste and redundancies, and focus defense dollars on the most
    vital programs. With the rollout of the fiscal year 2012 budget
    yesterday, we will want to know what parts of the defense
    intelligence enterprise will be affected.
        In the face of an unacceptably high and increasing deficit,
    we must examine all aspects of defense spending. I hope we can
    learn from you how you would apply these efficiencies for cost
    savings for other vital defense priorities. For example, which
    intelligence functions are redundant and can be eliminated;
    which intelligence organizations that are bloated can be cut;
    are there senior civilian positions that could be transferred
    or eliminated; which contracts for services could be
    terminated; and which major acquisition programs should be
    restructured or eliminated to save money?
        My questions, however, should not be interpreted as
    reflecting a lack of concern or support for our ongoing
    operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Obviously, failure is not
    an option in achieving our goals in both Operation New Dawn and
    Operation Enduring Freedom, and robust intelligence-gathering
    and analysis are critical to our success.
        The list of imperatives for the defense intelligence
    enterprise is lengthy. We must be able to continue to locate
    and track America's most relentless enemies on the battlefield,
    to include former Guantanamo detainees who have made their way
    back into the fight. We must safeguard our Nation's vital
    secrets to prevent another Wikileaks episode and any further
    neutralization of our lawful intelligence collection methods.
    Through sound acquisition practices, we have to ensure our
    troops and our Nation have the overhead surveillance required
    for national security and mission accomplishments.
        Dr. Rooney, you've had a distinguished career in law,
    education, and health administration. I expect you'll be called
    on very quickly to assist Secretary Gates and Under Secretary
    of Defense Stanley in making progress in several key areas that
    demand attention. Foremost among these is identifying ways to
    improve the well-being and quality of life of servicemembers
    and their families. After 9 years of combat operations in Iraq
    and Afghanistan, our forces, particularly the ground forces,
    special operators, and the combat support personnel who
    mobilize and sustain them through multiple deployments, are
    stressed.
        While recruiting is strong and retention levels for
    experienced noncommissioned officers and officers remain
    historically high, the Department must continue to ensure that
    the resources, policies, and programs are in place to guarantee
    that deploying troops are trained, ready, and focused. For our
    wounded or injured, there must continue to be world-class care
    on the battlefield, and when they return home that the
    procedures for helping them and their families transition
    seamlessly to the next stages of their military service or
    civilian life work as rapidly and fairly as possible.
        I look forward to hearing your testimony and I wish to
    congratulate you on your nominations and I look forward to
    confirming you as quickly as possible.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
        Let me now call on you for your opening statement,
    Secretary Vickers.

      STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL G. VICKERS, NOMINATED TO BE UNDER
                 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

        Dr. Vickers. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished
    members of the committee: It is an honor to appear before you
    here today. Thank you for your consideration of my nomination.
    I am profoundly grateful for the confidence President Obama has
    shown in me by nominating me for the position of Under
    Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and in designating me as
    the Acting USD(I) on 28 January. In the brief period I have
    been Acting USD(I), I have gained a further appreciation of the
    immense responsibilities of this office.
        I am also deeply grateful to Secretary Gates for his
    support. I had the great privilege of serving with Secretary
    Gates in the CIA during the 1980s and he has been the model for
    me ever since of what a professional intelligence officer
    should aspire to.
        The USD(I) is dual-hatted as the DNI's Director of Defense
    Intelligence. I have had the great honor of serving with
    Director Clapper for the past 3\1/2\ years and I am grateful
    for his support for my nomination.
        I would also like to thank my family for their love and
    support. It is a great honor, Mr. Chairman, to introduce them
    to the committee today. With me here today are my wife, Melana,
    and our daughters Alexandra, Sophia, Oksana, and Kalyna. I
    would be a very poor dad if I did not also introduce in
    absentia our fifth daughter, Natasha, who is busily studying
    for her midterms at Ohio State and thus could not be with us
    today.
        Chairman Levin. Which is the youngest of your daughters who
    are here today, by the way?
        Dr. Vickers. Kalyna is our kindergartener, who is 6 years
    old on February 8th.
        Chairman Levin. I was trying to win her vote here by asking
    which is the youngest. Thank you. [Laughter.]
        Dr. Vickers. I'd like to also add that Oksana has the same
    birthday as President Obama. [Laughter.]
        Also with me here today are my mother-in-law, Oksana
    Hepburn, my brother-in-law, Roman Gila, and his son and my
    nephew Muletti Gila, and numerous friends and colleagues from
    the Pentagon.
        It has been a great privilege and honor for the past 3\1/2\
    years to serve as Assistant Secretary of Defense for SOLIC&IC
    under both President Bush and President Obama. Our special
    operators do much to keep us safe and I am immensely proud of
    them.
        We face many challenges as a Nation, from the war with al
    Qaeda in Afghanistan to the pursuit of nuclear weapons by rogue
    states, the development of asymmetric capabilities by rising
    and resurgent powers, and the continued effects of the global
    financial crisis. I am confident we'll be more than equal to
    these challenges, as Americans before us were to the challenges
    that confronted them.
        Our intelligence capabilities constitute an increasingly
    critical source of advantage for our Nation. Recent events in
    the Middle East remind us of the importance of intelligence,
    but also of the unpredictable and rapid turns developments can
    take. Our warriors in the field and our policymakers here at
    home are better served by U.S. intelligence today than at any
    time since I began my service nearly 4 decades ago. We owe them
    the best intelligence we can provide. If confirmed as USD(I), I
    will do my best to ensure that this continues to be the case.
        As a CIA officer in the 1980s, I learned first-hand about
    the importance of congressional oversight of intelligence. Even
    more important, I learned what an indispensable partner
    Congress can be.
        I look forward to your questions, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Secretary Vickers, we thank you very much
    for that opening statement.
        Dr. Rooney.

     STATEMENT OF JO ANN ROONEY, Ph.D., NOMINATED TO BE PRINCIPAL
     DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS

        Dr. Rooney. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain,
    and members of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Thank you
    for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am grateful
    for the confidence that President Obama has shown in me by
    nominating me for the position of Principal Deputy Under
    Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. I also want
    to thank Secretary Gates for his support of my nomination. If
    confirmed, I will be honored to serve.
        I want to thank my family and extended family for their
    support and it's my pleasure to introduce them now. My mom,
    Patricia Rooney, is with me today and I want to offer her my
    heartfelt and special thanks. It is because of her support and
    that of my late dad, John, that I'm here with you today. My
    dad, an Army veteran, and my mom, a retired public school
    elementary teacher, taught me that anything is possible, but
    that I must embrace opportunities to use my experience and
    talent to help others and leave an organization and people
    better for my efforts.
        I'm also fortunate to have several other people very
    special in my life here today. My dearest friend of over 30
    years and true sister of the heart, Linda Pizzorni, is here.
    Her daughter Alessia, a high school senior, is also here with
    us today. She and her sister Veronica, who is home because she
    has to be in school and she's with her dad, are truly my nieces
    in many ways.
        Father Al Faretra, who is like my big brother, is
    representing the rest of the extended family in the Boston
    area. Prior to becoming a priest, Al served in the Navy and
    spent time aboard the USS Forrestal.
        Finally, Father Jim Rafferty, a very dear friend and
    someone who I've had the pleasure of logging many nautical
    miles sailing the waters throughout New England, is here
    lending support.
        I have not had the opportunity to serve our Nation in
    uniform, as did my dad, my uncles, my godfather, and many
    members of my extended family. They served in peacetime and in
    wartime, including World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. But like
    many Americans, I'm aware of the myriad of challenges members
    of our military, the civilian force, and their families face in
    supporting their service to our country. It is my desire to
    serve our country and, if confirmed, I pledge to bring all of
    my experience, knowledge, energy, and passion to the role.
        The responsibilities and functions of the Principal Deputy
    Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness are vast
    and challenging. They encompass advising and assisting the
    Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and
    advising the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense in
    matters relating to manpower, force management, planning,
    program integration, readiness, Reserve component affairs,
    health affairs, training, civilian and military personnel
    requirements and management, commissary and exchange, morale,
    welfare, and recreation, quality of life matters, spousal and
    family support, and dependent education.
        By nature, as the needs of our military and civilian
    members of DOD and their families change the responsibilities
    of the role must also evolve.
        My background in law, finance, business, strategy,
    organizational change, education, and health care provide me
    with a broad range of experiences and perspectives to bring to
    this role, if confirmed.
        All of us face daunting challenges, not only within DOD,
    but throughout the country, in areas of health care, cost
    containment, efficient use of resources, assessments, and
    accountability. Yet the goal is to balance these issues in a
    way to ensure we have the necessary resources so that the men
    and women in the Department are able to meet our Nation's
    requirements for national security.
        I understand the importance of working with this committee,
    the entire Congress, other governmental departments and
    agencies, and civilian and educational institutions in order to
    accomplish this goal. I understand the longstanding and
    daunting challenges associated with these and other aspects of
    DOD personnel and readiness, enabling the effective
    recruitment, retention, and training of the people we need. I
    will take all these responsibilities seriously and, if
    confirmed, I pledge my best efforts to work with this committee
    and many others to meet these challenges.
        In closing, I would like to again thank President Obama and
    Secretary Gates for selecting me as the nominee for this
    position. If the Senate confirms me, I will make every effort
    to live up to the confidence they and all of you have placed in
    me.
        Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Dr. Rooney.
        We give a warm welcome to your families and friends, who
    are such an important part of who you are and your being here
    today.
        We have standard questions which we ask our nominees, which
    we'll ask each of you now. You can answer together. Have you
    adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts
    of interest?
        Dr. Rooney. Yes.
        Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
    any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
    confirmation process?
        Dr. Vickers. No.
        Dr. Rooney. No.
        Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
    deadlines established or requested communications, including
    questions for the record in hearings?
        Dr. Vickers. Yes.
        Dr. Rooney. Yes.
        Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
    and briefers in response to congressional requests?
        Dr. Vickers. Yes.
        Dr. Rooney. Yes.
        Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
    reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
        Dr. Rooney. Yes.
        Dr. Vickers. Yes.
        Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
    testify upon request before this committee?
        Dr. Vickers. Yes.
        Dr. Rooney. Yes.
        Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
    including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
    timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
    to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
    faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
        Dr. Rooney. Yes.
        Dr. Vickers. Yes.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        I think we'll try a 7-minute round of questions.
        Dr. Vickers, we've been making efforts over the years, this
    committee, to expand the budgets, the production rate, the
    planned number of orbits, for major unmanned aerial vehicles
    that have been so critical to our forces in Afghanistan, Iraq,
    and elsewhere, including the Predator and the Reaper. Our
    current objective is 65 orbits for these aircraft. The budget
    for fiscal year 2012 that we just received funds these aircraft
    at the maximum current production rate.
        However, the fact is that our troops need more and are
    asking for more of these assets right now. They're living with
    significant unfulfilled requirements every day. Now, we were
    recently told that the limiting factor for accelerating the
    expansion of that force is operators and linguists rather than
    the production capacity at factories. My question is, why can't
    the Services accelerate the recruitment and the training of
    operators and linguists?
        Dr. Vickers. Mr. Chairman, our Intelligence, Surveillance,
    and Reconnaissance (ISR) task force, under Secretary Gates'
    direction, has been working very hard since 2008 to provide the
    intelligence capabilities our warriors in the field require.
    Nevertheless, demand has continually outstripped supply, which
    is one reason during the recent Quadrennial Defense Review we
    raised the requirement for Predator and Reaper combat air
    patrols or for orbits from 50 to 65, and it's not clear at this
    point that 65, which we'll reach in 2013, will still meet our
    demand.
        To supplement that, we've been adding manned aircraft of
    various kinds, variations of C-12 aircraft, Project Liberty by
    the Air Force, and medium altitude reconnaissance and
    surveillance systems by the ground forces, to address this
    shortfall.
        As you noted, buying the aircraft is not enough. We also
    have to have operators, linguists, bandwidth, across the
    intelligence cycle. The Air Force in particular has been
    working very hard at converting operators to these functions.
    In fact, there are now more pilots involved in unmanned
    aircraft in the Air Force than there are flying manned
    aircraft. But we still have work to do.
        Chairman Levin. I recently wrote Secretary Gates about the
    current requirements for ISR support in the Horn of Africa and
    about the Department's current acquisition plans for additional
    ISR assets to support the geographic combatant commands. Now,
    I've not received a reply to this letter, but I would ask,
    since less than 10 percent of the requirements are being filled
    right now, that you pay some very urgent attention to that and
    that you get a response to that as quickly as possible. Would
    you do that?
        Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir, I will.
        Chairman Levin. Dr. Vickers, in your current position as
    Assistant Secretary of Defense-SOLIC, I think you understand
    very well how our Special Forces have discovered how to tightly
    integrate the different sensors to achieve unprecedented
    capabilities to identify high-value enemy personnel, to locate
    them, to track them, to identify their broader networks, and
    attack them.
        Signals intelligence, sensors are used to cue airborne
    video cameras where to look. Radars that can detect moving
    vehicles or even people walking are used as tipoffs to begin
    focused collection, and so on.
        Now, it's proven a lot more difficult for the regular
    conventional forces of the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps to
    achieve the degree of ISR system integration necessary to
    replicate U.S. Special Operations Command's success because the
    ISR assets are not under unified control. It's my understanding
    that the ISR task force and the Joint Staff are focused now on
    this problem. Do you have any ideas as to how the
    organizational obstacles can be removed in order to truly
    integrate our ISR assets operationally?
        Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir, I do. As you noted, the technique
    that our Special Operations Forces have pioneered, which we
    call ``find, fix, finish, exploit, and analyze''--to have a
    recurring intelligence cycle to lead to successive operations
    to take down an enemy network is something that has been
    progressively transmitted from our national Special Operations
    Forces to our theater forces and progressively to our general
    purpose or conventional forces.
        General Petraeus is working this problem with his J-2 very
    hard in Afghanistan and we're seeing results in that area.
        I would add as well that we're providing additional
    capabilities in Afghanistan that we only had in very limited
    numbers in Iraq, for example, very persistent aerostats over
    all our conventional force positions to provide the kind of
    persistent surveillance that our forces need, particularly
    against improvised explosive devices.
        There is still some work that needs to be done. If you
    compare the different organizations, national, Special
    Operations Forces, theater, and conventional forces, in their
    ability to rapidly exploit this kind of information, but the
    gap is narrowing.
        When we used to describe a goal in the Department of trying
    to make conventional forces more special operations-like, we
    used to mean operating in small groups like special operators.
    Now we mean the ability to exploit intelligence across the
    cycle in the manner you described.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Dr. Vickers, General Petraeus in a recent interview
    discussed what he called the growing friction between local
    Taliban fighters living in Afghanistan and the Afghan Taliban
    leadership who phone in orders that the local insurgents should
    continue to fight against Afghan and coalition forces through
    the winter, while the leadership remains safely in the
    sanctuaries in Quetta and elsewhere in Pakistan.
        According to General Petraeus, Taliban leadership is eager
    to keep up the fight through the winter because they know
    they've suffered losses over the last year. He also said that
    we're seeing a degree of discord among the Afghan Taliban
    leaders and between them and the lower level fighters, and a
    level of discord that we have not seen in the past. Do you
    agree with General Petraeus' assessment that there is friction
    and discord between local Taliban fighters in Afghanistan and
    the Taliban leadership in Pakistan as the leadership phones in
    those orders while they keep safely somewhere else, and is this
    level of friction something that we've not seen in the past?
        Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir, I do agree with General Petraeus'
    assessment. I'd be happy to provide more detail in a classified
    session, but let me say now that this discord as operational
    commanders from Afghanistan go back to sanctuary in Pakistan
    for the winter has increased over the past year, particularly
    as the effects of the surge of forces the President ordered in
    December 2009 really began to be felt at the end of this past
    2010 fighting season, from September to November.
        The situation that General Petraeus was describing, where
    the Taliban senior leadership wants to continue the fight
    during the winter months--a lot of local commanders have been
    voting with their feet, essentially, and saying, ``I've had
    enough of this,'' to the effects of our increasingly effective
    operations, but also because of multiple competing interests
    within the insurgency. The insurgency is not a monolithic
    group. A lot of fighters fight for very different reasons,
    including economic ones. So there's naturally a lot of
    frictions induced there. But the leadership-warrior divide is a
    big part of it.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Before I call on Senator McCain, let me just quickly
    mention that I hope we'll get a quorum here this morning, and
    when we do we will offer the committee budget to be approved.
        I'm going to turn the gavel now over to Senator Reed and
    call upon Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank the witnesses. Secretary Vickers, we've
    recently heard some rather guardedly optimistic assessments of
    the situation in Afghanistan. Do you agree with those
    assessments?
        Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir, I do.
        Senator McCain. The main problems still being corruption
    and Pakistan?
        Dr. Vickers. The strategic problem, sir, as you identified,
    are the continued presence of a sanctuary in Pakistan and then
    the governance challenge.
        Senator McCain. On the issue of Wikileaks, what's your
    understanding of the status of investigations into the cause of
    Wikileaks?
        Dr. Vickers. Sir, the Office of the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Intelligence has mainly been focused on assessing
    the damage, which they've done a very good job on, and remedial
    measures with our chief information officer in the lead. My
    understanding of the investigation is that it is ongoing, but
    that's about all I can say at this time.
        Senator McCain. I've been interested to hear some in the
    media and others say that Wikileaks was a good thing, and that
    it didn't damage our national security or our ability to carry
    out our missions.
        Yet isn't it true that in Wikileaks some individuals who
    were cooperating with us were identified?
        Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir, that is true.
        Senator McCain. That puts their lives in danger?
        Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir, it does.
        Senator McCain. I'm curious about your assessment of the
    damage that Wikileaks did to your abilities, and particularly
    in the area of getting people to cooperate with us in the vital
    aspect of human intelligence.
        Dr. Vickers. Sir, I think it's had implications from the
    foreign policy level about governments wanting to ensure that
    their confidential relationships with the United States are
    protected, down to operational issues, as you mentioned, of
    assets that would cooperate with us. Fortunately, we are able
    to attract the intelligence assets that we require to serve our
    policymakers and warriors, but the damage should not be
    understated and the Department has learned many lessons about
    how to prevent this from ever happening again.
        Senator McCain. But the damage especially has been on the
    operational level. If we disclose an ambassador's candid
    assessment of a foreign leader, that's one thing. But to have
    operations and individuals disclosed in my view--and more
    importantly, what is your view--this can be very damaging, and
    some local individual may think twice before agreeing to
    cooperate with us if that person's name is going to be
    publicized.
        Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir, that is exactly correct. As a former
    CIA operations officer, your first responsibility is to protect
    the security of those who would cooperate with the United
    States through tradecraft and proper information security, and
    they depend on us to do that.
        Senator McCain. Do you have a good sense of how former
    detainees are making their way back into the battlefield? I saw
    a news report this morning that another one was apparently
    killed, just reported today. Do you have a sense on how they're
    making their way back to the battlefield?
        Dr. Vickers. Sir, approximately 20 to 25 percent have made
    their way back in one form or another.
        Senator McCain. That we know of.
        Dr. Vickers. That we know of. Some of those have
    subsequently been killed or recaptured. Others are out there
    fighting against us as well. The routes that they take depend
    on the circumstances of their release. But needless to say,
    it's been in multiple countries and multiple routes, and I'd be
    happy to discuss that in more detail at a classified session.
        Senator McCain. You would agree it is a problem?
        Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir, it is.
        Senator McCain. Because now it seems to be a status symbol
    for those that return to the battlefield with their
    compatriots.
        Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir. That's a very good point, that some
    mid-level operatives have been elevated to leadership positions
    by this conferral of status.
        Senator McCain. Dr. Rooney, we intend to confirm you, and
    obviously I believe you're well-qualified, but you don't have a
    depth of experience with the men and women in the military. If
    I could suggest--and suggestions are a very cheap commodity
    around here--that you spend some time traveling around, not
    only to the bases here in the continental United States, but
    also our overseas bases and areas, if you can, even forward
    deployed, so to give you a better depth and understanding of
    the challenges, particularly of the repeated deployments that
    our men and women in the military have been making and the
    strain and stress that puts on their families, I hope you will
    do that as a very high priority.
        Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir. If confirmed, that would be an
    immediate priority.
        Senator McCain. Last year, in a contentious markup, this
    committee voted 15 to 12 to allow servicemembers, their
    dependents, and retirees to obtain privately paid abortions at
    military hospitals. Do you support the administration's
    position that abortions should be provided in military
    hospitals?
        Dr. Rooney. My position, sir, is to support the law and
    enforce the law. But I also understand that the abortions are
    voluntary, they would be outpatient services, and it's not
    mandatory that any physicians there actually perform the
    abortions, but it's making the health care available. I would
    comply to the law.
        Senator McCain. Thank you.
        Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you, Senator McCain.
        Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to join both the chairman and Senator McCain in
    thanking you, Secretary Vickers, for your service in the past,
    very distinguished service, and thank you, Dr. Rooney, for
    undertaking this very challenging, but critically important,
    assignment.
        Secretary Vickers, I'd like to ask about one of the answers
    that you gave in the advance policy questions about a very
    important area that I know has concerned the committee in the
    past regarding the sharing of information, raw intelligence
    data, where you observed in the past there have been cultural
    barriers to the full access to this information.
        I wonder if you could please describe for the committee
    what steps you would take to increase the sharing and
    availability of this data to special operations personnel and
    others in the field who need it?
        Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir. As I indicated in my answers to the
    committee's advance policy questions, the Intelligence
    Community was raised throughout the Cold War on the principle
    of need-to-know, and increasingly in the war with al Qaeda and
    wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the responsibility to share is
    imperative for our forces on the battlefield. That means not
    only sharing with our own forces, but in Afghanistan we have 49
    nations fighting alongside us and sharing with them as well.
        This requires technical solutions to the problem. Until
    recently in Afghanistan we had 26 different networks, that
    we're standardizing to facilitate the movement of information
    into a common network. But it also requires changes in the way
    we operate and what information can be provided at what level.
    Particularly, as Chairman Levin noted, some of the sensitive
    information we get in signals intelligence and others, that has
    typically been very compartmented, is critical on a time-
    sensitive basis to operators, both to kill or capture their
    adversary, but also to protect from attack.
        We have been working that very hard. There is an inherent
    tension, however, between the responsibility to share and need-
    to-know that we always have to weigh to protect sources and
    methods from unauthorized disclosure, while making sure we get
    timely information in the hands of our warfighters.
        Senator Blumenthal. Do you feel that the barriers, as has
    been observed before, are still primarily cultural, or do you
    think there are procedural barriers that need to be overcome?
        Dr. Vickers. I think there's a mix, sir. I think some of it
    is cultural legacy, but others, as I said, are technical
    challenges, or also, as Chairman Levin noted earlier, having
    the intelligence structures to rapidly process and move the
    information. Not all elements of the force are equally equipped
    in that area and it's something we're working to address.
        Senator Blumenthal. Going to another line of questioning, I
    wonder if you could give us a more precise view about the
    extent of the discord and perhaps the magnitude of the
    phenomenon of these perhaps dissatisfied enemy combatants
    voting with their feet, as you have put it?
        Dr. Vickers. Sir, you mean those going back into combat?
        Senator Blumenthal. Exactly.
        Dr. Vickers. There are different perspectives on this, sir.
    Some are inherently repeat offenders, in the way that some
    portion of those from the criminal justice system do the same,
    particularly if they're going back into an area where they're
    surrounded by those engaged in terrorism, and there are certain
    ungoverned areas that they've made their way back to in Yemen,
    in Pakistan, that are very conducive to this. I wouldn't want
    to ascribe a single motivation, but looking at a number of
    these cases over the past several years and the recidivism,
    some have chosen a life of terrorism and their associates have.
        In some cases it's a family business that we've seen, that
    a lot of relatives are all engaged in the same line of work. I
    think that creates a greater propensity for them to go back.
    It's hard to know a priori necessarily which ones will and
    won't.
        There are those that we have very clear indications that
    would and therefore they're not released. But there are others
    that are in that grey ground that we need to do more to fix.
        Senator Blumenthal. Are there specific steps being
    contemplated to do more in that area, as you suggested?
        Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir. We have a Department of Justice-led
    initiative, with interagency participation, to review release
    of detainees at the highest levels or to transfer them to
    another country, and then we have task forces in the field
    working with local governments to review cases in the zones of
    armed conflict as well.
        Senator Blumenthal. Dr. Rooney, you may have seen recent
    reports about the very unfortunate and tragic perils of perhaps
    overuse of combinations of pharmaceutical drugs in treating
    young men and women coming back and suffering from post-
    traumatic stress and other psychological phenomena. Are you
    aware of these reports and do you have thoughts about what can
    be done to address this problem?
        Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir, I am aware of the reports and the
    issue of particularly psychotropic drugs, whether it's on the
    military side or the civilian side, absolutely shares some
    common factors. I think the lesson that we're all learning is
    that--and I'm not a medical doctor--the use of drugs and not
    understanding the interactions of the drugs actually at times
    exacerbates the problem. I think we're getting a lot more
    intelligent about that. We're starting to get a lot more
    research about where those drugs are effective and where
    they're not, and also understanding that at times it's critical
    to link--sometimes our service people are going outside to
    civilian providers and then also having service inside the
    military, and we're not necessarily connecting and
    understanding the drugs that have been prescribed by both.
        Because of that awareness, there is now much more emphasis
    on trying to destigmatize the treatment, so that we can have a
    coordinated basis of care. But it is an ongoing issue.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much. I thank you both
    for your answers and for your very distinguished service.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Ayotte.
        Senator Ayotte. Secretary Vickers, Dr. Rooney, I first of
    all want to commend both of you for your career histories.
    Secretary Vickers, thank you so much for your service to our
    country. You're both eminently qualified. I also want to
    commend your families and thank them for their support for both
    of you.
        Secretary Vickers, I wanted to ask you again; you had cited
    a statistic in response to Senator McCain that 20 to 25 percent
    of the Guantanamo detainees have been released and have
    returned to the conflict. Is that the correct number?
        Dr. Vickers. Yes, ma'am. In the case of Guantanamo it's
    closer to 25 percent. Of the approximately 600 that have been
    released, about 150, we either know that they've returned or we
    strongly suspect that they've returned. In the case of other
    detainees that have been released on the battlefield, the
    number is between 20 and 25.
        Senator Ayotte. How is that fact informing release
    decisions going forward?
        Dr. Vickers. It has a strong impact on it, in the sense
    that remaining cases are scrutinized not just for recidivism,
    but also the ability in the case of third countries to continue
    to detain them if they're transferred. A lot of detainees can't
    be transferred because there's no assurance that they'll be
    properly detained and not released.
        Part of the recidivism problem breaks down when they're
    transferred to another country and then they're quickly
    released. So part of it is, as I said, is looking at the
    transfer problem in itself.
        In zones of hostilities, it may be local politics in some
    cases. Someone with connections is getting someone released and
    then again there's a high probability that they'll be
    recidivists, but the political system has intervened in the
    past. We've learned from this experience and are trying to
    address it, but it's not a foolproof system.
        Senator Ayotte. Given the President's Executive order
    advocating for the closure of Guantanamo, if tomorrow we
    capture a high-value target in Pakistan or overseas, or perhaps
    someone you would deem a repeat offender, what are we doing
    with them?
        Dr. Vickers. The administration is in the final stages of
    establishing its detention policy. But there is a challenge
    with those picked up outside zones of hostilities. In zones of
    hostilities, in Afghanistan principally now, there are well-
    established procedures and mechanisms to detain them for the
    period as required. If a terrorist were picked up in Somalia,
    for example--one example of a very ungoverned space--that has
    been a vexing challenge for both administrations, I would add,
    both the Bush administration and the Obama administration,
    there's not an obvious solution that presents itself.
        But the USD(I)'s responsibility in this is to work on the
    intelligence aspects and not the detainee policy. I would defer
    to my policy colleagues in the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Policy's Office of Detainee Affairs to address your question
    more fully.
        Senator Ayotte. Secretary Vickers, I fully appreciate that
    there are others that will have more direct impact on this. But
    given the breadth of experience that you have in this area and
    the vexing challenges that you've identified, what
    recommendations would you have to your colleagues in the
    administration on how we can best address this issue to make
    sure that if we capture a high-value target in one of these
    areas that we can make sure that we have the ability to
    interrogate that individual and also, if they present a
    continuing threat, that we can detain them?
        Dr. Vickers. On the interrogation side, the first step to
    extract intelligence, the administration has established a
    high-value interrogation group led by the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation, with participation from Defense and the CIA as
    well. That group has deployed several times and that mechanism
    should work well for interrogation and debriefing of detainees.
        Options range from transferring to another country,
    provided human rights assurances and access to the detainee and
    others can be met. But given the problem that many countries
    are either incapable or unwilling of taking some of these
    detainees, we require some mechanism to be able to detain them
    ourselves. That again, others in the administration are working
    that very hard.
        Senator Ayotte. When we transfer to another country,
    Secretary Vickers, aren't we in a position in which we don't
    have full control over the situation, even if we get assurances
    from the country? The level of control we have is much less
    than if we had them, for example, in a Guantanamo-type
    facility?
        Dr. Vickers. Before we transfer anyone, we want assurances
    that, in a number of areas, as I said, if they need to be
    detained the country in question is capable of detaining them;
    if there is intelligence value to the detainee, that we would
    have access to that detainee. But countries are sovereign and
    we do our best to ensure that these conditions are met; they're
    not always met 100 percent in some of these areas. Again,
    that's part of the challenge.
        Senator Ayotte. How can Congress help with this issue,
    because it's obviously of deep concern if we are in a position
    where we capture a high-value target or a repeat offender and
    that person still remains a danger, or we need to have them in
    a position where we can gather important information from them?
        Dr. Vickers. It is critical to have the option of capturing
    for laws of war, but also for intelligence value as well.
    Again, this is something that my colleagues in the inter-agency
    and within DOD are working, and I'm sure they will come to
    Congress for help on this.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much. I appreciate your
    answers today. Thank you, Dr. Rooney.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator.
        Senator Hagan.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank Secretary Vickers for your past service to
    our country; and, to Secretary Vickers and Dr. Rooney, thank
    you for your agreeing to be nominated to these positions and
    your willingness to serve. Also, kudos to the families and
    extended families. Thank you for being here and supporting
    these very well-qualified individuals.
        I did want to ask, Secretary Vickers, when confirmed you
    will be responsible for implementing Secretary Gates'
    efficiency initiative as it relates to defense intelligence. In
    particular, you will need to downsize and consolidate the
    intelligence workforce and ensure that we avoid duplication of
    work among the respective intelligence agencies. What is your
    plan to address and implement this plan while still ensuring
    the timely development of actionable intelligence for our
    warfighters?
        Dr. Vickers. During the efficiencies process, the principal
    focus of eliminating redundancies was to look at Service,
    meaning Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps intelligence
    organizations and those of the combatant commands. So we have
    developed an organization called Joint Intelligence Operations
    Centers (JIOC), that every combatant command has, and they've
    all grown rather large, in the thousands of staff.
        We have developed a standardized model, after some
    experience now, that resulted in the major warfighting command,
    or Central Command, to have a large JIOC, as we describe it,
    and Pacific Command, which has a lot of challenges in its
    region, to also have a very large JIOC. But the other combatant
    commands have been reduced in some cases or had contractors
    eliminated to a more standardized model appropriate to their
    theaters, that is Africa Command, Southern Command, Northern
    Command, and European Command. There have been some savings in
    that area.
        We've also consolidated missions. The counter-threat
    finance mission has been, on the intelligence side, assigned to
    the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), so this will develop
    more focused intelligence to support Treasury and other
    policymakers who have the lead in this area, but also eliminate
    some redundancies. We had a lot of counter-threat finance
    intelligence across the Department.
        We've also done the same in counterterrorism intelligence
    in the Department in empowering our Joint Intelligence Task
    Force for Counterterrorism in DIA to be the lead.
        I would add that we've reduced senior executive service
    ranks, contractors, and others. I would add that Secretary
    Gates has been very clear that these rounds of efficiencies are
    really the first step in looking at eliminating redundancy.
    Intelligence is increasingly important to our policymakers and
    to our operators, but it's also an area in which the American
    people and Congress invest a lot of treasure and we have to
    make sure it's as efficient as possible. If confirmed as
    USD(I), it's something that will be on the top list of my
    priorities.
        Senator Hagan. You've said that a lot of these efficiencies
    have taken place, but you'll also work to ensure that more
    efficiencies will go forward in these same areas?
        Dr. Vickers. Let me clarify, Senator Hagan. The decisions
    have been made to standardize these intelligence organizations.
    There is an implementation plan that will occur. But yes,
    additional efficiencies might well be sought. Senator Levin
    mentioned in his opening comments about intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and Senator McCain as
    well, that we probably still have some homework to do down the
    road.
        Right now we're trying to give all the support we can to
    our warfighters in Afghanistan, but over time we will
    rationalize those as we move forward.
        Senator Hagan. Obviously, we do want to support them in
    every fashion possible.
        Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn has addressed the
    Department's cybersecurity strategy, which I understand
    involves five pillars: the first, recognition that cyberspace
    is a new domain of warfare; two, proactive defenses, avoiding a
    fortress mentality; three, ensure the safety of critical
    infrastructure; four, undertake collective defense; and five,
    sustained technological advantage.
        Dr. Vickers, within these pillars, which do you see as the
    most challenging to facilitate, and why? Just the whole pillars
    of cybersecurity.
        Dr. Vickers. Let me say, cyber is an increasingly important
    domain of warfare or competition, used both for intelligence
    purposes as well as potentially destructive purposes or
    warfighting purposes. The U.S. Cyber Command is overseen by our
    Policy Under Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
    while the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Intelligence really oversees the intelligence aspects of this.
        But let me try to address your question in saying that the
    reason Cyber Command was established was because of the need to
    have a command for this emerging domain that is so important to
    our national economy and infrastructure, as well as our
    warfighting, but also someone to have an organization and a
    commander that had responsibility for both offense and defense,
    protecting our networks as well as potentially using this tool.
        That integration of offense and defense I think will be
    very critical to our future, supported by appropriate
    intelligence in this new area.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you.
        Dr. Rooney, let me ask you. When confirmed, you will play
    an integral role in implementing Secretary Gates' efficiencies
    initiatives also related to personnel, namely the Army and
    Marine Corps end strength reductions, freeze in civilian hire,
    reduction in contractors in the administration of TRICARE. What
    do you believe will be the impact of these initiatives?
        Dr. Rooney. Yes, the efficiencies initiatives, as you've
    suggested, cut across many of the areas under personnel and
    readiness. The first one, from the human resource side, gives
    an opportunity to really take a look at that mixture of Active
    Duty, Reserve, civilian, and contractors, and looks at the
    roles, contractors and civilians, are playing in support
    services. Are some of those same programs still viable? Do they
    need to be administered differently? I think I've seen the term
    used, ``good business practices,'' and that's really just
    another way of saying, ``should we be doing the same thing, and
    if so should it be done maybe a little bit differently?''
        That would be the personnel side and are there ways to cut
    some of those costs and combine, really assess, programs. If
    they're not working, then at that point they need to be
    eliminated and resources shifted to more critical, mission
    critical-type initiatives.
        The health care side again is a myriad of possible
    initiatives, everything from a slight increase in the premiums,
    because that hasn't been changed since the mid-1990s, but also
    changing behaviors--prescription drugs, using mail order
    instead of the current system ends up saving a tremendous
    amount over the years. What we call supply chain, which is as
    you're purchasing, doing similar purchasing and look at how
    you're purchasing supplies for a hospital setting. You get
    great efficiencies in that. Contracting, another way that you
    can also look at your contracts, make sure you're getting not
    only the best prices, but coordination in those areas.
        Then there's some other, longer-term initiatives that end
    up eventually impacting efficiency, and that would be looking
    at practice plans. Are there ways to use urgent care facilities
    so that we're not forcing people to go to emergency rooms?
    That's also an issue on the civilian side. So there are some
    opportunities there, and using primary care physicians
    differently in terms of practice focus, and then also those
    types of things I've seen also working in mental health areas.
    It would be those types of things, taking the current proposals
    and expanding on them.
        Senator Hagan. You certainly do have a full plate in front
    of you. I will say, please look at TRICARE. So many of the
    individuals are having trouble having TRICARE accepted in
    places that are outside the actual bases.
        My time is up. Once again, I thank both of you for your
    commitment to our country. Thank you.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Webb.
        Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Vickers, you're eminently qualified by virtue of
    your military background, your operational experience, your
    educational enhancement, and your policy experience. I think
    this is a great fit and I will be a very strong supporter and
    hope to be working with you on some of these issues in the near
    future.
        Dr. Rooney, I congratulate you on a very strong career to
    date, particularly in the academic area, and your willingness
    to serve. At the same time, I would like to learn more from you
    about how you have prepared yourself to take the experiences
    that you have had and apply them to this position. It's my
    understanding from reading your bio that you have not worked
    with DOD before; is that correct?
        Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir, that's correct.
        Senator Webb. This is an extremely important under
    secretaryship. I would like to point out that I recommended the
    creation of this position in 1985 in a memorandum to Caspar
    Weinberger. I'm not the only person who's ever recommended this
    position, but at the time when I was serving as Assistant
    Secretary of Defense, we had 11 different stovepipes moving up
    to the Secretary, which was not a healthy management model. Cap
    Weinberger's hesitation at the time was that it was going to
    consolidate so much of the responsibilities, the day-to-day
    responsibilities of DOD, under one office, and if you're going
    to do that, you need to make sure that the people at the top
    comprehend the special nature of military service and of DOD.
        I'd like to point out, if I may--you may have come across
    this--that solutions in the military don't always compute on a
    traditional civilian model. There are a lot of different
    factors in military service and across the board. We have these
    situations in the acquisition side, too, as well, but
    particularly in the area of personnel.
        Your nomination has come forward very fast. It was sent on
    February 4, which was a Friday, and we've had 11 days, most of
    which last week we weren't here. I have not had the opportunity
    to meet with you. I'm the chairman of the Personnel
    Subcommittee, which is the subcommittee that would have policy
    jurisdiction over the issues that you're working on.
        Can you give me a better idea of how you have prepared
    yourself to understand the unique cultures that are involved in
    the United States military?
        Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir, I'd be happy to do that. I will step
    back a bit and say that when I went from being a business
    executive with a background in finance and tax law into higher
    education, my first presidency at a doctoral-level institution,
    I had never been a higher education administrator. I had taught
    for a number of years, but never ran a college or university.
    The way I assimilated into that culture was to be a perpetual
    student, which is what I would also propose here: learned
    really what happened in the institution and walk around, talk
    to people, listen, understand. It turned out to be very
    effective, to the point where I, prior to this, have been at my
    second presidency.
        The same with hospitals. When I first started on a hospital
    board, quite frankly, the first meeting I sat in I didn't
    understand most of the acronyms that were put in front of me.
    Again, what I really did was took the time to study it, talk to
    the people, spend time in the traditional form, as they say,
    walk-around management.
        As Senator McCain pointed out earlier, one of the first
    things I would do would be to continue what have been
    tremendous briefings, but they have certainly been briefings,
    sir, and material I've been able to read and get a handle on,
    to understand more clearly the military culture, but also that
    connection between the military members that this role would
    have responsibility for overseeing, personnel and readiness,
    but also the civilian counterparts in many ways and how that
    system worked together, and the contractors.
        I think it would be the breadth of understanding all of
    that, and I think my experience in the past shows that I can
    definitely make that transformation and dive in with that
    passion and that lifelong education focus, would enable me to
    prepare and be very effective for this role.
        Senator Webb. There are military cultures and there are
    cultures within the military cultures, and there are
    expectations that have evolved based on service in different
    eras, and they all affect the area that you are sitting here
    waiting to be confirmed on.
        When I was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
    Affairs, we had all 4 Active Services, all 7 Guard and Reserve
    components, plus political civilians and career civilians, and
    at any staff meeting we had at least 11 different cultural
    traditions among the uniformed people sitting at that table,
    with different relationships, quite frankly, with the
    overarching policies of DOD.
        On issues of health care, you just mentioned the notion of
    increasing the premiums on TRICARE. Would you elaborate on
    that?
        Dr. Rooney. I mentioned that one of the efficiencies
    initiatives set out for us by the Secretary was a modest
    increase, and I believe that number was about $5 per month, in
    the premiums, understanding that we have the duty and
    obligation to support our Service people--it's what we said
    from the beginning, that we would take care of our Service
    people--but on the other hand trying to find a balance of
    supporting that, but also doing it in a fiscally sound and
    sustainable manner. I would support the Secretary's position in
    looking at those modest increases.
        Senator Webb. Here's something you want to remember. As
    someone who grew up in the military, served in the military,
    have family members in the military, health care--lifetime
    health care for career military people--was part of a moral
    contract. I grew up inside that moral contract. On the one
    hand, if you're applying a civilian model to a DOD medical
    program, you can say, ``well, if you compare a civilian health
    care plan, this is an incredibly good deal.'' On the other
    hand, these are people who have been told since the day they
    came into the military that they're going to have health care
    for the rest of their lives if they give a career to the U.S.
    military.
        It's a moral contract. I'm the chairman of the subcommittee
    that's going to have to evaluate this proposal, and I hope you
    will pay strong attention to--again, this is the abstract
    nature of military service that doesn't come out when you try
    to compare a model directly with civilian programs.
        There are a number of other areas like that. I'm going to
    ask you to do something. I'm going to ask you to come by and
    see me. I did not have the opportunity to talk to you, and we
    can discuss some of these things a bit more.
        Dr. Rooney. I would welcome the opportunity, sir.
        Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Webb.
        I'm next in order, but let me recognize Senator Manchin.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me too add to all of my colleagues, our thanks for your
    service, to both of you, and your willingness to serve. I think
    it's admirable.
        Dr. Vickers, first with you. I've read your bio and I've
    learned a little bit about you and I like everything I see.
    Also, I'm new. With some of my colleagues, we're new to this
    committee, but we're also new to this process of evaluating
    where we are in the world, where we're going and how we get
    there in the most efficient manner. You seem to have been part
    of an Afghanistan movement back with the Soviet Union and what
    you were able to witness, what you were able to be a part of,
    to see an outcome, and to see how we dropped the ball. I think
    that was very well-documented.
        We're in a situation now where, if you could for me
    identify who our enemy is in the Middle East, what the strength
    of our enemy is, what is the cost to our enemy, what they're
    financing their war with, and compared to what we as the United
    States Government and the people that are supporting our
    troops, which we will always do, and the comparison between
    what you saw in the outcome of the Soviet invasion of
    Afghanistan to where we are today, and the predicted outcome--
    it's the longest war we've ever been in and we're not seeing
    much change. If you could help me with that, sir, first, your
    evaluation, because I don't know of a better person that's had
    a bird's-eye view and can evaluate this than you.
        Dr. Vickers. Thank you, sir. As you alluded to, one of the
    tragedies at the end of the Cold War, one of the great
    tragedies, is that we, after winning the war in Afghanistan,
    driving the Red Army out, failed to win the peace and left a
    sanctuary in which al Qaeda could grow, in partnership with the
    Taliban, that then led to the events of September 11. Secretary
    Gates has said repeatedly that we will never make that mistake
    again.
        As part of your second question----
        Senator Manchin. I'm sorry to interrupt you on that, but if
    I could just ask for a further clarification. With that comment
    that Secretary Gates made and with the failure of before, of
    the Soviets, then what we're saying is that we need to have a
    presence, maybe a different type of a presence, but we will
    have to have a presence over there. The American people should
    understand, the citizens of this country should understand, we
    have to have a presence there.
        Dr. Vickers. What form that engagement takes, of course,
    will be determined based on conditions down the road. But
    unlike at the end of the Cold War, where we essentially
    disengaged from that region and allowed an ungoverned area to
    become very hostile to us and to provide a sanctuary for al
    Qaeda, it's something that we don't want to repeat. A core
    element of our counterterrorism policy is to deny any sanctuary
    to terrorists, so that they can't plan operations against the
    Homeland or our interests abroad.
        You asked about the enemy. Unlike the Cold War, which was a
    very daunting time for Americans of a previous generation, but
    it had one virtue, that we had a principal adversary that we
    could focus on for a long period of time, and we got very good
    at that by the last decade of the Cold War. Today we face a
    more complex environment with a number of challenges around the
    world.
        Foremost among those right now is the continued threat that
    violent extremism poses to us, and specifically al Qaeda. It's
    why the President and his topmost advisors have said we are at
    war with al Qaeda, and that war spans a number of areas. Al
    Qaeda and its affiliates do not depend on great sums of
    financial strength to be able to plot against us in the manner
    they do. The September 11 attacks, for example, were carried
    out with approximately $500,000 of investment.
        Our Treasury Department, working with our interagency
    partners and partners around the world, does everything they
    can to constrict the flow of funds to al Qaeda and other
    terrorist and insurgent groups, and has had a significant
    success. But there are still funds flowing to various groups
    and, as I said, funding is not the critical resource that they
    depend on. It's willing people to do these attacks.
        Senator Manchin. What's the strength of al Qaeda in
    Afghanistan?
        Dr. Vickers. Al Qaeda in Afghanistan is largely confined
    now to mid-level operatives, no senior operatives.
        Senator Manchin. 10,000, 100,000?
        Dr. Vickers. No, sir. The Taliban insurgency is in the tens
    of thousands. Al Qaeda would be under 50,000 or so, 50,000 to
    75,000, and that is on a part-time basis. Al Qaeda is
    principally concentrated elsewhere, in Pakistan and then its
    affiliates in Yemen and elsewhere.
        Senator Manchin. We have how many troops in Afghanistan
    now?
        Dr. Vickers. We have just about 98,000 troops, just shy of
    100,000, and 40,000-some of our coalition partners, and
    building up a substantial Afghan National Security Force
    (ANSF).
        The principal challenge in Afghanistan is the Taliban which
    is still aligned with al Qaeda. They provided sanctuary to them
    in the past. It is adjacent to Pakistan, where al Qaeda's
    senior leadership resides currently. The President's stated
    goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and prevent
    their return to Afghanistan and Pakistan. So Pakistan and
    Afghanistan are an integrated strategy for the United States.
    Even though Afghanistan is not principally where al Qaeda is,
    it could become a future safe haven if we were to repeat the
    errors we made after the Cold War.
        Senator Manchin. I think the hardest thing that I have to
    understand, I know the people in West Virginia have to
    understand, is the greatest army that history has ever known,
    the United States, and the greatest trained and equipped
    soldiers, we're at 100,000 and let's say that our enemy may be
    at 30,000 maximum, probably more 10,000 or 15,000, by every
    report that I'm receiving.
        I've also read in your bio that you have a different type
    of a procedure that you think would have worked there, or maybe
    you still think that or not, by an unconventional type of war
    with your special operations. I think that it sounds very
    intriguing and it seems like we're not going in that direction.
        Dr. Vickers. Sir, every counterterrorism and
    counterinsurgency challenge has to be taken on its own merits
    and time. Ultimately, these are internal conflicts or
    transnational conflicts. We can't prevail in these wars
    without--in the counterterrorism case, it's a global
    challenge--a host of international partners. We simply couldn't
    do it by ourselves. In any intra-state conflict, in an
    insurgency, ultimately it's the locals that have to be able to
    secure their territory. Sometimes we have to create the time
    and space for them to be able to do that as we build them up.
        After our great success in 2001 of overthrowing the Taliban
    and kicking al Qaeda out of Afghanistan, we unfortunately did
    not build up ANSFs to a sufficient level where they could gain
    control or stabilize their country and secure it. We are
    rapidly addressing that in the past few years.
        Again, I would just caution that some of this is in the
    range of tactics specific to a portion in time, that may apply
    to one situation or one country and not another, or for this
    period of time and not a later period of time. But ultimately
    we have to empower locals to succeed.
        Senator Manchin. Mr. Chairman, if I may very quickly just
    follow up.
        If I may request that maybe I can meet with you personally
    and go into that in more detail, I would appreciate it very
    much, sir.
        Dr. Rooney, just very quickly. I have heard and I know that
    Senator Webb had mentioned and talked about some concerns he
    may have. That would be a valid concern when you see the
    resume, but the bottom line is I also see your private sector
    experience, too. Would you consider yourself a cost-cutter or
    efficiency expert?
        Dr. Rooney. I think if you ask those that have worked with
    me, they'd probably say yes.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
        Let me take my time and then recognize Senator Ayotte for a
    second round and, Senator Blumenthal, if you also want a second
    round.
        Secretary Vickers, Dr. Rooney, welcome. Thank you for your
    service. I've had the privilege to work with Secretary Vickers
    before. Thank you very much.
        First of all, because of your extensive experience in your
    field of endeavor, if there's anything that you feel would be
    best held to comment on in a private, nonpublic session, let me
    know. Don't feel obliged to answer. But one question I think is
    obvious in the wake of the last several days. We have
    cooperated and collaborated with intelligence services
    throughout the Maghreb--Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, et cetera.
    What's your estimate of the status today of that cooperation
    going forward? Would that impose any complications on efforts
    under your jurisdiction?
        Dr. Vickers. Sir, the U.S. Government has intelligence
    relationships with scores of partners around the world, many
    scores of partners, including in North Africa and the Middle
    East. Each of those relationships is important in some right,
    but they vary in terms of the depth of intelligence sharing and
    the particular threat that emanates from that country. I would
    hesitate in this open session to give a general answer, other
    than it's very important.
        A number of al Qaeda plots are broken up every year and
    they are done by our local partners with intelligence
    assistance in some cases from us, in some cases intelligence
    provided by them. Our relationships with some of these
    countries that have had instability in recent weeks, we've had
    longstanding ties with them that will transcend this
    instability, both on the military side and on the civilian
    intelligence side. Sir, I'd be happy to talk to you about it in
    greater detail.
        Senator Reed. Let me open up another topic, which Senator
    Hagan alluded to. That's cyber security. History often suggests
    that we fight the last war and prepare for the last war. I
    think we all recognize now that, even in the context of low-
    intensity conflict, that cyber activities are becoming
    increasingly more important. Let me pose some issues.
        How well do you think we're prepared for it, its coming, to
    what are the gaps, technological, institutional, and even legal
    gaps, in terms of your ability to actually deal with this new
    technology?
        Dr. Vickers. Sir, it is critically important and it's a
    domain that, as you indicated, is employed by both state and
    non-state actors in both forms of conflict, both for
    intelligence purposes as well as disruption and others. Cyber
    poses a number of challenges because it is inherently a global
    enterprise, so a lot of cyber traffic, of course, comes through
    the United States, which previous Congresses have addressed,
    which has been a tremendous help to U.S. intelligence.
        I would be guilty of practicing law without a license if I
    go too far----
        Senator Reed. You wouldn't be the first here. [Laughter.]
        Dr. Vickers. But in some cases it raises questions when the
    web site or server, for example, raises neutrality questions in
    law, of where that site is located. So it poses a number of
    unique challenges for us.
        Then of course, there's always intelligence gain-loss when
    we look at operations in these areas. Is it better to monitor
    someone or take down? There's always very difficult decisions
    for policymakers to weigh in that area as well.
        Senator Reed. I think this is again a topic that will
    consume us, indeed consume us going forward.
        Dr. Rooney, you've had an extraordinarily accomplished
    career. My colleagues with more experience have commented on
    the unique culture of the military, and it is unique. But my
    sense is that you have associated yourself and worked with
    people who share some of the same attributes as our military.
    They have vocations, not just jobs; and they're dedicated to
    selfless service, not just to personal ambition. I think in
    your service and your association you have those, so I think
    those might be touchstones going forward as you begin this job
    and I think they will be valuable touchstones.
        But let me ask two basic questions. You have a myriad of
    responsibilities, from the immediate you've spoken about, but
    there's one that's continuing, and that is to try to integrate
    not just the operations within DOD, but DOD and the Department
    of Veterans Affairs (VA). I know VA Secretary Shinseki has been
    working very diligently on this.
        We have problems where soldiers, sailors, marines, and
    airmen are injured and then they had disability determinations
    and then they're transferred to the VA system and there's no
    continuity of care. Just whatever impressions you have today of
    how you're going to deal with more fully integrating what the
    VA does for our veterans with what DOD does for Active Duty and
    Reserve personnel?
        Dr. Rooney. Yes, sir. While I have not been able to have an
    entire deep dive, what I can say is what I've learned is you're
    absolutely correct that the timing--even with the new
    integrated system--there is the first phase of that's been put
    in; there's two more phases throughout this year. My
    understanding is that will proceed on the timeline outlined.
    But those timeframes are still approaching just under a year,
    340 days, I think was the last I saw.
        I think any of us sitting here, while we might not know
    what the exact answer is, if you're looking for those services
    a day is too long, a week is too long. There are clearly some
    opportunities where better coordination and being able to
    understand where that process is bogging down. My understanding
    is it's in three different areas. What can be done to ensure
    much better communication and cooperation, building on--yes, a
    technology infrastructure is one way, so you don't duplicate
    services, but it's not the only answer at this point.
        I concur that what I've seen really points out some
    improvement, but a dramatic need for some further coordination
    between all areas.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        One other area. Under the new financial reform legislation,
    we have created a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and
    within that Bureau, there is an Office of Servicemember
    Affairs. In fact, Holly Petraeus is leading that up. I'm sure
    you will, but I urge you to ensure you link up, because some of
    the problems that military personnel face in terms of paying
    bills, in terms of getting appropriate resolution of their
    rights under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act is a function
    not only of DOD, but this new bureau. A lot of what you can do
    and will do through the Services is educating young military
    personnel about their rights and their responsibilities. That's
    just some advice as you, I assume, prepare to take these
    responsibilities.
        Dr. Rooney. Thank you, sir. If confirmed, I will.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, doctor.
        Dr. Rooney. Thank you.
        Senator Reed. Senator Ayotte.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Dr. Rooney, you were talking with Senator Webb about the
    health care system within the military and he mentioned to you
    the moral obligation that we have to the military. Appreciating
    that we're in a fiscal climate where we do need to look to do
    things differently, there are still some unmet needs. In my
    State of New Hampshire, we have approximately the fifth or
    seventh highest per capita rate of veterans in the country.
    Yet, effectively we're the only State in the Nation that does
    not have a full-service veterans hospital. Alaska is similarly
    situated, but there is an Active Duty military base in Alaska
    where there is full service available.
        I would ask you for a commitment to work with me to look at
    that need and to come up with a solution so that the needs of
    veterans in New Hampshire are met, and particularly since we
    have more and more deploying as well in the Guard and becoming
    veterans and serving our country.
        I would ask you to look at that very carefully, because it
    is a moral obligation that we have to fulfill and,
    unfortunately, my State is one where I don't believe that moral
    obligation is being fully met.
        Dr. Rooney. Absolutely. If confirmed, I would look forward
    to that.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much.
        The other question I have for you, we had talked briefly
    yesterday about this, but given the multiple deployments of our
    Guard and Reserve, what is it that you think that we can do to
    ensure that when our Guard and Reserve deploy and also when
    they return home that the services are in place to make sure
    that as they return to civilian life, both they and their
    families are getting the services that they need? Because with
    the multiple deployments in the Active Duty, there is usually a
    base where there is a much more robust set of programs
    available than in the Guard and Reserve. Yet we've asked so
    much of our Guard and Reserve with these deployments.
        I would ask you what thoughts you have on that to make sure
    that we are serving our Guard and Reserve and so when they come
    home that they can acclimate back into civilian life and we
    give them that support that they deserve?
        Dr. Rooney. You're right. I'm glad we had a brief
    opportunity to have that conversation. But really, the issue
    does come that this is the first time where we have relied on
    the Guard and Reserve and their families to the extent that we
    have with multiple deployments. One of the factors I think
    everyone is recognizing now is when these people go home it
    isn't to a base. They're scattering throughout their States,
    they're scattering throughout the country.
        The Department has not always been acutely aware of how to
    connect those people to services. At times--and we talked about
    it--there are some good examples where private sector
    nonprofits are brought in to be able to cover that. But that's
    not uniform across the country. So it would be a combination of
    looking at some of those States and those areas where those
    services are being connected better and seeing ways to do that
    across the country.
        The other thing would be to close some gaps, where there
    are benefits being given to Active Duty, but yet there's some
    that slip through for education, potentially, to make sure that
    those again extend to employers; to see how again that reentry
    process can be either streamlined and also involve the
    employers in that. Again, it's uniformity across the country,
    but there are some good examples out there to build on.
        Senator Ayotte. Very good. I appreciate that, and also
    would point you to a New Hampshire program called the
    deployment cycle support program that is a partnership between
    State agencies and also the private sector, as a pilot or one
    that you could look to, that I think is very effective and one
    that other States could employ as well.
        Dr. Rooney. Absolutely.
        Senator Ayotte. Secretary Vickers, we had testimony in
    February from General Austin and Ambassador Jeffrey about Iraq
    and our withdrawal from Iraq in December. I wanted to get your
    assessment, the other day I saw a report of another terrorist
    incident in Iraq. My question to you is, do you have any
    concerns about our ability to transfer security as of December
    to the Iraqis? Also, we're going to leave a significant
    responsibility to protect our own people with the State
    Department, without the military support. What thoughts do you
    have on that?
        Dr. Vickers. I am confident that we're on the path toward
    this transition. There will be a robust civilian mission--as
    Iraq becomes a normal country, there will still be a large
    diplomatic mission, with military assistance, intelligence, a
    range of things to ensure that any threats to the stability of
    Iraq or threats external there are properly dealt with through
    our Iraqi partners.
        That transition has already been well underway since August
    2010 on a path to the end of 2011, and I have no reason to
    expect that it won't succeed. There is still violence in Iraq,
    but it is at very low levels compared to what it has been. Some
    of these attacks of course make news and they will continue to
    be a challenge for Iraq going forward, but it's something I
    have high confidence that the Iraqis can handle.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Senator Reed. Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Just a couple of quick questions. First, to pursue the very
    significant questions asked by Senator Reed, and more comment
    on them than question. If there are any legal impediments to
    your efforts in this cyber area, I would very much like to know
    about them and I hope that you will suggest them, because I
    think, as Senator Reed very importantly observed, this is the
    next war or it may be even the present war, and if there's
    anything that you need in that area, meaning you collectively,
    DOD, our defense efforts, I would appreciate your letting us
    know.
        Then to pursue an answer that you gave to Senator McCain.
    He asked about the corruption in Pakistan, which you very
    adroitly referred to as a governance challenge. Do we face the
    same kind of governance challenge in Afghanistan and, if so, to
    what extent, and what are we doing about it?
        Dr. Vickers. Yes, sir. In any counterinsurgency, governance
    and development are essential lines of operation as much as
    security. Ultimately, of course, it's up to the people of a
    nation to determine how they'll be governed. Afghanistan's
    history has been one essentially of decentralized government, a
    central state that does some functions, but then the provinces
    and local areas have a lot of autonomy. When Afghanistan has
    been stable throughout its history, it's been with that model.
        The challenge is to make sure that there is governance that
    first and foremost meets the needs of the Afghan people, but,
    second, also does not undermine the international coalition's
    effort through corruption or other areas in providing
    assistance to the Government of Afghanistan. So governance is a
    central challenge in stability and it is in Afghanistan as it
    is in many countries around the world. But in Afghanistan, of
    course, we have 100,000 troops and so we care very dearly about
    it.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        Dr. Rooney, just very briefly. You may be aware that in the
    past there have been difficulties in some of the treatment of
    our National Guard and our reservists in terms of recognizing
    that they have become in effect part of our Active-Duty Force
    and the failure to recognize that service in educational
    benefits and sometimes health care has been a problem. I've
    observed it in Connecticut, and I would appreciate your
    commitment that you will do everything possible to make sure
    that they are given the recognition they deserve in terms of
    those benefits and fair treatment and keeping faith with them.
        Dr. Rooney. Absolutely, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.
        I want to thank Secretary Vickers and Dr. Rooney for your
    testimony today and, on behalf of Chairman Levin and the
    Ranking Member, Senator McCain, for your service and your
    prospective service.
        If there are no further questions, the hearing is
    adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:11 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

        [Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Michael G. Vickers by
    Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
    follow:]

                            Questions and Responses

                                DEFENSE REFORMS

        Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD)
    Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
    strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
    enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
    of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
    commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments
    to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
    to the combatant commanders.
        Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
    provisions?
        Answer. The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 and
    the Special Operations reforms have endured for a generation. I do not
    see a need for any modifications at this time. If confirmed as the
    Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), I will be alert
    to the need for any modifications.
        Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
    address in these modifications?
        Answer. N/A.

                                     DUTIES

        Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
    the USD(I)?
        Answer. The USD(I)'s primary responsibility is to support the
    Secretary of Defense in discharging his intelligence-related
    responsibilities and authorities under title 10 and title 50 U.S.C.
    This includes: serving as the principal intelligence advisor to the
    Secretary of Defense; exercising authority, direction, and control on
    behalf of the Secretary of Defense over all intelligence organizations
    within the Department of Defense (DOD); ensuring that intelligence
    organizations in DOD are manned, organized, trained, and equipped to
    support the missions of the Department; ensuring that the DOD
    components, which are also elements of the Intelligence Community, are
    responsive to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the
    execution of the DNI's authorities; ensuring that the combatant forces,
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the civilian leadership of the
    Department are provided with appropriate intelligence support; ensuring
    that counterintelligence activities in the Department are conducted and
    managed efficiently and effectively; ensuring that other sensitive
    activities which the Department conducts or supports are conducted and
    managed efficiently and effectively; overseeing Defense Department
    personnel, facility, and industrial security to ensure efficiency and
    effectiveness; serving as the Program Executive for the Military
    Intelligence Program, and ensuring that the DOD components funded by
    the National Intelligence Program are robust, balanced, and in
    compliance with the guidance and direction of the DNI; and ensuring
    that the Department provides the U.S. Congress with intelligence-
    related information sufficient to execute its oversight
    responsibilities.
        Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
    believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
        Answer. If confirmed, I believe I have the background and
    experience to perform the duties of the USD(I). My qualifications
    include: my training, operational experience, duties, and
    accomplishments as a Special Forces soldier and officer, Central
    Intelligence Agency (CIA) Operations Officer, and Assistant Secretary
    of Defense for Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict and
    Interdependent Capabilities (ASD(SO/LIC&IC)); my experience as a
    producer and consumer of intelligence at both the tactical/operational
    and national levels; my experience executing and overseeing clandestine
    operations and covert action programs; and my regular interaction and
    close relationships with the Office of the USD(I), the leadership of
    the U.S. Intelligence Community, and the leadership of several key
    foreign intelligence services.
        For the past 3\1/2\ years as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have had
    responsibility for overseeing the global operations of DOD, including
    the war with al Qaeda, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and sensitive
    counterproliferation and counternarcotics operations. I have had
    responsibility for overseeing a wide-range of intelligence operations,
    spanning the full range of intelligence priorities and capabilities,
    and have had responsibility for overseeing and supporting the full-
    range of special activities conducted by other agencies of the U.S.
    Government. As a member of the Deputy's Advisory Working Group, I have
    participated in the major resource allocation decisions of the
    Department, including many involving national and military
    intelligence. I have had access to all of the Department's special
    access programs.
        As a senior policy official, I have participated extensively in
    Deputies' Committee Meetings, and occasionally, Principals' Committee
    Meetings and meetings of the National Security Council chaired by the
    President, and through this experience, I have developed a keen
    appreciation for how intelligence supports policy. As a result of my
    oversight of global operations and the operational capabilities of the
    Department, I have developed a deep understanding of intelligence-
    driven operations and the Department's intelligence capabilities,
    including those in the cyber domain.
        I am a graduate of the CIA's Career Training Program and a CIA-
    certified Operations Officer. I have served operationally in three CIA
    Divisions: Latin America, Special Activities, and Near East and South
    Asia. I have had extensive interaction and have a close relationship
    with the Director and Deputy Directors of the CIA, as well as the
    Chiefs of CIA Centers, Divisions, Offices, and Stations and Bases. I
    have had extensive interaction and have a close relationship with the
    DNI and the staff and components of Office of the Director of National
    Intelligence (ODNI). I have had extensive interaction with and have a
    deep understanding of the intelligence organizations of DOD. I have had
    frequent interaction and have close relationships with the heads of
    several foreign intelligence services.
        Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
    enhance your ability to perform the duties of the USD(I)?
        Answer. If confirmed, I believe there are actions I would need to
    take to strengthen OUSD(I)'s oversight of the military intelligence
    program and clandestine activities and support for the national
    intelligence program. I also believe there are actions I could take
    that could achieve further efficiencies across the Defense Intelligence
    Enterprise.
        Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do
    you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?
        Answer. If confirmed, I believe the Secretary would expect me to
    discharge the duties and functions--both explicit and implicit--as
    outlined above. I believe the Secretary would expect me to ensure full
    intelligence support for ongoing operations; to ensure that
    intelligence operations conducted by DOD are effective and in
    compliance with all relevant statutes, authorities, directives, and
    policies; to ensure that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is
    postured to prevent strategic surprise; to ensure, without abrogating
    the Secretary's statutory responsibilities, that the DNI has visibility
    and oversight over the full range of intelligence activities in the
    Department; and to ensure that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is
    as efficient as possible. The Secretary may also assign me other duties
    as his priorities and my background and experience warrant.

                                 RELATIONSHIPS

        Question. The Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I will provide my full support to
    the Secretary of Defense in carrying out my duties as his principal
    advisor on intelligence, counterintelligence, and security. I will keep
    him informed, seek his guidance and direction, exercise his oversight
    authority on intelligence, counterintelligence, and security-related
    matters throughout the Department, and attempt to relieve him of as
    many burdens in the intelligence domain as possible.
        Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I will keep the Deputy Secretary
    fully informed of my activities and will afford him the same support
    provided the Secretary of Defense.
        Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
        Answer. Each of the Under Secretaries has vital functions to carry
    out. If confirmed as USD(I), I will work closely with each of them. A
    close relationship between the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
    and the USD(I) is particularly important. In my current position as
    ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked to forge a close relationship between
    Defense Policy and Defense Intelligence and between Policy and the
    broader Intelligence Community. I have also worked closely with
    components of the IC on major collection systems. If confirmed as
    USD(I), I would to continue to build on these relationships.
        Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Network and
    Information Integration (ASD(NII))/Successor Organization.
        Answer. ASD(NII) has had oversight of enabling capabilities which
    are central to the conduct of intelligence and security-related
    activities. If confirmed, I will work closely with the successor
    organization to ASD(NII) to ensure that this support remains robust.
        Question. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee
    Policy.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the DASD for
    Detainee Policy on the intelligence aspects of detainee policy and
    operations.
        Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
    Operations/Low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities
    (ASD(SO/LIC&IC)).
        Answer. USD(I) and the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) interact on several important
    matters, and this interaction has grown substantially during my tenure
    ASD(SO/LIC&IC). As the previous ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I will be well-placed,
    if confirmed, to ensure that this close interaction continues. If
    confirmed, I would seek to further expand the already close
    relationships that exist between Defense Intelligence and Special
    Operations Forces (SOF) and between the broader Intelligence Community
    and SOF.
        Question. The Service Secretaries and the Service Intelligence
    Directors.
        Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), as the Program Executive for the
    Military Intelligence Program, I will work with the Secretaries of the
    Military Departments and the Service Intelligence Directors to ensure
    their intelligence requirements are met, that the Military Departments
    and Services develop intelligence capabilities appropriate for the
    current and future security environment, and that the intelligence
    organizations contribute to meeting the intelligence needs of their
    respective Military Department/Service, the Joint Force, the
    Department, and the Nation.
        Question. The General Counsel of DOD.
        Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked very closely with the
    General Counsel and his staff. If confirmed as USD(I), I will continue
    to work closely with the General Counsel, and seek his advice on the
    myriad legal issues that impact USD(I)'s duties and functions.
        Question. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff.
        Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked closely with the Chairman
    and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a wide range of
    issues. If confirmed as USD(I), I would continue this close
    relationship to ensure that Defense Intelligence and the Intelligence
    Community meet the requirements of the Joint Staff and combatant
    commands.
        Question. The commanders of the combatant commands, including U.S.
    Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and U.S. Cyber Command.
        Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have had policy oversight of SOCOM,
    U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and U.S.
    Transportation Command. I was involved in the initial planning for the
    establishment of U.S. Cyber Command. I have had close relationships
    with all of the geographic combatant commanders. If confirmed as
    USD(I), I will build on these relationships to ensure that the
    intelligence needs of the commanders of the combatant commands are met.
        Question. The Directors of the Defense intelligence agencies.
        Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked closely with the Directors
    of the Defense intelligence agencies. If confirmed as USD(I), I will
    exercise the Secretary of Defense's authority, direction, and control
    over the National Security Agency (NSA), NGA, NRO, and DIA. In this
    capacity, I will provide planning, policy, and strategic oversight over
    the intelligence, counterintelligence, and security policy, plans, and
    programs they execute. I will work with the Office of the DNI to ensure
    clear and unambiguous guidance is provided to the Defense intelligence
    agencies.
        Question. The Director of National Intelligence.
        Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked closely with the Office of
    the DNI and its components, and have worked closely with the Director.
    If confirmed as USD(I), I intend to fully support the DNI in his goal
    of greater Intelligence Community integration. Dual-hatted as the DNI's
    Director of Defense Intelligence, if confirmed, I will advise the DNI
    on Defense intelligence capabilities. I will exercise the Secretary of
    Defense's authority, direction, and control over the Directors of NSA,
    NGA, NRO and DIA, and I will consult with the DNI regarding national
    intelligence and related matters as appropriate.
        Question. The Director of Central Intelligence.
        Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked to forge a particularly
    close relationship between the CIA and the Department. If confirmed as
    USD(I), I will strive to forge an even closer relationship with the
    Director of CIA, and will fully support him in his role as National
    Manager for Human Intelligence.
        Question. The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.
        Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have worked very closely with the
    Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. If confirmed as
    USD(I), I will build on this already close relationship, and provide
    policy, oversight, and guidance for all Defense intelligence,
    counterintelligence, and security support provided to the National
    Counterterrorism Center.
        Question. The Deputy and Assistant Directors of National
    Intelligence.
        Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I will fully support the Deputy and
    Assistant Directors of National Intelligence to ensure unity of effort
    in the direction and oversight of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.
        Question. Officials in the Department of Homeland Security with
    intelligence responsibilities.
        Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I will serve as the Secretary of
    Defense's focal point for intelligence, counterintelligence, and
    security matters for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). I will
    work with DHS to expand our intelligence and law enforcement
    information-sharing initiatives with state and local authorities.

                         MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

        Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
    confront the USD(I)?
        Answer. The major challenges that, in my view, will confront the
    next USD(I) are the continued unprecedented scope and pace of global
    operations and unmet demand for intelligence in an era of intelligence-
    driven operations; the need to adapt to a rapidly changing intelligence
    environment; the need to address longer-term challenges to prevent
    strategic surprise while fully supporting ongoing operations; and the
    need to do all this in a more constrained fiscal environment.
    Additionally, we must do a better job of protecting intelligence
    sources and methods and preventing unauthorized disclosure of
    information.
        Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
    addressing these challenges?
        Answer. If I am confirmed, given the importance of intelligence to
    ongoing operations, I would do my best to ensure that sufficient
    resources are devoted to the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, and that
    intelligence is shared as widely as possible while also ensuring that
    it is properly protected. I would also ensure that the clear priorities
    are established, that actions are taken to mitigate strategic risk, and
    that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is as efficient and adaptive
    as possible.
        Question. What do you anticipate will be the most serious problems
    in the performance of the functions of the USD(I)?
        Answer. One of the most serious problems currently confronting the
    USD(I) is the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. The
    spate of unauthorized disclosures of very sensitive information places
    our forces, our military operations, and our foreign relations at risk.
    It threatens to undermine senior leaders' confidence in the
    confidentiality of their deliberations, and the confidence our foreign
    partners have that classified information they share with us will be
    protected.
        Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines
    would you establish to address these problems?
        Answer. The Office of the USD(I) (OUSD(I)) recently led a
    comprehensive review of information security policy. If confirmed, I
    will work with the DOD Chief Information Officer to facilitate
    immediate implementation of the review's recommendations, as
    appropriate, and will take additional actions as required.

                                   PRIORITIES

        Question. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), you were quoted as saying: ``I spend
    about 95 percent of my time on operations'' leaving the rest of your
    time for ``Service Secretary-like'' activities including policy,
    personnel, organizational, and development and acquisition decisions
    impacting Special Operations Forces.
        Do you believe that division of time was appropriate in your
    position as ASD(SO/LIC&IC)?
        Answer. I have been assigned a very broad set of responsibilities
    during my tenure as ASD(SO/LIC&IC). Per the statutory obligations of
    ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have oversight of Special Operations Forces. I also
    serve as the Secretary's principal advisor on Irregular Warfare matters
    across the Department. I help provide oversight of the Department's
    global operations, including the war with al Qaeda and its affiliates
    and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and have shared oversight of the
    Department's clandestine operations and sensitive activities, including
    several which have involved the collection of intelligence. I have
    regularly participated in the national security policy decisionmaking
    process at Deputies' Committee meetings, and serve as the Secretary's
    principal advisor on special activities conducted by other agencies of
    the U.S. Government. In my Interdependent Capabilities role, I have had
    oversight of the Department's strategic and conventional forces, in
    addition to the Department's Special Operations Forces. I also help
    oversee the Department's special access programs. I have oversight of
    the Department counternarcotics and counterthreat finance activities,
    stability operations, partnership strategy, and humanitarian assistance
    and disaster relief, and was recently assigned responsibility for
    overseeing additional aspects of the Department's information
    operations (IO).
        The time I have personally devoted to each of these areas has
    varied, consistent with their importance to the Department's mission
    and the degree to which I could delegate oversight to my Principal
    Deputy. During the first 18 months of my tenure, I spent substantial
    amounts of time on capability and resource allocation decisions across
    strategic, conventional, and Special Operations Forces. During the
    2009-2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, I focused intensely on the
    Special Operations and Irregular Warfare capabilities of the
    Department. The unprecedented scale and scope of operations in which
    U.S. forces are involved, and the strategic importance of and oversight
    required for sensitive activities conducted by the United States have
    required increasing amounts of my time since mid-2008. With the war
    with al Qaeda and its affiliates, the war in Afghanistan, and other
    sensitive operations for which I have oversight responsibilities, the
    preponderance of my time in 2010 has been devoted to oversight of
    operations. This has been in line with the President's and Secretary's
    priorities. Throughout my tenure as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), blessed with my
    exceptionally capable and willing partner in Admiral Eric Olson, I
    believe that I have provided the strong oversight of and advocacy for
    Special Operations Forces that Congress intended when it established
    the position of ASD(SO/LIC). I likewise believe I have been effective
    in fulfilling my duties across my entire portfolio. Accordingly, I
    believe that the allocation of my time has been appropriate.
        Question. How would you anticipate dividing your time as the
    USD(I)?
        Answer. Although there is some overlap, the duties and functions
    assigned to USD(I) are very different from those I currently have as
    ASD(SO/LIC&IC). That said, if confirmed, I would use a similar approach
    to allocating my time: focusing on the President's and Secretary's top
    priorities and on the most difficult challenges, and delegating other
    responsibilities where I can to my Principal Deputy or other senior
    staff. I would anticipate dividing my time broadly between oversight of
    intelligence operations, the development of intelligence capabilities,
    and other duties as the Secretary and the DNI may assign.
        Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
    in terms of issues which must be addressed by the USD(I)?
        Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), I would establish the following
    broad priorities: (1) ensuring that the full weight of Defense
    intelligence capabilities are brought to bear to achieve the
    President's objective of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al
    Qaeda, creating and sustaining stability in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
    Iraq, and supporting other ongoing operations in which the Department
    is engaged or may be engaged; (2) ensuring that intelligence operations
    conducted by DOD are effective and in compliance with all relevant
    statutes, authorities, directives, and policies; (3) ensuring that the
    Defense Intelligence Enterprise is postured to prevent strategic
    surprise and fully exploit emerging opportunities; and (4) ensuring
    that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is as efficient as possible. I
    would expect to pay particular attention to ensuring that we have the
    right collection and analytical priorities, that we have a robust ISR
    architecture (both space and airborne), today and in the future, that
    the Department's clandestine operations are fully integrated with those
    of the CIA and National Clandestine Service, that the President's
    highest priority intelligence programs are fully resourced, that
    analysis addresses policymakers and operational commanders' needs, that
    intelligence is timely, accessible, and protected, and, where
    appropriate, that we aggressively exploit advances in technology to
    improve our intelligence capabilities.

                              COMBATING TERRORISM

        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
    Department's comprehensive strategy for combating terrorism (CT), both
    at home and abroad?
        Answer. The Department's counterterrorism strategy directly
    supports the President's stated goal to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat
    al Qaeda and its affiliates, first operationally and regionally, and
    then strategically and globally. Operationally defeating al Qaeda and
    its affiliates requires actions that render the organization incapable
    of planning and conducting attacks. Doing this requires, among other
    things, that the relationship between al Qaeda and groups that support
    al Qaeda and provide it sanctuary be severed. Strategically defeating
    al Qaeda requires preventing al Qaeda's resurgence. Achieving these
    aims requires a sustained global CT campaign involving several mutually
    reinforcing direct and indirect lines of operation. These include
    preventing the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction by
    terrorist groups, conducting operations to disrupt, dismantle, and
    defeat terrorist organizations and deny them sanctuary, building the
    capacity of our partners, and countering radicalization. Within zones
    of hostilities, the Department has a lead role, along with our
    international partners. Outside such zones and those areas where named
    operations authorized by the President are being conducted, the
    Department plays a supporting role. While al Qaeda and its affiliates
    remain the most dangerous threat to the United States, my assessment is
    that we--the Department, the U.S. Government, and our international
    partners--have the correct strategy, and it is increasingly working,
    particularly since mid-2008.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you fulfill your responsibilities
    related to combating terrorism?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will build on the work of my predecessors
    to ensure that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is fully engaged and
    supportive of all efforts to defeat al Qaeda and combat terrorism. I
    will work closely with the Military Departments and Services, the
    Defense intelligence agencies, the combatant commanders, the
    Intelligence Community, and our international partners to ensure that
    we have the intelligence capabilities we need to achieve our CT
    objectives.
        Question. How can the Department best structure itself to ensure
    that all forms of terrorism are effectively confronted?
        Answer. During my tenure as the ASD(SO/LIC&IC), it has become
    increasingly clear to me that close collaboration among U.S.
    departments and agencies and with our international partners is
    essential to CT success. Within DOD, we have restructured our
    organization to ensure full interagency contributions to the fight,
    through the establishment, for example, of Joint Interagency Task
    Forces (JIATF). We have forged an extremely close operational
    partnership with CIA and the Intelligence Community, and we have
    substantially strengthened our international capacity building efforts.
    We have also given top priority to the rapid development of CT and
    counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities. I believe these actions posture
    the Department to effectively combat terrorism.
        Question. Are there steps the Department should take to better
    coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other Federal
    agencies?
        Answer. During my tenure as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), we have worked hard to
    achieve unity of effort in CT operations across the U.S. national and
    homeland security establishment. This has included significant efforts
    to improve coordination of operations and interagency concurrence. If
    confirmed as USD(I), I would seek to build on this by moving, for
    example, from coordination of intelligence operations to integration.

                            SECTION 1208 OPERATIONS

        Question. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), you had oversight of all section 1208
    activities by Special Operations Forces to provide support (including
    training, funding, and equipment) to foreign regular forces, irregular
    forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations
    to combat terrorism.
        What is your assessment of this authority?
        Answer. Since its enactment in 2005, Section 1208 has been a
    critical authority for the war with al Qaeda and for counterterrorism
    and related COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the specific
    details of Section 1208 use are classified, it has enabled important
    human intelligence operations, operational preparation of the
    environment, advance force operations, unconventional warfare
    operations, and partnered CT operations.
        Question. Do you believe changes to the authority and/or funding
    restrictions are needed?
        Answer. I support the current request for additional funding
    authority, raising the annual funding level restriction from $40
    million to $50 million, and I support extending the authority for the
    duration of named counterterrorist operations and for other
    contingencies.

                          SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS

        Question. During your time as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), Special Operations
    Forces expanded their role in a number of areas important to countering
    violent extremist organizations, including those related to information
    and military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant
    changes to SOCOM's title 10 missions to make them better reflect the
    activities Special Operations Forces are carrying out around the world.
        What changes, if any, would you recommend to SOCOM's title 10
    missions?
        Answer. The list of special operations activities in section 167 of
    title 10, U.S.C. could be updated to reflect SOCOM's current list of
    core tasks and the missions assigned to it in the Unified Command Plan.
    The language in section 167 of title 10, U.S.C. also includes ``such
    other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary
    of Defense,'' which provides the President and the Secretary the
    flexibility they need to meet changing circumstances.
        Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role of Special
    Operations Forces in the Department's IO?
        Answer. IOs are a core SOF task. They are a vital instrument in
    countering violent extremism and other transnational threats. They can
    greatly enable unconventional warfare operations. IO support special
    operations from the combatant command level to the tactical
    battlefield.
        Question. In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out
    by special operations personnel different from those carried out by
    others in the Intelligence Community?
        Answer. Some intelligence operations conducted by special
    operations personnel have unique attributes which are a function of the
    background, training, and experience of special operators, the missions
    assigned to their organizations, the intelligence targets they pursue,
    and the collection methods they employ. Special operations intelligence
    activities primarily support SOF intelligence requirements. However,
    when directed, SOF intelligence operations also support Intelligence
    Community and combatant commander requirements. For certain national
    collection missions, SOF personnel receive the same training as
    officers in national intelligence organizations.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure intelligence
    activities carried out by Special Operations Forces are adequately
    coordinated with other activities carried out by those in the
    Intelligence Community?
        Answer. Special Operations Forces coordinate their intelligence
    activities with the Intelligence Community as required by applicable
    law, policy, and agreements, including Intelligence Community Directive
    Number 304 and the Memorandum of Agreement between DOD and CIA
    Concerning Operational Activities, July 20, 2005. If confirmed, I would
    further the operational integration between SOF and the Intelligence
    Community that has progressively been put in place during my tenure as
    ASD(SO/LIC&IC).

                    MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS

        Question. If confirmed, what role, if any, would you have with
    respect to military information support operations (MISO)?
        Answer. The Defense Intelligence Enterprise plays a crucial role in
    support of MISOs. Collecting and analyzing the information required to
    understand complex foreign human environments is the foundation for
    effective IOs. Additionally, if confirmed, I will ensure that military
    IOs are properly coordinated and operationally integrated with the IOs
    of other organizations within the Intelligence Community.
        Question. DOD recently announced that it was discontinuing use of
    the term ``psychological operations'' in favor of the term ``military
    information support operations.''
        Why do you believe such a terminology change was necessary?
        Answer. Psychological operations as a term had become increasingly
    anachronistic, and had taken on avoidable, negative connotations. MISO
    is a more accurate description of the purpose of these operations.
        Question. What operational and doctrinal impacts do you believe
    such a change will have?
        Answer. I believe it will have positive operational and doctrinal
    impacts.
        Question. In your experience as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), do you believe the
    Armed Forces have sufficient personnel and other assets to conduct the
    range of military information support missions being asked of them?
        Answer. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), and as a senior advisor to the 2006
    Quadrennial Defense Review before that, I strongly supported
    significant growth in our psychological operations/MISOs force
    structure. MISO forces remain in high demand across our combatant
    commands. MISOs require specially trained personnel and unique
    capabilities, and such personnel are important assets not only for the
    Department, but for other departments and agencies of the U.S.
    Government as well. Given the rapid rate of change in the information
    environment and the diverse character of this environment, sustained
    modernization and a diverse portfolio of capabilities is required. Our
    long-term goal is measured growth and significant quality improvements
    for this force.

                          COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

        Question. Over the past few years, DOD has funded a growing number
    of psychological operations and influence programs under the rubric of
    strategic communications programs. While the Department does not have
    any separate documentation outlining these activities, the Government
    Accountability Office reports that DOD ``spent hundreds of millions of
    dollars each year'' to support these operations, including initiatives
    funded by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization and
    the geographic combatant commands. Many of these programs support
    operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but Military Information Support
    Teams from SOCOM are also deploying to U.S. embassies in countries of
    particular interest around the globe to bolster the efforts of the
    Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development.
    In your capacity as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), you had limited oversight of a
    number of these programs. In the position for which you have been
    nominated, you will continue to play a role in these programs.
        What are your views on DOD's strategic communications,
    psychological operations and influence programs, and their integration
    into overall U.S. foreign policy objectives?
        Answer. The effectiveness of Department IOs in the rapidly evolving
    global information environment is an increasingly important determinant
    of our ability to achieve U.S. military objectives. DOD has an
    important role in IOs, particularly, but by no means exclusively, in
    zones of armed conflict. DOD IOs must be integrated with other U.S.
    Government efforts--those by the Department of State and other
    government agencies--to shape information environments to our
    advantage. They must also reduce our adversaries' abilities to do the
    same.
        Question. In 2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda's second-in-command,
    declared that ``We are in a battle, and more than half of it is taking
    place in the battlefield of the media.'' Earlier this year, a non-
    partisan study highlighted the lack of a U.S. strategy to counter
    radical ideologies that foment violence (e.g. Islamism or Salafist-
    Jihadism).
        As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), what did you do to further DOD's strategic
    appreciation of the ideological basis of al Qaeda and its affiliates?
        Answer. DOD fully recognizes the importance of al Qaeda's ideology
    and the extent to which it underpins the al Qaeda movement. As ASD(SO/
    LIC&IC), I worked to advance this strategic appreciation within DOD and
    across the interagency. I have strongly advocated for programs and
    activities, many of which are conducted by other departments and
    agencies of the U.S. Government, to deal with the ideological challenge
    posed by al Qaeda and its affiliates. In the unclassified realm, my
    office was recently involved in the establishment of the Department of
    State-led Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, which
    will serve as the interagency focal point for U.S. Government counter-
    radicalization efforts.
        Question. In your view, how do we counter radical ideologies that
    foment violence?
        Answer. The most effective counter will be within the affected
    population and the radical groups themselves.
        Question. What do you understand to be the role of the Intelligence
    Community, as opposed to DOD and the State Department?
        Answer. The Intelligence Community has special authorities and
    capabilities that can be brought to bear. Intelligence collection and
    analysis informs all IOs.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you plan to utilize the results
    of research being conducted by DOD's Minerva and Human Social Cultural
    Behavioral Modeling programs?
        Answer. Research from the Minerva program and the applications
    developed as part of Human Social Cultural Behavioral (HSCB) Modeling
    program are components of the overall Defense Intelligence effort to
    improve socio-cultural information. As currently envisioned by OUSD(I),
    the socio-cultural analytic effort will integrate social science
    research, all-source analysis, and regional expertise into fused
    intelligence products. The modeling capabilities in HSCB will help
    analysts manage and visualize large volumes of data on economics,
    infrastructure, demographics, et cetera. Insights developed as a result
    of enhanced capabilities could also improve the Intelligence
    Community's ability to provide warning on emerging crises.

                             INFORMATION OPERATIONS

        Question. IOs, as currently defined by DOD, include electronic
    warfare, operational security, computer network operations,
    psychological operations, and military deception--each of these lines
    of operations is unique and complex, and, in some cases, interwoven.
        What do you understand to be the roles of the OUSD(I) in overseeing
    DOD IOs?
        Answer. The roles and missions for IOs are being addressed by a
    Front End Assessment. I would expect that the OUSD(I) will continue to
    play an appropriate role in the oversight of several of these areas.
        Question. What are your views on the roles assigned to USD(I) and
    the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy with respect to IOs, and
    particularly offensive computer network operations? If confirmed, what
    changes, if any, would you consider recommending to the Secretary of
    Defense?
        Answer. The Front End Assessment is addressing this question. Some
    aspects of IO, as currently defined, will likely migrate to Policy,
    while others will likely remain in USD(I). I would expect that the
    USD(I) will continue to play an important role in overseeing computer
    network operations.
        Question. Given the formation of a separate U.S. Cyber Command,
    what are your views on retaining computer network operations as a core
    competency with IOs?
        Answer. IOs, as currently defined, refer to the integration of
    various information activities to achieve effects across the
    information environment, which includes the cyber domain. The formation
    of U.S. Cyber Command will not change the relationship of computer
    network operations to the other capabilities necessary for DOD to
    conduct information and cyber-related operations. It will, however,
    enhance our ability to conduct IOs in the cyber domain. As noted above,
    oversight of IO and its components, as currently defined, is being
    addressed in a Front End Assessment.

                             COUNTER THREAT FINANCE

        Question. A number of officials in DOD and the Intelligence
    Community have called for applying significantly more resources and
    attention to identifying, tracking, and halting the flow of money
    associated with the terrorist networks and the illegal narcotics trade.
    Comparable efforts have been undertaken by the Joint Improvised
    Explosive Device Defeat Organization against the flow of money and
    components supporting the construction and employment of improvised
    explosive devices.
        What are your views on efforts to invest additional resources into
    identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorism
    and narcotics, especially in Afghanistan?
        Answer. Engaging all U.S. Government tools to track and halt the
    flow of money associated with terrorist networks, the illegal narcotics
    trade, and other threats to the U.S. Government is critical. The narco-
    insurgent nexus is a key enabler, for example, of the insurgency in
    Afghanistan. While DOD is not the U.S. Government lead in counter
    threat finance (CTF), it does have a role to play. We are in the
    process of building an appropriate CTF capability within DOD, and will
    be alert to the need for additional resources.
        Question. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), you were responsible for a portion of
    the CTF duties in the Department. What is your assessment of DOD's
    current CTF organizational structure?
        Answer. DOD's threat finance structure is still developing, but it
    is headed in the right direction. In August 2009, Deputy Secretary Lynn
    approved the DOD Directive on CTF Policy, which formalizes CTF as a DOD
    mission. CTF Interagency Task Forces are making important contributions
    to our counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. A critical element of
    success in the CTF area will be DOD's ability to support the Department
    of Treasury, which has the CTF lead for the U.S. Government. The ODNI
    is also working to strengthen the Treasury Department's capabilities
    with respect to CTF intelligence.

                              INFORMATION SHARING

        Question. There are still strong barriers to sharing, or allowing
    access to, the mass of raw intelligence data that has not been included
    in finished reports or analyses and approved for dissemination within
    the Intelligence Community. As long as these barriers exist, DNI
    Clapper's vision of an integrated repository with analytic tools able
    to connect-the-dots cannot be achieved. The implication is that the
    Nation will remain more vulnerable to terrorist attacks than it could
    be. The reasons cited to justify these information access barriers are
    the need to protect sources and methods and the privacy of U.S.
    persons.
        What are your views about whether it is possible to provide greater
    access to counterterrorism data to analysts and Special Forces while
    adequately protecting intelligence sources and properly minimizing
    exposure of U.S. persons' information?
        Answer. I believe it is possible to provide greater access to
    counterterrorism data to analysts and Special Forces while adequately
    protecting intelligence sources and properly minimizing exposure of
    U.S. persons' information. While cognizant of the problem we face with
    respect to the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, if
    confirmed, I will seek, in concert with the DNI, to enable better,
    faster, and deeper sharing of counterterrorism data. We have already
    made significant progress in this area. Until very recently, multiple
    U.S. military, civil, and coalition networks in Afghanistan were unable
    to communicate with one another. We have moved to a common, integrated
    network--the Afghan Mission Network--and one common database--Combined
    Information Data Network Exchange--that supports intelligence, military
    operations, command and control, and logistics across all U.S. entities
    and 46 partner nations. This approach of establishing a common network
    and common database has allowed us to ensure that all releasable
    national, tactical, and commercially available data from across the DOD
    and IC is available and discoverable.
        Question. Do you agree with DNI Clapper that these barriers are
    mainly cultural in nature?
        Answer. Yes, I agree with the DNI. Reflecting upon my own
    operational experiences and the intelligence support I have received
    over the years, it is clear that the IC has produced multiple
    generations of intelligence analysts and leaders inculcated with the
    philosophy that need-to-know had to be proven before information could
    be shared. Under that approach, the first and foremost rule was to
    protect sources and methods, or the result would be loss of sensitive
    capabilities and lives. While protecting sources and methods must
    remain a critical concern and need-to-share cannot trump need-to-know,
    there can be an even greater risk to mission or potential loss of life
    if information is not shared between government agencies and with our
    allies. As USD(I), Mr. Clapper initiated and, if confirmed, I will
    continue to foster policy changes and make investments in training and
    capability development that will make Responsibility-to-Provide the
    mindset for the entire DOD enterprise. This is already underway in our
    schoolhouses where Write-for-Release is part of the curriculum, and in
    our acquisition programs where federated information sharing via common
    protocols is an integral part of all fielding efforts at the enterprise
    intelligence architecture level, the combatant commands and the
    military departments.
        Question. What role do you expect to play in addressing this issue,
    if confirmed, to be USD(I)?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the ODNI to ensure
    that as we build out our information-sharing capability, we do it in
    full synchronization with the IC. I will also ensure that we have
    appropriate controls in place to prevent unauthorized disclosure of
    information.

                                HOMELAND DEFENSE

        Question. With the establishment of the positions of USD(I), the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas'
    Security Affairs, and the Commander of U.S. Northern Command, DOD has
    been fundamentally reorganized to better address the critical homeland
    defense mission.
        In your view, what challenges lie ahead in integrating the
    intelligence capabilities of DOD with those of the Department of
    Homeland Security and other associated Federal, State, and local
    agencies?
        Answer. Two of the longstanding challenges to integrating the
    intelligence capabilities of DOD with those of the Department of
    Homeland Security and other associated Federal, State, and local
    agencies have been IT compatibility and guidance on sharing classified
    information. With the issuance of Executive Order 13549, Classified
    National Security Information Program for State, Local, Tribal, and
    Private Sector (SLTPS) Entities, we have made significant progress in
    the latter. The Executive Order establishes the right balance between
    sharing classified information with SLTPS entities in support of
    homeland defense, while ensuring proper safeguards are in place for
    protecting information from unauthorized disclosure. OUSD(I) is
    currently assisting DHS and other agencies in the development of
    implementation policy, and will have an ongoing role in supporting an
    integrated approach.
        Question. Does DOD's existing requirements-setting process
    adequately support the establishment of intelligence requirements for
    the homeland defense mission?
        Answer. The technical solutions needed to inject homeland defense
    intelligence requirements into the overall DOD requirements-setting
    process now exist or are in development. Dividing finite resources
    among existing DOD intelligence requirements, while ensuring adequate
    support for requirements unique to the homeland defense mission, will
    present a significant challenge. Adequate intelligence support must be
    provided, however. Al Qaeda continues to pose a grave threat to the
    American Homeland, and for at least a decade, intelligence
    professionals have recognized that the foreign-domestic divide has been
    shattered by transnational terrorist groups.

                            EFFECTIVENESS OF USD(I)

        Question. The Secretary of Defense took the extraordinary step of
    establishing an independent ISR Task Force in early 2008 to rectify
    major shortfalls in support to ongoing military and counterterrorism
    operations. The Secretary determined that the Military Services had not
    sufficiently deployed innovative solutions to meet the requirements of
    combatant commanders. Responsibility for this problem lay not only with
    the Military Services but also the functional manager for
    intelligence--the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Intelligence (OUSD(I)).
        Do you believe that the Secretary's initiative suggests that the
    OUSD(I) lacks expertise, initiative, or clout, or some combination
    thereof, or do you think that other factors prevented appropriate
    action?
        Answer. The ISR Task Force was established by Secretary Gates to
    assess and propose options for maximizing and optimizing deployed ISR
    capabilities in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It has
    been led by an OUSD(I) Deputy Under Secretary, and is primarily staffed
    by OUSD(I) personnel, though it is also comprised of personnel from
    OSD(AT&L), the Services, Joint Staff, and Combat Support Agencies. The
    establishment of the ISR Task Force does not reflect a unique shortfall
    within OUSD(I). Rather, gaps exist in the ability of the Department to
    quickly meet the urgent near-term needs of our warfighters,
    particularly when facing a rapidly evolving threat. This gap is not
    just confined to ISR or intelligence. The same extraordinary process
    was required, for example, to rapidly procure mine-resistant ambush
    protected vehicles and develop additional counter-IED capabilities for
    Afghanistan. The establishment of the ISR Task Force provided the focus
    and resources necessary to pursue rapid acquisition of ISR assets. Its
    efforts are part of a larger departmental effort to expand and
    institutionalize a rapid acquisition capability led by the USD(AT&L).
    As a result of the ISR Task Force's success, it was determined that
    there is an enduring need for the focus and effectiveness the Task
    Force has brought to integrating ISR systems into Joint Operations.
    Accordingly, the Secretary notified Congress on September 16, 2010,
    that he was institutionalizing the responsibilities of the ISR Task
    Force within the OUSD(I).

                  DUAL HAT AS DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE

        Question. In May 2007, Secretary Gates and DNI McConnell signed a
    Memorandum of Agreement designating the USD(I) as the Director of
    Defense Intelligence under the DNI.
        What is your understanding of the authorities and responsibilities
    of this office under the DNI?
        Answer. The position of the Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI)
    was established within the ODNI to assist the DNI in the execution of
    DNI responsibilities for the oversight of Defense intelligence matters.
    As the principal advisor to the DNI and ODNI for defense intelligence,
    the DDI is responsible for requirements, intelligence activities, and
    advice and assistance. This includes:

             Overseeing the development of DOD's national
            intelligence requirements on behalf of the DNI;
             Facilitating alignment, coordination, and
            deconfliction between National and Defense Intelligence
            activities; and
             Advising and assisting the DNI by synchronizing and
            integrating Defense intelligence functions with other IC
            elements.

        By creating this dual-hat arrangement, the DDI can exercise
    authority on behalf of the DNI, while the USD(I) exercises authorities
    delegated to him by the Secretary of Defense.
        Question. What is your assessment of the relevance or importance of
    this dual designation, and whether it should be continued?
        Answer. I believe strongly in the DDI/USD(I) dual-hat arrangement,
    and strongly support its continuation. I believe it is the most
    effective way to serve the Defense intelligence needs of both the
    Secretary of Defense and the DNI, and it is a key instrument for
    achieving greater integration of U.S. intelligence. The DDI/USD(I)
    attends all National Intelligence Boards, all DNI Executive Committee
    meetings, and all senior ODNI staff meetings. The DDI/USD(I) meets
    weekly with the DNI in a one-on-one session. A full-time senior liaison
    officer resides in each staff in an effort to enhance communication and
    coordination. If confirmed, I would plan to build on and expand the
    collaboration between the OUSD(I) and ODNI staffs through this
    arrangement.
         usd(i) role in intelligence personnel, acquisition, and policy
        Question. DOD senior leaders include Under Secretaries responsible
    for personnel, policy, and acquisition matters, yet the OUSD(I)
    includes staff with responsibilities for each of these areas as they
    apply to the intelligence mission.
        In your view, should the OUSD(I) staff continue to duplicate the
    functions and resources of these other Under Secretaries? If so, why?
        Answer. I do not view the OUSD(I) staff functions as duplicative,
    but rather complementary. The Intelligence components of the Department
    operate under the authority of the Secretary of Defense in title 10 of
    the U.S.C. In coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)), the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), the Under Secretary
    of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), and the DNI, the OUSD(I) staff provides
    oversight on behalf of the USD(I) to ensure these programs are aligned
    both within the Department and the broader Intelligence Community. The
    USD(I) is uniquely positioned to provide oversight of sensitive DOD
    programs that are integral to the Intelligence Community, including
    those exercised clandestinely, and to ensure that those programs
    complement the activities of the entire Department and the DNI. These
    efforts ensure maximum effectiveness and efficiency of the consolidated
    National Intelligence and Defense Intelligence programs.
        The USD(I) is the Principal Staff Assistant responsible for
    promulgation of intelligence policies within DOD (DODD 5143.01). In
    this capacity, the USD(I) exercises the authorities to ensure efficient
    use of resources for the intelligence mission set. DOD routinely
    interacts with the Intelligence Community, and those interactions
    require special consideration in order to preserve the necessary
    division between national and military intelligence activities. The
    USD(I) provides oversight of training, education, and career
    development for all Defense intelligence personnel. This oversight
    enables the Department to develop a cadre of well rounded and
    experienced intelligence experts and to horizontally integrate existing
    and new capabilities for warfighters. Without this focused oversight,
    the efficiency and effectiveness of the DOD Intelligence Enterprise
    would be put at risk. The Department also has responsibility to provide
    specialized oversight of all Military Intelligence Program funding.
    Congress has recognized the importance of this oversight in the areas
    of acquisition, security, personnel, and resources.
        OUSD(I) provides advice and assistance to OUSD(AT&L) concerning
    acquisition programs and processes that significantly affect Defense
    intelligence, counterintelligence, and security components.
    Additionally, OUSD(I) works closely with OUSD(AT&L) and ODNI on
    programs that are funded by the National Intelligence Program and
    executed in the Department. This advice and assistance is integral to
    OUSD(I)'s Military Intelligence Program oversight and Battlespace
    Awareness Capability Portfolio Management responsibilities.
        Question. What is your understanding and view of the military
    departments' initiatives with respect to their tactical, operational,
    and strategic intelligence collection and analysis force structure and
    technologies?
        Answer. The military departments understand that we are operating
    in a resource-constrained environment, and they are developing
    initiatives and strategies to field comprehensive capabilities
    providing optimized intelligence to full-spectrum operations. If I am
    confirmed as USD(I), they will have my full support. These strategies
    provide a range of investment options to realign and reinvest in
    existing capabilities, while still providing timely, fused, and
    actionable intelligence to the Joint Force. I support the Secretary of
    Defense's effort to maximize production of ISR capabilities in support
    of U.S. forces in combat, as evidenced by the ISR Task Force
    Initiative. If confirmed, I will work with the Intelligence Community,
    the military departments, and the combat support agencies to ensure an
    integrated effort. I will meet with the Service Intelligence Chiefs,
    the Joint Staff J2, the Combat Support Agency Directors, and the
    combatant commands to ensure I have a clear understanding of their
    highest priority initiatives.
        Question. If confirmed, what would be your priorities among these
    initiatives and how would you propose to provide policy and program
    oversight and support them with appropriate resources?
        Answer. If confirmed, my priorities would be nested with the
    Secretary of Defense's Planning Guidance and the DNI's National
    Intelligence Strategy. I would ensure that the initiatives and
    strategies of the military departments were also nested with Secretary
    of Defense priorities, and through my office of Joint and Coalition
    Warfighter Support, would provide the necessary oversight of their
    plans and programs. My top priority is to support our forces engaged in
    combat operations with the best intelligence available. To do that, we
    need to balance our capabilities at the strategic, operational, and
    tactical levels of war. We would improve innovation and pursue
    technological advances in support of information sharing--from policy
    to hardware to analysts; improving collection and exploitation,
    countering current and emerging threats, strengthening
    counterintelligence, and improving our security processes.

                              EFFICIENCIES ISSUES

        Question. The Secretary of Defense has announced his intention to
    eliminate the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks
    and Information Integration (ASD(NII)) and the J-6 from the Joint Staff
    on the grounds that other organizations in the Department perform
    similar functions, particularly the Defense Information Systems Agency
    and U.S. Cyber Command. Similarly, the Department has a number of
    combat support defense agencies that are totally engaged in
    intelligence--such as NSA, DIA, NGA, and NRO. There is also the DNI who
    manages intelligence, including all the national intelligence agencies
    within the Department. Each Military Service has an intelligence chief
    as well. U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and each of the
    other combatant commands have major intelligence components and
    missions.
        In your view, does the logic that led to the decision to eliminate
    NII and the J-6 imply that USD(I) and the J-2 should also be eliminated
    in view of the role played by DIA, NSA, NGA, NRO, U.S. Cyber Command,
    and U.S. Strategic Command? Why or why not?
        Answer. The Secretary of Defense is examining the Department's
    intelligence organization, responsibilities, and authorities as part of
    his efficiency effort. That endeavor is ongoing, and at this point the
    Secretary has not made any final decisions. Key members of the OUSD(I)
    staff are participating in the efficiency effort to inform the larger
    efficiency team about the intricacies of the Defense Intelligence
    Enterprise. In my view, there is a radical difference between
    streamlining oversight and management of command, control, and
    communications functions and those of a diverse intelligence
    enterprise. The USD(I), on behalf of the Secretary of Defense,
    coordinates, oversees and orchestrates the multidiscipline components
    of the global Defense Intelligence Enterprise and its interaction with
    the Intelligence Community. I believe the creation of the position of
    USD(I) was a major step forward in the oversight of defense
    intelligence, and that the dual-hatting of USD(I) as the DNI Director
    of Defense Intelligence ensures that Defense Intelligence is fully
    integrated into the U.S. Intelligence Community. I would not support
    its elimination. I likewise believe that the J-2 provides critical
    intelligence support to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
    Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Unified Combatant
    Commands.
        Question. Do you see an opportunity for the elimination of
    redundant layers of bureaucracy and greater efficiency in the operation
    and management of the Defense Intelligence Community, including the
    combatant commands and the Service component commands?
        Answer. The Secretary of Defense initiated an efficiency effort
    that includes the review of the organizations and functions of Defense
    Intelligence Enterprise components to identify overlaps and
    inefficiencies. This effort includes a review of the entire enterprise
    to include the Defense intelligence agencies, Service intelligence
    components, and all of the Combatant Command Joint Intelligence
    Operations Centers. I anticipate that the efficiency effort will
    identify some redundancies, and if confirmed, I will work to carry out
    any decisions made by the Secretary.

                  NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM CONSOLIDATION

        Question. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
    2004 is the most recent legislative attempt to calibrate the need to
    centralize management of intelligence across the Federal Government
    with the need to sustain the benefits of departmental intelligence
    answerable to cabinet secretaries. General Clapper, while serving as
    USD(I), initiated a proposal to separate out the National Intelligence
    Program (NIP) portion of the Defense budget, establish a new
    appropriations account within the 050 Defense Function, and expand the
    ODNI comptroller function to enable ODNI to execute these funds
    independent of the DOD Comptroller organization.
        Does this proposal weaken the authority of the Secretary of Defense
    over the intelligence components of the DOD?
        Answer. This proposal should not weaken the authority of the
    Secretary of Defense over the intelligence components of DOD.
    Separation of the NIP portion of the Defense budget, as conceptually
    proposed, is an administrative action. Thus, it will not affect the
    Secretary of Defense's ``authority, direction, and control over the
    Department of Defense.'' 10 U.S.C. sec. 113(b). It will not affect how
    the Secretary ``prescribe[s] regulations for the government of his
    department, the conduct of its employees, [and] the distribution and
    performance of its business.'' 5 U.S.C. sec. 301.
        Question. Is this proposal consistent with the Secretary's
    efficiencies initiative, which seeks to avoid duplication and to reduce
    the overhead burden, by creating a second large financial control
    system operating within the Department?
        Answer. The proposal to separate the NIP portion of the Defense
    budget was not intended to be an efficiency initiative, but to provide
    greater visibility and oversight of NIP resources, as well as improve
    NIP financial management practices. ODNI is leading a collaborative
    study effort to determine the feasibility of the conceptual proposal,
    with DOD stakeholders participating. The study team is still assessing
    possible approaches and implications. No final decisions have been made
    on removing the NIP from the DOD budget. If approved, I believe the
    proposal to separate the NIP portion of the Defense budget would not be
    incompatible with the Secretary's efficiencies initiative.

                         SUPPORT FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

        Question. In late 2009, Major General Michael T. Flynn, USA, who
    was serving as Chief, CJ2, International Security Assistance Force and
    U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, published an article that criticized the
    Intelligence Community broadly for focusing excessively on support for
    kinetic operations against adversary forces in Afghanistan and failing
    to devote sufficient attention to the counterinsurgency strategy and
    its emphasis on population protection, tribal dynamics, cultural
    insight, the rule of law, and the like.
        Do you think that General Flynn's criticism was accurate, and if
    so, has this imbalance been corrected?
        Answer. Major General Flynn was correct in his assessment that in a
    counterinsurgency environment, focusing our intelligence assets solely
    on the insurgent forces is not effective. A comprehensive understanding
    of the socio-cultural environment is absolutely critical to developing
    and implementing effective strategies to separate the insurgency from
    any viable base of support in the general population. Developing this
    comprehensive understanding is clearly an intelligence responsibility
    as laid out in Service and Joint doctrine within the Department.
    Mobilizing the local population in rural areas for village stability
    operations has become a critical element of our strategy in
    Afghanistan, one that is already showing major gains on the
    battlefield. Tribal engagement is increasingly central to U.S. strategy
    in other countries as well. Thus, a detailed understanding of tribal
    dynamics is a critical intelligence task, and will likely remain so for
    the foreseeable future.
        The Intelligence Community has worked hard to implement Major
    General Flynn's recommendations. The Stability Operations Information
    Centers he called for have been created and manned by the Defense
    Intelligence Agency and Service intelligence analysts who are doing the
    integration and analysis work necessary to generate the comprehensive
    District Assessment reports that were the cornerstone of Major General
    Flynn's approach. Significant challenges remain in developing the
    integrated information-sharing environment envisioned by Major General
    Flynn, but the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
    Task Force and the U.S. Central Command have been doing tremendous work
    in this area as well. Additionally, the former USD(I) commissioned the
    Intelligence Task Force of the Defense Science Board in March 2010 to
    evaluate how intelligence can most effectively support
    counterinsurgency operations. The Board is currently compiling its
    findings and recommendations and is scheduled to brief the results in
    the first quarter of calendar year 2011.
        I believe the Intelligence Community has responded well to the
    challenges laid out by Major General Flynn. One of my first actions, if
    confirmed, will be to confer with Brigadier General Fogarty, who has
    replaced Major General Flynn, to get his assessment of the support
    currently being provided by the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and the
    Intelligence Community to determine if additional enhancements are
    required.
        Question. In your opinion, has the Intelligence Community devoted
    enough resources to provide policymakers and combatant commanders with
    the information on the cultural, social, political, and economic
    dynamics needed to formulate sound strategies for other critical
    regions, like Yemen and Somalia?
        Answer. As noted above, tribal engagement is an increasingly
    critical tool in U.S. irregular warfare strategy. It was central to our
    success in overthrowing the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan in
    2001, it has been a major factor in our success in Iraq (Anbar
    Awakening), it is again becoming a critical element of our
    counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, and it offers U.S.
    policymakers important options in other countries of concern.
    Information on cultural, social, political, and economic dynamics is
    likewise needed for effective IOs, as well as enhanced options to deal
    with power brokers in urban areas. I believe we have made good progress
    regarding intelligence support in this area, but additional
    improvements are required. A key part of the required investment is the
    development of operators--within both the intelligence and the special
    operations communities--with the requisite language skills.
    Effectiveness in this area also requires intelligence analysts with
    very different backgrounds. If confirmed, I would engage the DNI, the
    Director of CIA, the relevant components of the Defense Intelligence
    Enterprise, and the Commander of SOCOM to ensure that we continue to
    develop the required capabilities.
        Question. Is collection and analysis on these subjects in these
    geographical areas a tier one priority for the Intelligence Community
    or is it classified as lower-priority general background intelligence
    information? Do you agree with this prioritization?
        Answer. As the committee is aware, our National Intelligence
    Priorities are classified. As noted above, however, intelligence
    support in this area is increasingly central to effective strategy and
    operations. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that it is accorded
    appropriate priority within both the Intelligence Community and the
    Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

                   NEED FOR INDEPENDENT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

        Question. Intelligence analysis should be independent and free of
    political pressure that it reach a certain conclusion, including a
    conclusion that fits a particular policy preference.
        If confirmed, how would you ensure that all intelligence analysts
    within DOD, including those who may be seconded to offices that are not
    part of the defense intelligence structure, are free from such
    pressure?
        Answer. In my experience, I have found the intelligence analysis
    that holds up best under scrutiny are those assessments that were
    reached impartially and independently, using all sources of information
    available, and which highlight the intelligence gaps that limit the
    judgments that can be reached by current analysis. Intelligence
    analysts are inculcated with the importance of ``speaking truth to
    power.'' As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have interacted regularly with
    intelligence analysts across the Intelligence Community, and have found
    them to be professionals who apply rigorous tradecraft standards to
    their products. The quality of analysis provided to policymakers today,
    in my judgment, is substantially better than it was in the Cold War. I
    have spoken to analysts as they attend their career training programs
    about the importance of what they do, and the need for objectivity and
    independence. If confirmed, I would reaffirm the importance of
    objective and independent analysis from the frontline analyst, to the
    Directors of analytical organizations, to senior policymakers. There
    will be zero tolerance for political pressure on analysts to reach
    certain conclusions.
        Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you think
    intelligence officers and analysts should be able to testify to
    Congress on their professional conclusions regarding a substantive
    intelligence issue even if those views conflict with administration
    positions?
        Answer. If Congress requires testimony on a substantive
    intelligence issue, it should be provided, whether or not it conflicts
    with an administration position.

                  CONTROL OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES WITHIN DOD

        Question. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
    (IRTPA) of 2004 granted the DNI control over the preparation and
    execution of the National Intelligence Program budget and tasking of
    national intelligence operations. However, IRTPA also contained
    language asserting that nothing in the act should be construed so as to
    impair the authorities of secretaries of cabinet departments, and the
    Secretary of Defense has delegated ``direction, control, and
    authority''--the highest form of authority in the executive branch--
    over the national intelligence organizations within the DOD to the
    USD(I).
        What are your views on the balance of authorities accorded in IRTPA
    to the DNI and to cabinet secretaries, particularly the Secretary of
    Defense?
        Answer. IRTPA struck a proper balance of authorities, in my view,
    in that it gave the DNI strong authority over core intelligence
    functions for the National Intelligence Program, such as setting
    requirements and budgets, as well as determining priorities for and
    managing the analysis and dissemination of national intelligence, while
    leaving the responsibility for execution of DOD intelligence activities
    to the Secretary of Defense, and assigning primary responsibility for
    leadership and management functions such as inspector general
    activities, personnel, information technology, financial management
    systems, and acquisition within the IC elements outside of ODNI and CIA
    to the heads of the departments in which those elements are located.
    The recently-enacted Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2010 significantly increased the authorities of ODNI over leadership
    and management functions in the IC elements, and I expect that DOD and
    the DNI will together devote considerable time and attention to
    implementing these new ODNI authorities in a manner that gives full
    effect to the act while avoiding unnecessary duplication of effort and
    preserving the Secretary of Defense's ability to execute his statutory
    responsibilities over DOD's intelligence components.
        Question. What are your views on the extent of the grant of
    ``direction, control, and authority'' to the USD(I) over DOD national
    intelligence organizations?
        Answer. Statutory provisions in both title 10 and title 50 of the
    U.S.C. assign authority, direction, and control to the Secretary of
    Defense over DIA, NSA, NGA, and NRO as components of the Department,
    consistent with the statutory authorities of the DNI. In my view, this
    balance of authorities is appropriate.
        Question. What type of relationship would you strive to establish,
    if you are confirmed, with the DNI to ensure that DOD interests in
    national intelligence are satisfied, that DOD adequately assists the
    DNI in discharging his responsibilities, and that the defense
    intelligence agencies are properly managed?
        Answer. With the former USD(I) now in place as the DNI, with his
    extensive experience in both DOD and the Intelligence Community, with
    the close personal partnership we have forged during my tenure as
    ASD(SO/LIC&IC), and with the close relationships we both have with the
    Secretary of Defense and with the leaders of the Intelligence
    Community, I believe there is an unprecedented opportunity to further
    strengthen the relationship between DOD and the DNI. If confirmed, I
    expect that together we will look for additional ways to build on the
    arrangement established by the Secretary of Defense and the DNI under
    which the USD(I) serves as the Director of Defense Intelligence within
    ODNI.
        Question. Do you believe that the relationships, authorities,
    processes, and structures in place between the DOD and the DNI provide
    sufficient influence for the DOD to ensure that the intelligence
    capabilities DOD will need in the future to prepare for and conduct
    military operations will be developed and acquired through the National
    Intelligence Program?
        Answer. Yes, I believe that current relationships, authorities,
    processes, and structures in place between DOD and the DNI have
    produced highly effective support by NIP resources for military
    operations.

                        ROLE IN ACQUIRING SPACE SYSTEMS

        Question. If confirmed, what role do you anticipate you would have
    in the requirements process for, and in oversight of the acquisition
    of, space systems, including space systems for which milestone decision
    authority rests with either the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics or the DOD Executive Agent for
    Space?
        Answer. If confirmed as USD(I), as the principal staff assistant to
    the Secretary of Defense for all intelligence matters, my role in space
    system acquisition will be to ensure the Defense Intelligence
    Enterprise meets national and Department requirements. I will ensure
    that we've balanced our investments towards delivering the right mix of
    intelligence capabilities to support the combatant commanders to
    accomplish their missions. DOD space systems are one component of a
    broader architecture of sensors, systems, and capabilities.
        As the DOD Program Executive for the Military Intelligence Program
    (MIP), the USD(I) role is to ensure all parts of the ISR architecture,
    to include space, air, and ground, are integrated into an overall
    architecture optimized to meet the warfighters' needs. If confirmed, I
    will work closely with the DNI to ensure that the DOD intelligence
    architecture, including space intelligence capabilities, is integrated
    with the national architecture, and that we have a mission-focused
    space enterprise that is affordable, responsive, efficient, flexible,
    and fully supportive of military operations and national security
    needs.
        As the Battlespace Awareness Capability Portfolio Manager, if
    confirmed, I will participate in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    (OSD) requirements and acquisition oversight process by providing
    intelligence input into the Joint Capabilities Integration and
    Development System (JCIDS) requirements process, the Functional
    Capabilities Board (FCB), the Joint Capabilities Board (JCB), and the
    Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), as well as provide input
    into the DOD acquisition process on the Defense Acquisition Board.

                     DOD INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATIONS POLICY

        Question. DOD Directive Number 3115.09 assigns the USD(I)
    responsibility for providing oversight of intelligence operations,
    detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning, and ensuring overall
    development, coordination, approval, and promulgation of DOD policies
    and implementation of plans related to intelligence interrogations,
    detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning.
        Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum
    issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant
    DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must
    fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
        Answer. Yes, I fully support this policy.
        Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
    specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
    22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
    Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
        Answer. Yes, I fully support these standards.
        Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies
    promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence
    interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply
    with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field
    Manual on Interrogations?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that all relevant DOD policies
    and plans comply with applicable U.S. law and international
    obligations, including Common Article 3.
        Question. Do you share the view that standards for detainee
    treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that
    we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat
    our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S.
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be
    captured in future conflicts?
        Answer. Yes, I strongly hold the view that the manner in which the
    United States treats detainees may well impact how captured U.S.
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are treated in future conflicts.
    I believe it has broader national security and foreign policy
    ramifications as well.
        Question. Under DOD Directive Number 3115.09, the USD(I) is
    responsible for developing policies and procedures, in coordination
    with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
    Logistics, the DOD General Counsel, and the appropriate DOD components,
    to ensure that all contracts in support of intelligence interrogation
    operations include the obligation to comply with the standards of DOD
    Directive Number 3115.09 and exclude performance of inherently
    governmental functions in accordance with DOD Directive 1100.4 and that
    all contractor employees are properly trained.
        What do you believe is the proper role of contractors in
    intelligence interrogation operations?
        Answer. Consistent with Section 1038 of Public Law 111-84, ``The
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010,'' October 28,
    2009, I believe that in areas where adequate security is available and
    is expected to continue, contractor personnel with proper training and
    security clearances may be used as linguists, interpreters, report
    writers, information technology technicians, and other employees
    filling ancillary positions (including as trainers of, and advisors to,
    interrogators) in the interrogation of individuals who are in the
    custody or under the effective control of DOD or otherwise under
    detention in a DOD facilities.
        Contractors may be used as interrogators only if the Secretary of
    Defense determines that it is in the interests of the national security
    to do so and grants a waiver for a 60-day period, and for an additional
    30 days if a renewal is approved. If a waiver is granted, contract
    interrogators must be properly trained and certified to DOD standards,
    and they must be supervised and closely monitored by properly trained
    and certified DOD military and/or DOD civilian interrogators to ensure
    that the contract interrogators do not deviate from the government-
    approved interrogation plans or otherwise perform any inherently
    governmental function.
        Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
    intelligence interrogation operations are performed in a manner
    consistent with the requirements of the manpower mix and that
    contractors involved in such operations do not perform inherently
    governmental functions?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that all relevant DOD policies
    and plans comply with Section 1038 of Public Law 111-84, ``The National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010,'' October 28, 2009,
    which delineates the functions that contractors may perform in support
    of intelligence interrogations. If the Secretary of Defense grants a
    waiver permitting the use of contractors as interrogators, I will
    ensure that they are properly trained and certified to DOD standards,
    and that they are supervised and closely monitored by properly trained
    and certified DOD military and/or DOD civilian interrogators to make
    certain that the contract interrogators do not deviate from the
    government-approved interrogation plans or otherwise perform any
    inherently governmental function.

             INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT

        Question. Over the last 5 years or so, the approved requirement for
    24-hour orbits of ISR aircraft has grown from approximately 10 to 65.
    U.S. Central Command, and specifically the Iraq and Afghanistan areas
    of operation, has received the overwhelming share of these assets. The
    other combatant commands, as well as such critically important regions
    as Yemen and the Horn of Africa, have received little or no additional
    assets. Even within U.S. Central Command, demand exceeds supply.
        Secretary Gates established the independent ISR Task Force partly
    because the normal requirements and acquisition processes in the
    Department favored long-term investments in capabilities for waging
    conventional military operations rather than the needs of deployed
    forces engaged in irregular warfare.
        In your view, is DOD allocating sufficient resources to airborne
    ISR to protect long-term force modernization preferences?
        Answer. I believe the Department is now allocating sufficient
    resources to airborne ISR. Working closely with Congress, the
    Department has greatly expanded airborne ISR capabilities during
    Secretary Gates' tenure. As ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I have consistently and
    strongly advocated for additional Predator/Reaper CAPs (orbits). These
    assets are absolutely critical to U.S. strategy in several areas, and
    demand continues to exceed supply. This is why in the 2010 Quadrennial
    Defense Review, the Secretary made the decision to expand the
    authorized U.S. Air Force force structure goal further by another 15
    CAPs/orbits (from 50 to 65). We continue to upgrade the capabilities of
    our airborne ISR systems as well. The introduction of high definition
    video capabilities, for example, provides resolution that was not
    possible just 5 years ago. Combining this capability with recently
    developed SIGINT capabilities has dramatically improved the
    effectiveness of our ISR orbits. Other airborne ISR systems are having
    an equally dramatic impact on the battlefield.
        The Secretary has provided very clear guidance. His first defense
    strategy objective is to ``Prevail in Today's Wars,'' and that is where
    the preponderance of our attention and effort is focused. His strategy
    also makes it clear that we must continue to ``Prevent Future
    Conflict'' and ``Prepare to Succeed in a Wide Range of Contingencies.''
    Maintaining an appropriate balance between winning today and preparing
    for the future requires tough choices, but they are being made. The
    President's budget for 2011 has the balance right, in my view.
        Question. Is the current focus an appropriate one?
        Answer. Yes.

       REPORTING OF CYBER OPERATIONS IN THE CLANDESTINE QUARTERLY REPORT

        Question. The USD(I) coordinates preparation of the quarterly
    report on clandestine military operations (Clandestine Quarterly
    Report) to Congress. In discussions with the Department about actions
    to establish the U.S. Cyber Command, it became apparent that the
    Department may have failed to report certain cyber activities in the
    Quarterly Report that should have been included, since they would
    legitimately fit the accepted definition of clandestine military
    activities.
        What is your understanding of whether the Department failed to
    report these activities in the regular Clandestine Quarterly Reports,
    and why?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the congressional language
    directing provision of the Clandestine Quarterly Report specifically
    calls for reporting on clandestine HUMINT activity. Former USD(I)
    Clapper, in an effort to keep Congress better apprised of activities
    within his purview, expanded the report to routinely include a wide
    range of activities that exceeded the congressional reporting
    requirements. I fully support this expanded approach, and, if
    confirmed, will review the status and process for reporting DOD cyber
    activities. I am committed to appropriate reporting of all intelligence
    and intelligence-related activities to Congress.
        Question. Setting aside the issue of advance notice of certain
    significant cyber activities, what is your view on the appropriateness
    of reporting cyber activities that fit the definition of a clandestine
    military operation in the Clandestine Quarterly Report?
        Answer. The USD(I) is charged with keeping the appropriate
    committees of Congress fully and currently informed on all DOD
    intelligence and intelligence related activities. It would be my
    intent, if confirmed, to fully comply with that responsibility, to
    include cyber activities.

                             SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

        Question. What technical challenges does the Intelligence Community
    face that in your opinion are currently not being addressed adequately
    by DOD science and technology efforts?
        Answer. I believe an ``Intelligence Revolution'' has been underway
    for some time, and that technological change is the principal driver of
    this revolution. This revolution has already posed, and will continue
    to pose, significant challenges as well as opportunities for the U.S.
    Intelligence Community. I believe that DOD science and technology
    programs are enabling the IC to keep ahead of the rapidly-changing
    intelligence environment.
        One challenge that we continue to face is making the best use of
    existing and planned sensors and then exploiting data coming from those
    sensors. Although we are continuing to push the envelope on new and
    better sensing technologies, the real challenge has shifted towards
    integrating data from platforms and sensors into a common framework.
    Related technical challenges include layering the data, developing
    advanced analytical tools that make sense of the data, and developing
    tools that automatically alert analysts or cross-cue other sensors to
    focus on unique and potentially dangerous activity. Other challenges
    include the protection of critical space systems and data networks.
        Question. Recently, DOD has been exploring a wide range of airship-
    related technologies for ISR purposes, including those for long-
    duration, high-altitude flight.
        What are your views on the specific missions, concepts of
    operation, technical viability, and affordability of airships as long-
    duration, high altitude ISR sensor platforms?
        Answer. I believe these technologies will have an immediate,
    positive impact on our operations in Afghanistan, and could play an
    even greater role in future operations as the capability continues to
    evolve. An ``unblinking eye and ear'' is central to our ISR strategy
    for the modern battlefield. Over the last decade, the Department has
    significantly expanded our ability to dwell over the battlefield with
    ISR platforms. We have done this predominantly through procurement of
    aircraft systems and sensors. With the advent of long-endurance
    platforms, the Department is expanding the paradigm of battlefield
    dwell by developing ``game-changing'' persistent capabilities that
    enable satellite-like endurance at a much lower cost and have the
    flexibility to reposition anywhere in the world. These developments
    will greatly increase the amount of valuable information available to
    the warfighter. The development of long-endurance airborne
    capabilities, I would add, is much broader than just airships. DOD is
    also pursuing other long-endurance fixed-wing medium- and high-altitude
    capabilities that can linger for weeks and even months at a time.

                            CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

        Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
    appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
    briefings, and other communications of information.
        Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
    this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
    committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
    information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
    with respect to your responsibilities as the USD(I)?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
    other communications of information are provided to this committee and
    its staff and other appropriate committees?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
    such documents?
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

                               WIKILEAKS REMEDIES

        1. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, the imperative after September
    11 was a paradigm shift from ``need-to-know'' to ``need-to-share''
    intelligence and law enforcement information. The Wikileaks fiasco
    illustrates some of the dangers that can accompany information-sharing
    practices that are not wisely structured. It seems to me that we have
    to be smart about this. We can't go back to the old practice of
    hoarding information, but we also cannot be wantonly posting sensitive
    material to hundreds of thousands of people who have no reason to see
    it. The committee is examining technologies and processes to achieve
    this balance, and I know that Secretary Gates and his staff have
    already taken actions and are engaged in longer-term planning. What are
    your views on how we can finally achieve our information-sharing goals
    while better protecting information from insider threats?
        Secretary Vickers. The Department of Defense (DOD) works to manage
    the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information through
    good security practices. For example, we vet our personnel for
    suitability and trustworthiness in the security clearance process. We
    establish and uphold rules for physical access to secure facilities and
    to classified information. We also have rules about the use of
    networked systems and conduct annual training to educate and remind
    employees about the rules. Security policy and processes are generally
    effective deterrents when everyone understands and implements them.
        The unauthorized transfer of classified information to WikiLeaks
    was made possible in part because standard security procedures were
    relaxed in a war zone in order to facilitate the rapid exchange of
    information critical to operations. In the aftermath of WikiLeaks, the
    Department is taking a number of mitigation steps, including possible
    disciplinary action. We are examining technologies that would improve
    our ability to identify and thwart a threat from inside the Department
    as well as strengthen information-sharing governance. Some actions were
    already under way before the WikiLeaks disclosures. For example, the
    Department has planned and resourced the development of a public key
    infrastructure that would authenticate users of the Secret Internet
    Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) so we would know exactly who is on
    the SIPRNet at any given time. Technical subject matter experts in the
    office of the DOD Chief Information Officer (CIO) are also reviewing
    options for developing role-based or attribute-based access control
    capabilities that would more effectively control who has access to what
    data--a very large and complex task given the Department's size and the
    scope of its responsibilities.
        To summarize, we can and must responsibly balance information
    security and information sharing by managing risk using a number of
    security and security-related protocols that act together to thwart
    both intentional and unintentional violations.

        2. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, in your answers to the
    committee's advance policy questions, you stated that the office of the
    Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) had recently
    completed a comprehensive review. What are the main recommendations of
    that review, and will you make it available to the committee?
        Secretary Vickers. Immediately following the WikiLeaks disclosures,
    the Secretary of Defense directed the USD(I), in concert with the Joint
    Staff and the DOD CIO, to review DOD information security policy and
    procedures for handling classified information in forward-deployed
    areas. The Secretary was particularly concerned over the appropriate
    balance between the need to share and the responsibility to safeguard
    classified information. The report was completed and provided to the
    Secretary in December 2010. The report itself is an internal DOD
    deliberative document, but some of the principal findings include the
    following:

             Adequate security policy and procedures exist, but
            compliance must be better enforced. Forward-deployed units
            maintained an over-reliance on removable electronic storage
            media.
             Roles and responsibilities for detecting and dealing
            with an insider threat must be better defined.
             Processes for reporting security incidents need
            improvement.
             Limited capability currently exists to detect and
            monitor anomalous behavior on classified computer networks.

        USD(I) Security staff will continue to work closely with the DOD
    CIO, elements of the Joint Staff and U.S. Cyber Command to address
    these issues in the months ahead. We stand ready to provide the
    committee with further details on the report's main recommendations, if
    requested.

                              INFORMATION SHARING

        3. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, on a closely related topic,
    since September 11 the intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland
    security communities have struggled to develop effective means to
    connect and correlate fragmentary information held by multiple
    departments and agencies to thwart terrorist threats. As we learned in
    the aftermath of the Christmas bombing attempt, achieving this so-
    called connect-the-dots capability is not so much a technical
    challenge; the hardest part is overcoming the resistance of agencies to
    sharing their sensitive information and resolving the important policy
    and legal concerns regarding protection of privacy and sources and
    methods.
        This challenge of finding and correlating the proverbial needles in
    haystacks is not confined to the national-level threat from terrorism.
    It turns out that our troops face identical types of challenges in
    discovering the people and networks of the terrorist and insurgent
    groups they are fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and elsewhere
    around the world.
        The committee's examination of this situation reveals that almost
    every agency and department is developing large-scale search,
    discovery, and correlation systems, but they are able to apply these
    tools only to their own data--in their own stovepipes. In other words,
    there is a lot of duplication going on but no interagency solution.
    Indeed, there is no enterprise-wide search capability even within DOD.
    Do you have an appreciation of this situation, and how do you think it
    can be fixed, both within DOD and throughout the Government?
        Secretary Vickers. Many DOD and Intelligence Community
    organizations have leaned forward to provide improved and impressive
    services rapidly for our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. This challenge
    has been increased significantly by the breadth of our modern
    coalitions, by the need to update intelligence disclosure and release
    policies, and by the need for technology solutions to assist in marking
    data for release and moving it down to non-traditional networks to
    support coalition operations. We expect this trend to continue in
    future contingency operations. I share your view that there is a need
    to better coordinate and integrate these various contingency efforts,
    and we are addressing this challenge aggressively in numerous ways.
        The Information Sharing and Collaboration (ISC) Team of the
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Task Force has,
    over the past year, fielded a number of improvements to intelligence
    architectures in theater and to data dissemination, discovery, access,
    and retrieval capabilities. This group has also been focused on
    identifying gaps, overlaps, and integration opportunities among the
    Quick Response Capabilities delivered to theater, and on ensuring that
    sustainment and upgrade decisions are made within the context of
    integrating duplicative efforts, and migrating capabilities to common
    enterprise standards. The ISC Team is working to ensure these quick-
    turn-around efforts are designed and upgraded in ways that increase
    their interoperability across the intelligence enterprise, and that
    these investments will work toward enduring long-term solutions that
    can be applied to global operations and will be reusable in future
    contingency operations. Specific examples of these efforts include:
    ensuring any upgrades or expansion of the CENTCOM's Combined
    Information Data Network Exchange database and search capabilities are
    migrated to global enterprise standards; and a just-initiated review of
    all DOD and Intelligence Community ``cloud'' efforts to highlight gaps,
    overlaps, and an enterprise integration way ahead.
        Yet another important organization is the Intelligence Community's
    Information Sharing Steering Committee (ISSC). DOD participates in the
    ISSC along with representatives from all Intelligence Community
    elements to align common information-sharing needs, priorities,
    solutions, and architectures.
        Our approach to accomplishing improvements in information sharing
    requires that we implement a multi-faceted, layered approach. We
    recognize explicitly that technology alone will not resolve
    information-sharing shortfalls. The need to implement improvements in
    an enterprise approach has led us to develop oversight processes
    designed to effectively manage and synchronize the many information-
    sharing initiatives we have underway into one well-orchestrated effort.
    This focus has led to the establishment of a new Information Sharing
    and Partner Engagement Directorate within USD(I). This newly created
    directorate is engaging in a broad range of efforts specifically
    designed to improve information sharing by addressing policy, foreign
    relationship management, enterprise architectures, international
    intelligence sharing architectures and mechanisms, and training and
    education, and is ensuring we place the appropriate high-level of
    attention from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on this
    subject. Among its duties, this new Directorate will support a
    governance structure to guide Intelligence Community-wide enterprise
    solutions. It will reconstitute and support the Defense Intelligence
    Information Enterprise (DI\2\E) Council, and will guide and oversee
    development of the associated DI\2\E Framework. A Charter for the new
    DI\2\E Council and Terms of Reference for the DI\2\E Framework have
    both been drafted and are in review.

                       U.S. CYBER COMMAND AND CYBERSPACE

        4. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, U.S. Cyber Command's mission
    is to defend networks and, when directed, conduct offensive operations
    in cyberspace. Both of these missions are heavily dependent upon
    intelligence support. From a policy perspective, USD(I) is not
    responsible for the mission of defending cyberspace, nor for offensive
    military operations. Those oversight roles are the province of the CIO
    and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)).
        However, as we have come to learn, gaining access in cyberspace to
    adversaries' networks to collect intelligence is tantamount to
    establishing a foundation for offensive actions. Thus, the intelligence
    activities that you oversee inherently have a relationship to potential
    offensive military operations. These intelligence operations in
    cyberspace can take on an extraordinarily sensitive cast, since
    adversaries could or likely would interpret a penetration of important
    targets as a potentially hostile act if or when they are discovered.
    How are you planning to monitor cyber intelligence collection
    operations under title 50 authorities and to coordinate with the USD(P)
    and the CIO?
        Secretary Vickers. Because the cyber mission transcends the various
    OSD offices which execute a principal staff advisor role, it is
    imperative that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
    (Intelligence) (OUSD(I)) coordinates and consults with these offices in
    order to ensure the integration and synchronization of cyber efforts
    amongst the military and the Intelligence Community to satisfy the
    requirements of the warfighter. USD(I) oversight of any cyber
    intelligence collection operations under title 50 authorities is
    conducted in accordance with applicable laws on reporting requirements
    for intelligence and intelligence-related sensitive activities.
    Oversight is executed in order to promote better cooperation and
    collaboration amongst the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to ensure
    efficient and effective use of our limited resources to achieve the
    Nation's highest priorities in accordance with the National Security
    Strategy, the Defense Intelligence Strategy, and the CIO's priorities.

        5. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, are the USD(P) and the CIO
    going to be consulted about sensitive intelligence operations in
    cyberspace?
        Secretary Vickers. As stated in a previous response, USD(I)
    consults and coordinates with USD(P) and CIO on significant
    intelligence and intelligence-related activities in accordance with
    current DOD policy. Because of the sensitivities that such operations
    could have across the Department, it is critical that OUSD(I)
    coordinates and consults with the various OSD offices which execute a
    principal staff advisory role pertaining to the cyber mission such as
    USD(P) and CIO. This close cooperation within the Department and within
    the Intelligence Community has empowered the Defense Intelligence
    Enterprise to support U.S. national objectives while maximizing our
    effectiveness.

        6. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, the National Security Strategy
    states that the United States will enhance deterrence in cyberspace by
    ``improving our ability to attribute and defeat attacks on our systems
    or supporting infrastructure.'' If confirmed as USD(I), what role will
    you play in identifying an effective deterrence strategy and
    declaratory policy for cyberspace?
        Secretary Vickers. USD(I) is a primary stakeholder in Department-
    wide efforts to define an effective deterrence strategy and declaratory
    policy for cyberspace. If confirmed, I will work closely with USD(P)
    and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and will participate in
    National Security Council (NSC)-led fora related to this matter.

        7. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, in your view, what are the
    elements of an effective deterrence posture for cyberspace that could
    attribute and defeat attacks?
        Secretary Vickers. An effective deterrence posture is one that
    would deny aggressors any benefit of an attack through a blend of
    diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools to influence
    behavior.

        8. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, are those two elements alone
    really enough to deter attacks, or is it also necessary to have a
    counter-attack component?
        Secretary Vickers. As we define our deterrence strategy, the
    challenge is to make our defense effective enough to deny an aggressor
    the benefit of an attack. In cyberspace, as with other areas, the
    United States reserves the right to respond using the full range of
    diplomatic, economic, and military tools at its disposal. Response to a
    cyber attack, if necessary, does not require a response in like kind.

         INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITIES

        9. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, in response to the committee's
    advance policy questions, you advocate for a robust DOD presence in
    conducting information operations and strategic communications programs
    more broadly in both theaters of war and globally. According to the
    Government Accountability Office, DOD spends ``hundreds of millions of
    dollars each year'' conducting these operations. This committee and
    Congress have repeatedly questioned DOD's ability to measure the
    effectiveness of the dollars spent supporting these operations. In your
    view, has DOD done enough to explain the measures of effectiveness for
    these programs?
        Secretary Vickers. The rapidly expanding pace of change in the
    information environment made global and instantaneous communications
    possible in ways that were unimaginable just a decade ago. Across the
    globe, our friends and our adversaries are constantly producing and
    consuming information that influences their decisions and their
    actions. Drawing a causal link between a discrete action in today's
    information environment and an individual or group decision is very
    challenging. We continue to place great emphasis on obtaining good
    measures of effectiveness and conducting thorough assessments of all of
    our information operations. Leveraging lessons learned from commercial
    enterprises, academia, and our interagency partners, we have made some
    progress to improve our ability to measure effects in our information
    programs. That said, we must continue to do much more in this area. As
    the information environment continues to evolve and its complexity
    grows, DOD must continue to press for new and innovative ways both to
    communicate with intended audiences and to measure the effects of
    communications and engagements.

        10. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, do you believe the programs
    you authorized while you were Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict have had a measurable
    impact?
        Secretary Vickers. Yes, although drawing a causal link between
    discrete acts in today's information environment and an individual or
    group response is very challenging, we continue to refine and improve
    our abilities to measure the impact of our operations. We must continue
    to invest both resources and intellectual energies to meet this
    challenge. Our measurement efforts routinely demonstrate our impact.
    Our COCOM-sponsored websites have ever increasing readership, providing
    frequent and robust feedback. Our small teams supporting embassies
    abroad are lauded both by the U.S. embassies they support and the
    partner nations with whom they interact. Advertising for our rewards
    programs has significantly increased the number and frequency of
    reports of high value targets and terrorist supporting materials.
        As the information environment continues to evolve, and its
    complexity grows, DOD will continue to press for new and innovative
    ways both to communicate with its intended audiences and to measure the
    effects of our communications and engagements.

        11. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, in response to the
    committee's advance policy questions, you suggest that DOD's
    information operations and strategic communications programs should
    support more robustly other government departments and agencies in
    countering the message of violent extremists. Given the clear lines of
    authority that each government department and agency are given by
    Congress, how do you foresee DOD increasing its support of the
    Department of State (DOS) and/or the Central Intelligence Agency?
        Secretary Vickers. The purpose of DOD Information Operations is to
    support our military objectives. The global nature of modern
    communications has blurred, however, traditional lines between agency-
    specific communications programs, increasing the need for mutual
    reinforcement among them. Messages promulgated by one department or
    agency which might previously have had effects limited to a single
    geographic region or audience now find immediate global resonance. This
    new communications paradigm makes cooperation and collaboration within
    and among the various departments critical to ensure consistency and
    efficacy of the U.S. global message. DOD maintains unique capabilities
    to reach audiences in denied areas or to promulgate information in ways
    that can support our military objectives. Those capabilities can also
    contribute, where appropriate, to the larger U.S. Government
    communications and public diplomacy strategies, in furtherance of U.S.
    national security objectives. We will continue to strive to provide
    transparency of our operations within the interagency environment, but
    more importantly, we will make our capabilities available to support
    other departments and agencies in areas where those capabilities
    provide additional options for effective communications and engagement.

        12. Senator Levin. Secretary Vickers, do you believe DOD has the
    authority for expanded support operations?
        Secretary Vickers. We have the authorities to support where and
    when required. We will continue to leverage long-established processes
    and mechanisms for planning, deconfliction, and partnered efforts to
    enhance mutually supporting objectives with our interagency partners.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Udall

                                  1208 FUNDING

        13. Senator Udall. Secretary Vickers, the committee has expressed
    concern that U.S. Special Operations Command may be using section 1208
    funding, which is intended to support counterterrorism operations, for
    long-term engagement with partner nations. Is this still the case or
    has it been corrected?
        Secretary Vickers. Section 1208 funds must be used for specific
    counterterrorism operations, not long-term engagement. Improved
    reporting procedures and increased coordination with and notifications
    to Congress have helped address past concerns regarding DOD section
    1208 programs. Reviews conducted as part of our annual process by
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity
    Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities, U.S. Special Operations
    Command, and the Geographic Combatant Commands, have resulted in the
    termination of several operations over the last 3 fiscal years.
    Beginning in 2010, SOLIC&IC began notifying the congressional
    committees with a list of approved continuing operations for the next
    fiscal year, along with any cost estimate changes. This information is
    also provided in the annual report to Congress in accordance with
    section 1208.

                              ZONES OF HOSTILITIES

        14. Senator Udall. Secretary Vickers, in your advance policy
    questions, you state that outside zones of hostilities, DOD plays a
    supporting role in combating terrorism. Does that mean that outside of
    Iraq and Afghanistan, the concurrence of our ambassadors is required?
        Secretary Vickers. We work closely with our DOS and other
    government agency colleagues to support whole-of-government approaches
    to terrorism challenges both inside and outside zones of hostilities.
    When directed by the President and the Secretary of Defense, geographic
    combatant commanders conduct counterterrorism operations in support of
    U.S. Government objectives while ensuring appropriate Chiefs of Mission
    are consulted and kept informed of all U.S. military activities.

        15. Senator Udall. Secretary Vickers, how does DOD define zones of
    hostilities in this context?
        Secretary Vickers. In the context of my response, this term refers
    to Iraq and Afghanistan.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich

                     INTEGRATING INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES

        16. Senator Begich. Secretary Vickers, in your view, what
    challenges will you face in integrating intelligence capabilities of
    DOD with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other Federal,
    State, and local agencies?
        Secretary Vickers. DOD enjoys a very positive relationship with
    DHS. Our commitment to DHS expands far beyond intelligence integration.
        I believe one of our greatest challenges to integrating
    intelligence capabilities between DHS and DOD is the important policy
    and legal balance regarding the protection of privacy rights and civil
    liberties. In fact, this challenge expands beyond the DHS and the DOD
    relationship and is indicative of the greater information-sharing
    issues facing the whole-of-government. The protection of privacy and
    other legal rights of Americans while defending our Homeland is no easy
    task. As we develop solutions, this protection of civil liberties is a
    core principle that must be kept in mind.
        I recognize the imperative for efficient integration between DOD,
    DHS, and other Federal, State, and local agencies and believe
    collaboration is a key driver of effective integration. As such, I am
    in the process of considering a first of its kind Joint Duty Assignment
    of a DHS representative to serve as a full-time liaison between DHS's
    Office of Intelligence and Analysis, State and Local Program Office,
    and the OUSD(I).
        In their mission to detect, prevent, and respond to acts of
    terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, State, local, and tribal
    agencies depend on the relationship between DHS and DOD. This
    relationship literally provides a critical link to actionable
    intelligence information. For example, allowing select State and major
    urban area fusion center personnel with appropriate security clearances
    access to appropriate classified terrorism-related information residing
    on DOD's classified networks is a major step forward. This information
    will contribute significantly to improving their mission processes
    supporting Suspicious Activity Reports and Alerts, Warning, and
    Notifications of potential attacks on our Homeland. This example of a
    joint initiative has bolstered increased collaboration between DHS,
    DOD, and other Federal departments and agencies, enabling the trusted
    and secure exchange of terrorism-related information in order to
    detect, deter, prevent, and respond to Homeland security threats.

        17. Senator Begich. Secretary Vickers, are there steps DOD can take
    to better coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with other
    agencies?
        Secretary Vickers. DOD extensively coordinates its efforts to
    combat terrorism with the National Security Staff, Chiefs of Mission,
    Chiefs of Station, relevant departments and agencies, and field
    activities to enable the broadest interagency collaboration consistent
    with maintaining the security of our efforts. We recognize that this is
    a constant process that requires regular and routine interface at
    multiple levels within the respective organizations. We have made wide
    use of the ``Joint-Interagency Task Force'' model to bring our
    interagency colleagues into a collaborative planning and execution
    forum, and are always vigilant for ways to share best practices and
    make adjustments to the process.
        It is critically important that DOD's counterterrorism activities
    be fully synchronized and integrated with those of other agencies to
    develop an optimal whole-of-government response to this vital national
    security issue. Nowhere is this need for integration more important
    than in our intelligence and information-sharing activities across the
    entire Intelligence Community. To support this objective, the DOD focal
    point for counterterrorism intelligence, the Defense Intelligence
    Agency's (DIA) Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism,
    has recently assigned a senior representative to work at the National
    Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) as a means of improving coordination
    between Defense and Intelligence Community counterterrorism analytic
    efforts. Finally, as part of the Secretary of Defense Efficiencies
    Initiatives, we have directed DIA to conduct a review of the overall
    Defense relationship with NCTC and develop an appropriate course of
    action and implementation plan to maximize the integration of analytic
    capabilities and information-sharing across the national and defense
    counterterrorism intelligence missions.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Hon. Michael G. Vickers
    follows:]
                        Nomination Reference and Report
                               As In Executive Session,
                                   Senate of the United States,
                                                       January 5, 2011.
        Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
    on Armed Services:
        Michael Vickers, of Virginia, to be Under Secretary of Defense for
    Intelligence, vice James R. Clapper.
                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of Hon. Michael G. Vickers, which
    was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
    referred, follows:]

                        Biography of Michael G. Vickers

    Education:
             Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD (attended
            Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC)

                     Doctor of Philosophy, International Relations-
                    Strategic Studies
                     1991-2010 (non-resident since 1995); degree
                    awarded August 2010

             The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania,
            Philadelphia, PA

                     Master of Business Administration
                     1986-1988; degree awarded May 1988

             University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL

                     Bachelor of Arts, International Relations
                     1980-1983 (New College - External Degree
                    Program); degree awarded June 1983

    Employment Record:
             Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and
            Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low
            Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities

                     2011-Present

             Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/
            Low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities

                     2007-Present

             Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

                     Senior Vice President, Strategic Studies
                     1996-2007

             Johns Hopkins University, Nitze School of Advanced
            International Studies

                     Acting Co-Director, Strategic Studies, and
                    Professorial Lecturer (part-time)
                     1996-1997

             Department of Defense

                     Special Government Employee (paid), Defense
                    Science Board Task Force (part-time), 1996
                     Unpaid member, Defense Science Board Task
                    Force (part-time), 1998, 1999

             Independent Consultant

                     Principal clients: Science Applications
                    International (contract work for the Department of
                    Defense); Defense Budget Project (predecessor
                    organization of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
                    Assessments)
                     1994-1996

             Office of Net Assessment, Department of Defense

                     Strategic Studies Fellow (part-time)
                     1993-1994

             News America Publishing (New York, NY)

                     Editor and Managing Director, The Daily
                    Intelligence Brief (start-up)
                     1990-1991

             BioAutomation, Inc (Bridgeport, PA)

                     Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
                    (start-up)
                     1988-1990

             Metallic Ceramic Coatings, Inc. (Bridgeport, PA)

                     Vice President, Finance and Strategy
                     1986-1988; 1992-1994

             Central Intelligence Agency

                     Operations Officer
                     1983-1986

             U.S. Army

                     Special Forces Officer (Captain) and
                    Noncommissioned Officer (Staff Sergeant)
                     1973-1983

    Honors and awards:
             Distinguished Member, 1st Special Forces Regiment,
            U.S. Army (2010)
             Alexander Hamilton Fellowship (Smith Richardson
            Foundation) (1993)
             Certification of Distinction, Central Intelligence
            Agency (1984)
             Honors graduate (cum laude), University of Alabama
            (1983)
             Meritorious Service Medal (1976, 1983)
                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
    nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate, and certain
    senior military officers as determined by the committee, to
    complete a form that details the biographical, financial and
    other information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon.
    Michael G. Vickers in connection with his nomination follows:]

                              UNITED STATES SENATE
                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                                  Room SR-228
                           Washington, DC 20510-6050
                                 (202) 224-3871

                        COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
          BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

        Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
    more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
    form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
    of your answer applies.
                        Part A--Biographical Information
        Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
    this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
    public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
    any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

        1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
        Michael George Vickers.

        2. Position to which nominated:
        Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence).

        3. Date of nomination:
        Originally nominated: September 29, 2010; renominated: January 5,
    2011.

        4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
        [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
    committee's executive files.]

        5. Date and place of birth:
        April 27, 1953; Burbank, CA.

        6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
        Married to Melana Zyla Vickers.
        Maiden Name: Melana Kalyna Zyla.

        7. Names and ages of children:
        Alexandra Novakovic Vickers, age 22.
        Natasha Novakovic Vickers, age 19.
        Sophia Novakovic Vickers, age 17.
        Oksana Elizabeth Vickers, age 9.
        Kalyna Cecilia Vickers, age 5.

        8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
    dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
        Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, 1991-2010, Doctor of
    Philosophy, International Relations, degree conferred August 2010.
        University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, 1986-1988, Master of
    Business Administration, degree conferred May 1988.
        University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL, 1980-1983. Bachelor of Arts,
    International Relations, degree conferred 1983.
        Hollywood High School, Hollywood, CA, 1968-1971, High School
    diploma.

        9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
    last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
    job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
        Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity
    Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities); 2500 Defense Pentagon, Room
    3C852A; August 3, 2007 to Present (confirmed July 23, 2007).
        Senior Vice President, Strategic Studies, Center for Strategic and
    Budgetary Assessments; 1667 K Street, NW, Suite 900, Washington, DC;
    September 1996 to August 2007.

        10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
    honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
    or local governments, other than those listed above.
        Classified and unclassified contract consulting work for the
    Department of Defense, 1994 to 2007 while employed by the Center for
    Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (1996 to 2007) and as a self-
    employed consultant (1994 to 1996).
        Part-time employment (paid) as a special government employee as a
    member of a Defense Science Board Task Force, 1996; unpaid service as a
    member of Defense Science Board Task Forces, 1998, 1999.
        Operations Officer, Central Intelligence Agency, June 1983 to March
    1986.
        Commissioned Officer, U.S. Army, December 1978 to June 1983.
        Enlisted, U.S. Army, June 1973 to December 1978.

        11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
    officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
    or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
    business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
        Trustee, Vickers Family Revocable Trust since December 2004; Melana
    Zyla Vickers (wife), co-trustee.

        12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
    professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
    other organizations.
        None.

        13. Political affiliations and activities:
        (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
    any public office for which you have been a candidate.
        None.
        (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
    to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
    years.
        None.
        (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
    organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
    entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
        None.

        14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
    society memberships, military medals, and any other special
    recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
        Meritorious Service Medal (U.S. Army); two awards, 1976, 1983.
        Certificate of Distinction, Central Intelligence Agency, 1984.
        Bachelor of Arts, Cum Laude, University of Alabama, 1983.
        Alexander Hamilton Fellowship (Smith Richardson Foundation), 1993.
        Distinguished Member, 1st Special Forces Regiment, U.S. Army, 2010.

        15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
    books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
    written.
        My most recent publication is my Ph.D. dissertation, ``The
    Structure of Military Revolutions'' (Johns Hopkins University, July
    2010), which is available through University Microfilms (UMI).
        I am the author of two book chapters: ``The Revolution in Military
    Affairs and Military Capabilities,'' in Robert Pfaltzgraff and Richard
    Shultz, eds., War in the Information Age (Brassey's, 1997); and
    ``Revolution Deferred: Kosovo and the Transformation of War,'' in
    Andrew Bacevich and Eliot Cohen, eds., War Over Kosovo: Politics and
    Strategy in a Global Age (Columbia University Press, 2001).
        I am the author or co-author of five Center for Strategic and
    Budgetary Assessments monographs: ``War in 2020--A Primer'' (1996);
    ``The Military Revolution and Intrastate Conflict'' (1997); ``The
    Quadrennial Defense Review: An Assessment'' (1997); ``Strategy for a
    Long Peace'' (2001); and ``The Revolution in War'' (2004). I am also
    the author co-author of four CSBA Backgrounders: ``Intelligence Reform
    and the Next CIA Director'' (2004); ``The 2001 Quadrennial Defense
    Review, the Fiscal Year 2003 Defense Budget Request and the Way Ahead
    for Transformation'' (2002); ``The Hart-Rudman Commission Report: A
    Critique'' (2000); and ``Perspectives on the Revolution in Military
    Affairs'' (1996).
        I have had three opinion-editorials published by USA Today: ``For
    Guidance on Iraq, Look to Afghanistan'' (June 2004); ``Will We Heed
    Lessons of War in Kosovo?'' (June 1999); and ``Ground Troops, Yes, But
    Whose?'' (April 1999). I have had one opinion-editorial published by
    the Washington Post: ``Ground War: Doing More With Less'' (April 2003).
    I have had two book reviews published by the Wall Street Journal: ``The
    Destiny of Combat'' (Review of Caspar Weinberger and Peter Schweitzer,
    The Next War, and George and Meredith Friedman, The Future of War,
    March 1997) and ``The Future of Force'' (Review of Frederick Kagan,
    Finding the Target, November 2006). I have had one book review
    published by the Journal of Military History: The Making of Strategy:
    Rulers, States, and War, Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin
    Bernstein, eds. (October 1997). I have also had an article published by
    Armed Forces Journal: ``What the QDR Should Say?'' (2006).

        16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
    speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
    copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
    been nominated.
        None.

        17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
        (a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
    conflicts of interest?
        Yes.
        (b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
    would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
        No.
        (c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
    deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
    for the record in hearings?
        Yes.
        (d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
    response to congressional requests?
        Yes.
        (e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
    testimony or briefings?
        Yes.
        (f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
    before this committee?
        Yes.
        (g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
    such documents?
        Yes.
                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
    committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
    forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
    Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                    ------

                               Signature and Date
        I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
    on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
    provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
    and complete.
                                                    Michael G. Vickers.
        This 12th day of January, 2011.

        [The nomination of Hon. Michael G. Vickers was reported to
    the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 15, 2011, with the
    recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
    was confirmed by the Senate on March 17, 2011.]
                                  ----------

        [Prepared questions submitted to Dr. Jo Ann Rooney by
    Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
    follow:]
                            Questions and Responses

                                DEFENSE REFORMS

        Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
    Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
    strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
    enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
    of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
    commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
    to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
    to the combatant commanders.
        Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
    provisions?
        Answer. Not at this time.
        Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
    address in these modifications?
        Answer. N/A.

                                 QUALIFICATIONS

        Question. What background and experience do you have that you
    believe qualifies you for this position?
        Answer. My broad professional experiences, educational credentials,
    and lifelong commitment to service provide a solid background for me to
    recognize and contribute positively to myriads of formidable challenges
    and tasks facing DOD and, in particular, Personnel and Readiness.
    During my 8 years as president of a doctoral level university, we
    successfully addressed not only difficult financial challenges,
    enabling the institution to realize significant operating surpluses
    after years of deficits, but developed an innovative educational model
    that directly impacted retention, graduation rates, and student
    success. By offering courses in a variety of delivery modalities,
    including blocks sessions, accelerated, low residency, and traditional
    semesters, we were able to deliver a unique, sustainable solution to
    the educational needs of traditional, nontraditional, and graduate
    students while at the same time creating a new business and human
    resource model for the university. My work on the Jewish Hospital Saint
    Mary's Healthcare System Board of Trustees in a leadership role has
    allowed me to be directly involved in developing policies and
    procedures impacting patient care, safety, operating efficiencies, and
    human resource policies across a system encompassing ambulatory,
    community hospitals and tertiary care facilities, an inpatient
    psychiatric hospital, a comprehensive rehabilitation facility, and
    clinical research. My current work as president of Mount Ida College
    and being a member of the Board of Trustees of Regis University have
    given me additional opportunities to lead an organization through a
    period of significant transition and be at the forefront of educational
    innovation. Other corporate and civic engagements have enabled me to
    lead organizations through dynamic structural and financial changes
    enabling them to better serve their constituents. My many years of
    experience outside of post secondary education in tax law, business,
    and finance provide me with a solid foundation and breadth of knowledge
    to deal with complex legal, financial, and policy issues.

                                MAJOR CHALLENGES

        Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
    the next Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
    Readiness (P&R)?
        Answer. There are a number of challenges facing P&R to ensure the
    human resource systems for civilian and military personnel, Active and
    Reserve, provide the level of training and high level skills needed to
    support current as well as potential future engagements. This includes
    evaluating and providing appropriate compensation and personnel
    policies commensurate with the skills and sacrifices being made by
    those in service to our country; ensuring quality, world-class health
    care, including mental health support, to ill and injured
    servicemembers; and providing comprehensive support services to
    families of servicemembers. In addition, there needs to be ongoing
    evaluation of current policies and procedures to identify opportunities
    for enhanced efficiencies without impacting service delivery.
        Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
    challenges?
        Answer. Although I do not have specific recommendations at this
    time, if confirmed, I would review the plans currently in place to
    address these challenges and determine what modifications, if any, need
    to be made. I would look for opportunities to enhance communication and
    collaboration with my colleagues throughout DOD to improve
    effectiveness in delivering programs supporting Personnel and
    Readiness.

                                     DUTIES

       Question. Section 136a of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
    Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
    shall assist the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
    in the performance of his or her duties.
        Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect to be
    assigned to you?
        Answer. If confirmed, I expect the Secretary of Defense to assign
    me my duties, through the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
    Readiness, functions, and responsibilities currently mandated by law
    and specified in the Department's directives for the position of
    Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
    Readiness.
        Question. In carrying out these duties, what would be your
    relationship with the following officials:
        The Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would serve the Secretary as his advisor
    and advocate for the management of human resources in the Department.
        Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would serve the Deputy Secretary as his
    advisor and advocate for the management of human resources in the
    Department.
        Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs
    (ASD(HA)).
        Answer. If confirmed, ASD(HA) would be my principal advisor for all
    DOD health policies, programs, and force health protection activities.
        Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
    (ASD(RA)).
        Answer. If I am confirmed, ASD(RA) would be my principal advisor
    for all Reserve component matters in the Department of Defense (DOD).
        Question. The DOD General Counsel.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would anticipate regular communication,
    coordination of actions, and exchange of views with the General Counsel
    and the attorneys assigned to focus on personnel and readiness policy
    matters. I would expect to seek and follow the advice of the General
    Counsel on legal, policy, and procedural matters pertaining to the
    policies promulgated from the USD(P&R).
        Question. The DOD Inspector General.
        Answer. The DOD Inspector General is in charge of promoting
    integrity, accountability, and improvement of DOD personnel, programs,
    and operations to support the Department's mission and serve the public
    interest. If confirmed, I would fully assist in any investigations or
    issues that relate to personnel and readiness.
        Question. The Service Secretaries.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretaries of
    the Military Departments on all matters relating to the management and
    well-being of military and civilian personnel in the DOD Total Force
    structure.
        Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
        Answer. The Chief, National Guard Bureau is a principal advisor to
    the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, on matters involving non-Federalized National Guard forces and
    on other matters as determined by the Secretary of Defense. If
    confirmed, I would work through ASD(RA) to ensure effective integration
    of National Guard capabilities into a cohesive Total Force.
        Question. The Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve
    Affairs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work with these officials as partners
    in carrying out the human resource obligations of the Services.
        Question. The Deputy Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force for
    Personnel, the Chief of Naval Personnel, and the Deputy Commandant of
    the Marine Corps for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with these officers to
    ensure that DOD attracts, motivates, and retains the quality people it
    needs.
        Question. The combatant commanders.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would foster mutually respectful working
    relationships that translate into providing the Total Force
    capabilities needed to complete combat missions.
        Question. The Joint Staff, particularly the Director for Manpower
    and Personnel (J-1).
        Answer. If confirmed, I would seek a close coordinating
    relationship and open channels of communication with the Joint Staff
    regarding personnel and readiness policy issues.

                    SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED WARRIORS

        Question. Servicemembers who are wounded and injured performing
    duties in Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn
    deserve the highest priority from their Service for support services,
    healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to
    duty, successful transition from Active Duty, if required, and
    continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet, as the
    revelations at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) in 2007
    illustrated, the Services were not prepared to meet the needs of
    returning wounded servicemembers. Despite the enactment of legislation
    and renewed emphasis, many challenges remain.
        What is your assessment of the progress made to date by DOD and the
    Services to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously
    ill and injured servicemembers and their families?
        Answer. While I do not have enough information at this time to make
    a full assessment, I am aware that medical, benefit, and transitional
    assistance improvements have been made since 2007 to ensure our
    wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers receive the care and support
    necessary to either return to Active Duty or to civilian life. However,
    it is a continually evolving process with ever increasing demands and
    the Department must regularly evaluate its Wounded Warrior programs and
    constantly strive to improve.
        Question. What are the strengths upon which continued progress
    should be based?
        Answer. A significant strength, in my opinion, is the highest level
    priority the Department has placed on caring for our wounded warriors
    and their families. The sustained focus and assessment of the needs of
    the wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers will allow the Department
    to continue its progress in caring for these members.
        Question. What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?
        Answer. The Department should better identify opportunities for
    improvement by putting in place a proactive assessment and evaluation
    process that corrects weaknesses.
        Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and
    resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded
    servicemembers and their families, and to monitor their progress in
    returning to duty or to civilian life?
        Answer. Although I do not have any specific recommendations at this
    time, if confirmed, I would ensure that current programs and policies
    are regularly evaluated and outcome assessments conducted with
    adjustments made, as needed, to ensure necessary resources are in place
    to take care of our recovering wounded warriors and their families.
        Question. Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at WRAMC
    pointed to the need to reform the disability evaluation system (DES). A
    DES pilot program, and now an Integrated DES program, has been
    established to improve processing of servicemembers.
        What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and
    improve the Integrated DES?
        Answer. There are always opportunities for improvements. I believe
    the Department has an obligation to our servicemembers participating in
    the Integrated DES to proactively evaluate the program and proactively
    apply lessons learned.
        Question. If confirmed, how will you address any need for change?
        Answer. The Integrated DES is a collaborative effort between DOD
    and the Department of Veterans Affairs. If confirmed, I would work in
    close collaboration with the Department of Veterans Affairs to
    continually evaluate the process and apply unified solutions to correct
    identified deficiencies.

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS COLLABORATION

        Question. Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of Veterans
    Affairs Shinseki have pledged their support for improving and
    increasing collaboration between their respective departments to
    support military servicemembers as they transition to veteran status,
    in areas of health and mental health care, disability evaluation, and
    compensation.
        If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in ensuring that
    DOD and Veterans Affairs achieve the administration's objectives in DOD
    and VA collaboration?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will be intimately involved in the
    collaborative efforts between DOD and the Department of Veterans
    Affairs. I share the vision of a model interagency partnership that
    delivers seamless, high quality, and cost-effective services to
    beneficiaries and value to our Nation. I will do my utmost to provide
    leadership that enables the interagency effort and facilitate the
    completion of those goals. Together with USD(P&R), I will ensure that
    DOD continues to work closely with the Department of Veterans Affairs
    to ensure that transitioning servicemembers receive the benefits, care,
    and transition support they deserve.

                            DISABILITY SEVERANCE PAY

        Question. Section 1646 of the Wounded Warrior Act, included in the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, enhanced
    severance pay and removed a requirement that severance pay be deducted
    from VA disability compensation for servicemembers discharged for
    disabilities rated less than 30 percent incurred in the line-of-duty in
    a combat zone or incurred during the performance of duty in combat-
    related operation as designated by the Secretary of Defense. In
    adopting this provision, Congress relied on the existing definition of
    a combat-related disability contained in title 10 U.S.C. 1413a(e)).
    Rather than using the definition intended by Congress, DOD adopted a
    more limited definition of combat-related operations, requiring that
    the disability be incurred during participation in armed conflict.
        If confirmed, will you reconsider the Department's definition of
    combat-related operations for purposes of awarding enhanced severance
    pay and deduction of severance pay from VA disability compensation?
        Answer. Although I do not know the details, it is my understanding
    that a review of the policy implementing section 1646 of the Wounded
    Warrior Act is currently underway. If confirmed, I would look into the
    status of this review to ensure that any policy change relating to the
    definition, if warranted, meets the intent of Congress and is
    consistent with the governing statute.

                           HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT POLICY

        Question. The current Homosexual Conduct Policy, commonly referred
    to as ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell,'' went into effect in February 1994
    after months of congressional hearings and debate resulting in the
    enactment of a Federal statute. Although there have been some changes
    in how this policy has been implemented, the basic policy has not
    changed. President Obama made it clear that he intends to work with the
    military and with Congress to repeal the policy. Following their
    February 2, 2010, testimony recommending repeal of the policy,
    Secretary of Defense Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    Admiral Mullen, initiated a high-level, comprehensive review of the
    impact of repealing the current law.
        What is your view on repealing or changing this policy?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would assist the USD(P&R) to work closely
    with the Military Department Secretaries and the Service Chiefs to
    provide the Secretary of Defense the best advice possible on the way
    forward regarding this issue.
        Question. If confirmed, what role, if any, would you anticipate
    playing in efforts to repeal or change this policy?
        Answer. If Congress changes the law and if confirmed, I would
    assist USD(P&R) in leading the implementation of the change in the
    policy within DOD. I would work closely with the Services to ensure the
    revising of this policy is done in a way that maintains our highest
    state of military readiness.

                              RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

        Question. What is your understanding of current policies and
    programs of DOD regarding religious practices in the military?
        Answer. The Department does not endorse the establishment of
    religion, but it does guarantee its free exercise. The Department and
    the Military Services ensure servicemembers may observe the tenets of
    their respective religions, including the right to hold no specific
    religious conviction or affiliation.
        Question. In your view, do these policies appropriately accommodate
    religious practices that require adherents to wear particular articles
    of faith?
        Answer. My understanding is that wearing particular articles of
    faith are permissible so long as the articles are neat and
    conservative; do not negatively impact the readiness, good order, or
    discipline of the unit; and the mission is not jeopardized. If
    confirmed, I would continue to monitor and evaluate this issue.
        Question. In your view, do these policies appropriately accommodate
    the free exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on
    those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices
    regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of
    formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a
    chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious
    beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs,
    including no religious beliefs?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the military chaplaincy has
    done an admirable job in ministering amidst the pluralistic environment
    of the military. Even as chaplains express their faith, they and their
    commanders also are asked to be as inclusive as possible when
    ministering to an interfaith group. I believe that as a group, military
    chaplains work to balance these responsibilities well.
        Question. The Independent Review Related to Fort Hood observed that
    ``DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity
    necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious
    practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or
    self-radicalization.'' Recommendation 2.7 of the Final Recommendations
    urged the Department to update policy to clarify guidelines for
    religious accommodation and Recommendation 2.8 urged the Department to
    task the Defense Science Board to ``undertake a multi-disciplinary
    study to identify behavioral indicators of violence and self-
    radicalization . . . ''.
        What is your view of this recommendation?
        Answer. I cannot make an assessment at this time, but if confirmed,
    evaluating the adequacy of current policies concerning the safeguarding
    of our servicemembers would be a top priority.
        Question. Will you work to ensure that a scientific fact-based
    approach to understanding radicalization will drive the Department's
    relevant policies on this topic?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would review the plans that are currently
    in place to address these challenges, and determine what, if any,
    changes should be made to them to address this critical issue. I would
    intend to collaborate with my colleagues in the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense, the Military Services, and the Joint Staff in charting the
    right course for the Department.

               PROTECTION OF U.S. FORCES AGAINST INTERNAL THREATS

        Question. One year ago, 13 people were slain and scores wounded
    during a shooting rampage allegedly carried out by a U.S. Army medical
    corps officer. A DOD review of the attack released in January 2010
    concluded that the Department was poorly prepared to defend against
    internal threats, including radicalization among military personnel.
        What is your assessment of the lessons learned from the tragedy at
    Fort Hood?
        Answer. It is my understanding that while the first responders and
    initial response teams were well-prepared to react to this incident,
    the proceeding warning signals were not properly recognized and
    therefore, this tragedy was not prevented. If confirmed, I would work
    with the USD(P&R) to gain a comprehensive understanding of the lessons
    learned, corrective actions taken, and the plan moving forward in order
    to increase our force protection on our installations.
        Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to
    prevent and mitigate such threats in the future?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with DOD leadership to
    strengthen the areas identified by the Fort Hood Independent Review to
    include mitigating violence in the workplace, ensuring commanders/
    supervisors have access to appropriate personnel records, and
    integrating and strengthening force protection policies. Furthermore, I
    will work closely with our medical community to give commanders a
    better understanding of how to identify violence indicators.

                          MUSLIMS IN THE U.S. MILITARY

        Question. Are you concerned that the attack at Fort Hood could lead
    to harassment or even violence against Muslims in the military?
        Answer. Every servicemember has a right to practice their religious
    faith without fear of persecution or retribution. If confirmed, I will
    review policies to ensure that they are adequate to provide physical
    and emotional safety from religious harassment and will take
    appropriate action, if needed.
        Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to
    address the potential for harassment or violence against Muslims in the
    U.S. military?
        In order to safeguard the rights of servicemembers, there must be
    both formal and informal feedback procedures that quickly identify and
    assess any harassment, should it occur. Responses to grievances, or any
    identified shortcomings in command climate assessments, must be quick,
    thoughtful, and effective. If confirmed, I would review the viability
    of these feedback systems, and take measures to correct them, as
    appropriate.

                     SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

        Question. The Department has in recent years developed
    comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and
    response to incidents of sexual assaults, including providing
    appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault. However,
    numerous incidents of sexual misconduct involving military personnel in
    combat areas of operation are still being reported. Victims and their
    advocates claim that they are victimized twice: first by attackers in
    their own ranks and then by unresponsive or inadequate treatment for
    the victim. They assert that their command fails to respond
    appropriately with basic medical services and with an adequate
    investigation of their charges followed by a failure to hold assailants
    accountable.
        Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures,
    particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Department has put
    considerable effort into the development of policies and programs
    designed to address sexual assault. If confirmed, I would review those
    policies to ensure the Department provides the appropriate care to
    victims and hold offenders accountable.
        Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in
    which this new confidential reporting procedure has been put into
    operation?
        Answer. I have not been informed of any specific problems in the
    implementation of the confidential reporting option, called restricted
    reporting. I am aware that the restriction of no investigation when a
    victim chooses restricted reporting has concerned commanders
    responsible for the actions of their unit members. I believe that the
    Department must find a balance between victim care and offender
    accountability but of the utmost importance is that victims come
    forward and obtain support they need following an assault.
        Question. What is your view of the steps the Services have taken to
    prevent and respond to sexual assaults in combat zones, including
    assaults against contractor personnel?
        Answer. I do not have enough information to make a detailed
    assessment at this time, but I am aware the Department has focused on
    educating servicemembers deploying to combat zones about how to prevent
    sexual assault and what to do should it occur. That said, it has been
    made clear to me that if anyone shows up at a military treatment
    facility following a sexual assault, he or she will receive care.
        Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
    resources the Services have in place to investigate and respond to
    allegations of sexual assault?
        Answer. I know that all Services have been directed to establish
    guidelines for a 24-hour, 7-day per week sexual assault response
    capability for all locations, including deployed areas. At this time, I
    cannot make an assessment of the effectiveness of those guidelines, but
    if confirmed, evaluating the adequacy of training and resources
    allocated to sexual assault investigation and response would be a top
    priority.
        Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of the
    Services to hold assailants accountable for their acts?
        Answer. I strongly believe that anyone who commits a sexual assault
    in the military needs to know that they will be held accountable. That
    is how DOD removes perpetrators from our ranks and, at the same time,
    show victims that taking the difficult step of assisting with an
    investigation will help their fellow servicemembers. I understand that
    the Services are working towards increasing the subject matter
    expertise of those investigating and prosecuting sexual assaults. If
    confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that accountability remains a key
    priority.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure senior
    level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to
    sexual assaults?
        Answer. Sexual assault reaches across the Department, and as such,
    outreach and accountability efforts need to have the same reach. If
    confirmed, I would ensure that the Department has the correct structure
    in place to engage the departmental leadership, and the leadership of
    other agencies such as the Departments of Veterans Affairs, Health and
    Human Services, and Justice, in planning, guiding, and evaluating our
    efforts.

                               SERVICE ACADEMIES

        Question. What do you consider to be the policy and procedural
    elements that must be in place at each of the Service Academies in
    order to prevent and respond appropriately to sexual assaults and
    sexual harassment and to ensure essential oversight?
        Answer. I believe the Department's sexual assault and sexual
    harassment policies provide a foundation for combating sexual
    misconduct at the Service Academies. There must be policies and
    procedures that encourage victims to come forward and that hold
    offenders accountable, as well as effective training programs. It is my
    understanding that the academies have institutionalized prevention and
    response programs. I further understand that the Department reviews the
    efforts of the academies annually. If confirmed, I would continue that
    oversight and determine whether additional measures need to be taken.
        Question. What is your assessment of measures taken at the Service
    Academies to ensure religious tolerance and respect, and to prevent
    sexual assaults and sexual harassment?
        Answer. Regarding religious tolerance, I do not have enough
    information to make an assessment at this time. I believe it is
    imperative that leaders, at all levels, must continue to ensure that
    every member of the DOD respects the spirit and intent of laws and
    policies surrounding the free exercise of religion.
        On the topic of sexual assault, it is my understanding that the
    academies have institutionalized prevention and response programs. I
    further understand that the Department reviews the efforts of the
    academies annually. If confirmed, I would continue that oversight and
    determine whether additional measures need to be taken.

                             WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

        Question. The Navy recently opened service on submarines to women
    and the Marine Corps recently expanded service opportunities for women
    in intelligence specialties. The issue of the appropriate combat role
    of women in the Armed Forces is a matter of continuing interest to
    Congress and the American public.
        Do you believe additional specialties should be opened up for
    service by women?
        Answer. In my opinion, DOD has sufficient flexibility under current
    law to make assignment policy for women, if needed. DOD should continue
    to monitor combat needs as Services recommend expanding deployment
    roles for women.
        Question. Do you believe any changes in the current policy
    regarding women in combat are needed?
        Answer. I am not aware of any changes necessary at this time. It is
    my understanding that Department policy and practices are reviewed on a
    recurring basis to ensure compliance and effective use of manpower. If
    confirmed, I would take my responsibility to review each proposed
    policy change very seriously and ensure changes to existing policy move
    forward only when accompanied by a thorough plan for implementation.

                          RISING COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE

        Question. In testimony presented to Congress in February 2009, the
    Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office asserted that
    ``medical funding accounts for more than one-third of the growth
    projected for operations and support funding between 2009 and 2026.''
    In April 2009, Secretary Gates told an audience at Maxwell Air Force
    Base that ``health care is eating the Department alive.''
        What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising medical
    costs on future DOD plans?
        Answer. I am informed that government estimates indicate these
    costs could rise to over 10 percent of the DOD budget in just a few
    years. If confirmed, I would research means to ensure that DOD provides
    quality care, and it does so in the most cost-effective way that
    provides the best value for our servicemembers and their families.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you initiate or
    recommend to the Secretary of Defense to mitigate the effect of such
    costs on the DOD top-line?
        Answer. I cannot make specific recommendations at this time.
    However, if confirmed, I would work closely with our healthcare
    leadership in DOD to examine every opportunity to assure military
    beneficiaries are provided the highest quality care possible while
    managing cost growth and to provide that advice to the Secretary of
    Defense.
        Question. What reforms in infrastructure, benefits, or benefit
    management, if any, do you think should be examined in order to control
    the costs of military health care?
        Answer. I believe that to control the costs of military health
    care, DOD needs to research all possibilities. If confirmed, I would
    examine the costs of the direct care facilities, determining where
    efficiencies can be gained and investing wisely in infrastructure
    requirements. I would look at the efficiencies in procuring health care
    services in the civilian market, and, I would evaluate the benefit
    structure to see where reasonable changes could occur. In the long
    term, the promotion of healthy lifestyles and prevention among our
    beneficiaries will also help greatly reduce the demand for health
    services.

                        PERSONNEL AND ENTITLEMENT COSTS

        Question. In addition to health care costs, personnel and related
    entitlement spending continues to grow and is becoming an ever
    increasing portion of the DOD budget.
        What actions do you believe can be taken to control the rise in
    personnel costs and entitlement spending?
        Answer. I am aware that personnel-related costs are consuming an
    increasing proportion of the Department's finite resources. At the same
    time, I believe DOD cannot fail to adequately provide for and support
    our All-Volunteer Force and their families. This includes maintaining a
    sufficient rotation base for both our Active and Reserve personnel. If
    confirmed, I know achieving a right-sized mix of Active Duty, Reserve,
    civilians, and contractors is imperative. A key part of this challenge
    will be striking the optimum balance between personnel,
    recapitalization, and operational and support costs, while ensuring
    that related entitlements are appropriate and well-reasoned.
        Question. In your view, can the Department and the Services
    efficiently manage the use of bonuses and special pays to place high
    quality recruits in the right jobs without paying more than the
    Department needs to pay, or can afford to pay, for others?
        Answer. Although I do not have a detailed knowledge of the
    Department's and the Services' special pay programs at this time, I
    believe the use of targeted pays and bonuses can be effectively and
    efficiently used in recruiting and retaining specific skills and
    specialties.

                                 MENTAL HEALTH

        Question. Senior military leaders, including the Secretary of
    Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, increasingly
    recognize the need to reduce the stigma for military personnel and
    their families and veterans in seeking mental health care.
        If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in expanding
    breadth of this message to military personnel and their families?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to ensure that existing DOD
    efforts to combat stigma toward help-seeking behavior among
    servicemembers be supported and, if necessary, would expand the breadth
    of the outreach efforts. I fully support the Department's efforts to
    improve health and mental health care services, and reduce the stigma
    of mental health care.

                               SUICIDE PREVENTION

        Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services has
    increased in recent years. The Army released a report in June 2010 that
    analyzed the causes of its growing suicide rate and examined disturbing
    trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high-risk behaviors.
        If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping DOD policies to
    help prevent suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase
    the resiliency of all servicemembers and their families?
        Answer. I believe DOD must support a culture to promote health and
    resiliency, and reduce high-risk behavior in the force. This requires
    both military and civilian leaders to be active participants in this
    effort and have essential roles in providing the requisite support. If
    confirmed, I will assure that proper emphasis on suicide prevention is
    placed through training, reducing stigma, increasing resilience, and
    increasing access to care. I will focus on providing standardization,
    integration of best practices, and general oversight, serving as a
    change agent and providing guidance from which the Services can operate
    their suicide prevention programs.
        Question. What is your understanding of the action that the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense is taking in response to the June 2010 Army
    report, and the data in Chapter 3 in particular?
        Answer. The Army released a report in June 2010 that analyzed the
    causes of its growing suicide rate and examined disturbing trends in
    drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high-risk behaviors. If confirmed,
    I will ensure that the Army is enforcing existing regulations and
    policies and has implemented risk mitigation strategies in suicide
    prevention for the substance abuse and behavior issues (disciplinary
    and high risk) they identified. In addition, I would support ongoing
    assessment and monitoring of the impact of these policies and
    regulations on the suicide rate.

                           READINESS RESPONSIBILITIES

        Question. Section 136 of title 10, U.S.C., gives the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness certain
    responsibilities for military readiness. Some important issues that
    affect military readiness, however, such as logistics and materiel
    readiness, have been placed under the jurisdiction of the Under
    Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
        What is your understanding of the responsibilities of the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness in ensuring military
    readiness?
        Answer. I view the responsibilities of the USD(P&R) as to advise
    the Secretary on all matters related to readiness. These include
    oversight of civilian and military training and education, personnel
    and medical readiness, and the analysis of broad mission assessments
    from the combatant commanders regarding the readiness of key units in
    support of the Secretary's deployment decisions. As for readiness
    responsibilities across the Department, if confirmed, I will work
    collaboratively with my colleagues in OSD, the Joint Staff, and the
    Services to ensure our forces are ready to execute the National
    Military Strategy, and I will sustain the readiness synergism and
    linkages that exist today across the Department, the other Federal
    Agencies, our coalition partners, and local governments and
    communities.
        Question. What are the most critical objectives to improve
    readiness reporting and monitoring of the Military Forces, and if
    confirmed, how would you work with the Military Departments as well as
    other Office of the Secretary of Defense offices to achieve them?
        Answer. I believe the Department needs accurate and timely
    readiness assessments of our military forces. These are the gauge by
    which DOD should measure our ability to execute the missions assigned
    by the President and Secretary of Defense. Accurate assessments allow
    the Department to effectively plan and manage its forces, and signal
    where there are capability shortfalls or assets are needed. It is my
    understanding that the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)
    provides the means to capture these assessments from our military
    commanders, and provides a holistic and important view of the
    Department's readiness to the senior leadership. If confirmed, I would
    personally review DRRS implementation to ensure the Department is
    meeting the needs of the senior leadership and a unity of effort across
    the Department to drive this important effort to a fully operational
    capability.

                            ACTIVE-DUTY END STRENGTH

        Question. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2010, Congress authorized higher Active Duty end strengths for all the
    Services.
        In your view, what is the appropriate Active Duty end strength for
    each of the Services?
        Answer. While I cannot make an informed assessment at this time, I
    believe strongly that our forces, both Active and Reserve, must be
    large enough to not only satisfy deployed demands, but also have a
    rotation base that recognizes the personal needs of our volunteers and
    their families. If confirmed, I would devote considerable attention to
    this important issue.
        Question. What challenges will the Services face in maintaining
    these higher end strengths?
        Answer. The foremost challenge will be monitoring and responding to
    retention and recruiting trends, especially as the economy improves.

                   MEDICAL PERSONNEL RECRUITING AND RETENTION

        Question. DOD continues to face significant shortages in critically
    needed military medical personnel in both the Active and Reserve
    components. The committee is concerned that growing medical support
    requirements will compound the already serious challenges faced in
    recruitment and retention of military medical, dental, nurse, and
    behavioral health personnel.
        What is your understanding of the shortages of health care
    professionals currently being experienced in DOD and the sufficiency of
    the plans to meet recruiting and retention goals?
        Answer. Regarding military healthcare servicemembers, it is my
    understanding the current overall manning of the health professions is
    at or above manning requirements. If confirmed, one of my goals will be
    to improve the recruitment and retention of health professional
    specialties which currently fall below manning requirements. To retain
    our health professionals, Congress has provided DOD broad authority to
    provide special and incentive pays for all health professional
    officers. I believe there is an increased need for civilian healthcare
    providers and DOD must remain competitive to recruit from the civilian
    labor market.
        Question. What legislative and policy initiatives, including
    bonuses and special pays, do you think may be necessary to ensure that
    the Military Services can continue to meet medical support
    requirements?
        Answer. In regard to legislative and policy initiatives for the
    Military Services, I do not have any specific recommendations at this
    time. However, I believe there may be a need for more flexible
    recruiting and retention strategies such as the recently granted
    authority to use bonuses and special pays as needed to recruit, hire,
    and retain medical specialties.

                                   DWELL TIME

        Question. Even though dwell time is improving as our forces draw
    down in Iraq, many Active Duty military members are still not
    experiencing the ideal dwell time of 2 years at home for every year
    deployed.
        In your view, when will the Active component dwell time goal be
    met?
        Answer. From my perspective, the largest impact to dwell time will
    come from the balance of the drawdown in Iraq and the President's
    decisions regarding Afghanistan. Increases in end strength for the
    Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces over the past several
    years should translate into dwell times increasing.
        The Iraq drawdown will also serve to increase the dwell time for
    our units as fewer forces will need to be deployed. How much this will
    increase dwell time depends on the level of forces needed for
    Afghanistan. In all cases, however, DOD must carefully manage our
    forces across the Department. This involves careful assessment of where
    and when military forces are needed, and how to structure the force to
    best meet the projected demands.
        Question. In your view, would additional Army end strength in 2011
    or 2012 improve dwell time ratios and reduce stress on the force, and
    if so, what numbers of Active and Reserve component members would be
    necessary?
        Answer. I do not have enough information to make an assessment at
    this time. I defer to the analysis of the Quadrennial Defense Review as
    to whether current end strength increases are sufficient in light of
    anticipated strategy and projected needs.

         MOBILIZATION AND DEMOBILIZATION OF NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

        Question. Over the past 9 years, the National Guard and Reserves
    have experienced their largest and most sustained employment since
    World War II. Numerous problems arose in the planning and procedures
    for mobilization and demobilization, e.g., inadequate health screening
    and medical readiness, monitoring, antiquated pay systems, limited
    transition assistance programs upon demobilization, and lack of access
    to members of the Individual Ready Reserve. Reserve Force management
    policies and systems have been characterized in the past as inefficient
    and rigid and readiness levels have been adversely affected by
    equipment stay-behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies.
        What is your assessment of advances made in improving Reserve
    component mobilization and demobilization procedures, and in what areas
    do problems still exist?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Department has focused on
    increasing the alert and mobilization times prior to mobilization; DOD
    needs to ensure that we provide predictability to servicemembers, their
    families, and employers. If confirmed, I would continue the efforts of
    the Department to monitor this issue closely, as we know that
    predictability is a major factor for all those affected, and I believe
    strongly that National Guard and Reserve personnel deserve first-class
    mobilization and demobilization procedures, health screening, and
    transition assistance programs.
        Question. What do you consider to be the most significant enduring
    changes to the administration of the Reserve components aimed at
    ensuring their readiness for future mobilization requirements?
        Answer. It is my understanding the most significant enduring
    changes are in the implementation of service force generation plans,
    which have been created to provide a defined cycle to prepare Reserve
    component units for employment as an operational force. This enables
    units to train for a mission prior to mobilization and deploy and
    redeploy on a predictable time line.
        Question. Do you see a need to modify current statutory authorities
    for the mobilization of members of the National Guard and Reserves?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would review existing authorities and
    proposed legislation to ensure that the Department has appropriate
    authorities in light of the role of the Guard and Reserves in our force
    deployment plans.

                  MEDICAL AND DENTAL READINESS OF THE RESERVES

        Question. Medical and dental readiness of Reserve component
    personnel has been an issue of significant concern to the committee,
    and shortfalls that have been identified have indicated a need for
    improved policy oversight and accountability.
        If confirmed, how would you seek to clarify and coordinate
    reporting on the medical and dental readiness of the Reserves?
        Answer. It is essential for DOD and all the Service components to
    have a single repository of data which accurately reflects the medical
    and dental readiness of the Reserve components. If confirmed, I will
    work with the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Health Affairs and
    Reserve Affairs in bringing the appropriate parties, including
    information management, medical, and line personnel, together to
    examine the reporting processes in detail, to agree on the necessary
    definitions of what and who should be monitored, and to fill any gaps
    in the reporting processes.
        Question. How would you improve upon the Department's ability to
    produce a healthy and fit Reserve component?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will closely examine the significant
    progress in improvement that I understand has been made in medical and
    dental readiness for the Reserve component and identify what still
    needs to be accomplished to achieve the goal of a healthy and fit
    Reserve component force.

                            MILITARY QUALITY OF LIFE

        Question. In January 2009, the Department published its second
    Quadrennial Quality of Life Review, which focused on the importance of
    key quality-of-life factors for military families, such as family
    support, child care, education, health care, and morale, welfare, and
    recreation services.
        How do you perceive the relationship between military recruitment
    and retention and quality-of-life improvements and your own top
    priorities for the Armed Forces?
        Answer. Quality-of-life efforts impact the recruitment and
    retention of military personnel and are key to maintaining the All-
    Volunteer Force. A servicemember's satisfaction with various aspects of
    military life as well as the servicemember's family experience
    influences members' decision to reenlist. If confirmed, I would review
    how effectively our programs meet the needs of servicemembers and their
    families, and ensure that they are contributing positively to
    recruitment and retention.
        Question. If confirmed, what further enhancements to military
    qualify-of-life would you consider a priority, and how do you envision
    working with the Services, combatant commanders, family advocacy
    groups, and Congress to achieve them?
        Answer. I would aggressively pursue the Department's priorities to
    promote the well-being and resilience of servicemembers and their
    families. I would focus on understanding the needs of our force and
    their families and expand assistance such as access to counseling,
    fitness opportunities, and childcare support to help minimize stress on
    the force. The Department leadership should work together with advocacy
    groups and Congress to efficiently close gaps and reduce overlaps in
    programs and to communicate effectively to ensure that families know
    how to access available support when they need it.

                                 FAMILY SUPPORT

        Question. Military members and their families in both the Active
    and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous
    sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military
    leaders have warned of growing concerns among military families as a
    result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations
    that go with them.
        What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
    issues for servicemembers and their families, and, if confirmed, how
    would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and
    adequately resourced?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would make family readiness issues one of
    my top priorities. I would support, prioritize, and appropriately
    resource quality physical and mental healthcare, spouse career
    assistance, childcare, other elements of dependent support, and
    education needs.
        Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
    light of global rebasing, BRAC, deployments, and growth in end
    strength?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue the Department's current
    approach to identify and address family readiness needs, to gather
    information from the Services, commands, servicemembers and families,
    professional organizations, and researchers about how to best prepare
    families for rebasing, BRAC, deployments, and other stressful aspects
    of military life.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support to Reserve
    component families related to mobilization, deployment, and family
    readiness, as well as to Active Duty families who do not reside near a
    military installation?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department's Yellow
    Ribbon Program is properly focused and funded to address the issues
    faced by members of the Active, Guard, and Reserve and their families.
    The program should provide information, access, referrals, and outreach
    to military members and their families. This needs to be underwritten
    by a coordinated, community-based network of care encompassing DOD, VA,
    State, local, non-profit, and private providers. My goal would be to
    provide a full range of services for Active, Guard, and Reserve members
    and their families.
        Question. If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to
    enhance family support?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would encourage the implementation of
    flexible family support programs that meet the needs of our
    servicemembers and their families, whether they live on military
    installations, near military installations, or far from military
    installations.

                              ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE

        Question. One of the major concerns for military family members is
    access to health care. Military spouses tell us that the healthcare
    system is inundated, and those stationed in more remote areas may not
    have access to adequate care.
        If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure complete access
    to healthcare for the families of servicemembers?
        Answer. I agree that access to care for family members is an
    important concern and, if confirmed, I will work to ensure appropriate
    access to care is a key feature of our TRICARE program and will
    continually explore ways to ensure all beneficiaries are provided the
    appropriate level of care within the established TRICARE Access to Care
    Standards.

      OFFICE OF COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR MILITARY FAMILIES WITH SPECIAL NEEDS

        Question. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2010 (section 563), Congress required the establishment of an Office of
    Community Support for Military Families with Special Needs within the
    Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.
    The purpose of this office is to enhance and improve DOD support for
    military families with special needs, be they educational or medical in
    nature.
        In your view, what should be the priorities of this Office of
    Community Support for Military Families with Special Needs?
        Answer. I believe the priorities of this office include medical and
    educational programs to strengthen military families with special
    needs. If confirmed, I would support the critical efforts of this
    office to establish consistent policy and monitor its implementation
    across the Services. I would identify programs already in existence
    that can provide special services to military families.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure outreach to those
    military families with special needs dependents so they are able to get
    the support they need?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure increased communication
    efforts to reach families with special needs through the use of
    webinars, social media outlets, base newspapers, commissaries and
    exchanges, childcare centers and youth facilities, DOD schools and a
    variety of DOD and Services' websites. In addition, I would emphasize
    collaboration with civilian community resources.

                     MY CAREER ADVANCEMENT ACCOUNTS PROGRAM

        Question. The Department established the My Career Advancement
    Accounts (MyCAA) program, a demonstration project that provides
    military spouses with funds through ``career advancement accounts'' to
    help enable them to pursue portable careers. In February 2010, the
    Department became overwhelmed by the numbers of program applicants,
    subsequently ran out of funds, and then temporarily halted the program.
    The program has now restarted, but the funds, as well as the number of
    spouses who would be eligible for the program, will be more limited.
        What is your understanding of the current focus and objectives of
    the program?
        Answer. I believe the objective of the MyCAA program is to ensure
    that military spouses have opportunities to pursue and sustain a career
    while supporting their servicemembers. It is my understanding that the
    current MyCAA is available only to spouses of Active Duty members in
    the pay grades of E1-E5, W1-W2, and O1-O2. MyCAA is restricted to
    $4,000 per eligible spouse and must be used over a 3-year period for an
    Associate's degree, a license, or a credential leading to a portable
    career. I believe these financial parameters will allow the Department
    to sustain the program. It is my understanding that DOD continues to
    offer robust career counseling programs to all our spouses.
        Question. If confirmed, what would be your objectives for the MyCAA
    program and other spouse employment initiatives or programs?
        Answer. My objective would be to assist, support, and empower them
    in making informed decisions through offering them an opportunity to
    obtain comprehensive information on high-growth, high-demand, portable
    occupations that can move with them as they relocate. This would
    include occupational information on education, license, and credential
    requirements, how to access other Federal, State, and private
    opportunities for financial assistance in achieving these requirements,
    as well as understanding earnings potential. I would also promote the
    outstanding pipeline of talent that military spouses represent to
    America's employers. Military spouses are talented, diverse, motivated,
    and bring strong values to the workplace.

                           MEDICAL RESEARCH PROGRAMS

        Question. What do you see as the highest priority medical research
    investment areas for DOD?
        Answer. I believe the highest priorities are to address critical
    research capability gaps related to the treatment and recovery of
    wounded warriors, such as the diagnosis and treatment of Traumatic
    Brain Injury (TBI), Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and other
    elements of combat related stress, development of improved prosthetics,
    treatment of eye injury, and other deployment and battlefield-related
    injuries.
        Question. How will you assess the amount of investment made in
    these research areas to determine if they are sufficient to meet DOD
    goals and requirements?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would review the current research portfolio
    to ensure it prioritizes and resources research appropriate to the
    requirements of the Department.
        Question. How will you ensure that DOD medical research efforts are
    well coordinated with similar research programs within the private
    sector, academia, the Services, DARPA, the Department of Veterans
    Affairs, and the National Institutes of Health?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would support coordination efforts to
    ensure that research is being conducted jointly, building on and
    partnering with industry, academia, and other government agencies to
    ensure the greatest return to our warfighters. I am aware that joint
    program committees have been established to engage with Federal
    partners to ensure that our research reflects the best interests of our
    service personnel.
        Question. How will you ensure that new medical technologies
    (including drugs and vaccines) are independently and adequately tested
    before their use by DOD organizations and personnel?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department applies
    the highest standards of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
    ensure new medical technologies, drugs, and vaccines are safe and
    effective before they are adopted for use in the Department.
        Question. There have been growing privacy and security concerns
    raised about the use of on-line social networks for medical research
    purposes.
        How will you ensure that the increasing use of social networking
    media for medical research purposes will protect the privacy and
    security of patients?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure active application of the
    Department's policy, which states that the rights and welfare of human
    subjects in research supported or conducted by the DOD components will
    be protected. This protection is based on the ethical principles of
    respect for persons and beneficence, and encompasses requirements to
    obtain informed consent and to do no harm. In implementing this policy,
    the Department will adhere to the applicable statutory provisions for
    human protections in research as well as supporting Department
    policies.
        Question. What are your biggest concerns related to the DOD medical
    research enterprise?
        Answer. Although I do not have detailed knowledge of the entire
    research portfolio, I am especially interested in ensuring the
    responsiveness of the research program to medical readiness and our
    warfighters' medical needs. This will be accomplished by assuring that
    DOD has a balanced investment in medical science and technology and in
    medical advanced development leading to timely incorporation into
    clinical practice in the Military Health System.

                        MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

        Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are
    critical to enhancement of military life for members and their
    families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments.
    These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users,
    including Active Duty and Reserve personnel and retirees.
        What challenges do you foresee in sustaining MWR programs
    (particularly in view of the Secretary's efficiencies initiatives) and,
    if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to achieve?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the benefits of strong MWR
    programs are critical to esprit de corps, stress reduction, and
    personal health and well-being. Although there are very extensive
    installation MWR facilities and programs, I believe there is an
    immediate challenge in ensuring that MWR programs for our deployed
    forces meet their needs, especially free access to the Internet to
    communicate with family and friends back home and fitness and
    recreation activities to keep forces fit to fight. Recreation support
    for our wounded warriors is also critical. In the longer term, I
    believe the Department needs to understand what programs are valued by
    servicemembers and their families in order to make wise investments. In
    addition, the MWR customers need to be involved in expressing their
    needs and satisfaction with our programs and policies; I understand the
    Department will conduct the second MWR customer satisfaction survey in
    fiscal year 2011. If confirmed, these are all areas I would
    aggressively pursue.

                    COMMISSARY AND MILITARY EXCHANGE SYSTEMS

        Question. Commissary and military exchange systems are significant
    quality of life components for members of the Active and Reserve Forces
    and their families.
        What is your view of the need for modernization of business
    policies and practices in the commissary and exchange systems, and what
    do you view as the most promising avenues for change to achieve
    modernization goals?
        Answer. I understand that commissary and exchange programs and
    policies must continue to evolve to meet the needs and expectations of
    our changing force and a changing marketplace. I believe efforts should
    be aimed at reducing overhead and pursuing new avenues to reach our
    military families who do not live on military installations. The
    commissary system should deliver customer savings and also achieve high
    satisfaction ratings. The military exchange resale community must
    continue to work, individually and collaboratively, to adapt marketing
    and selling practices, invest in technologies, and improve merchandise
    availability to be more responsive to military customers.
        Question. In the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Congress required the Secretary of Defense to
    establish an executive governing body for the commissary and exchange
    systems to ensure the complementary operation of the two systems.
        What is your understanding of the purpose and composition of the
    executive governing body?
        Answer. I am aware the Department established the DOD Executive
    Resale Board as the governing body to provide advice to the USD(P&R)
    regarding the complementary operation of the commissary and exchange
    systems. I have been informed that the Board works to resolve issues
    and has been instrumental in pursuing matters of mutual benefit to the
    elements of the military resale system. The Board is chaired by the
    PDUSD(P&R), and members include both the senior military officers and
    civilians who oversee and manage the commissary and exchange systems.
        Question. If confirmed, what would your role be with respect to the
    governing body, and what would your expectations be for its role?
        Answer. The Secretary designated the PDUSD(P&R) as the chairperson
    of the Executive Resale Board. If confirmed, I would ensure the Board
    would continue to meet regularly to review operational areas of mutual
    interest to the commissary and exchange systems.

                           CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SYSTEMS

        Question. Section 1113 of the National Defense Authorization Act
    for Fiscal Year 2010 repealed the statutory authority for the National
    Security Personnel System (NSPS), and required that all NSPS employees
    be converted to other personnel systems by no later than January 1,
    2012.
        What is your understanding of the Department's progress in
    converting its civilian employees from NSPS?
        Answer. I understand during fiscal year 2010, 172,000 employees
    representing approximately 76 percent of the NSPS population were
    transitioned from NSPS to the Government-wide General Schedule system.
    I also understand the transition of all remaining NSPS employees to the
    appropriate statutory pay and personnel system will be completed by the
    statutory deadline of January 1, 2012.
        Question. Section 1113 also provides DOD with extensive personnel
    flexibilities for its civilian employees that are not available to
    other agencies. In particular, section 9902(a) of title 5, U.S.C., as
    added by section 1113, directs the Department to establish a new
    performance management system for all of its employees. Section 9902(b)
    directs the Department to develop a streamlined new hiring system that
    is designed to better fulfill DOD's mission needs, produce high-quality
    applicants, and support timely personnel decisions.
        Do you agree that DOD's civilian employee workforce plays a vital
    role in the functioning of the Department?
        Answer. Yes, DOD's civilian employee workforce plays an
    instrumental role in the functioning of the Department.
        Question. What is your view of the personnel flexibilities provided
    by section 1113?
        Answer. I understand Congress provided these flexibilities to allow
    the Department to better meet mission requirements. If confirmed, I
    will support the work that I understand is under way to develop the
    flexibilities.
        Question. If confirmed, will you make it a priority to implement
    these flexibilities in a manner that best meets the needs of the
    Department and promotes the quality of the Department's civilian
    workforce?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Section 1112 of the National Defense Authorization Act
    for Fiscal Year 2010 directs the Department to develop a Defense
    Civilian Leadership Program (DCLP) to recruit, train, and advance a new
    generation of civilian leaders for the Department. Section 1112
    provides the Department with the full range of authorities available
    for demonstration programs under section 4703 of title 5, U.S.C.,
    including the authority to compensate participants on the basis of
    qualifications, performance, and market conditions. These flexibilities
    are not otherwise available to DOD.
        Do you agree that the Department needs to recruit highly qualified
    civilian personnel to meet the growing needs of its acquisition,
    technical, business, and financial communities?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. In your view, has the existing civilian hiring process
    been successful in recruiting such personnel and meeting these needs?
        Answer. Although I believe the Department currently has a highly
    talented workforce, I wholeheartedly support the initiatives to
    streamline and reform the civilian hiring process. There is much work
    to be done in this area, and if confirmed, I would ensure that the
    Department actively engages in the Government-wide initiative to reform
    civilian hiring and aggressively pursues improvements within the
    Department.
        Question. If confirmed, will you make it a priority to implement
    the authority provided by section 1112 in a manner that best meets the
    needs of the Department and promotes the quality of the Department's
    civilian workforce?
        Answer. Yes.

                             HUMAN CAPITAL PLANNING

        Question. Section 115b of title 10, U.S.C., as added by section
    1108 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2010 requires the
    Secretary of Defense to develop and annually update a strategic human
    capital plan that specifically identifies gaps in the Department's
    civilian workforce and strategies for addressing those gaps. Section
    115b requires that the plan include chapters specifically addressing
    the Department's senior management, functional, and technical workforce
    and the Department's acquisition workforce.
        Would you agree that a strategic human capital plan that identifies
    gaps in the workforce and strategies for addressing those gaps is a key
    step toward ensuring that the Department has the skills and
    capabilities needed to meet future challenges?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you see the need for any changes in the requirements
    for a strategic human capital plan under section 115b?
        Answer. At this time, I have no recommendations. If confirmed, I
    would review the strategic human capital planning that the Department
    has conducted over the past years against the section 115b requirements
    to determine if any changes may be needed to improve the Department's
    overall workforce planning effort.
        Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that DOD fully complies
    with these requirements?
        Answer. Yes.

          BALANCE BETWEEN CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES

        Question. In recent years, DOD has become increasingly reliant on
    services provided by contractors. Over the past 8 years, DOD's civilian
    workforce has remained essentially unchanged in size. Over the same
    period, the Department's spending on contract services has more than
    doubled, with the estimated number of contractor employees working for
    the Department increasing from an estimated 730,000 in fiscal year 2000
    to an estimated 1,550,000 in fiscal year 2007. As a result of the
    explosive growth in service contracts, contractors now play an integral
    role in the performance of functions that were once performed
    exclusively by government employees, including the management and
    oversight of weapons programs, the development of policies, the
    development of public relations strategies, and even the collection and
    analysis of intelligence. In many cases, contractor employees work in
    the same offices, serve on the same projects and task forces, and
    perform many of the same functions as Federal employees.
        Do you believe that the current balance between civilian employees
    and contractor employees is in the best interests of DOD?
        Answer. I support the Secretary's initiative announced with the
    fiscal year 2010 budget to reduce the Department's reliance on
    contracted services contractors. I believe the desired outcome of the
    Department's in-sourcing initiative is a balanced total workforce of
    military, government civilians, and contracted services that
    appropriately align functions to the public and private sector, and
    results in the best value for the taxpayer.
        Question. In your view, has DOD become too reliant on contractors
    to perform its basic functions?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would support the Department's ongoing
    efforts to critically examine currently contracted functions. Striking
    a balance between government and contractor performance that ensures
    uncompromising government control of critical functions, while
    providing best value to the taxpayer, is imperative.

                   SECRETARY GATES' EFFICIENCIES INITIATIVES

        Question. In May 2010, Secretary Gates launched an initiative to
    strengthen and modernize our fighting forces by eliminating inefficient
    or duplicative programs. In an August 16, 2010, memo to DOD components,
    the Secretary directed 20 specific initiatives, many involving military
    and civilian personnel and DOD contractors.
        What is your assessment of the efficiencies announced by the
    Secretary to date, and if confirmed, what criteria would you use to
    identify and justify additional opportunities for efficiency in
    programs within the purview of the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Personnel and Readiness?
        Answer. I understand that Secretary Gates is attempting to identify
    efficiencies and redundancies within DOD and, if confirmed, I would
    support the implementation and continuation of this effort. I would use
    the Secretary's criteria to divest the Department of missions that are
    not appropriate or part of our core mission. I would also build on the
    Secretary of Defense's work of finding greater efficiencies, with the
    goal of applying those resources toward higher priority efforts within
    the Department. From shared services to other process improvements, I
    would strive to ensure Personnel and Readiness is on the leading edge
    of efficiencies while still maintaining effectiveness for the
    Department.

                             ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

        Question. Over the past 15 years, DOD has dramatically reduced the
    size of its acquisition workforce, without undertaking any systematic
    planning or analysis to ensure that it would have the specific skills
    and competencies needed to meet current and future needs. Since
    September 11, 2001, moreover, the demands placed on that workforce have
    substantially increased. Section 852 of the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 established an Acquisition
    Workforce Development Fund to help DOD address shortcomings in its
    acquisition workforce. The fund would provide a minimum of $3 billion
    over 6 years for this purpose.
        Do you believe that DOD acquisition workforce is large enough and
    has the skills needed to perform the tasks assigned to it?
        Answer. While I cannot make an assessment of the size of the
    workforce at this time, I fully support the Secretary's goals of
    increasing the capacity and capability of the acquisition workforce
    through reducing reliance on contracted services in key acquisition
    support functions.
        Question. Do you support the use of the DOD Acquisition Workforce
    Development Fund to ensure that DOD has the right number of employees
    with the right skills to run its acquisition programs in the most cost
    effective manner for the taxpayers?
        Answer. Yes.

                   LABORATORY PERSONNEL DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM

        Question. The laboratory demonstration program founded in section
    342 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 as
    amended by section 1114 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2001, section 1107 of the National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2008, section 1108 of the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, and section 1105 of the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, paved the way
    for personnel management initiatives and new flexibilities at the
    defense laboratories. These innovations have been adopted in various
    forms throughout other DOD personnel systems.
        If confirmed, will you fully implement the laboratory demonstration
    program and the authorities under these provisions?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the directors of the
    defense laboratories are provided the full range of personnel
    flexibilities and authorities provided by Congress?
        Answer. Yes.

                          FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

        Question. A Foreign Language Transformation Roadmap announced by
    the Department on March 30, 2005, directed a series of actions aimed at
    transforming the Department's foreign language capabilities, to include
    revision of policy and doctrine, building a capabilities-based
    requirements process, and enhancing foreign language capability for
    both military and civilian personnel.
        In your view, what should be the priorities of the Federal
    Government to expanding the foreign language skills of civilian and
    military personnel and improving coordination of foreign language
    programs and activities among the Federal agencies?
        Answer. The priorities of the Federal Government to expanding the
    foreign language skills of civilian and military personnel and
    improving coordination between foreign language programs and activities
    among the Federal agencies should be an integrated, holistic, whole-of-
    nation approach to developing these skills beginning in pre-school and
    continuing through high school and college graduation. The shortage of
    language and cultural skills is a national shortfall, not just an
    isolated DOD problem. If confirmed, I will support and build upon DOD
    efforts to ensure the education of a broader pool of Americans with
    skills in critical languages. Early education and skill development in
    critical foreign languages is paramount and must begin in pre-school
    and continue through the high school and college years. Educating our
    children beginning in pre-school and continuing throughout their
    educational journey in critical languages will result in globally
    competitive citizenry from which DOD, other Federal Government
    agencies, and the private sector can recruit.

                                GI BILL BENEFITS

        Question. Congress passed the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational
    Assistance Act in 2008 that created enhanced educational benefits for
    servicemembers who have served at least 90 days on Active Duty since
    September 11. The maximum benefit would roughly cover the cost of a
    college education at any public university in the country.
        What unresolved issues related to implementation of the post-9/11
    Veterans Educational Assistance Act (e.g., coverage of additional
    military personnel) do you consider most important to be addressed?
        Answer. It is my understanding that there are two technical fixes
    needed in the current statute. First, the original statute
    inadvertently left out some National Guard Active Duty as qualifying
    time for Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits. Second, although the statute
    authorized the Services to offer a supplemental payment for enlistments
    in critical skills (commonly called ``kickers''), it did not include
    the specific language required to allow the Services to use the
    Education Trust Fund to pay for these kickers. Both of these provisions
    are rectified in the current version of S. 3447, recently introduced in
    the Senate.

                              MILITARY RETIREMENT

        Question. The 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation
    proposed a new defined benefit retirement plan that more resembles the
    benefits available under the Federal Employee Retirement System than
    the current military retirement benefit; increasing TRICARE fees for
    retirees; and the adoption of dependent care and flexible spending
    accounts for servicemembers. The head of a Defense Business Board Task
    Force has criticized military benefits as ``GM-style benefits''
    describing the military retirement system as a ``pre-volunteer force
    retirement system'' and criticizing ``taxpayer-subsidized grocery
    chains and low out-of-pocket healthcare costs.''
        What is your view of the adequacy of the current military
    retirement benefit?
        Answer. I have not yet formed an opinion on the adequacy of the
    current military retirement benefit. However, it is only one component
    of the entire military compensation system. I believe it will be
    important to consider the impacts of making changes to one part of the
    system so that DOD maintains their current high quality military force.
        Question. How might it be modernized to reflect the needs of a new
    generation of recruits, while easing the long-term retirement cost of
    the government?
        Answer. I don't have a recommendation at this time, but if
    confirmed, I would review this issue carefully.
        Question. Do you share the Defense Business Board Task Force view
    of military benefits?
        Answer. I have not reviewed this report in detail, but I know that
    one of its major recommendations was changing the military retirement
    system.
        It is my understanding that the Defense Business Board is
    considering alternatives to the current military retirement system and
    alternatives for the Department to consider. If confirmed, I look
    forward to reviewing these and other proposals with the military
    departments.

                            CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

        Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
    appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
    briefings, and other communications of information.
        Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
    this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
    committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
    information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
    with respect to your responsibilities as the Principal Deputy Under
    Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
    other communications of information are provided to this committee and
    its staff and other appropriate committees?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
    such documents?
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich

                               TRICARE IN ALASKA

        1. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, there are over 89,000 TRICARE
    beneficiaries in the State of Alaska. Active Duty military, their
    families, and retirees face many challenges accessing health care in
    Alaska. The Military Treatment Facilities (MTF) at Fort Wainwright and
    Elmendorf Air Force Base (AFB) are top quality and provide many
    services to military members and their families. However, many
    specialties are neither available at the MTFs or at capacity and cannot
    accommodate all customers. Many civilian specialists in Alaska do not
    participate in the TRICARE network. I've worked extensively with
    TRICARE Management Activity and the Services to improve access to care.
    I commissioned an interagency working group which identified the need
    for regulatory flexibility and a single reimbursement rate to improve
    access to care in Alaska. Are you aware of these challenges? If
    confirmed, what steps would you take to improve access to healthcare in
    Alaska?
        Dr. Rooney. I am aware of these challenges. I have been advised
    that throughout Alaska there are roughly 1,783 non-Federal physicians
    of whom 1,566 are TRICARE Participating Providers. Of the 1,566 TRICARE
    participating providers, 793 are primary care physicians with
    specialties in family practice, general practice, internal medicine,
    and pediatrics. The TRICARE Management Activity's strong support in
    approving 12 locality-based waivers ranging from 125 percent to 565
    percent of the CHAMPUS Maximum Allowable Charge (CMAC) for critical
    specialty providers, coupled with an existing Rate Reimbursement/Rate
    Demonstration which sets rates in Alaska at 1.4 times the CMAC
    allowable charges, has greatly increased acceptance of TRICARE by non-
    Federal providers. A significant change was noted from early 2008 to
    February 2011, when the TRICARE Preferred Provider Network increased
    from 465 to 845 providers.
        If confirmed, I would continue to support the TRICARE Management
    Activity's efforts in this regard. While I was pleased to learn that
    the Rate Reimbursement Demonstration initially set to expire in
    December 2010 was extended until December 2012, I will ensure that
    future changes to the rate structure are done collaboratively with the
    various Federal agencies that are also exploring options resulting from
    the Interagency Task Force's recommendation for regulatory flexibility
    and a single Federal reimbursement rate.

        2. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, if confirmed, please describe how
    you would work with the Army and the Air Force to ensure the MTFs in
    Alaska meet health care requirements of Active Duty military and their
    families, especially as the Army increases personnel stationed at Fort
    Wainwright.
        Dr. Rooney. If confirmed, I will meet regularly with the Surgeons
    General of the Services and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Health Affairs to discuss provider and ancillary support staffing gaps
    in the three Alaska MTFs. I will encourage support of the MTFs to the
    maximum extent possible given the high operational tempo and associated
    deployments. I have been advised that, in all forums, there appears to
    be a strong interest in ensuring access for all. This guided the
    TRICARE Management Activity's recently approved TRICARE Expansion Plan
    favorably endorsed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health
    Affairs and the Services' Surgeons General in collaboration with the
    Alaska community leadership. The focus of the Expansion Plan is on
    improved access for Department of Defense (DOD) beneficiaries without
    displacing non-DOD beneficiaries. In the context of improving access
    and protecting non-DOD beneficiaries from DOD overflow, I will
    encourage the Services' Surgeons General and the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Health Affairs to explore opportunities for partnerships
    with the Alaska community for such programs as Graduate Medical
    Education, thereby facilitating mutual positive outcomes. In addition,
    Elmendorf AFB already supports internships in dental, pharmacy lab,
    physician assistants, medical assistants, Doctor of Osteopathy, and a
    physician residency. State-wide recruiting efforts are being initiated
    by the State, hospitals, and our healthcare support contractor.

        3. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, please describe how you would work
    with TRICARE Management Activity as they work to increase the TRICARE
    network in Alaska to provide for better access to health care for our
    servicemembers and their families.
        Dr. Rooney. Access to care issues in Alaska cannot be addressed
    merely in terms of access to purchased care services in the community
    (network or non-network). As the interagency working group which you
    commissioned confirmed in their Report to Congress of September 2010, I
    have been advised that some of the issues are not under the control of
    the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R))
    or the Federal Government. These include licensure and certification
    rules, recruitment of primary care and specialty services, and
    apprehension on the part of private practitioners regarding changes in
    the reimbursement environment related to healthcare reform. Similarly,
    access challenges faced by TRICARE beneficiaries are no different from
    challenges faced by other beneficiaries covered by the Federal
    Government health plans or by many Alaskans covered by private pay
    plans. I was pleased to learn of the TRICARE Management Activity's
    recent initiatives in the State of Alaska, which include:

             Establishing a TRICARE Civilian Preferred Provider
            Network requiring the West Region's Health Care Support
            Contractor to develop and operate such a network in designated
            Prime Service Areas.
             Permitting eligible TRICARE beneficiaries to enroll in
            Prime with assignment to MTF Primary Care Managers, or, as an
            alternative, assignment to a civilian Primary Care Manager
            within the TRICARE civilian preferred provider network. This
            will allow approximately 250 to 300 beneficiaries to transfer
            to a civilian Primary Care Manager. This will include family
            practice, pediatrics, and internal medicine providers.
             Offering this new program, first, to the Prime Service
            Areas surrounding Fort Wainwright Army Base and Eielson AFB in
            Fairbanks and then, second, evaluating whether to expand it
            further into Anchorage surrounding the Joint Base Elmendorf
            Richardson.

        Working jointly with the political leadership, the Services, and
    the community, the TRICARE Management Activity's 18-month effort in
    bringing these initiatives to fruition is notable. If confirmed, I will
    continue to support these ongoing efforts while closely monitoring the
    impact these programs have on improving access to health care for our
    servicemembers and their families.

                           FAMILY DEPLOYMENT SUPPORT

        4. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, one of my priorities is support for
    our military families, especially those in Alaska. The 1st Stryker
    Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division will deploy to Afghanistan
    in May and I want to make sure their families are taken care of as
    their loved ones face yet another deployment. What do you consider to
    be the most important family readiness issue for servicemembers and
    their families?
        Dr. Rooney. I share your priority of supporting our military
    families. The impact of a deployment or multiple deployments on
    military families is the most significant family readiness issue for
    servicemembers and their families. The challenges to military family
    readiness and resiliency are numerous stressors related to separation,
    deployment, geographic isolation, high operational tempo, and financial
    worries.
        The Department has a network of Family Support Programs at all DOD
    installations worldwide that provide resources to prepare military
    families to effectively navigate the challenges of daily living
    experienced in the unique context of military service. Family Support
    Programs provide information and referral, education and training, and
    counseling services to educate families about the potential challenges
    they may face. The goal is to equip them with the skills needed to
    competently function in the face of such challenges and to increase
    their awareness of the supportive resources available to them. The
    focus of the support is to assist families with deployment, relocation,
    spousal employment, family life education (including parenting skills),
    personal financial management, volunteer opportunities, and non-medical
    counseling.
        The Family Support Programs are designed to provide training and
    support to servicemembers and families during all phases of deployment.
    In particular, to address the impact of deployment on children and
    youth, the Department augments Family Support Programs with licensed
    counselors placed in child development centers, schools, and State
    family programs. The counselors provide specialized non-medical
    counseling education, and training for parents, teachers, child
    development staff, and with parental permission, children and youth.
    Given the frequency and length of deployments, and the impact those
    separations can have on military children, the support provided by the
    child and youth counselors throughout the deployment cycle is very
    important.

        5. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, if confirmed, how would you ensure
    those needs are adequately resourced?
        Dr. Rooney. I will ensure funding and trained personnel are
    provided to support the ongoing needs of the families. I share the
    Department's strong commitment to providing assistance to
    servicemembers and their families, particularly in light of the
    unprecedented demands that have been placed on them. Family assistance
    programs serve a critical need in direct mission support for the
    mobilization and deployment of both the Active Duty and the Reserve
    components and I would work closely with the Services to ensure
    resources are adequate to meet the identified needs.
        In meeting the direction and goals of the Secretary of Defense to
    create a more efficient and effective organization, we will continue to
    review and assess where we can take offsets from existing programs to
    meet the high priority requirements and needs of the servicemembers and
    their families.

        6. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, what additional steps will you take
    to enhance family support?
        Dr. Rooney. I will ensure that existing as well as any new programs
    that serve families are continually assessed so that only those
    programs that add value and enhance family readiness and resilience are
    given resources and continued. I will insist that we integrate programs
    into a delivery system that is easily accessible and that ongoing
    evaluations focused on obtaining evidence of successful outcomes are
    developed. Successful support programs are those that respond directly
    to the needs identified by members and their families.
        The promotion and publicizing of these support programs to
    servicemembers and their families are also priorities. It is critical
    to make sure the breadth and depth of the programs are known, that they
    are being used to their full potential, and that they are being
    recognized as valuable to helping servicemembers and their families
    cope with the challenges of daily living experienced in the context of
    military service.
        In summary, it is important that:

        A.  Programs that support our servicemembers and their families
    which are regularly evaluated and have been shown to add value and
    enhance family readiness are resourced and continued;
        B.  Programs that are evidence-based are integrated into a delivery
    system that is easily accessible and those outcomes that respond to
    identified support needs of members and families are measured for
    effectiveness;
        C.  The support programs are adequately promoted and publicized;
    and
        D.  Innovative and effective programs are identified and presented
    as best practices for others to emulate.

                         OUTSOURCING VERSUS INSOURCING

        7. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, regarding DOD's outsourcing and
    insourcing efforts, it seems that the pendulum swings one way and then
    the other. I recently read an article which indicated the Army put
    their insourcing efforts on hold, and Secretary Gates has indicated the
    insourcing is not saving as much money as initially thought. In your
    opinion, how can DOD strike a balance between civilian and contractor
    employees that is in the best interest of DOD and the taxpayers?
        Dr. Rooney. When issues of sourcing are discussed within DOD, the
    goal is to consider it from the perspective of Total Force Management.
    Across the entire Department, it is recognized that continuous
    improvement to the Total Force Management of Active and Reserve
    military, government civilians, and contracts for services are
    critical. We must ensure that our military is not considered a free
    source of labor by organizations within the Department who rely on the
    Services to finance their recruitment, training, and development.
    Rather, the true cost of military, government civilians, and/or
    contracted support should be determined depending on individual facts
    and circumstances. To that end, the strategic view of the Total Force
    continues to evolve as the mission and plan across the FYDP are
    executed.
        Total Force Management requires a holistic analysis and
    prioritization of the work to be done. It requires identification of
    and investment in the most effective and efficient component of the
    workforce to best accomplish the tasks to deliver the required
    capabilities and level of readiness. The separate decisions that affect
    each component of the Total Force must be synchronized to achieve the
    desired outcomes and balance operational, fiscal, and acquisition
    risks.
        The challenge faced with Total Force Management is that it is
    dynamic and requires judgment informed by sound analysis. This not only
    includes the development and promulgation of policies, but also
    requires the Department to provide managers with the tools, resources,
    training, and information necessary to achieve the desired outcomes,
    all of which must occur in a difficult fiscal environment. Current
    business processes must be synchronized to ensure the risks associated
    with decisions made in the context of Total Force Management are fully
    considered.
        There is work being undertaken to improve the Department's
    Inventory of Contracts for Services, as recommended by the most recent
    Government Accountability Office (GAO) review of DOD processes and in
    compliance with changes to the governing statute as directed in the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. The tools and
    processes that inform the Department's inventory of military and
    civilian workload, the Inherently Governmental and Commercial
    Activities Inventory, are also being reviewed. Improvements to these
    tools are critical to achieve a more appropriate balance in the
    workforce, aligning inherently governmental activities to military and
    civilian workforces and commercial activities to the most cost
    effective service provider, whether military, civilian, or contracted
    support.

        8. Senator Begich. Dr. Rooney, how will you approach this issue?
        Dr. Rooney. I will approach this issue by recognizing that there
    has been a focus over the past few years on insourcing. The Department
    is committed to meeting the statutory obligations under title 10, which
    require an annual review of contracted services and identification of
    those services that are more appropriately performed by the government
    workforce and should be insourced.
        There is no prescribed solution, and neither all insourcing nor all
    outsourcing is ideal. The private sector and contracted support are,
    and will continue to be, a vital source of expertise, innovation, and
    support to the Department's Total Force.
        We also acknowledge the concern express by Congress as related to
    the A-76 public-private competition program, and the opportunity in the
    past year to review related policies, tools, and processes. We believe
    that the A-76 public-private competition process along with insourcing
    are critical tools for commanders and managers to have available to
    them for the purposes of validating manpower and other requirements;
    driving more consistent delivery of mission critical support and
    services to warfighters and families; and delivering required readiness
    levels while minimizing fiscal opportunity costs to meet the compelling
    needs of the Department.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen

                            NATIONAL GUARD PROGRAMS

        9. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, the United States has come to rely
    heavily on our National Guard members. Our Guard has experienced the
    largest and most sustained deployment since World War II. In New
    Hampshire, we have seen the largest Guard deployments in the history of
    our State. You mention in your advance policy questions that you
    believe that National Guard and Reserve personnel ``deserve first-class
    mobilization and demobilization procedures, health screening, and
    transition assistance programs.'' If confirmed, what role would you
    play in ensuring our National Guard and Reserve servicemembers are
    extended first-class support benefits--before, during, and after their
    deployments?
        Dr. Rooney. I share Congress' sentiment that our National Guard and
    Reserve servicemembers deserve first-class mobilization and
    demobilization procedures, medical and dental screening, and transition
    assistance programs. If confirmed, I will work with the Services to
    ensure that they comply with departmental activation policy and that
    the policy is balanced and effective. I would support current
    departmental initiatives aimed at providing as much advanced notice to
    deploying servicemembers and units as possible. This will ensure that
    servicemembers receive their entitlements in a timely fashion. I also
    believe that it is imperative that transition assistance be made
    possible to all redeploying servicemembers of the Reserve component. I
    will work with the Services to ensure that pre- and post-deployment
    health assessments are conducted, and any identified medical issues are
    dealt with as soon as possible and in a compassionate manner. I support
    the current policy which authorizes medical benefits to our National
    Guard and Reserve servicemembers before, during, and after their
    activation. In addition, I fully support the Yellow Ribbon
    Reintegration Program that provides access to services and information
    for our National Guard and Reserve servicemembers and their families
    throughout the deployment cycle. I am aware that there are a number of
    State-sponsored programs that exemplify innovative and effective
    support programs for National Guard and Reserve members throughout the
    cycle. I am interested in learning more about these initiatives and
    finding ways to emulate and integrate these best practices on a wider
    scale. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to ensure
    that our National Guard and Reserve servicemembers receive the benefits
    they deserve as they are activated in support of the defense of this
    Nation.

        10. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, I'm especially concerned about the
    unique challenges and factors that affect our returning National Guard
    members as they reintegrate back to their jobs, homes, and families.
    Oftentimes, our State's National Guard leadership has a better
    understanding of the unique support needed on a State-by-State basis,
    and--in some States like New Hampshire--they have developed their own
    effective full-cycle deployment support programs. Will you commit to
    working closely with individual States and their National Guard
    leadership in order to develop the most effective, first-class programs
    you mention in your testimony?
        Dr. Rooney. Yes. Understanding the unique needs and ensuring the
    effective reintegration of our National Guard and Reserve
    servicemembers back into their families, communities, and jobs is one
    of our most important responsibilities. The Department's Yellow Ribbon
    Reintegration Program has been effective at addressing many of the
    issues that confront our returning warriors and their families and I am
    aware of some of the successful programs developed by individual
    States. I am committed to working with the broad array of Federal,
    State, and community programs and services to most effectively meet the
    needs of our National Guard and Reserve servicemembers and their
    families.

                               SUICIDE PREVENTION

        11. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, each of the Services has reported
    increasing numbers of suicides in recent years. If confirmed, what role
    would you play in shaping DOD policies to help prevent suicides not
    only to Active Duty personnel, but also to National Guard and Reserve
    servicemembers and their families?
        Dr. Rooney. If confirmed, I would play a very active role. I have
    read the DOD Task Force Report on Suicide Prevention and found it to be
    thorough. I am impressed with the quality of the programs that each of
    the Services is currently employing and the active role that the
    Services' senior leaders play in the effort to prevent suicides among
    their respective members. There is still more that can be done,
    however. I believe that a single entity in the Department that would
    serve as a consistent policy and oversight authority DOD-wide, which
    would include the National Guard and Reserve, could disseminate
    information and interact with other departments, agencies, or
    organizations. This could also accelerate the implementation of key
    policy initiatives. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the
    recommendations which could have the most impact, as outlined in the
    report, were implemented in a timely and effective manner.

        12. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, are you content with the programs
    as they are currently structured?
        Dr. Rooney. While I believe the current suicide prevention programs
    among the Services as a whole are effective, there is clearly more that
    can be done. In early 2000, the overall DOD suicide rate was well below
    the rate of a comparable sample of the civilian population by almost
    half. One of the most promising avenues currently being pursued is our
    increasing emphasis on resilience across the Department highlighted by
    programs such as the Army's Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF). CSF is
    a structured, long-term assessment and development program to build
    resilience and enhance performance of every soldier, family member, and
    civilian employee. It incorporates the principles of Total Force
    Fitness that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have populated across the
    Services. These concepts have also been embraced by the National Guard
    and Reserve Forces so training has been modified to meet the needs of
    this population. I believe the Department's focus on getting out ahead
    of this issue will pay dividends in the future and go a long way
    towards building a formula for resistance, resilience, and recovery.

        13. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, what more can we do to reduce the
    number of these tragedies?
        Dr. Rooney. There are two other areas in which I believe we can
    make some progress. The first is data collection and standardization of
    reporting. I believe that more accurate and timely data can help us
    gain a further understanding of the complex issues and identify key
    leading indicators that we can use to take action before a potential
    suicide occurs. The second area is peer-to-peer programs that use the
    skills of our many veterans to directly interact with those in
    distress. I think this type of personal intervention program has
    significant potential to reach out to servicemembers particularly in
    the National Guard and Reserve where recent data has indicated a
    disturbing increase in suicide rates. Across the States, there are many
    great examples of National Guard and Reserve suicide prevention
    programs, self-assessment programs, and other web-based tools. I
    believe that it is incumbent upon the Department to ensure that we are
    aware of these State-led programs and share the information across
    States so that others can build on their successes.

                     SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

        14. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, in a February 15 Federal class-
    action lawsuit, more than a dozen female and two male current and
    former U.S. military servicemembers allege that incidents of sexual
    assault and misconduct were not adequately investigated or pursued.
    Sexual assault is an extremely grave concern, and all allegations
    should be taken seriously and investigated immediately. What is your
    response to this lawsuit and allegations that commanders are failing to
    respond appropriately to allegations of sexual assaults?
        Dr. Rooney. I cannot comment directly on current litigation.
    However, clearly, sexual assaults have no place in the U.S. Armed
    Forces. One sexual assault is one too many, and leadership throughout
    DOD has expressed this as well. However, when an assault does occur,
    victims are encouraged to come forward using one of the two reporting
    options available to get the help and services they need.
        The Department reviewed pre-command training and has proposed
    revised training standards for the Sexual Assault Prevention and
    Response (SAPR) policy that will be reissued this spring. In addition,
    all of the Service Chiefs and Secretaries of the Military Departments
    have aggressively championed the SAPR program at Service summits and
    through a variety of communication channels. We have and will continue
    to make it clear that commanders have a duty to take every allegation
    of sexual assault seriously, to see to the safety and care of the
    parties involved, and to hold offenders accountable in each and every
    case where evidence supports such action. There is progress being made.
    In cases where there was sufficient evidence for commanders to take
    action and the victim has chosen unrestricted reporting, the percentage
    of subjects who had court-martial charges initiated against them
    increased from 30 percent in 2007 to 52 percent in 2010.

        15. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, what specific levels and kinds of
    training are provided to officers and commanders in the field to
    respond in an appropriate way to allegations of sexual assault and
    misconduct?
        Dr. Rooney. DOD Instruction (DODI) 6495.02, SAPR Program
    Procedures, requires the Military Services to provide periodic,
    mandatory education at installation and fleet unit commands, during
    pre-commissioning programs and initial-entry training, and throughout
    the professional military education (PME) systems. All servicemembers
    are also required to receive SAPR training when they deploy to
    locations outside the United States that includes specific information
    addressing the location's customs, mores, and religious practices.
        The Department conducted Policy Assistance Team (PAT) visits in
    2009 to review commander training across the Services. Overall, the
    observed training met the requirements of DODI 6495.02, and the PATs
    found the training to be implemented in accordance with Department
    policy. However, the PATs recommended revisions to strengthen commander
    training by including concrete examples of supportive behavior to the
    program and the chance to practice skills or answer questions.
        The Services have also worked to ensure SAPR commander training is
    instituted. For example, the Army embedded SAPR training in
    professional military education at training institutions, including
    specific training support packages for pre-command courses and senior
    leaders. Work with Training and Education Command's Ground Training
    Branch produced an Interactive Media Instruction module on SAPR,
    targeting mid-level Marine Corps leaders who may be unable to
    physically attend annual training. The Navy briefs new installation and
    regional Commanding Officers on SAPR at the Navy's Senior Shore Station
    Leaders course a minimum of four times a year. The Air Force provides
    training to all new wing and group commanders five times a year and
    squadron commanders also receive training during their new commanders'
    orientation training. All of these meet DODI 6495.02 requirements.

        16. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, are the levels of training
    currently in place adequate to address this issue?
        Dr. Rooney. As my response to the previous question indicated, the
    Department conducted PAT visits in 2009 to review commander training
    across the Services. Overall, the observed training met the
    requirements of DODI 6495.02, and the PATs found the training to be
    implemented in accordance with Department policy. However, the PATs
    recommended policy revisions to strengthen commander training by
    including concrete examples of supportive behavior to the SAPR program
    and the chance to practice skills or answer questions. These revisions
    will appear in the reissuance of DODI 6495.02 scheduled for later in
    2011. However, the Services incorporated most of these revisions into
    their commander training programs in fiscal year 2010, as briefly
    described below:

             In fiscal year 2010, the Army developed training
            specifically for senior leaders. During fiscal year 2010, the
            U.S. Army School of Command Preparation (Pre-Command Course)
            trained 197 brigade commanders, 542 battalion commanders, and
            195 command sergeants major. In addition, the Army Reserve
            reported training 400 brigade and battalion commanders.
             In fiscal year 2010, the Navy revised key SAPR command
            personnel training to improve response to sexual assaults. Navy
            installation Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARC)
            reported training on roles and responsibilities for 1,807
            commanders in fiscal year 2010, as well as training for 805 new
            command SAPR program points of contacts, 484 new command
            liaisons, and 681 new SAPR data collection coordinators.
             Marine Corps provided command team training on SAPR
            roles and responsibilities to 258 commanders in fiscal year
            2010, which included how to perform commander-led discussions
            during installation orientation for newcomers.
             In the Air Force, senior pre-command training is
            conducted at Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL. In fiscal year
            2010, 122 wing and vice wing commanders and 270 group
            commanders received SAPR training as part of this training.
            Installation SARCs also provided SAPR-specific training to
            3,342 squadron commanders and first sergeants.

        The Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) is
    currently working with the Defense Equal Opportunity Management
    Institute to develop questions for the Defense Equal Opportunity
    Climate Survey (DEOCS) that address SAPR. The DEOCS is a commander's
    management tool that allows him or her to proactively assess critical
    organizational climate dimensions that impact the organization's
    effectiveness. These questions are being formulated to specifically
    assess the extent of knowledge, impact of messaging, and levels of
    skill associated with SAPR policy within military units. While survey
    responses for individual units will be provided back to commanders for
    their use, Service-wide response trends will be analyzed for Service
    strengths and potential gaps in training effectiveness. These
    cumulative survey results will be used to improve DOD training
    requirements for both servicemembers as well as commanders. In
    addition, commander training will continue to receive attention by
    SAPRO in its program oversight role. The Services also review commander
    training as part of their Service Inspector General assessments of the
    SAPR program at military installations.

        17. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, what additional measures--if any--
    would you recommend in order to more effectively respond to allegations
    of sexual assault in the field?
        Dr. Rooney. At this time, the Department is continuing to implement
    the recommendations of the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the
    Military Services--many of which were legislated in the National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. To date, 26
    recommendations have been completed or closed, 61 are in progress, and
    only 4 cannot move forward or are outside the Department's control.
        Some of the 26 recommendations that have been completed include:

             Including the SAPR program in the Department Program
            Objective Memorandum budgeting process to ensure a separate
            line of funding be allocated to the Services.
             Setting forth clear guidance to all commanders that
            their leadership of their commands' SAPR program is a non-
            delegable responsibility.
             Ensuring that Sexual Assault Forensic Examination
            (SAFE) kits are either available or accessible in sufficient
            time to preserve evidence.

        Some of the 61 recommendations that are in progress include:

             Developing standardized SARC and Deployable SARC duty
            descriptions in the SAPR DOD Instruction to ensure qualified
            personnel are appointed to fill these critical positions and to
            clarify roles and responsibilities.
             Directing SAPRO to develop training policies and
            exercise oversight of Military Service SAPR training programs.

                     Note: The Training Subcommittee of the Sexual
                    Assault Advisory Council developed training
                    requirements for servicemembers, commanders, senior
                    enlisted members, and first responders, and are
                    included in the SAPR policy scheduled for reissuance in
                    spring/summer 2011. A Working Integrated Product Team
                    has been established to discuss and address this
                    recommendation in regards to SAPR training for Equal
                    Opportunity Advisors.

             Enacting a comprehensive military justice privilege
            for communications between a victim advocate and a victim of
            sexual assault.

                     Note: The Department has submitted a proposed
                    Executive order that would create a Victim Advocate
                    Privilege to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
                    for formal coordination. This Executive order is
                    currently under OMB Federal Agency review and signature
                    is expected in the coming months. Once signed, it will
                    become part of the Manual for Courts-Martial Military
                    Rules of Evidence and will be included in the Federal
                    Register as a policy change that will extend privileged
                    communication to include all victims of sexual or
                    violent offenses, including domestic violence in all
                    cases arising under the Uniform Code of Military
                    Justice.

        The four recommendations that cannot move forward or are outside
    the Department's control are:

             Establish a Sexual Assault Response Team (SART)
            protocol. At a minimum, this protocol should include that the
            SART convene within 24 hours of a reported sexual assault.

                     Under further review. The Department altered
                    this recommendation to meet the intent. It is
                    impractical to mandate a SART meeting within 24 hours
                    of a reported sexual assault especially in a deployed
                    environment.

             Ensure that victims of sexual assault in training
            environments are provided confidential access to victim support
            services and afforded time for recovery.

                     On hold. All victims are provided confidential
                    access to victim support services. However, further
                    analysis needs to be given to restricted reporting in
                    the training environment and the impact it may have on
                    an individual's progress. The Department developed an
                    action plan to implement this recommendation at a later
                    date.

             Enact a law exempting Federal medical personnel from
            State provisions requiring them to report sexual assaults to
            civilian law enforcement to ensure all servicemembers have the
            restricted reporting option.

                     This recommendation lies with Congress.
                    However, the Department is exploring options on how to
                    otherwise implement this recommendation.

             Ensure the Services consistently implement the titling
            standard.

                     On hold. Military law enforcement
                    organizations already adhere to DOD Instruction 5505.7,
                    ``Titling and Indexing of Subjects of Criminal
                    Investigations in the Department of Defense.'' The
                    Department developed an action plan to further
                    implement this recommendation at a later date.

        In addition to the above, we have received approval to conduct a
    survey of victim experience with the SAPR program. This survey is
    expected to produce a measure of victim satisfaction that can be used
    to assess program effectiveness. This survey is expected to be
    completed in the fall of 2011. Also, as the Task Force was extremely
    thorough in its review of the SAPR program, the Department continues to
    believe greater program effectiveness will be achieved through these
    recommendations.

        18. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, do you believe that reporting
    procedures and policies currently in place are effective?
        Dr. Rooney. The reporting procedures and policies enacted in 2005
    have been effective in bringing additional victims forward for
    assistance and care. While there are many victims that still do not
    report the crime, more sexual assault victims are coming forward to
    make a report and get assistance than at any time in the Department's
    history. However, as more information is gathered, current policies and
    procedures can continue to evolve, further improving victim response
    and prevention of sexual assault.
        Most sexual assaults in civilian and military communities alike go
    unreported because of victim concerns about the stigma associated with
    the crime and loss of privacy. However, civilian research shows that
    when victims report the crime, they are more likely to get care. In
    2010, Department policy, training, and messaging brought forward 105
    percent more victims than what was received in 2004. Restricted Reports
    now account for nearly 30 percent of all initial reporting and increase
    on average by about 8 percent each year. Unrestricted Reports have
    increased on average by about 5 percent each year. The Department
    believes that much of this increase in reports is due to its reporting
    policy and training. In 2010, more than 93 percent of Active Duty
    members received training on sexual assault reporting options, how to
    report, and to whom reports should be made.
        Increased reports of sexual assault do not mean that more assaults
    are occurring. Given the historical underreporting of sexual assault,
    the Department believes that its policies are providing the support
    necessary to bring a greater proportion of victims forward and to
    establish a culture of prevention. This belief is supported by
    Department research in 2010 that found that the incidence rate of
    sexual assault during the year prior to the survey decreased by one
    third since 2006, while the number of reports made by victims actually
    increased. As a result, the Department now has greater visibility over
    the sexual assaults that occur against servicemembers. We believe that
    greater visibility leads to improved victim response, more
    opportunities to provide care, and heightened offender accountability.

        19. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, what more can DOD do in order to
    improve its responsiveness to these serious allegations?
        Dr. Rooney. When the Department enacted its current SAPR policy in
    2005, it created new resources for victims and required specialized
    training for all first responders, including healthcare providers,
    investigators, military attorneys, and chaplains. Currently:

             Over 700 SARCs and over 11,000 victim advocates were
            trained in fiscal year 2010 to assist victims of sexual assault
            all over the world.
             All first responders get annual and other specialized
            training on how to assist and treat victims, including unit
            commanders who receive SAPR program training prior to taking
            command.
             Victims today have greater access to SAFEs, trained
            personnel, and follow-up care than before the policy.
             Most victims who make Unrestricted Reports of sexual
            assault contribute to legal action against the alleged
            offender. However, a few hundred victims each year decline to
            participate in the military justice process.

        While the Department has improved its response system substantially
    by establishing a 24/7 response capability at every military
    installation worldwide, it must continue to improve the
    professionalism, capabilities, and resources of all who support victims
    seeking support. In addition, we must continue to create a culture
    where victims of crime are treated fairly by those with whom they
    serve. This includes our current policy of training all deployed
    personnel, including Guard and Reserve. These efforts take continuous
    time, attention, and resources, as well as patience and resolve, such
    that widespread victim support becomes a permanent feature of military
    culture. The Department believes that its current efforts to improve
    the confidentiality of victim communication with SAPR personnel sends
    an important message that victim privacy will be respected. In
    addition, ongoing efforts to teach commanders how to champion the SAPR
    program will further improve the professionalism of DOD's response to
    this crime. Ultimately, these efforts contribute to the Department's
    strategic priority of establishing a climate of confidence such that
    more victims will want to report the crime.

        20. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, sexual assault has been a
    particular risk in combat areas. In your advance policy questions, you
    suggested that you ``did not have enough information to make a detailed
    assessment'' about steps the Services have taken to prevent and respond
    to sexual assaults in combat zones. Can you provide a more thorough
    assessment of the steps the Services have taken in order to prevent and
    respond to sexual assaults in combat zones?
        Dr. Rooney. The Department has been diligent in addressing SAPR in
    combat zones and must be ready for any eventuality when it deploys
    people into these areas. Over the past 7 years, it has responded
    directly to the special circumstances that impact sexual assault in
    combat zones. A number of specific steps have been taken by the
    Department.
        In 2004, the Care for Victims of Sexual Assault Task Force was
    begun and its recommendations became the framework for the Department's
    SAPR policy enacted in 2005. Both of these efforts focused intently on
    the special circumstances that impact sexual assaults in combat zones.
    Deployable SARC and Unit Victim Advocate positions were created to
    ensure that SAPR services were available wherever servicemembers
    deployed. In addition, a special training requirement was developed to
    give pre-deployment training to individuals before they arrived in
    theater. This training addresses reporting procedures in theater, local
    customs and mores, and prevention skills.
        Following a 2008 GAO recommendation, the Department drafted changes
    to existing directives detailing responsibilities for the commanders of
    the combatant commands in deployed and joint environments.
        In 2009, the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military
    Services visited forward deployed installations that support Operation
    Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Task Force
    recommended that the Department improve access to qualified medical
    personnel to conduct evidence collection, especially in deployed and
    remote environments. The Services implemented this recommendation in
    fiscal year 2010. DOD is also in the process of fulfilling additional
    Task Force recommendations to improve the training of Deployable SARCs
    and establish Deployable Victim Advocate positions.
        In fiscal year 2010, the Department was tasked by Congress to
    report on the current availability and adequacy of comprehensive and
    proper medical care for victims of sexual assault in combat zones, as
    well as the availability and adequacy of post-mobilization medical and
    mental health care for victims of sexual assault in the Reserve
    components. The results of this review were forwarded to Congress in
    2010 and the three lines of action identified from this review are
    currently being pursued.
        OSD SAPRO and the Military Services continue to focus on these
    challenges. In fiscal year 2010, none of the Military Services reported
    any gaps in supplies, trained personnel, or transportation resources;
    reported any cases in which lack of an available SAFE kit or other
    medical supplies hindered care; or had any verifiable reports of
    victims for whom timely access of laboratory testing resources hindered
    care. The Marine Corps reported one case in which a victim had to be
    transported 90 minutes to undergo a SAFE and was addressing the matter
    at the end of fiscal year 2010. Department research since the SAPR
    policy was enacted in 2005 has found that, while most sexual assaults
    occur at one's home station, 25 percent of women and 27 percent of men
    indicated the unwanted sexual contact occurred while they were deployed
    to a combat zone or to an area where they drew imminent danger pay or
    hostile fire pay. This dictates that SAPR in combat zones must remain a
    focus of concern.
        Prevention of sexual assault in combat zones is challenging.
    However, the Department's strategy has been to teach skills and
    techniques that apply universally, regardless of location. The Services
    have all enacted programs that teach Active Bystander Intervention
    skills that enable members to identify situations that are at risk for
    sexual assault and safely intervene before the crime occurs. These
    programs mesh well with the battlefield ethos of ensuring the safety of
    fellow servicemembers, and the Department believes these strategies
    have contributed to a reduction of the sexual assault incident rate by
    one-third since 2006.
        When sexual assaults do occur, the delivery of comprehensive care
    to victims, wherever they are located, requires training care providers
    with the right skills and having the appropriate equipment at the right
    time and place. The unique and unpredictable circumstances in deployed
    environments can make it difficult for SAPR responders to deliver
    comprehensive and consistent care to victims. Tracking victim services
    accurately and consistently can also be challenging in deployed
    environments. Unit rotations and redeployment make it difficult to
    provide consistent assistance once a report has been made.
        The work on both prevention techniques and response effectiveness
    continues. Most recently, at the request of the Deputy Secretary of
    Defense, U.S. Central Command recommended changes to the policies and
    procedures of the OSD and Military Departments that they believed may
    hinder theater operations in a deployed environment. One of its
    recommendations was for the USD(P&R) to issue enduring guidance
    describing the SAPR services a combatant command must provide to
    contractor staff when contractors deploy with U.S. Armed Forces. OSD
    SAPRO proposed revisions to the SAPR Policy that will fulfill this
    recommendation when the SAPR Policy is reissued in 2011.

        21. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Rooney, what additional measures--if any--
    will you recommend in order to more effectively prevent sexual assaults
    in combat zones?
        Dr. Rooney. DOD prevention programs appear to be working and have
    contributed, at least in part, to a decrease in sexual assaults
    occurring annually against Active Duty servicemembers. The incidence
    rate of sexual assault has decreased substantially, according to the
    Defense Manpower Data Center Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of
    the Active Duty:

             In 2006, 6.8 percent of women and 1.8 percent of men
            on Active Duty indicated experiencing some form of sexual
            assault in the year prior to being surveyed.
             In 2010, 4.4 percent of women and 0.9 percent of men
            on Active Duty indicated experiencing some form of sexual
            assault in the year prior to being surveyed.

        This decrease in incidence rate suggests that there were nearly
    one-third fewer incidents of sexual assault in 2010 than in 2006. The
    decrease also reflects the fact that prevention concepts are well
    understood throughout the military community:

             93 percent of Active Duty received prevention training
            in 2010 (up from 88 percent in 2006).
             93 percent of Active Duty believe it their duty to
            prevent harm to a fellow servicemember.

        The Department plans to continue its prevention training
    initiatives as well as its predeployment briefings to servicemembers
    traveling to combat areas about prevention and response procedures
    specific to the area. However, prevention programs used by the
    Department are universal--the concepts taught apply anytime, anywhere
    servicemembers are stationed. The Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault
    in the Military Services also recommended that each installation and
    operational commander assess the adequacy of installation measure to
    ensure the safest and most secure living and working environments. This
    includes installations and forward operating bases in combat zones.
    Implementation of this recommendation is ongoing, and, if confirmed, I
    would continue to support these initiatives.
                                     ______

                   Question Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte

                     NATIONAL GUARD YOUTH CHALLENGE PROGRAM

        22. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Rooney, the National Guard Youth ChalleNGe
    Program (NGYCP) works to intervene in and reclaim the lives of at-risk
    youth by transforming their values and enhancing their skills,
    education, and self-discipline. The program has distinguished itself as
    an effective intervention in the lives of troubled youths. Despite this
    track record of success, I understand that the National Guard Bureau is
    considering a significant reduction in the national training program
    for the NGYCP. What is your assessment of the program and what is DOD's
    plan to fund this program going forward?
        Dr. Rooney. The NGYCP training and education program is a direct
    investment in the ChalleNGe program staff. The aim of the training and
    education program is to improve the performance of NGYCP staff and
    provide a cumulative effect of individual staff performance on cadet
    recruiting, retention, graduation rates, mentoring, and a positive
    placement following graduation.
        Course attendees consistently agree that the course offerings are
    of great value and benefit. Over 93 percent of the attendees report an
    increase in their performance and 85 percent of the attendees'
    supervisors report the performance for those who complete training and
    educational offerings as excellent. In summary, trained and educated
    staff members improve ChalleNGe program's overall performance in cadet
    recruiting, retention, graduation rates, mentoring, and positive
    placement following graduation.
        For fiscal year 2011, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Reserve Affairs provided funding and budget guidance for
    the NGYCP to operate under the ongoing Continuing Resolution. This
    guidance stated that the priority during the continuing resolution
    period is to make the necessary funds available to fully support the
    ChalleNGe programs at the cost share percentage authorized under 32
    U.S.C. 509, and to provide funds to increase enrollment at current
    programs in States that have the fiscal resources to meet the cost
    share funding requirements. Travel and training for the NGYCP staff
    should be considered after core NGYCP requirements were funded. While
    under the continuing resolution, the Department is limited to fiscal
    year 2010 spending levels which are less than the fiscal year 2011
    President's budget request. If and when the continuing resolution is
    resolved, then we plan to review the entire fiscal year 2011
    appropriation for the NGYCP. If the amount appropriated supports the
    President's budget request, then additional funding to support training
    for the rest of fiscal year 2011 will be available.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Dr. Jo Ann Rooney follows:]

                        Nomination Reference and Report
                               As In Executive Session,
                                   Senate of the United States,
                                                       January 5, 2011.
        Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
    on Armed Services:
        Jo Ann Rooney, of Massachusetts, to be Principal Deputy Under
    Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, vice Michael L.
    Dominguez.
                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of Dr. Jo Ann Rooney, which was
    transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
    referred, follows:]
                         Biography of Dr. Jo Ann Rooney
    Education:
             Boston University School of Management

                     September 1979-May 1983
                     B.S. Business Administration, Finance
                    Concentration, Summa Cum Laude, awarded May 1983

             Suffolk University Law School

                     September 1984-February 1987
                     Juris Doctorate Degree awarded February 1987

             Boston University School of Law

                     August 1989-May 1991
                     LL.M. (Master of Laws) in Taxation awarded May
                    1991

             University of Pennsylvania, Graduate School of
            Education

                     August 2003-May 2005
                     Ed.D. (Doctorate in Education) in Higher
                    Education Management
    Employment Record:
             Jewish Hospital & St. Mary's HealthCare
            (uncompensated)

                     Member, Board of Trustees (2007-present)
                     Vice Chair (July 2008-present)

                             System includes primary, ambulatory,
                            in-patient psychiatric, inpatient
                            rehabilitation center, et cetera

                               Approximately $1 billion in revenue

                             Committees:

                               Environment of Care (2006-present)
                               Strategic Planning (2007-present)
                               Investment (2007-present)
                               Management Review (2008-present)
                               Transition Committee (2009-present)
                               Benefits Measurement Committee (2009-
                            present)
                               CEO Search Co-Chair (2009-present)

             Regis University (uncompensated)

                     Member, Board of Trustees
                     2004-present

                             Executive Committee and Standing
                            Committee Chair (2008-present)

             Mount Ida College

                     President
                     July 2010-December 2010

             Mount Ida College

                     Professor of Business Administration
                     July 2010-December 2010

             Spalding University

                     President
                     August 2002-June 2010

             Spalding University

                     Professor of Business Administration
                     August 2002-June 2010

             The Housing Partnership (uncompensated)

                     Member, Board of Directors
                     2003-June 2010

                             Chair of the Board (June 2008-June
                            2010)
                             Chair Elect (2006-2008)
                             Executive Committee-Treasurer (2005-
                            2006)

             Emmanuel College

                     Adjunct Faculty
                     August 1994-August 2002

             The Lyons Companies, LLC (and affiliated companies)

                     Corporate General Counsel
                     Chief Financial Officer (CFO)
                     Chief Operating Officer (COO)
                     Partner
                     September 1994-August 2002

             Maselan & Jones, PC

                     Tax Attorney
                     July 1993-September 1994

             Steams, Rooney & Associates

                     Partner
                     July 1992-December 1993

             CIGNA Companies - IFSD

                     Staff Attorney
                     Technical Manager
                     June 1991-July 1993

             Caprio Law Offices

                     Attorney
                     September 1990-May 1991

             The Codman Company

                     Vice President

                             Senior Property Manager
                             Regional Marketing Director
                             Director of Residential Market
                            Research

                     June 1984-September 1990

             Boston University Metropolitan College

                     Senior Lecturer
                     September 1986-December 1987
    Honors and Awards:
             Beta Gamma Sigma (1983)
             Lock Honorary Society (1983)
             Mayor's Citation for Community Service to the City of
            Louisville, KY (2010)
             Scholar House, Lucy Award (2009)
             Business First, Partners in Health Care Award (2006,
            2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010)
             Today's Woman Magazine, Most Admired Woman in
            Education (2006)
             Business and Professional Women/River City, Woman of
            Achievement (2006)
                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
    nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by Dr. Jo Ann
    Rooney in connection with her nomination follows:]

                              UNITED STATES SENATE
                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                                  Room SR-228
                           Washington, DC 20510-6050
                                 (202) 224-3871
                        COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
          BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

        Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
    more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
    form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
    of your answer applies.

                        Part A--Biographical Information

        Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
    this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
    public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
    any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

        1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
        Jo Ann Rooney.

        2. Position to which nominated:
        Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
    Readiness.

        3. Date of nomination:
        Originally nominated: September 29, 2010; renominated: January 5,
    2011.

        4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
        [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
    committee's executive files.]

        5. Date and place of birth:
        March 23, 1961; Hazleton, PA.

        6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
        Single.

        7. Names and ages of children:
        None.

        8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
    dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
        University of Pennsylvania, Graduate School of Education, August
    2003-May 2005, Ed.D. (Doctorate in Education) Higher Education
    Management, May 2005.
        Boston University School of Law, August 1989-May 1991, LL.M.
    (Master of Laws) in Taxation, May 1991.
        Suffolk University Law School, September 1984-February 1987, J.D.
    (Juris Doctorate), February 1987.
        Boston University School of Management, September 1979-May 1983,
    B.S. Business Administration, Finance Concentration, Summa Cum Laude,
    May 1983.
        West Hazleton High School, September 1975-June 1979, High School
    Diploma, June 1979.

        9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
    last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
    job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
        7/2010-12/2010, President of Mount Ida College, Newton, MA
        7/2010-12/2010, Professor of Business Administration, Mount Ida
    College, Newton, MA
        8/2002-6/2010, President of Spalding University, Louisville, KY
        8/2002-6/2010, Professor of Business Administration, Spalding
    University, Louisville, KY
        8/1994-8/2002, Adjunct Faculty, Emmanuel College, Boston, MA
        9/1994-8/2002, Corporate General Counsel/Chief Financial Officer
    (CFO)/Chief Operating Officer (COO)/Partner, The Lyons Companies, LLC.
    (and affiliated companies) - Waltham, MA

        10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
    honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
    or local governments, other than those listed above.
        None.

        11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
    officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
    or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
    business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
        Jewish Hospital Saint Mary's Healthcare (JHSMH), Louisville, KY -
    Vice Chair, Board of Trustees.
        Regis University, Denver, CO - Board of Trustees.

        12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
    professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
    other organizations.
        American Bar Association Massachusetts Bar Association and
    Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers
        Rhode Island Bar Association
        Florida Bar Association
        Beta Gamma Sigma Honor Society
        Member - Trustees of the Reservations (MA)
        Member - Boat U.S.
        Member - U.S. Rowing
        Member - Hull Lifesaving Museum
        Penn Alumni Association
        Suffolk University Alumni Association
        Boston University Alumni Association
        St. Paul Parish (Hingham, MA)

        13. Political affiliations and activities:
        (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
    any public office for which you have been a candidate.
        None.
        (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
    to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
    years.
        None.
        (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
    organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
    entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
        None.

        14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
    society memberships, military medals, and any other special
    recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
        Beta Gamma Sigma
        Lock Honorary Society
        Today's Woman Magazine, 2006 Most Admired Woman in Education
        Business and Professional Women/River City, 2006 Woman of
    Achievement
        Business First, Partners in Health Care Award 2006, 2007, 2008,
    2009, and 2010
        Scholar House, Lucy Award 2009 (outstanding achievement supporting
    educational opportunities for women and families)
        Mayor's Citation for Community Service to the City of Louisville,
    February 1, 2010 (presented for distinguished and outstanding service
    to the City of Louisville)

        15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
    books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
    written.
        Dissertation Spring 2005 - Navigating in a Building Sea of Change:
    Successful Growth Strategies of Two Private Higher Education
    Institutions, Author: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney.
        April 2009, Association of Governing Boards (AGB) National
    Conference on Trusteeship, ``Board Engagement in Major Academic
    Change,'' Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney and Dr. L. Randy
    Strickland.
        May 2008, Kentucky Council on Post Secondary Education (CPE) 8th
    Annual Conference on the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning -
    Challenging Student to Think Critically and Learn Deeply, Keynote
    Address ``Boomers vs. X vs. Y: Educating Across Generations,'' Prepared
    and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney.
        April 2008, Association of Governing Boards (AGB) National
    Conference on Trusteeship, ``Fostering Active Board Participation in
    Academic Governance,'' Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney and
    Dr. L. Randy Strickland.
        February 2008, Kentucky Council on Post Secondary Education (CPE)
    Adult Learner Summit, ``Best Practices in Retention in Accelerated
    Programs,'' Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney.
        December 2007, Commission on Colleges of the Southern Association
    of Colleges and Schools (SACS) Annual Meeting, ``Reaffirmation 101: A
    Case Study of Spalding University'' Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo
    Ann Rooney, Dr. L. Randy Strickland, Dr. Lynn Gillette, and Victoria
    Murden McClure.
        December 2007, Commission on Colleges of the Southern Association
    of Colleges and Schools (SACS) Annual Meeting, ``General Education
    Assessment ASAP'' Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney, Dr. L.
    Randy Strickland, Dr. Lynn Gillette.
        November 2007, Council for Accelerated and Experiential Learning
    (CAEL) International Conference, ``Demonstrating the Effectiveness of
    Accelerated Programs'' Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney,
    Dr. L. Randy Strickland, Dr. Lynn Gillette.
        November 2007, Commission for Accelerated Programs (CAP) Annual
    Meeting Plenary Session, ``Best Practices in Retention in Accelerated
    Programs'' Prepared and Presented By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney, Dr. L. Randy
    Strickland, Dr. Lynn Gillette.
        May 2007, Educational Policy Institute RETENTION 2007, ``How to Use
    Assessment Data and Accreditation to Develop a QEP focused on Improving
    Students' Math Skills and Increasing Retention'' Prepared By: Dr. Jo
    Ann Rooney, Dr. L. Randy Strickland, Dr. Lynn Gillette.
        April 2007, N.C. State Undergraduate Assessment Symposium, ``From
    Assessing for Accreditation to Assessing for Improvement - The Case of
    Spalding University'' Prepared By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney, Dr. L. Randy
    Strickland, Dr. Lynn Gillette.
        January 2006, CIC President's Institute, ``Restoring the Luster to
    Good Places: Institutional Turn-around Stories'' Prepared and Presented
    By: Dr. Jo Ann Rooney.
        November 2005, Commission for Accelerated Programs (CAP),
    ``Teaching Accelerated Courses or Achieving Successful Outcomes with
    Adult Learners in Accelerated Courses'' Prepared and Presented By: Dr.
    Jo Ann Rooney.

        16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
    speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
    copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
    been nominated.
        See attached list.

        [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
    committee's executive files.]

        17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
        (a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
    conflicts of interest?
        Yes.
        (b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
    would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
        No.
        (c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
    deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
    for the record in hearings?
        Yes.
        (d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
    response to congressional requests?
        Yes.
        (e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
    testimony or briefings?
        Yes.
        (f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
    before this committee?
        Yes.
        (g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely mannerwhen requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
    such documents?
        Yes.
                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
    committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
    forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
    Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                    ------

                               Signature and Date
        I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
    on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
    provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
    and complete.
                                                         Jo Ann Rooney.
        This 20th day of January, 2011.

        [The nomination of Dr. Jo Ann Rooney was reported to the
    Senate by Chairman Levin on March 15, 2011, with the
    recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
    was confirmed by the Senate on May 26, 2011.]

      NOMINATION OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
              GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 3, 2011

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
    SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
    Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Manchin, Blumenthal, McCain,
    Inhofe, Chambliss, Brown, and Ayotte.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
    Gabriella E. Fahrer, counsel; Jessica L. Kingston, research
    assistant; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Jason W. Maroney,
    counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; and
    William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority
    staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; John
    W. Heath, Jr., minority investigative counsel; Daniel A.
    Lerner, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh,
    minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles and Christine
    G. Lang.
        Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Griffin,
    assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to
    Senator Reed; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb;
    Jennifer Barrett and Casey Howard, assistants to Senator Udall;
    Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Joanne
    McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; Chad Kreikemeier,
    assistant to Senator Shaheen; Jeremy Bratt, assistant to
    Senator Blumenthal; Anthony Lazarski, assistant to Senator
    Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde
    Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Charles Prosch,
    assistant to Senator Brown; Pam Thiessen, assistant to Senator
    Portman; and Grace Smitham, assistant to Senator Cornyn.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
    meets today to consider the nomination of General Martin
    Dempsey to be Chief of Staff of the Army.
        General Dempsey, we welcome you here today, along with
    members of your family. We look forward to your testimony and
    to your continuing service.
        America's Army today is as great as it has ever been in its
    235 years of service to our Nation. As we are reminded every
    day, this service continues to come with great sacrifice.
        Our Army remains globally committed and overstretched by
    nearly 10 years of continuous combat. The Army has met the
    challenges of the last decade with courage, determination, and
    professionalism for which they and all of us are justifiably
    proud and profoundly grateful.
        The challenges of the decade ahead, however, will be no
    less daunting. Over the next 4 years, under General Dempsey's
    leadership, the Army must deal with many enduring and new
    challenges. First and foremost, the Army must continue to meet
    the demand for trained and ready forces in support of
    operations in Afghanistan and, for a short while, longer in
    Iraq.
        Thankfully, the U.S. drawdown of forces in Iraq has begun.
    But, nearly 40,000 American soldiers remain there, contributing
    to the continued strain on our troops and their families.
        At the same time, over 60,000 Army troops are committed to
    operations in Afghanistan. Hard fighting will continue, even as
    we and our allies continue to build the Afghan security forces
    so that they may take more and more responsibility for their
    security.
        As adaptable and well prepared as our soldiers are today to
    support missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the future beyond
    these operations holds real questions about what we will need
    the Army to do and how it will be structured to do it. In a
    speech to cadets at the U.S. Military Academy last week,
    Secretary of Defense Gates outlined what he considers the
    greatest challenges facing the Army as it takes on board the
    lessons of the last decade and prepares for the uncertain and
    dangerous world that lies ahead. Secretary Gates argued that it
    is unlikely that the Nation will commit large land forces to
    future conflicts and that the Army must ``confront the reality
    that the most plausible high-end scenarios for the U.S.
    military will be primarily naval and air engagements.'' He
    cautioned that in a strategic environment where we are unlikely
    to fight an enemy employing large armored formations the Army
    will find if difficult to justify the number, size, and cost of
    its heavy armored brigades.
        In a press interview last week, General George Casey, the
    Army's current Chief of Staff, seemed to go in a different
    direction when he said that he expects that over the next 10
    years we will still have 50,000 to 100,000 soldiers deployed in
    combat.
        We look forward to hearing General Dempsey's views on these
    perspectives and how they may shape the Army's plans and
    priorities in the coming years.
        In his speech at West Point, Secretary Gates also said that
    his first concern is how the Army will structure itself--that
    is, its size and the number and composition of its deployable
    units, such as combat brigades--how it will structure itself
    for the missions it is most likely to perform. In restructuring
    itself, the Army must find ways, he said, to maintain its hard-
    won combat-proven current capabilities and invest in the right
    future capabilities within a fiscally constrained environment.
        Budget pressures are already being felt throughout the
    Defense Department. The Department's sufficiency initiative is
    intended to take funds away from less important or inefficient
    programs or activities and give them to higher, more relevant
    current and future modernization priorities.
        As the next Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dempsey
    will need to find ways to deal with the spiraling growth of
    personnel costs. In the face of these challenges, additional
    budget reductions, although still being debated, are more
    likely than not. We are interested to hear General Dempsey's
    assessment of the efficiency initiative and any ideas that he
    may already have for improving processes and systems to ensure
    that we get the most out of every dollar the Army spends.
        More directly related to its force structure, the Army
    needs to begin planning for the end strength reductions
    announced by Secretary Gates in January. The Army intends to
    begin drawing down 22,000 soldiers of temporary excess end
    strength, which was approved by Secretary Gates in the summer
    of 2009, and needs to do that between now and 2013. This
    reduction should not impact Army force structure, as this
    additional end strength was always temporary and intended to
    allow the Army to fill its deploying units and to end the use
    of stop loss that is holding soldiers beyond their enlistment.
    However, the Army also plans to reduce permanent end strength
    by another 27,000 people between 2015 and 2017, assuming
    security conditions are on track with current strategic plans.
        This second part of the drawdown plan should result in some
    reduction of the Army's force structure, likely including the
    elimination of some combat brigades. Although this reduction is
    not planned to begin until after 2014, which would be at the
    back end of General Dempsey's tenure as Army Chief of Staff, he
    will nonetheless be responsible, at a minimum, for the
    analysis, planning, and the initial implementation of these end
    strength and force-structure changes.
        The Army needs to rebuild its strategic depth--that is, the
    desired readiness in the nondeployed force--such that it is
    capable of responding to any unforeseen contingency. Strategic
    depth has been sacrificed over the last 10 years by the
    consuming force requirements of operations in Afghanistan and
    in Iraq. In order to gain and maintain the necessary higher
    readiness levels in our deployed forces, the readiness of our
    nondeployed forces has been at historic lows. Although the Army
    continues to meet the demand for counterinsurgency and support
    operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and around the world, and
    despite the amazing resilience of our troops and their
    families, the Army remains stressed in many ways. Given the
    planned Army drawdown, budget pressures, and force demands for
    operations in Afghanistan, we continue to face substantial
    risk, should we need the Army to respond to another
    contingency.
        As the next Chief of Staff, General Dempsey will have the
    opportunity, as commitments in Iraq are concluded, to rebuild
    some degree of strategic depth. We're interested to hear
    General Dempsey's assessment of Army readiness and his views on
    the prospects for its improvements over time.
        The Army needs to continue to rationalize and stabilize its
    near- and long-range modernization strategies and programs. In
    general, major Army modernization efforts have not been
    successful over the last decade or more. But, over the last 2
    years, under the leadership of Vice Chief of Staff of the Army,
    General Peter Chiarelli, and the Under Secretary of the Army,
    Dr. Joseph Westphal, the Army has worked diligently, through an
    objective and detailed series of capability portfolio reviews
    that has started it on a path towards achieving rational,
    stable, and affordable Army modernization strategies and
    programs. As a result of this analytical process, the Army has
    terminated over-ambitious, redundant, or unaffordable weapons
    systems. We're interested to hear General Dempsey's assessment
    of this review process and to share with the committee what
    role he might play in sustaining the momentum achieved over the
    last 2 years.
        Finally, the Army must work as long and as hard as possible
    to deal with the human cost to soldiers and their families of
    the pressures and consequences of an Army in continuous combat
    for 10 years. A high priority of the Army's leadership over the
    last 4 years has been dealing with the stress of multiple
    combat rotations and long separations, the stress on soldiers
    and their families.
        The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army set a goal
    that soldiers in units would have twice as much time at home as
    they would deployed, and that Army families would enjoy greater
    stability and less stress. Also, the Army has instituted
    significant programs for the improved care of our wounded
    soldiers and their families. Despite the efforts of the Army
    and leaders throughout the chain of command, heartbreaking
    incidents of suicide continue in the Active-Duty Force, and are
    now increasing in the National Guard and Reserves, as well. The
    committee is interested to hear General Dempsey's assessment of
    the Army's efforts in these areas.
        General Dempsey, the Nation could not be more proud of our
    Army, its soldiers, and their families. We are grateful for
    your leadership and for your willingness to assume
    responsibility for the readiness and the care of our
    magnificent Army. You are extraordinarily well qualified to
    undertake the position to which you have been nominated.
        We are also grateful for the service and sacrifices of your
    family in supporting you over the years. When we call upon you
    for your opening statement, we would be delighted if you would
    introduce your family who are with you here today.
        Senator McCain.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, welcome, and congratulations on your nomination.
    I'm grateful for your extraordinary service and personal
    sacrifices throughout your career. I'm very appreciative of
    your family and the support they've given to you.
        Since the attacks of September 11, soldiers and their
    families have served under the stressful conditions of active
    combat for nearly 10 years as the Army has transformed itself
    into a modular expeditionary force while simultaneously meeting
    the demands of two wars. We're enormously grateful for the
    sacrifices soldiers and their families have made for their
    Nation, for their units, and for one another. The human costs
    of combat have been great. But, I applaud the efforts of senior
    military leaders in DOD and the Army to provide the best
    medical care possible to respond to the needs of wounded
    soldiers and to assist the families of all soldiers. If you're
    confirmed, there will be no higher priority than continuing
    this work.
        While the cost of defeating al Qaeda and the Taliban, and
    those who would attack us again if they could, has been great,
    Army leaders at every level can take pride in their
    accomplishments. Four years ago, how different the situation
    was in Iraq. I described it then as dire and deteriorating, and
    there were those who declared that the war was lost and we
    should accept defeat. I shudder to think of how the Middle East
    would look today and what condition the Armed Forces would be
    in today if the Army had not surged troops to Iraq and not been
    so decisive in providing the security needed to turn the tide
    there.
        Winning the current fights in Iraq and Afghanistan must
    continue to be the Army's priority, and the next Chief of Staff
    must ensure that soldiers have what they need to succeed. As
    Chief of Staff, you will have to develop and justify your
    vision of what the Army should look like in the future.
        In his speech last week to the cadets at the U.S. Military
    Academy, Secretary Gates expressed his predictions about what
    their future service in the Army would look like. He discounted
    the likelihood of another land campaign like Operations Iraqi
    Freedom or Enduring Freedom, and forecast an Army, in coming
    years, that would most likely engage in short-duration, low-
    intensity operations engaged in counterterrorism, rapid
    reactions, disaster response, and stability security-force
    assistance missions. I'm interested in how much you share
    Secretary Gates' views.
        The budget plan for the Future Years Defense Plan through
    2016 also calls for reducing Active-Duty strength by 47,000
    soldiers. I'd like your views on whether such manpower
    reductions are consistent with the Army's focus on full-
    spectrum operations and readiness to conduct missions of any
    kind.
        Debate about the future missions of the Army is a necessary
    predicate for the weaponry the Army will need to succeed. I am
    deeply concerned by the Army's inability to manage successfully
    its major defense acquisition programs; most prominently, the
    Future Combat System (FCS). With the arguable exception of the
    Stryker, the Army has not successfully brought a major system
    from research and development, through full production since
    the so-called ``big five,'' the Abrams tank, Bradley fighting
    vehicle, Patriot missile, and Blackhawk and Apache Helicopters,
    in the late 1970s and early 1980s. To my knowledge, the Army
    has yet to negotiate the termination cost for the FCS contract.
    As such, the total cost of FCS has yet to be fully determined.
    Unfortunately, this failed 11-year investment in a
    ``modernization program'' has served only to set the Army and
    the American taxpayer back. I'd be interested to hear from you
    how we intend to improve the management and oversight of major
    Army acquisition programs so that something like FCS doesn't
    happen again.
        On balance, the Army can take great pride in its record of
    accomplishment, particularly those of its troops and its
    transformation from a garrison force to an expeditionary,
    mobile, and highly adaptable fighting force. Many challenges
    lie ahead, and the fiscal environment we are in will be very
    unforgiving if we repeat the mistakes of the recent past.
        I thank you for your willingness to take this assignment
    on, and look forward to your testimony.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
        We're delighted that Senator Reed is going to be
    introducing our nominee.
        You couldn't have anyone better to be introducing you. I
    want you to know that, General. You're very well served by the
    person we're going to hear from next.
        Senator Reed.

      STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
                              RHODE ISLAND

        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Levin, Senator
    McCain, my colleagues on the committee.
        It is a pleasure and a privilege to have the opportunity to
    formally introduce General Martin Dempsey to this committee as
    we consider his nomination as the 37th Chief of Staff of the
    U.S. Army.
        I recognize that many, if not all, of you have had the
    opportunity to meet and to work with General Dempsey in the
    various challenging assignments he's held in recent years in
    our Army, particularly his command of the 1st Armored Division
    in Operation Iraqi Freedom, taking a force into the country and
    then being suddenly told to stay longer than expected, and
    doing it with superb professionalism; and then his succeeding
    command as the leader of the Multi-National Security Transition
    Command in Iraq, responsible for the training, support, and
    establishment of the Iraqi security forces.
        Throughout his more than 36 years of Active service,
    General Dempsey has demonstrated the professional skill and
    personal character to lead our Army in challenging times. Our
    soldiers are engaged in two major operations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. The Army has been engaged, since 2003, in the
    longest sustained combat operations in this history of our
    country. General Dempsey recognizes this. He also recognizes
    that his first priority is to support our soldiers in the
    fight. This support requires the continued training, equipment,
    and leadership that has made our Army the superb force that it
    is today.
        Support for our soldiers also means support for their
    families, and General Dempsey knows about Army families.
    Throughout his career, his lovely wife, Deanie, has been
    serving with him, by his side, and together they have raised
    Major Christopher Dempsey, who's currently assigned to the
    Department of History at the U.S. Military Academy at West
    Point, and daughters, Megan and Caitlin, both veterans of the
    U.S. Army. The Army is indeed a family affair with the Dempsey
    family.
        But, General Dempsey also has the daunting challenge of
    shaping a force for the future in a time of increasingly
    constrained budgets. Dynamic change in technology, in
    international economic forces, in international institutions--
    indeed, even the notion of national sovereignty--all of these
    forces, and more, will shape the future and must, indeed, shape
    the Army. They must be responded to with innovative and
    creative proposals, and I am absolutely confident that General
    Dempsey will meet these challenges as we go forward.
        He is superbly prepared to provide this critical leadership
    at this challenging moment. I would urge my colleagues to
    confirm him speedily so he can assume these responsibilities.
        Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.
        A couple of our colleagues have asked their statements be
    submitted for the record, I will insert them here.
        [The prepared statements of Senator Begich and Senator
    Gillibrand follow:]
                   Prepared Statement by Senator Mark Begich
        General Dempsey, the Small Business 8(a) Business Development
    Program is a vital economic tool for Alaska Natives, Native Hawaiians,
    and Native American Tribes in the lower 48. This program provides for
    education opportunities, cultural preservation, infrastructure
    development, and other opportunity for tribal members. The program is
    directly tied to the U.S. Government's commitment and policy of the
    right of self-determination to our first people.
        Recently, the 8(a) program has unfairly been subject to criticism.
    Although some participants have pushed the limits of the opportunity
    provided to them, the majority of companies in the program have sound
    business practices and offer critical services and advantages to the
    Government. Additionally, to address loopholes that undermine the
    intent of the program, the Small Business Administration recently
    released the most comprehensive and thorough regulatory reform on the
    8(a) program in its history.
        A few 8(a) Army contracts have been subject to public scrutiny and
    criticism in the press. Addressing criticism, valid or not, can result
    in restrictive guidance undermining the 8(a) program, or a reluctance
    by contracting officers to contract with 8(a) Alaska Native
    Corporations, Native Hawaii Organizations, and tribal entities.
    However, the program itself is still a valid and important tool for
    Native peoples and for the Government.
        Collectively, contract performance for the services rendered by
    8(a) companies to their customers, including the Army, has been
    commendable. In addition, the contracting flexibility provided to the
    Army under this program has allowed it to address requirements for
    services in a timely and inefficient manner that could not otherwise be
    achieved.
        If confirmed, I request you continue to utilize this program to
    contract for appropriate services required by the Army.
                                     ______

              Prepared Statement by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand

        Admirals Row, built in the 19th century, consists of 11 brick
    buildings built to house high ranking Navy officers located in
    Brooklyn, NY. The buildings, which are architecturally distinguished
    and of historical importance, have been left mostly abandoned since the
    mid-1970s and are severely deteriorated and in dire need of repair. The
    Army National Guard currently controls the property, and has identified
    the Timber Shed and Building B for preservation. The Brooklyn Navy Yard
    Development Corporation (BNYDC), the non-profit corporation that
    manages the Navy Yard under a contract with New York City, has
    expressed its willingness to execute an emergency stabilization of
    these buildings prior to the property transfer between the National
    Guard and the city. The BNYDC would like to begin construction on the
    buildings at Admirals Row immediately, but is currently prohibited from
    starting work because the National Guard will not allow access to the
    site.
        I have written to Secretary McHugh to request that the Army take
    quick action to allow emergency stabilization of the Timber Shed and
    Building B in advance of the planned property transfer, while also
    completing the transfer expeditiously. I appreciate Colonel Presnell's
    response to BNYDC with a promise to expedite the environmental review.
    I want to reiterate my belief that the Army's flexibility in allowing
    the BNYDC to stabilize the buildings coupled with an expeditious review
    and transfer is in the best interest of both the Defense Department and
    the local community.

        Chairman Levin. General Dempsey, the committee has a series
    of standard questions that we ask all of our nominees, and I
    will ask them of you now.
        Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
    governing conflicts of interest?
        General Dempsey. I have, Senator.
        Chairman Levin. Do you agree, when asked to give your
    personal views, even if those views differ from the
    administration in power?
        General Dempsey. I do.
        Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
    any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
    confirmation process?
        General Dempsey. I have not.
        Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
    deadlines established for requested communications, including
    questions for the record in hearings?
        General Dempsey. I will, Senator.
        Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
    and briefers in response to congressional requests?
        General Dempsey. I will.
        Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
    reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
        General Dempsey. They will.
        Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
    testify, upon request, before this committee?
        General Dempsey. I do, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
    including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
    timely manner when requested by a duly-constituted committee,
    or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any
    good-faith delay or denial in providing such document?
        General Dempsey. I do.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, General Dempsey.
        Now we're ready for your statement.

     STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
        THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

        General Dempsey. Thank you, Chairman Levin.
        I do this at my great peril, but I'd like to stray from my
    prepared remarks, just at the beginning here, because I was
    struck by the, I hope, intended symbolism of having Senator
    Reed sit next to me during his introduction, because I've
    always felt as though this body, in particular, was a wingman
    of the Army's. Senator Reed has always been a great wingman;
    that is to say, someone who watches out for you and who helps
    you see yourself in ways that perhaps you're unable to see. I'd
    like to have that relationship with this committee and with the
    Congress of the United States, because, Mr. Chairman, I think
    you and the Ranking Member have mentioned the challenges we
    have before us, and articulated them very well, and we're going
    to have to work together to settle those.
        Chairman Levin. We look forward to working with you,
    General, on that basis, as a matter of fact. Very eloquently
    and aptly put.
        General Dempsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this
    committee today in support of my nomination as the 37th Chief
    of Staff for the U.S. Army.
        Senator Reed, thank you again, and the members of this
    committee, for allowing me to be part of this process. Thank
    you for your unwavering support and commitment to the soldiers
    of the U.S. Army and their families.
        I've known some of you for a decade or more, and I've met
    some of you only recently, in the last few days. I always
    welcome the chance to discuss our national security challenges
    with you, and I sincerely admire what the members of this
    committee and your professional staffs have done to support
    those who courageously serve and are resilient in the service
    of their Nation.
        I'd like to take a moment, as you suggested, Chairman
    Levin, to introduce my wife, Deanie, to you. I know she
    appreciates your kind words about her, too. We've been married,
    as you noted, for almost 35 years. She has joined me in
    commissioning all three of our children as officers in the
    Army, and she's sent two of them off to war. One of them, our
    son, Major Chris Dempsey, is here today.
        Deanie and I have built our lives both within and around
    the Army, and I can report to you that there is no greater
    champion for soldiers and their families than Deanie. If I am
    confirmed, the Army will receive the great gift of her
    continued service with, I must be honest, the occasional break
    to care for our three grandchildren, and soon-to-be five
    grandchildren. She is my hero, and I love her for many reasons,
    not least of which is her shared commitment to the U.S. Army.
        I'd also like to congratulate my predecessor, General
    George Casey, who will soon complete 41 years of distinguished
    service to our Nation.
        I've always considered service in the Army to be a
    privilege. That privilege is even more apparent when our way of
    life is challenged as it has been over these past 10 years. I
    sit before you today with confidence that whatever challenges
    confront us in the future, your Army will respond with the same
    courage and resolve that has characterized it for the past 235
    years.
        You have seen firsthand the superb performance of our
    soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. Less visible, but equally
    important, are the contributions of soldiers currently deployed
    in over 150 nations around the globe. These men and women are
    fulfilling tasks assigned to us in the National Security
    Strategy to seek to prevent conflict by representing our Nation
    and its values and by increasing the capabilities of our
    international military partners. They are Active, Guard, and
    Reserve. We are truly one Army, and we serve America proudly.
        Here at home, we partner with local communities, schools,
    and colleges. Each year, 75,000 of America's sons and daughters
    make a commitment to leave their homes and serve their Nation
    in the uniform of the U.S. Army. In return, we make a
    commitment to develop them as soldiers and as leaders. As
    Commanding General of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
    (TRADOC), I've met with soldiers serving in the very center and
    at the very edges of freedom. I've met with their families,
    living both at home and abroad. I've met with our wounded and
    with their families.
        They are inspirational. They understand the challenges that
    we face as an Army and as a Nation. Their expectations of us
    are as simple as they are profound. They trust that we will
    provide the resources necessary for them to succeed in the
    fights in which we are currently engaged, and they trust that
    we will have the wisdom and resolve necessary to prepare them
    for the missions unknown to us today, but which surely await
    us.
        If you confirm me as the Army's 37th Chief of Staff, you
    can be sure that I will act to earn their trust every day. I
    will work to match their drive, their sacrifice, and their
    resolve. I will partner with the Congress of the United States,
    and this committee in particular, to ensure we remain worthy of
    the title ``America's Army.''
        Mr. Chairman, I want to assure you and the members of this
    committee that I understand the gravity of the task at hand.
    The position to which I have been nominated carries daunting
    responsibilities. I embrace the challenge.
        I want to thank President Obama, Secretary Gates, and
    Secretary McHugh for their trust and their confidence in
    nominating me. I want to thank you for the opportunity to
    appear before you today.
        I look forward to your questions.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General.
        Let's try a 7-minute first round for questions.
        I made reference to Secretary Gates' West Point speech, and
    quoted from it. I wonder if you could give us your reaction to
    his remarks, both the ones that I quoted and any other part of
    that speech that you might like to refer to.
        General Dempsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Gates, in his speech at West Point, pulled
    together themes that he's been discussing with us for some
    time. It's an aggregate, if you will, of the professional
    conversations we've had about the current state and the future
    state of our Armed Forces. It's not a conversation he's had
    uniquely with the Army. He's challenged the other Services, as
    well.
        It seems to me that, in terms of the reference you made to
    his discussions about the heavy force, in particular, what he's
    challenging us to do is to reconsider the way we've
    proportioned our force--the force mix, if you will--and
    determine if that's the force mix that best suits our needs
    today. I don't think he's predisposed to the answer to that
    question. I think he's encouraging us to confront it. As we
    confront it, I think he is challenging us equally to look at
    the institution that supports it and the leaders that we
    develop. My personal, professional judgment, where I sit today,
    in TRADOC, is that we have to become an institution that
    accepts adaptation as an imperative. It has to be part of our
    fabric. Where that takes you is, we might develop an Army
    suitable for 2020 that, consciously, we know will not be
    exactly the Army we need in 2030, because the current and
    future operating environments, as we anticipate them, will
    require an institution that provides what the Nation needs when
    it needs it. I think that the key to that, actually, is the
    development of leaders; so, leader development is job one.
    Systems and processes have to become more responsive to change
    and allow for the introduction, laterally, of changes to
    technology, for example. Organizations, which always change in
    our Army, have to be prepared and embrace change. I think we
    understand the signal we're receiving, and I think we can find
    the answer.
        Chairman Levin. One of the points that he made at West
    Point was his identification of ``ongoing and prospective
    requirements to train, equip, and advise foreign armies and
    police.'' That raised the question, he said, as to how the Army
    should ``institutionalize security force assistance into the
    Army's regular force structure and make the related experience
    and skill set a career-enhancing pursuit.'' He flagged the
    importance of the Army's doctrine on this new advise-and-assist
    brigades, which he said have played the role that they've
    played in the last couple years, which is a ``key role in the
    successful transition to full Iraqi security responsibility.''
        Now, building the security forces of foreign forces has
    traditionally been a Special Operation Forces mission. But, in
    both Iraq and Afghanistan, our general-purpose forces have been
    performing that mission for some time, in the form of those
    Advise and Assist Brigades. I'm wondering what your reaction is
    to the possibility of adding that as a required fundamental
    capability for general-purpose forces, which would require
    additional education, training, and readiness challenges for
    the Army to meet.
        General Dempsey. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I do think it becomes a core competency for our force in
    the future, as part of our effort to prevent conflict. I think
    that we've made some dramatic and very successful adaptations
    at the tactical level in understanding what it takes to partner
    with indigenous forces and partners. I think where we probably
    have room to grow and room to learn is in how we partner with
    institutions, how we accomplish what we formerly called
    security sector reform at the ministerial level, because it's
    not simply enough to partner with international partners at the
    tactical level; we have to ensure that they have the systems
    and the institutions that support them so they become viable
    partners into the future. I do think, if confirmed, that will
    be an area that I would pay particular attention to.
        Chairman Levin. There were plans, some years ago--when
    Secretary Gates became Defense Secretary, there had been plans
    to restation two Army brigades currently in Europe back to the
    United States. Those plans were put on hold when Secretary
    Gates came into office. The Department has now started a global
    posture review to reexamine the purposes, locations, and costs
    of U.S. forces stationed around the world, including the Army's
    combat brigades in Europe.
        Can you give us your understanding of the status of that
    review--I believe you're a part of that review, maybe a major
    part of it--and give us the status of the review and whether or
    not that will include an assessment of Army forces stationed in
    Europe, as to whether we should continue them in the current
    numbers and configurations that they're at?
        General Dempsey. Yes, sir. The study that you refer to, of
    which TRADOC is part, is essentially the force mix and force
    design--how many types of each brigade and what are the
    internal capabilities of them. We are involved in that.
        We haven't made any decisions, because the recent
    announcement of the additional 27,000 has put us back to the
    drawing board, if you will, on trying to understand the
    implications of that and the assumptions we're making about the
    demand on us into the future.
        But, to your point, if I could knit your previous question
    and this one together, the issue at hand for us will be,
    whenever we decide our force structure and its location, is,
    what purpose does it serve, where it sits? I'm a product of 12
    years of the U.S. Army-Europe, and found great benefit in being
    immersed into that culture. I think that there will always be
    reason for us to have a forward-deployed force, both for the
    benefit of our partners, but also for our own benefit. But, I
    think that the size of that forward presence will be reexamined
    as we determine what our future force structure will look like.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Again, congratulations, General Dempsey.
        Prior to the Iraq war, there was a no-fly zone imposed as a
    result of the cease-fire agreement. That went on for, I
    believe, a decade. Isn't that correct?
        General Dempsey. Yes, sir.
        Senator McCain. We did not take out the Iraqi air defenses?
        General Dempsey. Actually, we did, Senator.
        Senator McCain. From all parts of Iraq?
        General Dempsey. This predates my time at U.S. Central
    Command (CENTCOM). I was back in Germany, as it turns out
    during those years.
        Senator McCain. Yes.
        General Dempsey. But, I do recall working on the Joint
    Staff. When there would be issues with Iraqis positioning air
    defense elements south of the latitude that we had established,
    we would attack them.
        Senator McCain. But, we didn't take out all Iraqi air
    defenses?
        General Dempsey. No, sir.
        Senator McCain. Our aircraft were within range of those
    defenses?
        General Dempsey. When they moved into a position that they
    were in range, we would attack them.
        Senator McCain. That wasn't too hard to do.
        General Dempsey. Not being part of it, Senator, I can't
    speak to the difficulty of it.
        Senator McCain. Have you seen media reports that Gaddafi is
    using some of his air assets to attack, or attempt to attack,
    the pro-revolutionary forces?
        General Dempsey. I have, Senator.
        Senator McCain. You have seen that. You might tell Admiral
    Mullen that you've seen that.
        Do you believe that the Arab League and the people on the
    ground in Libya that are being attacked by Gaddafi's air assets
    should be listened to when they are asking for us to see that
    it is stopped?
        General Dempsey. I think that they will have voice, and are
    having voice, inside the government.
        Senator McCain. As a veteran of several conflicts, isn't it
    true that if you tell the enemy that if they take certain
    measures, there will be reprisals--what I'm trying to say, if
    we tell the Libyans and Gaddafi that we are imposing a no-fly
    zone, that is a strong deterrence to many of their pilots as to
    whether to fly or not. We've already seen pilots defect. We've
    already seen a couple of them land in Malta. Wouldn't that have
    a certain deterrent effect on them, psychologically?
        General Dempsey. Deterrence is always one of the options
    that we should have available to the national command
    authority. I will say, of course, that my own personal
    experience is, sometimes the way our potential adversaries
    interpret our deterrent actions is not exactly as we've planned
    it. But, deterrence is a valid option.
        Senator McCain. The perception of Libyan pilots who now
    take off and land and attack pro-revolutionary forces might
    prove rather cautionary to them if they think that we will stop
    them and shoot them down if they carry out those missions.
        General Dempsey. We have the finest air force in the world,
    Senator.
        Senator McCain. May I just say, personally, I don't think
    it's loose talk on the part of the people on the ground in
    Libya, nor the Arab League, nor others, including the Prime
    Minister of England, that this option should be given the
    strongest consideration.
        I'm very concerned about Wikileaks. Almost daily, we see
    some additional revelation of the Wikileaks situation. First of
    all, how did this happen? Second of all, who has been held
    responsible for this greatest disclosure, frankly, of
    classified information in the history of this country?
        General Dempsey. Senator, I can't answer the question,
    ``How did it happen?'' I have been made aware that there's an
    ongoing--you know it as a 15-6 investigation--essentially, a
    commander's inquiry--commissioned by the Secretary of the Army,
    to answer that exact question. I know that the individual
    responsible for the investigation has had a series of meetings
    with Secretary McHugh. I'm looking forward to learning more
    about that, as well.
        To your point about the protection of information, I think
    that this will be a wake-up call for us. We have to go forward,
    but we have to balance our protection of information with the
    competing requirement to continue to collaborate with
    interagency partners on information so that we can be as agile
    as the networks that we fight.
        Senator McCain. To my knowledge, no one besides Private
    First Class Manning has been held responsible for Wikileaks. Is
    that correct?
        General Dempsey. To this point, that is correct, Senator. I
    don't know that that'll be the outcome.
        Senator McCain. One of your major responsibilities will be
    the issues of acquisition. A recently completed Decker-Wagner
    Army acquisition review paints a rather gloomy picture.
    According to this report, between $3.3 and $3.8 billion of the
    Army's research and development budget has been wasted per
    year, since 2004, on programs that were subsequently canceled.
        Do you believe those figures to be accurate?
        General Dempsey. I do, Senator.
        Senator McCain. Let me specifically mention one program to
    you, as I conclude my questioning, that I don't understand, and
    maybe you could provide us with some written response, because
    you may not know a great deal about it. But, the title is,
    ``U.S. to spend $800 million as it leaves MEADS program.'' It
    goes on to say, ``Over the next 3 years, the U.S. Government
    plans to spend more than $800 million on a missile defense
    proof of concept that Army Secretary John McHugh has little
    confidence will even work.'' In this article, it says the
    termination costs would be very high. I still don't quite
    understand why we would negotiate a contract that, if a
    contractor fails to meet its goals and we have to cancel the
    contract, we have to pay off the contractor. Do you know very
    much about this particular program, General?
        General Dempsey. I do not, Senator.
        Senator McCain. Good. Maybe you could provide us with a
    written response after you are sworn in.
        But, this kind of thing--I don't think there are stronger
    advocates in support of our defense spending and our need to
    equip and train our men and women who are serving, but when our
    constituents read stories like this--and it may not be totally
    accurate--but, when they read stories titled, ``U.S. to spend
    $800 million as it leaves the MEADS program,'' I think they
    deserve better, or at least a better explanation, at best.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), Memorandum of
    Understanding (MOU), not the contract, established the terms by which
    the international parties negotiated that the withdrawing partner would
    bear the responsibility for contract termination. These terms on
    withdrawal are normal for international agreements. According to the
    MEADS MOU that we have with Italy and Germany, the Department of
    Defense (as the withdrawing participant) would be required to pay all
    contract modification or termination costs that would not otherwise
    have been incurred but for its decision to withdraw, up to its share of
    the cost ceiling for its financial contributions. The purpose of
    including this provision, during the negotiations, is to make it more
    difficult for a country to withdraw from a multilateral agreement--a
    withdrawal that could really leave the remaining countries in a
    difficult and costly position. This provision provides all MOU
    participants with positive incentive to stay in MOU programs that have
    awarded substantial MOU-related contracts to implement the MOU scope.
    This provision is value neutral in its applicability and protects the
    United States (normally the largest partner nation) from potential
    withdrawals by other partner nations that could have major negative
    impacts on the United States.
        If the United States unilaterally terminated its participation in
    the MEADS program, we estimate our cost would be as high as the MOU
    ceiling amount of $846 million for the United States. Allowing the
    contractor to proceed to ``Proof of Concept'' avoids the expense of
    termination and allows the best use of remaining funds while maximizing
    return on investment.
        Conversely, if the United States and its partners pursue the
    proposed Proof of Concept effort using the remaining MEADS MOU funding
    our cost would be limited to the current MOU commitment of $804
    million. In addition to saving money, the United States and its
    partners would derive substantial benefit in terms of hardware,
    software, or intellectual property deliverables from the MEADS prime
    contractor. This would allow Germany and Italy to proceed into
    production and provide the United States with an expanded array of
    future choices with regard to future Air and Missile Defense system-of-
    systems capability.

        Senator McCain. I thank you, General.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
        General, you, then, will supply an assessment of that
    program and of that issue that Senator McCain has just raised,
    after you are confirmed.
        General Dempsey. If I could clarify. The Senator said,
    ``when sworn in.'' So, sometime after April 11, I will
    dutifully respond.
        Chairman Levin. I will stand corrected.
        General Dempsey. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Levin. After you are sworn in, then we would
    expect an answer.
        General Dempsey. Actually I should say, ``if I'm sworn
    in.''
        Chairman Levin. You are correct.
        General Dempsey. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. We assume that. I'm glad you also do not
    assume that.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I think it's a good assumption.
        I thank you, General Dempsey, for your career of service.
    It has impressed me, as I've had the honor to get to know
    people in our military, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan in
    recent years, that the quality of leadership, really, from top
    down, is quite remarkable. I would set--and I particularly mean
    it in your case--the level of capacity against leadership in
    any other sector of our society. We're very lucky to have had
    you rise to the position that you've been nominated for by the
    President. I look forward to working with you in the years
    ahead.
        I wanted to ask you one question about the ongoing
    situation in Libya, following up with what Senator McCain said.
    I, too, have felt that the no-fly zone ought to be under active
    consideration, premised on a request from the opposition, once
    it established a provisional government, which now seems to
    have happened. Second, of course, hoping that we would have
    allies in that effort.
        I want to ask you about another alternative here, because
    this is an ongoing situation and its outcome will determine, I
    think, not only how the lives of the people of Libya are, and
    whether more blood is shed there at the hands of a truly
    maniacal leader, Gaddafi, but also has an impact on the
    succession or transition to democracy in the rest of the Arab
    world. That's why we're all focused on it.
        Another alternative, obviously, is to try to help the
    opposition and stop Gaddafi, is to provide them with air
    defense systems, and train them in those systems. The question
    of whether we do that is not what I want to ask you about,
    because that has to be determined at a higher level. But, am I
    correct in saying that the Army has had experience in training
    militaries around the world in the use of air defense systems?
        General Dempsey. Yes, Senator. If I can respond to that,
    recalling my experience as the Acting CENTCOM Commander, the
    answer to that is yes.
        Senator Lieberman. Right. While we're considering the no-
    fly zone--and I hear all the concerns about how it would be--
    how difficult it would be to implement another alternative that
    we might provide the Libyan opposition with the capacity to
    defend themselves from Gaddafi's aircraft. I assume that, if
    directed to do so, the Army would be prepared, in your opinion,
    to carry out that mission, to train the opposition in Libya, to
    Gaddafi, in the use of better air defense systems.
        General Dempsey. Internal to TRADOC, we do have coursework
    and expertise in air defense.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
        You're not going to be surprised to hear that I'm concerned
    about the proposals to reduce the Army's end strength, although
    when Secretary Gates was before us, and when he made the
    announcement, it was very clear that this is conditions-based,
    depending on what the demands on the Army are, as we head into
    2015, which is the date when the reduction is supposed to
    occur. All of us are haunted by the phrase ``hollow Army''. We
    don't want to go through that again. We fought hard, side by
    side, in the spirit that you suggested earlier, to increase the
    end strength.
        I want to read to you an answer that you gave to one of the
    advance policy questions submitted to you by the committee. You
    were asked about the possible impact of decreasing Army end
    strength, and the Service's ability particularly to achieve the
    dwell ratio of 2 years at home for every year our soldiers are
    deployed. That was a big motivator for the statutory
    authorization of increased end strength. Your answer was, ``The
    decreases in Army end strength are condition-based, and I'm not
    in a position, at this time, to assess whether there will be an
    impact on the dwell goal of 1-to-2, based on these
    reductions.''
        I want to ask you whether you would say that one of the
    conditions that should be met, before the Army is asked to
    reduce its current end strength, would be a judgment that the
    2-to-1 or 1-to-2 dwell ratio for our Active-Duty Army will not
    be jeopardized by that reduction in end strength.
        General Dempsey. I absolutely agree with that, Senator.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that very much.
        We don't know now whether the Government of Iraq will
    request that any of our Armed Forces remain in Iraq after the
    end of the current Status of Forces Agreement, at the end of
    this year. I hope they do, because I think it's necessary to
    protect all that we've given there to achieve what has been
    achieved. But, just assuming, for a moment, that the Iraqi
    Government did ask us to maintain some number of our Armed
    Forces in Iraq after December 31st of this year, and we decided
    to do so, I assume that would have an impact on dwell ratios
    for our Army and on proposals for reducing U.S. Army end
    strength.
        General Dempsey. It may, Senator. It would turn on the
    depth of that commitment they were asking us to make and our
    assessment of what common interests we have in doing so. At
    some point, there is a bit of science to it. We know how big
    the Army is. We know what we're asking it to do. We know we
    want to have it on a 1-to-2 boots-on-the-ground (BOG)-dwell,
    because of the human dimension, and we can figure it out.
        Senator Lieberman. Good enough.
        One part of Secretary Gates' speech at West Point that's
    received less attention than other parts--and it was a very
    important and thoughtful speech--was his focus, not on the
    Army's hardware, but on the software of training, professional
    military education, doctrine, career management, and
    promotions, so much of which you've had a leadership role in,
    in recent years and overall in your career in the Army.
        I wanted to ask you--I know you've been leading a study on
    the Army as a profession of arms, in your current capacity--
    whether you could give us any of your initial thoughts on how
    the Army can best rise to what I describe as the software
    challenge, particularly the element of leadership, which you
    referred to in your excellent opening statement.
        General Dempsey. Yes. Thanks, Senator.
        It won't surprise you, I get a little advice, on occasion,
    in that regard from the junior officers and noncommissioned
    officers (NCO) among us. Incidentally, in my office calls, over
    here with many of you, I tend to have time to chat with your
    fellows, who, by the way, are just a remarkable bunch. That's
    across the Services. The question I always ask them is, how are
    you doing? How are we doing? What are you doing? What do you
    want to do? Some of your military legislative assistants are
    recently retired or resigned military. I ask them, was there
    something we could have done to keep you in the ranks? I get a
    lot of inputs.
        I like the problem we have. We talked about all the
    challenges we have. But, I'll tell you, I really like the
    problem we have, in terms of the leaders, and even the
    individual soldiers; because 10 years ago, Senator, we didn't
    really know whether we were a courageous, resilient, resolute,
    inquisitive, adaptable force. We didn't know. We hadn't been
    tested. We certainly have been tested over the past 10 years.
    That's the foundation on which we now have to build the future
    Army.
        Our challenge will be that these young men and women have
    had capabilities, authorities, and responsibilities, as
    captains, that I didn't have as a two-star general. I'm not
    exaggerating a bit when I say that. So, continuing their
    development, from that point, a much higher entry level than I
    had, is our challenge. We think there are different
    attributes--inquisitiveness--we think, the ability to adapt. We
    have to line up our evaluation system with these attributes. We
    have to relook at our professional military education, how much
    in the brick-and-mortar schoolhouse, how much can be done
    through these mobile learning devices. We have to find ways to
    broaden these young men and women at places like these
    fellowships.
        We can figure this out. But, what we can't do--and I think
    the message that the Secretary of Defense is sending us is, we
    can't simply--if I can use probably a poorly phrased metaphor
    here--but, if we were a rubber band and have been stretched
    over the last 10 years, we can't let ourselves simply contract
    back to our previous shape, because they won't stand for that.
        Senator Lieberman. Very well said.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        We are setting up a briefing on Libya that we will have
    tomorrow. It will be a classified briefing. We will share with
    the members of the committee, as soon as we have it, the time
    of that briefing.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I appreciate Senator Lieberman talking about the end
    strength and the fellowship program. I was going to ask about
    that, and I appreciate your answers.
        The fellowship program, I see a guy sitting, two seats to
    your left, who was a part of that--the only problem with that
    program: you learn to love these guys and gals and then they're
    gone. I don't know how we can correct that, though. I
    appreciate the fact that we started limiting that program,
    here, about 15 years ago, and it's been increasing since then.
    I would encourage you to keep that trend up.
        Let me say this. Your predecessor, General Casey--one of
    the things I liked and appreciated about him--and I know you
    have those same characteristics, because I've already been
    exposed to them--and that is, he's very hands-on. He wanted to
    know for himself what was going on. Of course, you're
    interested in the Joint Fires and Effects Trainer System
    (JFETS) Program and Air Defense Artillery and some of these
    things that are going on today. I hope that we can continue
    with that. I'm sure that we can. I appreciate the fact that you
    have, in our Fires Center of Excellence and all these things.
        It's a whole new concept, this simulation level that we've
    gotten to right now. People are in shock when they come from
    other countries and see and witness this thing. I'm hoping that
    you would keep that up.
        Do you have any comments about the JFETS program?
        General Dempsey. I think it's game-changing.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes.
        General Dempsey. For the other members, it's a simulation,
    where we can link several different locations around the
    country. For that matter, we can link forward-deployed forces
    and have a common, live, virtual, and constructive environment
    in which leaders can grapple with complex problems, some of
    which are military, some of which are not.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes.
        General Dempsey. We're working to actually impose that
    model on the rest of the Army, at least in the institutional
    force. I think, eventually, though, the next training
    revolution in our Army will be what occurs at home station,
    because we have to raise the bar at home station. But, JFETS is
    groundbreaking.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes, I agree with that.
        Just one quick thing on some of the problems we're having
    that are health-related. We know, of course, with the strain,
    the tempo of operations (OPTEMPO) and all of this, the suicide
    rates, divorces, and all of this stuff that have gone on--and I
    know that we are addressing these but, I'd specifically talk
    about one of them, this traumatic brain injury (TBI). I've been
    interested in this for some time. In fact, the Chairman was
    good enough, at my request, to hold a hearing. We've made
    another request to hold a hearing that would include not just
    the vice chiefs, which is what we had the first hearing, but
    also the medical people, civilians, some of the troops
    themselves. I would like to be able to have such a hearing.
    Would you encourage us to get into the TBI and some of the
    other related problems, health problems that our troops are
    having?
        General Dempsey. Senator, anything that this committee will
    do to remain teamed with us on the issue of care for wounded
    warriors, I will deeply appreciate and completely support.
        We all saw that Frank Buckles, our last World War I
    veteran, passed away, just a few days ago, at 110. The scars of
    this war will be with us for the next 90 to 100 years. Shame on
    us if we forget, when the conflicts dissipate a bit. Shame on
    us if we reflect that this is a long-term issue for our Army,
    but also for our Nation.
        Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that. I don't mean to imply
    that this is having that negative an effect on individuals. I
    spent New Year's Eve in Afghanistan with the troops, and then
    again last week. It's just shocking to me. I was a product of
    the draft, and so I'd never thought an All-Volunteer Army would
    be what this is. But, the spirits are so high, and it just
    seems that, even when the OPTEMPO is high, the spirits are
    high, and we've done a good job. I know you'll carry that on.
        Senator McCain talked about some of the aging equipment
    that we have. General Casey and General Chiarelli have stated
    that we're burning up equipment as soon as we can field them.
    This is something that is a concern of mine. There was a
    statement that was actually in the press, and I'll read it. The
    study of the Secretary of the Army by former Assistant
    Secretary of the Army, Gilbert Decker, and retired General
    Louis Wagner, found that the Army has spent $3.3 to $3.8
    billion annually since 2004 on weapons programs that have been
    cancelled. I am concerned, and you wouldn't know now, but for
    the record, I want to see if that has stopped by now. If not,
    maybe we can address and find out why.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Army Acquisition Review Panel submitted its report in February
    2011, which includes 76 recommendations in 4 broad areas that extend
    across various Army organizations. Those broad areas address
    requirements generation, risk management, organizational alignment, and
    resources. The Secretary of the Army has directed the Assistant
    Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology
    (ASA(ALT)) to assess those recommendations. The ASA(ALT) will provide
    specific recommendations for implementation of those portions of the
    report which are judged to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
    the Army's Acquisition process. That initial assessment is due to the
    Secretary in April. Following that, the Army will determine the path
    forward on implementation of the recommendations.

        Senator Inhofe. On the equipment, and the aging equipment,
    specifically, I've been concerned, as time has gone by--and I
    think Senator McCain mentioned this--and a good example would
    have been the Crusader. We needed to increase that non-line-of-
    sight capacity that we had. The Paladin, that we're using
    today, is the same technology that was there 50-some years ago,
    when I was in the U.S. Army. Now we have a Paladin Integrated
    Management (PIM) program. But, we went through the FCS and--as
    has been stated before--we get down the road to these things,
    then someone comes along and we whack them and start something
    new.
        I hope, and I believe, that you will do all you can--now
    that we have the PIM program--down the road a little ways, that
    we can continue to do that. It's just remarkable that our
    capability with the old Paladin, there are five countries,
    including South Africa, that make a better artillery piece than
    what we're using now.
        Do you have any comments about where we're going to go in
    the future and what you're going to try to keep the
    discontinuation from happening again?
        General Dempsey. Simply my commitment, Senator, to work
    that. I am familiar with the work of Dr. Decker and General
    Wagner. I think it's good work. My own professional view is
    that some of the programs that we aspire to field fail because
    of the time horizon we establish for them. I have been vocal,
    within TRADOC, that requirements determination and the
    acquisition solution to those requirements and capabilities
    need to be taken on a shorter timeline, a 5- to 7-year time
    horizon instead of a 10- to 15-year horizon, because if we try
    to project our needs 10 or 15 years in the future, it's almost
    certain we won't get it right. I think we have some good ideas
    in that report to work on. You have my commitment, Senator.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes. I'm sure that's right. My time has
    expired, but I would only tell you that--I remember the last
    year that I served on the House Armed Services Committee was
    1994--we had a witness that came in that said, ``In 10 years,
    we'll no longer need ground troops.'' You're right. As smart as
    all the generals are, we don't know what's out there in the
    future. But, I would like to get to the point where, no matter
    what is there, our kids have the best that there is out there,
    and I'm sure you feel the same way.
        I look forward to serving with you.
        General Dempsey. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        General Dempsey, welcome.
        Let me follow up on a point that you responded to, to
    Senator Inhofe, in that this 100-year burden for soldiers and
    marines and sailors and airmen who are bearing the fight now,
    it has to reflect not only in the DOD budget, but the Veterans
    Affairs budget. I think you concur. I just want that for the
    record.
        General Dempsey. Absolutely.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        We're talking, now, about the future. That is being shaped,
    or thought about, in terms of several different dimensions. One
    is a changing context: new technologies, social networking,
    climate change affecting the natural resources and will be the
    struggles. That has to be factored in.
        But, the other fact is the traditional threat; what other
    countries or non-state actors have, in terms of weapon
    capabilities and intentions. Can you talk about that aspect, as
    you go forward, of how you're trying to weigh that threat? Does
    it synchronize well with Secretary Gates' speech at West Point?
        General Dempsey. Yes, sir, I will speak to that. It gets at
    the reason--I don't think the Secretary was saying, ``Shed the
    heavy force and invest entirely in the light force and special
    forces,'' because he and I have had conversations, for example,
    about the Israeli experience in southern Lebanon in 2006, where
    a non-state actor, a terrorist organization, was as well
    organized, trained, and equipped as the traditional Israeli
    defense force that was confronting it: shore-to-ship missiles,
    air defense weapons, electronic warfare, advanced anti-armor
    capabilities. I mean really remarkable stuff. So, as the
    Secretary and I--and this is mostly in my job as acting CENTCOM
    commander--but, as we talked about the future of conflict, we
    generally believe that the future will be more a series of
    hybrid threats, where you have to be prepared to confront your
    adversary wherever he chooses to confront you.
        Sometimes it'll be very irregular and decentralized, and
    sometimes it will look a lot like a conventional conflict. So,
    what we owe the Nation is a force that has capabilities
    proportional to what we believe we'll confront but has all
    those capabilities. We need an institution that's adaptable
    enough that if we get it wrong--and, as we've said here
    earlier, we are likely to get it wrong--we have to have an
    institution that is adaptable enough to rebalance itself on a
    far more frequent basis than we have in the past. I think the
    world is a far more dangerous place today than it's ever been,
    and we owe the Nation an agile force that can adapt to the
    future, whatever it finds in that future.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Let me go to another point that was raised in the West
    Point speech; that is, developing, not just an officer corps,
    but NCO corps of expertise and flexibility and agility. Part of
    that goes as a reward structure. Do you have any thoughts or
    comments now about how you're going to think about changing the
    reward structure so that you find people at the upper levels of
    both the commissioned officer corps and noncommissioned corps
    who have a cultural awareness, who have a range of skills that
    are not the traditional tactical operational skills that have
    in the past been the gate to get into the upper ranks?
        General Dempsey. Yes. I will say, Senator, that's really
    been my life's work for the last 2 years, has been looking at
    leader development, really, all four cohorts; and I'll define
    the cohorts as officers, NCOs, warrant officers, and civilians
    as well, working a great deal with the Assistant Secretary of
    the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs on civilian
    development.
        I think we've done some very good work, in particular, in
    the NCO corps. When I came in the Army in 1974, a NCO was very
    likely not to have a high school education. Now, it's the
    expectation that, if a soldier rises to the rank of sergeant
    major, he'll have a bachelor's degree before he gets there. By
    the time he retires, he'll have a master's degree.
        We haven't actually adjusted how we use them yet to account
    for that additional capability. Someone approached me yesterday
    about the possibility of having NCO fellows here in the
    Congress of the United States. You kind of slap your forehead
    and say, ``Why didn't I think of that?'' We haven't really
    adjusted the way we use them. But, I have great faith, and I
    applaud the selection that General Casey made of the new
    Sergeant Major of the Army, Ray Chandler, who will push us in
    that regard, in development of the NCOs.
        On the officer side, and others, we're looking at a new
    personnel management model. You may have heard of the Blue
    Pages in IBM. We have a prototype, on a thing we call the Green
    Pages, that allow an individual officer to actually collaborate
    more on their career development, allows us to understand what
    they're interested in, not just the classes we've given them,
    but we might have somebody who worked in Outward Bound as a
    child or as a military child, spent 18 years in the Pacific
    Rim. We wouldn't know that today, but we'd like to know that.
    There's a number of programs that are out there. Technology
    provides huge opportunities to use them.
        What I will tell you, in closing this question, is, I am
    deeply committed to the development of our leaders, because we
    are likely to get the equipment, sort of right, but not
    perfect, and the organization sort of right, but not perfect.
    We're probably going to give guidance a little late, I've
    found. The person that pulls it together is that leader on the
    ground, and we have to keep committing to their development.
        Senator Reed. Just let me follow up on that and second your
    comment about the NCOs; they are the heart and soul of any
    military force, particularly the U.S. Army. In 1971, when I
    came on Active Duty, the same comment could be made about the
    NCOs' education level, and now they're superbly trained. I
    think you're absolutely on target.
        Second is that, with the advent of social networking--and
    this is not going to be a social network--but I was extremely
    impressed, years ago, when some enterprising young officers set
    up, sort of, Company Commander, Inc. or CompanyCommander----
        General Dempsey. Dot com.
        Senator Reed.--dot com. Is that informal learning--how are
    you going to integrate that into our plans?
        General Dempsey. That's the question that provides the
    greatest opportunities for us, I think, in terms of leader
    development.
        I have to just back up a second and tell you, when I took
    the job at TRADOC, Senator, I found a CD of General Donn
    Starry. Now, he's a name familiar to you.
        Senator Reed. I know.
        General Dempsey. But, Donn Starry was considered to be one
    of the great thinkers of our Army in the 1970s, and helped the
    Army, under other leaders, build to what it became in 1991, and
    even what it is today. But, he had a video--it was one of the
    first VCR tapes ever made in the Army--and it showed him
    walking into a mall in Hampton, VA, and looking at young men
    and women playing video games. He turned to the camera and
    said, ``We know they're in there. They're in there playing
    these games. They're paying for the opportunity to play.
    They're learning something. What we don't know is what they're
    learning.'' That was in 1981.
        I feel the same way today about social networking. We have
    young men and women playing massive multiplayer online role-
    playing games, MMOs as they call them, World of Warcraft and
    others--I mean, millions of children playing these interactive
    games. They're learning something about developing as leaders,
    believe it or not, because of the way these games structure,
    and you have to impose your own leadership into the game.
        We can figure out how to leverage a game like that for
    leader development, linking schoolhouses across the country--
    I'm talking about military schoolhouses. I think we'd be onto
    something in helping these young men and women collaborate,
    meet their desire to social network, and also facilitate the
    kind of learning we're going to need by introducing complex
    problems in that environment, that we can't replicate
    physically at places like Fort Hood, Fort Bragg, and Fort
    Carson. I think social networking has enormous opportunities
    for us.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, General.
        Mr. Chairman, if I may, I think I recognize General Gordon
    Sullivan, the former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army is in the
    audience today. His distinguished service must be applauded.
        Thank you, General Sullivan.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed. Thank you for
    making that reference to General Sullivan.
        We are very much intrigued by your answers here, I must
    tell you, General Dempsey. It's really mind-opening.
        Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        General Dempsey, let me echo the sentiments of my
    colleagues in congratulating you on this nomination, and also
    to thank you and your family for your service to our country
    and your continued commitment to freedom and democracy around
    the world.
        Also, I want to commend you, likewise, on this fellowship
    program, and I appreciate your comments and strong support of
    that. I have been blessed, going back to my days in the House,
    with outstanding young men and women serving in my office. It's
    been a privilege to have a chance to dialogue with those folks,
    one on one, about what really is happening out there which, in
    addition to the great service they provide from a information
    standpoint, personal-wise, they're just such an asset. It's a
    very valuable program.
        I want to go back to the question that Chairman Levin asked
    you about, on this decision regarding personnel serving in
    Europe. You'll recall, a couple years ago, a decision was made
    to put three brigades back in the continental United States,
    one at Fort Bliss, one at Fort Carson, one at Fort Stewart. I'm
    not sure how the decision can be characterized as a reversal,
    putting on hold, or whatever. But, I'd like for you to
    characterize exactly where that is. What kind of importance is
    that decision being given in your current discussions, relative
    to what's going to happen, as far as bringing troops back from
    Europe? Lastly, what's your timetable on that study?
        General Dempsey. Yes, thank you, Senator.
        We, at one point, were going to build 76 brigade combat
    teams. We took a decision--the Department did--that we would
    build only out to 73, and we held the 4 brigades in Europe,
    pending the outcome of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan,
    because we had them--all of the Army, on such a 1-to-1 BOG-
    dwell ratio that it would have been too disruptive to move
    them, under that situation.
        Now we're looking at absorbing, potentially, the 27,000
    reduction, and it is inevitable, as Chairman Levin said, that
    there will have to be some structural changes to account for
    that 27,000. The analysis is just really beginning on that, and
    I haven't been made privy to it.
        If confirmed, of course, that will come to the Chief and to
    the Secretary of the Army to determine which brigades are
    essentially the billpayers for that 27,000 end strength. I'm
    not suggesting it will be all brigade combat teams. It'll have
    to be some portion of the entire Army, to include the
    generating force. I think the timeline for that is probably the
    analysis over the next 6 months, because it'll be executed in
    the--in Program Objective Memorandum 13-17 and the timeline for
    our submission of 13-17 is on or about July 1. That's about the
    timeframe for this analysis.
        Senator Chambliss. Okay. While impressive gains in security
    have been made throughout the country of Iraq, Iraq still
    remains a very dangerous place to live, travel, and work in
    2011. Targeted assassinations, corruption, and Iraqi security
    force, medical, logistical, planning, and transportation
    shortcomings continue to undermine the Iraqi Government
    security and infrastructure improvement efforts throughout the
    country. The security of their oil fields, pipelines, and
    terminals, while also much improved, remain a critical
    vulnerability and a prime target of insurgent forces.
        As U.S. forces withdraw from Iraq, the Department of State
    will have to act quickly to significantly increase their
    security footprint in Iraq so that their diplomats can maintain
    a significant construction presence in Iraq for years to come,
    a job required sustained oversight engagement to watch over
    what remains of the $58 billion in U.S. construction programs.
    While that ability to find, vet, and hire so many professional
    security personnel in such a short period is by no means a
    certainty, neither is continued stability in Iraq. As we're
    seeing throughout the Middle East right now, there is all kinds
    of instability regarding neighbors to Iraq.
        My question is, with this sustained instability throughout
    the Muslim world, is the withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces
    from Iraq at the end of this year still the right thing to do?
        General Dempsey. I can't speak to whether it's the right
    thing to do for Iraq. I think that's the piece of this,
    Senator, that we would have to examine.
        We certainly have interests in Iraq and in the broader
    region. It will have to be determined whether Iraq's interests
    and ours will be matched, and that part of that match will be
    additional force structure remaining in Iraq. I mean, that's
    very much a negotiation that will have to occur between the two
    sovereign nations.
        I will say that some forward presence--U.S. military
    presence, but, even more specifically, U.S. Army presence--in
    that region is important to me. I think that's a very important
    region of the world, and will be, for the foreseeable future,
    and I am advocate of a forward presence there.
        Senator Chambliss. There's also been some preliminary
    discussion and conversation about, when it becomes time to
    leave Afghanistan, that we may leave that country from a combat
    standpoint, but that we will establish at least one base in
    Afghanistan. What's your thought, with reference to that issue?
        General Dempsey. I haven't been made aware of that
    planning. I'm not surprised that someone is--someone should be,
    in fact, looking beyond the date 2014, which is the commitment
    we've made with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies
    to provide the kind of support, and to be in the lead. I'm not
    surprised folks are beginning to look beyond that to determine
    what is our long-term interest there.
        I think the answer to that question, Senator, very similar
    to the one I gave vis-a-vis the Arabian Peninsula. We are very
    closely partnered with Pakistan and have some shared interests.
    We are currently in Afghanistan and have shared interests. How
    those interests are managed over time, I think, will be
    dependent upon how the situation on the ground plays out in the
    next 3 or 4 years.
        Senator Chambliss. As my time has expired, General, thanks
    again for your service. We look forward to continuing to work
    with you in your new role.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Again, General Dempsey, thank you for your service, and
    your family, for their service, as well.
        On a visit to Iraq, you and I spent time talking about how
    you were able to take the processes and procedures of
    acquisition of the U.S. military and use that to make
    acquisitions for the Iraqi military, recognizing that, in the
    absence of those processes and procedures--acquisition
    procedures in the Iraqi Government--they were basically
    incapable of getting all the money spent in the right way, 100
    percent for the acquisitions. By doing that, using Iraqi money,
    you were able to acquire their military material for their
    needs. I thought that was novel at the time. It also showed me
    that there was a recognition by the Iraqi Government that their
    responsibility was clearly theirs, not just simply the United
    States, to provide for the cost of their defense.
        As we look toward leaving in December 2011, there is a
    possibility that we're going, as you and I discussed, that the
    Iraqis are able to provide for their own defense, but they
    might decide that they need continuing support for their
    defense. We understand. If they can't defend, they can't
    govern. Self-defense and self-governance go hand-in-glove.
        What I'm getting to is, they're facing deficits in their
    budgets, as we're facing deficits in our budgets. On a relative
    basis, I would take theirs over ours. My point is, can we look
    to ways in negotiating anything, if we're going to stay and
    provide assistance, where they can pick up a bigger share of
    the cost so that the American taxpayer doesn't end up picking
    up a bigger share of the cost?
        General Dempsey. Senator, I think General Lloyd Austin,
    who's in Iraq--would be better positioned to answer whether
    they----
        Senator Nelson. Well, I asked him, too.
        General Dempsey. Oh, you did?
        Senator Nelson. Yes.
        General Dempsey. I probably should have read their answer
    before I tried to hazard a guess at my own.
        As I said in an earlier answer, Senator, I think this is
    all about identifying our common interests, and then
    challenging each of us to invest in those common interests. I
    think that the proposal would be absolutely appropriate.
        Senator Nelson. You may very well be, in your new position,
    when not only the Iraqi war winds down, but also perhaps, if
    we're so fortunate, that we would see a reduction in the level
    of activity and the costs associated with Afghanistan.
        While the Army is always engaged in planning, do you
    believe that we will be in a position to start looking towards
    some planning for a reduction in forces in Afghanistan? I know
    this is something we're going to ask General Petraeus, when
    he's here. But, from your standpoint, if that decision is made,
    that we are going to reduce forces, that you will take that
    into consideration, looking at our continuing end strength
    needs, as well as the rest of the military needs, to support
    the kind of defense that Secretary Gates has been talking
    about.
        General Dempsey. Senator, you will consider me for
    confirmation both as the Chief of Staff of the Army, but also
    as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and that last point
    there is the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs, to balance our
    commitments around the world for our national security. If
    confirmed, I'll absolutely take that obligation to heart.
        Senator Nelson. If we do that, how will this affect the
    current situation, where we're looking to draw down 27,000
    troops from the Army? By 2014, will that be reevaluated, do you
    believe? Will that have constant reevaluation, or is that a
    date set and a goal that just must be achieved, or will that
    have to be constantly reevaluated in the days ahead?
        General Dempsey. I consider it to be the latter case,
    Senator, where the assumptions on which those decisions were
    made need to be reevaluated as we see what occurs with Iraq,
    post-December 11, and what occurs with Afghanistan post-2014.
        Senator Nelson. Now I'm really going to test you on what
    our Chairman said at the beginning, about giving your opinion,
    no matter how it might shape up with other opinions with your
    colleagues.
        Chairman Levin. He's not confirmed yet, though. [Laughter.]
        Senator Nelson. That's true. You can tell me anything----
        Chairman Levin. But, we still expect that of you.
        Senator Nelson. We still expect it.
        Chairman Levin. Yes, I support Senator Nelson.
        General Dempsey. Thank you for your first response,
    Chairman Levin. [Laughter.]
        Senator Nelson. If confirmed as the Army Chief of Staff,
    can we expect that you would be a very strong advocate for our
    National Guard?
        General Dempsey. That's an easy one, Senator. Absolutely.
        Senator Nelson. Now the tough one. Do you believe that the
    Chief of the National Guard Bureau should become a member of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff? That's the tougher one.
        General Dempsey. Yes. It's tough, only because I haven't
    thought about it. I have learned, long ago, not to render an
    opinion about something I haven't thought about. What you can
    count on me to be is openminded about that.
        Senator Nelson. I hope that you will be openminded about
    it. The Guard has established itself as an operational force,
    no longer as a supply force. It's operational. It's not on the
    shelf, ready to go. It's active, as active as the Active Duty
    military. I would hope that you would consider that. Keep an
    open mind, but consider it. I'm going to keep pushing for it,
    because I think the importance of the role that the Guard has
    now taken is something that needs to be at the table all the
    time. Getting a four-star in charge of it was step number one.
    But, step number two, as a full partner, I think, involves
    being a member of the Joint Chiefs. I know it's touchy, but I
    hope that you and your colleagues will look very carefully at
    that.
        General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you, and good luck.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Ayotte.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Dempsey, I want to thank you for your distinguished
    service to our country.
        I also want to thank your wife, Deanie, and your son,
    Christopher. It's wonderful to have a military family here. The
    sacrifices that your entire family has made, we're deeply
    appreciative of.
        I welcomed the opportunity, also, to sit down with you
    yesterday.
        I want to take this moment just to express my deep
    condolences to the families of the Air Force members who were
    killed yesterday in Germany on their way to Afghanistan. I
    think it reminds us that we continue to be at war with
    terrorists, and the difficulties that we face, and also the
    sacrifices that our servicemen are making across the branches
    on behalf of our freedom and democracy in the world.
        General Dempsey, in your answers to the advance policy
    questions, you state that the significant increase in the
    number of soldier suicides is of greatest concern to you, and I
    share your concerns. With the number of suicides in the
    National Guard rising to especially troubling levels, I share
    your goal of reducing those suicides. In particular, as we
    discussed yesterday, in New Hampshire we have the National
    Guard's Deployment Cycle Program which I believe is the model
    program, because we not only need to make sure that programs
    are in place for the full deployment cycle for our Active Duty
    members, but also, we've asked so much of our guardsmen and -
    women in the Reserve to make sure that we are taking care of
    our soldiers when they come home from the Guard, as well. This
    program is a highly effective and fiscally responsible
    initiative. It's really a public-private partnership that I
    think is unique across the country.
        Yesterday, Senator Shaheen and I wrote a letter to Admiral
    Mullen, urging him to take a close look at this program, and
    also to support this program. We have seen the program work to
    help on retention, to help with the many issues and challenges
    that our guardsmen and -women face when they return from duty,
    and also when they are going to duty, as well their families. I
    would ask you--and I will provide you with a copy of this
    letter--for your support for this program, and for you to take
    a close look at it. I think it's a model for other States
    across the country, and very important that we not lose sight
    of our soldiers when they come home. Particularly in the Guard,
    when we've asked so much more of the Guard, with multiple
    deployments, than we have historically, that we make sure that
    those programs are in place.
        I just wanted to get your thoughts on what you envision,
    going forward, in addressing our guardsmen and -women and the
    deployment cycle support for them.
        General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator. Thank you for, by the
    way, your role as the spouse of an air national guardsman. I
    know you've been through a couple of deployments, as well.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
        General Dempsey. You speak with great authority and
    experience in that regard.
        I have already passed to my staff, as the TRADOC commander,
    the task to look at that program you mentioned to me yesterday.
        In general, though, I'll tell you that we continue to learn
    as we go. We've been reminded, recently by some of those
    statistics, other kinds of trends within the force, of the
    accruing effects of 10 years of war. The Guard presents a
    unique problem, because they don't come back to a central
    location. They come back, they spend a brief period of time,
    and then they dissipate, sometimes within a single State,
    sometimes within 10 or 15 States. I can assure you, at this
    point, that we are beginning to grapple with understanding the
    problem, and we will partner with you and others to solve the
    problem. Because, it's one, again, that will be with us for
    some time.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you. I very much appreciate that, and
    look forward to working with you on solving that problem, which
    is so important in supporting not only our Active Duty troops,
    but our guardsmen and -women, and Reserve, who we're asking so
    much of them at this time.
        General Dempsey, Chairman Mullen has also stated his belief
    that the national debt represents a preeminent threat to our
    national security. Do you share that concern?
        General Dempsey. I do, Senator. The instruments of national
    power--diplomatic, military, and economic--have to be in
    balance for us to be the power we need to be.
        Senator Ayotte. If we don't restore fiscal sanity to
    Washington and reduce our national debt, one of the concerns
    that I have is that the rising debt payments will begin to
    significantly crowd out the finances we have to be able to
    protect our Nation and its interests and, obviously, to fill
    our commitment to our Active Duty troops and to our veterans,
    who have sacrificed so much for us.
        I would ask you, as the--hopefully--new Chief of the Army,
    to look at two things, and also to get your thoughts on it. One
    is the recently released March Government Accountability Office
    (GAO) report. In that report, the GAO found that there were
    instances of duplication and waste among the branches, where
    the branches could better coordinate, where there were
    redundancies on areas of equipment and areas where we could
    work together to reduce costs. Have you had a chance to review
    that report yet?
        General Dempsey. No, I haven't reviewed the actual report,
    but I have seen the reporting on it.
        Senator Ayotte. I would ask you to review that report and
    look for ways to implement some of the recommendations that are
    made in that report so that we can reduce those duplications
    and make sure that we are using taxpayer dollars as effectively
    as possible, given the great challenges that we face right now.
        General Dempsey. I will.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you. I also wanted to follow up on
    the comments that Senator McCain made about the acquisition
    programs in the Army. We've seen, in some instances, where
    there have been billions of dollars that programs have been
    canceled, programs have been broken. How do you plan to address
    acquisition in a way that uses taxpayer dollars more wisely?
    Hopefully we can see some cost savings from that, as well.
        General Dempsey. Senator, we have to. We can't continue to
    hemorrhage resources that you'll be increasingly challenged to
    help provide.
        I think that the Decker-Wagner report gives an aperture
    through which to look at this issue much more seriously.
        One of the earlier comments was about these things called
    ``capability portfolio reviews''. I think you're familiar with
    them. The capability portfolio review process is really senior
    leadership of the Army, personified now as the Vice Chief of
    Staff of the Army himself, Pete Chiarelli--bringing together
    the requirement side of the house and the acquisition side of
    the house periodically to do exactly what you're talking about.
    I think the first step, in answering your question, is to
    institutionalize those capability portfolio reviews and then to
    take the Decker-Wagner report and implement it, or at least
    determine which pieces of it should be implemented.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much, General.
        My time is up. I want to again commend you and your family
    for your service. I look forward to working with you to make
    sure that you have the equipment that you need, but also on
    these issues of where we can save taxpayer dollars and do
    things more effectively and more efficiently.
        General Dempsey. Thank you.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
        Senator Udall.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Before, General, I direct some comments and questions your
    way, I want to associate myself with the remarks of the Senator
    from New Hampshire. She's on point. The Senate, right now,
    seems to be the one institution here in Washington that's
    really working on a long-term deficit and debt-reduction plan.
    A broke country is a weak country. We have some serious work to
    do. DOD can help us get the job done.
        You've talked about dwell time, General, and you know that,
    under the current Army force generation cycle, we're not able
    to provide the goal of 2 years at home. My question is, since
    the quantity of time at home station is limited, what steps
    would you take, as Chief, to improve the quality of time at
    home for soldiers?
        General Dempsey. That's a interesting way to put it,
    Senator. I haven't heard it phrased that way, but it's worth
    thinking about.
        Senator Udall. I have great staff, General.
        General Dempsey. Any of them behind you?
        Senator Udall. Yes.
        General Dempsey. Okay. Good.
        Senator Udall. He's a retired Army helicopter pilot.
        General Dempsey. Ah, a retired helicopter pilot. I might
    have known. I'm surrounded by helicopter pilots here, it seems.
        Senator, just before I talk about the quality issue, I
    don't want to walk away from the absolute imperative of the
    quantity issue, because every study we can possibly get our
    hands on suggests that it takes at least 2 years to fully
    recover from the experience that a young man or woman will have
    in a forward-deployed combat environment. So, it is quantity. I
    have to remain firmly committed to it.
        In terms of the quality, the issue, for me, is to
    determine--it's back to this best practices. There are some
    remarkable practices out there, some of which, by the way, we
    saw in effect at Fort Carson, CO, in a recent visit there. We
    have centers of excellence in different programs. One program,
    in particular, ties it together, called the ``Comprehensive
    Soldier Fitness Program,'' that has to be extended, and is
    being extended, into families, how to make families more
    resilient, right from the start of their service, not waiting
    until some crisis comes their way.
        But, what we're trying to do is take the best of ideas out
    there, and share them and institutionalize them, because some
    of the family care programs have been like a thousand flowers
    blooming. With good intentions, we've wanted to do as much as
    we could. Now we're in a position where we've seen a thousand
    things; we need to decide which 50 of them actually have the
    impact we're seeking. We need to invest in those to get at the
    quality issue you're talking about. That work is ongoing,
    generally through our Installation Management Command,
    commanded by Lieutenant General Ricky Lynch, but also in
    partnership with the Assistant Secretaries of the Army.
        Senator Udall. I think that fits into, I don't know if
    you've put this in a doctrine or not, but I think you have the
    rule of 5 versus the lure of 55. I hear you voicing that same
    kind of an approach to this.
        If I might, let me turn to a question of Civ-Mil jointness,
    if you will. We're asking our soldiers to be diplomats,
    ambassadors, trainers, and negotiators--even have an eye for
    business cycles and dynamics--in all these theaters in which
    they're deployed. They come back as experts in areas we never
    could have envisioned a few years ago. I'm wondering how we can
    ensure that they share what they've learned with other agencies
    before and after future combat rotations. Is there any joint
    predeployment training with nonmilitary agencies, like the
    State Department, at the National Training Centers? Would you
    see any value in such training?
        General Dempsey. First of all, absolutely, Senator. We are
    doing a good bit of it now. We jointly train the Provincial
    Reconstruction Teams (PRT), for example, that are forward-
    deployed. We train with them. To the extent we can, we try to
    get them, as well, to go through our mission readiness
    exercises with deploying brigades. Now, sometimes, because
    those other agencies of government are one deep at many of the
    skilled positions, unlike us, they can't make that training.
    But, we never deploy either a PRT or a brigade combat team
    without some of that training. Could and should we do more?
    Yes.
        Second, in the educational system of our Army, we have
    several programs. I'll mention one. We have a interagency
    fellowship program at the Command and General Staff College at
    Fort Leavenworth, KS, where we take young Army officers who
    have gone through an abbreviated Command and General Staff
    College course, and we'll put them into an agency of
    government--U.S. Agency for International Development, the
    Department of State, Department of Commerce, Department of
    Transportation--displacing one of their folks; that allows that
    person, then, to come to Fort Leavenworth and go through the
    10-month Command and General Staff college experience. We have
    about 20 of them out there now. We have the capacity to take
    36.
        But, those are the kind of programs I think we need to take
    a look at in the future, as well.
        Senator Udall. That would be a fantastic way to take
    advantage of that investment we've made. I know those soldiers
    are keen to share what they've learned.
        By the way, I wanted to comment on your comments about the
    NCO-in-residence opportunity here. I had the great privilege of
    having Master Sergeant Rubio serve for a year in my office in
    the first year of the NCO fellowship. It was phenomenal. I want
    to just underline the importance of that approach.
        Let me, in my remaining time, move to energy. DOD's been
    leading the way in the development of renewable energy programs
    that will reduce the force's need for fossil fuels. It's first
    and foremost about security. We know that many of the grievous
    injuries in theater, delivered by improvised explosive devices,
    are aimed at supply convoys and the like.
        The Marine Corps has set up what they're calling an
    experimental forward operating base in California. They're
    working with private industry to develop and test solar cells,
    batteries, and other products. Then they've taken the most
    promising approaches to Afghanistan, and they've cut their fuel
    consumption in the process.
        Do you have plans, in the Army, to look at this
    Expeditionary Forward Operating Base model. If you don't, what
    can we do to help make that a reality?
        General Dempsey. No, we do, Senator.
        All the technological advances that we're introducing into
    the force all put an increasing demand on the generation of
    power. So, we have a capabilities-based assessment on the issue
    of power.
        There's sort of a joke in Afghanistan: You can follow a
    U.S. Army unit through the mountains of Afghanistan by the
    trail of batteries they shed, because of the power requirement
    that all of these systems require.
        We have a study in place--a capabilities-based assessment--
    to try to determine how we can meet those power demands and
    become more self-sustaining. The aspiration is to eventually,
    in the out years, develop the capability to have a self-
    sustaining brigade that can produce its own water, its own
    power, its own energy. We're a long way from that, but that's
    the right question to be asked to those that partner with us,
    like Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, U.S. Army
    Research, Development, and Engineering Command, even the
    private sector, to try to help us become more self-sustaining.
        Senator Udall. That's exciting news, and count on me to be
    an advocate for what you're doing.
        Thank you, again. When you're confirmed, I look forward to
    further working with you.
        General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Udall. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall. Thank you for
    raising the energy question. It's a critically important
    question for the Army. I also talked to General Dempsey about
    that, and the need for our security, in many ways, to address
    that issue which you have raised. Thank you for your ongoing
    interest in that piece.
        Senator Brown is next.
        Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I'm bouncing back and forth, between hearings, like many
    others.
        Sir, I met you yesterday. Obviously, I asked a lot of the
    questions. I appreciate your candor. I look forward to voting
    in support of you.
        I have a couple of questions. I think you know that I have
    an interest in Guard and Reserve troops, and I attended the
    first National Guard Caucus event this year. I agree with many
    of the priorities referenced by Senator Graham, a dear friend
    of mine. He drilled down on several key themes that, if
    implemented, I believe would have a positive impact on our
    Nation's operational service and security.
        He was in the Reserves and, I just found out, the Guard, as
    well. I look forward to hearing his perspective on a whole host
    of issues regarding the Guard and Reserves.
        I'm concerned with the fact that our depressed economy is
    having a terrible effect on our heroes that have served,
    especially the Guard and reservists. Over 30 percent of our
    young non-Active-Duty soldiers are unemployed. I'm wondering,
    what does this mean to you, in your efforts, if any? Is there
    anything that we can do, and you can help us with, to have
    employers not only hire, but keep onboard, members of the Guard
    and Reserves?
        General Dempsey. Yes, Senator, thanks. Thank you for your
    service in the Guard.
        We are partnered with the other agencies of government,
    notably the Veterans Administration, of course, but also with
    Governors across the country, in trying to raise the interest
    and awareness of the plight of the returning veteran, if you
    will.
        General Petraeus' wife, Holly, was appointed to look at the
    predatory practices of some on trying to take advantage of
    soldiers, with things like loans and so forth.
        Senator Brown. Senator Reed and I actually dealt with that
    in our Financial Regulation bill, to try to address those.
        General Dempsey. Yes.
        Senator Brown. I recognize that, as well.
        General Dempsey. That crosses all components--Active,
    Guard, and Reserve.
        Senator Brown. Right.
        General Dempsey. We've partnered with academia, to the
    extent we can, to find educational opportunities. I won't name
    them, but there's some remarkable initiatives out there, in
    academia, where they are reaching out to veterans to allow them
    to use their GI Bill in a way that is both financially vital
    for them, but also to account for their unique needs as
    veterans as they come back from a conflict.
        Those are the things we're doing. What I would say to you,
    in response to your question, is, if confirmed, we have to keep
    the fire burning in that regard.
        Senator Brown. Right.
        General Dempsey. Because, again, this is not a 2-year
    problem or challenge, this is a multiyear challenge.
        Senator Brown. Sir, also, I know that you're dealing with
    the real issue of not only Active-Duty suicide rates, but, the
    Guard and Reserves rate seem to be dramatically higher. I'm
    trusting that you'll continue on with that effort and try to
    address what the needs are and try to have more intervention.
        General Dempsey. Absolutely, Senator.
        Senator Brown. Thank you. I'd appreciate that.
        Also, I was wondering if you could give any insight as to
    the M-9 pistol competition, where that will stand in the new
    go-round. Anything you can share?
        General Dempsey. In TRADOC, most of my attention to date,
    in terms of personal weapons, has been on the individual
    carbine, because TRADOC was tasked by the Secretary of the Army
    to run an analysis of whether it was time to move away from the
    M-4.
        We're actually doing two things with regard to the carbine.
    One is, improving the M-4, both its performance, but also the
    performance of the ammunition. We're looking at whether we need
    an individual carbine beyond the M-4. That work is ongoing. I
    think the request for proposal (RFP), in draft, has been
    released. I think the final RFP will be issued sometime in the
    third quarter of this fiscal year.
        I have not been involved, to date, Senator, on the issue of
    the M-9. Based on our conversation yesterday, I will look
    forward to learning more about that, if I'm confirmed.
        Senator Brown. Great. Sir, just in conclusion, I know the
    challenges are huge. My concern is that we get the best value
    for our dollars, but also that we can provide the tools and
    resources to our men and women who are fighting to not only do
    the job, but come home safely.
        One of the issues we talked about yesterday was the rules-
    of-engagement issue, and making sure that's revisited and
    updated so we can allow the soldiers to do the job without
    being handcuffed by attorneys. I'm one of them. But, obviously,
    I think that's important. Out of all the things I've heard
    about the morale, the issues, it's that one issue that always
    seems to come back with us, saying, ``You know what? I'd love
    to do A, B, C, and D, but the JAG says--or this person says--
    the commander's guidance is''--and I think, in some respects,
    at times, we may be jeopardizing the safety of our soldiers.
        I know you said you were going to look into that, and I
    appreciate it. Good luck to you and your family.
        Thank you.
        General Dempsey. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Brown.
        Senator Hagan is next.
        After Senator Hagan, Senator Shaheen, I believe, will be
    the last Senator, on this side at least, and she has agreed
    that she could stay on, if other Senators appear, and take the
    gavel at that point. I very much appreciate that.
        Senator Hagan.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to welcome General Dempsey, and really appreciate
    your service to our country, and your continued service.
        I also wanted to welcome your wife, Deanie, and your
    family. It's obviously a family affair, when somebody spends
    the number of years that you have with our military. I want to
    thank you so much. To have three children also having been in
    the Army certainly is a testament to you and your wife. So,
    thank you both for that.
        I want to ask a question about the sexual assaults. I know
    you will take this seriously, but I did want to bring this up.
    Last month, a group of veterans and Active-Duty servicemembers
    sued the Pentagon, citing military commanders aren't doing
    enough to prosecute sexual assault cases. If these claims are
    founded, the failure to provide basic guarantees of safety to
    women, who now represent 15 percent of the Armed Forces, is not
    just a moral issue or a morale issue, it is a defining
    statement about the condition and the approach of our military.
        The Pentagon has issued a statement, saying the issue is a
    command priority and that it is working to make sure all troops
    are safe from sexual abuse.
        In the Army today, what do you foresee as the challenges in
    implementing a safe and timely reporting system for sexual
    assaults?
        General Dempsey. You have my commitment, as I expressed
    yesterday, that this issue is foremost in mind, and here's why,
    Senator. It rubs at the fabric of our profession. You may have
    heard that we're doing an analysis this year of, what have the
    last 10 years of war done to our profession? How are we
    different? How do we perceive ourselves to be different? How
    have some of the responsibilities we've pushed to the lower
    echelons--should they have changed the way we develop leaders?
    These things are all tied together. One of the things that has
    come out of the analysis already is that the core of our
    profession--if we're going to be a profession--and we can't
    take that for granted--is trust. The reason that an issue like
    sexual harassment is so important is not just because we should
    be protecting young men and women from sexual predators, but it
    tears at the very fabric of our profession. It breaks the bond
    of trust between leader and led. That's why it's important.
        We have made some inroads. You're well aware of our three-
    phased program. We're well on the way to executing the program.
    Some of the reporting indicates, in the Active component, that
    it's steadied out. But, that's not good enough. It needs to
    nosedive, the number of incidents.
        You'll hear folks talk about whether it's better reporting
    or more incidents. I find that to be somewhat irrelevant,
    actually, because, again, it tears at the fabric of the
    profession. I do think the key is experts inside of brigade
    combat teams--and we're putting them there; education of our
    leaders about why it's important--not just because of the
    gender issues, but because of this issue of trust. We're doing
    that. But, what you have is my assurances that, if confirmed, I
    will press down even harder on the accelerator.
        Senator Hagan. I appreciate that. Thank you. I'm sure
    everybody will appreciate that.
        In the last decade, the Army has attempted to field the
    Crusader, the Comanche, the FCS, the non-light-of-sight
    missile, and the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter. This research
    and development adds up, I believe, to about over $10 billion
    of research and development for equipment that was actually
    never fielded.
        The ground combat vehicle (GCV) is the latest possibility
    that will be added to the Army vehicle fleet. Do you think the
    requirements for this vehicle are realistic in development?
    More importantly, is the use of research and development funds
    being spent on the ground combat vehicle going to transform the
    battlefield capabilities? Will the ground combat vehicle be
    superior to the Bradley enough to justify the costs associated
    with developing and fielding it?
        General Dempsey. Yes, thank you, Senator.
        I am convinced that the requirements for the ground combat
    vehicle have been articulated in a way that actually begins to
    get at some of our aspiration for acquisition reform, meaning
    this: We collaborated, right from the start, among senior
    leaders, those who do the requirements determination and the
    acquisition community, on the requirements, as opposed to,
    potentially, some of the other programs you mentioned, where
    the requirements were determined, passed to the acquisition
    community, and the collaboration clearly wasn't adequate.
        The other thing we've done with the GCV is, we've said,
    ``Look, if you can't give it to me in 5 to 7 years, I don't
    need it.'' Because, we know that if we shoot our aspirations
    beyond that technology we can see, generally speaking, we will
    be disappointed in the outcome.
        I think that the GCV is actually prototypical, not only of
    the next generation of ground combat vehicle, but of a process
    change. That's how we should look at it.
        The Bradley has been a venerable part of our inventory.
    But, it has reached its maximum capacity in weight and energy.
    As we continue to add technological advances, as we continue to
    learn more about what it means to protect, when we continue to
    learn more about the mobility required in urban areas, that's
    why we think the GCV is an important step in our modernization.
        Senator Hagan. Where are we on that timeline now?
        General Dempsey. The RFP is out, and I think we're
    approaching one of the milestones--I don't recall which--in the
    fall of this year.
        Senator Hagan. Okay. I think the collaboration is obviously
    very important to getting the right vehicle at the right time
    for the right price.
        As addressed in General Chiarelli's Suicide Awareness
    Report, published last July, in 2010, the life demands of a
    soldier today, when you look at the moving, the promotions, the
    combat stress, the exposure to trauma--all of these issues are
    disproportionately high, the suicides are comparatively high,
    compared to their civilian counterparts of the same age. The
    Army developed the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness to
    institutionalize mental resiliency. Although the Army is
    treating the symptoms of deployments, the larger issue, I
    believe, is rebalancing the force to allow the soldiers and
    their families to reset.
        As the Army works to teach soldiers to be internally
    prepared to deal with the challenges of the Army at war, what
    is the Army doing to create balance within the force, in terms
    of shorter deployments and longer stability within the
    assignments? We spoke a little bit about this yesterday.
        General Dempsey. We did, Senator. But, I appreciate the
    opportunity to reinforce it.
        We must get to a position where we have a minimum of 2
    years at home with 1 year deployed in the Active component.
    It's 1-to-4 in the Reserve component. I'm not sure that's going
    to be enough, to tell you the truth. I don't know.
        As I sit here today, I'm confident that, if we can get to
    1-to-2, we will be doing our soldiers and families a great
    service, that they well deserve, in terms of helping them cope
    with these life demands that Pete Chiarelli, who, by the way,
    deserves every accolade we can possibly heap upon him for the
    work he's doing in this regard.
        As we see these conflicts extend--and again, we're making
    some assumptions about Iraq and Afghanistan; and if those
    assumptions prove true, then 1-to-2 might be adequate to the
    task. But, if we continue to deploy in the numbers we're
    deploying, then we might have to reconsider and seek an even
    different BOG-dwell ratio. It might have to be 1-to-3. But, I'm
    not in a position--none of us are, really--to say that, right
    now.
        You know this, Senator, but, we'll always do what the
    Nation needs. If we have to break our BOG-dwell because of an
    emergency for this Nation, we're there. But, as a routine
    matter, when these issues become prolonged, we need to have a
    standard of 1-to-2 so we can address the issues you're
    addressing.
        Senator Hagan. It's so important for the soldiers, as well
    as their families.
        I thank you for your testimony, and I look forward to your
    confirmation.
        General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you.
        Senator Shaheen [presiding]. Good morning. It's still
    ``good morning''.
        General Dempsey, congratulations to you on your nomination.
    Thank you, to you and your family, for all of the service
    you've given to this country.
        I've been particularly impressed in the parts of your
    testimony, and questions that I've been able to hear this
    morning, about your work on leadership development. I would
    suggest that perhaps you could design a course for Members of
    Congress, because I think that would be helpful.
        General Dempsey. I think the appropriate response there is,
    ``No comment,'' Senator. [Laughter.]
        Senator Shaheen. I know that Senator Ayotte, in her
    remarks, mentioned New Hampshire's Deployment Cycle Support
    Program, which we have had in place for several years to help
    our deploying Guard and Reserves and their families. I would
    just like to reiterate how important this program is. I think
    it's a model for the rest of the country. There's some very
    impressive data on the successes of the program. People who
    have been part of it are four times more likely to stay married
    when they come back. They're four times more likely to stay in
    the military. They're five times less likely to become
    homeless. On the very critical issue of suicide prevention,
    that a number of people have raised this morning, 100 percent
    of those people considered at risk for suicide are in active
    prevention with licensed support personnel.
        It has been a hugely successful program. With the largest
    deployment in New Hampshire's history right now, we think it's
    very important. I hope, after you are confirmed, that you will
    help us figure out how we can continue this program, which had
    been supported primarily through congressionally directed
    spending. I hope you will take a look at this.
        General Dempsey. I will, Senator. Thank you.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        This summer, I had the opportunity to visit Iraq for my
    first time, and Kuwait. We visited Camp Arifjan. I was truly
    amazed--and I think most people don't recognize that the
    deployment out of Iraq is the largest movement of people and
    materiel in the military since World War II. It was really
    quite amazing. General Patton, I know, would be proud of what
    General Webster and folks there have been able to accomplish.
        One of the things that impressed me the most was the way
    they had integrated savings into the entire operation there so
    that all of the men and women who were part of that effort are
    looking at how they can be more efficient in bringing people
    out and the operations of that unit.
        I wonder if you could talk a little bit about how you see
    integrating that kind of culture into the entire Army, and
    what's happening on that right now.
        General Dempsey. Yes, thank you, Senator, because it gives
    me the opportunity to point out that I'm deeply committed to
    supporting the Secretary of the Army and what he's doing to
    inculcate that culture that you describe into our Army.
        Secretary McHugh has been very clear with us, with the
    four-stars as we assemble from time to time with him, on that
    issue. We both respect his judgments and the course that he's
    charted for us.
        I would also mention that one of those who has accepted
    that responsibility is General Ann Dunwoody, who, you probably
    know, is our Army Materiel Command Commander. I've often said
    to her that she is accomplishing this retrograde of equipment
    out of Iraq in a way that actually almost makes it invisible to
    the rest of us, and suggested maybe it shouldn't be. She's done
    a remarkable job.
        I think what you're reflecting is, you've seen, at the
    tactical level, the kind of adaptations and efficiencies that
    we're capable of. What you're suggesting is, we have to do the
    same thing as an institution, and you're exactly right.
        Senator Shaheen. How do you make that happen?
        General Dempsey. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, for
    the past few years, have pursued a thing that they call the
    ``enterprise approach,'' which is a way of suggesting that the
    stovepipes of the Army--and, sad to say, but not surprising, I
    suppose, we do have our own stovepipes: TRADOC, Forces Command,
    Army Materiel Command, the forward-deployed forces--we tend to
    see things inside of our own, if you will silos.
        Senator Shaheen. Right.
        General Dempsey. What the approach encourages is cross-
    collaboration. Now, I'd be disingenuous to suggest we're where
    we need to be. But, where we want to be, and where I think
    Secretary McHugh will guide us, is to an approach that allows
    us to see issues right from the start, with a resource-
    sensitive eye, which, frankly, to our discredit in some ways,
    we haven't had to do that because the American people have been
    so generous with their resources over the last 10 years.
        We've done fairly well with those resources, by the way. As
    has been said earlier, today's Army is the best Army it's ever
    been. Thank you for that. But, we have to understand that we
    also share part of the Nation's responsibility to be viable and
    to support the economic instrument of power, not just the
    military instrument of power. We're prepared to do that. To do
    that, we have to be more resource-conscious. We will.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        I want to also follow up on Senator Udall's question about
    how we reduce the dependency of our military on foreign oil and
    on how we are more efficient around energy use. You got into
    that a little bit, but I wonder if you could elaborate some
    more on the kinds of things that we're doing and what kind of
    support would be helpful from Congress as you're looking at
    what you need to do.
        General Dempsey. You know what I'd like to do, Senator, if
    confirmed, is take on board the opportunity to actually engage
    this committee--and you, in particular--on what we're doing
    with regard to this issue of power and energy, because we are
    doing a great deal. Much of it is really nascent. It's not
    really very well developed. But, we're looking at the same
    things that our civilian counterparts are looking at, in terms
    of solar and wind and the other noncarbon fuels that we might
    leverage to make ourselves more reliant. It's actually a matter
    of military necessity, because the more you're reliant on a
    fuel convoy, the more you're stuck to lines of communication;
    and you've what that's--happened to us in Iraq and Afghanistan.
        Senator Shaheen. Right.
        General Dempsey. Let me take on board the opportunity to
    engage you on that more coherently or articulately to let you
    know what we're doing and to seek your advice on what more we
    might do.
        Senator Shaheen. Good. I will definitely take you up on
    that.
        General Dempsey. Okay.
        Senator Shaheen. At this point, my time has expired. Since
    I am the last remaining Senator, I would like to again thank
    you. Thank you for being here, for your candor in your
    responses, and for your willingness to continue to serve.
        At this point, the hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

        [Prepared questions submitted to GEN Martin E. Dempsey,
    USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
    supplied follow:]

                            Questions and Responses

                                DEFENSE REFORMS

        Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
    Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
    strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
    enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
    of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
    commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments
    to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
    to the combatant commanders.
        Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
    provisions?
        Answer. No.
        Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
    address in these modifications?
        Answer. None. The Goldwater-Nichols Act has worked quite well in
    making the armed services an integrated joint force.

                                 QUALIFICATIONS

        Question. What background and experience do you have that you
    believe qualifies you for this position?
        Answer. I have over 35 years of experience in Army, Joint, and
    Coalition organizations from the tactical to the strategic levels of
    command, all of which have allowed me to see our Army at work in a
    broad variety of capacities and missions. Some of my most relevant
    experiences have been during periods of deployment when we have faced
    significant threats to our Nation's security. I served as a field grade
    officer during Operation Desert Shield/Operation Desert Storm and then
    Operation Iraqi Freedom as the Commanding General of 1st Armored
    Division. Later as the Commanding General, Multi-National Security
    Transition Command-Iraq training Iraqi Security Forces, I experienced
    firsthand the importance of preparing our Army for joint and combined
    operations. Returning from Iraq, I served as Deputy and then Acting
    Commander of U.S. Central Command. Most recently, as the Commanding
    General for Training and Doctrine Command, I have had an opportunity to
    reinforce the training ethos of our Army as we look toward an uncertain
    future. I have travelled across our Army and at every turn have seen
    the sacrifices of our soldiers and their families. Our soldiers are the
    best the world has ever seen, and they remain fiercely dedicated to our
    Nation and its security. If confirmed by this Senate, I would be
    honored to serve as their Chief of Staff.

                                     DUTIES

        Question. Sections 601 and 3033 of title 10, U.S.C., establishes
    the responsibilities and authority of the Chief of Staff of the Army.
        What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Chief
    of Staff of the Army?
        Answer. The Chief of Staff, Army serves as the senior military
    advisor to the Secretary of the Army in all matters and has
    responsibility for the effective and efficient functioning of Army
    organizations and commands in performing their statutory missions.
        Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect
    that Secretary McHugh would prescribe for you?
        Answer. I expect that Secretary McHugh would prescribe the
    following duties for me if I am confirmed as the Chief of Staff of the
    Army:

        (a)  Serve as the senior military leader of the Army and all of its
    components;
        (b)  Assist the Secretary with his external affairs functions,
    including presenting and justifying Army policies, plans, programs, and
    budgets to the Secretary of Defense, Executive Branch, and Congress;
        (c)  Assist the Secretary with his compliance functions, including
    directing The Inspector General to perform inspections and
    investigations as required;
        (d)  Preside over the Army staff and ensure the effective and
    efficient functioning of the headquarters, to include integrating
    Reserve component matters into all aspects of Army business;
        (e)  Serve as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and provide
    independent military advice to the Secretary of Defense, President, and
    Congress. To the extent that such action does not impair my
    independence as the Chief of Staff of the Army, in my performance as a
    member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would keep the Secretary of the
    Army informed of military advice rendered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    on matters affecting the Department of the Army. I would inform the
    Secretary of the Army of significant military operations affecting his
    duties and responsibilities, subject to the authority, direction, and
    control of the Secretary of Defense;
        (f)  Represent Army capabilities, requirements, policy, plans, and
    programs in joint fora;
        (g)  Supervise the execution of Army policies, plans, programs, and
    activities and assess the performance of Army commands in the execution
    of their assigned statutory missions and functions; and
        (h)  Task and supervise the Vice Chief of Staff, Army, the Army
    Staff and, as authorized by the Secretary of the Army, elements of the
    Army Secretariat to perform assigned duties and responsibilities.

        Question. What duties and responsibilities would you plan to assign
    to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army?
        Answer. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army would be responsible
    for providing advice and assistance in the execution of my
    responsibilities for those missions and functions related to manpower
    and personnel; logistics; operations and plans; requirements and
    programs; intelligence; command, control and communications; and
    readiness.
        Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
    enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Chief of Staff of the
    Army?
        Answer. If confirmed as the Chief of Staff, I will continually
    assess my ability to perform my duties and, if necessary, implement
    measures aimed at improving my ability to lead our Army.

                                 RELATIONSHIPS

        Question. If confirmed, what would be your working relationship
    with:
        The Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. The Secretary of Defense, as the head of the Department of
    Defense and the principal assistant to the President in all matters
    relating to the Department of Defense, issues guidance and direction to
    the Military Departments. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the
    Secretary of Defense and his Deputy, through the Secretary of the Army,
    for the operation of the Army in accordance with such directives. As a
    member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will serve as a military adviser
    to the Secretary of Defense as appropriate. I will cooperate fully with
    the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the Army properly implements
    the policies established by his office. In coordination with the
    Secretary of the Army, I will communicate with the Secretary of Defense
    in articulating the views of the Army.
        Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense performs such duties and
    exercises such powers as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe. The
    Secretary of Defense also delegates to him full power and authority to
    act for the Secretary of Defense and exercise the powers of the
    Secretary on any and all matters for which the Secretary is authorized
    to act pursuant to law. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the
    Secretary of Defense, and to his deputy, through the Secretary of the
    Army, for the operation of the Army in accordance with such directives.
    Also, in coordination with the Secretary of the Army, I will
    communicate with the Deputy Secretary of Defense in articulating the
    views of the Army. I will work closely with them to ensure that the
    Army is administered in accordance with the guidance and direction
    issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
        Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
        Answer. Acting on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, the Under
    Secretaries perform responsibilities that require them, from time to
    time, to issue guidance--and in the case of the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, direction--to the
    military departments. If confirmed, in coordination with the Secretary
    of the Army, I will communicate with the Under Secretaries in
    articulating the views of the Army. I will work closely with them to
    ensure that the Army is administered in accordance with the guidance
    and direction issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
        Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal
    military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and
    the Secretary of Defense. Subject to the authority, direction, and
    control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman
    plans the strategic direction and contingency operations of the armed
    forces; advises the Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and
    budgets identified by the commanders of the combatant commands;
    develops doctrine for the joint employment of the Armed Forces; reports
    on assignment of functions (or roles and missions) to the Armed Forces;
    provides for representation of the United States on the Military Staff
    Committee of the United Nations; and performs such other duties as may
    be prescribed by law or by the President or Secretary of Defense.
        In conjunction with the other members of the Joint Chiefs, the
    Chief of Staff of the Army assists the Chairman in providing military
    advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the
    Secretary of Defense. If confirmed as a member of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, I will provide my individual military advice to the President,
    the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. If
    confirmed, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it would be my
    duty to provide frank and timely advice and opinions to the Chairman to
    assist in his performance of these responsibilities. As appropriate, I
    will also provide advice in addition to or in disagreement with that of
    the Chairman. I will establish and maintain a close and professional
    relationship with the Chairman, and will communicate directly and
    openly on policy matters involving the Army and the Armed Forces as a
    whole.
        Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        Answer. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assists the
    Chairman in providing military advice to the Secretary of Defense and
    the President. If confirmed as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
    it would be my duty to ensure that the Vice Chairman is provided my
    frank views and opinions to assist him in his performance of his
    responsibilities.
        Question. The Secretary of the Army.
        Answer. If confirmed, my relationship with the Secretary of the
    Army would be close, direct, and supportive. Within the Department of
    the Army, a large part of my responsibility as Chief of Staff would be
    to serve as the Secretary's principal military adviser. My
    responsibilities would also involve communicating the Army Staff's
    plans to the Secretary and supervising the implementation of the
    Secretary's decisions through the Army Staff, commands and agencies. In
    this capacity, my actions would be subject to the authority, direction,
    and control of the Secretary. In my capacity as a member of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff, I would also be responsible for appropriately
    informing the Secretary about conclusions reached by the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff and about significant military operations, to the extent such
    action does not impair independence in the performance of my duties as
    a member of Joint Chiefs of Staff. I anticipate that I would work
    closely and in concert with the Secretary to establish the best
    policies for the Army in light of national interests.
        Question. The Under Secretary of the Army.
        Answer. The Under Secretary of the Army is the Secretary's
    principal civilian assistant and performs such duties and exercises
    such powers as the Secretary prescribes. His responsibilities require
    him, from time to time, to issue guidance and direction to the Army
    Staff. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the Secretary, and to the
    Under Secretary for the operation of the Army in accordance with such
    directives. I will cooperate fully with the Under Secretary to ensure
    that the policies established by the Office of the Secretary of the
    Army are properly implemented. I will communicate openly and directly
    with the Under Secretary in articulating the views of the Army Staff,
    commands, and agencies.
        Question. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.
        Answer. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army serves as the principal
    advisor and assistant to the Chief of Staff. If confirmed, I will
    establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the Vice
    Chief of Staff, Army.
        Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army.
        Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army have functional
    responsibilities that, from time to time, require the issuance of
    guidance to the Army Staff and to the Army as a whole. If confirmed, I
    will establish and maintain close, professional relationships with each
    of the Assistant Secretaries to foster an environment of cooperative
    teamwork between the Army Staff and the Army Secretariat as we deal
    together with the day-to-day management and long-range planning
    requirements facing the Army.
        Question. The General Counsel of the Army.
        Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the
    Department of the Army. His/Her duties include coordinating legal and
    policy advice to all members of the Department regarding matters of
    interest to the Secretariat, as well as determining the position of the
    Army on any legal question or procedure, other than military justice
    matters, which are assigned to The Judge Advocate General. If
    confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional
    relationship with the General Counsel to assist in the performance of
    these important duties.
        Question. The Inspector General of the Army.
        Answer. The Inspector General is responsible for inspections and
    certain investigations within the Department, such as inquiring into
    and reporting to the Secretary and the Chief of Staff regarding
    discipline, efficiency, and economy of the Army with continuing
    assessment of command, operational, logistical, and administrative
    effectiveness; and serving as the Department of the Army focal point
    for Department of Defense Inspector General inspections and noncriminal
    investigations, as well as the Department of Defense inspection policy.
    If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional
    relationship with the Inspector General to ensure effective
    accomplishment of these important duties.
        Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Army.
        Answer. The Judge Advocate General is the military legal advisor to
    the Secretary of the Army and all officers and agencies of the
    Department of the Army. The Judge Advocate General provides legal
    advice directly to the Chief of Staff and the Army Staff in matters
    concerning military justice, environmental law; labor and civilian
    personnel law; contract, fiscal, and tax law; international law; and
    the worldwide operational deployment of Army forces. The Chief of Staff
    does not appoint The Judge Advocate General, and does not have the
    personal authority to remove him. This enables The Judge Advocate
    General to provide independent legal advice. If confirmed, I will
    establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the TJAG
    as my legal advisor and I will assist him in the performance of his
    important duties as the legal advisor to the Secretary of the Army.
        Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
        Answer. The National Guard Bureau is a joint bureau of the
    Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force. Appointed by
    the President, he serves as principal adviser to the Secretary of
    Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on National
    Guard matters. The Chief, National Guard Bureau is also the principal
    advisor to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff on matters
    relating to the National Guard. If confirmed, I will establish and
    maintain a close, professional relationship with the Chief, National
    Guard Bureau to foster an environment of cooperative teamwork between
    the Army Staff and the National Guard Bureau, as we deal together with
    the day-to-day management and long-range planning requirements facing
    the Army.
        Question. The Director of the Army National Guard.
        Answer. The Director, Army National Guard is responsible for
    assisting the Chief, National Guard Bureau and Vice Chief, National
    Guard Bureau in carrying out the functions of the National Guard
    Bureau, as they relate to the Army National Guard. If confirmed, I will
    establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the
    Director, Army National Guard to foster an environment of cooperative
    teamwork between the Army Staff and the National Guard Bureau. This
    will be essential as we deal together with the day-to-day management
    and long-range planning requirements facing the Army to sustain and
    improve Army National Guard's operational capabilities.
        Question. The Chief of the Army Reserve.
        Answer. The Chief, Army Reserve is responsible for justification
    and execution of the personnel, operation and maintenance, and
    construction budgets for the Army Reserve. As such, the Chief, Army
    Reserve is the director and functional manager of appropriations made
    for the Army Reserve in those areas. If confirmed, I will establish and
    maintain a close, professional relationship with the Chief, Army
    Reserve as we deal together with the day-to-day management and long-
    range planning requirements facing the Army to sustain and improve the
    Army Reserve operational capabilities.
        Question. The Chiefs of the Other Services.
        Answer. If confirmed, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it
    would be my duty to engage in frank and timely exchanges of advice and
    opinions with my fellow Service Chiefs. I look forward to developing
    strong working relationships with these colleagues.
        Question. The Combatant Commanders.
        Answer. Subject to the direction of the President, the combatant
    commanders perform their duties under the authority, direction, and
    control of the Secretary of Defense, and are directly responsible to
    the Secretary of Defense for the preparedness of their commands to
    carry out missions assigned to them. As directed by the Secretary of
    Defense, the Service Secretaries assign all forces under their
    jurisdiction to the unified and specified combatant commands or to the
    U.S. element of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, to
    perform missions assigned to those commands. In addition, subject to
    the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and
    the authority of combatant commanders under title 10, U.S.C., section
    164(c), the Service Secretaries are responsible for administering and
    supporting the forces that they assign to a combatant command. If
    confirmed, I will cooperate fully with the combatant commanders in
    performing these administrative and support responsibilities. I will
    establish close, professional relationships with the combatant
    commanders and communicate directly and openly with them on matters
    involving the Department of the Army and Army forces and personnel
    assigned to or supporting these commands.

                             VISION FOR THE FUTURE

        Question. What is your vision for the Army of today and the future?
        Answer. The Army will remain a critical component of the Joint
    Force, providing an affordable mix of tailorable and networked
    organizations operating on a rotational cycle, providing a sustained
    flow of trained and ready land forces for full spectrum operations,
    prepared for unexpected contingencies and at a tempo that will sustain
    our All-Volunteer Force.
        Question. What roles do you believe the Army should play in
    contingency, humanitarian, and stability operations?
        Answer. We are capable of executing contingency, humanitarian or
    stability operations, as directed by the President or Secretary of
    Defense, under the control of the appropriate Combatant Commander. We
    are also capable of assisting our international partners in building
    their own operational capacity. Through security force assistance, we
    can increase the ability of other nations to uphold the rule of law,
    ensure domestic order, protect its citizens during natural disasters,
    and avoid conflicts, which would otherwise require U.S. military
    support.
        Question. Do you see any unnecessary redundancy between Army and
    Marine Corps ground combat forces, particularly between Army light or
    medium weight divisions and Marine Corps divisions?
        Answer. No. We each have unique but complementary capabilities that
    provide the National Command Authority with options for dealing with
    emerging threats and contingencies.

                          ARMY ROLE IN THE JOINT FORCE

        Question. The U.S. military fights as a joint force and strives to
    achieve realistic training in preparation for military operations. The
    Army provides trained and equipped forces for joint military
    operations.
        How do you believe the Army can best contribute to improved joint
    military capabilities while preserving its service unique capabilities
    and culture?
        Answer. The Army works our relationships with Sister Services
    diligently while maintaining our unique values, culture, and
    traditions. The Army provides forces for prompt and sustained combat
    operations on land as a component of the Joint Force. Through sustained
    operations on land and among populations, we make permanent the
    advantages gained by joint forces.

                        MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

        Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
    confront the next Chief of Staff of the Army?
        Answer. We have to win our current conflicts while simultaneously
    preparing for future security challenges. We must take care of our
    soldiers, our wounded, and their families. We must meet this challenge
    in an environment that demands more efficient use of limited resources.
        Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
    addressing these challenges?
        Answer. The Army, with support from Congress, is already working to
    understand and address many of these challenges. Although we don't have
    all the answers yet, it is clear that to be prepared for an
    increasingly complex and unpredictable future, we need thinking,
    adaptable, and resilient leaders. Investments in our human capital,
    both uniformed and civilian, coupled with a sustainable rotational
    force structure model, will ensure we are postured to meet the
    challenges of the future.
        Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
    the performance of the functions of the Chief of Staff of the Army?
        Answer. At this point, I am not aware of any problems that would
    impede the performance of the Chief of Staff of the Army.
        Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines
    would you establish to address these problems?
        Answer. I am committed to working to ensure that our management
    systems are maintained or refined to meet challenges facing the Army. I
    have not yet determined specific plans to modify systems currently in
    place or under revision but if confirmed will carefully assess how we
    execute our management functions to ensure appropriate stewardship of
    our resources.
        Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish?
        Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to the opportunity to talk
    with the Secretary of the Army, to develop priorities for our force. In
    my current position, I've asserted that we must be a learning
    organization, we must make training credible and relevant at home
    station so that it replicates more closely the challenges of the
    operational environment, and we must develop our leaders differently.
    It's also clear that we must work to preserve the All-Volunteer Force,
    care for our Wounded Warriors, continue to work to deliver Full
    Spectrum Capabilities, and transform systems and processes to build
    true adaptability into our institution.

                               ACQUISITION ISSUES

        Question. Major defense acquisition programs in the Department of
    the Army and the other military departments continue to be subject to
    funding and requirements instability.
        Do you believe that instability in funding and requirements drives
    up program costs and leads to delays in the fielding of major weapon
    systems?
        Answer. A variety of factors contribute to increased risks of cost
    increase and delay, depending on the program, the technologies
    involved, and the acquisition strategy employed. However, I agree that
    the foundation for any successful large acquisition program rests on
    carefully refined requirements, a sound program strategy, and funding
    stability.
        Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Army should take
    to address funding and requirements instability?
        Answer. Requirements must be carefully refined to meet realistic
    and affordable objectives, and they must account for the rate of
    technological and scientific change in meeting needed capabilities.
        Question. What is your view of the Configuration Steering Boards
    required by statute and regulation to control requirements growth?
        Answer. I support efforts by Congress to control costs, refine
    requirements, and reduce program risk in our major acquisition
    programs. The Configuration Steering Boards play a significant role in
    oversight of acquisition programs and compliment Army efforts to
    validate requirements and eliminate redundancies through Capability
    Portfolio Reviews. In tandem, these oversight processes help the Army
    avoid cost increases and delays in our programs.
        Question. What role would you expect to play in these issues, if
    confirmed as Army Chief of Staff?
        Answer. If confirmed as Chief of Staff, I will work diligently with
    the Secretary of the Army and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
    Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology to ensure that all oversight
    mechanisms for acquisition programs are used effectively to reduce cost
    and schedule risk. In the area of requirements, I will work with TRADOC
    to refine requirements to meet affordable and achievable acquisition
    strategies.
        Question. The Comptroller General has found that DOD programs often
    move forward with unrealistic program cost and schedule estimates, lack
    clearly defined and stable requirements, include immature technologies
    that unnecessarily raise program costs and delay development and
    production, and fail to solidify design and manufacturing processes at
    appropriate junctures in the development process.
        Do you agree with the Comptroller General's assessment?
        Answer. I agree that this assessment is valid with respect to some
    of the Army's past programs. However, the Army has already adopted
    different approaches in the development of more recent programs. I
    understand that prior to the release of the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV)
    Request for Proposals (RFP) in November 2010, the program's
    requirements were carefully reviewed, prioritized and weighted in the
    RFP to avoid reliance on immature technologies, mitigate cost and
    schedule risk, and provide an achievable and affordable framework for a
    new vehicle. The GCV program involved close coordination between
    acquisition, requirements and resourcing experts to provide a solid
    program foundation. The Army is vigorously working to avoid the
    characterizations in the Comptroller General's assessment in future
    programs.
        Question. If so, what steps do you believe the Department of the
    Army should take to address these problems?
        Answer. The Department of the Army has already begun taking
    significant steps to address these concerns. There is a renewed
    emphasis on collaboration between the requirements and acquisition
    communities in the development of new programs. Last year, Secretary
    McHugh commissioned a thorough review of the Army's acquisition process
    led by The Hon. Gil Decker and Gen (Ret.) Lou Wagner that provides a
    blueprint for improvements to the acquisition process. I understand the
    Army is now studying these recommendations and developing a plan to
    implement those that help our process. As a whole, the Department must
    continue to build on these efforts to avoid unnecessary cost and delay
    in our programs.
        Question. What role would you expect to play in these issues, if
    confirmed as Army Chief of Staff?
        Answer. If confirmed as Chief of Staff, I will continue to work
    with Department of the Army leadership to implement any necessary
    changes to ensure that the Army's acquisition programs succeed in
    providing needed capabilities to our soldiers.
        Question. Beginning in 2010, the Army began a series of
    capabilities portfolio reviews that have contributed to the
    rationalization of the Army's modernization plans and resulted in
    significant programmatic decisions, including the termination of major
    weapons programs.
        What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's
    capabilities portfolio reviews and process?
        Answer. The capabilities portfolio reviews have been successful in
    identifying redundancy and finding efficiencies across system
    portfolios. The Army is now studying how to best institutionalize the
    capabilities portfolio reviews process to identify additional
    efficiencies, and then work to achieve them.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take, if any, to
    institutionalize the portfolio review process within the Army?
        Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the studies to
    institutionalize portfolio review process to identify and achieve
    further Army efficiencies.

                               ARMY MODERNIZATION

        Question. In general, major Army modernization efforts have not
    been successful over the past decade. Since the mid-1990s, Army
    modernization strategies, plans, and investment priorities have evolved
    under a variety of names from Digitization, to Force XXI, to Army After
    Next, to Interim Force, to Objective Force, to Future Combat System and
    Modularity. According to press reports, a recent modernization study
    done for the Secretary of the Army by former Assistant Secretary of the
    Army Gilbert Decker and retired Army General Louis Wagner found that
    the Army has spent $3.3 billion to $3.8 billion annually since 2004 on
    weapons programs that have been cancelled.
        What is your assessment, if any, of the Army's modernization
    record?
        Answer. Over the last 10 years, our Army has achieved a remarkable
    degree of modernization in areas such as improving soldier protection,
    increasing battlefield intelligence, and bringing the network to
    individual soldiers. At the same time, we have nearly completed the
    modular conversion of over 300 brigade level organizations and to
    complete the conversion of our division and higher level headquarters
    to enable mission command in the operational environments we anticipate
    in the first half of the 21st century. If confirmed, I look forward to
    studying the Decker-Wagner recommendations to identify areas where we
    can improve.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to
    take to achieve a genuinely stable modernization strategy and program
    for the Army?
        Answer. I recognize that a stable modernization strategy and
    program is an important component to both a balanced Army and to
    exercise good stewardship of resources entrusted to the Services. If
    confirmed, I will work closely with Secretary McHugh on how to achieve
    this.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's
    current modernization investment strategy?
        Answer. While it is true that several of our major modernization
    efforts over the past decade have been unsuccessful, I would submit
    that the American soldier today is the best equipped and enabled
    soldier this country has ever fielded. Successes such as the Stryker
    vehicle, world class body armor, soldier night vision equipment,
    soldier weapons, precision fire systems such as Excalibur and High
    Mobility Artillery Rocket System, and vehicles such as the family of
    medium trucks all suggest to me that the Army has had some tremendous
    success in modernization.
        I believe the Army has learned some valuable lessons and now has
    both the processes and the mindset to more carefully and rigorously
    review programs both before we initiate them and while they are in
    progress. This will be an area I will assess more deeply if I am
    confirmed as Chief of Staff and will periodically give this committee
    my frank assessments.
        Question. Do you believe that this strategy is affordable and
    sustainable?
        Answer. If confirmed, I plan to closely examine this strategy to
    ensure it is affordable and sustainable.
        Question. In your view does the Army's current modernization
    investment strategy appropriately or adequately address current and
    future capabilities that meet requirements for unconventional or
    irregular conflict?
        Answer. From my current position, I believe the current
    modernization investment strategy strikes an appropriate balance
    between current and future capabilities. If confirmed, I look forward
    to studying this further with the Army staff.
        Question. Does the investment strategy appropriately or adequately
    address requirements for conventional, high-end conflict with a peer or
    near-peer enemy?
        Answer. From my current position, I believe the current
    modernization investment strategy appropriately and adequately
    addresses requirements for conventional, high-end conflict with the
    peer or near-peer enemy we can reasonably foresee in the fiscal year
    2012-2016 FYDP time horizon.
        Question. If confirmed, what other investment initiatives, if any,
    would you pursue with respect to unconventional or conventional
    capabilities?
        Answer. I have not yet formulated investment initiatives particular
    to either conventional or unconventional capabilities that are
    different from those the Army is currently pursuing, but I look forward
    to doing so, if confirmed.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to
    ensure that all these initiatives are affordable within the current and
    projected Army budgets?
        Answer. To be good stewards of the resources provided, the Army
    must continue to internalize a ``cost culture'' that considers
    ``affordability'' as an essential element of all (not just
    modernization) initiatives. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with
    the Secretary to ensure future initiatives are affordable within
    current and projected budgets.
        Question. In your view, what trade-offs, if any, would most likely
    have to be taken should budgets fall below or costs grow above what is
    planned to fund the Army's modernization efforts?
        Answer. While I do not have that information at this time, I
    believe trade-offs must occur after all areas of risk are carefully
    considered and coordinated with the Secretary of Defense and Congress.

                          ARMY WEAPON SYSTEM PROGRAMS

        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
    following research, development, and acquisition programs?
        Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV).
        Answer. In the development of the Ground Combat vehicle--the
    replacement for the Bradley Infantry Fighting vehicle--the Army is
    fully committed to the ``Big Four'' imperatives: soldier protection;
    soldier capacity (squad plus crew); the capability to operate across
    the Full Spectrum of operations; and Timing (7 years to the first
    production vehicle from contract award). The Ground Combat Vehicle will
    be the first vehicle that will be designed from the ground up to
    operate in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) environment. Modular
    armor will allow commanders the option to add or remove armor based on
    the current threat environment. The Ground Combat Vehicle will be
    designed with the capacity for Space, Weight, and Power growth to
    incorporate future technologies as they mature. The Army is using an
    incremental strategy for the Ground Combat Vehicle with the first
    increment being an Infantry Fighting Vehicle. The Army is currently
    reviewing proposals from vendors for Technology Development contracts.
        Question. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T).
        Answer. I believe that the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical
    is one of the Army's most important programs. It provides the broadband
    backbone communications for the tactical Army. Warfighter Information
    Network-Tactical Increment 1 (formerly Joint Network Node) began
    fielding in 2004 to provide a satellite based Internet Protocol network
    down to battalion level. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical
    Increment 2 begins fielding in fiscal year 2012 to provide an initial
    On the Move capability, extending down to company level. Warfighter
    Information Network-Tactical Increment 3 will provide improved
    capabilities, including higher throughput, three to four times more
    bandwidth efficiency, and an aerial transmission layer, to all 126
    brigades/division headquarters with an on-the-move requirement.
        Question. Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT) Network
    Integration Kit (NIK).
        Answer. The E-IBCT investment provides the infrastructure that will
    allow the Army to grow the tactical network capability, and an
    opportunity for both large and small companies to support the Army's
    tactical network strategy.
        The NIK is a necessary bridge solution that allows the Army to
    continue evaluation and development of incorporated network
    technologies.
        Question. Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) including the Ground
    Mobile Radio (GMR) and Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit (HMS)
    radios.
        Answer. Joint Tactical Radio System is the Services' future
    deployable, mobile communications family of radios. They provide Army
    forces dynamic, scalable, on-the-move network architecture, connecting
    the soldier to the network. Fiscal year 2012 procurement funding
    supports fielding of Joint Tactical Radio System capability to eight
    Infantry Brigade Combat Teams to meet fiscal years 2013/2014 network
    requirements.
        The Ground Mobile Radio is the primary vehicular radio capability
    using the Wideband Networking Waveform and Soldier Radio Waveform to
    meet tactical networking requirements.
        The Man Pack and Rifleman Radio are the primary Joint Tactical
    Radio System capability for battalion and below tactical operations.
    The man pack supports the Soldier Radio Waveform and interoperates with
    legacy waveforms (Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems,
    Ultra High Frequency Satellite Communications). Rifleman Radio
    primarily serves the dismounted formation and utilizes the Soldier
    Radio Waveform to provide voice and individual location information
    from the dismounted soldier to the leader. The combination of the three
    radios helps the Army to push the network to the individual soldier.
        Question. Stryker combat vehicle, including the Double-V Hull
    initiative, procurement of more flat-bottom vehicles, and the Stryker
    mobile gun variant.
        Answer. The current Stryker vehicle has exceeded its Space, Weight
    and Power and Cooling (SWaP-C) limits due to add-on applique (armor and
    devices) required for ongoing combat operations. In the near term, it
    is imperative to increase crew protection with the Double-V-Hull (DVH)
    Stryker. In the mid-term, Stryker modernization will improve protection
    and mobility by recouping SWaP-C, enabling future growth and allowing
    integration of the emerging network for all Stryker variants. Fleet-
    wide modernization for all variants upgrades protection, counter-IED,
    drive train, suspension, electrical power generation and management,
    and digital communications and network integration.
        Double-V Hull: Stryker Double-V Hull (DVH) is on track for June
    2011 fielding. The initial DVH test results are positive, indicating
    the vehicle will be ready for fielding as scheduled.
        Non-Double V Hull and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
    Reconnaissance Vehicle (NBCRV): The Army will procure 168 Stryker
    NBCRVs in fiscal years 2012 and 2013 for a total quantity of 284 (an
    Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model rotation quantity). These
    vehicles are in normal Hull configuration. The Stryker NBCRV provides a
    unique capability to the Joint Force including a critical mission of
    Homeland Defense, for which DVH protection is a lesser consideration.
        Stryker Mobile Gun System (MGS): The Army has procured and fielded
    142 of 335 MGS. In August 2009, the Army decided to not pursue
    additional MGS procurement at this time with forthcoming fleet-wide
    modernization.
        Question. Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).
        Answer. The JLTV is a joint program with the U.S. Marine Corps,
    Navy, and the Army; the Australian Army is also currently a partner in
    the Technology Development phase. I believe that the JLTV is a vital
    program to fill the force protection and payload gaps not currently
    satisfied by the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle. It will
    also fill the mobility, transportability and communication architecture
    gaps not satisfied by the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)
    vehicles being used in Light Tactical Vehicle (LTV) roles. The Army
    Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy plans for the JLTV to replace about a
    third of the LTV fleet, which is roughly 46,000 vehicles. The Army is
    currently examining the attributes of the JLTV program to ensure it
    meets our needs for the future Army light tactical fleet, especially in
    terms of protection.
        Question. Armed Aerial Scout (AAS).
        Answer. I agree the Army has an enduring requirement for an armed
    aerial scout as was reaffirmed after the termination of the Armed
    Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) program.
        This requirement will be validated by the ongoing Armed Aerial
    Scout Analysis of Alternatives whose findings are scheduled for release
    in third quarter fiscal year 2011.
        Question. M1 Abrams tank modernization.
        Answer. In my view, the Abrams modernization is necessary and will
    initially enable integration of the emerging network and provide
    ability to fire the next generation of 120mm ammunition. Future
    modernization will provide capability improvements in lethality,
    protection, mission command, mobility, and reliability intended to
    maintain the Fleet's combat overmatch and restore space, weight, and
    power margins to keep the Tank relevant through 2050. The Abrams
    modernization program is funded in the fiscal year 2012 budget request.
    If confirmed, I will be able to offer an assessment as the program
    matures.
        Question. M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle modernization.
        Answer. The Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) will be
    replaced by the Ground Combat Vehicle beginning in 2018. Bradley Non-
    Infantry Fighting Vehicle (Cavalry, Engineer and Fire Support variants)
    modernization will address recoupment of Space, Weight and Power to
    provide platform growth and enable improvements in protection, mobility
    and ability to integrate the emerging network.
        Question. Logistics Modernization Program (LMP).
        Answer. I understand the LMP is an Enterprise Resource Planning
    (ERP) system in the Operation and Support phase of its life-cycle.
        Based on commercial off-the-shelf SAP Corporation software
    technology, LMP provides the Army with an integrated end-to-end supply
    chain solution at the national level that improves overall
    synchronization of information.
        I concur with the Army's vision to achieve a seamless, end-to-end
    modernized logistics enterprise and to develop and implement logistics
    enterprise architecture with joint interoperability. To support that
    vision, the LMP will integrate with other Army ERPs, including General
    Funds Enterprise Business System (GFEBS), and Global Combat Support
    System-Army (GCSS-A), to provide a seamless enterprise-wide logistics
    environment spanning the factory to the foxhole in accordance with the
    approved Army ERP Strategy.
        Question. Paladin Integrated Management Vehicle program.
        Answer. I understand that the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM)
    program is an effort to address an existing capability gap in the self-
    propelled artillery portfolio brought about by an aging fleet and the
    termination of prior howitzer modernization efforts [Crusader and Non-
    Line-of-Sight-Cannon (NLOS-C)]. The PIM program provides upgrades that
    allow the Army to meet existing and future needs, and leverages the
    commonality with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle chassis and automotive
    components. PIM should provide growth potential in Space, Weight and
    Power and capacity for network expansion to accommodate future howitzer
    related needs, to include the addition of such Force Protection
    packages as add-on armor.
        Question. M4 Carbine Upgrades/Individual Carbine Competition.
        Answer. The Army continues to make improvements and upgrades based
    on operational lessons learned through the M4 Product Improvement
    Program. The Army's effort is designed to integrate full automatic
    firing, an ambidextrous selector switch and a more durable ``heavy''
    barrel. Simultaneously, the Army has initiated a full and open
    competition to confirm the best possible Individual Carbine solution.
    Results of the competition are expected in fiscal year 2013.

                MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP) VEHICLES

        Question. If confirmed, what would you propose should be the Army's
    long term strategy for the utilization and sustainment of its large
    MRAP and MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle fleets?
        Answer. The Army needs to continue to provide the best level of
    protection for our deploying soldiers. Given what we have learned
    during the last 10 years, I believe we should attempt to provide MRAP
    levels of protection to deploying forces worldwide commensurate with
    the mission assigned. The Army will integrate MRAPs into the force.

                           QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

        Question. The 2010 report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
    provides guidance that military forces shall be sized to prevail in
    ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the war against al Qaeda as
    well as for conducting foundational activities that prevent and deter
    attacks or the emergence of other threats.
        What is your assessment of the Army's current size and structure to
    meet the QDR report's guidance?
        Answer. The Army's size and structure have proven adequate to meet
    the demands of our defense strategy as we know them today, although a
    very heavy demand has been placed upon soldiers and their families for
    nearly 10 years. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretary
    of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs, and our combatant commanders to match end strength, structure,
    and tempo in our ARFORGEN rotational model to meet demands as they
    change.
        Question. If confirmed, what size or structure changes would you
    pursue, if any, to improve or enhance the Army's capability to meet
    these requirements?
        Answer. The nature of the strategic environment requires the Army
    to continuously assess its capabilities and force requirements. It's
    taken 10 years to achieve a size, structure, and capability that we can
    reasonably describe as balanced. We are accustomed to change, and we
    will undoubtedly need to continue to change. As we do we must seek to
    maintain a balance of capabilities that are available to meet the
    Nation's needs at a sustainable tempo.
        Question. The QDR report particularly emphasizes the requirement
    for improved capabilities in the following six key mission areas.
        For each, what is your assessment of the Army's current ability to
    provide capabilities to support these mission requirements?
        If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you pursue to improve the
    Army's capabilities to support:
        Defense of the United States.
        Answer. The Army is fully capable of fulfilling its responsibility
    to defend the homeland through detection, deterrence, prevention, and
    if necessary, the defeat of external threats or aggression from both
    state and non-state actors. A specific program recently undertaken to
    enhance this ability include the fielding of the enhanced Stryker
    Nuclear Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle. This provides
    us with a much improved technical assessment and decontamination
    capability.
        Question. Support of civil authorities at home.
        Answer. The Army is well postured to provide support to civil
    authorities. We are organized and trained to provide responsive and
    flexible support to mitigate domestic disasters, CBRNE consequence
    management, support to civilian law enforcement agencies, counter WMD
    operations and to counter narcotics trafficking activities. We continue
    to address the challenges associated with this mission set including
    unity of command, integration with civilian authorities, and the
    integration of Title 10 and Title 32 forces.
        Question. Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and
    counterterrorism operations.
        Answer. We are highly proficient in counter insurgency, stability
    and counter-terrorism operations. This has been the focus for the Army
    for much of the last 10 years and we have institutionalized lessons
    learned across the operating and generating force.
        Question. Build the security capacity of partner states (including
    your views, if any, on the use of general purpose forces in the
    security force assistance role).
        Answer. General Purpose Forces have a clear role in building
    sustainable capability and capacity of partner nation security forces
    and their supporting institutions. Peace time engagement is our best
    opportunity to shape the future operating environment. General Purpose
    Forces are well suited to support these activities through Security
    Force Assistance.
        Question. Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments.
        Answer. The Army's ability to deter and defeat aggression in anti-
    access environments as part of the joint force is adequate to meet the
    demands of the current security environment. That said, there are some
    tasks and skills to which we have not trained due to the demands of our
    ongoing conflicts. We must restore our proficiency in those tasks. We
    work with our sister Services to assess our capabilities to conduct
    entry operations as part of the joint force and watch closely the
    improved anti-access/area denial capabilities being developed by
    potential adversaries.
        Question. Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass
    destruction.
        Answer. The Army provides highly trained and ready forces with
    capabilities to support combatant commander requirements to counter the
    proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Current capabilities
    include operating effectively within a chemical, biological,
    radiological, and nuclear environment, specialized teams to locate and
    neutralize weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and an operational
    headquarters with expertise in eliminating WMD.
        Question. Operate effectively in cyberspace.
        Answer. We are on the right glide path to support U.S. Cyber
    Command and our geographic combatant commanders to operate effectively
    in cyberspace. On 1 October 2010, the Army stood up a new three star
    command (U.S. Army Cyber Command/2nd Army), to direct the operations
    and defense of all Army networks, and when directed, provide full-
    spectrum cyberspace operations. The Army is bringing the forces of
    network operations, defense, exploitation, and attack under one
    operational level command to integrate and synchronize global
    operations for the first time.

                                   MODULARITY

        Question. Modularity refers to the Army's fundamental
    reconfiguration of the force from a division-based to a brigade-based
    structure. Although somewhat smaller in size, modular combat brigades
    are supposed to be just as, or more capable than the divisional
    brigades they replace because they will have a more capable mix of
    equipment--such as advanced communications and surveillance equipment.
    To date, the Army has established over 90 percent of its planned
    modular units, however, estimates on how long it will take to fully
    equip this force as required by its design has slipped to 2019.
        What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's modularity
    transformation strategy?
        Answer. The modular transformation strategy reorganizes Army
    brigades, divisions and corps headquarters, and theater armies and
    subordinate commands into standardized designs. 98 percent of all Army
    brigades have converted or are in the process of converting to modular
    design. The remaining 2 percent are projected to begin modular
    conversion by 2013. Modular transformation improves the Army's ability
    to meet combatant commander requirements and National Security Strategy
    objectives by providing tailorable formations and leaders who are
    accustomed to building teams based on changing requirements.
        Question. In your view, what are the greatest challenges in
    realizing the transformation of the Army to the modular design?
        Answer. The most significant challenge associated with modular
    transformation is the full fielding of authorized equipment. Although
    all units will be organized in a modular design by the end of fiscal
    year 2013, full fielding of some items of equipment will take longer.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions or changes, if any, would you
    propose relative to the Army's modular transformation strategy?
        Answer. If confirmed, we will continue to review Army plans and
    strategies, including the modular transformation strategy, to ensure
    the Army continues to provide the joint force with the best mix of
    capabilities to prevail in today's wars, engage to build partner
    capacity, support civil authorities, and deter and defeat potential
    adversaries. If confirmed, I will continue to assess Army structure
    against current and potential threats to provide the best mix of
    capabilities and the highest levels of modernization possible.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
    employment and performance of modular combat brigades and supporting
    units in Operations Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn, and Enduring Freedom?
        Answer. These modular capabilities increase the effectiveness of
    the Army by better supporting the needs of combatant commanders across
    the full spectrum of operations.
        Question. What changes, if any, would you propose to the modular
    design, the mix of combat and supporting brigades, or modular unit
    employment to improve performance or reduce risk?
        Answer. At Training and Doctrine Command, we are currently working
    with current and former commanders, to examine our organizations to see
    if they are the best we can provide. We are continuously looking at
    alternate force designs and force mixes to see how we can improve, in
    both effectiveness and efficiency, our force structure.
        Question. With respect to the Army's modular combat brigade force
    structure design, press reports indicate that the Army is reassessing
    its heavy and infantry brigade structures and may add a third maneuver
    battalion to each where there are only two battalions now.
        If confirmed, how would you propose to implement a decision to add
    a third maneuver battalion to the heavy and infantry combat brigades?
        Answer. We are examining the current brigade designs and associated
    force mix including the number and type of brigades. This will produce
    alternatives to be analyzed. As the results of this analysis emerge, we
    will make appropriate decisions on the implementation of any of such
    proposals and their affect on our available resources. No decisions
    have been made regarding future force design or force structure
    changes.

                            ACTIVE-DUTY END STRENGTH

        Question. The Army has increased its Active-Duty end strength over
    the last several years to meet current and what was believed to be the
    demands of future operational requirements. Authorized active duty Army
    end strength is now 569,400. The Secretary of Defense has announced
    Army Active-Duty end strength reductions beginning this year through
    2014 of 22,000 soldiers followed by another 27,000 beginning in 2015.
    The fiscal year 2012 budget starts this reduction by requesting 7,400
    fewer soldiers.
        In your view, what is the appropriate Army Active-Duty end strength
    needed to meet today's demand for deployed forces, increase nondeployed
    readiness, build strategic depth, and relieve stress on soldiers and
    their families?
        Answer. We are continuously assessing the factors that affect end
    strength including assigned missions, operational demands, unit
    readiness, soldier and family well-being, Reserve component capability
    and capacity, and fiscal constraints in order to determine required
    Active-Duty end strength. Our Active-Duty end strength is adequate to
    meet current demand. As future demand is better understood, we will
    assess its impact.
        Question. In your view, what is the appropriate Army Active-Duty
    end strength needed to meet the likely future demand for deployed
    forces, maintain nondeployed readiness, ensure ground force strategic
    depth, and avoid increasing stress on soldiers and their families?
        Answer. I am not yet prepared to provide you with an answer on
    future Army end strength.
        Question. Plans for the reduction of Army end strength assumes that
    the cuts will be made gradually over several years.
        What, in your view, are the critical requirements of the management
    of this end strength reduction to ensure that should strategic
    circumstances change the cuts can be stopped and, if necessary,
    reversed?
        Answer. End strength reductions are not automatic. They are
    conditions based and will require periodic assessment. If confirmed, I
    will work with Secretary McHugh and Army Leadership to develop a plan
    that will allow us to accomplish current and projected missions,
    balance the well-being of soldiers and families, and keep us prepared
    to meet unforeseen operational demands.
        Question. The gradual reduction of end strength may provide a hedge
    against an unforeseen contingency requiring sufficient and available
    Army forces, however, savings from the reduction of forces could be
    realized sooner and with greater long-term advantages with faster
    implementation.
        What, in your view, are the most important advantages and
    disadvantages of faster end strength reductions?
        Answer. The Army's deliberate and responsible draw-down plans will
    proceed at a pace necessary to ensure mission success, the well-being
    of soldiers and families, compliance with directed resource constraints
    and flexibility for unforeseen demands.
        The advantage of drawing down faster would be the flexibility to
    invest in other required areas. The disadvantages lie in the reduced
    flexibility for meeting unforeseen demands and the precision to
    maintain the skills and quality of the remaining force.
        Question. End strength reductions totaling 49,000 soldiers will
    also require force structure reductions as well.
        If confirmed, how would you propose to reduce Army force structure,
    if at all, to avoid the problems associated with a force that is over-
    structured and undermanned?
        Answer. The Army is coordinating the end strength reductions with
    its deliberate Total Army Analysis process to ensure Army force
    structure contains required capability and capacity to meet current and
    future operational requirements within authorized end strength.
        Question. How will these planned end strength reductions impact the
    Army's plans for overseas basing of its units?
        Answer. In my present position, I have not had a chance to examine
    the potential impact of end strength reductions on overseas basing.
        Question. The Army has had two other major post-conflict end
    strength reductions in the last 40 years after Vietnam and after
    Operation Desert Storm.
        What, in your view, are the critical elements of the planning and
    management of a major force reduction to ensure that the health of the
    Army as a whole is not crippled impacting ongoing operations or general
    readiness?
        Answer. End strength reductions are conditions based and must be
    deliberate and responsible. The Army's plan should ensure
    accomplishment of its assigned missions, operational readiness for
    future demands, compliance with directed resource constraints while
    treating soldiers and their families with the dignity and respect they
    deserve.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that
    the planning and management of an end strength reduction minimize the
    negative impact on the readiness of the Army and soldier families?
        Answer. Throughout my entire career, I have focused on taking care
    of soldiers and families. If confirmed, I will look carefully at the
    impact on soldiers and families.
        Question. Does the Army have the legislative authority it needs to
    properly shape the force as part of the personnel drawdown?
        Answer. At this time, I am not aware of any additional legislative
    authority the Army needs to shape personnel drawdown. If confirmed, I
    will consult with Secretary McHugh and Senior Army personnel leadership
    to determine if additional authorities are necessary.

                                 STRATEGIC RISK

        Question. Do you believe that the extended pace and scope of
    operations in Iraq and Afghanistan create increased levels of strategic
    risk for the United States based on the lack of availability of trained
    and ready forces for other contingencies?
        Answer. In my current position, I have not yet had the opportunity
    to examine strategic risk given our global demand. If confirmed as a
    member of the Joint Chiefs, I will have the opportunity to look closely
    at this issue.
        Question. If so, how would you characterize the increase in
    strategic risk in terms of the Army's ability to mobilize, deploy and
    employ a force for a new contingency? In your view, is this level of
    risk acceptable?
        Answer. As mentioned in the previous question, I have not yet had
    the opportunity to examine strategic risk.
        Question. What is the impact of the decision to increase Army
    forces committed to Afghanistan on our ability to meet our security
    obligations in other parts of the world?
        Answer. The impact is manageable as we have available forces in the
    Train/Ready pool of forces to meet potential future requirements with
    an acceptable degree of risk. The Army is currently meeting all
    requirements and mitigates the Afghanistan additional commitment with
    forces made available commensurate with the drawdown in Iraq. The Army
    continuously balances meeting current requirements against building/
    maintaining strategic depth and capacity for contingency, full spectrum
    operations.
        Question. How and over what periods of time, if at all, will
    reductions to Army end-strength increase or aggravate this risk?
        Answer. These projected reductions, as mentioned by the Secretary
    of Defense in his 6 January announcement, are based on the condition of
    a decrease in demand. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh
    to ensure our force structure is adequate to meet all future demands.
        Question. If confirmed, what additional actions would you take, if
    any, to reduce or mitigate this strategic risk?
        Answer. The Army has a mature planning process to determine force
    structure changes within the approved end strength for all Army
    components. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the full readiness of
    units generating to deploy to known operations in or in preparation for
    contingency operations.

              ``INSTITUTIONALIZING'' SUPPORT FOR IRREGULAR WARFARE

        Question. A major objective of the Department over recent years has
    been increasing emphasis on lower-end, irregular, counterinsurgency,
    and stability type operations. All of which are areas that place a high
    premium and demands on Army capabilities. In order to ensure that a
    rebalance achieves this objective, and perhaps more importantly is then
    sustainable, Secretary Gates has stressed the need for the Department
    to ``institutionalize and finance'' the support necessary for the
    irregular warfare capabilities that have been developed over the last
    few years and will be needed in the future.
        What, in your view, does it mean to ``institutionalize''
    capabilities and support for irregular warfare capabilities in the
    Army?
        Answer. The Army views Irregular Warfare as an operational theme
    rather than a particular type of operation. We must be able to conduct
    Stability Operations, Counter-Insurgency, Counterterrorism, and Foreign
    Internal Defense and support the Special Operations Forces in
    unconventional warfare. I understand ``institutionalize'' to mean that
    the Army's operating forces and generating forces view operations under
    the theme of Irregular Warfare as a core capability. We must be able to
    execute missions across the full spectrum of conflict, to include
    irregular warfare.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of Army efforts
    to date to institutionalize and support these capabilities?
        Answer. The Army has institutionalized Irregular Warfare. We have
    an Irregular Warfare proponent within Training and Doctrine Command
    supported by an Irregular Warfare Fusion Cell that synthesizes Army
    Irregular Warfare efforts including those from the Army's Peacekeeping
    and Stability Operations Institute, Counter-Insurgency centers and
    others. The Army includes Irregular Warfare in our professional
    military education. The Army has built four Counter-Insurgency Centers,
    a Security Force Assistance training brigade, increased the military
    police, and significantly increased Special Operations and Civil
    Affairs forces.
        Question. In your view, what are the obstacles, if any, to
    institutionalizing this kind of support, and what will be necessary to
    overcome them?
        Answer. I have not seen any particular obstacles to
    institutionalizing this kind of support. The Army has to balance risk
    across the range of missions it may be called on to perform.
        Question. While force structure and program changes may be
    necessary, they are unlikely to prove sufficient to achieve full
    institutionalization. The greater challenge may be found in changing
    Army culture, attitudes, management, and career path choices, for
    example through adjustments to organization, training, doctrine, and
    personnel policies.
        In your view, what are the most important changes, if any, that
    might be necessary to complement programmatic changes in support of the
    further institutionalization of capabilities for irregular warfare in
    the Army?
        Answer. We have to retain the flexibility, adaptability, and
    agility to operate both in missions requiring maneuver over extended
    distances and in missions requiring the establishment of security over
    wide areas regardless of what kind of threats populate the battlefield.
        Question. Institutionalizing support for irregular,
    counterinsurgency, and stability capabilities in the force does not
    mean ignoring the requirement for the Army to be trained, equipped, and
    ready for major combat at the high-end of the full spectrum of
    operations.
        If confirmed, how would you propose to allocate the Army's efforts
    and resources to ensure that the force is prepared for major combat
    while at the same time it increases and institutionalizes support for
    irregular, counterinsurgency, and stability operations?
        Answer. We are training and educating our soldiers and leaders to
    understand that they must be capable of both combined arms maneuver and
    wide area security. In training, we replicate the threats and
    conditions they are likely to face in their next mission. For 10 years,
    that has meant irregular threats and conditions common in the wide area
    security role that supports counterinsurgency operations. As the demand
    for forces in Iraq and Afghanistan is reduced, we will introduce
    threats and conditions in training common in the combined arms maneuver
    role. The goal however is to avoid the false dichotomy of ``regular or
    irregular'' warfare. The future battlefield will be populated with
    hybrid threats--combinations of regular, irregular, terrorist, and
    criminal groups--and we must train and educate our leaders and units to
    understand and prevail against them.
        Question. Do you anticipate that the Army will continue to train
    and equip general purpose force brigades for the ``advise and assist
    brigade (AAB)'' mission after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan come to
    an end?
        Answer. I anticipate that there will be an ongoing requirement for
    Security Force Assistance activities of the type carried out by these
    brigades into the future. I believe building partnerships and partner
    capacity will be key roles for the Army in the future. If confirmed, I
    will continue to assess requirements and work with this Congress to
    ensure we have the resources and flexibility required to meet them.
        Question. If so, what mission essential task list changes do you
    plan to institutionalize this mission set in training for the general
    purpose force brigades?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with our joint partners to
    identify the mission essential tasks for Security Force Assistance and
    incorporate them into the Unified Joint Task List and Army Unified Task
    List.
        Question. Do you foresee that general purpose force brigades will
    be regionally aligned to carry out an AAB-type mission?
        Answer. I believe it is too early to tell. I believe some brigades
    may be regionally aligned. The number and type of brigades will depend
    upon what we have available after the priority requirements in the
    CENTCOM AOR, and the other COCOM requirements. If confirmed I will work
    with Secretary McHugh to determine the best allocation to support
    operational requirements.
        Question. If so, what changes to training and equipping of the
    ARFORGEN model will be necessary for regional alignment?
        Answer. The ARFORGEN model and our modular design are well-suited
    to the kind of adaptations that will be required to meet security force
    assistance requirements in the future.

                                LESSONS LEARNED

        Question. What do you believe are the major lessons that the
    Department of the Army has and should have learned from Operation
    Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) regarding its
    title 10, U.S.C., responsibilities for manning, training, and equipping
    the force?
        Answer. We have learned that soldiers require more than a year to
    fully recover from extended deployments and to prepare for another
    deployment. In addition, the ability to adapt rapidly is the key to
    success in the current and future operational environments. We have
    also learned that a fully integrated Reserve component is critical to
    meet force requirements.
        Question. If confirmed, which of these lessons, if any, would you
    address as a matter of urgent priority?
        Answer. They are equally important and all must be addressed.

                           ROTATION CYCLES/SCHEDULES

        Question. Although improving recently, the Active Army's ratio of
    time spent deployed to time at home station has remained fairly steady
    at 1:1--that is for each year deployed a soldier spends about 1 year at
    home station. The Active Army objective is 1:2 where soldiers can
    expect to be home for 2 years for each year deployed. The Reserve
    component objective is 1:5 where soldiers can expect to be home for 5
    years for each year deployed.
        What impact do you expect the proposed troop reductions in Iraq to
    have on the so-called ``dwell time'' of Army soldiers? Is it possible
    that the reduction of demand for Army forces in Iraq alone will allow
    the Army to achieve the 1:2 dwell time goal by the end 2011?
        Answer. The proposed troop reductions in Iraq will allow the Army
    to gradually increase dwell if there is not a significant increase in
    demand in Afghanistan or in other contingencies. We do not believe that
    the reduction of demand in Iraq alone will allow the Army to meet the
    1:2 dwell goal.
        Question. What is your assessment of the potential impact of the
    decision to decrease Army end-strength on the rotation schedule and
    meeting the dwell goal of 1:2 for Active-Duty Forces?
        Answer. With the proposed troop reduction in Iraq and projected
    decrease in Afghanistan, we will see improvement gradually in dwell,
    but the Army has not yet met its dwell goal of 1:2 for Active-Duty
    Forces. The decreases in Army strength are conditions based and I am
    not in a position at this time to assess whether there will be an
    impact to the dwell goal of 1:2 based on these reductions.
        Question. How, in your view, will the proposed reductions in Iraq
    impact the ability of the Army National Guard to respond to Homeland
    Defense and support to civil authorities?
        Answer. The return of these Army National Guard forces to state
    control should provide the Governors and Adjutants General with
    increased forces to conduct Homeland Defense, disaster response, and
    Defense Support of Civil Authorities. These forces will be better
    trained and more experienced due to their Iraq combat deployments.
    Although the National Guard has been able to meet all disaster relief
    requirements, the return of forces will allow more flexibility to
    accomplish local missions.

                             EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY

        Question. Both deploying and nondeploying Active and Reserve
    component Army units are training without all their required equipment.
    Deploying units do not receive some of their equipment until late in
    their predeployment training cycle or as they arrive in theater.
        In your view, has deployment of additional brigades to Afghanistan
    increased the strain on maintenance systems and further reduce
    equipment availability for training?
        Answer. There have been some challenges with equipment being
    available for training when it has been fielded directly to theatre.
    We're beginning to overcome this challenge.
        Question. What is the impact of our drawdown from Iraq in this
    regard?
        Answer. The drawdown from Iraq should improve availability of
    equipment for units to conduct pre-deployment training. For some
    systems, such as tactical wheeled vehicles, it will have a larger
    positive impact. For other pieces of more high demand equipment in
    short supply across the Army, I anticipate it will have a lesser
    impact.
        Question. Do you believe that the Army has enough modern equipment
    to fully support the predeployment training and operations of deploying
    units?
        Answer. The Army does not have enough equipment to fill all units
    to their fully modernized capabilities. This means there are some
    instances in which the most modern equipment is not available until
    later in a unit's pre-deployment cycle or until it arrives in theater.
    However, the Army uses the force generation model to resource units
    with adequate levels of the available modernized equipment to conduct
    their pre-deployment training and assigned mission upon deployment.
        Question. What do you see as the critical equipment shortfalls for
    training and operations?
        Answer. The Army is short unmanned aerial systems and some non-
    line-of-sight communications equipment. Due to the nature of the
    warfare in Afghanistan, we face shortages in light infantry specific
    equipment. As we continue to reset equipment returning from Iraq we
    will see a steady improvement in on hand equipment for units training
    for contingency force missions.
        Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address these
    shortfalls and ensure that units have what they need to train and
    operate?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continue our capability portfolio
    reviews to evaluate our priorities against mission requirements and
    adjust our resource allocations to ensure the Army continues to strike
    the critical balance between having enough modern equipment to fully
    support pre-deployment training and operations in theatre. If
    confirmed, I would support the Army Force Generation Model of phased
    equipping through which the Army intensively manages our equipment on-
    hand to ensure next deploying units, from all components, have
    sufficient equipment for training and deployment.

                             EQUIPMENT REPAIR/RESET

        Question. Congress provided the Army with approximately $15 to $17
    billion annually to help with the reset of nondeployed forces and
    accelerate the repair and replacement of equipment. However, the amount
    of reset funding requested for DOD in fiscal year 2012 decreased to
    $11.9 billion from the fiscal year 2011 request of $21.4 billion.
        In your view, is this level of funding sufficient to not only
    prepare Army forces for operations in Afghanistan but to also improve
    the readiness of non-deployed forces for other potential contingencies?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the $4.4 billion requested for
    reset in fiscal year 2012, though lower than requests in fiscal year
    2010 and fiscal year 2011, is adequate to replace equipment lost in
    combat and to repair equipment available for reset. If confirmed, I
    will closely examine this issue.
        Question. Is it your understanding that our repair depots are
    operating at full capacity to meet rebuild and repair requirements for
    reset?
        Answer. My understanding is that repair depots are operating at
    required capacity but not at their full capacity.
        Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe could be
    taken to increase the Army's capacity to fix its equipment and make it
    available for operations and training?
        Answer. There are certain measures, such as contract augmentation
    or rebalancing workload that could be used to increase capacity at our
    facilities. At this time, I am not in a position to determine whether
    these measures are necessary or appropriate.
        Question. What impact is it likely to have on the ability of Army
    National Guard (ARNG) units to respond to Homeland Security and support
    to civil authorities missions?
        Answer. I understand that the reduction of reset funding for fiscal
    year 2012 is commensurate with the reduction of troop and equipment
    levels supporting Operation New Dawn. I believe that the ARNG will
    still be able to respond to Homeland Defense missions and provide
    support to civil authorities.

                                MISSILE DEFENSE

        Question. The Department of Defense recently decided to terminate
    the Army's Surface-Launched Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile,
    and not to proceed with procurement and fielding of the tri-national
    Medium Extended Air Defense System, two Army air and missile defense
    systems.
        Do you consider missile defense to be one of the Army's core
    missions?
        Answer. Yes. The Army has confirmed on many occasions that Air and
    Missile Defense is a core competency. Protection of our deployed forces
    is the priority. The Army provides this protection in coordination with
    our sister Services and coalition partners.
        Question. How do you believe the Army should manage the risks that
    result from these decisions?
        Answer. I believe the Army needs to continue to monitor the threat
    and prioritize required future capabilities to ensure we provide
    effective affordable solutions in a timely manner to our forces.
        Question. The Army has recently proposed transferring a number of
    its air and missile development programs to the Missile Defense Agency
    (MDA).
        In your view, what is of the proper relationship between the Army
    and the Missile Defense Agency?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Army relies on the MDA to
    develop and produce the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). The
    Army works with MDA to provide those BMDS capabilities to the combatant
    commanders. The Army maintains a relationship with MDA through the
    Army/MDA Board of Directors and its four standing committees.
        Question. The Army has recently completed a review of its air and
    missile defense portfolio.
        In your view, what are or should be the Army's responsibilities, if
    any, with respect to development, procurement, and operation of missile
    defense systems?
        Answer. The Army's responsibilities depend on the type of missile
    defense system being developed and guidance from the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense.

                                     SPACE

        Question. The Army Space support to Strategic Command works closely
    with Air Force Space Command in getting space based communications to
    the warfighter. Recently the Army has begun to look at the possibility
    of expanding the scope of data that could be provided to the last
    tactical mile from space.
        In your view, what are the needs that the Army could address from
    space, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that this is coordinated
    with OSD?
        Answer. While I am not yet in a position to provide an informed
    assessment, I understand that the importance of space programs
    continues to increase across DOD, and the Army needs to keep pace to
    fully leverage capabilities and ensure that space systems are
    appropriately prioritized within both DOD and the Department of the
    Army.
        Question. If confirmed, what would be your vision for the Army
    space forces in the future?
        Answer. While I am not yet in a position to provide an informed
    assessment, one of my priorities, if I am confirmed, is to position the
    Army to keep pace to fully leverage capabilities and ensure that space
    systems are appropriately prioritized and resourced.
        Question. The Army, as do all the Services, tends to lag behind in
    the acquisition of ground and other terminals to work with new
    satellite systems. Acquisition of GPS M-code capable equipment is just
    one example of where there is needed capability on orbit but terminals
    will not be available in a timely fashion to utilize the capability.
        What is your view on this lag and, if confirmed, what actions would
    you propose taking to resolve the lag?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would need to examine this issue more
    closely. While I understand that all of the Services have specific
    requirements to meet specific needs for their forces and that the Army
    depends heavily on these systems, I am not yet in a position to provide
    an informed assessment.

                         LOW DENSITY/HIGH DEMAND FORCES

        Question. If confirmed, how would you address the Army's management
    of low density units such as Special Operations Forces, military
    police, civil affairs, and others which are in extremely high demand in
    this new strategic environment?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would use the Total Army Analysis (TAA) to
    identify the capabilities necessary, within resource constraints, to
    achieve the full spectrum of missions expected of the Army. When
    requirements for additional low density/high demand capabilities are
    identified through this process, they are resourced within acceptable
    risk. This process will help determine where these capabilities should
    reside: the Active component, the Reserve component, or a mix of both.
    The Army balances the inventory of these low density units to ensure
    availability of an affordable mix of flexible forces capable of
    accomplishing the missions required within the most likely security
    environment.
        Question. Are there functional changes among the Active and Reserve
    components that you believe should be made?
        Answer. I am not yet aware at this time of any changes that may be
    necessary.

                                 ARMY READINESS

        Question. How would you characterize Army readiness in its deployed
    and non-deployed units?
        Answer. I have some concerns about the readiness levels of deployed
    and nondeployed units. In the ARFORGEN model, deployed and deploying
    Army units are given the highest priority for manning, equipping and
    training to achieve the combatant commander's wartime/mission
    requirements. Nondeployed Army units are used to provide the additive
    resources to ensure that deployed and deploying Army units can meet
    mission requirements. This requires the Army to continue to do risk
    assessment so nondeployed units do not fall below an unacceptable level
    of risk.
        Question. Do you believe the current state of Army readiness is
    acceptable?
        Answer. In my opinion, the Army is prepared to accomplish current
    missions.
        Question. How do you see operations in Iraq and the war in
    Afghanistan impacting the readiness of Army forces that may be called
    upon to respond to an attack or another contingency?
        Answer. The current demand for Army forces coupled with the
    cumulative effect of nearly 10 years of conflict impacts the Army's
    flexibility to provide forces to other contingencies.

                        IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN DEPLOYMENTS

        Question. Many soldiers are on their fourth and some their fifth
    major deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Beginning in August 2008
    Department of Defense policy has been to limit deployments for Active
    component soldiers and mobilization of Reserve component soldiers to
    not longer than 12 months.
        What is your assessment of the impact of multiple deployments of
    troops to Afghanistan and Iraq on retention, particularly among young
    enlisted and officer personnel after their initial active duty
    obligated service has been completed?
        Answer. The Army monitors retention very closely, given the high
    operational demand and multiple deployments that soldiers are
    experiencing. Statistics reveal that multiple deployments to
    Afghanistan and Iraq are not adversely impacting retention. Continuous
    improvements to Army benefits, such as world class healthcare advances
    for wounded soldiers, enhancements in family support programs, and
    additional monetary bonuses have encouraged large numbers of our
    soldiers to continue their commitments beyond their obligated service
    periods.
        Question. What are the indicators of stress on the force, and what
    do these indicators tell you about that level of stress currently? In
    addition to any other stress indicators that you address, please
    discuss suicide and divorce rates, drug and alcohol abuse, AWOLs, and
    rates of indiscipline.
        Answer. The indicators of stress on the force that the Army tracks
    continuously include: Reenlistments, Chapter separations, Divorce,
    Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault, Enlisted Desertion, AWOL offenses,
    Drug and Alcohol Enrollments, Drug Positives, Courts-Martial and
    suicides.
        I understand that Army discipline and misconduct rates, including
    desertion, absence without leave, and courts-martial have remained
    steady or declined in the past year. Other indicators of stress on the
    force, such as substance abuse and domestic violence have increased.
    However, the significant increase in the number of soldier suicides is
    of the greatest concern. Soldiers and their families continue to make
    significant personal sacrifices in support of our Nation. If confirmed,
    I am committed to providing soldiers and families with a quality of
    life commensurate with their service and to continuing Army efforts to
    develop multi-disciplinary solutions directed at mitigating risk
    behaviors and enhancing soldier and family fitness and resilience.
        Question. For how long do you believe these levels of commitments
    can continue before there will be significant adverse consequences for
    the Army?
        Answer. I am concerned about the long-term health of the force if
    we are unable to achieve the appropriate deployment to dwell ratio for
    the deploying soldier. Adequate dwell time should help the visible and
    invisible wounds of this protracted conflict. If confirmed, I will
    closely monitor indicators of stress on the force and work to ensure
    that the Army has plans and programs to confront these issues
    appropriately.
        Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Casey has stated
    that the Army is ``out of balance''.
        What is your understanding and assessment of the concept and
    efforts to achieve ``balance'' for the Army?
        Answer. I understand balance to be the Army's ability to sustain
    the Army's soldiers, families, and civilians, prepare forces for
    success in the current conflict, reset returning units to rebuild the
    readiness consumed in operations and to prepare for future deployments
    and contingencies, and transform to meet the demands of the 21st
    century. With the help of Congress, we have made significant progress
    over the past 3 years to restore balance.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you take to
    achieve and sustain Army ``balance''?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh and Army
    leadership to adopt measures and strategies to achieve and sustain
    balance. Building resilience among our forces will be one of my highest
    priorities.

                  RESERVE COMPONENTS AS AN OPERATIONAL RESERVE

        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's
    Reserve Components as an Operational Reserve, as opposed to its
    longstanding traditional role as a Strategic Reserve?
        Answer. The demand for U.S. ground forces over this past decade has
    required continuous use of Active component (AC) and Reserve component
    (RC) forces in order to meet the Army's operational requirements. The
    RC is no longer solely Strategic Reserve. Current and projected demand
    for Army forces will require continued access to the RC. Mobilization
    and operational use of the RC will continue for the foreseeable future.
        Question. In your view, what are the major challenges to
    maintaining and enhancing the Army Reserve and Army National Guard as a
    relevant and capable Operational Reserve?
        Answer. In my opinion, the Army must ensure continued access to the
    Reserves as an essential part of the Total Force. If confirmed, I will
    work to ensure they have the necessary training equipment to accomplish
    all missions. Maintaining an appropriate level of resourcing for the
    Operational Reserve and mobilizing these forces on a predictable and
    recurring basis will be challenges for the Army.
        Question. What are your views about the optimal role for the
    Reserve component forces in meeting combat missions?
        Answer. In my view, Reserve component forces play a critical role
    in enabling the Joint Force Commanders to meet assigned missions.
    Today's force is structured to balance maneuver capability in the
    Active component with a majority of the enablers in the Reserve
    component. This balance should provide capabilities to meet operational
    requirements.
        Question. In your view, should the Department of Defense assign
    homeland defense or any other global or domestic civil support missions
    exclusively to the Reserve?
        Answer. Reserve component forces are uniquely positioned to be the
    first responder to these missions: however, the Army's Total Force must
    be able to execute homeland defense or other global or domestic support
    missions.
        Question. In your view, how will predictable cycles of 1 year
    mobilized to 5 years at home affect the viability and sustainability of
    the All-Volunteer Reserve Force?
        Answer. Once the Army can restore its balance and stress on the
    force has been significantly reduced, a predictable cycle that ensures
    full recovery and training will support the viability and
    sustainability of the All-Volunteer Reserve Force. I think the exact
    ratio--whether 1:4 or 1:5--requires further analysis.

         MOBILIZATION AND DEMOBILIZATION OF NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

        Question. In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001,
    the National Guard and Reserves have experienced their largest and most
    sustained employment since World War II. Numerous problems arose in the
    planning and procedures for mobilization and demobilization, e.g.,
    inadequate health screening and medical readiness monitoring, errors
    caused by antiquated pay systems, limited transition assistance
    programs upon demobilization, and lack of access to members of the
    Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Reserve Force management policies and
    systems have been characterized in the past as ``inefficient and
    rigid'' and readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment
    stay-behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies.
        What is your assessment of advances made in improving Army Reserve
    component mobilization and demobilization procedures, and in what areas
    do problems still exist?
        Answer. I understand the Army is currently reviewing all of its
    mobilization policies to ensure that the systems in place are effective
    and responsive for Reserve component soldiers. I believe Reserve
    components are a critical part of the Total Force, and if confirmed, I
    will continue the effort to ensure that Reserve component soldiers are
    mobilized and demobilized in the most effective and efficient way
    possible and that their needs and the needs of their families and
    employers are met.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
    sufficiency of current Reserve Force management policies?
        Answer. As I understand current Reserve Force management policies,
    the goal is to manage the force to produce a supply of units to the
    combatant commanders with a short-term goal of 1 year of mobilization
    every 5 years with a long-term goal of 1 year of mobilization every 6
    years. The challenge the Army has faced has been that demand has been
    greater than the supply and has caused the need for more frequent
    mobilizations. As operations in Iraq and Afghanistan start to draw-
    down, the Army should be better able to attain the mobilization to
    dwell goals.
        Question. What do you consider to be the most significant enduring
    changes to the administration of the Reserve components aimed at
    ensuring their readiness for future mobilization requirements?
        Answer. The Army Force Generation Model fundamentally changes the
    way the Army builds unit readiness for mobilization requirements. The
    ARFORGEN model presents a structured progression of readiness through a
    multi-year long cycle.
        Question. Do you see a need to modify current statutory authorities
    for the mobilization of members of the National Guard and Reserves?
        Answer. At present, I am not aware of a need to modify current
    statutory authorities to facilitate mobilization of the National Guard
    and Reserves. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh to review
    the statutory authorities to determine if they are sufficient.

                            INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE

        Question. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves has
    found that accessing the IRR as a viable source of manpower for the war
    was problematic, and that using the IRR as a solution for unit manning
    is a failed concept.
        What is your assessment of the value of the IRR to the All-
    Volunteer Force?
        Answer. I believe the IRR has proven an invaluable asset to all
    Army components to support contingency operations around the world.
        Question. What are your views on the proper role of the IRR in Army
    force management planning?
        Answer. The IRR can serve as a source of experienced and highly-
    skilled soldiers to help the Army meet critical skill and grade
    requirements.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, do you foresee making
    to the Army's IRR recall policy?
        Answer. At this time, I do not have sufficient information to
    recommend changes to this policy. If confirmed, I will consider input
    from all components to determine the best IRR recall policy.
        Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of the system in
    place for members in the IRR receiving orders to active duty to request
    a delay or exemption for that activation, including the procedures in
    place for appealing the Army's decision on that request?
        Answer. While this is an important part of the IRR mobilization, I
    do not have sufficient familiarity with this policy to recommend
    changes.
        Question. Recent studies of Army suicides show higher rates among
    the IRR.
        What should the Army and DOD do to address this concern?
        Answer. Suicides in the IRR are often more difficult to address
    because those soldiers are not affiliated with a unit. If confirmed, I
    will consider all methods to integrate IRR soldiers into the Army's
    Health Promotion/Risk Reduction efforts.

                        PERSONNEL AND ENTITLEMENT COSTS

        Question. In addition to health care costs, personnel and related
    entitlement spending continues its steep upward growth and is becoming
    an ever increasing portion of the DOD budget.
        If confirmed, what actions would you take to control the rise in
    the Army's personnel costs and entitlement spending?
        Answer. We need to strike a balance between preserving the All-
    Volunteer Force, accomplishing operational missions and retraining an
    Army that is affordable to the Nation. If confirmed, I will work with
    the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense on how best to
    achieve it.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to avoid a
    requirement for massive end-of-year reprogramming to cover personnel
    costs?
        Answer. My understanding is the President's budget is adequate to
    meet current personnel costs.
        Question. What would be the impact of a year-long continuing
    resolution on Army personnel funding?
        Answer. If the Army is given the flexibility to manage total
    resources (both Base and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds)
    to pay its force, then fiscal year 2011 continuing resolution will have
    minimal impact on military pay and allowances.

     MEDICAL AND DENTAL READINESS OF ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMY RESERVE
                                   PERSONNEL

        Question. Medical and dental readiness of Reserve component
    personnel has been an issue of significant concern to the committee,
    and shortfalls that have been identified have indicated a need for
    improved policy oversight and accountability.
        If confirmed, how would you seek to clarify and coordinate
    reporting on the medical and dental readiness of the Reserves?
        Answer. I believe the Army should develop and resource mechanisms
    to routinely identify screen and assess Reserve component medical
    readiness. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary of the Army, the
    Chief of Army Reserves, the Director of the Army National Guard, and
    the Surgeon General to develop policies for more effectively
    identifying personnel that are nondeployable for medical reasons.
        Question. How would you improve upon the Army's ability to produce
    a healthy and fit Reserve component?
        Answer. This is a very important issue, and I will work with the
    Army's Active and Reserve component leadership to assess whether there
    are challenges in this area. The Army is moving forward with a
    Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program. If confirmed, I would determine
    how this program applies to Reserve component and National Guard
    soldiers.

             NATIONAL GUARD ORGANIZATION, EQUIPMENT, AND READINESS

        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of changes in
    the global and domestic roles and mission of the Army National Guard
    and the National Guard Bureau?
        Answer. The Army National Guard is a component of the Reserve and
    Total Force. It responds to emergencies within the United States and
    deploys to support contingency operations overseas. Throughout the last
    10 years, the Army National Guard has transformed from a Strategic
    Reserve to an operational Reserve. The National Guard, with the support
    of the National Guard Bureau, has proven critical to the Army's Total
    Force, and I believe it will continue to do so in the years ahead.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's
    commitment to fully fund 100 percent of National Guard equipment
    requirements? In your view, do Army processes for planning,
    programming, and budgeting sufficiently address the requirements of the
    National Guard?
        Answer. I understand efforts are underway to modernize the Reserve
    components and to ensure they are equipped to fulfill their missions.
    If confirmed, I will examine the funding of the National Guard to
    ensure it receives the appropriate level of resources to maintain its
    role as a vital component of the Total Force.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that the resourcing
    needs of the Army National Guard are fully considered and resourced
    through the Army budget? In your view, what is the appropriate role for
    the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in this regard?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chief, National
    Guard Bureau, to ensure that Army National Guard requirements/needs are
    appropriately synchronized with Army priorities and resourcing
    strategy.
        Question. What is your assessment of the effect, if any, of
    increasing the grade of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to
    General (O-10)?
        Answer. The increase in grade reflects the significant
    responsibilities of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
        Question. In your opinion, should the Chief of the National Guard
    Bureau be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
        Answer. In my present role, I have not had the opportunity to
    consider this issue.
        Question. What is your understanding of the role and authority of
    the Director of the Army National Guard?
        Answer. The Director of the Army National Guard assists the Chief
    of the National Guard Bureau, organizing and managing its personnel and
    other resources to accomplish the responsibilities and functions. The
    Director of the Army National Guard assists in carrying out the
    functions of the National Guard Bureau as they relate to the Army.
        Question. In your view, should the Director of the Army National
    Guard be ``dual hatted'' as a Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army?
        Answer. In my present role, I have not had the opportunity to see
    how these positions would function together and have not formed an
    opinion.

                       ARMY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (S&T)

        Question. What do you see as the role that Army science and
    technology programs will play in continuing to develop capabilities for
    current and future Army systems?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Army's science and
    technology investment strategy is shaped to foster invention,
    innovation, and demonstration of technologies for the current and
    future warfighter. The science and technology program should retain the
    flexibility to be responsive to unforeseen needs identified through
    current operations.
        Question. What in your view have been the greatest contributions,
    if any, of Army science and technology programs to current operations?
        Answer. I believe the most significant contribution the Army
    science and technology community has offered to current operations is
    the ability to use technology to significantly improve warfighter
    capabilities. Technological innovations have resulted in the rapid
    development and deployment of lightweight and adaptable Armor solutions
    that have been critical to addressing emerging threats, enhancing
    intelligence capabilities, and better protecting our deployed forces.
        Question. What metrics would you use, if confirmed, to judge the
    value and the investment level in Army science and technology programs?
        Answer. To judge the value and investment level in Army science and
    technology programs, I would use metrics that demonstrate improved
    warfighter capabilities; improve acquisition programs; and align
    technology development to warfighter requirements.
        Question. What new S&T areas do you envision the Army pursuing, for
    instance to lighten soldier load, and to improve the survivability and
    combat effectiveness of dismounted soldiers and ground vehicles?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will engage the Army's science and
    technology program and its stakeholders, including the acquisition
    community, Training and Doctrine Command and the combatant commanders
    to discuss the needs of the warfighter and the ``art of the possible''
    for future technology-enabled capabilities to ensure the Army remains
    the best equipped force in the world.

      ARMY LABORATORIES AND RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ENGINEERING CENTERS
                                     (RDEC)

        Question. How will you balance the role of Army laboratories
    between long-term fundamental research, support to current operations
    and the development of new capabilities to support current and future
    Army missions?
        Answer. The Army laboratories are science and technology performing
    organizations and as such have and will continue to play a major role
    in supporting current operations with best capabilities available.
    Through their broad range of investments in key strategic science and
    technology areas, they also provide critical new capabilities for
    soldiers.
        Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Army
    laboratories and R&D centers have the highest quality workforce,
    laboratory infrastructure, resources, and management, so that they can
    continue to support deployed warfighters and develop next generation
    capabilities?
        Answer. Army laboratories and Research and Development Centers need
    to maintain the resources required to continue initiatives and
    advancements that support the warfighter. If confirmed, I will learn
    more about their operations and support efforts to improve best
    practices and workforce quality necessary for mission accomplishments.

                        ARMY TEST AND EVALUATION EFFORTS

        Question. In the past, the DOD Test Resource Management Center did
    not certify the Army's test and evaluation (T&E) budget due to
    identified shortfalls in T&E range sustainment, operations, and
    modernization.
        If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Army's T&E
    infrastructure is robust enough to test new systems and technologies
    and reliably verify their combat effectiveness and suitability?
        Answer. Testing is a crucial capability for maintaining the Army's
    combat edge and modernizing the force. I fully recognize the value of
    testing to ensure new technologies and equipment address the
    capabilities our warfighters need. If confirmed, I will work closely
    with the Army T&E community and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    T&E leadership to ensure the Army's T&E infrastructure is adequately
    resourced to address testing requirements and maintain robust test
    capabilities.

                   ARMY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) PROGRAMS

        Question. What major improvements, if any, would you like to see
    made in the Army's development and deployment of major information
    technology systems?
        Answer. I believe the Army needs to implement and enforce technical
    standards, make acquisition of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) or near-
    COTS technology easier, and field new technology to operational forces
    more quickly. This is in line with the congressional mandate you gave
    us in section 804 of the 2010 NDAA.
        As Commanding General for Training and Doctrine Command, I helped
    establish a center for network integration at Fort Bliss, TX--the Army
    Evaluation Task Force (AETF). It will serve as the Network's primary
    test unit with a two-fold intent, to remove the integration burden from
    the operational units and to provide an operational venue to evaluate
    new technologies and network capabilities prior to fielding to
    operational units. The new capabilities they develop should ultimately
    provide the impetus for future acquisition and equipping decisions.
        Question. How will the consolidation of IT systems announced under
    Secretary Gates efficiency initiative reduce the IT support cost per
    user to the Army?
        Answer. I understand the two primary Army initiatives that fulfill
    Secretary Gates' mandate are Enterprise Email and consolidation of Army
    data centers. Implementation of these initiatives should help reduce
    the cost of information technology support to the Army.

                             HUMAN TERRAIN SYSTEMS

        Question. What is your understanding of the Army's plans to
    institutionalize the Human Terrain System (HTS) program? Given the
    proliferation of such capabilities across the Services, what are your
    views, if any, on developing a joint HTS capability?
        Answer. The Army has institutionalized the Human Terrain System as
    an enduring capability assigned to Training and Doctrine Command and
    funded capability starting in the fiscal year 2011. I believe there is
    merit to developing a joint capability. In September 2010, I directed a
    Training and Doctrine Command capability based assessment of all Socio-
    cultural capabilities throughout the combatant commands and Services.
    The intent is to identify other ongoing socio-cultural initiatives, to
    determine potential synergies and best practices in order to develop
    and evolve an enduring joint capability. The results of this assessment
    are due in the spring of 2011.

                               OPERATIONAL ENERGY

        Question. Prior to and since the creation of the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Program, a number
    of the Services have made progress addressing concerns associated with
    operational energy. The Army has announced its operational energy
    aspirations for the future but, unlike the other Services, the Army's
    five strategic energy security goals appear vague and lack quantitative
    metrics against which to measure progress.
        If confirmed, how would you propose that the Army address its
    operational energy challenges, requirements, and opportunities in the
    immediate short-term?
        Answer. The most important issue with operational energy is the
    amount of fuel used to meet our operational needs. Most of our fuel is
    used in generation of electricity. The Army has implemented, and
    accelerated deployment, of generators that use less fuel as well as
    microgrid systems that tie generators together to operate more
    efficiently. We are developing more efficient motors for helicopters
    and vehicles to reduce our operational energy footprint and,
    ultimately, wars are won or lost by dismounted soldiers, so the Army is
    addressing excessive soldier loads, driven in large part by energy and
    power constraints. As the Commanding General of the Army Training and
    Doctrine Command, I'm a charter member of the Army's Senior Energy and
    Sustainability Council, which is responsible for addressing energy
    challenges across the Army. If confirmed I will continue efforts
    currently underway to increase our energy efficient capabilities in
    theater and emphasize energy awareness through the military chain of
    command, and across the Army, to foster a more energy-aware culture.
        Question. What is your understanding of the Army's progress with
    respect to testing and deploying operational energy technologies?
        Answer. The Army is taking advantage of every avenue, to include
    industry, to help us develop technologies that can reduce our
    operational energy footprint. Renewable energy systems and insulated
    tentage are some of the systems being piloted and tested. We are also
    evaluating technologies that will help lighten soldier loads and reduce
    the amount of batteries and fuel we must procure and deliver to
    theater. We will continue to pursue more efficient devices and employ
    energy management capabilities that are essential to retain energy as
    an operational advantage.
        Question. What is your understanding of how the Army is taking
    advantage of its labs and research, engineering and development centers
    to further its operational energy and security goals?
        Answer. The Army has integrated the national laboratories with
    Department of Energy and Army laboratories to develop solutions to a
    range of operational energy, power and security needs. Some of the
    initiatives include research to reduce the size and weight of
    components, broadening alternative energy sources, leveraging various
    emergent energy efficient technologies. These new technologies will
    increase energy efficiency and improve power supplies for contingency
    bases, forward operating bases and equipment carried by individual
    soldiers. If confirmed I will work to ensure that the research
    conducted at Army facilities continues to focus on meeting the
    operational energy needs of the current and future Army.

                          INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE

        Question. Witnesses appearing before the committee in recent years
    have testified that the military Services under-invest in their
    facilities compared to private industry standards. Decades of under-
    investment in our installations have led to increasing backlogs of
    facility maintenance needs, created substandard living and working
    conditions, and made it harder to take advantage of new technologies
    that could increase productivity.
        What is your assessment of Army infrastructure investment?
        Answer. Since fiscal year 2007, with BRAC, Transformation, and Grow
    the Army initiatives, the Army has made significant MILCON investments
    in its infrastructure. If confirmed, I will work with the Assistant
    Secretary of the Army, Installation, Energy and Environment, and the
    Commanding General at Installation Management Command to assess our
    infrastructure investments.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to
    increase resources to reduce the backlog and improve Army facilities?
        Answer. Proper stewardship of our facilities portfolio requires the
    Army to fully sustain the current facilities, dispose of our excess
    facilities, improve the quality of our worst facilities and build-out
    our largest and most critical shortages, all at a level adequate to
    support the mission.
        If confirmed, I will evaluate the proper balance of funding, to
    include evaluating whether the Army should increase operation and
    maintenance funding for restoration and modernization and Demolition.

                 ARMY POLICIES REGARDING DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE

        Question. What is your understanding of the Army's policy with
    respect to disciplinary action and administrative separation of
    soldiers who have been determined to have used illegal drugs? Do you
    agree with this policy?
        Answer. Army policy directs commanders to initiate administrative
    separation for all soldiers involved in trafficking, distribution,
    possession, use, or sale of illegal drugs. While the policy requires
    initiation of separation, commanders have the authority to retain or
    separate a soldier.
        I concur with this policy.
        Question. What is your understanding of the Army's policy with
    respect to rehabilitation and retention on active duty of soldiers who
    have been determined to have used illegal drugs or abused alcohol or
    prescription drugs? Do you agree with this policy?
        Answer. Army policy requires that the separation authority consider
    a soldier drug offender's potential for rehabilitation and further
    military service. For this reason, soldiers who commit drug and alcohol
    offenses are required to be evaluated by a certified substance abuse
    counselor through the Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP). Commanders
    consider the recommendation of ASAP counselors when determining a
    soldier's potential for rehabilitation and retention.
        I concur with this policy.
        Question. Do you believe that the Army has devoted sufficient
    resources to implementation of its rehabilitation policies and
    objectives since 2001? If not, in what ways?
        Answer. My personal experience at various command levels since 2001
    has been that the Army devotes sufficient resources to implement these
    objectives. If confirmed, I will assess and closely monitor the level
    of resourcing for this important area.
        Question. What measures are being taken to improve the Army's
    performance in responding to problems of drug and alcohol abuse?
        Answer. Army policy requires a comprehensive approach by
    commanders, law enforcement and the medical community for drug and
    alcohol abuse. The Army is working diligently to improve its
    surveillance, detection, and intervention systems for drug and alcohol
    abuse.
        The Army investigates all reported drug and alcohol incidents to
    assist commanders in properly adjudicating the offense. The Army is
    also enhancing detection capabilities through the Drug Suppression
    Teams.
        The Army is also working to improve intervention systems. In
    addition to increasing the number of ASAP counselors to accommodate the
    increasing demand, the Army continues to expand the Comprehensive
    Soldier Fitness program to build resiliency in the force. The Army is
    also conducting the Confidential Alcohol Treatment and Education Pilot
    program at six installations to promote help seeking behavior by
    allowing soldiers to confidentially seek help for alcohol problems.

                   MEDICAL PERSONNEL RECRUITING AND RETENTION

        Question. The Army continues to face significant shortages in
    critically needed medical personnel in both Active and Reserve
    components.
        What is your understanding of the most significant personnel
    challenges in recruiting and retaining health professionals in the
    Army?
        Answer. There continues to be a national shortage of medical
    professionals that challenges the Army's efforts to recruit and retain
    healthcare professionals. The Army competes with governmental and non-
    governmental agencies, as well as private healthcare organizations to
    attract and retain the most skilled and talented healthcare providers,
    in a uniformed or civilian capacity. The Army continues to evaluate
    initiatives to provide more flexibility to allow the Army to adequately
    compete in these areas.
        Question. If confirmed, would you undertake a comprehensive review
    of the medical support requirements for the Army, incorporating all new
    requirements for 2011 and beyond?
        Answer. I believe it is important to review medical support
    requirements on a regular, recurring basis. With that in mind, if
    confirmed I will assess whether the Army should undertake a
    comprehensive review of the medical support requirements for the Army.
        Question. If confirmed, what policies or legislative initiatives,
    if any, are necessary in order to ensure that the Army can continue to
    fulfill ongoing medical support requirements?
        Answer. Given the policy initiatives currently underway and the
    changes implemented by the National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2011 at this time, I do not believe additional legislative
    authorities are needed to ensure that the Army fulfills medical support
    requirements. If confirmed, I will closely monitor this area and will
    work closely with the administration and Congress to seek any
    additional authorities identified as necessarily to maintain this goal.

                                WOMEN IN COMBAT

        Question. What is your view of the appropriate combat role for
    female soldiers on the modern battlefield?
        Answer. Female soldiers have been and continue to be an integral
    part of our Army team, contributing to its success and overall
    readiness as they perform exceptionally well in specialties and
    positions open to them. Women are employed in units and positions and
    trained in theater--specific roles that often necessitate combat action
    such as defending themselves or their units from attack or accompanying
    patrols.
        Question. In your view, should the current policy prohibiting the
    assignment of women to ground combat units be revised or clarified in
    any way to reflect changing roles for female soldiers and the changing
    nature of warfare?
        Answer. Existing Army policy is more restrictive than the 1994
    Department of Defense policy. If confirmed, I will assess Army policies
    against the evolving nature and realities of modern combat.
        Question. Do you believe that it is appropriate for female soldiers
    to serve in positions in which they may be exposed to combat?
        Answer. Yes. Women are serving in positions that expose them to
    combat today and continue to make tremendous contributions as well as
    demonstrate their selfless - service and sacrifices in roles and
    responsibilities critical to the safety and security of our Nation and
    to the readiness of the Army.

                          FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

        Question. A Foreign Language Transformation Roadmap announced by
    the Department of Defense in March 2005, directed a series of actions
    aimed at transforming the Department's foreign language capabilities to
    include revision of policy and doctrine, building a capabilities based
    requirements process, and enhancing foreign language capability for
    both military and civilian personnel.
        What is your assessment of the progress the Army has made in
    increasing its foreign language capabilities in operations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan?
        Answer. As Commanding General for the Training and Doctrine
    Command, I witnessed a tremendous increase in foreign language
    capabilities in support of OIF/OEF. The Army revolutionized its
    recruiting processes to enlist native and heritage speakers into vital
    interpreter/translator positions. Pre-deployment training for the
    General Purpose Force Soldiers and Civilians has transformed to include
    Afghanistan/Pakistan Hands Program, Language Enabled Soldiers training,
    the Rapport Program, and other Soldiers and Civilians with Culturally
    Based Language Training. The Reserve Officer Training Corps has
    introduced a very successful Culture and Language Program, which
    provides incentives and immersion opportunities for cadets who take
    foreign language and related cultural studies. Overall, these
    initiatives have provided enhanced capabilities for counterinsurgency
    operations and building partner capacity overseas.
        Question. In your view, what should be the priorities of the
    Department of Defense, and the Army in particular, in responding to the
    need for improved foreign language proficiency and improving
    coordination of foreign language programs and activities among Federal
    agencies?
        Answer. In my opinion, one of the highest priorities for the
    Department of Defense should be the continued support of the Defense
    Language Institute Foreign Language Center, which provides Culturally
    Based Language Training to all Services and Department of Defense
    Components. With the increasing demand for Pashto and Dari instructors,
    and foreign language professionals in general, the Department of
    Defense must coordinate with Federal agencies to ensure best practices
    are shared to recruit and retain personnel with these critical skills.

               PROTECTION OF U.S. FORCES AGAINST INTERNAL THREATS

        Question. One year ago, 13 people were slain and scores wounded
    during a shooting rampage allegedly carried out by a U.S. Army Medical
    Corps officer. A Department of Defense review of the attack concluded
    that the Department was poorly prepared to defend against internal
    threats, including radicalization of military personnel.
        What is your assessment of the lessons learned from the tragedy at
    Fort Hood?
        Answer. The lessons learned are invaluable to the Army as we strive
    to improve the Army Protection Program for individuals and units
    against emerging threats. Through a holistic Protection approach, the
    Army is aggressively fielding material and nonmaterial solutions to
    address internal and external threats.
        Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to
    prevent and mitigate such threats in the future?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that we continue to integrate
    and synchronize the many Army Protection Programs that protect our
    soldiers, family members, and Department of the Army civilians by
    ensuring that commanders and leaders have the information and tools
    needed to address the ever changing threat environment.

                              RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

        Question. The DOD Independent Review Related to Fort Hood observed
    that ``DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity
    necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious
    practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or
    self-radicalization'' and recommended that the policy be updated.
        What is your view of the need to clarify the policy regarding
    religious accommodation in the Army?
        Answer. The policies for religious accommodation in the Army are
    published in AR 600-20, Army Command Policy. The policy must be clear
    and provide appropriate guidance to both soldiers and commanders
    regarding how the Army accommodates for religious beliefs and
    practices. To this end, if confirmed, I will assess the current policy
    and determine if further changes are necessary.
        Question. Are you concerned that the attack at Fort Hood could lead
    to harassment or even violence against Muslims in the Army?
        Answer. Your question raises a valid concern. However, the Army is
    a diverse force. As soldiers in the profession of arms, we understand
    the key role that good order, discipline, morale, and safety have in
    ensuring units are at all times ready to defend this nation. The Army
    has long been a place where people from all walks of life can serve
    proudly and where the many become one--a U.S. Army soldier.
        Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to
    address the potential for harassment or violence against Muslims in the
    Army?
        Answer. The Army has a longstanding commitment to treat all
    soldiers with dignity and respect. Treating soldiers with dignity and
    respect requires continuous leader emphasis and vigilance.
        Question. Do Army policies regarding religious practices in the
    military accommodate, where appropriate, religious practices that
    require adherents to wear particular forms of dress or other articles
    with religious significance?
        Answer. Regulations regarding wear of religious clothing or items
    are found in two regulations (AR 600-20, Army Command Policy and AR
    670-1, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia). The policy
    provides the authority to wear religious jewelry, apparel or articles
    if they are neat, conservative, and discreet and compliant with these
    regulations.
        Question. In your view, do these policies accommodate the free
    exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on those who
    have different beliefs, including no religious belief?
        Answer. In my opinion, current Army policies provide commanders
    with adequate flexibility to balance accommodation for religious
    beliefs and maintain good order and discipline.
        Question. In your opinion, do existing policies and practices
    regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of
    formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a
    chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious
    beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs,
    including no religious beliefs?
        Answer. The Army does not have a policy regarding public prayer by
    military chaplains. As a matter of practice, however, chaplains are
    encouraged to be considerate of the audience.

                                 FAMILY SUPPORT

        Question. The Army Family Action Plan has been successful in
    identifying and promoting quality of life issues for Army families.
        What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
    issues in the Army, and, if confirmed, what role would you play to
    ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately
    resourced?
        Answer. In my view the most pressing family readiness issues
    include sustaining the Army Family Covenant and improving communication
    and awareness of the extensive range of available support programs and
    services the Army has to improve soldier and family quality of life.
        In 2007, the Army Family Covenant was unveiled to improve quality
    of life by providing programs and services that enhance soldier and
    family strength, readiness, and resilience. Since then, the Army has
    made great progress and continues to fulfill its commitment to provide
    soldiers and families a quality of life commensurate with the quality
    of their service.
        The Army Family Action Plan, Survey of Army Families, and other
    studies revealed that soldiers and families may not be aware of the
    myriad of available support services. To address this concern, the Army
    is transforming Army Community Service (ACS) to help connect soldiers
    and families to the right service at the right time. This
    transformation will create a more streamlined and modular support
    structure that better supports our modular Army at every installation.
    The Army has begun piloting ACS transformation and anticipates
    completion by October 2011.
        The Army has made great progress in building a wide range of
    support capabilities over the last few years, but the strain on the
    force continues. If confirmed, I will continue to strengthen our
    support services and ensure our programs efficiently meet the needs of
    the soldiers and families who use them.
        Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
    light of global rebasing, BRAC, and lengthy deployments?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will endeavor to ensure that Army Family
    programs reach out to all soldiers and their families, regardless of
    geographic location or deployment status. I will also work to ensure
    that family program platforms and delivery systems keep pace with a
    mobile Army and utilize technological advances and social networking so
    services are available to the soldiers and families who need them.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support of Reserve
    component families related to mobilization, deployment and family
    readiness, as well as active duty families who do not reside near a
    military installation?
        Answer. I am committed to ensuring soldiers and families remain
    connected to Army Family services and programs, whether by internet,
    telephone, or in person regardless of geographic location or Component.
    Army OneSource (www.MyArmyOneSource.com) is the website of choice for
    information on Army Family programs and services. Army OneSource
    highlights Active and Reserve Component Family Programs, is publicly
    accessible, and thus available to all components and immediate and
    extended family members.
        The State Joint Force Headquarters is the platform for support of
    geographically dispersed servicemembers and families. This platform
    projects the Joint Family Support Assistance Program resources, ARNG
    Family Assistance Centers (FACs), ARNG Family Readiness Support
    Assistants, and the ARNG Child and Youth program in support of Reserve
    component families and Active component families that do not reside
    near the installation. Additionally, Army sponsored programs including
    Operation Military Kids and Community Based Child Care and Respite Care
    programs build community capacity for the geographically dispersed Army
    population. These programs offer similar services and assistance to
    geo-dispersed Reserve component families as would be available on
    installations and are connected to local resources that soldiers and
    families are eligible to use.

                          MENTAL HEALTH ADVISORY TEAMS

        Question. The Army's Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) studies in
    Iraq and Afghanistan have been valuable in identifying the extent of
    mental health conditions and resource and training challenges being
    experienced in combat theaters. The most recent report, MHAT VI, stated
    that multiple deployments were related to higher rates of acute stress
    and psychological problems, that servicemembers on their third and
    fourth deployment ``reported using medications for psychological or
    combat stress problems at a significantly higher rate,'' and that
    ``soldiers with short dwell-time report high mental health problems,
    high intent to leave the military and low morale.''
        Based on the findings of MHAT VI that soldiers experience increased
    stress due to multiple deployments and short dwell time, what actions
    would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that appropriate mental health
    resources are available to soldiers in theater, as well as upon their
    return?
        Answer. The MHAT studies play a key role in proactively identifying
    how changes in the operational environment impact the ability to
    provide behavioral health care. Since OEF MHAT VI, the number of
    behavioral health personnel in theater was significantly increased to
    improve the ratio of behavioral health specialists to soldiers.
    Specifically, the MHAT team recommended one behavioral health personnel
    should be deployed for every 700 soldiers, and this ratio was met.
    Second, the MHAT team recommended a redistribution of behavioral health
    personnel to ensure that each BCT had one additional dedicated provider
    to augment their organic provider. This ``dual provider'' model was
    designed to ensure that a provider would be available to travel to
    remote outposts to see soldiers who had limited access to the larger
    Forward Operating Bases. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Army
    continues to develop and synchronize the expeditionary components of
    health promotion, risk reduction, and suicide prevention programs and
    services.
        Question. What do you think have been the most valuable findings of
    the Army's Mental Health Advisory Teams, and what are the lessons which
    can be applied to future deployments?
        Answer. One of the most valuable findings from the MHATs has been
    to document that soldiers on multiple deployments report higher mental
    health problems. This finding was first observed in 2005 (MHAT III),
    and has been replicated in every subsequent MHAT. Another valuable
    finding noted in the question was the observation that mental health
    problems are related to dwell-times. Specifically, short dwell-times
    are associated with a heightened increase in reports of mental health
    problems. Other key findings include the observation that deployment
    length is strongly associated with reports of mental health problems
    and deployments have put a strain on marital relationships. Overall,
    the willingness to take a systematic look at the behavioral health care
    system and the behavioral health status of soldiers through programs
    such as the MHATs has ensured that the Army is being responsive to the
    needs of deployed soldiers to include refining behavioral healthcare
    delivery models.

                                    SUICIDES

        Question. The committee continues to be concerned about the
    continuing increase in soldier suicides, especially the sharp increase
    in Reserve component suicides. In June, 2010, the Army released a
    report on Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention that
    analyzed the causes of suicides in the Army and reported disturbing
    trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high risk behaviors.
    Chapter III of this report discussed the lost art of leadership in
    garrison.
        In your view, what is the cause of this surge in the number of
    suicides of Reserve Component members?
        Answer. The number of ARNG suicides for calendar year 2009 and
    calendar year 2010 were 62 and 112, respectively. The increase in
    suicides is due in part to improved reporting over the past 18 months
    for the Reserve components. This increase is not directly associated
    with deployments or unemployment as over 50 percent of ARNG suicides
    were soldiers who never deployed.
        Question. The Army is focusing attention on the differences between
    our Active-Duty (AD) and non-Active-Duty suicides because there are
    external variables at play. The Army believes that factors such as the
    economy (particularly a difficult labor market) are creating stress in
    our non-AD population. Data indicates that unemployment among our young
    non-AD soldiers is above 30 percent and we are experiencing an increase
    in requests for employment assistance through ESGR (Employer Support of
    the Guard and Reserve). Additionally, Reserve component soldiers do not
    have the same access to medical care as their AD counter parts.
        Answer. We continue to pull all accessible national data to better
    understand current trends. The CDC has a 3-year lag in reporting. So,
    while we have anecdotal indication of increased suicide in some
    civilian sectors, we don't have a clear picture of the national suicide
    rates for calendar year 2008-calendar year 2010. This is particularly
    important because these unreported years encapsulate the largest
    recession since WWII (Dec. 2007-June 2009). The Army is improving
    awareness of and access to training and resources; working with
    employers and private sector to mitigate economic stress; and improving
    the quality and access to health care for all Reserve component
    soldiers.
        Question. What is your assessment of the Army's response to the
    continuing increase in suicide rates?
        Answer. Leaders across the Army have taken aggressive steps to
    improve the health of the force, decrease high risk behavior and stem
    the increasing rate of suicides in our formations. This is a very tough
    issue and it is going to take consistent vigilance to fully understand
    the causes for this increase, identify the indicators and implement
    appropriate intervention measures. After nearly a decade of war, we are
    working to keep pace with the expanding needs of our strained Army, and
    continuously identify and address the gaps that exist in our policies,
    programs and services. The Army Health Promotion, Risk Reduction and
    Suicide Prevention Report 2010, along with the DOD Task Force on the
    Prevention of Suicide by Members of the Armed Forces and other
    strategic reports, serve as the foundation for our systemic effort to
    improve.
        Question. What is the Army doing to address the issues raised in
    the Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention?
        Answer. The Health Promotion, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention
    (HP/RR/SP) report was a focused 15 months effort to better understand
    the increasing rate of suicides in the force. This candid report
    informed and educated Army leaders on the importance of identifying and
    reducing high risk behavior related to suicide and accidental death,
    and reducing the stigma associated with behavioral health and
    treatment. Important issues raised in the HP/RR/SP Report include: gaps
    in the current HP/RR/SP policies, processes and programs necessary to
    mitigate high risk behavior; an erosion of adherence to existing Army
    policies and standards; an increase in indicators of high risk behavior
    including illicit drug use, other crimes and suicide attempts and an
    increased operational tempo.
        To address gaps in the current HP/RR/SP policies, processes and
    programs necessary to mitigate high risk behavior, the Army has taken
    actions such as disseminating policy addressing the issues of
    polypharmacy, requiring a comprehensive medical review of any soldier
    who is receiving four or more medications when one or more of those is
    a psychotropic or antidepressant.
        To address the erosion of adherence to existing Army policies and
    standards, the Army has issued commanders a compendium of Army policies
    emphasizing the Army's current policies and systems for surveillance,
    detection and intervention of high risk behavior. This has already
    increased our compliance and utilization rates across numerous proven
    policies and processes.
        To address the increase in indicators of high risk behavior
    including illicit drug use, other crimes and suicide attempts, the Army
    has taken actions such as instituting a new online system giving
    Medical Review Officers improved access to drug and alcohol information
    systems resulting in enhanced identification of prescription/illicit
    drug use.
        To address stressors associated with an increased operational
    tempo, the Army has increased the number of Military Family Life
    Consultants. These consultants work with soldiers and their families to
    provide them support during transitions and separations. They are
    available to support soldiers both prior to deployment/mobilization and
    during reintegration upon return from deployment.
        Question. What is your assessment of the status of the Army's
    Resiliency program in ensuring the readiness and well being of the
    Total Force?
        Answer. The Army's Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program is a
    ground breaking way of addressing stress on the force. We have migrated
    from treating stress and stress-related outcomes to developing
    resiliency in our young soldiers to get ahead of the effects of this
    hazardous occupation. We are shifting our focus from intervention to
    prevention, from illness to wellness.
        It is my view the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness is a critical
    component to the Army's holistic approach to the wellness of the Force.
    As part of our program we have fielded Master Resiliency Trainers into
    our training base to start early in developing resiliency among our
    recruits and trainees. We are gradually expanding this fielding to
    incorporate all units, particularly timed to our deploying forces
    during pre and post-deployment phases.
        Question. National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) is currently
    performing a 5-year study on suicides in the Army.
        Has the Army received any interim reports from this study that may
    influence Army suicide prevention programs?
        Answer. The Army has received several interim reports from the NIMH
    and is evaluating the findings. The Army continues to work with our
    national partners in academia to develop groundbreaking programs and
    initiatives, in particular the Army Study to Assess Risk and Resilience
    in Servicemembers being conducted by the NIMH.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose
    that the Army take in the meantime to enhance its suicide prevention
    program?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will sustain the extensive leader focus on
    this issue and its challenges. This is an enduring problem that
    requires enduring solutions.

                          SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED SOLDIERS

        Question. Wounded soldiers from Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi
    Freedom, and New Dawn deserve the highest priority from the Army for
    support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation
    for return to duty, successful transition from active duty if required,
    and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet, as the
    revelations at Fort Stewart in 2003 and Walter Reed in 2007 revealed,
    the Army was not prepared to meet the needs of returning wounded
    soldiers.
        In your view, what were the most critical shortcomings in warrior
    care since 2001?
        Answer. The quality of military medical care is in my opinion
    cutting edge and unequaled. In my opinion, at the outset of Operations
    Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the Army's infrastructure was
    lacking in the area of housing and managing outpatient care for
    returning wounded, ill, and injured soldiers received. Additionally, we
    identified shortcomings in Traumatic Brain Injury, Post Traumatic
    Stress, Behavioral Health, and Pain Management. Since 2001, we have
    invested significant research, resources and developed formal programs
    to improve warrior care.
        Question. What is your assessment of the Army's response?
        Answer. With the support of Congress, the Army has addressed the
    issues of housing wounded and injured soldiers, developed well
    resourced Wounded Warrior Transition Units (WTU) and effectively
    centralized our Army programs under the Warrior Transition Command.
        Question. How does the Army provide follow-on assistance to wounded
    personnel who have separated from active service?
        Answer. In 2004, the Army created the Wounded Warrior Care program
    to provide follow on assistance to wounded personnel who separated from
    service. Under the program, the Army maintains contact with soldiers to
    provide a continuum of care and support.
        Question. How effective, in your view, are those programs?
        Answer. With more than 170 Advocates stationed around the country
    in Department of Veterans Affairs medical facilities, at Warrior
    Transition Units, and everywhere severely injured Army Veterans reside,
    the Army Wounded Warrior (AW2) Program is where it needs to be to
    support those who have bravely served this great nation. As part of the
    Warrior Transition Command, AW2 is now positioned to ease the
    transition from soldier to veteran as part of a continuum of care and
    support that stretches from the battlefield to where they reside today.
        Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and
    resources that you would pursue to increase the Army's support for
    wounded personnel, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty
    or to civilian life?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continuously assess the efficiency and
    appropriateness of the Army's support for wounded personnel. I would
    implement strategies and seek resources as needed to ensure that the
    Army meets the needs of wounded soldiers.
        Question. Studies following the revelations at Walter Reed point to
    the need to reform the Army's disability evaluation system.
        What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's disability
    evaluation system?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will closely examine the disability
    evaluation system to reveal any areas that need to be improved or that
    could be streamlined. I would also work with Army, DOD and VA
    stakeholders to decrease the length of time to complete these
    evaluations and facilitate the transition to civilian life for those
    determined to be not fit for duty.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to
    address any need for changes in this system?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work with experts in this area and
    with the stakeholders in the Army, DOD and VA to identify elements of
    the current system that should be changed and develop a strategy for
    accomplishing those changes.

                    ARMY WARRIOR CARE AND TRANSITION PROGRAM

        Question. The Pittburgh Tribune-Review recently published a series
    of articles that alleged that the Army's 38 Warrior Transition Units
    had become ``a dumping ground for criminals, malingerers, and dope
    addicts'' creating an imbalance of soldiers who need complex medical
    case management and soldiers that commanders do not want to take on
    combat deployment.
        Does the Army have adequate guidelines to ensure that only those
    soldiers with qualifying medical needs are assigned to Warrior
    Transition Units?
        Answer. I am concerned that Warrior Transition units maintain the
    focus on complex medical care management and support those soldiers
    with a genuine need. If confirmed, I will continuously assess
    guidelines to ensure that only soldiers with qualifying needs are
    assigned to the WTUs.
        Question. In your view, are the Warrior Training Units serving the
    purpose for which they were created?
        Answer. Over the past 4 years, the Warrior Care and Transition
    Program has significantly improved the quality of care and support
    soldiers and families have received.
        Question. If confirmed, do you plan to make any changes to the
    criteria for assignment to a Warrior Training Unit?
        Answer. While I do not have plans to change the criteria for
    assignment to Warrior Training Units at this time, this is an issue I
    will thoroughly assess if confirmed. Also, I will continually assess
    the effectiveness of the Warrior Care and Transition Program to ensure
    it provides the level of care and support our wounded warriors deserve.
        Question. Staffing of Warrior Transition Units has been a major
    issue, especially at installations experiencing surges of redeploying
    troops.
        In your view, are the Warrior Transition Units staffed with
    sufficient numbers of qualified personnel?
        Answer. I am not fully aware of the existing staffing levels in the
    Warrior Transition units. I will, if confirmed, learn more about this
    area and to ensure appropriate resourcing of Warrior Transition Units
    to support the soldiers under their care.
        implementation of the repeal of ``don't ask don't tell'' policy
        Question. What is your assessment of the Army's readiness and
    capability to implement the repeal of the ``Don't Ask Don't Tell''
    (DADT) policy?
        Answer. The Army is on track with its implementation plan in
    accordance with DOD guidance and timelines, and I believe the Army is
    fully capable of executing the implementation. Our plan includes
    periodic assessments to review and consider feedback from the field
    throughout the implementation.
        Question. What in your view are the major challenges, if any, that
    could confront the Army in implementing the repeal of DADT? If
    confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose taking to deal with
    these challenges?
        Answer. The most important challenge is that we educate our
    soldiers who are in combat situations with a minimum of disruption and
    risk. We are making every effort to train units prior to deploying. We
    will also provide the training to currently deployed units and we will
    follow up with these deployed units to ensure that all soldiers receive
    the required training upon their return from deployment.
        Question. What measures is the Army taking to focus training on
    combat units and other deployed units and ensure that repeal of the
    current policy does not adversely affect combat operations?
        Answer. The Army is using a Chain Teach methodology, where each
    commander is responsible for educating his/her subordinates and they in
    turn train their Solders. Commanders and leaders will carefully manage
    deployed units' training to minimize impact on the mission. The Army is
    making every effort to train units prior to deployment.
        Question. If confirmed, what conditions or circumstances would you
    expect to be achieved, if any, before recommending that the Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs certify that DADT can be repealed without adversely
    affecting the Army?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would base my recommendation on the input I
    receive from commanders and leaders consistent with the requirements
    established by Congress and Department of Defense leadership. I would
    also seek to ensure that the Army completes training according to Army
    guidance.

                     SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

        Question. Numerous cases of sexual misconduct involving soldiers in
    Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan have been reported over the last several
    years. Many victims and their advocates contend that they were
    victimized twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by
    unresponsive or inadequate military treatment. They asserted that the
    Army failed to respond appropriately by providing basic services,
    including medical attention and criminal investigation of their charges
    and, ultimately, appropriate disciplinary action.
        What is your understanding of the resources and programs the Army
    has in place in deployed locations to offer victims of sexual assaults
    the medical, psychological, and legal help that they need?
        Answer. I am very concerned about reports of sexual assault
    anywhere in our Army but especially in deployed locations. We cannot
    tolerate this behavior wherever it occurs. While the deployed theatres
    pose special challenges, the Army is committed to providing victims in
    deployed units with appropriate medical care, resources and support.
    The Army has taken a number of significant steps to improve the
    assistance to victims of sexual assault, including enhanced recognition
    of the special circumstances posed by deployed soldiers. The Army's
    Sexual Harassment Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program
    includes medical, advocacy, chaplain, investigative and legal services.
    This program requires every brigade sized unit to appoint and train a
    deployable sexual assault response coordinator and every battalion to
    appoint and train unit victim advocates.
        Question. What is your view of the steps the Army has taken to
    prevent additional sexual assaults at deployed locations as well as
    home stations?
        Answer. In 2008, the Army implemented its I. A.M. (Intervene, Act,
    Motivate) Strong Sexual Assault Prevention Campaign. The campaign
    includes strategic, operational and tactical level execution of the I.
    A.M. Strong Campaign, with heavy emphasis on soldiers' commitment to
    intervene and protect their fellow soldiers from the risk of sexual
    assault and from the risk of sexual harassment. The campaign places
    additional emphasis on establishing a command climate that deters
    sexual harassment and assault.
        Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
    resources the Army has in place to investigate and respond to
    allegations of sexual assault?
        Answer. While increasing emphasis to prevent sexual assaults before
    they occur, the Army continues to emphasize victim services and
    response capabilities, to include enhancements to investigation and
    prosecution resources.
        The SHARP Program is a great start to managing strategies, policies
    and resources necessary to adequately prevent and respond to incidents
    of sexual assault. This is a challenging problem that will require
    leadership and constant vigilance at all levels.
        Question. Do you consider the Army's current sexual assault
    policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting,
    to be effective?
        Prior to implementation of the I. A.M. Strong Prevention Campaign,
    the focus of the Army program was primarily on victim response. Part of
    that response focus was the implementation of confidential reporting,
    or restricted reporting, which is an effective way to allow a victim to
    come forward and have their personal needs met without fear that may be
    associated with a criminal investigation. If confirmed, I will continue
    to look closely at the Army's sexual assault program.
        Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in
    which the confidential reporting procedures have been put into effect?
        Answer. Getting victims to trust the system and come forward can be
    challenging; however, I am not aware of any specific problems with the
    current reporting procedure. Confidential reporting, or restricted
    reporting, allows a victim to come forward and have their personal
    needs met without fear that may be associated with a criminal
    investigation.
        Question. What is your view of the appropriate role for senior
    military and civilian leaders in the Secretariat and the Army staff in
    overseeing the effectiveness of implementation of new policies relating
    to sexual assault?
        Answer. Perhaps the most important role of any Senior Army Leader
    is to ensure there is an adequate assessment of an organizational
    climate, where such behavior is not tolerated and where victims feel
    free to report incidents without fear of reprisal.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure
    senior management level direction and oversight of Departmental efforts
    on sexual assault prevention and response?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will have an active role in the oversight
    and implementation of the Army's Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and
    Prevention (SHARP) Program. I will work with the Secretary and the Army
    leadership to ensure the Army's SHARP program continues to receive the
    appropriate level of supervision, guidance, and support needed to
    drastically reduce incidents of this unacceptable crime.

                        MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

        Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are
    critical to enhancement of military life for members and their
    families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments.
    These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users,
    including Active Duty and Reserve personnel, and their eligible family
    members.
        What challenges do you foresee in sustaining and enhancing Army MWR
    programs and, if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to
    achieve?
        Answer. The Army has taken steps to ensure we care for and retain
    Families through a broad range of meaningful initiatives, to include
    many family and MWR programs and services. In October 2007, the Army
    leadership unveiled the Army Family Covenant, which institutionalized
    the Army's promise to provide soldiers and their families with a
    quality of life that is commensurate with their service to the Nation.
    The Soldier Family Action Plan provided the original roadmap to
    implement the Army Family Covenant, and includes such important
    programs as Soldier Family Assistance Centers, Survivor Outreach
    Services, improved services to the geographically dispersed,
    Exceptional Family Member respite care, Army OneSource, Child, Youth
    and School Services, Child Development Center and Youth Center
    construction, and more.
        A challenge will be to sustain a consistent level of funding for
    these programs. If confirmed, I will consult with commanders, soldiers
    and families to ensure that these programs are adequate and meet their
    needs.

                          DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS

        Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7,
    2006, memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating
    that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
    procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
    Conventions?
        Answer. Yes. The U.S. military has always adhered to one simple,
    enduring principle regarding detainees: they are to be treated
    humanely, no matter what the circumstances of their capture, and no
    matter how the conflict is characterized.
        Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
    specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
    22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
    Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
        Answer. Yes. Both of these documents provide effective, practical
    guidance and direction to the field on critically important issues
    relative to detainee treatment, detainee operations training, and the
    interrogation of detainees.
        Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective military
    operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of
    Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
        Answer. Yes. The requirements of Common Article 3 are nothing new
    to the U.S. military. The protections outlined in this article have
    been a part of U.S. policy on the law of war and the treatment of
    detainees for some time.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that U.S. forces in
    Iraq and Afghanistan comply with the standards in the Army Field
    Manual, the DOD Directive, and applicable requirements of U.S. and
    international law regarding detention and interrogation operations?
        Answer. First and foremost, I would set the right tone for the
    force by taking every opportunity to talk about the importance of
    ethical conduct on the battlefield. I would stress that the Army earns
    the trust and respect of the American people by our actions, especially
    our actions in combat. I would tell them that by adhering to the laws
    of war, treating detainees humanely, and showing compassion and
    restraint, we prove to America and to the world that we are what we say
    we are: a disciplined, professional fighting force.
        Second, I would sustain and improve our existing systems for
    helping our soldiers understand and adhere to the proper standards for
    detainee treatment, detention operations, interrogations, et cetera.
        Finally, the Army is committed to adherence to the Law of War and
    the humane treatment of detainees. When allegations of wrongdoing by
    soldiers surface, the Army must continue to fully investigate. If
    misconduct is substantiated, there are procedures in place to hold
    soldiers accountable.
        Question. In the past 2 years, significant changes have been made
    in Iraq in the way detention operations have been conducted in a
    counterinsurgency environment, including through the establishment of
    reintegration centers at theater internment facilities.
        What do you consider to be the main lessons learned from the
    changes to detention operations in Iraq?
        Answer. The two primary lessons learned from detention operations
    in Iraq were the need for centralized command and control and the
    requirement to nest with the host nation's correctional system and rule
    of law.
        Centralized command and control of detainee operations is necessary
    to ensure uniform implementation of policy.
        The other lesson we learned from Iraq was that detainee operations
    cannot stand alone; it must nest with the host nation's correctional
    system and rule of law. Integration of detainee operations with host
    nation police, judiciary and penal systems is essential to a smooth
    transition to host nation control.
        Question. What is your understanding of how these lessons are being
    applied in Afghanistan?
        Answer. Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF) 435 in
    Afghanistan incorporated the above lessons learned. The CJIATF
    incorporates detainee operations, corrections, and rule-of-law concepts
    that provide assistance to the GIROA to assume full detention and
    correction responsibilities. The CJIATF works closely with the
    Department of State and the host nation.
        Question. What should be done to incorporate those lessons learned
    into Department of Defense doctrine, procedures and training for
    personnel involved in detention and interrogation operations?
        Answer. As the DOD Executive Agent for detainee operations, the
    Army is working closely with DOD and the Services to incorporate these
    lessons learned into DOD-wide doctrine, procedures and training. The
    Army continues to compile and assess lessons learned to inform and
    update policy, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures.

                            CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

        Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
    appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
    briefings, and other communications of information.
        Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
    this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
    even if those views differ from the administration in power?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
    committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
    information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
    with respect to your responsibilities as the Chief of Staff of the
    Army?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
    other communications of information are provided to this committee and
    its staff and other appropriate committees?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
    such documents?
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

                              FUTURE ARMY AIRLIFT

        1. Senator Levin. General Dempsey, as the head of the Army's
    Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), you were responsible for
    studying the challenges to rapid deployment of ground forces to distant
    theaters from the Continental United States, and determining methods
    for increasing our responsiveness. Afghanistan is a case in point--a
    distant, landlocked theater that, like most of the Third World, has few
    airfields large enough to handle our long-range transport aircraft.
    Moreover, the few large airfields that do exist tend to have very
    limited space on the ground to park aircraft for unloading or staging
    personnel and equipment. This means that even when we can get to a
    region by air, the throughput is very limited. Moving even a single
    brigade in this fashion can take weeks or even months.
        In the ongoing Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) process for a
    replacement of the C-130, the Army's concern is that the large fleet of
    C-17s, C-5s, and C-130s has limited utility in the Third World, where
    airfields are scarce and restricted. In the AOA, the Army favors a
    replacement for the C-130 that has a vertical takeoff and landing
    (VTOL) capability much like that of the V-22. U.S. Transportation
    Command is also very interested in high-capacity alternatives to
    complement traditional fixed-wing lift assets. What are your views on
    the need for a C-130-sized VTOL capability to support the Army?
        General Dempsey. The Army has been actively collaborating with the
    U.S. Air Force for over 3 years to validate the Joint Future Theater
    Lift (JFTL) requirements and move to a Milestone A decision for a
    theater airlift capability with more payload and greatly improved
    access than a C-130. Our lessons learned from past and recent
    deployment experiences and studies support the need for a heavy-lift
    VTOL aircraft. This airframe will require the ability to operate in
    austere environments on unimproved landing areas within close proximity
    to objective areas and supported units. It will also require the
    ability to bypass known, prepared airfields, which an adversary can
    easily interdict or deny.

        2. Senator Levin. General Dempsey, do you think this would be an
    important capability for the Army and worth the significant investment
    it would require from the Air Force to develop and produce?
        General Dempsey. The Army has in-depth studies substantiating the
    capability. The promise of the technology represented by the JFTL could
    address the need for an intra-theater VTOL airlifter for the entire
    Joint Force. The Army will continue to collaborate directly with the
    U.S. Air Force to complete the ongoing JFTL Joint Technology Study in
    order to continue to march toward a Milestone Decision Document and
    `Milestone A' decision. The development of the JFTL will be a challenge
    because of the technical and engineering requirements, the reality of
    rapid deploying expeditionary formations, the costs associated with
    developing and fielding a truly transformational lift platform coupled
    with today's fiscal realities--not to mention the challenge in
    balancing the need for ``lift'' with ``strike'' capability to our
    Sister Services.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich

                                 ENERGY SOURCES

        3. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, energy is vital to the
    operational capability of the military. However, our current energy
    dependence puts lives at risk and undermines our operational
    capability. I know the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Services
    understand how vulnerable our reliance on oil, especially oil from
    foreign countries, has made us as a nation and are taking many steps to
    alleviate dependency. Nevertheless, the bottom line today is the
    military needs access to fossil fuels for energy needs. I prefer those
    sources to be domestic instead of overseas to ensure access and
    strengthen our national security. Please describe your view of how
    reliance on oil for fuel impacts Army operations and personnel.
        General Dempsey. The Army's reliance on oil, from domestic and
    foreign sources, for essentially all operational energy needs impacts
    our operations and personnel by placing the Army at risk of not meeting
    fuel requirements when supply chain disruptions occur. The logistical
    burden of fuel and water convoy operations needed to supply contingency
    bases has lead to significant loss of personnel and equipment. To the
    extent we can use energy more efficiently or, in some cases, use
    alternative energy sources, we can reduce the number of shipments and
    lessen the risk to our soldiers.

        4. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, what is your understanding of
    steps that have been taken to alleviate consumption of oil for current
    operations and what impact have those efforts had?
        General Dempsey. The Army is pursuing a comprehensive energy
    strategy that will reduce consumption across our installations and
    operational forces. We are developing and deploying advanced
    technologies and solutions to reduce fossil fuel demand and to increase
    energy efficiency across platforms, theater base camps, and
    installations. The Army is also adopting alternative and renewable
    energy systems, where life cycle cost effective, to expand operational
    alternatives and help reduce fossil fuel consumption. We're taking
    action to quantify and analyze the impacts of these initiatives. In the
    last year especially, the Army has taken definitive steps to more
    clearly articulate its energy security requirements and accelerate the
    development, integration, and deployment of capabilities to the field.
    If confirmed, I will continue to focus on this important area.

        5. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, in your view, what remains to
    be done?
        General Dempsey. I recognize that much more needs to be done. While
    the Army is already making positive strides, it must continue to pursue
    and field solutions in the areas of smart micro-grids, renewable energy
    technologies, and energy-efficient structures. As TRADOC Commander, I
    was a member of the Senior Energy and Sustainability Council. So I know
    that the Army's senior leaders are working these issues hard. Part of
    this effort is for Army leaders, at all levels, to understand the
    importance of operational energy considerations in mission success.

        6. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, how does the price of oil
    impact the Army's budget during these times of constrained resources?
        General Dempsey. Oil price increases have a definite impact on the
    Army budget in the year of execution. Since 2007, the Army has spent an
    average of more than $3 billion per year on fuel and energy, with more
    than half supporting liquid fuels for operations and the remainder
    representing power and energy at our installations. Higher oil prices
    mean higher energy costs and a significant reallocation of financial
    resources, which could impact the Army's ability to support important
    mission priorities.

        7. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, if confirmed, what steps will
    you take to alleviate dependency on foreign sources of energy, and
    ultimately decrease reliance on oil for fuel?
        General Dempsey. The Army Energy Security Implementation Strategy
    establishes principles that directly address this objective. If
    confirmed, I will continue to support and advocate for the Army's
    campaign to reduce consumption, expand energy alternatives, and improve
    management capabilities. We must curtail our reliance on oil and other
    imported sources of energy, in order to reduce our vulnerability
    associated with disruptions of supply or price fluctuations.

                               IRREGULAR WARFARE

        8. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, Army units from Alaska have
    made a significant contribution to operations overseas. Last week, I
    visited the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team (BCT) at the National
    Training Center (NTC) in California during their predeployment training
    exercise. In May, they will deploy to Afghanistan. Due to the
    operational tempo, their training is focused on capabilities required
    for the mission in Afghanistan. It is my understanding in fiscal year
    2012 the Army will be able to begin full spectrum operations (FSO)
    training as dwell time increases. However, as Secretary Gates
    highlighted in a speech at West Point last week, it is imperative the
    capabilities required for these types of missions are
    institutionalized. Yet the force must also be trained for the many
    different types of threats we will face in the future. If confirmed,
    what action will you take to institutionalize irregular warfare?
        General Dempsey. We recently published Change 1 to our capstone
    operations manual, FM 3-0. This manual explicitly states that the
    Army's operational concept is FSOs. FSOs is a combination of offensive,
    defensive, and stability or civil support operations undertaken
    simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize,
    retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create
    opportunities to achieve decisive results. FM 3-0 goes on to state that
    these operations are conducted amid populations, and that shaping the
    conditions with the civilian population is just as important to
    campaign success as are offensive and defensive combat operations.
        We are currently institutionalizing Irregular Warfare by
    highlighting it in our capstone doctrine, by inculcating it throughout
    our professional military education system, and by reshaping our
    training strategies to include stability and civil support operations
    in addition to standard offensive and defensive operations.
        At our Combat Training Centers (CTCs), the scenarios are developed
    to enable commanders to train their units on FSO mission essential
    tasks. These tasks include offensive operations, defensive operations,
    and stability and civil-support operations. During a typical FSO
    rotation at a CTC, the training unit will conduct both Combined Arms
    Maneuver against regular forces, and Wide Area Security against
    irregular forces and criminal elements. The degree of focus on offense,
    defense, and stability operations will vary based on unit training
    objectives and potential missions for the training unit. This wide
    array of tasks in a very complex operational environment will ensure
    our forces possess the agility to succeed in FSOs, including irregular
    warfare.

        9. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, how do you propose to sustain
    the capability currently at the NTC like role players and
    infrastructure that has been built up in recent years for irregular
    warfare?
        General Dempsey. The CTC Program, based on the TRADOC G-2's
    Operating Environment Master Plan and the Army Training Strategy, has
    identified enduring training enablers (including role players and
    infrastructure) that are required for training FSOs against hybrid
    threats. These enduring enablers will be prioritized based on the
    operational force needs, programmed in the Army's Program Objective
    Memorandum, and sustained in a resource-informed manner. For example,
    we currently use around 800 role players at each CTC per rotation
    through Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding to support
    Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation New Dawn counterinsurgency-focused
    mission rehearsal exercises. However, our initial estimate is that we
    will need 466 role players for FSOs training at the Joint Readiness
    Training Center (JRTC) and Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC)
    and 296 role players at the NTC to conduct full-spectrum operations
    training against hybrid threats. We will also continue to maintain the
    Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) villages at the CTCs,
    though we'll only man them to the minimal degree required.

                            ALASKA LAND MOBILE RADIO

        10. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, the Alaska Land Mobile Radio
    (ALMR) system provides interoperable communications for Federal, State,
    and local government agencies consistent with national interoperability
    objectives set by the Department of Homeland Security. ALMR is
    maintained cooperatively through a cost share with all partners. ALMR
    is used for operational needs of the Army like installation security,
    radio communication for convoys, synchronization of personnel during
    deployments and redeployments, transportation management, training
    support, and communication with other agencies. I understand the Army
    will be divesting 41 roadway sites in Alaska over a 2-year period
    beginning this summer. I appreciate the Army's proposal to transfer the
    sites to the State of Alaska at no cost. If confirmed, will you fully
    examine the impact of the divestiture on all partners to ensure the
    system will remain viable until it is replaced or upgraded?
        General Dempsey. We will absolutely continue to examine the impact
    of our divestiture, as I think we have done to this point, and will do
    our best to ensure that ALMR remains viable within the limitations we
    have. The Army no longer has a sufficient ``business case'' for
    continuing to maintain those sites that do not directly support day-to-
    day Army requirements. However, we remain fully committed to being good
    partners in this arrangement. To that end, we have offered to transfer
    the assets at our 41 sites, approximately $18 million in capital
    investment, to the State of Alaska at no cost. This will allow the
    State to continue to benefit from the Army's capital investment into
    ALMR that directly supports public safety and other State agency
    missions. We will also maintain our remaining sites in accordance with
    the ALMR Cooperative Agreement and will continue to share the use of
    Federal frequencies with the State, which is a key enabler of this
    system.

        11.Senator Begich. General Dempsey, if confirmed, will you work
    with the other partners to ensure the divestiture timeline allows for
    all partners to make the necessary preparations to assume
    responsibility for the sites if they choose to do so?
        General Dempsey. We have worked closely with ALMR partners and will
    continue to do so as we go through the divestiture process. While the
    ALMR Cooperative Agreement requires a 12 month notification for
    termination, in this case we provided a 16 month notification through
    Alaskan Command (ALCOM), our DOD Representative to the ALMR Consortium.
    We also developed a 2-year phased transfer plan with only one-third of
    the sites being transferred in the first year in order to provide
    maximum fiscal planning opportunity. Additionally, Brigadier General
    Scott, U.S. Army Pacific G-6, personally traveled to Alaska in March to
    meet with Commissioner Becky Hultberg and her staff to see if there was
    a way to further assist. At that meeting, the Army proposed additional
    accommodations by delaying start date of the planned divestiture (first
    13 sites) until January 2012, with the Army maintaining the sites in a
    reduced maintenance (or break-fix) posture for an additional 6 months
    before transferring equipment. This allows ALMR partners a total of 22
    months of preparation time from our original notification. We are
    absolutely interested in being good partners and will continue to do
    all we can to enable this transition within our limitations.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss

                              ARMY TRANSFORMATION

        12. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, the 2010 Quadrennial
    Defense Review (QDR) reinforced the focus on stability operations as an
    integral and co-equal element of FSOs. As such, the role of Civil
    Affairs (CA) forces as subject-matter experts for key stability tasks
    was elevated in two directives included in the Rebalancing the Force
    section of the QDR as enhancements to the capabilities of the U.S.
    Armed Forces. The first of these--``expand CA capacity''--provides
    resources and potential, creates opportunity, and presents challenges.
    The second one--``increase counterinsurgency, stability operations, and
    counterterrorism competency in general purpose forces''--is an
    important implied task for CA that presents its own opportunities and
    challenges.
        As the Commander, TRADOC, part of your mission was to: . . .
    design, develop, and integrate capabilities, concepts, and doctrine in
    order to build an Army that is a versatile mix of tailorable,
    adaptable, and networked organizations operating on a rotational cycle
    for FSOs. During your tenure there, part of TRADOC's web-based
    initiatives included the development or maintenance of a Capabilities
    Needs Assessment website, which documented CA capability requirements
    but never resolved the gaps in CA capabilities.
        How do you reconcile the status of these efforts to close the CA
    gaps and shortfalls while you were Commanding General, TRADOC, with the
    elevated status of stability operations, and by extension the
    importance of CA, within the 2010 QDR?
        General Dempsey. CA forces are an important part of Stability
    Operations. We identified through our Capability Needs Assessment
    process that the Army lacked sufficient resources, specifically CA
    capabilities, for Building Partner Capacity. Our analysis identified
    capability gaps. Our follow-on processes addressed those gaps, and we
    implemented solutions like resourcing the 162nd Infantry Training
    Brigade to prepare General Purpose Forces (GPF) for conducting
    Stability Operations. We have been expanding CA forces to provide the
    increased level of support required by both ongoing operations and
    anticipated future requirements in both the Reserves and the Active
    Force. In 2007 we had 29 CA Battalions with just 9 percent of the force
    in the Active component. By 2013 we will have 43 CA Battalions with 32
    percent of the force in the Active component. The continued growth and
    transformation of CA forces is a work in progress.

        13. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, in these tight financial
    times where we actively seek efficiencies wherever we can find them, is
    creating additional CA force structure (military construction dollars,
    training dollars, etc.) the best use of taxpayer funds?
        General Dempsey. The Army regularly assesses its ability to meet
    the demands of the combatant commanders. We identified the need for
    additional CA capability in ongoing operations and see the need for
    these capabilities continuing beyond those operations. CA specialists
    bring unique capabilities to the force, not only in our current
    operations, but also in our engagements and activities to build partner
    capacity. Our growth and transformation of Civil Affairs forces is a
    work in progress that we will continually assess as part of the Army's
    ongoing force modernization and development processes.

        14. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, is creating additional CA
    capacity (soldiers/units) the proper way to solve a capability
    shortfall?
        General Dempsey. CA forces provide a unique capability to the whole
    force, enabling us to better meet the needs of our National Security
    Strategy. When deciding how to solve a capability shortfall, the Army
    conducts a formal Capability Based Assessment (CBA) process resulting
    in a recommendation of how to meet the need. In this instance the
    recommended solutions broadly included creating additional CA units as
    well as resourcing the 162nd Infantry Training Brigade to prepare GPFs
    to conduct Stability Operations. We continuously assess how to maximize
    our capabilities and reduce shortfalls as part of our strategic reviews
    and the Total Army Analysis.

        15. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, would embedding CA within
    the Army BCT help resolve some or all of these capabilities gaps while
    simultaneously conserving precious resources during an era of
    increasingly constrained budgets?
        General Dempsey. As we look beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, we see the
    need to maintain flexibility to task organize our CA forces, which we
    anticipate may include the ability to operate outside a BCT, in
    conjunction with other Special Operations Forces (SOF).

                         SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES

        16. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, section 167, title 10,
    U.S.C., defines 10 activities as special operations (SO) activities
    insofar as each relates to SO. While there is a catchall proviso listed
    as well, designating ``such other activities as may be specified by the
    President or the Secretary of Defense'' as SO activities, given the
    2006 realignment of all Reserve CA and psychological operations/
    military information-support operations (PO/MISO) forces from the U.S.
    Special Operations Command (SOCOM), where they supported both the GPF
    and SOF, to the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC), where they now
    primarily support the GPF. Should CA and PO have remained on this list
    of SO activities?
        General Dempsey. Active component CA and Military Information
    Support Operations (MISO) should remain on the list of Special
    Operations Activities. However, Reserve component (RC) CA and MISO
    should be removed for two reasons. First, because RC CA and MISO
    support the GPF, they should be aligned with them to better facilitate
    their operational employment. Second, the complexities of managing a
    force the size and composition of the RC CA and MISO force are best
    handled by the USARC.
        Consistent with section 167, title 10, U.S.C., SOCOM is designated
    the joint CA Proponent. Within SOCOM, the Army SOCOM is the proponent
    for CA. It has long been acknowledged, in both design and practice,
    that CA is not an exclusively special operations discipline. The GPF
    has a longstanding history of employing CA that certainly extends to
    operations conducted abroad today.

        17. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, given this change of
    command and control, how do you reconcile the fact that Reserve
    component CA and PO/MISO soldiers continue to perform what is
    technically defined as a SO activity without commensurate authorities,
    training, equipping, or funding every time they deploy in support of
    combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa?
        General Dempsey. Per section 167, title 10, U.S.C., ``For purposes
    of this section, special operations activities include each of the
    following insofar as it relates to special operations . . . Civil
    Affairs . . . Psychological Operations . . . ''. Based upon this
    definition, the CA and MISO missions conducted by the Reserve component
    (RC) in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa are not Special
    Operations Activities because they are conducted in direct support of
    GPFs, not SOFs. The RC CA and MISO soldiers have the appropriate
    authorities (i.e. Commanders Emergency Relief Program), training (AC
    and RC CA and MISO forces are trained using the same Program of
    Instruction and Doctrine, with the exception of language training being
    optional for the RC), and Major Force Program 2 (MFP2) funding to
    support their combat operations and other operational employment.

        18. Senator Chambliss. General Dempsey, what can be done to clarify
    this statutory discrepancy?
        General Dempsey. If deemed necessary, a decision to clarify any
    perceived discrepancy would have to be in the form of a recommendation
    from the Secretary of Defense to Congress to address section 167, title
    10, U.S.C.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Scott P. Brown

                                   M9 PISTOLS

        19. Senator Brown. General Dempsey, what is the future of the M9 in
    the Army?
        General Dempsey. It is undetermined at this time. The Army is
    reviewing a current Modular Hand Gun requirement developed by the U.S.
    Air Force for applicability to the Army and adoption as an Army
    requirement. The review is still in early staffing so it would be
    premature to speculate on replacing the M9 at this time. The M9 Pistol
    has served the Army well over the past quarter century and has proven
    itself in numerous combat operations, including Panama, Desert Storm,
    Somalia, as well the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

        20. Senator Brown. General Dempsey, does the Army plan to procure
    more M9s or to compete for a replacement pistol?
        General Dempsey. No, the Army is not currently planning to procure
    any more M9s to include sustainment quantities. Current Army policies
    allow for 100 percent replacement of parts to include receivers during
    reset if necessary to maintain the required quantity of pistols in the
    Army inventory. The M9 Pistol has served the Army well over the past
    quarter century and has proven itself in numerous combat operations,
    including Panama, Desert Storm, Somalia, as well the current wars in
    Iraq and Afghanistan. While the Army does not have a current plan to
    compete for a replacement pistol, the Army is reviewing a current
    Modular Hand Gun Capabilities Production Document developed by the U.S.
    Air Force for applicability to the Army and adoption as an Army
    requirement. The review is still in early staffing so it would be
    premature to speculate on replacing the M9 at this time.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Rob Portman

                                  ABRAMS TANK

        21. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, in your written answers to
    the advance policy questions posed by the committee regarding Army
    weapon system programs you stated, ``In my view, the Abrams
    modernization is necessary and will initially enable integration of the
    emerging network and provide ability to fire the next generation of
    120mm ammunition. Future modernization will provide capability
    improvements in lethality, protection, mission command, mobility, and
    reliability intended to maintain the Fleet's combat overmatch and
    restore space, weight and power margins to keep the tank relevant
    through 2050. The Abrams modernization program is funded in the fiscal
    year 2012 budget request. If confirmed, I will be able to offer an
    assessment as the program matures.'' Do you acknowledge that the fiscal
    year 2012 budget request ends U.S. production of the tank for the first
    time in modern history?
        General Dempsey. The Army has continuously built Abrams tanks since
    1979. The M1A2SEPv2 production ends in fiscal year 2013, last fielding
    in fiscal year 2014. M1A1AIM SA production ends in fiscal year 2011,
    last fielding in fiscal year 2014.

        22. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, are you willing to work with
    this committee to address alternatives that would continue production
    of Abrams tanks beyond 2012?
        General Dempsey. We share your concerns over the viability of the
    industrial base and recognize the challenges associated with starting
    and stopping production. Abrams upgrade production will continue
    fielding 18 Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCT) equipped with M1A2SEPv2s
    and 6 HBCTs equipped with M1A1AIM SA by fiscal year 2014. Because of
    this effort, the Abrams tank will remain a critical part of the Army's
    combat vehicle force beyond 2014.

        23. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, what is the impact on ending
    tank production on U.S. industrial capability in our depots, armor
    facilities, and private companies across our Nation?
        General Dempsey. There will be a production break for the Abrams
    tank in fiscal year 2013. This is the result of the Army completing its
    objective to field upgraded Abrams tanks to 18 HBCTs. The near-term
    plan for Abrams modernization sustains government and contractor System
    Engineering capability. It will not provide the production workload at
    Anniston Army Depot in Anniston, AL and the Joint Systems Manufacturing
    Facility in Lima, OH (formerly known as the Lima Army Tank Plant) that
    would adequately sustain these facilities and key suppliers and
    subcontractors after fiscal year 2013. We are seeking to minimize the
    impact of the break with the approval of the requirement for the next
    package of Abrams tank improvements. At a minimum, the Army anticipates
    the break to continue for at least 2 years.

        24. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, the Army has acknowledged
    that the Abrams tank will remain in the inventory for the foreseeable
    future. What is the Army doing to upgrade the current fleet including
    the Abrams tank in terms of research, development, test, and evaluation
    (RDT&E) and production?
        General Dempsey. The Abrams Program is moving towards a Materiel
    Development Decision in third quarter of fiscal year 2011 that will
    define the next package of improvements for the Abrams tank. Abrams
    near-term modernization will focus on leveraging mature technologies to
    increase power generation, power distribution and fuel efficiency.
    Long-term modernization will provide capability improvements in
    lethality, survivability, mobility and reliability intended to maintain
    the Abrams tank combat overmatch and provide the size, weight, power,
    and cooling margin to keep the Abrams relevant through 2030 and beyond.

        25. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, I understand the Army intends
    to begin modernizing the Abrams tank with new capabilities including
    those directly tied to lessons learned from Iraq deployments, but the
    fiscal year 2012 budget request includes less than $10 million for
    Abrams RDT&E. How is $10 million sufficient in fiscal year 2012
    sufficient for this task?
        General Dempsey. The $9.7 million of RDT&E funds requested in the
    fiscal year 2012 President's budget is sufficient for Abrams
    modernization because the Army anticipates that the majority of the
    $107.5 million in fiscal year 2011 RDT&E funds will carry over to
    fiscal year 2012, thereby providing sufficient funding to execute all
    anticipated fiscal year 2012 RDT&E efforts.

        26. Senator Portman. General Dempsey, will you please provide a
    detailed modernization plan for the Abrams tank?
        General Dempsey. Abrams tank modernization will be done in two
    phases: Near term, we will pursue Power Generation and Power
    Distribution Modernization to enable integration of the Army Directed
    Requirements along with the ability to fire the next generation of
    120mm ammunition. This will be done through field modifications and
    technical insertions as the vehicles are at the depots. Long term
    modernization will provide major capability improvements in lethality,
    survivability, mobility, and reliability intended to maintain the
    Abrams tank combat overmatch and provide the size, weight, power, and
    cooling margin to keep the Abrams relevant through 2030 and beyond.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn

                               WEST POINT SPEECH

        27. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, in a speech at West Point on
    February 25, 2010, Secretary Gates stated, ``The Army also must
    confront the reality that the most plausible, high-end scenarios for
    the U.S. military are primarily naval and air engagements--whether in
    Asia, the Persian Gulf, or elsewhere . . . But in my opinion, any
    future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big
    American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should
    `have his head examined'.'' The United States has sent 100,000 or more
    ground troops into these very regions five times over the last 6
    decades. Does our Nation need to maintain its ability to carry out
    large-scale ground campaigns in order to ensure our national security,
    or is the requirement for these types of land operations truly a thing
    of the past?
        General Dempsey. The Secretary clarified his statement a week later
    at the Air Force Academy, stating that it would be wrong to interpret
    his statement as ``questioning the need for the Army at all, or at
    least one its present size, the value of heavy armor generally, and
    even the wisdom of our involvement in Afghanistan.'' We believe that
    the intent is for all the Services to think harder about the entire
    range of missions and how to achieve the right balance of capabilities
    in an era of tight budgets, how to use the assets we have with the
    greatest possible flexibility, and how to truly take advantage of being
    part of the Joint Force. I agree with all of those goals. Most
    importantly we need to look at how we prepare ourselves for an
    uncertain future, since the challenges we will face are different than
    those we grew up with. We take our profession of arms seriously; at all
    levels we are continuously assessing and adapting to changing
    environments. Trends in the 21st century security environment continue
    to create conditions leading to increased instability. The combination
    of population growth, fragile states, demand for natural resources,
    rapid diffusion and access to technology, and the proliferation of
    weapons of mass destruction increase the likelihood of conflict. The
    Army mitigates these conditions through our engagements, exchanges,
    exercise programs, security force assistance activities, and by
    building partnership capacity. As such, we as professionals are working
    to ensure the full complement of Army capabilities are available when
    needed. To meet these requirements we need a consistent flow of forces
    provided by a balanced and affordable Army comprised of ``tailorable''
    and networked organizations, operating on rotational cycles and capable
    of providing trained and available forces to conduct full-spectrum
    military operations.

        28. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, Secretary Gates also
    highlighted that the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan must be
    ``incorporated into the Service's DNA and institutional memory.'' He
    went on to say that the Army has always needed ``entrepreneurial
    leaders with a broad perspective and a diverse range of skills.'' In a
    recent interview, you said that the Army needs to focus on mastering a
    few skills that will prepare it for whatever future missions it is
    given, rather than becoming a ``jack-of-all-trades'' in a postwar era.
    In your view, what lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan are most important
    for the Army to carry forward?
        General Dempsey. Our Army is a learning organization--from the
    accumulation of all our experiences in peacetime and at war. Our
    Campaign of Learning is evidence of our commitment to learning. Within
    the Army, leadership remains the multiplying and unifying element of
    combat power. Our lessons learned garnered from 10 years of war for
    leader development clearly highlight the need for agile and adaptive
    leaders who are critical thinkers, innovative and can recognize and
    manage transitions to exploit opportunities for success on the
    battlefield. This also drives a requirement for learning systems that
    facilitate the education and training of our leaders.
        Continuation: As campaigns progressed over the last 10 years, U.S.
    Army forces learned the importance of counter-insurgency and other
    variations of stability and support operations. Leaders of all
    echelons, but especially leaders of squads and platoons, had to become
    masters of negotiation, persuasion and influence with local nationals.
    They had to bridge cultural barriers with local politicians, foreign
    security forces, spiritual leaders and citizens and had to learn ways
    to establish trust across these boundaries. They had to adapt their
    interpersonal skills to move others to the desired end state with
    indirect influence, instead of force or use of direct authority. They
    had to be prepared for rapid transitions between civil support missions
    to instantaneous response to attacks from insurgents and then back to
    peaceful interactions. With greater application of mission command,
    company and higher-level leaders had to learn to operate at greater
    levels of trust down the chain of command. Awareness of the importance
    of the alignment of intent and means across echelons was heightened.
        Army systems for leader development were required to adapt
    concurrently to meet the operational demands for more competent and
    agile leaders of character. This adaptation was deliberately aimed at
    developing critical and innovative thinkers prepared to meet the
    evolution of the Operational Environment. CTCs underwent significant
    adaptations to provide the conditions to train individuals and units in
    all aspects of deployed operations. Authentic native noncombatants were
    introduced in the mission rehearsal exercises, and opposing forces
    (OPFOR) role played the practices of terrorists and insurgents.
    Situational training exercises provided exposure to critical tasks and
    used increased variability to present soldiers with opportunities to
    practice adaptation. Leader development systems and management
    practices were updated to steward the effective development of leaders.
    Professional military education (PME) was modified to push senior- and
    mid-level learning outcomes down to lower ranks. Senior- and mid-level
    education addressed the broadened requirements for stability and
    support operations and operations with joint, interagency,
    intergovernmental and multinational forces. PME also adapted to the
    requirements of modularity and Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) in
    order to man deploying units with qualified leaders. We have learned
    that we must anticipate change early, to recognize the ``weak signals''
    in order to maintain our learning advantage over our adversaries, and
    we have learned that we must have training, education and assignment
    systems in place to develop our leaders that are equally as adaptive as
    the leaders themselves.
        Our experiences have underscored the importance of the role of
    leadership at all levels in our Army, the Joint Force, and with our
    partners to accomplish our Nation's aims. Within the Army, leadership
    remains the multiplying and unifying element of combat power.
    Leadership requires influencing others to accomplish the mission while
    improving our organizations at all levels of the Army to maintain the
    successful edge as the Nation's premier land power force. Leadership
    doctrine, founded on the principle of competent leaders of character
    supporting and defending the Constitution, subordinate to civilian
    authority, set the foundation for Army leaders to adapt to the rapid
    onset of operational requirements following 9/11 and the global war on
    terrorism. Our leadership requirements model establishes the attributes
    and competencies expected of all Army leaders. Leaders are responsible
    for upholding Army values and exercising the discipline necessary in
    combat as well as garrison to reflect those values to one another, to
    our citizenry, and to the world. We have learned to emphasize the
    responsibility for all leaders to influence beyond the chain of
    command, to operate in a ``whole-of-government'' approach to the
    Operational Environment and with our international partners. Increased
    attention has also been given to the requirement for resilience in
    leaders and leaders helping others deal with the stresses stemming from
    complex operations and recurring overseas deployments.

        29. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, what specific skills that have
    fallen by the wayside over the past decade are in need of further
    development?
        General Dempsey. To date, the Army has had the opportunity to only
    conduct one rotation at a CTC focused on FSOs against a Hybrid Threat,
    which is an insufficient number upon which to draw hard conclusions.
    However, that rotation indicates several areas within warfighting
    functions may need improvement. These warfighting functions include:
    Mission Command on the move, massing the effects of Intelligence,
    Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, fires, and maneuver at a decisive
    point, optimizing use of engineering assets for mobility, counter-
    mobility, and survivability, and operating away from protected fixed
    bases, such as Forward Operating Bases and Combat Outposts. Our next
    FSO rotations at CTCs are in August at the NTC, and in September at the
    JRTC. At these training rotations we'll aggressively work to both
    validate our initial impressions and gain new insights into skills that
    have atrophied over the past decade.

                               ARMY END STRENGTH

        30. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, in your advance policy
    response to the committee, you stated that it has taken the Army ``10
    years to achieve a size, structure, and capability that we can
    reasonably describe as balanced.'' During this time, the Army has
    increased its Active-Duty end strength in order to meet current and
    future operational requirements. However, as part of his cost-saving
    initiatives, Secretary Gates has proposed reductions to the Army's
    Active-Duty end strength of 22,000 soldiers by 2014, followed by an
    additional 27,000 soldiers beginning in 2015. Over the last 40 years,
    the Army has conducted two major post-conflict end strength reductions,
    first after the Vietnam War and then again after Operation Desert
    Storm. Given that we live in what some senior military leaders,
    including the current Chief of Staff of the Army and the current
    Secretary of the Army, refer to as an ``era of persistent conflict,''
    how risky is it to reduce our Army's end strength so soon?
        General Dempsey. Assumptions about future demand for Army forces
    are critical to assessing potential implications associated with both
    end strength and force structure adjustments. DOD's assumption is that
    the drawdown in Iraq will continue, and that it will be completed by 31
    December 2011. DOD also assumes that forces in Afghanistan will
    moderate to a sustainable level, in accordance with current
    administration policy. While we cannot predict with certainty when and
    where crises may occur, we do anticipate that in an era of persistent
    conflict, Army forces will continue to be required for a variety of
    missions. The Army does not anticipate that near-term future demands
    will reach a level of commitment seen in recent years, and we are in
    the process of conducting deliberate analysis to determine how and when
    to implement directed reductions. The Army will continue to ensure
    accomplishment of its assigned missions, improve operational readiness
    to meet future demands, and care for the well-being of its soldiers and
    their families.

        31. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, extended deployments and the
    high operational tempo have put a substantial strain on our All-
    Volunteer Army, resulting in high rates of post-traumatic stress
    disorder, suicide, and alcohol and drug abuse, as well as other health
    issues within the force. The Army's increase in Active-Duty end
    strength was designed, in part, to mitigate these effects and allow for
    longer dwell-time between deployments. If conditions on the ground in
    Afghanistan do not allow for the administration's planned drawdown of
    U.S. troops by 2014, will the reduction of 22,000 soldiers to the
    Army's Active-Duty end strength have a negative impact on the quality
    and resiliency of our force?
        General Dempsey. The additional 22,000 end strength has been an
    integral part of the Army's ability to meet the manning requirements of
    deploying units. The planned reduction is based on the assumption that
    the demand for Army forces will decline by the end of 2013. If that
    assumption proves to be inaccurate, the Army will re-evaluate its
    ability to meet the new demand and engage with the Secretary of Defense
    to determine the appropriate mitigation strategy to meet the new demand
    signal.
        As far as quality and resiliency of the force, the Army will
    continue its efforts to retain soldiers with the greatest potential to
    serve and align them with our leadership development strategy. The
    Army's deliberate and responsible drawdown plans will take into
    consideration operational demands, individual and unit readiness, and
    sustainment of the All-Volunteer Force.

                         ARMY COMBAT BRIGADES IN EUROPE

        32. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, the Pentagon reportedly
    intends to decide in the near future how many Army BCTs to keep in
    Europe, which could be as many as four or as few as two. Meanwhile,
    since 2002, two Germany-based BCTs have essentially been in limbo while
    the Pentagon debates their fate. It now appears unlikely that these
    units, which had been scheduled to return to the United States by 2013,
    will meet that deadline. One of these BCTs has been slated to relocate
    to Fort Bliss, TX, a post whose role in our national defense has
    increased greatly in recent years. At Fort Bliss, soldiers are afforded
    unparalleled training opportunities at its vast ranges, whose
    conditions accurately replicate those faced by soldiers in Afghanistan
    and Iraq. In addition, military quality of life at Fort Bliss is high,
    partly as a result of substantial Federal investment in its expansion.
    In your view, is delaying the return of these Army units from Europe
    the right course of action, given that our European allies have their
    own highly capable militaries?
        General Dempsey. The National Security Strategy and the QDR affirm
    the importance of investing in the capacity of strong and capable
    states. These efforts further U.S. objectives of securing a peaceful
    and cooperative international order. The Army's forces represent the
    Nation's enduring commitment to the defense of Europe specified in the
    North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Article 5, ensure a
    credible deterrent against all forms of aggression, and provide a
    robust capability to build Allied and partner capacity for coalition
    operations such as in Afghanistan. It must also be noted that the
    majority of nations contributing troops in support of the International
    Security Assistance Force, the NATO's largest and most complex out-of-
    area operation, come from NATO members. The relationships needed to
    support these types of operations can only be developed through long-
    term, sustained relationships achieved with American servicemembers
    stationed in Europe.

        33. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, why are these Army BCTs still
    permanently stationed in Europe, and when will the Army bring them
    home?
        General Dempsey. The Office of Secretary of Defense is currently
    reviewing the disposition of forces in Europe. A decision on the future
    posture in Europe is expected soon. Army forces in Europe will have
    better facilities for soldiers and families, access to better training
    facilities and ranges, and a consolidated footprint that will help U.S.
    Army Europe operate more cost effectively and efficiently.

                      PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION POLICIES

        34. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, current Army policy requires
    relatively frequent Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves for most
    soldiers and their families. At a time when our military is being
    pressured to find ways to stretch each and every dollar and improve its
    fiscal stewardship, a thoughtful and sensible revision of the Army's
    PCS policies could potentially save millions of dollars annually, which
    the Army could use to meet other requirements. Requiring PCS moves
    every 5 or 6 years--instead of every 2 or 3--would also reduce the
    strain on military families. In so doing, you would enable many
    military spouses to pursue their own careers without facing frequent
    relocations, and you would ease the stress that frequent moves and
    school relocations puts on military children. Do you see any potential
    for the Army to rethink its current PCS policies to cut unnecessary
    expenses and improve the quality of life for military families?
        General Dempsey. As a general rule, the Army does not require
    soldiers to move simply because they have remained at one location for
    a set number of years. Overseas moves are an exception, by the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense policy. They have established specific tour
    lengths based on environmental conditions in the overseas locations.
        Two-thirds of all Army PCS moves result from accessions,
    separations, and professional development. The remaining third are used
    to distribute soldiers internal to the Army. They are used to maintain
    an acceptable match of skills and grades in units to meet operational
    requirements. Over the past 10 years the requirements for moves has
    accelerated by the need to meet the demands of filling deploying units.
    As demand for Army units decreases, we will work to increase the time
    on station for soldiers and families while maintaining the critical
    match of skills and grades across the Army.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA,
    follows:]
                        Nomination Reference and Report
                               As In Executive Session,
                                   Senate of the United States,
                                                      February 7, 2011.
        Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
    on Armed Services:
        The following named officer for appointment as the Chief of Staff,
    U.S. Army, and appointment to the grade indicated while assigned to a
    position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C.,
    sections 601 and 2033:

                                 To be General

        GEN Martin E. Dempsey, 0000
                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA,
    which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
    nomination was referred, follows:]

               Biographical Sketch of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA

    Source of commissioned service: USMA

    Educational degrees:
        U.S. Military Academy - BS - No Major
        Duke University - MA - English
        U.S. Army Command and General Staff College - MMAS - Military Arts
    and Sciences
        National Defense University - MS - National Security and Strategic
    Studies

    Military schools attended:
        Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
        National War College
        U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

    Foreign language(s): French

    Promotions:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Promotions                       Date of Appointment
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2LT.......................................  5 Jun 74
    1LT.......................................  5 Jun 76
    CPT.......................................  8 Aug 78
    MAJ.......................................  1 Sep 85
    LTC.......................................  1 Apr 91
    COL.......................................  1 Sep 95
    BG........................................  1 Aug 01
    MG........................................  1 Sep 04
    LTG.......................................  8 Sep 05
    GEN.......................................  8 Dec 08
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Major duty assignments:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  From                        To              Assignment
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Jan 75..........................  May 76............  Platoon Leader, B
                                                           Troop, 1st
                                                           Squadron, 2d
                                                           Armored Cavalry,
                                                           U.S. Army Europe
                                                           and Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany
    May 76..........................  Sep 77............  Support Platoon
                                                           Leader, 1st
                                                           Squadron, 2d
                                                           Armored Cavalry,
                                                           U.S. Army Europe
                                                           and Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany
    Sep 77..........................  Jun 78............  S-1 (Personnel),
                                                           1st Squadron, 2d
                                                           Armored Cavalry,
                                                           U.S. Army Europe
                                                           and Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany
    Jul 78..........................  Jan 79............  Student, Armor
                                                           Officer Advanced
                                                           Course, U.S. Army
                                                           Armor School,
                                                           Fort Knox, KY
    Apr 79..........................  Jan 80............  Motor Officer, 1st
                                                           Squadron, 10th
                                                           Cavalry, 4th
                                                           Infantry Division
                                                           (Mechanized),
                                                           Fort Carson, CO
    Jan 80..........................  Oct 80............  Commander, A
                                                           Troop, 1st
                                                           Squadron, 10th
                                                           Cavalry, 4th
                                                           Infantry Division
                                                           (Mechanized),
                                                           Fort Carson, CO
    Oct 80..........................  Jun 81............  S-3 (Operations),
                                                           1st Squadron,
                                                           10th Cavalry, 4th
                                                           Infantry Division
                                                           (Mechanized),
                                                           Fort Carson, CO
    Jun 81..........................  Jul 82............  Commander,
                                                           Headquarters and
                                                           Headquarters
                                                           Troop, 1st
                                                           Squadron, 10th
                                                           Cavalry, 4th
                                                           Infantry Division
                                                           (Mechanized),
                                                           Fort Carson, CO
    Aug 82..........................  May 84............  Student, Duke
                                                           University,
                                                           Durham, NC
    Jun 84..........................  Jul 87............  Instructor, later
                                                           Assistant
                                                           Professor,
                                                           Department of
                                                           English, U.S.
                                                           Military Academy,
                                                           West Point, NY
    Aug 87..........................  Jun 88............  Student, U.S. Army
                                                           Command and
                                                           General Staff
                                                           College, Fort
                                                           Leavenworth, KS
    Jul 88..........................  Sep 89............  Executive Officer,
                                                           4th Battalion,
                                                           67th Armor, 3d
                                                           Armored Division,
                                                           U.S. Army Europe
                                                           and Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany
    Sep 89..........................  May 91............  S-3 (Operations),
                                                           later Executive
                                                           Officer, 3d
                                                           Brigade, 3d
                                                           Armored Division,
                                                           U.S. Army Europe
                                                           and Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany and
                                                           Operations Desert
                                                           Shield/Storm,
                                                           Saudi Arabia
    Jul 91..........................  Jun 93............  Commander, 4th
                                                           Battalion, 67th
                                                           Armor, 1st
                                                           Brigade, 1st
                                                           Armored Division,
                                                           U.S. Army Europe
                                                           and Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany
    Jul 93..........................  Jun 95............  Chief, Armor
                                                           Branch, Combat
                                                           Arms Division,
                                                           Officer Personnel
                                                           Management
                                                           Directorate, U.S.
                                                           Total Army
                                                           Personnel
                                                           Command,
                                                           Alexandria, VA
    Aug 95..........................  Jun 96............  Student, National
                                                           War College, Fort
                                                           Lesley J. McNair,
                                                           Washington, DC
    Jul 96..........................  Jul 98............  Commander, 3d
                                                           Armored Cavalry
                                                           Regiment, Fort
                                                           Carson, CO
    Jul 98..........................  Oct 99............  Assistant Deputy
                                                           Director for
                                                           Politico-Military
                                                           Affairs, Europe
                                                           and Africa, J-5,
                                                           The Joint Staff,
                                                           Washington, DC
    Oct 99..........................  Aug 01............  Special Assistant
                                                           to the Chairman
                                                           of the Joint
                                                           Chiefs of Staff,
                                                           The Joint Staff,
                                                           Washington, DC
    Sep 01..........................  Jun 03............  Program Manager,
                                                           Saudi Arabian
                                                           National Guard
                                                           Modernization
                                                           Program, Saudi
                                                           Arabia
    Jun 03..........................  Oct 04............  Commanding
                                                           General, 1st
                                                           Armored Division,
                                                           U.S. Army Europe
                                                           and Seventh Army
                                                           Operation Iraqi
                                                           Freedom, Iraq
    Oct 04..........................  Jul 05............  Commanding
                                                           General, 1st
                                                           Armored Division,
                                                           U.S. Army Europe
                                                           and Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany
    Aug 05..........................  May 07............  Commander, Multi-
                                                           National Security
                                                           Transition
                                                           Command-Iraq/
                                                           Commander, NATO
                                                           Training Mission-
                                                           Iraq, Operation
                                                           Iraqi Freedom,
                                                           Iraq
    Aug 07..........................  Mar 08............  Deputy Commander,
                                                           U.S. Central
                                                           Command, MacDill
                                                           Air Force Base,
                                                           FL
    Mar 08..........................  Oct 08............  Acting Commander,
                                                           U.S. Central
                                                           Command, MacDill
                                                           Air Force Base,
                                                           FL
    Dec 08..........................  Present...........  Commanding
                                                           General, U.S.
                                                           Army Training and
                                                           Doctrine Command,
                                                           Fort Monroe, VA
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Summary of joint assignments:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Assignments                    Date              Grade
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Assistant Deputy Director for          Jul 98-Oct 99                   Colonel
     Politico-Military Affairs, Europe
     and Africa, J-5, The Joint Staff,
     Washington, DC....................
    Special Assistant to the Chairman      Oct 99-Aug 01                   Colonel
     of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The
     Joint Staff, Washington, DC.......
    Commander, Multi-National Security     Aug 05-May 07  Lieutenant General
     Transition Command-Iraq/Commander,
     NATO Training Mission-Iraq,
     Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.....
    Deputy Commander, U.S. Central         Aug 07-Mar 08  Lieutenant General
     Command, MacDill Air Force Base,
     FL................................
    Acting Commander, U.S. Central         Mar 08-Oct 08  Lieutenant General
     Command, MacDill Air Force Base,
     FL................................
    Executive Officer, 3d Brigade, 3d      Jan 91-Feb 91        Lieutenant Colonel
     Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe
     and Seventh Army, Operations
     Desert Shield/Storm, Saudi Arabia.
    Commanding General, 1st Armored        Jun 03-Oct 04  Brigadier General/
     Division, U.S. Army Europe and                           Major General
     Seventh Army, Operation Iraqi
     Freedom, Iraq.....................
    Commander, Multi-National Security     Aug 05-May 07  Lieutenant General
     Transition Command-Iraq/Commander,
     NATO Training Mission-Iraq,
     Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.....
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    U.S. decorations and badges:
        Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
        Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
        Defense Superior Service Medal
        Legion of Merit (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
        Bronze Star Medal with ``V'' Device
        Bronze Star Medal
        Meritorious Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
        Joint Service Commendation Medal
        Army Commendation Medal
        Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
        Combat Action Badge
        Parachutist Badge
        Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
    military officers nominated by the President to positions
    requiring advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form
    that details the biographical, financial, and other information
    of the nominee. The form executed by GEN Martin E. Dempsey,
    USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]

                              UNITED STATES SENATE
                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                                  Room SR-228
                           Washington, DC 20510-6050
                                 (202) 224-3871
                        COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
          BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

        Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
    more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
    form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
    of your answer applies.
                        Part A--Biographical Information
        Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
    this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
    public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
    any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

        1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
        Martin E. Dempsey.

        2. Position to which nominated:
        Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

        3. Date of nomination:
        7 February 2011.

        4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
        [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
    committee's executive files.]

        5. Date and place of birth:
        March 14, 1952; Jersey City, NJ.

        6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
        Married to Diane Sullivan Dempsey.

        7. Names and ages of children:
        Christopher, 32.
        Megan, 31.
        Caitlan, 27.

        8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
    honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
    or local governments, other than those listed in the service record
    extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
        None.

        9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
    officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
    or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
    business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
        None.

        10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
    professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
    other organizations.
        Member, Veterans of Foreign Wars.
        Member, Association of U.S. Army.

        11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
    society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
    service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
    extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
        None.

        12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees:
        I, Martin E. Dempsey agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify
    upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.

        13. Personal views:
        I, Martin E. Dempsey, agree, when asked before any duly constituted
    committee of Congress, to give my personal views, even if those views
    differ from the administration in power.

                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
    committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
    forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
    Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                    ------

                               Signature and Date
        I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
    on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
    provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
    and complete.
                                                     Martin E. Dempsey.
        This 1st day of February, 2011.

        [The nomination of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, was reported
    to the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 15, 2011, with the
    recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
    was confirmed by the Senate on March 16, 2011.]

         NOMINATION OF HON. LEON E. PANETTA TO BE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

                                  ----------

                             THURSDAY, JUNE 9, 2011

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in
    room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
    Akaka, Nelson, Webb, McCaskill, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Manchin,
    Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions,
    Chambliss, Wicker, Brown, Portman, Ayotte, Collins, Graham, and
    Cornyn.
        Other Senators present: Senators Feinstein and Boxer.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and
    Travis E. Smith, special assistant.
        Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
    Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken,
    professional staff member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel;
    Jason W. Maroney, counsel; Thomas K. McConnell, professional
    staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet,
    professional staff member; Russell L. Shaffer, counsel; and
    William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority
    staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
    Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; Lucian L.
    Niemeyer, professional staff member; Michael J. Sistak,
    research assistant; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff, Brian F.
    Sebold, Bradley S. Watson, and Breon N. Wells.
        Committee members' assistants present: Vance Serchuk,
    assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to
    Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Ann
    Premer, assistant to Senator Nelson; Gordon Peterson, assistant
    to Senator Webb; Tressa Guenov, assistant to Senator McCaskill;
    Casey Howard, assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant
    to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator
    Begich; Joanne McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; Chad
    Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen; Elana Broitman,
    assistant to Senator Gillibrand; Jeremy Bratt and Ethan Saxon,
    assistants to Senator Blumenthal; Anthony Lazarski, assistant
    to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator
    Sessions; Tyler Stephens, assistant to Senator Chambliss;
    Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; William Wright,
    assistant to Senator Brown; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator
    Ayotte; Ryan Kaldahl, assistant to Senator Collins; Taylor
    Andreae, assistant to Senator Graham; Dave Hanke, assistant to
    Senator Cornyn; and Joshua Hodges, assistant to Senator Vitter.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
        This morning, the committee meets to consider the
    nomination of Leon Panetta to be Secretary of Defense. Director
    Panetta is no stranger to testifying before Congress over the
    course of his long and distinguished career in public service.
    We welcome you to the committee today, and we thank you, Mr.
    Panetta, for your decades of dedicated service to our Nation
    and your willingness to answer the call once again.
        We know your wife, Sylvia, is not able to be here with you
    today. She has made her own sacrifices over the last 50 years,
    supporting your efforts in both the public and private sector.
    I know that I speak for the committee when I say that we would
    love to thank her in person for the sacrifices that she has
    made. Director Panetta, please let your wife know of the
    committee's gratitude for her support and her sacrifice.
        If confirmed, Director Panetta will replace Secretary
    Robert Gates at the helm of the Department of Defense (DOD).
    When President Obama asked Secretary Gates, then-President
    Bush's Secretary of Defense, to stay on in that position, it
    provided welcomed continuity and experience in our defense
    leadership. Director Panetta's nomination to be Secretary of
    Defense represents change, but brings an impressive level of
    continuity as well.
        The next Secretary of Defense will face an extraordinarily
    complex set of demands on our Armed Forces. Foremost among them
    are the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Between these 2
    conflicts, we continue to have approximately 150,000 troops
    deployed.
        The U.S. military is also providing support to the North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in Libya. In
    addition, even after the extraordinary raid that killed Osama
    bin Laden, terrorist threats against our Homeland continue to
    emanate from Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere.
        The risk of a terrorist organization getting their hands on
    and detonating an improvised nuclear device or other weapon of
    mass destruction remains one of the gravest possible threats to
    the United States. To counter this threat, the Defense
    Department is working with the Departments of State, Energy,
    Homeland Security, and other U.S. Government agencies to
    prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, fissile
    materials, and dangerous technologies.
        A number of key national security decisions will have to be
    made in the coming weeks and months. Even as the drawdown of
    U.S. forces in Iraq is on track, recent signs of instability
    may lead Iraq's political leadership to ask for some kind of
    continuing U.S. military presence beyond the December 31st
    withdrawal deadline agreed to by President Bush and Prime
    Minister Maliki in the 2008 security agreement between our
    countries.
        Another key decision point is looming in Afghanistan
    regarding reductions in U.S. forces starting in July. President
    Obama said the other day that, ``It is now time for us to
    recognize that we have accomplished a big chunk of our mission
    and that it is time for Afghans to take more responsibility.''
        The President has also said that the reductions starting in
    July will be ``significant'' and not just ``a token gesture''.
    I support that decision. The more that Afghan leaders
    understand that we mean it when we say our commitment is not
    open-ended, the more serious they will be in preparing Afghan
    security forces to assume security responsibility for all of
    Afghanistan.
        I support the so-called ``transition strategy'', which
    calls for Afghan security forces to take more and more of the
    lead in providing for their country's security. The more that
    Afghan security forces do that, the better are the chances of
    success because the Taliban's biggest nightmare is a large,
    effective Afghan Army, an army already respected by the Afghan
    people, in control of Afghanistan's security.
        Having Afghan security forces in the lead would deprive the
    Taliban of their biggest propaganda target, the claim that
    foreign troops are occupiers of Afghanistan. There is nothing
    inconsistent between transitioning security responsibility to
    Afghan security forces and a long-term strategic relationship
    with Afghanistan, which is also important to sustaining a
    successful outcome.
        Another major issue facing the Department is the stress on
    our Armed Forces after 10 years of nonstop war. The repeated
    deployments of our military over the last decade has resulted
    in many of our servicemen and women being away from their
    families and homes for two, three, four, or more tours. It is
    not only our force which is stressed, so are our military
    families.
        Our incredible men and women in uniform continue to answer
    the call, but we must act to reduce the number of deployments
    and to increase the time between deployments.
        The next Secretary of Defense will be required to juggle
    the competing demands on our forces while Washington struggles
    with an extremely challenging fiscal environment. The defense
    budget will not, and should not, be exempt from cuts. But this
    will require Congress, working with the next Secretary of
    Defense, to scrub every program and expenditure in the defense
    budget and to make tough choices and tradeoffs between the
    requirements of our warfighters today and preparations for the
    threats of tomorrow.
        The administration in February submitted a defense budget
    for fiscal year 2012, which included some efficiency savings.
    But in April, President Obama announced he wanted to reduce
    security spending by $400 billion over 12 years, starting in
    the next fiscal year, presumably including under the umbrella
    of security spending the budgets of the Pentagon, Departments
    of State and Homeland Security.
        Now we have asked the administration what part of the $400
    billion reduction do they recommend be Pentagon cuts, and how
    many of those for fiscal year 2012? So far, we have received no
    answer.
        Hopefully, today we will get Mr. Panetta's understanding of
    that matter and his opinion on the central fiscal issues. His
    service as President Clinton's Director of the Office of
    Management and Budget (OMB) is invaluable because he
    understands the inner workings of the budget process and
    because he shaped the decisions that helped achieve the budget
    surpluses of the late 1990s.
        Fortunately for the Nation, Director Panetta brings a
    compelling record of achievement and experiences well suited to
    the demands of the position for which he has been nominated.
        Leon Panetta has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to work
    across party lines. Since entering public service in 1966, he
    worked on the staff of the Republican Whip in the U.S. Senate,
    and headed the Office of Civil Rights in the Nixon
    administration. He later won election to the House of
    Representatives as a Democrat, where he served eight terms and
    became chairman of the House Budget Committee.
        Throughout his time in public service, Leon Panetta has
    been guided by a clear moral compass. He has said, ``In
    politics, there has to be a line beyond which you don't go--the
    line that marks the difference between right and wrong, what
    your conscience tells you is right. Too often,'' he said,
    ``people don't know where the line is. My family, how I was
    raised, my education, all reinforced my being able to see that
    line.''
        Finally, Leon Panetta has been intimately involved in the
    most pressing national security issues of our time during his
    tenure as President Obama's Director of the Central
    Intelligence Agency (CIA). This includes his having personally
    overseen the manhunt for Osama bin Laden and the impressive
    operation that brought an end to al Qaeda's murderous leader.
        This operation epitomizes the way in which the CIA and the
    Defense Department are finally working together to support each
    other in the counterterrorism operations. The assault on bin
    Laden's hideout is the first significant instance, I believe,
    of an operation that could have been conducted under Defense
    Department authorities under U.S. Code title 10 but that was
    instead executed under the authorities of title 50, with the
    Director of the CIA exercising operational control over our
    elite military force.
        Now let me conclude by expressing, on behalf of this
    committee, our gratitude and our deep admiration for the man
    whose shoes Director Panetta has been nominated to fill,
    Secretary Robert Gates. Secretary Gates' service to the country
    has been extraordinary, having worked in the administration of
    eight Presidents.
        He left the comfort and rewards of private life, following
    a long career in Government, to serve his country again in the
    critical post of President Bush's Secretary of Defense at a
    difficult time in our history. Throughout his tenure across the
    Bush and Obama administrations, Secretary Gates' leadership,
    judgment, and candor have earned him the trust and respect of
    all who have worked with him.
        Secretary Gates has combined vision and thoughtfulness with
    toughness and clarity and courageous, firm decisionmaking. I
    would add that right from the start, Secretary Gates
    established a direct and open relationship with Congress, and
    this committee in particular, for which I am personally most
    grateful.
        I believe history will judge Secretary Gates' time as
    Secretary of Defense to have been truly exceptional.
        Senator McCain.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me welcome Director Panetta and congratulate him on his
    nomination to be the next Secretary of Defense.
        I am grateful for his remarkable career of public service
    and his willingness to serve in this new and very important
    capacity. I am appreciative of your family and the support they
    have given to you.
        Let me also welcome our colleagues from California today,
    who will shortly underscore your extraordinary qualifications
    to assume the position of Secretary of Defense.
        Your successes as Director of the CIA over the last 2
    years, and there have been many, especially finding and
    eliminating Osama bin Laden, are a credit to you, and to the
    men and women of the Intelligence Community. At the same time,
    you and I know the director would be the first to admit that he
    has big shoes to fill, if confirmed, in the person of Robert
    Gates.
        I have seen many Secretaries of Defense in my years, and I
    believe that history will long remember Secretary Gates as one
    of America's finest, most effective, and most impactful
    Secretaries of Defense.
        One of the key criteria that we should be looking for in
    the next Secretary of Defense is continuity--the continuation
    of the wise judgment, policies, and decisionmaking that have
    characterized Secretary Gates' leadership of DOD. Thanks to the
    good work of Secretary Gates, his team, and our men and women
    in uniform, the next Secretary of Defense will take office with
    a great deal of positive momentum. But many consequential
    challenges remain.
        Indeed, over the next several years, our country faces
    decisions related to our national security and defense that
    will echo for decades to come, decisions that will determine
    whether we remain the world's leading global military power,
    able to meet our many commitments worldwide, or whether we will
    begin abandoning that role.
        What will have perhaps the most impact on this outcome is
    the President's stated goal of cutting $400 billion in defense
    spending by 2023, on top of the $178 billion in efficiencies in
    top line reductions that Secretary Gates has already announced.
        In recent weeks, Secretary Gates has been sounding the
    alarm against misguided and excessive reductions in defense
    spending that cut into the muscle of our military capabilities.
    I could not agree with him more. Defense spending is not what
    is sinking this country into fiscal crisis. If Congress and the
    President act on that flawed assumption, they will create a
    situation that is truly unaffordable--the decline of U.S.
    military power.
        I know there will be cuts to defense spending, and some
    reductions are no doubt necessary to improve the efficiency of
    DOD. But I also remember, and I think you do also, Director
    Panetta, when General ``Shy'' Meyer, then Chief of Staff of the
    Army, who warned in 1980 after draconian cuts were made,
    testified before this committee that we had a ``hollow army''.
        That is not an experience that we can or should repeat in
    the years to come. We must learn the lessons of history. I
    would welcome the nominee's opinion on this vital matter,
    including how the President's proposal could be implemented.
        Another major decision involves how we achieve our
    objectives in the three conflicts in which U.S. forces are now
    engaged--Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. In Iraq, the key
    question now is whether some presence of U.S. forces will
    remain in Iraq beyond the end of this year, pending Iraqi
    request and approval, to support Iraq's continuing needs and
    our enduring national interests. I believe such a presence is
    necessary, as Secretary Gates has argued.
        In Afghanistan, the main question is the size and scope of
    the drawdown of forces beginning this July. Here, too, I would
    agree with Secretary Gates that any drawdown should be modest,
    so as to maximize our ability to lock in the hard-won gains of
    our troops through the next fighting season.
        Finally, in Libya, there are signs that Gaddafi may be
    starting to crack, but the odds of a stalemate remain far too
    high. I believe U.S. strategy should be to reduce those odds as
    much as possible and quickly force Gaddafi to leave power,
    rather than hoping we achieve that objective with minimal
    effort.
        Another significant challenge facing the Defense Department
    is acquisition reform for its weapons and services. Secretary
    Gates has made some courageous decisions in attempting to get
    major weapons procurement programs on track. A similar focus
    needs to be brought to how the Defense Department chooses to
    buy billions of dollars in services to maintain the highest
    degree of readiness.
        In addition, especially in this budget environment, it will
    be important to continue to eliminate weapons programs that are
    over cost, behind schedule, and not providing improvements in
    combat power and capabilities. After 10 years of war, we must
    continue to eliminate every dollar in wasteful spending that
    siphons resources away from our most vital need--enabling our
    troops to succeed in combat.
        Director Panetta, you are nominated to lead our Armed
    Forces amid their 10th year of sustained overseas combat. Not
    surprisingly, this has placed a major strain on our forces and
    their families. Yet, our military is performing better today
    than at any time in our history.
        This is thanks to the thousands of brave young Americans in
    uniform who are writing a new chapter in the history of our
    great country. They have shown themselves to be the equals of
    the greatest generations before them.
        The calling that all of us must answer in our service is to
    be equal and forever faithful to the sacrifice of these amazing
    Americans.
        Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe has to leave, and he would
    like to make just a very brief 10-second comment.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes, thank you, Senator McCain.
        I only want to say that because of an unavoidable conflict,
    I have to leave. But I was honored to serve for 8 years with
    then-Congressman Panetta, and I have always considered him to
    be a very close friend.
        I look forward to supporting his confirmation and serving
    with him in his new capacity.
        Thank you for the opportunity to say that.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
        We have our two wonderful colleagues from California here
    to introduce Director Panetta, and we are delighted to have
    both of you here and to have you as colleagues. It is a treat
    for all of us that you are with us.
        Senator Feinstein?
        Who, by the way, is also chair, may I say, of the Senate
    Intelligence Committee, so she has a lot of very direct
    experience now and long before with Director Panetta.

    STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
                             OF CALIFORNIA

        Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
    members of the committee.
        It is really a distinct pleasure for me to introduce the
    Director of the CIA and distinguished Californian, Leon
    Panetta, who was nominated by President Obama on April 28 to be
    the 23rd Secretary of Defense.
        As members of this committee well know, in his 47 years of
    public service, Director Panetta has held the positions of
    congressman, chairman of the House Budget Committee, Director
    of OMB, Chief of Staff to the White House, Co-Director with his
    wife of the Leon and Sylvia Panetta Institute for Public
    Policy--which I have had the pleasure of speaking before--
    member of the Iraq Study Group, Director of the CIA, and from
    1964 to 1966, a second and then a first lieutenant in the U.S.
    Army as an intelligence officer.
        I would add to that list trusted adviser to the President
    and respected member of his national security team. In the
    course of 2 years as Director, he has mastered the intelligence
    field, led the CIA through a very tumultuous time, restored
    badly damaged relationships with Congress and with the Director
    of National Intelligence, and carried out President Obama's
    personal instruction to him to find Osama bin Laden.
        I have no doubt that his past experience and his
    capabilities prepare Leon Panetta to meet the major challenges
    before DOD. With knowledge of CIA operations and analysis, he
    will come to the Pentagon with a thorough understanding of the
    situation in Afghanistan, as well as the aggravating factors of
    our relationship with Pakistan. Through CIA analysis and
    operations, he is also well aware of the other contingencies
    around the globe where the U.S. military may be called to
    deploy.
        Director Panetta is also well positioned to guide the
    Department through the constrained budget environment, which
    the chairman spoke of, along with the rest of Government. He
    possesses the credentials and experience to make cuts where
    needed and where prudent. I am confident that he will do so in
    a way that keeps the military strong and capable and in a way
    that maintains the cohesion of the Department and its Services.
        Finally, let me recognize that there are many officials in
    the Government with the intellect and management skill to do
    this job. Leon brings something more. He has an interesting
    leadership style, with a deft personal touch that really
    matters to the people in his charge and that greatly benefits
    the oversight responsibility that we in Congress have.
        Let me give you an example. It was early in his tenure at
    the CIA in 2009 when Director Panetta requested an urgent
    meeting with the Senate Intelligence Committee to brief us on a
    program that he had just learned of and that he had learned had
    never before been briefed to Congress. He found that
    unacceptable, and we very much appreciated his position.
        In the 2 years since, he has never declined to answer a
    question or provide us with his candid views. I believe the
    vice chairman of the committee, who is a member of this
    committee, Senator Chambliss, can testify to this. Leon has
    been completely forthright and motivated only by what is best
    for the CIA and, more importantly, this Nation.
        Let me conclude. A National Public Radio interview last
    week with Secretary Gates noted that the healthcare budget of
    DOD was bigger than the entire budget of the CIA and that no
    other position can fully prepare someone to be Secretary of
    Defense.
        I have great respect for Secretary Gates and praise him for
    his service to this country. Beyond all reasonable
    expectations, he has been an outstanding Secretary of Defense.
    But I would suggest to you that Leon Panetta, who has served
    honorably and successfully in Congress, at OMB, at the White
    House, and now the CIA, is prepared and uniquely qualified to
    be another outstanding Secretary of Defense in this very
    challenging time.
        I thank the committee.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Feinstein, for
    a very strong introduction.
        Now, Senator Boxer?

    STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
                               CALIFORNIA

        Senator Boxer. Thank you so much.
        I clearly appreciate every word that my colleague Senator
    Feinstein said about my friend Leon Panetta. What I am going to
    try to do is add a little bit more of a personal side because I
    have known this man and worked with him since 1982, when I was
    elected to Congress, and he became one of my mentors at that
    time.
        Eventually, I served on the House Budget Committee where he
    was the chairman, and I watched him very carefully reach out
    across every kind of line that would divide us--Republican,
    Democratic, liberal, conservative, moderate. We were facing at
    that time a lot of new, perplexing issues.
        One was the AIDS crisis. No one quite knew where this was
    headed, what it was about. I remember going to Leon and saying
    there is this new disease, and nobody quite understands it, and
    we haven't done anything about it. He said, ``You know, why
    don't you hold some hearings on it? It seems to really concern
    you, and bring in the Republicans,'' and we did.
        We were able to get the very first funding in that time for
    AIDS research because Leon was willing to listen. This is
    someone who is very smart, and he gets it. But he also was
    willing to listen to all sides, and I think we have seen that
    in every single job that he has fulfilled. This is a man who
    has dedicated himself to public service, and we are so grateful
    to him.
        I won't go through every job he has held. First of all, it
    would take too much time. Second of all, Senator Feinstein
    highlighted so many of those. But to be someone who could work
    as effectively behind the scenes as you can in front of a
    camera, to be someone who could be such a trusted adviser that
    two Presidents have chosen him.
        I could just go on about Leon. I am sure you don't want me
    to because you have a lot of work to do. Let me say for the
    people of California what he has meant to us.
        He has recognized the importance of our resources in our
    State, namely our coast and our ocean. He stepped out in front
    in the early years and said this is an economic issue for us,
    and he preserved that coast. That is forever. That Monterey
    sanctuary is forever. He is visionary.
        Then when we saw him move into the national security arena,
    as he did at the CIA, and the work he did in the latest
    achievement that he can talk about, and doesn't really do that
    much, in terms of making sure that Osama bin Laden was finally
    taken out. This was a brave mission by our military, and Leon
    Panetta was a part of the decisionmaking.
        I think at this time where we are engaged around the world
    in so many difficult conflicts, so many difficult conflicts, he
    is bringing now the intelligence perspective to the job.
        I would ask unanimous consent that my formal statement be
    printed in the record.
        I just want to turn to Leon at this time, just as a Senator
    from California and a friend, and say thanks so much for
    everything you have done throughout your career for this
    country. I know your origins. I know how proud your family is,
    and I think we all share that pride in you.
        Good luck, and I hope the committee confirms you quickly.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Boxer follows:]

                  Prepared Statement by Senator Barbara Boxer

        Mr. Chairman and colleagues--good morning.
        I am so very pleased to be here today to introduce my former
    colleague and fellow Californian, Leon Panetta, President Obama's
    nominee to be Secretary of Defense.
        I can think of no better person to fill this critical post at a
    time when our Nation continues to face threats to our national
    security.
        Mr. Panetta has devoted 4 decades of his life to public service.
    During that time, he has earned the trust and confidence of his
    colleagues on both sides of the aisle.
        The son of Italian immigrants, Mr. Panetta was born and raised in
    the city of Monterey, CA.
        Shortly after earning his bachelor and law degrees from Santa Clara
    University, Mr. Panetta joined the U.S. Army as an intelligence officer
    and went on to receive the Army Commendation Medal for his service.
        Mr. Panetta came to Washington in 1966 and rose to become the
    Director of the U.S. Office for Civil Rights, where he fought for the
    desegregation of public schools even as other government officials were
    calling for slower enforcement of civil rights laws in the south.
        Mr. Panetta does what he thinks is right, and I saw him bring that
    same strength and passion to his work as a Member of the House of
    Representatives, where I am proud to have served with him.
        He was my chairman of the House Budget Committee and together we
    worked on the first ever funding to fight AIDS.
        Among his many accomplishments, Mr. Panetta authored the Hunger
    Prevention Act of 1988, worked to extend Medicare and Medicaid to cover
    hospice care for the terminally ill, and was a critical voice in
    protecting California coastlines.
        As the Director of the Office of Management and Budget during the
    Clinton administration, Mr. Panetta learned the intricacies of the
    Federal budget process and, most importantly, how to effectively set
    and manage a budget.
        He also served as President Clinton's Chief of Staff, engaging at
    the highest levels on critical national security matters.
        For the past 2 years, Mr. Panetta has served as Director of the
    Central Intelligence Agency, where he has been responsible for
    protecting Americans around the world. Most recently, he oversaw the
    covert mission that located and killed Osama bin Laden, the founder of
    al Qaeda and mastermind behind the horrific attacks of September 11,
    2001.
        Bin Laden's death was the result of close coordination between our
    military and intelligence communities and Mr. Panetta's deep
    understanding of our Intelligence Community will be particularly
    beneficial in this new role.
        I think it is clear that Mr. Panetta has the unique experience
    needed to serve our Nation at this critical time and I know he will
    continue to work tirelessly to keep America safe.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to speak on behalf of
    Mr. Panetta.
        I hope that he will get a favorable vote from your committee.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Boxer, for a very moving
    introduction and tribute.
        You are both welcome to stay or leave. I know you both have
    committee chairs that you have to fulfill responsibilities.
        Senator Boxer. I have a bill on the floor. By the way, we
    do have a bill on the floor about the Economic Development Act,
    and I want to remind everybody. So I will be going down on the
    floor.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. You never miss an opportunity to make your
    point effectively. [Laughter.]
        Thank you very much.
        Let me now call on Mr. Panetta. After your opening
    statement, we will ask you the usual questions and then turn to
    our questions.
        Thank you very much again for your service. Director
    Panetta?

    STATEMENT OF HON. LEON E. PANETTA, NOMINATED TO BE SECRETARY OF
                                DEFENSE

        Mr. Panetta. Thank you very much, Chairman Levin, Ranking
    Member McCain, all of the distinguished members of the
    committee.
        I am deeply honored and deeply humbled to be here as the
    President's nominee to be Secretary of Defense.
        I also want to take this moment to thank my fellow
    Californians, Senators Feinstein and Boxer, who are not only
    distinguished Senators who have represented their State well,
    but are dear friends and dear colleagues.
        The role of Secretary of Defense, while, without question,
    it involves a very large responsibility in size alone, still in
    a very basic way is similar to the role of the CIA Director in
    that our first and foremost mission is to protect the country.
    If confirmed, my number one job will be to ensure that America
    continues to have the best-trained, the best-equipped, and the
    strongest military in the world in order to make sure that we
    protect our country.
        As many of you know, I have devoted my career to public
    service. But it began a long time ago when I served as an
    intelligence officer in the U.S. Army. I was proud to wear the
    uniform of our country, and my respect and my admiration for
    our Nation's Armed Forces has only grown in the decades since.
        My youngest son, Jim, served in Afghanistan and received
    the Bronze Star. I have personally witnessed the tradition of
    service and sacrifice that drives each generation to fulfill a
    fundamental duty to our country.
        In addition to respecting that great tradition of duty, I
    have done a number of things to try and prepare for this very
    difficult and challenging job. First, in the weeks since my
    nomination, I spent a number of hours with Bob Gates. Bob is a
    dear friend, and he and I first got to know each other as we
    were building our careers in public service.
        We also served together on the Iraq Study Group, and we
    continue to serve together as members of the President's
    national security team. We share a common belief that the
    national security of this country is the responsibility of all
    Americans, regardless of party.
        I, too, believe that he will be remembered as one of the
    greatest Secretaries of Defense in our Nation's history for the
    way he led the Department during a time of war and for the
    crucial reforms that he has tried to put in place in the way
    the Pentagon does business. Those are reforms that I intend to
    carry on.
        Second, I talked with our Service Secretaries and the
    Service Chiefs. I believe it is important to have a candid,
    open line of communication between the Secretary and all of the
    Service Chiefs. They are the ones that are out there leading
    each of their Services, and I need to know what they are
    thinking, and I need to know what is important in terms of
    serving the interests of the troops that they directly lead.
        One of those chiefs told me for our troops, there has been
    no shortage of war. Indeed, we are a Nation at war. Our All-
    Volunteer Force has been stretched by combat that has lasted
    nearly a decade. We owe it to them, we owe it to their families
    to ensure that they have the best leadership, the best
    training, the best equipment, the best benefits, and the best
    healthcare that we can give them.
        I pledge to them and I pledge to you that every deployment
    decision that I make will be mindful of the stresses on our men
    and women in uniform and on their families.
        Third, I have reached out to the former Secretaries of
    Defense, both Democrat and Republican, and asked for their
    advice. To a person, they impressed upon me how important it
    was to stay focused on the management of the Pentagon. This is
    the biggest enterprise in our Government, and it requires
    focused, hands-on management, which is, frankly, the only way I
    know how to do business.
        Fourth, I have sat down with many of you and have known
    many of you throughout my career. Because I really do believe
    that Congress has to be a partner in this role in the
    protection of our country, I am a creature of Congress and I
    believe that the Pentagon is made stronger by your oversight
    and by your guidance.
        As a young legislative assistant a long time ago here in
    the Senate, I had the honor of seeing firsthand the
    bipartisanship of leaders like Dick Russell and Henry Jackson,
    John Stennis, and Barry Goldwater. As a Member of Congress, I
    saw that tradition carried on by other great leaders.
        I believe deeply in the tradition of strong, bipartisan
    national security leadership. You, Mr. Chairman, and you,
    Senator McCain, have carried on that tradition. I thank you for
    that.
        This is a time of historic change. Unlike the Cold War,
    when we had one main adversary, we face a multitude of
    challenges--al Qaeda and other global terrorist networks,
    places like Yemen, Somalia, North Africa, not just the
    Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan.
    Dangerous enemies spread out across the world.
        We face insurgents and militants who cross borders to
    conduct attacks. We face the proliferation of dangerous weapons
    in the hands of terrorists, in the hands of rogue nations. We
    face cyber attackers, a whole new arena of warfare that can
    take place not only now, but in the future, and something we
    have to pay attention to.
        We face the challenge of rising and changing powers and
    nations in turmoil, particularly in the Middle East, undergoing
    enormous political transformation. We are no longer in the Cold
    War. This is more like the ``blizzard war'', a blizzard of
    challenges that draw speed and intensity from terrorism, from
    rapidly developing technologies, and the rising number of
    powers on the world stage.
        But despite the times we live in, there is reason to be
    confident. The operation that killed Osama bin Laden, in my
    view, has not only made clear to the world that we will do what
    we have to do, but it has also given us the greatest chance
    since September 11 to disrupt, dismantle, and to defeat al
    Qaeda.
        But to do that, to be able to finish the job, we have to
    keep our pressure up. If confirmed, my first task at DOD will
    be to ensure that we prevail in the conflicts that we are
    engaged in. In Afghanistan, we must continue to degrade the
    Taliban. We have to train security forces. We have to help the
    government take ownership of their country so that they can
    govern and protect their country.
        In Iraq, we must assure that the Iraqi military and
    security forces are prepared to safeguard their nation so that
    it can become a stable democracy in a very important region of
    the world.
        As we do that, I am very aware that we must be highly
    disciplined in how we spend the taxpayers' precious resources.
    This committee well knows that the days of large growth and
    unlimited defense budgets are over. Our challenge will be to
    design budgets that eliminate wasteful and duplicative spending
    while protecting those core elements that we absolutely need
    for our Nation's defense.
        I do not believe, based on my long experience in government
    and working with budgets, that we have to choose between strong
    fiscal discipline and strong national defense. I don't deny
    that there are going to be tough decisions that have to be made
    and tough choices that have to be made. But we owe it to our
    citizens to provide both strong fiscal discipline and a strong
    national defense.
        Finally, and most importantly, it is the job of Secretary
    of Defense to be a tireless advocate for our troops and for
    their families. It is their sacrifice and their dedication that
    have earned the respect of a grateful nation and inspired a new
    generation to volunteer to wear the uniform of our country.
        They put their lives on the line to fight for America, and
    I will just as surely fight for them and for the families who
    support and sustain them.
        As Director of the CIA, I had no more solemn duty than
    sending young people into harm's way to put their lives on the
    line. After we lost seven of our colleagues in Afghanistan in
    December 2009, I had to do what my colleagues in the military
    do all too often--visit the wounded at Bethesda, attend the
    ramp ceremony at Dover, offer a prayer at the side of an
    Arlington Cemetery gravesite for a patriot who left this world
    too young.
        Not one day will pass when I don't think of the brave souls
    who have fought and died and those who fight today for our
    freedom. As Secretary Gates emphasized in his last trip to the
    troops, they will always be in my thoughts and prayers.
        If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I pledge to you that I will
    always keep our troops foremost in my mind, that I will be a
    careful, accountable steward of our Nation's precious
    resources, that we will have the strongest national defense in
    the world, and that you will always have my best and most
    candid advice, and that I will always, always seek yours.
        I am the son of Italian immigrants. My father used to say
    to me time and time again that to be free, we have to be
    secure. That is the pledge that I make to you, that I will do
    everything I can to keep America secure so that it can be free.
    I will do that if I am confirmed as Secretary of Defense.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Panetta follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Hon. Leon E. Panetta

        Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and distinguished members of
    the committee.
        I am humbled to be here as the President's nominee to be Secretary
    of Defense. The role of the Secretary of Defense is similar to the role
    of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director--first and foremost
    to protect the country. If confirmed, my number one job will be to
    ensure that America continues to have the best-trained, best-equipped,
    and strongest military in the world.
        I have devoted my career to public service--and it began when I
    served as an intelligence officer in the U.S. Army. I was proud to wear
    the uniform of my country--and my respect and admiration for our
    Nation's Armed Forces have only grown in the decades since. My youngest
    son Jim served in Afghanistan and received the Bronze Star. So I have
    personally witnessed the tradition of service and sacrifice that drives
    the generations to fulfill a duty to our country.
        In addition, I have done a number of things to try and prepare for
    this job.
        First, in the weeks since my nomination, I have spent a number of
    hours with Bob Gates. Bob and I first got to know each other as we were
    building our careers in public service. We also served together on the
    Iraq Study Group. We share a common belief that national security is
    the responsibility of all Americans, regardless of party. I believe he
    will be remembered as one of the greatest Secretaries of Defense in our
    Nation's history for the way he led the Department during a time of
    war, and for the crucial reforms he made in the way the Pentagon does
    business--reforms that I intend to carry on.
        Second, I talked with the Service Secretaries and the Service
    Chiefs--I believe it is important to have candid, open lines of
    communication between the Secretary and the Services. One of those
    chiefs told me, ``For our troops, there is no shortage of war.''
        Indeed, we are a Nation at war. Our All-Volunteer Force has been
    stretched by combat that has lasted nearly a decade. We owe it to them
    and their families to ensure that they have the best leadership, the
    best training, the best equipment, the best benefits and health care
    that we can give them. I pledge to them and I pledge to you that every
    deployment decision I make will be mindful of the stresses on our men
    and women in uniform and their families.
        Third, I reached out to every living former Secretary of Defense--
    Democrat and Republican--and asked for their advice. To a person, they
    impressed upon me how important it was to stay focused on management of
    the Pentagon. This is the biggest enterprise in our government, and it
    requires focused, hands-on management--which is, frankly, the only way
    I know how to do business.
        Fourth, I sat down with many of you--because Congress is my partner
    in this role and in the protection of the country. I'm a creature of
    Congress and I believe that the Pentagon is made stronger by your
    oversight. As a young legislative assistant, I had the honor of seeing
    firsthand the bipartisanship of leaders like Dick Russell, Henry
    Jackson, John Stennis, and Barry Goldwater. I believe deeply in the
    tradition of strong bipartisan national security leadership that you
    and this committee carry on.
        This is a time of historic change. Unlike the Cold War, when we had
    one main adversary, today we face a multitude of challenges--al Qaeda
    and other global terrorist networks, insurgents and militants who cross
    borders, the proliferation of dangerous weapons, cyber attackers,
    rising and changing powers, and nations--particularly in the Middle
    East--undergoing enormous political transformation.
        We are no longer in the Cold War. This is the Blizzard War--a
    blizzard of challenges that draws speed and intensity from rapidly
    developing technologies and the rising number of powers on the world
    stage.
        But, despite the times we live in, there is reason to be confident.
    The operation that killed Osama bin Laden, in my view, has given us the
    greatest chance since September 11 to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al
    Qaeda permanently. We must keep up the pressure.
        If confirmed, my first tasks at the Department of Defense will be
    to ensure that we prevail in the conflicts in which we are now engaged.
    In Afghanistan, we must continue to degrade the Taliban, train the
    security forces, and help the government take ownership for the
    country's progress and security. In Iraq, we must assure that the Iraqi
    military and security forces are prepared to safeguard their nation.
        As we do that, I am very aware that we must be highly disciplined
    in how we spend the taxpayer's precious resources. This committee well
    knows: the days of unlimited defense budgets are over. Our challenge
    will be to design budgets that eliminate wasteful and duplicative
    spending while protecting those core elements we need for our Nation's
    defense. I do not believe that we have to choose between strong fiscal
    discipline and strong national defense. We owe it to our citizens to
    provide both.
        Finally, it is the job of the Secretary of Defense to be a tireless
    advocate for our troops and their families. It is their sacrifice and
    dedication that have earned the respect of a grateful nation . . . and
    inspired a new generation to wear the uniform of our country. They put
    their lives on the line to fight for America, and I will just as surely
    fight for them and for the families who support and sustain them.
        As Director of the CIA, I had no more solemn duty than sending
    young people into harm's way. After we lost seven of our colleagues in
    Afghanistan in December 2009, I had to do what my colleagues in the
    military do all too often--visit the wounded at Bethesda, attend the
    ramp ceremony at Dover, and offer a prayer at the side of an Arlington
    Cemetery grave for a patriot who left this world too young.
        Not one day will pass when I won't think of the brave souls who
    fight for our freedom.
        If confirmed, Mr. Chairman, I pledge to you that I'll always keep
    our troops foremost in my mind . . . that I will be a careful,
    accountable steward of our national resources . . . that we will have
    the strongest national defense in the world . . . and that you'll
    always have my best and candid advice. To be free, we must be secure.
    That is my pledge to you if I am confirmed as Secretary of Defense.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Director Panetta, for a
    powerful, moving, and a very straightforward statement.
        We have standard questions, which we ask of nominees before
    we take turns at asking our own questions, and I will put those
    questions to you now.
        Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
    governing conflicts of interest?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will.
        Chairman Levin. Do you agree, when asked, to give your
    personal views, even if those views differ from the
    administration in power?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will.
        Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
    any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
    confirmation progress?
        Mr. Panetta. No, I have not.
        Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
    deadlines established for requested communications, including
    questions for the record in hearings?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will.
        Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
    and briefers in response to congressional requests?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will.
        Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
    reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes, they will.
        Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
    testify upon request before this committee?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will.
        Chairman Levin. Finally, do you agree to provide documents,
    including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
    timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
    to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good-
    faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        I think what we will do is we will be here all morning, and
    then we will have a break for lunch. Then we are going to go
    into a classified session this afternoon.
        Let us start with a 7-minute first round here for
    questions.
        Director Panetta, in answer to prehearing questions, you
    said that you support the July 2011 date set by President Obama
    for the beginning of a process of transferring increasing
    responsibility for Afghanistan's security to the Afghan
    security forces and of drawing down U.S. forces from
    Afghanistan. President Obama recently said that the size of
    U.S. troop reductions from Afghanistan will be significant.
        Director Panetta, do you agree that the U.S. troop
    reductions from Afghanistan beginning in July should be
    significant?
        Mr. Panetta. I agree with the President's statement.
        Chairman Levin. There are approximately 100,000 more Afghan
    soldiers and police today than there were in December 2009. The
    NATO training mission in Afghanistan is ahead of schedule in
    meeting the target of 305,000 Afghan security forces by this
    fall.
        In addition, a new target of 352,000 Afghan security forces
    by 2012 has been set to ensure that these forces have the
    specialized skills needed to sustain these units over the long
    term, and I very much support that decision. Do you agree,
    Director Panetta, that training and partnering with the Afghan
    army and police and getting those forces in the lead on
    operations is key to the success of our counterinsurgency
    strategy in Afghanistan?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes, I do.
        Chairman Levin. Now, Pakistani leaders deny being aware of
    the presence of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad. It is
    counterintuitive to believe that none of their leaders knew of
    it. But nonetheless, that is not my question.
        Pakistan's leaders are well aware and acknowledge their
    awareness of the sanctuaries in Pakistan by the Haqqani network
    and the Afghan Taliban down in Quetta. Now those people are
    attacking our troops, Afghan troops, coalition troops across
    the border in Afghanistan and then go back to their sanctuary
    in Pakistan.
        A recent Defense Department report called the extremist
    Haqqani network ``the most significant threat in eastern
    Afghanistan,'' and yet the Haqqanis continue to enjoy open safe
    haven across the border in Pakistan. I think this is a totally
    unacceptable situation. I am wondering if you agree, and if so,
    what should be done about it?
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, I share your concern with regards to
    the safe haven in Pakistan, particularly as it relates to
    groups like the Haqqanis. I have strongly urged those in
    Pakistan to take steps to do whatever they can to prevent these
    kind of cross-border attacks and to prevent the safe havens
    that do exist on the Pakistani side of the border.
        This is a difficult challenge. The relationship with
    Pakistan is at the same time one of the most critical and yet
    one of the most complicated and frustrating relationships that
    we have. It is extremely critical in that we are conducting a
    war against our primary enemy in the FATA in their country.
        It is critical because supply lines, vital supply lines go
    through their country. It is critical because they are a
    nuclear power, and there is a danger that those nukes could
    wind up in the wrong hands.
        At the same time, it is very complicated, complicated by
    the fact that they maintain relationships with certain
    terrorist groups, that they continue to not take aggressive
    action with regards to these safe havens, and that their
    concern about the sovereignty results in criticism of the
    United States when, in fact, my view is that the terrorists in
    their country are probably the greatest threat to their
    sovereignty.
        Having said all of that, we have to maintain the
    relationship. We have to do everything we can to try to
    strengthen that relationship so that both of us can work to
    defend both of our countries.
        Chairman Levin. Director Panetta, as I mentioned in my
    opening statement, the President has called for $400 billion in
    reductions to national security spending over the next 12
    years. Now do you have any understanding of the proposed
    breakdown of that $400 billion as to how much he is proposing
    for reductions in Pentagon spending, how much in intelligence
    spending, the intelligence organizations, and how much he is
    proposing to reduce in the Homeland Security Department?
        Mr. Panetta. No, I do not.
        Chairman Levin. Can you try to find that out for us?
    Because we need to find that out, and give us an answer for the
    record.
        Mr. Panetta. I will certainly ask whether or not that
    decision has been made.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The administration has not made final decisions concerning the
    specific details on the $400 billion reduction.

        Chairman Levin. Do you know whether we are going to receive
    a budget amendment for the fiscal year 2012 DOD budget?
        Mr. Panetta. I do not know the answer to that.
        Chairman Levin. All right. On the question of torture, you,
    in your answers to the committee's prehearing policy questions,
    said the following, ``I will ensure that all interrogations
    conducted by DOD personnel are conducted consistent with the
    Army Field Manual and in accord with the Geneva Conventions.''
        My question, is waterboarding consistent with the Army
    Field Manual and the Geneva Conventions?
        Mr. Panetta. I have taken the same position as the
    President of the United States. I believe that waterboarding
    crosses the line, the use of that tactic with regards to
    interrogations. The President outlawed the use of that, plus
    other enhanced interrogation techniques, in an Executive order
    that he issued when he first came into the presidency.
        Chairman Levin. I need to switch gears here on you a lot
    because time requires that we do that. Senator Webb and I
    recently went to Okinawa, Guam, and Senator Webb was in Korea
    before. Senator McCain obviously has great personal experience
    in this area as well. Senator McCain, Senator Webb, and I
    proposed changes to basing plans on Okinawa and Guam. We urged
    a review of the plans in Korea because we believe that the
    current plans are unrealistic, unworkable, and unaffordable.
        Then, independently, the Government Accountability Office
    (GAO) concluded that the cost of these military realignments
    are higher than expected and in many cases largely unknown, a
    highly critical GAO report of this direction that we are
    currently moving. I am wondering whether or not you are
    familiar with this issue. If confirmed, in any event, whether
    you are familiar with these issues or not in those three
    places, will you agree to review this matter and work with us
    to find a solution that helps advance our strategic objectives
    in the region.
        Because we have strategic objectives in the region, but
    they are currently unaffordable. They are unknown in terms of
    cost. Would you be willing to review this matter and to work
    with us?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will, Senator. You discussed this with
    me when I met with you, and also Senator Webb discussed his
    concerns about that area. I agree with you that it is a very
    important strategic area for the United States. We do have to
    maintain a presence there.
        But there are a lot of issues to be resolved and worked on,
    and I look forward to working with you, Senator McCain, Senator
    Webb, and others to try to determine what the best and most
    cost-effective approach would be.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Director Panetta.
        What is your assessment of the battlefield situation in
    Afghanistan since we inaugurated the surge?
        Mr. Panetta. I think the assessment is that we have made
    progress with regards to security in that country. Albeit
    fragile and reversible, I nevertheless believe that progress
    has been made to try to advance security.
        We also have made good progress in training the forces
    there in Afghanistan, both their police and military force. I
    think the area where, frankly, greater progress needs to be
    made is on the governance side, to try to ensure that they
    improve their governance so that, ultimately, they can take
    responsibility for that country.
        Senator McCain. When you point out that it is fragile and
    reversible, I think that is absolutely accurate. So you would
    agree with Secretary Gates' repeated statements that
    withdrawals in July should be modest?
        Mr. Panetta. I agree that they should be conditions based,
    and I am going to leave it up to Secretary Gates, General
    Petraeus, and the President to decide what that number should
    be.
        Senator McCain. If you are the Secretary of Defense when
    that decision is made, obviously, you will have significant
    influence. You just came from a position where you have a very
    good assessment of the military situation. I think it is not
    inappropriate for you to answer when I ask if you agree with
    Secretary Gates' assessment that the withdrawal should be
    modest.
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, if I am confirmed, I will have to,
    obviously, arrive at a decision myself that I will have to
    ultimately present to the President. But I am not in that
    position now, and that decision really does rest with General
    Petraeus, Secretary Gates, and the President.
        Obviously, I have tremendous admiration for Secretary
    Gates. He and I pretty much walk hand-in-hand on these issues.
    But with regards to specific numbers, I just am not going to--
    --
        Senator McCain. I wasn't asking for specific numbers. On
    the subject of Iraq, if the Iraqi Government and all its
    elements agree that there should be a residual U.S. military
    presence in Iraq, particularly in three areas--air defenses,
    intelligence capability, and security in the areas around
    Kirkuk and that part of Iraq where there has been significant
    tensions--would you agree that that would be a wise thing for
    us to do?
        Mr. Panetta. I believe that if Prime Minister Maliki and
    the Iraqi Government requests that we maintain a presence
    there, that ought to be seriously considered by the President.
        Senator McCain. Do you think it would be in our interest to
    do that, given the situation?
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, I have to tell you, there are 1,000
    al Qaeda that are still in Iraq. We saw the attack that was
    made just the other day. It, too, continues to be a fragile
    situation, and I believe that we should take whatever steps are
    necessary to make sure that we protect whatever progress we
    have made there.
        Senator McCain. Do you know of anyone of authority either
    in Congress or in the administration who believes that we
    should send ground troops into Libya?
        Mr. Panetta. I haven't met anybody yet who supports that.
    [Laughter.]
        Senator McCain. I haven't either. Nor do I. In fact, I
    think it would be a great mistake.
        Do you believe that it is a proper role of Congress to
    restrict the powers of the President of the United States to
    act? In other words, you and I were around when there was a
    vote for cutoff of funds for Vietnam. Whether that was right or
    wrong, that was the appropriate role of Congress.
        Does it worry you if Congress begins to tell the Commander
    in Chief as to exactly what he can or cannot do, what the
    President can or cannot do in any conflict?
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, I believe very strongly that the
    President has the constitutional power as Commander in Chief to
    take steps that he believes are necessary to protect this
    country and protect our national interests. Obviously, I think
    it is important for Presidents to consult, and to have the
    advice of Congress. But in the end, I believe he has the
    constitutional power to do what he has to do to protect this
    country.
        Senator McCain. I agree. In 2007, the last time we went
    through a very serious crisis, it was concerning whether we
    should withdraw from Iraq or not, and I see some parallels as
    the rising and understandable war-weariness of the American
    people continues to be manifested.
        One of the things that we did at that time was set up some
    benchmarks that we expected to be met by both the Iraqis and
    the United States. As I recall, there was 13 or a number of
    those. Over time, most of those benchmarks were met.
        Don't you think it would be appropriate for us to do the
    same thing as far as Afghanistan is concerned? We can measure
    progress by certain metrics, and I think it would be important
    in order to gain or keep the confidence of the American people
    that we should set up some benchmarks for progress, both in
    Afghanistan and as far as Pakistan is concerned, since we are
    sending billions of dollars of taxpayers' money to Pakistan as
    well.
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, I think we all know what the
    fundamental goal here is to try to develop a stable enough
    Afghanistan that it will never again become a safe haven for al
    Qaeda or----
        Senator McCain. My specific question is----
        Mr. Panetta.--for other terrorists.
        Senator McCain.--would you agree----
        Mr. Panetta. But with regards to achieving that goal, I
    think that working with the administration, working with the
    President, working with the Secretary of Defense, establishing
    some of those areas where we need to make progress and
    identifying those, I think that is something that would be
    worth pursuing.
        Senator McCain. Thank you. I thank you for your service,
    and I thank you for your willingness to continue to serve.
        My time has expired. But one of the biggest problems that I
    see--and I apologize, Mr. Chairman--but is this whole issue of
    acquisition. We have terrible out-of-control costs for
    literally every weapon system that we have acquired in the last
    10 years that I know of.
        I believe you have a good team there in the Pentagon. I
    think that Mr. Carter is doing a good job. But we are going to
    have to get our arms around this. We cannot afford aircraft
    that double and triple the original estimated costs and don't
    meet the timelines that are set up. The F-35 is just the most
    outstanding example.
        I know you will make this as one of your highest
    priorities. It is simply not affordable for us to continue
    business as usual the way we acquire weapons today. It may
    require some really fundamental changes in addition to the
    legislation that we have already passed to try to address this
    issue.
        I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I thank you, sir.
        Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Senator. I agree with you fully on
    that issue.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you. He speaks, I think, for our
    entire committee in saying that, and I think it is also clear
    you have the background to really do something about it and to
    dig into it.
        Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Director Panetta, thank you for answering the call to serve
    your country again. I have the greatest confidence in your
    ability and your principles.
        I love the quote from your father. Our fathers must have
    come out of the same cloth, which is to value the freedom that
    America provides is our unique and distinguishing contribution
    to governance, but to understand that without security, there
    is no freedom. I can't think of anything I would rather hear
    from a nominee for Secretary of Defense than that.
        I want to begin with a few quick questions about Iran. Do
    you agree that the Islamic Republic of Iran is working very
    hard to develop a nuclear weapons capability?
        Mr. Panetta. Our concern with Iran is that they continue to
    try to develop some kind of nuclear capability. As to whether
    or not they have made certain decisions as to how far they
    should go, those are questions that I would probably have to
    address in another forum. But there is no question that they
    continue to work to try to develop some kind of nuclear
    capability.
        Senator Lieberman. Right. Also, to the best of your
    knowledge, is the Islamic Republic of Iran working to develop
    increased capacities in intercontinental ballistic missile
    systems to deliver nuclear or other weapons?
        Mr. Panetta. That is correct.
        Senator Lieberman. As I am sure you know, there has been a
    lot of both diplomatic and economic sanctions work being done
    to attempt to discourage Iran's nuclear ambitions and really to
    end them. However, as President Obama has said, all options
    have to remain on the table.
        I wanted to ask you whether, as Secretary of Defense, you
    will consider it to be one of your responsibilities to have
    credible military plans to strike and destroy Iran's nuclear
    facilities if the President, as Commander in Chief, decides
    that it is necessary to use that option?
        Mr. Panetta. I think in line with the President's statement
    that we should keep all options on the table, and that would
    obviously require appropriate planning.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
        Let me go to Afghanistan and see if I can approach it this
    way. I thought the President made not only a correct, but a
    courageous decision in 2009 in deciding to raise the number of
    our forces in Afghanistan by 30,000 plus, a so-called
    Afghanistan surge. At the time, the statement was made that we
    would begin to draw those troops down around July of this year,
    2011.
        There was a lot of anxiety in the region, particularly in
    Afghanistan and Pakistan and beyond, about whether that was the
    beginning of a kind of early withdrawal and, again, a retreat
    from the region. Discussions were had, particularly between us
    and the Afghans, and President Obama settled with President
    Karzai, as you well know, on a plan that will begin the
    transition around July of this year. But the goal is to remove
    effectively all of our forces, unless there is a mutual
    agreement to the contrary before then, by the end of 2014.
        You have said today and in the answers to the questions we
    submitted earlier that you thought we were making measurable
    progress. The American military are making measurable progress
    in Afghanistan, but that the progress was reversible. Rather
    than asking you to adopt an adjective that someone else has put
    on it, is it fair to say that the standard you would apply to
    the drawdown of American forces that would begin in July of
    this year, is it that it not be so great as to risk the gains
    we have made, which, as you have said, are reversible?
        Mr. Panetta. There is no question we ought not to take any
    steps that risks the gains that have been made, and I have
    great confidence, frankly, that General Petraeus and Secretary
    Gates and the President will make the right decision in a
    transition that has to take place going towards 2014.
        Senator Lieberman. Is it fair to say that if you are
    confirmed as Secretary of Defense, that the goal that you see
    is to turn responsibility for security of Afghanistan over to
    the Afghans at the end of 2014 and not to jeopardize our
    capacity to do that before then?
        Mr. Panetta. No, that is absolutely correct. At the Lisbon
    conference, 48 nations plus President Karzai made the decision
    that there would be a transition going towards 2014, and it
    would be then that, hopefully, we would be able to transfer
    responsibility. We ought to do nothing that jeopardizes that
    path.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that. Let me just briefly
    read you what Secretary Gates said this weekend in Afghanistan.
    ``I think that once you have committed, that success of the
    mission should override everything else because the most costly
    thing of all would be to fail.''
        Do you agree with that?
        Mr. Panetta. Absolutely.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate your answers to those
    questions.
        Let me move to another part of the world. I think at the
    end of the last century, if you asked most people up here and
    in the Defense Department, State Department, et cetera, CIA,
    what would be our focus in this century, they probably would
    have said that the Asia-Pacific region would be the strategic
    center of gravity of the 21st century.
        We were obviously and necessarily distracted by the attack
    on us on September 11, and I think we have responded with
    remarkable courage and effectiveness. But I think that the
    Asia-Pacific remains the strategic center of gravity for the
    21st century.
        As I think you know and those of us who have been there
    recently have found, there is an anxiety among our friends in
    Asia about, one, China's growing military capabilities and,
    two, about America's staying power and commitment to the
    region. I wanted to give you an opportunity to speak to that
    anxiety that, if confirmed as Secretary of Defense,
    notwithstanding the budget pressures on the U.S. Government,
    would our strategic involvement in the Asia-Pacific region, in
    your opinion, continue to be a national security priority?
        Mr. Panetta. Absolutely. I think that region is very
    important to us from a strategic point of view. We have to
    maintain a presence in the Pacific arena. I think we also, in
    line with that, have to maintain a relationship with China.
    Building that kind of relationship for the 21st century, I
    think, is extremely important.
        Obviously, there are concerns, concerns about some of the
    things they are doing in modernizing their military. At the
    same time, I think we have to be able to work with them in
    terms of scale and transparency so that we are working together
    and not in opposition to one another in order to make sure that
    we protect the security of that region.
        Senator Lieberman. But in your watch as Secretary of
    Defense, you certainly don't anticipate any withdrawal or
    retreat of America's commitment to the Asia-Pacific region and
    our allies there?
        Mr. Panetta. Not at all. Not at all.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Chambliss. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Director Panetta, thanks for your willingness to continue
    to exhibit great public service.
        As you and I have had the privilege of working together for
    many years now since I was a freshman member of the House, and
    you were a member of the Clinton administration. We don't need
    to talk about how many years that has been. But I respect your
    service and value our friendship.
        I would just say that I know you will be the first to
    credit the many hard-working and very professional men and
    women in the intelligence and military community that led to
    the successful takedown of bin Laden, and you would be right to
    do that. But the fact is without strong leadership at the top,
    that mission would not have been successful. I give a lot of
    the credit for that mission to you, and it is well deserved.
        You and I had the opportunity to talk about the issue of
    rising healthcare costs in the DOD budget when we visited a
    couple of weeks ago. I noticed you had several questions on
    that issue in your advance policy questions, and I appreciate
    your responses.
        I don't have a question on this. But as the chairman said
    earlier, you are going to have a very difficult job when it
    comes to trying to find savings and become more efficient at
    DOD. There is no bigger expense, at least from the standpoint
    of increasing annually, than the healthcare costs.
        I just want to reemphasize the fact that this is an
    extremely important issue, and we need to get our arms around
    it. I look forward to working with you. I encourage you to
    continue to think creatively about how we can bring these costs
    down without negatively impacting the quality of service to
    those who depend on that system.
        I want to go back to the line that Senator McCain was
    addressing on Afghanistan. Regarding the troop withdrawals, I
    think it is clear from an operational perspective that the
    withdrawal of U.S. troops at this point makes no sense. It may
    make sense from a domestic political perspective. It may make
    some level of sense in terms of waking up the Afghans to the
    fact that we are not going to be there forever, and they need
    to step up to the plate.
        But I am concerned that a significant withdrawal of U.S.
    forces will reverse the progress that we have made in
    Afghanistan and that the Afghans have made. I am glad to see
    you say in your responses to questions that you ``support a
    responsible, conditions-based withdrawal''. However, I would
    prefer there to be no withdrawal until it is clear that the
    gains that we have made will not be reversed.
        My question for you is, as we withdraw troops from
    Afghanistan, if it becomes clear from an operational
    perspective that the withdrawal is negatively affecting
    progress and stability, will you advise the President that the
    withdrawal should be stopped and that, if necessary, additional
    U.S. forces be sent back to Afghanistan?
        Mr. Panetta. As I have said and as the President has said,
    and the Secretary has emphasized, this has to be a conditions-
    based withdrawal. That means you look at the conditions on the
    ground as it proceeds, obviously, we need to do everything we
    can to try to stay, hopefully, on target with regards to the
    2014 date.
        But again, it is conditions based, and I think based on
    what changes take place, then obviously the President and the
    Secretary would have to make adjustments.
        Senator Chambliss. I would hope that from a conditions-
    based standpoint, Leon, that you would give strong
    consideration to the safety and security of our soldiers. I
    know they are of number one importance to you.
        If withdrawal of troops puts our men and women in greater
    harm's way, I hope that we would make it conditions based and
    that we would cease the withdrawal. I hope that would be your
    recommendation to the President.
        Mr. Panetta. Yes.
        Senator Chambliss. Another issue that I want to bring up
    with you that we have discussed is the issue of tactical
    aircraft and fifth-generation fighters. Let me just say that
    several years ago, Secretary Gates made a push to place the
    future of tactical aviation on basically one weapon system, and
    that is the F-35.
        He argued that it had stealth and other advanced
    capabilities that made it the airplane of the future. However,
    at a recent hearing, last month Secretary Carter indicated, in
    fact, that DOD has taken money out of the F-35 program to buy
    fourth-generation fighters.
        Not only are these fourth-generation fighters costing
    billions of dollars, but they are going to be in the inventory
    for probably 20, 30 years, and we are going to be paying to
    maintain them at even a greater cost. Yet their utility is
    greatly limited against any kind of modern threat, and in my
    view, this does not seem to be a very good way to expend
    taxpayer dollars.
        What is your perspective on this issue? If confirmed, will
    you absolutely be committed to preserving U.S. supremacy and
    air dominance and ensuring our resources are spent most wisely
    towards that end?
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, obviously, I want to make sure that
    we have the very best in terms of our fighter planes, and I
    know the F-35 is a plane that is being developed as the next-
    generation fighter. But I also know that there are extensive
    costs associated with how that plane is being developed, and I
    think we have to watch it very carefully.
        I want to assure you that one of my responsibilities, in
    line with what Senator McCain said, is to take a very hard look
    at all weapon systems to make sure that they are cost effective
    and that they are, in the end, providing the very best
    equipment our forces need.
        Senator Chambliss. What really concerns me about where we
    are with that program is exactly what Senator McCain alluded
    to. That is that we just seem to be out of control and that we
    keep moving the goalpost with contractors and then blaming
    contractors for an increase in cost, when, frankly, part of it
    is due to our inefficient management of the systems.
        If we are going to spend the kind of money that we are
    committed to spend on that fifth-generation fighter, because
    that is where we are headed, and we all know that. We have to
    have that airplane in the inventory. The decisions that are
    going to be made by you, as Secretary of Defense, relative to
    procurement, to acquisition, as well as to the testing of that
    airplane, are going to be critical.
        You bring a wealth of knowledge from that perspective from
    your years at OMB, as well as where you are today. Again, we
    look forward to dialoguing with you, between you and this
    committee on that issue as well as our other acquisition issues
    that are going to be before you.
        Let me ask you one other matter relative to Libya. I notice
    that you agree that the Gaddafi regime must go. How are we
    going to do it? Based on what we are doing today, from our
    participation in the NATO operation, how are we going to make
    that happen?
        Mr. Panetta. That is, as the President has said, the
    objective. It has to be done by a number of means.
        Number one, we are bringing strong economic sanctions
    against them. Number two, we are bringing strong diplomatic
    pressure against them. We have implemented embargoes and, more
    importantly, the work that NATO is doing, pursuant to the
    United Nations (U.N.) resolution.
        The NATO forces that are there are bringing tremendous
    pressure, I believe, on them, not only fighting obviously to
    protect civilians, but to implement the no-fly zone. But in
    addition to that, target the command and control elements of
    the regime. I think all of those factors have to continue in
    order to put pressure on Gaddafi.
        Frankly, I think there are gains that have been made. We
    have seen the regime weakened significantly. We have seen the
    opposition make gains both in the east and the west. I think
    there are some signs that if we continue the pressure, if we
    stick with it, that ultimately Gaddafi will step down.
        Senator Chambliss. Again, thanks for your service, and I
    look forward to continuing to work with you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Director, for your extraordinary public service,
    particularly in the last few months for your decisive and
    courageous advice to the President, which led to the successful
    raid against bin Laden. It would not have been as successful or
    as effective without your participation.
        Thank you personally for your friendship over many years.
        Let me return to the topic of Afghanistan. We are looking
    at a decision shortly that will be based on conditions on the
    ground. But it strikes me, and I think implicit in what you
    said in your testimony, that those conditions on the ground
    might be more relevant vis-a-vis Pakistan than Afghanistan.
        That, in fact, as long as the Government of Pakistan at
    least appears to see some of these terrorist groups on their
    soil as strategic assets and not liabilities, that our
    operations in Afghanistan are going to be very difficult.
        Going to the real conditions on the ground, your comment on
    whether those conditions are really more about Pakistan than
    Afghanistan, and whether our effort, our strategy, our focus
    has to be there as much as Afghanistan. I would also include in
    this context some type of regional dialogue, including
    Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. Your comments, Mr. Director?
        Mr. Panetta. I would agree with that, Senator. I think it
    is pretty clear we can't succeed in Afghanistan if we are not
    succeeding in Pakistan in terms of controlling the safe havens
    and the cross-border operations. We have to work at both in
    order to ensure that we are able to stay on path with what we
    would like to achieve in Afghanistan.
        In addition to that, I agree with you this is a regional
    issue. To the extent that the countries in that region can work
    together and relate to each other instead of being suspicious
    of each other and creating the kind of dynamic that, frankly,
    has not been very helpful, I think it would be in the interest
    of peace in that region if we could get all three to continue
    to work together to advance the same goals.
        Senator Reed. One of the points that I believe your
    predecessor made--I, too, will join my colleagues in commending
    him for exemplary service. Indeed, one of the challenges you
    have is following an extraordinarily talented, successful, and
    decent human being. You will do it, I know. But you have a
    challenge.
        Secretary Gates pointed out how important non-DOD
    operations were at the Department of State, and agricultural
    programs at the Department of Agriculture. Now we are getting
    also into the spectrum of these violent climate episodes
    throughout the globe of scientists in the National Oceanic and
    Atmospheric Administration and others. Yet there is a real
    danger here that those budgets might suffer.
        In terms of Afghanistan, my colleagues on the Senate
    Foreign Relations Committee yesterday released a report
    criticizing the build stage in the operation. Can you comment
    upon that partnership and how critical it is?
        Again, when we look ahead at the conditions on the ground,
    we could be successful interdicting terrorist groups, seizing
    caches of weapons, even interdicting transmissions from
    Pakistan. But if there is no political capacity or governmental
    capacity, healthcare, education, or anything, we are going to
    still have a population that is disgruntled and probably
    destructive towards us.
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, I agree with what you have said. It
    has to be a whole-of-government approach as we deal with these
    issues. Clearly, the State Department plays a very important
    role in providing assistance to individuals to ensure that an
    area remains secure: the education area. The Justice Department
    provides assistance. The area of agriculture also provides
    important assistance.
        I know DOD is our primary military weapon in terms of
    securing areas. But if we don't follow it up with these other
    important assets, we will never be able to fully secure these
    countries.
        Senator Reed. Let me change topics for a moment. It strikes
    me that I am old enough to remember when there were three
    dimensions of conflict--air, land, and sea. I did some land
    stuff and technically air because I jumped out of airplanes.
        But there is a whole new dimension, cyber. I don't think we
    know enough yet to be fully prepared, fully conversant. But can
    you comment briefly on the strategy that you will try to
    develop? I presume that strategy will involve some deterrence,
    preemption, offense, and defense. As was just indicated, there
    is a policy now within the context of the rules of war, what
    would constitute some type of casus belli?
        I think you are stepping in at a critical moment where we
    are just beginning to develop a strategy for a new dimension of
    warfare that we have never really confronted yet, and your
    leadership will be critical.
        Mr. Panetta. There is no question that the whole arena of
    cyber attacks, developing technologies in the information area
    represent potential battlefronts for the future. I have often
    said that there is a strong likelihood that the next Pearl
    Harbor that we confront could very well be a cyber attack that
    cripples our power systems, our grid, our security systems, our
    financial systems, and our governmental systems.
        This is a real possibility in today's world. As a result, I
    think we have to aggressively be able to counter that. It is
    going to take both defensive measures as well as aggressive
    measures to deal with it. But most importantly, there has to be
    a comprehensive approach in Government to make sure that those
    attacks don't take place.
        I have a huge responsibility, if confirmed in this new
    position, in dealing with the cyber area through the National
    Security Agency (NSA) and others. My goal would be to work very
    closely with them and with others to develop not only the
    capability, but also the law that I think we need to have in
    order to determine how we approach this challenge in the
    future.
        Senator Reed. Just a final topic, and really echoing what
    Senator McCain said, Senator Chambliss, and others, is that
    there is an acquisition bow wave coming, as you recapitalize
    and innovate our military forces, and that has been pushed off
    a bit. It has been deferred a bit, but it is coming.
        One of the aspects, as Senator Chambliss pointed out, is
    that it is not simply the sheer number of systems that we have
    to buy--land, sea, air, and others--it is the price tag on each
    one of these systems. I know Secretary Carter has been working
    very hard to make affordability part of the design. But all of
    those efforts are going to be absolutely necessary because
    there will be no room within even a generous budget to do
    everything that has to be done unless we make significant
    progress in that area. Just your comments again, Mr. Director.
        Mr. Panetta. In the briefings that I have had, it is
    obvious that this is an area that we have to pay a lot of
    attention to because of the efficiencies, because of
    competition, because of the nature of expanding contracts that
    have taken place there.
        We have seen these weapon systems grow in cost. It takes an
    extraordinary amount of time to field a system--from the
    beginning of moving that kind of weapon system to the time it
    is finally developed, finally deployed, it almost becomes
    outdated. We have to improve that process.
        I know Congress has taken steps in that arena, but I look
    forward to working with you and with the members of this
    committee to take greater steps to make sure we are looking at
    every possible efficiency in the procurement arena in order not
    only to save dollars, but to make sure we are getting better
    equipment as a result of it.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Director.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Brown.
        Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good to see you again, sir. I appreciate you taking time
    with me yesterday, I look forward to voting to confirm you.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing.
        I echo a lot of the same thoughts that my colleagues do
    regarding the cross-border operations, the tremendous amount of
    aid we give to Pakistan, $4 billion, I think, give or take. I
    have deep concerns that as we try to move forward with
    completing our mission and bringing our men and women home from
    Afghanistan that we are having these areas where you have the
    safe havens, yet we are giving them billions of dollars in aid.
        It is either you are with us or you are not? Either you are
    helping or you are not. Is there an effort and/or what is your
    position with regard to carrying that message that people like
    me and others in Congress are getting a little bit frustrated
    with that duplicity?
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, I want to assure you that Secretary
    Clinton; Chairman Mike Mullen, who meets with them regularly;
    myself; my deputy, who was just there; have all made the same
    point that we need to have their cooperation, we need to have
    their partnership in confronting what, frankly, is a common
    enemy here.
        Terrorism just isn't our problem. It is their problem. They
    are the subject of attacks every day from terrorists. It is in
    their interest to try to take greater action to control
    terrorism within their borders, and I think they have to
    recognize that we expect in a relationship and a partnership
    that it is a two-way street, that it isn't just one way. It has
    to be two ways if we are going to protect both of our
    countries.
        Senator Brown. Right. I mean, the fact that bin Laden was
    there. Clearly, if they didn't know he was there then--I, quite
    frankly, don't believe them. But I am hopeful that message
    continues very strongly. I know when I went over there, I
    conveyed that same message as well.
        If you are walking down the hallway and a media group grabs
    you and says, ``Sir, what is the mission in Afghanistan?'' What
    is your response? When I go back home, what should I convey to
    the people back in Massachusetts as to now that, obviously, we
    have made progress there? We have done A, B, C, and D. What
    should I convey and what do you convey, sir, in your everyday
    conversations, what is the mission in Afghanistan right now?
        Mr. Panetta. The fundamental mission in Afghanistan is to
    provide sufficient stability so that country never again
    becomes a safe haven for al Qaeda or al Qaeda's militant
    allies. I think that is the fundamental mission.
        Senator Brown. Is it your plan to achieve that mission by
    setting benchmarks that will hopefully be attained so we can
    step back and bring our men and women home? Let me ask you that
    first.
        Mr. Panetta. I think the President has made clear that
    there are goals that we are continuing to work on. We need to
    weaken the Taliban. We need to develop the force structure in
    Afghanistan with the police and the army so they can assume
    these responsibilities, and we need to develop the governance
    system there so that it can provide greater security for the
    future. Each of these areas has to be focused on in order to
    arrive at our goal.
        Senator Brown. Is it your opinion that there is a will in
    Afghanistan with the people and the government folks there to
    do that, to ultimately be self-sufficient?
        Mr. Panetta. I think there is. I think in the discussions I
    have had there, I think they really do want their country to
    succeed. It is not always easy. This is a tribal society. It is
    not a simple thing to be able to work together.
        Senator Brown. You have the tribal society, then you have
    the central government. There is very little interaction.
        Mr. Panetta. It is not easy. It is difficult. Yet, I think
    they understand that, ultimately, this is their country, and
    they are going to have to provide the security in their
    country.
        Senator Brown. I am also deeply concerned and I am hopeful
    that you will look at it, we keep hearing reports that monies
    that we are providing are going ultimately to terrorists and
    ultimately being used against our men and women that are
    serving. Is that something you have a comment on?
        Mr. Panetta. I think we have to continually oversee that
    and make certain that doesn't happen. I don't deny that there
    has been corruption in that country, and I think we have to
    ensure that one of their responsibilities as a government is to
    make sure that doesn't happen.
        Senator Brown. Just to shift gears a little bit, what is
    happening in Egypt and that region of the world, obviously,
    people are hopeful that they are having an opportunity to share
    in the freedoms and privileges that we and other countries like
    us have. Yet there is also deep concern about voids that may be
    left after these transitional periods.
        For example, in Egypt, we have given them billions of
    dollars, and they have purchased billions of dollars of
    military equipment and the like. They have upcoming elections
    at some point. Depending on who gets in power, they still have
    the equipment. They still are receiving aid.
        I am concerned about Israel and its safety and security. I
    am concerned about other parts of that region. What are your
    thoughts on the relationship with Israel, the transition we are
    seeing over in the Middle East?
        Mr. Panetta. We will and have to continue to maintain a
    strong relationship with Israel and that part of the world, and
    we have to reach out to other nations in that part of the world
    as well if we are going to ultimately preserve peace in that
    region.
        This is an area that is in great turmoil now. I think you
    have just commented on that. A lot of these countries are going
    through turmoil--Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen. There
    are a number of countries that are dealing with uncertainty.
        I think the United States has to, on a case-by-case basis,
    work with each of these countries to ensure that they reduce
    the violence, to ensure that they are recognizing some degree
    of universal rights, and that they are implementing economic
    and political reform. That is not going to be easy. There are
    tremendous changes going on, but we have to play a role in what
    is developing in the so-called ``Arab spring''.
        I think the President spoke to that. The fact is that if we
    don't, there are other countries in that region like Iran that
    are going to try to influence what takes place. We can't afford
    for that to happen.
        Senator Brown. Thank you, sir. Good luck.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Brown.
        Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to say aloha and welcome to Director Panetta, who is
    a dear friend and a former colleague. We have so many things
    that we can talk about, but I want to tell you, Director
    Panetta, that I am really impressed with your opening
    statement. What else can I say, as we consider a person who was
    nominated by the President to be Secretary of Defense who will
    be a tireless advocate of our military and will bring about
    support and sustain them?
        For me, this is great and that this will be in your
    thoughts and prayers and supported by your dad's principles of
    having a free country and a country that is secure and that you
    would continue to bring strong discipline and national defense
    for our country. With all of this, I want to wish you well and
    tell you that you certainly have my support.
        As we discussed, you will face significant challenges, if
    confirmed. The men and women of the Armed Forces have served
    with honor and resolve in two major conflicts that have taken a
    tremendous toll on our Armed Forces. We must do all we can to
    care for them. Fulfilling this sacred obligation is dependent
    on DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) cooperation.
        I am glad that you stated in your advance policy questions
    that you would ensure that DOD continues to work closely with
    the VA to support servicemembers and their families, and we
    talked about working on a seamless transition between DOD and
    the VA. With this, as you carry on into the position of
    Secretary, you certainly have my support.
        Director Panetta, if confirmed, what will be your top
    priorities as you look to care for men and women in uniform and
    their families?
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, obviously, my first and foremost
    priority is to protect this country, but I can't do it unless
    we have good fighting men and women who are willing to put
    their lives on the line in order to defend this country. I
    think we owe it to them as a result of that, and we certainly
    owe it to their families, to make sure that we are doing
    everything possible to meet their needs.
        I think, obviously, providing the kind of healthcare,
    providing the benefits, providing the counseling that is
    necessary, particularly for wounded warriors, making sure that
    they can transition to the VA in a seamless way, all of these
    are areas that I have to pay attention to because I have seen
    it firsthand that these kids are out there. They are, indeed,
    putting their lives on the line, and we have asked them to go
    there time and time again.
        We have to make sure that they know that they are fully
    supported in this effort. It is going to be my job, if
    confirmed as Secretary of Defense, to ensure that we are
    providing those benefits. Obviously, I want to work with people
    like yourselves that have been working at this for a long time
    to make sure that we are covering all of their needs.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you.
        I am impressed as you did tell us just about five steps of
    what you are planning to do and have social reforms. I thought
    it was unique where you want the Service Chiefs and the
    Secretaries to work together and share their concerns as well
    and that you want to work on the Pentagon management, which I
    think is so important as well. This is also important, to
    regard Congress as a partner and to work with Congress as well,
    and then to deal with the challenge of nations that are rising
    and changing, as you mentioned.
        Director Panetta, the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990
    required DOD to prepare financial statements, which were found
    ultimately unreliable. In 2010, the National Defense
    Authorization Act requires the Department to provide auditable
    financial statements by 2017. I believe in accountability, and
    I know you do, too. We owe the American people complete and
    accurate financial information from the Pentagon.
        Additionally, accurate books would allow Pentagon leaders
    to make better-informed decisions in a resource-limited
    environment. If confirmed, what will you do to ensure that the
    Department meets these requirements?
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, I was concerned in finding out that
    the Department would not be able to achieve full auditability
    until something like 2017. I understand how areas of the budget
    developed, the American people should know that, obviously,
    there is auditing that does go on within each of these areas.
    But as a department, we should be able to audit that
    department.
        If I am confirmed, one of the first things I am going to do
    is to try to see if we can't take steps to try to improve on
    that timetable so that we can say to the American taxpayer that
    what we are spending on national defense is being fully
    audited.
        Senator Akaka. Director Panetta, DOD is one of the few
    departments that has recognized the importance of developing
    and maintaining its language and cultural awareness
    capabilities. A number of steps have been taken to improve
    these skills within the Department and across the country, such
    as leading the National Language Service Corps and coordinating
    its activities with other Federal agencies.
        What are your thoughts on the importance of cultural and
    foreign language capabilities within DOD?
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, I am a big believer in language
    training and getting our people equipped with the ability not
    only to speak the language, but to understand the culture of
    the countries that we are dealing with. I say that not only
    because I think it is good for each individual to be able to
    have that capability, but I have to tell you it is important to
    our national defense to have that capability.
        At the CIA, I have developed a requirement for analysts,
    for those that are operations officers to have a language
    capability. It makes them not only a better individual, it
    makes them a better intelligence officer to have that
    capability.
        I think at DOD, I think we need to also encourage greater
    language training so that they understand not only the
    language, but the culture of the countries that they are
    involved with. Having that capability makes us much better at
    doing our job.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
        Senator Ayotte.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you so much, Director Panetta, for your leadership
    and distinguished record of service to our country.
        I wanted to ask you, the President's proposal starting in
    2013 to cut $400 billion, do you agree with that proposal, and
    is it a realistic number in terms of preserving our national
    security?
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, obviously, I agree with the
    commitment of the President to try to take action to reduce the
    deficit and the number that he suggested. I do want to say that
    there is a comprehensive review that is going on that the
    President himself stated would take place, the Secretary has
    stated would take place.
        That comprehensive review is looking at a number of issues
    related to the Defense Department in order to determine what is
    the right pace, what are the right areas, what is the right
    transition in order to achieve that savings. I look forward to
    the results of that comprehensive review.
        Senator Ayotte. As a follow-up, you have certainly
    expressed your admiration for Secretary Gates, and I share that
    admiration for his service to our country. He has made some
    recent statements expressing concerns over the $400 billion
    proposal and I think, in fact, talked about it cutting into the
    meat, in terms of the muscle of our defense. Do you disagree
    with him on that front?
        Mr. Panetta. No, no. I share his concerns. I share his
    concerns about the possibility of hollowing out our force. I
    think that would be a terrible mistake. I share his concern
    about some kind of automatic, across-the-board cuts and just
    implementing some kind of formulaic approach to cutting defense
    when we have to look at each area and determine where we are
    going to achieve savings in order to protect defense.
        Obviously, I share those concerns. But what I want to do is
    to be able to look at that comprehensive review in order to
    make sure that none of the concerns that Secretary Gates has
    raised or that I am concerned about take place in seeking those
    reductions.
        Senator Ayotte. In conducting that review, when you get
    into the position of being the Secretary of Defense, if you
    disagree that $400 billion is a reasonable number and could
    jeopardize our national security, would you express your
    opposition to the President on that?
        Mr. Panetta. If the end result of that comprehensive review
    were to come to that conclusion, then obviously, I would share
    those concerns. I don't think it will, but I think that if
    there was something that indicated that our national defense
    would be impacted, obviously, I would share that with the
    President.
        Senator Ayotte. Director, I wanted to ask you about the CIA
    and interrogations. Does the CIA currently conduct
    interrogations of high-value targets or of terrorists or those
    that are captured?
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, the way it works now is that when a
    high-value target is captured, there is a high-value detainee
    interrogation group (HIG) that comes together. That involves
    the Army, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the
    CIA working as a team. They will go and interrogate an
    individual for intelligence as a team. It works pretty well,
    but that is the way it works now.
        Senator Ayotte. But just to clarify, does the CIA actually
    do the interrogations themselves? Meaning I understand what the
    HIG does, but as I understand it, the CIA has really--while
    participating in the HIG, has not been doing interrogations. Am
    I wrong on that?
        Mr. Panetta. Generally, the CIA individual there can ask
    questions. Generally, what is done is that they will share with
    each other what questions ought to be asked by the
    interrogator. That could be the Army individual. It could be
    the FBI. But every once in a while, the CIA individual asks
    questions as well.
        Senator Ayotte. Is there anything that prohibits the CIA
    from taking the lead in conducting interrogations under current
    policy?
        Mr. Panetta. The way the team works now is that, if it is
    someone where intelligence is the primary objective here, going
    after and trying to find that out, then the CIA individual
    becomes pretty central to the questions that are asked. That is
    the way it works now.
        In other words, if there is a real emphasis on that, that
    is one case. If it is an FBI case and they are looking at
    trying to prosecute that individual, then obviously FBI takes
    the lead. If it is a military case or individual that could
    involve follow-up on the military, then they would take the
    lead.
        It really works as a team. That is probably the best way to
    say it. It is a team, and they do it on a case-by-case basis.
        Senator Ayotte. Nothing currently prohibits the CIA from
    being the lead in conducting interrogations?
        Mr. Panetta. Nothing prohibits that from happening.
        Senator Ayotte. Okay. To your knowledge, does it happen
    now? I understand it is a team. But I am just trying to
    understand whether the CIA ever takes the lead.
        Mr. Panetta. It is not the direct interrogation that used
    to take place early on in this decade, but it is much more of a
    team approach right now, and that is the way it works.
        Senator Ayotte. I wanted to follow up with respect to the
    Detainee Treatment Act. Do you agree with all the provisions of
    the Detainee Treatment Act, including the provisions that
    provide legal authority regarding interrogations?
        Mr. Panetta. Obviously, I agree with the law, yes.
        Senator Ayotte. You talked about your view on
    waterboarding. Do you think that all of the enhanced
    interrogation techniques cross the line, I think, was what you
    used when you discussed waterboarding.
        Mr. Panetta. No, I don't have the same view with regards to
    all of the other enhanced techniques that I do with regards to
    waterboarding.
        Senator Ayotte. So, right now under the President's
    Executive Order, the interrogations are limited to the Army
    Field Manual. Is that right?
        Mr. Panetta. Correct.
        Senator Ayotte. You would agree that there are some
    enhanced interrogation techniques that don't necessarily cross
    the line but wouldn't be contained within the Army Field
    Manual. Is that right?
        Mr. Panetta. The enhanced techniques that were used early
    on have now been forbidden by the President's Executive order.
    It is the Army Field Manual that is the primary guide with
    regards to interrogations.
        Senator Ayotte. But to the extent that some of those
    techniques may be permitted under the Detainee Treatment Act,
    and would you necessarily disagree with the law contained
    within the Detainee Treatment Act?
        Mr. Panetta. If it is permitted under the Army Field
    Manual, then obviously, I would support that.
        Senator Ayotte. My time is up. I appreciate your answering
    my questions.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Director Panetta, thank you for your decades of public
    service and your willingness to step forward and extend that
    public service in this new position.
        You will inherit 10 years of war, budget belt-tightening,
    and two wars winding down, if confirmed. You will be tasked
    with reshaping DOD, including resetting its combat-weary units,
    drawing down the DOD budget, and taking care of the DOD members
    and their families. To say that is a set of tall orders is an
    understatement of giant proportions.
        With respect to Afghanistan, there has been quite a bit of
    discussion about the need for benchmarks to do authentic
    assessment of where we are in the transition to the Afghanistan
    capability of defending itself so that it can govern itself
    going forward. I have been a prime supporter of benchmarks,
    first with regard to Iraq and now with respect to Afghanistan
    as well.
        I am introducing legislation today that will require
    benchmarks to evaluate progress being made toward the
    transition of security responsibility to the Government of
    Afghanistan. The bill would call for the benchmarks on
    transition to be included as a part of the already-established
    reporting requirements for Afghanistan known by I think it was
    1230 and 1231 reports to make it consistent.
        I am encouraged by your discussion and your support of this
    method of evaluating progress by some form of metrics so that
    we are not in a gray area always about whether we are winning
    or we are losing or making progress. It gives us an opportunity
    to decide what level of progress have we made, what remains to
    be accomplished for us in that regard. I am encouraged by many
    of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle talking about the
    benchmarks as well.
        Because if we intend to transfer security responsibility to
    the Afghan Government by 2014, obviously, it is important to
    mark our progress. Do you have any preliminary thoughts as to
    the kinds of things you might look at as part of benchmarking
    that would help you evaluate conditions on the ground as to
    whether or not we are making satisfactory progress to where you
    can say we are 25 percent there, 50 percent there, or we have
    50 percent yet to go?
        Mr. Panetta. I think that to establish any metrics or
    guideposts here, it is very important that General Petraeus,
    that obviously our diplomatic leaders there, the administration
    participate in trying to identify those areas that are
    important.
        Levels of violence is an important area to look at. A
    district assessment that looks at each of the districts and
    tries to determine the stability in each of those areas.
    Clearly, an evaluation of the development of the Afghan army,
    police operation, and how they are performing. That is another
    important element. Obviously, the governance responsibilities
    within Afghanistan. I mean, those are all key areas that I
    think need to be evaluated.
        Senator Nelson. In your view, and it is obviously a unique
    view as Director of the CIA, can you give us some idea of what
    you think the impact of the death of Osama bin Laden might have
    on the campaign going forward in Afghanistan and keeping it
    from a safe haven for future al Qaeda operations?
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, with regards to specific intelligence
    on that, that is probably more appropriate in another forum.
    But I think it is fair to say that the death of Osama bin
    Laden, there is no question that it impacted al Qaeda. He was
    the spiritual leader of al Qaeda, and I think it did impact on
    their capability. In addition to that, obviously, there are a
    number of operations that I think have impacted on their
    command and control capabilities as well.
        But having said that, they still remain dangerous, and they
    are dangerous with regards to the efforts they continue to work
    at in Pakistan. One of the concerns that I will share with you
    is that I think we do have to pay attention to these nodes that
    are developing where al Qaeda has moved some of its operations,
    places like Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa. Those are areas
    that I think we have to continue to focus on.
        So, yes, it has had an impact. Yes, I think it has weakened
    them. But they still remain dangerous, and we still have to go
    after them.
        Senator Nelson. I agree with you, and I appreciate that
    view.
        We have had a very touchy situation develop with respect to
    Pakistan in terms of what level of support Osama bin Laden may
    have had from anyone involved in the Pakistan Government. It is
    a complicated relationship, we understand. But the American
    people are really quite concerned about double dealing. You
    can't have a friend be your friend and your enemy at the same
    time. Your friend, but working against you.
        Do you think that the relationship with Pakistan is
    transparent enough at the present time? Is there something we
    can do so that the American public can make a better
    determination of that relationship that we share with the
    Government of Pakistan?
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, I think we have to continually work
    at that. We have to work at developing a relationship of trust
    with the Pakistanis. I don't know that we are totally there. I
    mean, there are some areas where, frankly, we have good
    discussions. We have good communications. But there are a
    number of areas where, frankly, we don't have that level of
    trust or communication capability.
        I think we have to work at that. We have to develop it
    because, as I have said, it is in the interest of both
    countries to have a trusting relationship because terrorism is
    an enemy not just for the United States. It is an enemy for
    Pakistan.
        Senator Nelson. Do you think that an internal investigation
    with some level of transparency within their government to try
    to determine responsibility for anyone who may have had
    involvement in trying to protect the presence of bin Laden in
    their country, that that will be fruitful? If it is fruitful,
    that it will be looked as credible by our Government first, but
    by the American people?
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, at this point, we don't have any
    intelligence to indicate that there was any relationship here.
    But having said that, I do believe that the Pakistanis are
    conducting several investigations at different levels to try to
    investigate what took place, and I think probably would be
    important to see what the results of those investigations are.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you. Good luck in your new position,
    which you are about to achieve.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Graham.
        Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Director, I can't thank you enough for being willing to
    do this job after being CIA Director. I just think the
    President has put together an A-plus national security team,
    and you are one of the linchpins of that. So now, some hard
    questions. [Laughter.]
        You mentioned to Senator Nelson that you think the killing
    of bin Laden has created some momentum. I couldn't agree with
    you more. What to do with that momentum?
        The statement to me that it makes, there is no place you
    can go and no passage of time that will protect you from
    justice being delivered by the American people. I think that is
    a statement that needs to be made. But we also need to make
    another statement. You can count on America.
        My general belief is that this war is more complicated than
    killing terrorists. Do you agree with that?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes.
        Senator Graham. We have to make an equal investment in
    helping those who would fight the terrorists in their own
    backyard and be our partner. Don't you agree that takes more
    time, that it is more costly and, in many ways, more deadly to
    build up partnerships than just killing an individual?
        Mr. Panetta. It absolutely does take more time.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that the payoff is
    much more enormous if we can get it right?
        Mr. Panetta. Correct.
        Senator Graham. What happens if we lose in Afghanistan?
        Mr. Panetta. I think if we lose in Afghanistan, we not only
    create another safe haven for al Qaeda and for their militant
    allies, but I think the world becomes a much more threatened
    place because of that loss, particularly in that region.
        Senator Graham. I can't agree with you more. I think that
    is absolutely dead on.
        What do I tell a family in South Carolina who has lost a
    son or daughter in Afghanistan to an improvised explosive
    device (IED) that we know was made in Pakistan, and we can't do
    a damned thing about it? What do I tell them?
        Mr. Panetta. I think that is one of those situations that
    is frustrating and angering. One where we have to say to that
    family that we are not just walking away from that
    responsibility, but we are continuing to put pressure on those
    countries that are involved with that.
        Senator Graham. I couldn't agree with you more. I don't
    think, quite frankly, we are going to be able to sustain our
    efforts in Afghanistan until we deal with the safe havens. I
    trust you and General Petraeus to deliver that message.
        But on behalf of the people of South Carolina and I think
    most members of this committee, if you are listening in
    Pakistan, you need to choose. Because it is in your interest to
    help fight the people that would undermine Afghanistan, as well
    as Pakistan.
        I am all in for winning in Afghanistan and doing what we
    need to do in Iraq. But Pakistan needs to get with the program
    one way or the other.
        Now, the Pentagon itself. Do you agree that the general
    system we have today to buy weapons is that the longer it takes
    to develop a weapon and the more it costs, the more the
    contractor makes?
        Mr. Panetta. That is right.
        Senator Graham. Isn't that kind of stupid? [Laughter.]
        Mr. Panetta. Not for the contractor.
        Senator Graham. I mean, it really is. Yes, yes, yes. I
    don't blame the contractor. I blame us.
        What if we did this? What if we said to the contractors in
    the future, you are welcome to bid on major weapon systems, but
    why don't you share 25 percent of the development cost, and at
    the end of the day, we are going to have a fixed price, not a
    cost plus. If there are any overruns, you share in the
    overruns. Do you think that is some idea to at least consider?
        Mr. Panetta. I think that is a suggestion worth looking at.
        Senator Graham. Yes, I think it is, too. I think it would
    save us a lot of money. One thing I would like you to do is go
    back in the past, and if you had a cost-sharing arrangement,
    how much money would we have saved in the last 20 years if we
    had that arrangement versus the longer it takes, the more it
    costs, the more you make? I think it is a way to save money and
    actually get weapons done quicker.
        When it comes to Iraq, if the Iraqis ask us to provide some
    troops in 2012, Secretary Gates says he thinks that would be
    smart. Do you think that would be smart to say yes?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes.
        Senator Graham. Okay. Secretary Gates, do you agree that he
    has a pretty good view of what is going on in the world?
        Mr. Panetta. He sure does.
        Senator Graham. He has served our country in an
    extraordinary manner, I think. If he says 3,000 to 5,000 makes
    sense when it comes to July withdrawal in Afghanistan, would
    you give great consideration to that number?
        Mr. Panetta. I don't want to speculate on what the number
    is. But whatever Secretary Gates recommends----
        Senator Graham. Well, that is what he said. It is not
    speculation. He said 3,000 to 5,000 would be a wise move in
    July. Would you at least consider that request?
        Mr. Panetta. I think Secretary Gates' position, General
    Petraeus' position, obviously the President's position, all of
    that ought to be considered.
        Senator Graham. Would you agree that between all of us,
    that probably Gates and Petraeus have the best view of anybody
    that I know of, if I had to pick two people to ask?
        Mr. Panetta. They have a pretty good view.
        Senator Graham. I would put you on that list, too. Okay.
    Now, when it comes to Libya. If Gaddafi stays, what does that
    mean for our national security interests after we said he must
    go?
        Mr. Panetta. I think it impacts on our national security
    interests in the world if that happens.
        Senator Graham. Do you think it kills the Arab spring?
        Mr. Panetta. I think it sends a terrible signal to these
    other countries.
        Senator Graham. Do you think it tells the Iranians that you
    really don't have to fear America when it comes to developing
    nuclear weapons?
        Mr. Panetta. I think it tells them that our word isn't
    worth very much if we are not willing to stick to it.
        Senator Graham. I couldn't agree with you more. I can't
    wait to vote for you. [Laughter.]
        Now, when it comes to detainees, if we captured someone
    tomorrow in, say, Yemen or Somalia, some of these failed
    states, high-value target, where would we put them as far as a
    jail? Do we have a jail available to our Armed Forces?
        Mr. Panetta. Probably better than anyone here, the----
        Senator Graham. Can I tell you what Admiral Mullen said
    when I asked him that question?
        Mr. Panetta. Sure.
        Senator Graham. We don't have an answer for that question.
    Would you help me come up with an answer?
        Mr. Panetta. That is probably not a bad answer.
        Senator Graham. I think it is the truth. But do you think
    that is a smart policy, to be a nation without a jail in the
    war on terror?
        Mr. Panetta. I think we have to have facilities to be able
    to provide to detainment of these individuals. That is clear.
        Senator Graham. To the committee, we don't, and we need to
    find one. I think Guantanamo Bay is a good candidate because it
    is the only one left.
        Now, in 2014, everybody is focusing on a transition in
    Afghanistan. I think, if we do this smartly, we can transition.
    But I am very interested in making sure, as you said,
    Afghanistan never becomes a failed state.
        Secretary Gates said today, and he said in February when I
    asked him this question, that he believes that joint basing
    past 2014, where you would have American air power and
    counterterrorism units left behind in Afghanistan in a joint
    environment for training and counterterrorism, if the Afghans
    request it, would be a very good policy for us. Do you
    generally agree with that?
        Mr. Panetta. I think the President has made clear that we
    have to make a long-term commitment to stability in that region
    not just now, but in the future.
        Senator Graham. Can I read you what Secretary Gates said to
    my question in February about joint basing?
        Mr. Panetta. Sure.
        Senator Graham. ``A security agreement with Afghanistan
    that provided for a continuing relationship and some kind of
    joint facilities and so on for training, for counterterrorism,
    and so on beyond 2014 I think would be very much in our
    interests.'' Do you think that is a reasoned statement?
        Mr. Panetta. I think that is worth looking at.
        Senator Graham. I do, too. Now, at the end of the day, you
    are taking over at a time when the budget for the Nation has
    never been more out of whack. We're in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
    Libya. You have a very big agenda to fulfill.
        At the end of the day, we are a war-weary Nation. What
    would you tell the American people in terms of the attitude we
    need to take as a country? Address their war weariness and tell
    them why, in your view, we should consider staying behind in
    Iraq, why we should consider a long-term relationship with
    Afghanistan. Why is it so important that we continue to stay in
    the fight after 10 years?
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, it goes back to my father's
    statement. If you want to be free, you have to be secure. The
    only way to ensure that security is to be able to establish
    some kind of peaceful solution to these challenges abroad.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Graham.
        Senator McCaskill.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I welcome you and thank you for your service and look
    forward to working and supporting you in every way possible.
        Obviously, part of our mission in counterinsurgency is to
    secure and stabilize and enhance the infrastructure, and I want
    to certainly commend to you and ask you to direct the folks
    that work with you to pay attention to some of the findings of
    the Commission on Wartime Contracting. They issued a report
    last Friday, and I think it is full of very basic common-sense
    information that seems to be escaping us in the area of
    contracting and contingency operations.
        That is two important factors. One on the front end is
    security, whether or not the security is available and
    appropriate in order to support the building of projects that
    we put a lot of money in. We saw this in Iraq over and over
    again, where we would build a power plant, we would work on an
    oil refinery, and then 2 months later it would be blown up. So,
    I think that security piece and, obviously, the cost of the
    security piece in order to build the projects needs to be taken
    into account.
        But the second one, and this report they came out with
    Friday is a really important report, Director, and that is
    sustainability. We have white elephants all over this part of
    the world, all brought to you courtesy of the American
    taxpayer. I will read you just one quote from this report. ``A
    project may be carefully planned, well executed, and
    economical, but become wasteful if the host nation cannot
    provide trained staff, afford parts or fuel, perform necessary
    maintenance, or produce intended outcomes.''
        We have one of these white elephants we spent $300 million
    on in Kabul, a power plant that was designed to be dual fuel,
    and Afghanistan made a commitment to us that they would fuel
    it. Now they say they can't afford the fuel. The fact that it
    is a dual fuel makes it complicated in terms of the technology.
    So, basically, it is now only being used as a backup, and
    Afghanistan is buying electricity from another country.
        This is a great example, but it can be replicated over and
    over again. I really think it is time--and I understand the
    mentality. I respect greatly General Petraeus and his
    strategies in terms of counterinsurgency, but what happens is
    there is this almost myopic focus. If we can build this
    project, we will put people to work. This is good. This is what
    counterinsurgency is all about.
        They don't think about what is it going to look like in 3
    or 4 years. Especially in Afghanistan, you and I discussed the
    sustainability questions in Afghanistan are particularly acute.
    This is not a nation that is ready to take over many things,
    including some of these projects that we are building.
        I really think that if we don't begin analyzing
    sustainability at the front end--and I am going to make a
    formal request to you that every project that is being built
    right now--whether it is a road, whether it is a healthcare
    center, whether it is a school--every project be analyzed right
    now for sustainability.
        If it is obvious it is not going to be sustained, I really
    believe you have to pull the plug. I mean, this is hundreds and
    tens upon billions of dollars have just gone down a rat hole
    because we didn't think about what happens when we are finished
    building it. I think it is really important.
        This is the hardest question, and you and I talked about
    this. What are the conversations that are ongoing and what is
    the planning that is ongoing about how Afghanistan, with their
    very meager gross national product (GNP), very meager GNP, how
    in the world do they afford what we are building them, both in
    the projects and, more importantly, this army that we are
    building for them?
        It is very difficult for me to figure out what happens to
    this army when we leave because they can't afford it.
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, first of all, on your first point, I
    want you to know that if I am confirmed, I really do want to
    work with you closely with regards to the contracting issue in
    order to ensure sustainability. I share all of your concerns. I
    know why it has happened. I know how that has developed. But at
    the same time, I don't think we have paid enough attention to
    that issue, and I would like to work with you in trying to
    improve that whole aspect.
        With regards to the issue of Afghanistan, again, I share
    your concern about where are they going to draw the resources
    they need not only to sustain the army and the police force,
    but to be a country, to be able to carry on their
    responsibilities. I think that is going to be part of the
    governance challenge that we are going to face there is to
    ensure that, as a nation, they begin to develop the resources,
    develop the revenues that they need in order to be able to
    govern that country. That is going to be part of it. Otherwise,
    it is not going to work.
        Senator McCaskill. Is there a plan in place for short term
    and long term? Is there some kind of plan that is in the works
    that we will be putting I think it is $13 billion this year?
    What is the plan for 4, 5 years from now? Is there a plan that
    we will continue to spend upwards of $5 billion or $6 billion a
    year just keeping this army?
        We are building them an army with a size and scope that is
    beyond--they have never had an army, a national army in
    Afghanistan. So this is new, and is there planning going on,
    joint planning or anything else that would indicate how this is
    going to look 2, 3, 4 years down the line in terms of what we
    have built?
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, I have not been fully briefed on what
    directly is being looked at in terms of that longer term. But
    let me get into that. If I am confirmed, I would like to look
    at that and then be able to give you a better answer.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The administration is working to ensure a successful transition to
    the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) having the lead
    responsibility for security throughout Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
        We are making steady progress in developing the quantity, quality,
    and operational capacity of the ANSF. We remain on track to reach the
    envisioned end strength of 195,000 Afghan National Army soldiers and
    157,000 Afghan National Police personnel. Our effort now include the
    development of logistical, engineering, communications, medical, and
    other enabling capabilities that the ANSF will need to support their
    own operations, as well as organic training and education capabilities
    they will need to sustain themselves by developing their future
    recruits. Our efforts also include the development of ministerial-level
    management and oversight capabilities necessary to lead and sustain the
    ANSF.
        Detailed planning for long-term ANSF sustainment is an ongoing,
    active effort. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan is
    collaborating with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
    Staff, and NATO to analyze the long-term requirements for ANSF
    capability in light of current fiscal constraints. We envision a
    continuing role for the United States and expect continued
    contributions from international donors. To that end, before retiring,
    then-Secretary of Defense Gates challenged our partners in the
    International Security Assistance Force to contribute a combined 1
    billion euros annually to the NATO Afghan National Army Trust Fund.
        Although international support for the ANSF will likely be required
    for some time to come, ultimately, Afghanistan must continue to
    increase its funding for its own security. This will depend on
    continued economic growth and governance in Afghanistan, which, in
    turn, will benefit from the security that a properly sustained ANSF can
    provide, as well as from the stabilizing effects that can result from a
    strategic partnership between Afghanistan and the United States and the
    continued presence of U.S. forces.
        As our plans evolve, we will engage you and congressional
    colleagues on the details of this challenging effort.

        Senator McCaskill. That is great. The only other topic is
    warning you that I will subject you to pop quizzes on the
    Wartime Contracting Commission's work. They have done some
    really good work. My colleague Senator Webb and I have worked
    very hard getting it established, and I think it is like many
    other commissions. Unfortunately, it is not getting enough
    attention, and really, where it needs to be front and center is
    going to be under your purview.
        I am hoping that you will make sure that your immediate
    staff is aware of its work and takes it to heart. Because we
    have an awful lot of lessons learned that we have never
    learned. I think it is really important, as we try to do things
    with less money.
        The only other issue I want to bring up with you today that
    I don't think has been discussed yet is just getting your
    commitment and your comments about what needs to be done and
    should be done as it relates to the problem of sexual assault
    within the military, women in the military that have had a
    great deal of difficulty accessing some sense of justice.
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, we talked about that together in your
    office, and I totally share your concerns. We have to have zero
    tolerance for any kind of sexual assaults in the military, and
    we have to allow the victims of those sexual assaults the
    ability to be able to complain, to have those complaints
    listened to, and to have the evidence that is necessary to be
    able to establish those cases.
        There are a lot of steps that need to be taken, and I look
    forward to working with you and with others in the Department
    to make sure that we protect women, who have served so well in
    the military these days.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you so much for your time here
    today. Most of all, thank you for loving your country so much
    that you are willing to take on this incredibly big, huge, and
    important responsibility.
        Mr. Panetta. Thank you.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
        Senator Cornyn.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Director Panetta, good to see you.
        Mr. Panetta. Nice to see you.
        Senator Cornyn. As you and I discussed in my office, and
    thank you for coming by recently to talk about some of my
    concerns with the financial management problems at DOD, I think
    most Americans would find it shocking that DOD is unable to
    produce timely, accurate, and complete information to support
    management decisions.
        As we also discussed, the law of the land requires DOD to
    be able to complete a clean audit by 2017. Again, I think that
    would be shocking to most people.
        But I appreciate your response on page 74 of your advance
    policy questions, the answers you submitted to our questions
    that you said achieving clean audit opinions would be one of
    your top management improvement priorities. Certainly, you have
    the background and experience to move the Department in that
    direction and to complete that requirement of the law.
        I am advised that the Marine Corps actually is doing a
    relatively good, compared to the other Services, job in this
    area, and they are experiencing a 3-to-1 return, on for every
    dollar they spend on improving financial management, actually
    getting a good return on that investment. I know that it may be
    the attitude, there may be strong institutional resistance at
    DOD--believe me, as many do and as I do--that their main job is
    to fight and win the Nation's wars, but that this is not a
    priority.
        But you know and I know, we all know, the budgetary
    pressures the Department and others are going to be under as we
    deal with this unsustainable debt and these huge deficits is
    important. I think this is important to me and I know important
    to you to make financial management reform one of your
    important priorities.
        Having said that, I would just ask you the straight-up
    question, do you agree with Secretary Gates when he said that
    the defense budget, however large it may be, is not the cause
    of the country's fiscal woes?
        Mr. Panetta. I agree with that. I think it isn't. It is by
    no means the cause of the deficits, the huge deficits that we
    are incurring today.
        Senator Cornyn. The President has requested $671 billion
    for fiscal year 2012. That is a lot of money, $671 billion. I
    know that there is going to be room for the Department to share
    in some of the budget cuts that are going to be on the table.
        But of course, as you and I have discussed, I hope that
    this is not seen as an opportunity for those who want to whack
    the Pentagon budget to do so in a way that will impair our
    ability to defend ourselves or protect our national security
    interests. I am sure you share that view as well, don't you?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes, I do.
        Senator Cornyn. Let me just ask a question, you have the
    benefit of great experience and long experience with
    Government. But that also means you have a record that I want
    to ask you about. Of course, you were President Clinton's Chief
    of Staff and Director of OMB before that. You played a big role
    in the budget decisionmaking during the presidency of President
    Clinton, overseeing a major reduction in DOD procurement
    spending, including a 13.4 percent decline in fiscal year 1994.
        Some have called that a procurement holiday. Others have
    said we were cashing the peace dividend, even though we still
    had many threats to our country. I want to give you an
    opportunity, if you would, to explain your role in those cuts
    and whether you think they were deeper than they should have
    been or just please give us your perspective. Because, frankly,
    I hope we don't try to cash a peace dividend in 2012 while we
    are engaged in two and a half wars.
        Mr. Panetta. As Director of OMB, obviously, I was given the
    responsibility by the President to try to achieve significant
    savings as part of the economic plan that was adopted by
    Congress that, by the way, reduced the deficit by almost $500
    billion. I think that, plus other agreements that were made in
    the Bush administration and, ultimately, with the Republican
    Congress all contributed to our ability to achieve a balanced
    budget.
        Specifically, with regards to the defense area, my
    responsibility as OMB Director was to provide a number to the
    Defense Secretary and allow the Defense Secretary and those at
    the Defense Department to determine how best to try to achieve
    those savings. I do understand that was part of what they
    proposed.
        But looking at it in hindsight, it might not have been the
    best way to achieve those savings, but it was a decision that
    was made at the Defense Department.
        Senator Cornyn. Turning to Afghanistan, I know there is a
    lot of comment and favorable comment about your involvement,
    and I think you deserve credit for your part played in taking
    down Osama bin Laden. Congratulations to you and the
    President's national security team for that accomplishment.
        But I get the sense that people are sort of prematurely
    declaring that the fight is over because we have degraded al
    Qaeda in Afghanistan. I am glad to hear you point out that they
    have metastasized to other parts of North Africa and the
    region.
        But I just want to ask you in particular, I know there are
    other groups that may not be as familiar to Americans as al
    Qaeda, like Lashkar-e-Taiba and other groups. Could you just
    talk a little bit about the Islamic jihadist groups that are
    out there that could easily morph into a threat as dangerous as
    al Qaeda?
        Mr. Panetta. There are a number of terrorist groups that
    are out there, Senator. Obviously, al Qaeda is the one that we
    are principally concerned about because they attacked this
    country, and they continue to plan to attack this country.
        But there are interrelationships that they have with other
    terrorist groups. The Haqqanis, for example, are a group that
    has relations with al Qaeda. They, in turn, obviously are
    conducting attacks in Afghanistan. There is a group called
    Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, which is another group in the FATA
    that has relationships with al Qaeda that conduct attacks, not
    only plan attacks against us, but also have conducted attacks
    within Pakistan as well.
        There is Lashkar-e-Taiba which is a terrorist group that
    focuses on attacks largely in India but have been known to
    discuss attacks elsewhere as well.
        If you move to the area of Yemen, there, al Awlaki who is
    associated with al Qaeda, but nevertheless I think represents a
    real threat on his own because he is very computer oriented
    and, as a result of that, really does represent the potential
    to try to urge others, particularly in this country, to conduct
    attacks here. So that is a concern.
        We have Somalia, where al Shabaab operates in Somalia.
    Although it is primarily located in Somalia, we do have
    intelligence that indicates that they, too, are looking at
    targets beyond Somalia. Then if you add to that Hezbollah and
    Hamas, you can see that you have a pretty good array of
    terrorist groups to confront.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much. My time is up. But I
    think it is important that the American people understand the
    threat to our country, our national interests, our interests of
    our allies and American citizens extends beyond solely al
    Qaeda. I appreciate your answer.
        Thank you. I look forward to working with you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
        Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this
    hearing.
        Thank you so much, Mr. Panetta, for your extraordinary
    public service to our country. I am extremely grateful.
        I want to touch upon three issues, if we have time. I want
    to explore a little more on Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Arabian
    Peninsula (AQAP), and then go to a little bit of cyber warfare.
        Chairman Mullen stated a few months ago that it is fairly
    well known that elements of the Inter-Services Intelligence had
    a longstanding relationship with the Haqqani network.
    Obviously, addressing the Haqqani network is really important
    to reaching our goals in Afghanistan.
        Yet a week ago, he reported that Pakistan has agreed to go
    after the terrorist group. How will you judge the seriousness
    of Pakistan's commitment to that effort?
        Mr. Panetta. I think there is probably a simple test, which
    is whether or not the Haqqanis are continuing to go into
    Afghanistan and attacking our forces. It seems to me that if
    they have an influence over the Haqqanis, that they could urge
    them to cease fire and to stop those kinds of attacks.
        Senator Gillibrand. I appreciated your testimony earlier
    about the nature of al Qaeda, that it has fundamentally
    metastasized, and in fact, many believe that al Qaeda in the
    Arabian Peninsula is perhaps far more dangerous than any other
    aspect of al Qaeda today.
        You also mentioned that al Qaeda works in a very diffuse
    way, that oftentimes, it is inspiring groups like al-Shabaab in
    Africa and AQAP in Yemen. Of the three terrorist attempts on
    our homeland since September 11, the one on New York came out
    of Pakistan, the Christmas Day attempt on Chicago from Yemen,
    and the Fort Hood massacre motivated out of Yemen. Al Awlaki
    recruits online, including from Europe and the United States,
    and we need to focus on a smart strategy to address these
    threats.
        I support your view that we have to take these threats
    head-on and we have to make them very much part of our mission.
    I want to understand why in Yemen our approach is so different
    than that of Afghanistan. Perhaps not in this setting, but to
    talk a little bit about what some of your long-term strategies
    are to deal with the fact that al Qaeda has changed so much.
        Mr. Panetta. With regard to specific operations, I would
    have to do that in another forum. But just generally, I think
    our approach has been that because of these nodes that have
    developed, our approach has been to develop operations in each
    of these areas that will contain al Qaeda and go after them so
    that they have no place to escape.
        So that we are doing that in Yemen. It is obviously a
    dangerous and uncertain situation, but we continue to work with
    elements there to try to develop counterterrorism. We are
    working with Joint Special Operations Command as well in their
    operations. Same thing is true for Somalia and with regards to
    al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in North Africa, we are working
    with both the Spanish and the French to develop approaches
    there that will contain them as well.
        I think we have at the CIA tried to develop a more
    comprehensive strategy to kind of look at all of those nodes,
    look at all of those threats, and not just focus on the FATA or
    Pakistan, but focus on all of those threats in order to try to
    deal with it.
        Senator Gillibrand. Right. Now, obviously, Yemen is under
    substantial turmoil, and we don't know whether the government
    survives or not. Do we have strategies in place to make sure
    that if there is a transition that we are very knowledgeable
    about what military assets are there, what will happen to them?
    Have you engaged the Saudis or any other potential allies in
    what we can do there to protect against future growth of
    terrorism?
        Mr. Panetta. Again, with regards to specific operations, I
    really have to discuss that in another forum. But it is a very
    uncertain situation. It has been destabilized, and yet we are
    continuing to work with those individuals in their government
    to try to go after AQAP, and we are continuing to receive
    cooperation from them.
        At this point in time, I would have to say that while,
    obviously, it is a scary and an uncertain situation, with
    regards to counterterrorism, we are still very much continuing
    our operations.
        Senator Gillibrand. Last, if I still have time, Mr.
    Chairman, I appreciated the testimony you gave earlier, Senator
    Reed asked about it and others, about cyber terrorism, cyber
    crime, cyber attacks, and cyber warfare. I appreciated the fact
    that the statement was made that a cyber attack could well be a
    declaration of war, and you and I had a chance to talk about
    this in some respects.
        Can you share with us any of your vision, design, goals
    with regard to how we create a greater platform for
    cybersecurity and cyber defense? In particular, I have worked
    with Senator Hatch on creating some international protocols to
    create alliances and working relationships with both allies and
    nonallies on how to begin to have an ability to enforce laws
    against cyber attacks, cyber criminals, cyber terrorists, and
    any other form of cyber mischief. I would love your thoughts on
    what you can share with us.
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, as we discussed in your office, this
    is an area of great concern for me because I think what I have
    witnessed at the CIA and elsewhere is that we are now the
    target of increasing attacks that go after our systems, and it
    is extremely important for us to do everything we can to
    confront that threat.
        Obviously, I have a great resource with the NSA that has
    tremendous expertise and tremendous knowledge in this area.
    What I would like to do is to develop an even more effective
    force to be able to confront cyber terrorism, and I would like
    to work with you on the effort to try to develop those kinds of
    relationship not only here, but abroad, so that other countries
    can work with us in this effort.
        We talk about nuclear. We talk about conventional warfare.
    We don't spend enough time talking about the threat of cyber
    war.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        Last, I just want to thank you for your testimony today
    about your priority to look out for the men and women serving
    in our armed services and their families. I think not only must
    that be one of your primary responsibilities, but I appreciate
    that it is in the forefront of your mind.
        My time has expired. I will just leave you with I hope you
    continue that focus and particularly focus on the issue of
    housing. Because a lot of troops are coming back from various
    missions, and Fort Drum and other places around the United
    States really have inadequate housing supply. I hope that you
    can address that in a perhaps more aggressive and more nuanced
    way.
        Thank you so much, very much for your testimony.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Director, you certainly deserve the widespread accolades
    and expressions of gratitude that you are receiving from
    virtually every member of this committee today, and I want to
    add my own thanks for your willingness to continue to serve our
    country during such a difficult time.
        But like my colleagues Senator Graham and Senator Brown,
    now the hard questions start. I want to start with Libya.
        You have repeated today the administration's goal that
    Colonel Gaddafi must go. But what then? If there is any painful
    lesson that we have learned from our experience in Iraq, it is
    that if we do not have a plan in place after we have deposed a
    tyrant, that chaos and violence ensues.
        Do you have confidence that we have a plan for dealing with
    Libya post Gaddafi, and do we even really know who we are
    dealing with in the opposition?
        Mr. Panetta. I know that Secretary Clinton is spending a
    great deal of her time working with our allies to respond to
    that concern, to try to work with those in the opposition who
    have come together in the consuls that they have developed
    there, to try to work with them in terms of greater support so
    that if they do, in fact, have to take control of the country,
    that they will have that capability.
        What you have raised is a legitimate concern, and it is an
    area that we have a lot more work to do in order to ensure that
    if Gaddafi does step down that we can ensure that Libya will be
    a stable country.
        Senator Collins. It really concerns me, particularly when
    you look at the leadership of al Qaeda and the Libyan presence
    there, if you look at the number of foreign fighters in Iraq
    that have come from Libya. I just don't feel any confidence
    that we know what comes next.
        Mr. Panetta. The opposition, obviously, has been made up of
    various tribal groups that have come together, and there are
    concerns about some of the other influences that are now trying
    to impact on the opposition. It is something that we are
    watching very closely, but I do think that if we can get
    Gaddafi to step down that I am confident that there are enough
    leaders in the opposition who can provide, hopefully, that
    continuity.
        Senator Collins. Let me next turn to Afghanistan. No one
    wants to lose Afghanistan, and all of us are so mindful of the
    enormous sacrifices that our military men and women have made
    in Afghanistan and the enormous amount of taxpayer dollars that
    have been spent.
        Senator Brown asked you a key question today about what is
    our mission? You talked about the goal of having Afghanistan be
    a stable state, and that certainly is something that I want
    also. But to me, that seems to be a never-ending mission. I
    don't see how we get to a stable state in Afghanistan.
        Let me give you an example. A key to our transition in
    Afghanistan, the key to our troops being able to come home is
    the development of a competent, aggressive Afghan security
    force, and we have made a lot of progress in that area.
        But I look at the cost of maintaining the Afghan security
    force. In this year's presidential budget request, it is $12.8
    billion. The total Afghanistan gross domestic product (GDP) is
    about $30 billion, and 97 percent of Afghanistan's GDP is
    derived from spending related to international military and
    donor community presence.
        When I look at that imbalance, I don't see how Afghanistan
    is ever going to be able to even afford its own security
    forces. That says to me that we are going to have to continue
    to be a major contributor to paying for those security forces
    forever, virtually. Tell me how this ends. I just don't see how
    it ends.
        Mr. Panetta. I understand the concerns that you have
    raised, Senator, and I think we all share those concerns. I
    guess I can only say, having served on the Iraq Study Group,
    there was a moment in time when I had a lot of the same
    concerns about Iraq and whether or not Iraq would ever be
    stable enough to be able to draw down our forces there.
        While Afghanistan is a very different country and has a
    very different history, the fact is that over the last few
    years, I have seen progress made with regards to governance in
    some of the key areas, with regards to security, with regards
    to the role of the Afghans in participating with our forces to
    try to secure area. They have gotten better.
        Whether or not, in the end they are going to be able to
    develop the resources, develop the revenues, develop the
    governance that needs to be done, those are major questions.
    But I think if we stick with it, if we continue to provide help
    and assistance to them, that I think there is going to be a
    point where Afghanistan can control its own future. We have to
    operate on that hope.
        Senator Collins. Finally, let me echo the concerns that my
    colleagues have raised about whether the budget constraints,
    which are very real, are going to drive our military
    requirements rather than vice versa. This is an issue we
    discussed in my office.
        This year, when the independent panel looked at the
    Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), it concluded that the QDR had
    been molded by the budget rather than being what it is supposed
    to be, which is an unvarnished assessment of what our military
    requirements are. I am particularly concerned about the gap
    when I look at the Navy's shipbuilding budget. The Chief of
    Naval Operations has testified before our committee that we
    need, at a minimum, a 313-ship Navy, and we know the 313-ship
    goal is much smaller than the actual requirement that our
    combatant commanders have for ships.
        Indeed, there was a recent report just 2 months ago from
    the Navy on the ballistic missile defense (BMD) force structure
    requirements that states that the Navy currently does not have
    the capacity to meet the demands of our combatant commanders
    for BMD capable ships. I am very worried about that gap in this
    time of budget constraints. I am worried that the Navy has yet
    to complete the contracts on the DDG-1000, the second and third
    ships.
        What actions do you think need to be taken to help close
    the gap between the 285-ship Navy today and the, at a minimum,
    313-ship requirement?
        Mr. Panetta. I strongly believe that the Navy has to
    project our force throughout the world and that the Navy is
    obviously crucial to that mission. I agree with the ship
    numbers that have to be developed for the Navy in order to be
    able to do that.
        I think the key here is going to be something that has
    happened in your own State, which is that shipbuilding
    operations have to develop greater efficiencies. Yours is a
    great example of having developed those kinds of efficiencies
    that helps us on the cost control side and at the same time
    allows us to continue our shipbuilding capability.
        I do think that greater competition, greater presence of an
    industrial base here that deals with these issues will provide
    the kind of cost savings that we will need in order to fulfill
    that mission.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, and I look forward to working
    with you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, I don't know if you are going to take
    a break. But I just----
        Chairman Levin. Yes. I think it sounds to me like we are
    going to take a break. [Laughter.]
        But this will not be a lunch break. This will just be a
    very brief 5-minute break, and Senator Blumenthal will be next.
    Just take a very quick break and then back here. We will finish
    the questions, and then we will have a lunch break.
        Mr. Panetta. Thank you. [Recess.]
        Chairman Levin. Senator Blumenthal?
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Panetta, thank you for answering all our questions, for
    your extraordinary service, and for your very powerful and
    eloquent testimony today and your very responsive answers to
    all of the issues that have been raised.
        I want to second the sentiment that has been expressed by
    Senator Graham, which is I can't wait to vote for your
    confirmation, and I appreciate your willingness and patriotism
    to take on this very tough assignment. Also to second Senator
    Graham's views, and I think they are widely shared, that we
    need fundamental and far-reaching reform in our methods of
    acquiring and terminating weapons programs.
        Would you agree with that?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes, I do.
        Chairman Levin. I think, Senator Blumenthal, that probably
    Director Panetta would also agree that Secretary Gates can't
    wait for us to vote for Director Panetta's confirmation.
    [Laughter.]
        Mr. Panetta. I think that is fair to say.
        Chairman Levin. That will not be taken out of your time, by
    the way.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Speaking of Secretary Gates, I hope and assume you would
    agree with him that the second engine for the F-35 is
    unnecessary and should be terminated?
        Mr. Panetta. I support that position.
        Senator Blumenthal. Also that we need to continue the sub
    building program at the rate of two per year, which I think is
    fairly noncontroversial?
        Mr. Panetta. That is correct.
        Senator Blumenthal. Would you also agree with Admiral
    Mullen that talking about a secure and thereby free America,
    that the greatest threat to our security today is the national
    deficit?
        Mr. Panetta. There is no question in my mind that the size
    of the deficit we are confronting represents a threat to our
    security.
        Senator Blumenthal. That we need to address that problem
    without excessive cost cutting in the defense budget?
        Mr. Panetta. Obviously, defense needs to play a role. But
    when you are facing that size deficit, everything has to play a
    role.
        Senator Blumenthal. I want to talk for a moment about one
    of the causes of those costs in both our defense budget and our
    veterans programs, and they are a cause of cost that is not
    necessarily in the headlines or even reported, and those costs
    have to do with tobacco use and tobacco addiction and the costs
    of tobacco-related diseases.
        I know that the Defense Department is very much aware of
    these costs because, as a matter of fact, it asked all military
    personnel last year to make their 2011 New Year's resolution to
    quit smoking. In fact, about $1.6 billion a year in DOD costs
    are related to medical care that is provided for tobacco-
    related diseases. Among the retirees from our military for
    veterans, about 80 percent of the $5 billion in annual costs of
    treating pulmonary disease are directly attributable to
    smoking.
        The costs of smoking simply in dollar terms, medical
    treatment, are at least $5 billion a year, not to mention the
    impacts on readiness, which are, in effect, less fit, less
    physically able military personnel, more likely to sustain
    injuries, more likely to be stressed out, more likely to be
    dependent and addicted to nicotine. The stark fact is that
    military personnel are 50 percent more likely to smoke and more
    likely to use tobacco products than their civilian peers.
        My question to you is both an immediate and a longer-range
    one. First, whether you have any suggestions as to what can be
    done immediately? Second, would you be willing to commit the
    resources and interests of DOD to addressing the problems of
    nicotine addiction and tobacco use and the related medical
    impacts?
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, if I am confirmed, one of the areas I
    have to focus on is the health costs that are impacting here. I
    think the area that you have just defined is one area that we
    do have to pay attention to in terms of its implications on
    health and its implications on cost. I would look forward to
    working with you to try to develop an approach that would allow
    us to, again, not only deal with smoking, but deal with other
    threats to healthcare that impact on not only our soldiers but,
    frankly, that impact on Americans.
        Senator Blumenthal. On the families of our soldiers and our
    veterans?
        Mr. Panetta. That is right.
        Senator Blumenthal. Because of not only the immediate
    effects of smoking or other kinds of health problems, but also
    the related impacts on families.
        Mr. Panetta. No, that is right. I think smoking, good
    nutrition, good exercise. I mean, there are a number of areas
    that I think need to be focused on as part of the solution to
    dealing with healthcare costs.
        Senator Blumenthal. I would welcome the opportunity to work
    with you on those issues.
        Mr. Panetta. Thank you.
        Senator Blumenthal. Let me say while we are talking about
    veterans, I have offered a measure, a number of other Senators
    have, to broaden and deepen the commitment of our country to
    caring for issues relating to employment, homelessness,
    healthcare of our veterans and would hope that DOD would also
    increase its commitment in that area and hope under your
    leadership, it would, given your very moving and powerful
    remarks about the need to take better care of our military
    personnel.
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, I really do feel an obligation to
    those that served, and I don't treat this like a situation
    where once you have completed your service and you become a
    veteran that somehow you are somebody else's responsibility. I
    think we have an obligation to make sure that people are
    treated right once they have served this country not only now,
    but in the future.
        Senator Blumenthal. Finally, because my time is close to
    expiring, let me ask you one last question. The ammonium
    nitrate fertilizers that are the cause of probably the vast
    majority of the IED very tragic and unfortunate injuries to our
    troops are transported from Pakistan, and I wonder what can be
    done to stop that flow of fertilizer, the ammonium nitrate
    substances that are the basis for those explosive devices?
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, that is a continuing concern for us,
    and it is not so much the transfer of the material, but it is
    actually the development of IEDs, the explosives themselves,
    that we see taking place in Pakistan that make their way into
    Afghanistan. We have to take a number of steps not only with
    the Pakistanis, but also trying to check at the border to make
    sure that we do everything possible to stop that flow of IEDs.
    It is a very real threat, and a lot of that is coming across
    the border.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much, and I look forward
    to working with you. Thank you once again for your service to
    our Nation.
        Mr. Panetta. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Portman.
        Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        It is a pleasure to have you before the committee. As I
    told you, Mr. Panetta, when we had the opportunity to speak, I
    am delighted to see that a former OMB Director could actually
    make something of himself. You have done a great job as CIA
    Director, and I know that you have had the opportunity today to
    answer some tough questions, but also I am sure that the tone
    has been appreciative and respectful.
        I am most concerned on the budget front and particularly
    with regard to our major acquisitions programs. The cost
    growth, the time delays have been particularly troubling to me.
    On this committee over the 4 or 5 months, we have heard lots of
    testimony, and this is at the same time, of course, that we are
    talking about not just restraining spending but actually
    putting everything on the table to deal with our historic
    deficits and the debt overhang that is affecting our economy so
    directly and affecting our future.
        This concerns me greatly. It also, I think, impacts our
    national security because our men and women in uniform need the
    best equipment and they need it in a timely manner, and they
    are not getting it.
        A couple of data points, and you know them well. Cost
    overruns annually now are, in some years, over $300 billion a
    year. This is, as compared to just a decade ago, when annual
    overruns were on average about $40 billion year. The average
    delays almost 2 years in delivering initial capabilities for
    these programs.
        The reasons are varied. Sometimes it is internal DOD
    processes, I think. Sometimes it is these contracting processes
    that still aren't working, and these practices have been
    subject to a lot of GAO reports, directives, and public and
    private studies. There has been some good work done on it, and
    the chairman has done some good work on it, but we still have a
    long way to go.
        This would be one of my major concerns. Given your
    background and experience, I think you are well qualified to
    address it. I would like to hear a little about that.
        Senator Graham apparently talked earlier today about cost-
    sharing arrangements and the potential for that. I think that
    is an interesting idea. On the Joint Strike Fighter program
    alone, we heard testimony before the committee that we are 80
    percent over cost from the original estimates. That is over
    $150 billion and 30 percent more than the current baseline that
    was just set in 2007.
        After 15 years of development and 2 years into operational
    production, we still don't have a stable design. Again, I think
    that impacts our warfighters as well. I realize the Defense
    Department is working on implementing the Systems Acquisition
    Reform Act, and the better buying power initiative is ongoing.
    But, frankly, there is a lot more that needs to be done.
        Could you talk a little about this and particularly the
    benefits of competition, as we talked about privately, and
    finding efficiencies?
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, because we share a common background,
    I think we understand the costs that are involved in this area.
    I think we are dealing with a culture that has developed that
    somehow we have to change. I know during the period from
    September 11 there has been an awful lot of money that has been
    put into the defense budget, a lot of equipment that has been
    developed during that period. I think at the same time, a lot
    of it has certainly been worthwhile, been important to our
    national defense. But a lot of bad habits have developed during
    that period.
        I think there is an assumption that somehow this thing can
    play out and that the cost can increase as dramatically as you
    have pointed out in some of these areas and that somehow
    somebody is still going to pay the bill. I think what we have
    to do is to make clear that those who are involved--and they
    are great companies; they are good people; a lot of them do a
    great job--that they have a responsibility here to be able to
    work with us to develop better competition, to do some of the
    things that Senator Graham mentioned in terms of absorbing some
    of the costs of development.
        The work that they are doing is not just money in their
    pocket. What they are working on is important to the national
    security of this country, and I think what we have to do is
    work with them, work with contractors, work with others to try
    to develop approaches that can try to shape the costs that are
    involved and the delays that are involved here.
        I know this is tough. I know that some of this military
    technology is extremely intricate. It involves a lot of
    complicated work. But I am absolutely convinced that there has
    to be a way to achieve greater cost savings, and I hope to work
    with you and others to try to see what we can do to do that.
        Senator Portman. I am encouraged from our conversations and
    this testimony today that you are prioritizing that.
    Ultimately, if we don't fix it, we will be robbing from some of
    the fundamental responsibilities you would have as Secretary of
    Defense to protect our country. Because looking at some of
    these projections over the next decade or 2 decades, if we
    don't begin to figure out how to deal with these overruns on
    the acquisition programs, they will quickly take the entire
    current defense budget.
        We need to be sure that our men and women in uniform are
    getting what they need and be sure that this and the healthcare
    issue, which I know you have also addressed here today, is the
    other one where I think you look at the huge cost increases
    there, has to be handled in a way that, again, ensures that the
    focus is on our national security concerns.
        Quickly, on trade agreements, as you are aware, we are
    hoping soon to be reviewing proposed export opening agreements
    with the Republic of Korea, with Panama, and with Colombia.
    This has been increasingly clear in the post Cold War
    environment, all elements of our national power must be used to
    provide for our security and build effective allies, and these
    three countries are great allies.
        In response to prepared questions, you noted that the U.S.-
    Republic of Korea alliance remains one of the cornerstones of
    U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific. I found that interesting,
    and you have pledged to stay in close contact with your
    counterparts there and build on the relationships laid by
    Secretary Gates.
        You also noted the importance of the Government efforts to
    support DOD activities providing training, equipment, and so on
    to our Central American partners, including Panama, given the
    importance of the canal particularly and the U.S. Southern
    Command's (SOUTHCOM) work there.
        Also with regard to Colombia, in testimony earlier this
    year, the commander of SOUTHCOM described our trade agreement
    with Colombia as ``a very positive, beneficial aspect for our
    cooperation because of a growing capacity to support the
    capabilities of Armed Forces and law enforcement.''
        My question would be to you, how do you assess the value
    from a security standpoint of building upon these commercial
    ties through these trade opening agreements with these allies,
    and do you agree that these enhanced trade and investment
    agreements is one way to combat the threats that these states
    face to their security and to the broader region?
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, I think that when it comes to
    protecting our security, there are a number of areas that have
    to be addressed, and one of those, obviously, it is not just
    the military responsibility, but there is an economic side of
    this that plays a very important role in terms of promoting
    better security.
        The ability of these other countries to develop trade with
    us, to develop their economies creates greater stability within
    those countries. I think that is a fact. To the extent that we
    can help promote that kind of trade, that we can promote that
    kind of economic development, I think it assists these nations
    in their ability to achieve stability.
        Colombia is a good example. They have done a great job
    going after narco-trafficking. If we can help, be able to help
    them develop their economy, that could become another added
    factor in providing greater security in that region. The same
    thing is obviously true for Korea.
        Senator Portman. Do you think ratification of these three
    agreements would be positive for our national security
    interests?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes, I would.
        Senator Portman. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Portman.
        Senator Webb.
        Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Director Panetta, again, I appreciate your having come by
    my office to have detailed conversations on a number of areas.
    Having had the honor and the privilege of meeting with Caspar
    Weinberger, when he was Secretary of Defense, on a daily basis
    for 4 years, I am well aware of the challenge of your job. I
    honestly believe that, other than the presidency itself, this
    is probably the most difficult and complicated job in our
    Federal Government, and I wish you the best.
        I also appreciate or was gratified to hear your response to
    Senator Collins with respect to the need to rebuild our Navy,
    to get the Navy's numbers up. I think as the situation in
    Afghanistan and Iraq allows us more leeway in terms of how we
    shape the DOD budget, we really do need to do that.
        If you are looking at the size of the Navy right now, I
    think it is about 282 ships, and the ground floor goal of 313
    and all of the interests, the vital national interests that we
    have with respect to the stability of East and Southeast Asia,
    it is going to be a very important thing for us to look at. In
    that regard, I would like to raise two points with respect to
    the situation in East Asia, and then I also would like to ask
    you a question about Libya.
        First, when we are looking at the tempo in East Asia, we
    see clearly that Chinese military activities have dramatically
    increased over the past 15 or 16 months. The two most glaring
    examples of that were the set-to with Japan in the Senkaku
    Islands about a year ago, and then most recently, the Chinese
    naval vessels actually cutting the cable of a Vietnamese ship
    that was exploring oil, the possibility of oil in the South
    China Sea.
        These incidents are basically related to sovereignty
    issues, and they are not only national security issues, they
    obviously have downstream economic consequences. But to me,
    they clearly talk to the commitments that we have for stability
    in this region.
        We have made these commitments. We are the key, I think, to
    the strategic balance in that region. I am wondering if you are
    of the same mind as Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates were
    last year, a year ago, when they pretty strongly stated that we
    are not going to be deterred from protecting the interests of
    countries in international waters in that part of the world?
        Mr. Panetta. Very much. That is an extremely important
    region. We have to have a presence there in order to protect
    our own interests and to work with other countries in that
    area. In order to do that, there has to be respect for
    international law, and there has to be freedom of the seas so
    that we can do our job.
        I think it is important to have a relationship with China,
    but they also need to understand that by trying to advance in
    the China Sea, they can't interfere with our ability to
    navigate in that part of the world.
        Senator Webb. Or to unilaterally address sovereignty issues
    with respect to other countries?
        Mr. Panetta. That is correct.
        Senator Webb. Thank you.
        That also gets to the very important question of our basing
    system in this part of the world. I know Chairman Levin
    addressed this, and I heard your response to that. I think the
    timing of addressing these basing issues, particularly with
    respect to the Japanese, is vital. This has been going on for
    15 years, and we keep kicking the can down the road on it.
        We are not going to have stability in Asia if we don't have
    it in Northeast Asia. It is the only place in the world, as you
    well know, where the direct interests of Russia, China, Japan,
    the United States intersect, and the Korean Peninsula is right
    in the middle of all of that. I hope that we can work with you
    on the suggestions that Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and I
    brought forward in order to have a timely solution of that
    basing issue.
        Mr. Panetta. No, I really appreciated the conversation we
    had in your office. I know this isn't--it is not an easy issue.
    That is why the can has been kicked down the road, I guess, all
    of these years because of the cost and the politics and the
    diplomatic problems involved with each of these decisions.
        I think it absolutely has to be addressed. We have to
    establish a stable situation there. We can't have a situation
    in which we are just playing this year to year. I think we need
    a long-term solution, and I really want to work with you and
    the chairman and others to try to find a solution.
        Senator Webb. I thank you for saying that. Because I do
    believe this is fixable and have spent many years thinking
    about this. I believe what we were able to come up with is at
    least the right approach, and it could be done in a timely way
    if we could get people to work with us on doing that.
        With respect to the situation in Libya, I take your point
    during your exchange with Senator McCain that it is the
    President's responsibility to ensure national security. At the
    same time, we have a situation where when the President
    unilaterally decides to begin a military operation and then
    continues it, where, clearly, I think as a former Member of
    Congress, you would agree that Congress needs to be involved in
    shaping downstream when something like that occurs?
        Let me say it another way. No one would disagree that with
    the President's authority to unilaterally order military force
    if the country was under attack, under imminent threat of
    attack, invoking the inherent right of self-defense, which is
    actually I think what we are doing in a lot of these strikes,
    even places like Yemen. Or if we are coming to the aid of an
    ally based on a treaty commitment, or we are defending
    Americans, protecting Americans who are in distress.
        But when you have a situation like in this case where the
    justification is humanitarian, you can see the potential for a
    very broad definition of what a humanitarian crisis is. Once
    that decision is made unilaterally by the President, it needs
    to be subject to the review and the direction of Congress, in
    my view.
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, it has been my experience, both as a
    Member of Congress and member of administrations, while
    obviously that constitutional power does rest with the
    President, that once those decisions are made, in order for
    those decisions to be sustained, that it is very important to
    work with Congress, seek the best advice and counsel of
    Congress, and hopefully to get Congress' support for those
    actions.
        Senator Webb. I did hear you agree with Senator McCain or
    to his comment that nobody is thinking about putting American
    ground forces in Libya?
        Mr. Panetta. That is correct.
        Senator Webb. I assume that also means after the fall of
    the Gaddafi regime?
        Mr. Panetta. As far as I know, no one is discussing any
    boots on the ground there--at any time.
        Senator Webb. The House passed a provision to that effect
    with 416 votes, and I have introduced a provision here. I just
    think we have our hands full, and it is not something we should
    be doing in the future in that part of the world.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
        Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        We are almost done, Director Panetta. I was listening to
    Senator Nelson's litany of the challenges ahead of you once you
    get confirmed, and I certainly intend to vote for that. I think
    you will get confirmed. I wondered, ``Hmm, why does he want to
    do that?'' But like everyone on this committee, I am very
    grateful that you are willing to do that and appreciate your
    patriotism and commitment to the country. Thank you very much
    for that.
        Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Shaheen. I also very much appreciated the
    opportunity to sit down with you and your willingness to listen
    to some of our particular concerns in New Hampshire and was
    very pleased to hear that you are familiar with the work of the
    men and women at the Portsmouth naval shipyard and was pleased
    to hear your comments to Senator Collins about your commitment
    to address the backlog that both the shipyard and other
    shipyards around the country are facing.
        I was also very pleased that you were willing to listen to
    the good work that has been done by New Hampshire's National
    Guard deployment support program. Listening to your commitment
    today to better serve men and women after they get out of the
    military, I hope you will look at programs like New Hampshire's
    and some of the other States that have been so successful.
    Because not only are our National Guard and Reserves going to
    continue to play a greater role in our defense, but there is
    some very good data that shows how successful these programs
    have been.
        I think they serve as a good model for the rest of the
    Military Services to look at. I hope you will do that.
        Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Shaheen. One of the reasons that we have been so
    successful in developing the technology for our national
    security and have given us really our superiority in terms of
    our military might around the world is because of our national
    defense technology sector. New England and New Hampshire have
    been a knowledge center for that defense technology sector, and
    I wonder if you could speak to how DOD or what DOD is currently
    doing to ensure that there is a sustained commitment to that
    defense technology sector so they will continue to be there as
    we need them in the future?
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, I haven't been fully briefed on all
    of the efforts to try to deal with preserving that kind of
    technology. But if I am confirmed, I just want you to know that
    I am a very strong believer that if we are going to have a
    strong defense in this country that we have to have industries
    here that are American. We have to have technology capabilities
    that are American. We have to be able to have a base of support
    in this country in order to maintain our defense systems.
        It doesn't mean that we don't deal with our allies. It
    doesn't mean that we try to negotiate agreements with them in
    certain areas. But if we are going to protect our national
    defense, we have to protect our industrial base. We have to
    protect our technological base. We have to be able to protect
    the capabilities that we need here in order to make that
    happen.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much for that commitment. A
    piece of that is the research and development (R&D) needs, and
    obviously, DOD has been a very important part of ensuring that
    that R&D gets done. Given the budget constraints that we are
    facing, how do you see that affecting our ability to continue
    to ensure that the R&D that we need is done?
        Mr. Panetta. Again, I don't think we can do this job
    without investing in R&D as part of the process of making sure
    we are at the cutting edge for the future.
        I recognize that, obviously, as part of the effort to look
    at the entire budget in order to achieve savings that all of
    those areas will be looked at. But my view is that if we want
    to protect the weapons systems, if we want to protect our
    capabilities for the future, we have to be able to have good
    R&D at the same time.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        In talking to some of those New Hampshire and New England
    companies that are part of our national defense manufacturing
    base, one of the concerns that I often hear from them, because
    they are often doing commercial work as well as work for the
    military, is their frustration with our export control system.
    As I know you know, International Traffic in Arms Regulations
    restrictions are onerous. In many cases, they are out of date.
    They were really designed for a Cold War system that no longer
    exists, and I know that Secretary Gates has been a real
    proponent of addressing that system.
        I hope that you will be as committed, and I would ask how
    you see moving forward an agenda that updates our export
    control system in a way that both protects our national
    security, but also recognizes that we need to be competitive
    globally?
        Mr. Panetta. I want you to know, Senator, that I share
    Secretary Gates' attitude here. I think we have to be able to
    develop 21st century approaches to this kind of exchange in
    order for us to be able to make sure that the technologies we
    have are, in fact, technologies that we are working with others
    to assure and to have.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        I know earlier you were asked about Iraq and whether we
    would continue to stay in Iraq if we are asked. Like others, I
    have been concerned about increasing violence in Iraq, about
    the recent casualties. We just lost someone from New Hampshire
    in the attack over the weekend. I wonder if you could talk to
    what we need to do to keep our focus on the efforts in Iraq,
    and assuming that we are not asked to stay, how we will deal
    with drawing down the remaining troops that are there?
        Mr. Panetta. We are, at the present time, on track to
    withdrawing our forces by the end of 2011. But I think that it
    is clear to me that Iraq is considering the possibility of
    making a request for some kind of presence to remain there. It
    really is dependent on the prime minister and on the Government
    of Iraq to present to us what is it that they need and over
    what period of time in order to make sure that the gains that
    we have made in Iraq are sustained.
        I have every confidence that a request like that is
    something that I think will be forthcoming at some point.
        Senator Shaheen. My time has expired. I would like to
    explore that more later.
        Mr. Panetta. Okay.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Udall.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Welcome, Mr. Director. I was going to say good morning, but
    I realize it is the afternoon. Thank you for your patience.
        I want to also, with everybody else on the committee,
    acknowledge your tremendous leadership, your personal
    friendship, and your willingness to take on yet another
    assignment, perhaps one of the biggest and most important in
    the Federal Government.
        I think you and I share a concern about the country's
    fiscal trajectory. Of course, Secretary of Defense Gates has
    pointed out that this is a key threat to our national security,
    as had the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen.
        I know we are going to not support any cuts that will harm
    our capacity to secure our Nation or the well-being of our
    troops. But we are going to have to make some tough decisions.
    A broke country is a weak country. Conversely, a solvent
    country can be a strong country.
        You have had to deal with this at the agency. That is, how
    do you balance the needs and the resources? I think we have all
    said, hey, everything has to be on the table. But I am curious
    what your thoughts are about what the right size is of our
    military and how do we determine what our mission ought to be?
        I have two easy questions for you. What role do you believe
    that the American military should play in the world? As the
    senior military adviser-to-be to the President, when you are
    confirmed--I am going to be that optimistic--what would be a
    set of guidelines that you would use to recommend to the
    President whether military action is justified?
        Mr. Panetta. Obviously, I think that the United States
    exercises a unique role in the world by virtue of our
    leadership in the diplomatic arena, but also because of our
    military power, we are able to back that up. I think it is
    extremely important in today's world, where there are so many
    challenges and so many threats that we are confronting, that we
    maintain a strong military in order to deal with those kinds of
    threats.
        It is not only the fact that we are involved in wars, but
    clearly, we are facing increasing turmoil. We are facing
    terrorism. We are facing other challenges. In my view, the
    United States plays a very unique role in the world as far as
    providing the kind of leadership that tries to advance
    universal rights, a peaceful approach to dealing with the world
    that tries to advance good economic and political reform.
        That is a unique role for the United States, and I think we
    need to continue to send that message and to continue to exert
    that leadership. For that reason, I think having a strong
    military is essential to that larger role that the United
    States plays in today's world.
        We hope that others would work with us. We do, obviously,
    work with our allies. We work with NATO. We work with other
    nations. But there is no question in my mind that the United
    States is the fundamental leader right now in the world in a
    number of ways, and having the military strength to back up
    that kind of leadership is very important.
        With regards to how we approach the use of force, I think
    there are several important guidelines. Number one, what is the
    threat to our national interests? What is our capability to be
    able to respond, our military capability to respond to that
    kind of a threat? Have we exhausted all other remedies and
    options to the use of force? Lastly, what are the prospects to
    get the support of not only Congress, but the American people
    in that effort? I think all of those things are important
    considerations.
        Senator Udall. Thank you for those thoughts, Director
    Panetta. I think this will be a topic of ongoing conversations,
    obviously, as we work to consider how, if we need to
    reconfigure DOD and how we are prepared in a world of
    insurgencies and cybersecurity needs, satellite systems that
    are very important to all of us. There is a real change
    underway.
        I also hope that we will continue to do what we can to
    strengthen our relationship with China as it becomes more of an
    economic powerhouse. Hopefully, it will shoulder some of the
    responsibility on a worldwide basis because of its own self-
    interest, frankly.
        Let me turn to energy. I think this has been an area of
    your interest as well. It is one of a deep concern, but I also
    think a great opportunity for us. Admiral Mullen has said
    saving energy saves lives. He recently pointed out that before
    we buy another airplane or a ship, we ought to look at what we
    can do to save the lives of our soldiers, marines, airmen, and
    sailors through our dependence on oil and other energy
    technologies.
        What are your thoughts on what DOD can do to continue to
    push alternative technologies and reducing our dependence on
    foreign oil?
        Mr. Panetta. Senator, this is an area that I want to learn
    a lot more about in terms of how the Defense Department is
    approaching this. At least from some of the briefings I have
    gotten, I think the Defense Department really is a leader in
    terms of trying to develop better energy efficiency, and we
    need to be because we use an awful lot of fuel.
        My hope is to continue those efforts and to work with you
    and others to try to determine what additional steps can we
    take, both in the development of weapons, the development of
    technologies, how we can better use clean energy, how we can
    better use some of the new forms of energy in order to reduce
    fuel costs at the Pentagon. But more importantly, in order to
    contribute to, hopefully, a cleaner environment.
        Senator Udall. I have just introduced a bill along with
    Congressman Giffords, I should say reintroduced a bill that we
    had put in the hopper in the last Congress, that would provide
    more direction to DOD. It has widespread support from
    particularly retired general officers and others, and I look
    forward to working with you and the chairman as we move to
    authorize the Defense Department's activities for 2012.
        You are right. DOD's energy bill is about $13 billion a
    year, and DOD uses more energy than most countries use, which
    stands out. But it is an opportunity. I don't see it as a
    burden. I see it as a real opportunity. I think you do, too.
        Mr. Panetta. I think it is.
        Senator Udall. I see my time has expired. But maybe for the
    record, I could ask one question and you could maybe give a
    brief response. Then if you want to expound on it for the
    record, that would be great.
        I know 2014 is our date for Afghanistan, the full handoff.
    I do worry about and you know all too well about the safe
    havens and the sanctuary they provide for the Taliban. If we
    can't reduce those safe havens or, at best, eliminate them,
    what are your thoughts on what that means for the hopes of a
    resolution of the situation in Afghanistan?
        Mr. Panetta. I think we can only win in Afghanistan if we
    can win in Pakistan by reducing those safe havens. I think the
    two go hand-in-hand. The ability to achieve stability in
    Afghanistan is dependent on whether or not we can limit and,
    hopefully, stop the transfer of terrorism across that border.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Director. You and both the
    chairman are my heroes because you have both been sitting here
    for some 4 hours and with great patience and articulate
    answers.
        Thank you. I look forward to serving with you. Thank you.
        Mr. Panetta. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Udall.
        Let me just, before we break for lunch, try to clarify two
    parts of your testimony regarding the transition of security
    responsibility to the Afghan security forces.
        First, would you agree that security transition to Afghan
    security forces is to be completed by 2014, but that the
    process of transferring provinces and districts to an Afghan
    security force lead begins in July?
        Mr. Panetta. That is correct.
        Chairman Levin. That President Karzai in March identified
    the first group of areas to begin transition this year,
    including a number of identified provinces, and that has
    already been presented and approved by NATO?
        Mr. Panetta. That is correct.
        Chairman Levin. Next, my staff tells me that they have not
    been able to find any statement of Secretary Gates in which he
    specifies a number of U.S. troops that he believes should be
    withdrawn from Afghanistan starting in July. Are you aware of
    any statement by Secretary Gates identifying such a number,
    whether it is 3,000 to 5,000 or any other number?
        Mr. Panetta. I have discussed this with the staff at DOD,
    and they are not aware of any statement that he has made that
    has indicated a number that would be involved.
        Chairman Levin. At this point?
        Mr. Panetta. At this point.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        It looks like it is about 5 after 1 p.m. Is that right? We
    will meet at 2:30 p.m. in a classified session.
        Thank you all. Thank you again for your testimony and for
    your service.
        [Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

        [Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Leon E. Panetta by
    Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
    follow:]

                            Questions and Responses

                                DEFENSE REFORMS

        Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
    Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
    strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
    enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
    of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
    commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments
    to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
    to the combatant commanders.
        Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
    provisions? If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
    address in these modifications?
        Answer. It has been 25 years since the passage of Goldwater-Nichols
    legislation which has prepared the Department of Defense (DOD) to
    better meet today's challenges. At this time, I do not believe
    Goldwater-Nichols should be amended, but, if confirmed, I will continue
    to evaluate this issue and will work with the committee on this very
    important topic.

                       DUTIES OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

        Section 113 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the Secretary of
    Defense is the principal assistant to the President in all matters
    relating to DOD. Subject to the direction of the President, the
    Secretary of Defense, under section 113, has authority, direction, and
    control over DOD.
        Do you believe there are actions you need to take to enhance your
    ability to perform the duties of the Secretary of Defense?
        Answer. Current authorities for the Secretary of Defense appear to
    be clear and appropriate.
        Question. What changes to section 113, if any, would you recommend?
        Answer. At this time, I have no recommendation for changes to
    section 113. My view may change based on the perspectives I may gain
    while serving in the position of Secretary of Defense, if confirmed.

                                   PRIORITIES

        Question. If confirmed, you will confront a range of critical
    issues relating to threats to national security and ensuring that the
    Armed Forces are prepared to deal with these threats.
        What broad priorities would you establish, if confirmed, with
    respect to issues which must be addressed by DOD?
        Answer. The top priority of the Secretary of Defense is to ensure
    the security of the American people.
        We face a number of challenges: first, prevailing in the current
    conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and in the fight against al Qaeda;
    second, keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of
    terrorists and rogue nations; third, preparing to counter future
    military threats; fourth, preserving the finest fighting force in the
    world and taking care of servicemembers and their families; and fifth,
    continuing the reforms DOD's leadership has initiated which will be
    crucial in this time of budget constraints.

                      NATIONAL SECURITY BUDGET REDUCTIONS

        Question. The President has called for $400 billion in reductions
    to national security spending over a 10-year period starting in 2013,
    and has asked Secretary Gates to lead a review to provide
    recommendations on where to make those cuts.
        What is your understanding of the current status of that review?
        Answer. Secretary Gates has discussed with me his overall approach
    for the Comprehensive Review. It is my understanding that the process
    initiated focuses principally on driving program and budget decisions
    from choices about strategy and risks. Such a strategy-driven approach
    is essential to ensuring that we preserve a superb defense force to
    meet national security goals, even under fiscal pressure.
        Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in guiding
    the review and in determining what cuts, if any, should be made to the
    defense budget?
        Answer. If confirmed, I expect to play a large role in the
    Comprehensive Review and to have it completed in the fall.
        Question. Do you believe that a national security spending
    reduction of this magnitude can be accomplished without significant
    adverse impact on our national security?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work to make disciplined decisions in
    ways that minimize impacts on our national security. But it must be
    understood that a smaller budget means difficult choices will have to
    be made.
        Question. If confirmed, how will you prioritize the objectives of:
    making needed investments in the future force, addressing pressing
    requirements for completing the mission in Iraq and Afghanistan,
    resetting of the force, meeting ongoing operational commitments across
    the globe, and achieving the level of savings proposed by the
    President?
        Answer. From my years of service in the public sector, I recognize
    the importance of balancing immediate and future needs. In national
    security matters, such a balance is essential to keeping America safe
    both today and tomorrow. Decisions on budget must be carefully made so
    that none of the listed objectives is compromised.
        If confirmed, I will work with both DOD's civilian and military
    leaders to seek the right balance and I will not hesitate to provide my
    views on the potential consequences of proposed future changes in the
    DOD's budget.

                                CHAIN OF COMMAND

        Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
    chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
    and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Section
    163(a) of title 10 further provides that the President may direct
    communications to combatant commanders be transmitted through the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and may assign duties to the
    Chairman to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in
    performing their command function.
        Do you believe that these provisions facilitate a clear and
    effective chain of command?
        Answer. Based on my understanding of the existing authorities and
    the practice I have personally observed while Director of the CIA, I
    believe there is currently a clear and effective chain of command. If
    confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I will work to ensure that the chain
    of command continues to be clear and effective.
        Question. In your view, do these provisions enhance or degrade
    civilian control of the military?
        Answer. I believe these provisions enhance civilian control of the
    military.
        Question. In your capacity as the Director of the Central
    Intelligence Agency, you were reported to have been in charge of the
    recent operation against Osama bin Laden, an operation using military
    forces of DOD, presumably under the authorities in title 50, U.S.C.
        Are there circumstances in which you believe it is appropriate for
    U.S. military forces to be under the operational command or control of
    an authority outside the chain of command established under title 10,
    U.S.C.?
        Answer. I believe the chain of command established by title 10 is
    the appropriate mechanism for command and control of military
    operations. Without commenting on the bin Laden operation in
    particular, I will state that in general there are instances in which
    military capabilities are temporarily made available to support an
    activity of a non-DOD U.S. Government department or agency. In those
    circumstances, it is appropriate for the head of such department or
    agency to direct the operations of the element providing that military
    support while working with the Secretary of Defense. In such
    situations, the President remains at the top of the chain of command
    and at all times has overall command and responsibility for the
    operation. The military units supporting such an operation are still
    governed by the laws of armed conflict. Military personnel remain
    accountable to the military chain of command, including the Uniform
    Code of Military Justice.
        Question. Can you explain the chain of command for U.S. military
    forces in the operation against bin Laden, and what role, if any, the
    Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of
    Defense each had in that chain of command?
        Answer. I cannot comment publicly on the chain of command for the
    bin Laden operation, in particular. In general, see my answer above.
        Question. Please explain the pros and cons of utilizing U.S.
    military personnel for missions under the authorities contained in
    title 50, United Sates Code.
        Answer. Non-DOD Federal departments and agencies may, in carrying
    out their duties, occasionally require support that only the U.S. Armed
    Forces can provide. It is therefore sometimes preferable to make an
    appropriate military capability temporarily available to support the
    operations of other departments and agencies. A significant advantage
    of doing so is that it permits the robust operational capability of the
    U.S. Armed Forces to be applied when needed. A potential disadvantage
    is that the department or agency receiving the support may not be
    specifically organized or equipped to direct and control operations by
    military forces.
        Question. If the reports mentioned above are accurate, please
    describe the authorities and agreements which are in place to allow
    U.S. military personnel to carry out missions under the authorities
    contained in title 50, U.S.C. Do you believe any modifications to these
    authorities are necessary?
        Answer. As noted above, consistent with title 50 of the U.S.C., the
    President may authorize departments, agencies, or entities of the U.S.
    Government to participate in or support intelligence activities. I
    cannot comment publicly on any specific arrangements in this regard. As
    stated above, military personnel in support of any such activities
    remain subject to the laws of armed conflict and the Uniform Code of
    Military Justice while operating under the direction of the head of a
    non-DOD Federal department or agency. I believe that existing
    authorities are sufficient to facilitate DOD's providing appropriate
    support under title 50 while ensuring necessary oversight.
        Question. Please explain your views on the preferred chain of
    command structure for counter terrorism operations conducted outside of
    Iraq and Afghanistan.
        Answer. My view is that the chain of command established under
    title 10 is appropriate for command of U.S. military operations,
    regardless of the location. The determination of whether a military
    counterterrorism operation is appropriate will depend on the nature of
    the contemplated operation and the circumstances specific to the time
    and place of that operation.

           ADVICE OF THE SERVICE CHIEFS AND THE COMBATANT COMMANDERS

        Question. Section 151 of title 10, U.S.C., provides, in part, that
    the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military
    adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the
    Secretary of Defense and that if any member of the Joint Chiefs submits
    to the Chairman advice or an opinion, in disagreement with, or advice
    or an opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman, the
    Chairman shall present that advice or opinion at the same time he
    provides his own advice to the President, the National Security
    Council, and the Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. Section 163 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the Chairman
    of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the spokesman for the combatant
    commanders, especially on the operational requirements of their
    commands.
        Question. What changes in law, if any, do you think may be
    necessary to ensure that the views of the individual Service Chiefs and
    of the combatant commanders are presented and considered?
        Answer. At this time, I do not recommend any changes to the law. If
    confirmed, and after I have been in office for a sufficient time to
    determine if changes are advisable, I will recommend changes as
    appropriate or necessary.
        Question. Do you believe the Chief of the National Guard Bureau
    should be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
        Answer. No. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau is now a 4 star
    general and attends Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings and provides
    invaluable advice. Members of the Guard are members of the uniformed
    services and adding its Chief to the Joint Chiefs of Staff would
    introduce inconsistencies among its members and will create the
    impression that the National Guard is a separate military service.

                 GOLDWATER-NICHOLS FOR THE INTERAGENCY (POLICY)

        Question. Several groups and individuals have been calling for a
    Goldwater-Nichols Act for the entire Federal Government. They argue
    that the U.S. and allied militaries can prevail on the battlefield but
    that the global war on terror requires a concerted effort by a host of
    U.S. agencies.
        What are your views on the merits of instituting a Goldwater-
    Nichols Act for the entire Federal Government?
        Answer. In the 25 years since Goldwater-Nichols much has changed.
    In the post-September 11th era, there have been significant benefits
    due to increased unity of effort and interagency cooperation. Civilian-
    military collaboration has improved, and our military commanders expect
    to operate in a coordinated and joint, multi-service environment.
    Diplomats, development experts, intelligence analysts, and law
    enforcement must work together in today's complex operations.
        At this time, I do not know that instituting such a change across
    the entire Federal Government is needed. However, there may be
    additional ways to develop more effective and inclusive approaches to
    our national security challenges that do not require legislation.
        If confirmed, I intend to reiterate to all civilian and military
    personnel in DOD the important role each interagency partner plays in
    supporting our Nation's security.

                             USE OF MILITARY FORCE

        Question. The question as to whether and when U.S. forces should
    participate in potentially dangerous situations is one of the most
    important and difficult decisions that the national command authorities
    have to make. Prior Secretaries of Defense and Chairmen of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff have proposed criteria to guide decisionmaking for such
    situations.
        What factors would you consider in making recommendations to the
    President on the use of force?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would consider many of the same factors
    that previous Secretaries of Defense have evaluated in their
    recommendations to the President on the use of force, including the
    threat to our vital interests, the ability to employ non-military
    methods to respond to the threat, our capability to defeat that threat
    and improve our strategic situation through the use of military force,
    and the prospects for sustained public support for military action.
        Question. What circumstances should pertain for you to recommend
    that the President employ preemptive force?
        Answer. As the 2010 National Security Strategy discusses, military
    force, at times, may be necessary to defend our country and allies or
    to preserve broader peace and security, including by protecting
    civilians facing a grave humanitarian crisis.
        While the use of force is sometimes necessary, if confirmed, we
    will continue to exhaust other options before war whenever we can, and
    carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against the costs and
    risks of inaction. When force is necessary, if confirmed, we will
    continue to do so in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our
    legitimacy, and we will seek broad international support, working with
    such institutions as NATO and the U.N. Security Council.
        The United States must reserve the right to act unilaterally if
    necessary to defend our Nation and our interests, yet we must also seek
    to adhere to standards that govern the use of force.
        Question. What degree of certainty do you believe is necessary
    before the United States would use preemptive force?
        Answer. I believe the use of preemptive force should be based on
    the strongest evidence of the need. It is a decision that must not be
    taken lightly.
        Two years as CIA Director has made me realize that intelligence is
    often ambiguous. I believe the men and women in the Intelligence
    Community do their best to get the most reliable intelligence possible.
    Still, we need to be aware of the caveats that come with intelligence
    products. We need to continue to ask hard questions about the
    information presented to policymakers.
     department of defense and department of veterans affairs collaboration
        Question. Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of Veterans
    Affairs Shinseki have pledged to improve and increase collaboration
    between the respective departments to support military servicemembers
    as they transition to veteran status, in areas of health and mental
    health care, disability evaluation, and compensation.
        If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in ensuring that
    DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs achieve the administration's
    objectives in DOD and VA collaboration?
        Answer. I understand significant improvements have been made in
    DOD-VA collaboration in the last few years. If confirmed, I will
    continue the efforts made by Secretary Gates, and look forward to
    working with Secretary Shinseki to accelerate current timelines. If
    confirmed, I will ensure that DOD continues to work closely with VA to
    support servicemembers and their families in all facets of making a
    seamless transition to veteran status will remain a top priority.

                            DISABILITY SEVERANCE PAY

        Question. Section 1646 of the Wounded Warrior Act, included in the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, enhanced
    severance pay and removed a requirement that severance pay be deducted
    from VA disability compensation for servicemembers discharged for
    disabilities rated less than 30 percent incurred in the line-of-duty in
    a combat zone or incurred during the performance of duty in a combat-
    related operation as designated by the Secretary of Defense. In
    adopting this provision, Congress relied on the existing definition of
    a combat-related disability contained in 10 U.S.C. 1413a(e)). Rather
    than using the definition intended by Congress, DOD adopted a more
    limited definition of combat-related operations, requiring that the
    disability be incurred during participation in armed conflict.
        If confirmed, would you review the interpretation of this provision
    by the Department's subject matter experts and reconsider the
    Department's definition of combat-related operations for purposes of
    awarding enhanced severance pay and deduction of severance pay from VA
    disability compensation?
        Answer. I understand this matter is currently being reviewed. If
    confirmed, I will continue that review and ensure that any policy
    change, if warranted, meets the intent of Congress.

                           HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT POLICY

        Question. The ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010,'' enacted
    on December 22, 2010, provides for the repeal of the current DOD policy
    concerning homosexuality in the Armed Forces, to be effective 60 days
    after the Secretary of Defense has received DOD's comprehensive review
    on the implementation of such repeal, and the President, Secretary, and
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff certify to the congressional
    defense committees that they have considered the report and proposed
    plan of action, that DOD has prepared the necessary policies and
    regulations to exercise the discretion provided by such repeal, and
    that implementation of such policies and regulations is consistent with
    the standards of military readiness and effectiveness, unit cohesion,
    and military recruiting and retention.
        What is your view on repealing the current DOD policy?
        Answer. I support the Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010 and
    the certification process defined in the law.
        If confirmed, and in the event Secretary Gates does not sign such a
    certification prior to his departure from office, I will work closely
    with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assess whether the elements for
    certification in the law are met before signing it myself.

               PROTECTION OF U.S. FORCES AGAINST INTERNAL THREATS

        Question. On November 5, 2009, a gunman opened fire at the Soldier
    Readiness Center at Fort Hood, TX, killing 13 people and wounding or
    injuring 43 others. A DOD review of the attack released in January 2010
    concluded that the Department was poorly prepared to defend against
    internal threats, including radicalization among military personnel.
        What is your assessment of the lessons learned from the tragedy at
    Fort Hood?
        Answer. I understand that the Fort Hood review released by DOD in
    August 2010 included 79 recommendations on how to improve personnel
    policies, force protection, emergency response and mass casualty
    preparedness, and support to DOD healthcare providers. I am told that
    DOD has completed implementation of half of these recommendations.
        If confirmed, I intend to review all the lessons learned,
    recommendations for improvement, and progress made to date and work
    closely with Members of Congress to ensure that DOD is prepared to
    defend against internal threats, including radicalization among DOD's
    military and civilian personnel.
        Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to
    prevent and mitigate such threats in the future?
        Answer. I understand that the findings and recommendations of the
    Fort Hood Review are the foundation of DOD's current strategy and
    leadership and accountability are key. If confirmed, I will review this
    strategy and how it has been implemented, seek the advice of DOD's
    civilian and military leadership, and consult with Congress to ensure
    that DOD implements the most effective policies to prevent and mitigate
    such threats in the future.

                              RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

        Question. The Independent Review Related to the Tragedy at Fort
    Hood observed that ``DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks
    the clarity necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate
    religious practices from those that might indicate a potential for
    violence or self-radicalization.'' Recommendation 2.7 of the Final
    Recommendations urged the Department to update policy to clarify
    guidelines for religious accommodation and Recommendation 2.8 urged the
    Department to task the Defense Science Board to ``undertake a multi-
    disciplinary study to identify behavioral indicators of violence and
    self-radicalization . . . .''
        What is your view of these recommendations?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Fort Hood Follow-on Review
    prepared an implementation plan in response to both of these
    recommendations. If confirmed, I will review that report and the
    progress that has been made to ensure DOD policies, programs, and
    procedures appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion
    while effectively protecting our servicemembers from harm.
        Question. What is your understanding of current policies and
    programs of DOD regarding religious practices in the military?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the military places a high
    value on the rights of servicemembers to observe their respective
    religious faiths and that policies and programs reflect this.
        Question. In your view, do these policies appropriately accommodate
    the free exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on
    those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?
        Answer. I understand each Religious Ministry Professional has
    committed to functioning in a pluralistic environment and to
    supporting, both directly and indirectly, the free exercise of religion
    by all members of the Military Services, their family members, and
    other persons authorized to be served by the military chaplaincies. If
    confirmed, I will review the relevant policies, seek the advice of the
    military leadership, and consult with Congress to ensure that DOD
    appropriately accommodates the free exercise of religion.
        Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices
    regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of
    formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a
    chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious
    beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs,
    including no religious beliefs?
        Answer. I understand current policy appears to strike the proper
    balance by allowing chaplains to voluntarily participate, or not
    participate, in settings which conflict with their faith traditions,
    while also ensuring chaplains performing in an interfaith setting, such
    as an official dinner or interfaith memorial service, are mindful of
    the requirement for inclusiveness. If confirmed, I will monitor these
    policies and practices.
        Question. If confirmed, will you work to ensure that a scientific
    fact-based approach to understanding radicalization will drive the
    Department's relevant policies?
        Answer. I understand DOD has commissioned a Defense Science Board
    study on violent radicalization and plans to commission two additional
    clinical studies to identify any potential indicators of violent
    behavior in military personnel. The results of these studies will
    inform DOD's policies and programs on radicalization. If confirmed, I
    intend to ensure that DOD continues to rely on a scientific, fact-based
    approach to countering radicalization and protecting our force.
        Question. Current policy in the Department gives discretion to
    military leaders to decide whether requests to waive uniform and
    appearance standards should be granted based on religious beliefs. The
    Department has submitted a legislative proposal that would clearly
    exempt the armed services from the requirements of the Religious
    Freedom Restoration Act.
        In your view, do DOD policies appropriately accommodate religious
    practices that require adherents to wear particular articles of faith?
        Answer. I understand the important and delicate balance that must
    be struck between accommodating religious practices that require
    adherents to wear particular articles of faith and maintaining the
    military's uniform grooming and appearance standards. If confirmed, I
    will work with the leaders of the military services to achieve an
    appropriate balance between maintaining the military's uniform grooming
    and appearance standards and approving requested religious
    accommodations.

                          MUSLIMS IN THE U.S. MILITARY

        Question. Are you concerned that the attack at Fort Hood could lead
    to harassment or even violence against Muslims in the military?
        Answer. I recognize the events related to the attack at Fort Hood
    are first and foremost a tragedy for all involved. While it is possible
    that such a tragic act could spur harassment and violence as a means of
    retaliation, I am informed that military leaders and supervisors at all
    levels take precautions to prevent such occurrences and maintain good
    order and discipline in the force. No form of harassment will be
    tolerated.
        Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to
    address the potential for harassment or violence against Muslims in the
    U.S. military?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would advocate open communications,
    decisive action on the part of military leaders and supervisors, and
    command emphasis on the military standard for maintaining good order
    and discipline. More specifically, this would include safeguarding the
    rights of servicemembers by exercising the established procedures and
    processes for addressing all indications of harassment and complaints.
    If confirmed, I would review the effectiveness of these feedback
    systems, and take measures to improve them, as appropriate.

                     SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

        Question. The Department has in recent years developed
    comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and
    response to incidents of sexual assault, including providing
    appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault. However,
    numerous incidents of sexual misconduct involving military personnel in
    combat areas of operation and at home stations are still being
    reported. Victims and their advocates claim that they are victimized
    twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by unresponsive
    or inadequate treatment for the victim. They assert that their command
    fails to respond appropriately with basic medical services and with an
    adequate investigation of their allegations followed by a failure to
    hold assailants accountable.
        Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures,
    particularly those on confidential or restricted reporting, to be
    effective?
        Answer. Sexual assault has no place in DOD--and it will not be
    tolerated. DOD's zero tolerance policy on sexual assault is the right
    policy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs,
    and the Service Secretaries are continuously and directly engaged in
    emphasizing the importance of addressing sexual assault. DOD is deeply
    committed to broad and focused improvements in how it prevents and
    responds to sexual assault. Advancements in development of policies and
    programs, such as hiring additional investigators, field instructors,
    prosecutors, and lab examiners have been made. But there is still work
    to do to integrate and continue to improve our efforts across DOD and
    the Services. If confirmed, I would continue to ensure DOD is committed
    to addressing sexual assault in a comprehensive manner.
        Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in
    which the restricted reporting procedure has been put into operation?
        Answer. I have not been informed of any specific problems in the
    implementation of the restricted reporting option. It is my
    understanding that restricted reporting allows victims who wish to
    remain anonymous to come forward and obtain the support they need
    following an assault without being identified. I believe that the most
    important concern in reviewing the reporting procedure should be to
    ensure that victims are coming forward. If confirmed, I will review
    DOD's program to gain a clear picture of progress and areas for future
    improvement in sexual assault reporting procedures.
        Question. What is your view of the steps the Services have taken to
    prevent and respond to sexual assaults in combat zones, including
    assaults against contractor personnel?
        Answer. Sexual assault against anyone is unacceptable in any
    location. I do not have enough information to make a comprehensive
    assessment at this time, but it is my understanding that if any of our
    deployed servicemembers, civilians, or contractors is assaulted, he or
    she will receive appropriate and responsive support and care. It is
    also my understanding that individuals who commit sexual assault are
    appropriately punished. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure DOD is
    committed to addressing sexual assault in a comprehensive manner across
    the Services in all locations. There is no tolerance in DOD for sexual
    assault in any location or for any personnel who serve in DOD.
        Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
    resources the Services have in place to investigate and respond to
    allegations of sexual assault?
        Answer. DOD is committed to addressing sexual assault in a
    comprehensive, integrated and uniform manner. It is my understanding
    that all Services have been directed to establish guidelines for a 24-
    hour, 7 day a week sexual assault response capability for all
    locations, including deployed areas. I also understand that the
    Services recently enhanced their resources for investigating and
    prosecuting sexual assault cases. While, I cannot make a specific
    assessment at this time, if confirmed, evaluating the adequacy and
    efficacy of training and resources allocated to the Services for sexual
    assault investigation will be a priority.
        Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of the
    Services to hold assailants accountable for their acts?
        Answer. DOD's policies emphasize the command's role in effective
    response to sexual assault. DOD has taken action to provide training
    for commanders and to ensure adequate training and resources for
    prosecutors and investigators. I understand that DOD's policies seek to
    balance victim care and appropriate command action against offenders,
    with one of the aims being to build the victim's confidence to assist
    in an investigation. If confirmed, I will ensure accountability,
    appropriately balanced with victim care, remains an important focus of
    DOD's sexual assault prevention and response efforts.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure senior
    level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to
    sexual assaults?
        Answer. I believe that sexual assault has no place in the Armed
    Forces, and that DOD currently has a zero tolerance policy. I
    understand DOD has assigned a General/Flag Officer with operational
    experience to provide direct oversight of the Sexual Assault Prevention
    and Response Program office. This senior leader will facilitate and
    integrate a comprehensive and uniformed approach to sexual assault
    prevention and response policy across DOD. If confirmed, I will
    continue to make sexual assault prevention and response a priority for
    DOD and will work closely with the Secretaries of the Military
    Departments and the Chiefs of the Military Services to ensure that DOD
    maintains senior leadership focus on this issue.
         mobilization and demobilization of national guard and reserves
        Question. In support of the current ongoing conflicts, the National
    Guard and Reserves have experienced their largest and most sustained
    employment since World War II. Numerous problems have arisen over time
    in the planning and procedures for mobilization and demobilization,
    e.g., inadequate health screening and medical response to service-
    connected injuries or illnesses, antiquated pay systems, limited
    transition assistance programs upon demobilization, and inefficient
    policies regarding members of the Individual Ready Reserve. Reserve
    Force management policies and systems have been characterized in the
    past as ``inefficient and rigid'' and readiness levels have been
    adversely affected by equipment shortages, cross-leveling, and reset
    policies.
        What is your assessment of advances made in improving Reserve
    component mobilization and demobilization procedures, and in what areas
    do problems still exist?
        Answer. I understand there have been many changes made in policies
    governing the utilization of the Guard. There is now a 180-day
    notification prior to mobilization, dwell ratio standard of no more
    than 1 year mobilized for 5 years not mobilized, and Guard and
    reservists can only be involuntary activated for 1 year.
        These changes have improved morale by providing a predictable cycle
    of active duty.
        A key problem that remains is there are over 30 different duty
    statuses for Guard and Reserve personnel. This diversity of duty status
    is cumbersome and results in mobilization and de-mobilization delays.

                  MEDICAL AND DENTAL READINESS OF THE RESERVES

        Question. Medical and dental readiness of Reserve component
    personnel has been an issue of significant concern to the committee,
    and shortfalls that have been identified have indicated a need for
    improved policy oversight and accountability.
        If confirmed, how would you seek to clarify and coordinate
    reporting on the medical and dental readiness of the Reserves?
        Answer. In order to fully assess the capability of the Reserve
    Force, it is critical to measure and report medical and dental
    readiness in a standardized manner. It is my understanding that over
    the past several years, small, but steady improvements have been made
    across the Services, but there is more work to do in confirming the
    medical and dental readiness of the entire Reserve Force.
        Medical and dental readiness is tracked through standardized
    calculations each quarter. Currently, the medical readiness achievement
    goal is 75 percent and DOD is at 63 percent. The dental readiness
    achievement goal is 85 percent, and DOD has met that goal.
        While progress can be seen, the medical and dental readiness of the
    Reserve component remains a priority if I am confirmed.
        Question. How would you improve upon the Department's ability to
    maintain a healthy and fit Reserve component?
        Answer. It's my understanding that DOD continues to pursue new and
    improved opportunities to provide flexible options for the Guard and
    Reserve to improve their overall readiness.
        Producing and maintaining a healthy and fit Reserve component
    requires more than access to health care--it also requires command
    emphasis and individual accountability.
        Recently, the Army Reserve approved and funded two medical/dental
    readiness days per soldier starting in fiscal year 2010.
        If confirmed, I will work with the Services to incorporate the
    findings and recommendations from the executive-level DOD Prevention,
    Safety and Health Promotion Council (PSHPC) recently created to advance
    health and safety promotion and injury/illness prevention policy
    initiatives to address readiness requirements developed from evidence-
    based research.

                                   DWELL TIME

        Question. While dwell time is improving as our forces draw down in
    Iraq, many Active Duty military members are still not experiencing the
    dwell time goal of 2 years at home for every year deployed.
        In your view, when will the Active component dwell time goal be
    met?
        Answer. I understand that the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps, on
    average, are meeting or exceeding DOD's dwell time goal of 1:2 for the
    Active component. The Army is now averaging 1:1 but expects to be 1:2
    by October 2011. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor this issue
    closely.
        Question. When will dwell time objectives be met for the Reserve
    components?
        Answer. I understand Reserve component dwell time is improving, but
    has not reached DOD's dwell time goal of 1 year of active duty and 5
    years at home, or 1:5. If confirmed, I will continue to work toward the
    goal of a 1:5 dwell time ratio for the Reserve component.

                            ACTIVE-DUTY END STRENGTH

        Question. Secretary Gates announced this year that the Army would
    reduce its end strength by 22,000 through fiscal year 2013, including
    7,000 in fiscal year 2012. This end strength was part of the temporary
    increase authorized in 2009 and was intended to enable the Army to
    cease relying on ``stoploss'' and to make up for a growing population
    of non-deployable soldiers. Beginning in fiscal year 2015, depending on
    conditions on the ground, the Army and Marine Corps plan to reduce
    their permanent end strength and force structure by 27,000 soldiers and
    at least 15,000 marines, respectively.
        Do you agree with this Active-Duty end strength reduction plan?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review the plan, but it is my
    understanding, that based upon what we know today, and the well
    reasoned assumptions that have been made, that the current plan strikes
    a prudent balance between serving operational needs and ensuring the
    funds available for recapitalization which are critical to future
    readiness. However, I know that ensuring that commanders have the right
    numbers and right kinds of volunteers to perform their mission is of
    critical importance. As future national security circumstances could
    change, if confirmed, our plan will change accordingly.
        Question. What is your view of how these planned end strength
    reductions will affect dwell time ratios?
        Answer. The Army and Marine Corps end strength reductions, planned
    for fiscal year 2015, are based on the assumption of a future draw-down
    in Afghanistan. If this assumption holds true, the dwell ratio of 1:2
    should not be affected.
        Question. What effect would inability to meet dwell time objectives
    have on your decision to implement the planned end strength reductions?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will take into consideration dwell time
    objectives and our ability to meet competing strategic objectives
    before implementing the planned end strength reductions.
        Question. In your view, can the Army accelerate to 2012 more of its
    planned reduction in its temporary over-strength without an adverse
    impact on national security?
        Answer. I am unable to express an opinion on this issue at this
    time. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Army on appropriate
    end strength.
        Question. What would be the effect on dwell time of accelerating
    the Army's force reduction plan?
        Answer. That would depend on the Army's deployment footprint and
    the period of acceleration. However, I would anticipate that the Army
    may not be able to achieve the dwell ratio goal of 1:2 on its current
    schedule. This is an issue that I will need to evaluate, if confirmed.
        Question. What are the assumptions regarding ``conditions on the
    ground'' that will allow for the planned reductions beginning in 2015
    to occur on time?
        Answer. Generally speaking, I would consider our progress against
    the established security objectives at the time. I would solicit the
    advice of DOD's senior military and civilian leaders to inform my
    judgment on such decisions.
        Question. The Navy and Air Force have requested congressional
    authorization of force management tools to avoid exceeding end strength
    limits and save money.
        In your view, what tools do the Department and Services need to get
    down to authorized strengths in the future, and which of these require
    Congressional authorization?
        Answer. I understand that some of the authorities used during
    previous force reductions have expired or are expiring soon. DOD is
    seeking to renew these authorities and is requesting new legislation to
    size and shape the force. My view is that DOD should make maximum use
    of voluntary authorities; however, great care should be taken to ensure
    those who leave are not going to be needed in the near term. If
    confirmed, I will study this issue closely and rely on the advice of
    both civilian and military professionals at the Department.

                              RECRUITING STANDARDS

        Question. Recruiting highly qualified individuals for military
    service during wartime in a cost-constrained environment presents
    unique challenges. The Army has been criticized in past years for
    relaxing enlistment standards in tough recruiting environments with
    respect to factors such as age, intelligence, weight and physical
    fitness standards, citizenship status, tattoos, and past criminal
    misconduct. On the other hand, as the Deputy Chief of Staff of the
    Army, G-1, recently testified, less than 25 percent of all 17-24 year
    olds are eligible to enlist, primarily due to physical and educational
    requirements.
        What is your assessment of the adequacy of current standards
    regarding qualifications for enlistment in the Armed Forces?
        Answer. From my understanding, the current enlistment qualification
    standards are well-defined and have stood the test of time. They are
    driven by the need to provide the Services with men and women who are
    prepared to adapt to the rigors of military life and meet performance
    requirements. To that end, the Services carefully screen applicants,
    who come from all walks of life. The traditional high school diploma is
    the best single predictor of attrition. Some standards may change over
    time. Medical standards have been revised, for example, as pre-
    enlistment treatments result in improved outcomes.
        Question. In your view, is there any way to increase the pool of
    eligible enlistees without sacrificing quality?
        Answer. From my understanding, the Services are exploring ways to
    improve our ability to predict attrition. The Services may be able to
    augment their screening procedures by incorporating other measures,
    such as personality, to identify applicants who are likely to adapt
    well to the military. If confirmed, I will work with the Services to
    continually find new ways to recruit.
        Question. Are there any enlistment requirements or standards that
    are overly restrictive or which do not directly correlate to successful
    military service?
        Answer. I am not aware that DOD assesses that military enlistment
    standards are overly restrictive. The Services employ fitness,
    adaptability, and aptitude standards which correlate to the physical,
    disciplined, regulated lifestyle and cognitive demands needed to
    succeed in the Armed Forces.
        Question. Do you believe that current policies defining three tiers
    of high school diploma credentials, aimed at minimizing attrition
    during the initial enlistment term, should be retained?
        Answer. My understanding is the Services track the attrition rates
    of military recruits, by a variety of credential types, and traditional
    high school diploma graduates have lower rates of attrition than any
    other type of credential holder.

                             WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

        Question. The Navy has opened service on submarines to women, the
    Marine Corps recently expanded service opportunities for women in
    intelligence specialties, and the Army is reviewing its assignment
    policy for female soldiers. The issue of the appropriate role of women
    in the Armed Forces is a matter of continuing interest to Congress and
    the American public.
        Do you believe additional specialties should be opened up for
    service by women?
        Answer. It is my understanding DOD believes it has sufficient
    flexibility under current law to make appropriate assignment policy for
    women. DOD will continue to monitor combat needs as Services recommend
    expanding combat roles for women and notify Congress accordingly as
    required by statute (10 U.S.C., Sec. 652 and/or Sec. 6035). Any
    decision regarding opening additional specialties for service by women
    should be based on our obligation to maintain a high state of mission
    readiness of our All-Volunteer Force.
        Question. Do you believe any changes in the current policy or
    legislation regarding women in combat are needed or warranted?
        Answer. I understand DOD policies and practices that restrict
    assigning female servicemembers are currently under review per section
    535 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. If
    confirmed, I will take my responsibility to thoroughly review any
    proposed policy change and ensure changes to existing policy move
    forward after appropriate notice to Congress.

                          RISING COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE

        Question. In testimony presented to Congress in February, 2009, the
    Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office asserted that
    ``medical funding accounts for more than one-third of the growth
    projected for operations and support funding between 2009 and 2026.''
    In April, 2009, Secretary Gates told an audience at Maxwell Air Force
    Base that ``health care is eating the Department alive.'' The
    administration has proposed health care efficiencies to save nearly
    $8.0 billion through 2016.
        Do you agree with the proposed health care efficiencies?
        Answer. As they have been described to me, I believe that the
    proposed health care efficiencies are sensible efforts to control DOD's
    health care costs while maintaining the same level of care. I also
    believe the modest increases in beneficiaries' cost shares are
    reasonable.
        Question. What reforms in infrastructure, benefits, or benefit
    management, if any, do you think should be examined in order to control
    the costs of military health care?
        Answer. While the proposals included in the fiscal year 2012
    President's budget are a significant first step, I believe that we need
    to continue to explore all possibilities to control the costs of
    military health care. In the long term, the promotion of healthy life
    styles and prevention among our beneficiaries is one way to help reduce
    the demand for health services.
        Question. What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising
    medical costs on future DOD plans?
        Answer. I understand that even with the estimated savings from the
    health care efficiencies proposed in the fiscal year 2012 budget, the
    cost of the Military Health System continues to increase as a
    percentage of the DOD budget and will exceed 10 percent of the budget
    in just a few years.
        During a period when there is heavy downward pressure on all
    Federal spending, including defense spending, we must make smart
    choices that permit us to maintain a balance between personnel benefits
    and funding for equipment and readiness.
        If confirmed, one of my highest priorities would be to ensure that
    DOD provides quality care, and it does so in a way that provides the
    best value for our servicemembers and their families, as well as the
    American taxpayer.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you initiate or
    recommend to mitigate the effect of such costs on the DOD top-line?
        Answer. I cannot make specific recommendations at this time. If
    confirmed, I would work closely with the health care leadership in DOD
    to examine every opportunity to ensure military beneficiaries are
    provided the highest quality care possible while managing cost growth.

                        PERSONNEL AND ENTITLEMENT COSTS

        Question. In addition to health care costs, personnel and related
    entitlement spending continues to grow and is becoming an ever
    increasing portion of the DOD budget.
        What actions do you believe can and should be taken, if any, to
    control the rise in personnel costs and entitlement spending?
        Answer. I am aware that an increasing portion of DOD's limited
    resources are devoted to personnel-related costs.
        I understand there have been many incremental adjustments to
    military pay and benefits over the years; however, much of the military
    compensation system remains rooted in structures established
    generations ago. If we are going to manage costs, I believe everything
    must be on the table. It may be appropriate to conduct a comprehensive
    review of the military pay and benefits structure to determine where
    costs can be contained.
        I believe that it may be possible to restructure our military
    benefits in a way that reduces costs, but any such effort must continue
    to attract and support our men and women in uniform and their families
    in a wide variety of situations.
        Question. In your view, can the Department and the Services
    efficiently manage the use of bonuses and special pays to place high
    quality recruits in the right jobs without paying more than the
    Department needs to pay, or can afford to pay, for other elements of
    the force?
        Answer. I understand recruiting and retention bonuses are cost-
    effective tools to achieve DOD's personnel strength and experience
    objectives. However, we must continually monitor these tools to ensure
    they are being used efficiently as well as effectively. A review of the
    utilization and efficacy of bonuses should certainly be part of any
    comprehensive review of the military pay and benefits structure.

                              MILITARY RETIREMENT

        Question. The 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation
    (QRMC) proposed a new defined benefit retirement plan that more
    resembles the benefits available under the Federal Employee Retirement
    System than the current military retirement benefit; increasing TRICARE
    fees for retirees; and the adoption of dependent care and flexible
    spending accounts for servicemembers. The head of a Defense Business
    Board Task Force has criticized military benefits as ``GM-style
    benefits'' describing the military retirement system as a ``pre-
    volunteer force retirement system'' and criticizing ``taxpayer-
    subsidized grocery chains and low out-of-pocket healthcare costs''.
        What is your view of the adequacy of the current military
    retirement benefit?
        Answer. I understand that the military retirement system was
    created in an earlier era and, in general, accomplishes the purpose for
    which it was designed; to provide a strong incentive to attain 20 years
    of service and then to leave shortly thereafter. To maintain the right
    military force structure, the comprehensive mix of pay and benefits,
    which includes military retirement, needs to be adequate. However, over
    time, the world has changed and private-sector compensation practices
    have changed, but the military retirement system has remained
    essentially the same. I believe it may be appropriate to also review
    the military retirement system for needed changes and efficiencies.
        Question. How might it be modernized to reflect the needs of a new
    generation of recruits, while easing the long-term retirement cost of
    the government?
        Answer. I understand there are many proposed alternatives to the
    current military retirement system. I am unable to make recommendations
    at this time but will closely study proposals and their impact if
    confirmed.
        Question. Do you share the Defense Business Board Task Force view
    of military benefits?
        Answer. I am aware that the Defense Business Board is reviewing
    military retirement, but I do not believe it has released their report.
    I look forward to reviewing it once it is made available. I agree that
    it may be possible to restructure our military benefits in a way that
    reduces costs, but any such effort must continue to attract and support
    our men and women in uniform and their families.

                 DEPENDENT CARE AND FLEXIBLE SPENDING ACCOUNTS

        Question. The 10th QRMC recommended providing dependent care and
    flexible spending benefits to Active-Duty servicemembers. Providing
    these benefits would seem consistent with the initiatives of First Lady
    Michelle Obama and Dr. Jill Biden on behalf of military families. It
    would appear that no new legislative authority is needed for the
    Department to provide these benefits to servicemembers and their
    families.
        If confirmed, would you extend these benefits to the active duty
    servicemembers and their families?
        Answer. I understand that in response to the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, DOD examined and provided a
    report on the advantages and disadvantages of providing flexible
    spending accounts to military members. If confirmed, I will review
    whether flexible spending accounts should be extended to Active-Duty
    servicemembers and their families.

                    SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED WARRIORS

        Question. Servicemembers who are wounded or injured performing
    duties in Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn
    deserve the highest priority from their Service for support services,
    healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to
    duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and
    continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet, as the
    revelations at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) in 2007
    illustrated, the Services were not prepared to meet the needs of
    significant numbers of returning wounded servicemembers. Despite the
    enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis, many challenges remain,
    including a growing population of soldiers awaiting disability
    evaluation.
        What is your assessment of the progress made to date by DOD and the
    Services to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously
    ill and injured servicemembers and their families?
        Answer. Although I do not have sufficient information to make a
    full assessment at this time, I am aware that significant improvements
    in these areas have been made in the last 4 years. However, it is my
    opinion that more must be done. If confirmed, I will strive to ensure
    DOD regularly evaluates and seeks to improve its wounded warrior
    programs to ensure that the needs of our wounded warriors and their
    families are met.
        Question. What are the strengths upon which continued progress
    should be based?
        Answer. In my opinion, one of the most significant strengths is the
    high priority which DOD has placed on caring for our wounded warriors
    and their families. In my view, next to the wars themselves, there is
    no higher priority, and if confirmed, I will continue to place the
    highest priority on these efforts.
        Question. What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?
        Answer. A challenge facing DOD in this area, as in other areas, is
    to ensure that in delivering the highest standard of care for our
    wounded, ill and injured, we do so in an effective and cost-efficient
    manner.
        Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and
    resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded
    servicemembers and their families, and to monitor their progress in
    returning to duty or to civilian life?
        Answer. I do not have any specific recommendations at this time. If
    confirmed, I will closely monitor and evaluate this issue to ensure
    necessary resources are in place to take care of our recovering
    wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers and their families.
        Question. Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at WRAMC
    pointed to the need to reform the disability evaluation system (DES). A
    DES pilot program, and now an Integrated DES program, have been
    established to improve processing of servicemembers.
        What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and
    improve the Integrated DES?
        Answer. I have been told that a revised and improved disability
    evaluation system developed by the Departments of Defense and Veterans
    Affairs, known as the Integrated Disability Evaluation System, today
    serves over half of those in the system, and that its wide adoption is
    a priority of the VA and DOD leadership. I do not currently have any
    specific recommendations regarding the Integrated Disability Evaluation
    System, but I support these ongoing efforts and, if confirmed, will
    look for opportunities to further improve on them.
        Question. If confirmed, how will you address any need for change,
    particularly the Army's growing problem?
        Answer. I do not have specific recommendations at this time, but,
    if confirmed, I will work with DOD and VA to continually evaluate the
    system and identify opportunities for improvement.

                 SUICIDE PREVENTION AND MENTAL HEALTH RESOURCES

        Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the services has
    increased in recent years. The Army released a report in July 2010 that
    analyzed the causes of its growing suicide rate and examined disturbing
    trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high risk behaviors. In
    addition, studies conducted by the Army of soldiers and marines in
    theater are showing declines in individual morale and increases in
    mental health strain, especially among those who have experienced
    multiple deployments.
        In your view, what role should DOD play in shaping policies to help
    prevent suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase the
    resiliency of all servicemembers and their families, including members
    of the Reserve components?
        Answer. The rise in suicides in the military and by veterans is
    tragic and DOD has a responsibility to address the factors that
    contribute to suicidal behavior among our military men and women
    whether they are deployed, at a military installation or in their home
    communities. I understand all of the Services have implemented
    prevention and resilience building programs. The Final Report of the
    Department of Defense Task Force on the Prevention of Suicide by
    Members of the Armed Forces is being used as a vehicle to review all
    Departmental policies and procedures related to suicide prevention. If
    confirmed, I will ensure that DOD continues to improve suicide
    prevention policies and processes.
        Question. What is your understanding of the action that the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense and the Army are taking in response to the
    July 2010 Army report, and the data in Chapter 3 in particular?
        Answer. While I have not had the opportunity to read Army Health
    Promotion, Risk Reduction, Suicide Prevention Report 2010, I know that
    sustaining a force steadily engaged in combat for over a decade has
    unexpected challenges. Some of those challenges include a rise in
    ``high risk'' behaviors and suicides. It is my understanding the Army's
    report provided an introspective look at these issues and concluded
    that suicide and other high risk behaviors must be addressed with a
    more holistic and multidisciplinary approach. If confirmed, I will work
    to see the Services share lessons learned to jointly address these risk
    factors.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that
    sufficient mental health resources are available to servicemembers in
    theater, and to the servicemembers and their families upon return to
    home station?
        Answer. Ensuring that our servicemembers and their families have
    sufficient access to the mental health resources that they need is
    critical to the wellness of our total force. I am advised that DOD is
    working to determine workforce requirements for mental health
    professionals, and utilizing all the medical, educational, and
    counseling resources available, but there is further room for
    improvement. If confirmed, I will monitor how well we are meeting these
    goals by assessing current utilization rates and further determining
    ways in which we can leverage more resources for our servicemembers and
    their families.

                            MILITARY QUALITY OF LIFE

        Question. In January 2009, the Department published its second
    Quadrennial Quality of Life Review, which focused on the importance of
    key quality of life factors for military families, such as family
    support, child care, education, health care and morale, welfare and
    recreation services.
        How do you perceive the relationship between military recruitment
    and retention and quality of life improvements and your own top
    priorities for the Armed Forces?
        Answer. While I have not had the opportunity to read the
    Quadrennial Quality of Life Review, I know that quality of life
    factors, such as those highlighted in the report, contribute
    significantly to recruiting and retention are key to maintaining the
    All-Volunteer Force. It is well known that a servicemember's
    satisfaction with various aspects of military life, as well as the
    servicemember's family's experience, has a strong influence on a
    member's decision to reenlist. If confirmed, I will monitor how
    effectively DOD programs, in conjunction with community efforts, meet
    the needs of servicemembers and their families, and ensure that they
    are contributing positively to recruitment and retention.
        Question. If confirmed, what further enhancements to military
    quality of life would you consider a priority, and how do you envision
    working with the Services, combatant commanders, family advocacy
    groups, and Congress to achieve them?
        Answer. I understand the importance of quality of life programs on
    the wellness of the total force as well as on recruiting and retention.
    If confirmed, I will study the key areas such as access to counseling,
    fitness opportunities, child care support and spouse employment
    opportunities. I look forward to working with advocacy groups and
    Congress to efficiently close gaps and reduce overlaps in programs and
    to communicate effectively with families to ensure that they know how
    to access available support when they need it.

                                 FAMILY SUPPORT

        Question. Military members and their families in both the Active
    and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous
    sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military
    leaders have warned of growing concerns among military families as a
    result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations
    that go with them.
        What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
    issues for servicemembers and their families, and, if confirmed, how
    would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and
    adequately resourced?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will study this issue in great detail, but
    I believe that family readiness is tethered to family resilience. It is
    DOD's responsibility to ensure that families are well prepared to meet
    the challenges that come with deployment and service. Through focusing
    on the psychological, social, financial, and educational well-being of
    military families, DOD can continue to build family resilience. I
    understand that great strides have been made in improving access to
    resources for families through such programs as Military One Source,
    the Yellow Ribbon Program, but DOD can always improve.
        Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
    light of global rebasing, base realignment and closure, deployments,
    and growth in end strength?
        Answer. Given upcoming structural changes across the world, it is
    DOD's responsibility to ensure that all resources including those in
    health care, education and employment are available to families at the
    level they need wherever they may be located. In order to accurately
    address the needs of these families in a changing environment, it is
    also critical to DOD's success to build community partnerships between
    all Federal agencies and with local governments, businesses, and non-
    profit organizations that are stakeholders in addressing the stressful
    aspects of military life. If confirmed, I will monitor the changing
    needs of our military families closely.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support to Reserve
    component families related to mobilization, deployment and family
    readiness, as well as to Active Duty families who do not reside near a
    military installation?
        Answer. DOD has a duty to ensure that every family has access to
    quality resources, regardless of location. These resources should
    provide information, access, referrals, and outreach to all military
    members and their families. This needs to be underwritten by a
    coordinated, community based network of care encompassing DOD, VA,
    State, local, non-profit and private providers. It is my understanding
    that DOD's Yellow Ribbon Program has been successful in addressing
    these needs. If confirmed, I will assess this program to ensure that it
    is properly focused and funded to address the issues faced by Active
    Duty, Guard, and Reserve servicemembers and their families.
        Question. If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to
    enhance family support?
        Answer. During my pre-hearing office calls, I heard about many
    excellent State programs that support servicemembers and their
    families. If confirmed, I would like to explore these further and see
    if they can be expanded across all States.
        Question. In your view, are the recent increases in military family
    support (which have risen to $8.3 billion in the fiscal year 2012
    President's budget) sustainable in future years?
        Answer. I believe family programs are sustainable in future years.
    It will be necessary to review family programs with respect to
    efficiencies just as every other program in DOD will be reviewed
    against the overall needs of DOD. The focus should not merely be on
    more resources, but rather on the efficiency and quality of Family
    Support programs along with the leveraging community-level
    organizations and citizens who desire to help their military-connected
    neighbors. DOD efficiency, along with community partnerships and
    cooperation, are key to allowing DOD to meet the long-term needs of our
    military families in an ever-increasing fiscally constrained
    environment.

                           DETAINEE TREATMENT POLICY

        Question. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006,
    memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all
    relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
    procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
    Conventions?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
    specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
    22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
    Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies
    promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence
    interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply
    with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field
    Manual on Interrogations?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you share the view that standards for detainee
    treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that
    we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat
    our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S.
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be
    captured in future conflicts?
        Answer. Yes, I believe that DOD's leadership should always be
    mindful of multiple considerations when developing standards for
    detainee treatment, including the risk that the manner in which we
    treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which
    U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be
    captured in future conflicts.
        Question. Do you consider waterboarding to be torture?
        Answer. As I stated at my February 2009 confirmation hearing and
    prior to that hearing, I believe that waterboarding crosses the line
    and should not be employed. Having said that, I also believe, as the
    President has indicated, that those individuals who operated pursuant
    to a legal opinion indicating that the technique was proper and legal
    ought not to be prosecuted or investigated. They were acting pursuant
    to the law as it was presented to them by the Attorney General at that
    time.
        Question. Do you believe that waterboarding is consistent with the
    requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
        Answer. As stated, I have expressed the view that I believe that
    waterboarding crosses the line and should not be employed. I therefore
    believe that waterboarding is inconsistent with the requirements of
    Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention.
        Question. Do you believe that we have obtained intelligence through
    waterboarding that we would not have been able to obtain through other
    means?
        Answer. As I have stated previously, the Intelligence Community
    relies on many sources of information. Whether that technique is the
    only way to obtain certain information is an open question, as I have
    repeatedly said. If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I will ensure
    that all interrogations conducted by DOD personnel are conducted
    consistent with the Department of the Army Field Manual 2-22.3 and in
    accord with Geneva Conventions Common Article 3.
        Question. Do you believe that the intelligence we received through
    waterboarding was accurate, or did we receive false leads?
        Answer. I cannot generalize about the quality of the intelligence
    that has been obtained through any particular technique. I am aware of
    instances in which useful information has been obtained from detainees
    and other instances in which detainees sought to provide false
    information.
        Question. Are there any circumstances under which you believe the
    United States should resume waterboarding of detainees?
        Answer. As I testified at my February 2009 confirmation hearing, I
    fully support the President's decision to establish the Army Field
    Manual, which does not permit waterboarding, as the single standard
    applying to all interrogations by U.S. Government personnel and have
    upheld this standard while I was CIA Director. I will continue to do so
    if confirmed as Secretary of Defense. I believe we should do everything
    possible to collect intelligence while remaining in compliance with the
    law.
        Question. Are you familiar with the ``enhanced interrogation
    techniques,'' other than waterboarding, that have been applied to so-
    called ``high value detainees'' at Guantanamo and elsewhere?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you believe that these enhanced interrogation
    techniques are consistent with the requirements of Common Article 3 of
    the Geneva Conventions?
        Answer. I would refrain to offer a legal opinion on this question
    as the answer also depends upon the nature and extent of the technique
    employed.

             COORDINATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        Question. After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
    Congress established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and DOD
    established the U.S. Northern Command and an Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs.
        What is your assessment of the current situation regarding
    cooperation and coordination between DOD and DHS on homeland security
    matters, and what will be your goals in this regard if you are
    confirmed?
        Answer. I understand that DOD has established a strong relationship
    with DHS.
        I believe DOD and DHS have a common goal: the protection of the
    United States.
        Elements of DOD work very closely with a number of the operational
    components of DHS including the Coast Guard, the Federal Emergency
    Management Agency (FEMA), the Secret Service, Customs and Boarder
    Protection, and others.
        DOD and DHS work hand in hand with the Council of Governors to
    reach common goals. I understand DOD has a number of liaison and
    coordination officers throughout DHS and its components. I also
    understand that there are a number of cyber security related issues on
    which the Departments are also in collaboration.
        If confirmed, my goal would be to continue this strong relationship
    and build upon a number of these important initiatives.
        Question. What do you believe is the appropriate mechanism for DOD
    to respond to the needs of domestic agencies for DOD support--whether
    through new or modified programs within DOD or otherwise?
        Answer. I understand the mechanisms for DOD to respond to the needs
    of domestic agencies appear to be working effectively. During the 2010
    Deepwater Horizon oil spill, DOD responded to 141 requests for
    assistance from DHS and the U.S. Coast Guard, by providing ships to
    skim surface oil, air traffic control capabilities, and other critical
    assets. DOD has responded to over 50 requests for assistance from FEMA
    in the past year for a variety of disasters. DOD also regularly assists
    other agencies in the homeland as well, including the Department of
    Agriculture for fighting wildfires, and the Secret Service for security
    during special events such as the Presidential Inaugural. If confirmed,
    I will work closely with domestic agencies to ensure DOD is prepared to
    continue to support civil authorities, when appropriate.

                              IRAQ LESSONS LEARNED

        Question. What do you believe are the major lessons learned from
    the Iraq invasion and the ongoing effort to stabilize the country?
        Answer. One of the most important lessons is the U.S. Government
    must train and plan for post-combat operations. Conflict can occur
    along a spectrum. Our military must be prepared for combat, but also
    may have a role in shaping the political, cultural and economic factors
    that can fuel conflict. The U.S. military must plan and train with
    civilian counterparts, be prepared to operate effectively in all phases
    of conflict, and develop better awareness of political, cultural, and
    economic factors to ensure that our actions will meet our objectives.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the
    Department's adaptations or changes in policy, programs, force
    structure, or operational concepts based upon these lessons learned?
        Answer. I understand that lessons learned from Iraq and other
    recent engagements have led to deep and wide-ranging changes in
    doctrine, organization, training, and policy. For example, the
    counterinsurgency doctrine has been completely revised, culminating in
    the publication of Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24. The development
    of Advise and Assist Brigades and intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance units are examples of force structure changes.
        Question. If confirmed, what additional changes, if any, would you
    propose making to policy, programs, force structure, or operating
    concepts based on the lessons of combat and stability operations in
    Iraq?
        Answer. I am not in a position to recommend specific measures at
    this time. I understand that many of the lessons from Iraq are in the
    process of being integrated into DOD policy and doctrine, and are
    contributing to the effort in Afghanistan. If confirmed, I will monitor
    this ongoing process closely.

                         LEAD AGENCY TRANSITION IN IRAQ

        Question. Responsibility and authority for lead U.S. agency in Iraq
    is scheduled this year to transition from DOD to Department of State
    (DOS). By October 2011, DOS is supposed to achieve an initial operating
    capability as lead agency and achieve full operating capability by
    December.
        What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the planning
    and progress on executing this transition from DOD to DOS? In your
    view, what are the sources of greatest risk, if any, to the current
    plan and successful implementation of this transition?
        Answer. DOD, State Department, and other agencies and offices have
    undertaken unprecedented levels of coordination and planning for the
    transition in Iraq. I understand that DOD has an excellent working
    relationship with DOS and that the two departments are working together
    at all levels to achieve a successful transition. As one would expect
    with a transition of this scope and complexity, challenges exist and
    DOD is doing everything it can to help set up DOS for success.
        The biggest concern I am aware of is that the State Department may
    not receive the resources it needs for the transition.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to
    the current plan or actions for implementation of the transition?
        Answer. I believe the current plans are sufficient, based on what I
    have been briefed to date. If confirmed, I would review and assess the
    Iraq transition planning and make recommendations on any necessary
    changes.

                        STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

        Question. The U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has
    underscored the importance of planning and training to prepare for the
    conduct and support of stability and support operations in post-
    conflict situations.
        In your view, what are the appropriate roles and responsibilities,
    if any, between DOD and other departments and agencies of the Federal
    Government in the planning and conduct of stability operations?
        Answer. As seen in recent operations, there is a great need for
    economic development, governance, and law enforcement experts who work
    for the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development
    (USAID), and the Justice Department. As appropriate, I understand that
    DOD operates within U.S. Government and international structures for
    managing civil-military operations, and will seek to enable the
    deployment and use of the appropriate civilian capabilities and
    resources. Ideally, I understand that DOD usually will be in a
    supporting role. But when no other options are available, and when
    directed, DOD has led stability operations activities to establish
    civil security and control and to restore essential services, repair
    and protect critical infrastructure, deliver humanitarian assistance,
    and then transitioned lead responsibility to other U.S. Government
    agencies, foreign governments and security forces, and international
    governmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations.
        Question. In developing the capabilities necessary for stability
    operations, what adjustments, if any, should be made to prepare U.S.
    Armed Forces to conduct stability operations without detracting from
    its ability to perform combat missions?
        Answer. I note DOD policy states that ``stability operations are a
    core U.S. military mission that DOD shall be prepared to conduct with
    proficiency equivalent to combat operations.'' This represents a
    significant cultural and programmatic shift in recent years. If
    confirmed, I intend to familiarize myself with the efforts of the
    Military Departments to enhance proficiency on these missions and will
    work with the Chairman, the Military Department Secretaries, and
    Service Chiefs to ensure appropriate adjustments are made.
        Question. Do you believe that the authorities provided under
    section 1206 (Building the Capacity of Foreign Military Forces) and
    section 1207 (Security and Stabilization Assistance) of the National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 contribute to a policy
    of military engagement?
        Answer. I believe the authorities provided under sections 1206 and
    1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006
    have made the government more agile in its ability to respond to urgent
    and emergent counterterrorism and stabilization challenges. I am told
    that the ``dual-key'' processes established to manage these projects
    have fostered greater collaboration between the Departments of State
    and Defense. If confirmed, I intend to apply the lessons learned from
    our experience with these programs in future security and stabilization
    assistance efforts with Secretary Clinton and other interagency
    partners.
        Question. Do you believe that the U.S. Government needs to
    establish new organizations or offices to manage stability operations?
    If so, why?
        Answer. Although I have not studied this issue in detail, my
    understanding is that the U.S. Government does not need to establish
    new organizations or offices to manage stability operations. If
    confirmed, however, I will be open to the advice of others on this
    issue.
        Question. Do you believe that the U.S. Government needs to
    establish new procedures to manage stability operations? If so, why?
        Answer. I think one area where we can improve is to strengthen our
    combined ability to conduct ``whole-of-government'' planning which will
    enhance the management and the effectiveness of the U.S. Government's
    stabilization and reconstruction activities. If confirmed, I will
    review how to make such planning a priority.
        Question. What role do you believe DOD should play in providing
    training and advocacy for ``rule of law'' development in Iraq and
    Afghanistan?
        Answer. Without fair and effective rule of law, neither Iraq nor
    Afghanistan will be able to prevent the return of terrorists. Both
    countries require U.S. Government assistance in rule of law capacity
    building in such areas as civilian police forces, attorneys, and
    judges. I strongly support the State Department's lead in this critical
    endeavor. However, in fragile security environments, my sense is that
    DOD rule of law practitioners can also play a major and useful role in
    providing training and assistance.

                           SECURITY SITUATION IN IRAQ

        Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation
    in Iraq?
        Answer. Iraq still faces dangerous and determined enemies, but
    these enemies do not have the support of the Iraqi people. Although
    occasional high-profile attacks still occur, the underlying security
    situation in Iraq remains stable and these attacks have not sparked a
    return to widespread insurgency or civil war.
        Question. What are the main challenges to stability and security in
    Iraq over the coming months?
        Answer. The main challenges to internal stability and security in
    Iraq are al Qaeda in Iraq and Iranian-backed Shia extremist groups.
    Moreover, the unresolved status of territories claimed by the Kurdistan
    Regional Government has the potential to create fissures that can be
    exploited by extremist groups, and could even lead to an escalation of
    tension between Kurdish and central government forces. However, with
    sustained political engagement by Iraqi leaders and a strong U.S.
    support role, the ISF should be able to handle these challenges.

                                DRAWDOWN IN IRAQ

        Question. Do you support the current plan for the drawdown of U.S.
    forces from Iraq consistent with the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement of
    2008 signed by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. If the Government of Iraq were to ask for the continued
    presence in Iraq of U.S. forces beyond the end of 2011, would you
    support the deployment or retention of additional troops in Iraq beyond
    the current deadline for U.S. troop withdrawal?
        Answer. Iraqi leaders and U.S. officials have acknowledged that
    there will be gaps in Iraqi Security Forces' capabilities after 2011,
    especially in external defense. I believe the United States should
    consider a request from the Government of Iraq to remain in Iraq for a
    limited period of time to provide limited assistance to fill these
    gaps.

                        U.S.-IRAQ STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

        Question. In your view, what will be the nature of the U.S.-Iraq
    strategic relationship after December 31, 2011?
        Answer. The nature of the U.S.-Iraq strategic relationship desired
    by both countries is articulated in the November 2008 Strategic
    Framework Agreement (SFA). The SFA establishes a structure for
    cooperation and collaboration across a variety of sectors, including
    commercial, education, cultural, political, energy, and defense.
        Question. What do you see as the greatest challenges for that
    relationship over the coming years?
        Answer. The greatest challenges will be maintaining U.S. engagement
    and support for Iraq during a time of change. Recent turmoil in the
    broader Middle East highlights the importance of active U.S. engagement
    and maintaining strategic partnerships with regional partners based on
    mutual interests and mutual respect. We must maintain focus on Iraq in
    order to advance broader U.S. objectives of peace and security in the
    region.

                     AFGHANISTAN COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY

        Question. Do you support the counterinsurgency strategy for
    Afghanistan? In your view, is that the right strategy?
        Answer. Yes, I support the strategy that the President has set
    forth and I believe it is the right strategy. We have the necessary
    resources and strategy in place to succeed in our focused
    counterinsurgency campaign. This strategy has reversed the insurgency's
    momentum and is helping the Afghans increase their governance capacity
    and build security forces that are capable of providing the security
    and basic services necessary to achieve a peaceful, stable Afghanistan
    that does not again become a safe haven for terrorists. The gains made
    are fragile and reversible.
        Question. If confirmed, are there changes you would recommend to
    the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan? For example, would you support an
    increase in counterterrorism action in Afghanistan?
        Answer. I believe U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is sound. The
    administration tracks metrics of progress throughout the year and
    conducts annual reviews to determine whether adjustments are necessary.
    Counterterrorism is a significant part of the counterinsurgency
    strategy, and managing the balance of all aspects of the strategy is an
    ongoing process.
        Question. What is your assessment of the progress of the
    counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan?
        Answer. Important gains have been made over the past 18 months,
    establishing security and Afghan Government authority in former Taliban
    strongholds such as Helmand and Kandahar, as well as building the
    capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces. Although the gains are
    fragile and reversible, momentum has shifted to the Afghan Government,
    and they are on track to begin the transition process by assuming lead
    security responsibilities in several areas of the country this summer.
        Question. In your view, how significant an impact does the death of
    Osama bin Laden have on the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan?
        Answer. The death of Osama bin Laden is a significant victory in
    our campaign to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, which is the
    core goal of our efforts in Afghanistan. The successful operation does
    not mean we can rest, but rather we have a unique opportunity to make
    new gains on al Qaeda while it is in disarray. It is too early to
    assess the long-term impact of his death, but it clearly conveys our
    persistence, determination and capability to achieve our goals.

      TRANSITION OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY IN AFGHANISTAN AND U.S. TROOP
                                   REDUCTIONS

        Question. Do you support the July 2011 date announced by President
    Obama to begin transferring more and more responsibility for
    Afghanistan's security to the Afghan security forces and to begin the
    drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, with the pace of reductions
    to be based on conditions on the ground?
        Answer. I support the July 2011 date to begin the process of
    transferring lead security responsibility to the Afghan National
    Security Forces (ANSF) and to begin a responsible, conditions-based
    drawdown of U.S. forces. Over the preceding 18 months, the
    International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its ANSF partners
    have made significant gains in the overall security environment. Their
    hard-earned gains have set the necessary conditions to begin the
    transition of responsibility.
        Question. Do you support a significant drawdown of U.S. troops
    starting in July of this year?
        Answer. I support a responsible conditions-based drawdown as called
    for by the President. I believe we have made the progress necessary to
    give the President meaningful options for his decision. Decisions
    regarding the size and pace of the drawdown will be based on
    commanders' assessment of conditions and warfighting requirements.
        Question. In your view, what impact, if any, does the death of
    Osama bin Laden have on the size or time table for the reduction of
    U.S. troops in Afghanistan?
        Answer. It is too early to know the implications of Osama bin
    Laden's death on the region and how it will affect the campaign. While
    bin Laden's death sends a clear message to other al Qaeda and Taliban
    senior leaders about U.S. resolve, there are no indications at this
    stage of what impact, if any, it might have for decisions regarding the
    size or time table for reducing forces in Afghanistan.
        Question. Do you support the goal of transitioning security
    responsibility to the Afghan security forces by 2014?
        Answer. Yes. At the NATO Summit in Lisbon, the participants in ISAF
    endorsed President Karzai's goal of ANSF assuming lead responsibility
    for security throughout Afghanistan by 2014. Although much work is
    still left, I am confident that this objective can be met.

                      AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

        Question. What is your assessment of the progress in developing a
    professional and effective ANSF?
        Answer. The ANSF have made enormous progress in size and quality
    over the past 2 years and remain ahead of schedule for their growth
    targets this year. In addition, both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and
    Afghan National Police (ANP) have made significant gains in
    effectiveness and professionalism, although more remains to be
    achieved. The establishment of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program
    has also fostered greater local capability to resist insurgents. U.S.
    and NATO efforts to recruit, train, equip, and deploy these forces, in
    conjunction with very capable Afghan Ministers of Defense and Interior,
    are paying real dividends on the ground in Afghanistan. These gains
    have set the ANSF on a path to be capable of assuming lead security
    responsibilities across Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
        Question. Do you support the increase in the size of the ANSF
    beyond the level of 305,000 by the fall of 2012?
        Answer. Yes. Military commanders, who are closest to the problem
    and have expert knowledge, have conducted detailed studies on ANSF
    personnel and capabilities requirements. These requirements were
    developed by examining the terrain, the strength of the enemy, and the
    core goals in the DOD campaign plan. In order to ensure the Afghans
    have the capabilities they need to secure their country in the current
    threat environment, continued ANSF growth is needed. The President has
    endorsed growth to 352,000 and I support that decision.
        Question. What do you see as the main challenges to building the
    capacity of the ANSF and, if confirmed, what recommendations, if any,
    would you make for addressing those challenges?
        Answer. Some of the main challenges to building the capacity of the
    ANSF include poor literacy rates and low education levels in the Afghan
    population which constrain the development of more advanced
    capabilities such as logistics, aviation, medical and communications
    units. These are capabilities that will be necessary for the ANSF to
    ensure Afghanistan does not again become a safe haven for terrorists.
    NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan has put a lot of attention on, and
    resources toward, the literacy problem. Another key challenge is the
    development of strong and capable leadership, which takes time and
    experience. If confirmed, I will work with military and civilian
    leaders and international partners to explore ways to bolster ANSF
    capacity.

                       AFGHAN GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

        Question. While improving security for the Afghan people is a key
    component of our counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, the success
    of that strategy also depends on improving the Government of
    Afghanistan's capacity to provide governance, better services and
    economic development. Significant concerns remain over the performance
    of the Government of Afghanistan in meeting the needs of the Afghan
    people and fighting corruption.
        What do you see as the role for DOD in building the capacity of the
    Government of Afghanistan to deliver services, provide better
    governance, improve economic development and fight corruption in
    Afghanistan?
        Answer. I strongly agree that improving governance and economic
    development is as crucial to our strategy in Afghanistan as is
    improving security. While DOS and USAID are the lead agencies within
    the U.S. Government on governance and development initiatives in
    Afghanistan, the DOD contributes to this effort and must cooperate
    closely with State and USAID. Coordinating DOD stabilization projects
    with civilian reconstruction and development efforts ensures that the
    military and civilian activities work together to support longer-term
    development objectives, as well as near-term stabilization.
        In areas where civilians cannot operate independently due to an
    insecure environment, they regularly collaborate with military
    counterparts. Recognizing that corruption erodes the legitimacy of the
    Afghan state and fuels the insurgency, the Commander, ISAF, created
    Task Force Shafafiyat (``Transparency'') to foster a common
    understanding of the corruption problem and coordinate anti-corruption
    efforts among ISAF, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, the Afghan Government, and
    the international community. The task force has enabled ISAF to begin
    helping the Afghans address corruption and has improved U.S.
    contracting practices to ensure our funds are not being used in ways
    that contribute to the corruption that enables the insurgency

                                 RECONCILIATION

        Question. Under what conditions should reconciliation talks with
    the Taliban leadership be pursued?
        Answer. The President has clearly outlined our support for an
    Afghan-led process to achieve a political resolution to the conflict in
    Afghanistan. I support Afghan Government efforts to achieve the
    reconciliation of groups and individuals who agree to cut ties with al
    Qaeda, cease violence, and accept the Afghan Constitution.
        Question. What is your assessment of the likelihood that such
    conditions may be achieved in the near future?
        Answer. The clear successes we have seen in the military campaign
    are helping to create the conditions for reconciliation. The insurgency
    does not represent a clear hierarchy, and includes a variety of
    competing and affiliated groups. Resolution of the conflict in
    Afghanistan will likely require a process that includes both national
    and local dispute resolution. I am optimistic that the sustained
    combination of our military, governance, and diplomatic efforts is
    helping to set the conditions for the Afghan Government to build the
    political consensus that will ultimately bring about a resolution to
    the conflict.

                   U.S. STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN

        Question. What in your view are the key U.S. strategic interests
    with regard to Pakistan?
        Answer. Most importantly, the core national security goal remains,
    to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its militant allies, and
    eliminate their capacity to threaten the United States and its allies
    in the future. U.S. strategic interests in Pakistan encompass both our
    relationship with Pakistan itself and Pakistan's role in the campaign
    against al Qaeda. Al Qaeda and other extremists use safe-havens in
    Pakistan to plot and prepare attacks against the U.S. and our allies
    and partners, and it is essential to continue working with Pakistan to
    eliminate these safe havens.
        In addition, Pakistan's civilian-led government requires
    international support to maintain political stability and to work
    toward the ability to govern all of its territory effectively. The fact
    that Pakistan is a nuclear state that faces internal threats from
    extremist organizations adds to the urgency of these requirements.
    Furthermore, U.S. economic interests in South Asia require stability in
    the region. Preventing, if possible, a potential Pakistan-India
    conflict is another important and strategic interest. For these
    reasons, it is in the United States' interest for Pakistan to have a
    strong civilian-led government and an open society, to live in peace
    and security with its neighbors, and to ensure its nuclear assets
    remain secure, in accordance with international standards. If
    confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress as we pursue these
    strategic interests with Pakistan.
        Question. U.S. and Pakistan officials have been working together
    for years to counter the threat of terrorism. However, the revelation
    that Osama bin Laden has been hiding out apparently for years at a
    spacious, highly-secure compound in Pakistan, less than 35 miles from
    the capital, has raised disturbing questions about the nature of
    Pakistan's cooperation with the United States in the fight against
    terrorism.
        What in your view are the key lessons from the operation to kill
    Osama bin Laden for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship?
        Answer. The operation against Osama bin Laden was a vital element
    of the President's comprehensive strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and
    defeat al Qaeda, but it is far from the only element in this strategy.
    One of the key lessons from this operation is that we have seen no
    clear evidence to indicate that senior Pakistani leaders were involved
    in harboring Osama bin Laden or knew of his whereabouts. Although the
    relationship with Pakistan is not always easy and we have our
    differences, continuing cooperation with Pakistan is critical to keep a
    tremendous amount of pressure on al Qaeda's leadership and the networks
    that provide it support and safe haven at a time when it is most
    vulnerable. The operation presents a historic opportunity not only for
    us, but also for Pakistan, to advance our shared interests and
    strengthen our cooperation in eradicating terrorist networks that
    threaten both nations. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our
    partners in both Afghanistan and Pakistan to achieve our goal of
    eliminating terrorist networks that threaten the United States and our
    allies and partners and continue to seek Pakistan's unambiguous support
    in the fight against al Qaeda and the regional syndicate of terrorist
    networks.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
    for U.S. relations with Pakistan, particularly in terms of military-to-
    military relations?
        Answer. Our military-to-military relationship with Pakistan, like
    our overall relationship, has featured ups and downs and is challenged
    by a long-term lack of trust within Pakistan about our intentions. If
    confirmed I will continue to focus on building the trust that is
    necessary for the effective partnership we need with Pakistan.

                          U.S. ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

        Question. Since 2001, the United States has provided significant
    military assistance to Pakistan, including foreign military financing
    and training and equipment through the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund
    to build the capacity of the Pakistan Army and Frontier Scouts to
    conduct counterinsurgency operations. In addition, the United States
    has provided significant funds to reimburse Pakistan for the costs
    associated with military operations conducted by Pakistan along the
    Afghanistan-Pakistan border and other support provided in connection
    with Operation Enduring Freedom.
        How effective, in your view, has this assistance been in improving
    Pakistan's efforts and commitment to counter terrorists in Pakistan?
        Answer. Security assistance, Coalition Support Fund reimbursements,
    and cross-border coordination with ISAF and Afghan forces have helped
    enable Pakistan's counterinsurgency campaign. Since 2009, Pakistan has
    undertaken counterinsurgency operations against extremist organizations
    in the northwest, including in Swat, South Waziristan, Mohmand, and
    Bajaur, with varying levels of success. Pakistan's level of commitment
    is reflected in the enormous casualties it has suffered as a result of
    terrorism in the last few years, including more than 11,000 military
    personnel killed or wounded in action and more than 30,000 civilian
    causalities in recent years, most recently in significant attacks
    following the bin Laden operation. However, Pakistan continues to lack
    the necessary military and civilian capacities to ``hold'' and
    ``build'' in cleared areas. If confirmed, I will work Congress to
    ensure that the support we provide is yielding the results we seek.

                          OSAMA BIN LADEN AND AL QAEDA

        Question. What changes, if any, should the United States make to
    its security assistance policy regarding Pakistan in light of the
    revelation of Osama bin Laden's hideout within Pakistan?
        Answer. The current ``train-advise-and-equip'' programs with the
    Pakistan military and paramilitary forces have been an important
    component in pursuing the near-term objective of eliminating terrorist
    sanctuaries and disrupting the al Qaeda network. It is vital, however,
    that Pakistan live up to its end of the bargain, cooperating more fully
    in counterterrorism matters and ceasing to provide sanctuary to Afghan
    Taliban and other insurgent groups. Therefore, in the wake of the Osama
    bin Laden raid, we have asked Pakistan to take a number of concrete
    steps to demonstrate cooperation and counter-terrorism. Future requests
    for security assistance will be informed by Pakistan's response to the
    counter-terrorism steps we have proposed.
        Question. In your view, will the death of Osama bin Laden have a
    significant impact on the conflict against al Qaeda and if so, how?
        Answer. The death of Osama bin Laden is a significant blow to al
    Qaeda and brings us closer to its strategic defeat. However, al Qaeda
    remains a potent, dangerous, and adaptable foe. Its close allies, such
    as Pakistan Taliban and the Haqqani Network, have increasingly adopted
    al Qaeda's jihadist vision and, as core al Qaeda is weakened, there is
    a risk that decentralized affiliates may pose an increased threat to
    the United States. To achieve the President's objective of defeating al
    Qaeda and preventing its return to either Pakistan or Afghanistan, it
    is vital that we continue to aggressively pursue our accelerated
    counterterrorism campaign in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.
        Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda
    affiliates to the U.S. Homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and western
    interests more broadly? Which affiliates are of most concern?
        Answer. Al Qaeda and its adherents are diverse, dispersed, and
    decentralized. They are present in the Arabian Peninsula, North and
    East Africa, South Asia, Iraq, and elsewhere around the globe,
    including within the United States. Intent and ability to attack the
    United States varies by group, but such attacks are a common theme in
    their propaganda and planning. Bin Laden himself remained very focused
    on attacking the Homeland. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has
    already demonstrated both the intent and the capability to conduct
    attacks against the United States. Despite the death of Bin Laden, core
    al Qaeda and its adherents in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region remain a
    very dangerous threat.

                                  ARAB SPRING

        Question. The Arab Spring has changed--and will likely continue to
    change--the political dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa for
    many years to come. These changes will require the United States to
    adjust our military-to-military and defense civilian relations in this
    region. Some observers argue that the United States should reduce
    significantly our military-to-military contact in countries as a result
    of the ongoing changes and others advocate more robust and stepped-up
    contact with our partners in this region.
        In your view, what should be the posture of the U.S. Government on
    military-to-military and defense civilian relations in the region?
        Answer. The DOD's military-to-military and defense civilian
    relations with our partners in the Middle East and North Africa have
    played a critical role in advancing U.S. strategic interests: defeating
    extremists, countering weapons of mass destruction, countering
    terrorist organizations, ensuring the free flow of commerce, preventing
    Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, disrupting smuggling and piracy,
    supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and securing Israel.
    Engagement with our key Middle Eastern and North African partners'
    defense ministries and militaries, building partner capacity to meet
    common challenges, having a forward presence to enable operations and
    deter potential threats, and being able to access regions--if and when
    necessary for future contingencies--require considerable effort on the
    part of many organizations within DOD working in tandem with DOS.
    During this time of change and uncertainty in the region, I understand
    that DOD will continue to evaluate and re-calibrate the nature and
    substance of our relationships to ensure they are consistent with U.S.
    values and advance U.S. vital national interests.

                                     LIBYA

        Question. Do you support the limited U.S. military mission in
    Libya?
        Answer. Yes. DOD is supporting operations against Libya as a part
    of an international coalition that is enforcing United Nations Security
    Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973. The coalition's combined efforts have
    prevented the mass killing of civilians in Libya. The President was
    clear from the beginning that the United States would bring its unique
    set of capabilities to bear on the front end of this conflict to stop
    the advance of Qadhafi's forces, take out regime air defenses, and set
    the stage for the NATO mission. While our role is now to support and
    assist, the U.S. military can provide unique capabilities to this
    effort that our NATO allies and other partners cannot provide either in
    kind or at the levels required, such as electronic warfare, aerial
    refueling, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support, and
    unmanned aerial vehicle strikes.
        Question. Do you support broadening the military mission to include
    regime change?
        Answer. No. While I do believe that the Qadhafi regime has lost all
    legitimacy and must go, the goal of our military effort, and the
    mandate of the United Nations (U.N.) resolution, is very clear: protect
    the Libyan people. We must continue to use a range of diplomatic and
    economic tools to apply further pressure on the Qadhafi regime.
    Ultimately, however, it will be up to the Libyan people to decide their
    future.
        Question. Should the United States provide arms and training to the
    Libyan rebels?
        Answer. The purpose of our military action is grounded in UNSCR
    1973, to protect the Libyan people in population centers like Benghazi
    from a massacre at the hands of Qadhafi's forces, and any assistance
    will be for that purpose. The administration has chosen not to provide
    arms or training to the rebels at this time, but it is my understanding
    that DOD has authorized up to $25 million of non-lethal support which
    includes medical equipment, protective vests, binoculars, and radios.

              STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS

        Question. Over the past few years, DOD has funded an increasing
    number of psychological operations and influence programs. While the
    Department does not have any separate documentation outlining its
    strategic communication activities, GAO reports that DOD ``spent
    hundreds of millions of dollars each year'' to support its information
    operations outreach activities. Many of these programs are in support
    of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but Military Information Support
    Teams (MISTs) from United States Special Operations Command are also
    deploying to U.S. embassies in countries of particular interest around
    the globe to bolster the efforts of DOS and the USAID. Further, the
    geographic combatant commands are moving into this operational space.
        What are your views on DOD's psychological operations and influence
    programs and its integration into overall U.S. foreign policy
    objectives?
        Answer. I understand that DOD's capability to effectively operate
    in the information environment is essential to the U.S. Government's
    ability to engage foreign audiences and adversaries to service our
    strategic and operational interests and objectives. It is particularly
    important to counter the rise of violent extremism, reduce the
    influence of those who challenge our interests and military operations,
    and it is a critical element of Combatant Command strategies for
    security and stability in their respective geographic regions. To be
    effective, these activities must be nested in U.S. foreign policy
    objectives and integrated across government and with our allies. I have
    seen much improvement in the coordination and de-confliction of these
    activities across the interagency and, if confirmed, will seek to build
    on these relationships.
        I am aware that there has been acute interest from Congress in this
    area as budget requirements have risen sharply in recent years based on
    the growing realization of our military leaders that we must
    effectively operate in the 21st century information environment. Over
    the last year, DOD has taken significant steps to improve and ensure
    appropriate and focused management and oversight of all influence
    programs including psychological operations (now re-named Military
    Information Support Operations). If confirmed, I will continue this
    effort fully cognizant of both its importance to our military strategy
    and the requirements to ensure that DOD operates as a mutually
    supporting partner in a cooperative effort to advance our Nations
    objectives.
        Question. You were reportedly a strong supporter of the creation of
    the State Department's Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
    Communications. In your view, what--if any--support should DOD provide
    to this Center?
        Answer. As the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, I
    supported the creation of the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
    Communications (CSCC) and it will continue to have my support should I
    be confirmed as Secretary of Defense. Both DOD and CIA support the
    Center with personnel. DOD currently provides three military
    servicemembers in support of the CSCC, and I understand that DOS has
    requested several additional personnel. This request is undergoing
    review and consideration within DOD.
        Question. In 2005, al Qaeda's Ayman al-Zawahiri declared that ``We
    are in a battle, and more than half of it is taking place in the
    battlefield of the media.'' Last year, a non-partisan study highlighted
    the lack of a U.S. strategy to counter radical ideologies that foment
    violence (e.g. Islamism or Salafist-Jihadism).
        What is the role of DOD versus the Intelligence Community and the
    State Department?
        Answer. I understand DOD participates in several interagency
    efforts to counter violent extremism and works closely with not only
    DOS, but also CIA, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and
    others to ensure DOD programs are synchronized and deconflicted with
    programs of the other departments and agencies. Due to DOD's global
    presence, DOD personnel often encounter the effects of radical
    ideologies and the violence propagated by Islamist extremists on a
    daily basis. DOD personnel are thus well situated to contribute to U.S.
    Government efforts to counter the messages of violent extremists. DOD
    seeks to reduce support for violent extremist organizations by engaging
    foreign local populations, countering adversary propaganda, and
    developing relationships with key leaders and credible local
    interlocutors across the globe.
        Question. In your view, how do we counter radical ideologies that
    foment violence?
        Answer. The efforts of the U.S. Government to counter radical
    ideologies must be persistent and long-term, and should be developed in
    order to shape and support collaborative regional security initiatives.
    One critical area of focus is those populations that are most
    vulnerable to extremist messaging. The U.S. Government should work
    within the interagency framework to build and implement programs and
    activities that address these at-risk audiences, which are
    predominantly under 30 years of age and mostly, but not exclusively,
    male. We have learned from experience that one of the most effective
    ways of countering such messaging is by seeking to amplify the credible
    voices of our Muslim partners.
        Question. Defense Secretary Gates launched the Minerva Program in
    2009 to develop deeper social, cultural and behavioral expertise for
    policy and strategy purposes.
        Do you support this program and its goals?
        Answer. I have not had an opportunity to be briefed on the program
    and its specifics. In general, I agree that understanding the dynamics
    of social, political, economic, and cultural systems is critical not
    only for national security policy makers and strategic planners, but
    also for commanders down to the lowest tactical level.

                                    SOMALIA

        Question. Somalia is a collapsed state with a weak government
    unable to project either power or stability or to provide services to
    its people. Somalia is also a training and operations hub for: al
    Shabaab and other violent extremists; pirates operating in the Indian
    Ocean and Arabian Peninsula; illicit traffickers of weapons, humans,
    and drugs; and remnants of the al Qaeda East Africa cell that was
    responsible for the destruction of our embassies in Dar es Salaam and
    Nairobi in August of 1998.
        What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Shabaab to the
    U.S. and Western interests in the Horn of Africa and to the U.S.
    Homeland?
        Answer. The threat from al-Shabaab to the U.S. and Western
    interests in the Horn of Africa and to the U.S. Homeland is significant
    and on the rise. Al-Shabaab leaders, who have claimed affiliation with
    al Qaeda since 2007, are developing ties with al Qaeda in the Arabian
    Peninsula, and are showing an increasing desire to stage international
    terrorist attacks in addition to their acts of violence inside Somalia.
    Al-Shabaab employs several hundred foreign fighters and regularly tries
    to recruit fighters from Somali diaspora communities in the United
    States and Europe. The Kampala bombings last July, which killed 79
    innocent civilians, were a wake-up call and a reminder that al-Shabaab
    is willing to operationalize its rhetoric. As al-Shabaab faces
    increasing international pressure, we may see the group increase its
    international attacks. Al-Shabaab continues to repress the Somali
    people and remains the main adversary to the Somali Transitional
    Federal Government (TFG) and to the African Union Mission in Somalia
    (AMISOM) peacekeepers in Mogadishu.
        Further, Somalia's lack of governance and sparse population could
    make it appealing as a safe haven for al Qaeda. As al Qaeda undergoes
    leadership changes and regroups from counterterrorism operations in
    Pakistan, we need to ensure that it does not relocate its center of
    operations to Somalia.
        Question. Given your knowledge of the role of the various U.S.
    Government departments and agencies in the Horn of Africa, what
    changes, if any, would you make to DOD's current role in the Horn of
    Africa?
        Answer. I understand the DOD mission in the Horn of Africa is to
    build partner-nation capacity in order to promote regional security and
    stability, prevent conflict, and protect U.S. interests. I believe this
    mission is appropriate. I am informed U.S. Africa Command is
    undertaking a review of East Africa to determine how our military
    efforts in the region work in concert with our interagency partners to
    achieve our collective regional goals and counter al Qaeda's linkages
    to elements of al-Shabaab. DOD's ultimate goal is a fully integrated
    strategy under which security assistance, capacity building,
    operational collaboration with regional partners, and counter-terrorism
    actions are synchronized to provide the regional security and stability
    that is in the interest of both the United States and our regional
    partners.
        This review of DOD's East Africa strategy will also review the
    status of Joint Task Forces to determine if any should be considered
    for transition to a more permanent Joint Interagency Task Force--
    including recommendations on basing and funding for Combined Joint Task
    Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) based at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti. If
    confirmed, I will work to ensure our strategy is developed as part of a
    coordinated U.S. national security policy towards the Horn of Africa,
    and to determine how the DOD can and should best support this policy.

                  YEMEN AND AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

        Question. A number of senior U.S. officials, including you, have
    indicated the most significant threat to the U.S. Homeland currently
    emanates from Yemen.
        What is your assessment of the current U.S. strategy in Yemen?
        Answer. U.S. goals in Yemen are to ensure Yemen is stable, unified,
    and economically viable, and to help Yemen deny al Qaeda in the Arabian
    Peninsula (AQAP) a safe-haven and operational platform. We do not yet
    know how the current crisis will play out.
        The ongoing unrest has weakened an already fragile economy and
    allowed AQAP to expand its influence and to make some tactical gains in
    the tribal areas--in several cases seizing and holding territory now
    outside of Republic of Yemen Government control. However, despite
    AQAP's limited gains, they remain distant from, and largely counter to,
    the current anti-government movement in Yemen.
        AQAP is intensely focused on conducting a near-term attack against
    the United States, and poses an immediate terrorist threat to U.S.
    interests and the Homeland. The Christmas Day attempted bombing of the
    Detroit-bound airliner in 2009 and the failed package bombing attempt
    in October 2010 were the more recent attempts by al Qaeda to attack the
    U.S. Homeland. Despite these setbacks, al Qaeda and its affiliate,
    AQAP, are still actively plotting attacks, with the principal goal of
    successfully striking the U.S. Homeland. If confirmed, I will continue
    to work to achieve U.S. objectives in Yemen.
        Question. Given the ongoing political upheaval and splintering of
    the military in Yemen, what are your views on the United States
    continuing to provide security assistance--most significantly DOD
    section 1206 funding--to Yemeni counterterrorism forces?
        Answer. In consideration of the ongoing political environment in
    Yemen, I understand DOD is constantly evaluating our security
    assistance and capacity building programs--particularly those provided
    under section 1206. The Republic of Yemen Government currently remains
    a critical partner in the war against al Qaeda, and DOD remains
    particularly mindful of the continued and growing threat to the
    Homeland from AQAP.

                                      NATO

        Question. At the NATO Summit in Lisbon last November, NATO members
    adopted a new Strategic Concept setting out the Alliance's vision for
    the coming decade. In their communique from that Summit, NATO countries
    envisioned a more agile, capable and cost-effective alliance, able to
    defend against a full range of threats and to operate effectively with
    other international organizations and non-NATO nations. At the same
    time, many NATO members have significantly reduced their national
    defense budgets in response to the global economic crisis.
        What are the greatest opportunities and challenges that you foresee
    for NATO in meeting its strategic objectives over the next 5 years?
        Answer. The United States has enormous stakes in a strong, mutually
    supportive NATO alliance, and the President has stressed his strong
    desire to rebuild and adapt transatlantic security relationships to
    meet 21st century security challenges. NATO's new Strategic Concept is
    an important step in ensuring that NATO will continue to play its
    unique and essential role in ensuring the common security of its
    members and it will guide the next phase in NATO's evolution. Over the
    next 5 years, top-tier NATO-related challenges include, first and
    foremost, achieving durable progress on a successful transition in
    Afghanistan, implementing missile defense in Europe, and stemming the
    deterioration in European military capability. It is my sense that a
    number of our NATO allies, while fulfilling their current commitments,
    have been underperforming in terms of their own investments in defense
    capabilities, especially when it comes to deployable expeditionary
    forces. Many are planning further cuts to defense investment in order
    to sustain their operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere while coping
    with the financial crisis. The challenge will be for allies to work
    together to determine which capabilities must be sustained and how that
    can be done in a more cost-effective manner, while also identifying
    other capability or mission areas where a higher degree of risk is
    acceptable.
        Question. Do you envision further enlargement of NATO within the
    next 5 years?
        Answer. The President has stated that NATO enlargement should
    continue so long as new candidates are democratic, peaceful, and
    willing to contribute to common security. Precisely which countries and
    within what timeframe NATO would undertake further enlargement are
    important questions which the administration would need to address in
    close consultation with Congress and our allies. It is important that
    each NATO aspirant should be judged on its individual merits and
    progress in implementing political, economic and military reforms.
        Question. In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S.
    nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries?
        Answer. NATO's New Strategic Concept stated NATO's commitment to
    the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear
    weapons, but made clear that as long as there are nuclear weapons in
    the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance. At Lisbon, NATO also
    initiated a review of its overall posture in deterring and defending
    against the full range of threats to the Alliance. I am informed that
    this review will recommend an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional
    and missile defense capabilities for the Alliance. This provides an
    opportunity to adapt NATO's nuclear posture to the realities of the
    21st century. NATO's new Strategic Concept reflects allies' commitment
    to NATO as a nuclear alliance and to nuclear burden sharing as
    fundamental to deterrence and assurance in Europe. NATO has rightly
    made clear that it will not unilaterally eliminate its nuclear
    capabilities absent an agreement with Russia on non-strategic nuclear
    weapons. The administration is exploring negotiations with Russia to
    address the disparity in non-strategic weapons, and will consult with
    allies on those negotiations.

                           SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

        Question. The previous two Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) have
    mandated significant growth in our Special Operations Forces and
    enablers that directly support their operations.
        Do you believe that we should further increase the number of
    special operations personnel? If so, why, and by how much?
        Answer. I believe that the current growth in special operations
    personnel is appropriate. I understand that U.S. Special Operations
    Command (SOCOM) is programmed to meet the growth mandated by the last
    two QDRs. If confirmed, I will examine if additional growth of Special
    Forces is needed, but only after that programmed growth is complete.
        Question. In your view, how can the size of Special Operations
    Forces be increased, while also maintaining the rigorous recruiting and
    training standards for special operators?
        Answer. Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced. Special
    Operations Command leaders have stated that Special Operations growth
    should not exceed 3 to 5 percent per year in order to ensure quality of
    the manpower being produced. I have been informed that this is the pace
    SOCOM has sustained to great effect over the past several years and is
    on track to sustain over the next several years.
        Question. In recent years, Special Operations Forces have taken on
    an expanded role in a number of areas important to countering violent
    extremist organizations, including those related to information and
    military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant
    changes to SOCOM's title 10 missions to make them better reflect the
    activities Special Operations Forces are carrying out around the world.
        What current missions, if any, do you believe can and should be
    divested by SOCOM, and why? Are there any additional missions that you
    believe SOCOM should assume, and, if so, what are they and why do you
    advocate adding them?
        Answer. I understand that DOD uses a range of processes, such as
    the Unified Command Plan, to review the mission sets and
    responsibilities it assigns to SOCOM on an ongoing basis. Additionally,
    the law provides the President and the Secretary of Defense flexibility
    needed to meet changing circumstances. At this time I would not
    advocate significant changes to SOCOM's title 10 missions. If
    confirmed, and after I have been in office for a sufficient time to
    determine if changes are advisable, I will consider any recommend
    changes as appropriate or necessary.
        Question. What can be done to ensure that indirect special
    operations missions with medium- and long-term impact, such as
    unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, receive as much
    emphasis as direct action, and that they receive appropriate funding?
        Answer. The activities of Special Operations Forces are quite
    varied, from high-risk strikes and counterterrorist raids to working
    by, with, and through local partners, whether training and advising
    foreign counterparts or providing support to civilian authorities
    abroad. I believe that each of these missions is highly valued within
    the special operations community. However, as the security landscape
    has changed, the demands for these kinds of missions have begun to
    exceed the ability of the Special Operations community alone to meet
    them. As a remedy to this situation, Secretary Gates advocated that the
    conventional forces be prepared to take on more of the kinds of
    missions that used to fall exclusively to SOF, including, for example,
    Security Force Assistance. I agree that broadening the spectrum of
    irregular missions that our conventional forces are able to take on
    will alleviate some of the demands being placed on the SOF community
    and ensure that the Total Force is adequately prepared to undertake
    both direct and indirect missions.

                              COMBATING TERRORISM

        Question. What is your understanding of the Department's strategy
    for combating terrorism?
        Are there steps the Department should take to better coordinate its
    efforts to combat terrorism with those of other Federal departments and
    agencies?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the DOD strategy for combating
    terrorism is comprised of three elements: antiterrorism--defensive
    measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property
    to terrorist acts; counterterrorism--offensive actions to disrupt,
    dismantle and defeat terrorists, and resolve terrorist incidents; and
    consequence management--measures to recover from terrorist attacks.
    Each of these components of combating terrorism has its own policies
    and strategies, developed in close coordination with interagency
    partners.
        While I served as Director of the CIA, I worked closely with my
    interagency counterparts on strategies to defeat terrorism around the
    globe and will bring that experience to bear if confirmed as Secretary
    of Defense. If confirmed, I will continue to work with my interagency
    partners and the National Security Council and Staff to ensure the best
    coordination possible.

                  INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR INDIRECT ACTIVITIES

        Question. Some observers contend that the national intelligence
    agencies focus their assistance to the Defense Department in
    Afghanistan and Iraq on special operators engaged in direct action
    operations. As a consequence, it is alleged, general purpose forces and
    Special Operations Forces engaged in indirect activities, including
    foreign internal defense and population protection, receive less
    intelligence support.
        Do you believe this is true?
        If so and if confirmed, how would you ensure Special Operations
    Forces engaged in indirect activities receive adequate intelligence
    support?
        Answer. The Intelligence Community (IC) supports a range of DOD
    customers to include those involved in foreign internal defense and
    population protection. Especially in light of efforts over the last
    several years, the IC and DOD are appropriately providing intelligence
    support to all warfighters across the board. For example, DOD created
    the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Task Force to
    field ISR platforms rapidly and, with the committee's support, has
    continued to work to expand airborne ISR capabilities. Over the past
    year, the IC has also provided significant support to the surge of
    forces to Afghanistan through Attack the Improvised Explosive Device
    Network capabilities that support both general purpose and Special
    Operations Forces. DOD and the IC are also substantially increasing
    intelligence support to Village Stability Operations and to the Afghan
    local police. The IC has also put greater emphasis on developing a
    comprehensive understanding of the socio-cultural environments within
    which terrorist networks and insurgent forces operate, which has
    enabled all warfighters to effectively engage the local population
    during stability operations. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that
    such programs, which support all warfighters, remain robust.

                            SECTION 1208 OPERATIONS

        Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), as amended
    by subsequent bills, authorizes the provision of support (including
    training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces,
    and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S.
    Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.
        What is your assessment of this authority?
        Answer. I understand that section 1208 authority is a key tool that
    combatant commanders have repeatedly confirmed as essential to
    combating terrorism in their areas of responsibility. It enables the
    Special Operations Forces under their control to leverage willing
    partners that possess access to areas, people, and information that are
    denied to our forces, but critical to tactical and strategic success.
    The authority has allowed DOD to respond immediately to emergent global
    challenges. Section 1208 requires appropriate civilian oversight,
    including Secretary of Defense approval and congressional notification.

      CAPABILITIES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

        Question. The 2010 QDR called for increased counterinsurgency,
    counterterrorism, and security force assistance capabilities within the
    general purpose forces.
        What is your assessment of the QDR with regard to the mix of
    responsibilities assigned to general purpose and Special Operations
    Forces, particularly with respect to security force assistance and
    building partner military capabilities? Do you believe that our general
    purpose forces need to become more like Special Operations Forces in
    mission areas that are critical to countering violent extremists?
        Answer. I concur with Secretary Gates that America's dominance in
    traditional warfighting has created powerful incentives for adversaries
    to use alternative methods to counter U.S. influence and interests. I
    also agree that, for the foreseeable future, the most likely
    contingencies the United States will face will involve irregular
    threats. Therefore, I believe the 2010 QDR's strategic shift toward
    expanding general purpose forces' capabilities and capacity for these
    contingencies makes sense. The overall flexibility of our Armed Forces
    can be greatly improved by investing in key enablers within our
    conventional force, such as strengthening and expanding capabilities
    for security force assistance; increasing the availability of rotary-
    wing assets; expanding manned and unmanned aircraft systems for
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; improving counter-
    improvised explosive device capabilities; and enhancing linguistic,
    cultural, counterinsurgency, and stability operations competency and
    capacity.
        Question. Are there certain mission areas that should be reserved
    for Special Operations Forces only?
        Answer. Special Operations Forces are a unique component of our
    U.S. Armed Forces that are trained to conduct operations in areas under
    enemy control or in politically sensitive environments, including
    counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, direct action, special
    reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, and counter-proliferation of
    weapons of mass destruction. In such environments, Special Operations
    Forces provide a unique and essential capability.

                 U.S. FORCE POSTURE IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION

        Question. The Defense Department's 2010 report of the QDR states
    that the United States needs to ``sustain and strengthen our Asia-
    Pacific alliances and partnerships to advance mutual security interests
    and ensure sustainable peace and security in the region,'' and that, to
    accomplish this, DOD ``will augment and adapt our forward presence'' in
    the Asia-Pacific region.
        Do you agree that the U.S. needs to augment and adapt our presence
    in the Asia-Pacific?
        Answer. Yes. DOD must keep pace with changes in the Asia-Pacific
    security environment that pose profound challenges to international
    security, such as the rise of new powers, the growing influence of non-
    state actors, and the potential spread of weapons of mass destruction
    (WMD).
        DOD should maintain an enduring military presence in the Asia-
    Pacific region that provides a tangible reassurance that the United
    States is committed to Asia's security, economic development, and the
    prosperity essential to the region's success.
        Question. If so, what specific capabilities or enhancements are
    needed in your view?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review DOD's posture in Asia and make
    appropriate recommendations on any enhancements. In general, our
    regional allies and partners must remain confident in the continued
    strength of our deterrence against the full range of potential threats.
        Question. What do you see as the U.S. security priorities in the
    Asia-Pacific region?
        Answer. As outlined in the 2010 National Security Strategy, the
    United States must develop a positive security agenda for the region.
    DOD's priorities include protecting U.S. territory, citizens, and
    allies; deterring aggression and maintaining regional stability;
    maintaining free and open access to the maritime, air, and space
    domains; deterring and defeating violent extremism; and preventing the
    proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their associated
    materials.

                                  NORTH KOREA

        Question. North Korea represents one of the greatest near term
    threats to regional security and stability. This seriousness of the
    threat is seen by North Korea's continued pursuit of a nuclear
    capability and ballistic missile program, and particularly, over the
    past year, by North Korea's unprovoked and deadly attacks against South
    Korea--specifically the attack on the Republic of Korea navy ship
    Cheonan in March 2010 and the artillery attack on South Korea's
    Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010.
        What is your assessment of the current security situation on the
    Korean peninsula?
        Answer. North Korea's large conventional military, pursuit of
    asymmetric advantages through its ballistic missile and weapons of mass
    destruction (WMD) programs, including the newly revealed uranium
    enrichment activities, and proliferation behavior, underscores that
    North Korea poses a growing and direct threat to the United States, our
    allies in the region, and to the international community. If confirmed,
    I intend to monitor the security situation on the Korean Peninsula
    closely, work for the continued transformation of our alliances and
    partnerships in the region, and maintain the military capabilities
    necessary to protect our interests, defend our allies, and deter North
    Korea from acts of aggression and intimidation.
        Question. In your view does the lack of progress in diplomatic
    efforts to persuade North Korea to verifiably dismantle its nuclear
    weapons program inform or guide U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy in the
    region?
        Answer. I understand that U.S. strategy toward the Korean Peninsula
    is centered on maintaining peace through deterrence and diplomacy. The
    U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy has helped to prevent renewed war on
    the Korean Peninsula for more than half a century through escalation
    dominance, secure second-strike capabilities, and robust extended
    deterrence commitments to regional allies. Successful deterrence
    creates the space within which diplomacy can operate. The success of
    diplomatic efforts, however, will ultimately hinge on the willingness
    of North Korea to comply with the agreements it makes.
        Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United
    States and its allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD
    capabilities and the export of those capabilities?
        Answer. North Korea's missile and WMD programs pose a serious
    threat to U.S. regional allies and partners, and increasingly, are
    becoming a direct threat to the United States itself. The United States
    must continue to monitor carefully North Korea's WMD and missile
    development programs and related proliferation activities. If
    confirmed, I would ensure that DOD continues to work closely with other
    parts of the U.S. Government to address these and other emerging
    threats, reduce our vulnerabilities and those of our allies and
    partners, and work cooperatively with our allies to ensure our
    contingency planning remains adaptive and responsive.
        Question. In your view are there additional steps that DOD could
    take to ensure that North Korea does not proliferate missile and
    weapons technology to Syria, Iran and others?
        Answer. I understand that DOD, with its interagency partners, has
    taken several measures to prevent North Korea's proliferation of
    weapons-related technology, to include working to advance international
    nonproliferation norms, and cooperating with partner nations to inspect
    and interdict vessels and aircraft suspected of carrying illicit cargo.
    If confirmed, I would continue to work to strengthen international
    consensus against proliferation, invest in capacity building programs
    with partner nations, and find ways to increase WMD-related information
    sharing with international partners.

                               REPUBLIC OF KOREA

        Question. Since the end of World War II, the alliance between the
    United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) has been a key pillar of
    security in the Asia Pacific region. This relationship has gone through
    periods of inevitable change.
        What is your understanding of the current U.S. security
    relationship with the ROK?
        Answer. In my view, the U.S.-ROK Alliance remains one of the
    cornerstones of U.S. strategy in the Asia Pacific and is as strong and
    viable today as it has ever been. A mutual commitment to common
    interests, shared values, continuous dialogue, combined planning, and a
    recognition of the need to transform the relationship in light of the
    changing regional and global circumstances provide a strong
    underpinning to the Alliance and can serve to inform U.S. and ROK
    efforts going forward as the Alliance becomes a more equal military
    partnership.
        Question. If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to
    improve the U.S.-ROK security relationship?
        Answer. As I understand it, DOD and the ROK continue to work
    closely to realign U.S. forces on the Peninsula and prepare for the
    transition of wartime operational control to the ROK by December 2015.
    As part of these efforts, for example, DOD is repositioning U.S. forces
    to bases south of Seoul. This will make the U.S. presence less
    intrusive to the Korean people, will remove U.S. forces from the center
    of Seoul, and result in a U.S. force posture that enhances U.S. forces'
    readiness and quality of life. If confirmed, I would maintain close
    contact with my ROK counterpart and build upon the solid foundation
    laid by Secretary Gates to continuously improve and transform this
    important security relationship.
        Question. What is your view regarding the timing of turning over
    wartime operational command to the ROK?
        Answer. I understand that the United States and ROK have an
    understanding on a comprehensive way forward for the transfer of
    wartime operational control by December 2015. If confirmed, I will
    continue to work with my ROK counterpart to complete this process.
        Question. Do you believe that current planning regarding tour
    normalization in the ROK should be reconsidered in view of the high
    cost of the plan and the risks associated with significantly higher
    numbers of dependents on the Korean peninsula?
        Answer. I understand tour normalization in Korea was designed to
    further our commitment to support our forward-stationed forces and
    family members. It was to be implemented on an ``as affordable'' basis
    and not according to any specific timeline. If confirmed, I will
    continue to assess the cost of implementation and our proposed force
    posture to determine the best way forward.

                                     CHINA

        Question. Much has been made about the economic and military growth
    in China and what that growth might mean in terms of regional and
    global security.
        From your perspective, what effect is China's expanding economy and
    growing military having on the region at-large and how is that growth
    influencing the U.S. security posture in Asia and the Pacific?
        Answer. China's sustained economic growth is in the United States'
    interest and has contributed to the Asia-Pacific's economic growth and
    development in recent years. In terms of regional security, China's
    economic growth has increased China's international profile and
    influence, and has enabled China's leaders to embark upon and sustain a
    comprehensive transformation of its military forces. The pace and scale
    of China's military modernization, coupled with the lack of
    transparency, raises many questions, both within the United States and
    the region as a whole, about China's future.
        From my perspective, DOD has a special responsibility to monitor
    China's military and to deter conflict. Through a robust forward
    presence, prudent capability developments, and, sustained action to
    strengthen alliances and partnerships, DOD can support our national
    interest in promoting a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Asia-Pacific
    region.
        Question. What do you believe are the objectives of China's
    military modernization program?
        Answer. China appears to be building the capability to fight and
    win short duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery. Its
    near-term focus appears to be on preparing for potential contingencies
    involving Taiwan, including possible U.S. military intervention. Its
    modernization efforts emphasize anti-access and area capabilities.
    China is also devoting increasing attention and resources to conducting
    operations beyond Taiwan and China's immediate periphery. Beijing's
    growing focus on military missions other than war includes humanitarian
    assistance, non-combat evacuation operations, and counter-piracy
    support. Lastly, China is strengthening its nuclear deterrence and
    enhancing its strategic strike capabilities through modernization of
    its nuclear forces and improving other strategic capabilities such as
    space and counter-space operations and computer network operations.
        Question. How do you believe the United States should respond to
    China's military modernization program?
        Answer. I believe that we should continue to monitor closely the
    growth of China's military capabilities while continuing to encourage
    Beijing to be more transparent about its military and security affairs.
    Our strategy must be designed to preserve peace, enhance stability, and
    reduce risk in the region. Our response to China's military
    modernization should be flexible and supported by the continued
    transformation of our force posture in the Asia-Pacific, the
    maintenance of our global presence and access, the modernization of our
    own capabilities, and the strengthening of our Alliances and
    partnerships.
        Question. U.S.-China military-to-military dialogue has been
    strained over the past several years and efforts to establish and
    maintain mutually beneficial military relations has been hampered by
    China's propensity for postponing or canceling military engagements in
    an apparent effort to influence U.S. actions.
        What is your view of the relative importance of sustained military-
    to-military relations with China?
        Answer. President Obama and President Hu Jintao have expressed that
    a healthy, stable, reliable, and continuous military-to-military
    relationship is an essential part of their shared vision for a
    positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship. I
    fully agree with that assertion. The complexity of the security
    environment, both in the Asia-Pacific region and globally, calls for a
    continuous dialogue between the Armed Forces of the United States and
    China to expand practical cooperation where we can and to discuss
    candidly those areas where we differ.
        Question. Do you believe that we should make any changes in the
    quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what
    changes and why?
        Answer. I understand that our two Armed Forces have made progress
    in recent months to build toward a more sustained--and sustainable--
    relationship. I was informed the recent visit of General Chen was a
    success. We can build on that progress to improve the U.S.-China
    military-to-military relationship, both in terms of the quantity of
    exchanges, but more importantly, the quality of the dialogue. I believe
    that military exchanges with China can be valuable, but can only truly
    work if China is willing to reciprocate with transparent and
    substantive discussions. If confirmed, I will look for ways to deepen
    and enhance our military-to-military relationship with China, and to
    encourage China to act responsibly both regionally and globally.

                     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERNARCOTICS

        Question. On an annual basis, DOD's counternarcotics (CN) program
    expends approximately $1.5 billion to support the Department's CN
    operations, building the capacity of certain foreign governments around
    the globe, and analyzing intelligence on CN-related matters. In a
    recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, GAO found that
    DOD ``does not have an effective performance measurement system to
    track the progress of its counternarcotics activities.'' This is the
    second such finding relating to DOD CN in the last decade.
        What is your assessment of the DOD CN program?
        Answer. Drug trafficking and associated organized crime are a
    multidimensional threat to the United States. In addition to the impact
    on our Nation's public health and economy, drug trafficking and other
    forms of transnational organized crime provide a funding source for
    terrorists and insurgents, undermine legitimate government
    institutions, and contribute to international instability.
        I have not had an opportunity to assess the DOD counternarcotics
    program. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress and the
    Office of National Drug Control Policy to ensure that these programs
    achieve measureable results and that those results are clearly aligned
    with the goals of the National Security Strategy and the National Drug
    Control Strategy.
        Question. In your view, should DOD continue to play a role in
    attempting to stem the flow of illegal narcotics?
        Answer. Based on my experience with this issue from my time in
    Congress, in the Clinton administration, and in my most recent
    assignment, all agencies must work to confront the flow of illicit
    narcotics. This whole-of-government approach has been critically
    important to the progress we have made since the 1980s and should
    continue.

                    INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING CONTRIBUTIONS

        Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign
    Affairs (July 29, 2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the
    United Nations, stated that the United States ``is willing to consider
    directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers,
    civilian police, and other civilian personnel--including more women I
    should note--to U.N. peacekeeping operations.''
        What is your view on whether the United States should contribute
    more military personnel to both military observer and staff positions
    in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?
        What are the advantages and disadvantages of contributing
    additional military personnel to U.N. peacekeeping operations?
        Answer. The United States has a stake in the success of U.N.
    peacekeeping operations. I believe that, where practicable, the United
    States should continue to provide military personnel for U.N.
    peacekeeping operations, especially for key staff positions that can
    help shape the direction and success of the mission. However, as with
    any investment, there are associated costs. If confirmed, I will
    carefully evaluate any proposals to contribute military or civilian
    personnel to a U.N. peacekeeping operation, weighing the potential
    positive impact of U.S. participation in the mission against other
    military commitments we have around the globe and the proposed cost of
    U.S. involvement.

                             COUNTER THREAT FINANCE

        Question. A number of officials in DOD and the Intelligence
    Community (IC) have called for investing significantly more resources
    in identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorist
    networks and illicit trafficking. The objective would be to identify
    key individuals, as well as individuals enabling the flow of money
    outside of certain countries of interest.
        What are your views on the role of DOD in counter threat finance
    activities?
        Answer. Terrorists, drug traffickers, and other adversaries rely
    heavily on legal and illegal funding sources to support their
    activities, which routinely work against U.S. interests. It is critical
    to engage all U.S. Government tools to track and halt the flow of money
    associated with these organizations. It is my understanding that DOD
    has capability to identify and disrupt our adversaries' finances while
    working with its interagency counterparts in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
    DOD is not the U.S. Government lead agency in counter threat finance
    but, it plays a supportive role by working with other departments and
    agencies, and with partner nations, to fight our adversaries' ability
    to use global financial networks.

                           CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO

        Question. During a recent Senate Armed Services Committee hearing,
    the Commanders of U.S. Northern Command and Southern Command discussed
    the increasingly dangerous region along the northern and southern
    borders of Mexico and the devastating impact transnational criminal
    organizations are having on the people and security of southern Mexico,
    Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, and El Salvador. The United States has
    increased its assistance in this region, but--to date--DOD has had only
    a small role.
        What are your views on the threats posed by transnational criminal
    organizations in this region?
        Answer. These threats are real and are felt throughout Mexico,
    Central America, and elsewhere in the region. Transnational criminal
    organizations (TCOs) threaten the security and prosperity of the United
    States' neighbors and have the resources to impact the stability of
    some of the more vulnerable nations in the region. To confront these
    threats effectively, it is necessary to harness the talents and
    resources of DOD, in coordination with those of DOD's Federal partners
    and the governments of Mexico and Central American nations.
        Question. What is your assessment of DOD's current activities in
    Mexico and Central America?
        Answer. I have not yet had an opportunity to make a thorough
    assessment but generally speaking, DOD activities such as training,
    equipping, information sharing, infrastructure support, operational
    support, and related cooperation with Mexican and Central American
    militaries and security forces complement other U.S. Government
    security efforts under the Merida Initiative and the Central America
    Regional Security Initiative. I am mindful, however, that DOD plays a
    supporting role to its law enforcement partners in the fight against
    TCOs and that DOD-led efforts alone are not enough in the long term. I
    believe a long-term solution will require a whole-of-government effort.
        Question. What changes, if any, would you propose to the DOD's
    current activities in this region?
        Answer. As I noted above, I have not had an opportunity to make a
    thorough assessment of DOD's current activities in the region. If
    confirmed, I look forward to working closely with DOD's Federal
    partners and the U.S. Government's partners in the governments of
    Mexico and the Central American nations, in consultation with Congress,
    to shape the scope and scale of continued DOD efforts in the region.

                           INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION

        Question. The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces,
    general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and
    agencies has played a significant role in the success of
    counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years.
    However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.
        What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the
    collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?
        Answer. Our Nation has learned many hard lessons about the
    importance of whole-of-government approaches in counterinsurgency and
    counterterrorism operations over the past several years. One of the
    most important lessons of our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq is
    that success in counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and post-conflict
    stability operations depends upon the integrated efforts of both
    civilian and military organizations in all phases of an operation, from
    planning through execution. Sustainable outcomes require civilian
    development and governance experts who can help build local civilian
    capacity. DOD supports civilian agency lead in areas such as fostering
    political reconciliation, building accountable institutions of
    government, restoring public infrastructure, and reviving economic
    activity, so that DOD can focus on providing a safe and secure
    environment and assisting in building accountable Armed Forces. If
    confirmed, I will continue efforts to ensure that interagency
    collaboration is as robust and effective as possible.
        Question. How do you believe these efforts can be improved? How can
    the lessons learned in recent years be captured in military doctrine
    and adopted as ``best practices'' for future contingency operations?
        Answer. I believe interagency collaboration can be improved by
    continuing to ensure that the U.S. military plans and trains with our
    civilian counterparts and is prepared to operate effectively in all
    phases of conflict, including post-conflict reconstruction and
    stabilization. In addition, improving the interagency planning process
    would ensure that optimal use is made of all national instruments of
    statecraft, while also enhancing the ability to conduct comprehensive
    assessments, analysis, planning, and execution of whole-of-government
    operations. Robust civilian capabilities are critical to realizing any
    improvements in interagency efforts and best practices for future
    operations.

            INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004

        Question. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
    2004 (IRTPA), among other actions, realigned the responsibilities for
    budgeting for and management of intelligence organizations between the
    Secretary of Defense and the head of the Intelligence Community, the
    Director of National Intelligence (DNI).
        What do you believe is the role of DOD in intelligence under IRTPA?
        Answer. I believe the role of DOD, including its intelligence
    components, is spelled out clearly in law. Under title 50 of the
    U.S.C., the Secretary of Defense has responsibility for all
    intelligence and intelligence-related activities conducted by DOD
    components. DOD contains a number of elements of the Intelligence
    Community, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National
    Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the
    National Reconnaissance Office. Consistent with the statutory
    authorities of the DNI under the IRTPA, the Secretary of Defense is
    responsible for the continued operation of these elements as effective
    unified organizations within DOD for the conduct of their missions in
    order to satisfy the requirements of the Intelligence Community. The
    Secretary is also responsible for ensuring that the budgets of these
    elements are adequate to satisfy the overall intelligence needs of the
    Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, the geographic combatant commanders,
    and other departments and agencies, as well as ensuring that such
    elements are responsive and timely in satisfying the needs of
    operational military forces. In the period since IRTPA's signing, a
    tremendous amount of integration has occurred within the Community and
    I believe the elements of the Intelligence Community, including those
    within DOD, are working together more closely than ever.
        Question. Do you believe that the IRTPA strikes the correct balance
    between the duties and responsibilities of the Secretary and the DNI?
        Answer. Yes. Based on my understanding of authorities granted under
    IRTPA, I believe the duties and responsibilities of the Secretary and
    the DNI are sufficiently balanced. The IRTPA gave the DNI strong
    authority over core intelligence functions for the National
    Intelligence Program, such as setting requirements and budgets, as well
    as determining priorities for and managing the analysis and
    dissemination of national intelligence, while leaving the
    responsibility for execution of DOD intelligence activities to the
    Secretary. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is dual-
    hatted as the Director of Defense Intelligence in the Office of the DNI
    which helps ensure the equities of both the DNI and Secretary of
    Defense are taken into account. If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, I
    will maintain the current strong working relationship with the DNI to
    address any issues that might arise over the balance of
    responsibilities.
        Question. What changes in the IRTPA, if any, would you recommend
    that Congress consider?
        Answer. At this point, I do not recommend any change to the current
    law. If confirmed, I will wait until I have sufficient time to weigh
    options, should I discover a reason to recommend a change.

     QUALIFICATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OFFICIALS AND SECRETARIES OF
                                    DEFENSE

        Question. During the Bush and Obama administrations, there has been
    significant criticism about the appointment of active duty and retired
    military officers to senior positions in the Intelligence community,
    including as Director of National Intelligence and Director of the
    Central Intelligence Agency. Some have referred to this as the
    ``militarization'' of the CIA and the Intelligence Community. With your
    nomination to be Secretary of Defense, we now have the situation where
    the last two nominees to be Secretary of Defense have been CIA
    Directors.
        Is there reason to be concerned about current or former military
    officers serving in senior positions in the Intelligence Community?
        Answer. No. I have served alongside many current or former military
    officers and have been impressed with their knowledge, professionalism,
    and effectiveness. While it is important to maintain a military and
    civilian balance across the Intelligence Community, in my view, there
    is no reason to be concerned, as a general matter, about current or
    former military officers serving in senior positions in the
    Intelligence Community. The challenges facing the Intelligence
    Community are enormous and require the most capable leaders available.
    Our military possesses a considerable pool of talented leaders who have
    proven experience within, or related to, the Intelligence Community.
    The wealth of experience and leadership these military officers bring
    with them is invaluable in meeting the Community's challenges.
        Question. Is there reason to be concerned about civilian heads of
    Intelligence Community elements serving in senior positions in the
    Defense Department, including as Secretary of Defense?
        Answer. No. I think it is fair to say that DOD and IC integration
    has never been better. This is a product, in part, of people like
    Secretary Gates, who brought his wealth of experience as a CIA officer
    and National Security Council official to DOD. Both the head of an
    Intelligence Community element and the Secretary of Defense strive to
    achieve the same central objective: keeping the American people safe. I
    believe that the knowledge and experience obtained as a senior leader
    in the Intelligence Community is extremely valuable and will improve my
    ability, if confirmed as Secretary of Defense, to successfully prevail
    in this mission.

                           QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

        Question. The 2010 report of the QDR provided that military forces
    shall be sized to prevail in ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq,
    and the war against al Qaeda as well as for conducting foundational
    activities that prevent and deter attacks or the emergence of other
    threats. The QDR report particularly emphasizes the requirement for
    improved capabilities in key mission areas such as counterinsurgency,
    stability, and counterterrorism operations, as well as building the
    security capacity of partner states.
        What is your understanding and assessment of the current ability of
    each Service to provide capabilities to support these mission
    requirements and, if confirmed, what changes, if any, would you pursue
    to improve these capabilities?
        Answer. Our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan attests to the fact
    that U.S. forces have made tremendous strides over the past decade in
    developing capabilities and doctrine for effective counter-terrorism,
    counter-insurgency, and stability operations. This is true across the
    board, but particularly in our Army and Marine Corps forces, which have
    borne the brunt of the burden of bringing stability to these two
    countries.
        Further improvement is always possible and it will be important
    that we continue to gather and assess ``lessons learned'' from our
    forces in the field. If confirmed, I will continue to press for
    enhancements in our capabilities for all-source intelligence
    collection, analysis, and dissemination; rapid, secure communications
    to units in remote areas; defeating improvised explosive devices;
    training, advising, and assisting host-country forces; and cultural
    understanding.
        Question. A major objective of the Department over recent years, as
    well as guidance in the QDR report, has been toward increasing emphasis
    on and institutionalization of lower-end, irregular, counterinsurgency,
    and stability type operations.
        In your view, what does it mean to ``institutionalize''
    capabilities and support for irregular warfare capabilities in each of
    the Services? What is your understanding and assessment of Department's
    efforts to date to institutionalize and support these capabilities?
        Answer. Institutionalizing these capabilities means working to
    ensure that our forces actively maintain and continue to improve
    effective capabilities for counter-insurgency and stability operations
    even after we have achieved our goals in the current conflicts. This
    will entail not only retaining much of the equipment that has been
    fielded over the past decade for ongoing operations but also sustaining
    the improvements in doctrine and training of experienced warfighters
    that has been central to the successes we have achieved.
        I understand DOD has taken steps to accomplish this. For example,
    as units rotate back to home station from deployments to Iraq and
    Afghanistan, they have been resetting equipment for operations that
    include COIN and stability operations. Furthermore, military education
    and training programs have been revised to place much greater emphasis
    on counter-insurgency and stability operations.
        The United States will continue to face challenges from non-state
    adversaries and regions threatened by terrorist and insurgent violence.
    Our Armed Forces must, therefore, retain the ability to counter these
    threats effectively.
        Question. Institutionalizing support for irregular,
    counterinsurgency, and stability capabilities in the force does not
    mean ignoring the requirement to be trained, equipped, and ready for
    major combat at the high-end of the full spectrum of operations.
        If confirmed, how would you propose to redistribute the
    Department's efforts and resources, if at all, to ensure that the force
    is prepared for major combat while at the same time it increases and
    institutionalizes capabilities and support for irregular,
    counterinsurgency, and stability operations?
        Answer. The 2010 QDR recognized the imperative to improve
    capabilities for operations against both irregular adversaries and
    states equipped with advanced anti-access and area-denial weapons.
    Accordingly, DOD is allocating resources to both ends of the spectrum
    of operations. This is appropriate, given the array of threats and
    challenges facing our Nation, but it is also difficult to accurately
    predict future threats and, accordingly, allocate sufficient resources,
    particularly in an era of fiscal austerity. Secretary Gates has pointed
    out that it may be necessary to shrink the force and accept that we
    will have less overall capacity in order to ensure that the forces we
    field are superbly trained and equipped for the most important
    missions. If confirmed, this is a set of issues to which I will devote
    priority attention.

                           TACTICAL FIGHTER PROGRAMS

        Question. Perhaps the largest modernization effort that we will
    face over the next several years is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
    program to modernize our tactical aviation forces with fifth generation
    tactical aircraft equipped with stealth technology.
        Based on current and projected threats, what are your views on the
    requirements for and timing of these programs?
        Answer. I understand that the F-35 will replace a range of legacy
    tactical aircraft in the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps with a fifth
    generation fighter. Based on the current and projected threats, I
    believe it is important that we transition to a fifth generation
    tactical aviation capability across the U.S military services as soon
    as practical. I understand that one F-35 variant, the Marine Corps'
    Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) F-35B is on ``probation''
    while technical issues are addressed. Overall, I believe we should
    maintain sufficient legacy inventory to support the force structure
    needed to prevail in the wars we are currently engaged in, as well as
    in possible future conflicts, while we field the F-35.
        Question. What is your assessment of whether the restructuring of
    the JSF program that we have seen over the past 2 years will be
    sufficient to avoid having to make major adjustments in either cost or
    schedule in the future?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the F-35 program restructure
    was intended to put the program on solid ground, with realistic
    development and production goals and significant reduction in
    concurrency. I support DOD's current effort to focus on and reduce F-35
    sustainment costs. If confirmed, I will review the overall F-35
    program's status and health.

                               NAVY SHIPBUILDING

        Question. Today's Navy is at its smallest size in decades and could
    decline further without additional shipbuilding efforts. The Chief of
    Naval Operations has concluded that the Navy requires a fleet of at
    least 313 ships to perform its mission.
        What are your views regarding the CNO's conclusions about the
    appropriate size and composition of the fleet, and the adequacy of the
    Navy's current and projected plans to deliver that inventory of ships?
        Answer. A strong naval force is essential to project U.S. military
    power and ensures a global presence. I am not familiar with all of the
    analysis performed in the Chief of Naval Operations' assessment to
    reach a minimum number of 313 ships. However, if confirmed, I will work
    with the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations to
    ensure that the appropriate force structure requirements are fully
    identified and supported.

                             INFORMATION ASSURANCE

        Question. Protection of military networks, information, and
    communications is critical to DOD operations. The Department has not
    yet provided Congress with a comprehensive legislative proposal that
    would allow the Department to implement the President's guidance on
    dealing with current and future cyber threats.
        What is your assessment of the cyber security posture of the
    Department's critical information systems?
        Answer. From my understanding, DOD is developing a solid foundation
    for securing critical information systems. Given the lack of strong
    security features in today's commercial information technology,
    however, DOD's critical information systems, like other critical
    financial, energy, transportation information systems, contain
    vulnerabilities that are at risk of being exploited by a sophisticated
    adversary. To mitigate these vulnerabilities I understand that DOD has
    implemented and continues to improve a capability for protecting and
    defending its networks. Among other actions, the recent stand-up of
    U.S. Cyber Command has brought increased operational focus to these
    tasks.
        Going forward, an enormous amount of work is required to keep pace
    with technology and capabilities, and to stay ahead of system
    vulnerabilities that put our information and communications technology
    systems at risk. If confirmed, I will continue the efforts to secure
    DOD's information and communications technology, address cyber
    challenges, and ensure DOD can defend against network adversaries.
        Question. What Department-wide policies, guidance, or changes in
    legislation do you believe are necessary to address information and
    cyber security challenges for current and future systems?
        Answer. I am not in a position to recommend specific policies,
    guidance, or changes to authorities at this time. The administration is
    currently working with Congress to fashion new cyber legislation, and
    DOD is an active participant in these ongoing discussions. If
    confirmed, I will be studying this issue and if I determine any
    recommended changes in legislation to address information and cyber
    security challenges, I will work with the administration to provide
    those recommendations to Congress.

                                  FUTURE ARMY

        Question. In a speech at West Point last February, Secretary Gates
    argued that it is unlikely that the Nation will commit large land
    forces to future conflicts, and that the Army must ``confront the
    reality that the most plausible, high-end scenarios for the U.S.
    military [will be] primarily naval and air engagements.'' Accordingly,
    the Army will find it difficult to justify the number, size, and cost
    of its heavy forces. On the other hand, former Chief of Staff of the
    Army, General George Casey Jr., said he expected that over the next 10
    years we will still have 50,000 to 100,000 soldiers deployed in combat.
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Michael Mullen said that for
    planning purposes the Department assumes 6 to 10 combat brigades will
    likely be deployed.
        Do you agree with Secretary Gates assertion that the commitment of
    land forces, on the scale of Iraq or Afghanistan, is unlikely in the
    future? Why or why not?
        Answer. I think our historical experience argues for humility in
    predicting the shape or direction of future conflicts. Dismissing the
    prospect of a particular type of warfare could lead to unpreparedness
    or strategic surprise. Therefore, we must be prepared to conduct
    operations across the spectrum of conflict, and our forces, including
    the Army, need the ability and flexibility to adapt to a changing
    security environment. However, I believe that we should employ the full
    range of diplomatic, economic, and informational tools to achieve
    national security objectives with reduced reliance on military force
    whenever possible.
        Question. Do you agree that high-end military operations will
    primarily be naval and air engagements such that the Army will have
    difficulty justifying the size, structure, and cost of its heavy
    formations?
        Answer. It is always difficult to predict the characteristics of
    future conflict, but I think DOD must be prepared to confront potential
    adversaries armed with advanced technologies, such as integrated air
    defense systems, long-range ballistic missiles, and anti-ship cruise
    missiles. Given the importance of power projection for U.S. operations,
    naval and air assets will undoubtedly play a key role in these future
    military engagements. However, robust Army capabilities, which provide
    an unquestioned and essential ability to find and defeat opposing
    ground forces and establish security over wide areas, also serve as a
    deterrent to potential aggressors. Our experience in Iraq and recent
    military operations by our allies and partners has informed our
    thinking on the role of heavy forces across the spectrum of conflict,
    including in urban areas and the conduct of counterinsurgency
    operations. Of particular concern for ground forces are not only the
    modernization efforts of nation-states but also the proliferation of
    increasingly advanced weaponry, such as precision-guided anti-tank
    weapons, manportable air defense systems, and precision-guided rockets,
    artillery, and mortars, to non-state actors. If confirmed, I will work
    closely with the Services to assess current and future challenges and
    adjust the size and focus of each Service accordingly.
        Question. In your view, what are the most important considerations
    or criteria for aligning the Army's size, structure, and cost with
    strategy and resources? If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you
    propose to properly align the Army's size and structure with the
    requirements of security strategies and the likely availability of
    resources?
        Answer. I understand that our Nation needs an Army that can win on
    conventional battlefields, that can conduct effective counterinsurgency
    and stability operations, and that can partner with the ground forces
    of partner states to impart skills that can help them bring security
    and stability to their own countries and regions. Maintaining skills
    across this broad mission set while ensuring excellence will be a
    challenge, particularly in a period of budget austerity, and may
    require some tradeoffs across the force. If confirmed, I will work
    closely with military and civilian leaders to balance these risks.

                               ARMY MODERNIZATION

        Question. In general, major Army modernization efforts have not
    been successful over the past decade. According to a recent study done
    for the Secretary of the Army by former Assistant Secretary of the Army
    Gilbert Decker and retired Army General Louis Wagner the Army has sunk
    $3.3 billion to $3.8 billion annually since 2004 into weapons programs
    that have been cancelled. The report states that, ``The Army lacks a
    credible, quantitative model and process for determining realistic,
    achievable requirements for modernization and recapitalization given
    reduced budgets.''
        What is your assessment of the Army's modernization record?
        Answer. I understand that many of the Army's development and
    procurement problems stemmed from pursuing programs that ultimately did
    not match the needs of DOD, were cost prohibitive or were
    technologically infeasible. I understand that the Army has been working
    to rapidly review and implement many of the innovative recommendations
    of the Decker-Wagner panel. If confirmed I will review current Army
    programs to ensure this history is not repeated.
        Question. What actions, if any, would you take to ensure that the
    Army achieves a genuinely stable modernization strategy and program?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will closely monitor and oversee the Army
    modernization efforts. This will include reviewing the steps that the
    Army is taking to improve the effectiveness of its requirements and
    acquisition systems. Moreover, as the Army implements changes to its
    acquisition system, I will encourage that the lessons learned from the
    Army's efforts are infused into other programs across the Services and
    DOD.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the
    Army's capabilities portfolio review process and its current
    modernization priorities and investment strategy?
        Answer. I understand that as part of his comprehensive efforts to
    reform Army acquisition, in February 2010, Secretary McHugh ordered an
    Army-wide ``capability portfolio reviews'' to scrutinize requirements,
    identify potential redundancies and if appropriate, recommend program
    changes, including terminations. These portfolio reviews appear to be
    sound steps toward improving the results of the Army's requirements and
    acquisition systems; however, I have not had the opportunity to review
    this initiative in detail.
        Question. What actions, if any, would you take to sustain the
    momentum of these reviews in stabilizing the Army's modernization
    strategy and priorities?
        Answer. As noted above, if confirmed, I will closely monitor Army
    modernization efforts. In doing so, I will encourage the Army to
    continue its capability portfolio review process and share its lessons
    learned from this effort throughout DOD.

                           BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

        Question. In September 2009, President Obama announced that he had
    accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff to pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to
    missile defense in Europe. This approach is intended to defend all of
    Europe against existing and emerging threats from Iranian missiles,
    starting this year and increasing in capability with each of its four
    phases. Phase 4 of the European PAA is intended to provide a capability
    to defend against long-range missiles that could reach the United
    States, thus augmenting the existing homeland missile defense
    capability.
        Do you support the Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense in
    Europe and, if confirmed, will you implement it?
        Answer. I support the President's policy on European Phased
    Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and, if confirmed, I will ensure DOD supports
    the program's full implementation.
        Question. In February 2010, the Defense Department issued its
    report on the first-ever comprehensive review of U.S. ballistic missile
    defense policy and strategy, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review
    (BMDR), as required by Congress. The BMDR established a number of
    policy priorities, including establishing defense against near-term
    regional missile threats as a top priority of missile defense plans,
    programs and capabilities. It also stated the policy of sustaining and
    enhancing the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system to
    defend the homeland against attack by a small number of long-range
    missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran, and of hedging
    against future uncertainties.
        Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth
    in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review and, if confirmed, will you
    implement them?
        Answer. I will need to further study the Ballistic Missile Defense
    Review (BMDR), if confirmed, but as I understand the issue currently, I
    support the administration's policies, strategies, and priorities as
    set forth in this review. If confirmed, I will implement the policy
    priorities of the BMDR, including sustaining and enhancing defense of
    the homeland, while increasing our capability against the growing
    regional threats.
        Question. The two most recent flight tests of the Ground-based
    Midcourse Defense (GMD) system failed to intercept their targets. The
    Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has formed a Failure
    Review Board to determine the root cause of the most recent failure and
    will devise a plan to correct it, including two flight tests to confirm
    the correction. Until the second flight test confirms the correction,
    probably sometime in late 2012, the Director of MDA has suspended
    production of the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicles (EKVs) of the type that
    failed last year's flight tests, in order to ensure that those EKVs do
    not contain a flaw that would need to be corrected later.
        Do you agree that it is prudent to verify that the flight test
    failure problem has been corrected before continuing production of the
    EKVs, and before building more Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) or
    deciding how many additional GBIs may be needed in the future?
        Answer. Verifying and correcting the problems with the EKVs prior
    to continuing production is prudent and supports the administration's
    policy to ``fly before you buy'' in order to improve reliability,
    confidence, and cost control of U.S. missile defense systems.
        Question. Do you support the continued modernization and
    sustainment of the Ground-based midcourse defense system?
        Answer. Yes. The United States is currently protected against the
    threat of limited ICBM attack from States like North Korea and Iran. It
    is important we maintain this advantage by continuing to improve the
    Ground-based Midcourse Defense system.
        Question. The United States and NATO are seeking options to
    cooperate with Russia on missile defense. President Obama has announced
    that such cooperation would not limit U.S. or NATO missile defense
    capabilities.
        Do you agree that such cooperation could enhance the security of
    the United States, NATO, and Russia against common missile threats from
    nations such as Iran?
        Do you agree that irrespective of Russian objections, the United
    States is committed to the continued development and deployment of
    United States missile defense systems worldwide, including qualitative
    and quantitative improvements to such systems?
        Answer. Yes, I believe that missile defense cooperation with Russia
    can enhance U.S., NATO, and also Russian security. The United States is
    committed to sustaining strategic stability with Russia, and it is my
    understanding that neither current nor planned U.S. missile defenses
    will impact this stability. The United States is committed to
    continuing to develop and deploy missile defenses, including
    qualitative and quantitative improvements.

                                     SPACE

        Question. China's test of an anti-satellite weapon in 2007 was a
    turning point for the United States in its policies and procedure to
    ensure access to space. As a nation heavily dependent on space assets
    for both military and economic advantage, protection of space assets
    became a national priority.
        Do you agree that space situational awareness and protection of
    space assets should be a national security priority?
        Answer. Yes. Space situational awareness underpins our ability to
    operate safely in an increasingly congested space environment and
    enables the protection of space assets. Maintaining the benefits
    afforded to the United States by space is central to our national
    security.
        Question. In your view should China's continued development of
    space systems inform U.S. space policy and programs?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. If confirmed would you propose any changes to National
    Security space policy and programs?
        Answer. I am not in a position to recommend any proposed changes at
    this time. If confirmed, I would continue implementation of the
    President's 2010 National Space Policy and the supporting National
    Security Space Strategy. The two offer pragmatic approaches to maintain
    the advantages derived from space while confronting the challenges of
    an evolving space strategic environment.
        Question. The Federal Communications Commission is currently
    considering licensing a telecommunications provider who plans on using
    a signal that has the potential to disrupt GPS signals.
        If confirmed, would you look into this matter to understand the
    impact on GPS signals?
        Answer. Yes. I understand DOD is currently addressing this issue.
    If confirmed, I will work with the FCC to ensure GPS remains accessible
    to support national security, public safety, and the economy.
        Question. The management of national security space and space
    systems appears to be more fragmented than ever.
        If confirmed, would you commit to reviewing the overall management
    and coordination of the national security space enterprise?
        Answer. It is my understanding that DOD recently took steps
    intended to clarify and streamline space management, by amending the
    Secretary of the Air Force's responsibilities as the Executive Agent
    for Space, and by establishing a Defense Space Council. If confirmed, I
    will assess what further steps may be required within DOD and in the
    interagency to ensure effective management of the National Security
    Space Enterprise.
        Question. What is your view on weapons in space and the merits of
    establishing an international agreement establishing rules of the road
    for space operations?
        Answer. I support the principles outlined in the 2010 National
    Space Policy, including that all nations have a right to explore and
    use space for peaceful purposes, and that all nations should act
    responsibly in space to help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and
    mistrust. I understand that the Joint Staff is conducting an
    operational assessment of the European Union's proposed Code of Conduct
    for Outer Space; if confirmed, I look forward to reviewing this
    assessment and considering appropriate steps to establish clear rules
    of the road for space operations.

                               STRATEGIC SYSTEMS

        Question. Over the next 5 years DOD will begin to replace or begin
    studies to replace all of the strategic delivery systems. For the next
    15 plus years, DOD will also have to sustain the current strategic
    nuclear enterprise. This will be a very expensive undertaking.
        Do you have any concerns about the ability of the Department to
    afford the costs of nuclear systems modernization while meeting the
    rest of the DOD commitments?
        Answer. I share the President's commitment to a safe, secure, and
    effective nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist.
    Sustaining our nuclear deterrent requires life extension programs for
    warheads and modernization of delivery systems. I believe that
    providing necessary resources for nuclear modernization should be a
    national priority.

                                      IRAN

        Question. Iran continues to expand its nuclear program and has
    failed to provide full and open access to all aspects of its current
    and historic nuclear program to the International Atomic Energy Agency.
    In addition the P-5 +1 talks have stalled, with Iran setting
    unreasonable preconditions to resume the talks.
        Do you believe it would be in the United States' interest to engage
    Iran in a direct dialogue regarding stability and security in Iraq?
        Answer. The United States continues to reject Iran's destabilizing
    behavior towards Iraq and calls on Iran to meet its international
    obligations. The Iran and Iraq relationship is an issue that should be
    negotiated by their respective governments, especially as the United
    States draws down. However, I also believe we should continue the
    current strategy of engagement and pressure and remain open to
    additional talks with Iran through the P5+1.
        Question. What more do you believe the United States and the
    international community could be doing to dissuade Iran from pursuing a
    nuclear weapons program?
        Answer. I believe that we should explore ways to increase the
    pressure on Iran, including through additional sanctions, and make it
    as clear as possible that Iran's failure to meet its international
    obligations will make it less--not more--secure. At the same time, we
    should leave open the door for diplomacy, since it is not too late for
    Iran to provide commitments and take steps that ensure that its nuclear
    programs will remain peaceful.
        Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by Iran?
        Answer. Iran remains a significant threat to the United States, its
    allies, and its interests in the region. Iran continues to enrich
    uranium and pursue an illicit nuclear program, support terrorist groups
    that attack U.S. forces and interests, and aggressively exert its
    influence throughout the region. There is a real risk that its nuclear
    program will prompt other countries in the region to pursue nuclear
    options or threaten the broader global non-proliferation regime.
        Question. In your view, what has been the effect of sanctions
    against Iran--have they been effective and should additional unilateral
    or multilateral sanctions be levied against Iran?
        Answer. The increasing economic pressure that the Obama
    administration has brought to bear on Iran has caused surprise and
    anxiety in Tehran. I do not believe that Iran's leaders believed that
    we could generate the level of international support that we have for
    sanctions. Iranian behavior has not changed, as Iran's leadership
    continues to flout U.N. resolutions and has failed to meet its
    international obligations. I believe, however, that we must continue to
    increase the economic pressure on Iran in an attempt to change Iran's
    behavior.

                   DOD'S COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

        Question. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which is
    focused primarily on eliminating Cold War era weapons of mass
    destruction (WMD) in the states of the former Soviet Union, has several
    key objectives that include: (1) eliminating strategic nuclear weapons;
    (2) improving the security and accounting of nuclear weapons and
    weapons-usable fissile material; (3) detecting, eliminating and
    preventing the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons and
    capabilities; and (4) encouraging development of capabilities to reduce
    proliferation threats.
        In your view, what needs to be done to reduce the proliferation
    threat from the residual Cold War stockpiles of WMD weapons and
    materials in the former Soviet Union?
        Answer. I believe the countries of the former Soviet Union have
    made appreciable strides in the past two decades to reduce the threats
    associated with the extensive Soviet WMD programs, facilities and
    stockpiles in their territories--in many cases with the support and
    assistance of DOD's CTR program. While much has been done, residual
    Cold War stockpiles of WMD and materials continue to pose a threat to
    U.S. national security, especially in light of the potential for WMD
    terrorism. Where and when host governments are unable to mitigate this
    threat on their own, CTR and other U.S. programs should work with these
    nations to reduce this threat.
        Question. Are Russia and the former Soviet Union countries making a
    significant contribution to efforts to reduce the proliferation threats
    they inherited?
        Answer. It is my understanding that Russia and states of the Former
    Soviet Union are making important contributions to reduce proliferation
    threats they inherited and to address new ones. These contributions
    include direct national funding as well as collaboration with U.S.
    agencies and other international partners.
        I understand that DOD's principal vehicle to support these efforts
    is the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which is
    executed in close coordination with related activities of the
    Departments of State and Energy. As examples, I understand that
    Kazakhstan is partnering with U.S. agencies to reduce a variety of
    nuclear and biological threats that were left by the Soviets on its
    soil. Similarly, Georgia is taking a leading role, with U.S.
    assistance, to eliminate Soviet-era biological threats and to turn
    itself into a regional bio-defense leader. I am also told that we have
    maintained a strong non-proliferation partnership with Russia in a
    number of areas.
        Question. Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among
    the U.S. Government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts in
    Russia, e.g., DOD, the Department of Energy, and the State Department?
        Answer. I understand that DOD's CTR mission is executed with
    essential support from DOS, and in cooperation with the Department of
    Energy and other interagency partners. Robust collaboration across U.S.
    agencies and interagency coordination is a hallmark of the program and
    key to its effectiveness. If confirmed, I will evaluate whether
    interagency coordination can be improved.
        Question. As the CTR program expands to geographic regions beyond
    the states of the former Soviet Union, in your view what proliferation
    and threat reduction goals should the DOD establish?
        Answer. Expanding the geographic reach of the CTR program beyond
    the former Soviet Union strikes me as an important step toward
    preventing and reducing WMD threats and building global partnerships.
    The President has highlighted the threats posed by nuclear and
    biological terrorism as key proliferation concerns requiring
    international attention. In line with these priorities, I am informed
    that DOD's goals for the program are: (1) reducing and eliminating
    nuclear weapons threats; (2) improving the security and accounting of
    nuclear weapons and weapons-usable fissile material; (3) detecting,
    eliminating and preventing the proliferation of biological and chemical
    weapons and capabilities; and (4) encouraging development of
    capabilities to reduce proliferation threats among key partners and
    regions. I believe that these goals make sense.

                              PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE

        Question. The 2010 QDR concluded that the United States will
    continue to experiment with prompt global strike prototypes. There has
    been no decision to field a prompt global strike capability as the
    effort is early in the technology and testing phase.
        In your view, what is the role for a conventional prompt global
    strike capability in addressing the key threats to U.S. national
    security in the near future?
        Answer. Conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) weapons would
    provide the Nation with a unique conventional capability to strike
    time-sensitive targets, so that distant, hard-to-reach places will no
    longer provide sanctuary to adversaries. It is my understanding that
    the only current prompt global strike capability in the U.S. inventory
    is a nuclear armed ballistic missile. CPGS would be a valuable option
    for the President to have at his disposal.
        CPGS systems could be useful in scenarios involving regional
    adversaries considering an attack using weapons of mass destruction or
    against high-priority non-state adversaries. More broadly, CPGS may be
    the only systems available in situations where a fleeting, serious
    threat was located in a region not readily accessible by other means.
        Question. What approach to implementation of this capability would
    you expect to pursue if confirmed?
        Answer. I understand that DOD is developing and testing
    technologies relevant to both land-based and sea-based CPGS. It would
    be premature to make any decisions regarding a future deployed system
    until the results of these tests are in-hand.
        Question. In your view what, if any, improvements in intelligence
    capabilities would be needed to support a prompt global strike
    capability?
        Answer. Like other weapon systems, effective employment of CPGS
    weapons would depend on the availability of timely and accurate
    intelligence on the nature, location, and disposition of a potential
    target. If confirmed, I will consider what specific improvements in
    intelligence capabilities may be needed to enable effective use of CPGS
    systems for various types of targets. I believe that it is important to
    pursue continued enhancements in our capabilities to collect, analyze,
    and distribute intelligence irrespective of the development of CPGS
    systems.

                   NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP

        Question. Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program
    with the aim of creating the computational capabilities and
    experimental tools needed to allow for the continued certification of
    the nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable without the
    need for nuclear weapons testing. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy
    are statutorily required to certify annually to Congress the continued
    safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
        As the stockpile continues to age, what do you view as the greatest
    challenges with respect to assuring the safety, reliability, and
    security of the stockpile?
        Answer. It is my understanding that stockpile stewardship is
    effective; today's stockpile appears to be safe, secure, and reliable
    and not require further nuclear testing. But the stockpile is aging. I
    understand that there are challenges in identifying and remedying the
    effects of aging on the stockpile. If confirmed, I am committed to
    working with the Department of Energy to maintain the critical skills,
    capabilities, and infrastructure needed to ensure the safety,
    reliability, and security of the stockpile, all in a constrained budget
    environment.
        Question. If the technical conclusions and data from the Stockpile
    Stewardship Program could no longer confidently support the annual
    certification of the stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable, would you
    recommend the resumption of underground nuclear testing?
        Answer. As stated in my answer above, my understanding is that
    today's nuclear stockpile appears to be safe, secure, and effective and
    does not require a return to nuclear testing. I understand that nuclear
    testing is not currently anticipated or planned. It is my understanding
    that the Stockpile Stewardship Program has demonstrated an ability to
    resolve problems that in the past would have been resolved with
    testing, and I believe that if the Stockpile Stewardship Program is
    adequately funded to maintain critical technical and manufacturing
    capabilities, it can continue to fulfill this role. My recommendation
    on a course of action in the event that I was unable to certify the
    stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable would depend critically on the
    root causes of problems in the stockpile.
        Question. What considerations would guide your recommendation in
    this regard?
        Answer. The dominant considerations would be the safety, security,
    and reliability of the nuclear stockpile and our ability to sustain the
    U.S. nuclear deterrent. Technical and military considerations would
    guide my recommendation to the President. I would certainly take into
    account the expert technical judgment of the three nuclear weapons
    laboratory directors, coupled with the military judgment of the
    Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, as well as the judgment of other
    experts. I would also ask for the best military judgment of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff.
        Question. Do you agree that the full funding of the President's
    plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to
    as the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority?
        Answer. I have not had the opportunity to review this report. If
    confirmed, I look forward to the opportunity to do so. I do believe
    that maintaining a safe, reliable, and secure nuclear stockpile is a
    critical national security priority. At the same time, I believe that
    nuclear modernization, as with all DOD's efforts, must be undertaken in
    a cost-effective manner. I am informed that Secretary Gates took steps
    to reduce the estimated costs of the Ohio-class replacement ballistic
    missile submarine and the new Long-Range Strike Family of Systems. If
    confirmed, I would continue to work to ensure affordability while
    sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
        Question. Prior to completing this modernization effort, do you
    believe it would be prudent to consider reductions below New START
    treaty limits for either the deployed or non-deployed stockpile of
    nuclear weapons?
        Answer. I have not had an opportunity to review the timeframe of
    the modernization program or to assess its relationship to reductions
    below the New START treaty limits. I agree with the Senate's resolution
    of ratification for the New START treaty in calling for negotiations
    with Russia to ``secure and reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a
    verifiable manner.'' I understand that the administration has suggested
    bilateral negotiations with Russia on this matter, after consultation
    with our allies. I believe that any proposed further reductions should
    take into account the status of the stockpile of nuclear weapons, and
    that our investments and these negotiations should be pursued in
    parallel.

                   MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES INITIATIVE (MCMI)

        Question. The administration has produced an interagency strategy
    for the advanced development and manufacture of medical countermeasures
    (MCM) to defend against pandemic influenza and biological warfare
    threats. In this strategy, DOD will be responsible for the development
    and manufacture of medical countermeasures to protect U.S. Armed Forces
    and DOD personnel.
        Do you support this interagency strategy and the MCM Initiative
    and, if confirmed, would you plan to implement them?
        Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work to establish this important
    capability that is needed to support our forces and sustain our global
    operations.

                           DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM

        Question. Two years ago, Congress enacted the Weapon Systems
    Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA), without a dissenting vote in
    either House. WSARA is designed to ensure that new defense acquisition
    programs start on a sound footing, to avoid the high cost of fixing
    problems late in the acquisition process.
        What are your views regarding WSARA and the need for improvements
    in the Defense acquisition process?
        Answer. I support the improvements in the areas of defense
    acquisition organization and policy that are addressed in the WSARA.
    WSARA mandated needed improvements in the defense acquisition process.
    I support the law's requirements that DOD examine trade-offs between
    cost, schedule, and performance to significantly reduce cost growth in
    major defense acquisition programs. I am aware that DOD has undertaken
    significant further acquisition reform. If confirmed, I will continue
    the effort to improve the acquisition system consistent with the
    direction provided in WSARA.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you improve all three aspects of
    the acquisition process--requirements, acquisition, and budgeting?
        Answer. I believe that the acquisition process must be closely
    coordinated with the requirements and budget processes. Since enactment
    of WSARA, progress appears to have been made in coordinating these
    three processes, but I understand there remains room for improvement
    and that DOD can reduce costs to get better value for its defense
    dollar. I understand DOD is currently engaged in a comprehensive
    initiative designed to reduce cost throughout the defense acquisition
    system. I understand that a major part of this ``Better Buying Power''
    initiative is to coordinate the requirements, acquisition, and budget
    processes in a way that mandates affordable requirements and full
    funding into weapon systems up front. I support these efforts.
        I also believe that it is necessary to create a ``Fast Lane'' for
    acquiring and fielding systems in response to urgent operational needs,
    as was done with the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle in
    Iraq and Afghanistan. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, DOD has
    engaged in rapid acquisition through a variety of largely ad hoc
    processes. Section 804 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2011 requires DOD to consider a formal process for rapid
    acquisition. If confirmed, I will make creating a formal process for
    rapid acquisition a priority.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you improve acquisition
    accountability?
        Answer. Goldwater Nichols established a chain of command for the
    acquisition process which provides for clear accountability. However,
    the acquisition process must be operated in close coordination with the
    requirements process and the budget process, and this requires active
    participation by DOD's senior leadership to ensure all three processes
    are properly coordinated and held accountable. If confirmed, I am
    committed to ensuring accountability in all aspects of acquisition
    during my tenure.
        Question. Do you believe that the current investment budget for
    major systems is affordable given increasing historic cost growth in
    major systems, costs of current operations, and asset recapitalization?
        Answer. I have not reviewed DOD's investment budget in detail.
    However, it is clear to me that in this current fiscal environment,
    pursuing affordability and cost control are critical. In recent years,
    Secretary Gates has cancelled a number of programs that were unneeded,
    were not delivering affordably, or had been procured in adequate
    numbers already. These efforts have gone a long way towards paring down
    DOD's portfolio of major weapons systems to those that are truly
    needed. Existing programs must be managed so that cost growth does not
    make them unaffordable. If confirmed, I will continue to examine the
    investment budget closely for affordability and for opportunities to
    achieve cost savings.
        Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue and
    guard against the potential impact of weapon systems cost growth?
        Answer. Clearly, continued implementation of WSARA is a critical
    element in controlling cost growth. If confirmed, I will support this
    and other ongoing efforts to control costs and reform the acquisition
    system. In particular I will review DOD's major programs to determine
    if they are affordable and I will direct the Services to do the same
    for programs under their direction.

                              SERVICES CONTRACTING

        Question. Over the past decade, there has been a dramatic increase
    in the volume of services purchased by DOD. According to a recent
    report by the Defense Science Board, the Department now spends
    substantially more for contract services than it does for all products,
    including weapon systems. Yet, the Department is still struggling to
    establish a management structure for services contracts comparable to
    the structure in place for the acquisition of products.
        What is your view of the Department's reliance on service
    contractors?
        Answer. I recognize that the private sector is, and will continue
    to be, a vital source of expertise, innovation and support and that
    DOD, which relies on an All-Volunteer Force, simply cannot operate
    without the support of service contractors. These contractors do
    account for more of the defense budget than contractors who provide
    products to DOD. I believe that properly managing service contractors
    is just as important as managing DOD's contractors who provide weapon
    systems and other products.
        Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address the issue of
    cost growth in services contracting and ensure that the Department gets
    the most for its money in this area?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review the processes DOD is using to
    manage service contractors to ensure that they are providing good value
    for the funds they receive.
        Question. Over the last decade, the Department has become
    progressively more reliant upon contractors to perform functions that
    were once performed exclusively by government employees. As a result,
    contractors now play an integral role in areas as diverse as the
    management and oversight of weapons programs, the development of
    personnel policies, and the collection and analysis of intelligence. In
    many cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the
    same projects and task forces, and perform many of the same functions
    as DOD employees.
        In your view, has DOD become too reliant on contractors to support
    the basic functions of the Department?
        Answer. At this time I do not have enough information to make this
    assessment. However, I believe that reliance on contractors is
    something that must be assessed function by function. Many functions
    are appropriate for contractor support, however some, such as program
    management, are more appropriately performed by government personnel.
    Some functions are inherently governmental and should not be performed
    by contractors. If confirmed I will assess this issue to determine
    whether or not DOD's reliance on contractors has become excessive.
        Question. Do you believe that the current extensive use of personal
    services contracts is in the best interest of DOD?
        Answer. Although I am not familiar with the various types of
    functions acquired through personal service contracts, or the extent to
    which DOD acquires these functions through personal services contracts,
    I understand there are statutory restrictions. In my view, the basis
    for those restrictions is as applicable to DOD as to that of other
    Federal departments and agencies. If confirmed, I will ensure that
    personal services contracts are not used inappropriately.
        Question. What is your view of the appropriate applicability of
    personal conflict of interest standards and other ethics requirements
    to contractor employees who perform functions similar to those
    performed by government employees?
        Answer. When it is appropriate for contractors to perform work that
    is similar to work performed by government employees, my view is that
    those contractor employees should be subject to appropriate ethics and
    conflict of interest requirements. Contractor employees should be held
    to similar ethical standards as the Government employees they support,
    and in particular, should not be allowed to misuse the information
    which may be available to them as a result of their performance under a
    DOD contract.
        Question. U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have
    relied on contractor support to a greater degree than previous U.S.
    military operations. According to widely published reports, the number
    of U.S. contractor employees in Iraq and Afghanistan has often exceeded
    the number of U.S. military deployed in those countries.
        Do you believe that DOD has become too dependent on contractor
    support for military operations?
        Answer. I am not in a position to offer such an assessment at this
    time. While DOD's use of contractors is high relative to previous
    conflicts, current levels may be warranted. DOD now has several years
    of experience with the widespread use of contractors to support the
    All-Volunteer Force engaged in counter-insurgency and stability
    operations. It is my understanding that the increased level of reliance
    on contracted support in contingency operations is highlighted in a
    recent study conducted by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        Furthermore, it is my understanding that based on a recommendation
    by the Chairman, Secretary Gates recently issued a memorandum to DOD
    regarding a wide range of initiatives associated with contractor
    support in contingencies. This memorandum requires the military
    departments to assess opportunities for in-sourcing contracted
    capabilities that represent high risk to the warfighter. If confirmed,
    I will review this study and the military departments' assessments.
        Question. What risks do you see in the Department's reliance on
    such contractor support?
        Answer. Reliance on contractor support can lead to operational
    problems if contractors fail to perform. Experience has shown that a
    number of other problems can arise including a potential for increased
    fraud, waste and abuse, problems that arise from contractor interaction
    with local communities, and issues with the use of force. It is also
    possible that skills needed in the military in the future will atrophy
    or disappear due to reliance on contractor support.
        Question. What steps do you believe the Department should take to
    mitigate such risk?
        Answer. I believe the first step in mitigating such risk is to gain
    a thorough understanding of any risks we have with the current
    workforce mix of military, civilian and contractors. The aforementioned
    study led by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
    assessments being conducted by the military services and agencies will
    provide me with a baseline level of understanding. If confirmed, I will
    review and continue ongoing efforts to conduct effective oversight of
    service contracts in contingencies.
        Question. Do you believe the Department is appropriately organized
    and staffed to effectively manage contractors on the battlefield?
        Answer. It is my understanding that originally DOD was not properly
    organized and staffed to effectively manage contractors in the ongoing
    contingency operations, but that corrective actions have been taken
    over the last several years. If confirmed, I will review ongoing
    efforts to ensure DOD institutionalizes its contingency contracting
    capabilities and the lessons learned from our experiences in Iraq and
    Afghanistan are applied to future conflicts.
        Question. What steps if any do you believe the Department should
    take to improve its management of contractors on the battlefield?
        Answer. It is my understanding that DOD has made significant
    progress in implementing effective management of contractors during
    contingency operations through several ongoing efforts. If confirmed, I
    will review and ensure these efforts are adequate and effective and I
    will work to institutionalize the effective management processes that
    have been developed over the last several years as appropriate.

                          PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS

        Question. Federal agencies, including DOD, have spent more than $5
    billion for private security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan over
    the last decade. Over this period, there have been numerous reports of
    abuses by private security contractors, including allegations of
    contractors shooting recklessly at civilians as they have driven down
    the streets of Baghdad and other Iraqi cities. In September 2007,
    employees of Blackwater allegedly opened fire on Iraqis at Nisour
    Square in downtown Baghdad, killing more than a dozen Iraqis and
    wounding many more. More recently, the Senate Armed Services Committee
    reported on questionable activities by private security contractors in
    Afghanistan.
        Do you believe DOD and other Federal agencies should rely upon
    contractors to perform security functions that may reasonably be
    expected to require the use of deadly force in highly hazardous public
    areas in an area of combat operations?
        Answer. Without a substantial increase in the force structure
    committed to contingency operations, the use of contractors for some
    security functions in contingencies is a necessity. However, these
    contractors must be properly regulated and supervised and their mission
    must be carefully limited. Contractors cannot engage in combat
    operations. Their use of force is limited to self-defense and the
    defense of others against criminal violence and the protection of
    critical property. Under these circumstances, I believe that the
    limited use of security contractors in contingency operations is
    acceptable. It would be inappropriate for me to comment on their use by
    other departments. If confirmed I will ensure that proper limitations
    on private security contractors are in place and enforced.
        Question. In your view, has the U.S. reliance upon private security
    contractors to perform such functions risked undermining our defense
    and foreign policy objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan?
        Answer. The use of force by contractors or military personnel can,
    if misapplied, undermine our policy objectives. Contractors for
    physical security missions have been a necessity in Iraq and
    Afghanistan and will continue to be so. My understanding is that, over
    time, DOD has established procedures to manage these contractors
    effectively to prevent unnecessary violence that would be detrimental
    to our policy objectives. This is an area that requires constant
    attention and continued supervision and policy refinement is required.
    If confirmed, I will focus on providing that supervision.
        Question. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to ensure
    that any private security contractors who may continue to operate in an
    area of combat operations act in a responsible manner, consistent with
    U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that two actions are
    taken. First, the use of private security contractors in any area of
    combat operations must be fully coordinated. There must be unified and
    consistent procedures for all such contractors, regardless of which
    U.S. agency hires them. Our commanders on the ground must have
    authority to restrict security contractors' operations as the situation
    requires.
        Second, there must be assured legal accountability for the actions
    of private security contractors. In a given circumstance, the host
    nation will have responsibilities in this regard as well, such as
    rigorous licensing procedures and enforcement of its own laws.
        Question. Do you support the extension of the Military
    Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act to private security contractors of
    all Federal agencies?
        Answer. I support steps to ensure that there is legal
    accountability for the actions of all contractors performing work for
    the U.S. Government in an area of combat operations. If confirmed, I
    will consult with my interagency partners concerning appropriate
    mechanisms to ensure such accountability.
        Question. What is your view of the appropriate application of the
    Uniform Code of Military Justice to employees of private security
    contractors operating in an area of combat operations?
        Answer. There must be assured legal accountability for the actions
    of all contractors deployed to an area of combat operations. The
    application of the Uniform Code of Military Justice is one tool to do
    this.
        Question. OMB Circular A-76 defines ``inherently governmental
    functions'' to include ``discretionary functions'' that could
    ``significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of private
    persons''
        Answer. In your view, is the performance of security functions that
    may reasonably be expected to require the use of deadly force in highly
    hazardous public areas in an area of combat operations an inherently
    governmental function? In your view, is the interrogation of enemy
    prisoners of war and other detainees during and in the aftermath of
    hostilities an inherently governmental function?
        I am not familiar with DOD policies governing the use of
    contractors in detention operations, but if confirmed, I will review
    them to ensure they properly separate inherently governmental functions
    from work performed by contractors. I am aware that Congress spoke to
    the issue of interrogation by contractors in section 1038 of the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 which prohibits
    the interrogation by contractor personnel of detainees or others in the
    custody or under the effective control of DOD in connection with
    hostilities. If confirmed, I will ensure this provision is enforced.
        Question. Do you see a need for a comprehensive reevaluation of
    these issues now?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review these issues to determine
    whether there is a need to reevaluate these policies.

                             ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

        Question. Over the last 15 years, DOD has reduced the size of its
    acquisition workforce by almost half, without undertaking any
    systematic planning or analysis to ensure that it would have the
    specific skills and competencies needed to meet DOD's current and
    future needs. Since September 11, 2001, moreover, the demands placed on
    that workforce have substantially increased. Section 852 of the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 established an
    Acquisition Workforce Development Fund to help DOD address shortcomings
    in its acquisition workforce. Over the last year, Secretary Gates has
    stated that the Department must continue to rebuild its acquisition
    workforce, even as it seeks efficiencies in other areas.
        Do you agree that the Department would be ``penny-wise and pound
    foolish'' to try to save money by cutting corners on its acquisition
    workforce at the risk or losing control over the hundreds of billions
    of dollars that it spends every year on the acquisition of products and
    services?
        Answer. Yes. I am aware that DOD is expending far more today on
    goods and services with an acquisition workforce substantially reduced
    in size from the 1990s. If confirmed, I will support a properly sized
    and highly capable acquisition workforce.
        Question. Do you believe that the Acquisition Workforce Development
    Fund is needed to ensure that DOD has the right number of employees
    with the right skills to run its acquisition programs in the most cost
    effective manner for the taxpayers?
        Answer. Yes. It is my understanding that DOD has used the Defense
    Acquisition Workforce Development Fund, which originated in this
    committee, to resource a number of initiatives to attract, develop, and
    retain individuals with critical acquisition skills. DOD must continue
    to fund these initiatives which are critical to achieving a properly
    sized and highly capable acquisition workforce.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps if any will you ensure that the
    money made available through the Acquisition Workforce Fund is spent in
    a manner that best meets the needs of DOD and its acquisition
    workforce?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will direct that the Under Secretary for
    Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics monitor the implementation of
    the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund to ensure that it
    focuses on rebuilding critical skills in the workforce, without which
    our goals for affordability, cost control, and reform of the
    acquisition system cannot be met.

                               MANAGEMENT ISSUES

        Question. The Government Performance and Results Act is intended to
    provide managers with a disciplined approach by developing a strategic
    plan, establishing annual goals, measuring performance, and reporting
    on the results by for improving the performance and internal management
    of an organization.
        What do you consider to be the most important priorities and
    challenges facing DOD as it strives to achieve these management goals?
        Answer. I share Secretary Gates' concern, as noted in his recent
    speech to the American Enterprise Institute, that the current systems
    for managing people and money across the DOD enterprise are inadequate.
    It is my understanding that the defense agencies, field activities,
    joint headquarters, and support staff functions of DOD operate without
    centralized mechanisms to allocate resources, track expenditures, and
    measure results relative to DOD's overall priorities. If confirmed, I
    look forward to addressing this issue.
        Question. What are your views on the importance and role of
    financial information in managing operations and holding managers
    accountable?
        Answer. I believe that having access to the appropriate financial
    information, as well as other key performance indicators, is critical
    towards managing operations and holding leaders accountable for
    results.

                              FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

        Question. DOD spends billions of dollars every year to acquire,
    operate, and upgrade business systems needed to support the warfighter,
    including systems related to the management of contracts, finances, the
    supply chain, and support infrastructure. Despite these expenditures,
    the Department's business systems are stovepiped, duplicative, and
    nonintegrated. As a result, the Department remains unable to produce
    timely, accurate, and complete information to support management
    decisions.
        If confirmed, will you ensure that the financial management
    problems of DOD receive priority attention at the senior management
    level?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. What priority do you believe the Department should place
    on achieving a clean financial statement, as required by section 1003
    of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010?
        Answer. Achieving clean audit opinions is one of my top management
    improvement priorities. A clean financial audit opinion is important to
    demonstrate that DOD is a responsible steward of public funds and to
    ensure management has accurate and timely information for
    decisionmaking. I understand DOD has a plan for achieving auditable
    statements that includes goals, a governance process, and resources;
    and that this plan depends in part on modernizing its business systems.
        I expect senior leaders across DOD to work together to continue
    progress towards meeting the legal requirement to be ready for audits
    by the end of 2017, and will ensure that the Comptroller, in
    partnership with the Chief Management Officers, devotes time and
    resources to leading this effort.

                             HUMAN CAPITAL PLANNING

        Question. DOD faces a critical shortfall in key areas of its
    civilian workforce, including the management of acquisition programs,
    information technology systems and financial management, and senior DOD
    officials have expressed alarm at the extent of the Department's
    reliance on contractors in these areas. Section 115(b) of title 10,
    U.S.C., requires the Department to develop a strategic workforce plan
    to shape and improve its civilian employee workforce.
        Would you agree that the Department's human capital, including its
    civilian workforce, is critical to the accomplishment of its national
    security mission?
        Answer. Yes. DOD's human capital, including its civilian workforce,
    is not only critical, but an essential element to the successful
    accomplishment of its national security mission. It is my understanding
    that the civilian workforce is viewed as one entity throughout DOD.
    Given the intent to have civilians be capable and ready to move to
    where an emerging requirement exists within DOD, collaboration is an
    ongoing process amongst the Services, Defense Agencies, Joint Staff,
    and Office of the Secretary of Defense. This process ensures that DOD
    is speaking in one voice for its civilian workforce to ensure
    transparency, develop and recommend enterprise policy, and support the
    overall lifecycle. DOD employs a robust system of talent management to
    ensure it possesses and plans for future workforce needs. If confirmed,
    I will work to ensure that this ready and capable civilian force has
    the support it needs through programs that foster ideas, methods, and
    procedures for lifecycle management.
        Question. Do you share the concern expressed by others about the
    extent of the Department's reliance on contractors in critical areas
    such as the management of acquisition programs, information technology
    and financial management?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will monitor whether or not DOD is too
    reliant on contractors. The private sector will continue to provide
    vital support to DOD. There are areas in acquisition, IT and financial
    management where support from contractors is an appropriate and cost
    effective solution to perform work that does not require government
    personnel discretion. If confirmed, I will be committed to proactively
    managing the Total Force of military and civilian personnel, and
    support provided by contractors.
        Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the Department
    undertakes necessary human capital planning to ensure that its civilian
    workforce is prepared to meet the challenges of the coming decades?
        Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure that a comprehensive
    workforce plan provides strategies for recruitment, development, and
    retention of a mission-ready civilian workforce is in place. Planning
    is critical as fiscal constraints impact workforce capabilities and
    sustainment.

                              TEST AND EVALUATION

        Question. A natural tension exists between major program objectives
    to reduce cost and schedule and the test and evaluation (T&E) objective
    to ensure performance meets specifications and requirements.
        What is your assessment of the appropriate balance between the
    desire to reduce acquisition cycle times and the need to perform
    adequate testing?
        Answer. I support rigorous independent testing and evaluation to
    provide accurate and objective information on the capabilities and
    limitations of defense systems to both acquisition executives and
    warfighters and to ensure contractors deliver products that meet their
    requirements. When systems are urgently needed in the field, the
    imperative for accurate and objective testing is still just as
    important but should be addressed through efforts to expedite the T&E
    process. I understand this has been accomplished successfully for such
    urgent efforts as the MRAP vehicle program. In those urgent cases I
    believe that some risk can be taken, but safety and basic performance
    must be verified prior to fielding. Testing is needed to validate
    system performance and I believe it is a necessary part of the
    acquisition process. That said, there may be opportunities to achieve
    this goal through more efficient processes than those currently in
    practice.
        Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe we
    should procure weapon systems and equipment that has not been
    demonstrated through T&E to be operationally effective, suitable, and
    survivable?
        Answer. In a limited number of urgent circumstances it might be
    necessary to field a system prior to operational testing in order to
    address an urgent gap in a critical capability. But even in such cases,
    operational evaluation should still be conducted at the earliest
    opportunity to assess the system's capabilities and limitations and
    identify any deficiencies that might need to be corrected.
        Question. Congress established the position of Director of
    Operational Test and Evaluation to serve as an independent voice on
    matters relating to operational testing of weapons systems. As
    established, the Director has a unique and direct relationship with
    Congress, consistent with the statutory independence of the office.
        Do you support the continued ability of the Director of Operational
    Test and Evaluation to speak freely and independently with Congress?
        Answer. Yes.

          FUNDING FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS AND WORKFORCE

        Question. In his State of the Union speech earlier this year, the
    President said that ``maintaining our leadership in science and
    technology (S&T) is crucial to America's success.'' In the fiscal year
    2012 budget submission, despite the significant efforts to find
    efficiencies, the DOD's basic research investments grow by 2 percent
    per year and other S&T activities remain constant taking into account
    inflation.
        Do you support maintaining growth in the DOD's S&T investments?
        Answer. I understand and appreciate the valuable role government
    investment in S&T has had for the Nation and DOD. As Director of the
    Central Intelligence Agency, I noted that many of that agency's key
    capabilities emerged from long-term S&T funding. I have seen the
    results and I support long-term S&T investments. I am also aware that
    the President has challenged S&T funding levels for all government
    components. While S&T investment will be a high priority if I am
    confirmed, all defense appropriations must be considered during this
    time of budget constraints.
        Question. How will you assess whether the S&T investment portfolio
    is adequate to meet the current and future needs of the Department?
        Answer. If confirmed, I anticipate conducting an early review of
    DOD's capabilities to support the administration's goals, including S&T
    investment. DOD's budget must balance a number of competing needs and,
    if confirmed, I will have to assess all those needs, and the risks
    associated with various levels of funding.
        Question. Well over half of all graduates of U.S. universities with
    advanced degrees in S&T are non-U.S. citizens. Due to a variety of
    reasons, many return to their home countries where they contribute to
    competing against the United States in technology advancement.
        What is your view on steps that the Department should take, if any,
    to ensure that DOD and the defense industrial base are able to recruit
    and retain scientists and engineers from this talent pool?
        Answer. The issue of enabling and encouraging foreign students to
    remain in the United States to pursue careers in science and
    engineering is one that affects the Nation as a whole. If confirmed, I
    would work within the administration and with Congress to find ways to
    retain this talent pool.

                            DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE

        Question. The latest QDR addressed the need for strengthening the
    defense industrial base. Specifically, it said: ``America's security
    and prosperity are increasingly linked with the health of our
    technology and industrial bases. In order to maintain our strategic
    advantage well into the future, the Department requires a consistent,
    realistic, and long-term strategy for shaping the structure and
    capabilities of the defense technology and industrial bases--a strategy
    that better accounts for the rapid evolution of commercial technology,
    as well as the unique requirements of ongoing conflicts.''
        What is your view on steps that the Department should take, if any,
    to strengthen the defense industrial base?
        Answer. I believe a strong, technologically vibrant, and
    financially successful defense industrial base is in the national
    interest. I understand that national policy for many years has been to
    let market forces adjust the defense industrial base to our evolving
    threats and requirements, and to changing technology. The government
    specifically supports defense S&T, and small businesses entering the
    defense market. Occasionally, specific industrial policies are used to
    assure the long-term health of particular sectors of the defense
    industry. If confirmed, I will ensure DOD uses a sector-by-sector
    approach to the defense industrial base, with productivity growth and
    long-term health as its goals.

                                  ENCROACHMENT

        Question. Some of the most significant issues that impact the
    readiness of the Armed Forces are categorized as outside encroachment
    upon military reservations and resources. This encroachment has
    included, but is not limited to environmental constraints on military
    training ranges, local community efforts to obtain military property,
    housing construction, and other land use changes near military
    installations, airspace restrictions to accommodate civilian airlines,
    and transfer of radio frequency spectrum from DOD to the wireless
    communications industry. Unless these issues are effectively addressed,
    military forces will find it increasingly difficult to train and
    operate at home and abroad.
        In your opinion, how serious are encroachment problems for the U.S.
    military? If confirmed, what efforts would you take to ensure that
    military access to the resources listed above, and other required
    resources, will be preserved?
        Answer. I believe that encroachment is a serious issue for the U.S.
    military. I am aware that DOD has a number of key programs to influence
    activities outside our installations so that they do not conflict with
    our training and operations. I strongly support such efforts and, if
    confirmed, will work closely with Congress to ensure that these efforts
    are effective.

                           LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION

        Question. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is
    pending consideration in the United States Senate.
        What is your view on whether or not the United States should join
    the Law of the Sea convention?
        Answer. I support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.
        Question. How would being a party to the Law of the Sea convention
    help or hinder the United States' security posture?
        Answer. Being a party to the Law of the Sea Convention would not
    hinder the U.S. security posture, nor would it have any adverse impact
    on our sovereignty. In fact, becoming a party would enhance our
    security posture by enabling the United States to reinforce the
    Convention's freedom of navigation and overflight rights, including
    transit passage in strategic straits, and preserve our rights and
    duties in the Arctic. In addition, becoming a Party to the Convention
    would support combined operations with coalition partners and support
    the Proliferation Security Initiative; establish undisputed title to
    our extended continental shelf areas; and bolster our leadership in
    future developments in the law of the sea. Accession would also add to
    DOD's credibility in a large number of Asia-focused multilateral venues
    where Law of the Sea matters are discussed.

                            CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

        Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
    appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
    briefings, and other communications of information.
        Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
    this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
    committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
    information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
    with respect to your responsibilities as Secretary of Defense?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
    other communications of information are provided to this committee and
    its staff and other appropriate committees?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
    such documents?
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

                             EXPORT CONTROL REFORM

        1. Senator Levin. Mr. Panetta, the outgoing Secretary of Defense
    has been a leading proponent of the administration's effort to reform
    our export control system. One element of that effort is a review of
    the U.S. Munitions List (USML), which is expected to result in the
    transfer to the Commerce Control List (CCL) less sensitive items that
    do not require USML controls. What is your view of the administration's
    effort to reform export controls?
        Mr. Panetta. I fully support the reform efforts because I believe
    they are absolutely necessary to meet 21st century national security
    challenges. Secretary Gates played a key role in setting the
    administration's export control reform objectives: a single list, a
    single licensing agency, a single enforcement coordination agency, and
    a single U.S. Government-wide information technology licensing system.
    The administration has made significant progress in most areas. The
    Department of Defense (DOD) has been fully engaged in revising the USML
    and continue to focus on completing this important work with our
    interagency partners to produce a single export control list that is
    more transparent and predictable for government and industry.

        2. Senator Levin. Mr. Panetta, if you are confirmed, do you plan to
    continue the review of the USML, and to transition items, as
    appropriate, to the CCL?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will work to ensure that DOD continues to be
    the key driver in revising the USML into a positive list, tiering
    controls based on the criticality of items and technologies for
    military and intelligence applications, and identifying items that
    should be moved to the more flexible licensing policies under the CCL.

        3. Senator Levin. Mr. Panetta, what is your understanding of the
    timing for this effort?
        Mr. Panetta. With respect to revising the USML and moving items to
    the CCL, DOD has developed initial drafts of 19 categories of the USML.
    My understanding is that following interagency deliberations, the plan
    is to incrementally publish these re-built categories for public
    comment in the latter part of 2011 and early 2012.
        With respect to establishing a single information technology
    system, DOD is leading this critical step. Using DOD's U.S. Exports
    System (USXPORTS) program, for the first time, all agencies will have
    access to a full licensing dataset that will facilitate fully informed
    and timely decision making. The Departments of State and Commerce will
    be connected to USXPORTS this year; the Treasury Department is expected
    to have connectivity in 2012.
        My understanding is that the administration is working to finalize
    the rules for the Export Enforcement Coordination Center (EECC) as
    directed by Executive Order 13558, signed by the President in November
    2010. The EECC is a key pillar of export control reform.
        Finally, the administration will need to work with Congress on
    legislation that would allow the President to establish a single U.S.
    export control licensing agency.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich

                                     BUDGET

        4. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen
    have recently been vocal about DOD being unable to sustain any more
    cuts to force structure. I do not agree that DOD is in a position where
    it cannot achieve additional cost savings and efficiencies through
    elimination of poor performing programs and a reassessment of
    priorities and requirements, especially in light of some requests made
    this year by DOD which do not make fiscal sense and are not in the best
    interest of the force. For instance, DOD is requesting $804 million to
    continue developing the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). Yet
    we will not procure this system and based on the programs past
    performance we will not get anything viable out of continued
    development. Additionally, DOD intends to carry out tour normalization
    in Korea. Moving dependents to this increasingly volatile area will
    cost billions in military construction and basic housing allowance over
    the long term. It doesn't make fiscal sense or common sense. Another
    example is the realignment of marines to Guam. The cost is astronomical
    and the agreement may not be executable and need re-examining as
    Chairman Levin has pointed out this year. The Government Accountability
    Office (GAO) has also identified several actions DOD could take to
    eliminate redundancy and save money. If confirmed, will you closely
    examine previous decisions and agreements that are costing taxpayers
    billions of dollars and are not enhancing national security or
    providing for our military?
        Mr. Panetta. The Department has begun a comprehensive review of the
    defense programs in light of the current fiscal environment. Everything
    is on the table and we will assess each program in terms of the
    contribution the program makes to our national security strategy.

        5. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, what type of review will you
    conduct?
        Mr. Panetta. I will continue the comprehensive review begun by
    Secretary Gates and bring it to a conclusion by this fall.

        6. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, how will you manage/
    prioritize DOD's budget in this time of scare resources to ensure the
    readiness of our forces but eliminate wasteful spending?
        Mr. Panetta. During both the current comprehensive review and the
    development of subsequent budgets, I will ensure we protect our
    essential military capabilities while continuing to pursue additional
    efficiencies, streamline operations, control acquisition cost growth,
    and identify lower priority efforts that can be eliminated or
    curtailed. That said, difficult choices will have to be made to operate
    within reduced resources.

                            AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

        7. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, I support eliminating the threat to
    U.S. national security in Afghanistan and Pakistan by defeating al
    Qaeda and preventing those countries from being safe havens again.
    However, like many of my colleagues, after a decade in the country I am
    concerned about an indefinite U.S. presence. In light of the recent
    killing of Osama bin Laden and elimination of many terrorists and
    insurgents, I believe we need a thorough threat assessment and to
    concisely define a realistic and achievable end-state. What is your
    assessment of our current strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan?
        Mr. Panetta. Our strategy is working, but much work remains.
    Although the death of Osama bin Laden was a significant achievement in
    our Nation's effort against al Qaeda, his death does not mark the end
    of our efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its
    affiliates. Al Qaeda and other extremist groups continue to threaten
    the United States and U.S. allies and partners from safe havens in
    Pakistan, and wish to reestablish safe havens in Afghanistan.
        In Afghanistan, the progress that we have made over the past 16
    months in driving the Taliban from their home territory in Helmand and
    Kandahar is evidence that the insurgency is under intense pressure and
    that their capabilities are being degraded. We have reversed the
    insurgency's momentum in many key areas and are now making strides with
    the Afghans to enable a government capable of providing basic services
    and security. The implementation of this strategy has moved us closer
    to our desired end-state of an Afghan state capable of repelling
    insurgent threats to the central government, and of denying the
    reestablishment of a safe haven for al Qaeda.
        Although our relationship with Pakistan is a challenging one,
    continued cooperation with Pakistan is important to maintaining
    necessary pressure on al Qaeda leadership and the networks that provide
    it support and safe haven, at a time when it is most vulnerable. Al
    Qaeda vulnerability in the wake of the death of Osama bin Laden
    presents an historic opportunity not only for us, but also for
    Pakistan, to advance our shared interests and strengthen our
    cooperation in eradicating terrorist networks that threaten both
    nations, as well as our partners in the region and the world. I will
    continue to seek Pakistan's unambiguous support in the fight against al
    Qaeda and the regional syndicate of terrorist networks.

        8. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, what is your assessment of the
    threat to U.S. national security in the region?
        Mr. Panetta. [Deleted.]

        9. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, how do you view the United States'
    long-term commitment--financially, reconstruction, and security-wise?
        Mr. Panetta. The United States and the international community have
    sacrificed an extraordinary amount--in lives and resources--for the
    Afghan people. We remain committed to assisting Afghanistan in seeking
    a secure Afghanistan that is free of al Qaeda safe-havens. Ultimately,
    however, the Afghans must be responsible for taking the lead for
    security in their country, and the transition process through 2014 will
    support this.
        President Obama and President Karzai have agreed that the United
    States and Afghanistan should have an enduring strategic partnership
    beyond 2014. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the
    international community have also made clear that their commitment to
    Afghanistan is enduring and will continue beyond the completion of the
    transition to Afghan security responsibility. We are currently engaging
    with the Afghans to outline in broad terms a vision for our long-term
    cooperation and presence.
        Afghanistan will require international assistance for many years to
    come; this is the reality of over 30 years of war. Our assistance,
    however, must be focused on helping the Afghans take full
    responsibility for their own future. We need to ensure that as a nation
    they begin to develop the capacity and the resources they need to
    reduce their reliance on international aid.

        10. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, what is your assessment of
    President Hamid Karzai as a partner?
        Mr. Panetta. President Karzai is the democratically elected leader
    of Afghanistan, and we are committed to working with him to achieve our
    shared objectives. U.S. policy toward Afghanistan is not contingent on
    a single leader; our commitment is to the people of Afghanistan, based
    on the core interests that we share.
        President Karzai faces a difficult situation in Afghanistan. He is
    fighting an insurgency with the assistance of more than 140,000 foreign
    forces. The burden of this war has been great on the Afghan people.
    They have been traumatized by some 30 years of war. Inevitably, there
    will be times of tension or disagreement, and just as President Karzai
    needs to listen to our concerns, we also need to listen carefully to
    his. President Karzai sometimes airs these concerns in ways we find
    unhelpful. But ultimately, he appreciates what the United States is
    doing and the sacrifices made by our forces.

        11. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, what do you see as the role for
    DOD in building the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan to
    deliver services, provide better governance, improve economic
    development, and fight corruption in Afghanistan?
        Mr. Panetta. Although the Department of State (DOS) has the lead
    for governance and economic development activities in Afghanistan, DOD
    brings capabilities and resources that augment civilian efforts,
    particularly in contested areas. As part of the counterinsurgency
    strategy, U.S. military forces also support developing Afghan
    governance and economic capacity, particularly at the district and
    provincial levels. U.S. military forces use Commanders' Emergency
    Response Program funds to carry out small-scale projects designed to
    meet urgent humanitarian relief requirements or urgent reconstruction
    requirements of the population, with a focus on short-term stability
    rather than long-term development. Military commanders provide co-
    leadership of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and generally are key
    partners of Afghan Government officials at the district level.
        Further, the President's December 2009 strategy review designated
    DOD as having primary responsibility for building capacity within the
    Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior. This includes a range of
    responsibilities to help build ministerial capacity to recruit, train,
    equip, and sustain their own forces. DOD also contributes to anti-
    corruption efforts through its Shafafiyat task force and its support to
    the Ministry of Interior's law enforcement activities.

        12. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, do you have concerns with the
    Afghan Government's ability to sustain our efforts--like funding their
    own security forces? What more can we be doing?
        Mr. Panetta. After 30 years of war, the institutional and economic
    capacity of Afghanistan is badly damaged. Nonetheless, Afghanistan has
    several areas with great potential for economic development and revenue
    generation, but we expect that the Afghan Government will require
    international assistance for years to come to realize that potential. A
    key aim of U.S. assistance, therefore, must be to help the Afghans take
    full responsibility for their own future, and we need to ensure that as
    a nation they begin to develop the capacity and the resources they need
    to reduce their reliance on international aid. This is why the design
    of U.S. Government-funded projects is increasingly focused on Afghan
    capacity to sustain those projects.
        Projects to help build the Afghan Government's capacity include
    improvements to the Afghan energy sector (a major catalyst for economic
    development), transportation and associated infrastructure to
    facilitate regional trade, improvements to the agricultural sector, and
    efforts to improve the Afghan Government's ability to collect customs
    revenue. In addition DOD has implemented programs through its Task
    Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) to connect outside
    investors to potential Afghan producers and to help Afghanistan build
    the capacity to develop its mineral and other natural resources in
    environmentally sound and sustainable ways.
        Aside from increasing the Afghan Government's capacity and revenue
    to sustain the current joint efforts with the United States, we
    anticipate that costs for Government services, such as the funding the
    Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), could be adjusted over time.
    Detailed planning for long-term ANSF sustainment is an ongoing, active
    effort. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan is
    collaborating with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
    Staff, and NATO to analyze the long-term requirements for ANSF
    capability in light of current fiscal constraints. We envision a
    continuing role for the United States and expect continued
    contributions from international donors. To that end, before retiring,
    then-Secretary of Defense Gates challenged our partners in the
    International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to contribute a combined
    1 billion Euros annually to the NATO Afghan National Army Trust Fund.
    The Department is working with our international partners to pursue
    that initiative.

        13. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, will you support the
    drawdown in July?
        Mr. Panetta. I will support the President's decision.

        14. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, how long should the drawdown take?
        Mr. Panetta. The pace and scope of the drawdown should take into
    account security and other conditions on the ground. I will listen to
    the recommendations from the commanders and provide my best military
    advice to the President. A successful transition of security lead to
    ANSF requires careful planning and implementation.

        15. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, what is your assessment of the
    progress in developing a professional and effective ANSF?
        Mr. Panetta. Progress in developing professional and effective ANSF
    has been steady. One hundred thousand have been added to the rolls of
    the ANSF since the establishment of NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan
    (NTM-A) in November 2009. NTM-A has set the conditions for enhancing
    professionalism by the opening of twelve branch schools in the past
    year, implementing an aggressive literacy program, and establishing
    leadership training for officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs).
    The focus this year is on training Afghan trainers to train their own.
    A sign of progress in this regard is the graduation 2 weeks ago of 26
    new Sergeants Major from the Sergeant Major Academy--the first class
    trained solely by Afghan Instructors and leaders. Similarly the
    Commander of ISAF Joint Command (IJC) has led improvements in the
    operational effectiveness of the ANSF through partnering. Ninety-Five
    percent of all Afghan Kandaks (battalions) are partnered with coalition
    forces. In the ISAF's main effort operation in Kandahar Province,
    HAMKARI, ANSF comprise 60 percent of the total forces and are
    increasingly taking the lead in planning and executing operations. The
    response to the recent Taliban attacks in Kandahar City on 7 May 2011
    was an example of the improving effectiveness of the ANSF. They dealt
    with the attackers in a deliberate manner, eliminating the threat with
    minimal casualties and limited ISAF support. Clearly there are
    challenges and issues as we continue to grow and develop the ANSF, but
    commanders at all levels are working shoulder to shoulder with their
    Afghan counterparts to resolve them. I am confident that we can proceed
    with transition of security responsibilities in designated areas to the
    ANSF, and meet our goal of ANSF lead for security countrywide in
    Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

        16. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, will you make it a
    goal to transfer the security mission to the Afghans sooner than 2014?
        Mr. Panetta. President Karzai established the 2014 transition goal,
    which NATO subsequently endorsed based on joint assessments with the
    Afghan Government about the state of the insurgency, the rate at which
    the ANSF can develop their capability to take over security lead, and
    the level of governance capacity and development throughout the
    country. Actual conditions on the ground will drive the ultimate rate
    and sequence of transition, but the 2014 goal remains a realistic
    target for a responsible transition.

        17. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, what changes, if
    any, would you recommend for U.S. relations with Pakistan, particularly
    in terms of military-to-military relations?
        Mr. Panetta. I would continue to seek Pakistan's unambiguous
    support in the fight against al Qaeda and its affiliates operating in
    the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Pakistan, however, must choose what
    kind of partnership it seeks. Pakistan's own security depends on its
    civilian and military efforts to deny safe havens in the tribal and
    border regions and to extend economic opportunity and the government's
    writ to those areas. It is also in the United States' interest that
    Pakistan take these steps. Strong military-to-military relations and
    assistance can be an important means of building Pakistan's
    capabilities for this effort, but it will also require a mutual effort
    to build and sustain trust in a commitment to achieving shared
    objectives.

                           LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION

        18. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, the United Nations Convention on
    the Law of the Sea (CLOS) is pending consideration in the U.S. Senate.
    I support ratification of this treaty and know the Arctic is an
    increasingly important region. What is your view on whether or not the
    United States should join the CLOS?
        Mr. Panetta. I support U.S. accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea
    Convention (LOS Convention). The rights guaranteed under the LOS
    Convention are essential for the global presence of U.S. forces,
    enabling large-scale movement of materiel through the Straits of
    Gibraltar, Malacca, Hormuz, and Bab el-Mandeb and into the Persian Gulf
    to sustain our combat forces into Iraq and Afghanistan. These rights
    also permit the U.S. submarine fleet to transit submerged through key
    choke points on critical missions and allow the U.S. Air Force to
    conduct global missions without overflying foreign national airspace.
    Finally, freedom of navigation and overflight rights ensure the
    uninterrupted flow of commerce to and from our shores.

        19. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, how would being a party to the
    CLOS help or hinder the United States' security posture?
        Mr. Panetta. Becoming a Party to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention
    (LOS Convention) would enhance our security posture by enabling the
    United States to reinforce the LOS Convention's freedom of navigation
    and overflight rights, including transit passage through strategic
    straits, and preserve our rights and the duties of all States in the
    Arctic. In addition, becoming a Party to the LOS Convention would:
    support combined operations with coalition partners; support the
    Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); establish undisputed title to
    our extended continental shelf areas; and bolster our leadership in
    future developments in the law of the sea. Accession to the LOS
    Convention would also add to DOD credibility in a large number of Asia-
    focused multilateral venues where law of the sea matters are discussed.

        20. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, what will you do to get this
    treaty to the Senate for approval?
        Mr. Panetta. I look forward to supporting the administration's
    continued engagement with the Senate toward favorable consideration of
    U.S. accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOS Convention).
        I have been and remain a strong advocate of the LOS Convention. I
    will support the administration's goal of ratification of this treaty.

                         GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE

        21. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
    (GMD) system in Alaska and California is the only missile defense
    system that protects the U.S. Homeland from long-range ballistic
    missile attacks. This is an extremely complex program that was
    simultaneously fielded and developed. It is our only line of defense
    and it is imperative there is confidence in the system and the
    appropriate resources are allocated. If confirmed, will you support the
    2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review which established GMD as a
    priority and ensure the program is resourced to be able to protect the
    U.S. Homeland against evolving threats?
        Mr. Panetta. I support the priority given to GMD in the 2010
    Ballistic Missile Defense Review.

        22. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, what role do you see GMD playing
    in the long-term security of the Nation?
        Mr. Panetta. The protection of the United States against a
    ballistic missile attack remains a vital security priority. As the
    Secretary of Defense, I will work to ensure United States citizens have
    the best possible defenses against such an attack. With GMD and a
    successful intercept, the United States retains a broader range of
    response options than without. I also believe that threat nations will
    be less inclined to prosecute a ballistic missile attack against the
    United States if they believe that we have the capability to destroy
    the ballistic missile in flight, before it reaches its target. For
    these reasons, we must continue to maintain a viable defense and
    continue to evolve our capability so that it is effective against
    future threats.

                    RARE EARTH-DEPENDENCY ON FOREIGN SOURCES

        23. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, I am concerned about a potential
    threat to U.S. national security and military operability: the issue of
    rare earth elements and our military's dependence on unreliable foreign
    nations for our supply. China produces approximately 97 percent of the
    world's rare earth supply and has restricted export quotas of rare
    earth elements based on their own internal demand. Rare earths are
    essential components to clean energy technologies. They are also
    critical to many modern defense applications, such as radar and sonar
    systems and precision-guided munitions. DOD comprises a small segment
    of aggregate rare earth demand, but we cannot function effectively
    without these elements. Our most critical weapons systems rely on these
    elements. Please share your view on the importance of rare earths and
    our current dependency on China for them.
        Mr. Panetta. I share your concerns that access to certain
    individual rare earth elements and components may be an issue. We must
    work to ensure that the U.S. has adequate supplies of the needed
    elements and carefully monitor supply and demand.

        24. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, will you ensure DOD
    adequately and appropriately evaluates near-, mid-, and long-term
    supply-chain availability, determines aggregate defense demand, and
    establishes a plan to address potential supply chain vulnerabilities?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes. While it appears expected domestic production of
    rare earth elements should be substantial by the end of next year, I
    remain concerned that access to certain individual rare earth elements
    and components may be an issue and will continuously monitor the
    situation.

        25. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, where do you see it in the list of
    priorities of DOD?
        Mr. Panetta. Given the fact that rare earth elements are a critical
    component of our defense capability, availability of these elements
    will be one of my priorities and areas of focus.

        26. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, how long should it take to develop
    a plan?
        Mr. Panetta. Identifying individual rare earth elements of concern
    to the defense industrial base is the focus of the rare earth materials
    assessment required by Congress under section 843 of the Ike Skelton
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. Depending upon
    its findings regarding defense demand and market supply for the
    individual elements, the assessment will include, as appropriate,
    options for mitigating risk in order to ensure the availability of the
    necessary rare earth materials or components. It should be possible to
    identify strategy options within months after identifying the elements
    of concern.

                               RESERVE COMPONENT

        27. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, the National Guard and Reserves
    are critical to our force. For the last decade they have performed
    alongside their Active Duty brethren with honor and distinction as an
    operational force instead of a strategic Reserve. If any lesson was
    learned it is that they are critical to a ready force and during times
    of high operational tempo. Over the last several years there has been a
    total force approach to better incorporate the Reserve component. I
    worry, however, business will go back to usual and funding and support
    for the Reserve component will dramatically be reduced by the Services
    thereby compromising their readiness. If confirmed, how will you
    approach the Reserve component force structure role as operations
    decrease?
        Mr. Panetta. I agree that the Guard and Reserve have made major
    contributions to the Department's efforts over the last 10 years, and
    have been integral to the Total Force. Our Reserve component is a
    valuable, highly experienced and well-trained element of that force,
    and continuing to support their readiness is critical. Given the
    current era of conflict and the broad range of security challenges on
    the horizon, sound decisions regarding the rebalancing of capabilities
    and aggregate capacity of the Total Force are essential to defending
    and advancing our national interests. It will be my approach to make
    the most efficient use of the Total Force--Active, Guard, Reserve,
    civilians, and contractors. In order to reduce stress on the overall
    force, maintain an All-Volunteer Force, and leverage the skills and
    experience resident in the Guard and Reserve, their continued
    contribution in the future is critical.

        28. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, how will you ensure
    total force integration initiatives, like associate units in the Air
    Force, undergo a thorough requirements scrub and are properly resourced
    to reflect the steady state requirements of the unit?
        Mr. Panetta. In order to ensure Total Force integration, I would
    work to use the Guard and Reserve in partnership with the Active Forces
    to best advantage, increasing the capacity of, and reducing the burden
    on, all our military personnel and their families. I will work to
    ensure that the gains made in readiness, training, and equipping in the
    Reserve components over the last decade are preserved and maintained,
    reflecting the steady state demands on our Armed Forces.
        We must adequately resource and effectively employ all elements of
    the Total Force, consistent with their assigned missions. Accordingly,
    I will continue the significant work by the Department and the Services
    to sustain and refine the effectiveness of our total Force.
        To this end, Secretary Gates approved a Quadrennial Defense Review
    (QDR)-directed Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve
    Components, which outlined the organizational and operational benefits
    of initiatives such as the associate units in the Air Force, along with
    other effective employment options, which use the Guard and Reserve to
    best advantage. As this review was approved by Secretary Gates, it will
    be my approach to take these important recommendations under my review.
    In addition, we have defined the accepted use of Reserve component
    units and personnel in response to unforeseen outside the continental
    U.S. (OCONUS) events, which I will ensure that the Department embraces
    as the United States continues to act as a stabilizing force throughout
    the world.

                                   DWELL TIME

        29. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, when you visited me we talked
    about the high operational tempo of the brigades and units in Alaska.
    Currently, the 1/25 Stryker Brigade Combat Team is deployed to
    Afghanistan and the other brigade--the 4/25 Airborne Brigade Combat
    Team--will deploy at the end of the year. The brigades have not yet had
    a 1:2 dwell time. Dwell time is crucial to an all-volunteer healthy
    force. Please discuss your view on the importance of dwell time to the
    force.
        Mr. Panetta. I agree-dwell time is critically important to the
    sustainment of the all-volunteer force. The Department struggles with
    balancing critical operational requirements and the burden we are
    asking some of our servicemembers to bear.
        Six years ago, DOD established business rules designed to protect
    dwell time. The Service Chiefs, combatant commanders, OSD, the
    Chairman, and ultimately the Secretary of Defense review any deployment
    order that exceeds dwell time goals; extends a unit in theater more
    than 14 days beyond what they were originally told; or is longer than
    365 days. These individual reviews look for other ways we can meet the
    requirement without breaking a given unit's dwell. Frequently, options
    include similarly capable units, volunteers, and task organizing units
    to shield components that were deployed more recently than their parent
    unit.
        We currently have a deploy-to-dwell time of 1:1 and that will
    increase to 1:2 by October 2011 for all Active Duty members. The goal
    for reservists is 1:5.

        30. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, in your view, will the Army and
    Marine Corps planned manpower decreases facilitate the attainment of
    DOD's dwell time objectives? If so, how? If not, do the cuts make
    sense?
        Mr. Panetta. The dwell times for our deploying forces are primarily
    driven by our commitment in Afghanistan and other operations around the
    world. I will take into consideration the conditions on the ground and
    our ability to meet our strategic objectives before deciding the
    appropriate course of action for force reductions. I will continue to
    monitor dwell times and future manpower reductions as we move forward.
        In the meantime, the Department will continue to use existing
    processes to carefully vet all deployment orders that unduly burden our
    servicemembers. This series of individual reviews, from the Service
    Chiefs up to me, carefully considers all viable options for mitigating
    deployment stress. Where there are no viable alternatives I ultimately
    consider the criticality of the requirement, relative to the harmful
    effects of the deployment. Unfortunately, we have not been able to
    eliminate dwell shortfalls completely and this concerns me. The
    Department must continue to look for solutions in order to maintain
    this superb force.

        31. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, what should be the goal for dwell
    time?
        Mr. Panetta. The Department goal for dwell time for our Active
    component is a ratio of 1:2. The goal for our Reserve component is a
    ratio of 1:5.

     department of defense and department of veterans affairs collaboration
        32. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, Secretary of Defense Gates and
    Secretary of Veterans Affairs Shinseki have pledged to improve and
    increase collaboration between their respective departments to support
    military servicemembers as they transition to veteran status, in areas
    of health and mental health care, disability evaluation, and
    compensation. If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in
    ensuring that DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs collaborate?
        Mr. Panetta. I understand significant improvements have been made
    in DOD-VA collaboration in the last few years, but much work remains to
    be done. I will ensure that DOD continues to work closely with VA to
    support servicemembers and their families, and I look forward to
    working with Secretary Shinseki.

                               SUICIDE PREVENTION

        33. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, the number of suicides in each of
    the Services has increased in recent years. The Army released a report
    in July 2010 that analyzed the causes of its growing suicide rate and
    examined disturbing trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high
    risk behaviors. In addition, studies conducted by the Army of soldiers
    and marines in theater are showing declines in individual morale and
    increases in mental health strain, especially among those who have
    experienced multiple deployments. The 4/25 in Alaska has experienced
    one confirmed suicide and two suspected suicides within the last month.
    This brigade has experienced a high operational tempo and will deploy
    again late this year. These incidents are tragic, unfortunate, and
    impact the entire unit. In your view, what role should DOD play in
    shaping policies to help prevent suicides both in garrison and in
    theater and to increase the resiliency of all servicemembers and their
    families, including members of the Reserve components?
        Mr. Panetta. The Department should play an active role in shaping
    policies to help prevent suicide no matter where it may occur and
    whether they are Active, Reserve, or Guard. Suicide prevention is a
    very important issue within the Department. Each Service acknowledges
    the important role that leaders, both officer and Non-Commissioned
    Officers (NCO), play in building resilience among those under their
    command. At the OSD level, we have established a working group to
    better integrate the efforts and programs across Services. To this end,
    we are specifically looking at training leadership, effective peer-to-
    peer programs, and outreach to Guard and Reserve members. As Secretary,
    I will ensure the Department is fully engaged on this issue.

                                ENERGY SECURITY

        34. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, the 2010 QDR identified energy
    security as one of four key priorities for reform because doing so will
    reduce risks to military personnel, safeguard strategic interests, and
    ensure troop readiness. Recognizing this, General Petraeus recently
    issued guidance to the troops in Afghanistan asking them to reduce
    energy consumption. I know DOD and the Services understand how
    vulnerable our reliance on oil, especially oil from foreign countries,
    has made us as a Nation and are taking many steps to alleviate
    dependency. However, the bottom line today is the military needs access
    to fossil fuels for energy needs. I prefer those sources to be domestic
    instead of overseas to ensure access and strengthen our national
    security. Please describe your view of how reliance on foreign oil for
    fuel impacts the military and national security.
        Mr. Panetta. America's dependence on foreign oil and fossil fuels
    puts our national security at risk. For DOD, our reliance on oil shapes
    our missions--both strategically and tactically. This is especially
    true because we seek to purchase fuel as close to the fight as
    possible--for both financial and operational reasons. Because assured
    access to energy is a core part of fighting and winning the Nation's
    wars, we can and must do better as a Department in improving the
    efficiency of our use and the range of energy alternatives available to
    our forces.
        Success in this area will not come easily for DOD. But global
    energy trends make success imperative. They include the rising global
    demand for energy, changing geopolitics, and new threats, which mean
    that the cost and availability of conventional energy sources will be
    less certain in the future. By changing the way we power the force now
    and in the future, America will have a military that is better able to
    project and sustain power around the world for the full spectrum of
    military missions.

        35. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, what is your understanding of
    steps that have been taken to alleviate consumption of oil for current
    operations and what impact have those efforts had?
        Mr. Panetta. DOD components are taking steps to include energy as a
    consideration in how they organize, train, and equip the Nation's
    warfighters. In June 2011, the Department released its initial
    ``Operational Energy Strategy.'' The Strategy is the DOD roadmap for
    transforming energy use in military operations and improving energy
    security for the warfighter. Additionally, the Services have each
    produced mission-specific energy strategies. Components are
    implementing these strategies to improve their energy use.
        The Department is taking steps to better track energy use, and is
    testing and fielding systems to reduce the energy demand of our forces
    and use alternate sources. Our technical initiatives include smart
    micro-grids; energy-efficient shelters; solar energy; fuel cells;
    waste-to-energy systems; hybrid engines; lightweight and low drag
    materials; improved power generation and distribution; and energy
    storage solutions. In addition, the Department is making non-materiel
    changes, such as better aircraft routing and loading.
        Many of these efforts are being fielded now and are making
    immediate operational gains.

        36. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, in your view, what remains to be
    done?
        Mr. Panetta. DOD is the Nation's single largest user of energy. In
    2010, the Department consumed over 5 billion gallons of petroleum fuels
    for military operations.
        For the long term, if we are to significantly reduce our volume of
    fuel use, we must systematically consider the risks and costs
    associated with our energy use as we build the future force. As our
    experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate, we cannot assume
    secure logistics. The Department must integrate energy security
    considerations into the full range of planning and force development
    activities, including the requirements and acquisition processes.
        Congress has given the Department the statutory tools it needs to
    implement this change, and we are beginning to do so. If the Department
    requires additional authority, I will not hesitate to seek the
    necessary Congressional authorization.

        37. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, what steps will you
    take to alleviate dependency on foreign sources of energy, and
    ultimately decrease reliance on oil for fuel?
        Mr. Panetta. While the Department is a significant consumer of
    energy, it only accounts for about 1 percent of the energy all
    Americans use. The cost of America's national energy consumption,
    particularly oil, is too high, both in the billions of dollars the
    Nation sends overseas, the geostrategic consequences, and costs to the
    warfighter. The solutions to the Nation's energy challenges require
    action at every level of Government as well as from the private
    industry and every American. The Department has an opportunity to
    reduce these costs by achieving energy efficiencies while leading the
    way for the Nation by focusing on warfighter requirements.

                           PRIORITIES AND CHALLENGES

        38. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, what priorities will
    you establish?
        Mr. Panetta. My top priority as Secretary of Defense is to ensure
    the security of the American people.
        We face a number of challenges: first, prevailing in the current
    conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and in the fight against al Qaeda;
    second, keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of
    terrorists and rogue nations; third, preparing to counter future
    military threats; fourth, preserving the finest fighting force in the
    world and taking care of servicemembers and their families; and fifth,
    continuing the reforms DOD's leadership has initiated which will be
    crucial in this time of budget constraints.

        39. Senator Begich. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, what do you believe
    will be your greatest challenge? Do you have a plan for addressing that
    challenge?
        Mr. Panetta. We must ensure that we prevail in the conflicts in
    which we are now engaged. In Afghanistan, we must continue to degrade
    the Taliban, train the Security Forces, and help the government take
    ownership for the country's progress and security. And in Iraq, we must
    assure that the Iraqi military and security forces are prepared to
    safeguard their nation.
        As we do that, I am very aware that we must be highly disciplined
    in how we spend the taxpayer's precious resources. The days of
    unlimited defense budgets are over. Our challenge will be to design
    budgets that eliminate wasteful and duplicative spending while
    protecting those core elements we need for our Nation's defense. I do
    not believe that we have to choose between strong fiscal discipline and
    strong national defense. We owe it to our citizens to provide both.
        I will also be a tireless advocate for our troops and their
    families. It is their sacrifice and dedication that have earned the
    respect of a grateful nation, and inspired a new generation to wear the
    uniform of our country. They put their lives on the line to fight for
    America, and I will just as surely fight for them and for the families
    who support and sustain them.
                                     ______

              Question Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand

                             VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

        40. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Panetta, in conflicts around the world,
    rape of women and girls has become one of the most horrific weapons of
    choice used systematically to attack civilians, devastate families, and
    destabilize societies. Violence against women and girls is frequently
    an early indicator of repressive regimes and instability and it is
    often an obstacle to security, stabilization, and the development of a
    sustainable peace. Despite the recognition of rape as a war crime, a
    crime against humanity, and a form of genocide, over the years the
    brutality and frequency of this crime has only increased.
        Could you describe the steps taken by DOD to:

             incorporate training on prevention and response into
            the basic training curricula of foreign military forces and
            judicial officials;
             ensure that U.S. assistance to units involved in
            regional or multilateral peacekeeping operations includes such
            training; and
             incorporate training on preventing and responding to
            violence against women and girls when U.S. military personnel,
            military contractors, and military observers are to be deployed
            in humanitarian relief, conflict, and post-conflict settings.

        Mr. Panetta. DOD recognizes that sexual and gender-based violence
    (SGBV), particularly when used as a tactic of war, is not only a human
    rights issue, but also an obstacle to conflict resolution and lasting
    security. DOD has taken important steps to build the capacity of
    partner militaries, as well as DOD personnel, to prevent and respond to
    SGBV. The Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS)
    provides training on prevention and response to SGBV to foreign
    military units receiving security assistance from the United States.
    DIILS addresses SGBV as part of seminars such as ``Human Rights and the
    Law of Armed Conflict'' and ``Developing a Professional Military
    Force.'' In addition, geographic Combatant Commands provide targeted
    training to address specific country contexts. For example, DIILS and
    U.S. Africa Command train military judicial personnel in the Democratic
    Republic of the Congo to investigate and prosecute SGBV crimes.
        As part of its efforts to build the capacity of partner countries
    to participate in international peacekeeping operations, the Global
    Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) provides training to peacekeepers to
    protect civilians from SGBV. Geographic Combatant Commands implement
    half of GPOI activities, which are funded by DOS.
        U.S. personnel also receive pre-deployment training on preventing
    and responding to SGBV. Training on combating trafficking in persons
    (TIP) and on sexual assault prevention and response are required,
    including risk-reduction factors in specific deployment locations.
    Combatant Commands and the Military Departments also provide mission-
    specific pre-deployment training that addresses SGBV. For example, all
    personnel who deploy to U.S. Southern Command's area of responsibility
    are required to take the ``Human Rights Awareness Education'' training
    prior to deployment. U.S. Southern Command's training module includes
    TIP specific scenarios, information on identifying victims, and
    appropriate responses.
        DOD is developing an action plan on women, peace, and security to
    build on current efforts, including integration of prevention and
    response to SGBV into training of partner militaries, peacekeepers, and
    DOD personnel. This will be integrated into the National Action Plan
    that the National Security Staff is developing with DOS, USAID, and
    DOD.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

                              ENERGY REQUIREMENTS

        41. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, section 526 of the Energy
    Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007 (P.L. 110-140) stated:

              ``Procurement and Acquisition of Alternative Fuels. No
            Federal agency shall enter into a contract for procurement of
            an alternative or synthetic fuel, including a fuel produced
            from nonconventional petroleum sources, for any mobility-
            related use, other than for research or testing, unless the
            contract specifies that the lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions
            associated with the production and combustion of the fuel
            supplied under the contract must, on an ongoing basis, be less
            than or equal to such emissions from the equivalent
            conventional fuel produced from conventional petroleum
            sources.''

        This provision effectively prevents DOD from procuring petroleum
    from Canadian tar sands sources, a vital energy supplier for the DOD
    mobility-related uses at our military bases along the northern tier of
    the United States. DOD has apparently ignored this provision as it has
    proven unworkable and completely unresponsive to the budgetary
    constraints and wartime needs of DOD. I might add that President Obama
    at Georgetown on March 30, 2011, stated: ``I set this goal knowing that
    we're still going to have to import some oil. It will remain an
    important part of our energy portfolio for quite some time, until we've
    gotten alternative energy strategies fully in force. And when it comes
    to the oil we import from other nations, obviously we've got to look at
    neighbors, like Canada and Mexico that are stable and steady and
    reliable sources.'' If confirmed, would you support DOD's current
    actions to receive and use oil from Canada, a strategic ally and
    trading partner?
        Mr. Panetta. My understanding of this issue is that this particular
    provision has not prevented the Department from meeting our energy
    needs. I am also told that this is an area of active litigation for the
    Department, so it would be inappropriate for me to comment further on
    this issue.

        42. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, in your view, what would be the
    burden placed on DOD from a fiscal perspective and on DOD contracting
    personnel if required to enforce a strict compliance to section 526 of
    EISA?
        Mr. Panetta. My understanding is that the Department is already in
    strict compliance with the provision.

        43. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, would you support legislative
    action that would repeal section 526 of EISA?
        Mr. Panetta. This is an issue I look forward to learning more
    about. I can say that energy security and, increasingly, climate change
    are key issues for the 21st century defense missions. As the 2010 QDR
    stated, ``although they produce distinct types of challenges, climate
    change, energy security, and economic stability are inextricably
    linked.'' Climate change and associated extreme weather events act as
    an accelerant of instability around the world, which places demands on
    civil and military institutions. As we make decisions about how we
    assure that U.S. forces have a reliable supply of energy, now and in
    the future, the Department must balance both energy security and
    climate security considerations.

                                DEFENSE BUDGETS

        44. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, in your answers provided to the
    committee prior to this hearing, you responded to a question about the
    impact of defense spending reductions on our national security by
    stating ``I will work to make disciplined decisions in ways that
    minimize impacts on our national security. But it must be understood
    that a smaller budget means difficult choices will have to be made. DOD
    is in the process of working through fiscal year 2011 with about $20
    billion less than what was requested by the President.'' If confirmed,
    what priorities will guide the comprehensive review and these difficult
    decisions?
        Mr. Panetta. I will ensure that we protect our essential military
    capabilities while continuing to pursue additional efficiencies,
    streamline operations, control acquisition cost growth, and identify
    lower priority efforts that can be eliminated or curtailed. That said,
    difficult choices will have to be made to live within a reduced Defense
    topline.

        45. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, how would you propose reining in
    spending in the short-term?
        Mr. Panetta. Each defense program must be assessed in terms of its
    contribution to the national security strategy. I will continue the
    effort begun by Secretary Gates to seek efficiencies, eliminate
    overhead, control costs, and identify lower priority efforts.

        46. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, is it time to stop the spending
    sprees that mark the end of each fiscal year for DOD program managers
    trying to spend every dime they have before funds expire?
        Mr. Panetta. I will vigorously investigate any indication of
    wasteful year-end spending.

        47. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, what would you do to eliminate
    wasteful spending?
        Mr. Panetta. I will build on the efficiencies identified by
    Secretary Gates and work with the Department's leadership to manage
    defense spending prudently. Reducing spending on any lower priority
    programs, or programs that are no longer needed, will be a key
    component of that management effort.

        48. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, Admiral Mullen stated recently
    that in the search for $400 billion in savings that ``two of the big
    places the money is, is in pay and benefits.'' He warned against the
    ``relatively easy'' choice of cutting hardware while maintaining the
    increasing costs of pay and health care for military personnel,
    retirees, and their dependents and asserted that ``all things are on
    the table.'' In your advance policy questions, you talked about the
    need for a ``comprehensive review of the military pay and benefits
    structure to determine where costs can be contained.'' Do you agree
    with Admiral Mullen that personnel costs have to be included in the
    search for a solution to the response to a smaller DOD budget?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes, everything must be on the table. Any such effort
    should take into consideration that the Nation must continue to attract
    and support our men and women in uniform and their families in a wide
    variety of situations.

                         BASE REALIGNMENTS AND CLOSURES

        49. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, as you may know, DOD is required
    by law to complete base realignments and closures (BRAC) resulting from
    the 2005 BRAC round by September 15, 2011. Are you committed to DOD's
    compliance with the BRAC deadline established by law to the maximum
    extent practicable?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes. Of the 222 recommendations forwarded by the
    Commission to the President, the Department has a handful of
    recommendations facing scheduling challenges. The Department is working
    diligently to ensure we satisfy our BRAC legal obligations.
        In order to ensure no disruption to the full and complete
    implementation of each of the recommendations facing scheduling
    challenges, as well as continuity of operations, the Department has
    requested legislation that would provide the Secretary of Defense or
    Deputy Secretary of Defense with limited authority to extend the BRAC
    implementation period for up to 10 recommendations, for up to a year,
    when such an extension is necessary to ensure the operational readiness
    of units or functions being relocated as part of the recommendation.
    This legislation would not modify the substance of any BRAC
    recommendation nor would it eliminate the legal obligation to fully
    implement each recommendation; it merely would provide the Secretary or
    Deputy Secretary with limited authority to extend the implementation
    period.

        50. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, in your opinion, given the need to
    find another $400 billion over the next 12 years, should DOD conduct
    another round of BRAC to reduce excess infrastructure?
        Mr. Panetta. It is my understanding the Department has not asked
    for authorization for another Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) and
    is very single mindedly focused on the current one and meeting current
    deadlines. Whether another round of BRAC is needed is something I will
    assess.

              DEFENSE FUNDS EARMARKED FOR NON-DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS

        51. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, in these times of fiscal austerity
    where DOD is making hard decisions about savings and efficiencies, DOD
    should not be spending DOD funds on non-DOD requirements like local
    roads, financial support for parks and recreation areas, and many other
    worthy causes that have no connection to military readiness. If
    confirmed, what would you do to ensure that funds provided to DOD are
    spent only on essential defense and national security requirements?
        Mr. Panetta. If confirmed, I will ensure that the President's
    Budget requests will reflect the level of funding that is required to
    meet essential defense and national security requirements each year.
    Once funds are appropriated, I will ensure that the Department will
    execute funds in accordance with the legislative direction provided in
    the annual appropriations acts.

                            DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE

        52. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, the current DOD policy of relying
    on market forces to sustain the health of the industrial base may not
    account for instances where DOD is the sole customer for military
    unique weapons. Do you intend to continue the current initiative to
    develop an industrial base strategy?
        Mr. Panetta. The Department recognizes the defense industrial base
    is more global, commercial, and financially complex than ever before.
        The Department regularly addresses specific industrial-base
    concerns within programs and services and has also embarked on a more
    comprehensive sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier analysis of the industrial
    base. This approach will help inform future programmatic decisions,
    expand the scope of the Department's industrial base assessments, and
    create a database on industry for use as an input to many decision-
    making processes across the Department.

        53. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, such a strategy will work best if
    there is open communication between defense officials and industry
    leaders so that industry can shape itself to meet the needs of DOD.
    Secretary Gates began a Secretary/Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
    dialogue to facilitate that communication. Do you intend to continue
    that dialogue?
        Mr. Panetta. I am committed to maintaining an open dialogue with
    industry and increasing the transparency within which we operate to the
    maximum extent permitted by law.

        54. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, the current export control regime
    is seen by some as reducing U.S. industries global competitiveness.
    What actions do you believe are necessary to be taken to improve the
    export control regime?
        Mr. Panetta. There are compelling national security arguments for
    fundamentally changing the regulations and procedures we have had in
    place since the Cold War for determining what weapons and dual-use
    equipment and technology may be exported and under what terms. Over the
    years, we have made incremental changes--but this has not been
    adequate. We need to establish new rules, organizations, and processes
    that deal effectively and efficiently with 21st century challenges.
    This is the basis for the ``four singles'' of the administration's
    export control reform effort: a single export control list, a single
    licensing agency, a single enforcement coordination agency, and a
    single information technology system for export licensing. The export
    control reform initiative is focused on protecting sensitive items and
    technologies that are the U.S. ``crown jewels''. By doing so, we would
    be better able to monitor and enforce controls on technology transfers
    with real security implications, while helping to speed the provision
    of equipment to allies and partners who fight alongside us in coalition
    operations. This revised export control system, based on revised
    controls and new licensing policies and procedures, would allow U.S.
    companies to compete more effectively in the world marketplace.

                         MILITARY SCHOOLS AND EDUCATION

        55. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, DOD is currently embarked on a
    $4.0 billion investment plan over the next 5 years to address the
    deteriorated facilities conditions of K-12 schools maintained and
    operated by DOD Education Activity (DODEA). The urgent requirement was
    revealed in a study requested by this committee which assessed the
    condition of DODEA schools worldwide and the impact of underinvestment
    of funding for replacements and renovations. As a result, Secretary
    Gates established a priority to ensure that the children of our
    military personnel are provided the best education opportunities in
    world-class facilities with the most current technology available. If
    confirmed, will you continue this firm and comprehensive commitment of
    funds over the next 5 years to upgrade DODEA schools?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will continue to commit to funds for upgrading
    DODEA schools. As Secretary Gates recognized, I too believe we have an
    obligation to provide a quality education to dependents of our
    servicemembers, and part of this is ensuring the facilities are in good
    condition.

        56. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, what goals would you expect DODEA
    to maintain in carrying out the upgrade and modernization of K-12
    schools owned by DODEA?
        Mr. Panetta. The Department's goal is to provide schools that will
    best showcase a 21st century education. We can do this by enhancing the
    curriculum to better support Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math
    (STEM) programs, and use technology to create a teaching environment
    that would increase student performance. Our future schools will focus
    on how to best improve student learning and incorporate features that
    can transition schools to a facility that incorporates various teaching
    tools to accommodate differentiated learning to benefit all students.

        57. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, should our commitment to quality
    K-12 education facilities extend to the use of DOD funds to improve
    schools owned and operated by local school districts?
        Mr. Panetta. It is DOD policy to first rely on local education
    agencies to provide for the education of military children. In some
    locations, the Department has been able to make property on its
    installations available for local educational agencies to construct,
    operate, and maintain local schools. While the Department continues to
    believe that school maintenance and repair is a local responsibility,
    it cannot ignore the fact that its children are currently being
    educated in less than ideal facilities. Recognizing this, Congress
    recently appropriated $250 million ``to make grants, conclude
    cooperative agreements, or supplement other Federal funds to construct,
    renovate, repair, or expand elementary and secondary public schools on
    military installations in order to address capacity or facility
    condition deficiencies at such schools.''
        The Department is reviewing needs of local schools on bases to
    determine which have the most serious facility deficiencies.

        58. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, what guidelines for DOD investment
    would you establish to manage the funding provided to local districts?
        Mr. Panetta. As required by section 8109 of Public Law 112-10, the
    Department will give ``priority consideration to those military
    installations with schools having the most serious capacity or facility
    condition deficiencies.'' We are implementing this requirement and will
    manage the Department's investment accordingly.

                              FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

        59. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, the business processes and systems
    at DOD lack the controls and discipline necessary for DOD to produce
    auditable financial statements. This impacts the quality and timeliness
    of information you will be receiving for critical decisions around how
    to best utilize taxpayers' money. Secretary Gates recently conveyed his
    frustration on this issue in a speech before the American Enterprise
    Institute. What specific actions do you plan to take to ensure DOD
    achieves the September 2017 date for obtaining an audit opinion of
    DOD's financial statements?
        Mr. Panetta. I intend to ensure the DOD financial statements are
    audited as soon as possible. Financial statement audit opinions provide
    the public a measure of confidence in the financial management of
    Federal agencies. They provide an independent assessment of the
    accuracy of financial information that management relies upon to make
    critical decisions.
        I understand DOD has a plan to improve processes and systems in
    order to provide reliable and accurate financial information and
    financial statement audit opinions. I plan to ensure this effort
    receives the right amount of leadership attention and resources across
    all functional areas.

        60. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, Secretary Gates set in motion a
    focus on eliminating inefficiencies in DOD. The reductions he levied
    across the Services may not achieve their intended results in view of
    the fact that DOD did not assess how they could do business more
    efficiently and with less cost, but instead levied budget cuts in areas
    with the least resistance or complexity. It is imperative in the
    current and foreseeable future of downward budgets that DOD makes
    reductions in their spending in areas where solid business cases
    justify the reductions. We cannot afford to have decisions made without
    understanding the impacts of reductions on the overall mission of DOD.
    What actions will you take to ensure that any decline in DOD's budget
    is achieved in a responsible manner that supports DOD's mission?
        Mr. Panetta. I will be guided by the objective of ensuring the
    Department continues to meet its responsibility to support the national
    security strategy. A strategy-driven approach is essential and the
    ongoing comprehensive review seeks to do that. I will continue the
    initiative to find additional efficiencies and eliminate lower priority
    programs. However, it must be understood that difficult choices will
    have to be made.

        61. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, what are the opportunities you
    envision to consolidate administrative and leadership functions of the
    various agencies or DOD enterprises? One example could be the
    consolidation of the Defense Contract Management Agency and Defense
    Contract Audit Agency under one leadership function with two operating
    arms.
        Mr. Panetta. I intend to continue Secretary Gates' effort to make
    the Department more efficient. As part of this effort, I will explore
    ways to consolidate functions in a manner that will still support
    defense requirements.

                    MILITARY UNIFORM AND APPEARANCE POLICIES

        62. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, military leaders have expressed
    concern about the provisions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
    (RFRA) and whether it should apply to the uniform and personnel
    appearance standards of military members. The requirements of military
    discipline, unit cohesion, use of emergency protective equipment, and
    so on, have produced insistence on uniform standards over many years.
    Out of concern about the ability of DOD to prevail in litigation
    challenging the applicability of the RFRA to the Armed Forces, the
    administration forwarded a legislative proposal that would amend title
    10 to specify that the language of the RFRA does not apply to the
    military. What are your views about the importance of this issue and
    the need for legislation to address this problem?
        Mr. Panetta. I understand the important and delicate balance that
    must be struck between accommodating religious practices that require
    adherents to wear particular articles of faith and maintaining the
    military's uniform grooming and appearance standards. I will work with
    the leaders of the Military Services to achieve that balance.

                               HEALTH CARE COSTS

        63. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, in response to the advance policy
    questions you stated: ``In the long term, the promotion of healthy life
    styles and prevention among our beneficiaries is one way to help reduce
    the demand for health services.'' Do you agree that tobacco use
    adversely affects military performance and the health of DOD's
    beneficiary population?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes, I agree. The negative health effects that are
    commonly known about tobacco use, such as lung cancer and heart
    disease, certainly adversely affect those military and civilian
    beneficiaries who use these products. As such, I understand the
    Department offers programs to assist servicemembers and their families
    in quitting this habit.

        64. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, what is the rationale for DOD
    selling tobacco products to servicemembers, retirees, and their
    families at a discounted rate in military exchanges and commissaries?
        Mr. Panetta. While DOD policies recognize that tobacco use is
    detrimental to health and readiness, the rationale for the discount is
    similar to other discounts we provide the servicemembers: to provide
    savings on products they use.
        The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009
    directed the Department to develop a smoking cessation benefit to
    encourage users to quit or reduce their tobacco use. Moving forward, we
    will build strategic partnerships with all the Military Services to
    support the smoking cessation benefit. DOD continues to actively
    encourage servicemembers to quit tobacco and many military treatment
    facilities offer treatment and classes to assist with quitting.

        65. Senator McCain. Mr. Panetta, is it time to reassess this policy
    in order to achieve your goal of healthy life styles and prevention for
    DOD beneficiaries, and if confirmed, would you pledge to do so?
        Mr. Panetta. I will ensure that the Department undertakes a
    thorough policy review to identify the best strategies to reduce the
    impact of tobacco products on our servicemembers and their families.
    The Department must support healthy lifestyles as a means of sustaining
    the health of our servicemembers and their families.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

                           STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

        66. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, the National Guard provides unique
    capacity-building capabilities through its State Partnership Program
    (SPP). SPP specifically supports both combatant commanders' and U.S.
    ambassadors' strategic objectives by establishing sustainable
    relationships with critical partner nations around the world. SPP
    started back in the early 1990s as part of European Command's
    engagement plan with former Warsaw Pact nations; SPP has grown and is
    now engaged with 62 nations around the world. The National Guard Bureau
    (NGB) has been developing an updated overall strategic plan for SPP
    that looks at the world today and where we should be engaging with SPP.
    One of those areas is the continent of Africa which currently has only
    eight active partnership programs. Although the SPP has great
    potential, cumbersome statutory limits and unsteady funding streams
    have hamstrung positive efforts. I have been working with the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense (OSD), NGB, DOS, and others to deconflict the
    statutes currently severely limiting how and where guardsmen can
    operate when operating in the SPP. What are your views of our SPP?
        Mr. Panetta. The SPP is an excellent security cooperation tool that
    provides valuable training and experience to National Guard members
    through interactions with foreign counterparts. The SPP contributes
    significantly to achieving U.S. national security goals by building
    partner capacity globally, and by providing unique, niche capabilities
    in direct support to the Geographic Combatant Commanders and U.S.
    Chiefs of Mission in fulfilling their theater and country engagement
    objectives. In addition to building a partner nation's capacity, the
    SPP forges personal relationships between the individual National Guard
    members and foreign government personnel, creating an enduring bond
    that, over time, fosters trust between the organizations involved.

        67. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, will you continue to
    work on improving and expanding this program, to include statute and
    funding changes?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will. Over the past 2 years, OSD has been
    working on a Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) that describes the use of
    DOD appropriated funds for State Department Partnership Program
    activities. They are in the final stage of completing the DTM which
    will be the basis for a new DOD Instruction on the State Department
    Partnership Program. During the creation of the DTM, we discovered that
    there are a few limitations that need to be addressed in legislation to
    allow us to conduct State Department Partnership Program engagements
    more effectively in the area of defense related activities. We will
    work to propose legislation that will allow us to expand our ability to
    conduct these State Department Partnership Program activities to build
    and strengthen our partner capabilities and relationships.

                  SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ENGAGEMENT PROGRAMS

        68. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, I have been one of the strongest
    supporters of our security assistance and engagement programs, whether
    it is foreign military financing and sales (FMF and FMS), international
    military education (IMET), or our train-and-equip programs. These
    programs have been extremely effective programs, executed predominantly
    by DOD in close coordination with DOS. Our military-to-military (1206),
    civilian-to-civilian (1207), small-scale Special Forces (1208),
    Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), and Combatant
    Commander's Initiative Fund (CCIF) have proven to be vital resources in
    aiding developing countries in the professionalization of their
    militaries, fighting terrorism, and providing resources for emergency
    situations. A key to these programs has been that the engagements are
    worked by both DOS and DOD, chiefs of mission, and combatant commanders
    working together to increase the capabilities of our partner nations to
    provide for their own security, increasing stability in their region
    and around the globe. Are you familiar with these programs? If yes,
    what is your opinion of them?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes, I am familiar with these programs. Building our
    foreign partners' capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations and
    creating an environment inhospitable to terrorists and insurgents are
    among the major elements of Geographic Combatant Commanders' strategies
    to counter terrorism and instability around the world. Enabling our
    foreign partners to provide for their own security and contribute to
    multilateral security efforts is an investment that pays immediate and
    long-term dividends by reducing the need for costlier U.S.
    interventions in response to turmoil in regions critical to U.S.
    interests. As you note, collaboration between the Departments of State
    and Defense in formulating and implementing these programs is a key
    factor in their success, and promotes effective use of taxpayers'
    dollars by combining the expertise and abilities of personnel from
    across the Executive Branch. The security challenges facing partner
    countries are linked to multiple parts of the security sector,
    including the military, police, and judiciary. I look forward to
    working with Congress and my counterparts in the administration to
    fulfill this shared responsibility to build partner nation security
    capability and capacity.

        69. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, would you continue
    to support investment by DOD in these programs?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes, I believe that continuing to engage with foreign
    partners through counterterrorism and capacity-building efforts, and
    maintaining strong international security relationships, will continue
    to be an imperative for DOD. Enabling other countries to provide for
    their own security will be an enduring test of U.S. global leadership,
    and these efforts will be critical to protecting our national security
    interests. In a world where the most likely threats will emanate from
    failed and fractured states, building the security capacity of partners
    is a vital warfighting instrument. It reduces the need for direct U.S.
    military intervention, with all of its attendant political, financial,
    and human costs. It also provides better security as capable partners
    are often more effective addressing threats in their neighborhoods than
    outside actors. Improving the way the U.S. Government implements these
    programs requires continued investment across our national security
    infrastructure, not just DOD. I look forward to continuing DOD's
    partnership with Congress in developing innovative solutions that
    enable the United States to respond with agility to emerging threats
    and opportunities.

        70. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, DOD and DOS are working on a
    proposal to pool funding for security assistance into three long-term
    funds totaling as much as $2 billion. This proposal would provide long-
    term funding vice the year-to-year funding that has had a negative
    impact on our current engagement programs. However, there are issues
    with how the funding is pooled by the two departments, who has
    oversight in Congress, and how will the funds get executed in a timely
    and consistent manner. If confirmed, can you provide an update on the
    status of this proposal and how you will resolve funding, oversight,
    and execution issues?
        Mr. Panetta. I would be happy to update the committee regarding
    this proposal and the administration's efforts to resolve the issues
    you mention.
        The proposal to create a Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF)
    was included in the President's fiscal year 2012 budget request. The
    proposal represents more than a year's work within the administration
    to develop a new business model for addressing security sector
    assistance requirements within the budget cycle. It also reflects an
    appreciation for the degree to which defense, diplomacy, and
    development must be better integrated so that U.S. assistance programs
    are more effective and targeted in an era of transnational challenges
    and rapidly changing dynamics.
        I look forward to working with Congress to address any outstanding
    concerns regarding the GSCF.

                                  AFGHANISTAN

        71. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, various press reports state that
    administration officials are considering withdrawing from Afghanistan
    more rapidly than currently planned. Secretary Gates said this weekend
    in Afghanistan that pulling out of Afghanistan too fast would threaten
    the gains made in the 18 months since the surge of 30,000 troops.
    Secretary Gates told marines in Afghanistan on Sunday, ``If you guys
    and everybody keeps the pressure on, we can hang onto everything we've
    gained over the last year to 18 months, we can expand the security
    bubble beyond that . . . We have succeeded in stopping the Taliban's
    momentum . . . but we've just kind of turned that corner and I think we
    need to keep the pressure on.'' In Kabul, he appealed for patience and
    said that only modest U.S. troop reductions would make sense this
    summer in a still unstable Afghanistan. U.S. and coalition commanders I
    met on the ground in Afghanistan have repeatedly told me that it's too
    early to make major changes on the ground, and some believe it will
    take until the end of this fighting season to get a true assessment of
    the conditions on the ground in Afghanistan. I trust our military
    leadership to make the right decision based on their assessment of the
    conditions on the ground. Some argue that, with Osama bin Laden dead,
    our mission in Afghanistan is complete. The killing of Osama bin Laden
    was a great victory, but our mission in Afghanistan is to ensure that
    it can never again become a staging area for terrorist attacks against
    the American Homeland.
        What conditions must be met in July 2011 to determine the extent of
    a U.S. troop drawdown?
        Mr. Panetta. The conditions for determining the extent of the
    drawdown include progress on several interrelated aspects of our
    counterinsurgency strategy, such as reversing the Taliban's momentum,
    denying the Taliban access to and control of key population centers and
    lines of communication, disrupting the Taliban outside secured areas
    and denying al Qaeda safe haven, and developing the ANSFs and their
    capability to manage a degraded insurgency. We have made progress in
    each of these areas sufficient to enable the President to make his
    decision about the drawdown and its extent.

        72. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, which conditions have been met?
        Mr. Panetta. There has been progress across the range of factors
    and in some cases substantial progress. For example, the momentum has
    shifted to the Coalition & ANSF and together we have degraded the
    Taliban's capability and achieved significant security gains,
    especially in the Taliban's heartland in the south. These security
    gains are enabling key political initiatives to make progress. We have
    begun a transition process that will ultimately put Afghans in the lead
    for security nationwide by 2014. The growth in the quantity and quality
    of the ANSF--which have fielded more than 100,000 additional forces
    over the past 18 months--is one of the critical conditions that is
    enabling the drawdown of U.S. surge forces. We are beginning to see
    reintegration and reconciliation processes gain traction, and we are
    discussing a strategic partnership with the Afghans to signal our
    enduring commitment to regional peace and stability.

        73. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, what conditions would cause you to
    ask President Obama to delay the withdrawal of troops?
        Mr. Panetta. At this time, the progress that has been achieved has
    established conditions necessary for the President to make his drawdown
    decision on schedule.

        74. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, are there future planned decision
    points after July 2011 that will be used to determine further
    reductions in U.S. troop commitments?
        Mr. Panetta. Beyond the President's immediate drawdown decision,
    commanders will need to make recommendations for decisions regarding
    the overall pace and shape of the transition to Afghan security. Those
    decisions will depend upon continued progress and conditions on the
    ground.

        75. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, what conditions must be met in
    2014 to transition to Afghan control?
        Mr. Panetta. Transition will begin this July in seven districts and
    provinces and then spread throughout the country by the end of 2014.
    The exact conditions for entering and completing the transition process
    in a given area will vary across the country, reflecting the
    differences across Afghanistan. The ability of the ANSFs to carry out
    lead security responsibilities effectively is a central consideration
    as are the abilities of Afghan institutions of government, especially
    at the provincial and district levels, to meet the basic needs of
    citizens for dispute resolution and economic development.

        76. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, what are the minimum conditions
    that must be achieved in Afghanistan, in order for Afghans to be able
    to sustain stability with relatively limited international assistance?
        Mr. Panetta. One of the most critical preconditions for Afghans to
    maintain a stable, secure Afghanistan will be capable, professional
    ANSF. Although support for the ANSF will continue to require
    international assistance for many years, security forces continue to
    make significant progress, with increases in quantity, quality, and
    operational capacity. Over time, as U.S., Coalition, and Afghan forces
    continue to degrade the Taliban insurgency, the Afghan Government may
    be able to reduce the size, and therefore cost, of the ANSF to address
    a diminished threat.
        Another essential condition to build sustainability will be
    increased Afghan fiscal self-sufficiency. External support will likely
    continue to be critical in the near and medium-term to help mitigate
    shortfalls in infrastructure, human capacity, and security concerns.
    However, over time, as economic growth continues and Afghanistan tax
    revenues increase, levels of required assistance should decline.

        77. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, what impact would a failure in
    Afghanistan have on U.S. national security in the long term?
        Mr. Panetta. Failure in Afghanistan would mean a return of the
    conditions that resulted in Afghanistan becoming the safe haven from
    which al Qaeda plotted the September 11 attacks against the United
    States. It would mean a perilous increase in the security threats the
    United States faces from violent extremists, as well as in the threats
    these groups pose to other countries in the region. Moreover, failure
    in Afghanistan would undermine the credibility of U.S. security
    commitments elsewhere around the world and jeopardize the national
    interests they are meant to protect.

        78. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, during my visit over New Years,
    Afghan and coalition personnel unanimously told me that setting the
    July 2011 timeline to begin withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan
    had a devastating effect on operations--it sent the wrong signal to the
    Afghan people, our coalition partners, and the Taliban. Do you believe
    the announcement of a July 2011 withdrawal date negatively impacted
    operations?
        Mr. Panetta. No. Establishing the July 2011 timeline to begin a
    conditions-based drawdown of U.S. surge forces struck an appropriate
    and responsible balance between giving our commanders the resources
    they need to carry out the strategy and communicating to the Afghans
    that they must step forward and take on the responsibility for their
    own security. The timeline additionally undercuts claims that we are
    occupiers and assures the American people that the mission is not open-
    ended. The date also provided ample time for our forces to turn back
    the Taliban's momentum while building up capable ANSFs that are
    increasingly taking on responsibility to hold and expand on the
    security gains achieved thus far.

                               MILITARY SPENDING

        79. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, the Office of Management and
    Budget has asked DOD for $400 billion in cuts through 2023 . . . a 6\1/
    2\ percent annual decrease from current spending rates. These cuts
    would come solely out of base budget. On May 25, 2011, Secretary Gates
    said at the American Enterprise Institute, ``The Reagan build-up of the
    1980s fielded a new generation of weapons platforms that continue to be
    the mainstay of the force today . . . In contrast, the 1990s
    represented basically a procurement holiday . . . What remains are
    much-needed capabilities . . . that our Nation's civilian and military
    leadership deem absolutely critical. For example: we must build a new
    tanker . . . field a next generation strike [fighter] . . .
    recapitalize the ground forces . . . replace our ballistic missile
    submarines.'' How will you balance the pressure to cut defense spending
    with the military's readiness and acquisition priorities?
        Mr. Panetta. I will ensure that future spending decisions are based
    on the Department's priorities, national security strategy, and a clear
    understanding of associated risks. It is an important process where we
    must identify options for the President and Congress, to ensure that
    the Nation consciously acknowledges and accepts additional risk in
    exchange for reduced investment in its military.

        80. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, what do you see as DOD's top
    readiness and acquisition priorities?
        Mr. Panetta. My top priority is ensuring that the warfighters have
    what they need to accomplish their missions and to provide for the
    national security of the United States.

                            DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE

        81. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, throughout the post-World War II
    era, the United States has maintained its military leadership in large
    part as a result of its industrial leadership--particularly in
    aerospace and other defense industries. That leadership is due in large
    part to the employees of that industry--the engineers, scientists, and
    machinists. Maintaining this leadership in the future will require that
    DOD identify and communicate what it needs to counter future military
    threats. If confirmed, what will you do to map out the industrial
    policy and needs of DOD?
        Mr. Panetta. As Secretary of Defense, I will ensure DOD policies,
    procedures, and actions: (1) stimulate and support vigorous competition
    and innovation in the industrial base supporting defense; and (2)
    establish and sustain cost-effective industrial and technological
    capabilities that assure military readiness and superiority.
        I will do so by: (1) monitoring industry readiness,
    competitiveness, ability to innovate, and financial stability as the
    Department moves to capabilities-based acquisitions in an era of
    increasingly sophisticated systems; (2) leveraging DOD research and
    development, acquisition, and logistics decisions to promote
    innovation, competition, military readiness, and national security; (3)
    leveraging statutory processes (for example, the Defense Priorities and
    Allocations System; Hart-Scott-Rodino antitrust evaluations; Exon-
    Florio Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
    evaluations) and promoting innovation, competition, military readiness,
    and national security; (4) leading efforts for the Department to engage
    with industry to ensure openness and transparency; and (5) continuing
    our long history of supporting science, technology, engineering, and
    mathematics education initiatives in a collaborative process at local,
    regional, and national levels.

                              NUCLEAR FORCE LEVELS

        82. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, during the New START hearings,
    General Chilton was asked by Senator Feingold whether the New START
    treaty allowed the United States to ``maintain a nuclear arsenal that
    is . . . more than is needed to guarantee an adequate deterrent.''
    General Chilton replied, ``I think the arsenal that we have is exactly
    what is needed today to provide the deterrent. . . . [I]t is sized to
    be able to allow us to hedge against both technical failures in the
    current deployed arsenal and any . . . changes in the geopolitical
    environment that might cause us to need more weapons deployed.'' Do you
    agree with General Chilton?
        Mr. Panetta. Over the last 50 years, U.S. nuclear strategy and
    force structure have continually evolved with the global-strategic
    environment. DOD will continue to assess the proper force size and
    capabilities required for an effective nuclear deterrent. The DOD is
    committed to sustaining and modernizing a safe, secure, and effective
    nuclear deterrent in an efficient and cost effective manner that
    maintains strategic deterrence and stability, strengthens regional
    deterrence, and assures our allies and partners.

                             NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION

        83. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
    (NPR) and during the discussion on the New START treaty, the
    administration made substantial commitments to the sustainment and
    modernization of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Secretary Gates was a
    strong supporter of the nuclear triad and a robust modernization
    program: ``In many ways, the primary threat to the effectiveness and
    credibility of the American deterrent is one that we control ourselves,
    and that is failing to invest adequately in our Nation's nuclear weapon
    infrastructure, a point I have made a number of times in recent
    years.'' Will you commit to the nuclear modernization plan (referred to
    as the 1251 plan) that was the basis for Senate support for the New
    START treaty?
        Mr. Panetta. I am committed to the sustainment of a safe, secure,
    and effective nuclear deterrent, and I support the administration's
    plan for modernization and sustainment as laid out in the Report to
    Congress pursuant to section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2010.

        84. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, will you support decisions for a
    follow-on nuclear bomber, air-launched cruise missile, intercontinental
    ballistic missiles (ICBM), and submarine launched ballistic missiles
    (SLBM)?
        Mr. Panetta. I will continue the DOD commitment to sustaining and
    modernizing a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent that
    supports strategic deterrence and stability, strengthens regional
    deterrence, and assures our allies and partners in an efficient and
    cost-effective manner.

        85. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, will you support modernization of
    our nuclear weapons laboratories and characterize such funding as
    ``national security activities'' as opposed to regular Department of
    Energy funding?
        Mr. Panetta. I am committed to the sustainment of a safe, secure,
    and effective nuclear deterrent, and I support the administration's
    plan for modernization and sustainment as laid out in the Report to
    Congress pursuant to section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2010. As described in the 2010 NPR and in the
    Report pursuant to section 1251, modernization of the nuclear weapons
    infrastructure is a key element of the administration's nuclear policy.
    This is exemplified by the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
    Replacement-Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) and the Uranium Processing
    Facility (UPF), which, when fully operational, will support production
    of critical components needed to ensure a safe, secure, and effective
    nuclear stockpile.
        Funding for these activities is currently part of the Weapons
    Activities Account in the National Nuclear Security Administration
    budget; accordingly, it is already considered national security
    funding.

                             U.S. NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

        86. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, the administration is reviewing
    nuclear deterrence requirements and nuclear targeting guidance with a
    goal of further nuclear reductions. This could precipitate a move away
    from longstanding nuclear doctrine characterized by a second-to-none
    approach, with flexible nuclear forces capable of providing the
    President a wide array of targeting options, to a minimum deterrence
    approach with too few forces that may lack credibility. The
    administration has called for a study of current nuclear deterrence
    requirements and nuclear targeting guidance. As the study progresses,
    will you make yourself and your staff available for regular briefings
    to describe the study?
        Mr. Panetta. Over the last 50 years, U.S. nuclear doctrine and
    targeting strategies have continually evolved with the global strategic
    environment. Every President since the beginning of the nuclear age has
    asked DOD to conduct such analyses and has used that information to
    inform updated planning guidance provided to DOD. We would be remiss if
    we did not re-examine our nuclear strategy in today's dynamic security
    environment. It is my intention to keep Congress fully informed of U.S.
    nuclear deterrence strategy.

        87. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, will you ensure that a thorough
    assessment is conducted, including analysis of the implications for
    reductions on stability and preserving a second-to-none capability?
        Mr. Panetta. Any future nuclear reductions must strengthen
    deterrence of potential regional adversaries, maintain strategic
    deterrence and stability vis-a-vis Russia and China, and maintain the
    reliability and effectiveness of our security assurances to our allies
    and partners. In the NPR Report follow-on analysis, we will identify
    the force levels required to support those objectives and any potential
    risks associated with each.

        88. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, will you commit to a careful
    consideration of the advice provided by our military leaders?
        Mr. Panetta. It is my intention to work with the military
    leadership to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.

        89. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, do you agree it is important to
    determine deterrence requirements and the types of forces necessary to
    achieve those requirements before engaging with the Russians in another
    round of nuclear reductions?
        Mr. Panetta. As noted in the 2010 NPR Report, any future nuclear
    reductions must strengthen deterrence of potential regional
    adversaries, maintain strategic deterrence and stability vis-a-vis
    Russia and China, and maintain the credibility and effectiveness of our
    security assurances to our allies and partners. In the NPR Report
    follow-on analysis, DOD will identify the force levels needed to
    support those objectives and any potential risks associated with each.
    The analysis will help shape our negotiating position as further arms
    reduction agreements are considered.

        90. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, will you pledge to provide
    detailed briefings to Congress on any future analysis in support of a
    future arms control negotiation?
        Mr. Panetta. It is my intention to keep Congress fully informed
    about developments in U.S. nuclear strategy and arms control policy.

        91. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, in 1992, you voted as a Member of
    the House of Representatives to eliminate all U.S. non-strategic
    nuclear warheads. The policy of this administration is to maintain non-
    strategic weapons in Europe until such time that NATO consensus
    supports their removal. Will you confirm your support for the
    administration position?
        Mr. Panetta. As noted in the 2010 NPR Report, reassuring U.S.
    allies and partners is one of the key objectives of U.S. nuclear
    deterrence policy and force posture. Any change in our nuclear posture
    will be considered in the context of our continuing need to assure our
    allies and partners of our commitment to their security. Any decision
    to change the status of U.S. nuclear forces committed to the defense of
    NATO would be after thorough review and consultations with NATO. I
    fully support the administration's policy on this issue.

        92. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, will you work to ensure that a
    nuclear-capable F-35 is developed to allow the continuation of that
    commitment?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes, I am committed to the development of a dual-
    capable F-35 fighter. DOD will carry out the direction stated in the
    2010 NPR Report, that ``the Air Force will retain a dual-capable
    fighter (the capability to deliver both conventional and nuclear
    weapons) as it replaces F-16s with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.''
        As set out in the Report to Congress pursuant to section 1251 of
    the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, the Air
    Force will continue to conduct the dual-capable aircraft mission with
    existing fighter aircraft until the F-35 is fielded.

                            SHIFT IN MISSILE DEFENSE

        93. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, while directing that we sustain
    and enhance our ability to defend the Homeland against limited numbers
    of long-range ballistic missiles, the administration has made defending
    against regional threats ``a top priority of our missile defense
    plans,'' according to Secretary Gates. As a result, funding for the GMD
    system has steadily declined, while the two test failures of the GMD
    system in 2010 suggest the Missile Defense Agency is not doing nearly
    enough to sustain and enhance the system. GMD reductions include:

             Cutback deployment from 44 to 30 GBIs and cancellation
            of 10 GBIs in Poland;
             $500 million reduction to the GMD program in the
            fiscal year 2010 budget request;
             Fiscal years 2011-2015 funding for GMD declines by
            $600 million when compared to President's budget last year; and
             Obama GMD budget for fiscal years 2010-2013 is $4
            billion less than Bush fiscal years 2010-2013 planned budget.

        Will you pledge to end this neglect of the GMD system and provide
    the attention and funding necessary to return the GMD system to full
    operational reliability and ensure the system is improved and
    modernized over time?
        Mr. Panetta. I will support the continued sustainment and
    improvement of the GMD system as a key priority.
        I share Secretary Gates' view that the ``protection of the United
    States from the threat of ballistic missile attack is a critical
    national security priority.''
        The current ballistic missile defense posture for the United States
    protects against ICBMs that might be deployed by states like North
    Korea or Iran. Improvements to the existing sensors and software, in
    addition to the procurement of additional ground-based interceptors
    (GBIs) and radars, and the development of the SM-3 IIB interceptor,
    will continue this protection against future ICBM threats from states
    like North Korea and Iran.

                    MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA

        94. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, will you commit to share with
    Congress, no later than 30 days after your confirmation:

             Missile defense and threat information provided to
            Russia, including in the NATO context;
             The draft Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement,
            including the Bush administration's draft;
             The Missile Defense Cooperation Agreement that had
            been discussed with the Russians; and
             Analysis of the location of the AN/TPY-2 radar being
            considered for deployment in Turkey, and any other locations
            being considered by this and past administrations.

        Mr. Panetta. DOD and DOS have briefed Congress on cooperation
    efforts with Russia and efforts to implement the European Phased
    Adaptive Approach (EPAA), including the deployment of the AN/TPY-2
    radar, and will continue to do so.
        Discussions on the draft Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement
    (DTCA) were initiated in 2004 at President Bush's direction to
    establish a legal framework for purposes of conducting with Russia a
    broad range of defense-related cooperative research and development
    activities, which could include missile defense. The Obama
    administration has continued these efforts to negotiate and conclude a
    DTCA with Russia. A draft Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation
    Agreement (BMDCA), which Russia declined to negotiate, would have been
    a more limited form of the DTCA. These agreements were briefed in
    detail to Senate staff members in December 2010 during discussions as
    part of the Senate's consideration of the New START treaty advice and
    consent to ratification. Finally, the United States only shares
    sensitive information with foreign countries in accordance with Foreign
    Disclosure laws and regulations.

                             NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION

        95. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, in the 2010 NPR and during the
    discussion on the New START treaty, the administration made substantial
    commitments to the sustainment and modernization of the U.S. nuclear
    deterrent. Enhanced safety, security, and reliability of nuclear
    weapons stockpile, modernization of the nuclear weapons complex, and
    maintenance of the nuclear delivery systems are key to enabling
    maintaining our nuclear deterrence. The Perry-Schlesinger Commission
    stated it was alarmed by the disrepair and neglect of the nuclear
    weapons stockpile and complex. Secretary Gates warned in October 2008,
    there's ``no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the
    number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to testing
    our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program.'' We are the only
    major nuclear power not modernizing its' weapons. Our weapons are an
    average of 26 years old and most are 15 or more years beyond design
    life. Secretary Gates was a strong supporter of the nuclear triad and a
    robust modernization program. Secretary Gates said, ``In many ways, the
    primary threat to the effectiveness and credibility of the American
    deterrent is one that we control ourselves, and that is failing to
    invest adequately in our Nation's nuclear weapon infrastructure, a
    point I have made a number of times in recent years.'' Do you support
    the triad of bombers with gravity bombs and nuclear cruise missiles,
    ballistic missile submarines, and ICBMs?
        Mr. Panetta. I will continue the DOD commitment to sustaining and
    modernizing a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent that
    supports strategic stability in an efficient and cost-effective manner,
    deters regional threats, and assures allies and partners.

        96. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, is it important to maintain a
    nuclear triad?
        Mr. Panetta. As stated in the 2010 NPR Report, each leg of the
    triad has unique advantages. I will continue the DOD commitment to
    sustaining and modernizing a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
    deterrent that supports strategic stability in an efficient and cost-
    effective manner, strengthens regional deterrence, and assures our
    allies and partners.

        97. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, are you committed to the nuclear
    modernization plan, referred to as the 1251 plan, that was the basis
    for Senate support for the New START treaty?
        Mr. Panetta. I am committed to the sustainment of a safe, secure,
    and effective nuclear deterrent, and I support the administration's
    plan for modernization and sustainment as laid out in the Report to
    Congress pursuant to section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2010.

        98. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, do you support modernization of
    our nuclear weapons labs?
        Mr. Panetta. I am committed to the sustainment of a safe, secure,
    and effective nuclear deterrent, and I support the administration's
    plan for modernization and sustainment as laid out in the Report to
    Congress pursuant to section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2010. As described in the 2010 NPR Report and in
    the Report pursuant to section 1251, modernization of the nuclear
    weapons infrastructure, including the nuclear weapons laboratories, is
    a key element of the administration's nuclear policy.

        99. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, would you characterize this
    funding as national security activities?
        Mr. Panetta. Funding for activities needed to ensure a safe,
    secure, and effective nuclear stockpile is currently part of the
    Weapons Activities Account in the National Nuclear Security
    Administration budget; accordingly, it is considered national security
    funding.

                    NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE GLOBAL THREAT

        100. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, on January 6, 2011, Secretary
    Gates told Jim Lehrer that ``I think [the thing] people need to
    remember is that providing for the common defense is an unambiguous
    Federal responsibility. . . . I would argue that defense is not the
    problem when it comes to the deficit. If you look at defense as a
    percentage of Federal expenditures or as a percentage of gross national
    product, we're at a lower level, particularly for wartime, than we have
    been during any previous war, and as a percentage of the overall
    Federal budget, about where we have been for a number of years.'' DOD
    is executing several efficiency initiatives to make the most of the
    limited budget it has been given but even those efficiencies will not
    allow the military to fully sustain operations, maintain the force, and
    modernize our equipment. DOD needs to fully fund current operations . .
    . not just in Iraq and Afghanistan but at home and around the globe . .
    . this includes training and exercises. It needs to take care of its
    people . . . an exponentially growing cost. And it needs to modernize
    its aging fleet of ships, vehicles, and aircraft or spend increasing
    amounts of DOD dollars to sustain old equipment. The $400 million
    across-the-board cut favored by the administration next year does not
    take into account the risks to our national security or our ability to
    execute the national security strategy. During questioning about
    postponing weapon systems acquisition and maintenance at a hearing in
    front of the Senate Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee of
    the Senate Armed Services Committee, Vice Admiral Burke said: ``you can
    pay for it now or pay more for it later.'' If confirmed, how will you
    ensure our military is postured to counter the full spectrum of
    national security threats?
        Mr. Panetta. This spring, President Obama announced a framework for
    deficit reduction. As part of that effort, the President set a goal of
    holding the growth in base national security spending slightly below
    inflation for the next 12 years, which would save about $400 billion.
    Although defense spending is not the source of the Nation's current
    fiscal condition, it will have to be part of the national solution.
        In April, Secretary Gates launched a comprehensive review to ensure
    that future spending decisions are focused on priorities, strategy, and
    risks, and are not simply a math and accounting exercise. He said, and
    I agree, that the choices we make in terms of reductions in defense and
    security spending must be made with a clear understanding of the
    potential risks and consequences of those choices.
        The overarching goal of the comprehensive review is to preserve a
    U.S. military capable of meeting crucial national security priorities
    across the range of potential threats. This process seeks to inform and
    support decisions by the President and Congress and to ensure that the
    Nation consciously acknowledges and accepts the implications, including
    additional risk, of reduced investment in its military in an uncertain
    and still dangerous security environment. The defense of the United
    States and the American people is a sacred trust. I take the Nation's
    defense very seriously, as I know all Members of Congress do. I look
    forward to working with Congress to maintain a highly capable military
    that will protect and defend the United States and preserve security
    abroad, now and in the future.

        101. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, are we on a path to continue
    acquiring the best systems and enough of those systems to meet the
    current requirements or does there need to be a change in our National
    Security Strategy modifying those requirements?
        Mr. Panetta. As Secretary Gates has stated, we must ensure that
    future defense spending decisions are strategically informed and
    focused on priorities and risks. With regard to capabilities, the
    Department over the past 2 years has cancelled acquisitions or
    curtailed modernization programs that were badly over budget, behind
    schedule, dependent on unproven technology, supplied a niche
    requirement that could otherwise be met, or were impractical in a
    rapidly changing security environment.
        Particularly, amid declining resources, it is critically important
    that we continue the Department's commitment to developing technology
    and fielding weapons systems that are affordable, versatile, and
    relevant to the range of threats in the decades to come. This approach
    is consistent with the 2010 National Security Strategy, which notes
    that ``we will scrutinize our programs and terminate or restructure
    those that are outdated, duplicative, ineffective, or wasteful. The
    result will be more relevant, capable, and effective programs and
    systems that our military wants and needs.''

        102. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, overall funding for procurement
    is down $6 billion in fiscal year 2012 (base budget and Overseas
    Contingency Operations) compared to the fiscal year 2011 Continuing
    Resolution. Research and development is down $5 billion and military
    construction is down $4 billion. What impact does this have on our
    future forces and the cost to recapitalize our infrastructure,
    vehicles, ships, aircraft, and other equipment 5 to 10 years down the
    road?
        Mr. Panetta. The impact is not precisely known at this time. If
    confirmed, I intend to ensure that limited Defense resources are used
    on those programs that will provide the warfighter with equipment and
    support that is needed to accomplish the national security mission of
    the United States. The Department will have to continue to identify
    ways to become more efficient so that scarce Defense resources are not
    wasted and the highest priorities are funded.

        103. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, what impact will delaying
    modernization have on the cost of future weapons systems?
        Mr. Panetta. Any cost impacts associated with the pace of
    modernization would be highly dependent on the specific choices and
    implementation. This is an area I will be looking at closely.

                                FORCE REDUCTIONS

        104. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, in January 2007, the end strength
    of the Army grew by 65,000 because we did not have enough ground forces
    to sustain operations. Two years later Congress approved a temporary
    increase in Army end strength of another 22,000. At the same time, we
    also grew the size of the Marine Corps by 27,000. DOD is projecting
    cutting the Army by 27,000 and Marine Corps by 20,000 between 2015 and
    2016. Secretary Gates said this week that `` . . . the worst thing in
    the world would be what was done in the 1970s and 1990s . . . give
    everybody in the military a same percentage cut across the board.
    That's the way you hollow out the military. That's the way you don't
    have enough ammunition to use at firing ranges, you don't have enough
    money for exercising or training, you don't have enough money for tank
    miles or steaming days or flight hours . . . if we have to reduce the
    size of the military in some way, I want the level of excellence when
    we're done to be at the same standard it is today.'' I felt we cut our
    force too deep during the Clinton administration which resulted in our
    need to increase the force in 2007. In your answers to the advance
    policy questions, you state that ``2 years as Central Intelligence
    Agency (CIA) Director has made me realize that intelligence is often
    ambiguous.'' I agree. Our crystal ball has been cloudy at best when it
    comes to anticipating impacts to our national and global security. Do
    you support cuts in Army and Marine Corps end strength?
        Mr. Panetta. Any reduction will need to be monitored and will be
    affected by security considerations around the globe and the readiness
    of our military.

        105. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, do these cuts assume zero forces
    in Iraq in 2012 and zero forces in Afghanistan in 2014?
        Mr. Panetta. Any reductions in the Army and the Marines Corps will
    be based on security considerations in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as
    around the globe.

        106. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, are these personnel cuts being
    driven by budget constraints or based on national security
    requirements?
        Mr. Panetta. DOD has increased U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps end
    strengths in order to meet the demands generated by simultaneous
    operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The planned cuts in their end
    strengths are deferred until after fiscal year 2015 to reflect our
    expectation that ground force requirements for operations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan will be markedly lower after fiscal year 2015. Although
    realistic force planning must be mindful of resource constraints, it is
    driven by strategic considerations that assess the nature of challenges
    likely to be confronted in the future, the types of missions the U.S.
    Armed Forces will be required to perform, and the capabilities and
    capacities needed to execute those missions successfully.

                                 GUANTANAMO BAY

        107. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, I returned from my most recent
    visit to Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) on May 20, 2011. It was important for me
    to return to get an update on the operations and see firsthand the
    current conditions of the detention facilities and the detainees. I
    took six members who had never been to GTMO before. Each of them,
    regardless of party, came away with a greater appreciation for the work
    that is being done there. GTMO is the single greatest repository of
    human intelligence in the war on terror. This intelligence has
    prevented terrorist attacks, saved lives, and helped lead us to Osama
    bin Laden. You said that ``enhanced interrogation techniques'' yielded
    some of the intelligence information that ultimately led to Osama bin
    Laden, but ``whether we would have gotten the same information through
    other approaches I think is always going to be an open question.'' Do
    detainees at GTMO pose a threat to U.S. national security?
        Mr. Panetta. As I have stated before, I fully support the
    President's decision to establish Army Field Manual 2-22.3 as the
    single standard applicable to all interrogations by U.S. Government
    personnel. This decision was based on the results of a careful review
    conducted by the President's interagency Interrogation and Transfer
    Policies Task Force which was charged with evaluating the sufficiency
    of the interrogation practices and techniques in the Army field manual.
    The Task Force found that additional techniques were not necessary. I
    believe we should do everything possible within the law to gather
    information, and I agree with those who state that information can be
    obtained without resorting to measures such as waterboarding. I do not
    support a set of classified interrogation methods that are not open to
    public scrutiny.

        108. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, do you believe the United States
    will continue to capture terrorists around the world?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes. When it comes to protecting the American people
    from al Qaeda and its associated forces, intelligence is critical to
    identifying and disrupting their plots, as well as to dismantling their
    networks. Among our greatest sources of information about al Qaeda, its
    plans, and its intentions have been the members of its network who have
    been taken into custody by the United States and our partners overseas.
    Wherever possible, we must maintain a preference to capture terrorists
    and take advantage of the opportunity to gather information through
    interrogation that is vital to the safety and security of the American
    people.

        109. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, where will you put existing
    detainees and future detainees?
        Mr. Panetta. The United States will continue to hold detainees in
    accordance with the authority provided by the 2001 Authorization for
    Use of Military Force, as informed by the law of war. DOD's ability to
    detain the enemy and interrogate them for intelligence in prosecuting
    the war against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces is
    essential to U.S. national security. The United States has been
    detaining individuals in this war for nearly a decade and has learned
    that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to the complex issue of law
    of war detention in a 21st century conflict with a transnational
    terrorist group.
        DOD currently holds detainees in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo
    Bay. We are transitioning our detention operations in both Iraq and
    Afghanistan, with the intent of moving from a law of war detention
    framework to a peacetime domestic legal framework where each respective
    nation takes responsibility for its own citizens.
        I fully support the President's commitment to close the detention
    facility at Guantanamo Bay because it is in our national security
    interest to do so. I do acknowledge, however, that the United States
    needs a place to hold individuals whom we capture abroad. This is a
    very serious issue for our country, and it is one I believe
    policymakers need to address expeditiously. The decision to capture an
    individual outside an active theater of combat operations is a complex
    issue, involving a range of factors unique to the individual and the
    place and circumstances of capture. With respect to future detainees,
    disposition recommendations would be informed by the unique
    circumstances of each capture, with decisions made on a case-by-case
    basis among policymakers.

        110. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, if held at locations in other
    countries such as Afghanistan or Yemen, isn't there a greater risk of
    escape, attack on the prison, or release of these terrorists?
        Mr. Panetta. The United States does not ask other nations to detain
    on its behalf. When we transfer detainees to another nation, that
    individual becomes subject to the laws of the receiving nation. In
    certain cases, detainees have been held and/or tried by the receiving
    nation for crimes they have committed. There have been instances where
    former detainees, or dangerous individuals held by other nations, have
    escaped or have been released. We take these instances very seriously,
    and certainly factor them when assessing the transfer of a detainee to
    the control of another government.
        As we strengthen our own detention policies and procedures, we must
    continue to work with our partners around the world to build their
    capacity to confront this common challenge. Specifically, we must
    deepen our cooperation with our international partners to develop
    credible rehabilitation and reintegration programs as part of a durable
    counterterrorism strategy. We must ensure that our detention policies
    remain principled and consistent with the rule of law, that they evoke
    credibility with our public and the international community, and that
    they can be sustained into the future as a useful tool in our
    counterterrorism fight.

                                      IRAQ

        111. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, there continues to be concerns
    about our ability to safely withdraw forces out of Iraq by the end of
    the year. Four days ago, several servicemembers were killed in eastern
    Baghdad in a rocket attack. If confirmed, what steps will you take to
    ensure our forces can safely withdraw from Iraq?
        Mr. Panetta. The current security agreement gives us the right to
    defend ourselves and Iraqi forces all the way through our drawdown. We
    will approach our security posture throughout the drawdown in
    partnership with Iraqi forces. We continue to ensure both U.S. forces
    and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are prepared for this period of
    transition by continuing to provide training for our Iraqi partners.
    This includes training for Iraqi Police, ISF, and Iraqi Special
    Operations forces. Additionally, we will continue to closely monitor
    external malign influences and refine our deterrent options to address
    any threat posed to our forces. Finally, we will maintain robust self
    defense capabilities throughout the drawdown and address potential
    threats through a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic actions.
        We will maintain a full spectrum of land, air, and naval forces,
    supported by a total complement of Special Operations Forces (SOF),
    Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), logistics, and
    other enablers throughout the drawdown. The plan to withdraw U.S.
    forces from Iraq has been thoroughly briefed and rehearsed, and we will
    retain flexibility to react to changing circumstances.

        112. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, do you think there will be a U.S.
    military presence in Iraq after 2011?
        Mr. Panetta. I believe some U.S. military personnel would be
    appropriate to support Iraq's continuing needs and enduring U.S.
    national interests, as Secretary Gates has stated. However, any post-
    2011 U.S. military mission would require a formal request from the
    Iraqi government, which we would be willing to consider. To date no
    request has been received.

                 INVESTIGATION INTO CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

        113. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, you have opposed Attorney General
    Holder's investigation of possible incidents of abuse by CIA personnel
    during interrogations that went beyond guidelines imposed by the Bush
    administration. You stated: ``I think the reason I felt the way I did
    is because I don't believe there's a basis there for any kind of
    additional action.'' What is the current status of the investigation
    and your opinion of it continuing?
        Mr. Panetta. I refer you to the Department of Justice with respect
    to the status of any investigation. My views are stated in the record.

                       U.S.-GEORGIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

        114. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, there have been multiple
    terrorist acts and several terrorist attempts in the territory of
    Georgia orchestrated by the Russian Federation. The last one happened
    just 2 days ago when Georgian police prevented a terrorist plot
    targeting the NATO Liaison office in Tbilisi. The Obama administration
    is aware of these developments. On April 15, 2011, at a meeting in
    Berlin between the foreign ministers of Georgia and NATO, Secretary
    Clinton stated, `` . . . We share Georgian concerns regarding recent
    Russian activities that can negatively affect regional stability.''
    Despite the ongoing reset policy with the Russian Federation and the
    attempts of the Obama administration to engage Russia positively,
    Moscow persistently continues to undermine the security of Georgia.
    While the timeline for Georgia's NATO membership remains unclear, what
    is your opinion on the steps the United States should undertake to
    enhance the security and stability of Georgia, including any
    possibilities of supporting acquisition of defensive capabilities from
    the NATO countries?
        Mr. Panetta. The United States steadfastly supports Georgia's
    sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally
    recognized borders, and is committed to maintaining a strong bilateral
    defense relationship with Georgia.
        Our security assistance and military engagement with Georgia
    focuses on two areas. First, we are focused on strengthening defense
    institutions and providing comprehensive defense assistance covering
    doctrine, personnel management, logistics, education, and training to
    support Georgia's defense reform and modernization efforts along Euro-
    Atlantic lines. This approach will ensure the lasting institutional
    transformation of the Georgian Armed Forces and provide the foundation
    for a secure Georgia.
        Second, the United States is assisting the Georgian Armed Forces
    with training and equipping infantry battalions to deploy and operate
    alongside U.S. forces in a counter-insurgency environment in
    Afghanistan. Georgian forces are currently deployed, without caveats,
    as part of the ISAF in Helmand Province.
        In addition to these bilateral efforts, we also encourage our
    international partners to demonstrate support for Georgia's territorial
    integrity and sovereignty. Through NATO, we work with our allies to
    assist Georgia with implementing its Annual National Program and to
    encourage Georgia to use tools available through the NATO-Georgia
    Commission.

                         HUAWEI AND THE IT SUPPLY CHAIN

        115. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, as CIA Director, you must have
    been concerned about the threat of foreign technology (i.e., hardware,
    software, and services) in the U.S. information system supply chain,
    especially where that technology originates from companies under the
    control of the People's Republic of China. Would you be comfortable
    with Huawei (or a companion company, ZTE) being significant vendors to
    the CIA or DOD? If not, why not?
        Mr. Panetta. Continued globalization marks today's information and
    communications technology (ICT) marketplace. Moreover, DOD represents a
    small portion of the commercial ICT market, and it is unlikely its
    unique high assurance requirements can drive the development of
    commercial off-the-shelf products. Yet the leveraging of the rapid
    technology advancement of the commercial marketplace remains a key DOD
    advantage. While globally sourced technology provides innumerable
    benefits to the Department, it also provides foreign sources with
    increased opportunity to compromise the supply chain by inserting
    malware into ICT in order to access or alter data, and intercept or
    deny communications. Even though the risk of such a supply chain attack
    may be tolerable for many consumers of commercial ICT, the DOD cannot
    ignore these risks to its national security missions.
        In this setting, use of Chinese or other foreign-sourced equipment
    in the absence of adequate risk management would concern me. The DOD is
    taking a proactive risk management approach to address this issue,
    enhancing the acquisition process in light of the changing global
    market to ensure rigor in addressing foreign sourcing risks.
        In response to these risks, DOD is in the process of
    institutionalizing the Trusted Defense Systems/Supply Chain Risk
    Management (SCRM) strategies described in the Report on Trusted Defense
    Systems in Response to National Defense Authorization Act, section 254,
    delivered to Congress in January 2010. The Department's strategy for
    achieving trustworthy defense information and weapons systems in light
    of supply chain risk contains the following core elements:

        1.  Prioritize scarce resources based on mission dependence--
    Allocate the Department's systems assurance resources based on their
    criticality and risk of attack.
        2.  Plan for comprehensive program protection--Employ comprehensive
    program protection planning, including systems engineering, supply
    chain risk management, hardware and software assurance,
    counterintelligence, and information assurance to identify and protect
    critical components, functions, technologies, and information using a
    full range of tools, resources, and practices.
        3.  Detect and respond to vulnerabilities in programmable logic
    elements--Invest in enhanced vulnerability detection research and
    development, and transition such analytical capabilities to support
    acquisition.
        4.  Partner with industry--Collaborate with industry to develop
    commercially reasonable standards for global sourcing and SCRM and to
    identify leading edge commercial practices and tools.

        The forgoing strategy is being implemented to protect DOD systems
    from supply chain risk. Through the application of these processes, any
    particular proposed use of Chinese or other foreign-sourced equipment
    would first be evaluated for the supply chain risk to DOD Systems and
    Networks in light of system criticality, all source intelligence, and
    the feasibility of adequate mitigation measures.

        116. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Panetta, do you feel the private sector
    also needs to make better procurement decisions, and also needs
    additional information in order to make better decisions?
        Mr. Panetta. Through the course of developing its Trusted Defense
    Systems Strategy, it became increasingly clear that the DOD was exposed
    to risk through the supply chains of the commercially-owned and
    operated telecommunications infrastructures upon which DOD depends, and
    that the forgoing strategy does not directly address these broader
    risks. To address this gap, DOD and DHS are co-leading an Interagency
    Task Force that will in partnership with industry develop a more
    complete understanding of the relevant technical risks to the U.S.
    telecommunications infrastructure and will assess the dependency of
    vital governmental and economic operations upon that infrastructure. It
    will then evaluate a range of potential technical risk mitigations
    strategies. Central to this activity is an assessment of information
    sharing deficiencies within the telecommunications sector. These
    deficiencies inhibit effective risk management of supply chain risk
    within that sector. While the Task Force is studying these issues, DOD
    in cooperation with other parts of the national security community is
    monitoring specific risks to the broader telecommunications
    infrastructure related to foreign sourcing that could affect national
    security and of which we are already aware. As a result, there have
    been interim actions taken to address specific risks to the broader
    telecommunications infrastructure posed by foreign sourcing.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions

                                MISSILE DEFENSE

        117. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, the Obama administration's
    Phased-Adaptive Approach for ballistic missile defense in Europe has
    been criticized because it leaves a gap between Iran's movement towards
    ICBMs that can threaten Europe and the United States, and on the other
    hand, the deployment of an American missile defense system that is
    capable of protecting the continental United States from ICBMs. Do you
    see Iran's ICBMs as a threat to the United States and, if so, what
    should be done to close the gap?
        Mr. Panetta. The United States is currently protected against any
    attacks from North Korea or Iran if those countries were able to
    develop and deploy an effective ICBM capability today. This protection
    is a result of investments made over the past decade in a system based
    on GMD. Because of continuing improvements in the GMD system and the
    number of GBIs now deployed compared to potential North Korean and
    Iranian long-range ballistic missile capabilities, the United States
    possesses a capability to counter the projected threat from North Korea
    and Iran for the foreseeable future.
        In order to maintain this advantageous position, the administration
    is taking several steps to improve the protection of the United States
    from the potential ICBM threat posed by Iran and North Korea. These
    steps include the continued procurement of GBIs, the deployment of
    additional sensors, and upgrades to the Command, Control, Battle
    Management, and Communications system.

        118. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, while directing that we sustain
    and enhance our ability to defend the Homeland against limited numbers
    of long-range ballistic missiles, the administration has made defending
    against regional threats ``a top priority of our missile defense
    plans,'' according to Secretary Gates. As a result, funding for the GMD
    system has steadily declined, while the two test failures of the GMD
    system in 2010 suggest the Missile Defense Agency is not doing nearly
    enough to sustain and enhance the system. GMD reductions include:

             Cutback deployment from 44 to 30 GBI and cancellation
            of 10 GBIs in Poland;
             $500 million reduction to the GMD program in the
            fiscal year 2010 budget request;
             Fiscal year 2011-2015 funding for GMD declines by $600
            million when compared to the President's budget last year; and
             Obama's GMD budget for fiscal years 2010-2013 is $4
            billion less than Bush fiscal years 2010-2013 planned budget.

        Will you pledge to complete the deployment of an effective GMD
    system?
        Mr. Panetta. I will support the continued sustainment and
    improvement of the GMD system.
        I share the view of Secretary Gates, who said that the ``protection
    of the United States from the threat of ballistic missile attack is a
    critical national security priority.''
        The current ballistic missile defense posture for the United States
    protects against ICBMs that might be deployed by states like North
    Korea or Iran. Improvements to the existing sensors and software, in
    addition to the procurement of additional GBIs and radars, will
    continue this protection against future ICBM threats from states like
    North Korea and Iran.

        119. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, should we support the emphasis
    on regional missile defense at the expense of Homeland defense?
        Mr. Panetta. The administration has put in place a balanced
    program, which addresses both the short-range and longer-range threats
    in a timely manner and is responsive to development of the threats. The
    forward-based radar that will be deployed as part of Phase 1 of the
    European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), and the deployment of the SM-
    3 Block IIB to Europe in Phase 4 of the EPAA, will improve the missile
    defense coverage of Europe while also enhancing protection of the
    United States from a potential ICBM attack from Iran.
        In addition, the administration is making improvements to the
    existing GMD sensors and software and is procuring additional GBIs. The
    United States must also be well hedged against the possibility of rapid
    threat developments or delays in U.S. technological advances. The
    administration has already made several decisions to strengthen the
    U.S. hedge posture, including the construction of Missile Field 2 at
    Fort Greely, AK, mothballing six GBI silos at Missile Field 1 at Fort
    Greely instead of decommissioning them, and the development and
    assessment of a two-stage GBI.

                                 NUCLEAR POLICY

        120. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, President Obama identified a
    ``world without nuclear weapons'' as a long-term national security goal
    in an April 2009 speech. However, when asked in the advance policy
    questions about your assessment of the threat posed by Iran and North
    Korea, you responded that there is a real risk that Iran's nuclear
    program will prompt other countries in the region to pursue nuclear
    options. In addition, you stated that North Korea's newly revealed
    uranium enrichment activities underscores that it poses a growing and
    direct threat to the United States, our allies in the region, and the
    international community. Do you share the goal of a world without
    nuclear weapons?
        Mr. Panetta. As stated in the NPR Report, the greatest threat
    facing our Nation is nuclear proliferation. The NPR Report also stated
    that the United States is committed to the long-term goal of a world
    free of nuclear weapons. As long as nuclear weapons exist, however, the
    United States will sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
    deterrence force. The nuclear deterrence force will continue to play an
    essential role in deterring potential adversaries and reassuring allies
    and partners around the world of the U.S. commitment to their security.
    Therefore, without jeopardizing our traditional deterrence and
    reassurance goals, we are now able to shape our nuclear weapons policy
    and force structure in ways that will better enable us to meet our most
    pressing security challenges.

        121. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, do you believe that this goal
    is realistic? If so, how does this square with the reality of the
    threat posed by Iran's and North Korea's nuclear programs?
        Mr. Panetta. As the President stated, such a goal is ambitious and
    will not be reached quickly. Presently, changes in the nuclear threat
    environment have altered the hierarchy of our nuclear concerns and
    strategic objectives. In coming years, we must give top priority to
    discouraging additional countries from acquiring nuclear-weapons
    capabilities and stopping terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear
    weapons or the materials to build them. At the same time, we must
    continue to maintain stable, strategic relationships with Russia and
    China. We must also counter threats posed by any emerging nuclear-armed
    states, thereby protecting the United States and our allies and
    partners against nuclear threats or intimidation, and reducing any
    incentives that any emerging nuclear-armed states might have to seek
    their own nuclear deterrents.

        122. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, given that the nuclear age has
    had an absence of great power conflicts like World War II, what are the
    risks and dangers of a ``world without nuclear weapons''?
        Mr. Panetta. Nuclear forces continue to play an essential role in
    deterring potential adversaries and reassuring allies and partners
    around the world. Until such time as the administration's goal of a
    world free of nuclear weapons is achieved, the maintenance of nuclear
    capabilities will remain a core mission of DOD.
        Our defense posture will continuously adapt to changes in the
    strategic environment. Credibly underwriting U.S. defense commitments
    in a world without nuclear weapons will demand an increased reliance on
    tailored approaches to deterrence that integrate all aspects of
    national power. This includes land, air, and naval forces capable of
    fighting limited and large-scale conflicts in environments where anti-
    access weaponry and tactics are used, as well as forces prepared to
    respond to the full range of challenges posed by state and non-state
    groups.
        The United States is positioned with capabilities across all
    domains to deter a wide range of attacks or forms of coercion against
    the United States, its allies, and partners. If deterrence fails and
    adversaries challenge our interests with the threat or use of force,
    the United States must be prepared to respond in support of U.S.
    national interests. The range of plausible future challenges is
    significant. Potential adversaries of the United States are likely to
    employ a diverse array of approaches and capabilities if and when they
    choose to oppose the United States, its allies, or its partners. In the
    future, U.S. forces must be sized and shaped to provide the maximum
    possible versatility for the broadest plausible range of conflicts. A
    deliberate, continuing assessment of national interests, military
    requirements, and the strategic environment should guide U.S. global
    defense posture planning. In the emerging security environment, the
    United States will tailor its defense posture to mitigate foreseeable
    security risks and manage future security challenges effectively.

        123. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, what are your views about
    future nuclear force levels?
        Mr. Panetta. As stated in the 2010 NPR Report, any future nuclear
    reductions must continue to strengthen deterrence of potential regional
    adversaries, maintain strategic stability vis-a-vis Russia and China,
    and maintain the reliability and effectiveness of our security
    assurances to our allies and partners. We will continue to assess the
    force size required for an effective deterrent. DOD is committed to
    sustaining and modernizing a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
    deterrent in an efficient and cost-effective manner that supports
    strategic stability.

        124. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, are you committed to
    supporting, maintaining, and modernizing America's triad of nuclear
    delivery systems--that is, America's ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-armed
    long-range bomber aircraft, in addition to specifically meeting the
    commitments President Obama made in his letter during the START debate?
        Mr. Panetta. I am committed to the sustainment of a safe, secure,
    and effective nuclear deterrent, and I support the administration's
    plan for modernization and sustainment as laid out in the Report to
    Congress pursuant to section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2010. I will continue the DOD commitment in an
    efficient and cost-effective manner.

        125. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, as a Congressman, you voted
    against nuclear testing and voted for a nuclear test ban. You also
    voted for funding cuts and against the development of numerous missile
    systems, including the MX missile, Pershing II, and Trident II, as well
    as voting for funding reductions and cuts to the B-1 and B-2 bombers.
    Will you support and fulfill policies even if you personally disagree
    with them?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes. As my record of service in the Executive Branch
    demonstrates, I am fully committed to executing the President's
    policies and complying with all legal requirements enacted by Congress,
    while offering my own candid advice to the President.

                               RUSSIA COOPERATION

        126. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, in your response to the advance
    policy questions, you state that you agree with missile defense
    cooperation with Russia. What evidence have you seen in the past that
    would demonstrate that Russia is a reliable partner for cooperation in
    missile defense?
        Mr. Panetta. The United States and Russia conducted a robust and
    successful missile defense exercise program, with five exercises
    conducted between 1996 and 2006. This cooperation, unprecedented at the
    time, contributed to the understanding of our respective missile
    defense capabilities and interests and demonstrated our countries'
    shared interest in and ability to work together to address common
    security threats.
        With our new push for deeper missile defense cooperation, we seek
    to responsibly foster and sustain a stable relationship with Russia. As
    the pace of military-technical innovation increases and the global
    security environment evolves, we believe it is important to enlist
    Russia's help in addressing common 21st century security challenges,
    specifically regional actors seeking illicit capabilities.
        Appropriate levels of cooperation with Russia on missile defense
    would send a powerful signal to regional actors, such as Iran, that
    Russia and the United States are working together to counter the threat
    posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and pursuit of nuclear
    weapons capabilities. Our goal is a level of cooperation that will
    improve U.S. and Russian security and the security of our NATO allies
    while increasing transparency to reduce Russia's concerns about U.S.
    missile defense efforts.

        127. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, what does cooperation mean to
    you? Does it include a joint area where Russians have their hand on a
    launch trigger?
        Mr. Panetta. The administration has been clear that Russian
    objections will not change or limit our missile defense system
    capabilities or missile defense deployments, nor will Russia have a
    ``launch trigger'' that will control any U.S. or NATO missile defense
    systems.
        The administration's concept for missile defense cooperation stems
    from the conviction that NATO must be responsible for defense of NATO
    territory and that Russia should be responsible for defense of Russian
    territory. We would operate our respective systems independently but
    cooperatively, including sharing of sensor data that may enhance the
    ability of both systems to defeat missile attacks by regional actors
    such as Iran.

        128. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, in 2009, the administration
    initiated a reset in relations with the Russians. I would like to
    understand your assessment of the impact of this so-called ``reset'' of
    U.S.-Russian relations, especially in light of how they have threatened
    their neighbors and invaded Georgia. Specifically, has the ``reset''
    resulted in an improved Russian strategic, diplomatic, and economic
    posture toward our allies in Central Europe, including Georgia?
        Mr. Panetta. Our approach in transforming our defense relationship
    with Russia has been to work to integrate Russia more closely into the
    fabric of the international community to ensure that parties on all
    sides have more of a stake in keeping the relationship on the right
    track. Our goal has been to cooperate with Russia where we have common
    interests but not at the expense of our principles or our friends.
        Through interactions with Russia, we hope we can build the
    infrastructure for future collaboration, identify and clarify the
    extent of agreement and disagreement, counteract narratives of ``zero-
    sum'' competition, and reform existing structures, such as the NATO-
    Russia Council and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
    Europe, to meet new challenges.
        We have seen some key successes over the course of the past 2 years
    on Afghanistan, strategic arms control, Iran, and bilateral defense
    relations. Military-to-military relations were revitalized in 2009,
    including the resumption of regular consultations between Chiefs of
    Defense and their staffs; military exchanges, visits, and exercises,
    and a broadening and deepening of cooperation in such areas as armed
    forces reform, defense policy and national security priorities,
    transparency and confidence-building measures, and regional and global
    security.
        In all our engagements, we remind our Russian counterparts of
    Russia's obligation to respect the security, sovereignty, territorial
    integrity, and independence of its neighbors. We are open about our
    defense engagement with those countries and make clear that we welcome
    the opportunity to work with Russia's neighbors as well as with Russia.

        129. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, in addition, has the ``reset''
    resulted in improved Russian cooperation on the nuclear proliferation
    challenges posed by Iran and North Korea? Please explain specific
    improvements.
        Mr. Panetta. In general, the ``reset'' has resulted in greater
    cooperation by the Russian Federation. For example, Russia agreed to
    United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1874 and 1929
    against North Korea and Iran, respectively. After the adoption of UNSCR
    1929, Russia cancelled the delivery of the S-300 missile defense system
    to Iran.

                              AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

        130. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, the United States cannot give
    away the work of its magnificent military in Afghanistan and Iraq by a
    too precipitous withdrawal. How will you monitor the situation on the
    ground in Afghanistan and Iraq to ensure that stability remains during
    and after the withdrawal of U.S. forces?
        Mr. Panetta. I completely agree that the withdrawal from
    Afghanistan must be meticulously planned and not precipitous in order
    to not risk the gains we have made at great sacrifice of our blood and
    treasure. I will monitor the situation through the eyes of our
    commanders on the ground and by personally visiting Afghanistan to
    assess for myself. Preserving our recent gains will be my top priority,
    as we begin to transition security lead to the ANSF.
        Regarding Iraq, General Austin and his staff have a number of
    systems in place to monitor the situation in Iraq during the drawdown.
    He will report regularly to me, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, and General Mattis on issues relating to security, politics,
    rule of law, and training and readiness for foreign military and police
    forces. Additionally, my office and the Joint Staff participate in
    National Security Staff led weekly updates at the deputies' committee
    to discuss Iraq from a broader interagency perspective. Finally, DOD
    maintains active involvement in a robust interagency process of weekly
    working groups covering a variety of topics including security, rule of
    law, transition, international engagement, and strategic
    communications.

        131. Senator Sessions. Mr. Panetta, what contingency plans do you
    have in place in the event that a redeployment is required during the
    drawdown to ensure stability?
        Mr. Panetta. Contingency planning is an ongoing effort by our
    military to ensure we are ready for rapidly changing situations. I will
    work closely with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
    military commanders to ensure we remain ready for any contingency.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss

                      LOANS AND CREDIT FOR SERVICEMEMBERS

        132. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Panetta, I understand that DOD
    regulates interest rates on short-term loans that do not amortize when
    made to its uniformed servicemembers, capping them at 36 percent.
    Traditional, amortizing installment loans are exempt from such interest
    rate caps. What is DOD's current position on short-term loans that do
    not amortize and those that do amortize?
        Mr. Panetta. DOD does not have a position on any specific types of
    loans given to servicemembers. The Department proposes to help ensure
    that servicemembers and their families receive fair protections by
    working with Federal and State governments on existing and proposed
    policies impacting all consumers. The goal is to try to eliminate the
    need to identify servicemembers and their families separately for
    protections, which may create unintentional barriers to credit.

        133. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Panetta, how does DOD propose to
    balance consumer protection for its members without creating
    unintentional barriers to credit for them in the future?
        Mr. Panetta. The Department proposes to help ensure that
    servicemembers and their families receive fair protections by working
    with Federal and State governments on existing and proposed policies
    impacting all consumers. The goal is to try to eliminate the need to
    identify servicemembers and their families separately for protections,
    which may create unintentional barriers to credit.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker

                                 FUTURE THREATS

        134. Senator Wicker. Mr. Panetta, the United States faces a number
    of national security challenges today and our forces--our resources--
    are stretched thin in order to meet those challenges. However, we also
    know that the future will bring its own set of challenges and threats
    to the security and prosperity of the next American generation. In
    order to prepare for those threats and meet our responsibilities to
    those who follow us, we must ensure the actions we take will give
    future generations the flexibility and resources they need, including
    an industrial base capable of sustaining our future military forces. As
    Secretary, what actions will you take to examine the industrial base at
    all levels, develop an industrial base policy and communicate that
    policy with the private sector, to ensure that we maintain a robust and
    capable aerospace and defense industrial base capable of meeting the
    threats of the future?
        Mr. Panetta. I understand the Department is examining the
    industrial base by conducting a sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier (S2T2)
    research effort. S2T2 is a process to expand the scope of the
    Department's industrial base assessments beyond their traditional
    programmatic perspective and to create a database on industry for use
    as an input to many decision-making processes across the Department.
        I am committed to maintaining an open dialogue with the private
    sector and increasing the transparency within which we operate to the
    maximum extent permitted by law.

                                 EXPORT CONTROL

        135. Senator Wicker. Mr. Panetta, it is widely accepted that the
    current export control regime is antiquated and reduces U.S.
    industries' global competitiveness. Since the addition of commercial
    satellites to DOS's technology control list, we have seen the U.S.
    global share of that industry reduced from over 70 percent to less than
    30 percent as the Europeans and others have marketed their products as
    International Traffic in Arms Regulations compliant. What actions are
    necessary to be taken to improve the export control regimen?
        Mr. Panetta. On May 6, 2011, DOD and DOS transmitted a joint
    interim report to Congress in response to section 1248 of the National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. The report, entitled
    ``Risk Assessment of United States Export Control Policy,'' is a
    conservative starting point for transferring satellite and related
    items from the USML to the CCL. It recommends that, under certain
    conditions, commercial communications satellites, systems, subsystems,
    and components be controlled on the CCL.
        A more comprehensive assessment of controls on satellites, related
    items, and technology is currently underway, as part of the
    administration's Export Control Reform (ECR) initiative. DOD, with its
    interagency partners, is expected to complete this review of USML
    Category XV (Spacecraft Systems and Associated Equipment) in the coming
    months. The draft will include recommendations for what items should
    remain on the USML and those that can be moved to the CCL. No items
    controlled on the USML by statute will be removed from the USML unless
    and until the authority to do so is provided by Congress.
        I understand that DOD expects to provide the final section 1248
    report to Congress later this year, based on the findings from work
    underway in the ECR initiative. Since the administration has not
    completed its revision of controls on spacecraft in the USML, I cannot
    provide any conclusions at this time regarding its recommendations.
    However, consistent with our overall approach to ECR, I expect that the
    administration will consider how to provide ``higher fences around
    fewer items,'' and increase transparency and predictability so that the
    U.S. space industry will be able to compete globally and more
    efficiently.
        I am aware that current U.S. law limits the flexibility of the
    President and requires control of these items on the USML per section
    1513 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. If
    confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress on the legislative
    changes that would be required to implement any proposed changes.

                           TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY

        136. Senator Wicker. Mr. Panetta, U.S. defense policy since World
    War II has been to rely on advances in technology rather than force
    size for our national security. Do you believe that the Pentagon should
    strive to maintain our technological superiority in all mediums of
    combat?
        Mr. Panetta. I fully understand the role advanced technology and
    technological superiority has on the strategic options available to the
    President, including the size and shape of our forces. We live in an
    era where nations have increased their investments in world-class
    science and technology talent and facilities. While much of this
    investment is centered on commercial applications, there are
    significant national security implications. These investments provide
    nations with options to develop new military capabilities and non-state
    actors the opportunity to build asymmetric capabilities to challenge
    our forces.
        Given this environment, the Department must continue to build upon
    the technical strengths it has developed over the decades since World
    War II. The combined scientific, technical, and engineering talent in
    our universities, the defense industrial base, other parts of
    commercial industry, and Government labs are second to none in the
    world. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department's investments in
    research, development, test and evaluation protect this technical
    advantage while providing the taxpayer with the greatest return on
    their tax dollars in ensuring the technical superiority of our forces.

                        INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND LEADERSHIP

        137. Senator Wicker. Mr. Panetta, throughout the post-World War II
    era, the United States has maintained its military leadership in large
    part as a result of its industrial leadership--particularly in
    aerospace and other defense industries. That leadership has only been
    possible by tremendous work on the part of the employees of that
    industry--the engineers, scientists, and machinists. Maintaining this
    leadership in the future will require that DOD identify and communicate
    what it needs to counter future military threats. As Secretary, what
    will you do to map out the industrial policy and needs of DOD?
        Mr. Panetta. As Secretary of Defense, I will ensure that Department
    policies, procedures, and actions: (1) stimulate and support vigorous
    competition and innovation in the industrial base supporting defense;
    and (2) establish and sustain cost-effective industrial and
    technological capabilities that assure military readiness and
    superiority.
        I will do so by: (1) monitoring industry readiness,
    competitiveness, ability to innovate, and financial stability as the
    Department moves to capabilities-based acquisitions in an era of
    increasingly sophisticated systems; (2) leveraging Department research
    and development, acquisition, and logistics decisions to promote
    innovation, competition, military readiness, and national security; (3)
    leveraging statutory processes (for example, the Defense Priorities and
    Allocations System; Hart-Scott-Rodino antitrust evaluations; Exon-
    Florio Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
    evaluations) and promoting innovation, competition, military readiness,
    and national security; (4) leading efforts for the Department to engage
    with industry to ensure openness and transparency; and (5) continuing
    our long history of supporting science, technology, engineering, and
    mathematics education initiatives in a collaborative process at local,
    regional, and national levels.

        138. Senator Wicker. Mr. Panetta, do you believe that our aerospace
    and defense industrial base are essential strategic assets and that
    strategic assessments must include the impact on the industrial base
    from policy decisions?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes. In order for DOD to develop, field, and maintain
    high-quality equipment, it must rely on a robust and capable defense
    industry. We must understand, therefore, the impact of the actions we
    take on the industrial base and consider those impacts when making
    strategic decisions.

        139. Senator Wicker. Mr. Panetta, as defense budgets flatten, how
    do you think rapidly rising personnel and operations accounts can be
    prevented from driving the investment accounts below 35 percent of the
    defense top line needed to modernize the forces for future threats?
        Mr. Panetta. The Department will need to continue to look for ways
    to become more efficient to accomplish the core Defense mission. The
    Department is conducting a comprehensive review of the Defense programs
    in light of the current fiscal environment. I will ensure that
    everything is on the table and assess each program in terms of its
    contribution to our national security strategy.

        140. Senator Wicker. Mr. Panetta, alone among major nations, the
    United States does not have a defense industrial base policy. The
    current DOD policy of relying on market forces to sustain the health of
    the industrial base ignores the fact that DOD is the sole customer for
    military-unique weapons. Do you intend to continue the current
    initiative to develop an industrial base strategy?
        Mr. Panetta. The Department recognizes the defense industrial base
    is more global, commercial, and financially complex than ever before.
        I understand the Department regularly addresses specific
    industrial-base concerns within programs and services and has also
    embarked on a more comprehensive sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier
    analysis of the industrial base, which will help inform future
    programmatic decisions, expand the scope of DOD industrial base
    assessments, and create a database on industry for use as an input to
    many decisionmaking processes across the Department.

        141. Senator Wicker. Mr. Panetta, such a strategy will work best if
    there is open communication between defense officials and industry
    leaders so that industry can shape itself to meet the needs of DOD.
    Secretary Gates began a Secretary/CEO dialogue to facilitate that
    communication. Do you intend to continue that dialogue?
        Mr. Panetta. I am committed to maintaining an open dialogue with
    industry and increasing the transparency within which we operate to the
    maximum extent permitted by law.

                                    PAKISTAN

        142. Senator Wicker. Mr. Panetta, I am taking a close look at the
    $1.1 billion requested by the administration for the Pakistan
    Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF). I am of two minds: on the one
    hand, I understand the importance of Pakistan if we are to succeed in
    Afghanistan and in the region; on the other hand, Pakistan has received
    a lot of U.S. assistance over the past few years (nearly $6 billion
    combined in fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 and over $5 billion
    alone in the fiscal year 2012 request). My initial thinking is that the
    funding needs additional benchmarks and criteria which ensure that our
    money is spent wisely and that the Pakistanis are cooperating with us.
    I am interested in your perspective on this subject, both broadly and
    specifically, on what Pakistan is doing or not doing to ensure
    accountability for any aid we provide to the country.
        Mr. Panetta. The PCCF and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund
    (PCF), jointly implemented by DOS and DOD, is the cornerstone of our
    efforts to enhance the Pakistani military's ability to conduct
    effective military operations against militants operating within the
    country's borders.
        Since 2009, DOD has executed PCF/PCCF to train and equip those
    forces that Pakistan has committed to the counterinsurgency (COIN)
    fight. Unlike traditional security assistance, PCF is structured such
    that DOD's field element in Pakistan, the Office of the Defense
    Representative-Pakistan (ODRP), plays the lead role in identifying the
    Pakistani military's COIN capability shortfalls. ODRP also identifies
    the requirements for training, equipment, and infrastructure that would
    address these capability shortfalls. These requirements have focused on
    enhancing COIN-specific capabilities like intelligence-driven
    operations; air mobility; close air support, night operations, and
    countering improvised bombs.
        PCF/PCCF is structured so that the delivery of equipment is tied to
    our ability to train Pakistan's security forces. In the weeks and
    months ahead, continued delivery of PCF/PCCF training and equipment
    will require resolution of issues like the Pakistan Army's ordered
    drawdown of U.S. military personnel, the primary implementers of this
    program.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham

                                DEFENSE SPENDING

        143. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, Secretary Gates has previously
    identified the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a benchmark for defense
    spending. Admiral Mullen previously stated that GDP should serve as a
    reference to ``stimulate discussion relative to the affordability of
    increased defense spending in a challenging security environment.''
        Since 2003, GDP as a percentage of defense spending has increased
    from 4.34 percent to 5.78 percent in 2010. As a percentage of our
    Nation's wealth, these figures are on average markedly lower than
    spending in other times of war:

             World War II (5.72 percent to 42.04 percent);
             Korean Conflict (8.25 percent to 15.01 percent); and
             Vietnam War (7.65 percent to 10.86 percent).

        Do you agree with Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, and others that
    the GDP should act as a marker for defense spending? If so, what does
    the lower percentage average spent during the war on terror as compared
    to other times of conflict lead you to conclude about future defense
    spending as a percentage of GDP?
        Mr. Panetta. Defense expenditures are currently at a much lower
    percentage of GDP than during previous major wars. Defense consumed
    more than half the Federal budget, and the portion of the Nation's
    economic output devoted to the military was about 9 percent in 1961. By
    comparison, this year's base defense budget of $530 billion--the
    highest since World War II adjusted for inflation--represents less than
    15 percent of all Federal spending and equates to roughly 3\1/2\
    percent of GDP--a number that climbs to about 4\1/2\ percent when the
    war costs in Iraq and Afghanistan are included. I do not believe the
    Department is likely to return to Cold War levels of defense
    expenditures, at least as a share of national wealth anytime soon--a
    sentiment also expressed by Secretary Gates.

                            LIMITING INTERROGATIONS

        144. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, I understand that you support the
    Obama administration's policy of limiting the interrogation techniques
    of U.S. military and CIA personnel to those consistent with a U.S. Army
    Field Manual, FM 2-22.3. I am concerned that President Obama's
    restrictions on interrogations are misplaced, unnecessarily hamper our
    interrogators, and provide an advantage to our enemies. Should a U.S.
    Army Field Manual be the single standard for governance on
    interrogation methods for the U.S. intelligence community or should the
    Intelligence Community have its own, possibly classified, standard?
        Mr. Panetta. As I have stated before, I fully support the
    President's decision to establish Army Field Manual 2-22.3 as the
    single standard applicable to all interrogations by U.S. Government
    personnel. This decision was based on the results of a careful review
    conducted by the President's interagency Interrogation and Transfer
    Policies Task Force which was charged with evaluating the sufficiency
    of the interrogation practices and techniques in the Army field manual.
    The Task Force found that additional techniques were not necessary. I
    believe we should do everything possible within the law to gather
    information, and I agree with those who state that information can be
    obtained without resorting to measures such as waterboarding. I do not
    support a set of classified interrogation methods that are not open to
    public scrutiny.

        145. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, do you believe there is any risk
    in limiting all government interrogations to the U.S. Army Field
    Manual, a publicly available document?
        Mr. Panetta. No. I fully support the President's decision to
    establish Army Field Manual 2-22.3 as the single standard applicable to
    all interrogations by U.S. Government personnel. This decision was
    based on the results of a careful review conducted by the President's
    interagency Interrogation and Transfer Policies Task Force which was
    charged with evaluating the sufficiency of the interrogation practices
    and techniques in the Army field manual.

                                  RAIL ASSETS

        146. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, the use of rail to move,
    mobilize, and reset our Nation's military personnel and assets has
    proven to be a cost-effective, efficient, and environmentally-friendly
    mode of transportation. Do you agree that the use of rail to move DOD's
    assets is a ``must-be included'' in any mobilization or reset plan
    developed?
        Mr. Panetta. Rail as well as air, sea, and road are needed to
    deploy and redeploy forces, and for the movement of sustainment
    requirements. The effective use of the different modes must be
    integrated to support and synchronize timely and cost-effective
    deployment of personnel, their equipment and the associated
    sustainment.
        Surface (both ship and rail) are the most cost efficient modes for
    moving large volumes of military equipment and sustainment/resupply
    requirements.
        The Department relies heavily upon commercial rail, truck, ocean
    and air assets, and through the partnerships that are developed, to
    meet national security objectives. It is our desire that commercial
    industry maintains these critical capabilities.

        147. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, with the drawdowns in Iraq and
    Afghanistan, it is critical to have a logistics infrastructure capable
    of moving DOD's vehicles and assets to and from their reset and storage
    facilities. Do you feel the required rail assets are currently in place
    to support the surge in reset and storage requirements that will come
    from the drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan?
        Mr. Panetta. Currently, the numbers of DOD and commercial rail
    assets available are sufficient to meet requirements. However, over the
    next decade commercial rail assets will reach federally-mandated
    retirement timelines. DOD is currently studying this issue and is
    assessing courses of action designed to ensure significant commercial
    rail assets are available to meet the Department's future needs.

                             RADIATION AND MEDICINE

        148. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, in light of the recent situation
    in Japan, coupled with the ever-present threat of terrorist attacks on
    our Nation, where do you rank the importance of our military's
    capability to provide the best possible protection against radiation
    exposure?
        Mr. Panetta. Protecting our military forces from radiation exposure
    is one of the Department's highest priorities. It is an integral part
    of our overall emphasis on protecting the warfighters and our Nation
    against the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
    (CBRN) events, whether intentional or accidental. The Department has a
    well-established strategy designed to deter and deny our adversaries
    the ability to threaten our Nation with weapons of mass destruction.
    Should our forces face the dangerous effects of CBRN weapons or
    materials, their protection and ability to mitigate those effects are
    essential to our success. Currently, I see our radiation protection
    priorities as being within larger CBRN defense efforts to: (1)
    strengthen our capability to respond and recover from a CBRN incident;
    (2) provide the necessary U.S. Food and Drug Administration-approved
    prophylactics (vaccines and other preventative products) and
    therapeutics (treatments) that protect against CBRN hazards; (3)
    provide comprehensive situational awareness necessary to counter the
    threat, along with the ability to share information and data analysis
    to guide the appropriate response to a CBRN incident; (4) provide the
    necessary detection and diagnostics to keep people safe and identify
    those affected; and (5) maintain and improve current individual and
    collective protection capabilities.

        149. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, in your opinion, are our Nation's
    first responders currently equipped with the best possible pre- and
    post-exposure radiation therapeutics and, if not, would you agree that
    we would be remiss in not ensuring that our government was doing
    everything in its power to develop and stockpile the most advanced and
    clinically-tested drugs presently available?
        Mr. Panetta. It is DOD's policy to provide the best possible
    medical countermeasures, including prophylaxis and therapeutics, to
    protect our military and civilian personnel. To this end, I will
    continue to work with the Service Chiefs to ensure our installation
    emergency managers continue to reach out to their civilian counterparts
    to ensure we are doing the right planning to meet any radiological
    hazard. In addition, we will continue cooperating with the Departments
    of Health and Human Services and the Department of Homeland Security to
    maintain in the National Strategic Stockpile adequate supplies of the
    best countermeasures available.

        150. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, are you aware that the Armed
    Forces Radiobiology Research Institute has committed years of research
    and millions of dollars toward developing a very mature prophylactic
    radiation protection drug and that it has received positive test
    results and garnered widespread support across Government agencies?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes, I am aware of the efforts by the Armed Forces
    Radiobiology Research Institute to develop new drugs that could be used
    for protection against radiation. I understand that they have been
    working on a promising candidate, which is in clinical testing
    according to Food and Drug Administration protocols.

        151. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, that despite all this, inter-
    departmental procedures and roadblocks have inhibited such a drug from
    being stockpiled by our military which has, in fact, repeatedly been
    the request of the Office of Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs?
        Mr. Panetta. We will work with the Food and Drug Administration as
    it conducts clinical tests according to its protocols.

        152. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, would you be
    willing to further investigate this issue in order to determine what
    roadblocks have halted the procurement of such a promising drug, and
    how best to remove such hindrances?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes, I would be willing to look into this issue.

        153. Senator Graham. Mr. Panetta, would you commit to further
    dialogue on this issue and to provide regular updates to ensure our
    government and the American people are as protected as possible against
    these imminent threats?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will certainly look into this issue.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn

                                DOD BUDGET CUTS

        154. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, in his April speech on debt
    reduction, the President targeted security spending for $400 billion in
    cuts over the next 12 years, the preponderance of which is expected to
    come from the DOD budget. If confirmed, will you pursue cuts to the
    defense budget that go even further than that?
        Mr. Panetta. It is premature to provide an assessment of additional
    defense cuts until we complete our review associated with the
    President's target.

                                    PAKISTAN

        155. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, in your written responses to the
    advance policy questions, you note that ``U.S. strategic interests in
    Pakistan encompass both our relationship with Pakistan itself and
    Pakistan's role in the campaign against al Qaeda.'' What is absent from
    your response is any mention of the major terrorist group, Lashkar-e-
    Taiba (LeT). Director of National Intelligence Clapper recently
    testified before this committee that LeT is becoming ``an increasing
    threat to U.S. forces in Afghanistan.'' What is your assessment of the
    threat that LeT poses to U.S. interests, as well as our allies?
        Mr. Panetta. [Deleted.]

                              OVERDUE DOD REPORTS

        156. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, the Senate-passed version of the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 included an
    amendment I sponsored that required DOD to report to Congress within 90
    days on the status and capabilities of Taiwan's current air force, as
    well as an analysis of the specific weapons systems Taiwan would need
    in order to defend itself. That report is now 16 months overdue.
    Likewise, DOD is also overdue in submitting the required annual ``China
    Military Power Report'', which is mandated for delivery no later than
    March 1 of each year. The failures by DOD to submit timely reports, as
    mandated, undermine Congress' oversight role. If confirmed, will you
    commit to ensuring that these two important reports are submitted to
    Congress without further delay?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes. I am committed to providing these and other
    reports to Congress in a timely manner.

                               VIOLENCE IN MEXICO

        157. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, I remain extremely concerned by
    the intense cartel-driven violence occurring in Mexico, just a stone's
    throw from my own home State, and also what I consider to be a lack of
    focus on this problem by the current administration. This
    administration does not seem to have a coherent, meaningful strategy in
    place to help the Government of Mexico regain control over its country
    and defeat the cartels. Instead, momentum seems to be moving in the
    opposite direction. Mexican President Felipe Calderon has boldly taken
    on the cartels, but I'm concerned about whether his successor will
    share his commitment to fight the cartels and restore law and order in
    Mexico. What do you see as the risks to our own national security if
    the Mexican cartels are not defeated?
        Mr. Panetta. I share your concern about the increased violence
    levels in Mexico and the threats posed by transnational criminal
    organizations (TCOs) operating there and, increasingly, throughout the
    region. Although concerned about the escalating violence, the U.S.
    Government remains confident that Mexico's democracy is strong and its
    government maintains control over its territory.
        As I understand it, the U.S. Government began coordinating
    assistance to Mexico under the Merida Initiative in 2008 with the goal
    of supporting the Government of Mexico's efforts to build capacity to
    combat TCOs, strengthen the rule of law and respect for human rights,
    reduce violence, and stem the flow of drugs north and arms and illicit
    money south. DOD is working with its counterparts in Mexico to assist
    their efforts to dismantle TCOs. The Department recognizes that, moving
    forward, U.S. efforts should reinforce the progress made in disrupting
    cartels. The United States should also reinforce Mexico's move toward
    institutionalizing its capacity to act on public safety and security
    issues, transform its borders to respond to security threats while at
    the same time remaining competitive globally, and ensure that
    communities see the benefit of respecting human rights and the rule of
    law and adopting a culture of lawfulness.
        It does not appear that TCO violence is spilling across the border
    into the United States. Still, the Department recognizes that TCOs have
    linkages to illicit groups operating inside the United States,
    including drug traffickers and gangs that pose health, law enforcement,
    economic, and security challenges to cities and towns throughout the
    United States. Although Mexico has called upon its armed forces to
    support Mexican law enforcement efforts in combating TCOs, they
    continue to see the problem as law enforcement in nature, as does the
    U.S Government. DOD, along with its interagency partners, is working
    closely with its Mexican counterparts to support their efforts to
    dismantle TCOs, and if confirmed, in coordination with interagency
    partners, I will continue the Department's efforts to provide
    assistance as requested by the Government of Mexico.

        158. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, could Mexico become a failed
    state?
        Mr. Panetta. [Deleted.]

        159. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, what would a failed state mean
    for the United States?
        Mr. Panetta. [Deleted.]

        160. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, I am encouraged by your written
    response acknowledging that, in order to confront the threats posed by
    transnational criminal organizations in Mexico, ``it is necessary to
    harness the talents and resources of DOD, in coordination with those of
    DOD's Federal partners and the Governments of Mexico and Central
    American nations . . . . I believe a long-term solution will require a
    whole-of-government effort.'' What would you do to leverage DOD
    resources in confronting this growing threat on our southern border?
        Mr. Panetta. U.S.-Mexico relations have grown significantly in
    recent years. The increased military-to-military engagement between our
    two nations is especially valued. DOD is working closely with
    interagency partners to provide support and deliver assistance, as
    requested by the Government of Mexico. As I understand it, DOD
    representatives meet and speak regularly with Government of Mexico
    officials to assess the progress we have made to date, and to identify
    priorities moving forward through established forums such as the U.S.-
    Mexico Defense Bilateral Working Group and other ongoing meetings with
    Government of Mexico officials. As the force directly confronting the
    TCOs, the Government of Mexico is best positioned to identify the
    resources and support needed to challenge the organizations operating
    in Mexican territory. The most important step DOD can take is to be
    prepared to respond quickly when assistance is requested. I look
    forward to working closely with U.S. national security agencies,
    Mexico, Central American Governments, and Congress to shape the scope
    and scale of continued DOD efforts.

        161. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, how would you improve interagency
    cooperation in this area?
        Mr. Panetta. DOD has been engaged with its Mexican counterparts on
    exchanges and training, providing equipment, and information sharing
    for many years. But as I mentioned previously, defense assistance is a
    small part of the U.S. whole-of-government support to Mexico, which
    focuses on building civilian institutions and capacity and for which
    DOD is in complete support.
        I will ensure that DOD continues to work closely with other U.S.
    departments and agencies and foreign partners to integrate our
    cooperation with Mexico. DOD has unique capabilities within the U.S.
    Government, but it must ensure that its policies are complementary
    rather than duplicative, and that those agencies with the right tools
    have a seat at the table. Although the Government of Mexico has called
    upon its armed forces to support Mexican law enforcement efforts in
    combating transnational criminal organizations, as I understand it,
    Mexico continues to see the problem as law enforcement in nature, and
    the U.S. Government agrees with this assessment. In addition to DOD's
    engagement with its Mexican counterparts, if confirmed, I will ensure
    that DOD remains prepared to provide support to U.S. law enforcement
    agencies in their work with Mexico.

                               THE FUTURE OF IRAQ

        162. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, the recent killing of five
    American soldiers served as a chilling reminder that security in Iraq
    remains fragile. The radical Shiite cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, is
    attempting to reinsert himself into Iraq's political process through
    demonstrations and threats of violence. Several military and civilian
    leaders have expressed serious concern regarding the Iraqis' limited
    military capabilities in the key areas of logistics, intelligence, and
    aviation, and what those shortfalls will mean for Iraq once U.S. forces
    withdraw as planned, by December 31, 2011. How concerned are you about
    stability in Iraq following the departure of U.S. Armed Forces?
        Mr. Panetta. Although the ISF are currently functioning well as a
    counterinsurgency force and demonstrating the capability to maintain
    internal security, U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) assesses that gaps,
    particularly in the capability to defend against external threats, will
    exist. USF-I assesses that the broad categories of projected gaps are
    cross-ministerial intelligence sharing; combined arms capability;
    integrated air defense and air sovereignty enforcement; and sustainment
    and logistics. USF-I will focus its efforts on these areas between now
    and the end of the mission. Additionally, USF-I will continue to assist
    the Iraqis in the fielding of modernized equipment, providing advice
    during maneuver training, conducting advanced specialty skills
    training, and working to mature maintenance and supply operations.

        163. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, can the Iraqis adequately prevent
    terrorist organizations from taking root and growing in Iraq?
        Mr. Panetta. [Deleted.]

                                      IRAN

        164. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, it remains clear that Iran plans
    to influence the future of Iraq. The ongoing Iranian meddling in Iraqi
    affairs is very concerning. In your opinion, how would a complete
    withdrawal of U.S. forces impact Iran's relations with Iraq?
        Mr. Panetta. We remain troubled by Iran's continued support to and
    training of militant groups that target both Iraqi and U.S. personnel.
    We encourage Iran to maintain constructive and peaceful relations with
    its neighbor Iraq, with which it shares a long history of cultural,
    religious, and economic ties. Iran should respect Iraqi sovereignty and
    end its support to those who promote terrorism in Iraq. In addition,
    Iraq is a sovereign country and has proven resistant to Iranian
    meddling.

        165. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, would this give the Iranians more
    opportunity to influence Iraq's future course?
        Mr. Panetta. Iran has pursued a multi-pronged strategy in Iraq
    consisting of political outreach, soft-power initiatives, and lethal
    support for surrogate groups. Iran often seeks to fill power vacuums,
    real or perceived, in order to gain leverage. It is therefore possible
    that Iran could view the U.S. draw down as an opportunity to gain such
    leverage. However, Iraq is a sovereign country that, in its own
    interest, would be expected to resist efforts by any of its neighbors
    to exert improper influence.

                          INDIA'S ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN

        166. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, as of February, there was a
    shortage of 740 trainers in Afghanistan needed to train Afghan soldiers
    and police. Last summer, Secretary Gates signed an order sending 850
    military personnel to Afghanistan as a stop-gap measure to fill
    vacancies in the high-priority effort to train local security forces.
    Administration officials continue to reaffirm that the trainers'
    mission is essential for preparing Afghan forces to take over the
    security mission and remains a central tenet of the transition strategy
    in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, India has proven its willingness to support
    the effort in Afghanistan, playing an important role in the ongoing
    reconstruction efforts. To date, India has committed some $1.3 billion
    to this cause, in addition to some 3,500 Indian personnel working on
    relief and reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. Given the clear and
    immediate demand for more trainers and training options in Afghanistan,
    as well as India's willingness to help thus far, should we invite India
    to play a greater role in training the Afghan security forces?
        Mr. Panetta. India provides scholarships for ANSF personnel to
    study in India, and the Indian Government is currently exploring
    options to train Afghan women police in India. We welcome these efforts
    and have encouraged India to coordinate its efforts with the NATO
    Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A).
        We also encourage India to consider further assistance in
    Afghanistan through priority infrastructure projects and additional
    training and education assistance and technical assistance to the
    agriculture sector. As Prime Minister Singh's recent visit to
    Afghanistan illustrated, India continues to work bilaterally with the
    Afghan Government to identify additional areas of cooperation.
        During President Obama's visit to India in November 2010, he and
    Prime Minister Singh committed to intensify consultation, cooperation,
    and coordination to promote a stable, prosperous, and independent
    Afghanistan. They agreed to collaborate closely to assist the people of
    Afghanistan by identifying opportunities to leverage our relative
    strengths, experience, and resources, including joint projects on
    agriculture and women's economic development. Eighty-five percent of
    Afghans derive their income from agriculture, and Afghan women continue
    to lack economic, social, and political opportunities.

                                PERSONNEL COSTS

        167. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, in your written responses, you
    note that the portion of DOD's budget devoted to personnel-related
    costs continues to grow. You acknowledge that the current military
    compensation system ``remains rooted in structures established
    generations ago,'' and that you ``believe it may be possible to
    restructure our military benefits in a way that reduces costs.''
    Likewise, Secretary Gates, in his last major policy speech delivered on
    May 24, stated that we may need to consider ``reexamining military
    compensation levels in light of the fact that--apart from the U.S. Army
    during the worst years of Iraq--all the Services have consistently
    exceeded their recruiting and retention goals . . . '' If confirmed, do
    you intend to direct a comprehensive review of military pay and
    benefits?
        Mr. Panetta. The fiscal environment requires us to look at all
    areas to meet the savings target including compensation, but we will
    take care of our personnel and their families, particularly our Wounded
    Warriors whose sacrifices demand that we deliver on our promises.

        168. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, what overarching changes and
    modifications do you believe are necessary to control rising personnel
    costs, while continuing to adequately provide for servicemembers?
        Mr. Panetta. We need to examine all aspects of compensation in a
    manner that recognizes the unique nature of military life and the need
    to attract and retain needed personnel. While I don't yet have any
    specific proposals, I do recognize the importance of this review.

        169. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, do you agree with the recent
    recommendation of Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, that when implementing President Obama's call for $400 billion
    in cuts to security spending, savings should be identified within
    military pay and benefits before cuts are made to force structure, such
    as weapons programs, equipment, and end strength?
        Mr. Panetta. I look forward to working with the Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff about priorities and potential areas for savings.
    Finding the $400 billion sought by the President will require us to
    make disciplined decisions in a number of areas, and we will need to
    find the right balance between military pay and benefits, weapons
    programs, equipment, and end strength.

                           MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM

        170. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, your written responses also
    evidenced your concerns regarding the military retirement system,
    including that it was ``created in an earlier era,'' and that it ``may
    be appropriate to also review the military retirement system for needed
    changes and efficiencies.'' Secretary Gates also stated in his May 24
    speech that we currently have a ``one-size-fits-all approach to
    retirement, pay, and pensions left over from the last century.'' He
    went on to say, ``a more tiered and targeted system--one that weighs
    compensation towards the most demand and dangerous specialties--could
    bring down costs while attracting and retaining the high quality
    personnel we need . . . '' If confirmed, do you intend to direct a
    comprehensive review of the military retirement system?
        Mr. Panetta. I expect that, if confirmed, I will need to direct a
    review of all aspects of military compensation including retirement.
    That review needs to recognize the unique nature of military life. If
    retirement changes are proposed, I am committed to grandfathering those
    currently serving.

        171. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, what overarching changes and
    modifications do you believe are necessary to control rising costs
    while continuing to attract the high-quality personnel we need for our
    national defense?
        Mr. Panetta. Controlling rising costs will require us to make
    disciplined decisions in a number of areas. We will need to find the
    right balance between military pay and benefits, weapons programs,
    equipment and end strength and understand the impact of any pay changes
    on our ability to recruit and retain the future force.

                                MILITARY VOTING

        172. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, in a letter to me dated December
    16, 2009, Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn wrote, ``I am
    pleased to inform you that I will designate all military installation
    voting assistance offices as National Voter Registration Act (NVRA)
    agencies . . . Those designations will be advertised to State and local
    election officials, as well as Uniformed Service voters, when
    implemented.'' This action was taken under section 7(a)(2) of the NVRA.
    Please provide a detailed status on the implementation of this
    decision.
        Mr. Panetta. Since July 2010, the Department has accomplished the
    following:

             Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) provided an
            Installation Voter Assistance (IVA) Office Training Handbook
            including specific step-by-step voting assistance decision
            trees for both military and civilians entering the IVA office.
             In-person training was provided in 36 military
            concentration areas, and three webinars were conducted to
            assist installation personnel who were unable to attend the in-
            person training.
             The Under Secretary for Personnel & Readiness issued
            Directive-Type Memorandum 10-021, directing the Services to
            establish IVA Offices at all military installations.
             The Department is completing the revision of DOD
            Directive 1000.04, FVAP, which includes instructions to the
            Services for fulfilling all aspects of the Military and
            Overseas Voter Empowerment Act. This is scheduled for
            completion later this year.
             The Service Senior Voting Representatives report
            quarterly to the Director, FVAP, on the implementation of IVA
            Offices and on other voting assistance metrics. The Services
            expect to have 100 percent Voter Assistance Office and NVRA
            implementation by the end of fiscal year 2011.

        173. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, what is your opinion on the
    proper role of DOD in ensuring that our military personnel and their
    families have a meaningful opportunity to vote in Federal elections,
    regardless of whether they are stateside or overseas?
        Mr. Panetta. The role of DOD is to assist uniformed servicemembers,
    their families, and overseas voters to exercise their right to vote.

                               CIA LEGAL EXPENSES

        174. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, Attorney General Eric Holder
    reopened the investigations of several CIA interrogators in August
    2009, after their cases had been formally closed in 2007 following
    thorough consideration by Federal prosecutors. Has the CIA paid for any
    of the legal expenses incurred by these interrogators as a result of
    these re-investigations? If so, how much Federal funding has the CIA
    spent on these efforts to date?
        Mr. Panetta. The CIA's expenditure of its appropriations for legal
    expenses incurred in connection with investigations of CIA
    interrogators, and the Agency's potential need for additional Federal
    funding for such expenses, are matters beyond this Department's
    purview. Accordingly, I defer to the CIA for response.

        175. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, how much additional Federal
    funding does the CIA anticipate needing to spend on this?
        Mr. Panetta. The CIA's expenditure of its appropriations for legal
    expenses incurred in connection with investigations of CIA
    interrogators, and the Agency's potential need for additional Federal
    funding for such expenses, are matters beyond this Department's
    purview. Accordingly, I defer to the CIA for response.

                                 UNITED KINGDOM

        176. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, what are the implications of the
    United Kingdom's reductions in military spending for the future of the
    NATO alliance?
        Mr. Panetta. We are concerned about the implications reductions in
    defense expenditure across the Alliance will have on NATO's future
    viability. The Department continues to engage in frank discussions with
    all of our NATO partners, in public and private, regarding the
    challenges associated with declining defense expenditures.
        The United Kingdom faces an austere budget environment coupled with
    an unsustainable defense program that needs to be overhauled. It will
    implement a number of cuts as a result of its Strategic Defense and
    Security Review (SDSR) reducing the size and some of the capabilities
    of its armed forces. Nevertheless, we expect that the United Kingdom
    will maintain its position as a leading NATO partner for the long term.
        Although these are challenging economic times and many countries
    have significant fiscal challenges, all allies will need to find ways
    to spend limited funds more wisely through pooling, specialization, and
    multinational procurement. Although not a panacea, these practices
    should help our NATO allies to get more capability out of their defense
    investment.

        177. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, are there any lessons from the
    United Kingdom's reductions that can be applied to the current U.S.
    debate about defense spending reductions?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes. The United Kingdom undertook a SDSR last year to
    tackle the very difficult problem of an austere fiscal environment and
    a defense program that was overspent, overstretched, and in need of new
    strategic direction. It is important to note that, even after the SDSR,
    the United Kingdom was able to maintain 2 percent of GDP expenditure on
    its military, sustain its commitment to NATO operations in Afghanistan,
    and respond to the situation in Libya as a leading partner in the
    effort.
        Our own defense establishment must also address an increasingly
    austere budgeting environment, a complex set of security challenges,
    and an uncertain future. We are consulting with the British on shared
    lessons and experiences as our defense establishments continue to
    explore efficiencies and best practices in our respective defense
    models.

                                  F-22 EXPORTS

        178. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, Air Force Chief of Staff General
    Norton Schwartz has previously indicated that having a fleet of only
    187 F-22 fighters creates a high risk for the U.S. military in meeting
    its operational demands. Given China's development of a stealth
    aircraft and Russia's development and export of air defense systems,
    the F-22 Raptor has taken on even greater importance. If confirmed,
    will you consider creating an export variant of the F-22 for sale to
    allied air forces?
        Mr. Panetta. I will review the F-22 program, along with my planned
    review of all of the Department's major weapons systems. However, it is
    my understanding that export versions of U.S.-made weapons systems are
    the result of interest from foreign countries through Foreign Military
    Sales (FMS) requests. At this time I am not aware of any official
    requests for F-22 FMS.

                     WEAPON SYSTEM CODEVELOPMENT WITH INDIA

        179. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, there are eight partner nations
    committed to the development and production of the F-35 Joint Strike
    Fighter. These partnerships are the source of extra investment for
    development of the aircraft, help drive down per-unit cost, and support
    the industrial base through foreign military sales. I believe there is
    potential for the United States and our strategic partner India to co-
    develop one or more military weapon systems, such as the replacement
    aircraft for the Air Force's 40-year old T-38 trainer aircraft. Co-
    development of a trainer jet would also expand the opportunities for
    U.S. Air Force pilots and Indian Air Force pilots to train side-by-
    side, which would be of great value. Do you agree that co-developing a
    weapon system with India would be in both our strategic and fiscal
    interest? Do you support this idea?
        Mr. Panetta. The Department accrues significant benefit from
    cooperative research and development projects with our NATO partners
    and friendly foreign nations. 10 U.S.C. 2350a requires our acquisition
    community to provide an assessment of cooperative opportunities prior
    to the first acquisition milestone or decision point. I agree that co-
    development is in both our strategic and fiscal interest and support
    the idea. If an opportunity for co-development with India were to
    arise, we would certainly pursue it if practically feasible.

        180. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Panetta, what other future programs would
    be good candidates for DOD to embark on similar joint development
    efforts with India?
        Mr. Panetta. The Department identifies assessment of cooperative
    opportunities for co-development at or before the first acquisition
    milestone or decision point. During that analysis we identify good
    candidates for joint development. I do not, at this point, know of any
    specific candidates identified for co-development programs with India,
    although there is an ongoing cooperative research and development
    engagement with India.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter

                        IRAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY

        181. Senator Vitter. Mr. Panetta, Iran continues to maintain a
    rapid pace in its progress towards a nuclear weapons capability. The
    International Atomic Energy Agency continues to report that Iran
    conducts illicit nuclear activity. Iran's missile program also shows
    progress towards a nuclear weapons capability that demonstrates
    prospective increases in proficiency and range. In fact, Iran has
    already enriched a sufficient quantity of uranium to produce multiple
    nuclear warheads if it further enriched that material to weapons-grade
    level. In response, the United States and our allies have imposed
    significant sanctions on Iran, with the hopes that these steps will
    press Tehran to change course. Do you agree that the prospect of a
    nuclear-armed Iran and the persistent threat posed by Iran's proxies,
    Hamas and Hezbollah, demonstrate the need for the missile defense
    systems being developed by the United States and its allies?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes, the ballistic missile threat from Iran and its
    continued defiance of international obligations regarding its nuclear
    program demonstrate the need for the development and deployment of
    missile defenses for the protection of the United States, as well as
    our deployed forces, allies, and partners.

        182. Senator Vitter. Mr. Panetta, do you agree that Iran's pursuit
    of nuclear weapons poses an unacceptable risk to the United States?
        Mr. Panetta. We remain committed to preventing Iran from acquiring
    a nuclear weapon. The consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran would be
    highly destabilizing for the Middle East, and could have significant
    implications for U.S. interests. No one can say with certainty how the
    situation might unfold, but a nuclear-armed Iran could cause other
    states in the Middle East to pursue nuclear programs. It could also
    embolden Iran in its actions throughout the region--most notably by
    expanding its support for proxies. A nuclear-armed Iran could also
    cause strategic instability that could eventually lead to a regional
    conflict.

        183. Senator Vitter. Mr. Panetta, do you agree with the President
    that all options must be on the table to address Iran's illicit
    activities?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes, I agree with the President that all options
    should remain on the table to address Iran's illicit activities. It is
    DOD's responsibility to plan for all contingencies, and through prudent
    military planning we continue to refine options to protect U.S. and
    partner interests from Iranian aggression. However, we continue to
    believe that diplomacy and economic pressure are the most effective
    tools for changing Iranian behavior at this time.

        184. Senator Vitter. Mr. Panetta, if confirmed, will you ensure DOD
    is prepared to carry out any orders the President may give to address
    the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon?
        Mr. Panetta. It is DOD's responsibility to plan for all
    contingencies, and through prudent military planning we continue to
    refine options to protect U.S. and partner interests from Iranian
    aggression. However, we continue to believe that diplomacy and economic
    pressure are the most effective tools for changing Iranian behavior and
    achieving our objectives. I will continue to ensure the Department is
    prepared to carry out any orders given by the Commander in Chief.

                        MILITARY PERSONNEL LOANS/CREDIT

        185. Senator Vitter. Mr. Panetta, I would like to raise an issue
    regarding lending to military personnel that has come to my attention
    and which I find very concerning. The North Carolina legislature is
    considering legislation (HB 810) that would increase interest rates
    charged by installment finance lenders. DOD has clearly defined
    regulations governing lending to military personnel (32 CFR Part 232)
    which imposes a 36 percent rate cap on short-term loans which do not
    amortize. Yet, during a hearing military officers testified against the
    bill indicating that the Office of Secretary of Defense ``found the
    bill objectionable.''
        Further, when Congress passed the Wall Street Reform Act, despite
    the opportunity to do so, DOD did not recommend any changes to the
    statute governing these regulations nor did Congress enact any changes.
        When DOD reviewed and considered the regulation in place that
    imposes a 36 percent rate cap on short-term payday loans which do not
    amortize, it found that amortizing installment loans should not be
    covered by the regulation.
        72 Federal Register 5058 (August 31, 2007), at page 50582, reads:
    ``Likewise, there are installment loans with favorable terms and some
    with terms that can increase the interest rate well beyond the limits
    prescribed by 10 U.S.C. 987. Isolating detrimental credit products
    without impeding the availability of favorable installment loans was of
    central concern in developing the regulation. Consequently, installment
    loans that do not fit the definition of `consumer credit' in section
    232.3(b), including the definition of `payday loans,' `vehicle loans,'
    or `tax refund anticipation loans' are not covered by the regulation.
    The Department's intent is to balance protections with access to
    credit. The protections posed in the statute assist servicemembers,
    when applied with precision to preclude unintended barriers.''
        However, I have seen reports of local commanders and civilian
    representatives of DOD advocating at the State level against the very
    types of loan instruments that DOD's own regulations call a favorable
    form of credit for servicemembers and their families.
        I am very concerned about continued credit availability to military
    families. Has DOD changed its policy to include other lenders within
    the coverage of the regulation?
        Mr. Panetta. No, DOD has not changed its policy and does not intend
    at this time to include other lenders within the coverage of the
    regulation. The Department proposes to help ensure that servicemembers
    and their families receive fair protections by working with Federal and
    State governments on existing and proposed policies impacting all
    consumers. The goal is to try to eliminate the need to identify
    servicemembers and their families separately for protections, which may
    create unintentional barriers to credit.

        186. Senator Vitter. Mr. Panetta, has there been any study finding
    abuse in this area?
        Mr. Panetta. There have been no DOD-directed studies of installment
    lending practices.

        187. Senator Vitter. Mr. Panetta, is it still the position of DOD
    to balance consumer protection while preventing unintended barriers to
    obtaining credit?
        Mr. Panetta. Yes, this is still DOD's position. The Department
    proposes to help ensure that servicemembers and their families receive
    fair protections by working with Federal and State governments on
    existing and proposed policies impacting all consumers. The goal is to
    try to eliminate the need to identify servicemembers and their families
    separately for protections, which may create unintentional barriers to
    credit.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Hon. Leon E. Panetta follows:]
                        Nomination Reference and Report
                               As In Executive Session,
                                   Senate of the United States,
                                                          May 26, 2011.
        Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
    on Armed Services:
        Leon E. Panetta, of California, to be Secretary of Defense, vice
    Robert M. Gates.
                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of Hon. Leon E. Panetta, which was
    transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
    referred, follows:]
                Resume of Career Service of Hon. Leon E. Panetta
    Education:
             Santa Clara University, 1956-1960

                     Bachelor of Arts Degree in Political Science
                    awarded 1960

             Santa Clara University School of Law 1960-1963

             Juris Doctor Law Degree awarded in 1963
    Employment Record:

        The following are positions for which I received compensation:

             Central Intelligence Agency

                     Director
                     2009-present

             Santa Clara University

                     Presidential Professor
                     1999-2009

             California State University Office of the Chancellor

                     Distinguished Scholar
                     1997-2009

             Joint Ocean Commission Initiative

                     Commissioner and Co-Chair (compensation from
                    Meridian Institute)
                     1996-2009.

             Meridian Institute .

                     Board of Directors (no compensation) Member,
                    Policy Planning Staff
                     2008-2009

             Blue Shield of California

                     Director
                     2001-2009

             International Advisory Board, Fleischman-Hillard,

                     Member
                     1998-2009

             Corinthian Colleges Inc.

                     Director
                     2008-2009

             BP Corp. North America, Inc.

                     Member of Advisory Board
                     2005-2009

             Zenith Insurance Company

                     Director
                     2000-2009

             California Forward

                     Co-Chair
                     2007-2009

             Inns of Monterey LTD & Inns of Cannery Rd LTD

                     Director
                     2003-2009

             Pacific Maritime Association

                     Governmental Advisor
                     1998-2009

             IDT Corp.

                     Director
                     2004-2006

             Connetics Corp. (Stiefel Laboratories)

                     Director
                     2000-2006

             New York Stock Exchange

                     Director
                     1997-2003

             New York Stock Exchange

                     Co-chairman, Corporate Accountability and
                    Listing Standards Committee
                     2002-2003

        The following are uncompensated positions in which I have served,
    although in some cases I was compensated for my necessary expenses
    associated with my work in the organization:

             Leon & Sylvia Panetta Institute for Public Policy

                     Founder and Co-Director
                     1998-2009

             Pew Oceans Commission

                     Chairman (2000-2003)
                     Commissioner (2003-2006)

             Bread for the World
                     Director
                     2001-2009

             National Marine Sanctuary Foundation
                     Director
                     2004-2009

             Close Up Foundation
                     Director
                     1999-2009

             Junior Statesmen Foundation, Inc.
                     Trustee
                     2003-2009

             Public Policy Institute of California
                     Director
                     2005-2009

             National Review Board, U.S. Conference of Catholic
            Bishops
                     Member
                     2002-2004

             National Steinbeck Center
                     Director
                     1998-2001

             U.C. Santa Cruz Foundation
                     Director
                     1998-2001

             Santa Clara University Law School Board of Visitors
                     Member
                     1998-2009

             Santa Clara University Board of Trustees
                     Member
                     2000-2009

             Community Hospital of the Monterey Peninsula

                     Trustee
                     2000-2007

             Center for National Policy

                     Chairman of the Board
                     1999-2003

             Power Up

                     Director
                     1999-2000

             Independent Task Force on Immigration and America's
            Future

                     Member
                     2005-2007

             Monterey Bay Aquarium

                     Director
                     2004-2008

             National Leadership Roundtable on Church Management

                     Director
                     2005-2009

             Citizens Advisory Group of the Panel on the Nonprofit
            Sector

                     Member
                     2005

             National Advisory Council for Aspen Rodel Fellowship
            Program, Aspen Institute

                     Member
                     2005-2009

             Aspen Security Group, Aspen Institute

                     Member
                     2008-2009

             Marks Ranch Advisory Committee, Big Sur Land Trust

                     Co-Chair
                     2005-2007

             Bretton Woods Committee

                     Member
                     2001-2009

             California Foundation on the Environment and the
            Economy

                     Director
                     2000-2009

             National Advisory Committee, Campaign for the Civic
            Mission of Schools

                     Trustee
                     2008-2009

             Caring Institute

                     Honorary Trustee
                     2001-2009

             Center for the Study of the Presidency

                     Member, Strengthening America's Future
                    Initiative Steering Committee
                     Member, National Commission to Unite a Divided
                    America
                     Trustee
                     2008-2009

             Children's Neurobiological Solutions Foundation

                     Member, Board of Advisors
                     2001-2009

             Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget

                     Trustee
                     2000-2009

             Making Washington Work Committee, Committee for
            Economic Development

                     Member
                     2006-2009

             National Advisory Board, Commission on the Future of
            America's Veterans

                     Member
                     2006-2009

             Committee on the Constitutional System

                     Co-Chair
                     1999-2009

             Leadership Council, Competitive Clusters

                     Member
                     2003-2009

             Consortium for Ocean Leadership

                     Trustee
                     2008-2009

             Council for Excellence in Government

                     Principal
                     2000-2009

             Friends of Long Marine Lab

                     Honorary Director
                     2006-2009

             Heartland Democracy Center

                     Selected Advisor
                     2007-2009

             Meridian Institute

                     Director
                     2008-2009

             National Commission on Federal Reform

                     Member
                     2001

             Next Ten

                     Senior Advisor
                     2003-2009

             Ocean Champions

                     Advisory Committee
                     2003-2009

             Advisory Board of Governors, Partnership for Public
            Service

                     Member
                     2004-2009

        In addition to the compensated activities mentioned above, prior to
    my confirmation as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, I had
    conducted much of my pre-2009 independent writing (such as my column in
    the Monterey Herald), speaking (including my Washington Speakers Bureau
    work), and other professional business through Panetta & Associates, an
    unincorporated sole proprietorship. I received no salary from Panetta &
    Associates, but I did receive through it compensation for writing and
    speaking.
    Honors and Awards:

             Army Commendation Medal, 1966
             NEA Lincoln Award, 1969
             A. Philip Randolph Award, 1984
             The Farm Bureau's Golden Plow Award, 1991
             The American Council on the Teaching of Foreign
            Languages President's Award, 1991
             The Peter Burnett Award for Distinguished Public
            Service, 1993
             The Distinguished Public Service Medal from the Center
            for the Study of the Presidency, 1995
             The Special Achievement Award for Public Service from
            the National Italian American Foundation, 1997
             John H. Chafee Costal Stewardship Award, 2001
             Special Achievement Award, Santa Clara University
            School of Law Alumni Association, 2002
             Julius A. Stratton Award for Coastal Leadership, 2003
             Exemplary Leadership Award from the American
            Leadership Forum, Silicon Valley, 2004
             Aquarium of the Pacific Ocean Conservation Award, 2006
             Lifetime Achievement Award for the National Marine
            Sanctuary Foundation, 2006
             Smithsonian Institution National Portrait Gallery Paul
            Peck Presidential Award, 2006
             Natural Resources Defense Council Forces for Nature
            Award, 2007
             National Hospice Foundation Silver Anniversary
            Honoree, 2007
             Lifetime of Service Award, City Year Silicon Valley,
            2007
             Distinguished Public Service Award, Association of
            Jesuit Colleges and Universities, 2007
             The Santa Clara University School of Law Social
            Justice and Human Rights Award, 2008
                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
    nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate, and certain
    senior military officers as determined by the committee, to
    complete a form that details the biographical, financial and
    other information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon.
    Leon E. Panetta in connection with his nomination follows:]

                              UNITED STATES SENATE
                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                                  Room SR-228
                           Washington, DC 20510-6050
                                 (202) 224-3871
                        COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
          BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

        Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
    more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
    form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
    of your answer applies.
                        Part A--Biographical Information
        Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
    this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
    public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
    any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

        1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
        Leon Edward Panetta.

        2. Position to which nominated:
        Secretary of Defense.

        3. Date of nomination:
        May 26, 2011.

        4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
        [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
    committee's executive files.]

        5. Date and place of birth:
        June 28, 1938; Monterey, CA.

        6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
        Married to Sylvia (Varni) Panetta.

        7. Names and ages of children:
        Christopher Panetta, age 48.
        Carmelo Panetta, age 46.
        James Panetta, age 41.

        8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
    dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
        Monterey High School, 1952-1956, diploma.
        Santa Clara University, 1956-1960, BA in Political Science, 1960.
        Santa Clara University, 1960-1963, JD, 1963.

        9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
    last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
    job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
        The following are positions for which I received compensation. Note
    that the dates are my best recollection.

             Director, Central Intelligence Agency, McLean VA,
            2009-present
             Presidential Professor, Santa Clara University, Santa
            Clara, CA, 1999-2009
             Distinguished Scholar, California State University
            Office of the Chancellor, Monterey CA, 1997-2009
             Commissioner and Co-Chair, Joint Ocean Commission
            Initiative, 1996-2009 (compensation from Meridian Institute)
             Director, Blue Shield of California, San Francisco CA,
            2001-2009
             Member, International Advisory Board, Fleischman-
            Hillard, 1998-2009
             Director, Corinthian Colleges Inc., Santa Ana, CA,
            2008-2009
             Member of Advisory Board, BP Corp. North America,
            Inc., Warrenville IL, 2005-2009
             Director, Zenith Insurance Company, Woodland Hills CA,
            2000-2009
             Co-Chair, California Forward, Sacramento CA, 2007-2009
             Director, Inns of Monterey LTD & Inns of Cannery Rd
            LTD, Monterey CA, 2003-2009
             Governmental Advisor, Pacific Maritime Association,
            San Francisco CA, 1998-2009
             Director, IDT Corp., Newark, NJ, 2004-2006
             Director, Connetics Corp. (Stiefel Laboratories),
            Research Triangle Park, NC, 2000-2006
             Director, New York Stock Exchange, New York, NY, 1997-
            2003
             Co-chairman, Corporate Accountability and Listing
            Standards Committee, New York Stock Exchange, New York, NY,
            2002-2003

        The following are uncompensated positions in which I have served,
    although in some cases I was compensated for my necessary expenses
    associated with my work in the organization. Dates are to the best of
    my recollection.

             Leon & Sylvia Panetta Institute for Public Policy,
            Founder and Co-Director, 1998-2009
             Pew Oceans Commission, Chairman (2000-2003) and
            Commissioner (2003-2006)
             Director, Bread for the World, 2001-2009
             Director, National Marine Sanctuary Foundation, 2004-
            2009
             Director, Close-Up Foundation, 1999-2009
             Trustee, Junior Statesmen Foundation, Inc., 2003-2009
             Director, Public Policy Institute of California, 2005-
            2009
             Member, National Review Board, U.S. Conference of
            Catholic Bishops, 2002-2004
             Director, National Steinbeck Center, 1998-2001
             Director, U.C. Santa Cruz Foundation, 1998-2001
             Member, Santa Clara University Law School Board of
            Visitors, 1998-2009
             Member, Santa Clara University Board of Trustees,
            2000-2009
             Trustee, Community Hospital of the Monterey Peninsula,
            2000-2007
             Chairman of the Board, Center for National Policy,
            1999-2003
             Director, Power Up, 1999-2000
             Member, Independent Task Force on Immigration and
            America's Future, 2005-2007
             Director, Monterey Bay Aquarium, 2004-2008
             Director, National Leadership Roundtable on Church
            Management, 2005-2009
             Member, Citizens Advisory Group of the Panel on the
            Nonprofit Sector, 2005
             Member, National Advisory Council for Aspen Rodel
            Fellowship Program, Aspen Institute, 2005-2009
             Member, Aspen Security Group, Aspen Institute, 2008-
            2009
             Co-Chair, Marks Ranch Advisory Committee, Big Sur Land
            Trust, 2005-2007
             Member, Bretton Woods Committee, 2001-2009
             Director, California Foundation on the Environment and
            the Economy, 2000-2009
             Trustee, National Advisory Committee, Campaign for the
            Civic Mission of Schools, 2008-2009
             Honorary Trustee, Caring Institute, 2001-2009
             Member, Strengthening America's Future Initiative
            Steering Committee; Member, National Commission to Unite a
            Divided America; and Trustee, Center for the Study of the
            Presidency, 2008-2009
             Member, Board of Advisors, Children's Neurobiological
            Solutions Foundation, 2001-2009
             Trustee, Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget,
            2000-2009
             Member, Making Washington Work Committee, Committee
            for Economic Development, 2006-2009
             Member, National Advisory Board, Commission on the
            Future of America's Veterans, 2006-2009
             Co-Chair, Committee on the Constitutional System,
            1999-2009
             Member, Leadership Council, Competitive Clusters,
            2003-2009
             Trustee, Consortium for Ocean Leadership, 2008-2009
             Principal, Council for Excellence in Government, 2000-
            2009
             Honorary Director, Friends of Long Marine Lab, 2006-
            2009
             Selected Advisor, Heartland Democracy Center, 2007-
            2009
             Director, Meridian Institute, 2008-2009
             Member, National Commission on Federal Reform, 2001
             Senior Advisor, Next Ten, 2003-2009
             Advisory Committee, Ocean Champions, 2003-2009
             Member, Advisory Board of Governors, Partnership for
            Public Service, 2004-2009

        In addition to the activities mentioned above, prior to my
    confirmation as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, I had
    conducted much of my pre-2009 independent writing (such as my column in
    the Monterey Herald), speaking (including my Washington Speakers Bureau
    work), and other professional business through Panetta & Associates, an
    unincorporated sole proprietorship. I received no salary from Panetta &
    Associates, but I did receive through it compensation for writing and
    speaking and I paid my wife, Sylvia, a salary as its single employee.
    Note that Panetta & Associates, the sole proprietorship through which
    my wife used to receive a salary, is a different entity from The
    Panetta Institute, where she currently serves as the Director in an
    unpaid capacity (see Part B, Question 5).

        10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
    honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
    or local governments, other than those listed above.

             Iraq Study Group, 2006
             Co-chair, Council on Base Support and Retention,
            Office of the Governor of California, 2004-2005
             Chief of Staff, The White House, 1994-1997
             Director, Office of Management and Budget, 1993-1994
             Member of Congress, U.S. House of Representatives,
            1977-1993
             Executive Assistant, Mayor of New York City, 1970-1971
             Director, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and
            Welfare (HEW) Office of Civil Rights, 1969-1970
             Special Assistant to Secretary, U.S. HEW, 1969
             Legislative Assistant, U.S. Senator Thomas Kuchel,
            1966-1969
             Officer, U.S. Army, 1964-1966

        11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
    officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
    or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
    business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
        I resigned from all previously held positions upon becoming
    Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

        12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
    professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
    other organizations.
        None other than my regular attendance at the Our Lady of Mount
    Carmel Catholic Church in Carmel Valley, CA.

        13. Political affiliations and activities:
        (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
    any public office for which you have been a candidate.
        I successfully ran for the U.S. House of Representatives in
    California every 2 years from 1976 to 1992, in the 16th (1976-1990) and
    the 17th (1992) congressional districts.
        (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
    to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
    years.
        I have been a member of the Democratic Party for many years.
        (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
    organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
    entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
        I have contributed to Democratic candidates over the years. Below
    is what has been identified from my recollection and records, as well
    as from a search of internet databases. Despite my searches, there may
    be other contributions I have been unable to identify, find or
    remember.
    Federal:
        McCloskey for Congress, $250, 5/12/2006
        Murtha for Congress Committee, $500, 5/15/2006; $1,000, 3/16/2007;
    $250, 2/21/2008
        America's Opportunity Fund, $250, 10/11/2007
        Hillary Clinton for President, $1,000, 11/28/2007; $1,000, 3/14/
    2007; $1,000, 4/30/2008
        Larocco for Senate, $250, 6/26/2007; $500, 10/16/2008; $250, 2/20/
    2008
        Slattery for Senate, $1,000, 6/29/2008
        Matsui for Congress, $250, 8/7/2008
        Obama for America, $2,300, 10/24/2008
        Spratt for Congress Committee, $500, 6/27/2006
        DCCC, $250, 10/31/2006
        DNC, $2,300, 10/20/2008
    State:
        Anna Caballero for Assembly, $100, 3/21/2006; $250, 11/3/2008;
    $200, 2/26/2008

        14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
    society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
    for outstanding service or achievements.
        During my tenure as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, I
    have been privileged to receive recognition from various organizations
    and foreign governments in the course of my official duties.
        As a Member of Congress, executive branch official in the Nixon and
    Clinton administrations, and as a public figure since leaving
    government, I am honored to have received more awards and other
    recognitions from civic organizations than I can recall. Examples that
    we found while searching my files prior to my confirmation as Director
    of the Central Intelligence Agency included:

             Army Commendation Medal, 1966
             NEA Lincoln Award, 1969
             A. Philip Randolph Award, 1984
             The Farm Bureau's Golden Plow Award, 1991
             The American Council on the Teaching of Foreign
            Languages President's Award, 1991
             The Peter Burnett Award for Distinguished Public
            Service, 1993
             The Distinguished Public Service Medal from the Center
            for the Study of the Presidency, 1995
             The Special Achievement Award for Public Service from
            the National Italian American Foundation, 1997
             John H. Chafee Coastal Stewardship Award, 2001
             Special Achievement Award, Santa Clara University
            School of Law Alumni Association, 2002
             Julius A. Stratton Award for Coastal Leadership, 2003
             Exemplary Leadership Award from the American
            Leadership Forum, Silicon Valley, 2004
             Aquarium of the Pacific Ocean Conservation Award, 2006
             Lifetime Achievement Award for the National Marine
            Sanctuary Foundation, 2006
             Smithsonian Institution National Portrait Gallery Paul
            Peck Presidential Award, 2006
             Natural Resources Defense Council Forces for Nature
            Award, 2007
             National Hospice Foundation Silver Anniversary
            Honoree, 2007
             Lifetime of Service Award, City Year Silicon Valley,
            2007
             Distinguished Public Service Award, Association of
            Jesuit Colleges and Universities, 2007
             The Santa Clara University School of Law Social
            Justice and Human Rights Award, 2008

        15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
    books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
    written.
        In my official capacity as Director of the CIA, I have written
    multiple messages to my workforce, some of which have been made
    available on the cia.gov website and have been picked up by the press.
    Additionally, in that same official capacity, I have written two op-ed
    pieces:

             Congress and the CIA: Time to Move On, Leon Panetta,
            Washington Post, 2 August 2009, Page A17.
             The CIA is Proud to Be on the Front Lines against al
            Qaeda, Leon Panetta, Washington Post, 10 January 2010, Page
            A13.

        I wrote one book, Bring Us Together: The Nixon Team and the Civil
    Rights Retreat (1971).
        As a Member of Congress and executive branch official in past
    administrations, I authored many articles, reports, and pieces of
    legislation--too many to list or recall.
        The following are items published between my departure from the
    White House in 1997 and my arrival at the CIA in 2009, to the best of
    my recollection.
    Commission Reports
             Iraq Study Group--As a member of the Study Group, I
            participated in the drafting of its final report in 2006,
            available at http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq--study--group--
            report/report/1206/index.html
             Task Force on Immigration and America's Future--As a
            member of this commission, I participated in preparation of a
            2006 report, available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/
            ITFIAF/index.php.
             Pew Oceans Commission--I chaired the Commission, which
            released its report America's Living Oceans: Charting a Course
            for Sea Change in May 2003, available at http://
            www.pewtrust.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/
            Protecting--ocean--life/env--pew--oceans--final--report.pdf.
             National Review Board for the Protection of Children
            and Young People of the United States Conference of Catholic
            Bishops--The board, on which I served, released a number of
            studies, most notably The Nature and Scope of the Problem of
            Sexual Abuse of Minors by Catholic Priests and Deacons in the
            United States, March 2004, available at http://www.usccb.org/
            nrb/nrbstudy/nrbstudyhtml.htm.org.
             New York Stock Exchange Corporate Accountability and
            Listing Standards Committee--I co-chaired this committee, which
            released a report in June 2002, available at http://
            www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp--govreport.pdf.
    Book Chapters
             ``The Politics of the Federal Budget Process,''
            chapter in James A. Thurber, ed., Rivals for Power:
            Presidential-Congressional Relations, 2002 and 2005 editions.
    Articles and Essays
      2009
             Governance, Budgeting Require Full Overhauls--and We
            Can Do It, The Sacramento Bee, January 4, 2009
      2008
             Obama's Ultimate Legacy Will Be Forged on Capitol
            Hill, Roll Call, January 20, 2008
             Beyond Winning, The Ability To Govern, The San
            Francisco Chronicle, November 9, 2008
             Obama Faces Challenges of Change, The Monterey County
            Herald, November 9, 2008
             Who Bails Out The U.S. Government?, The Christian
            Science Monitor, November 5, 2008
             What Binds America Is Values In Our Constitution, The
            San Francisco Chronicle, September 17, 2008
             Five Points for the Next President, The Monterey
            County Herald, September 7, 2008
             Protect Our Oceans, San Jose Mercury News, August 30,
            2008
             Nonprofits Are the American Dream, Commonfund, Summer
            2008
             Protecting the Jersey Shore Together, New Jersey
            Times, June 25, 2008
             If Leaders Can't Lead, the People Must, The Monterey
            County Herald, July 13, 2008
             State Budget Process Crippled By Chronic
            Shortsightedness, The Sacramento Bee, June 22, 2008
             How Democrats Could Blow the Election, The Monterey
            County Herald, May 11, 2008
             Americans Reject Scare Tactics, The Monterey County
            Herald, March 9, 2008
             No Torture, No Exceptions, Washington Monthly,
            February 18, 2008
             We Need Real Change Not Campaign Talk, The Monterey
            County Herald, January 13, 2008
             Room for Improvement in Our Waters, The Washington
            Post, January 7, 2008
      2007
             In Support of the Law of the Sea, The Washington
            Times, December 19, 2007
             Bringing Order to the Ocean, Boston Globe, November
            18, 2007
             What's Missing in '08 Run--Candidates' Core Beliefs
            Buried in Campaign Rhetoric, The Monterey County Herald,
            November 11, 2007
             ``Surge'' Not Working as Hoped, The Monterey County
            Herald, September 9, 2007
             An Empire in Decline, The Monterey County Herald, July
            18, 2007
             Preserving the Ocean For Our Children, The Good Times,
            June 19, 2007
             Consensus on Iraq Exists--Build on It, The Monterey
            County Herald, May 13, 2007
             A Renaissance in Ocean Science, Sea Technology
            Magazine, April, 1, 2007
             Government a Plague of Incompetence, The Monterey
            County Herald, March 11, 2007
             What About Those Other Iraq Deadlines?, The New York
            Times, April 14, 2007
             States' Map For Saving The Oceans, The Washington
            Post, February 3, 2007
             The Wrong Message To Iraq, The Monterey County Herald,
            January 14, 2007
      2006
             A Last Chance for Consensus on Iraq, The Monterey
            County Herald, December 17, 2006
             The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward--A New
            Approach, December 6, 2006
             Iraq Clock Ticking, the Monterey County Herald,
            December 6, 2006
             We Won. Now What?, The New York Times, November 12,
            2006
             Now Parties Must Govern Together, The Monterey County
            Herald, November 12, 2006
             Time For a Budget Summit, The San Francisco Chronicle,
            November 5, 2006
             Facing Reality in Iraq, The Monterey County Herald,
            September 10, 2006
             Doing Justice: The Core of a Jesuit Education,
            Explore, Fall 2006
             Policymakers should look to Californians for
            decisions, The Monterey County Herald, July 20, 2006
             ``A republic . . . if you can keep it'', The Monterey
            County Herald, July 9, 2006
             Price of Gas--Curse or Blessing, The Monterey County
            Herald, May 7, 2006
             Immigration Reform Challenging, The Monterey County
            Herald, March 12, 2006
             Lobby Reform is Overdue in Congress, The Monterey
            County Herald, January 15, 2006
             Immigration and America's Future: A New Chapter,
            Report of the Independent Task Force on Immigration and
            America's Future, 2006
      2005
             After the Hurricane: What will we learn from Katrina?,
            The Monterey County Herald, September 11, 2005
             Looking for Honesty in Our Leaders, The Monterey
            County Herald, June 10, 2005
             Where is the Battle for Ideas?, The Monterey County
            Herald, May 8, 2005
             California: The Key to Transforming America's
            Military, The Report of the California Council on Base Support
            and Retention, April 7, 2005
             California is Key to Transformation of Nation's
            Defense, The San Francisco Chronicle, March 28, 2005
             Time for a Party That Can Govern, The Monterey County
            Herald, March 13, 2005
             The Vulnerability of Modern Society, The Monterey
            County Herald, January 16, 2005
             New Commerce Chief Must Protect Collapsing Oceans, The
            Monterey County Herald, January 12, 2005
      2004
             Political Crossroads: Heal or Divide, The Monterey
            County Herald, November 7, 2004
             Healing the Nation, The San Francisco Chronicle,
            October 25, 2004
             Pick a Message, Any Message, The New York Times,
            September 19, 2004
             The Price of Truth, The Monterey County Herald,
            September 12, 2004
             The State of Democracy in America, The Monterey County
            Herald, July 11, 2004
             American Democracy at Risk, The Monterey County
            Herald, May 9, 2004
             Deja vu all Over Again in Washington, The Monterey
            County Herald, March 7, 2004
             A Report On the Crisis in the Catholic Church in the
            United States, National Review Board for the Protection of
            Children and Young People, February 27, 2004
             Federal Deficit A Nightmare For Our Children, The San
            Jose Mercury News, February 8, 2004
             Talking with Americans, The Globe and Mail (Canada),
            February 5, 2004
             From Athens to Iowa: Let The Games Begin, The Monterey
            County Herald, January 11, 2004
      2003
             Reform Must Follow Recall, The Monterey County Herald,
            November 16, 2003
             Summer of Our Discontent, The Monterey County Herald,
            September 7, 2003
             Saving Our Seas Requires Leadership at Home and
            Abroad, Ambassador Review, Fall 2003
             This is Direct Democracy Run Amok, The Los Angeles
            Times, July 27, 2003
             Mortgaging Our Children's Future, The Monterey County
            Herald, July 13, 2003
             America's Living Oceans--Charting a Course for Sea
            Change: Summary Report Recommendations for a New Ocean Policy,
            Pew Oceans Commission, May 2003
             The End of Fighting--But What Is Victory?, The
            Monterey County Herald, May 11, 2003
             The Deafening Sound of Silence, The Monterey County
            Herald, March 9, 2003
             The Economy Needs Certainty, Not Stimulus, The
            Monterey County Herald, January 12, 2003
             Lessons Not Learned: California's $35 Billion in Red
            Ink Calls for Fearless Leaders, The San Jose Mercury News,
            January 12, 2003
      2002
             But Can They Govern?, The Monterey County Herald,
            November 10, 2002
             Did September 11 Really Change America?, The Monterey
            County Herald, September 1, 2002
             Restoring Trust in Corporate America, The Monterey
            County Herald, July 14, 2002
             Washington Turf Wars Take Teeth Away from Ridge's
            Office, The Monterey County Herald, May 12, 2002
             Ocean Dimension of Earth Day, The Washington Times,
            April 22, 2002
             A Time to Ask ``Who Can We Trust?'', The Monterey
            County Herald, March 10, 2002
             Can Congress Discipline Itself?, The New York Times,
            February 8, 2002
             Davis' Budget Has Flaws, but Works, Los Angeles Times,
            February 5, 2002
             Did Sept. 11 Change Washington?, The Monterey County
            Herald, January 20, 2002
      2001
             The Attack on Our Economic Security, Roll Call,
            December 2001
             America Must Not Lose Focus in Its War on Terrorism,
            The Monterey County Herald, November 11, 2001
             The Politics of Geography, The San Jose Mercury News,
            September 10, 2001
             The Price of `Spin' Versus the `Truth', The Monterey
            County Herald, September 9, 2001
             Back to `Borrow and Spend', The Monterey County
            Herald, July 8, 2001
             Reinventing the Energy Wheel, Christian Science
            Monitor, May 18, 2001
             A Nation of All, Not of One?, The Monterey County
            Herald, May 13, 2001
             You Can't Fool All the People All the Time, The
            Monterey County Herald, March 18, 2001
             The Clinton Paradox, The San Jose Mercury News,
            January 1, 2001
             To Succeed As President, Bush Must Learn from Lessons
            of the Past, The Monterey County Herald, January 1, 2001
             To Assure Pride and Confidence in the Electoral
            Process, Report for the National Commission on Federal Election
            Reform, 2001
      2000
             Time for a Bush-Gore Summit, The New York Times,
            November 14, 2000
             Can He Govern, The Monterey County Herald, November
            12, 2000
             Big Money Undermines Democracy, The San Jose Mercury
            News, October 15, 2000
             Modern Political Conventions are All Script, No Drama,
            The San Jose Mercury News, July 30, 2000
             High Cost of Housing Threatens Economy, The Monterey
            County Herald, July 9, 2000
             A Government By and For All the People, Buon Giornio,
            June/July 2000
             The Initiative Process? Undermining our
            Representatives, The Monterey County Herald, May 14, 2000
             What Went Wrong With Reformers?, The Monterey County
            Herald, March 12, 2000
             The Key to the Last Century is the Key to the Next,
            The Monterey County Herald, January 9, 2000
      1999
             Not a Time for Jokers or Games, The Monterey County
            Herald, November 14, 1999
             Young Bush's Credibility is on the Line, The Monterey
            County Herald, September 12, 1999
             How Congress Was Cornered, The New York Times, October
            21, 1999
             The Wide Open Race for Money, The Monterey County
            Herald, July 11, 1999
             How Not to Spend the Surplus, The New York Times, June
            30, 1999
             Service in the Age of Information, The Monterey County
            Herald, May 21, 1999
             What the Hell is this War Really About?, The Monterey
            County Herald, May 16, 1999
             A National Nightmare is Ended . . . Or is it?, The Los
            Angeles Times, February 14, 1999
             Impeachment has Weakened the Appeal of Public Service
            for Young Americans, The Monterey County Herald, January 7,
            1999
      1998
             Time to Rise Above Petty Politics, The Monterey County
            Herald, November 8, 1998
             Censure Makes Sense, The Washington Post, September
            17, 1998
             Putting the Surplus, if Any, to Work, The New York
            Times, January 9, 1998.
      1997
             The True Balance of Power, The New York Times,
            February 2, 1997

        16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
    speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
    copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
    been nominated.
        As Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, I addressed my
    workforce in my official capacity on a regular basis. In addition to
    these internal speeches, I made the speeches listed below. I am
    providing two copies of each of these speeches, either in transcript
    (T) form or as prepared for delivery (APFD).

             Pacific Council on International Policy, Los Angeles,
            CA, May 18, 2009 T
             University of Maryland Commencement Ceremony, College
            Park, MD, May 21, 2009 APFD
             National Italian-American Foundation, Washington, DC,
            June 11, 2009 APFD
             White House Initiative on Historically Black Colleges
            & Universities, Washington, DC, September 1, 2009 T
             Arab-American Iftar Dinner, Dearborn, MI, September
            16, 2009 APFD
             Commonwealth Club of California, San Francisco, CA,
            October 23, 2009 APFD
             Fall of the Berlin Wall Commemoration, CIA
            Headquarters, November 9, 2009 APFD
             CIA Officers Memorial Foundation, Arlington, VA,
            January 29, 2010 APFD
             In-Q-Tel CEO Summit, San Francisco, CA, February 9,
            2010 APFD
             University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, March 8, 2010 T
             Congressional Black Caucus, Washington, DC, April 28,
            2010 APFD
             California State University--Stanislaus Commencement,
            Stanislaus, CA, June 4, 2010 APFD
             National Association of Asian-American Professionals
            Convention, San Francisco, CA, August 14, 2010 APFD
             Hispanic Association of Colleges & Universities
            Conference, San Diego, CA, September 1, 2010 APFD
             Santa Clara University Class of 1960 Reunion, Santa
            Clara, University, October 8, 2010 APFD
             Foreign Language Summit, College Park, MD, December 8,
            2010 T
             Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA, March 15, 2011 APFD
             CIA Officers Memorial Foundation, Arlington, VA, March
            30, 2011 APFD
             The Business Council Dinner, Washington, DC, May 12,
            2011 APFD
             The Truman National Security Project & Educational
            Institute Conference, Washington, DC, May 13, 2011, APFD

        As a Member of Congress and Executive Branch Official in past
    administrations, I gave innumerable speeches--too many to list or
    recall. I usually speak extemporaneously, with the barest of
    handwritten notes. The following are speeches given between 2006 and my
    confirmation as Director of CIA in February 2009 for which I did the
    most preparation, or of which there may be a transcript or recording,
    to the best of my recollection. I have noted where a record is
    available, and the format. In most cases, transcripts and
    videorecordings may be obtained from The Panetta Institute upon
    request.

             Commonfund Address, March 12, 2006, video recording
             National Marine Sanctuary Foundation Leadership Awards
            Dinner video tribute to Leon Panetta, June 13, 2006, video
            recording
             CSU Monterey Bay Master of Public Policy open house
            address, January 9, 2007, video recording
             Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget annual
            conference and dinner, March 13, 2007, video and transcript on
            website
             Marine Economy Forum co-hosted by Roger Williams
            University and the New England council, April 2, 2007, video
            recording
             Santa Clara University President's Speakers Series: Is
            There Light at the End of the Tunnel? address regarding the
            report of The Iraq Study Group, May 31, 2007, video on website
             Union University scholarship banquet video
            introduction, October 23, 2007, video recording
             Panetta Institute Jefferson-Lincoln Awards: An Evening
            to Honor Lives of Public Service, November 10, 2007, cable TV
             National Marine Sanctuary Program West Coast Regional
            Office Sustainable Tourism Symposium: Monterey Bay--Riding the
            Wave, November 29, 2007, video recording
             Commonfund address, March 10, 2008, video recording
             Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget annual
            roundtable and dinner, April 2, 2008, video and transcript on
            website
             Center for the Study of the Presidency address re:
            challenges facing the next president, April 11, 2008, summary
            of remarks
             Panetta Institute Monterey County Reads Volunteer
            Recognition Ceremony remarks, May 8, 2008, video recording
             Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget forum:
            Toward Fiscal Responsibility, May 20, 2008, video recording
             Carlyle Investment Management LLC, September 9, 2008,
            video recording
             Smithsonian Institute forum: An Evening with the
            Presidential Chiefs of Staff, September 15, 2008, video
            recording
             California Forward forum: Getting Past Gridlock--
            Achieving Budget Reform, September 24, 2008, video broadcast
            (Cal. Channel)
             Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget forum: What
            Comes Next? The Economic and Budgetary Consequences of the
            Bailout, October 8, 2008, video and transcript on website
             California Credit Union League address, November 6,
            2008, video recording
             Brookings Institution Memos to the President, November
            7, 2008, transcript on website
             Governors' Global Climate Change Summit: Finding
            Solutions Through Regional and Global Action, November 18,
            2008, video webcast.

        Additionally, prior to my confirmation as Director of the Central
    Intelligence Agency, I had often made a short introduction for speakers
    who participated in the Panetta Lecture Series at the Panetta Institute
    and then moderated discussion. A list of recordings of many of these
    events maybe found on the Panetta Institute's Web site at http://
    www.panettainstitute.org.

        17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
        (a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
    conflicts of interest?
        Yes.

        (b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
    would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
        No.

        (c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
    deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
    for the record in hearings?
        Yes.

        (d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
    response to congressional requests?
        Yes.

        (e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
    testimony or briefings?
        Yes.

        (f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
    before this committee?
        Yes.

        (g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
    such documents?
        Yes.
                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
    committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
    forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
    Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                    ------

                               Signature and Date
        I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
    on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
    provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
    and complete.
                                                       Leon E. Panetta.
        This 26th day of May, 2011.

        [The nomination of Hon. Leon E. Panetta was reported to the
    Senate by Chairman Levin on June 14, 2011, with the
    recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
    was confirmed by the Senate on June 21, 2011.]

      NOMINATIONS OF GEN JAMES D. THURMAN, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
     GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/COMBINED
     FORCES COMMAND/U.S. FORCES-KOREA; VADM WILLIAM H. McRAVEN, USN, TO BE
    ADMIRAL AND COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND; AND LTGEN JOHN
      R. ALLEN, USMC, TO BE GENERAL AND COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
              ASSISTANCE FORCE/COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES-AFGHANISTAN

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, JUNE 28, 2011

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in
    room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
    Webb, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Blumenthal, McCain, Chambliss,
    Brown, Portman, Ayotte, Collins, Graham, and Cornyn.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Jessica L. Kingston,
    research assistant; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K.
    Levine, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; William
    G.P. Monahan, counsel; and Michael J. Noblet, professional
    staff member.
        Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority
    staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
    Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; Michael J.
    Sistak, research assistant; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff
    member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Christine G. Lang and Breon N.
    Wells.
        Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Griffin,
    assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to
    Senator Reed; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb;
    Tressa Guenov, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Casey Howard,
    assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator
    Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Joanne
    McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; Ethan Saxon,
    assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to
    Senator Sessions; Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
    Chambliss; Joseph Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; Charles
    Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown; Brent Bombach, assistant to
    Senator Portman; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; Ryan
    Kaldahl, assistant to Senator Collins; Sergio Sarkany,
    assistant to Senator Graham; and Dave Hanke and Russ Thomasson,
    assistants to Senator Cornyn.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
        The committee meets this morning to consider three military
    nominations for command of some of the most critical and
    challenging missions facing our Nation.
        Our witnesses this morning on what is truly a joint panel
    are General James Thurman, U.S. Army, nominated to be
    Commander, United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and
    U.S. Forces Korea; Vice Admiral William McRaven, U.S. Navy, for
    appointment to the grade of admiral and nominated to be
    Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM); and
    Lieutenant General John Allen, U.S. Marine Corps, for
    appointment to the grade of general and nominated to be
    Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
    International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. Forces-
    Afghanistan.
        Thank you all for your many years of great service to this
    Nation and your willingness to serve once again.
        Let me also extend our thanks to your families, whose
    support is so essential to your and our Nation's success. As is
    the tradition of this committee, I would invite each of you to
    introduce any family members or friends who may be here with
    you when you make your opening remarks.
        General Thurman's nomination as the next Commander of U.S.
    Forces in Korea comes at a time of significant change and
    simmering tension on the Korean Peninsula. Our commitment to
    peace and stability in the region remains steadfast, and our
    alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK) is as strong as ever.
        The strength of that alliance will be particularly
    important over the next few years, as we embark on an ambitious
    realignment of our forces on the peninsula and need to deal
    with the unpredictable and aggressive behavior of a North
    Korean regime that continues to follow the destructive path of
    an international pariah.
        General Thurman's long experience in positions of
    leadership and with maintaining well-trained, equipped, and
    ready soldiers provides the kind of foundation and professional
    skills that will be required of the U.S. commander in Korea.
        Vice Admiral William McRaven is nominated to be the ninth
    Commander of SOCOM. Admiral McRaven has commanded at every
    level in the special operations community, most recently as
    Commander of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), and
    served in various staff and interagency positions, including
    time with the National Security Council. Incoming Secretary of
    Defense Leon Panetta has credited Admiral McRaven with being
    the ``real commander'' of the extraordinary operation that
    killed Osama bin Laden.
        Admiral McRaven has been nominated to be Commander of SOCOM
    at a time of exceptionally high operational tempo and growth
    for Special Operations Forces (SOF). As the current Commander
    of SOCOM, Admiral Eric Olson, told the committee earlier this
    year, ``Since September 11, our manpower has roughly doubled,
    our budget has roughly tripled, and our overseas deployments
    have quadrupled.'' Admiral Olson has also indicated that the
    force is beginning to show signs of ``fraying around the
    edges.''
        Admiral McRaven, the committee looks forward to hearing
    your thoughts on how the stress on special operations personnel
    can be mitigated, given the demand for their unique skills. The
    committee is also interested in your views on the future of
    special operations and the challenges that special operations
    personnel are likely to face. Will the announced drawdown of
    forces in Afghanistan impact SOF, given that SOF depend heavily
    on their counterparts in the general purpose forces for many of
    the enabling capabilities that they need to be successful?
        In addition, the committee would be interested in your
    thoughts on the employment of the range of special operations
    capabilities against al Qaeda and associated groups outside of
    Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. Director Panetta has expressed
    concern about al Qaeda's shifting to other places, most notably
    in Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa, and I hope that you will
    address what you see as the appropriate role for SOF in those
    areas.
        In announcing Lieutenant General Allen's nomination,
    President Obama called him ``the right commander to take over
    the vital mission in Afghanistan.'' If confirmed, Lieutenant
    General Allen will have some big boots to fill in succeeding
    General Petraeus as Commander of the 49-member ISAF coalition
    and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan.
        Like General Petraeus, General Allen brings an in-depth
    understanding of the complexities of the counterinsurgency
    (COIN) effort based on his own experience as the commander in
    Anbar Province in Iraq. Working with the Sunni Awakening, the
    marines in Anbar succeeded in getting local Sunni tribal
    leaders to reject the insurgency and instead support the Iraqi
    Government.
        As the Deputy Commander at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM),
    General Allen has developed a regional perspective on issues
    affecting the mission in Afghanistan. He will be the first
    marine to serve as the top commander in Afghanistan.
        General Allen's number-one priority will be implementing
    President Obama's decision last week to accelerate the
    transition of security responsibility to Afghan forces and to
    start bringing U.S. surge forces home. As outlined by the
    President, 10,000 U.S. troops will be withdrawn by the end of
    this year, and the remaining 23,000 U.S. surge forces will be
    drawn down by September of next year.
        The President's decision keeps the pressure on Afghan
    leaders to assume more and more responsibility for their
    security, just as the establishment of a date to begin
    reductions had the effect of creating a sense of urgency on the
    part of the Afghan Government to take responsibility for
    Afghanistan's security. The assumption of that responsibility
    by the Afghans is the path to a successful mission and a
    stable, non-Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.
        The President's transition decision was buttressed by the
    significant gains that coalition and Afghan forces, partnered
    together, have made in the last year in reclaiming former
    Taliban strongholds, particularly in the south.
        Another major change in the last year is the surge in
    Afghan Security Forces. There are now 100,000 more Afghan
    Security Forces than 18 months ago when President Obama
    announced the U.S. surge, and another 70,000 Afghan soldiers
    and police who will be trained and equipped by the end of next
    summer, when all 33,000 U.S. surge troops will have withdrawn.
        In his testimony to Congress last week, Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen characterized the
    President's decision as ``more aggressive and incurring more
    risk'' than Admiral Mullen had initially recommended. However,
    Admiral Mullen felt that, ``Only the President in the end can
    really determine the acceptable level of risk that we must
    take,'' because, as he put it, ``The truth is, we would have
    run other kinds of risks by keeping more forces in Afghanistan
    longer.''
        Among those other risks, Admiral Mullen said, are the risks
    of perpetuating greater Afghan dependence on our forces and
    inhibiting the growth and capability and confidence on the part
    of Afghan forces. The committee will be interested in hearing
    from General Allen as to his views of the President's decision.
        Again, gentlemen, our great thanks and our gratitude go to
    each of you and to your families.
        Senator McCain.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me thank our very distinguished witnesses, who are each
    nominated for a military command that is essential to the
    security of our Nation and our allies. I want to thank each of
    them for their many years of dedicated service and for stepping
    forward again when called upon to serve when and where their
    Nation needs them most.
        All of you will help lead a force that has been at war for
    10 years. We honor the service and sacrifice of our men and
    women in uniform, and we pray that they will return safely and
    successful in their missions.
        General Thurman, you have been nominated to lead our forces
    on the Korean Peninsula at a tense time in this long-running
    conflict and a critical time for our alliance with the ROK. We
    thank General Sharp for his leadership over the past few years.
        The U.S.-ROK alliance has never been better and stronger.
    But the situation on the peninsula has rarely been as dangerous
    as it is today. The transition of power in North Korea from
    father to son has contributed to a series of provocative acts
    of aggression against our South Korean allies.
        It is clear to me that if there is another such
    provocation, South Korea will not turn the other cheek. This
    has serious implications for the United States as we are bound
    as treaty allies to the defense of South Korea. We remain as
    committed as ever to our responsibilities. It is for this
    reason, and especially in light of the heightened state of
    alert and increased tensions, that we need to take a hard look
    at our current plans for U.S. force realignment and tour
    normalization on the Korean Peninsula.
        This committee needs a better understanding of this major
    undertaking, the costs of which are significant and growing.
    But ultimately, what must guide U.S. defense policy vis-a-vis
    the ROK is our obligation to ensure our mutual security and
    success.
        Admiral McRaven, what you have achieved in your
    distinguished career was already extraordinary before May 2,
    2011. But on that day, by leading the mission that killed Osama
    bin Laden, you and your men won an enduring place in American
    military history. To say that I am confident in your ability to
    lead SOCOM is an understatement.
        Admiral Olson has done an exceptional job, and I am
    confident that you will build on his great work, if confirmed.
    The leader of al Qaeda is dead, but a new one has taken his
    place. Your mission will be to help ensure he meets the same
    end.
        At the same time, a series of deadly franchises, especially
    al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, continues to threaten the
    security of our Homeland, our interests, our friends, and our
    allies. We look to SOCOM to continue planning and synchronizing
    our global operations and to continue building up the capacity
    of our partners to defeat our enemies far away from our
    Homeland.
        Finally, General Allen, you have perhaps the biggest boots
    to fill in General David Petraeus, but we know that General
    Petraeus personally recommended you and supported you as his
    successor to lead our mission in Afghanistan. I can think of no
    higher compliment to pay a military officer.
        The challenge that you will face in Afghanistan was always
    going to be significant. But I fear this challenge has only
    been increased unnecessarily by the drawdown of U.S. forces
    that the President announced last week.
        I agree with the President that we are making amazing
    progress in Afghanistan. This progress is real, and it is
    remarkable. But as our commanders on the ground all point out,
    it is also fragile and reversible.
        Our commanders also say that next year's fighting season
    will be decisive. This will be our opportunity to consolidate
    our gains in southern Afghanistan while increasing numbers of
    U.S. forces shift their main effort to eastern Afghanistan,
    where the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and other regional
    militant groups are still present and operating actively.
        However, under the President's plan, which calls for having
    all of our surge units out of Afghanistan by September, these
    troops will begin flowing out of Afghanistan right at the time
    that the Taliban, al Qaeda, and their terrorist allies begin to
    step up their operations next spring and summer. At the moment
    when our troops could finish our main objective and begin
    ending our combat operations in a responsible way, the
    President has now decided to deny them the forces that our
    commanders believe they need to accomplish their objective.
        I hope I am wrong. I hope this decision will not endanger
    the hard-won gains that our troops have made or the decisive
    progress that they still need to make next year. But I am very
    concerned that the President's decision poses an unnecessary
    risk to the progress we have made thus far, to our mission, and
    to our men and women in uniform.
        After all that we have given to this mission--the money we
    have committed to it, the decade we have devoted to it, and the
    precious lives we have lost in it--why would we do anything now
    that puts our mission at greater risk of failure? By drawing
    down U.S. forces those several months early so that they miss
    the next fighting season, how much additional risk are we
    incurring, and how could it negatively affect our mission?
    Those are just some of the questions we must answer at this
    critical moment.
        It is a pleasure to have all of you before the committee
    today. You all make me proud of America's Armed Forces and
    confident about their future.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
        Let me now call on our witnesses for their opening
    statements.
        General Thurman?

     STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES D. THURMAN, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
       THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS
           COMMAND/COMBINED FORCES COMMAND/U.S. FORCES KOREA

        General Thurman. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and other
    distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I
    thank you for the opportunity to appear here today.
        I would like to thank the Secretary of Defense and the
    President for nominating me to be the next Commander, United
    Nations Command; Commander, U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command;
    and Commander, U.S. Forces Korea.
        If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this
    committee, as well as our alliance partner, the ROK, to address
    the challenges and opportunities we face together on the
    strategically important Korean Peninsula. Recognizing that a
    strong U.S.-ROK alliance is one of the most important factors
    for maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and
    in the region at large, I will, if confirmed, continue the work
    of my predecessors directed at sustaining strong ties with our
    Korean partner.
        I would also like to thank this committee for the support
    it has provided to our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines,
    our Department of Defense civilians and their families, who
    selflessly serve our great Nation both at home and abroad. As
    the Commander of U.S. Army Forces Command, which is the Army's
    largest organization, I am all too well aware of the support
    this committee has provided and the difference this support has
    made to the men and women who serve our country in the Armed
    Forces.
        If confirmed, I will make every effort to ensure that those
    serving us in the ROK will receive the very best working,
    living, and training environment that can possibly be provided.
    If confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee to
    achieve this commitment.
        I would also like to thank my wife, Dee, for over 37 years.
    She has been magnificent in raising our two daughters, Jaime
    and Carey, who are now both married to Army officers and
    bringing up our four grandchildren.
        Dee has also selflessly supported our soldiers and their
    families. Like other military spouses, she is truly an unsung
    hero. I am blessed to have her love and commitment as I
    continue to serve our Nation.
        With that, I thank the committee again for allowing me to
    appear before you today. I look forward to answering your
    questions.
        Chairman Levin. General, thank you so much.
        Admiral McRaven?

     STATEMENT OF VADM WILLIAM H. McRAVEN, USN, TO BE ADMIRAL AND
               COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

        Admiral McRaven. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain,
    distinguished members of the committee, thank you for allowing
    me the opportunity to appear here today.
        I am deeply honored that the President has nominated me to
    serve as the next SOCOM commander. If confirmed, I promise you
    that I will work tirelessly to ensure that SOCOM continues to
    provide the American people the finest SOF in the world.
        Joining me today is my wife, Georgeann. She has been a
    constant source of strength to me and to the men and women and
    their families with whom I have served. I have been extremely
    lucky to have her by my side for the past 33 years.
        I have three children as well. My oldest son is a captain
    in the Air Force. My number-two son is completing his Ph.D. in
    California, and my daughter is going into her junior year in
    college.
        I have been very fortunate to have spent the past 34 years
    in special operations, and I can tell you from my personal
    experience that the decision by Congress to establish SOCOM was
    the best thing that ever happened to SOF. As a result of your
    efforts and your interest in the well-being of U.S. special
    operations soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians,
    we have the best-trained, the best-equipped, and the most
    experienced SOF in the history of the United States and
    possibly the world.
        The special operations soldier's unparalleled contributions
    to the security of this great Nation in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
    around the world are a direct reflection of the support SOCOM
    has received from Congress over SOCOM's 24-year history. I want
    to personally thank you for that support.
        If confirmed, I will continue to train, organize, equip,
    deploy, and, when directed by the Secretary of Defense, employ
    this force across the spectrum of conflict. We will at all
    times be prepared to answer the Nation's call with experienced
    forces whose intellect, maturity, and courage allows them to
    operate in politically and militarily complex environments--men
    and women who relish challenges and who willingly go where the
    threat to America is at its greatest.
        However, as good as this force is, I know that, if
    confirmed, one of my primary responsibilities will be to ensure
    the SOF members and their families are well taken care of, both
    physically and emotionally. In his 2011 posture hearing,
    Admiral Eric Olson noted that as a result of 10 years of
    continuous combat, the force is frayed at the edges.
        Admiral Olson and his wife, Marilyn, were exceptionally
    engaged in the welfare of the SOF soldiers and their families,
    particularly our wounded warriors. If confirmed, Georgeann and
    I will follow their lead and put forth every effort to ensure
    the well-being of the individuals under my command and the
    families that support them.
        It has been my privilege to serve my entire career in
    special operations. In all those years, I have never ceased to
    be amazed by the courage and sacrifice of the men and women in
    special operations. I am humbled to be considered for
    assignment as their commander.
        Thank you very much, and I am standing by for any
    questions.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Admiral.
        General Allen?

       STATEMENT OF LTGEN JOHN R. ALLEN, USMC, TO BE GENERAL AND
     COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE/COMMANDER,
                        U.S. FORCES-AFGHANISTAN

        General Allen. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain,
    distinguished members of the committee, thank you for this
    opportunity to appear before you today.
        I am truly honored to be nominated by the President to
    command the International Security Assistance Force and U.S.
    Forces in Afghanistan. I am grateful to the Members of
    Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff for their confidence, the support, and
    assistance extended to me since my nomination.
        Of course, I am and have always been humbled by the
    incredible sacrifice of our servicemembers and their families,
    who have continued to serve our Nation despite many hardships.
        Mr. Chairman, at this point, I must note the vital role of
    this committee and its leadership in providing crucial support
    to our men and women who have so honorably served in
    Afghanistan and Iraq. Thank you for that support.
        I would also like to start by acknowledging and thanking
    General David Petraeus, whose outstanding service as the
    Commander of ISAF has been so essential to generating the
    progress that we have seen in Afghanistan. If confirmed, I will
    seek to emulate his principled and resolute leadership. If he
    is confirmed to be the Director of the Central Intelligence
    Agency, I look forward to a very close working relationship
    with him and with the rest of the Intelligence Community.
        I would also like to express my admiration for Ambassador
    Eikenberry and his team in Kabul for their untiring dedication
    to the mission. If confirmed, I look forward to working with my
    friend, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, with whom I served in Iraq,
    and the NATO senior civilian representative, Ambassador Simon
    Gass, to ensure that our military and civilian efforts are
    closely synchronized.
        I would also like to express my profound admiration for all
    of the partner nations and their forces in Afghanistan. With 49
    ISAF nations from all over the globe currently serving in
    Afghanistan and supporting that mission, the scale of this
    coalition is truly historic.
        As General Petraeus has noted, Afghan and ISAF forces have
    halted the insurgency's momentum in much of the country and
    reversed it in key areas. Based on my work as the Deputy
    Commander of CENTCOM, numerous visits to the theater over the
    past 3 years, including last month, and extensive discussions
    with senior military and civilian leaders, I share in that
    assessment.
        Afghan and coalition forces now largely control the battle
    space in strategically important areas such as Kabul, where
    one-fifth of the Afghan population lives; in and around
    Kandahar, the spiritual and historic sanctuary of the Taliban;
    and in Helmand, a former Taliban stronghold; and in many other
    key areas.
        Meanwhile, we are continuing to exert unprecedented
    pressure on the insurgency, with a variety of efforts,
    including the Afghan Local Police initiative, which is
    mobilizing communities to defend themselves; Afghan-led efforts
    to reintegrate former fighters, with nearly 1,900 reintegrated
    to date having joined the peace process; and a variety of
    governance and development initiatives focused on establishing
    the conditions to achieve long-term security.
        Much of this progress has been enabled by and increasingly
    led by the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), who are
    conducting their own surge. They are currently on track to meet
    the 2011 goal of 305,000 troops, and substantially more and
    more capable Afghan forces will be trained and fielded over the
    next year as well.
        Although there are reasons to be cautiously optimistic,
    there are also many challenges remaining. Insurgents still
    maintain lethal capabilities, and the fighting will continue to
    be intense in some of the areas as the enemy seeks to recover
    lost territory. Transnational terrorist groups like al Qaeda
    will seek to establish new bases and safe havens in Afghanistan
    and Pakistan, and corruption and other challenges to good
    governance will still need to be addressed.
        Still, none of these challenges are insurmountable. As the
    President announced last week, and in fulfillment of his West
    Point commitments, we will begin the drawdown of surge forces
    next month. Although I was not a participant in those
    discussions, I support the President's decision and believe
    that we can accomplish our objectives.
        If confirmed, I will offer my candid assessment to the
    chain of command on the current state of the conflict, as well
    as provide options with respect to the President's goals in
    accomplishing this strategy.
        Even once the security surge forces have been removed,
    there will still be some 68,000 U.S. troops and thousands of
    international forces in Afghanistan, not to mention some 70,000
    more Afghan forces, which will join the fight in the next 15
    months, at the same time the United States and NATO are both
    discussing long-term strategic partnerships with Afghanistan.
    This reality sends an important message of commitment to the
    Afghan people, as well as a sense of urgency that Afghans must
    take more responsibility for their security.
        I would like to close by thanking my family and, most
    importantly, my wife, Kathy, who is with me here this morning,
    for her years of dedicated and loyal service to our magnificent
    troops and their families. Kathy raised our two daughters,
    Betty and Bobbie, often alone, during a career where we have
    been married for 34 years. They have grown up, those two young
    ladies, to be wonderful and independent women and citizens.
        I would also like to add that Kathy and I understand the
    sacrifices of war, with both our families having experienced
    conflicts firsthand across the span of American history. If
    confirmed, I assure you and all the military families that I
    will do everything I can to provide our forces in Afghanistan
    with the resources they need to accomplish the mission and to
    return home safely.
        Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of
    the committee, it has been a great honor to appear before you
    this morning. I am prepared to answer your questions.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General Allen. Now, let
    me ask the three of you the standard questions that we ask of
    our witnesses.
        Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
    governing conflicts of interest? [All witnesses answered in the
    affirmative.]
        Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even
    if those views differ from the administration in power? [All
    witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
        Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
    would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation
    outcome? [All witnesses answered in the negative.]
        Will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines
    established for requested communications, including questions
    for the record in hearings? [All witnesses answered in the
    affirmative.]
        Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
    response to congressional requests? [All witnesses answered in
    the affirmative.]
        Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
    testimony or briefings? [All witnesses answered in the
    affirmative.]
        Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon
    request before this committee? [All witnesses answered in the
    affirmative.]
        Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when
    requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult with
    the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or
    denial in providing such documents? [All witnesses answered in
    the affirmative.]
        Okay, let us try a 7-minute first round of questions. We
    have three votes at noon, which may complicate this a bit. We
    will see how it works out.
        General Allen, let me start with you. You indicated in your
    advance policy questions and your testimony that you agree and
    support the President's decision on U.S. troop reductions in
    Afghanistan. Can you tell us a little more why you do agree
    with this decision?
        General Allen. Mr. Chairman, the President, in December
    2009, enunciated the strategy, a result of a deliberate process
    of the review of the situation in Afghanistan, which was to be
    resourced in a number of different ways, but in particular with
    the surge forces. At that time, he announced that those surge
    forces would begin to be withdrawn in July 2011.
        There were two points, I think, that were made importantly
    in that speech. One was that the nature of this resourcing of
    that strategy was a clear signal of U.S. support to Afghanistan
    and our intent to provide Afghanistan the opportunity and the
    time to begin to develop its ANSF to provide for the security
    of the country.
        But also the other aspect of his announcement was that by
    beginning to withdraw those surge forces in July 2011, it sent
    a message of urgency to the Afghans that they must begin to
    take ownership of their security themselves. The President's
    announcement in West Point set the schedule ultimately for the
    withdrawal of those forces.
        This was augmented ultimately in the meeting in Lisbon, the
    conference in Lisbon in November 2010, where the schedule for
    transition was developed, where our security forces would
    provide ultimately the cover for the Afghan forces as the
    transition of terrain in Afghanistan proceeded from 2011 to
    2014. In essence, at the end of 2014, Afghan forces being in
    the lead across the country.
        That brings us to the President's announcement. We expected
    that he would begin the process of the withdrawal. He has made
    that announcement. As General Petraeus and the Chairman said
    last week, we are accounting for that number.
        We will begin the implementation. He has begun the
    implementation in Afghanistan with his ISAF staff to implement
    the President's decision. I support that because that decision
    was timely. It provides a full accounting for the President's
    commitments in December 2009.
        As we begin the implementation, we will continue to have
    68,000 American forces on the ground, an upswing of about
    70,000 ANSFs, and we anticipate that this decision by the
    President can be accounted for within the current strategy,
    sir.
        Chairman Levin. How important, General, is it to the
    success of the mission in Afghanistan that the Afghan Security
    Forces take ownership of the responsibility for their security?
        General Allen. Mr. Chairman, it is essential. In the end,
    our strategy has envisioned that the Afghan Security Forces
    would take ownership all along.
        In the aftermath of the Lisbon conference, the intent was,
    as agreed to by the member nations of the coalition and by
    President Karzai, that transition would be completed by 2014,
    where ISAF forces would support the development and the
    deployment of the ANSFs and by the end of 2014 be in a position
    to provide strategic overwatch of that. It is essential to the
    strategy, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Now let me ask you, Admiral, do you see the
    President's announced reductions as creating problems for SOFs
    in Afghanistan?
        Admiral McRaven. Sir, I do not. As General Allen mentioned,
    there is still going to be a sizable U.S. force and coalition
    force there. For SOF to operate effectively in Afghanistan, we
    need to make sure that we continue to have the infrastructure,
    which will remain in place and, frankly, the enablers, which
    are always critical to us.
        If confirmed, I will work with General Allen to make sure
    that we balance the counterterrorism and the SOF requirements
    with the conventional requirements so that at the end of the
    day, we are still able to put pressure on the enemy. So, no,
    sir, I do not think the drawdown will affect SOF.
        Chairman Levin. Admiral, what is the role of Afghan Special
    Forces in the counterterrorism operations that have been
    carried out? How would you assess the capability of the Afghan
    forces?
        Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. There is a number of different
    Afghan SOF forces, if you will. There are the Afghan commandos,
    which are trained by U.S. Army Special Forces personnel, and
    they are clearly some of the elite Afghan forces. They are
    magnificent soldiers.
        There are Afghan Special Forces, which are the Green Beret
    counterpart. Then with the force that I operated with, we had
    what we referred to as the Afghan partner unit. These were
    Afghans that went on target with the JSOC forces forward to
    ensure that we had an Afghan that was, if you will, going
    through the door first, that was making first contact with the
    locals, in order to make sure that we kind of protected the
    culturally sensitive issues or items that were on target.
        The Afghans that we have worked with are top notch, to be
    honest with you, sir.
        Chairman Levin. How important is it to our counterterror
    effort and to our counterinsurgency effort that they be in the
    lead in that way, the Afghan Special Forces be in the lead?
        Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. I think it is very important. As
    General Allen mentioned, at the end of the day, the Afghans
    have to take ownership for the security of Afghanistan, and I
    would say the same thing applies to special operations.
        At the end of the day, we have to make sure that the
    Afghans take the lead in special operations, recognizing that,
    right now, we still need to maintain a fair amount of
    overwatch. But over time, hopefully, that overwatch will
    diminish and the Afghans will take a larger role in that.
        Chairman Levin. You feel they are capable of doing so?
        Admiral McRaven. I do, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Let me ask both of you, Admiral, General
    Allen, the safe haven enjoyed by the Haqqani Network in
    Pakistan continues to provide the freedom for that group to
    launch attacks against the United States and coalition troops
    in Afghanistan.
        You both, I believe, have talked to Pakistani military
    leaders. Why does Pakistan refuse to take on the Haqqani
    Network? In your judgment, is that going to change?
        Let me start with you, General Allen.
        General Allen. Sir, I think it is a complex answer that we
    would receive from them. It is a function probably of capacity.
    But it might also be a function of their hedging, whether they
    have determined that the United States is going to remain in
    Afghanistan, whether our strategy will be successful or not.
        At some point, as we have emphasized to the Pakistanis, we
    have to bring pressure to bear on this insurgent safe haven. In
    the end, what we would hope is that they would listen to our
    desires for them to do that, would muster the capacity and the
    capability, and ultimately put pressure on the Haqqani Network
    to deny them that safe haven from which that element of the
    Taliban can move across the border and conduct operations
    against ISAF and against the ANSFs as they take over more of
    the security.
        Chairman Levin. Admiral, do you want to comment? Is this
    likely to change in the near term?
        Admiral McRaven. Sir, I don't think it is likely to change.
    I would agree with General Allen. It is a very complex
    situation, obviously, in Pakistan.
        As both General Allen and I have had an opportunity to talk
    to military leaders in Pakistan, again, it is both a capacity
    issue for the Pakistanis and I think potentially a willingness
    issue, recognizing that the situation in the Federally
    Administered Tribal Areas is difficult for them to deal with.
        Chairman Levin. Something has to give, something has to
    change because it just can't continue this way, for them to
    expect that we are going to have a normal relationship with
    them, which we all hope for. But it can't continue this way
    with that expectation in place.
        Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Allen, do you know of any military leader that
    recommended in 2009 that the President make an announcement in
    2011 of drawdown of troops?
        General Allen. I do not, Senator.
        Senator McCain. Do you know of any military leader that
    recommended the drawdown plan that the President announced last
    week?
        General Allen. I do not, Senator.
        Senator McCain. Does it surprise you that after the
    President's announcement, that President Sarkozy, the British,
    other of our allies have now announced that they will be
    withdrawing from Afghanistan?
        General Allen. It does not, Senator.
        Senator McCain. Did you see the picture in the paper over
    the weekend of President Karzai and the Ayatollah Khamenei
    sitting down at a meeting, pledging friendship, support for one
    another?
        General Allen. I didn't see the picture, sir, but I was
    aware of the meeting.
        Senator McCain. Is it true that improvised explosive
    devices (IED) manufactured in Iran are still coming across the
    border into Afghanistan and killing Americans?
        General Allen. I believe they are, sir.
        Senator McCain. Did you hear of the statement the Taliban
    field commander, Jamal Khan, told the Daily Beast of his
    reaction to Mr. Obama's speech? ``My soul and the soul of
    thousands of Taliban who have been blown up are happy. I had
    more than 50 encounters with U.S. forces and their technology,
    but the biggest difference in ending this war was not
    technology, but the more powerful Islamic ideology and
    religion.''
        Are you aware of that statement by the leader of the
    Taliban?
        General Allen. I am, Senator.
        Senator McCain. Does the President's announcement of this
    withdrawal make your job--if you are confirmed, and I am sure
    you will be--more difficult and more challenging or easier?
        General Allen. Senator, that is a difficult question to
    answer, sir.
        Senator McCain. I am sure it is. That is why I asked it.
        General Allen. Not being confirmed yet and not being the
    commander, I have no ability to assess it with great accuracy
    at this particular moment. As the Chairman said, the announced
    decision was a bit more aggressive than we had anticipated. But
    he supported the decision. General Petraeus supports the
    decision.
        General Petraeus is working now to begin the implementation
    of that decision. We had anticipated that those forces would be
    coming out. There is a lot that has to happen between now and
    the end of this year, sir, and the end of the period of the
    drawdown.
        Senator McCain. General, I understand why it would be
    difficult for you to answer that question. I appreciate that,
    and I appreciate your answer.
        I have talked to probably 20 retired and Active Duty
    military leaders since the President's announcement was made,
    and it is very obvious that the challenges are now enormous.
    The question is whether we will still be able to succeed or
    not. I appreciate your willingness and your patriotism to take
    on what is obviously a dramatically increased risk.
        The Economist states again this week, ``Mr. Obama would
    only have himself to blame if, for entirely domestic political
    reasons, he undermines the conditions for a security transition
    to Afghan national forces by 2014 that still looks just about
    doable. His rush for the exit could yet end up delaying the
    very thing he is hoping for.'' I think that summarizes the
    views of most.
        Admiral McRaven, do you believe that the United States
    should have a residual force in Iraq in order to assist
    particularly with special operations functions, intelligence?
        Admiral McRaven. Sir, I think that it would be mutually
    beneficial to us and the Iraqis if, in fact, that was the case.
    Obviously, it remains to be seen whether the Iraqis will want
    us to stay past the intended drawdown time. But clearly, there
    is still a threat in Iraq, and a small, soft presence there I
    think would be advisable.
        Senator McCain. If you look at recent U.S. casualties, the
    situation, at least in some respects, politically as well as
    militarily, has shown some deterioration. Would you agree?
        Admiral McRaven. Sir, I would. Statistically, that appears
    to be the case. Yes, sir.
        Senator McCain. General Allen, do you believe that we ought
    to have an enduring military presence, for example, a base, an
    air base in Afghanistan? Everything that I know and hear is
    that President Karzai is very interested in such an
    arrangement.
        General Allen. Sir, I believe we should have an enduring
    military relationship with the Afghans. How ultimately that
    would be negotiated, how ultimately those missions, roles, and
    functions would be determined I think remains to be determined
    by discussions with the Afghans and certainly our own
    discussions and our determination.
        With regard to a permanent base, I don't believe that we
    need a permanent base in Afghanistan. We could probably conduct
    operations over the long term from a shared basing concept
    within Afghanistan.
        Senator McCain. I guess we are getting into semantics here.
    A shared basing concept is, I think, fairly agreeable.
        General Thurman, this committee has shown some serious
    concerns about the cost and the policy of the base realignment.
    I hope you will work with us closely on that issue, and I think
    we are going to ask for a pause until we can get a full
    evaluation.
        My question, though, is that there has been recent public
    reports about a North Korean ship that was turned around that
    may have had materials in it which would have had some--again,
    press reports are it had, perhaps some nuclear technology
    onboard. It was headed for Burma. It was turned around by the
    United States and headed back to port in North Korea.
        Can you tell the committee anything about that?
        General Thurman. Senator, only what I have read in the open
    source. I do know there are two United Nations Security Council
    Resolutions, 1718 and 1864, that the purpose of that is to
    prevent the proliferation of nuclear or weapons of mass
    destruction from North Korea.
        I believe it is very important that we continue to monitor
    that carefully. I believe it needs to be dealt with in a whole-
    of-government approach.
        Senator McCain. I thank you.
        I say congratulations to the three of you, and you make all
    of us extremely proud that the United States is blessed with
    such leadership, dedication, and sacrifice; and that includes
    your families as well.
        Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        I would pick up where Senator McCain left off and say that
    listening to the opening statements that the three of you made
    and hearing you respond to the questions of Chairman Levin and
    Senator McCain, which I would not describe as softballs, I
    think the cumulative effect is that you are really a very
    impressive group.
        Today, I think you have shown us your intelligence and that
    you are well spoken. Your records speak really with
    extraordinary power to a career of patriotism, bravery, and
    leadership capacity. You remind us about how much every
    American has to be grateful to you and everyone else in uniform
    for all you do every day to protect our security and our
    freedom. I thank you very much for that.
        General Allen, I want to get into the decision that the
    President made last week and announced about Afghanistan, let
    me just ask you this question. As I understand what was
    announced, one way to look at it is that this calendar year, we
    will withdraw from Afghanistan 10,000 of the 33,000 troops we
    surged as a result of the President's decision in December
    2009. Next year, we will withdraw the remaining 23,000 by
    sometime in September.
        But here is what I want to ask you. My understanding is
    that within those parameters this year and next year, you, as
    ISAF commander, will be given latitude to determine both the
    pace of the withdrawal that will begin in July and which of our
    forces are withdrawn. Is that correct?
        General Allen. That is correct, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. The second question I want to ask is
    this. In your response to the questions submitted to you by
    this committee, you state, ``I will constantly monitor and
    assess the situation on the ground, and should I determine the
    situation has changed, I will so advise my chain of command
    through the proper channels.''
        My understanding of what you are saying there is that if,
    as we go through this year into next year, you find that the
    pace of the withdrawal is having an effect on what is happening
    on the ground in Afghanistan that you think is really negative,
    that you will exercise your authority to report that up the
    chain of command and, if necessary--this is a hypothetical--
    would ask that the pace of withdrawal be slowed down?
        General Allen. Senator, that is a very important question.
    If confirmed, and if I take command of ISAF, I am going to
    monitor the operational environment and the conditions
    constantly, not just as it relates to the drawdown of the
    forces with respect to the surge, but throughout the entire
    period of time I command during this campaign.
        It is my responsibility to the chain of command and to our
    Commander in Chief to ensure that should I be concerned over
    the progress of the execution of the campaign, that I so advise
    the chain of command with my forthright advice. I will make
    that obligation now. I state that obligation now, and I see
    that as an important responsibility, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that reassurance and I
    thank you for it.
        Admiral McRaven, with regard to Afghanistan, obviously, the
    SOF has been playing an extraordinarily important role in the
    counterinsurgency strategy that we are carrying out there with
    significant success. Is it your expectation as the drawdown of
    our forces overall, pursuant to the President's decision last
    week, goes forward, that the SOFs are likely not to be drawn
    down in number? I think you know what I am asking.
        Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. Sir, I think that remains to be
    seen. Again, if confirmed, I will work very closely with
    General Allen and General Mattis to take a look at what the
    right balance is for SOFs.
        We have to strike a good balance between the conventional
    piece and the various elements of SOF in order to be
    successful, I think.
        Senator Lieberman. Yes, I accept that answer. My own sense
    of it is that as the forces, our overall number is drawn down,
    it may be that the special operating forces are going to be
    even more critical. So that they, in some sense, would be not
    the last, but you would want to have a critical mass of SOF
    there as this goes on.
        Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir.
        Senator Lieberman. General Allen, do you have an opinion
    going in about that?
        General Allen. I do, Senator, thank you.
        We are currently engaged in a comprehensive civil-military
    counterinsurgency campaign of which counterterrorism and the
    role of SOF forces play a very important role.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Allen. As this campaign continues to mature, as we
    continue to look at the progress on the ground, we may well see
    that the role of SOF may increase, in fact, as time goes on
    within the context of the counterinsurgency campaign.
        SOF does more than simply direct action or strike
    operations. SOF is critical to the development of capacity, as
    Admiral McRaven has already said, with respect to the Afghan
    Security Forces. But also SOF is playing a vital role on the
    ground in the establishment of the Afghan Local Police program
    and the Village Stability Operations program.
        All of that together constitutes an enormously powerful
    contribution by special operating forces to the campaign today,
    and we would see that an enduring contribution over the long
    term, out to 2014 and beyond.
        Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
        General Thurman, arguably, you will be assuming command in
    Korea at the most dangerous time in quite a while. I say that
    based on the continuing provocations by North Korea of our
    allies in the ROK, by the statement that the President of the
    ROK has made that if there is another provocation, there will
    be a response in measure from South Korea, our allies.
        But also because we are watching a pattern of aggressive
    behavior by the People's Republic of China in the region
    generally that is quite different than what we have seen for a
    while, really staking claims to territory and a kind of
    extended sovereignty that we haven't seen in quite this way.
        I wondered, going in, whether you would, first, give us
    your reflections on the state of mind of the leadership of the
    two countries that most worry me anyway, in the region now,
    very different, obviously. One is North Korea and the second,
    of course, is the People's Republic of China, with which we
    have ongoing comprehensive relations, and we try very hard to
    manage our relations in a constructive way. The North Koreans,
    of course, are in a very different place.
        General Thurman. Thank you, Senator.
        I have the same concerns going in. I believe Kim Jong Il is
    an unpredictable leader. He continues to antagonize through his
    coercive diplomacy to protect his nuclear capability, I
    believe. There is no question there is a deteriorating economy.
    Reports I have read is there is a food shortage.
        I think he will continue this cycle of provocations. I
    believe it is important for us to work closely with the ROK,
    their military, to counter these provocations in a responsible
    manner.
        Having said that, I think it is very important for us to
    also maintain relations with China. I intend to work close, if
    confirmed, with Admiral Willard, the U.S. Pacific Command
    Commander, as we look at and assess the whole security posture
    and stance, particularly on the peninsula.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, General. Thanks to the three of
    you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Ayotte.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First of all, I want to say we are blessed and grateful to
    have the service of all three of you for our country. I want to
    thank your families and all that have served underneath you for
    what you have done. We have great confidence in all of your
    qualifications.
        I wanted to ask Vice Admiral McRaven, in your advance
    policy questions, you were asked what are the weaknesses and
    shortcomings in the current effort to combat terrorism and
    insurgency in Afghanistan. In one of your answers, you said,
    ``Those weaknesses and shortcomings will arise not from the
    strategy or the efforts of our soldiers, marines, airmen, and
    civilians on the ground, but from diminished resourcing, lack
    of long-term commitment, and any decrease in international
    assistance.''
        Vice Admiral, can you elaborate for me what you meant by
    that statement in terms of the concerns about diminished
    resourcing or lack of long-term commitment?
        Admiral McRaven. Yes, ma'am. This is basically focused on
    what we refer to as the enablers. For us, special operations,
    to continue to be successful in Afghanistan is going to be a
    function of ensuring that we continue to have the airlift we
    need, the rotary-wing support, the fixed-wing support, the
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in terms
    of unmanned aerial vehicles.
        That is the aspect of the support that is critical now and
    for the long run in order for special operations to be
    effective.
        Senator Ayotte. Does the President's recent withdrawal
    announcement, in your view, impact the lack of a long-term
    commitment--one of the issues that you raise?
        Admiral McRaven. No, ma'am. I would contend it doesn't
    affect SOF directly. The reason it doesn't is because it is a
    function of how you balance the withdrawal.
        Again, in discussions with General Allen and General
    Mattis, I will make it clear that as General Allen looks at
    that withdrawal, that he takes into consideration the critical
    enablers necessary to continue to support special operations
    across the battlefield. While it is not just about the direct
    action piece, which is important--and in my former role as a
    JSOC commander, that was vitally important--but it is about all
    the other enablers that support the broader SOF effort in
    Afghanistan.
        Senator Ayotte. Are there any other concerns you have about
    diminished resourcing, based on what you highlighted in your
    statement, that we should be aware of?
        Admiral McRaven. No, ma'am. Again, the two primary ones are
    the airlift support and the ISR support.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Admiral.
        Lieutenant General Allen, the fighting season in
    Afghanistan is roughly from April through October. The
    President has decided on September 2012 as the deadline for
    withdrawal of the surge forces. Is there any strategic,
    operational, or tactical advantage to a September deadline for
    withdrawal during the fighting season, as compared to waiting
    through the fighting season?
        General Allen. Senator, I think that the value of a second
    fighting season, as was expressed by the Chairman and General
    Petraeus in their testimony last week, is important. But as
    General Petraeus said in his recommendations, those
    recommendations are forwarded to the CENTCOM Commander,
    ultimately to the Secretary of Defense. The discussions, which
    ultimately generated the President's decision, account for the
    President's unique role and unique position in terms of his
    national security views and his views as President of the
    United States and the Commander in Chief.
        He has made the decision at this juncture with respect to
    when the end of the drawdown of the surge forces should occur.
    We support that decision. We will implement that decision. We
    are in the planning process for it now, Senator.
        As I said before to Senator Lieberman, it is my intention,
    obviously, as the commander to monitor the progress, the
    operational environment, the progress, and the situation with
    respect to the accomplishment of our objectives and missions
    respect to the campaign plan. Should I become concerned that
    our ability to accomplish those objectives are threatened, I
    will ensure that I give forthright and prompt advice to the
    chain of command.
        Senator Ayotte. We deeply appreciate that, General. I just
    wanted to follow up, just so I am clear. I certainly appreciate
    the President's unique role as Commander in Chief. But in your
    view, is there any strategic, operational, or tactical reason
    to withdraw in September versus at least allowing us to finish
    the fighting season?
        Because you are going to be in the middle of the fighting
    season. Can you think of any reason of a strategic nature or
    operational nature why we would withdraw then?
        General Allen. Senator, again, the forces that are at work
    during that particular time are not just about the presence of
    U.S. forces on the battlefield. Even as those forces come down,
    we will still have some portion of the surge throughout most of
    the fighting season.
        We will have the 68,000 U.S. forces that will be persistent
    in the presence, tens of thousands of ISAF forces, about 50,000
    more Afghan national security police and army forces, and some
    20,000 or so Afghan Public Protection Force. They will all be
    joining the fight. They will all become part of the process
    during that period of time.
        Again, the President was presented recommendations by the
    Commander of ISAF, forwarded by the CENTCOM Commander, and the
    discussions were held in the White House, and the President
    applied his view ultimately as the President of the United
    States and the Commander in Chief and made the decision.
        Senator Ayotte. I appreciate that, General. I understand
    that you didn't participate in those discussions, but their
    recommendations were different than the ones that the President
    adopted in terms of timing after the fighting season. Is that
    right?
        General Allen. The Chairman said that the President's
    decision was a bit more aggressive than was recommended.
        Senator Ayotte. One of the concerns with a more aggressive
    recommendation, of course, is, as Senator McCain has outlined,
    given the progress we have made in Afghanistan, that that
    progress, we could see a regression of that progress. Is that
    right?
        General Allen. We are going to take advantage of the
    opportunity between now and the end of the year to assess where
    we are with the progress of the campaign. We have made really
    spectacular progress in the south. I wish all Americans had the
    opportunity to see the great work that has been done by the
    forces at work, ISAF forces in the south and southwest.
        We are going to consolidate that progress and, at some
    point, take other actions, which I won't get into the great
    details here. But we will take other actions as necessary. The
    President's decision will be accounted for, obviously, in the
    planning that will go forward. We anticipate that we will
    continue to achieve the objectives of the campaign.
        But we must account for the decisions that the President
    has made, and we will go forward with those--accounting for
    those decisions, we will go forward with every intention of
    accomplishing the objectives. We believe that can be done now,
    and we are moving forward with the planning with the ISAF staff
    now.
        Senator Ayotte. General, I want to thank you for your
    testimony. My time is up.
        I had the opportunity as a new Senator to go to Afghanistan
    in January, and I was very impressed with the progress that has
    been made. I remain concerned and appreciate the challenges
    that you face with having to withdraw a significant number of
    our troops during that fighting season.
        Thank you for your testimony.
        General Allen. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
        Senator Udall.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for your presence, and I
    want to associate myself with the remarks of my colleagues on
    the dais as to your service and particularly acknowledge your
    families who are here, and what wonderful Americans.
        General Allen, if I could turn to you, and I know you are
    going to have some challenges. You have a leadership record
    that is exemplary. But I would like to focus on some specific
    items today that I hope then gives us an understanding of your
    priority and needs.
        In that spirit, let me turn to the success that you had and
    we had in Anbar, in Iraq. You reached out to a population that
    had been previously pretty hostile and worked with them to then
    turn their focus to al Qaeda and the elements of terrorism that
    had really created enormous chaos. In the process, the COIN
    doctrine was validated.
        I don't want to imply that the two countries are alike. But
    could you talk about the primary lessons that we learned in
    Anbar and how we are going to apply those lessons in
    Afghanistan?
        General Allen. Senator, much of what was accomplished in
    the Anbar Province, of course, needless to say, much of it was
    accomplished on the shoulders of the sacrifice of many terrific
    soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen. We honor that service
    and their sacrifice in having accomplished that really
    remarkable outcome.
        But what was accomplished in the Anbar Province was really
    the result of a comprehensive civil-military counterinsurgency
    strategy. It was a strategy that leveraged every aspect of
    military capacity that could be brought to bear in the battle
    space, civil affairs, conventional military capabilities,
    advisory capacity to build the Iraqi police, the Iraqi Security
    Forces, the two divisions of Iraqi infantry that we had.
        Special operators, who worked both as advisers and mentors,
    but also, euphemistically, the term ``black SOF'', the strike
    forces that would enter the battle space to attack the
    insurgent network. We pressurized the insurgent network
    constantly.
        While we were pressurizing and shredding the insurgent
    network and blunting their capabilities with the use of
    conventional forces, we worked very hard to build the capacity
    of the Iraqi Security Forces, both the army--those two
    divisions--and we went from about 4,000 police to almost 30,000
    police in the year that we were there, in 2007 and 2008.
        All of that was complemented by a comprehensive plan with
    respect to civilian outreach as well. The U.S. Agency of
    International Development resourced three embedded provincial
    reconstruction teams (PRT) and resourced our PRT, our
    provincial PRT in Ramadi. I believe that the wise outreach to
    the sheiks in the tribe, the wise expenditure of tax dollars
    with respect to both the stabilization projects and development
    projects, our efforts to build governance capacity, where the
    governance has been completely shattered as a direct result of
    the efforts of al Qaeda and other of the insurgent efforts,
    that comprehensive effort paid off in the end.
        It built up governance which had the capacity to stand up
    on its own two feet and extend the writ of the provincial
    government out into the districts and down to the
    municipalities and even to the tribes. It incorporated the
    tribes into the solution rather than have the tribes be on the
    outside of governance and part of the problem.
        It ultimately built the capacity for the people of that
    province, the beleaguered people along the Euphrates River to
    ply their trade, to engage in economic development. That, in
    conjunction with the persistent governance, all overwatched by
    U.S. forces, but eventually overwatched by Iraqi Security
    Forces, provided the trade space necessary ultimately for the
    persistence of governance and the success, frankly, that we
    have seen in the aftermath in the Anbar Province to this very
    moment, sir.
        Senator Udall. Let me jump to Afghanistan in that context,
    General. We have been talking here about the withdrawal numbers
    and the concern that some have about the effect on the fighting
    season next year. I know we have a full complement for this
    fighting season.
        Do you think you are going to have to shift to a
    counterterrorism (CT) model, or can you blend the two
    strategies? I know we throw those acronyms around casually. But
    can CT and COIN be implemented simultaneously in different
    provinces depending on the needs of those populations and the
    strategy that you have in place?
        General Allen. Indeed, Senator, it is occurring now. There
    is an active counterterrorism capability that is underway
    within the larger counterinsurgency campaign.
        As Vice Admiral McRaven knows so well from his time as JSOC
    and our task force commander in the CENTCOM, the capabilities
    of those strike forces have really been spectacular in getting
    at the enemy's network. As well, the use of SOF, as I
    previously mentioned, will have an important role in developing
    the training, supporting the training of the Afghan special
    operators, as well as facilitating ultimately the mobilization
    of the populations in those key villages where the Afghan Local
    Police are being expanded.
        To answer specifically your question, we would see that
    there will continue to be a counterterrorism dimension to the
    overarching counterinsurgency campaign. As time passes, as
    conditions in the battle space evolve, as we approach 2014, and
    as we define our long-term relationship with Afghanistan, we
    may well see that the development of CT will become even more
    important as time goes on. So there will be an important role,
    sir.
        Senator Udall. Would you talk about reintegration? Do we
    have enough formal structure around what we are trying to do
    there? There have been some stories recently that there is more
    we could do, that we have sent some mixed messages to the
    fighters in the Taliban forces who want to come out of the
    cold.
        General Allen. Reintegration is an essential dimension to a
    counterinsurgency strategy. It helps us to begin to decompose
    the base of the insurgency.
        The Afghans ultimately will be responsible for
    reintegration. It is their program. They are ultimately to be
    responsible for accepting these fighters out of the insurgency
    and reintegrating them back into Afghan society.
        To that effect, the Afghan Peace and Reintegration
    Committee has been formed at a national level. There are
    provincial peace committees that have been formed throughout
    the country. In that process, we are working closely with our
    Afghan counterparts to facilitate the reintegration process,
    which ultimately is that local fighters and many of the
    fighters are, in fact, close to their villages, close to their
    homes.
        Local villagers who desire ultimately to leave the
    insurgency and to become part of the future of Afghanistan will
    put down their weapons, renounce violence, sever their ties
    with al Qaeda and the insurgency, and become part of the
    solution, become part of the peace process. In return, the
    village elders and the village benefits ultimately by bringing
    them back into the fold. Through the use of funds, which are
    cycled through the Afghan Government through the Peace and
    Reconciliation Committee councils, projects are performed in
    those villages which benefit everyone, and the quality of life
    improves for everyone.
        So the village leadership vouches for that young fighter
    who has come off the battlefield. They embrace him. They bring
    him back into the community. They make him a reintegrated,
    productive element within the committee. The whole village
    benefits as a result.
        To your question specifically, the issue with respect to
    what we can do better, we are just getting started. The
    infrastructure within the Afghan side is really just beginning
    to gain purchase at this particular time.
        As we recognize as a persistent shortfall in Afghanistan in
    a number of different areas, the ability to flow resource from
    the central government down to the provinces and ultimately
    into the projects for the reintegration program, that is the
    challenge at this particular moment. I know that our civilian
    colleagues are working very closely with their Afghan
    counterparts to improve the ability to get this money on budget
    and get it flowed in an expeditious manner to take advantage of
    the opportunities as these fighters come off the battle space.
        We are at about 1,900 soon of those individuals who have
    formally reintegrated, and there are about 3,000 in the
    pipeline. So getting this process accelerated has the effect of
    providing another option if you are a fighter. You can fight
    U.S. or Afghan forces and potentially be killed. You can fight
    U.S. or Afghan forces or be detained. Or you can put your
    weapon down and become part of the future of Afghanistan, be
    reintegrated into your village, and the whole village will
    benefit because of it. I think that is a pretty stark option in
    reality.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, General.
        My time is expired. General, I look forward to working with
    you, particularly on this initiative because this is the key
    element to bringing our forces home and successfully concluding
    our operations in Afghanistan.
        Thank you.
        General Allen. Yes, Senator. Thank you.
        Senator Udall. Thanks.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
        Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First, let me thank each of you for your service and your
    willingness to accept these new challenges.
        General Allen, the people of Maine have paid a heavy price
    for the war in Afghanistan. Our State has suffered the highest
    rate of casualties of any State in the Nation.
        We have seen lots of discussion at this hearing and others
    last week about the number of troops, the pace of withdrawal,
    and the timetable. But I have for you a more fundamental
    question and that is, is there any number of troops that can
    ensure a stable Afghanistan that is going to be able to take
    responsibility for its own security, given the safe havens and
    turmoil in Pakistan and the lack of a competent central
    government that is not plagued by corruption?
        In other words, are these such insurmountable obstacles
    that no matter how many troops we have, for how long, and how
    brave and skilled they are, are those two facts--the safe
    havens in Pakistan, the corruption and incompetence of the
    central Afghan Government--insurmountable obstacles?
        General Allen. Senator, I don't believe so. There are
    challenges. There are significant challenges. Those have been
    explained by both the current ISAF Commander, by the Chairman
    of the Joint Chiefs. But I believe that the campaign, as we
    currently envisage its unfolding, has the development of the
    ANSFs ultimately to be in the lead of security out to 2014 as
    an objective which is attainable, with U.S. forces in a
    strategic overwatch position.
        Your question about the safe havens, it complicates the
    process. There is no question of that. We would recommend to
    our Pakistani friends that they take those measures that are
    necessary to reduce those safe havens because, in many
    respects, those safe havens are not only safe havens that
    generate the opportunity for those insurgent elements to attack
    into Afghanistan, but they have also turned out to be safe
    havens that provide a springboard for the assault directly upon
    the Pakistani Government and the Pakistani military.
        We will encourage and we will continue to encourage our
    Pakistani friends to bring pressure to bear upon those safe
    havens. It is not just good for the outcome of our strategy and
    for the President's vision on the outcome in Afghanistan. It is
    good for Pakistan as well.
        I might add that our relationship with Pakistan, while
    strained at this particular moment, there is a bright spot,
    frankly, in the many different facets of the relationship that
    I will touch. That bright spot is the tripartite planning
    committee, where on a regular basis U.S., Afghan, and Pakistani
    military officers sit down and go through the process of
    planning for how they will conduct cross-border operations in a
    way that limit the operations across the border.
        So there is a bright spot in that regard, and I think it is
    an opportunity for us to continue through that contact to
    leverage our relationship with Pakistan, to emphasize, as you
    point out correctly, Senator, the difficulties that these safe
    havens provide to the accomplishment of our strategy, but also
    how they endanger Pakistan as well.
        To that part of your question that relates to corruption
    and incompetence, we have been partners with President Karzai
    for a long time. In the course of this long-term partnership,
    and in particular in the last couple of years, we have seen our
    civilian colleagues operating within the context of the
    civilian surge, which accompanied President Obama's military
    surge, provide efforts to increase capacity within the Afghan
    Government, within key ministries, to provide better,
    predictable, uncorrupt governance.
        That process has been accompanied by activity within ISAF,
    the formation of Task Force Shafafiyat, which stands for
    transparency in Dari, which is supported by Task Force 2010,
    which seeks to get at corruption and difficulties associated
    with contracting that can create additional corruption, as well
    as Task Force Spotlight, which seeks to control the evolution
    of private security companies.
        There are a number of measures that we have put in place
    through the civilian surge with our colleagues in the embassy,
    through Ambassador Eikenberry and soon-to-be Ambassador
    Crocker, as well as measures that have been put in place
    through ISAF with the task forces associated with corruption,
    that seek to build both capacity, at the same time we address
    the particular issues associated with corruption.
        Today, we do face the dilemma of the safe havens. Today, we
    do work with an Afghan Government that embraces the desire
    ultimately to reduce corruption and increase competency. We
    will remain in close partnership with the Afghan Government to
    get at both of those issues, and we will continue to work with
    the ANSF.
        Even if the safe havens are not reduced, it is our strong
    desire and hope that in the end, as the Afghan Security Forces
    ultimately take to the field in the numbers that we anticipate,
    with the capabilities that we are building into those ANSF
    forces, that they will be able to provide the cover for
    Afghanistan so it can have a secure and stable future.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your service to the Nation and for
    your families' service. Your service to the Army, to the Navy,
    to the Marine Corps, and--Admiral McRaven, because of your
    son--the Air Force. I can get all the principal Services in. So
    thank you very, very much.
        Let me begin with General Allen. You talked very
    eloquently, in response to Senator Collins, about the need to
    work closely with the Pakistanis. Have you had the occasion to
    meet on a regular basis yet or do you intend to meet on a
    regular basis with General Kayani and your counterparts on the
    Pakistani Armed Forces?
        General Allen. Senator, I have met General Kayani on a
    number of occasions. It is not a relationship yet. That, I hope
    to develop. It is, in fact, the intent for General Petraeus and
    I, should I be confirmed, to pay a call on General Kayani so
    that the relationship that he has enjoyed with General Kayani
    can ultimately be passed to me.
        I look forward to the opportunity to work closely with
    General Kayani and the senior Pakistani military leadership in
    partnership, in the context, as I said before, of the
    tripartite planning committee because, in the end, we have so
    many common objectives that we need to get after. I look
    forward to that opportunity to work with the Pakistani
    military.
        Senator Reed. I think from your comments, General, from
    both sides, their perspective and our perspective, it is a
    complicated and sometimes frustrating relationship. But it is a
    relationship that is essential to our continued operations in
    Afghanistan. I would commend your efforts and urge you, as
    General Petraeus has, to establish at least lines of
    communication to the leadership.
        There is another aspect, too, that you touched upon in your
    testimony. That is the development of the Afghan National
    Security Forces. In the several visits I have made there, they
    have made some progress over the last year, after 7 or 8 years
    of fits and starts and not being particularly impressive. But I
    think over the last few years, we have gained momentum.
        It seems to be one of the major building blocks of our
    strategy, our reduction is really almost directly related to
    their ability to field competent forces. I wonder if you might
    comment briefly, if you already had, on that aspect.
        General Allen. It is central to the strategy, Senator. As
    you correctly point out, as we have developed the real capacity
    in the last couple of years--and here I must mention Lieutenant
    General Bill Caldwell and his terrific team in both Combined
    Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and NATO
    Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTMA), for the work that they
    have done. It has been a comprehensive approach with respect to
    the development of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan
    National Police.
        He has put in place a number of training initiatives that
    are paying big dividends, not the least being literacy
    training. Where in a country where the literacy, depending on
    statistics, varies between 10 percent and 20 percent, it is not
    surprising that many of those who seek to be soldiers or police
    are illiterate. That alone has given the members of the ANSFs a
    different feel about who they are and the role that they could
    potentially play in their country.
        That, plus many of the other initiatives which are
    underway, which are gaining purchase now and traction, leave me
    confident that our end state, which is an Afghan Security Force
    which has both capability and staying power, will be successful
    in the end.
        It is not just about NTMA and Bill Caldwell's efforts.
    General Rodriguez in the ISAF joint command and all of our
    conventional forces on the ground that are so closely partnered
    with Afghan units in the field have become also vital to this
    process as well, the professionalization of units, as well as
    the individual preparations of Afghan national security police
    and army troops in the training pipeline as well, sir.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
        Admiral McRaven, again, like all of my colleagues, I salute
    you, your colleagues, and the SEALs for extraordinary
    operations, and thank you. I think your decisiveness and your
    feel for every level of the conflict, from the villages of
    Afghanistan and Pakistan all the way up here to the more
    complicated rooms in Washington was amply demonstrated.
        Thank you for your service.
        Admiral McRaven. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Reed. Let me touch on a point I am sure has also
    been raised. You have a force that is small, very select, can't
    expand overnight because of criteria, can't be lowered to
    accommodate size. It is under significant pressure after 10
    years.
        Your efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan are significant,
    but you also look to other places--Yemen particularly of
    concern at the moment; Somalia, there is indication of
    operations there.
        Then just a further point is that you, I think, will be, as
    we go forward, strategically the force that is called upon sort
    of right out of the box, if you will, which is a change, a
    slight change in strategic thinking. Given this, the pressure
    on your SOCOM, your comments about what we have to do to give
    you the resources.
        Are you prepared and capable to expand your operations at a
    moment's notice worldwide or in different parts of the world? I
    would appreciate your comments.
        Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. Thank you, Senator.
        We are not prepared to expand immediately worldwide. The
    problem, as you point out, is that it is very difficult to grow
    SOFs overnight.
        Admiral Olson, in his capacity as Commander of SOCOM, has
    gone on record as saying that he wants to try to grow the
    manpower within SOCOM at the rate of about 3 percent to 5
    percent per year, which I think is about right as well.
        Part of this is making sure that the standards that we have
    set at our various special operations training elements for the
    special forces officers, the SEALs, the marines, and the
    aviators remains very high. We don't want to come off those
    standards because, at the end of the day, the American people
    expect us to put forth a world-class special operations
    operator.
        I think expanding the force rapidly will be difficult. One
    of the greatest challenges I think we will have for the future
    is there will be a greater demand on SOF. As we have talked
    about today, intuitively, we think as the drawdown occurs in
    Afghanistan in terms of the conventional force, there will
    probably be some additional requirements for SOFs to cover
    down, if you will, in Afghanistan.
        I don't think we know exactly what the size of that will be
    yet. I think these are going to have to be discussions between
    myself, if confirmed, General Allen, General Mattis, and the
    Secretary to find out what is the right amount of forces we
    need to put into Afghanistan.
        As we look out from Iraq, Afghanistan, and, frankly, across
    the globe, and, as you are well aware, sir, SOFs any day of the
    year are in about 60 to 80 countries around the world.
    Sometimes in very small numbers, but those small numbers can
    have very large effects in other areas. They are building host
    nation capacity, hopefully putting forth those values, those
    American values that the other forces can see and want to
    replicate. Frankly, that allows us to kind of get ahead of some
    of the conflict in other countries.
        As we look at the hotspots in Yemen, where you have al
    Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or Somalia, where you have East
    African al Qaeda and al Shabaab, these are clearly areas of
    concern. We are looking very hard right now--at least from my
    standpoint as a former JSOC commander, I can tell you we were
    looking very hard at Yemen and at Somalia.
        Our shortfall, as always, in a lot of these areas, for
    kinetic strikes is always our ISR, our unmanned ISR or our
    manned ISR. It is a critical enabler for us to be able to do
    our mission if it is a direct action mission.
        However, having said that, I will tell you that both
    CENTCOM and U.S. Africa Command have been terrific about kind
    of apportioning that ISR as required, depending upon the
    missions that pop up. To get to the crux of your question, sir,
    it will be difficult to expand, manpower wise. I think any
    expansion of manpower is going to have to come with a
    commensurate expansion of the enablers.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Admiral. My time is
    expired.
        General Thurman, let me just congratulate you on a great
    service to the U.S. Army, and I look forward to working with
    you, should you be confirmed.
        You are all very correct about that term, but I have a
    certain hope for all of you gentlemen. Thank you.
        General Thurman. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.
        Senator Brown.
        Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        It's good to see you all, and congratulations to you and
    your families.
        General Allen, something that has always bothered me is the
    lack of other countries fulfilling their commitment with regard
    to helping train and get up to speed, the Afghan army and
    police. How do you think that with the current shortfall of
    about almost 500 institutional trainers, the withdrawal of
    10,000 troops will affect that training mission?
        General Allen. We will continue, Senator, to ask our
    partners for trainers. We are going to continue to work, if I
    am confirmed, through NATO and through ISAF, to the non-NATO
    troop-contributing nations to continue to provide the kinds of
    trainers necessary to build the capacity of the ANSFs that we
    all need in the end to accomplish our objective.
        It is no secret that has been difficult to do. It is no
    secret that we have made it very clear. The current commander
    has made it very clear, the current Supreme Allied Commander of
    Europe, Admiral Stavridis, and the NATO leadership has made it
    very clear that we need more trainers. As you are correct,
    Senator, we are still short about 480 trainers.
        If confirmed and if I become the Commander of ISAF, I will
    continue to emphasize that we have to have trainers in order,
    ultimately, to bring to bear the kinds of quality training in
    the velocity that we need in order to get this ANSF stood up.
        Senator Brown. Is it a higher level? Does it go to the
    President's level where he goes to the other leaders and says,
    ``Listen, in order to get out of here, we need to train these
    folks and get them up. And you made a commitment.''
        It seems like we have been making that request forever, but
    there hasn't been a heck of a lot of return, reciprocity in
    providing them.
        General Allen. Senator, I can't speak to whether the
    President has asked that question specifically. But I know the
    Secretary of Defense, this Secretary, has been unambiguous in
    calling on NATO and the other non-NATO troop-contributing
    nations to provide trainers.
        If confirmed and I become the Commander of ISAF, I will be
    unambiguous in that requirement as well. I believe Admiral
    Stavridis has been beating that drum very loudly and regularly,
    sir.
        Senator Brown. What do you think the ratio is? Is there a
    ratio between trainer and trainee that works? Are we at that,
    or how far below are we on that?
        General Allen. I would have to get back to you on that,
    sir.
        Senator Brown. If you wouldn't mind, that would be helpful.
        General Allen. I would be happy to.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The current overall coalition trainer to Afghan National Security
    Force (ANSF) trainee ratio is approximately 1:14, which is sufficient
    to produce the Army combat and police formations required for the
    Afghans to transition to security lead. However, the critical shortage
    of 65 air coalition trainers hinders the development of the Afghan Air
    Force (Mi-17 and C-27 pilots). The Afghan logistics and medical systems
    are also short trainers, but these have been identified and are
    scheduled to be ``boots on the ground'' by the end of the year. This
    should allow the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training
    Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) to reach the ANSF growth objective of
    352,000 by October 2012 and should complete the training and fielding
    of the Afghan Army and Police by December 2013. Additionally, NTM-A is
    training and certifying Afghan trainers to be able to take the lead for
    basic training of army and police. The goal by the end of 2011 is to
    have 4,400 Afghan trainers to assume the lead for training to allow
    coalition trainers to shift focus to professionalizing the force and
    developing systems that will endure past transition at the end of 2014.

        Senator Brown. How about the flexibility? Do you think you
    have the flexibility you need to keep the enemy on its heels
    and also train the Afghan Security Forces from now until the
    end of the summer? Even though the enemy now has the timeline
    for our departure, does it affect those two things at all?
        General Allen. I believe we do have the flexibility.
        Senator Brown. General Thurman, in looking at your new job,
    when you are confirmed, how do you deal with a lot of the
    insecurity over there?
        Let us say, hypothetically, that North Korea makes another
    probe and tries to instigate things, and South Korea responds.
    What role, then, do we play? How do you envision that
    potentially working out?
        General Thurman. Senator, thank you.
        I think the number-one point is we have to maintain a
    strong presence on the peninsula. There is no question, based
    on what I have reviewed, that the ROK military is a very
    professional and competent force.
        I think the other important point is making sure that all
    our plans that we have are current, they are exercised
    frequently, and we have the right training programs in place. I
    think the other important thing is maintaining the alliance and
    continuing the transformation efforts.
        If confirmed, I fully expect to look at and review our
    capabilities and make sure they are the right capabilities and
    we are positioned properly to support any type of aggression.
    But I do feel it is very important to maintain a strong
    presence with our Korean partner and continue to work close
    with them and to make sure that we have the right strengths and
    can counter any type of aggression.
        Senator Brown. Thank you.
        Back to you, General Allen, I agree with the chairman when
    he was talking about our relationship with Pakistan. I also
    feel, we have given them $4 billion, and yet sometimes we don't
    know if they are in or they are out. Are they with us, are they
    not?
        How do you view your role in dealing with that situation
    over there, that country building or country pushback? What do
    you think your role will ultimately be, if any?
        General Allen. I think there is a role, Senator. The role,
    as has been demonstrated by both General McChrystal and, after
    him, General Petraeus, was to seek ways and opportunity across
    the border with the Pakistani military to try to have effect
    upon the nature of the border, the safe havens, those elements
    of the insurgency where we can focus our efforts.
        General Petraeus has established, I think, a productive
    relationship with General Kayani. I hope to follow in that
    process where, leveraging the role of the ISAF Commander, we
    can continue to place the kind of emphasis that we need to with
    the Pakistani Government, the Pakistani military to continue to
    pressurize those insurgent safe havens.
        In the end, it is a decision that they will make. But in my
    role as the operational commander, I am going to leverage every
    possibility that I can for cooperation across the border, to
    build habits of cooperation, habits of partnership. Hopefully,
    from there, as we continue to evolve our relationship overall
    with Pakistan, this will be a mechanism that can provide a
    bright spot for additional cooperation later. I think here is
    an important opportunity with Pakistan.
        Senator Brown. Thank you, sir.
        Admiral McRaven, I noted that you said that there is some
    fraying at the edges, potentially, with everything that is
    happening, and that is rightly understandable. It is not like
    you can, all of a sudden, just press the button and you get a
    special ops guy ready--or gal ready to go. What do you
    anticipate trying to do to deal with that problem?
        Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. In fact, Admiral Olson has put
    together a Pressure on the Force Task Force and has done really
    an amazing job of getting out to the various operational units
    to talk to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, their
    families, to find out what are the stresses on the force. That
    task force is continuing to gather its data and information. If
    confirmed, I will come in, take the recommendations of that
    task force and then aggressively pursue programs that make
    sense in order to take care of the families and their soldiers.
        We have to take a hard look at not just making sure that
    this force is sustainable for the next couple of years, but
    what is it going to look like in 5 years, in 10 years, in 15
    years. If we don't get ahead of this and if we don't get on top
    of the concerns and the pressures that are on the families and
    the soldiers, I have great concerns about what this force will
    look like 10 years from now.
        Senator Brown. Great. Thank you, sir.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Brown.
        Senator Begich.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Again, thank you all for your willingness to serve. Like
    many of my colleagues here, I anticipate and hope that you are
    all confirmed and look forward to your additional service to
    this country.
        First, General Thurman, let me ask you, if I can, I know
    the President has delayed the transition of operational control
    (OPCON) of South Korea I think until 2015. If you could give me
    some thoughts of your understanding how this additional time
    will allow the United States and the Republic of South Korea to
    conduct a successful transfer.
        Can you give me kind of a feel? It has been delayed, but
    what does this mean?
        General Thurman. Yes, sir, Senator. Based on what I have
    been briefed on, it was delayed until 2015. There has been a
    Strategic Alliance 2015 that was agreed upon by our Secretary
    of Defense and the South Korean Minister of Defense. It was the
    two Presidents that agreed to delay the OPCON transition.
        What I believe is this allows the ROK military to continue
    to transform their efforts. They have several transformation
    efforts ongoing. They are a highly capable and competent force.
        What I have reviewed, there is a timeline and a set of
    well-defined milestones through the exercise program that will
    get us on the road to OPCON transition in 2015. If confirmed, I
    will review the Strategic Alliance 2015 and those milestones
    and work closely with the ROK Chairman and the ROK Minister of
    Defense and the ROK military to help progress them along on
    that timeline.
        Senator Begich. Let me also ask you, I know you have heard
    a little bit of discussion--this is more of a yes or no. But if
    you want to expand, feel free. The security concerns and fiscal
    realities that you have heard some questions already on the
    feasibility on tour normalization.
        Assuming you are confirmed, are you willing and obviously
    going to reexamine the plans for the tour normalization and how
    that all will work in the future?
        General Thurman. Senator, if confirmed, I will review the
    overall concept of tour normalization. I am well aware of the
    fiscal constraints we are under as a Nation. I am also aware of
    some of the proposed legislation that has been perhaps
    provided, if the National Defense Authorization Act is
    approved.
        I will work very close with the Department of Defense and
    this committee to make sure that we are doing the right thing
    and to make the recommendations.
        Senator Begich. Very good. Thank you very much.
        I will look forward to that as it progresses. Assuming we
    actually pass an authorization bill, that will be good, and it
    will have some guidance, hopefully. So thank you.
        If I can, Vice Admiral McRaven, this year the Cold Weather
    Maritime Training Facility will be built in Kodiak, AK, which,
    of course, we would invite you to Kodiak--not in the summer,
    but in the winter because that gives you great extra points, to
    be frank with you.
        Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir.
        Senator Begich. But Kodiak is a great place. You have
    answered this a little bit already through your conversation
    with other members, but how important is facility
    infrastructure investment really for the readiness that you
    need for your special operations?
        Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. I will tell you, the Kodiak cold
    weather training facility is kind of a great topic to look at
    in terms of the effect on the operators and then, frankly, the
    rest of the infrastructure across SOF.
        But right now, when SOCOM was stood up, the legislation was
    passed in 1986 and really got going in 1987, a lot of the
    military construction (MILCON) that was in place--when the
    money flowed from the Services, a lot of the recapitalization
    money for a number of the MILCON projects did not flow with
    that.
        Now, 24, almost 25 years into SOCOM, we have a number of
    facilities out there that are in need of repair or, in fact, we
    need new facilities. I know Admiral Olson has come forth in his
    posture hearing and made it clear that he is looking for
    additional support from Congress in order to recapitalize some
    of this infrastructure.
        As with any force, sir, our readiness is a direct
    reflection of the amount of equipment and infrastructure we
    have to do the job, to train with both in garrison and forward.
    The infrastructure is critical to our special operations
    operators.
        Senator Begich. As you review that--again, assuming you get
    confirmed--I am assuming you will share your analysis on where
    those gaps are and prioritize those based on funding.
        Sometimes around this place, the funding occurs based on
    who yells the loudest. But my view would be what is the most
    critical elements of infrastructure investment that is
    necessary for your operations to continue at the level you are
    at, plus, obviously, growing itself?
        Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir.
        Senator Begich. Great.
        Admiral McRaven. Thank you.
        Senator Begich. One other piece. You had mentioned--I may
    be abbreviating this--you called it the something-something
    stress task force?
        Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir.
        Senator Begich. What is the timetable that you anticipate
    some results? The reason I say this, for all the reasons, I
    want to echo what you said. That is the readiness of our forces
    and the impacts on them as individuals and the families that
    are being impacted because of the amount of deployments and the
    speed. What is your timetable, do you think you might have?
        Admiral McRaven. Sir, the Pressure on the Force Task
    Force----
        Senator Begich. There we go.
        Admiral McRaven.--that Admiral Olson has implemented has
    been in place for many months now. They have gone around the
    country talking to the special operations operators and their
    families.
        Having said that, we have had a number of programs at all
    the units in place for quite some time. The units, down to the
    O-5 level, to the lieutenant colonel and the commander level,
    have programs supported by SOCOM to take care of the families
    and the operators.
        The real question I think for SOCOM is, is that enough? I
    think as the Pressure on the Force Task Force begins to look at
    what 10 years of fighting has done, we realize that the current
    programs are not enough. We have a number of programs that are
    being implemented daily across the force. But we think, based
    on the results coming back from this task force, that we are
    going to need to apply additional resources to support the
    families and the soldiers.
        Senator Begich. Will you share that with us?
        Admiral McRaven. Absolutely, sir.
        Senator Begich. Okay. My time is expired, but I want to end
    with one question to Lieutenant General Allen, and that is the
    whole issue of corruption in the Karzai Government. You seem
    optimistic. I don't, to be very frank with you. It seems it has
    gotten worse.
        I was there a year and a half ago, maybe longer now, 2
    years ago. Again, time flies around this place. But without
    solving the corruption issue, from Karzai down, how are we ever
    going to get the system--and you talk about reintegrating
    people back in--the peace and reconciliation committees and the
    cash flow that goes through there. But the corruption is layer
    upon layer upon layer, generational upon generational upon
    generational.
        Give me some thoughts on how that is ever going to get
    resolved because, honestly, it seems like every dollar we send
    over there, everyone is taking a piece of it until it gets to
    the end, and there is very little then utilized for the
    Services. I will say it here, as I have said publicly, I think
    from the Karzai Government on down, he is not exempt from this.
        Give me your thoughts on how we are dealing with a corrupt
    government and a corrupt system. There is the easy question for
    the day. [Laughter.]
        General Allen. Thank you, Senator.
        It is a daunting problem, as you have indicated. But we are
    working closely with the institutions of government that are
    emerging, seeking to create patterns of conduct, systems of
    accountability, the process of responsible budgeting, the
    execution of the budget, accountability within the execution of
    the budget, in ways that can reduce these problems associated
    with corruption.
        It is an effort with which we will, if I am confirmed as
    Commander of ISAF, I will partner very closely with Ambassador
    Crocker in his efforts and his great civilian team. I will work
    very closely with Ambassador Simon Gass, who is a senior
    civilian representative of NATO, and other elements within the
    interagency to do all that we can to build capacity which holds
    people accountable, that creates systems and provides
    mechanisms for predictability and accountability within the
    government.
        But it is a problem, Senator. You have correctly identified
    that as a difficulty. Corruption, of course, is corrosive to
    any democratic process and any hope of democracy. It is our
    very strong hope that in partnership with the Afghan
    Government, we can get at this issue.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
        Again, I want to thank all of you for your willingness to
    serve and to your families that I know are the backbone to your
    service. So thank you all very much.
        General Allen. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Begich.
        Senator Graham.
        Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to compliment the President for making the
    selections of each of you. You are good choices by the
    President.
        These hearings are not so much about getting you confirmed
    as it is about allowing us to understand what we can do to help
    you and what your challenges are. I am completely okay and very
    much support the idea of civilian control of the military. I
    think that is essential. That is what has made America great
    for all these years.
        But politicians are accountable to the voters. The generals
    are accountable to their troops, to their chain of command, and
    to Congress. I just want to make sure those of us who make
    decisions in politics that affect the war, that we are
    accountable. If it turns out well, we get the credit. If we
    have done some things to undermine the effort, then people will
    notice where the blame lies. That is my view of what we are
    trying to do here in the next few months.
        Admiral McRaven, is Mullah Omar in Pakistan?
        Admiral McRaven. Sir, we believe he is.
        Senator Graham. Okay. Let us just stop for a second. We
    believe that the leader of the Taliban after the fall of the
    Russians, Mullah Omar, who invited bin Laden to come in to be
    the honored guest in Afghanistan, who empowered Osama bin Laden
    to attack the country, is still in Pakistan.
        Do we believe he is there with the knowledge of the Inter-
    Service Intelligence and the upper echelons of the army?
        Admiral McRaven. Sir, I believe that the Pakistanis know
    that he is in Pakistan. Whether or not there is a----
        Senator Graham. Let me ask you this. If they tried for
    about a week, do you think they could find him?
        Admiral McRaven. Sir, I can't answer that question. I don't
    know whether they could or not because I don't know exactly
    where Mullah Omar is.
        Senator Graham. Have we asked them to find him?
        Admiral McRaven. Sir, I believe we have.
        Senator Graham. I am asking. I think that Senator Levin and
    I both will ask together today. We are asking the Pakistan
    Government to help us find Mullah Omar, who has tried to
    destroy Afghanistan, who has formed an allegiance with al
    Qaeda.
        Along those lines, General Allen, are we certain that IEDs
    being used against American troops in Afghanistan and coalition
    forces in general are coming out of Pakistan?
        General Allen. Senator, I believe, yes, we are.
        Senator Graham. As a matter of fact, we have given the
    Pakistanis information about buildings where we can see these
    things being put together. Is that not true?
        General Allen. That is correct, sir.
        Senator Graham. Have they responded effectively?
        General Allen. They have not, sir.
        Senator Graham. Okay. I am with Chairman Levin on this.
    This has to stop.
        Now let us talk about corruption. Have you read the article
    that has come out--I know you have been busy--about the Afghan
    head of the Central Bank flees to the United States--Central
    Bank chief flees to the United States? Are you familiar with
    that at all?
        General Allen. Sir, I have read many articles at this
    juncture about that issue.
        Senator Graham. I know. I know you----
        General Allen. I don't recall that one specifically.
        Senator Graham. I would like to put this in the record, if
    I may, Mr. Chairman?
        Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Senator Graham. I am convinced. I met with the gentleman
    when I was over there, as Senator Graham, and I met with him
    extensively. He went to the floor of the Afghan parliament, and
    he started naming names about Kabul Bank, about who was
    involved in setting up this bank. The bank was used to pay
    Afghan Government bills, depositing coalition currency as well
    as Afghan currency.
        The International Monetary Fund (IMF) called it the biggest
    abuse or rip-off of a bank they have ever seen. For the IMF to
    say that, that is something because they have seen a lot.
        I want to associate myself with Senator Begich. I really do
    believe that they are trying to cover up, the Karzai Government
    and other people in Afghanistan are trying to cover up the
    extent of the fraud and manipulation in this bank.
        General Allen, I would ask you to report back to us as soon
    as you can, to the committee, about your view of the Kabul Bank
    situation and how it affects our efforts to stop corruption.
        General Allen. I will, Senator.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The level of corruption across Afghanistan's public and private
    sectors represents a threat to the success of the International
    Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission and the viability of the
    Afghan state. The issues we have seen at Kabul Bank are representative
    of the problems we face as we seek to enhance transparency and reduce
    corruption in Afghanistan. While other agencies have the lead on Kabul
    Bank, I agree that we must support the International Monetary Fund
    (IMF) as it works with Afghan authorities to address the prior actions
    they stipulated as necessary to establish a new assistance program.
    These actions include resolving the issues related to Kabul Bank as
    well as addressing broader weaknesses in the Afghan banking system.
    While the Afghan Government has taken some positive steps forward,
    additional progress on the IMF prior actions is essential to restoring
    public and international confidence in Afghan financial institutions.
        As the Kabul Bank situation highlights, we must continue to work
    with Afghan leaders to insulate critical institutions from criminal
    capture and support efforts to investigate and prosecute criminals that
    divert development and security force assistance; obstruct justice; and
    engage in or protect illicit activities that strengthen the insurgency
    and undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of the government. In
    coordination with the international community and in support of the
    Afghan Government, ISAF's Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-
    Shafafiyat leads ISAF's effort to foster a common understanding of the
    wider corruption problem, plan and implement ISAF anti-corruption
    efforts, and integrate ISAF anti-corruption activities with those of
    key partners. This is done to support the development of what President
    Karzai has called an ``active and honest administration'' in
    Afghanistan.

        Senator Graham. Thank you.
        Now let us talk about counterinsurgency. I have learned
    more about this than I ever thought I would know. As a military
    lawyer, I find the whole concept fascinating.
        Since December 2009 to now, I want, from my point of view,
    the country to know that I believe that General Petraeus and
    all under his command--Admiral McRaven, all of your forces--
    have done a fantastic job of going from defense to offense,
    that the 33,000 surge forces have been used effectively and
    that we have really put the enemy on the run in many places.
        My question, General Allen, if we withdraw the 33,000 by
    September of next year, will this still be a counterinsurgency
    operation? Does the math work out? Will there be enough people
    left behind next year to effectively do counterinsurgency?
        General Allen. I believe there will, Senator.
        Senator Graham. Okay. Now walk me through that. If we
    needed 33,000--if 70,000 wasn't enough and we had to add 33,000
    to make this a counterinsurgency mission, next summer how can
    we maintain counterinsurgency if all the surge forces have
    gone? Have we improved that much?
        General Allen. I think the surge forces, Senator, are a
    part of the overarching counterinsurgency mission.
        Senator Graham. Now, there were 40,000 requested. The
    President authorized 30,000. It has been my understanding that
    the strategy was to go into Regional Command (RC)-South, take
    the Taliban on, and next summer, 2012, reinvest some of those
    surge forces to RC-East. Have we had enough people in RC-East
    since December 2009 to have an effective counterinsurgency?
        General Allen. I believe that the RC-East forces have been
    conducting an effective counterinsurgency.
        Senator Graham. Is the counterinsurgency a mathematical
    formula?
        General Allen. To some extent.
        Senator Graham. To some extent. Would you run the math and
    report back to the committee as to whether or not RC-East has
    been adequately resourced to have an effective
    counterinsurgency program? Also report back to the committee if
    you take the 33,000 troops out, what does that do to
    counterinsurgency operations going forward? Could you provide
    us with that information?
        General Allen. I certainly will, Senator.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Although Regional Command-East is currently a supporting effort in
    the overall campaign, it is already achieving some local successes. As
    I assume command, I will examine the campaign and operational
    environment and provide any concerns to my chain of command. My early
    impression is that it is too early to determine the detailed
    implications of the drawdown on the current campaign plan, in terms of
    where geographically, we might accept more or less risk; the general
    impact is that the Afghan National Security Force will have to take an
    increasingly leading role in counterinsurgency operations. The Afghan
    National Security Force are growing in capability that will facilitate
    their security lead. At the same time, International Security
    Assistance Forces will also have to assess our way ahead to maintain or
    even increase momentum of our hard fought gains. This is an expected
    evolution as we move toward Afghan security lead and continue to use
    our resources as wisely and discriminately as possible.

        Senator Graham. Okay. Admiral McRaven, I can't thank you
    and those under your command enough for what you have been able
    to achieve, particularly with bin Laden. If you caught someone
    tomorrow in Yemen, Somalia, you name the theater, outside of
    Afghanistan, where would you detain that person?
        Admiral McRaven. Sir, right now, as you are well aware,
    that is always a difficult issue for us. When we conduct an
    operation outside the major theaters of war, Iraq or
    Afghanistan, we--and again, I will defer to my time as a JSOC
    commander--put forth a concept of operation (CONOP).
        The CONOP goes up through the military chain of command and
    is eventually vetted through the interagency, and the decision
    by the President is made for us to conduct a particular
    operation. Always as part of that CONOP are options for
    detention. No two cases seem to be alike.
        There are certain individuals that are under the
    Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), and those
    are easier to deal with than folks that may not have been under
    the AUMF. In many cases, we will put them on a naval vessel,
    and we will hold them until we can either get a case to
    prosecute them in U.S. court or----
        Senator Graham. Are we going to have a second round, Mr.
    Chairman?
        Chairman Levin. Depending on how long the first round lasts
    and when that vote starts, but I hope so.
        Senator Graham. I would like to inquire into this in a
    second round. So I don't want to intrude----
        Chairman Levin. Yes, I do hope that we will have at least a
    few minutes each.
        Senator Graham. Okay. To be continued.
        Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. You could finish your answer, however, if
    you want.
        Senator Graham. Absolutely. So we put a guy on a ship?
        Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. The bottom line, Senator, is
    there are----
        Senator Graham. How long do we keep him on the ship?
        Admiral McRaven. Sir, there are a number of different
    options, based on----
        Senator Graham. What is the longest we can keep somebody on
    the ship?
        Admiral McRaven. Sir, I think it depends on whether or not
    we think we can prosecute that individual in a U.S. court, or
    we can return him to a third-party country.
        Senator Graham. What if you can't do either one of those?
        Admiral McRaven. Sir, again, if we can't do either one of
    those, then we will release that individual. I mean, that
    becomes the unenviable option, but it is an option.
        Chairman Levin. Okay. Thank you, Senator Graham.
        Senator Hagan?
        Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I just want to say we are mighty proud of each and every
    one of you and thank you for your service and your commitment
    to our country.
        I wanted to ask a question about the U.S.-Afghanistan
    relationship. We have to ensure that Afghanistan does not
    reemerge as a safe haven for al Qaeda and transnational
    terrorism.
        Though the initial phase of the drawing down of our forces
    from Afghanistan is limited, we must ensure that the ANSF are
    capable enough to preserve the tactical gains. It is important
    that as we transition to the ANSF responsibility, that they are
    enabled with the appropriate capability, such as intelligence
    planning, logistics, and maintenance.
        General Allen and Admiral McRaven, what should an enduring
    U.S.-Afghanistan strategic partnership look like beyond 2014?
    What type of training, advising, and SOFs presence should we
    have there, if any?
        General Allen. We are in discussion with the Afghans about
    what the long-term, enduring relationship will look like. In
    the course of that discussion, we will ultimately identify the
    roles and missions and functions which conceivably the U.S.
    forces could bring to this enduring relationship.
        I think while much remains to be discussed, it is not
    beyond the realm of possibility that some advisory capacity
    will be required, some enabling capacity will be required for
    ANSF operations. Some intelligence capacity would be required,
    both to build the intelligence capabilities of the Afghan
    forces, and then some counterterrorism capabilities to address
    any reemergence or any potential terrorist hotspot that could
    conceivably emerge in Afghanistan in the period beyond 2014.
        But much of this discussion remains to be had. We are
    nowhere near talking numbers yet or specific units. But in very
    general terms, based on the discussions that we had in Iraq,
    for example, those kinds of broad roles and functions could
    conceivably be discussed over the long term.
        Admiral McRaven. Yes, ma'am, and I would agree with General
    Allen's comments.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you.
        A few weeks ago I met with General Barbero, the Director of
    the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to discuss the
    interagency effort to interdict the flow of the IED caches. I
    want to do everything possible to improve the detection rates
    and stem the flow of ammonium nitrate from Pakistan coming into
    Afghanistan, and I think we need to put serious pressure on the
    Pakistani network distribution of ammonium nitrate.
        We know who the key facilitators are in Pakistan. They are
    pushing these caches of IEDs made with the ammonium nitrate
    across the Afghan border, which ultimately is killing or
    injuring our troops. General Allen, how do you plan to
    incentivize the Pakistanis to control the distribution of this
    ammonium nitrate, particularly given the fact that the
    Pakistani military and the civilian population, they, too, have
    suffered from these IED attacks at the hands of the Pakistani
    internally focused militants?
        General Allen. The Pakistanis have recently, I think to
    their credit, issued a counter IED strategy. We will continue
    to work with them to build their capacities to do that
    themselves with respect to protecting themselves from IEDs.
        But I think that at multiple levels within our government,
    we have to make very clear to the Pakistani national
    leadership, to the military leadership that the continued
    production of ammonium nitrate, for the purposes of this
    discussion--the fact that it is unregulated, the fact that it
    gets into the hands of those who would move it across the
    border, we have to make it very clear to the Pakistanis. I know
    we are doing that.
        I personally said this to the secretary of defense of
    Pakistan, we need their help in that regard. They have to
    control this. They have to do what they need to, to regulate
    the production and the sale so that it goes into the hands of
    legitimate businessmen.
        On the other hand, on the other side of the border, we will
    continue to posture our forces to both detect, as best we can,
    to detect the infiltration of those caches of ammonium nitrate
    that come across. As we can, we will interdict them, and we
    have had some pretty big interdictions this year. But it is
    only a part of the flow that is coming across.
        It has to be a joint effort. It has to be an effort with
    the U.S. and Afghanistan on one side of the border and the
    United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan on the other side of
    the border. I believe at many different levels of the
    government, we have expressed our great desire that the
    Pakistanis sign up to this and stand up to the process of
    controlling and regulating ammonium nitrate and its flow and
    the hands into which it goes. If confirmed as the Commander of
    ISAF, I will continue to add emphasis to that.
        Senator Hagan. You said the Pakistanis are now putting
    forward their counter IED plans. Do you know what those are?
        General Allen. We will get back to you on that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The improvised explosive device (IED) is as great a threat to
    Pakistan as it is to Afghanistan. According to Joint Improvised
    Explosive Device Defeat Organization, since January, there have been
    684 IED events in Pakistan. Of those, 30 percent targeted Pakistan's
    security forces, 10 percent targeted schools, 12 percent targeted
    civilians, and 16 percent targeted infrastructure.
        On June 17, 2011, the Interior Division of the Government of
    Pakistan issued their National Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-
    IED) Strategy through the General Civil Defense Directorate. This
    strategy focuses on national level stakeholders countering IED threats
    through effective interagency coordination. Some of their priorities
    and goals are as follows:

             Improve border control measures with special attention
            on smuggling of improvised explosive devices, accessories,
            ammonium nitrate, and other improvised explosive device
            precursors;
             Adopt legislation for Pakistan's Anti-Terrorism Act;
             Create a National Counterterrorism Authority that
            provides specific requests for technical assistance from the
            National Counterterrorism Center;
             Implement an aggressive public improvised explosive
            device awareness campaign;
             Establish a C-IED cell within the office of the
            Director General, Civil Defense;
             Engage international communities to help Pakistan
            build and develop their own C-IED capabilities by equipping the
            Armed Forces and police and providing focused training on the
            interdiction of improvised explosive device precursors; and
             Establish a Level II National Improvised Explosive
            Device Exploitation Facility (NIEF), principally funded and
            supported by the United States, to attack the network by
            exploiting IED evidence primarily for prosecution purposes. The
            NIEF in Islamabad remains a long delayed aspiration.

        Senator Hagan. Also, do you have a timeframe at all on what
    the Pakistanis might be doing as far as controlling the
    businesses producing this?
        General Allen. I do not.
        Senator Hagan. Okay. Thank you.
        In your answers to the committee's advance policy
    questions, Admiral McRaven, you mentioned the importance of the
    female cultural support teams to engage with elements of
    certain populations, presumably the women and children, which
    have previously been difficult to reach during
    counterinsurgency operations.
        Can you describe the importance of these teams to
    counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, how they are being
    integrated into SOFs, and any changes to policy or law that you
    might suggest that would make these teams more effective?
        Admiral McRaven. Yes, ma'am. They have been wildly
    effective in terms of supporting our efforts in Afghanistan.
    Right now, when a special operations mission goes out, we
    normally take four females as part of the female engagement
    team with us. As you point out, their role in that particular
    mission is after we have secured an objective. I will speak
    first from the direct action side, and then I will talk a
    little bit about the special forces side, if you will.
        But from the direct action side, after we have secured an
    objective, part of the role of our female engagement teams is
    to talk to the Afghan females on target, to make sure, one,
    that there is nobody else left inside the compound, that
    everybody is safe and secure, that we reassure the females and
    the children that they are going to be safe. Many times we will
    do tactical questioning of the females with a U.S. female
    soldier. Again, that has been wildly effective for us.
        The special forces, the broader special forces teams that
    are part of developing the Afghan Local Police and the NATO
    forces that are supporting the provincial reconnaissance
    companies are also using some variation of the female
    engagement team to a great effect as well. They are essentially
    fully integrated, if you will, into the operational units.
        They go through an extensive training period for the SOF
    female engagement teams back at Fort Bragg, under the auspices
    of the U.S. Army's SOCOM. The Marine Corps SOF also has a
    female engagement team training program.
        Once they have gone through their basic training program,
    they will come forward. There is some additional training that
    goes on forward with the unit that they are assigned to. Then,
    once they have achieved the standard we are looking for, then
    we will put them forward into the field.
        Right now, all the policies and authorities are in place
    for us to do that. Again, it is probably several years late in
    coming. We probably would have been much better off had we
    developed these female engagement teams early on in the fight.
    But as we look at them now, they are a key component to our
    success in the special operations battlefield, if you will, in
    Afghanistan.
        Senator Hagan. Do you know how many of these female teams
    that you have?
        Admiral McRaven. I know from a JSOC standpoint. I am not
    sure what the broader Army has. Right now, we have 12 teams,
    growing to 16.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you.
        Admiral McRaven. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Hagan. My time is out.
        General Thurman, I did want to just say you have done a
    great job as the commander of U.S. Army forces command in Fort
    Bragg. I welcome you, and I look forward to your confirmation.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
        Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to join in expressing my thanks and admiration for
    your great service to the country, the extraordinary sacrifice
    and service of the men and women who serve under you, and, of
    course, your families, and look forward to your confirmation
    and voting for it.
        I want to pursue the line of questioning that Senator Hagan
    began. On the assumption that the Pakistanis are not
    cooperative, because they have not proven cooperative in the
    past, what additional measures can we take to destroy the
    sources of the calcium ammonium nitrate that has proved so
    absolutely and horrifically destructive to the men and women
    who serve our Armed Forces in Afghanistan?
        General Allen, I would like, respectfully, to ask you to
    begin. Then, Admiral McRaven, if you could follow with perhaps
    some perspective on what can be done through special
    operations?
        General Allen. Senator, that is an important question. The
    posturing of our intelligence-gathering apparatus, our
    capabilities, our ISR capabilities, the posturing, potentially,
    of our special operators on the western side of the border to
    detect the infiltration of these capabilities, to detect the
    infiltration of the ammonium nitrate, they come generally along
    relatively well-known routes of infiltration, to posture
    ourselves in a way where we can detect and interdict that
    material as much as we possibly can.
        As I said with Senator Hagan, we have had some large
    interdictions this year. It is because there have been explicit
    plans, explicit efforts being put forward and being pursued to
    do just that. Should I be confirmed and become the Commander of
    ISAF, it is my intention to redouble that effort in every
    possible way we can to interdict and stop that flow as it gets
    to the border.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        Admiral McRaven?
        Admiral McRaven. Sir, to continue on from General Allen's
    discussion, from a special operations standpoint, we actually
    target the networks, vice the product itself.
        Now, when we have the nexus of the product obviously in the
    network and the individuals in the network, then we get a two-
    fer. But for the most part, what we are trying to do is shut
    down the leadership, both the senior leadership and the mid-
    level leadership and, to some degree, the foot soldiers that
    are moving this home made explosives (HME) from areas like
    Chaman across the border and into southern Afghanistan.
        What we found is where we have focused our effort against
    some of the HME networks, the Taliban networks down south, we
    have been very effective at disrupting the HME. The additional
    piece of this, and probably better to discuss in a more
    classified form, is there some technology out there that is
    allowing us to detect HME before the critical components are
    put together and turned into a homemade explosive.
        I think we need to continue to pursue that technology
    because it has been reasonably effective early in the testing
    of it, to be able to determine where some of this HME is. Then
    we are subsequently going after those compounds where we see
    it.
        Senator Blumenthal. I thank you both for those answers. I
    would like to pursue the offer to learn more about that
    technology in a different setting, if I may? General Allen,
    also from you, whatever additional information you or your
    staff can provide.
        I am planning to be in Afghanistan and Pakistan toward the
    end of August on a trip that is designed specifically to focus
    on this issue, and I would like to be helpful and supportive
    through the committee and through the authorization-
    appropriation process--I know the entire committee will share
    that view--in developing not only the technology, but whatever
    resources are necessary to pursue the calcium ammonium nitrate
    that is brought into Afghanistan.
        I want to focus on the impacts of the explosive devices
    that are manufactured with those substances. Particularly,
    General Allen, I understand there are now 34 active
    telemedicine portals in operation in Afghanistan. That number
    will be expanded, I think, by an additional 42 planned focusing
    on the impacts of the IEDs and other explosive devices,
    particularly when it comes to traumatic brain injury and post-
    traumatic stress.
        General Allen. That is correct.
        Senator Blumenthal. I wonder if you could discuss not only
    the use of those resources but others to diagnose and treat the
    post-traumatic stress and traumatic brain injuries (TBI) that,
    in many respects, are among the signature wounds of this war?
        General Allen. Senator, that is a very important question
    from the standpoint of the health of the force in the long
    term. As we discussed yesterday, we have come a very long way
    with respect to our reaction to the effects of blast on our
    troops.
        As I indicated, the nature of the immediate action that
    occurs in the aftermath of an attack has given us the ability
    to not just detect the results of the attack but to take those
    actions, those medical actions necessary in the immediate
    aftermath of the attack so that we can provide the opportunity
    for rest and medical care for those who have been caught in the
    blast effects.
        That process has evolved dramatically, to the extent that
    today some 95 percent of those who are immediately diagnosed
    can be returned to their units. But there is some number,
    because of the immediacy of the care, that we are able to
    determine right away that can go quickly to follow-on care. I
    think that process, as I said, has evolved pretty dramatically
    in recent time.
        Of course, that follows on to the post-traumatic stress
    disorder (PTSD) that you have mentioned, Senator. What I would
    like to do is to give you a definitive lay-down both of how the
    detection for TBI is administered immediately on the spot and
    how it flows ultimately into the PTSD, so that you have one
    comprehensive answer.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        My time has expired. I want to thank both of you for the
    very informative, candid, and forthright testimony that you
    have given today. It has been very helpful.
        I would like to pursue the additional information that you
    both have mentioned. Thank you very much.
        General Allen. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Let us try a 3-minute second round, see if
    we can all get 3 minutes of questions in.
        Let me first ask you, General Allen, you were asked about
    the question of deadlines and as to whether you were aware of
    any deadlines that had been previously set that were supported
    by military commanders, I believe. In Iraq, back in November
    2008, President Bush, as I remember, agreed to two deadlines
    for U.S. forces, one, a June 2009 deadline for the withdrawal
    of U.S. combat forces from Iraqi cities and, second, a December
    31, 2011, deadline for the withdrawal of all U.S. military
    forces from Iraq. Is that accurate?
        General Allen. Mr. Chairman, I will have to check those
    dates, but thank you for that elaboration.
        Chairman Levin. But do you remember those two deadlines
    being set?
        General Allen. I do remember them.
        Chairman Levin. Did they have the support of the military
    at that time, do you remember?
        General Allen. They did, actually. I remember the
    withdrawal from the cities that worked quite well, actually.
        Chairman Levin. All right.
        Second, relative to Korea, General Thurman, you indicated,
    I believe, that you would be willing to look into the plans
    that we have going on for a transformation underway in South
    Korea. There are three major initiatives going on involving our
    military, including a Yongsan Relocation Plan, a Land
    Partnership Plan, and a tour normalization plan. The costs of
    those, I believe, are something like $10 billion, significantly
    more than they were originally thought to be. That is just our
    share of the cost.
        Can you, when you get there, take a look at the current
    plans to bring 8,000 more families to South Korea? There is a
    real question about the rationale. Why are we bringing more
    families to South Korea if it is a more dangerous place and
    continues to be a very dangerous place? There is also a very
    large question about the costs of that normalization, much
    greater than originally contemplated.
        But would you take a look at the current plans and their
    rationale and their costs when you get there and get the full
    report to this committee? Because we have now basically put a
    hold on those plans until we can really make an assessment.
        General Thurman. Mr. Chairman, yes, sir, I will. Based on
    our discussion yesterday, I fully expect to make that the
    number-one priority if I am confirmed, once I get on the ground
    over there.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Mr. Chairman, I am fully aware of the concerns raised by you and
    other members of this committee regarding the Command's tour
    normalization initiative as well as the efforts to consolidate forces
    onto two enduring hubs. My top priority remains the review of these
    programs in order to address the concerns that have been raised.

        Chairman Levin. All right. Thank you.
        Also, do you have any thoughts about the balance, the
    decisionmaking process as to, if there is another aggression,
    which I think is likely, from North Korea, what the proper
    response is to that aggression, as to what that decisionmaking
    process is, as to the adequacy of the response, but also as to
    the proportionality of the response? Is that a joint decision
    by us and South Korea?
        General Thurman. Mr. Chairman, that is a very good
    question. First off, South Korea is a sovereign country, and I
    believe it is well within their rights to protect themselves if
    there is a provocation. Obviously, that has to be balanced.
        I do know that General Sharp has been working very close
    with the ROK chairman of their joint forces on counter-
    provocation and looking at the responses in a joint fashion.
    But I do expect, if confirmed, I will look into that and make
    sure that we are doing the right things, because I think a
    provocation can occur any time.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Finally, Admiral, on the question of your detention of
    people, you made reference to a couple, I think, that are on a
    ship, something like that. Is there any legal prohibition
    against them being tried before an Article 3 court or before a
    military commission?
        Admiral McRaven. Sir, again, it depends on the individual
    case, and I would be more than happy to discuss the cases that
    we have dealt with.
        Chairman Levin. Well, no, not specific cases so much as is
    there any legal prohibition, assuming it is planned to having
    those people tried either before an Article 3 court, if they
    have committed a crime against the United States, or if they
    have committed a crime of war, by being tried by a U.S.
    military commission?
        Admiral McRaven. Sir, not to my knowledge, there is no
    prohibition.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I wanted to follow up, General Allen, on the question of
    detention. If we were to, for example, capture someone like
    Ayman al-Zawahiri in Yemen, for example, outside of
    Afghanistan, could we detain him in Afghanistan at the
    detention facilities there?
        General Allen. We would not recommend that.
        Senator Ayotte. Why is that?
        General Allen. Because Afghanistan is a sovereign country.
        Senator Ayotte. So we are not going to use the detention
    facilities, for example, in Afghanistan to detain terrorists
    who are captured outside the territory of Afghanistan?
        General Allen. It is not our intention.
        Senator Ayotte. Following up, Admiral, with respect to
    detention, if we, for example, were to capture al-Zawahiri, and
    capture him and not kill him but hold him for purposes of
    gathering intelligence and detaining him long term because we
    felt we needed to under the law of war, where would we hold
    him?
        Admiral McRaven. Yes, ma'am. I think that is a policy
    question that I am really not in a position to answer. From a
    practical military standpoint, obviously, we can hold Zawahiri
    or Anwar al-Awlaki or anybody else in a number of places, from
    a practical standpoint.
        It becomes a policy issue and a sovereignty issue for
    various countries. As General Allen said, we have looked a
    number of times at whether or not we would do that in
    Afghanistan, but owing to the nature of the sovereignty of
    Afghanistan and the concern about the potential backlash from
    the Afghan Government, we have recommended not to do that.
        Senator Ayotte. Admiral, would it not be helpful, 10 years
    into the war on terror, to have a long-term detention and
    interrogation facility that would be secure for individuals
    where we need to gather further intelligence?
        Admiral McRaven. Ma'am, I believe it would be very helpful.
        Senator Ayotte. As far as you understand it, is Guantanamo
    Bay still off the table in terms of being used for that type of
    facility?
        Admiral McRaven. As far as I understand it, it is. Yes,
    ma'am.
        Senator Ayotte. Okay. Thank you very much.
        I wanted to also ask, General Allen, as the Deputy
    Commander of CENTCOM, could you tell me if any ISR assets have
    been pulled from Iraq and Afghanistan or Yemen or the general
    CENTCOM area of operations in order to support operations in
    Libya?
        General Allen. While I was still serving at CENTCOM, yes,
    there were.
        Senator Ayotte. Could you describe generally what those
    assets were taken away and whether that has taken any
    capabilities away from us, ISR capabilities in Afghanistan?
        General Allen. Not in Afghanistan, ma'am. I will get back
    to you on that question.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        There were no U.S. intelligence, surveillance, or reconnaissance
    assets taken from Afghanistan to support operations in Libya. One
    Predator unmanned aerial vehicle scheduled to flow to Afghanistan was
    redirected to support Libya operations. In addition, the United Kingdom
    remissioned an ASTOR reconnaissance aircraft (Ground Moving Target
    Indicator collection) from Afghanistan to support Libya operations.
    These adjustments were planned for and thus had no significant impact
    to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities in
    Afghanistan.

        Senator Ayotte. I would appreciate an answer on that. Thank
    you very much for that.
        I do have an additional question for you, General Thurman,
    and I will submit that for the record.
        I want to thank all three of you for your distinguished
    service and your willingness to continue to serve our country.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
        Senator Graham.
        Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral McRaven, if night raids were stopped, ordered to be
    stopped by the Afghan Government, how would that affect our
    ability to be successful?
        Admiral McRaven. Sir, I think stopping night raids would
    certainly be detrimental to the special operations aspect of
    the fight in Afghanistan.
        Just to give you some statistics, sir, over the course of
    the last 12 months, the task force that I commanded over there,
    we conducted approximately 2,000 operations. Of those 2,000
    operations, somewhere in the neighborhood of 88 percent of them
    were, in fact, conducted at night. I think what is lost on a
    lot of folks is that approximately 84 to 86 percent of those
    missions, we never fired a shot.
        Senator Graham. Admiral, I think it is fair to say that 78
    percent of the people we are detaining come from those special
    operations missions.
        Admiral McRaven. They do, sir.
        Senator Graham. Now, General Allen, if the Afghan
    Government insisted that the 2,400 people we are detaining at
    Parwan Prison under the law of war be transferred to Afghan
    control by January 2012, would you have concerns about that
    decision?
        General Allen. I would, sir.
        Senator Graham. Would it affect our ability to be
    successful?
        General Allen. I think it would.
        Senator Graham. All right. Now let us talk about
    counterinsurgency. The option that the country has chosen
    through President Obama is to withdraw 10,000 this year, all
    surge forces gone by September.
        Is it fair to say, General Allen, that was not one of the
    options presented to the President by General Petraeus?
        General Allen. It is a more aggressive option than that
    which was presented.
        Senator Graham. My question is, was that an option?
        General Allen. It was not.
        Senator Graham. I just want the country to understand that
    this is not the Petraeus strategy any longer. The Commander in
    Chief has the perfect right to do what he did. I just hope that
    it hasn't undercut what I think could be a very successful
    outcome.
        Now, perception is reality. Do you agree, General Allen,
    that when the President announced at West Point that we would
    be withdrawing in July 2011, that created a problem in
    Afghanistan because it was seen by some as that America is
    leaving?
        General Allen. I believe there are those who could have----
        Senator Graham. Were letters sent to people by the Taliban
    saying, ``America is leaving in July, you better watch what you
    do,'' something to that effect?
        General Allen. The Taliban have, in fact, communicated----
        Senator Graham. Would you agree that the Lisbon statement
    that we are going to transition in 2014 was very helpful?
        General Allen. It was.
        Senator Graham. Okay. My question is, now that we have
    changed the strategy and the withdrawal timeline, have we sent
    the signal yet again of uncertainty? Seems to be the Taliban
    commanders have renewed optimism, and it seems to be some of
    our allies are going to Iran and other places.
        My question is, do you believe that this more aggressive
    withdrawal policy by the President has sent a signal of
    uncertainty, or do you know?
        General Allen. I think it is too early to tell, Senator.
        Senator Graham. Great answer. I know you are going to try
    your best. We are all pulling for you. Let us know what we can
    do to help you. God bless you all.
        General Allen. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Your own position, though, you do support
    that decision of the President. Is that correct?
        General Allen. I do, Senator.
        Chairman Levin. I think it is important that even though
    this apparently was more aggressive than General Petraeus
    recommended, that military leaders of our country support this
    decision and feel it was an appropriate decision for the
    President to make. Is that correct?
        General Allen. Mr. Chairman, we are in execution now.
        Chairman Levin. But you also felt it was a proper decision
    for the President to make?
        General Allen. It is the prerogative of the President to
    take the recommendations of his commanders and to make the
    decision. He made that decision, and we are executing it.
        Chairman Levin. All right. Is it something you agree with?
        General Allen. I agree.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        We want to thank all of you. I think we have probably run
    just exactly to noon, where we thought we would end.
        Your families are sitting behind you, some of them
    shivering. They are not just figuratively behind you, but they
    are literally behind you. The air conditioning here is robust,
    just the way you and your men and women who serve with you act
    robustly.
        Your challenges are tremendous. You are all up to them.
    With the support of your families, you will succeed in meeting
    those challenges. This committee is very grateful for the work
    that you do and the men and women with whom you serve. I can't
    say that enough. I am sure it sounds to some people listening
    to our hearings it is a bit repetitious, but from our
    perspective, we cannot repeat it enough. We do that with a
    purpose, so that our troops understand exactly how much they
    mean to us and to the American people.
        Thank you again, and we will stand adjourned. We will hope
    to get these confirmations done this week. That is also a
    challenging, aggressive schedule, but we are up to it, just the
    way you are up to it.
        Thank you.
        [Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

        [Prepared questions submitted to GEN James D. Thurman, USA,
    by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
    follow:]

                            Questions and Responses

                                DEFENSE REFORMS

        Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
    Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
    strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
    enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly
    delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities
    and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These
    reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and
    the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and
    education and in the execution of military operations.
        Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
    provisions?
        Answer. No. If confirmed, I will continue to be alert to the need
    for any modifications.
        Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
    address in these modifications?
        Answer. Not applicable.

                           DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS

        Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
    the Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command (CFC)/
    U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and what is your understanding of how these
    different command responsibilities interrelate?
        Answer. The Commander, United Nations Command (CDR UNC), serves as
    commander of an international command and is responsible for
    maintaining the Armistice Agreement on the Korean Peninsula. The CDR
    UNC acts in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions
    and directives. The CDR UNC also acts in accordance with directives
    from the U.S. Government that are transmitted by the Secretary of
    Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, keeping the
    Commander of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) informed. The CDR UNC is
    responsible for the strategic direction, guidance, operational control
    of forces, conduct of combat operations, and acceptance and integration
    of United Nations Command (UNC) member nations' forces during
    contingencies. This includes enabling access to the seven UNC bases in
    Japan.
        The Commander, CFC, as commander of a bi-national command, supports
    Armistice Agreement compliance, deters hostile acts of external
    aggression directed against the Republic of Korea, and, should
    deterrence fail, defeats an external armed attack. In this position,
    the Commander, CFC, is responsible for receiving strategic direction
    and missions from the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) Military Committee,
    which acts as the strategic coordinating interface for ROK and U.S.
    national authorities. The missions and functions for the Commander,
    CFC, are prescribed in the Terms of Reference for the Military
    Committee and in the U.S.-ROK ``Military Committee Strategic Directive
    Number 2''.
        The Commander, USFK, as a subunified Commander of PACOM, is
    responsible for all duties and functions associated with title 10,
    U.S.C., the Unified Command Plan, and CJCSI 5130. This role provides
    the United States with the means to provide forces to CDR UNC/CFC as
    required, and to support these forces with the required logistics,
    administration, and policy initiatives necessary to maintain readiness.
        These three commands are, in a sense, mutually supporting of each
    other's missions. The CFC and USFK can both provide support to the
    Armistice functions of the UNC. Similarly, both USFK and UNC can
    provide support to CFC for the latter's deterrence and defense
    missions. International support to the CFC is coordinated through the
    UNC. The close consultative partnership with our ROK allies and the
    member nations of UNC ensure that these commands are leveraged in a
    complementary fashion in order to support the national interests of
    both nations.
        Question. What background and experience, including joint duty
    assignments, do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform
    these duties?
        Answer. If confirmed, my first priority as the UNC/CFC/USFK
    Commander must be to maintain trained, ready, and disciplined joint and
    combined commands that are prepared to fight and win. My extensive
    operational combat and joint duty experience positions me well to
    perform this key task. As a battalion executive officer during Desert
    Shield/Desert Storm, the Chief of Plans and Policy for Allied Forces
    Southern Europe in Kosovo (1999-2000), the Chief of Operations for
    Coalition Forces Land Component Command during the invasion of Iraq
    (2002-2003), and the Multi-National Division Commander responsible for
    all coalition operations in Baghdad, Iraq (2006), I have obtained the
    operational experience and skills that are needed by a UNC/CFC/USFK
    Commander who must lead forces that are ready to ``fight tonight'' on
    the Korean Peninsula. If confirmed, my operational experience in a
    combined/coalition environment would be of great benefit in a future
    role as the Commander of multinational UNC and the bi-national U.S.-ROK
    CFC. In the case of CFC, the ability to work effectively with a partner
    nation is particularly important as significant change will occur under
    the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan. Experience gained from operating and
    leading in multiple combined/coalition environments prepares me well
    for applying the lessons learned toward further strengthening of the
    U.S.-ROK Alliance. Most recently, my assignment as the Commander of
    U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) has prepared me for leading large
    and complex organizations--FORSCOM is the Army's largest organization--
    an experience that will serve me well when dealing with the
    complexities of UNC, CFC, and USFK. Additionally, by currently having
    the responsibility of overseeing, manning, training, and equipping
    237,000 Active component soldiers, and training and readiness oversight
    of 560,000 soldiers in the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve, I
    am well positioned to apply this experience toward maintaining joint
    and combined commands on the Korean Peninsula that are prepared to
    fight and win.
        Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
    take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander,
    UNC/CFC/USFK?
        Answer. If confirmed, I plan on conducting in-depth discussions and
    exchange with personnel of the U.S. and ROK Governments,
    nongovernmental organizations, educational and research institutions,
    and civil society at large in order to enhance the expertise needed to
    command UNC, CFC, and USFK. I will continue this dialogue and exchange
    throughout my time in command so that my knowledge and understanding of
    affairs in the ROK continues to increase and mature.

                                 RELATIONSHIPS

        Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
    chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
    and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant
    commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however,
    establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please
    describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, UNC/
    CFC/USFK with the following officials:
        The Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) is composed of the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint
    Staff, the Office of the Inspector General of DOD, the combatant
    commands, the military departments, the defense agencies, DOD Field
    Activities, and such other offices, agencies, activities,
    organizations, and commands established or designated by law, or by the
    President or by the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with sections
    111, 113, and 192 of title 10, U.S.C. The functions of the heads of
    these offices are assigned by the Secretary of Defense in accordance
    with existing law. The CDR UNC reports to the Secretary of Defense
    through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and through the Secretary
    of Defense to the President, while at the same time keeping the
    Commander, PACOM, informed of any communications with U.S. national
    authorities. A validated binational U.S.-ROK document provides further
    guidance on CDR CFC's unique relationship with the ROK National Command
    and Military Authorities and the U.S. Secretary of Defense.
        Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the
    authorities contained in title 10, U.S.C., and except as expressly
    prohibited by law or order of the President or Secretary of Defense,
    has full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense and to
    exercise the powers of the Secretary of Defense upon any and all
    matters concerning which the Secretary of Defense is authorized to act
    pursuant to law.
        Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
        Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is the Principal
    Staff Assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of
    Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and
    defense policy, and the integration and oversight of DOD policy and
    plans to achieve national security objectives.
        Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
        Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is the
    Principal Staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy
    Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence, counterintelligence,
    security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters.
        Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal
    military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, the
    Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. CDR UNC
    communicates through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the
    Secretary of Defense.
        Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
        Answer. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the
    Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments are
    responsible for, and have the authority necessary to conduct, all
    affairs of their respective Departments, including: recruiting;
    organizing; supplying; equipping to include research and development;
    training; servicing; mobilizing; demobilizing; administering to include
    the morale and welfare of personnel; maintaining; construction,
    outfitting, and repairs of military equipment; and the construction,
    maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities as well
    as the acquisition, management, and disposal of real property and
    natural resources.
        Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
        Answer. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services are responsible for the
    organization, training, and equipping of the Services under title 10,
    U.S.C. Their support is critical to meet readiness needs. The Service
    Chiefs of Staff also provide military advice to the President, the
    National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, the Secretary
    of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as members of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        Question. Commander, U.S. Pacific Command.
        Answer. The Commander, USFK, as commander of a subunified command
    of PACOM, reports directly to Commander, PACOM, on matters directly
    pertaining to USFK areas of responsibility. Commander, UNC and
    Commander, CFC, keep the Commander, PACOM, informed of any
    communications with U.S. national authorities.
        Question. Other Combatant Commanders.
        Answer. The commanders of the combatant commands are responsible to
    the President and the Secretary of Defense for accomplishing the
    military missions assigned to them and shall exercise command authority
    over assigned forces as directed by the Secretary of Defense. The
    operational chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary
    of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. The Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff functions within the chain of command by
    transmitting to the commanders of the combatant commands the orders of
    the President or the Secretary of Defense.

                         MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

        Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
    confront the next Commander, UNC/CFC/USFK?
        Answer. Based on my initial study of the security situation on the
    Korean Peninsula and vital U.S. national interests in Northeast Asia,
    there are four major and enduring challenges that confront any UNC/CFC/
    USFK Commander.
        First is the requirement to deter war, defend against provocation
    and attack, and maintain the Armistice. As shown by events in 2010,
    North Korea continues to commit provocations that have become
    increasingly escalatory and dangerous. A significant challenge is to
    understand the regime of Kim Jong-il and attempt to determine its
    intent. The Alliance must take the necessary actions to deter attack,
    break the cycle of North Korean provocation, and remain ready to defend
    if deterrence fails.
        Second, the command must continue readiness preparations to fight
    and win a war with North Korea and at the same time prepare to deal
    with the complexity of a regime collapse and the attendant
    consequences.
        Third, the UNC/CFC/USFK Commander must sustain the strategic U.S.-
    ROK Alliance and ensure that the military component of the Alliance
    continues to be strong as it has been historically and serves the
    interests of our two countries.
        Finally, we must continue to transform the Alliance in the best way
    to achieve national security objectives on the Korean Peninsula. This
    should be done within the dynamic changes occurring in the region and
    the fiscal constraints imposed by the global economic situation.
        Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
    addressing these challenges and problems?
        Answer. If confirmed, to address these enduring challenges I will
    focus on the readiness of U.S. and ROK forces to be able to ``fight
    tonight.'' This includes placing strong emphasis on joint and combined
    warfighting fundamentals, readiness and sustainment at best value,
    interoperability of forces, and counter-provocation. Planning and
    preparing for the complex challenges of war and collapse provides the
    foundation for deterrence, defense, and maintaining the armistice. If
    deterrence fails the Alliance will win the war; if regime collapse
    occurs we will deal with the myriad potential scenarios of regime
    collapse.
        If confirmed, I will work to sustain and strengthen the Alliance,
    building on the great work both our militaries and our governments have
    done over the years and focus on sustaining mutual trust and
    interoperability of forces through a robust joint and combined training
    program.
        Finally, if confirmed, I will work toward transforming the military
    component of the Alliance in accordance with the interests of the
    United States and ROK and our fiscal constraints.

                                  NORTH KOREA

        Question. North Korea represents one of the greatest near-term
    threats to regional security and stability. The seriousness of the
    threat is seen by North Korea's continued pursuit of a nuclear
    capability and ballistic missile program, and particularly, over the
    past year, by North Korea's unprovoked and deadly attacks against South
    Korea--specifically the attack on the ROK navy ship Cheonan in March
    2010 and the artillery attack on South Korea's Yeonpyeong Island in
    November 2010.
        What is your assessment of the current security situation on the
    Korean peninsula?
        Answer. I believe North Korea remains the primary threat to
    security in Northeast Asia. Over the past few years, the security
    situation on the peninsula has reached high levels of tension following
    the attack on the Cheonan and the artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong
    Island. North Korea has hindered the progress of Six-Party
    denuclearization talks; adopted a policy of provocative actions in an
    attempt to secure concessions; continues its nuclear program, which
    includes pursuit of Highly Enriched Uranium; and continues to
    proliferate dangerous technologies. Although its conventional force
    threat continues to decline, it has compensated by investing in
    asymmetric capabilities, such as ballistic missiles and Special
    Operations Forces. However, Kim Jong-il carefully weighs the cost and
    benefit of military action and avoids actions that could escalate to
    war. Our primary concern is the potential for additional North Korean
    provocations, which is a tool of choice as part of its coercive
    diplomatic strategy designed to safeguard the regime, maintain internal
    control, and extort foreign aid.
        North Korea is also in the process of a succession of power from
    Kim Jong-il to his son, Kim Jong-un, adding another dynamic to
    deterrence. Although little is known of Kim Jong-un, there is no
    evidence to suggest his decisionmaking calculus will differ
    significantly from his father's or that his strategic priorities will
    change. However, Kim Jong-un's youth and inexperience increase the
    likelihood of miscalculation, as does the imperative for him to
    establish credibility with the military hardliners he needs to support
    succession. These factors make him less predictable in the near-term.
        I believe the U.S.-ROK Alliance is strong and ready to address
    these and other security challenges on the Korean Peninsula.
        Question. What is your understanding of how the attacks on the
    Cheonan and on Yeonpyeong Island changed the ROK and U.S. security
    posture on the Peninsula?
        Answer. In response to these two attacks by North Korea, the United
    States and ROK engaged in a series of combined military exercises
    designed to send Pyongyang the clear message that its irresponsible and
    belligerent behavior must stop and that both the United States and ROK
    remain committed to enhancing their combined defense capabilities. The
    first exercise held in this series was a combined maritime and air
    readiness event called Invincible Spirit. This exercise included
    extensive training in the areas of anti-submarine warfare, battle group
    air defense, surface warfare training, including live fire exercises,
    and a robust complement of aircraft that flew a variety of missions.
        Invincible Spirit was followed by the Ulchi Freedom Guardian
    exercise. This annual exercise, like all other training events
    conducted by the CFC, was designed to improve the U.S.-ROK Alliance's
    ability to preserve the Armistice. The exercise was focused on ensuring
    readiness to prepare for, prevent, and prevail against a full range of
    provocations that could occur on the Korean peninsula now and in the
    future. Following Ulchi Freedom Guardian, the United States and ROK
    conducted a combined anti-submarine warfare exercise. Focused on anti-
    submarine warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures, the exercise was
    conducted in the waters west of the Korean Peninsula. This anti-
    submarine warfare exercise was followed by a U.S.-ROK naval and air
    training event that provided training in the areas of fleet protection,
    alerts/intercepts and defensive counter air/combat air patrols, air
    defense, surface warfare readiness, basic seamanship maneuvers,
    logistics sustainment, and communications.
        When viewed in their totality, the set of combined exercises
    conducted since North Korea's attacks in 2010 have enhanced U.S. and
    ROK combined defense capabilities and readiness, improved force
    interoperability, and demonstrated U.S. commitment to regional
    security.
        Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed to South
    Korea, Japan, and the United States by North Korea's ballistic missile
    and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities?
        Answer. North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear programs pose a
    direct threat to security in Northeast Asia. The Kim Regime continues
    to use these two programs to shape conditions to gain leverage during
    negotiations, to extract concessions, and ensure regime survival.
        With an inventory of more than 800 ballistic missiles, North Korea
    continues to build short and medium range missiles of increasing range,
    lethality, and accuracy, while enhancing the survivability of its
    missile forces. With its continued research and development of an
    Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, and possible fielding of an
    intermediate range missile, North Korea grows closer to threatening the
    western United States and striking Okinawa, Guam, and Alaska. This
    missile development program presents a threat which cannot be ignored.
        North Korea demonstrated the ability to produce a nuclear weapon
    with its second nuclear test on 9 October 2006 at Punggye. The
    intelligence community assesses that North Korea has enough material
    for at least six plutonium-based weapons. Additionally, there are
    indications that North Korea has pursued a highly enriched uranium
    program in the past, and it is likely the effort continues today. In
    November 2010 North Korea displayed a uranium enrichment facility at
    Yongbyon to foreign visitors. The facility's purpose, ostensibly, is to
    produce fuel for a light water reactor currently under construction at
    the facility. However, this capability could provide an alternative
    source of highly enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons.
        Question. What is your assessment of North Korea's conventional
    capabilities and readiness?
        Answer. Despite decades of decline in overall readiness and
    capabilities, North Korea retains the fourth largest armed force in the
    world with more than one million active duty and five million Reserve
    personnel. More than 70 percent of these forces are arrayed within 90
    miles of the Demilitarized Zone and North Korea has garrisoned up to
    250 long-range artillery systems in positions to strike the Greater
    Seoul Metropolitan Area. Although an aging and technologically inferior
    force, North Korea fields over 1,700 aircraft, 800 naval vessels, and
    13,000 artillery systems. The most modern North Korean tanks are no
    match for the U.S. M1A2 main battle tank or ROK K1 and K2 tanks. The
    North Korean Air Force has a very limited number of modern aircraft,
    and its pilots have a fraction of the flight hours of ROK and U.S. Air
    Force pilots. The North Korean Navy's surface fleet is likewise aging
    and suffering from maintenance problems. North Korea's leadership
    likely understands its military is incapable of seizing the Korean
    Peninsula by force and that a conventional war would result in an end
    to the Kim Regime. However, the North will continue to use its military
    as a key component of a coercive strategy designed to gain concessions
    through intimidation and provocations.
        Question. What, if anything, should be done to strengthen
    deterrence on the Korean Peninsula?
        Answer. I believe the most important factor in maintaining
    deterrence on the Korean Peninsula is the maintenance of a strong U.S.-
    ROK Alliance. The Alliance is grounded in the Mutual Defense Treaty and
    we are now striving to develop and expand the Alliance based on the
    June 2009 U.S.-ROK Joint Vision Statement, Strategic Alliance 2015
    plan, and the Guidelines for U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation. These
    Alliance development measures are designed to build more adaptive and
    flexible force capabilities and promote closer policy and strategic
    coordination between the United States and ROK. Additionally, it is
    important to think of deterrence in a holistic manner, and to this end
    I will seek to ensure that we maximize the military elements of
    national power as a part of a synchronized whole-of-government
    approach. By maintaining a strong Alliance, the United States and ROK
    will maximize the deterrence effect of their combined capabilities.

                          NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

        Question. North Korea recently disclosed that it has a functioning
    uranium enrichment program. Whether this program is intended for
    nuclear power, as the North Korean government claims, or for nuclear
    weapons is unknown. Having achieved enrichment capability, however,
    North Korea could certainly use that capability to produce highly
    enriched uranium for weapons. North Korea has a history of
    proliferating missile and nuclear technology. The Proliferation
    Security Initiative (PSI) was established as a means to interdict
    suspect shipments, including shipments of nuclear or missile items to
    and from North Korea.
        Would you recommend any improvements to the organization or
    capability of the PSI member nations to improve the ability to
    interdict prohibited shipments to and from North Korea?
        Answer. The PSI is an interdiction program designed to impede or
    stop the transfer of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials
    to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. It is
    an interdiction partnership among participating states where the
    development of operational concepts, organization of the program, and
    the sharing of information is done through meetings of its Operational
    Experts Group (OEG). Since endorsing the Statement of Interdiction
    Principles in May 2009, the ROK has increased its PSI participation.
    This increased participation is evidenced by its hosting of the Eastern
    Endeavor 10 maritime WMD interdiction drill off the port city of Busan
    and its joining of the OEG in November 2010. Although issues of
    organization and operational concepts of the PSI are an issue for the
    OEG, I do believe the initiative is an important component of the
    international community's effort to stop the transfer of WMD, their
    delivery systems, and related materials to states and actors of
    concern. I support enhancement of the initiative.
        Question. In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could
    take to ensure that North Korea does not proliferate missile and
    weapons technology to Syria, Iran and others?
        Answer. Effective counterproliferation requires an interagency and
    international cooperative effort with the intelligence effort the most
    critical. ROK and U.S. naval forces from the U.S. 7th Fleet
    participated in the October 2010 ROK led PSI exercise Eastern Endeavor
    10. If confirmed, I will assess whether U.S. or Combined ROK/U.S.
    forces can more effectively contribute to the PSI. For the employment
    of other DOD forces and capabilities, I would defer to the Commander,
    PACOM, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of
    Defense.
        Question. In your view, how does the lack of progress in diplomatic
    efforts to persuade North Korea to verifiably dismantle its nuclear
    weapons program inform or guide U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy in the
    region?
        Answer. As I understand the situation, our diplomatic efforts have
    been extensive and we have made numerous attempts to reach an agreement
    leading to a verifiable disablement and dismantlement of North Korea's
    nuclear weapons programs through the Six-Party Talks. However,
    responsibility for the lack of agreement rests with North Korea. The
    Kim regime continues to pursue its nuclear weapons and delivery systems
    programs and this indicates its potential intent to be able to employ
    or proliferate nuclear weapons. Therefore, the United States must
    maintain its nuclear deterrence capability and continue extended
    deterrence for the ROK until such time as North Korea verifiably
    dismantles its nuclear program.

                      BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PRIORITIES

        Question. The proximity and size of North Korea's missile inventory
    and the unpredictability of the North Korean regime place a premium on
    the missile defense capabilities in the vicinity of the Korean
    Peninsula.
        What is your assessment of the highest priority missile defense
    needs of USFK and CFC?
        Answer. In 2008, the Secretary of Defense signed guidance directing
    the distribution of a set number of Patriot PAC-3 and GEM missiles for
    the Korean Peninsula. To date, the designated number of munitions set
    forth in that document has not been provided to the U.S. Patriot forces
    stationed in the ROK. The number of missiles designated for the ROK or,
    preferably, the Air Defense Artillery Brigade's full unit basic load,
    is the highest priority concerning missile defense on the Korean
    Peninsula.
        Question. What missile defense capabilities do you believe are
    needed in the near term to meet the operational needs of these
    commands, and what systems are available to provide such capabilities?
        Answer. One of the basic tenants of air and missile defense is the
    employment principle of ``layered defense.'' Layered defense allows
    different missile defense systems to engage an inbound ballistic
    missile at different points in its trajectory. Although there is more
    than one missile defense system in the ROK, they are not mutually
    supporting nor do they provide layered defense. The U.S. and ROK
    militaries both have Patriot systems which conduct engagements in the
    terminal phase of a missiles flight (the current version of the ROK
    Patriot systems provide a very limited Theater Ballistic Missile [TBM]
    defense capability). The ROK Navy has acquired three Aegis-like missile
    defense cruisers (KDX IIIs) but they currently do not have missiles to
    be used in theater missile defense (TMD) nor do they have the ability
    to engage TBMs over the Korean Peninsula. The system that would best
    support the layered defense employment principle is a Terminal High
    Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system which can engage inbound TBMs at
    either the terminal or mid-course phase of flight. A THAAD system could
    be used to provide layered defense and also improve early warning for
    the Korean Peninsula as well as enhance Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
    early warning in the region.
        Question. The February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review
    established a policy of pursuing a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to
    regional missile defense, including in Europe, the Middle East, and
    East Asia. This approach is intended to provide timely and effective
    defense of existing and emerging missile threats with a flexible set of
    missile defense capabilities, tailored to each region.
        Do you support the PAA to missile defense, and do you believe it is
    an appropriate approach to providing missile defense capabilities for
    the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula?
        Answer. I do support the President's guidance on PAA as detailed in
    the Ballistic Missile Defense Review report. This approach is designed
    to enhance regional security and deterrence architectures in a way that
    is flexible and adaptive, and responsive to the threat. In coordination
    with Commander, PACOM, USFK has been working over the past decade to
    build a robust BMD force posture that contributes to deterrence and
    assures the ROK of our commitment to their security and to greater
    regional peace and stability. I will continue to work with my
    counterparts as plans for a regional PAA are further developed.
        Question. Do you believe it would be in our security interests to
    seek a cooperative missile defense relationship with South Korea as a
    means of enhancing security on the Korean Peninsula and the region?
        Answer. Yes. There are many benefits and synergies to be gained by
    cooperative missile defense with the ROK. The United States is working
    with the ROK to evaluate its missile defense requirements. Should the
    ROK decide to pursue additional BMD capabilities, experience with other
    allies has shown that we can each leverage our BMD capabilities through
    operational cooperation. We also believe that regional security can be
    enhanced through cooperative missile defense relationships.

                      NORTH KOREA-POW-MIA RECOVERY EFFORTS

        Question. From 1996-2005, the United States worked with the North
    Korean military to recover and repatriate the remains of American
    servicemembers who perished on the Korean peninsula. However, in the
    spring of 2005, the United States unilaterally halted the program.
        In your opinion, should the United States work with North Korea to
    repatriate the remains of American servicemembers found in North Korea?
    If so, when, or under what conditions, should the United States resume
    such cooperation?
        Answer. It is a core value of the United States and our military to
    not leave a fallen comrade and I believe every attempt should be made
    to recover those missing as long as it does not conflict with critical
    security interests and appropriate conditions exist to execute recovery
    operations. This is an enduring commitment our Nation makes to its
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines.
        The Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) has
    responsibility for strategy and policy regarding the recovery of Korean
    War remains and provides DOD oversight on the entire personnel
    accounting process. The UNC assists DPMO and PACOM Joint POW/MIA
    Accounting Command in arranging operational and logistics support to
    remains recovery operations in North Korea. Also, the UNC conducts
    repatriation ceremonies after remains are transferred to UNC control at
    the Joint Security Area at the end of each operation.
        Once national policymakers determine that conditions permit
    reengagement with North Korea, DPMO will lead the U.S. team for
    negotiating the resumption of repatriating Korean War remains. If U.S.
    and North Korean representatives can reach a mutually agreeable
    arrangement that provides the necessary process and procedures to
    conduct operations, it would seem possible to resume this humanitarian
    effort. The arrangement must address the safety and security of U.S.
    personnel executing remains recovery in North Korea. When U.S.
    commanders are satisfied that an acceptable level of risk to U.S.
    personnel exists, remains recovery operations can resume in North
    Korea.
        Question. If confirmed, what, if anything, would you do to restart
    cooperation with North Korea on the POW-MIA remains recovery program?
        Answer. National policymakers will decide when to restart remains
    recovery operations in North Korea. This is a bilateral U.S.-North
    Korea policy issue. However, when the decision is made, the UNC will
    continue to play a key role in supporting remains recovery operations
    in North Korea.

                        REPUBLIC OF KOREA-U.S. ALLIANCE

        Question. Since the end of World War II, the U.S.-ROK alliance has
    been a key pillar of security in the Asia-Pacific region. This
    relationship has gone through periods of inevitable change.
        What is your understanding of the current U.S. security
    relationship with the ROK?
        Answer. It is my understanding the current U.S. security
    relationship with the ROK is very strong. It is based on mutual respect
    and trust and grounded in the Mutual Defense Treaty. In June 2009, the
    United States and ROK signed a Joint Vision statement that commits both
    nations to building an alliance that ensures a peaceful, secure, and
    prosperous future for the Korean Peninsula, the Asia-Pacific region,
    and the world at large. Objectives established in the Joint Vision
    statement are being supported by the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan that
    was agreed to by the United States and ROK in October 2010. The
    Strategic Alliance 2015 plan will synchronize multiple U.S. and ROK
    military transformation efforts that are designed to build adaptive and
    flexible force capabilities to deter and defeat aggression and
    provocations against the ROK. The plan moves the United States and ROK
    toward building an Alliance that ensures a peaceful, secure, and
    prosperous future for the Korean Peninsula, the Asia-Pacific region,
    and the world, as called for in the June 2009 U.S.-ROK Joint Vision
    statement.
        The military component of Alliance development is led by the
    Guidelines for U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation that were agreed to by the
    U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK Minister of Defense in October 2010.
    Established to direct the future course of the U.S.-ROK defense
    relationship, they are based on and serve to advance the June 2009
    Joint Vision Statement and the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. Under
    the guidelines, the U.S. upholds a firm commitment to ROK defense and
    both nations will implement a set of enabling measures needed for an
    effective combined defense posture. These enabling measures are: to
    enhance intelligence and information sharing; strengthen operational
    planning; further develop capabilities to address the ballistic missile
    threat from North Korea; institutionalize an extended deterrence policy
    committee; enhance interoperability; enhance the combined exercise
    program; and to collaborate on lessons learned. The defense guidelines
    also recognize the importance of close bilateral cooperation to promote
    regional and global peace and stability. In support of these stability
    objectives, the guidelines specify implementation of the following
    measures: strengthening capabilities to contribute to regional and
    global peace and stability; supporting the non-proliferation of WMD,
    related materials, technologies, and their means of delivery; enhancing
    bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral defense relationships;
    strengthening cooperation for international security and peacekeeping
    efforts; and cooperating closely on other transnational and non-
    traditional security challenges. The defense guidelines recognize the
    importance of close policy and strategic consultation between the
    United States and ROK for the enhancement of common interests and
    further development of the Alliance.
        Question. If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to
    improve the U.S.-ROK security relationship?
        Answer. Recognizing that a strong U.S.-ROK Alliance is one of the
    most important factors for maintaining peace and stability on the
    Korean Peninsula and in the region at large, I will, if confirmed,
    continue the work of my predecessors directed at sustaining strong ties
    with personnel of the ROK military, other members of the ROK
    Government, Korean civil society, and the South Korean people at large.
    I will encourage continued exchange and cooperation activity between
    Command personnel and the people of local Korean communities--activity
    that connects and binds Americans and Koreans together. I will also
    execute the Alliance building initiatives to promote the continuation
    of a strong U.S.-ROK security relationship.
        Question. What is your assessment of ROK warfighting capability
    trends with regard to the modernization and capability improvements in
    ROK equipment and training?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the ROK military is a highly
    professional and competent force with a modern, mobile network-centric
    warfare capability that fields an array of advanced weapon systems.
    These weapon systems include the K1 main battle tank, K9 self-propelled
    artillery, and the KDX-III guided missile destroyer. The ROK military
    is led by a professional officer corps that currently exercises daily
    command of its forces. It has sustained and supplemented operational
    experience through recent deployments to places such as Iraq,
    Afghanistan, the Gulf of Aden, Lebanon, as well as participating in a
    host of United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance
    operations. Initiatives to further enhance force capabilities,
    modernize weapon systems, and improve organizational structures and
    force management are being implemented as part of the ongoing ``307''
    defense reform program.
        ROK military modernization and capability improvements are
    supported through the maintenance of a robust Foreign Military Sales
    (FMS) and Defense Armaments Cooperation Program with the U.S. These
    programs promote interoperability between U.S. and ROK forces and thus
    create a more capable combined force. During fiscal year 2010, the ROK
    was our 11th largest FMS buyer. FMS sales were augmented by a robust
    military training program, where the ROK sends students to the U.S. for
    training in a variety of military-related courses.
        ROK force capability is also sustained and improved through the
    conduct of a tough and realistic exercise program. In addition to
    participating in the combined Ulchi Freedom Guardian, Key Resolve, and
    Foal Eagle exercises with the U.S., the ROK military also conducts
    annually the Taegeuk, Hoguk, and Hwarang exercises. These exercises
    help derive requirements for joint force and unit structure
    development, improve interoperability between the military services,
    and practice inter-agency coordination. It is these factors in total
    that lead me to believe that the ROK is a highly professional,
    competent, and modern military force.
        Question. Until last year, the United States and ROK were planning
    the transfer to wartime operational control (OPCON) of ROK forces to
    the ROK in 2012. Then, in June 2010, the United States and ROK agreed
    to further delay the transfer of OPCON until December 2015. This delay
    was purportedly agreed to because of the evolving security situation on
    the Peninsula and in order to more closely synchronize the transfer
    with other transformation initiatives.
        What is your understanding of the ROK's current and projected
    military capabilities and the ability of ROK forces to assume a greater
    role in the defense of their homeland including responsibility for
    command and control of the readiness, operations, and warfighting of
    their own forces in wartime (``OPCON Transfer'')?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the South Korean military is a
    highly professional and competent force that will be capable of leading
    Alliance defense of the ROK in wartime. Numbering over 633,000 active
    duty personnel, it ranks as the world's sixth largest military in terms
    of personnel and is a modern, mobile network-centric warfare capable
    force that fields an array of advanced weapon systems. The ROK military
    is led by a professional officer corps that currently exercises daily
    command of its forces. It has gained operational experience through
    recent deployments to places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, the Gulf of
    Aden, Lebanon, as well as participating in a host of United Nations
    peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations in East Timor and
    Morocco and other operations around the world. Initiatives to enhance
    force capabilities, modernize weapon systems, and improve
    organizational structures and force management are being implemented as
    part of the ongoing ``307'' defense reform program.
        ROK military force capability is supplemented through the conduct
    of a tough and realistic exercise program. In addition to participating
    in the combined Ulchi Freedom Guardian, Key Resolve, and Foal Eagle
    exercises with the U.S., the ROK military also conducts annually the
    Taegeuk, Hoguk, and Hwarang exercises. These exercises derive
    requirements for joint force and unit structure development, improve
    interoperability between the military services, and practice inter-
    agency coordination. Because of these factors, it is my understanding
    that the ROK will be ready and capable of leading Alliance defense of
    the ROK in wartime.
        Question. Following the decision to delay OPCON transfer to 2015,
    the United States and ROK entered into an agreement referred to as
    Strategic Alliance 2015 which is described in the USFK October 2010
    Strategic Digest as ``an overarching and synchronized Alliance
    transformation roadmap, containing mutual Alliance end states and
    milestones, ensuring a smooth transition of the lead for the combined
    defense of the Republic of Korea.''
        What is your understanding of the purpose and scope of the
    Strategic alliance 2015?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Strategic Alliance 2015
    plan synchronizes multiple U.S. and ROK transformation efforts that are
    designed to build adaptive and flexible capabilities to deter
    aggression against the ROK and to defeat aggression should it occur.
    The plan's objective is to sustain and enhance the U.S.-ROK Alliance's
    combined defense posture and capabilities and to support the Alliance's
    future vision and bilateral defense priorities as stated in the
    Guidelines for U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation. Execution of the Strategic
    Alliance 2015 plan ensures the effective synchronization of major
    elements of Alliance restructuring while maintaining a strong combined
    defense posture to deter or respond to the range of North Korean
    security challenges throughout the transition process. Key elements of
    the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan include: refining and improving
    combined defense plans; defining and developing the new organizational
    structures required for ROK lead of the war effort; implementing more
    realistic exercises based on the North Korean threat of today and
    tomorrow; preparing for the transition of wartime operational control
    to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff in December 2015; consolidating U.S.
    military forces in the ROK onto two enduring hubs under the Yongsan
    Relocation Plan (YRP) and Land Partnership Plan (LPP); and force
    management. The goal of all initiatives under the Strategic Alliance
    2015 construct is to build adaptive force capabilities that deter and
    defeat future provocations against the ROK and fight and win on the
    Korean Peninsula should deterrence fail. The Strategic Alliance 2015
    plan as a whole synchronizes ongoing transformation efforts to ensure
    they are aligned and mutually supporting and better postures both
    nations to deter, counter, and defeat North Korean provocations and
    aggression.
        Question. How will it help ensure that the OPCON transfer takes
    place no later than December 2015, as it is now scheduled?
        Answer. It is my understanding that established within the
    Strategic Alliance 2015 framework is a governance structure that guides
    implementation of the plan to include the transition of wartime
    operational control according to specified milestones. Implementation
    issues are identified and addressed through a bottom-up process, where
    U.S.-ROK governance bodies in order of rising decisionmaking authority
    include council of colonels, subcommittees headed by two-star level
    general officers, a steering committee, the joint committee, and the
    Strategic Alliance 2015 working group. These bodies continually work
    issues related to--among other elements of Strategic Alliance 2015--
    OPCON transition and ensure that established milestones are adhered to
    and difficulties addressed as they arise.

                                REGIONAL POSTURE

        Question. In your opinion, how should the United States employ its
    forces in ROK to provide for regional presence and engagement, and to
    best respond to regional threats, provide support for out-of-area
    contingencies, and maintain readiness?
        Answer. It is my understanding that how U.S. forces stationed in
    the ROK are employed is currently in a state of evolution as the
    Command transforms its presence there. Our primary focus must remain
    the deterrence of aggression against the ROK--a key Alliance and
    security treaty partner--and to defeat aggression should it occur.
    However, the Command's transformation initiatives as currently
    structured will create the opportunity for U.S. forces stationed in the
    ROK to become available for use in regional exercises, engagement, and
    global operations. We must maintain a U.S.-ROK Alliance military
    posture that allows for an immediate capability to deal with military
    threats and other contingencies on the Korean Peninsula while also
    seizing upon opportunities to address global challenges such as
    terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, piracy, peacekeeping, post-
    conflict stabilization, and regional engagement, as called for in the
    2009 U.S.-ROK Joint Vision for the Alliance. If confirmed, I will
    conduct a careful and thorough review of the opportunities for U.S.
    forces to be employed toward the support of regional engagement and
    out-of-area operations.

                          CONSOLIDATION OF U.S. FORCES

        Question. The LPP is consolidating the combat brigade and
    supporting elements of the 2nd Infantry Division in and around Camp
    Humphreys, south of Seoul. New construction of facilities and
    infrastructure required to support the consolidation is being carried
    out using funds from both the Host Nation (South Korea) and U.S.
    military construction accounts. The YRP proposes to move most of the
    U.S. forces currently stationed at Yongsan compound in Seoul to Camp
    Humphrey as well. The YRP relocation is to be largely funded by the
    South Korean Government, but the United States will pay for the
    construction of the housing to support the relocation.
        What is your assessment of the current status of the two
    consolidation plans and the timeline for completion?
        Answer. The YRP and the Land Parnership Plan (LPP) are being
    executed simultaneously and are scheduled for completion in 2016. The
    two plans are structured in such a way as to facilitate the orderly
    movement of servicemembers, civilian employees, and their families to
    the enduring hubs. The YRP and LPP plans are closely dependent on each
    other. Land development and infrastructure projects are under
    construction and must be completed before any unit moves can take
    place.
        The LPP program is on schedule with the majority of projects under
    design and/or construction. The current plan is to complete
    construction of the LPP program in the first quarter of calendar year
    2016 and complete all unit moves by the end of 2016. YRP negotiations
    still continue concerning requirements for the U.S. Korea Command
    (KORCOM) Headquarters. Any delays in reaching agreement over this
    facility could push back completion of the YRP program. However, both
    the United States and ROK expect these negotiations to be concluded
    shortly. The current plan is to complete YRP construction in early 2016
    and complete all moves by the end of 2016 in accordance with the
    Strategic Alliance 2015 plan.
        For the relocation initiative as a whole, as I understand it, the
    planning and program phase is nearly complete and the design phase is
    well underway. Site development/construction has been on-going since
    2005 and vertical construction of YRP projects will begin within weeks.
    LPP program construction has been at a steady state since it began in
    2004.
        Question. What do you anticipate to be the total costs to be
    incurred by the U.S. Government to carry out the two consolidations?
        Answer. According to the LPP signed by the United States and ROK in
    2002, most of the facility costs associated with moving U.S. forces
    from locations north of Seoul to areas south are obtained from host
    nation burden sharing funds. It should be noted, however, that some of
    the LPP facility construction was paid for with U.S. Military
    Construction (MILCON) funds. Under the YRP, the majority of costs
    associated with relocation will be covered by the ROK, to include the
    construction of facilities such as barracks, operational facilities,
    and support facilities. Housing owned by the United States at U.S. Army
    Garrison Yongsan--a facility that is returned to the ROK under YRP
    excluding a small parcel--will be replaced by the ROK at U.S. Army
    Garrison Humphreys. Housing currently leased at U.S. Army Garrison
    Yongsan will be replaced by a privately financed housing project. For
    both YRP and LPP, additional land required to execute these two
    agreements was purchased and provided by the ROK.
        Over $2 billion worth of projects are in design and approximately
    $1.2 billion worth of construction are currently underway at U.S. Army
    Garrison Humphreys. The United States agreed to provide the majority of
    required family housing and unaccompanied senior leader quarters for
    our force at a cost estimated at between $1-$2 billion. With respect to
    the relocation of 2nd Infantry Division under the LPP, the United
    States intends to fund the requirements using both appropriated funds
    and host nation provided burden sharing funds. The U.S. share of the
    total cost to carry out the two ROK-U.S. agreements will be
    approximately $2.4 billion.
        Question. To what extent to you believe the United States should be
    responsible for the costs related to environmental clean-up at bases
    being vacated as a result of the LPP?
        Answer. The return of U.S. installations in the ROK is governed by
    the U.S.-ROK Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and its relevant
    agreements. The environmental clean-up of overseas facilities must be
    accomplished in accordance with existing DOD instructions. If
    confirmed, I will ensure that all provisions established in the SOFA
    and relevant DOD instructions are adhered to during the base return
    process and work with all parties concerned to practice good
    environmental stewardship at Command facilities.
        Question. In your opinion, does the consolidation better support
    the warfighting mission? If so, how?
        Answer. I have been briefed that the relocation initiative improves
    warfighting capabilities in several ways. First, the 2nd Infantry
    Division and future Korea Command will be collocated at U.S. Army
    Garrison Humphreys, improving coordination and planning between staffs
    of the two organizations. Similarly, relocating 2nd Infantry Division
    to U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys consolidates the Division's subordinate
    units at a single location, increasing direct face-to-face contact
    amongst unit personnel while reducing the physical span of control and
    infrastructure needed to support the Division. The unit is better
    postured to train and fight together.
        I understand that consolidation at two enduring hubs also enhances
    command and control and coordination. In addition to strengthening
    relationships between operational staffs of the 2nd Infantry Division
    and a future Korea Command, 2nd Infantry Division is better positioned
    to affect initial liaison and coordination during reception, staging,
    and onward movement of deploying maneuver and sustainment brigades.
    Early liaison and coordination sets the conditions to more reliable and
    effective command and control during execution of later phases/stages
    of conflict. Positioning of the 2nd Infantry Division at U.S. Army
    Garrison Humphreys also improves tactical flexibility by posturing the
    division in a better tactical location for rapid commitment in support
    of either of the forward stationed ROK armies and corps. This position
    also shortens logistical lines during the initial phases of conflict
    that better postures the division for successful employment later.
        I have been briefed that consolidation will also enhance the
    execution of noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO). By reducing the
    dispersion of transportation assets, movement times are reduced. By
    separating U.S. forces from initial wartime threats such as North
    Korea's long-range artillery and its ground forces threatening Seoul,
    the vulnerability of these forces is reduced and their survivability
    enhanced. 2nd Infantry Division located at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys
    will be better able to integrate follow-on maneuver and sustainment
    brigades while not under the fire of North Korean long-range artillery.
    This factor supports the Division's preparation for combat activities.
    Finally, I understand that force consolidation enhances warfighting
    capabilities by improving soldier quality of life, realization of
    stationing efficiencies, optimizes use of land in Korea, and enhances
    force protection and survivability.

                      HOST NATION BURDEN-SHARING PROGRAMS

        Question. Two programs supported by the ROK, the Combined Defense
    Improvement Program and the Korea Host Nation Funded Construction
    Program, provide cash and in-kind projects to satisfy U.S. military
    facility and infrastructure requirements.
        What is your assessment of the current level and quality of the
    burden-sharing arrangement?
        Answer. I have been informed that since 1991, the ROK has made
    contributions toward the costs of stationing U.S. military forces on
    its territory. These contributions are known as cost sharing
    contributions, where cost sharing is defined as the cash and in-kind
    contributions allies make to help offset the costs of stationing U.S.
    forces on their territory. Over the years cost sharing arrangements
    between the ROK and U.S. have been established and specified in a
    series of special measures agreements that typically covered periods of
    time ranging from 1 to 3 years. On 15 January 2009, the ROK and U.S.
    signed a 5-year Special Measures Agreement (SMA) that specifies cost
    sharing arrangements during the 2009 through 2013 time period.
        ROK SMA contributions are divided into three cost sharing
    categories: labor, logistics, and ROK Funded Construction (ROKFC).
    Labor contributions are used solely for the purpose of paying the
    salaries and benefits of USFK's Korean national employees. Logistics
    support consists of in-kind support (logistics equipment, supplies, and
    services) to USFK from the ROK. Finally, ROKFC contributions support
    USFK's military construction and military construction-like
    requirements. ROK cost sharing contributions help ensure that the
    Command maintains its fight tonight readiness and builds the
    infrastructure needed for a transformed U.S. military force presence in
    the ROK.
        In addition to support provided through the SMA, the ROK makes
    other contributions toward the costs of stationing U.S. military forces
    on its territory that are outside the SMA framework. Support of this
    type includes items such as force protection outside USFK facilities,
    the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) program, improvements
    to infrastructure outside and around USFK facilities, use of ROK
    training areas, various fee exemptions, and other contributions.
    Unfortunately, the value of the non-SMA contributions is much more
    difficult to estimate, but in the past contributions of this type have
    been estimated to be valued in the range of hundreds of millions of
    dollars.
        The current SMA expires at the end of 2013. Prior to 2013, the
    United States and ROK will engage in negotiations over a new SMA to
    specify cost sharing arrangements for the post-2013 time period. If
    confirmed, I will conduct an assessment on the level and adequacy of
    current cost sharing arrangements so that support can be given to U.S.
    goals and objectives during negotiations for a post-2013 SMA.
        Question. What priorities would you establish, if confirmed, for
    U.S. forces in Korea to make the best use of these programs?
        Answer. It is my understanding that USFK currently has a process in
    place to determine the appropriate distribution of ROK cost sharing
    contributions across the three cost sharing categories of labor,
    logistics, and ROK Funded Construction on an annual basis. If
    confirmed, I will review this process and make any needed changes to
    ensure that the contributions are being put to best use.
        Question. The overwhelming majority of burden-sharing funds over
    the last 4 years has been used to carry out construction supporting the
    consolidation of forces at Camp Humphreys.
        Do you believe this funding trend should be continued, or that
    funding should be spread to critical requirements at other U.S. bases
    in Korea?
        Answer. ROK burden sharing (cost sharing) contributions are divided
    across three cost sharing categories: labor, logistics, and ROK Funded
    Construction (ROKFC). It is my understanding that USFK has a process in
    place to determine not only the appropriate distribution of cost
    sharing contribution across the three categories, but also the
    appropriate distribution within categories as well. Needs emanating
    from LPP requirements at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys are supported in
    the ROKFC account. During the 2009-2011 time period, the value of cost
    sharing contribution allocated to ROKFC averaged 40 percent of the
    total SMA contribution yearly. USFK conducts regular reviews of the
    ROKFC account to ensure that important and emergent military
    construction requirements are met. If confirmed, I will review the
    allocation of ROK cost sharing contribution across the ROKFC category
    to ensure that needs at Command facilities are being properly
    addressed.

                TRAINING OF U.S. FORCES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

        Question. In the past several years, as U.S. forces in Korea have
    drawn down and consolidated, home station training of both U.S. Army
    and Air Force units based on the Peninsula has emerged as a significant
    concern.
        Do you believe there is sufficient availability and access to
    training ranges for large ground unit maneuver and fires, and for close
    air support missions and other Air Force operations?
        Answer. As I understand it, the ground training requirements for
    U.S. forces in the ROK are currently being met. Expanded digital
    connectivity is being leveraged to combine live events in the field
    with virtual or simulation-driven events to maximize training
    opportunities at the tactical and operational levels. This might
    include linking events on and off the Korean Peninsula to both
    replicate the complexity of joint and combined warfare and to optimize
    use of available resources.
        Access to air-to-ground training ranges in the ROK has increased in
    recent years due to refinements in range scheduling procedures. The
    command will need to continue unit deployments to other locations for
    the foreseeable future in order to maintain air crew qualifications
    with all types of ordnance and for electronic warfare. Additional
    arrangements must still be made with the ROK Government to further
    improve the level of range access.
        Question. In your view, are the ranges in Korea adequate to meet
    the training requirements of U.S. forces?
        Answer. I have been briefed that the current inventory for training
    ranges is sufficient to meet U.S. ground forces training requirements
    and maintain readiness. The United States is working closely with the
    ROK to improve the quality and availability of training ranges for our
    air component. Due to the ROK's rapid economic growth, the relatively
    large scale of its military given the size of the country,
    environmental concerns, and competition between military and civic
    infrastructure, our Korean military partners work within the same
    limitations on range availability that U.S. forces face at home. If
    confirmed, I will continue to work with our ROK ally to modernize and
    fully utilize all available training facilities to ensure force
    readiness requirements are met.

                       TOUR NORMALIZATION IN SOUTH KOREA

        Question. DOD is pursuing full tour normalization for U.S. military
    personnel assigned to the Korean Peninsula. Essentially, full tour
    normalization would lengthen service tours from predominantly 1 year,
    as is the case today, to 3 year tours for those accompanied by their
    families and 2 years for those who are unaccompanied. Completion of
    full tour normalization would result in about 12,000 U.S. military
    families in South Korea.
        With the events of the past year on the Korean Peninsula and the
    likelihood that circumstances on the Peninsula will remain
    unpredictable for the foreseeable future, and considering that the
    costs of such a policy change have not yet been fully identified, do
    you believe that it is prudent to proceed with plans for full tour
    normalization and to significantly increase the number of U.S. families
    in South Korea? If so, why?
        Answer. It is my understanding that one of the most important
    benefits of tour normalization is improved force readiness. Currently,
    about 85 percent of USFK servicemembers rotate each year, just as they
    have completed Korea specific training and the local exercise cycle.
    This limits the ability to achieve the same level of readiness enjoyed
    by American forces in the Continental United States, Europe, and other
    locations in the Pacific region. Conversely, as the proportion of
    trained military personnel in place with 3 year accompanied and 2 year
    unaccompanied tours increases, USFK will see benefits such as improved
    understanding of the region and operational environment, the
    strengthening of relations with our ROK ally, and enhanced ability to
    support the transition of Wartime Operational Control to the ROK.
    Simultaneously, USFK is in the process of relocating the majority of
    its forces in the ROK south of the capital city Seoul, thereby reducing
    the immediate threat to family members and simplifying the execution of
    noncombatant evacuation operations if such operations should ever
    become necessary. Non-combatant evacuation operation plans are
    exercised and practiced on a regular basis. Future hubs under the
    Command's relocation initiative lie outside the effective range of
    North Korean artillery. If confirmed, I will conduct a review of the
    tour normalization initiative, taking into account recent
    recommendations made by members of this committee.
        Question. Since full tour normalization was not contemplated as
    part the either the LPP or YRP, what is your understanding of the total
    costs of full tour normalization and how do you believe it would be
    funded?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Secretary of Defense
    directed in September 2010 implementation of full tour normalization in
    Korea as affordable and according to no specific timeline. The
    Secretary further directed that a plan be provided to him on how to
    proceed with tour normalization no later than 31 March 2011. It is my
    further understanding that the Secretary of Defense is currently
    reviewing options to implement the tour normalization initiative and
    that his recommended course of action will be forwarded to the
    President as part of the fiscal year 2013 budget request.

                                QUALITY OF LIFE

        Question. Through investment in quality of life amenities, to
    include housing, health care, and recreation, the Department has worked
    to achieve the goal of making South Korea an ``assignment of choice''
    for U.S. Forces.
        What do you consider to be the most essential quality of life
    programs for soldiers and their families stationed in Korea and, if
    confirmed, what would be your goals in this regard?
        Answer. I believe the most essential quality of life programs for
    soldiers and their families serving in the ROK are access to quality
    living and working conditions and facilities, quality health care, and
    quality educational opportunities for dependent family members. If
    confirmed, I will advocate for and take actions to provide our soldiers
    and family members with the best possible living and working
    environment, health care services, and educational opportunities for
    dependent family members.
        Question. What is your understanding of the capacity of DOD schools
    in South Korea to accommodate the increase in families/children
    associated with tour normalization?
        Answer. My understanding is that USFK currently has 10 schools with
    the capacity of about 5,500 students. A number of these schools are
    scheduled to be replaced as part of the YRP, LPP, and the DOD Education
    Activity School Rebuilding Program. When these programs are completed,
    USFK will have the capacity to educate about 6,100 students. School
    capacity will need to increase to about 14,800 students in order to
    satisfy the projected demand required by full tour normalization.

                     MEDICAL CARE FOR U.S. FORCES IN KOREA

        Question. One of the most important quality of life issues in Korea
    is ensuring access to high quality medical care for servicemembers of
    all military branches and their families. Separate medical chains of
    command responsible for providing health care, and the presence of non-
    command-sponsored family members who need health services, among other
    factors, have presented challenges. One possible reform that has been
    proposed is to offer a TRICARE-like benefit to all family members and
    DOD employees, regardless of command sponsorship.
        If confirmed, how would you assess the need for improvement in the
    management and delivery of health care services in South Korea?
        Answer. Quality health care is essential for all servicemembers
    regardless of where they serve. However, this is even more important
    for our servicemembers stationed in the ROK, who are thousands of miles
    from home. I have been informed of the long history of excellent care
    provided by U.S. military treatment facilities in the ROK (Army and Air
    Force) as indicated by the most recent pinnacle surveys by the Joint
    Commission in 2010 that placed them among the top for patient care,
    patient safety, and overall performance for military installations.
    Furthermore, the advances in specialty care to include surgical care,
    imaging, and therapeutics of our host nation partners in the ROK is
    among the top in the world, with four of the institutions with whom
    USFK conducts business certifying in the Joint Commission International
    Surveys in the last 2 years. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor
    and assess the availability and quality of health care for our
    servicemembers, DOD civilian employees, and their families serving in
    the ROK.
        Question. What is your view on whether or not the policy regarding
    medical support to noncommand sponsored family members should be
    reconsidered and revised by DOD?
        Answer. It is my understanding that starting under previous USFK
    commanders and continuing through the present time, extraordinary
    strides have been made to ensure access and availability of the full
    range of services, entitlements, and privileges for noncommand
    sponsored family members and dependent family members who reside with
    their military, DOD civilian, or invited contractor sponsor in the ROK.
    If confirmed, I will continue those efforts. I will also remain abreast
    of and weigh in on DOD policy adjustments that support adequate
    staffing and funding of U.S. military treatment facilities so that
    noncommand sponsored personnel can gain access at levels approaching
    that of command sponsored beneficiaries.

                     SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

        Question. DOD and the Military Services have developed
    comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and
    response to incidents of sexual assaults, including providing
    appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault. However,
    numerous incidents of sexual misconduct involving military personnel in
    deployed areas as well as at home stations are still being reported.
    Victims and their advocates claim that they are victimized twice: first
    by attackers in their own ranks and then by unresponsive or inadequate
    treatment for the victim. They assert that commands fail to respond
    appropriately with basic medical services and with an adequate
    investigation of their charges, followed by a failure to hold
    assailants accountable.
        Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures,
    particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective?
        Answer. First and foremost, one sexual assault in our ranks is too
    many and significantly affects the morale and readiness of our units
    and personnel. We are working to eliminate these crimes from our
    formations. The current Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR)
    policies and procedures are effective and will continue to improve as
    we transition to the Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention
    (SHARP) program, especially for the confidential (restricted) cases.
    Over the next 27 months, the SHARP program is expected to be fully
    functional with trained, full time professionals to educate, respond,
    and assist in the reduction and elimination of this terrible crime.
        Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in
    which confidential reporting procedures have been put into operation?
        Answer. Confidential (restricted) reporting is critical to
    empowering victims of these traumatic crimes. It provides them with
    confidential reporters such as Sexual Assault Response Coordinator
    (SARC), Victim Advocate, Chaplain, and/or Medical Provider to privately
    discuss the details and aid in their recovery. The challenge is when a
    non-confidential reporter such as a concerned roommate, friend, parent,
    Equal Opportunity Advisor, or by-stander is informed or aware of the
    incident and attempts to provide assistance and reports it, then the
    victim's confidentiality is lost and the case automatically becomes an
    Unrestricted case. This is when the victims may consider themselves
    ``revictimized'' and forced to relive the assault. We must continue to
    encourage reporting, support victims of sexual assault, and ensure
    commanders can take appropriate actions as required to maintain good
    order and discipline.
        Question. What is your view of the policies and procedures in place
    to prevent and respond to sexual assaults, including assaults against
    contractor personnel?
        Answer. The Army has sound policies and procedures in place to
    prevent and respond to sexual assaults. Annually all soldiers are
    required to take Awareness and Prevention Training. Every sexual
    assault victim regardless of duty status is treated with dignity and
    respect, receives immediate medical care and victim advocate services.
    If the victim is a contractor then the case is transitioned to the
    contractor's medical, victim advocate, and investigative staff unless
    the company does not possess these services then the Army provides the
    necessary care for the victim.
        Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
    resources in place to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual
    assault?
        Answer. Our Criminal Investigation Division (CID), special sexual
    assault investigators and prosecutors are well-trained and do an
    outstanding job investigating and responding to every allegation of
    sexual assault.
        Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of the
    commanders to hold assailants accountable for their acts?
        Answer. Commanders understand their roles as commanders and
    judicial officials under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. I am
    confident commanders exercise those authorities and responsibilities.
    Each case requires investigation, examination of the evidence,
    appropriate advice from experts, and decisions by the commander. I
    trust commanders to make their best judgment in each case, and am not
    aware of any reluctance to make the hard decisions when required.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure
    senior level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond
    to sexual assaults and to hold assailants accountable for their
    actions?
        Answer. I am a strong supporter of the Army's ``I. A.M. Strong''
    campaign which directs all personnel to Intervene, Act, and Motivate
    each other to prevent sexual assaults. In addition, I will ensure the
    command has the required number of trained SARC/SHARP, Medical, CID,
    and Chaplain personnel to provide ample prevention training to units
    and responsive care to all victims. These actions support the CSA's
    desire for a cultural change in our Army and lead the attack on sexual
    assaults in our Nation.

                           HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT POLICY

        Question. The ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010'', enacted
    on December 22, 2010, provides for the repeal of the current DOD policy
    concerning homosexuality in the Armed Forces, to be effective 60 days
    after the Secretary of Defense has received the DOD's comprehensive
    review on the implementation of such repeal, and the President,
    Secretary, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff certify to the
    congressional defense committees that they have considered the report
    and proposed plan of action, that DOD has prepared the necessary
    policies and regulations to exercise the discretion provided by such
    repeal, and that implementation of such policies and regulations is
    consistent with the standards of military readiness and effectiveness,
    unit cohesion, and military recruiting and retention.
        What is your view on repealing the current DOD policy?
        Answer. This is a policy change that we can make successfully. I
    believe that the great soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines can and
    will accommodate such a significant change. The American people have
    spoken on this subject through their elected officials, and the result
    is the law that we currently have and the new policy we are
    deliberately preparing to implement. An important part of this process
    is to engage our men and women in uniform and their families. The
    Services' chain-teaching programs facilitate thoughtful, constructive
    dialogue on the subject between leaders and servicemembers. Ultimately,
    I am confident we will continue to have an outstanding military ready
    and able to serve and meet the needs of the Nation.
        Question. If confirmed, do you foresee any problems with
    implementing a repeal of the policy commonly referred to as ``Don't
    Ask, Don't Tell'' in the ROK and USFK, if the President, Secretary of
    Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs make the required
    certification to Congress?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will implement repeal of the policy
    commonly referred to as ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell,'' as directed. I have
    completed the DOD policy repeal training.

                        PREVENTION OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING

        Question. Following media reports connecting prostitution and human
    trafficking in Korea to U.S. military forces, Commander, USFK, in 2004
    instituted a zero tolerance policy regarding the illegal activities of
    prostitution and human trafficking. Under this policy, all USFK
    personnel, military and civilian, as well as contractors and their
    employees, are expected to comply with prohibitions, including
    observance of curfews and laws regarding off-limits areas and
    establishments, aimed at curtailing these practices.
        What effects have changes in U.S. policy, as well as new criminal
    laws implemented by the ROK, had on the incidence of prostitution and
    human trafficking in Korea?
        Answer. It is my understanding that USFK has a zero tolerance
    policy regarding the illegal acts of prostitution and human
    trafficking. The command's policy is built upon a four-prong strategy
    of awareness, identification, reduction, and enforcement. Awareness is
    established and increased through improved education such as mandatory
    prostitution and human trafficking training for all USFK personnel.
    Identification involves the recognition of indicators that an
    establishment may be participating in prostitution and human
    trafficking activities and the procedures to assist victims. Reduction
    occurs through constant Command presence and efforts to increase
    alternative activities available for servicemembers to participate in.
    Finally, the Command pursues aggressive enforcement on illegal
    establishments and offenders. Additionally, USFK regulation requires
    all incoming personnel to be briefed on the Command's policy towards
    prostitution and human trafficking, establishments and areas that have
    been placed off-limits, and on individual conduct and values. As a
    result of this policy and related actions, there has been a steady
    decrease in the number of reports of prostitution and human trafficking
    and the awareness of Command personnel on this important issue has
    increased. I fully support the Command's current policy of awareness,
    identification, reduction, and enforcement, and will continue--and
    improve upon if necessary--this approach if confirmed.
        Question. What further changes, if any, to the Uniform Code of
    Military Justice and military regulations are needed in your judgment
    to ensure maximum effectiveness of the zero tolerance policy?
        Answer. I know of no changes needed to the Uniform Code of Military
    Justice and military regulations. If confirmed, I will continue to be
    alert of the need for any changes.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to further
    enhance the effectiveness of the zero tolerance policy?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the Command's existing policy
    of awareness, identification, reduction, and enforcement, and make
    efforts to sustain and build upon the success achieved to date.

                            CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

        Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
    appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
    briefings, and other communications of information.
        Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
    this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
    even if those views differ from the administration in power?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
    committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
    information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
    with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, UNC/CFC/USFK?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
    other communications of information are provided to this committee and
    its staff and other appropriate committees?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such
    documents?
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

               Question Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman
                        North Korean Nuclear Deterrence

        1. Senator Lieberman. General Thurman, I note that in response to
    an advance policy question submitted to you by this committee, you
    stated that ``the U.S. must maintain its nuclear deterrence capability
    and continue extended deterrence for the Republic of Korea (ROK) until
    such time as North Korea verifiably dismantles its nuclear program.'' I
    would appreciate it if you would expand upon this response, as I am
    concerned it does not fully reflect U.S. policy on extended deterrence
    for the ROK. For example, in a joint communique by the U.S.-ROK
    Security Consultative Meeting issued on October 8, 2010, Secretary of
    Defense Robert Gates ``reaffirmed the continued U.S. commitment to
    provide and strengthen extended deterrence for the ROK, using the full
    range of military capabilities, to include the U.S. nuclear umbrella,
    conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities,'' without
    linking that commitment to the dismantlement of the North Korean
    nuclear program. I thank you again for undertaking this important
    assignment, and look forward to your response to this question.
        General Thurman. I fully support current U.S. policy on extended
    deterrence for the ROK. Specifically, that the United States will use
    the full range of military capabilities to include the nuclear
    umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities,
    without linking the duration of that commitment to dismantlement of
    North Korea's nuclear program. This policy has been established in
    several Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communique as well as in
    the June 2009 Joint Vision of the U.S. and ROK Alliance. My intention
    was not to limit U.S. extended deterrence policy for the ROK in my
    response to the advanced policy question.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

                               KOREAN REALIGNMENT

        2. Senator McCain. General Thurman, do you agree with the
    conclusion of Senator Levin, Senator Webb, and myself that a period of
    review and reassessment is needed to determine whether the base
    realignment plan in Korea is still the right plan?
        General Thurman. I am fully aware of your concerns regarding the
    Command's base relocation plans. My top priority is to review the
    relocation program in order to address the concerns that have been
    raised.

        3. Senator McCain. General Thurman, what is your understanding of
    the cost of this current plan?
        General Thurman. It is my understanding that total costs for the
    Yongsan Relocation Plan and Land Partnership Plan will be about $12
    billion.

        4. Senator McCain. General Thurman, what do you consider to be the
    benefits of current planning for base realignment?
        General Thurman. It is my understanding that the relocation plans
    were developed to address several problems associated with the existing
    basing arrangement. These problems included civilian encroachment, non-
    optimal base locations for the conduct of operations today, and
    declining servicemember quality of life due to aging and deteriorating
    facilities. I have been briefed that the relocation initiatives will
    improve warfighting capabilities by: colocating 2nd Infantry Division
    and the future U.S. Korea Command, enhancing coordination, planning,
    and command and control; reducing 2nd Infantry Division's span of
    control and support infrastructure needs; improving tactical
    flexibility by better positioning 2nd Infantry Division for rapid
    support of either of the forward stationed ROK armies and corps; and
    shortening logistical lines during the initial phase of a conflict. In
    addition to improving these warfighting capabilities, the relocation
    initiatives will also enhance force protection and survivability by
    moving personnel and equipment outside tactical effective range of
    North Korean long-range artillery and improve the ability to conduct
    non-combatant evacuation operations. I have been told that once
    completed, relocation will create stationing efficiencies and optimize
    the Command's use of land in the ROK. Servicemember quality of life
    will be improved through the construction of new and modern facilities.

                      DEPLOYMENT OF ARMY UNITS FROM KOREA

        5. Senator McCain. General Thurman, in your answers to the
    committee's advance policy questions, you stated that the U.S. Forces
    Korea (USFK) Command's transformation initiatives as currently
    structured ``will create the opportunity for U.S. forces stationed in
    the ROK to become available for use in regional exercises, engagement,
    and global operations.'' GAO completed a report last month that
    questioned the cost effectiveness of the tour normalization plan and
    whether Army families would consider it an improvement in quality of
    life if soldiers assigned to South Korea would be required to deploy to
    other regions. Is the extended deployment of U.S. combat forces away
    from Korea consistent with the guidelines contained in the U.S.-ROK
    Defense Cooperation agreement and the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan?
        General Thurman. The deployment of U.S. forces off the Korean
    Peninsula appears to be consistent with mutually agreed upon documents
    between the United States and ROK. For example, the June 2009 Joint
    Vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance states that the two countries are
    building a comprehensive strategic alliance of bilateral, regional, and
    global scope, adding that the ROK will take the lead role in combined
    defense of Korea supported by an enduring U.S. military force presence
    on the Korean Peninsula, in the region, and beyond. The Joint Vision
    further notes that the United States and ROK will work closely to
    address the global challenges of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of
    mass destruction, and piracy, enhancing bilateral coordination on the
    conduct of peacekeeping and post-conflict stabilization operations.
        It is my understanding that the deployment of U.S. forces off the
    Korean Peninsula is consistent with the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan.
    Similarly, the October 2010 Guidelines for U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation
    recognize the importance of close bilateral cooperation to promote
    regional and global peace and stability. With this recognition in mind,
    the guidelines list measures that will be taken to strengthen the
    Alliance's role in enhancing regional and global security. These
    measures are: strengthening capabilities to contribute to regional and
    global peace and stability; supporting the nonproliferation of weapons
    of mass destruction, related materials, technologies, and their means
    of delivery; enhancing bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral defense
    relationships; strengthening cooperation for international security and
    peacekeeping efforts; and cooperating closely on other transnational
    and nontraditional security challenges. The defense guidelines
    recognize the importance of close policy and strategic consultation
    between the United States and ROK for the enhancement of common
    interests and further development of the Alliance. It should be noted,
    however, that U.S. commitment to ROK security remains strong and the
    focus should always be placed on maintaining peace and stability on the
    Korean Peninsula.

        6. Senator McCain. General Thurman, if confirmed, will you be
    comfortable with allowing a portion of the approximately 28,000 U.S.
    forces under your command to be deployed to other regions of the world
    for up to a year while leaving their families in Korea?
        General Thurman. It is my understanding that USFK's current
    transformation initiatives will create the opportunity for U.S. forces
    stationed in the ROK to become available for use in regional exercises,
    engagement, and global operations. Making these forces available for
    activities such as this appears to support objectives established in
    the June 2009 Joint Vision for the U.S. and ROK Alliance. It is my
    intention to conduct a careful and thorough review of the opportunities
    and timing for U.S. forces stationed in Korea to be employed toward the
    support of regional exercises, engagement, and global operations, as
    well as the effect such employment would have on security of the Korean
    Peninsula and military families.

        7. Senator McCain. General Thurman, how is the participation of
    USFK forces in the Army's force generation process consistent with the
    U.S. goal to deter or defeat aggression should it occur?
        General Thurman. It is my intention to conduct a careful and
    thorough review of the effects deploying U.S. forces stationed in the
    ROK to regional exercises and global operations will have on deterring
    and defeating aggression directed at the ROK. Our primary focus must
    remain defense of the ROK.

        8. Senator McCain. General Thurman, could a deployment of a
    sizeable number of U.S. forces away from Korea for a year act as a
    destabilizing event?
        General Thurman. The primary focus of U.S. forces stationed in the
    ROK must be the deterrence of aggression against the ROK and, should
    deterrence fail, defeat of that aggression. My intention is to conduct
    a careful and thorough review of the prospect for employing military
    forces assigned to USFK toward the support of regional exercises and
    global operations and the effect such employment would have on security
    of the Korean Peninsula.

        9. Senator McCain. General Thurman, how would such deployments be
    seen by our ROK allies?
        General Thurman. Through documents such as the June 2009 Joint
    Vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance and October 2010 Guidelines for U.S.-
    ROK Defense Cooperation, the ROK has committed itself to working with
    the United States to address the global challenges of terrorism,
    proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, piracy, and enhance
    bilateral coordination on the conduct of peacekeeping and post-conflict
    stabilization operations. The ROK has also committed itself to
    cooperate with the United States toward the promotion of regional and
    global peace and stability. Thus, there are bilateral agreements
    between the United States and ROK that suggests the latter's openness
    to the deployment of USFK forces to operations off the Korean
    Peninsula. With that being said, my intention is to conduct a careful
    and thorough review of the prospect for employing USFK forces toward
    the support of regional exercises and global operations.

                          TOUR NORMALIZATION IN KOREA

        10. Senator McCain. General Thurman, it has long been a goal of
    commanders of USFK to change from year-long, unaccompanied tours for
    most soldiers assigned to duty in South Korea to a normalized tour of 3
    years, accompanied by dependents. However, the costs of carrying out
    this plan are very high. Building the required family housing,
    Department of Defense (DOD) schools, medical facilities, and so on
    represent an investment that the Army may not be able afford. What is
    your view of the feasibility of the current planning in this regard?
        General Thurman. It is my understanding that the Secretary of
    Defense directed in September 2010 implementation of full tour
    normalization in Korea as affordable and according to no specific
    timeline. The Secretary further directed that a plan be provided on how
    to proceed with tour normalization no later than 31 March 2011. It is
    my further understanding that the Secretary of Defense is currently
    reviewing options to implement the tour normalization initiative. A top
    priority of mine now is to review the tour normalization initiative
    along with the appropriate stakeholders.

        11. Senator McCain. General Thurman, do you support the proposal to
    increase the Overseas Housing Cost of Living Allowance to $5,000 a
    month, per soldier, to pay for family housing?
        General Thurman. It is my understanding that the projected monthly
    Overseas Housing Allowance (OHA) under the Humphreys Housing
    Opportunity Program (HHOP) will be initially set at $4,200. The HHOP
    OHA will be a special rate for HHOP units only. I also understand that
    establishing the OHA rate requires joint approval by the Secretary of
    the Army and Chairman of the Per Diem and Entitlements Committee who
    works within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Personnel and
    Readiness). The Secretary of the Army approved the rate establishment
    on 29 March 2011 and forwarded the request to the Chairman of the Per
    Diem Committee for action. It is my understanding that the request is
    still within the Office of Secretary of Defense (Personnel and
    Readiness). A top priority of mine in the near-term will be a review of
    the Command's transformation program as a whole in order to address
    concerns that have been raised by Congress.

        12. Senator McCain. General Thurman, what is your understanding of
    the current position of Army leadership on this issue?
        General Thurman. It is my understanding that the February 2010
    Quadrennial Defense Review stated that the Defense Department's long-
    term goal is to phase out all unaccompanied tours in Korea. Later that
    year, in September 2010, the Secretary of Defense directed the
    implementation of full tour normalization in the ROK as affordable and
    according to no specific timeline. It is also my understanding that the
    Secretary of Defense is currently reviewing options to implement the
    tour normalization initiative. A top priority of mine is to review the
    tour normalization initiative with all key stakeholders, to include
    Department of Army leadership.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

                                  NORTH KOREA

        13. Senator Inhofe. General Thurman, how does the shifting of U.S.
    forces impact the United Nations' readiness for deterring or repelling
    North Korean attacks?
        General Thurman. I have been briefed that the Command is currently
    implementing a relocation program under the Land Partnership Plan and
    Yongsan Relocation Plan. These plans were developed to address several
    problems associated with the existing basing arrangement. These
    problems included civilian encroachment, non-optimal base locations for
    the conduct of operations today, and declining servicemember quality of
    life due to aging and deteriorating facilities. I have been further
    briefed that the relocation initiatives will improve warfighting
    capabilities by: co-locating 2nd Infantry Division and the future U.S.
    Korea Command, enhancing coordination, planning, and command and
    control; reducing 2nd Infantry Division's span of control and support
    infrastructure needs; improving tactical flexibility by better
    positioning 2nd Infantry Division for rapid support of either of the
    forward stationed ROK armies and corps; and shortening logistical lines
    during the initial phase of a conflict. In addition to improving these
    warfighting capabilities, the relocation initiatives will also enhance
    force protection and survivability by moving personnel and equipment
    outside tactical effective range of North Korean long-range artillery
    and improve the ability to conduct non-combatant evacuation operations.
    A top priority of mine is to review the relocation program underway in
    the ROK to ensure that the Command maintains its ``fight tonight''
    readiness.

        14. Senator Inhofe. General Thurman, are U.S. forces in Korea
    receiving all the equipment they need to fight and win on the
    peninsula?
        General Thurman. [Deleted.]

        15. Senator Inhofe. General Thurman, how will the military
    construction that USFK is requesting contribute to that readiness?
        General Thurman. I have been briefed that USFK has requested three
    military construction projects for fiscal year 2012. These three
    projects are: construction of a barracks complex at Camp Henry (Army);
    construction of a barracks complex at Camp Carroll (Army); and
    construction of a dormitory at Osan Air Base (Air Force). The two Army
    projects are needed so that unaccompanied soldiers can live in barracks
    that comply with new Army standards for security, space, and privacy.
    Current facilities are inadequate and adversely affect soldiers'
    quality of life and morale. The Air Force dormitory will eliminate a
    deficiency in unaccompanied personnel housing and improve quality of
    life for enlisted personnel. Taken as a whole, it is my understanding
    that these three projects will improve soldier quality of life, morale,
    and thus, combat readiness.

        16. Senator Inhofe. General Thurman, how does the normalization of
    tours from 1 year tours to 3 year tours affect our readiness?
        General Thurman. I have been briefed that the tour normalization
    initiative will improve force readiness. Currently, about 85 percent of
    USFK servicemembers rotate each year, just as they have completed Korea
    specific training and the local exercise cycle. This limits the ability
    to achieve the same level of readiness enjoyed by American forces in
    the Continental United States, Europe, and other locations in the
    Pacific region. Conversely, as the proportion of trained military
    personnel in place with 3 year accompanied and 2 year unaccompanied
    tours increases, USFK will see benefits such as improved understanding
    of the region and operational environment, the strengthening of
    relations with our ROK ally, and enhanced ability to support the
    transition of Wartime Operational Control to the ROK. One of my top
    priorities upon arrival in the ROK is to conduct a review of the tour
    normalization initiative and how it will affect combat readiness.

                  SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ENGAGEMENT PROGRAMS

        17. Senator Inhofe. General Thurman, our military-to-military
    (1206), civilian-to-civilian (1207), small-scale special operations
    (1208), Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), and Combatant
    Commander's Initiative Fund (CCIF) have been incredibly successful in
    aiding developing nations, fighting terrorism, and providing resources
    for emergency situations. My belief is that the key to these programs
    has been the combined efforts of DOD, DOS, the chiefs of mission, and
    combatant commanders working together to increase the capabilities of
    our partner nations to provide for their own security, increasing
    stability in their region and around the globe. What value do these
    funds provide in your prospective areas of responsibility?
        General Thurman. In DOD, offices that play a role in management and
    execution of the programs identified in the question above are the
    Office of the Secretary Defense, Joint Staff, and combatant commands.
    As a subunified command, it is my understanding that the USFK Commander
    does not participate in the operation of these programs. Thus, I will
    have to defer to others on this question.

        18. Senator Inhofe. General Thurman, do you have any concerns about
    being able to effectively execute these programs in your prospective
    areas of responsibility?
        General Thurman. As a subunified command, it is my understanding
    that the USFK Commander does not participate in the operation of these
    programs. That being said, it should be noted that by working on a
    daily basis with Korean counterparts to maintain peace and stability on
    the Korean Peninsula, USFK operates a robust engagement program with
    the ROK. This daily engagement is supplemented by USFK's Good Neighbor
    program. Under this program, a host of activities are conducted that
    engage and connect the Command with the local Korean community. Good
    Neighbor events educate, inform, and familiarize Koreans with the
    mission and purpose of USFK. This direct engagement allows Americans
    and Koreans to develop mutual understanding of one another's cultures,
    customs, and lifestyles, often leading to the formation of lifelong
    friendships between members of the two communities. Examples of events
    conducted by the Good Neighbor program include English-language camps,
    speaking engagements by U.S. military personnel, and tours of the Joint
    Security Area/Demilitarized Zone and USFK installations. The program
    promotes two-way exchange between USFK personnel and people of the ROK.
    The program helps foster exchange, understanding, and cooperation
    between members of USFK and the Korean communities that exist beside
    USFK facilities. All of these events strengthen the U.S.-ROK Alliance
    at both the professional and personal levels.
                                     ______

                 Question Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker

                                  GLOBAL HAWK

        19. Senator Wicker. General Thurman, by sharing intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) responsibility with our
    coalition partners, I understand U.S. forces will realize a four-fold
    improvement in coverage over the Korean peninsula beyond Guam-based
    U.S. Air Force Global Hawk assets alone. I also understand USFK will
    have direct access to ISR data coming off a Korean Global Hawk, and
    U.S. and Korean intelligence analysts will continue to work side-by-
    side with Global Hawk data as they do today with U-2 data. Can you
    elaborate on the positive impact ROK acquisition of unmanned aircraft
    system platforms such as Global Hawk will have on American and ROK
    warfighters?
        General Thurman. ROK Global Hawk systems will dramatically increase
    our collection capacity. It means sustained collection for days and
    weeks at a time in crises or combat operations. Our goal is to
    distribute Global Hawk data creating new opportunities for existing
    exploiters and surge capacity in times of crises. Global Hawk in Korea
    provides the means to launch and recover U.S. platforms operating in
    the region. It provides greater capacity for Indications and Warning.
    Global Hawk can range the entire peninsula without risks to aircrews
    from air defense systems. In the hands of our allies, Global Hawk is a
    force multiplier on the peninsula and throughout the region.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte

                  PATRIOT PAC-3 AND GUIDANCE ENHANCED MISSILES

        20. Senator Ayotte. General Thurman, in your responses to the
    advance policy questions, you state that the U.S. Patriot forces
    stationed in South Korea have not received the designated number of
    Patriot PAC-3 and Guidance Enhanced Missiles as per the Secretary of
    Defense's 2008 guidance. Why hasn't the designated number of munitions
    been provided yet to our troops in South Korea?
        General Thurman. [Deleted.]

        21. Senator Ayotte. General Thurman, has there been a subsequent
    policy decision to not provide these missiles to our forces in South
    Korea or is there a lack of capacity in the industrial base?
        General Thurman. No. However, the Joint Capabilities Mix II--and
    now III--studies show that there are not enough missile defense assets
    in the world to keep up with the growing threats. The 2010 Ballistic
    Missile Defense Review acknowledges this fact and describes methods and
    suggestions to deal with this to include burden sharing with our allies
    and ensuring that the missile defense fight is a joint capabilities
    fight using assets and capabilities from all Services to negate and
    defeat the multiple and diverse tactical ballistic missile threats.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of GEN James D. Thurman, USA,
    follows:]

                        Nomination Reference and Report
                               As In Executive Session,
                                   Senate of the United States,
                                                           May 4, 2011.
        Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
    on Armed Services:
        The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Army to the
    grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and
    responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

                                 To be General

        GEN James D. Thurman, 0000.
                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of GEN James D. Thurman, USA,
    which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
    nomination was referred, follows:]
                Biographical Sketch of GEN James D. Thurman, USA
    Source of commissioned service: ROTC.

    Educational degrees:
        East Central University--BA--History
        Webster University--MA--Management

    Military schools attended:
        Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
        U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
        U.S. Army War College

    Foreign language(s): None recorded.

    Promotions:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Date of Appointment
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2LT.......................................  4 Jun 75
    1LT.......................................  4 Jun 77
    CPT.......................................  18 Nov 79
    MAJ.......................................  1 Jan 86
    LTC.......................................  1 Apr 91
    COL.......................................  1 Sep 95
    BG........................................  1 Jan 00
    MG........................................  1 Jan 03
    LTG.......................................  19 Jan 07
    GEN.......................................  3 Jun 10
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Major duty assignments:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  From                        To              Assignment
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Oct 75..........................  Dec 75............  Platoon Leader, A
                                                           Company, 6th
                                                           Battalion, 32d
                                                           Armor, 4th
                                                           Infantry Division
                                                           (Mechanized),
                                                           Fort Carson, CO
    Dec 75..........................  Sep 77............  Platoon Leader,
                                                           Combat Support
                                                           Company, later
                                                           Executive
                                                           Officer, C
                                                           Company, 6th
                                                           Battalion, 32d
                                                           Armor, 4th
                                                           Infantry Division
                                                           (Mechanized),
                                                           Fort Carson, CO
    Oct 77..........................  Dec 77............  Motor Officer, 6th
                                                           Battalion, 32d
                                                           Armor, 4th
                                                           Infantry Division
                                                           (Mechanized),
                                                           Fort Carson, CO
    Dec 77..........................  Sep 78............  Student, Officer
                                                           Rotary Wing
                                                           Aviator Course,
                                                           U.S. Army
                                                           Aviation Center,
                                                           Fort Rucker, AL
    Sep 78..........................  Jan 81............  Aero-Scout Section
                                                           Leader, later,
                                                           Aero-Scout
                                                           Platoon
                                                           Commander, later
                                                           Operations
                                                           Officer, A Troop,
                                                           1st Squadron,
                                                           17th Cavalry, 82d
                                                           Airborne
                                                           Division, Fort
                                                           Bragg, NC
    Jan 81..........................  Sep 81............  Assistant S-3
                                                           (Operations), 1st
                                                           Squadron, 17th
                                                           Cavalry, 82d
                                                           Airborne
                                                           Division, Fort
                                                           Bragg, NC
    Sep 81..........................  May 82............  Student, Armor
                                                           Officer Advanced
                                                           Course, U.S.
                                                           Armor School,
                                                           Fort Knox, KY
    May 82..........................  May 84............  S-3 (Operations),
                                                           Combat Aviation
                                                           Squadron, 11th
                                                           Armored Cavalry
                                                           Regiment, U.S.
                                                           Army Europe and
                                                           Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany
    May 84..........................  May 85............  Commander, B
                                                           Troop, 11th
                                                           Combat Aviation
                                                           Squadron, 11th
                                                           Armored Cavalry
                                                           Regiment, U.S.
                                                           Army Europe and
                                                           Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany
    May 85..........................  Jun 86............  Student, U.S. Army
                                                           Command and
                                                           General Staff
                                                           College, Fort
                                                           Leavenworth, KS
    Jun 86..........................  Feb 87............  S-3 (Operations),
                                                           Apache Training
                                                           Brigade, Fort
                                                           Hood, TX
    Feb 87..........................  Jun 87............  Student, AH-64
                                                           Aviator
                                                           Qualification
                                                           Course, U.S. Army
                                                           Aviation Center,
                                                           Fort Rucker, AL
    Jun 87..........................  Jun 88............  S-3 (Operations),
                                                           Apache Training
                                                           Brigade, Fort
                                                           Hood, TX
    Jul 88..........................  Dec 89............  Executive Officer,
                                                           3d Squadron, 6th
                                                           Cavalry Brigade,
                                                           Fort Hood, TX
    Dec 89..........................  Jun 91............  Executive Officer,
                                                           1st Battalion,
                                                           32d Armor, 1st
                                                           Cavalry Division,
                                                           Fort Hood, TX and
                                                           Operations Desert
                                                           Shield/Storm,
                                                           Saudi Arabia
    Sep 91..........................  Apr 92............  Commander, 2d
                                                           Squadron, 2d
                                                           Armored Cavalry
                                                           Regiment, U.S.
                                                           Army Europe and
                                                           Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany
    Jul 92..........................  Dec 93............  Commander, 3d
                                                           Squadron, 4th
                                                           Cavalry, 3d
                                                           Infantry Division
                                                           (Mechanized),
                                                           U.S. Army Europe
                                                           and Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany
    Dec 93..........................  Jul 94............  G-3 (Operations),
                                                           3d Infantry
                                                           Division
                                                           (Mechanized),
                                                           U.S. Army Europe
                                                           and Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany
    Jul 94..........................  Jun 95............  Student, U.S. Army
                                                           War College,
                                                           Carlisle
                                                           Barracks, PA
    Jun 95..........................  Jun 97............  Commander, 2d
                                                           Brigade, 3d
                                                           Infantry Division
                                                           (Mechanized),
                                                           Fort Stewart, GA
    Jul 97..........................  Jan 99............  Commander,
                                                           Operations Group,
                                                           U.S .Army
                                                           National Training
                                                           Center, Fort
                                                           Irwin, CA
    Jan 99..........................  Jun 00............  Assistant Chief of
                                                           Staff, Plans and
                                                           Policy Division,
                                                           Allied Forces
                                                           Southern Europe,
                                                           Regional Command
                                                           South, Italy
    Jul 00..........................  Aug 02............  Commanding
                                                           General, National
                                                           Training Center
                                                           and Fort Irwin,
                                                           Fort Irwin, CA
    Sep 02..........................  Sep 03............  Director of
                                                           Training, Office
                                                           of the Deputy
                                                           Chief of Staff, G-
                                                           3, U.S. Army, and
                                                           Chief,
                                                           Operations,
                                                           Coalition Forces
                                                           Land Component
                                                           Command,
                                                           Operation Iraqi
                                                           Freedom, Kuwait
    Oct 03..........................  May 04............  Office of the
                                                           Deputy Chief of
                                                           Staff, G-3, U.S.
                                                           Army with duty as
                                                           Director, Army
                                                           Aviation Task
                                                           Force, U.S. Army
                                                           Training and
                                                           Doctrine Command,
                                                           Washington, DC
    Jun 04..........................  Dec 05............  Commanding
                                                           General, 4th
                                                           Infantry Division
                                                           (Mechanized),
                                                           Fort Hood, TX
    Dec 05..........................  Nov 06............  Commanding
                                                           General, 4th
                                                           Infantry Division
                                                           (Mechanized)/
                                                           Commanding
                                                           General, Multi
                                                           National Division-
                                                           Baghdad,
                                                           Operation Iraqi
                                                           Freedom, Iraq
    Nov 06..........................  Jan 07............  Commanding
                                                           General, 4th
                                                           Infantry Division
                                                           (Mechanized),
                                                           Fort Hood, TX
    Jan 07..........................  Aug 07............  Commanding
                                                           General, V Corps,
                                                           U.S. Army Europe
                                                           and Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany
    Sep 07..........................  Apr 10............  Deputy Chief of
                                                           Staff, G-3/5/7,
                                                           U.S. Army,
                                                           Washington, DC
    Jun 10..........................  Present...........  Commanding
                                                           General, U.S.
                                                           Army Forces
                                                           Command, Fort
                                                           McPherson, GA
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Summary of joint assignments:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Date               Grade
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans      Jan 99-Jun 00  Brigadier General
     and Policy Division, Allied
     Forces Southern Europe, Regional
     Command South, Italy.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Summary of operations assignments:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Date               Grade
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Executive Officer, 1st Battalion,    Dec 89-Jun 91  Major/Lieutenant
     32d Armor, 1st Cavalry Division,                    Colonel
     Fort Hood, TX, and Operations
     Desert Shield/Storm, Saudi
     Arabia.
    Director of Training, Office of      Sep 02-Sep 03  Brigadier General/
     the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3,                     Major General
     U.S. Army, and Chief,
     Operations, Coalition Forces
     Land Component Command,
     Operation Iraqi Freedom, Kuwait.
    Commanding General, 4th Infantry     Dec 05-Nov 06  Major General
     Division (Mechanized)/Commanding
     General, Multi-National Division-
     Baghdad, Operation Iraqi
     Freedom, Iraq.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    U.S. decorations and badges:
        Distinguished Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
        Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
        Legion of Merit (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
        Bronze Star Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
        Meritorious Service Medal (with five Oak Leaf Clusters)
        Army Commendation Medal
        Army Achievement Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
        Combat Action Badge
        Parachutist Badge
        Senior Army Aviator Badge
        Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
        Army Staff Identification Badge
                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
    military officers nominated by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by GEN James D.
    Thurman, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]

                              UNITED STATES SENATE
                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                                  Room SR-228
                           Washington, DC 20510-6050
                                 (202) 224-3871
                        COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
          BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

        Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
    more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
    form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
    of your answer applies.
                        Part A--Biographical Information
        Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
    this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
    public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
    any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

        1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
        James D. Thurman.

        2. Position to which nominated:
        Commander, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S.
    Forces Korea.

        3. Date of nomination:
        May 4, 2011.

        4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
        [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
    committee's executive files.]

        5. Date and place of birth:
        September 19, 1953: Gainesville, TX.

        6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
        Married to Delia L. (Hilton) Thurman.

        7. Names and ages of children:
        Jamie C. (Thurman) Brown, age 34.
        Carey L. (Thurman) Thomas, age 32.

        8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
    honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
    or local governments, other than those listed in the service record
    extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
        None.

        9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
    officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
    or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
    enterprise, educational, or other institution.
        None.

        10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
    professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
    other organizations.
        Association of the U.S. Army.
        Army Aviation Association of America.
        American Legion.
        Military Officer Association of America.

        11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
    society memberships, and any other special recognition for outstanding
    service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
    extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
        In 2005, I received the Robert M. Leich Award from the Army
    Association of America for outstanding service to Army Aviation.

        12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
    if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
    constituted committee of the Senate?
        Yes.

        13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
    constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
    those views differ from the administration in power?
        Yes.
                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
    committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
    forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
    Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                    ------

                               Signature and Date
        I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
    on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
    provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
    and complete.
                                                      James D. Thurman.
        This 13th day of February, 2011.

        [The nomination of GEN James D. Thurman, USA, was reported
    to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 29, 2011, with the
    recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
    was confirmed by the Senate on June 30, 2011.]
                                  ----------

        [Prepared questions submitted to VADM William H. McRaven,
    USN, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
    supplied follow:]

                            Questions and Responses

                                DEFENSE REFORMS

        Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
    Reorganization Act of 1986 and subsequent reforms related to Special
    Operations Forces (SOF) have strengthened the warfighting readiness of
    our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of
    command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders'
    responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved
    cooperation between the Services and the combatant commanders, among
    other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of
    military operations.
        Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
    provisions?
        Answer. Yes. Goldwater-Nichols did not meaningfully affect the
    Service manpower/personnel, acquisition, readiness reporting, training
    or other processes. U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), in its
    daily interaction with all Services, must often address each issue in
    four different ways.
        If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in
    these modifications?
        Answer. SOCOM needs greater personnel management authority to shape
    mid- and senior-grade SOF operators to meet SOCOM defined requirements.
    Promotions, selection for command, selection for advanced educational
    opportunities, foreign language testing policy, and foreign language
    proficiency bonus payment policy all differ significantly by Service
    and are all primarily crafted to support Service needs.
        Question. Do you believe that the role of the combatant commanders
    under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies
    and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. From the perspective you have gained in your previous
    assignments, do you believe that the authority and responsibility of
    the combatant commanders, in general, and the Commander, SOCOM, in
    particular, are appropriate?
        Answer. Yes, I believe the combatant commanders generally have
    appropriate authorities. As the Commander of SOCOM, I would seek to
    clarify the responsibilities Geographic Combatant Commanders have for
    supporting their assigned Theater SOCOMs.

                                 QUALIFICATIONS

        Question. What background and experience do you have that you
    believe qualifies you for this position?
        Answer. By experience, training and education I have what is needed
    to lead this extraordinary force now and into the future. I have
    commanded at every level within the special operations community,
    including assignments as Commander Joint Special Operations Command
    (JSOC) and Deputy Commanding General for Operations at JSOC. My service
    in top leadership positions at both Service and joint headquarters has
    prepared me to operate at the senior levels of government, including as
    Director for Strategic Planning in the Office of Combating Terrorism on
    the National Security Council Staff. As Commander U.S. Special
    Operations Command-Europe, I gained valuable experience and built
    useful relationships with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
    and international special operations partners. I also established the
    Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict curriculum at the Naval
    Postgraduate School.

                                 RELATIONSHIPS

        Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
    chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
    and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other
    sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important
    relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your
    understanding of the relationship of the Commander of SOCOM to the
    following offices:
        The Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. The Secretary of Defense is the SOCOM Commander's next
    superior command authority in the chain of command, as your
    introductory paragraph stated. If confirmed, I will look to the
    Secretary of Defense for operational authority to deploy and employ SOF
    as well as Department-level direction in the prioritization and
    accomplishment of the SOCOM mission. The SOCOM Commander owes the
    Secretary of Defense the commander's best military advice on all
    aspects of recruiting, training, equipping, managing and employing SOF
    in support of his, and the President's, national security objectives.
        Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        Answer. The SOCOM Commander coordinates activities through the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As the senior military advisor
    to the President and Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is essential in
    communicating SOF capabilities and requirements to the President and
    Secretary of Defense. Coordination of SOCOM activities ensures that the
    Chairman remains fully informed in support of his responsibilities and
    for coordination of SOCOM staff and the Joint Staff efforts to meet
    Presidential and Secretary of Defense directed taskings.
        Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)).
        Answer. The USD(P) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to
    the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for all
    matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy. The
    USD(P) develops, coordinates and oversees the implementation of a wide
    variety of Department policy, including matters related to planning,
    programming, budgeting, and execution of special operations activities,
    including civil affairs and psychological operations, and of low-
    intensity conflict activities, including counter-terrorism, support to
    insurgency, and contingency operations. USD(P) also exercises
    authority, direction and control over the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and
    Interdependent Capabilities (ASD(SO/LIC/IC)) who is responsible for
    overall supervision of special operations activities. If confirmed, I
    will work closely with USD(P) to ensure SOCOM activities are closely
    aligned with Department policies.
        Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)).
        Answer. The USD(I) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to
    the Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence, counterintelligence,
    security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters.
    If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with USD(I), particularly
    to ensure the intelligence requirements of SOF in the field are met.
        Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)).
        Answer. The USD(AT&L) is the principal staff assistant and advisor
    to the Secretary of Defense for all matters relating to the DOD
    Acquisition System, including procurement; research, development, test
    and evaluation; military construction; and nuclear, chemical, and
    biological defense programs. If confirmed, I will closely coordinate
    SOCOM acquisition activities with USD(AT&L) to ensure SOCOM procurement
    efforts are closely aligned with Department procurement processes and
    priorities.
        Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
    Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities
    (ASD(SO/LIC/IC)).
        Answer. The ASD(SO/LIC/IC) is the principal staff assistant and
    civilian advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P))
    and the Secretary of Defense on special operations matters. The
    principal duty of the ASD(SO/LIC/IC) is the overall supervision of
    special operations activities within the Department of Defense (DOD),
    including SOCOM. As I state in subsequent responses, the SOCOM
    Commander works closely with ASD(SO/LIC/IC) in the execution of his
    ``Service-like'' authorities under 10 U.S.C. section 167.
        Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
    Security Affairs.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Assistant
    Secretary, and with U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command
    (CENTCOM), and U.S. Africa Command, to ensure the effective employment
    of SOF capability in support of national security objectives in the
    Europe, the Middle East and Africa. I am particularly interested in
    developing an enduring relationship with the newly established NATO SOF
    Headquarters, and look forward to working with the Assistant Secretary
    in developing policies in support of NATO SOF Headquarters.
        Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific
    Security Affairs.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Assistant
    Secretary, and with U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), to ensure the
    effective employment of SOF capability in support of national security
    objectives in the Asian and Pacific regions.
        Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
    and Americas' Security Affairs.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Assistant
    Secretary in developing SOCOM's role in Homeland Defense, and in
    support of civil authorities, to determine the special operations
    support necessary to protect the United States and its citizens during
    domestic emergencies.
        Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic
    Affairs.
        Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Assistant
    Secretary in support of his efforts to develop policy on countering
    weapons of mass destruction and cyber security issues, two areas of
    abiding interest for SOF.
        Question. The Service Secretaries.
        Answer. The SOCOM Commander's authority over the Service
    components, and those forces assigned to him, is clear in the
    Goldwater-Nichols Act, but requires close coordination with the Service
    Secretaries to ensure that SOCOM does not intrude upon each Service
    Secretary's legal responsibilities. Close coordination between the
    SOCOM Commander and each of the Service Secretaries is also essential
    to gaining and maintaining the Services' support of SOF with support
    units from the general purpose forces and with service-common materiel.
        Question. The Service Chiefs.
        Answer. Without the full support and cooperation of the Service
    Chiefs, the SOCOM Commander cannot ensure the preparedness of his
    assigned forces to execute his assigned missions. The Joint Chiefs are
    also a source of experience and judgment that every combatant commander
    may call upon. If confirmed, I will continue a full and frank dialog
    with the Service Chiefs.
        Question. The other combatant commanders.
        Answer. Successive SOCOM Commanders have fostered an atmosphere of
    teamwork and trust in their relationships with the combatant
    commanders. These relationships have only strengthened over the last 10
    years, and certainly since SOCOM has been responsible for synchronizing
    counterterrorist operations after September 11. If confirmed, I will
    continue to work closely with the other Combatant Commanders to achieve
    our common objectives against transnational terrorist threats and
    violent extremist organizations.
        Question. The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.
        Answer. SOCOM is actively engaged in support of the National
    Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and has been since it was established
    after September 11. SOCOM also relies upon NCTC estimates and reports
    in the refinement and synchronization of counterterrorist operations,
    and will continue to assist NCTC to achieve our common objectives
    against transnational terrorist threats and violent extremist
    organizations.
        Question. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
        Answer. SOCOM and its subordinate elements are consumers of CIA
    products and analysis. If confirmed, I will ensure that SOCOM continues
    to develop interoperable capabilities so that, when directed by the
    President or Secretary of Defense, we may work efficiently in close
    partnership to accomplish our assigned missions.
                        major challenges and priorities
        Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
    the next Commander of SOCOM?
        Answer. I believe Admiral Olson, in his 2011 Posture Statement,
    clearly laid out the major challenges that will confront the next
    Commander of SOCOM. These seven major challenges are discussed
    individually below (not necessarily in priority order) and I have laid
    out what I believe are each of their main drivers.

        1.  Carefully and deliberately meet the ever-increasing demand for
    SOF.

        The SOF community has seen these challenges take shape over the
    last several years, and I see these same challenges continuing as SOF
    remain a first choice for many military operations.
        First, we must carefully and deliberately meet the ever-increasing
    demand for SOF. Since September 11, SOF manpower has roughly doubled,
    the budget has roughly tripled, and the overseas deployments have
    quadrupled. Demand is outpacing supply, but we cannot grow more than 3-
    5 percent every year or we risk compromising the quality of the force.
    Simply stated, more SOF cannot be created overnight. Our ``new normal''
    is a persistently engaged, forward-based force to prevent and deter
    conflict and, when needed, act to disrupt and defeat threats. Long-term
    engagement is a hedge against crises that require major intervention
    and engagement positions us to better sense the environment and act
    decisively when necessary. The ``new normal,'' however, translates into
    increased demand for SOF. The pace of the last 10 years is indicative
    of what we expect for the next 10 years.

        2.  Improve and expand our tactical and operational level skills,
    equipment, and systems.

        The strategic challenges facing our Nation are numerous and many
    may not be foreseen. Virtually all will continue to emanate from the
    incredibly dynamic and increasingly complex global environment. The
    next SOCOM Commander will be challenged to ensure our special operators
    are properly trained and equipped to fulfill the high degree of
    expectations the Nation places on our special operators. They must
    excel under the most demanding conditions while accomplishing some of
    the most difficult and sensitive tasks regardless of the environment or
    the difficulty.
        Our special operators are supported by technology, mobility and
    communications systems that allow SOF to share information, rapidly
    move, tactically maneuver, and strategically influence the
    environment--whether via direct strike or indirect means. Our
    technology edge needs to be maintained to retain the capability to
    execute our missions.

        3.  Preserve our proposed budget levels and authorities.

        Managing and preserving SOCOM's Major Force Program-11 (MFP-11)
    funding within the current and future budget discussions is perhaps the
    major challenge facing the next SOCOM Commander. At the forefront of
    this challenge is acknowledging that many of the current expenditures
    are funded by Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. The
    Department has made a commitment to phase the OCO funding into SOCOM's
    baseline requirement, but the command will continue to rely on OCO
    funding over the next few years as the phased transfer to the base
    budget occurs. The next SOCOM Commander must acknowledge our Nation's
    current fiscal condition will focus attention on the Department thus
    creating the challenge to preserving the baseline for MFP-11. The
    current and future demand for SOF capabilities and foundational
    activities will exceed force deployment capacity. SOCOM infrastructure
    and readiness accounts have not kept pace with SOF growth or demand.
    Current operations will pressure future development and limit required
    modernization and recapitalization efforts. While the new baseline
    budget will be questioned, the new SOCOM commander will be challenged
    to deliver the required capabilities in a fiscally constrained
    environment knowing the budget without OCO transition does not fully
    resource the command.
        Part of this major challenge includes monitoring and understanding
    the stress the Service budgets are facing and the impacts it will have
    on their ability to meet established and future SOCOM requirements for
    forces, capabilities and platforms. Operationally important Service
    provided capabilities that enable SOF success in the field will be
    stressed and potentially unfunded. MFP-11 is used to address ``SOF-
    peculiar'' requirements; it cannot be used to deliver these basic
    building blocks or to generate new SOF capabilities to cover for
    fiscally limited service-provided capabilities.

        4.  Find better structures and processes to obtain Service-provided
    capabilities.

        With SOF growth constrained to 3-5 percent annually, effectively
    meeting the growing demand for our force can only be met through the
    commitment of the Military Services to attach supporting and enabling
    forces at a commensurate rate. It is a ``SOF Truth'' that most SOF
    operations require non-SOF support. This is true for the acquisition
    process, personnel policies, and the preparation and execution of the
    full range of SOF operations.

        5.  Continue to improve our acquisition speed and agility.

        ``More'' is not always the best answer and should not be the first
    answer. The speed and agility of SOCOM acquisition authority is
    achieved through Title 10 authority, its own budget line from Congress
    in the appropriation process, and being chartered to purchase non-
    mainstream military equipment, also known as special operations
    peculiar equipment procured using MPF-11. MPF-11 grants SOCOM the
    authority to purchase equipment, material, services, and supplies
    required for special operations mission support for which there is no
    conventional service requirement.

        6.  Better understand the people and conditions in the places we
    go, whether to assist or fight.

        One of the Command's top challenges is to better understand the
    people and conditions in the places we go, whether to assist or fight.
    Indeed, understanding the operational context of the environments in
    which we operate is a hallmark of SOF.
        Our complex, dynamic world presents ambiguous problems that
    challenge our Nation's national security and interests. SOCOM's
    strategic appreciation of these challenges stresses the importance of
    deeper knowledge of micro-regional geography, history, languages,
    religions, cultures and traditions, to enable SOF to conduct its
    activities with more predictable outcomes.
        Developing this deep experience and high level of knowledge
    requires cultivating an agile intellectual posture within our force and
    maintaining persistent presence with partners and populations in
    diverse locations around the globe.

        7.  As our most solemn duty, look after the health and well-being
    of this magnificent force from whom we ask so much.

        As the Commander, I would consider it my responsibility to ensure
    we are doing the most we can to support our teams and families in
    recognition of the vital role they play in our national security--there
    is no greater responsibility.
        Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
    challenges?
        Answer.

        1.  Carefully and deliberately meet the ever-increasing demand for
    SOF.

        I see the need to maintain the maximum growth rate of 3 to 5
    percent per year. I also see the need to match this growth and the SOF
    demand with commensurate levels of Military Services' provided
    capabilities that enable SOF to accomplish its mission. We were
    designed to rely on the Services to meet most of our combat support and
    combat service support requirements. I intend to continue SOCOM's
    efforts with the Services to implement a way to align SOF demand with
    these Service-provided capabilities.
        I will provide my best special operations military advice to the
    Chairman and the Secretary of Defense on how to best use SOF to ensure
    we are optimizing our contribution to national security. Given the
    competing demands for SOF, we will need to be judicious and rigorous in
    our approach to support the Geographic Combatant Commanders and to do
    our part in support of national strategies and global campaign plans.
    Not all missions are appropriate for SOF, and we must guard against
    accepting missions at the expense of those operations requiring our
    unique skills and capabilities.
        Lastly, if confirmed, I intend to continue the SOCOM initiatives to
    adapt how we train, deploy, and reset SOF for the ``new normal.'' The
    force is fraying, but we can stop the stress on the force by pursuing
    innovative ways that provide a predictable deployment pattern that
    accomplishes our missions while sustaining our force and protecting our
    people and families.

        2.  Improve and expand our tactical and operational level skills,
    equipment, and systems.

        Success increasingly depends upon the larger combination of
    defense, diplomacy, and development activities. Long term success will
    depend more and more on SOF individuals that are selected and have
    expertise for the regions that they are going to habitually operate in.
    Our culture and language programs can be augmented to enhance our sub-
    regional and micro-regional knowledge, awareness and understanding.
    Efforts in training and personnel management can create better
    opportunities for our personnel to build the productive and enduring
    relationships we desire.
        In addition to a focus on the SOF operator, mobility enabling
    capabilities are a focal point in the existing SOCOM Strategic Plan;
    and technology areas seen as vital to intervention capability will also
    continue as focus areas for SOCOM research and development.
        Finally, we must preserve our SOF buying power by critically
    assessing what we buy and prioritizing that which is most important
    while ensuring that the required service-provided capabilities are
    properly resourced.

        3.  Preserve our proposed budget levels and authorities.

        First, I must ensure there is a clear understanding and support for
    the necessity of establishing and sustaining the new baseline budget
    through the transition of OCO funding into SOCOM's baseline. OCO to
    baseline does not grow the force; it only preserves the command's
    existing capabilities and current level of effort. The current and
    future demand for SOF capabilities makes this a top priority.
    Preserving MFP-11 budget levels is critical in ensuring SOF can meet
    the Nation's requirements, which is the SOCOM Commander's primary
    responsibility. MFP-11 provides for the advanced and unique training
    recently demonstrated in Pakistan. It enables the timely and flexible
    fielding of equipment, and the capability to rapidly and effectively
    project our force. A decrease in the Command's budget level would
    severely impact my ability to meet the demand for SOF and significantly
    increase the risk to our Nation's security. The importance of this
    issue is highlighted in the Command's fiscal year 2012 budget
    submission where 34 percent of the total MFP-11 request is OCO funding.
    For some higher intensity SOF elements, the OCO percentage is greater
    than 75 percent. Without this transition, mission failure is a real
    possibility.

        4.  Find better structures and processes to obtain Service-provided
    capabilities.

        For acquisition matters, regular Acquisition Summits with the
    Military Services create enhanced transparency and effectiveness in
    finding common solutions for Service-wide requirements, which in turn
    allows SOCOM to better invest in SOF-peculiar modifications and special
    capabilities. For operational matters, a new SOF Force Generation
    process (SOFORGEN) will be fully synchronized with the Military
    Services, and fully operational by fiscal year 2013. SOFORGEN will
    identify Service-provided requirements in advance, allowing the
    development of habitual relationships for training and operations,
    thereby ensuring best possible support to the Geographic Combatant
    Commanders.

        5.  Continue to improve our acquisition speed and agility.

        The speed and agility of SOCOM acquisition authority coupled with
    leveraging general purpose forces and service support mechanisms
    enables Special Operations to remain decisive on the battlefield.
    Working closely with the Services we have identified priorities to
    ensure there is no redundancy. We have taken the initiative to divest
    ourselves of equipment that is not core to the SOF mission. We have
    focused ourselves by disposing of obsolete, redundant or marginally
    beneficial capabilities. Leveraging acquisition ensures that special
    operations peculiar equipment necessary to confront the enemy is there
    when needed most and with the speed to ensure it meets the needs of the
    operator.

        6.  Better understand the people and conditions in the places we
    go, whether to assist or fight.

        SOCOM will maintain and support a number of initiatives the Command
    has recently developed and implemented, which have shown promising
    potential and early progress toward meeting these challenges. For
    example, SOCOM will continue to review and coordinate changes to
    Service personnel policies to further incentivize language pay for key
    languages such as Pashto, Dari and Arabic, and increase the number of
    career SOF individuals in advanced language training. In order to gain
    the greater levels of nuanced understanding possessed by indigenous
    populations, SOCOM will continue to strongly support DOD's Military
    Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) and the Army's
    Intermediate and Advanced Language Programs (IALP) to recruit and
    access the requisite expertise provided by native speakers.
    Additionally, our attached female Cultural Support Teams (CSTs) allow
    us to reach key elements of the population in some environments which
    was not previously possible.
        Furthermore, SOCOM will continue to expand our base of global
    expertise, pursue every opportunity to strengthen our overseas
    presence, and develop meaningful personal relationships with key
    foreign military leaders. To enhance current battlefield effectiveness,
    SOCOM will strive for repetitive deployments by individuals and small
    teams to the same locations. More broadly, SOCOM will participate in
    academic symposia and seminars, and place SOF members in key positions
    in U.S. Missions abroad, as well as foreign military units and
    headquarters. In addition, SOCOM will pursue career incentives that
    place value on regional and micro-regional expertise and determine a
    process that allows us to track and assign Foreign Area Officers with
    prior SOF experience back into SOF units.

        7.  As our most solemn duty, look after the health and well-being
    of this magnificent force from whom we ask so much.

        SOF warriors face an increased operational tempo which will not
    abate even after eventual drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan due to the
    nature of ``new normal'' strategic environment that will require
    increasing SOF presence. To help SOF warriors and their families cope
    with the psychological hardships that accompany extended separation and
    the trauma that comes from violent armed conflict, and most critically
    to our wounded warriors, SOCOM has created the Care Coalition and is
    committed to the Tactical Human Optimization, Rapid Rehabilitation and
    Reconditioning (THOR3) Program. Both programs work with governmental
    and non-governmental organizations, to provide top-notch, personalized
    support and to physically and psychologically wounded SOF warriors and
    their families at multiple locations throughout CONUS. Through the Care
    Coalition and the Chaplaincy, SOCOM will continue to focus on improving
    the standard of living, happiness, and support of SOF warriors and
    their families.
        Question. What are the most important lessons you have learned
    during your tenure in senior leadership positions in the special
    operations community?
        Answer.

        1.  The SOF operator is the ``platform'' for special operations and
    we must always remain focused on this over what he carries with him to
    execute the mission. While material is important, the operator is the
    primary concern.
        2.  The world's strategic environment has evolved toward one that
    is characterized more by Irregular Warfare activity rather than major
    nation state warfare. We must confront this ``new normal'' and posture
    our forces to be successful in it.
        3.  Partnerships are keys to success. The complex challenges of the
    world demand a more global approach to solving problems with those who
    share our interests. Part of the partnership building is within our own
    Interagency--building those relationships and trust that will build
    unity of effort in whole-of-government approaches to addressing
    problems.
        4.  Reputation is everything. We must work everyday to be the best
    that we can be, the most prepared, the best skilled operators in the
    world.
        5.  SOF continues to provide unique options for complex problems.
    The agility and diverse capabilities of our force, from long-term
    engagement to rapid lethal operations, make SOF a first choice for many
    military operations.

        Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
    in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Commander of SOCOM?
        Answer. As the Commander of Joint SOCOM and a member of the SOCOM
    and SOF Board of Directors I helped to craft the Command's current
    touchstone priorities of Mission, People, and Equipment. I believe
    these have served the Command well and will continue to do so in the
    future. Specifically, if confirmed, I will focus my efforts to enhance
    our efforts under each area using the following focus areas:

            1.  Mission

                     Deter, Disrupt, and Defeat Terrorist Threats

                             Plan and conduct special operations
                             Emphasize persistent, culturally-
                            attuned engagement
                             Foster interagency cooperation

            2.  People

                     Develop and Support our People and Families
                             Focus on quality
                             Care for our people and families
                             Train and educate the joint warrior/
                            diplomat

            3.  Equipment

                     Sustain and Modernize the force
                             Equip the operator
                             Upgrade SOF mobility
                             Obtain persistent intelligence,
                            surveillance, and reconnaissance systems
                          civilian oversight of socom
        Question. The 1986 Special Operations legislation assigned
    extraordinary authority to the Commander of SOCOM, to conduct some of
    the functions of both a military service and a unified combat command.
        Which civilian officials in DOD exercise civilian oversight of the
    ``Service-like'' authorities of the Commander, SOCOM?
        Answer. The ASD(SO/LIC/IC) is the principal staff assistant and
    civilian advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P))
    and the Secretary of Defense on special operations matters. The
    principal duty of the ASD(SO/LIC/IC) is the overall supervision of
    special operations activities within DOD, including SOCOM.
        SOCOM also coordinates with the USD(P), Under Secretary of Defense
    (Acquisition and Technology), USD(AT&L), and Under Secretary of Defense
    (Comptroller) on matters within their jurisdiction which touch upon the
    SOCOM Commander's ``service-like'' authorities under 10 U.S.C. section
    167. The SOCOM Commander and his staff works closely with USD(P),
    USD(AT&L), and the Comptroller, and their staffs, to ensure SOCOM's
    programs are aligned with DOD acquisitions policies and are
    appropriately funded.
        Question. In your view, what organizational relationship should
    exist between the ASD (SO/LIC) and the Commander, SOCOM?
        Answer. The ASD(SO/LIC/IC)'s role, as described above and in
    subsequent responses to your questions, describes the organizational
    relationship as it exists--and as it should continue to exist--between
    ASD(SO/LIC/IC) and the SOCOM Commander.
        Question. What should be the role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in preparation
    and review of Major Force Program 11 and the SOCOM's Program Objective
    Memorandum?
        Answer. ASD(SO/LIC/IC) is directed by the Deputy Secretary of
    Defense to provide overall supervision of the preparation and
    justification of SOF programs and budget; review and approve memoranda
    of agreement governing the SOCOM program, budget, and execution
    process; approve the SOCOM recommendations concerning which programs
    the SOCOM Commander will execute directly; review the SOCOM Program
    Objectives Memoranda (POM) and budget prior to submission to the
    Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation and the DOD Comptroller,
    respectively; and present and defend the SOF program to Congress, with
    the advice and assistance of the SOCOM Commander. I believe these
    duties describe the appropriate role for ASD(SO/LIC/IC) in oversight
    and support of SOCOM.
        Question. What is the appropriate role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in the
    research and development and procurement functions of the SOCOM?
        Answer. Working with the SOCOM Commander and the SOCOM Acquisition
    Executive, the ASD(SO/LIC/IC) advises and coordinates with the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
    (USD(AT&L)) on acquisition priorities and requirements for special
    operations-peculiar material and equipment. I do not presently
    recommend any changes to ASD(SO/LIC/IC)'s role in research and
    development and procurement functions of SOCOM.
        Question. What is the appropriate role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in the
    operational planning of missions that involve SOF, whether the
    supported command is SOCOM, a Geographic Combatant Command (GCC), or
    another department or agency of the U.S. Government?
        Answer. Through his broad policy, coordination and oversight roles
    as the principle staff assistant and civilian advisor on special
    operations matters, the ASD(SO/LIC/IC) reviews the procedures and
    provides policy guidance to the SOCOM Commander on all aspects of
    special operations planning, including contingency planning when
    directed by the President or Secretary of Defense.

                              COMBATING TERRORISM

        Question. What is your understanding of the Department's strategy
    for combating terrorism?
        Answer. The current Unified Command Plan (UCP), 06 Apr 2011,
    designates the Commander, SOCOM, as responsible for synchronizing
    planning for global operations against terrorist networks, including
    the integration of DOD strategy, plans, and intelligence priorities for
    operations against terrorist networks designated by Secretary of
    Defense (Pg 24, Para 17). The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)
    assigns Commander, SOCOM, the responsibility to prepare the DOD (vice
    SOCOM) Global CT Campaign Plan, and to perform as the global
    synchronizer for planning (JSCP fiscal year 2008, Enclosure G, Appendix
    A, Para. 2).
        Question. What are the roles and responsibilities of the Commander
    of SOCOM within the Department's combating terrorism strategy and how
    would you fulfill such responsibilities if confirmed?
        Answer. Practical implementation of global CT synchronization
    occurs throughout the development of the DOD Global CT Campaign Plan
    (CAMPLAN 7500) and its revisions, and in the parallel development of
    the GCCs' subordinate regional CT plans. Specifically, through the
    Joint Planning Working Groups, comprised and represented by all GCCs
    and FCCs, led by HQ SOCOM, regional objectives/intermediate military
    objectives, tailored 7500 Lines of Operation (LOO), and planning and
    assessment tasks, are agreed upon. Further, certain cross-area of
    responsibility (AOR) threat actor sets are assigned to specific GCCs
    for Supported or Supporting planning for Flexible Response Options. The
    regional (GCC) plans will have an in-progress review, either
    simultaneously or serially, at the Under Secretary level, allowing
    policy leader's visibility on GCC planning focus and priorities in each
    AOR.
        Question. Are there steps the Department should take to better
    coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other Federal
    departments and agencies?
        Answer. Joint Staff J5 and USD(P) leadership is vital to advise
    planners of changes in Department priorities (e.g. resource
    availability, threat focus, interagency issues, IPR types and
    scheduling) when they occur. Further, as the 's Global CT plan, CONPLAN
    7500's alignment with the key national strategic documents should the
    Secretary of Defense be validated from the policy perspective. Finally,
    the indirect LOO concerning partner capacity building and eroding or
    discrediting of violent extremist narratives are areas where the Joint
    Staff and USD(P) can provide oversight and collaboration guidance for
    interagency review and validation events such as Promote Cooperation.

                                  AFGHANISTAN

        Question. What is your assessment of the current situation in
    Afghanistan? What are the weaknesses and shortcomings in the current
    effort to combat terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan?
        Answer. General Petraeus' population centric campaign strategy is
    yielding its intended results. Although hard won, we are witnessing a
    reversal in Taliban Momentum since 2005, hundreds of Taliban are
    integrating, Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA)
    capacity is increasing, security force competencies are improving and
    the GIROA's span of influence is beginning to impact a larger segment
    of the rural population. Security and governance are evolving across
    the country and as a result we are seeing an incremental shift in
    popular opinion toward the GIROA. As you can readily recognize, a
    myriad of political, operational and economic challenges remain, but we
    are employing the appropriate methodology and it is producing success.
        Those weaknesses and shortcomings will arise not from the strategy
    or the efforts of our soldiers, marines, airmen, and civilians on the
    ground, but from diminished resourcing, lack of long-term commitment
    and any decrease in international assistance. These are the obstacles
    we must avoid to ensure success.
        Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role of SOF in
    Afghanistan, and the proper relationship between direct action and
    counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations there?
        Answer. Counterterrorism (CT) and Counterinsurgency (COIN) are
    inextricably linked in Afghanistan. There must be a balanced and
    measured approach to their application. CT efforts including direct
    action shape the environment and create conditions necessary for the
    causes of instability to be address, enabling governance capacity
    development, Afghan Security Force evolution and economic opportunity.
    However, CT efforts by themselves, offer no long-term chance at
    establishing stability and it is for this exact reason that SOF-led
    Village Stability Program is so important for future progress.
        Question. General Petraeus and others have emphasized the
    importance of the Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local
    Police (ALP) programs to the strategy in Afghanistan.
        What has been the effect of these programs on rural Afghan
    populations and what has been the response from the Taliban?
        Answer. VSO has focused on security, governance, and development
    simultaneously. It is a bottom-up approach linking governance to the
    village level. In the span of approximately 1 year, VSO has expanded
    GIROA influence in key rural areas from 1,000 Sq km to 23,500 Sq km
    today, roughly the size of the East Tennessee Valley or Lake Erie.
    Growth has been exponential since April 2010 and across Afghanistan we
    are witnessing increasing numbers of local communities requesting to
    participate in this GIROA program. Five sites have already transitioned
    to Afghan Government control, which is one measure of the GIROA's
    evolving capacity. The ALP program, the armed neighborhood watch
    association with VSO establishment by President Karzi has grown into
    the thousands and the Afghan Ministry of the Interior projects numbers
    nearing 10,000 by the summer of 2012. VSO has also enabled a massive
    expansion in small scale infrastructure development in these key rural
    areas. Approximately 2,000 development projects have demonstrated GIROA
    legitimacy in areas that have remained disenfranchised and ignored
    since 2001. These security and developmental successes combined with an
    aggressive GIROA governance mentoring effort are definitively changing
    popular attitude. It is empowering local communities, providing hope to
    historically disenfranchised segments of the population and as a result
    it is eroding support for the Taliban, denying them safe-haven and
    ultimately creating the conditions for long-term stability.
        As a result, the Taliban have mounted an aggressive intimidation,
    assassination and disruption effort against GIROA officials and
    supportive populations. Despite these efforts however, we are
    witnessing ALP capturing insurgents, District Leaders requesting
    permissions to participate in VSO and ALP. In the south and west and
    north, this trend continues and increasing numbers of low-level and
    mid-level Taliban leaders are seeking reintegration.
        Question. Do you believe the availability of U.S. Special
    Operations teams is a limiting factor in expanding these programs to a
    point where they can have a strategic impact in Afghanistan?
        Answer. Yes, the expansion of this effort depends largely now on
    the growth of SOF teams and enablers. Our combined teams are producing
    strategic changes presently and additional SOF force structure will
    demonstrably expand this effect across the country.
        Question. How do indirect approaches like Village Stability
    Operations and Afghan Local Police Programs compliment direct action
    counterterrorism missions within the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan?
        Answer. Village Stability Operations are the foundation of General
    Petraeus' population centric campaign strategy in key rural areas
    across Afghanistan. Counterterrorism efforts compliment these rural
    efforts by shaping and managing the security environment where these
    indirect approaches are pursued. One is no less or more important than
    the other; they are separate and distinct efforts that must, and are
    working in tandem to achieve immediate and enduring stability.
        Question. President Karzai has criticized ``night raids'' carried
    out by U.S. and coalition SOF in Afghanistan and alleged that they
    frequently result in civilian casualties.
        What steps have SOF taken to avoid civilian casualties and other
    collateral damage resulting from counterterrorism missions?
        Answer. This is a very sensitive issue for our SOF operating in
    Afghanistan. They have applied multiple approaches to minimize the
    potentialities for civilian casualties.

        1.  All of our forces receive formal instruction in theater
    tactical directives pertaining to civilian casualties (CIVCAS).
        2.  Every operation is conducted with our Afghan counterparts and
    they are always in the lead during entry of compounds and call-outs.
        3.  Escalation of force measures are strictly followed.
        4.  Full integration of Afghan Security Force leadership in the
    planning, execution, and post-operation phases has occurred to ensure
    full transparency and enable their leadership to balance risk, cultural
    considerations, and operational requirements.
        5.  Our Afghan partners, as well as our own commands strive to keep
    district and provincial political leadership appraised of all
    operations.
        6.  Employment of close air support and indirect forces is a more
    closely managed effort at every level of command today.

        CIVCAS is the exception today, not a commonality in SOF operations.
    These multiple efforts have a combined effect of reducing opportunities
    for CIVCAS and mitigating it when in the off chance it does occur.

                                    PAKISTAN

        Question. The relationship between the United States and Pakistan
    has often been described as tumultuous and the effects on this
    relationship of the operation that killed Osama bin Laden on May 1,
    2011, remain to be seen. Concerns from senior Pakistani officials
    related to the presence of SOF in the country could negatively impact
    training and advising activities designed to counter al Qaeda, the
    Taliban, and the Haqqani Network.
        What is your assessment of the military-to-military relationship
    between the United States and Pakistan?
        Answer. Our military-to-military relationship with Pakistan remains
    positive overall, particularly at the unit level. However, periodic
    events within the region, oftentimes beyond the United States' or DOD's
    control, create temporary strains at the senior level. As with most
    military-to-military of this nature, relationships, personalities play
    a key role and must be maintained and nurtured over the long term. SOF
    has a long history of military-to-military relations with Pakistan. The
    creation and stand-up of the Office of Defense Representative--Pakistan
    (ODRP) and SOCOM Central (Forward)--Pakistan (SOC(FWD)-PAK) has
    enhanced and continues to foster our military-to-military relations
    with Pakistan. Since 2008, ODRP and SOC(FWD)-PAK have cultivated the
    military-to-military relationship on a daily basis with much success.
    Over the years, many enduring personal relationships have been
    established and benefit both Pakistan and the United States. I can only
    speak for U.S. SOF, but I expect it also holds true for ODRP that I
    expect these relationships and new ones to continue to grow and
    strengthen the relationship between Pakistan and the United States.
        Question. In your assessment, how important is the U.S.-Pakistan
    military-to-military relationship to the success of our
    counterterrorism strategy?
        Answer. Our national and military strategy is based on the direct
    and indirect approach. Our military-to-military relationships with
    Pakistan, along with other partner nations, are part of that indirect
    approach and are critical to the success of our counterterrorism
    strategy. The United States cannot win the war on terrorism alone.
    Wherever possible, we must garner support of partner nations so they
    can combat terrorism within their nations' borders. The Pakistanis are
    a key partner in the war on terror. Our military-to-military
    relationship has assisted the Pakistanis with their successes in
    countering insurgent networks within their borders. Maintaining a
    strong military-to-military relationship is vital for Pakistan to enjoy
    continued success. From training and equipping to infrastructure
    enhancements, all are key components in developing and fostering out
    military-to-military relationship with Pakistan. Maintaining a properly
    balanced U.S. military presence of SOF personnel and Office of Defense
    Representatives--Pakistan personnel enable us to cultivate and enhance
    our relationship.

                                      IRAQ

        Question. From your perspective as Commander, JSOC, what are the
    main ``lessons learned'' from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation New
    Dawn?
        Answer. Both operations have provided us with many lessons learned
    which we have incorporated into our current operations. Some of these
    lessons include: the need for a unified U.S. Government approach,
    active and integrated interagency coordination, the necessity for
    culturally attuned forces and the need to maximize combined operations.
    U.S. military and government efforts need to be synergized to provide a
    focused effort while reducing the likelihood of duplication and opposed
    efforts. Interagency integration is essential in our fight against
    violent extremism. Some of our greatest accomplishments would not have
    come to fruition without this coordinated effort. Our forces are now
    more culturally sensitive than ever before, greater language skills and
    incorporating female military personnel into our post operations
    activities have allowed our forces greater access and integration with
    the Iraqi and Afghan civilian populace. Lastly, we have maximized our
    combined operation efforts by working with and through the host nation
    forces. Every operation is coordinated with the Government of Iraq and
    Afghanistan and the Iraqi and Afghan Partnering Units. These combined
    operations are not only doing a tremendous job in accomplishing the
    mission but, also help enable and empower the Iraqi and Afghan SOF for
    future success.
        Question. As conventional forces continue to draw down in Iraq, SOF
    remain heavily engaged with their Iraqi counterparts. However, SOF rely
    on their conventional counterparts for many support and enabling
    functions including airlift, medical evacuation, resupply, and
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
        If confirmed, how would you ensure SOF are adequately supported in
    Iraq as the drawdown progresses?
        Answer. As we reduce our presence in Iraq, it will be essential
    that we make sure that our SOF continues to receive support. SOF will
    continue to provide assistance and support to Iraq Special Forces until
    relieved. U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) is developing and refining their
    support plans as situations dictate. USF-I has instructed its forces to
    conduct detailed coordination and contingency plans to mitigate any
    degradation to SOF support. It will be crucial for SOF to maintain
    access to the key enablers you have already mentioned and more until
    the end of Operation New Dawn. SOCOM is postured to respond positively
    and provide SOF in support of CENTCOM missions. I will continue to
    ensure SOF operating in austere locations are provided the required
    support through detailed coordination and planning. Contingency plans
    to provide emergency assistance to U.S. SOF outside of the remaining
    U.S. bases will require alternate means of support which will take time
    to coordinate and execute.

                                     YEMEN

        Question. The U.S. Government has a robust security assistance
    program with Yemen to help enable Yemeni security forces to deal with
    the threat posed by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Much of the
    training and advising activities under these assistance programs has
    been carried out by SOF.
        In light of the political situation in Yemen, what is your
    assessment of the most effective way the United States can advance its
    counterterrorism objectives there?
        Answer. Yemen is unique in the Arab world, with socio-economic
    indicators similar to the poorest African nations, and governance
    limitations that invite easy comparisons with some of the world's most
    vulnerable states. Current political turmoil and an uncertain Yemen
    Government are enormous challenges that face the Republic of Yemen and
    by extension, the U.S. counterterrorism policy. No other nation enjoys
    the level of influence with the Yemen Government than that of the U.S.
    counterterrorism initiatives with the Yemen Government contribute
    directly to a more stable security environment.
        Fiscal year 2011 International Military Education and Training
    funds will continue to be used to train and educate Ministry of Defense
    personnel, thereby increasing Yemen's versatility and utility as a
    coalition member. These funds will continue to provide equipment and
    training essential for Yemeni Counterterrorism Forces to combat
    terrorist groups, including al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
    Increased funding levels for military assistance, particularly those
    that relate to training and equipping Yemeni counterterrorism forces
    will be essential for the Yemeni Government to neutralize the threat
    from AQAP within their borders. SOCOM and SOF will complement these
    activities with a carefully calibrated engagement in tribal areas of
    the country where violent extremists enjoy safe haven. Towards this
    end, we have established a close, working relationship with Yemen
    Counterterrorism Forces.

                          TERRORISM THREATS IN AFRICA

        Question. Over the course of the last few years, al Qaeda-inspired
    and affiliated groups in Somalia and the Trans-Sahara have continued to
    gain strength, leading many to express concern about their intent and
    ability to strike the interests of the U.S. and partner nations.
        What is your understanding of U.S. policy with regard to countering
    the threats posed by these groups?
        Answer. As with all our counterterrorist actions across the globe,
    we work in concert with the Geographical Combatant Commands and SOF is
    integrated as just one piece of the overall ``Whole of Government''
    endeavor within U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has laid out a
    comprehensive approach to building security capacity with partner
    nations across the continent. SOF will play a significant role in
    AFRICOM's four defense-oriented goals for their partner nations: having
    a capable military force, having professional security institutions,
    having the capability to defeat transnational threats, and increase
    Partner Nation support to international peacekeeping efforts. In
    assisting AFRICOM with these goals, basing, overflight and arming
    rights are just a few of the challenges confronting us. We need
    streamlined policy and procedures supporting rapid capacity building
    and information/intelligence sharing, in order to facilitate new and
    nurture existing partner relationships. We also understand this will
    all take place in a resource constrained environment. The difficult
    decisions facing Congress as you wrestle with the fiscal realities
    facing this nation will most definitely have an impact on our counter
    terrorist activities in Africa and across the globe.
        Question. Do you believe the Intelligence, Surveillance, and
    Reconnaissance (ISR) assets and other resources allocated to countering
    terrorism threats in Africa are adequate to understand and respond to
    the threats posed by these groups?
        Answer. A significant portion of the U.S. counterterrorism effort
    is focused on the CENTCOM AOR and they have received the lion's share
    of ISR assets. ISR is a high demand, yet finite resource, and in some
    areas, to include Africa, we have executed an economy of effort in
    tackling terrorist groups. As our Nation's activities in the Pakistan/
    Afghanistan AOR change, additional ISR assets may be available to
    address AFRICOM's needs. DOD, with the outstanding support of Congress,
    continues to build more capacity, spotlighting other significant
    limiting factors within Africa such as communications, basing and
    overflight rights/agreements, information sharing with partner nations,
    and highly diverse language requirements across the continent. Given
    the tenuous nature of African governments and the difficulties
    associated with adding basing/footprint on the continent, we
    specifically envision the need for substantial sea-based ISR to support
    Africa CT operations. We will be in lockstep with AFRICOM as they
    tackle each of these challenges. SOF will be an integral part of
    AFRICOM's engagement program and will help lead their response to
    terrorist networks working on the continent.

            WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

        Question. General Fraser, Commander of U.S. Southern Command,
    recently testified that ``The northern triangle of Guatemala, El
    Salvador, and Honduras is the deadliest zone in the world outside of
    active war zones.''
        What is your assessment of the threat from transnational criminal
    organizations (TCO) operating in the Western Hemisphere?
        Answer. TCOs are a threat to our national security. They enable
    insurgencies and terrorism, and undermine state security and stability.
    An obvious outcome can be seen in the violence in Mexico and Central
    America. They have evolved into regional threats as seen with Mexican
    cartel members operating as far south as Peru. These threats must be
    addressed through multi-national, multi-agency collaborative efforts.
        Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role, if any, for
    SOF in countering these threats?
        Answer. SOF should continue to support SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM's
    requirements to build the capacity of selected partner nation forces
    through training under Counter-Narcoterrorism and Joint Combined
    Exchange Training authorities. Where appropriate, U.S. SOF should be
    applied to advise and assist partner nation forces in planning
    operations against TCOs.
        Question. For more than a decade, Colombian security forces have
    worked in partnership with SOF to counter-threats similar to those
    described by General Fraser. This partnership has helped to enable the
    Colombians to significantly degrade the terrorist organization known as
    the FARC.
        What do you believe are the primary lessons learned from SOF
    training and advising activities in Colombia?
        Answer. SOF is mostly effectively applied when we have persistent
    presence, we train the right unit at the right level, and we exercise
    the appropriate authorities through Regional command and control
    structures.
        Question. Are there lessons learned that may apply to U.S. support
    to Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras in their efforts to
    counter the threats posed by transnational criminal organizations?
        Answer. SOF has the capability to train partner nation (PN) forces
    in a myriad of specialties that are ideal in combating transnational
    criminal organizations. Many of the security cooperation strategies
    used successfully in Colombia should be applied in other Western
    Hemisphere countries.

                                  PHILIPPINES

        Question. What is your view of the effectiveness of the special
    operation forces assistance being provided to the Philippine military
    in its fight against terrorist groups?
        Answer. Although the focus of the 10 year old mission in the
    Philippines tends to be on the actions of the military unit against the
    most prominent terrorist groups, I want to emphasize that this has
    truly been, and continues to be, a multi-faceted approach. We have
    engaged with each branch of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
    and Philippine National Police (PNP) using every available authority to
    help build capacity, while at the same time working to improve the
    image and public trust of both the AFP and PNP. Individual examples of
    these efforts range from Title 22 funded (using Navy and Air Force SOF)
    training to improve AFP aviation Night Vision Goggles and maritime
    capabilities, to 1206 funded procurement of precision munitions, to DOD
    funded Military Information operations efforts and Civil Military
    Support Element funded Civil Affairs projects. Additionally, diplomatic
    efforts, congressional interest and senior military engagement have
    solidified the willingness of the Philippine Government to maintain the
    pressure on the key terrorist groups. As a direct result of these
    combined efforts, the capacity and legitimacy of the Philippine
    Security Forces has been greatly improved. An assessment of the
    Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) mission is currently
    being conducted by Commander, PACOM.
        Question. If confirmed, what measures or guidelines will you employ
    to ensure that U.S. personnel do not become involved in combat in the
    Republic of the Philippines?
        Answer. Ultimately, it is the Commander, PACOM, who assesses the
    situation and coordinates with the Ambassador on the execution of OEF-P
    to include the size of the U.S. Force and its employment. In addition
    to the restrictions dictated by the Philippine Constitution, the
    current Secretary of Defense and Commander, PACOM, orders are very
    specific and clear on how U.S. Forces may work by with and through the
    AFP. Obviously the right to self-defense would allow any U.S. military
    element to protect itself if unexpectedly attacked by the enemy. As a
    direct result of the current rules of engagement, there have been only
    three combat-related deaths; all due to IEDs.

                                     PIRACY

        Question. Despite a significant and concerted international effort,
    which includes various U.S. agencies and the U.S. military, piracy in
    the northwestern Indian Ocean and the approaches to vital sea lanes
    through the Gulf of Aden continues largely unabated. Similar threats
    exist in other key areas including the Straits of Malacca.
        How do you assess the threat posed by piracy?
        Answer. Piracy operations directly threaten U.S. personnel and
    interests in these regions. Kidnap for ransom by pirates has recently
    led to the death of U.S. civilians. Piracy's biggest impact however, is
    economic. The seizing of cargo ships and ransom demands have harmful
    economic impacts to companies and countries. Anti-piracy efforts for
    ship protections and the deployment of military assets for prevention
    operations continue to require significant expenditures of funds and
    further strains limited military assets supporting these operations.
        The second and third order effects of piracy may lead to future
    destabilization in the affected areas. The resultant vast sums of money
    in these impoverished areas lead to the establishment of safe heavens
    for pirates and their support groups. These funds also further subvert
    the efforts of African Union Mission in Somalia and the Transitional
    Federal Government in Somalia to stabilize Mogadishu against violent
    extremist organization (VEO) groups.
        Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role, if any, of
    SOF in counter piracy efforts?
        Answer. NATO conglomerate, Navy capabilities, as well as Naval
    assets from coastal adjacent countries should lead the effort to deter/
    prevent piracy. This includes patrolling pirate populated waters and
    identifying, boarding and where appropriate, engaging with and
    confiscating suspect vessels and collecting data on suspect pirates.
        Special operations involvement is currently limited in the counter
    piracy efforts. SOF support with unique capabilities when required.
    These capabilities involve maritime direct action, information
    operations and building partner capacity for maritime operations.
        SOF provide unique capabilities for execution of specialized
    missions worldwide. These capabilities can be incorporated into
    counter-piracy operations but due to the high demand, low density
    nature of SOF, they should not be the lead. Conventional maritime
    forces have capabilities better designed to deal with the full range of
    counter-piracy operations on the water. U.S. SOF should only be
    employed in extreme scenarios where the situation exceeds ability of
    conventional forces to respond adequately.
        Overall, with SOF current force structure and high demand worldwide
    for its capabilities, current U.S. policy does not warrant a high
    enough priority for the allocation of SOF assets against this mission
    since other forces have more relevant capabilities to deal with the
    full scope of counter-piracy operations.

                  INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR INDIRECT ACTIVITIES

        Question. Some observers contend that the national intelligence
    agencies focus their assistance to the Defense Department in
    Afghanistan and Iraq on special operators engaged in direct action
    operations. As a consequence, it is alleged, general purpose forces and
    SOF engaged in indirect activities, including foreign internal defense
    and population protection, receive less intelligence support.
        Do you believe this is true?
        Answer. No.
        Question. If so and if confirmed, how would you ensure SOF engaged
    in indirect activities receive adequate intelligence support?
        Answer. CONPLAN 7500 makes clear the primacy of indirect activities
    in combating VEOs, and the successful prosecution of that approach is
    predicated on the level of support given to those efforts, specifically
    intelligence support. SOCOM enables the indirect approach with an
    intelligence network focused on supporting Irregular Warfare,
    specifically on the tenets: Unconventional Warfare (UW), Foreign
    Internal Defense (FID), and Civil-Military Operations (CMO).
        At SOCOM intelligence support to IW is accomplished by the fusing
    of all source intelligence with cutting edge pattern analysis, imagery,
    and socio-cultural analysis (SCA) tools and analytic techniques. These
    efforts are coordinated by the SOCOM Joint Intelligence Center (JICSOC)
    and the Global Mission Support Center (GMSC), which provide network
    connectivity, 24/7 reachback support to deployed forces and Special
    Operations Task Forces, and coordination venues for ISR support.
        Although the support to the indirect approach is directed by SOCOM,
    the requirements themselves are byproducts of the constant interaction
    between the supported Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) and
    SOCOM. This interaction ensures the coordination of SOCOM intelligence
    support with that of the regional Joint Intelligence Operations Centers
    (JIOC). At SOCOM we realize that the majority of the GCCs are combating
    terrorism and VEOs in non-kinetic operations so providing tailored
    intelligence support to those missions is vital to successfully
    supporting the national security strategy.
        The Central Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial Intelligence
    Agency, National Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Organization,
    and Defense Intelligence Agency have all adapted very well to these
    indirect approach intelligence requirements. To be sure, there are
    always capacity challenges as we continue to conduct military
    operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and still meet other global
    challenges, but on balance I am very appreciative of the support
    provided by the national intelligence agencies.

                            SECTION 1208 OPERATIONS

        Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), as
    amended by subsequent bills, authorizes the provision of support
    (including training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces,
    irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military
    operations by SOF to combat terrorism.
        What is your assessment of this authority?
        Answer. Section 1208 authority remains a key tool for SOF to
    operate by, with, and through an array of willing partners in Iraq,
    Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and other locations. These foreign
    regular and irregular forces leverage their natural access to
    locations, populations and information that are denied to SOF, but
    critical to our success. Their work is challenging and often carries
    significant personal risk. The training, equipping, and operational
    support provided to these partners by our forces under 1208 authority
    are absolutely essential to overall mission accomplishment. We are
    appreciative of Congress' continued support for this authority.
        Recent Interaction with Congress: DASD-SOCT (Garry Reid)
    accompanied by SOCOM reps provided a briefing on April 27 to House and
    Senate Armed Services Committee staffers that covered the fiscal year
    2010 annual report. The briefing was well-received, with no significant
    issues. There was some additional discussion on expanding the authority
    to go beyond combating terrorism.
        Future of the Authority: Rep Mac Thornberry (R-TX), Chairman of the
    Emerging Terrorism and Capabilities subcommittee of the HASC, has
    marked the House version of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012 with an
    increase in 1208 authority from $45 million to $50 million, and
    directed DOD to provide a report/briefing on the future of the
    authority to address CT, UW, and IW requirements.
        Expenditure trends (current authority is $45 million): (a) fiscal
    year 2010: $31 million spent of estimated $38 million requirement; and
    (b) fiscal year 2011 (to date): $9 million obligated of estimated $34
    million.

                             COUNTER-THREAT FINANCE

        Question. A number of officials in DOD and the Intelligence
    Community have called for applying more resources to identify, monitor,
    and halt the flow of money associated with terrorist networks and the
    illegal narcotics trade. Comparable efforts have been undertaken by the
    Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization against the flow
    of money and components supporting the construction and employment of
    improvised explosive devices.
        What is your assessment of the value of counter-threat finance
    (CTF) activities?
        Answer. Finding, stopping, and via our law enforcement partners,
    freezing or seizing terrorist and narcoterrorist resources is immensely
    valuable in defeating current threat operations, disrupting future
    threat operations and ultimately in dismantling the enemy's carefully
    crafted facilitation networks. Money is the oil that keeps these
    illicit networks in operation, whether moving guns, jihadists, drugs,
    or illegal merchandise or persons. Sustained CTF activities are a
    critical part of any effective counterterrorism effort or campaign. CTF
    done well is preventive and thus highly cost effective.
        Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role, if any, of
    SOCOM in supporting CTF activities?
        Answer. The enemy's sustainment networks are global in nature, and
    to defeat them, our approach must be global as well. We are not
    effective against these threats when we constrain ourselves in archaic
    thinking that limits our field of action, whether geographically,
    functionally, or otherwise. Hence, SOCOM was recently designated the
    DOD Lead for CTF and that role should be maintained, possibly even
    expanded, to ensure DOD can operate effectively alongside and in
    support of our interagency partners.

                         SOCOM ACQUISITION AUTHORITIES

        Question. SOCOM is unique within the DOD as the only unified
    command with acquisition authorities and funding. Further, the
    Commander of SOCOM is the only uniformed commander with a subordinate
    senior acquisition executive.
        If confirmed, how would you ensure SOCOM requirements are
    adequately vetted and balanced against available resources before
    moving forward with an acquisition program?
        Answer. SOCOM has a robust requirements and programming process
    that is vetted through a Board of Directors consisting of leadership
    from each of the component commands. This disciplined process allows
    SOCOM to align available resources with requirements and to prioritize
    these requirements within our budget and future year programs.
        Question. What role can SOCOM's development and acquisition
    activities play in broader Service and DOD efforts?
        Answer. SOCOM is a microcosm of the entire Defense Department, and
    our challenges are very similar to investment requirements among the
    Services. SOCOM also has mature processes to conduct rapid evaluations
    of technology, systems, and concepts of operations, the results of
    which benefit SOF and are transferrable to the rest of the Department.
    SOF Acquirers specialize in the integration of emerging off-the-shelf
    technologies. This integration allows SOCOM to take the best from each
    Service as well as industry and modify or customize the equipment to
    meet special operations needs and rapidly field it to the force. Our
    success can then be shared with the Services to improve their
    capabilities. Some of the SOF technologies that have made their way to
    the Services include the MH-47 Chinook helicopter common avionics
    architecture system (CAAS) cockpit, an extended service life wing for
    the C-130, the MK48 lightweight machine gun, software defined tactical
    radios, and an improved sniper sight.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that Special
    Operations capabilities and requirements are integrated into overall
    DOD research, development, and acquisition programs?
        Answer. Although SOCOM generates and validates all SOF
    requirements, these requirements are provided to the Joint Staff for
    inclusion in the Joint Requirements Knowledge Management System. In
    addition, SOCOM has initiated acquisition summits with OSD, drawing
    together SOCOM, USD(AT&L), and the Service Acquisition Executives (SAE)
    where we discuss acquisition issues of common interest. For example,
    the SAEs agreed to synchronize technical and programmatic plans among
    all investment portfolios as well as explore initiatives to develop
    common architectures and standards across different future SOF and
    Service platforms. Additionally, USD(AT&L) agreed to develop a plan to
    address the standardization for certification and other Service test
    requirements between Services and SOCOM to gain efficiencies and
    promote common process reciprocity. Continuing that dialogue/exchange
    will remain one of my priorities.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure sufficient resources
    are dedicated to the development of special operations-unique
    platforms, when required?
        Answer. Ensuring SOF not only has the resources to conduct today's
    operations but preparing ourselves for the future environment is one of
    my top priorities. The Board of Directors process allows the Command to
    take a strategic view of future requirements and achieve a balance.
    Since September 11, the MFP-11 budget has kept pace with operations,
    and the investment funding has allowed SOCOM to support these increased
    demands and acquire equipment as required.
        Question. If confirmed, what metrics will you use to determine the
    effectiveness of SOCOM technology development investments and whether
    SOCOM is investing sufficient resources in these efforts?
        Answer. We have created a series of technology roadmaps that assist
    us in identifying promising solutions to our problems. These roadmaps
    are schedule oriented, containing both the technology development
    timelines and the formal acquisition program schedules. As such, they
    have quantifiable metrics (cost, schedule, performance, and technology
    readiness) embedded in them.
        Question. SOCOM has undertaken a series of acquisition programs to
    fulfill its undersea mobility requirements. Both the Advanced Seal
    Delivery System and the Joint Multi-Mission Submersible programs were
    terminated and SOCOM recently initiated a new undersea mobility
    acquisition strategy.
        What lessons has SOCOM drawn from previous undersea mobility
    acquisition efforts and, if confirmed, how would you ensure they are
    incorporated into current undersea acquisition efforts?
        Answer. From our previous efforts, SOCOM learned that satisfying a
    wide range of undersea requirements with a ``one size fits all''
    solution was challenging. As a result, we are pursuing a series of dry
    combat submersibles along with modifications to the dry-deck shelters.
    This diversified approach will allow us to meet our operational
    requirements by deployment from either a surface ship or via a dry deck
    shelter on a submarine.

                             ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

        Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that SOCOM has an
    acquisition workforce with the skills, qualifications, and experience
    needed to develop and manage its acquisition and research and
    development programs?
        Answer. The SOCOM Acquisition Executive manages the SOF Acquisition
    workforce similar to the SAEs. SOF Acquirers are specialists in science
    and technology, acquisition, contracting, and logistics. They are
    operationally oriented, professionally trained and certified, and
    experts in the SOF-unique processes needed to meet the equipping needs
    of SOF. We are working with USD(AT&L) to expand our organic acquisition
    workforce, as well as create a unique identifier for SOF acquisition
    positions.

                TRANSFORMATION OF THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

        Question. Much attention has been focused on the transformation of
    our conventional Armed Forces to make them more capable of conducting
    counterinsurgency and combating terrorism missions.
        Do you believe our SOFs need to be transformed as well?
        Answer. No, not in reference to the development of COIN or
    combating terrorism capabilities.
        Question. If so, what is your vision for such a transformation, and
    how would the transformation of conventional forces complement a SOF
    transformation, and vice versa?
        Answer. SOCOM and its components have featured counterinsurgency
    capabilities for many years. We have worked closely with the Services
    to prepare the total Joint Force, including conventional forces, to
    execute COIN and counterterrorism missions.
        The partnership between conventional forces and SOF is as strong as
    it has ever been. The extensive combat employment of both forces in
    shared battle spaces has increased the need to closely coordinate our
    operations. This has resulted in a sharing of tactics, techniques, and
    procedures (TTP) between SOF and conventional forces that has helped to
    increase conventional force capabilities to execute COIN and combating
    terrorism operations.
        The transformation of SOF needs to build on the hard combat skills
    we have honed over the last 10 years by adding to our ability to
    understand the operational environment and better discern the likely
    effects of kinetic and non-kinetic actions we take in complex and
    increasingly urbanized environments. One of the ways we will help in
    this transformation is to increase our language and cultural
    capabilities of our forces. This includes recruiting of both females
    and U.S. born citizens who speak certain specific languages and are
    knowledgeable about the socio-cultural aspects of these regions.

                    SPECIAL OPERATIONS PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

        Question. Some have argued that the Commander of SOCOM should have
    greater influence on special operations personnel management issues
    including assignment, promotion, compensation, and retention of SOF.
    One proposal would modify section 167 of title 10, U.S.C., to change
    the role of the SOCOM Commander from ``monitoring'' the readiness of
    special operations personnel to ``coordinating'' with the Services on
    personnel and manpower management policies that directly affect SOF.
        What is your view of this proposal?
        Answer. Ensuring we have the right people to perform SOF missions
    is paramount to our operational success. Service personnel policies
    significantly impact SOF retention--especially as they relate to
    compensation, development, and promotions. Changing Section 167 to
    reflect the word ``coordinating'' rather than ``monitoring'' will give
    SOCOM more influence than it currently possesses. The recently
    implemented DOD Instruction 5100.01 requires the Services to coordinate
    their personnel policies and plans with SOCOM. The ``coordination''
    policy will provide SOCOM more visibility into personnel policy changes
    and initiatives. SOCOM is in the initial phases of working with the
    Services to put this policy into action. We're optimistic that the
    inputs provided by SOCOM during the coordination process will provide
    the influence needed to develop and retain the most capable SOF
    personnel.

                       SIZE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

        Question. The previous two Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) have
    mandated significant growth in our SOF and enablers that directly
    support their operations.
        Do you believe that we should further increase the number of
    special operations personnel? If so, why, and by how much?
        Answer. The growth we received during the previous two QDRs has
    served us well. We are still realizing these increases, with more than
    12,000 programmed personnel still to arrive in the next 4 years. The
    current commander has recommended that manpower growth not exceed 3 to
    5 percent annually and I agree with Admiral Olson that growing too fast
    will dilute capability and outpace the support structure we have in
    place. A gradual increase in capacity ensures that second and third
    order affects can be accounted without sacrificing the quality of the
    SOF operator.
        In your view, how can the size of SOF be increased, while also
    maintaining the rigorous recruiting and training standards for special
    operators?
        We are acutely aware of the risks of focusing on quantity rather
    than quality. In order to sustain our current growth rates at an
    acceptable level, we have stepped up our recruiting efforts and have
    enhanced our training pipelines to increase the throughput of our
    operators with no loss in quality.

                        READINESS AND OPERATIONAL TEMPO

        Question. The current Commander of SOCOM has described a
    ``fraying'' of the SOF due to high operational tempo (OPTEMPO).
        What is the current dwell time ratio for SOCOM personnel?
        Answer. The calculation of dwell time varies depending on the
    context. Within the Global Force Management process, SOCOM is required
    to provide real time dwell calculations when responding to force
    requests.
        These responses are generated based on actual deployment data and
    current force structure. SOCOM has multiple unit types (e.g.: Special
    Forces Operational Detachment Alphas, SEAL Platoons, aircraft platforms
    and crews, Marine Special Operations Teams, et cetera); too many to
    list in this response. However, overall, the deployment to dwell ratio
    for SOCOM capabilities ranges between 1:0.8 and 1:2. The most requested
    tactical level units lie at the lower end of this scale while the
    higher level headquarters at the upper end. With the exception of
    Special Forces ODAs, the current dwell of forces closely relates to
    that projected in the Operational Availability 2010 assessment. This
    assessment accounted for force structure growth not yet realized.
    However, force demand has continued to outpace some programmed growth.
    For example, between August 2009 and August 2010, SOCOM added 36 ODAs
    to the inventory while ODA requirements increased by 37.5 percent.
        Question. In your view, how will shifting resources from Iraq to
    Afghanistan affect personnel tempo and dwell time ratios?
        Answer. While some special operations resources will shift from
    Iraq to Afghanistan, it most likely will not be a one-for-one offset.
    Some SOF will shift to support other operations as well. The demand for
    SOF worldwide is at such a high level that OPTEMPO will still have to
    be very carefully managed.
        Question. What can be done to increase dwell time for SOCOM
    personnel?
        Answer. SOCOM will continue to support the requirements of
    Geographic Combatant Commanders at the highest level we can sustain
    without ``breaking'' the force. In most cases, SOF are doing what they
    expected and wanted, and they feel good about their impressive
    contributions. That said, we will set and enforce maximum deployment
    rates for each element of the force.
        Much of the answer to the OPTEMPO challenge is in providing: (1)
    greater predictability, and (2) more opportunities to train closer to
    home when not deployed overseas.
        Today, due to the significant demand for SOF, many units conduct a
    combat rotation then, during their dwell period, will deploy for a
    shorter duration in order to support foundational (Phase-0 type)
    operations before again deploying for a combat rotation.
        Question. In your view, how has sustained high operational tempo
    impacted the readiness of special operations personnel?
        Answer. High OPTEMPO has had a number of impacts on SOF readiness:

        1.  CENTCOM Focus: Over the years one of the major hallmarks of SOF
    personnel has been regional expertise and language proficiencies for
    the key nations and/or non-state groups of the region. Since September
    11 the vast majority of SOF operations have taken place in CENTCOM AOR.
    As a result language proficiency and cultural awareness for other
    Geographic Combatant Commands has suffered.
        2.  The compressed time between deployments has had a major impact
    on the readiness of SOF forces. Opportunities to attend some schools
    and advanced training normally required for SOF personnel has been
    reduced or eliminated. Examples include reduced time for classroom
    language training/proficiency for all SOF; advanced Survival, Evasion,
    Resistance, and Escape School; lack of fixed wing aircraft available
    for live ordnance drops needed to train Joint Tactical Air Controllers;
    lack of vertical lift capability to train SOF ground forces and aircrew
    proficiency; lack of fixed wing refueling aircraft for helicopter in-
    flight refueling and ships available to conduct deck landing
    qualifications. Insufficient availability of non-SOF ranges to support
    SOF training is a significant issue.
        3.  Equipment: The lack of CONUS equipment also impacts SOF
    personnel readiness. SOF aircraft are deployed at the maximum
    sustainable rate. The lack of CONUS-based rotary/tilt wing lift
    presents a serious readiness challenge for aircrew qualifications/
    proficiency and training for SOF ground forces. Many of these assets
    are either forward deployed or in depot level maintenance. These
    equipment issues, coupled with compressed inter-deployment timelines,
    have had a significant impact on overall SOF readiness.

        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to reduce the
    negative impacts associated with high operational tempo of special
    operations personnel?
        Answer. First and foremost, we must instill the force sourcing
    discipline previously discussed to improve dwell time, reduce the high
    operational tempo, and therefore, reduce some of the negative impact
    resulting from the current operational tempo.
        Additionally, SOCOM must coordinate with the combatant commands and
    Services to ensure that we have developed the best possible force
    sourcing recommendation for combatant command requirements. In some
    cases, Conventional Forces or a combination of Conventional and SOF may
    provide a better solution than a solely SOF.
        A number of actions have already been taken to reduce some of these
    negative impacts on SOF. These include realigning Army Special Forces
    Groups to specific Geographic Combatant Commands in order for those
    personnel to regain cultural and language proficiencies; increasing
    language proficiency pays and training opportunities for all SOF
    personnel; contracting fixed wing aircraft as a short term ``fix'' for
    training Joint Tactical Air Controllers (JTAC); and maximizing CONUS-
    based vertical lift assets for training SOF ground forces.
        In the future it is imperative we continue our close relationships
    with the Services in order to gain or maintain current access to
    various ranges and to utilize more military fixed wing aircraft for
    JTAC training. Other initiatives should include continued development
    and utilization of simulators as a substitute for a portion of live
    ordnance training requirements; creation of a SOF special pay based on
    the current aviation flight pay model; and continue or enhance current
    retention incentives for SOF personnel.
        Question. In your opinion, how has the high operational tempo
    affected the resiliency of SOCOM personnel, including rates of suicide,
    over the past several years?
        Answer. Trend analysis shows that SOF personnel, compared to the
    conventional force and the population in general, are more resilient
    and capable of successfully handling the stress of high operational
    tempo. The SOF community has become extremely responsive to the
    creeping ``fraying'' of the force as operational tempo has increased
    over the past several years. Successful preventative programs include
    Command Leadership, an in-depth assessment and selection process,
    prevention, treatment, and education.
        This responsiveness, based on proactive command leadership
    directives, significantly increased overall force resilience. These
    directives support the enhancement and availability of psychological
    support throughout the SOF community. The success of this program is
    based on a number of basic concepts:

        1.  A SOF peculiar application of ``Assessment and Selection'' of
    potential candidates has been critical to this process. Command
    leadership, combined with the use of embedded psychologists, assess all
    personnel and closely monitors those individuals with potential or
    actual issues.
        2.  This process enhances the ``Prevention'' aspect of the
    directive through training, education, and monitoring.
        3.  The key to this program is ``access to care'' within the
    Military Health System (MHS) when required. This has decreased the
    negative stigma associated with seeking professional psychological
    help.

                            RECRUITING AND RETENTION

        Question. How successful have the services been in recruiting and
    retaining the special operations personnel that are needed?
        Answer. In today's operating environment, the demand is much
    greater for SOF operators with varying languages, more cultural
    attunement, and regional expertise. Service recruitment efforts face
    many challenges as selection from the pool of eligible U.S. citizens
    and legal permanent residents are limited due to medical, educational,
    or conduct reasons. However, Service recruiting commands, in
    coordination with SOF component commands continue to be overall
    successful in recruiting SOF operators.
        Continued support for programs like Military Accessions Vital to
    the National Interest, which has great potential to alleviate some
    critical strategic language and cultural gaps is needed. Looking
    forward, the Services' recruitment must increase for those candidates
    who will bring ethnic, business, academic, technical and experimental
    diversity to SOF.
        Question. What are the biggest challenges to retention you see in
    the SOCOM community?
        Answer. The recent pressure on our force focus groups identified
    that one of the primary reasons personnel consider leaving the force is
    the lack of predictability for deployments to both named operations and
    to GCC theater security cooperation program missions--specifically,
    late shifts in deployment schedules and the insertion of new
    requirements.
        Question. What steps need to be taken, in your view, to meet the
    recruiting and retention goals of each of the Services' SOF?
        Answer. The Services need increased flexibility to incentivize
    those qualified individuals who choose the path to become special
    operators. We need your help in supporting programs that are beneficial
    to SOF and in maintaining recruiting budgets for the Services.
        Question. What monetary or non-monetary incentives do you believe
    would be most effective in this regard?
        Answer. SOCOM currently has a set of retention incentives programs
    focused on maintaining our most senior and most experienced SOF
    personnel: Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB), Special Duty
    Assignment Pay (SDAP), Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) and Critical
    Skills Accession Bonus (CSAB). These programs have been effective in
    retaining their target demographic.
        OSD directed a compensation study to verify the effectiveness of
    our current incentives programs. The OSD study is also looking at
    trends inside other demographics beyond our senior SOF personnel. This
    will give us the information we need to change or modify our existing
    programs. Trends are starting to show losses in our junior and mid-
    career SOF personnel. Adapting our retention incentives to counter
    losses within our junior ranks will ensure they stay SOF until they
    become our senior SOF personnel.
        Prior to the initiation of the OSD study, SOCOM established a
    compensation working group composed of members of the SOCOM
    headquarters and the SOF Components. This working group was charged
    with gaining the approval of the Services to extend the current
    incentives and look at modifying our compensation plan based on being
    in a state of persistent engagement. The working group proposed a new
    compensation plan called SOF Career Pay or SCP (pronounced ``skip'').
        There are two primary intents incorporated into SCP: Predictability
    and Relative Parity. By institutionalizing the retention benefit, we
    eliminate the need for periodic revalidation and approval as with
    current incentive programs. However, periodic re-evaluation of the
    program is integrated into the proposal. SCP will provide
    servicemembers with a predictable and dependable retention plan which
    incentivizes them throughout their entire SOF career. One of the
    thought processes behind SCP is to ensure newly trained and mid-career
    SOF personnel remain in military service to become our experienced
    senior SOF personnel. Currently, our retention incentives' package
    focuses solely on senior SOF personnel. The Services will reap the
    long-term benefit of the time and resources invested into our SOF
    personnel. The second primary intent of SCP is relative parity across
    the Services by granting similar compensation to those possessing
    similar skills, experience, and mission sets.

                               DIVERSITY IN SOCOM

        Question. How do you define diversity in SOCOM?
        Answer. SOCOM's definition of diversity includes the traditional
    categories of minority representation and more. The ability to speak
    foreign languages, know the eccentricity of the region, blend into
    foreign environments, and understand the local cultures of our
    operating regions are invaluable skills which lends diversity to SOCOM.
    Diversity in application is our female Cultural Support Teams which
    allow us access to key populations in some environments which were not
    previously possible.
        Question. Do you believe that achieving greater diversity in SOCOM
    is a priority?
        Answer. Yes, diversity is an operational necessity for SOF. SOF
    engagement continues to grow into populations with varied societal
    values. SOF success is impacted by our ability to assess and adapt on
    multiple fronts. As such, SOF members must possess a broad range of
    skills and backgrounds.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
    continued progress toward diversity goals is achieved without violating
    reverse discrimination principles of law?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Senior DOD leadership and
    the Services to identify future operational requirements and support
    funding for them. The ability to recruit the right people, with the
    right skills, means establishing the right target goals.

                     SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

        Question. What is your assessment of current sexual assault
    prevention and response policies and procedures in SOCOM?
        Answer. The Military Services have primary responsibility to ensure
    sexual assault response personnel (Sexual Assault Response Coordinators
    (SARC), Victim Advocates, medical and mental health providers, and
    criminal investigation personnel) are well trained to support victims,
    investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault. If resources
    are not readily available where the alleged incident occurred, victims
    are transported to a facility where there is appropriate victim
    advocate support, medical and psychological care (regardless of
    service) and investigative/legal support.
        The Joint Staff remains a key partner with the Services and OSD in
    the campaign against sexual assault. Additionally, the Joint Staff
    works closely with the combatant commands during the development of
    operational plans and personnel policy guidance to ensure the
    prevention and response to incidents of sexual assault is addressed.
        Prevention of sexual assault is a leadership responsibility.
    Commanders at all levels must remain committed to eliminating sexual
    assault within our forces by sustaining robust prevention and response
    policies; by providing thorough and effective training to all assigned
    servicemembers, by identifying and eliminating barriers to reporting;
    and by ensuring care is available and accessible.
        Question. Do you consider current sexual assault policies and
    procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting, to be
    effective?
        Answer. Yes. For a multitude of reasons, sexual assault has
    historically been an under-reported crime. Restricted reporting has
    been effective. Although the use of restricted, or confidential,
    reporting doesn't allow a commander to investigate alleged assaults, it
    does allow a sexual assault victim to confidentially receive medical
    treatment and counseling without triggering the official investigation
    process.
        Unrestricted reporting supports a sexual assault victim who desires
    medical treatment and counseling--but also provides for official
    investigation of his or her allegations within existing administrative
    reporting channels (such as their chain of command, law enforcement or
    through the SARC).
        As our military members' confidence in the reporting and
    investigative policies and procedures improve, I believe and certainly
    hope that more victims will choose unrestricted reporting. This will
    ultimately increase offender accountability.
        Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
    resources SOCOM has in place to investigate and respond to allegations
    of sexual assault?
        Answer. The Services are responsible for training sexual assault
    response personnel to ensure they are well-trained to investigate and
    respond to allegations of sexual assault. For example, in March of this
    year, the Army opened phase three of its Intervene Act Motivate
    (I.A.M.) Strong program. The four-phase program emphasizes that leaders
    must understand their responsibilities to ensure victims of sexual
    assault receive sensitive care and support and are not re-victimized as
    a result of reporting the incident. It also provides tangible
    guidelines to help Army leaders remain alert to, and respond
    proactively to, incidents of sexual assault. Improved training for
    investigators is also a priority and this includes investigative
    resources in deployed areas. As you may imagine, the combat environment
    and deployed operations are very dynamic and investigative resources
    are often strained by other mission requirements. Remoteness of
    locations, availability of transportation, or the level of ongoing
    operations may complicate access to resources. I believe the DOD
    training network in place now prepares investigators to handle sexual
    assault cases in a caring, responsive, and professional manner. Our
    ability to respond and support victims is critical.

                                WOMEN IN COMBAT

        Question. The expanding role of women and the implementation of
    women-in-combat policies in the Armed Forces is a matter of continuing
    interest to Congress and the American public.
        Answer. Prior to 1994, DOD Ground Combat Exclusion Policy
    prohibited assignment of female servicemembers to units expected to
    engage in direct ground combat. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 1994 repealed
    the U.S. Code that supported that policy (10 U.S.C. 6015), and required
    the armed services to issue policy/orders governing the same. The
    Secretary of Defense issued a ``Direct Ground Combat Definition and
    Assignment Policy'' on 13 January 1994 that took effect on 1 October
    1994. In part, that policy states:

        a.  Rule. Servicemembers are eligible to be assigned to all
    positions for which they are qualified, except women shall be excluded
    from assignment to units below the brigade level whose primary mission
    is to engage in direct combat on the ground, as defined below.
        b.  Definition. Direct ground combat is engaging an enemy on the
    ground with individual or crew served weapons, while being exposed to
    hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with
    the hostile force's personnel.''

        Additionally, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 required DOD and the
    Services to review all laws, policies and regulations restricting
    service of female members of the Armed Forces. DOD is expected to
    provide its report to Congress by October 2011.
        Question. What is the current SOCOM policy regarding the role of
    women in SOCOM operations?
        Answer. SOCOM follows the DOD policy. Recently, SOCOM sought and
    was granted approval from USD(P) to attach females to select SOFs in
    order to perform activities that are inappropriate for males to
    accomplish, i.e. assisting in the searching of and engaging with women
    and children. This approval is in full compliance with established DOD
    policy.
        Question. What is your view about changing the policy to allow
    female military personnel to be assigned to SOCOM units?
        Answer. Many female military personnel are already assigned to SOF
    units in a variety of roles. In order to explore opportunities to
    expand the participation of females in operational activities, SOCOM
    fully supports the DOD's efforts to review all laws, policies and
    regulations restricting service of female members of the Armed Forces
    as directed by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011.

                  LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL AWARENESS CAPABILITIES

        Question. Deployed special operations personnel are heavily
    concentrated in the CENTCOM theater of operations, including many who
    have been deployed outside of their regional area of expertise.
        Are you concerned that the language and cultural skills among SOF
    are being degraded because of repeated deployments outside their
    regional area of expertise?
        Answer. Rotational deployments of units not regionally aligned to
    the CENTCOM AOR have indeed taken a toll on the language, regional
    expertise, and culture capabilities of those units for their aligned
    regions. OPTEMPO limits our ability to retain and retrain for primary
    areas of responsibility while still preparing for the next CENTCOM
    deployment. This is being addressed to a degree by our force structure
    growth, however, that growth places increased stress on our training
    resources.
        OPTEMPO continues to reduce our ability to send mid and senior
    grade operators to advanced regional education and professional
    development programs such as Foreign Professional Military Education
    (FPME) and the Regional Centers program. We leverage these programs to
    improve specific regional acuity and cultural understanding.
        Over the last year, we have improved as a command with getting
    operators to Regional Centers, however during the previous 2 years we
    pulled primarily from the senior grade SOCOM HQ Staff officers due to
    operational units executing rotational deployments. Therefore, the
    return on this investment was limited by our decreased ability to send
    mid-grade operators, with longevity in SOF, to build core capability
    and long-term regionally focused relationships.
        Question. If so and if confirmed, what, if anything, would you do
    to ensure these unique skills are adequately maintained?
        Answer. SOCOM set new, higher language capability requirements for
    its components in 2009. Since then, the SOF Service components
    significantly ramped up and improved training processes. The HQ, SOCOM
    also worked recruiting, language proficiency pay, and other policy
    issues to help facilitate higher capabilities within SOF organizations.
    Following through on these initiatives and ensuring the resources
    necessary for their continuation will remain priorities for the
    Command. The SOF Service components are actively engaged in
    implementing their programs and SOCOM will continue to engage the
    Department and Services to this end. Policy issues we continue to
    pursue include native/heritage recruiting, valuing language and
    regional capabilities in selections and promotions, language testing
    and incentives, maintaining DOD funded Defense Language Institute
    detachments at some of our components, adding SOF specific school
    billets and funding from the Services for foreign education, and
    encouraging the Services to award Intermediate Level Education and
    Senior Level Education equivalency for FPME programs.

                 MARINE CORPS FORCES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

        Question. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command (MARSOC),
    is a subordinate component command to SOCOM established in 2005.
        What is your assessment of the progress made in standing up and
    growing MARSOC, and what do you consider to be the principal issues
    that you would have to address to improve its operations?
        Answer. MARSOC was ordered established in November 2005 and
    actually activated on February 24, 2006. Since that time, MARSOC has
    made great strides developing and deploying relevant forces in support
    of SOCOM and the GCC's. Support from both SOCOM and the Marine Corps
    have been good. Even though MARSOC represents only 5 percent on SOCOM's
    total force, they have been aggressively employed as they continue
    their force build. In fact, MARSOC has conducted over 150 deployment to
    18 countries since activation, and has 2 full Marine Special Operations
    Companies continually present in Western Afghanistan, as well as having
    just recently completed its second Special Operations Task Force HQ's
    deployment there. Over the last 5 years, they have also completed their
    Critical Skills Operator training pipeline, screening applicants with a
    rigorous Assessment and Selection process and then training those
    selected marines in SOF operations through an 8 month Individual
    Training Course. MARSOC has similarly built a training pipeline for all
    its inherent Combat Support personnel in order to ensure all their
    deployed marines and sailors can conduct well integrated operations
    once deployed. Finally, I want to mention the superb working
    relationship between the Marine Corps and SOCOM. Over the next several
    years MARSOC will grow by an additional 1001 active duty Marine
    billets, occupy state of the art training and living facilities
    currently under construction and continue receiving next generation
    SOF-peculiar and Service common equipment. The Military Construction
    program produced significant mission support capability through
    delivery of facilities at Marine Corps Bases Camp Lejeune and Camp
    Pendleton, with plans to deliver additional facilities to accommodate
    capacity shortfalls. The interrelated relationship between the Marine
    Corps and SOCOM not only solidified the Marine Corps role as an equal
    partner in the SOF community, but also expanded the SOF capacity and
    capability that our Nation needs at this critical juncture in the war
    on terror. So, I would assess MARSOC's progress over the past 5 years
    as tremendous.
        As to the principle issue remaining, I believe that MARSOC's
    greatest challenge is the management of its continued growth as it
    moves toward Full Mission Capability. We currently project that MARSOC
    will be fully manned with critical skills operators in fiscal year
    2014. The 1,001 additional CS and CSS marines previously mentioned will
    be assigned to MARSOC from fiscal year 2013-2016. This uniformed
    growth, with an accompanying growth in civilian structure, will allow
    MARSOC to fully deploy and employ their robust capability of one Marine
    Special Operations Regiment (consisting of three battalions, each with
    four companies, with each company containing four teams), one Marine
    Special Operations Support Group (made up of all the Combat Support and
    Combat Service Support necessary to support MARSOC operations) and one
    Marine Special Operations School (conducting Assessment and Selection,
    the Individual Training Course, and follow-on Advanced Courses).
        Question. What unique attributes, if any, does MARSOC contribute to
    the capabilities of SOF?
        Answer. MARSOC brings several unique attributes to SOCOM:

        1.  First, they are marines, and they bring a marine perspective to
    all their efforts. This perspective, though not easy to quantify, is
    very valuable and the results speak for themselves. They certainly are
    very agile and can rapidly reorganize and adapt in order to address new
    or emerging requirements.
        2.  Second, MARSOC has been leading the effort to completely
    integrate Intelligence and Operations at the lowest possible level. To
    that end, they have task organized their 14-man Marine Special
    Operation Teams with additional Intel Marines and all the equipment
    necessary to collect and fuse locally collected intelligence. Their all
    source intel analysis allows the team to conduct organic, bottom-up
    targeting/engagement. The local battlespace dominance and distributed
    operations we see MARSOC conducting in Afghanistan today are proof of
    the value of this concept and the 1,001 marines being added to MARSOC's
    structure include a large number of Intel Marines to further bolster
    this capability.
        3.  Third, MARSOC brings a unique Command and Control mindset and
    capability to SOCOM. As marines, coming from a Marine Air-Ground Task
    Force background, they are experienced and comfortable with ground
    elements, aviation elements and logistics elements combined within a
    single command and adept at tying all those efforts together into a
    cohesive effort. MARSOC has twice deployed Special Operations Task
    Force Headquarters to Afghanistan, provided Command, Control,
    Coordination and Support to Special Operation Forces spread of 100,000
    square miles. At the lower levels, Marine Special Operations Companies
    routinely operate and direct the operations of SEALs, Special Forces
    and even foreign SOF elements in conjunction with their own inherent
    teams.

        Question. Recently, the Marine Corps approved a primary military
    occupational specialty (MOS) for enlisted marines trained as special
    operators allowing these personnel to remain in MARSOC for their
    professional careers.
        Do you believe officers should have a similar opportunity as
    enlisted marines to serve the duration of their military career in
    MARSOC rather than rotating through the command as they do currently?
        Answer. Officers who attend the individual training course are
    assigned to MARSOC for a 4 year tour instead of the traditional 3
    years. They also receive designation with an additional MOS (0370) to
    ensure their MARSOC service and training are highlighted in their
    record. With the 0370 designation, these officers can then be tracked
    and their records reviewed for the potential of follow on assignments
    back to MARSOC. However, the number of officers assigned to the
    operating forces at MARSOC is very small. My initial impression is that
    retaining certain officers within MARSOC for their entire career would
    impose some manpower management difficulties on the Service, but the
    topic is worthy of discussion between myself and the Commandant,
    particularly as we move closer toward the completion of MARSOC manning
    in fiscal year 2016.

                          SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS

        Question. In recent years, SOF have taken on an expanded role in a
    number of areas important to countering violent extremist
    organizations, including those related to information and military
    intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant changes to
    SOCOM's Title 10 missions to make them better reflect the activities
    SOFs are carrying out around the world.
        What current missions, if any, do you believe can and should be
    divested by SOCOM, and why?
        Answer. SOCOM and SOF senior leaders are in the process of
    reviewing the current list of SOF core activities, as listed in DOD
    Directive 5100.01, to ensure it captures the ``new normal''. The
    outcome of this review could become the basis for a future update to
    the Directive and other key documents.
        Question. Are there any additional missions that you believe SOCOM
    should assume, and, if so, what are they and why do you advocate adding
    them?
        Answer. SOCOM and SOF senior leaders are in the process of
    reviewing the current list of SOF core activities, as listed in DOD
    Directive 5100.01, to ensure it captures the ``new normal''. The
    outcome of this review could become the basis for a future update to
    the Directive and other key documents.
        Question. What can be done to ensure that indirect SOF missions
    with medium- and long-term impact, such as unconventional warfare and
    foreign internal defense, receive as much emphasis as direct action,
    and that they receive appropriate funding?
        Answer. Indirect SOF missions are part of what the Department now
    calls foundational activities. The foundational activities which SOF
    perform have not necessarily lacked emphasis, but rather took a back
    seat during the last decade as SOF surged in Iraq and Afghanistan.
    Therefore, today we have plenty of resulting pent up demand. Moreover,
    we expect a future increase in the requirement for SOF to conduct
    foundational activities, as an evolved defense strategy premised on
    conflict prevention takes root. Accordingly, I do not see a lack of
    emphasis as being a future issue for SOF foundational activities.
    However, appropriate funding and authority are key. First, I believe
    Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton's current proposal before
    Congress to create a Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) that would
    provide assistance for security forces, rule of law, and stabilization
    is indispensable to the future success of SOF foundational activities.
    (Both departments would contribute resources to the GSCF and have a say
    in its allocation, creating a real incentive for integrated planning
    and prioritization.) Accordingly, I recommend Congress pass it as
    proposed in the current legislative session. Second, we appreciate
    Congress' ongoing support for section 1206, which we view as one of our
    most critical tools for building the capacity of partners to conduct
    counterterrorism operations and fight alongside us in stability
    operations. Third, increasing the resources at the Department of State
    for this work is essential. The Foreign Military Financing program
    provides a structure for long-term partner capacity development
    essential to future missions, but it is not sufficiently resourced to
    meet important needs.

                      MAY 1, 2011, OPERATION IN ABBOTTABAD

        Question. The successful operation on May 1, 2011, which resulted
    in the death of Osama bin Laden, was a significant victory in the armed
    conflict against al Qaeda and affiliated organizations.
        What do you view as the most important factors that contributed to
    the success of this operation?
        Answer. The operation was successful due to excellent interagency
    cooperation, operational security, and the tenacity and flexibility of
    the operators involved to adjust to any contingency that they
    encountered.
        Question. What steps need to be taken, in your judgment, to ensure
    that the capabilities of SOF to undertake similar missions in the
    future are maintained and improved?
        Answer. SOCOM must maintain the ability to rapidly take full
    advantage of cutting edge technology that will allow our SOF operators
    to gain the edge on an increasingly sophisticated advisory. But
    developing new technology from scratch is too time consuming and
    expensive so SOF must continue to be innovative in utilizing and
    modifying commercial off-the-shelf technology to support our missions.
    In addition, the key factor in any operation is the operator.
    Maintaining high standards, challenging training environments, and
    encouraging ingenuity develops unique and valuable operators. Finally,
    continuing to break down barriers between the various Agencies and
    Departments allows for increased cooperation and synchronization,
    allowing the U.S. Government to successfully accomplish the mission.

                        MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

        Question. In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out
    by special operations personnel different from those carried out by
    others in the intelligence community?
        Answer. SOF intelligence operations follow all existing policies
    and regulations guiding DOD and interagency activities. One key
    difference is the speed of special operations activities. SOF has
    refined the find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze (F3EA) intelligence
    cycle to support the cycle rate of SOF activities. The F3EA process is
    now being migrated to conventional forces. SOF have also placed a
    premium on sensitive site exploitation (SSE) and the collection and
    registration of biometrics data from the battlefield. SOCOM elements
    have developed a series of joint interagency task force nodes, both in
    deployed areas and in CONUS, that bring together expertise from all our
    interagency partners. Their specific expertise in SSE, combined with
    the methodology of the F3EA process, drives special operations on a
    much faster operational cycle than conventional operations. SOF
    maximizes interagency contributions through reachback, deconfliction
    and coordination of activities between agencies, which allow our forces
    to get inside the enemy's decision cycle.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure intelligence
    activities carried out by SOF are coordinated adequately with other
    activities carried out by those in the Intelligence Community?
        Answer. SOCOM will continue to follow all applicable intelligence
    community directives, report required sensitive activities to the
    USD(I), maintain the robust intelligence oversight processes in place
    involving our Inspector General, Staff Judge Advocate, and our Command
    Oversight Review Board. I will maintain and build upon the
    relationships developed over time with the numerous Federal
    intelligence and law enforcement agencies represented in our
    Interagency Task Force in Tampa. Additionally, SOCOM will continue to
    employ and leverage our liaison officers, which we call Special
    Operations Support Team members, to coordinate with agencies in the
    National Capital Region. Interagency collaboration is a significant
    contributing factor in many of our biggest successes.

                   SPECIAL OPERATIONS PERSONNEL IN EMBASSIES

        Question. SOCOM deploys personnel to work with country teams in a
    number of priority countries where the United States is not engaged in
    direct action operations, but rather trying to stop the spread of
    violent extremism. Their mission is to support the priorities of the
    Ambassador and the geographic combatant commander's theater campaign
    plan against terrorist networks. At times, Ambassadors have complained
    that they have not been adequately informed of activities by SOF in
    their country.
        If confirmed, what do you intend to do to make sure the goals of
    special operations personnel deployed to these countries are aligned
    closely with those of the Ambassadors they are working with?
        Answer. SOCOM has two persistent, strategic avenues to engage with
    and inform the Embassy leadership of SOF capabilities and operations,
    the Ambassador Orientation Visit (AOV) Program and the Special
    Operations Liaison Officer (SOLO) Program.
        The AOV provides future Ambassadors the opportunity to visit SOCOM
    headquarters, receive briefings on SOCOM unique capabilities and
    responsibilities, as well as regionally targeted introductions
    considerate of their newly assigned posts. During the program the
    ambassadors have a 1-hour one-on-one discussion period with their
    respective TSOC Commander and a 1-hour session with the SOCOM
    commander. To date SOCOM has hosted more than 75 ambassador designees.
    Feed back on the program has been positive and the future ambassadors
    have indicated that the experience is worthwhile and will help them in
    the future.
        Question. Please describe the value of these special operations
    personnel to their respective Geographic Combatant Commands and the
    country teams they are supporting.
        Answer. SOLOs are SOCOM sourced, SOF qualified officers, and placed
    under Chief of Mission authority as part of the Country Team, via the
    National Security Decision Directive-38. There are currently 8 serving
    SOLOs in various countries with 2 more going out summer 2011, for a
    total of 10 SOLOs working with the U.S. Embassy country teams. These
    countries were selected based on their proven or potential ability and
    desire to work SOCOM as partners across the spectrum of special
    operations missions and goals. The SOLOs serve as the SOCOM Commander's
    representative to the country team and host nation SOFs. A prime
    objective of the SOLO program is improving coordination between the
    U.S. country team, the TSOC and the host nation. Although the program
    is still relatively new, all indications are positive. The countries
    that have SOLO's enjoy a more efficient, direct coordination, and
    information sharing on SOF specific issues.

                    MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS

        Question. DOD recently announced that it was discontinuing use of
    the term ``psychological operations (PSYOP)'' in favor of the term
    ``military information support operations (MISO).''
        Do you support this change? Why or why not?
        Answer. Yes. Today, for some, the term PSYOP unfortunately conjures
    up images of propaganda, lies or deception--and these inaccurate
    perceptions limit the willingness to employ MISO personnel in some
    areas where they could be extremely effective.
        To date, there is some evidence that the name change has allowed
    for some increases in acceptance, cooperation and coordination
    throughout the U.S. Government and our partner nations.
        Question. What operational and doctrinal impacts do you believe
    such a change will have?
        Answer. Replacing the term Psychological Operations with MISO
    throughout military doctrine, manuals, and other documents is one of
    semantics. There were no directed changes in doctrine or operational
    employment of the force.
        Question. Do you believe the Armed Forces have sufficient personnel
    and other assets to conduct the range of military information support
    missions being asked of them?
        Answer. MISO forces and assets, like the rest of the military, are
    stretched thin with the ongoing operational requirement to the deployed
    combat forces. This low density force is one of the most deployed in
    the military which demonstrates the need to increase forces and assets.
    Under Admiral Olson, SOCOM conducted several reviews to address these
    issues. One of the first responses to increasing the MISO capability is
    the reorganization of SOCOM MISO forces. This reorganization will
    reduce redundancy in commands and allow for the repurposing of numerous
    positions from staff to operational capability.
        Question. Al Qaeda and affiliated violent extremist groups work
    hard to appeal to both local and foreign populations. The composition
    and size of these groups in comparison to the U.S. Government permits
    them to make policy decisions quickly.
        Do you believe DOD is organized to respond quickly and effectively
    to the messaging and influence efforts of al Qaeda and other affiliated
    terrorist groups?
        Answer. DOD is well positioned and organized from the strategic
    level to the tactical to quickly respond to al Qaeda and its affiliates
    when a quick response is what is required. But unlike kinetic warfare,
    effectiveness in the war of ideas does not necessarily lie in outpacing
    the tempo of our enemies. A steady drumbeat which clearly articulates
    U.S. policy over time, anchored in the bedrock truth, best serves our
    national interests. DOD takes its lead from the Commander in Chief and
    the Department of State, in re-enforcing the message from our Nation.
    In doing so, we are extremely effective in face-to-face engagements,
    through a broad array of engagements with our partner and host nations,
    and allies, on a daily basis. As a representative example, we reinforce
    our ability to engage with printed products, such as the Geographic
    Combatant Command's Regional Magazines and the Geographic Combatant
    Command's foreign engagement websites. These mediums allow us a broad
    range of options.
        In addressing al Qaeda, we collectively identify and exploit their
    miscues and errors, and forcing them into a reactive role to gain the
    initiative. The DOD in that way, determines the appropriate level of
    response and quickly coordinates that response with other agencies, and
    the State Department. Our military commanders have a solid
    understanding of the impact messaging can have in the strategic
    environment and exercise authorities with coordinated guidance allowing
    them broad flexibility to respond in the most appropriate manner.
        While shocking video and extremist propaganda constantly reminds us
    that al Qaeda and their affiliated terrorist groups exercise
    streamlined and individual messaging--with unencumbered release
    processes and no mandate for truth--it would appear to give them the
    ability to address emerging issues, as they see them, at a time and
    place of their choosing. But recent events suggest that the mainstream
    is rejecting their propaganda.
        Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role for Military
    Information Support Teams (MIST) in these activities?
        Answer. The MIST is the MISO equivalent to the Special Forces
    operational detachment. The element that executes MISO at the
    operational and tactical level--but should not be equated to tactical
    loudspeaker elements that operates in support of combat maneuver forces
        The MISTs develop messages to counter hostile information and
    propaganda, that are culturally relevant and acceptable to the host
    national population. Such messaging is closely coordinated with the
    embassy due to the Team's relationship in support of the embassy staff.
    The MISTs also can maintain awareness of the information environment by
    identifying current trends in local and regional media reporting,
    identifying hostile messaging, and measuring local populace reaction.

                            CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

        Question. Civil affairs (CA) activities carried out by SOF in
    partnership with host nation personnel play an important role in
    developing infrastructure, supporting good governance and civil
    societies, and providing humanitarian assistance, including medical and
    veterinary services to needy populations.
        In your view, does SOCOM have sufficient personnel and resources to
    conduct the range of civil affairs missions required for today's
    operations?
        Answer. Civil Affairs activities are most effective when
    coordinated with other U.S. Government efforts, most notably those
    carried out by the U.S. Agency for International Development.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure Civil Affairs
    activities by special operations personnel are integrated into larger
    U.S. Government efforts?
        Answer. MISOs can have an amplifying effect on Civil Affairs
    activities by actively promoting the efforts of the U.S. military and
    host nation and by communicating truthful messages to counter the
    spread of violent extremist ideology among vulnerable populations.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure Civil Affairs and
    MISOs are adequately coordinated to achieve a maximum impact?
        Answer. I'll start by saying this is a mutually supporting effort
    where, as you've stated, MISO can and does support, reinforce, and
    amplify CA efforts on the ground. On the other hand, CA can and does
    amplify MISO efforts to affect behavior through their on the ground
    activities. In a nutshell, it's about ``words and deeds''--you can't
    have one without the other, and depending upon the situation one will
    support or be supported by the other.
        Today, we affect this coordination and synchronization through our
    strategic plans and guidance, where both MISO and CA staff members
    participate with our strategic planners to ensure, depending upon the
    situation, activities of both are nested and mutually supporting. This
    is also true at the TSOCs and GCCs.
        On the ground, this coordination and synchronization is affected
    through the deployment and organization of cross-functional SOF teams
    that often include elements of MISO and CA who work together, plan
    together, and often operate together, in coordination with the U.S.
    Embassy and Country team and JSOTF and/or TSOC commander's objectives.
        While there's room for improvement, we believe we're on the right
    track. We continue to reinforce our efforts for CA and MISO to work
    more closely and better achieve our population-centric and indirect
    approach. Starting with a synchronized campaign in coordination with,
    and often in support of, our U.S. Government civilian interagency
    partners, CA and MISO have and will continue to improve operations to
    counter violent extremism as part of U.S. Government strategic
    objectives globally.

                              TRAINING CAPABILITY

        Question. What capabilities do you consider most important for
    effective training of special operations personnel?
        Answer. Professional military education remains an essential
    element to the development, sustainment, and advancement of SOF.
    Additionally, language skills and cultural knowledge continue to be key
    to establishing effective relations with the foreign forces,
    organizations, and individuals with which SOF will interact.
        Maintaining core Special Operations skills are also critical. They
    provide the base for what makes SOF special.
        Question. What improvements are necessary, in your view, to enhance
    training for special operations personnel?
        Answer. SOF competition for Service installation's Ground Tactical
    Ranges and Training Areas with the General Purpose Forces is one of our
    greatest challenges. Given SOF's OPTEMPO and unforecasted mission
    requirements SOF needs priority at Service installations over GPFs
    allowing immediate and unfettered access to ranges and training areas.
    In the current environment, training time is short and precious.
        From a Presentation of Force Perspective, Pre-mission and Pre-
    deployment training with relevant Service-provided capabilities (e.g.
    mobility, fires, engineers, et cetera) is also critical to ensure that
    joint SOF packages are effective and fully-enabled. The continued
    emphasis on language and cultural awareness training is important. SOF
    have seen remarkable improvements to three key areas since September
    11--shooting, moving, and communicating. Now the command must
    concentrate on ``understanding.''
        Question. What are the most significant challenges in achieving
    effective training of special operations personnel?
        Answer. SOCOM must move from a primarily threat-focused approach to
    a populace-centric approach. To achieve U.S. strategic objectives, the
    instruments of national power, including the military, and more
    specifically SOF, must posture for and then execute an approach based
    on populace-centric engagement. In this approach, the United States out
    competes rivals in the open market of relevant populations as opposed
    to countering rivals in a more conventional manner based on threat-
    centric engagement. While emphasizing the need for the indirect
    approach, we must not weaken our ability to execute direct action when
    necessary. To be successful, we must optimize our role with the
    defense-diplomacy-development construct and design our training
    programs to maximize our combat capability and make our staffs more
    effective.
        Another challenge is ensuring there is enough time to train in the
    deployment cycle to maintain proficiency in our core SOF capabilities.
    Since most SOF missions require non-SOF support, time must be added to
    work closely with the Service Providers prior to deployment.
        Question. What, if any, training benefits accrue to SOF from
    training foreign military personnel?
        Answer. SOF providing training in regional synchronization,
    intelligence sharing, planning and coordination for counterterrorism
    related operations has provided huge benefits. SOF also participates in
    Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) exercises throughout the world.
    These exchanges enhance SOF skills and fulfill training requirements.
    They also build person-to-person and unit-to-unit relationships.
        The bottom line is we must continue to develop relationships with
    our foreign counterparts for persistent engagement, cultural awareness
    and to maintain SOF instructor and language skills.
        Question. To what extent, in your view, is it appropriate for the
    United States to rely upon contractors for training foreign military
    personnel? What do you see as the primary risks and advantages in such
    contractor training?
        Answer. Training of foreign forces, as a general rule, must be
    conducted as a part of the Department of State title 22 funded Security
    Assistance or Security Cooperation programs. SOF support to these
    programs usually does not include the use of contracted personnel. The
    use of contractors in many cases may make sense from a cost
    perspective, as well as relieving military assets from these tasks. The
    risk to SOF in using contracted personnel is the possible disclosure of
    Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) which SOF has developed, and
    has resulted in our successes on the battlefield. SOF reviews contracts
    for training to foreign forces to ensure TTPs are protected from
    disclosure. The problem is trying to monitor contracted training that
    is being done by other countries for foreign forces. Frequently, former
    U.S. military personnel accept employment with foreign companies to
    conduct SOF training. It is very difficult to monitor the disclosure in
    this case.
        Contractors are not a SOF substitute. They should only be used in a
    support role such as logistics and administration. The risk is they are
    not military and therefore cannot represent the U.S. Government. The
    advantages are they free up SOF from routine logistical and admin
    support functions and allow them to concentrate on operational mission
    accomplishments.
      capabilities of special operations forces and general purpose forces
        Question. The 2010 QDR called for increased counter insurgency,
    counterterrorism, and security force assistance capabilities within the
    general purpose forces.
        What is your assessment of the QDR with regard to the mix of
    responsibilities assigned to general purpose and SOF, particularly with
    respect to security force assistance and building partner military
    capabilities?
        Answer. SOF have routinely been the force of choice for Security
    Force Assistance (SFA) activities. However, SOF cannot indefinitely
    sustain current levels of overseas presence. The resulting pressure on
    the force and our families is too great and the pressure is creating a
    dramatic effect on our readiness. All capabilities, including SOF,
    require foundational activities to make them sustainable. Any
    comprehensive plan to develop a capability must address these
    activities base. The General Purpose Force (GPF) maintains the subject
    matter expertise to deliver most of these foundational activities. The
    GPF's primary challenge is the lack of core competence in advising
    specific skills. The GPF's challenge in the future will be to
    effectively institutionalize what they have learned, developing the
    right capabilities, and establishing effective and responsive policies,
    processes, and procedures to meet the national security goals with
    respect to building foundational activities necessary for conflict
    prevention. Once it is institutionalized across the Department, we feel
    the development of foundational activities can be accomplished through
    the appropriate employment of GPF, SOF or SOF/GPF mix.
        GPF are best suited for delivering GPF capabilities to foreign
    military forces in environments where overt U.S. presence is acceptable
    to the host-country government and where large-scale U.S. presence is
    considered necessary and acceptable by the host-country government or
    in areas where a limited overt presence is acceptable to the host
    nation government. SOF is more appropriate for politically sensitive
    environments where an overt U.S. presence is unacceptable to a host
    country government. These are not hard and fast rules but should serve
    as general guidelines for the Department.
        Question. Do you believe that our general purpose forces need to
    become more like SOF in mission areas that are critical to countering
    violent extremists?
        Answer. A key element to countering violent extremists is removing
    the factors that inspire hatred and discontent, both in their
    organizations and more importantly, among the populations they recruit.
    In order to do this effectively, any force, whether SOF or GPF, needs
    to have an understanding of the culture, and be able to build
    relationships with the population that promote mutual respect. A key
    element in the training of SOF personnel is the development of regional
    and cultural orientation, language capability, and an ability to
    interact effectively in other cultures. In Afghanistan for example,
    there are many GPF units currently conducting activities that are
    traditionally Special Operations and that are important for building
    Afghan capacity to counter VEOs and raising their standard of living to
    a point where most incentives to join VEOs no longer exist. NATO
    Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-
    Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) has GPF conducting Foreign Internal Defense
    by training Afghan National Army and Police forces. Provincial
    Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are conducting capacity building, medical,
    and engineering support missions that fall under the heading of Civil
    Affairs, as well as Information Operations to help the Afghan
    Government communicate more effectively with its own population. PRTs
    and other GPF units also conduct Humanitarian Assistance activities.
        GPF needs to be more SOF like as it pertains to the Knowledge,
    Skills and Attributes (KSA) that make SOF effective, such as language,
    culture, regional expertise, cross-cultural ability, diplomacy, and
    adaptability. These KSAs will enable the GPF to effectively execute the
    missions and activities that support SOF, in coordination with SOF or
    independently to create an environment unfavorable to violent extremist
    organizations (i.e.: enhanced capabilities to conduct or support
    missions in foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, stability
    operations, security force assistance, unconventional warfare, and
    information operations as outlined in the 2010 QDR). I would also
    mention that the Services have made great strides in this direction in
    the last 2 or 3 years.
        Question. Are there certain mission areas that should be reserved
    for SOF only?
        Answer. Missions involving the Title 10 SOF Core Activities of
    Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, and Unconventional Warfare are
    highly specialized and from a military standpoint SOF should have
    primacy due to the extensive specialized mental and physical training
    required and the high degree of risk that the personnel conducting
    these missions accept.
        However, other agencies in the U.S. Government also specialize in
    some of these missions, particularly Counterterrorism and Counter
    Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. SOF needs to partner
    closely with them in the conduct of these operations. Additionally, SOF
    is best suited for politically sensitive environments, where an overt
    U.S. presence is unacceptable to the host country government, and to
    denied environments.

                    SPECIAL OPERATIONS ENABLING CAPABILITIES

        Question. The Commander of SOCOM has described the ``non-
    availability'' of force enablers as SOCOM's ``most vexing issue in the
    operational environment.'' The 2010 QDR sought to balance previously
    mandated growth in SOF with additional enabling capabilities.
        What do you believe are the greatest shortages in enabling
    capabilities facing SOF?
        Answer. The greatest shortage is in those enabling capabilities not
    organic to SOCOM's force structure.
        SOCOM's organic enabling capabilities are those that provide our
    forces the ability to self-sustain for short durations while
    maintaining the agility that allows us to deploy forces quickly in
    support of the combatant commanders. Support of SOF, by doctrine, and
    except under special circumstances, becomes the responsibility of each
    Service's theater logistic command and control structure; Services and/
    or executive agents should be prepared to support special operations
    not later than 15 days after SOF are employed.
        Shortages of enabling capabilities for SOF are often similar to the
    shortage of enablers that plague the rest of the deployed force. SOF
    struggle to obtain enough intelligence, EOD, ISR, communications
    personnel, medical, and security personnel support.
        Question. Do you believe additional enabling capabilities, beyond
    those mandated by the QDR, are required to support SOF?
        Answer. The QDR mandated an increase in the number of organic
    combat and combat service support assets available to both the Army and
    Navy special operations units. These capabilities include logisticians,
    communications assets, forensic analysts, information support
    specialists, and intelligence experts. We are slowly realizing this
    programmed growth, and it will make a difference in how our units are
    supported. The QDR only addresses growth within SOCOM. SOCOM will
    always rely on the Services for some level of support as addressed in
    the previous question. Our higher `tooth to tail' ratio when compared
    to conventional forces will make us dependent on the services for most
    operations in excess of 15 days.
        Question. Do you believe additional enabling capabilities should be
    grown within SOCOM or provided in support of SOF by the Services?
        Answer. Both, but the preponderance of those support capabilities
    should remain in the conventional force and be provided to SOF through
    the habitual association of Service combat support and combat service
    support capabilities with the SOF units they primarily support.
        Currently the responsibility of the conventional force to provide
    sustainment support to SOF is not clearly defined or specified. This
    limits SOF's ability to sustain operations.
        SOCOM is currently working with its components, the Services and
    the JS to develop the Special Operation Force Generation process to
    improve how it requests these critical capabilities. We will work to
    better define our requirements and make them farther in advance, to
    allow the Services to plan for the employment of habitually associated
    units in support of SOF. A reduction of our emergent requests and an
    increase in habitually associated Service provided capabilities will go
    a long way to resolve this problem.

                            RENDER SAFE PROFICIENCY

        Question. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a
    growing and especially concerning threat to our Nation. Select special
    operations units are assigned the task of interdicting and rendering-
    safe weapons of mass destruction should they ever fall into the wrong
    hands.
        If confirmed, how would you ensure render-safe capabilities are
    adequately maintained by special operations units who may currently be
    heavily engaged in offensive kill/capture missions against high value
    targets in Afghanistan and elsewhere?
        Answer. Currently, our capabilities are adequately maintained by
    special operations units. I will continue to use the current training
    and exercise programs in place. Special operations units participate in
    the Joint Operational Readiness and Training (JORTS) Cycle that
    incorporates world-wide deployments, individual training, collective
    training, and joint exercises (and evaluations) year round.
        Question. Do you believe additional render-safe capabilities are
    needed within SOCOM?
        Answer. Yes, but allow me to qualify that answer. As I stated
    before--our capabilities, training, and exercises are on track. We are
    abreast of the latest's threats. However we cannot rest. We must stay
    in front of the evolving threat through our research and development
    (R&D) programs. I am grateful for what we have, but as with any
    program, we are limited by funding. Increased funding for our R&D
    programs could potentially enhance our current capabilities within
    SOCOM.

                          SUPPORTED COMBATANT COMMAND

        Question. Under certain circumstances and subject to direction by
    the President or Secretary of Defense, SOCOM may operate as a supported
    combatant command.
        In your view, under what circumstances should SOCOM conduct
    operations as a supported combatant command?
        In your view, what resource, organization, and force structure
    changes, if any, are required in order for SOCOM to more effectively
    conduct both supporting and supported combatant command
    responsibilities?
        Answer. The plan of using SOCOM as a supported commander for CT ops
    was developed soon after September 11. Part of the reasoning was based
    on the assumption that SOCOM forces would most likely be prominent
    players in any terrorist-related incident, and also the fact that SOCOM
    is not limited to any specific area of ops. Additional rational was
    that the SOCOM Headquarters staff would be best suited to quickly plan
    any effort that spanned several AORs and/or involved precision timing
    based on a potential need for near-simultaneous execution against
    multiple targets. However, during the last 10 years, several real-world
    scenarios and numerous CT-focused global exercises have not supported
    the earlier belief that the Commander, SOCOM, is the best choice for
    being the supported commander for CT-related ops. In every case, both
    real-world and exercise, the final decision was to designate the GCC as
    the supported commanders. Their staffs, each of which includes a TSOC
    of more than 100 personnel, proved they were able to competently
    coordinate cross-GCC efforts and there was no need for an added layer
    of command and control between them and the Secretary of Defense. Also,
    the Joint Staff has concluded they are capable of executing the
    planning for any CT-related mission and may only require some SOF
    augmentation rather than a SOCOM-led effort. I cannot think of any
    other situation where the Commander, SOCOM, would be the best choice
    for acting as the supported commander.

                           INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION

        Question. The collaboration between SOF, general purpose forces,
    and other U.S. Government departments and agencies has played a
    significant role in the success of counterinsurgency and
    counterterrorism operations in recent years. However, much of this
    collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.
        What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the
    collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?
        Answer. We have learned a great deal over the last decade about the
    strength of collaboration. The organizational innovation of forming
    small task forces of subject matter experts from across the military,
    government, and partner nations allowed SOF in Iraq, Afghanistan and
    elsewhere to synchronize efforts with an efficient agility. These task
    forces all follow three simple principles: the practice of flattened,
    agile communications, extensive senior leader involvement across the
    U.S. Government and allies, and the leveraging of information dominance
    provided by these subject matter experts and their systems. These
    principles are our most important lessons learned.
        Question. How do you believe these efforts can be improved?
        Answer. As we approach future phases of operations in New Dawn and
    OEF, these forward interagency task forces will likely relocate and
    refocus on other regions and priorities. We must preserve the ability
    for the greater interagency network to support these task forces by
    asking them to loan their best and brightest to the effort. We must
    remember that any complex task is best approached by flattening
    hierarchies. It gets everybody feeling like they're in the inner
    circle, so that they develop a sense of ownership.
        Question. How can the lessons learned in recent years be captured
    in military doctrine and adopted as ``best practices'' for future
    contingency operations?
        Answer. We're on the right track with doctrinal publications such
    as Joint Pub 3-08, ``Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and
    Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations.''
    Capturing the best practices of these horizontal interagency teams in
    future editions is critical.

                             TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

        Question. Section 1403 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006 provides
    that no individual in the custody or under the physical control of the
    U.S. Government, regardless of nationality or physical location shall
    be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.
        In your view, is the prohibition in the best interest of the United
    States? Why or why not?
        Answer. Yes. It is essential that we follow both international and
    domestic laws regarding treatment of detainees. We do this not only to
    maintain international respect but also to set the example and to live
    our values. The way we behave shows how we view individual's lives. It
    is who we are.
        Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
    specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
    22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the DOD
    Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
        Answer. Yes, I fully support those standards.
        Question. Section 2441 of title 18, U.S.C., as amended by the
    Military Commissions Act of 2006, defines grave breaches of common
    Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, including torture and cruel and
    inhuman treatment.
        Do you believe it is consistent with effective counterinsurgency
    operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of
    Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that SOF comply with
    the standards in the Army Field Manual, the DOD Directive, and
    applicable requirements of U.S. and international law regarding
    detention and interrogation operations?
        Answer. SOCOM ensures that these regulations are followed through
    unit and individual training, and incorporated into all operational
    plans, pursuant to law and DOD instructions. I would emphasize their
    importance, direct continued compliance, and hold those who fail to
    follow the standards accountable for their actions. Prompt
    investigation into allegations of abuse and swift action are keys to
    ensuring strict compliance.
        Question. What steps, if any, would you take to ensure that those
    foreign forces trained by our SOF understand the necessity of complying
    with the Geneva Conventions when detaining and interrogating
    individuals?
        Answer. When conducting the training, I would ensure that our SOF
    personnel continue to explain in clear terms why it is important to
    follow international laws, treaties, and conventions, and the
    consequences of failure to abide by them. Additionally, I will make
    sure that we continue to use these training opportunities not just to
    show them what we do and how we do it, but to also explain why it
    works. The best thing we can do is set the example and set down our
    expectations that they should emulate what we do not because we tell
    them to but because it is the right thing to do. Finally, we make it
    known that further military assistance and training is predicated on
    their adherence to the law of war and human rights laws, as required by
    the Leahy Amendment.

                            CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

        Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
    appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
    briefings, and other communications of information.
        Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
    this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
    even if those views differ from the administration in power?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
    committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
    information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
    with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander of SOCOM?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
    other communications of information are provided to this committee and
    its staff and other appropriate committees?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
    such documents?
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

                                SOLAR MICROGRIDS

        1. Senator Levin. Vice Admiral McRaven, for several years, elements
    of Special Operations Command (SOCOM) have supported the development of
    solar power generators for Special Operations teams deployed in remote
    areas of Afghanistan, and for the use by the Afghan people through the
    Village Stability Operations program. The committee understands that
    two units have been built and forward-deployed for trial and
    evaluation. A third unit, reflecting input from the deployment of the
    first two, is now being tested at Aberdeen Proving Grounds before its
    scheduled deployment to Afghanistan.
        For our Special Operations Forces (SOF), these solar generators
    could dramatically reduce the consumption of diesel fuel and other
    consumables such as batteries. As we all know, getting supplies to
    forces in dangerous remote areas is hard and risky and reducing the
    number of convoys saves lives. What is your assessment of the utility
    and maturity of the solar microgrid system that SOCOM has developed?
        Admiral McRaven. SOCOM deployed the first two of three Mobile Smart
    Power Initiative Systems to Afghanistan in support of Operation
    Enduring Freedom in late December 2010 as part of a pilot program to
    evaluate and assess the use of alternative power generation
    technologies at remote Forward Operating Base locations.
        The overall objective was to increase energy efficiency and reduce
    reliance on fossil fuels by our SOF elements deployed at remote Village
    Stability Platform locations. Operating costs, transport demands,
    resupply needs, and exposure to improvised explosive devices
    necessitate the need for alternative power capabilities at remote
    locations throughout Afghanistan. Thus far, the systems have
    demonstrated utility at both locations for the stated goals of fuel
    savings but equally important for village stability operations. At both
    locations we are supplying power to our SOFs but also to the Afghans
    village centers and medical clinics. System maturity will increase as
    we move forward applying lessons learned from the first two systems
    into a larger third system that will be deployed in August 2011. This
    third system will offer increased power generation capability and will
    undergo a similar limited user assessment. We believe solar power along
    with other fuel saving initiatives have a solid place on the
    battlefield.

        2. Senator Levin. Vice Admiral McRaven, could fielding of solar
    microgrid systems for the Village Stability Operations program be
    accomplished using funding from the Commander's Emergency Response
    Program (CERP) and/or Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund?
        Admiral McRaven. The fielding of Solar Microgrid systems to provide
    electricity or power generation can be funded from the CERP or the
    Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund.

        3. Senator Levin. Vice Admiral McRaven, is SOCOM considering
    procurement of solar microgrid systems for the use of SOF?
        Admiral McRaven. SOCOM investment will be limited to the three
    initial systems. We will provide our lessons learned to the Service
    that could best move this type of effort forward into a service common
    system.

        4. Senator Levin. Vice Admiral McRaven, should SOCOM procure these
    systems or is the command looking to one of the Services to sponsor and
    fund this acquisition?
        Admiral McRaven. SOCOM investment will be limited to the three
    initial systems. We will provide our lessons learned to the Service
    that could best move this type of effort forward into a service common
    system.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Kay R. Hagan

                                    AL QAEDA

        5. Senator Hagan. Vice Admiral McRaven, Secretary-designate Panetta
    has expressed concern about the shifting of al Qaeda to ``nodes''
    outside of Pakistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan--most notably in Yemen,
    Somalia, and North Africa--and the need to keep up the pressure on
    these nodes. How would you characterize the relative threat these nodes
    pose to the United States and our allies?
        Admiral McRaven. Al Qaeda (AQ), its associated movements (AQAM),
    and key affiliates (to include AQ in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Shabaab,
    AQ in Iraq, and AQ in the Islamic Maghreb) remain the pre-eminent
    threat to the U.S. Homeland and interests abroad, to include our
    allies.
        While AQ has been unable to perpetuate a ``Spectacular'' attack
    against the U.S. Homeland since September 11, the United Kingdom and
    Spain have suffered AQ-inspired attacks. The failed ``Christmas Day
    Bomber'' attempt to bring down an airliner over Detroit, MI, claimed by
    AQ in the Arabian Peninsula, is proof that AQ Senior Leader guidance to
    attack western interests and the U.S. Homeland is being adhered to by
    AQ affiliates around the globe. AQ utilizes modern communications,
    financial and logistic networks that transcend national borders and
    boundaries throughout the globe.
        U.S. and partner nation Counterterrorism (CT) efforts, supported by
    SOCOM Forces and the U.S. Interagency (IA), have frustrated AQ's
    operations in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility and
    across the globe; yet AQ's motivation to attack the homeland is
    undiminished and their ability to reconstitute their capabilities is
    remarkable.
        The shift of AQ operational nodes to Yemen, Somalia, and North
    Africa poses challenges for the U.S. in that the United States may have
    to conduct Security Cooperation and Security Force Assistance
    activities to assist these country's Armed Forces improve their
    military and security capacity and capability to meet the AQ threat
    within their borders.

        6. Senator Hagan. Vice Admiral McRaven, do you believe we are
    applying sufficient resources to address these threats?
        Admiral McRaven. We are applying significant resources toward
    neutralizing al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Somalia, and East
    Africa. Our shortfalls continue to be manpower and Intelligence,
    Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) in support of kinetic operations
    in these areas. Unmanned ISR is a critical enabler for SOF in these
    direct action missions. Both the U.S. Central and Africa Commands have
    done an exceptional job in apportioning the available ISR but, we
    continue to experience shortages during these missions. Manpower is one
    of our greatest challenges we have and will continue to face in the
    future. The demand for SOF worldwide has quadrupled since September 11
    and we do not expect this to decrease. SOF can not be massed produced.
    Our planned growth for manpower within SOCOM is 3-5 percent per year.
    It is essential that we ensure our forces have the resources that they
    need to survive and succeed in the complex, ambiguous and often violent
    environments in which we ask them to operate in.

                      GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT MODIFICATIONS

        7. Senator Hagan. Vice Admiral McRaven, in response to the
    committee's advance policy questions, you indicated that you believe
    modifications to the Goldwater-Nichols Act are required to provide
    SOCOM with ``greater personnel management authority to shape mid- and
    senior-grade SOF operators to meet SOCOM's defined requirements.'' In
    what ways do the Goldwater-Nichols Act and current DOD policies provide
    insufficient authority to SOCOM to address these issues?
        Admiral McRaven. I believe the Goldwater-Nichols Act is one of the
    most significant pieces of legislation passed by Congress regarding DOD
    operations and organization. However, it has been 25 years since the
    enactment of Goldwater-Nichols and with the passage of time and an ever
    changing landscape of threats, I believe it is prudent for DOD to
    continuously review and innovatively improve our personnel management
    practices. We must revisit how we manage our personnel in order to
    guarantee that our system produces the type of leaders needed to
    succeed in the future operational environment.

        8. Senator Hagan. Vice Admiral McRaven, what specific modifications
    would you recommend?
        Admiral McRaven. I am not prepared now to recommend any
    modifications, but look forward to reviewing this milestone legislation
    and assessing whether any modifications should be considered to address
    the challenges faced in today's security environment.

                      TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

        9. Senator Hagan. Vice Admiral McRaven, earlier this year, the
    Commanders of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and U.S. Southern
    Command (SOUTHCOM) described the debilitating impact of transnational
    criminal organizations in Central America and Mexico. Appropriately,
    both commanders indicated the lead U.S. Government agencies for
    supporting our foreign partners in their efforts to counter the
    influence of transnational criminal organizations should be U.S. law
    enforcement and DOS. However, they both indicated that DOD can play an
    important support and enabling role. Would you support SOCOM and SOF
    playing a more significant role in support of other U.S. Government
    departments and agencies in this region?
        Admiral McRaven. Clearly the transnational criminal organizations
    are a threat to our national security that must be addressed through
    multi-national, multi-agency collaborative efforts. Per direction from
    the Secretary of Defense, SOCOM forces under the operational control of
    the NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM commanders currently execute counter-
    narcoterrorism training of selected partner nations' security forces in
    support of those combatant commanders' theater strategies. While SOF
    possess additional unique capabilities that could be leveraged against
    the problem, I would defer to the Secretary of Defense and the
    combatant commanders to determine what, if any expanded role SOF would
    have within the context of the whole of U.S. Government and Department
    of Defense strategy. Should an expanded role be requested and approved,
    we would support to the extent possible.

        10. Senator Hagan. Vice Admiral McRaven, in your view, what--if
    any--support capabilities can SOCOM bring to this effort that the
    geographic combatant commands cannot?
        Admiral McRaven. We can bring to this effort the following: an in-
    depth understanding from a global perspective on Transnational Criminal
    Organizations networks based on our experience in counterterrorism; a
    well established relationship of working with law enforcement in
    forward deployed locations, in the National Capitol Region, and through
    our Interagency Task Force in Tampa; and finally SOCOM can bring a
    well-honed process to identify lines of effort that should prove
    effective at disrupting Transnational Criminal Organizations networks.
        In conducting our global mission of synchronizing DOD plans and
    planning for counterterrorism, we recognize the increasing threat posed
    by this crime-terror-insurgency nexus. SOCOM is uniquely positioned to
    contribute to the U.S. Government effort against Transnational Criminal
    Organizations through information sharing with those agencies
    possessing the authorities to take action. SOCOM has close working
    relationships with all of the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) and
    their subordinate TSOCs on countering these threats.

                             COUNTER-THREAT FINANCE

        11. Senator Hagan. Vice Admiral McRaven, in response to the
    committee's advance policy questions, you indicate you are a strong
    advocate for counter-threat finance operations. You also indicated that
    you believe SOCOM might want to explore additional activities in this
    important area. Can you explain what sort of additional and expanded
    activities you have in mind?
        Admiral McRaven. We need to expand threat finance operations into
    the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) and develop our
    capabilities in the collection and processing of threat finance
    information. Processing means getting the information into the hands of
    our interagency partners or DOD elements that can operationalize that
    information. Since threat finance is still a relatively new and
    sometimes not well-understood addition to DOD operations, expanding
    threat finance operations/capabilities at the TSOCs may also include
    assigning experienced threat finance personnel from SOCOM to the
    combatant commands as needed or requested. Additionally, we need to
    expand our interaction with our interagency partners. This will enable
    a broader level of support to Law Enforcement, Treasury and other
    partners who assist in disrupting the global illicit financial
    networks. This cooperative work with law enforcement is a logical
    extension of the effort of SOCOM and the combatant commands.
    Interagency threat finance operations, supported by DOD worldwide, is a
    unique combination of authorities to mitigate, degrade and defeat the
    financial networks that support organizations threatening the United
    States.

        12. Senator Hagan. Vice Admiral McRaven, transnational criminal
    organizations in Central America and Mexico are having a debilitating
    impact on the ability of our foreign partners to govern their nations
    and provide opportunities for their people. Do you think expanded
    counter-threat finance activities in this region would be beneficial?
        Admiral McRaven. Yes, provided they are led by our interagency
    partners, supported by DOD, and focused toward disrupting the illicit
    financial flows of the organizations versus High Value Individual (HVI)
    hunting. We need to emphasize disrupting the movement of illicit
    capital into, out of, and through such countries as Mexico, Guatemala,
    Belize, Panama, Curacao, and Barbados. In addition, al Qaeda and its
    allies have expressed an interest in leveraging transnational criminal
    networks operating through Central America and Mexico into the United
    States. Disrupting these financial flows can help cripple the
    transnational criminal organizations, their associated drug trafficking
    organizations (DTOs), and the financial intermediaries who enable this
    activity. It can also reduce the possibility that terrorist groups can
    leverage transnational criminal organizations in Central America and
    Mexico to conduct attacks in the U.S. Homeland.

                             NATO SOF HEADQUARTERS

        13. Senator Hagan. Vice Admiral McRaven, during your time as the
    Commander of the Special Operations component of U.S. European Command,
    you oversaw the creation of what is now known as the North Atlantic
    Treaty Organization SOFs Headquarters (NATO SOF HQ). In your response
    to the committee's advance policy questions, you indicated you are
    ``particularly interested in developing an enduring relationship'' with
    the NATO SOF HQ. What do you see as the value of the NATO SOF HQ to
    International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in
    Afghanistan and to broader multilateral military engagements around the
    world?
        Admiral McRaven. I am indeed very familiar with the NSHQ as I was
    appointed by the Supreme Allied Commander-Europe as the first Director
    of the NSHQ's predecessor organization, the NATO SOF Coordination
    Center (NSCC) in December 2006 while concurrently serving at the
    Commander of the Theater Special Operations Command.
        The NSHQ value to the ISAF SOF effort has been nothing short of
    immense. I say that with first hand knowledge of its impact cognizant
    of where we started, but also from my more recent vantage point of an
    operational Commander in Afghanistan. In February 2007, just a few
    months after the establishment of the NSCC, we led the first NATO
    Senior SOF leader assessments to Afghanistan where we took many of the
    NATO SOF Commanders to Afghanistan to ascertain a first hand
    perspective. This event began a series of NSCC related activities in
    support of ISAF SOF, but most importantly served as a catalyst for
    invigorating NATO SOF force generation, which is the NATO process of
    gaining commitment of NATO SOF forces to the ISAF SOF team.
        From 2007 to now, the NATO Allied and Partner SOF footprint in
    Afghanistan has grown 500 percent to some 2,100 personnel, primarily
    due to the NSCC/NSHQ support to the NATO Force Generation process
    managed by the Deputy SACEUR. Additionally, the NSCC/NSHQ has been an
    essential partner to the ISAF SOF Command over the last several years
    providing a degree of coherence to the effort that did not exist
    previously, in fact the current ISAF SOF Commander is the former NSHQ
    Deputy Commander. Other NSCC/NSHQ support to ISAF dating back to 2007
    has included the development of a Strategic Concept for ISAF SOF
    Capabilities, a second ISAF SOF Assessment in December 2008 at the
    request of SACEUR, the drafting of a Strategic ISAF SOF Vision and
    supporting plan, an ISAF SOF Air Assessment, advice and assistance to
    the broader Afghanistan SOF command and control arrangements, and
    creation of ISAF SOF Medical information briefings and medical
    directives.
        One of the most significant contributions was the creation of the
    SOF Fusion Cell, comprised of contributions from the ISAF SOF troop
    contributing nations and the NSHQ. It is focused on garnering
    information from in excess of forty different multinational sources and
    fusing that information to support ISAF SOF Special Operations Task
    Groups. This is really an unheralded success story that has been an
    unprecedented success for information sharing among Allied SOF that is
    difficult to appreciate. It has cut new ground for SOF collaboration
    that we aim to fully exploit for the future. As mentioned, today, more
    than 2,100 NATO Allied and Partner SOF are training and advising
    partnered elite Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) paramilitary
    units as part of a broader force multiplying/economy of force effort.
    As mentioned in my testimony, as forces draw down in Afghanistan, one
    can assume that NATO Allied and Partner SOF will figure prominently in
    continuing to facilitate the transition to Afghan lead.
        In terms of broader global military engagement, the experience of
    the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) is important to the
    U.S. and to SOCOM because we have seen U.S. leadership of this effort
    achieve a generational leap forward in NATO Allied and Partner SOF
    capabilities. We have been able to achieve this by leveraging the
    unique framework of the NATO Alliance as a vehicle to achieve greater
    effectiveness, efficiency, and coherence of special operations.
    Frankly, this is one of the unrecognized advantages or residual
    benefits of exploiting an Alliance framework. Beyond Afghanistan, the
    continued evolution of NATO Allied and Partner SOF into a more agile
    and dynamic force, and capitalization on best practices, will better
    enable these forces to augment and compliment U.S. national and theater
    level efforts against enduring challenges such as terrorism and
    proliferation of WMD.
        The breadth of the NSHQ's involvement beyond the 26 Allies that
    maintain SOF are also of interest to SOCOM. These evolutionary effects
    among NATO Allied and Partner SOF also resonate with and influence
    international SOF well beyond the NATO Alliance via other NATO
    cooperative mechanisms such as Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean
    Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperative Initiative, the European Union and
    NATO collaboration with ``contact countries'' such as Australia, and
    New Zealand. The continued maturation and codification of the NSHQ's
    Allied and Partner Collaborative Network will allow for comprehensive
    and sustained engagement among the NATO Allied and Partner SOF ``human
    network,'' which is in fact a de facto regional node of SOCOM's broader
    Global SOF Network. This SOF human network takes a long view towards
    fostering deeper and more effective enduring relationships among SOF,
    and for this reason, NSHQ is of great interest to SOCOM.

        14. Senator Hagan. Vice Admiral McRaven, if confirmed, how would
    you seek to build the relationship between SOCOM and the NATO SOF HQ?
        Admiral McRaven. The Secretary of Defense's (SECDEF) November 5,
    2010, designation of SOCOM as the Lead Component Tasked with Executive
    Agent Responsibilities for the NSHQ established the framework for the
    relationship between SOCOM and the NSHQ in accordance with the 2010
    National Defense Authorization Act. Specifically, SECDEF charged SOCOM
    with providing NSHQ with advocacy for resources, personnel, and funding
    within the Department; establishing the appropriate links with NSHQ to
    share best practices and lessons learned; creating mechanisms to
    provide NSHQ with the latest releasable U.S. policy, strategy,
    operations, tactics, and training for SOF; and serving as interlocutor
    for NSHQ to the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
    So, the basis or foundation for the relationship already exists, and
    SOCOM has since established a NSHQ Working Group specifically oriented
    on the NSHQ.
        Additionally, myself and ADM Olson both have been habitually
    engaged and involved in bi-annual NATO Allied and Partner SOF
    Commanders' Conferences over the last several years. We have been
    active members of this growing NATO Allied and Partner Collaborative
    ``human'' Network alongside the other national SOF representatives.
    Indicative of this degree of involvement, in May of this year at the
    NATO Allied and Partner SOF Symposium in Krakow, Admiral Olson offered
    to host the next symposium in conjunction with SOCOM's May 2012
    International SOF Week in Tampa. As you can imagine, this is a superb
    opportunity to diversify our broader global SOF outreach efforts
    alongside the NSHQ's annual event and anticipated strong NATO SOF
    participation.
        From a SOCOM perspective, the NSHQ is viewed as a force multiplier,
    that leverages the unique venue of NATO to effectively and efficiently
    enhance the capability, capacity, and interoperability of U.S. and NATO
    Allied and Partner SOF from a centralized hub of influence within the
    Alliance. U.S. framework nation activities of the NSHQ support U.S.
    objectives through the construct of the Alliance to achieve commonality
    of doctrine, procedures, and equipment among NATO Allied and Partner
    SOF. This is an unprecedented opportunity for SOCOM to participate,
    lead, and influence where appropriate this aspect of commonality
    relative to SOF and multinational interoperability. This commonality
    creates an enduring framework for collective interoperability shaped
    and influenced by U.S. leadership of the NSHQ, rather than relying on
    short-term ad hoc solutions. So I think it is beneficial and in our
    interests to work closely with the NSHQ in these areas that are part of
    the mandate set forth by the Secretary of Defense. Ultimately, these
    efforts better posture NATO Allied and Partner SOF to provide world
    class complimentary capabilities alongside U.S. SOF or independently in
    support of U.S. objectives relative to contemporary and emerging
    challenges. Afghanistan is a prime example and the NATO Allied and
    Partner SOF contribution is not something we take lightly, it is a
    significant, sizable, and potent SOF element. So again, from a SOCOM
    perspective, access, influence and participation in the NSHQ provide a
    very beneficial venue for a parallel and complimentary line of effort
    to other U.S. bilateral and multilateral means to build NATO Allied and
    Partner SOF capacity and capability. As a result, SOCOM will continue
    to look for opportunities to evolve further, what has been very
    successful collaboration thus far.

              SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

        15. Senator Hagan. Vice Admiral McRaven, the 2010 Quadrennial
    Defense Review called for increased counterinsurgency,
    counterterrorism, and security force assistance capabilities within the
    General Purpose Forces. These missions have traditionally been within
    the purview of SOFs. What actions, if any, do you believe need to be
    taken in order to allow SOFs and General Purpose Forces to successfully
    share these missions in the future?
        Admiral McRaven. Doctrinally, all forces may have a role in these
    missions. Today, General Purpose Forces are participating in these
    mission sets globally, whether in the lead or in support of SOF.
    However, by approaching mission planning with a mid- to long-term view
    of the objectives and an holistic view of force capabilities, planners
    will increase both their force sourcing and force employment teaming
    options between General Purpose Forces and SOF for successful mission
    execution.

        16. Senator Hagan. Vice Admiral McRaven, are there certain mission
    areas that should be reserved for SOFs only?
        Admiral McRaven. Counterterrorism and Unconventional Warfare
    missions should be reserved solely for SOF. In addition, the mission of
    Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, conducted in a
    hostile environment, should be reserved for SOF only. However, other
    SOF core activities, when conducted in politically sensitive areas,
    should be directed towards SOF as the primary force, supported by
    General Purpose Forces as required.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

                  SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ENGAGEMENT PROGRAMS

        17. Senator Inhofe. Vice Admiral McRaven, our military-to-military
    (1206), civilian-to-civilian (1207), small-scale special operations
    (1208), CERP, and Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund have been
    incredibly successful in aiding developing nations, fighting terrorism,
    and providing resources for emergency situations. My belief is that the
    key to these programs has been the combined efforts of DOD, DOS, the
    chiefs of mission, and combatant commanders working together to
    increase the capabilities of our partner nations to provide for their
    own security, increasing stability in their region and around the
    globe. What value do these funds provide in your prospective areas of
    responsibility?
        Admiral McRaven. Section 1208 authority, which is specifically for
    SOF to enable foreign regular and irregular forces directly supporting
    our combating terrorism operations, has been tremendously useful in
    Iraq, Afghanistan and other key locations in our efforts to disrupt
    terrorist networks. The foreign elements that we leverage through
    section 1208 authority have been crucial in finding and fixing the
    enemy, resulting in more precise and timely targeting, reduced risk to
    our forces, and minimal civilian casualties. We have also worked to
    leverage 1206 authority in areas such as the Philippines to support
    their counterterrorist activities in Mindanao.

        18. Senator Inhofe. Vice Admiral McRaven, do you have any concerns
    about being able to effectively execute these programs in your
    prospective areas of responsibility?
        Admiral McRaven. SOCOM has and maintains effective processes and
    procedures to execute these programs as currently established. Each of
    these programs, however, has specific purposes with limited annual
    funding that can cause the disaggregation of a holistic plan in order
    to meet the requirements and purpose of a specific program. 1206, for
    example, prohibits the training of non-Ministry of Defense forces with
    the exception of foreign maritime security forces. Many Partner
    Nations, however, maintain their CT forces outside of their Ministry of
    Defense. Additionally, there are border security and other paramilitary
    forces that conduct military tasks relevant to counterterrorism and
    counter insurgency that SOF or other DOD units would be best suited to
    train. In order to improve the combined efforts of the DOD, DOS, chiefs
    of mission and combatant commanders to aid developing countries to
    fight terrorism, insurgency and trans-criminal organizations; we should
    appropriately modify these programs that would allow DOD to train and
    equip all Partner Nation security forces that are conducting
    traditional U.S. military tasks, roles and missions. This would allow
    SOF and other DOD assets to improve its effective support to DOS and
    chiefs of mission initiatives to improve Partner Nations' capabilities
    to fight terrorism, insurgency and transcriminal organizations in a
    holistic, proactive manner. Additionally, DOD and the combatant
    commanders should develop resource informed, multi-year plans that are
    informed by DOS Mission Strategic Resource Plans that would link
    initiatives in these programs to more long-term Foreign Military
    Finance funded programs which would enable measurable phased-in
    approaches to aid developing countries efforts to fight terrorism,
    insurgency and transnational criminal organizations. Lastly,
    improvements to these programs, coupled with mutually supportive
    interagency plans will be extremely valuable in developing approaches
    to deal with the aftermath of the ``Arab Spring'' so that these nations
    do not fall into the influence of al Qaeda or other like minded
    extremist organizations.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss

                    COUNTERTERRORISM RESOURCING/AUTHORITIES

        19. Senator Chambliss. Vice Admiral McRaven, although highly
    desired, perfection with respect to counterterrorism has yet to be
    obtained. While our capabilities have greatly improved since September
    11, some security experts speculate that the military personnel charged
    with combating terrorism are still not properly trained, robustly
    staffed, or sufficiently resourced to effectively combat all the
    emerging threats to our national security. What, if any, resources or
    authorities do you feel the counterterrorism community lacks in order
    to adequately combat the host of emerging threats to our national
    security?
        Admiral McRaven. The military component of the counterterrorist
    community, specifically the joint SOF for which HQ SOCOM has
    responsibility, will have adequate resources to execute currently
    approved plans and missions, if the current Program Objective
    Memorandum input and the related OCO-to-Base requests are accepted
    during the DOD budget approval process.
        The plans in effect currently have adequate authorities, in law and
    policy, to pursue the nationally assigned strategic and operational
    counterterrorism (CT) objectives. We have several major CT plans in
    development, including the third revision of the DOD global CT campaign
    plan, and its SOF supporting plan, for which modified or additional
    authorities may become necessary. However, at the current stage of plan
    development, it is too early to speculate on specific authorities that
    may need to be modified or added. As these plans are presented to the
    Secretary of Defense for guidance during the coming year, any potential
    new requirements should become more readily apparent.

                         SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES

        20. Senator Chambliss. Vice Admiral McRaven, section 167, title 10,
    U.S.C., defines 10 activities as ``special operations'' activities
    insofar as each relates to special operations. While there is a
    catchall proviso listed as well, [i.e. ``such other activities as may
    be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense''], given the
    2006 realignment of all Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological
    Operations/Military Information Support Operations (MISO) forces from
    SOCOM, where they supported both the general purpose force and SOFs, to
    the U.S. Army Reserve Command, where they now primarily support the
    general purpose force, should civil affairs and psychological
    operations have remained on this list of special operations activities?
        Admiral McRaven. Although frequently coordinated for mutual support
    and synergy of effect, Civil Affairs (CA) and (MISO previously called
    Psychological Operations (PsyOp)) are distinct activities and should
    not be regarded as synonymous. As such, the following responses address
    each activity separately:
        The skill set associated with providing strategic influence
    capabilities, coupled with the intricacies of foreign audiences
    specifically in today's asymmetric warfare, make military information
    support operations a natural fit with the irregular and unconventional
    nature of special operations activities. So, the simple answer to your
    question is ``yes'', MISO is a special operations activity and should
    remain as such. This section does not restrict other DOD components
    from performing the activities. It is the mission profile and the
    supported unit that determine whether the particular mission is a
    conventional or special operation. However, in order for the MISO
    community to advise on the graduate-level cultural and social nuances
    required in the current and future operating environment, professional,
    multi-tiered training and up-to-date technological operating systems
    are a must. Unfortunately, similar to the dilemma faced by most of our
    Reserve component, time and other resource constraints force them to
    focus mainly on tactical missions. Several studies fundamental to this
    issue are in staffing throughout the Department of Defense.
    Recommendations from these comprehensive analyses are being validated
    through a joint and service requirements process, and will provide
    incremental solutions for this systemic challenge.
        CA should be left as is in title 10, section 167 as a special
    operation activity. Leaving CA as a SOF activity, when conducted by SOF
    units, increases the scope of activities which SOCOM can pursue as it
    fulfills its strategic objectives. It allows SOF to expend MFP 11 (SOF)
    funds to prepare for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
    operations; provides authority for SOF to engage in CA operations
    consisting of support to civil administration, nation assistance; and
    complements our direct action capability with more unique missions in
    the building partnership capacity line of operation designed to
    reinforce our friends and strengthen their ability to maintain security
    and stability within their borders.
        I do believe, however, that amendments to the U.S. Code may be
    appropriate to better clarify the role of CA within the Department of
    Defense. Although it is a key SOF enabler, CA is not a unique SOF
    capability and is in fact required and used by non-special operations
    units. CA units are currently used to supplement Provincial
    Reconstruction teams in theater; historically have been used to provide
    military governance in an occupied territory with no host nation
    governance capability in place; and provide an interagency and
    nongovernmental organization (NGO) link during operations through the
    establishment of civil military operations centers.

        21. Senator Chambliss. Vice Admiral McRaven, given this change of
    command and control, how do you reconcile the fact that Reserve
    component CA and Psychological Operations/MISO soldiers continue to
    perform what is technically defined as a special operations activity
    without commensurate authorities, training, equipping, or funding when
    they deploy in support of combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
    the Horn of Africa?
        Admiral McRaven. Although frequently coordinated for mutual support
    and synergy of effect, CA and MISO are distinct activities and should
    not be regarded as synonymous. As such, the following responses address
    each activity separately:
        Other non-Special Operations DOD entities can, and do, perform
    section 167 functions. For example, humanitarian assistance is
    performed by many agencies. Reserve component MISO performs a Special
    Operations activity with a conventional mission profile, but it is
    still MISO. They have accomplished their mission with great competence,
    and have unmistakably contributed to the combat successes of their
    supported units operating under authorities derived from the supported
    Geographic Combatant Commander.
        U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School is the proponent
    for all Army MISO and, commensurate with that responsibility, is
    refining the training progression and materiel solutions to provide a
    more capable and flexible total MISO force. Since the 2006 realignment,
    that force exists under two separate chains of command, and Reserve
    component MISO funding has been outside the purview of SOCOM. We are
    now reorganizing the Active component MISO forces to better support SOF
    and General Purpose Forces, when required. The MISO studies currently
    in the requirements process recommend reviewing how best to organize
    DOD MISO forces to support the DOD, and I support that concept.
        CA is not solely a SOF function. The wording of section 167 states
    that CA is a Special Operations Activity ``insofar as it relates to
    special operations.'' CA units are conducting Civil Affairs Operations
    (CAO) outside of SOF, and the need for them to do so in support of non-
    SOF units and operations is indisputable. I would note that the U.S.
    Marine Corps and U.S. Navy both operate a CA capability which is
    conventional, not SOF unique. The Marine Corps has operated their
    conventional Civil Affairs Groups (CAG) since 1985.
        CA is inherently joint, interagency, and multinational in scope for
    planning and operations and is critical to both special and
    conventional operations and forces. CA is not just a capability
    required by SOF, it is a capability required by all. CA units conduct
    the same core missions whether assigned to a SOF or conventional unit;
    however, each employs this capability in different operating
    environments. SOF units work in austere, often sensitive areas which
    require special training and preparation while CA units in conventional
    forces support conventional warfare operations. For example, SOCOM
    operates a Civil Military Engagement program which uses SOF CA teams to
    compliment and enable select U.S. Embassy Mission Strategic plans in
    conjunction with U.S. Country Teams. These teams work in austere,
    politically sensitive, or strategically critical areas to further the
    goals outlined in the strategic plans.
        There are two ways ahead for the CA capability. Clarification is
    needed in the law to define CA as not just a Special Operations
    Activity, but a core activity for non-SOF military forces as well.
    Second, the man, train, and equip mission for CA should not reside in a
    SOF organization. The Services should have this mission for their
    respective CA forces in their force structure. This will require them
    to provide guidance, combat development, and authorities needed for
    them to execute their conventional missions for their Service and the
    Joint Force as codified in current strategy and guidance documents.
    SOCOM will focus on those CA units assigned to us and ensure they
    receive additional SOF specific equipment, training, or guidance needed
    to support SOF.

        22. Senator Chambliss. Vice Admiral McRaven, does this apparent
    statutory discrepancy need to be addressed or clarified?
        Admiral McRaven. Although frequently coordinated for mutual support
    and synergy of effect, CA and MISO are distinct activities and should
    not be regarded as synonymous. As such, the following responses address
    each activity separately:
        Activities listed in section 167 are each special operations
    activities insofar as they relate to special operations. Therefore,
    when conducted by SOF units they are special operations, when conducted
    by non-SOF units they are not. It simply provides authority for SOF to
    conduct missions like MISO and expend MPF-11 funds to do so. Amendments
    to the U.S.C. may be appropriate to better articulate the role and
    responsibilities when these activities are performed by non-SOF units.
        I do not believe that section 167 should be amended to remove CA as
    a special operations activity. It should remain as it provides
    authority for SOF to conduct CA missions and spend MPF-11 funds on CA
    units assigned to SOF.
        The current wording of section 167 clearly and unambiguously states
    that CA ``insofar as it relates to special operations'' is a Special
    Operations Activity. Therefore, all other CA activities conducted by
    non-SOF units are not in the SOF purview since they are conducting
    conventional operations outside the SOCOM operational chain. Likewise,
    if the 95th CA Brigade (A) units are performing CA operations and
    activities in support of a SOF mission, it is clearly a special
    operations activity since they reside in the operational SOCOM chain.
        I do believe that amendments to the U.S.C. may be appropriate to
    better articulate the role and entities responsible for CA outside of
    SOCOM. CA is not a unique SOF capability, and is in fact required and
    used by non-special operations units. CA units are currently used to
    supplement Provincial Reconstruction Teams in theater; historically
    have been used to provide military governance in an occupied territory
    with no host nation governance capability in place; and provide an
    interagency link during operations through the establishment of civil
    military operations centers.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker

                           FACIAL RECOGNITION SYSTEM

        23. Senator Wicker. Vice Admiral McRaven, I understand there is a
    need for collecting and processing real-time intelligence in the field
    where the presence of bandwidth may be limited or non-existent. Do you
    believe there is a need for a lightweight, portable, real-time facial
    recognition system which can recognize and record enemy combatants in a
    matter of seconds, inconspicuously at a standoff distance without the
    use of bandwidth?
        Admiral McRaven. Yes, this could be a useful capability, but it is
    not a top priority. Facial recognition is not on our top 10 list of
    Identity Management Technical Development Priorities. Special
    Operations Development and Acquisition Science and Technology Division
    tracks, researches and evaluates emerging technologies for SOF
    development. Facial recognition technologies are still considered an
    immature and inaccurate means of obtaining a positive identification.
    Operational deployment of unconstrained facial recognition technology
    will introduce significant deviations in subject control, impacting
    image quality and performance. Therefore, facial recognition at a
    distance is still considered a ``soft biometric'', and will not be
    relied upon for positive identification in a tactical decision
    scenario. SOCOM anticipates this technology will be operationally
    viable within the next 5 to 7 years. Meanwhile, a stand-off capability
    could add value as a triage tool for identifying potential targets at
    long distances.
        Current Facial Recognition Capability: SOCOM and other DOD
    organizations submit facial photos of persons of interest to the DOD
    Automated Biometrics Identification System (ABIS). ABIS includes a
    facial recognition capability that produces a list of potential matches
    when queried which then must be manually reviewed by a skilled examiner
    to determine a match/no match. Since January 29, 2009, SOCOM has
    received the following facial recognition matches:

          Face Only: 219
          Face, Finger, Iris: 4477
          Face and Iris: 115
          Face and Finger: 1996

        There were 78,738 total biometric matches during this timeframe, so
    face was involved in 9 percent of total matches.
        The SOCOM Sensitive Site Exploitation Capabilities Development
    Document v.2, dated October 30, 2009, outlines the current requirements
    for a tactical facial recognition capability.

        24. Senator Wicker. Vice Admiral McRaven, if it does not already,
    should an operational requirement for such a system exist?
        Admiral McRaven. The SOCOM Sensitive Site Exploitation Capabilities
    Development Document v.2, dated October 30, 2009 addresses the SOF
    requirement for Facial Recognition. Paragraph 6 d., Tactical Biometrics
    Capability 3.
        Facial Recognition states: ``Provide a ruggedized means to collect
    digital facial images at the minimum required resolution (currently
    five megapixels) and store images using the approved format (currently
    JPEG or JPEG 2000 format.) Objective capability would be a standoff
    facial recognition/geometry capability utilizing digital photographic
    capture technology of a person at 300 meters, and have it cross
    referenced with facial recognition software. It should interoperate
    with existing SOF software platforms.''
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of VADM William H. McRaven, USN,
    follows:]
                        Nomination Reference and Report
                               As In Executive Session,
                                   Senate of the United States,
                                                         April 6, 2011.
        Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
    on Armed Services:
        The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Navy to the
    grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and
    responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

                                 To be Admiral

        VADM William H. McRaven, 0000.
                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of VADM William H. McRaven, USN,
    which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
    nomination was referred, follows:]
             Biographical Sketch of VADM William Harry McRaven, USN

      06 Nov. 1955............................  Born in Pinehurst, NC
      08 June 1977............................  Ensign
      08 June 1979............................  Lieutenant (junior grade)
      01 July 1981............................  Lieutenant
      01 Jan. 1987............................  Lieutenant Commander
      01 Sep. 1991............................  Commander
      01 Apr. 1998............................  Captain
      01 Aug. 2004............................  Rear Admiral (lower half)
      23 July 2006............................  Designated Rear Admiral
                                                 while serving in billets
                                                 commensurate with that
                                                 grade
      01 June 2007............................  Rear Admiral
      13 June 2008............................  Vice Admiral, Service
                                                 continuous to date

        Major duty assignments:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                       Assignments                       From         To
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    NROTC Unit, University of Texas (DUINS).........    May 1977   July 1977
    Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado, San Diego, CA     July 1977   Jan. 1978
     (DUINS)........................................
    Underwater Demolition Team Eleven (Assistant       Jan. 1978   Jan. 1980
     Platoon Commander).............................
    Naval Special Warfare Unit One (Intelligence       Feb. 1980   Feb. 1982
     Officer).......................................
    SEAL Team Six (Team Leader).....................   Feb. 1982   Mar. 1983
    USS Spiegel Grove (LSD 32) (Officer in Charge of   Apr. 1983   Oct. 1983
     Special Warfare Detachment for Unitas XXTV)....
    SEAL Team Four (Platoon Commander)..............   Oct. 1983   Dec. 1984
    Swimmer Delivery Vehicle Team Two (Operations      Dec. 1984   Apr. 1986
     Officer).......................................
    Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Sea/SDV   Apr. 1986   Aug. 1988
     Branch Head) (OP-31)...........................
    Commander, Naval Special Warfare Group One         Aug. 1988   Dec. 1988
     (Special Projects Officer).....................
    XO, SEAL Team One...............................   Dec. 1988   June 1990
    Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command           June 1990    May 1991
     (Assistant Current Operations).................
    Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA (DUINS).   June 1991   June 1993
    Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command           June 1993   June 1994
     (Training and Readiness Officer)...............
    CO, SEAL Team Three.............................   June 1994   June 1996
    Commander, Naval Special Warfare Group One         June 1996   Oct. 1997
     (Chief of Staff)...............................
    Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command         Oct. 1997   Sep. 1999
     (Division Chief and SOCOM Strike Assessment
     Director)......................................
    Commander, Naval Special Warfare Group One......   Sep. 1999   Oct. 2001
    National Security Council, The White House         Oct. 2001   July 2003
     (Director for Strategy and Defense Issues).....
    Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command         July 2003   June 2006
     (Deputy Commanding General for Operations,
     Joint Special Operations Command)..............
    Commander, Special Operations Command Europe/      June 2006   June 2008
     Director, Special Operations, U.S. European
     Command........................................
    Commander, Joint Special Operations Command/       June 2008     To date
     Commander, Joint Special Operations Command
     Forward, U.S. Special Operations Command.......
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Medals and awards:
        Defense Superior Service Medal with Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster
        Legion of Merit with one Gold Star
        Bronze Star with one Gold Star
        Defense Meritorious Service Medal
        Joint Service Commendation Medal
        Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal
        Combat Action Ribbon
        Meritorious Unit Commendation with two Bronze Stars
        Navy ``E'' Ribbon
        National Defense Service Medal with one Bronze Star
        Southwest Asia Service Medal with three Bronze Stars
        Afghanistan Campaign Medal
        Iraq Campaign Medal
        Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal
        Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
        Sea Service Deployment Ribbon
        Navy and Marine Corps Overseas Service Ribbon
        Kuwait Liberation Medal (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)
        Kuwait Liberation (Kuwait)
        Rifle Marksmanship Medal with Silver ``E''
        Pistol Marksmanship Medal with Silver ``E''

    Special qualifications:
        BJ (Journalism) University of Texas, 1977
        MA (National Security Affairs) Naval Postgraduate School, 1993
        Designated Special Warfare Officer, 1978
        Designated Joint Specialty Officer, 2003
        Capstone, 2006-2
        Designated Level IV Joint Qualified Officer, 2009

    Personal data:
        Wife: Georgeann Brady of Dallas, TX
        Children: William B. McRaven (Son); Born: 13 March 1979
        John E. McRaven (Son); Born: 13 January 1982
        Kelly M. McRaven (Daughter); Born: 3 February 1991

    Summary of joint duty assignments:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Assignment                    Dates               Rank
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Commander, U.S. Special             Oct. 97-Sep. 99   CDR/CAPT
     Operations Command (Division
     Chief and SOCOM Strike
     Assessment Division).
    National Security Council, The      Oct. 01-July 03   CAPT
     White House (Director for
     Strategy and Defense Issues).
    Commander, U.S. Special             July 03-June 06   CAPT/RDML
     Operations Command (Deputy
     Commanding General for
     Operations, Joint Special
     Operations Command).
    Commander, Special Operations       June 06-June 08   RADM
     Command Europe/Director,
     Special Operations, U.S.
     European Command.
    Commander, Joint Special            June 08-To Date   VADM
     Operations Command/Commander,
     Joint Special Operations
     Command Forward, U.S. Special
     Operations Command.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
    military officers nominated by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by VADM William
    H. McRaven, USN, in connection with his nomination follows:]
                                    ------

                              UNITED STATES SENATE
                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                                  Room SR-228
                           Washington, DC 20510-6050
                                 (202) 224-3871
                        COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
          BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

        Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
    more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
    form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
    of your answer applies.
                        Part A--Biographical Information
        Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
    this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
    public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
    any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

        1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
        William H. McRaven.

        2. Position to which nominated:
        Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.

        3. Date of nomination:
        April 6, 2011.

        4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
        [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
    committee's executive files.]

        5. Date and place of birth:
        November 6, 1955; Pinehurst, NC.

        6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
        Married to Georgeann Brady McRaven (Maiden name: Brady).

        7. Names and ages of children:
        William Brady McRaven, age 31.
        John Emory McRaven, age 28.
        Kelly Marie McRaven, age 19.

        8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
    honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
    or local governments, other than those listed in the service record
    extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
        None.

        9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
    officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
    or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
    business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
        None.

        10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
    professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
    other organizations.
        Underwater Demolition Team/Seal Association.

        11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
    society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
    service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
    extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
        None beyond what's listed in my Service record.

        12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
    if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
    constituted committee of the Senate?
        Yes.

        13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
    constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
    those views differ from the administration in power?
        Yes.
                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
    committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
    forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
    Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                    ------

                               Signature and Date
        I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
    on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
    provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
    and complete.
                                                    William H. McRaven.
        This 16th day of March, 2011.

        [The nomination of VADM William H. McRaven, USA, was
    reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 29, 2011, with
    the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
    nomination was confirmed by the Senate on June 30, 2011.]
                                  ----------

        [Prepared questions submitted to LtGen John R. Allen, USMC,
    by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
    follow:]
                            Questions and Responses
                                     duties
        Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
    the Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International
    Security Assistance Force (ISAF)?
        Answer. The Commander of ISAF (COMISAF) is the senior NATO
    uniformed officer in Afghanistan. He is the in-theatre operational
    commander of all ISAF forces in Afghanistan and is tasked with: (a)
    employing assigned forces and conducting population-centric
    counterinsurgency operations; (b) enabling an expanded and effective
    ANSF capable of fighting their own counterinsurgency; (c) providing
    support to governance and development efforts to protect the Afghan
    people and to provide a secure environment for sustainability; and (d)
    evaluating ISAF security, governance, and development support
    activities.
        ISAF is a NATO-directed operation conducted under United Nations
    Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386 (2001), which authorizes the
    establishment of ISAF to assist the Afghan Government in maintaining
    security in Kabul and surrounding areas and to take all necessary
    measures to fulfill this mandate.
        Following a United Nations (U.N.) and NATO/North Atlantic Council
    agreement, NATO assumed strategic command of ISAF on 11 August 2003
    under the authority of UNSCR 1386 and successor UNSCRs. Subsequently,
    UNSCR 1510 (2003) geographically expanded the ISAF mandate established
    in UNSCR 1386 to cover all of Afghanistan.
        Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
    the Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and how do those
    duties and functions relate to those of the Commander, NATO ISAF?
        Answer. The Commander of USFOR-A is the senior U.S. officer in
    Afghanistan with duties distinct from his duties as Commander, ISAF.
    Commander, USFOR-A exercises National Command Element and National
    Support Element authorities and responsibilities ensuring that U.S.
    forces have the guidance, equipment, and funding they need to conduct
    their missions. He ensures unity of effort among all U.S. forces
    including those under the ISAF command and those forces not under ISAF
    command, such as those U.S. forces conducting U.S. detention operations
    and U.S. counterterrorism operations.
        COMISAF employs the forces that troop-contributing nations provide
    to ISAF. The United States remains the largest troop-contributing
    nation to ISAF. The Commander, USFOR-A, directs and oversees the U.S.
    military contributions within ISAF. COMISAF ensures that the operations
    of all troop-contributing nations, including those of U.S. forces, are
    coordinated.
        Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
    believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
        Answer. Since the chain of command for the Afghanistan theater runs
    through Central Command (CENTCOM), as the Deputy Commander of CENTCOM
    from 2008-2011, I had the opportunity to work very closely on
    Afghanistan. During that time, I traveled to Afghanistan multiple times
    as well as other countries in the CENTCOM Area of Operations, including
    Pakistan. As a result, and if confirmed, I believe I understand
    Afghanistan and the region and also believe that my personal
    relationships with senior military and government leaders in the region
    will contribute to my ability to perform my duties at ISAF.
        I also served as the deputy commanding general of the II Marine
    Expeditionary Force (Forward) when it deployed to Iraq's Anbar Province
    from 2007-2008. That experience not only prepared me for battlefield
    command and the harsh reality of war, but it also taught me a
    tremendous amount about the nature of this kind of conflict and the
    complex challenges unique to counterinsurgencies. This was driven home
    in particular during the ``Anbar Awakening,'' which occurred during my
    time in Iraq.
        Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
    take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander,
    NATO ISAF, and/or Commander, USFOR-A?
        Answer. I believe that a professional military officer should never
    stop learning. I believe that my experiences have prepared me for this
    position, but, if confirmed, I will constantly educate myself about the
    strategic environment so that I can lead a force that is resilient and
    adaptive to the ever-changing battlefield--key requirements in this
    kind of conflict.
                                 relationships
        Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of
    the Commander, NATO ISAF/Commander, USFOR-A, to the following:
        The Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. The Commander, USFOR-A reports to the Commander, CENTCOM
    who, in turn, reports directly to the Secretary of Defense. This
    reporting relationship is prescribed in 10 U.S.C. Section 164(d)(1).
    COMISAF does not have a formal relationship with the Secretary of
    Defense because COMISAF reports to the NATO chain of command
    (Commander, Joint Forces Command-Brunssum), who reports to the Supreme
    Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).
        Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        Answer. The Commander, USFOR-A does not have a formal command
    relationship with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but he
    coordinates with him through the Commander, CENTCOM, on a regular
    basis. The Chairman is the principal military advisor to the President,
    the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. Although
    he is the Nation's senior military officer, the Chairman is not in the
    chain of command. The Commander, USFOR-A sends his advice and opinions
    on military operations to the Commander, CENTCOM who, in turn, presents
    them to the Chairman.
        Question. NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
        Answer. NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, is the NATO
    strategic-level commander of all NATO forces, including those assigned
    to the NATO mission in Afghanistan. He provides Commander, Joint Forces
    Command Brunssum (JFC-B), with strategic guidance and direction. JFC-B
    is NATO's operational level command that is responsible for the mission
    in Afghanistan. In turn, Commander, JFC-B, directs COMISAF with respect
    to SACEUR's and JFC-B's campaign objectives and COMISAF's performance
    of key military and supporting tasks, as mandated by the North Atlantic
    Council.
        Question. Commander, U.S. Central Command.
        Answer. The Commander, USFOR-A works very closely with the
    Commander, CENTCOM on all aspects of U.S. military operations in
    Afghanistan.
        By law, the Commander, USFOR-A reports directly to the Commander,
    CENTCOM. The Commander, CENTCOM exercises authoritative direction and
    control over all U.S. Forces in the CENTCOM area of responsibility,
    which includes all U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. The Commander, CENTCOM
    provides authoritative direction over all aspects of military
    operations, joint training, and logistics. He has delegated National
    Command Element and National Support Element authority and
    responsibilities to the Commander, USFOR-A.
        Question. Commander, NATO Training Mission--Afghanistan/Commander,
    Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan.
        Answer. Commander, NTM-A/CSTC-A reports to COMISAF/Commander,
    USFOR-A. NTMA/CSTC-A is a subordinate HQ to both HQ ISAF and HQ USFOR-
    A. The CSTC-A element retains its U.S.-only character primarily for
    funding and administrative authorities, and responds to the U.S. chain
    of command. The NAC established NTM-A in April 2009, and it was merged
    into CSTC-A in March 2010 under a dual-hatted commander.
        Question. Commander, ISAF Joint Command.
        Answer. Commander, ISAF Joint Command (IJC), reports to COMISAF.
    IJC is ISAF's operational-level command and is subordinate to HQ ISAF.
    IJC was established in November 2009. The IJC Commander is also dual-
    hatted as the Deputy Commander, USFOR-A, and retains certain U.S.
    command authorities.
        Question. U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan.
        Answer. The Commander, USFOR-A provides operational assistance and
    advice, to include U.S. military views and recommendations, to the U.S.
    Ambassador. He maintains a close working relationship with the
    Ambassador to ensure that military and civilian efforts are
    synchronized and mutually supporting. This is particularly important in
    the Rule of Law arena where the Department of State has the lead for
    the U.S. Government. The Commander, Combined Joint-Interagency Task
    Force 435 (who reports directly to the Commander, USFOR-A), provides
    support to the Ambassador for Rule of Law and Law Enforcement, who
    reports directly to the U.S. Ambassador.
        Question. The Secretary General of NATO.
        Answer. The NATO Secretary General chairs the North Atlantic
    Council, the highest political authority in NATO, responsible for the
    overall decisions and direction of NATO policy and operations. The
    North Atlantic Council is comprised of ambassador-level representatives
    of all NATO members, including the United States. The Council is
    advised on military matters and the conduct of operations by the
    Military Committee, which is also composed of senior military
    representatives from each member state. The Council, under the
    Secretary General's leadership, provides overall direction and guidance
    to the military chain of command. In practical terms, the Supreme
    Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) leads all NATO military operations and
    advises NATO's Military Committee. Thus, in the case of the ISAF
    mission, the Secretary General, following consultations and decisions
    by the North Atlantic Council, provides guidance and direction to
    SACEUR through the Military Committee, and the SACEUR communicates
    those directives and guidance through NATO's military chain of command.
    COMISAF and the Secretary General confer and consult regularly,
    including formal updates to the Secretary General and the North
    Atlantic Council on the progress of military operations in Afghanistan.
        Question. NATO Senior Civilian Representative for Afghanistan.
        Answer. The NATO Senior Civilian Representative-Afghanistan (SCR)
    is the civilian counterpart to COMISAF. As the NATO Secretary General's
    direct representative in Afghanistan, the SCR is charged with carrying
    forward the political aspects of NATO's engagement in Afghanistan.
        Although there is no formal command relationship, the SCR and
    COMISAF work in close concert and with full transparency following the
    North Atlantic Council approved Terms of Reference for the SCR and
    SACEUR and Commander JFC-B's guidance for COMISAF. In short, this
    cooperative relationship is critical to underwrite NATO's operational
    military and political engagement in Afghanistan and can help to
    improve cooperation between ISAF and international civilian agencies in
    Afghanistan.
        Question. United Nations Special Representative in Afghanistan.
        Answer. U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)
    for Afghanistan is an important leader in the international community's
    efforts in Afghanistan. While no command relationship exists between
    COMISAF and the UN SRSG, the ISAF mission was authorized by U.N.
    Security Council Resolution to assist the Afghan Government in the
    establishment of a secure and stable environment. Similarly, the UN
    SRSG has a mandate to lead the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
    (UNAMA) in supporting the Afghan Government in its efforts to improve
    critical areas, including security, governance, economic development,
    and regional cooperation, as well as to support the full implementation
    of mutual commitments made on these issues at the London Conference in
    January 2010 and the subsequent Kabul Conference in July 2010. The
    SACEUR Operational Plan states that COMISAF is expected to work in
    close coordination with both the NATO SCR and the U.N. SRSG. These
    partnerships support efforts to work with the Afghan Government to
    ensure progress towards the goal of a self-sufficient Afghanistan.
               afghanistan-pakistan strategy and major challenges
        Question. In his speech at West Point in December 2009, the
    President formulated his strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
        Do you agree with that strategy?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. What are the major challenges and problems you foresee,
    if confirmed as the next Commander, NATO ISAF/Commander, USFOR-A, in
    the implementation of that strategy?
        Answer. Significant challenges will persist in Afghanistan. Among
    them, the Taliban will seek to recover lost ground, particularly in the
    south and southwest. Insurgent organizations such as the Haqqani
    network will continue to threaten our ability to secure some of the
    population in the east and will also seek to conduct high-profile
    attacks in the capital region. Transnational terrorist groups such as
    al Qaeda will seek to establish new bases and safe havens in both
    Afghanistan and Pakistan. Corruption and other challenges to good
    governance will need to be addressed. Finally, although the mission is
    on track, there will be challenges as we build the Afghan National
    Security Forces to the point where they can assume full responsibility
    for Afghanistan's security.
        Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
    challenges and problems?
        Answer. We must continue to focus on protecting the population,
    degrading the insurgency, and developing Afghan Security Forces that
    can assume more responsibility. Additionally, we have to continue--and,
    in some cases--expand our efforts on issues ranging from security to
    good governance and Rule of Law. For example, we have to continue
    building layered defenses to prevent insurgent infiltration from
    Pakistan and we also have to continue working with our Afghan partners
    to address corruption. If confirmed, I will work closely with
    international, Afghan, and Pakistani partners on all lines of effort of
    the campaign plan to maintain and accelerate the momentum that our
    campaign has generated.
        Question. On June 22, 2011, the President announced his decision
    regarding the beginning of reductions of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and
    the size and pace of reductions through 2012.
        Do you agree with the President's decision to begin reducing U.S.
    forces in July 2011? Why or why not?
        Answer. Although I was not a participant in the discussions about
    the various options, I agree with the President's decision to begin
    reducing forces. The troops that will be redeployed in July represent
    the fulfillment of the President's commitment to both resource the
    strategy he enunciated at West Point but also to demonstrate to Afghan
    leadership the urgency of increased Afghan National Security Force
    strength and capability to assume its proper role in securing
    Afghanistan. In the context of our longer-term goal of transitioning
    security responsibility to Afghans by the end of 2014, this reduction
    reflects an inflection point alongside the commencement of transition,
    scheduled to begin next month.
        Question. Do you agree with the President's decision announced on
    June 22nd regarding the size and pace of reductions in U.S. forces? Why
    or why not?
        Answer. Yes, I agree with the President's decision. Of course, I
    will constantly monitor and assess the situation on the ground and,
    should I determine the situation has changed, I will so advise my chain
    of command through the proper channels.
        It is also important to bear in mind that, even once the surge
    forces are removed, there will still be more than 68,000 U.S. troops
    and thousands of international forces in Afghanistan--not to mention
    the addition of some 70,000 Afghan forces, which will join the fight
    during the next 15 months. At the same time, the international
    community has demonstrated its intention to support Afghanistan until
    at least 2014, and the United States and NATO are both discussing some
    form of long-term partnership relationship with Afghanistan. I believe
    this reality sends an important message of commitment to the Afghan
    people, as well as a sense of urgency that the Afghans must take on
    more responsibility for securing their own country.

                       SECURITY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

        Question. What is your assessment of the security situation in
    Afghanistan and the nature, size, and scope of the insurgency?
        Answer. Based on my understanding of the situation on the ground, I
    believe that the momentum that the insurgency enjoyed for a number of
    years has been halted in most of the country and reversed in many key
    areas. For example, violence is 5 percent lower so far this year in
    comparison to last year, and it is down 40 percent in Regional Command
    Southwest. Obviously, we are facing a very resilient insurgency that
    has demonstrated continued lethal capacity as well as the ability to
    regenerate over time. That said, the ongoing maturation of Afghan
    National Security Forces, combined with the beginning of transition in
    July, should help to further pressure the enemy by degrading support
    networks and further reduce support for the enemy among the Afghan
    population. We and our Afghan partners still face numerous challenges,
    and there will be more tough fighting in the years ahead as we
    transition security to Afghan lead by the end of 2014.
        Question. In your view, what is the impact of the death of Osama
    bin Laden on the security situation in Afghanistan?
        Answer. We do not yet know what effect, if any, bin Laden's death
    will have on enemy operations and morale among insurgents in
    Afghanistan and Pakistan, especially at the operational and tactical
    level. The reality is that we still face very resilient enemies who
    will continue to try to establish safe havens from which they can
    expand their influence and from which they can target the governments,
    forces, and people of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the forces and
    diplomats of all of the Nations contributing to the mission.

                     TRANSITION OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY

        Question. In March, President Karzai announced the first tranche of
    provinces and municipal districts designated for the transition of lead
    responsibility for security to the Afghanistan security forces. The
    transition of security responsibility in these areas is to begin in
    July and be completed by the end of 2011.
        Do you support the process established by NATO and the Government
    of Afghanistan for designating areas for transition of security lead to
    the Afghan Security Forces, including an initial round of transition to
    be completed by the end of 2011?
        Answer. Yes, I believe that the comprehensive, collaborative
    process established to identify areas for transition is working as
    intended. If confirmed, I will look closely at our transition planning
    and implementation and make any changes I believe will increase the
    effectiveness of the process. The first tranche is on schedule to begin
    transition next month, and I support moving forward with the timelines
    that have been established. As the first tranche begins to transition,
    there will likely be lessons learned that can be incorporated into
    future transition planning and implementation.
        Question. What is your assessment of the capacity of the Afghan
    Security Forces to assume the lead for security in the areas designated
    for this initial round of transition?
        Answer. Based on my understanding of the current size and
    capability of Afghan Security Forces, I believe that Afghans are
    prepared to assume the lead for security in the areas designated in the
    first tranche. In some cases, such as Kabul and Panshir, Afghan
    Security Forces are already in the lead and have been for some time.

                  BUILDING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

        Question. There are approximately 100,000 more Afghan soldiers and
    police now than there were in November 2009. The strategy for training
    and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) calls for
    growing the Afghan National Army (ANA) to a level of 171,000 and the
    Afghan National Police (ANP) to a level of 134,000 by October 2011. In
    addition, a new ANSF target end strength has been set of 352,000 by
    2012.
        In your view, are the target end strength levels for the ANA and
    ANP sufficient to provide security and stability in Afghanistan?
        Answer. If the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board approves the
    352,000 ANSF target end-strength, then I believe the ANA and ANP should
    be capable of achieving the goal outlined at the November 2010 Lisbon
    Summit of Afghans in the lead for security by the end of 2014. However,
    as the NATO Secretary General has stated, the training mission in
    Afghanistan will likely extend beyond our combat mission as part of an
    enduring partnership with Afghanistan.
        Question. What in your view are the greatest challenges to building
    the capacity of the ANSF to assume responsibility for Afghanistan's
    security?
        Answer. Based on my understanding, there are five main challenges
    to building ANSF capacity.
        Leadership: Leader development is one of our top priorities since
    good leadership provides the foundation upon which any organization
    develops and improves. Even though we have significantly expanded
    leadership training and development efforts, there are still
    shortfalls, especially since it takes substantially more time to train,
    educate, and develop leaders. With the growth of the force over the
    last year, the training mission has been able to focus more efforts on
    leader development as well as professionalization across the force.
        Attrition: Attrition within the ANSF continues to be a challenge.
    Through ISAF's partnership with the ANSF at the ministerial and unit
    levels, there has been some success at reducing attrition rates. If
    confirmed, I will ensure that ISAF continues to work with our Afghan
    partners to address this problem and to develop new initiatives to
    reduce ANSF attrition.
        Insider Threat: To safeguard against infiltration and co-option by
    insurgents, the ANSF has developed a multi-layered defense, which
    starts with an eight-step vetting process for all new recruits joining
    the police and army. The addition of Afghan counter-intelligence
    personnel into the formations, as well as additional education and
    training on identifying threats, is intended to minimize this risk.
        Logistics: Logistics and maintenance capabilities are required to
    ensure ANSF can sustain itself over the long-term, which is
    particularly important as Afghans assume more responsibility for
    security. We are working with the Afghan Government to field these
    enabling forces, but developing these specialized skills is complex and
    timeconsuming.
        Literacy: Literacy is the essential enabler for professionalization
    of ANSF, although it is a challenge in a nation with a 15 percent
    literacy rate. Since November 2009, over 100,000 ANSF have completed
    some level of literacy training, and we have increased these efforts
    recently, with some 70,000 ANSF in literacy training on any given day.
    Training is focused on developing the basic ability to read and write
    so that ANSF can, for example, properly account for material, write
    reports, and read pay statements.
        Question. There remains a shortfall in the number of training
    personnel required for the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A),
    in terms of both institutional trainers and embedded training teams,
    the so-called Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and
    Police OMLTs (POMLTs).
        What is your understanding of the current shortfall in NTM-A
    institutional trainers and OMLTs and POMLTs?
        Answer. There is currently a shortfall of 490 NTM-A institutional
    trainers, which is a significant improvement over the last few months.
    Despite additional pledges at the ISAF Force Generation Conference in
    May, we remain short of OMLTs and POMLTS, particularly in Regional
    Commands North, West, and Central. The partnering shortfall within the
    Afghan National Army remains at 10 units (Turkey has offered an
    additional OMLT for 2nd Brigade HQ, 111th Capital Division, which may
    alleviate some of these shortfalls). ISAF Joint Command is examining
    ways to potentially thin partnering relationships with more capable
    army units to mitigate these shortfalls. With the Afghan National
    Police, there is a shortfall of 88 units in Key Terrain Districts and
    Areas of Interest. There is an additional shortfall of 137 POMLTs in
    low priority locations, and we are looking at ways to reduce this
    shortfall using non-military assets.
        Also of note, these shortfalls reflect 305,600 ANSF end strength;
    when the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board meets later this year,
    it is expected to endorse the growth of the force to 352,000 personnel,
    which may impact the nature, if not the number, of required OMLTs and
    POMLTs. Given the importance of the training mission to the overall
    campaign, filling all of these shortfalls is critical to the long-term
    success of our operations.
        Question. Are there additional steps that you believe could or
    should be taken to get NATO and other coalition partners to provide
    more institutional trainers?
        Answer. Training shortfalls are a longstanding issue best addressed
    by continued engagement with our partners by all elements of the U.S.
    Government--including Congress--as well as by NATO/SHAPE HQ, HQ ISAF,
    and representatives of the NATO training mission. Contributing nations
    who have operational commitments should be encouraged to reinvest any
    combat troop reductions with trainers, especially ones with specialized
    skills such as police, logisticians, medical and maintenance
    specialists. Even as we solicit more trainers, we are also developing
    more Afghan trainers, which allows us to remission coalition trainers.
        Question. Are there additional steps that you believe could or
    should be taken to encourage NATO and other coalition partners to meet
    the requirements for additional OMLTs and POMLTs?
        Answer. As noted above, continuous engagement by all elements of
    the U.S. Government as well as NATO and other relevant organizations
    represents the best chance of generating more OMLT and POMLT pledges.

                     PARTNERING WITH AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES

        Question. A key component of efforts to build the capacity of
    Afghan Security Forces is partnering ANSF units together with ISAF
    units in the field. A recent Department of Defense (DOD) report states
    that field reports suggest that a partnership ratio of greater than
    three ISAF personnel to one ANSF personnel ``reduces the effectiveness
    of the ANSF's participation'' and that ``ANSF are more motivated and,
    hence, more effective when the partnership ratio [between ISAF and ANSF
    personnel] is closer to even.''
        What is your assessment of the effectiveness of partnering for
    building the capacity of the Afghan Army and Afghan police?
        Answer. The process and practice of partnering is critical to
    building the capacity Afghan Security Forces so that Afghans can assume
    the lead for security across the country by the end of 2014. Over the
    past year and a half, we have made significant strides with our
    baseline training. At the same time, we have focused substantially on
    increasing our partnership efforts since this has proven to be the most
    effective way of increasing Afghan capability, confidence, and
    professionalism in the field. In fact, we have seen the most rapid
    improvements in our Afghan counterparts in places where we have higher
    partnering ratios and where our troops live and fight alongside their
    Afghan partners. It is also worth noting that partnering increased our
    own effectiveness since Afghan forces understand the human and cultural
    terrain in ways that we do not.
        Question. Do you believe that the partnering of ISAF and ANSF
    forces can move to a partnership ratio below 1:1 (fewer than 1 ISAF
    soldier for every ANSF soldier) as the capability of Afghan Security
    Forces improves?
        Answer. Yes, that is precisely what we intend to do as we
    transition security responsibility. Over time, we will move from
    partnered operations, to operations with Afghans in the lead with our
    forces in support, to operations where we are in a strategic over-watch
    position. For example, we would help offer advice on planning and
    enabling, but Afghans would carry out the operation by themselves.
    Eventually we plan to move to complete Afghan control. Many units are
    already below a 1:1 partner ratio, and there are increasingly more
    areas where Afghans are in the lead or operating independently. For
    example, Afghans have assumed more responsibility as our forces have
    thinned out in parts of the central Helmand river valley, and Afghan
    forces comprise the majority of forces around Kandahar City. In Kabul
    Province, Afghans lead almost all operations.

                    SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

        Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role of Special
    Operations Forces (SOF) in Afghanistan, and the proper relationship
    between counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations there?
        Answer. SOF in Afghanistan are a vital component of our overall
    counterinsurgency strategy, and play many critical roles in our overall
    campaign. Special operations strike forces, supported by intelligence
    and other enablers, are essential for attacking insurgent networks to
    capture or kill insurgent leaders. Special forces teams that are part
    of the Combined Forces Special Operations Command-Afghanistan are
    essential to the support of Village Stability Operations (VSO) and the
    mentoring of the Afghan Local Police (ALP), primarily in smaller
    villages and rural areas. The multinational special forces teams in the
    ISAF SOF provide essential training and partnering to Afghan
    specialized Provincial Response Companies to facilitate targeted
    missions against insurgent, drug trafficking, and other networks. Each
    of these elements also partners with, trains, and assists the Afghan
    units with which they are working--a critical component of increasing
    Afghan capabilities. All SOF coordinate closely with the conventional
    force battle space owner in the region in which they operate so that
    special operations missions complement conventional force operations to
    achieve the overall counterinsurgency effect. Counterterrorism
    operations are an important component of any comprehensive civil-
    military counterinsurgency campaign.
        Question. As U.S. forces are drawn down in Afghanistan, do you
    anticipate the requirement for SOF will be reduced, stay the same, or
    increase?
        Answer. Although the exact future requirements for SOF are yet to
    be determined, they will clearly play a prominent role in the future.

                AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE/VILLAGE STABILITY OPERATIONS

        Question. General Petraeus and others have emphasized the
    importance of the VSOs and ALP programs to the strategy in Afghanistan.
        What has been the effect of these programs on rural Afghan
    populations and what has been the response from the Taliban?
        Answer. The ALP program and VSO have had a measurable and positive
    effect on security in Afghanistan. Since the program's inception in
    August 2010, ALP has grown to over 6,500 patrolmen operating at 41
    validated sites. These units provide a measure of security where ISAF
    forces are scarce or non-existent, and build connections between the
    village, the province, and the central government. Additionally, the
    program appears to have jump-started local governance and also
    mobilized communities, a key condition for local populations to resist
    Taliban influence. Because this program has been so effective in
    denying terrain to the Taliban, the enemy has explicitly targeted it
    (although it appears that ALP members have fought off Taliban attacks
    in a number of recent incidents). Nonetheless, the ALP program and VSO
    continue to grow, and Afghans across the country are eager for the
    program to come to their area.
        Question. Do you believe the availability of U.S. Special
    Operations teams is a limiting factor in expanding these programs to a
    point where they can have a strategic impact in Afghanistan?
        Answer. The number of ALP and VSO sites that we can establish in
    Afghanistan is limited by the availability of Operational Detachment
    Alpha (ODA) teams, but we have developed an innovative solution that
    allows us to continue to expand the programs without additional teams.
    We have begun integrating conventional forces with our special forces,
    which, after a period of specialized training, are able to thicken the
    ODAs and free up more special forces personnel for new ALP/VSO
    missions. We expect that this will allow us to continue to increase the
    ALP program, even as the number of ODAs in Afghanistan remains fairly
    constant.
        Question. How do indirect approaches like VSO and ALP Programs
    complement direct action counterterrorism missions within the U.S.
    strategy in Afghanistan?
        Answer. The ALP and VSO programs are part of the comprehensive
    civil-military counterinsurgency strategy and, as such, they complement
    other efforts--both kinetic and non-kinetic--to protect the population,
    to degrade the insurgency, and to build sustainable, effective
    governance in Afghanistan. By giving local villagers a stake in their
    own security, the ALP program builds cooperation and support for the
    district, provincial and central government, which, in turn, makes the
    environment inhospitable to the Taliban and other insurgent groups. The
    local security and improved governance that the ALP and VSO programs
    bring also increase local Afghans' confidence, which sets the
    conditions for development and grassroots community organizing,
    grievance resolution, and communal problem-solving. All of these
    activities complement the other elements of the comprehensive
    counterinsurgency strategy, which includes direct-action
    counterterrorism missions.

                    SPECIAL OPERATIONS ENABLING CAPABILITIES

        Question. The Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command has
    described the ``non-availability'' of force enablers as the ``most
    vexing issue in the operational environment'' for SOF. In many
    instances, SOF rely on general purpose forces to provide the enabling
    capabilities they need to be successful in their missions, including
    rotary wing airlift, medical evacuation, intelligence, surveillance,
    and reconnaissance capabilities.
        What do you believe are the greatest shortages in enabling
    capabilities facing our forces in Afghanistan?
        Answer. Given the decentralized manner in which SOF are dispersed
    in austere, remote areas--especially those forces conducting VSO and
    training ALP--the greatest enabling shortage is air asset support, both
    rotary and fixed wing. Although substantial progress has been made with
    increasing the number of air assets in theater over the last 2 years,
    meeting the requirement for these assets will be critical as the number
    of VSO and ALP sites increase, since this will mean that more small
    units are fielded in rural areas. Related, these teams also have an
    increased requirement for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
    platforms equipped with signals intelligence and full-motion video
    capabilities. The intelligence analysts, and associated systems, are
    also necessary to properly exploit the data collected. Additionally,
    units in rural areas often need dedicated Route Clearance Packages to
    support ground movement, to conduct ground combat operations, and to
    maintain freedom of movement.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure the requirements for
    enabling capabilities of SOF in Afghanistan are met as general purpose
    forces are drawn down?
        Answer. Based on lessons from the drawdown in Iraq, I expect
    requirements for special operations enablers to increase as the
    conventional force footprint is reduced in Afghanistan. Requirements
    will continue to evolve as we adapt to the new force posture, but my
    top priority will be to ensure full connectivity to our teams,
    especially when it comes to maintaining the ``Golden Hour'' for medical
    evacuation. Additionally, I will ensure that we have sufficient air
    assets, including Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and
    close-air support platforms as well as Route Clearance Packages.

                           INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION

        Question. The collaboration between U.S. SOF, general purpose
    forces, and other U.S. Government departments and agencies has played a
    significant role in the success of counterinsurgency and
    counterterrorism operations in recent years. However, much of this
    collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.
        What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the
    collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan?
        Answer. One of the most important lessons learned over the past few
    years is the necessity of a whole-of-government approach to be
    successful in campaigns such as that in Afghanistan. After all, the
    complexity of these missions requires experts from many fields and
    backgrounds to conduct an effective comprehensive civil-military
    campaign. Keeping all the actors on the same page, and communicating
    closely at all levels, has perhaps been a central factor in achieving a
    unified approach to our campaign plan. In particular, the close
    collaboration between the State and Defense Departments--from action
    officers to senior leaders--supports a unity of effort that has enabled
    progress in Afghanistan.
        Question. How do you believe these efforts can be improved?
        Answer. Although there has been substantial progress improving
    interagency and international coordination and collaboration, there is
    still room to improve in areas such as our collective understanding of
    roles and responsibilities and the manner in which they fit into the
    overall campaign plan. Essential to this is to maintain an open line of
    communication and frequent coordinated action between and among all the
    various actors--including the U.S. Embassy, NATO's Senior Civilian
    Representative, the United Nations, and nongovernmental organizations--
    to increase efficiencies, reduce redundancies, eliminate waste, and
    seek areas where cooperation could lead to results greater than the sum
    of the whole.

                  INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR INDIRECT ACTIVITIES

        Question. Some observers contend that the national intelligence
    agencies focus their assistance to the Defense Department in
    Afghanistan on special operators engaged in direct action operations.
    As a consequence, it is alleged, general purpose forces and SOF engaged
    in indirect activities, including foreign internal defense and
    population protection, receive less intelligence support.
        Do you believe this is true?
        Answer. I believe this is a misperception since the national
    intelligence agencies are integrated into command processes throughout
    USFOR-A and ISAF. For example, Cryptologic Support Teams from the
    National Security Agency are spread across the theater down to the
    brigade level. Several hundred all-source analysts and specialty units
    from the Defense Intelligence Agency are located at every Regional
    Command (even the non-U.S. commands) and in conventional units
    executing VSO. There are also over 100 geospatial analysts and
    specialists from the National Geospatial Agency support units
    throughout Afghanistan. In every case, these professionals bring
    expertise and reach-back capabilities for all types of forces and have
    been an integral part of enabling the intelligence fusion that has
    contributed to our success.
        With regard to the belief that some Special Operation Forces (SOF)
    are less supported than direct action SOF, this perception may arise
    from the operational reality of SOF elements that are supporting
    foreign internal defense, VSO, and the ALP. While most SOF forces
    engaged in direct action operate from fixed bases--with extensive
    communications, robust staff, and assigned national agency analysts--
    SOF elements engaged in indirect activities are normally deployed in
    small teams to remote locations. These teams do not have large staffs
    and the support they do receive from headquarters elements is less
    direct, and, therefore, less obvious to many observers.
        Question. If so, and if confirmed, how would you ensure SOF engaged
    in indirect activities receive adequate intelligence support?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to maintain the strong
    relationship between COMISAF and intelligence organizations' leadership
    to ensure intelligence products are available to all of our forces and
    are concentrated to support the main effort. I will also continue to
    partner with National Intelligence Agencies to ensure our requirements
    are focused and clearly understood. Finally, I will continue requesting
    the Intelligence Community's assistance in producing ``tear-line''
    products to allow near-real-time and broad dissemination to all members
    and units of ISAF, as well as our Afghan partners.

              CONTRACT OVERSIGHT AND PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS

        Question. The United States has implemented a number of efforts to
    reduce the risk that U.S. contracting practices will be subject to
    corruption, which helps fuel the insurgency and undermines the
    legitimacy of the Afghan Government. These efforts include the
    establishment of the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Shafafiyat
    (Transparency) to coordinate ISAF anti-corruption activities.
        What is your assessment of ISAF's anti-corruption efforts and
    understanding of criminal patronage networks, and what additional
    steps, if any, do you believe should be taken to improve those efforts
    and to ensure adequate oversight of ISAF and U.S. contracts is in
    place?
        Answer. ISAF and its partners in the Afghan Government and key
    embassies have together developed a common understanding of the problem
    of corruption and its effect on the ISAF mission and the viability of
    the Afghan state. The most dangerous forms of corruption involve
    criminal patronage networks, which divert development and security
    force assistance, subvert state institutions, obstruct justice, and
    engage in and protect illicit activities that strengthen the insurgency
    and undermine the effectiveness and legitimacy of the government.
        The establishment of Combined Joint Interagency Task Force
    Shafafiyat (Transparency) has led to a better understanding of these
    problems as well as important initiatives to address them. As a result
    of Shafafiyat's work, ISAF developed and implemented Counterinsurgency
    Contracting Guidance, which has helped ISAF and the international
    community be better buyers, and buy from legitimate suppliers. As a
    result of improved vendor-vetting efforts and integration of
    procurement and contracting into intelligence and operations at all
    levels, 75 U.S., international, and Afghan individuals or companies
    have been debarred from receiving contracts, 24 individuals and
    companies have been suspended, and 27 debarment actions are pending.
    Additionally, ISAF has supported the training of specialized Afghan
    anti-corruption units to develop sustainable Afghan capacity to address
    corruption.
        Given the complexity of this problem, more work can be done. In
    particular, based on what I know, there is still a need to develop
    comprehensive U.S. and coalition vendor-vetting and contract oversight
    procedures. ISAF is currently consolidating over two dozen contracting
    databases; USFOR-A and the CENTCOM Contracting Command are coordinating
    to implement a new, more rigorous vendor-vetting process; and ISAF has
    submitted a proposal to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the
    establishment of the Acquisition Accountability Office-Afghanistan,
    which would provide oversight for all U.S. contracts in the country. If
    confirmed, I will examine these efforts to determine if they are on
    track and if anything else needs to be done.
        Question. President Karzai has issued a decree calling for the
    disbandment of most private security contractors (PSCs). Following that
    decree, the international community negotiated a temporary arrangement
    to allow for the continued use of PSCs for 1 year while the capacity of
    a Ministry of Interior guard force, called the Afghan Public Protection
    Force (APPF), is developed.
        What is your assessment of the potential for the APPF to replace or
    supplement PSCs in providing security?
        Answer. The APPF currently provides approximately 6,000 guards for
    various clients throughout Afghanistan, with plans to expand
    significantly to replace PSCs. I support the Afghan Government's
    decision to eliminate PSCs and, if confirmed, intend to support the
    further development of the APPF. The most significant challenge is the
    short timeframe in which the APPF needs to increase in size and
    capability so that it can accomplish its mission. Efforts are underway
    to this end, including newly expanded APPF headquarters and the
    construction of a training center for guards. In short, the potential
    exists for the APPF to replace PSCs on time, although it will require
    significant work over the next year. Currently, joint ISAF-Afghan
    assessments of the APPF--which is part of the bridging strategy--are
    scheduled for September 2011, December 2011, and March 2012.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you recommend to
    improve the development and oversight of the APPF?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will look closely at APPF to determine what
    steps might be necessary to improve development and oversight. Based on
    what I know, I believe that we should focus on two parallel lines of
    effort. First, we should support the development of command, control,
    and management functions within the existing APPF, which is similar to
    developing any police or military headquarters to perform a specific
    security missions. Second, we should support the development of a
    state-owned enterprise, which will support the APPF as it strives to
    provide security services in a manner similar to those of commercial
    security companies.

                        REINTEGRATION AND RECONCILIATION

        Question. The Afghanistan Peace and Reconciliation Program (APRP)
    has been established to enable former insurgent fighters to renounce
    violence and reintegrate peacefully into their communities. As of mid-
    June more than 1,700 former fighters had enrolled in the APRP, and the
    Afghan Government reported that it was in negotiations with more than
    40 additional groups representing up to 2,000 more fighters. The APRP
    has been criticized, however, as involving only a small fraction of the
    Taliban insurgents.
        What is your assessment of the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration
    Program and the program's potential for reintegrating further numbers
    of low- to mid-level insurgent fighters?
        Answer. The Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) is an
    essential component of our comprehensive, civil-military
    counterinsurgency campaign, one that convinces insurgents to join the
    peace process, accept the Afghan constitution, renounce violence, and
    rejoin Afghan society. It is a viable alternative to continued fighting
    or detention. Since the APRP began in August 2010, over 1,850 former
    insurgents have officially reintegrated--double the number from a few
    months ago--and at least another 2,000 are in some stage in the
    reintegration process. All 34 provinces now have Provincial Peace
    Committees, and a number of provinces have fully-functioning Provincial
    Reintegration Accounts, which give the Provincial Peace Committee
    resources to disburse in support of reintegration at the local level.
        The greatest factor affecting reintegration, however, is not the
    number of functioning committees or the presence of reintegration
    accounts (though those are essential for the program's successful
    operation). Rather, it is the insurgency's declining resources, low
    morale, and poor leadership--all of which convince insurgents to
    abandon the fight and rejoin Afghan society. We are seeing some signs
    that these factors are encouraging informal reintegration (where
    insurgents do not enter the reintegration process, but simply return to
    their homes). As we continue to pressure insurgents on all fronts, we
    anticipate that we will see increased numbers of formal reintegrees as
    well. But where we can, we will encourage informal reintegrees to join
    the peace process by joining formal reintegration.
        Question. It has been reported that coalition officials and Taliban
    representatives have engaged in preliminary talks on reconciliation.
        Do you support the beginning of reconciliation talks with the
    Taliban at this time?
        Answer. Historically, ending an insurgency requires some sort of
    political settlement. At the same time, I recognize that any solution
    to the fighting in Afghanistan must be led by the Afghan Government if
    it is to be effective and enduring. For that reason, I fully support
    Afghan-led reconciliation efforts and support the overall concept as it
    has been articulated by the Secretary of State.
        ammonium nitrate for improvised explosive devices from pakistan
        Question. Ammonium nitrate (AN), a prime component in improvised
    explosive devices (IEDs) that have killed or wounded thousands of U.S.,
    coalition, and Afghan troops and Afghan civilians, continues to flow
    into Afghanistan. The vast majority of this AN flows in from fertilizer
    factories in Pakistan. In 2010, in an effort to stem the flow of this
    material, the Afghan Government banned the use of AN as a fertilizer.
    Despite this effort and vigilance by Afghan National Security Forces
    (ANSF), IED incidents and casualties have continued. The amounts of AN
    reportedly ferried into Afghanistan from Pakistan are staggering.
        In light of your recent position at CENTCOM, what is your
    understanding of the situation regarding the flow of AN into
    Afghanistan?
        Answer. We assess that a large amount of the AN used in IEDs in
    Afghanistan originates in Pakistan, where it is manufactured as a
    fertilizer called calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN). There are no
    regulatory controls to adequately control the sale and distribution of
    CAN in Pakistan, which, combined with the porous border between
    Afghanistan and Pakistan, allows insurgents to procure and move large
    amounts of CAN into Afghanistan. Although Afghan and ISAF forces have
    made considerable progress in interdicting shipments of CAN in
    Afghanistan and along the border since President Karzai banned it in
    early 2010, it will take a concerted, international effort with the
    Pakistani government and Pakistani industry in order to better
    regulate, track, and interdict CAN. The Pakistanis took a significant
    step forward recently with their release of national counter-IED
    strategy and the issue is being addressed with the Pakistani government
    on multiple levels within the U.S. Government.
        Question. If confirmed as Commander, NATO ISAF/Commander, USFOR-A,
    what tools would you have at your disposal to address the flow of AN
    into Afghanistan and are there any additional tools that you would seek
    to have?
        Answer. There are a variety of current tools at our disposal, and,
    if confirmed, I would closely examine what other resources,
    technologies, and initiatives could be brought to bear to reduce the
    flow of AN into Afghanistan. Currently, there are several border
    initiatives to address AN, and AN interdiction has increased
    significantly over the last year, aided by forces on the border and
    increased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets.
    However, due to the porous nature of the border, there also need to be
    efforts to address the flow of AN at its source: the factories in
    Pakistan that produce AN. This would require diplomatic resources--
    including continuing to work closely with the U.S. Embassy in
    Islamabad--to facilitate an agreement between the Governments of
    Pakistan, Afghanistan, and perhaps the United States to either
    transition to a fertilizer that cannot be used for IEDs or, possibly,
    to dye the AN to identify which factories are producing AN used in
    IEDs. If confirmed, I would engage senior Pakistani military officials
    on this issue and would also work closely with interagency and
    international partners to reduce the flow of AN and other IED
    components.

                               AFGHAN OPIUM TRADE

        Question. According to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime
    2010 Annual Report--released in June 2010, drugs from Afghanistan have
    an annual market value of $65 billion, cater to 15 million drug users,
    cause 100,000 deaths each year, are contributing to the spread of HIV
    at an unprecedented rate, and are a source of funds for criminal
    groups, insurgents and terrorists. Moreover, since 2006, much more
    opium has been produced in Afghanistan than is consumed worldwide, and
    the resulting stockpile is now large enough to meet 2 years' worth of
    world heroin demand.
        As it relates to the drug trade in Afghanistan, what is your
    understanding of the role of the Commander of ISAF and Commander of
    USFOR-A respectively?
        Answer. The Commander of ISAF operates under NATO mandate, which
    precludes forces under ISAF command from conducting operations
    specifically directed against narcotics organizations. However, NATO
    forces can conduct nexus operations, which are operations against
    narco-groups with direct linkages to the insurgency.
        The Commander of USFOR-A operates under direction of U.S. policy.
    Selected U.S. units and organizations that are under the command of
    USFOR-A, such as Combined Joint Task Force-Nexus, can conduct
    operations that target the drug trade specifically.
        Question. What is your understanding of the rules of engagement for
    U.S. forces as it relates to drug labs and the drug network
    respectively?
        Answer. ISAF's mandate prevents the Alliance from participating in
    operations that are exclusively focused on counter-narcotics, although
    NATO forces can conduct nexus operations against narco-groups with
    direct linkages to the insurgency. U.S. forces under the ISAF command
    structure can participate in counternarcotics operations only when
    there is a connection between narcotics and the insurgency. Of course,
    it should also be noted that our forces always retain the right to
    defend themselves when they are facing an imminent threat.
        Question. What is your understanding of the nexus--if any--between
    the drug trade and the various insurgent groups in Afghanistan?
        Answer. The illegal narcotics industry is intrinsically linked to
    the insurgency, corrupt actors, and criminal patronage networks. There
    is no clear line separating any of these groups since their operations
    and support networks overlap and are intertwined at a fundamental
    level.
        Question. How significant a source of funding is the drug trade for
    insurgent groups in Afghanistan?
        Answer. While estimates vary, a significant percentage of the
    illegal drug trade funds the insurgency, and we assess that the illegal
    drug trade is the largest internal source of funding for the Afghan
    Taliban.
        Question. What is your understanding of the role of the Drug
    Enforcement Agency and comparable NATO law enforcement efforts in
    Afghanistan?
        Answer. The Drug Enforcement Agency, the Department of Homeland
    Security, Customs and Borders Patrol, the Bureau of International
    Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the U.S. Marshalls, the Serious
    Organized Crime Agency (UK), and other organizations all work closely
    with the Afghan Government and the international community to improve
    and reform the Afghan criminal justice system and to strengthen Afghan
    law-enforcement capacity. All of these groups bring unique skill sets
    required to address challenges posed by the drug trade and to help the
    Afghan Government develop long-term solutions.
        Question. As Commander of ISAF and Commander of USFOR-A,
    respectively, what would be your relationship to these law enforcement
    activities?
        Answer. To ensure unity of effort, ISAF/USFOR-A will continue to
    synchronize its efforts with civilian law enforcement partners in the
    areas of capacity-building, public awareness, disrupting illicit
    precursor chemicals, and combating nexus organizations. As with other
    efforts, the key to this is close communication and coordination so
    that we are all working toward the same goal and focused on our
    campaign plan.

                     COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICE OF AFGHANISTAN

        Question. In each of the past 3 fiscal years, DOD has expended
    approximately $450 million building the capacity of the
    Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA).
        What is your current assessment of the CNPA?
        Answer. The CNPA have dramatically improved over time. In Helmand
    Province, which accounts for approximately 40 percent of the world's
    illicit opium production, the CNPA have provided expertise to help
    investigate narcotics trafficking in support of the Provincial
    Governor's counternarcotics campaign (contributing to a 94 percent
    conviction rate in 2010). In May 2011 alone, the CNPA helped seize
    12,000 kg of narcotics around the country.
        Despite this progress, more work remains to be done. For example,
    the CNPA lacks sufficient manpower to effectively enforce counter-
    narcotics laws across the entire nation. It also needs to improve
    institutional capabilities such as strategic planning, budget
    formation, and logistics to reduce its reliance on other agencies, such
    as the Ministries of Interior and Defense.
        Question. As the Commander, NATO ISAF/Commander, USFOR-A, what
    would be your relationship to the CNPA?
        Answer. Currently, NTM-A/CSTC-A has a mentoring relationship with
    the CNPA to support its development. As Commander ISAF/USFOR-A, if
    confirmed, I would oversee this mentoring relationship.
        Question. Are you satisfied with the arrangement?
        Answer. Yes.

                COUNTER-THREAT FINANCE ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN

        Question. In 2008, the United States created the Afghanistan Threat
    Finance Cell (ATFC) to disrupt the flow of funding from the Afghan
    opium trade and other illicit sources to the Taliban, al Qaeda, and
    other terrorist and insurgent groups in Afghanistan. The ATFC and
    related organizations have helped Afghan authorities investigate and
    prosecute individuals connected to the opium trade, identify outside
    sympathizers who have been supplying funding to those individuals, and
    police a variety of corrupt schemes that have filled the coffers of the
    Taliban-led insurgency and other illicit actors. The ATFC has also
    helped U.S. forces identify and target individuals associated with IED
    networks operating in Afghanistan.
        What is your assessment of the operations of the ATFC?
        Answer. The ATFC is a unique interagency, civilian-military
    organization that provides a variety of products, services, and support
    for military units and civilian agencies. These include target packages
    that support Joint Prioritization Effects List (JPEL) nominations for
    military commands; Drug Kingpin and Terrorist Designations; district-
    by-district assessments of insurgent finances used by military planners
    to identify targets; threat finance risk assessments for U.S.
    development projects and contracting; and training and mentoring of
    specialized Afghan investigative organizations. The ATFC provides
    support to a large number of United States agencies, coalition
    partners, and the Afghan Government. Given the imperative to staunch
    the illicit financial activities that fuel the insurgency, as well as
    the criminal patronage networks that undermine the government, the work
    of the ATFC plays a vital role supporting many elements of our overall
    strategy.
        Question. Some have argued that tracking and targeting the
    financial sources of insurgent networks is a waste of scarce
    intelligence resources.
        What is your view of counter-threat finance activities,
    particularly as it relates to Afghanistan?
        Answer. Given the nexus of the insurgency, illegal narcotics
    networks, and criminal organizations, counter-threat finance activities
    are vital to our overall effort to degrade the insurgency while
    simultaneously supporting the development of an effective Afghan
    Government. As noted above, counter-threat finance activities involve
    more than just the tracking of financial sources, and, in fact, lead to
    intelligence and knowledge that is directly actionable. Additionally,
    these activities inform military planners as they are developing
    operational plans and allocating resources. Overall, counter-threat
    finance activities contribute significantly to multiple elements of the
    broader campaign.

           GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES USED FOR SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

        Question. Building the security forces of foreign nations has
    traditionally been a SOF mission. However, in both Iraq and
    Afghanistan, general purpose forces have been performing this mission
    for some time.
        What is your understanding and assessment of the preparation and
    performance of Army and Marine Corps general purpose forces operating
    in Afghanistan in a security force assistance role?
        Answer. The Armed Forces of the United States have now been
    involved in counterinsurgency missions for nearly a decade, during
    which time they have had extensive experience with security force
    assistance. We have learned numerous lessons during this time,
    incorporated them into our training and education systems, and used
    past experience to prepare soldiers, marines, and others for the
    complex nature of these conflicts, to include security force
    assistance. Having seen our forces in action, my assessment is that
    they have performed very well in this role and have, in fact, surpassed
    all expectations.
        Question. How do you envision the use of general purpose forces in
    the security force assistance role, if at all, as U.S. forces begin to
    drawdown between 2011 and 2014?
        Answer. General purpose forces will continue to be used in a
    security force assistance role, helping to develop the ANSF as Afghans
    increasingly take the lead for security throughout Afghanistan.

                  SUPPORT THE MISSION WITH OPERATIONAL ENERGY

        Question. On June 7, 2011, General Petraeus signed and issued a
    memorandum for U.S. Forces-Afghanistan providing command guidance on
    supporting the mission with operational energy. In the memorandum
    General Petraeus stated his expectation that commanders will take
    ownership of unit fuel demand and announced the standing up of an
    office to improve operational energy capabilities by changing how
    Coalition forces use energy. The memorandum also called on commanders
    to make energy-informed, risk-based decisions on aviation and vehicle
    operations, base camp design, power and water generation and
    distribution. General Petraeus also called for energy considerations to
    be included in requirements and oversight of contracts.
        Do you concur with General Petraeus' command guidance and his
    efforts to date?
        Answer. Yes, since our forces are more dependent on energy than
    ever before, this guidance recognizes the importance of managing that
    risk by reducing our energy consumption. Moreover, reducing our
    environmental footprint is also important in our efforts to be good,
    environmentally-conscious guests of the Afghan people.
        Question. If confirmed, to what extent will you continue to support
    the mission of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan with operational energy or issue
    similar command guidance?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize this issue and
    will issue similar guidance.

                                WOMEN IN COMBAT

        Question. What restrictions, if any, do you believe should be
    imposed with respect to the assignment of combat-related duties to
    women in uniform, or the assignment of women to combat units?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will adhere to the current policies in
    place regarding combat-related duties for women in uniform. That said,
    I understand that, at the direction of Congress, the Department is in
    the process of reviewing current policies. If they change, I will
    ensure that all forces under my command follow the new rules and
    guidelines and I will work with all the relevant parties to make sure
    potential changes are instituted with as little disruption as possible.
    Obviously, women in uniform make tremendous contributions every day on
    the battlefield, and, due to the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan,
    many women have been engaged in combat and have performed courageously.
    Some have been wounded, and indeed, some have been killed. I honor
    their sacrifice.

                              HEALTH OF THE FORCE

        Question. The committee is concerned about the stress on military
    personnel resulting from lengthy and repeated deployments and their
    access to mental health care in theater to deal with this increased
    stress. Increased suicide rates are clear reminders that
    servicemembers, particularly those who have been deployed multiple
    times, are under tremendous stress and need access to mental health
    care.
        What is your assessment of the adequacy of health care and mental
    health capabilities supporting servicemembers in Afghanistan?
        Answer. With over 9,000 health-care personnel in Afghanistan,
    representing most medical specialties, I believe that our forces have
    access to excellent health-care facilities and professionals. This is
    particularly true with our emergency health-care capabilities. Rates of
    U.S. forces killed in action and those dying from wounds have declined
    since 2009, despite an increase in number of personnel at risk. More
    troops are surviving devastating wounds as a result of increased
    medical aviation platforms, more field hospitals, and efforts like our
    ``flying intensive care unit,'' in which wounded forces are transported
    to Landstuhl, Germany, often within hours of injury.
        Based on what I know, I likewise assess our mental-health
    capabilities as robust. There has been a significant increase in the
    number of behavioral health-care personnel in theater in the last 2
    years, as well as in the number of restoration and reconditioning
    centers for those with behavioral and mental-health problems. A new
    mental health telemedicine network has also been established, allowing
    direct communication with mental health-teams by troops based even in
    remote regions. Currently, there are 34 active telemedicine portals in
    operation, with an additional 42 planned. Also of note, the first
    theater-wide behavioral health and neurology care conference took place
    this month, which allowed mental-health experts to discuss best
    practices and lessons learned. Additionally, all efforts in theater
    have been bolstered by the Defense Department's focus on this area, and
    significant improvements in pre- and post-deployment assessments and
    support. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure that our forces have
    access to the mental health care that they need.
        Question. What is your assessment of suicide prevention programs
    and resources available to support these programs in Afghanistan?
        Answer. Suicide is obviously a huge concern for all commanders, and
    the military has made significant strides to address worrisome trends.
    In late 2009, The Suicide Prevention Task Force reviewed more than 300
    programs, culminating in a report of best practices that have been
    incorporated throughout the force. In addition to multiple direct care
    programs, the Army is managing 13 suicide prevention research projects.
        The military suicide prevention program currently spans the pre-
    deployment, deployment, and post-deployment phases, with each Service
    having tailored programs for their members. All members are exposed to
    specific prevention and resiliency training, much of this through the
    Religious Support Teams in theater and through programs such as ``Ask,
    Care, Escort'' and ``Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training.''
    More than 32,000 additional servicemembers have received the suicide
    awareness training so far this year, and over 900 have been trained to
    act as ``gatekeepers.''
        Overall, I assess that we are actively addressing this problem with
    adequate resources. If confirmed, I will continue to make this a
    priority within the command.
        Question. What is your assessment of the implementation of DOD
    policy on management of mild traumatic brain injury throughout
    Afghanistan?
        Answer. This is obviously another area of concern since these types
    of injuries have been so prevalent in these conflicts. Under current
    guidance, medics and forward physicians in theater use straightforward
    flow charts on laminated cards to determine who needs to rest and who
    needs to be referred to higher levels of care. This process appears to
    be working, with neurologists at the centers for higher levels of care
    indicating that the patients they see have been appropriately dealt
    with according to the clinical guidelines. As a result, these forward
    centers have achieved a 95-99 percent return-to-duty rate without the
    need for advanced intervention. The 1-5 percent that do not recover
    using these guidelines are referred to the two major concussion/
    traumatic brain injury specialty care centers, where specialists are
    able to diagnose and treat more advanced injuries. Overall, I assess
    that Defense Department policy is being followed in Afghanistan, with
    good effect.
        Question. What is your assessment of medical evacuation
    capabilities in theater today?
        Answer. I assess that medical evacuation capabilities in theater
    today are excellent, with the overall system performance continuing to
    improve. In 2009, the average time for urgent missions was 62 minutes;
    in 2010 it was 47 minutes; and, so far this year, it is 42 minutes.
    There are currently sufficient aircraft and crews in theater to
    continue to outperform the 60 minute ``golden hour'' standard through
    2011.
        Question. If confirmed, what standard would you establish for
    capability and availability of medical evacuation assets, including for
    forward operating units?
        Answer. It is absolutely essential that we sustain the same high
    standard of medical evacuation performance and reliability to ensure
    that our forces have the support they need, especially in the critical
    summer fighting season. We have sufficient medical evacuation assets in
    theater to allow 24/7 coverage of the main battle space and the ability
    to forward position medical evacuation assets for deliberate operations
    outside the normal coverage rings. If confirmed, I will maintain these
    standards and continue to look for ways to improve this vital mission.

                     SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

        Question. The Department has in recent years developed
    comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and
    response to incidents of sexual assaults, including providing
    appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault. However,
    incidents of sexual misconduct involving military personnel in
    Afghanistan are still being reported. Victims and their advocates claim
    that they are victimized twice: first by attackers in their own ranks
    and then by unresponsive or inadequate treatment for the victim. They
    assert that their command fails to respond appropriately with basic
    medical services and with an adequate investigation of their charges
    followed by a failure to hold assailants accountable.
        Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures,
    particularly those on restricted reporting, to be effective?
        Answer. Yes, I believe that the current sexual assault policies and
    procedures are effective. DOD believes its first priority is for
    victims to be protected, treated with dignity and respect, and to
    receive the medical treatment, care, and counseling that they deserve.
        A restricted reporting option is available for victims who wish to
    confidentially disclose incidents so that they can receive medical
    treatment and counseling without triggering the official investigative
    process. Servicemembers who are sexually assaulted and desire
    restricted reporting under this policy must report the assault to a
    Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC), a Victim Advocate, a
    health-care provider, or a chaplain. Health-care providers will
    initiate the appropriate care and treatment, and report the sexual
    assault to the SARC in lieu of reporting the assault to law enforcement
    or the command. The goal of the restricted-reporting option is to
    encourage victims to come forward and receive help.
        Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in
    which restricted reporting procedure has been put into operation?
        Answer. Although I do not know the exact details, I understand that
    there was an issue when victims were flown via medical evacuation to
    other medical facilities where their identity and situation were
    unintentionally made known. This issue has been corrected, with the
    reason for a medical evacuation now listed as ``internal wounds''
    versus ``sexual assault trauma''. This change protects and ensures the
    sexual-assault case remains restrictive.
        Question. What is your view of the steps taken to prevent and
    respond to sexual assaults in Afghanistan, including assaults against
    contractor personnel?
        Answer. There are robust policies and procedures in place to
    prevent and to respond to sexual assaults. Our medical personnel,
    military police, and SARC support all personnel, including contractors.
        Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
    resources in place in Afghanistan to investigate and respond to
    allegations of sexual assault?
        Answer. We currently have adequate training, resources, and
    investigators to respond to sexual assaults. One area of concern,
    however, is that some medical providers are not trained and/or
    certified before arriving in theater to conduct sexual-assault forensic
    examinations. This weakness was identified during a recent sexual
    assault assessment, and, as a result, medical providers will be
    required to receive adequate training and/or certification prior to
    deployment.
        Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of
    military leaders to hold assailants accountable for their acts?
        Answer. I expect everyone under my command to hold assailants
    accountable, and, if confirmed, I will explicitly tell subordinates at
    all levels that sexual assault prevention is a command issue and I
    expect and require their personal commander's attention.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure senior
    level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to
    sexual assaults in Afghanistan?
        Answer. Sexual assault prevention is a command issue, and if
    confirmed, I will tell my senior leaders that this is a priority for me
    and that I expect them to respond to incidents in a timely manner with
    appropriate medical services, to conduct thorough investigations, and
    to hold assailants accountable. My program managers will be tasked to
    provide the proper education and training on sexual assault prevention
    and reporting procedures to all personnel.

                      STANDARDS FOR TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

        Question. Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act
    for Fiscal Year 2006 provides that no individual in the custody or
    under the physical control of the U.S. Government, regardless of
    nationality or physical location shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or
    degrading treatment or punishment.
        If confirmed, will you take steps to ensure that all relevant DOD
    directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures applicable
    to U.S. forces in Afghanistan fully comply with the requirements of
    section 1403 and with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
    specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
    22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the DOD
    Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. How would you ensure a climate that not only discourages
    the abuse of detainees, but that encourages the reporting of abuse?
        Answer. Leadership starts at the top, and, if confirmed, I will
    personally ensure that the troops under my command understand my
    expectations and the clear standards under which we operate. I will
    provide clear guidance at every level of command, proper training, and
    ensure prompt and effective action is taken if there is a situation
    where we fail to meet our own high standards. Additionally, if
    confirmed, I will ensure that we continue to undertake thorough
    inspections of all detention facilities and related programs throughout
    Afghanistan and also that we continue to cooperate with the
    International Committee of the Red Cross. Our country must always live
    our values, and nowhere is that more true than how we treat detainees.

                      DETENTION OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

        Question. In the past several years, significant changes have been
    made in the way detention operations have been conducted in a
    counterinsurgency environment. In Afghanistan, Combined Joint
    Interagency Task Force 435 is responsible for overseeing detention
    operations, with the goal of responsibly transitioning detention
    operations to the Government of Afghanistan.
        In your view, what are the main lessons learned over the last
    several years regarding the conduct of detention operations within a
    counterinsurgency environment?
        Answer. Detention operations are an integral part of any
    counterinsurgency campaign, and our experiences over the past few years
    have taught us many valuable lessons. Perhaps chief among them is that
    detention operations have to be conducted in the most humane manner
    possible, since our treatment of detainees directly reflects our values
    as a nation and, as a result, can have strategic effects. We have also
    learned that we have to conduct counterinsurgency ``inside the wire'',
    since detained individuals have the potential not only to be sources of
    intelligence, but also to be part of the solution if they can be
    effectively reintegrated into society. At the Detention Facility in
    Parwan, for example, we have initiated various programs to teach
    detainees job skills that range from agriculture to tailoring.
    Additionally, we have established a robust Detainee Review Board
    process and are conducting ``release shuras'' in which communities come
    together to support individuals we believe can safely be released.
    Another lesson learned in recent years is that all of our detention
    operations have to be conducted with the understanding that they will
    eventually be transitioned to the host nation; capacity-building must
    always be a primary focus.
        Question. What is your assessment of the progress of efforts to
    build the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan to assume
    responsibility for detention operations?
        Answer. The U.S. Detention Facility in Parwan--our flagship
    detention facility in Afghanistan--began transitioning detention
    operations in January with Afghans assuming responsibility at some of
    the Detention Housing Units. The Afghan Government clearly intends to
    assume more responsibility for detention operations over time, and we
    will continue to support efforts to build additional Afghan capacity to
    take on this mission. There are two areas in particular that still need
    additional work as the transition continues. First, we have to continue
    our efforts to support the Afghan Government as it establishes a more
    capable judicial system, which will require recruiting and training
    more judges and prosecutors, among other officials. (These efforts will
    be bolstered by the NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission-Afghanistan,
    which was approved by the North Atlantic Council and endorsed by ISAF
    Defense Ministers this month; this organization will be established as
    a dual-hat command with the U.S. Rule of Law Field Force-Afghanistan.)
    Additionally, the Afghan Government needs to establish a legal
    framework for effectively dealing with insurgents. If confirmed, I will
    work closely with the interagency Rule of Law task force to closely
    examine our efforts to build the necessary Afghan capacity so that
    Afghans can assume more responsibility for detention operations.

                        AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN COOPERATION

        Question. What is your assessment of the current level of
    cooperation between Afghan and Pakistani forces in confronting the
    threat of militant extremists in the border region?
        Answer. While the relationship between Afghan and Pakistani forces
    along the border has had its ups and downs, the level of cooperation in
    the border region has improved significantly over the last 2 years,
    especially at the operational level. For example, four Border
    Coordination Centers have been established; these centers are manned by
    Afghan, Pakistani, and ISAF liaisons and facilitate the timely exchange
    of information as well as operational coordination. Additionally, there
    have been several coordinated ``hammer and anvil'' operations along the
    border in Regional Command-East (RC(E)) between Afghanistan's Kunar
    Province and Pakistan's Mohmand Agency--in which forces on both sides
    of the border work together to ensure that insurgents do not use the
    border areas as an escape route.
        Despite this operational progress, there is significant room for
    improvement. There are still periodic incidents of ``friendly fire'',
    and insurgent cross-border movement has increased in recent months (due
    in part to the warmer weather). Despite these recent incidents--and
    increased tensions in the wake of the bin Laden raid--Afghan,
    Pakistani, and ISAF forces along the border have continued to use the
    Border Coordination Centers to exchange information.
        Question. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you
    have for improving security cooperation between Afghanistan and
    Pakistan?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would seek to increase opportunities for
    military-to-military and civilian-to-civilian dialogue on security
    matters. I believe this dialogue is critical so that we can best
    coordinate our activities with each other and pursue new initiatives. I
    would also build at the operational and tactical level on the
    collaboration in RC(E) by expanding existing Border Coordination Center
    cooperation and by looking to expand coordinated cross-border
    operations, including along the border in Regional Command-South.

                            CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

        Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
    appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
    briefings, and other communications of information.
        Do you agree, if confirmed for this position, to appear before this
    committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
    even if those views differ from the administration in power?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
    committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
    information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
    with respect to your responsibilities as the ISAF Commander/Commander,
    USFOR-A?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
    other communications of information are provided to this committee and
    its staff and other appropriate committees?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
    such documents?
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill

                               CONTRACTING REFORM

        1. Senator McCaskill. Lieutenant General Allen, in 2010, General
    Petraeus issued a memorandum for commanders on counterinsurgency
    contracting guidance, in which he instructed commanders, among other
    things, to know where our money is going in contracting. General
    Petraeus said: ``where our money goes is as important as the service
    provided or the product delivered.'' Unfortunately, in the past few
    years, it has become painfully obvious that in many instances, we do
    not even know how much we are spending on contracting, which makes it
    very difficult to know where it is going.
        I can pick up the phone and get 10 different statements from 10
    different people about how much we are spending on contracting in
    Afghanistan. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
    Reconstruction (SIGAR) recently removed a report on Department of
    Defense (DOD) contract spending from its website, citing inaccuracies
    in one of the Central Contracting Command's reporting. The Government
    Accountability Office (GAO) just notified Congress that it was not yet
    able to comply with its congressionally mandated review of the
    Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) database,
    which is supposed to provide a single repository to track contractors
    in Iraq and Afghanistan, because DOD, the Department of State (DOS),
    and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) did not
    provide the information on time. GAO also reported that the agencies
    had declined to agree with GAO's prior recommendations to address
    problems with the accuracy of SPOT reporting.
        Do you plan to make contracting oversight a priority under your
    command and, if so, how?
        General Allen. I am committed to making contracting oversight a
    priority. We are working closely with Office of the Secretary of
    Defense and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to address contracting
    accountability and to institute a mechanism to better capture in-
    theater contracting information. This mechanism will enable us to have
    visibility of what we are spending and what we are about to spend; to
    ensure we are spending money with the right people and in the right
    areas to achieve the desired counterinsurgency results; and to ensure
    we serve as good stewards of the money the American people provide us.
    Additionally, in April 2011, CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support Contracting
    Command provided a contracting general officer to support our
    counterinsurgency contracting objectives and demonstrate our commitment
    to effective oversight as the Senior Contracting Official-Afghanistan.
    While his headquarters, staff, and 12 regional contracting centers only
    execute 20 percent of the spending in Afghanistan, they play a critical
    coordination role with all theater contracting agencies. Contracting
    oversight will be a priority during the period of my command.

        2. Senator McCaskill. Lieutenant General Allen, how will you work
    with the Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (under the CENTCOM
    Contracting Command) to manage contracting going on within your
    theater?
        General Allen. We will work with the Senior Contracting Official-
    Afghanistan of the CENTCOM-Joint Theater Support Contracting Command to
    manage contracting within the theater through a three prong approach.
        First, we will continue to participate in established venues for
    the coordination of logistics and contracting initiatives throughout
    Afghanistan-including the Interagency Combined Joint Logistics
    Procurement Support Board, Counterinsurgency Contracting Executive
    Steering Committee, and Regional Commander's Interagency
    Counterinsurgency Management Boards.
        Second, we will ensure the strategic and holistic development of
    requirements and allocation of resources.
        Finally, we will remain engaged to improve our processes through
    regular feedback from Task Force 2010, Task Force Spotlight,
    commissions, audit agencies and inspectors general to include the
    Commission on Wartime Contracting, the U.S. Army Audit Agency, and the
    Special Inspectors General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
        Towards these ends, the Senior Contracting Official-Afghanistan
    created Integration Cells within the U.S. Forces Afghanistan and
    Regional Commands to assist with contracting issues. The goals of the
    Integration Cells are to provide acquisition advice and education to
    the Commanders and staffs, to create cradle-to-grave requirements
    insight, to improve requirements definition, and speed procurement
    processes.

        3. Senator McCaskill. Lieutenant General Allen, how will you
    address the issue of contractors conducting oversight under your watch?
    I know there has been some improvement of late, but I remain concerned
    about that issue.
        General Allen. While contractors can serve a valuable function as a
    force multiplier for Contracting Officers Representatives and
    Administrative Contracting Officers, contract oversight will continue
    to be addressed primarily through Contracting Officer Representatives.
    Commanders in the field have to continue to emphasize the criticality
    of Contracting Officer Representative duties to ensure we hold
    contractors accountable to their contracts. Those Contracting Officer
    Representatives are our eyes and ears on-site for every contract to
    provide feedback to Contracting Officers across the theater to ensure
    satisfactory performance of those efforts.

        4. Senator McCaskill. Lieutenant General Allen, how will the
    reduction in surge troops called for by the President affect the cadre
    of U.S. Government personnel (whether military or civilian) that we
    have worked hard to build up to conduct oversight? GAO still says there
    aren't enough folks to do the job as it is.
        General Allen. The reduction may certainly reduce the number of
    personnel available to provide contract oversight. However, on 21 March
    2011 the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense issued a Class
    Deviation for the designation of Contracting Officer Representatives.
    This deviation clarifies that a Contracting Officer Representative must
    be an employee, military or civilian, of the U.S. Government, a foreign
    government, or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/Coalition
    partners; this will increase the pool of available Contracting Officers
    Representatives, especially at remote sites without a significant U.S.
    military presence.
        This limitation requires that those personnel available for
    contract oversight more efficiently and effectively achieve our
    contract administration requirements. To enable this, I will leverage
    contractors within the boundaries of what is appropriate and legal
    given their status. In this way they can serve as a force multiplier
    for Contracting Officers Representatives and Administrative Contracting
    Officers. In addition, we will continue to take advantage of the
    Defense Contract Management Agency and their disciplined and robust
    processes for contract administration to administer complex and
    sensitive contracts in Afghanistan.

                     COMMANDERS' EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM

        5. Senator McCaskill. Lieutenant General Allen, concerning the
    Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP), I have made clear in the
    past to General Petraeus I really appreciate the core, fundamental
    concept of providing small-scale humanitarian relief and reconstruction
    projects to help win the local people and to provide force protection.
    I think you should have that flexibility as commander. However, I have
    also been concerned that we give too much money to CERP (and to its
    affiliate funds such as the Afghan Infrastructure Fund) to be
    effective. I also have never been confident in the accounting mechanism
    for CERP, even though I realize some improvements have been made under
    General Petraeus' watch. Can you tell me how you would, as commander,
    improve and maximize the way CERP is used?
        General Allen. When I take command, I will certainly review our
    CERP, to include prior audits and assessments. Additionally, we will
    continue to ask for outside agency audits to review our compliance and
    to evaluate our progress. I will take action on those audits as
    appropriate and required.

        6. Senator McCaskill. Lieutenant General Allen, what changes, if
    any, do you think need to be made to the way CERP is handled and
    overseen?
        General Allen. CERP has been a very successful tool for commanders
    on the ground. They depend heavily on this program to influence their
    battle space, support Afghan local populations, and most importantly
    work with local governments to improve capacity to deliver essential
    services and address urgent needs. These successes have improved the
    lives of Afghans and substantially contribute to the effectiveness of
    our counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. However, there is always room
    for improvement.
        Proposed changes include a greater emphasis on small-scale projects
    (less than $500,000) and those that can be completed within 1 year of
    obligation. Additionally, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) CERP
    guidance has been updated to require greater scrutiny of projects and
    additional steps to verify sustainability of projects. We are also
    going a step further and looking at our internal procedures. Finally,
    we are continuing to coordinate our efforts with development experts
    such as USAID and nongovernmental organizations working in the Combined
    Joint Operations Area-Afghanistan.
        These steps will provide increased oversight and significantly
    decrease the risk of project failures. We will remain vigilant in
    monitoring our ability to successfully execute CERP and continuously
    seek improvements to refine our procedures.

        7. Senator McCaskill. Lieutenant General Allen, what do you have to
    say about the effectiveness of CERP and how do you plan to document it,
    and its effect on the COIN strategy, as commander?
        General Allen. CERP has proven to be an effective tool that our
    commanders employ to execute our COIN strategy. It is used in
    conjunction with our COIN Contracting Guidance, which emphasizes hiring
    Afghans first, buying Afghan products, and building Afghan capacity.
    This is an integral part of our strategy to increase the Afghans' trust
    in their government and deter insurgent influences, which often prey
    upon young men that need jobs to support their families. CERP is also
    part of the greater reconstruction effort. We synchronize local efforts
    with national programs implemented by DOS/USAID and the Afghanistan
    Government's National Priorities Program.
        Based on observations from our Special Operations Forces and Civil
    Affairs specialists and their interactions with the population, the
    execution of post-project atmospherics show that the completion of a
    project consistently has a positive effect on improving relationships
    and our ability to interact with and influence both the general
    population and key leaders within a community. In addition, projects
    are often designed to achieve other stabilizing effects like
    stimulating economic activity and supporting local government. Project
    effects are feeding into more comprehensive assessments such as the
    Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan
    (CFSOCC-A) Village Stability Methodology and International Security
    Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Command (IJC) Provincial Stability
    Reports. These assessments address the three pillars of stability:
    development, security, and governance. These assessments and our
    experience collectively indicate that CERP has successfully supported
    stability operations and our overall COIN strategy.
                                     ______

                   Question Submitted by Senator Mark Begich

                            LITERACY IN AFGHANISTAN

        8. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Allen, in your answers to the
    advance policy questions from the committee you identified literacy as
    one of the greatest challenges to building the capacity of the Afghan
    National Security Forces (ANSF) to assume responsibility for security.
    I agree literacy is essential for a professional, capable and enduring
    security force. Literate Afghan people are also key to economic growth,
    proficient governance, and independence from corruption. What, if any,
    additional action do you believe the United States and coalition
    partners can take to increase literacy in Afghanistan, specifically
    within ANSF?
        General Allen. The ANSF Literacy Program's mission is to bring
    everyone in the ANSF to a third grade literacy level by the end of
    2014. To date, over 94,247 have received literacy training and
    successfully tested at either the first, second, or third grade level.
        To ensure long-term sustainability of the literacy program, there
    are three distinct opportunities for countries to contribute to
    literacy efforts in Afghanistan.
        First, countries can donate funds to the NATO Training Mission-
    Afghanistan (NTM-A) established ``Addendum to the Trust Fund in Support
    of the Afghan National Army for the ANSF-Literacy and English Language
    Training, and Professional Military Education Programme.'' This fund
    exists to institutionalize the long-term commitment to literacy through
    the ANSFs. Donating to this fund will give the literacy program an
    opportunity to expand and provide literacy training to the ANSFs
    operational force beyond just the third grade level, and well beyond
    2014. To date, the largest contributing nation to this fund has been
    the United Arab Emirates with a $10 million donation.
        Second, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
    Organization has partnered with NTM-A and the Government of Japan to
    establish a comprehensive program that combines literacy with
    professional police education.
        Third, using the United Nations' highly regarded Education for All
    philosophy, countries can partner with the Afghan Ministry of Education
    to develop and certify a National Education Strategic Plan. Many
    features of this plan are already in place and literacy in schools is
    expected to increase steadily in the coming years.
                                     ______

                  Question Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen

                             U.S.-AFGHAN TECHNOLOGY

        9. Senator Shaheen. Lieutenant General Allen, as we draw down our
    forces in Afghanistan, the Afghan Government will need to be able
    provide for its own security on an ever-increasing basis. The Afghan
    Minister of Defense and the Chief of the Afghan Army believe
    technologies currently employed by the U.S. Marines Corps will help
    them provide security to their own forces and population. The Person-
    Born Improvised Explosive Device (PB-IED), or suicide bomber, is one of
    the more difficult threats to detect, but is particularly dangerous at
    checkpoints. The Afghan military leaders have thus requested NTM-A
    approval to receive the technology used by the marines to detect and
    thus counter PB-IED from a safe distance. Could you please provide me
    with an update on the status of the Afghan request, or plans to provide
    the counter-PB-IED technology (commercial name: CounterBomber)
    capability to the Afghan forces?
        General Allen. In January 2011, NTM-A received a request from the
    Afghan Minister of Defense to review counter PB-IED technologies,
    followed by a March 2011 request of the Chief of the General Staff of
    the Afghan Army. NTM-A is working with the Afghan Ministry of Defense
    to evaluate counter Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
    capabilities from the perspective of capability, cost, sustainability,
    feasibility, and the ability to integrate into a larger, more
    comprehensive Afghan counter-improvised explosive device (IED)
    strategy. They are also evaluating the financial capacity of the
    Afghanistan government to sustain this technology after the transition
    of Coalition support and assistance. A current estimate for the Counter
    Bomber technology is approximately $175 million, which provides for 200
    systems with 3\1/2\ years of operations and support.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

                         CONTRACTING IN CENTRAL COMMAND

        10. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Allen, various initiatives
    undertaken by CENTCOM commander last year, in particular, Task Force
    2010 and Task Force Spotlight, have shed light on how some contractors
    (and subcontractors) to DOD have in some cases hired insurgents and
    other malign actors who were actively opposing U.S. forces in
    Afghanistan. Needless to say, if left unaddressed, this could
    significantly undermine the United States' conduct of counterinsurgency
    operations in theater. Since those initiatives begun, in your view, how
    successfully, or unsuccessfully, have the CENTCOM commander and DOD
    been in discovering and discontinuing the inadvertent funding of such
    relationships with contract funds?
        General Allen. I believe we are taking the appropriate steps to
    bring attention to the corruption problem and be good stewards on the
    management of contract funds; however, we still have much to do in this
    area.
        Over this past year, in partnership with DOD and CENTCOM, we
    greatly increased our understanding of the corruption problem and how
    inadvertent funding affects our counterinsurgency efforts in theater.
    Combined Joint Interagency Task Force Shafafiyat (Dari word meaning
    ``transparency'') has helped us map out the criminal patronage networks
    that exist in Afghanistan and to address corruption as a strategic
    problem. Task Force Spotlight has aided in tracking and enforcing our
    procedures regarding private security companies. Task Force 2010 has
    assisted us in helping us better understand with whom we are doing
    business, and provided commanders and contracting activities with the
    information needed for them to take action.
        One of the principal tools available to us has been the infusion of
    intelligence into the assessment of potential vendors. Though not at
    the pace we desire, we are working closely with CENTCOM to expand the
    capability in Tampa to vet potential companies prior to doing business
    with them. To date, the ISAF Joint Command/CENTCOM Contracting Command
    vendor vetting cell has reviewed 483 companies and rejected 34 from
    contract award consideration. Task Force 2010, working with the
    Procurement Fraud Branch of the U.S. Army Legal Services Agency,
    follows up by referring those rejected companies for suspension and
    proposed debarment under the Federal Acquisition Regulation. Within the
    last year, we have seen an increase in the follow-on actions to debars
    companies and individuals who are deemed non-responsible and should not
    do business with the U.S. Government in Afghanistan. Our most recent
    results show 78 companies or individuals debarred; 67 companies or
    individuals suspended pending debarment; and 64 more companies or
    individuals submitted for consideration for suspension or debarment. In
    comparison with last year, we were tracking 23 companies or individuals
    debarred and 19 companies or individuals suspended pending debarment.

        11. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Allen, in the National
    Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2012, which this committee
    recently reported out, section 861 would enable contracting authorities
    at DOD to void a contract, or restrict the award of future contracts,
    to anyone who is determined by the CENTCOM commander to be actively
    opposing U.S. forces in Afghanistan. It also allows DOD to terminate--
    without liability to the taxpayer--any contract with anyone who fails
    to exercise due diligence to ensure that no contract funds are being
    used by persons to actively oppose U.S. forces there. Another provision
    in the same bill, section 862, would authorize DOD to examine any
    records of a contractor (or subcontractor) in the CENTCOM theater to
    ensure that contract funds are not subject to corruption or extortion
    or not provided to anyone actively opposing U.S. forces in Afghanistan.
    The need for such authorities was originally requested by General
    Petraeus. In your view, would these authorities be sufficient to
    provide the Commander of ISAF and U.S. Forces Afghanistan with the
    flexibility needed to ensure that the United States is not
    inadvertently contracting with the enemy in Afghanistan?
        General Allen. I appreciate the support of this committee in
    providing us the tools needed to combat contract fraud and corruption.
    Though the provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2012 will not stop corrupt practices, it does address a
    critical gap within the Federal Acquisition Regulations. It provides us
    the authority to rescind or void a contract with someone identified as
    supporting or working for the enemy, and it provides us the
    transparency needed to look at all contracts in a contingency
    environment, especially regarding companies below the prime contractor
    level. Both of these authorities arm our leaders with the tools needed
    to gain visibility on the flow of contract funds, and if connections to
    the enemy are detected, the ability to take immediate steps to deny
    them further access to our money.

        12. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Allen, what additional
    authorities may be needed, if any?
        General Allen. Currently no additional authorities are required. We
    recognize that Federal and DOD acquisition regulations, policies, and
    procedures do not adequately differentiate between peacetime and
    operational contracting practices. To address potential gaps and future
    authorities that may be needed to bridge the peacetime and the
    contingency environment, Task Force 2010 established a working group to
    review existing regulations, policies, and procedures with the goal to
    recommend areas where changes or select authorities can enhance our
    acquisition strategy and contract management in-theater. This forum
    includes all contracting and oversight agencies conducting business in
    Afghanistan.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

                        OVERALL STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN

        13. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Allen, what level of risk
    are we accepting by following the President's withdrawal timeline?
        General Allen. As commander, one of my very first duties would be
    to assess any necessary adjustments in concept and approach that may be
    required. In terms of risk, the surge recovery does not, in my opinion,
    render our objectives in Afghanistan unattainable. This is primarily
    because the surge, while still ongoing and important for continued
    momentum, has created success in several key parts of the country. It
    has curtailed the momentum of the insurgency, and the ANSFs continue to
    grow and develop in their warfighting capacity. Even once the security
    surge forces have been removed, there will still be some 68,000 U.S.
    troops and thousands of international forces in Afghanistan, not to
    mention some 70,000 more Afghan forces that will join the fight in the
    next 15 months. At the same time, the U.S. and NATO are both discussing
    long term strategic partnerships with Afghanistan. That said, I will
    continue to assess and evaluate the surge recovery and keep the chain
    of command informed.

        14. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Allen, in which areas are we
    accepting more risk?
        General Allen. Any endeavor as complex as that which we are trying
    to achieve in Afghanistan requires balancing a variety of risks. As
    commander, it will be my job to assess the variety of challenges we
    face as we transition from ISAF lead to Afghan lead-not only in
    security, but in other areas as well.
        I believe that the campaign has the development of the ANSFs,
    ultimately to be in the lead of security by 2014 with U.S. forces in a
    strategic overwatch, as an objective that is attainable. It is my
    opinion that the ANSFs, backed up by continued U.S. support and the
    provision of key enablers, will be up to the task. We will seek to
    constantly evaluate risk, and mitigate it whenever possible. The
    mission for all of us, including coalition partners is far from over,
    and success will increasingly depend on the degree to which Afghans can
    sustain this most important fight. If in my assessments and judgment
    risk becomes untenable I will so advise my chain of command.

        15. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Allen, which conditions have
    been met that justify the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan at this
    point?
        General Allen. As General Petraeus has noted, Afghan and ISAF
    forces have halted the insurgency's momentum in much of the country and
    have reversed it in key areas. Based on my work as the Deputy Commander
    of U.S. Central Command, numerous visits to the theater over the past 3
    years, and extensive discussions with senior military and civilian
    leaders, I share that assessment. Meanwhile, we are continuing to exert
    unprecedented pressure on the insurgency with a variety of efforts,
    including the Afghan Local Police initiative that is mobilizing
    communities to defend themselves, Afghan-led efforts to reintegrate
    former fighters, and a variety of governance and development
    initiatives focused on establishing the conditions necessary to achieve
    long-term security. Much of this progress has been enabled by and
    increasingly led by the ANSFs, which are conducting their own surge.
        Even once the surge forces have been removed, there will still be
    some 68,000 U.S. troops and thousands of international forces in
    Afghanistan, not to mention some 70,000 additional Afghan forces that
    will join the fight in the next 15 months. At the same time, the U.S.
    and NATO are both discussing long-term strategic partnerships with
    Afghanistan. This reality sends an important message of commitment to
    the Afghan people, as well as a sense of urgency that Afghans must take
    more responsibility for their security.

        16. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Allen, what conditions would
    cause you to ask President Obama to delay the withdrawal of troops?
        General Allen. As the commander in Afghanistan, one of my solemn
    duties would be to provide my best military advice to the President. I
    am going to monitor the operational environment and the conditions
    constantly, not just as they relate to the drawdown of the forces with
    respect to the surge, but throughout the entire period of time I
    command during this campaign. It is my responsibility to the chain of
    command and to our Commander in Chief to ensure that should I be
    concerned with the progress of the campaign, I would advise the chain
    of command with my forthright advice. If I feel that the drawdown of
    surge forces compromises our ability to achieve our national objectives
    in Afghanistan, I will not hesitate to recommend an adjustment to the
    current plan.

        17. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Allen, what role do you
    expect your military judgment to play in decisions about troop levels
    in Afghanistan?
        General Allen. As commander in Afghanistan, one of my solemn duties
    would be to render my best military advice to the President of the
    United States, to include advice concerning the force levels necessary
    to accomplish my assigned mission. I expect that the President will be
    willing to receive that advice, to consider it, and to weigh it amongst
    the full range of issues and concerns presented to him. I am fully
    aware that the decisions the President makes must always be informed by
    a wide range of considerations, of which the assessment from
    Afghanistan is one important component.

        18. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Allen, what conditions must
    be met in 2014 to transition to Afghan control?
        General Allen. There are three aspects to the stages of transition,
    the first of which is security. To complete security transition to
    Afghan control, the ANSFs should be responsible for population security
    and law enforcement, be accountable, and serve the Afghan people. ISAF
    has a defined role to be postured to provide the strategic overwatch
    and the assistance needed to achieve sustainable security. Second,
    Afghan governance and development must be sufficiently inclusive,
    accountable, and acceptable to the Afghan people. Lastly, the
    population should have access to basic social services and adequate
    rule of law in order to establish the foundation for sustainable
    economic growth. ISAF will enable these second two goals by supporting
    U.S. efforts across the whole of government, as well as international
    efforts to assist the Afghan people.

        19. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Allen, do you believe this
    is a realistic date?
        General Allen. I believe that the mission before us is hard, but
    doable. ISAF is going to take advantage of the opportunity between now
    and the end of the year to assess where we are with the progress of the
    campaign.
        The primary governing factors that will determine successful
    completion by 2014 are ANSFs readiness, the Afghan Government's
    legitimacy, the civil-military campaign progress, and the resulting
    decisions made by the enemy and other key regional players. The
    greatest influence ISAFs have over all these objectives is the ANSFs
    development, rate of fielding forces, and the quality of its emerging
    leadership from the ministry-level down to the noncommissioned officer.
    Quality ANSFs will promote the Afghan Government's legitimacy,
    reinforce governance with improving law enforcement capacity, and have
    a positive effect on the campaign.

        20. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Allen, what impact would a
    failure in Afghanistan have on U.S. national security in the long term?
        General Allen. The effects of a potential failure to achieve our
    core objective in Afghanistan, to ensure that Afghanistan is never
    again a sanctuary for al Qaeda, could be significant. Were al Qaeda
    able to re-establish sanctuaries because Afghan forces and governmental
    authorities proved incapable of securing and governing the country,
    there could be obvious negative implications for U.S. national security
    interests. Al Qaeda could operate once again from Afghan soil and there
    could very well be substantial civil strife in Afghanistan as well.
        The coalition in Afghanistan consists of 49 Troop Contributing
    Nations, the largest coalition since WWII and operating under a United
    Nations Security Council Resolution with significant international
    legitimacy. Additionally, this is NATO's first operation outside of
    Europe, and NATO performance in this area may well signal the future
    effectiveness and cohesion of the alliance in other out-of-area
    operations.

                     COUNTERINSURGENCY VS. COUNTERTERRORISM

        21. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Allen, one ongoing debate is
    how to deal with insurgencies. Some believe the best way to defeat an
    insurgency is to win over the population through COIN strategy. Others
    believe in a counterterrorism strategy that directly targets the
    insurgents and their networks. Some proponents of the withdrawal have
    said that we can accomplish our goals in Afghanistan with special
    operators alone. However, one of our lessons learned in Iraq is the
    importance of large amounts of conventional forces for
    counterinsurgency operations. You have worked closely with General
    Petraeus on his efforts in Iraq and are now discussing operations in
    Afghanistan. What is the best strategy to achieve our primary goal of
    preventing Afghanistan from being used as a base for terrorists and
    extremists to attack the United States and our allies?
        General Allen. Insurgencies are exceptionally complex and each
    presents unique and differing challenges. The comprehensive civil-
    military counterinsurgency strategy currently employed in Afghanistan
    includes operations across the spectrum of counterinsurgency, and
    includes targeted operations by counter-terrorism forces. Also
    important are clear, hold and build operations to protect the
    population, the development of the ANSFs to establish long-term
    security, and creation of local security forces to empower local
    authorities. It also provides support to various civilian endeavors.
    The goal is a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy, closely
    integrated across the whole of government and the international
    coalition, which is comprised of forces from ISAF troop contributing
    nations.

        22. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Allen, can counterterrorism
    alone achieve our primary goal in Afghanistan?
        General Allen. No. On its own, counter-terrorist operations are
    insufficient to neutralize the insurgency. To be effective, they must
    be part of a strategy which includes the fielding and
    professionalization of ANSFs and the development of governance and
    socio-economic capacity to the degree that allows the Afghan Government
    to maintain pressure on insurgent forces and prevent the return of
    transnational terrorist organizations like al Qaeda. This is the
    approach we are taking today, and one we should continue to pursue.

                          REINTEGRATION OF THE TALIBAN

        23. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Allen, estimates of the
    strength of the various Taliban factions vary from 20,000 to 40,000.
    Almost 2,000 Taliban fighters have accepted the offer of reintegration
    from the Karzai Government. The reintegration program is aimed at the
    so-called ``accidental guerillas'' for which fighting in the insurgency
    is just a job. What is the status of this program?
        General Allen. Provincial Peace Councils have been established in
    32 provinces, with one emerging in Kandahar and one previously
    established in Nangarhar under review. Twenty-three Provincial Joint
    Secretariat Teams (technical and administrative support to Provincial
    Governors) have been formed. Currently 1,926 fighters have registered
    with the program, with others coming forward. Recently, 375 enrolled in
    one event in Badghis Province and will likely be added to the total
    once processed. However, progress is slower in the South and East where
    the infrastructure of the insurgency is most dense. The capacity to
    implement the program has been slow to develop. However, as structures
    develop, resources begin to flow, and confidence builds, we expect to
    see an increase in reintegration activity.
        Reintegration is not easy or straightforward. Most fighters fight
    on the basis of local grievances, which mean they join this program on
    the basis of local grievance resolution and local military pressure.
    This also means that the program is continually dealing with small
    groups of fighters as opposed to larger networks or blocks. ISAF is
    working at accelerating reintegration by applying military pressure on
    the insurgents, supporting Afghan national and provincial leadership
    and organization, and developing Afghan ability to support local,
    community-based solutions.

        24. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Allen, what are your
    thoughts on the risks and payoffs of this program?
        General Allen. Reintegration is a logical outcome in any
    counterinsurgency campaign. With the emergence of the Afghan mechanisms
    to support reintegration, we will seek every opportunity to permit
    insurgents to stop fighting and join the peace process. The payoffs of
    the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program are potentially significant,
    though it is currently making only incremental progress. The number of
    fighters who have officially enrolled is now almost 2,000 and growing
    steadily. In the past few weeks, the first demobilization event was
    held in Helmand province, and in the northwestern province of Badghis,
    375 fighters registered at a single event.
        We are realistic about potential scope of the program. One concern
    is that only the local `accidental guerillas' will reintegrate--not the
    hardened, ideologically driven fighters. However, the reintegration of
    local fighters potentially undermines support for the hard liner and in
    time may cause the latter to reintegrate. A second risk is that
    reintegrated fighters will return to the fight. However, the evidence
    so far is that the reintegrees who go through the demobilization
    process are genuine. The key to this success is local reconciliation
    combined with provincial and national vetting. A third risk is that the
    Afghan national and provincial governments' will lack the capacity to
    implement the program. ISAF is supporting the program by: assisting in
    the development of procedures; mentoring the selection and training of
    Provincial Joint Secretariat Teams; providing enabling funding through
    the DOD Afghan Reintegration Program; and, of course, by applying
    military pressure on the battlefield.

                        AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

        25. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Allen, is it correct to say
    that the capability of ANSF is the decisive point of our Afghan
    strategy?
        General Allen. The capability of the ANSF is one of the decisive
    points of the ISAF campaign. To that end, the coalition continues to
    emphasize ANSF growth and development. I should note recruiting
    continues to meet our desired goals, and the ANSF is increasingly
    capable and perceived positively. In addition, all Afghan National Army
    Branch schools are currently functioning and dedicated efforts to
    increase the professionalism of the ANSF are bearing fruit.
        This is not to say that we are without challenges. As the campaign
    progresses, it is important to support our ANSF partners in the
    campaign. We will continue to partner and mentor the ANSF at the
    appropriate levels, in order for the ANSF to continue to take the lead
    in security operations.

        26. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Allen, will they be ready by
    the 2014 timeline that President Karzai has requested?
        General Allen. Although 2014 is an aggressive timeline for the ANSF
    to take the security lead, it is achievable. The ANSF will begin
    assuming security lead this month in seven areas of Afghanistan. As the
    transition process moves forward and the ANSF take security lead, they
    will not be doing so alone. As each geographic area undergoes
    transition, the associated ANSF units will progress through a series of
    stages where they grow in capability as their partnered ISAF gradually
    step back. In fact, in certain areas of the country, coalition forces
    will continue to provide advising and enabling capabilities to the ANSF
    to ensure they remain capable, credible, and connected to the Afghan
    people and a deterrent to insurgent and transnational terrorist groups.
    This support will continue only until such time the ANSF can become
    completely self-sufficient.

        27. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Allen, as the ANSF end
    strength is increased, will there be sufficient U.S. forces available
    to partner with Afghan units?
        General Allen. As the ANSFs increase in strength, they will also
    grow in capability. Partnership remains a critical part of our campaign
    plan and future professionalization of the force, which is invaluable
    to our efforts to conduct irreversible transition by the end of 2014.
    That said, as we conduct the surge recovery, we will continue to assess
    our partnership framework as well as future requirements for enablers,
    mentorship, and support. Progress to date allows us to adjust our
    partnership ratios as enabled by improving security conditions on the
    ground.

        28. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Allen, can the Afghan
    Government sustain/fund these robust security forces in the future?
        General Allen. The Afghan economy is expected to be able to
    generate some of the income to partially support its security forces,
    but the Afghan Government will require supplemental funding from the
    United States and the international community to sustain them. The
    amount of outside funding will depend upon the level of the insurgency,
    and the estimated size of the ANSF required for the maintenance of
    security in Afghanistan beyond 2014.

                  SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ENGAGEMENT PROGRAMS

        29. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Allen, our military-to-
    military (1206), civilian-to-civilian (1207), small-scale special
    operations (1208), CERP, and Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund
    (CCIF) have been incredibly successful in aiding developing nations,
    fighting terrorism, and providing resources for emergency situations.
    My belief is that the key to these programs has been the combined
    efforts of DOD, DOS, the chiefs of mission, and combatant commanders
    working together to increase the capabilities of our partner nations to
    provide for their own security, increasing stability in their region
    and around the globe. What value do these funds provide in your
    prospective areas of responsibility?
        General Allen. Our assessments have shown that the CERP has
    significantly supported our comprehensive civil-military
    counterinsurgency strategy. Through investments into Afghan
    communities, the CERP empowers commanders to reinforce security gains
    with localized governance and development initiatives. The CERP is a
    powerful mechanism by which we have already convinced many Afghans in
    previously contested areas that the Afghan Government has greater
    capacity to offer peace, stability, and prosperity than insurgents.
        CERP is a flexible tool that enables U.S. Commanders to respond to
    urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their
    area of responsibility (AOR). In Afghanistan, CERP has been employed to
    great effect to repair battle damage, repair irrigation systems, build
    schools and medical clinics, provide urgently needed medical supplies,
    and supply many other urgent needs to local Afghans. We should continue
    to aggressively utilize CERP to achieve the desired end state in the
    Combined Joint Operations Area-Afghanistan (CJOA-A).
        To a significantly lesser extent, we have also made use of CCIF in
    the CJOA-A. CCIF is currently being used to support Rule of Law (ROL)
    enhancement with the construction of guard housing and other support
    facilities at the Saraposa Prison in Kandahar.

        30. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Allen, do you have any
    concerns about being able to effectively execute these programs in your
    prospective areas of responsibility?
        General Allen. The CERP projects have improved the lives of
    millions of Afghans and substantially contribute to the effectiveness
    of our counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. In some areas, the
    operational environment has matured beyond the acute phases of
    stability operations to more advanced activities that support
    development and enabling governance. As a result, some aspects of CERP
    have evolved to include more complex, longer-term projects. I am
    concerned that commanders are incurring an increased risk of project
    failures as they attempt to address some of the more advanced needs
    within their battle space, but fortunately steps are already being
    taken to mitigate this concern.
        Proposed changes include a greater emphasis on small-scale projects
    (less than $500,000) and those that can be completed within 1 year of
    obligation. Additionally, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) CERP
    guidance has been updated to require greater scrutiny of projects and
    additional steps to verify sustainability of projects. We are also
    going a step further and looking at our internal procedures. Finally,
    we are continuing to coordinate our efforts with development experts
    such as United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and
    nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working in the CJOA-A.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss

                       AFGHANISTAN--MITIGATION STRATEGIES

        31. Senator Chambliss. Lieutenant General Allen, while impressive
    gains in security have been made throughout Afghanistan since the surge
    was implemented, those gains have been repeatedly characterized as
    ``fragile and reversible''. Afghanistan remains a dangerous place.
    Nonetheless, last week President Obama announced the beginning of the
    withdrawal of the surge forces ordering 10,000 troops to depart
    Afghanistan by the end of this year and the transfer of authority from
    ISAF to the Afghans to be completed by the end of 2014. As Tunisia,
    Egypt, and other nations in the Middle East have shown us so suddenly
    in these past weeks and months, and given the increasing level of
    instability throughout the Muslim world, is the drawdown of U.S. combat
    forces in Afghanistan the right thing to do at this time from an
    operational perspective?
        General Allen. I support the President's decision and believe that
    we can accomplish our objectives. This is primarily because the surge,
    while still ongoing and important for continued momentum, has created
    success in several key parts of the country. It has curtailed the
    momentum of the insurgency, and the ANSF continues to grow and develop
    in their warfighting capacity. Even once the surge forces have been
    removed; there will still be some 68,000 U.S. troops and thousands of
    international forces in Afghanistan, not to mention some 70,000 more
    Afghan forces, which will join the fight in the next 15 months. At the
    same time, the United States and NATO are both discussing long-term
    strategic partnerships with Afghanistan. I will offer my candid
    assessment to the chain of command on the current state of the
    conflict, as well as provide options with respect to the President's
    goals in accomplishing this strategy. As the commander in Afghanistan,
    it would be my responsibility to render my best military advice, and
    then to execute the President's decisions as skillfully and diligently
    as possible.

        32. Senator Chambliss. Lieutenant General Allen, should things take
    a turn for the worse in Afghanistan, what mitigation strategies are you
    prepared to execute to manage risk to the mission and protect U.S.
    personnel remaining in Afghanistan as we remove forces from theater,
    and if needed, would you recommend ceasing the withdrawal of U.S.
    forces and even increasing U.S. forces if that were the right
    operational move?
        General Allen. The primary means to mitigate risk related to the
    United States surge drawdown is through the continued growth and
    development of the ANSF. Increases in the quantity of ANSF will likely
    outpace decreases in ISAFs. Of note, the Afghan Local Police are a
    particularly important element of risk mitigation, since they reside in
    local areas, often where U.S. and coalition forces do not already have
    a dense presence.
        I will closely monitor the operational environment and make
    appropriate recommendations to mitigate risk and to adapt the force and
    our operational approach as necessary. It is imperative that we
    constantly review and assess our progress by challenging previous
    assumptions and then adapt our campaign and force to confront a
    changing environment. I will keep the chain of command informed of my
    assessments and any adjustments that may be required as the operational
    environment evolves.

                       AFGHANISTAN RECONCILIATION EFFORTS

        33. Senator Chambliss. Lieutenant General Allen, in your responses
    to advance policy questions you mention your service as the ``deputy
    commanding general of the II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) when
    it deployed to Iraq's Anbar Province from 2007-2008'' as experience
    that ``not only prepared [you] for battlefield command and the harsh
    reality of war but . . . also taught [you] a tremendous amount about
    the nature of this kind of conflict and the complex challenges unique
    to counterinsurgencies.'' While you performed this duty during the
    Anbar Awakening in Iraq, Afghanistan is not Iraq. Afghans are
    accustomed to switching sides frequently, sometimes even during a
    battle. With that in mind, if confirmed as the next commander in
    Afghanistan, how do you propose furthering the political process of
    reconciliation to help ensure we are able to create and leave behind a
    secure Afghanistan and ensure the ``fragile and reversible'' gains we
    have made are permanent?
        General Allen. Reconciliation is a political process among the
    Afghan people, and is supported by the DOS through the U.S. Embassy.
    ISAF has a key role in enabling this process, and is one which I will
    fully support. Reintegration is a complementary process, one where ISAF
    supports the Afghan-led Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program by
    assisting in the development of procedures, mentoring the selection and
    training of Provincial Joint Secretariat Teams, providing enabling
    funding through the DOD Afghan Reintegration Program, and by applying
    military pressure on the battlefield. These programs are an integral
    element of the counter insurgency (COIN) campaign, are fundamental to
    the strategic peace process, and are a key building block of the
    transition process. Progress in reconciliation processes is a function
    of building on security gains and governance improvements such that
    they tip the balance of confidence at all levels decisively in favor of
    the government. Building on current gains, a successful transition will
    provide the Afghans with the strength to make reconciliation and
    reintegration irreversible.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Scott P. Brown

                            TRAINER-TO-TRAINEE RATIO

        34. Senator Brown. Lieutenant General Allen, the President's
    withdrawal plan would leave about 68,000 U.S. troops on the ground in
    Afghanistan by the end of next summer, along with an expected ANSF end-
    strength totaling about 352,000 soldiers and police. From your
    perspective, what is the ideal trainer-to-trainee ratio you intend to
    meet by the end of this year?
        General Allen. The current overall coalition trainer to ANSF
    trainee ratio is approximately 1:14, which is sufficient to produce the
    Army combat and police formations required for the Afghans to
    transition to the security lead. However, the critical shortage of 65
    air coalition trainers hinders the development of the Afghan Air Force
    (Mi-17 and C-27 pilots). The Afghan logistics and medical systems are
    also short trainers; these have been identified and are scheduled to be
    ``boots on the ground'' by the end of the year. This number of trainers
    will allow NTM-A to reach the ANSF growth objective of 352,000 by
    October 2012 and should complete the training and fielding of the
    Afghan Army and Police by December 2013. Additionally, NTM-A is
    training and certifying Afghan trainers to be able to take the lead for
    basic training of Army and Police. The goal by the end of 2011 is to
    have 4,400 Afghan trainers assume the lead for training allowing
    coalition trainers to shift focus to professionalize the force and
    develop systems that will endure past transition at the end of 2014.

        35. Senator Brown. Lieutenant General Allen, with a current
    shortfall of 490 institutional trainers, how will the withdrawal of
    10,000 troops by the end of this year affect your training mission?
        General Allen. The withdrawal of 10,000 troops by the end of this
    year is not expected to impact the training mission. NTM-A trainers who
    are inbound from the United States and coalition countries between now
    and this fall will address all training shortfall except 65 air
    trainers (C-27 and Mi-17 pilots)-likely enabling us to reach the growth
    objective of 352,000 by October 2012 and complete the training and
    fielding of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police by the
    end of 2013. One key effort to meeting this goal will be appropriately
    balancing trainers and force structure requirements in the future.

        36. Senator Brown. Lieutenant General Allen, what is the ideal
    trainer-to-trainee ratio you intend to meet by the end of next summer?
    Is that number an acceptable level of risk, in your opinion?
        General Allen. The current overall coalition trainer to ANSF
    trainee ratio is approximately 1:14, which is sufficient to produce the
    Army combat and police formations required for the Afghans to
    transition to the security lead. However, the critical shortage of 65
    air coalition trainers hinders the development of the Afghan Air Force
    (Mi-17 and C-27 pilots). The Afghan logistics and medical systems are
    also short trainers; these have been identified and are scheduled to be
    ``boots on the ground'' by the end of the year. This number of trainers
    will allow NTM-A to reach the ANSF growth objective of 352,000 by
    October 2012 and should complete the training and fielding of the
    Afghan Army and Police by December 2013. Additionally, NTM-A is
    training and certifying Afghan trainers to be able to take the lead for
    basic training of Army and Police. The goal by the end of 2011 is to
    have 4,400 Afghan trainers assume the lead for training allowing
    coalition trainers to shift focus to professionalize the force and
    develop systems that will endure past transition at the end of 2014.
                                     ______

                 Question Submitted by Senator Susan M. Collins

                       AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE CONTRACTING

        37. Senator Collins. Lieutenant General Allen, both DOD and DOS
    have played a role in training the Afghanistan National Police. DOD has
    established the desired outcomes for this training, and, until this
    year, DOS handled the contracting. At the beginning of last year, the
    DOD and DOS Inspectors General reported that DOD failed to provide DOS
    with these requirements to include them in the contracts.
    Unfortunately, only 11 of the 64 police districts evaluated met the
    goal of being able to carry out law-enforcement actions unaided. We are
    told by the DOD Inspector General (IG) that the contract now resides
    with DOD. What metrics and performance requirements has DOD written
    into this training contract now that it has assumed responsibility for
    it?
        General Allen. In April 2011, DOS transferred the Afghan National
    Police training mission to DOD. DOD and specifically NTM-A picked up
    this training mission and converted the training from contractor to
    coalition civilian and military personnel. The DOD IG conducted an
    audit of DOS to DOD transfer of mission and provided 10 findings in
    their draft report. NTM-A has addressed 9 of the 10 recommendations,
    with the remaining open recommendation being addressed between DOS and
    DOD leadership regarding funding reimbursement.
        NTM-A has provided information to DOD IG as to how it has addressed
    or mitigated 9 of the recommendations, which will be identified in the
    final report from the DOD IG. Specific to the 64 police districts to
    meet the goal of being able to carry out law-enforcement actions
    unaided, ISAF Joint Command has written performance metrics to gauge
    the operational capability of the Afghan Police. The ISAF Joint Command
    Unit Assessment Tool serves as the basis for these metrics and
    performance requirements. Specific metrics and performance
    requirements, which are written in the Ministry of Interior Training
    and Support Statement of Work (dated 2 February 2011), include
    measuring the Afghan National Police's ability to report the status of
    personnel, logistics, and operations and then take specific actions
    based on these reports in order to enable the long-term viability of
    the force.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of LtGen John R. Allen, USMC,
    follows:]
                        Nomination Reference and Report
                               As In Executive Session,
                                   Senate of the United States,
                                                          June 8, 2011.
        The following named officer for appointment to the grade of general
    in the U.S. Marine Corps while assigned to a position of importance and
    responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

                                 To be General

        LtGen John R. Allen, 0000.
                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of LtGen John R. Allen, USMC,
    which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
    nomination was referred, follows:]
                Biographical Sketch of LtGen John R. Allen, USMC
    Position:
        Deputy Commander, U. S. Central Command

    Assigned:
        17 Jun 08

    Projected Rotation:
        17 Jun 11

    Date of Rank:
        31 Oct 08

    Date of Birth:
        15 Dec 53

    Date Commissioned:
        2 Jun 76

    MRD:
        1 Jul 14

    Education/Qualifications:
        U.S. Naval Academy, BS, 1976
        Georgetown University, MA, 1983
        Defense Intelligence College, MS, 1984
        The Basic School, 1977
        Amphibious Warfare School Non-Resident, 1982
        CMC Fellow--Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1985
        Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1993
        National War College, 1998
        CAPSTONE, 2006
        CFACC, 2008
        CLFLCC, 2008
        Infantry Officer
        Joint Qualified Officer

    Commands:
        Acting Commander, U.S. Central Command (LtGen: June 10-Aug. 10)
        Commanding General, 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MajGen: Aug.
    06-June 08)
        Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy (Col: Dec. 01-Sep 03)
        Commanding Officer, The Basic School (Col: June 99-Apr. 01)
        Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, 2d Marine Division
    (LtCol: July 94-Mar. 96)

    Joint assignments:
        Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command (LtGen: July 08-June 10)
        Principal Director (Asia & Pacific), Office of the Deputy Under
    Secretary of Defense (Asia &Pacific) (BGen: Oct. 03-June 06)
        Commanding Officer, Migrant Processing, Joint Task Force-160
    (LtCol: May 94-July 94)

    Service Staff Assignments:
        Deputy Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy (Col: Apr. 01-
    Dec. 01)
        Military Secretary to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (Col: June
    98-June 99)
        Aide-de-Camp to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (LtCol: Mar. 96-
    July 97)
        Assistant Operations Officer, G-3, 2d Marine Division (Maj/LtCol:
    June 93-Mar. 94)
        Director, Infantry Officers' Course, The Basic School (Maj: June
    90-Aug. 92)
                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
    military offiers nominated by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by LtGen John R.
    Allen, USMC, in connection with his nomination follows:]

                              UNITED STATES SENATE
                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                                  Room SR-228
                           Washington, DC 20510-6050
                                 (202) 224-3871
                        COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
          BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

        Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
    more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
    form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
    of your answer applies.
                        Part A--Biographical Information
        Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
    this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
    public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
    any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

        1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
        John R. Allen.

        2. Position to which nominated:
        Commander, International Security Assistance Force.

        3. Date of nomination:
        June 8, 2011.

        4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
        [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
    committee's executive files.]

        5. Date and place of birth:
        15 December 1953, Fort Belvoir, VA.

        6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
        Married to Katherine Glickert Allen.
        Maiden name: Katherine Ann Glickert.

        7. Names and ages of children:
        Betty Batchelder Allen; age 30.
        Barbara Elizabeth ``Bobbie'' Allen; age 26.

        8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary
    or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local
    governments, other than those listed in the service record extract
    provided to the committee by the executive branch.
        None.

        9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
    officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
    or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
    enterprise, educational or other institution.
        None.

        10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
    professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
    other organizations.
        Member, Council on Foreign Relations
        Term Member, Council on Foreign Relations
        Marine Corps Association
        Naval Academy Alumni Association
        Georgetown University Alumni Association
        National War College Alumni Association
        National Naval Officer Association

        11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
    society memberships, or any other special recognitions for outstanding
    service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
    extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
        Honorary Life Member, Montford Point Marine Association
        Pi Sigma Alpha, National Political Science Honor Society
        Marine Corps Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies
        Commandant of the Marine Corps Fellow

        12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
    if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
    constituted committee of the Senate?
        Yes.
        13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
    constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
    those views differ from the administration in power?
        Yes.
                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
    committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
    forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
    Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                    ------

                               Signature and Date
        I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
    on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
    provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
    and complete.
                                                         John R. Allen.
        This 23rd day of May, 2010.

        [The nomination of LtGen John R. Allen, USMC, was reported
    to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 29, 2011, with the
    recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
    was confirmed by the Senate on June 30, 2011.]

    NOMINATIONS OF MADELYN R. CREEDON TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
       FOR GLOBAL STRATEGIC AFFAIRS AND ALAN F. ESTEVEZ TO BE ASSISTANT
           SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL READINESS

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, JULY 19, 2011

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in
    room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Nelson, Hagan,
    Begich, Blumenthal, McCain, Brown, and Ayotte.
        Also present: Senators Lugar and Bingaman.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Joseph M. Bryan,
    professional staff member; Ilona R. Cohen, counsel; Ozge
    Guzelsu, counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff
    member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Jessica L.
    Kingston, research assistant; Peter K. Levine, general counsel;
    Jason W. Maroney, counsel; Thomas K. McConnell, professional
    staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet,
    professional staff member; Russell L. Shaffer, counsel; and
    William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority
    staff director; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member;
    Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F.
    Walsh, minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff and
    Hannah I. Lloyd.
        Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta,
    assistant to Senator Reed; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator
    Nelson; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Joanne
    McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; Ethan Saxon,
    assistant to Senator Blumenthal; Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to
    Senator Chambliss; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown;
    and Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
        The committee meets today to consider the nominations of
    Madelyn Creedon to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global
    Strategic Affairs and Alan Estevez to be the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness.
        We welcome our nominees and their families to today's
    hearing. The long hours and the other sacrifices that our
    nominees are willing to make to serve our country are
    appreciated by us, and they could not happen without the
    support of their families. I hope the nominees will take an
    opportunity when we call on them for their opening statements
    to introduce any family members or friends who are here with
    them.
        Both of our nominees have exceptional records of public
    service. Mr. Estevez has served with distinction in the
    Department of Defense (DOD) for 30 years, beginning with a
    series of positions in the Military Traffic Management Command
    in the 1980s and rising through the ranks over the course of
    five administrations to his current position as Principal
    Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and
    Materiel Readiness.
        Ms. Creedon has served our country for the last 30 years in
    positions that included Assistant Administrator of the National
    Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) for Defense Programs,
    Associate Deputy Secretary of Energy for National Security
    Programs, General Counsel for the Defense Base Closure and
    Realignment Commission, and a trial attorney in the Department
    of Energy.
        Of course, Madelyn has served with distinction as counsel
    for this committee for 18 of those years, from 1990 to 1994,
    from 1997 to 2000, and from 2001 to the present. Over that
    time, we have all benefited from Madelyn's energy, her
    intelligence, and her breadth of knowledge. We know firsthand
    of her extraordinary understanding of the nuclear, strategic,
    and space programs of DOD, programs that few know as well as
    she does.
        Our committee has long benefited from her passionate
    commitment to the success of these programs, and to the
    national security of the United States. We will miss you,
    Madelyn, both personally and professionally.
        Senator McCain.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I congratulate Mr. Estevez and Ms. Creedon on their
    nominations.
        Ms. Creedon, as you mentioned, has served with distinction
    for over 17 years on the staff of the Senate Armed Services
    Committee. Ms. Creedon, I guess you are free at last, as the
    sentiment goes. [Laughter.]
        I look forward to hearing, Ms. Creedon, your views
    regarding the future of nuclear reductions and how deterrence
    of attacks by our adversaries should most effectively be
    maintained, on the recapitalization of the nuclear weapons
    enterprise, and the future development and sustainment of
    missile defense.
        The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) only entered
    into force in February. It will take 7 years to fully
    implement. The administration has signaled its intent to pursue
    further reductions to the size and scope of the nuclear
    stockpile.
        During debate on the treaty in the Senate, the Senate made
    it clear that the recapitalization of our aging nuclear weapons
    infrastructure would be a prerequisite for pursuing further
    reductions, and the administration has proposed an adequate
    investment strategy. But to date, and with spending levels in
    flux across the board, it remains unclear if the strategy will
    be fulfilled.
        Recent comments by the President's national security
    adviser have prompted new questions about the administration's
    intent, including the possibility of unilateral reductions and
    changes in targeting requirements and alert postures.
        With respect to defense cyber strategy, Deputy Secretary of
    Defense, William Lynn, gave a speech last week at the National
    Defense University, which I thought was an important speech,
    but it also failed to answer some fundamental questions about
    how DOD will approach its responsibilities for defending
    national security aspects of cyberspace, including what
    constitutes a hostile act against our cyber capabilities and
    when the United States would respond, as necessary, with
    offensive cyber operations.
        The comments of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, General Cartwright, who questioned the predominantly
    defensive strategy portrayed by Secretary Lynn, highlight the
    need for the administration to clarify the authorities and
    policy that will apply to military operations in cyberspace.
        Last month, Secretary Panetta said that, ``The next Pearl
    Harbor we confront could very well be a cyber attack.'' Yet, so
    far, U.S. strategy appears to have major shortcomings that
    could impair our ability to carry out military operations
    during a cyber attack.
        Mr. Chairman, I would freely admit that Congress has not
    gotten its act together on this issue either.
        General Cartwright stated his view, ``There is no penalty
    for attacking the United States right now.'' This statement,
    from one of our most senior military leaders, underlines the
    uncertainty that now exists.
        I have often stated my view that Congress needs to act
    promptly to develop and pass comprehensive legislation to
    address cyber threats not only to defense networks and systems,
    but also to maintain the Nation's critical infrastructure,
    encompassing the electric grid, air traffic control system,
    water supplies, financial networks, and much more from a cyber
    attack.
        The Department's cyber strategy identified this area as one
    of its five pillars, but we have yet to answer the vast
    majority of key policy and legal questions that exist.
        I still believe that the best course of action for the
    Senate to take is to establish a select committee on
    cybersecurity and electronic intelligence leak that would
    develop comprehensive cybersecurity legislation, building on
    much of the good work that has been done already, but
    considering new ideas and approaches as necessary.
        With various agencies, Senate committees, and the White
    House moving forward with cybersecurity proposals, there is a
    need for clarity and unity of effort. A temporary select
    committee could provide much-needed order and urgency of
    purpose to the process.
        Ms. Creedon, I look forward to hearing your assessment, as
    well as the role you foresee you will play in addressing and
    answering these questions on policy and legal authorities.
        Mr. Estevez, the Department and combatant commands are now
    carrying out the tasks of removing, relocating, and
    transferring equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan. Major
    challenges remain in establishing new supply lines if our
    ability to move equipment through Pakistan into Afghanistan is
    jeopardized.
        Additionally, we will need your expertise and background as
    the Department is faced with operations and sustainment costs
    of the F-35 that may exceed $1 trillion over the life of the
    aircraft.
        We will also need to ensure that the current tendency to
    slash future defense budgets will not detrimentally affect
    readiness, to include the capabilities of our forces, depots,
    and other industrial bases to the point which we may be faced
    with a hollow force reminiscent of the 1970s.
        I look forward to your testimony on these issues, as well
    as the continued transformation of the Department's joint
    logistics processes to better support the warfighter.
        I thank both the nominees again for their willingness to
    serve in these positions.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
        Now we are going to ask Senator Lugar to make an
    introduction of Ms. Creedon.
        We welcome you. Senator Lugar, you are truly one of our
    experts on national security. You work with this committee on
    so many issues important to our national security throughout
    the years, nuclear proliferation just being one of those
    issues. We give you a very warm welcome to our committee this
    morning, and you can proceed with your introduction.
        Senator Lugar.

    STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
                               OF INDIANA

        Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your
    warm introduction--Ranking Member Senator McCain, Senator
    Nelson.
        It is truly an honor once again to introduce Madelyn
    Creedon, nominated to serve as the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Global Strategic Affairs in the Pentagon.
        Because of the testimony already of the distinguished
    chairman and ranking member, I know that she really needs no
    introduction, but I will proceed anyway because I am proud that
    the State of Indiana and the city of Indianapolis have produced
    an experienced and very capable threat reduction and deterrence
    expert, a longtime member of the staff of this committee.
        I support her nomination, and I am proud to recommend
    Madelyn Creedon, this distinguished Hoosier, to the committee
    today.
        This is not the first time I have had this privilege,
    providing support for Madelyn. If confirmed, it will not be
    Madelyn's first time to serve in the executive branch in a
    Senate-confirmed position. In April 2000, I was pleased to
    express my support for her to this committee as the President's
    nominee to be the Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear
    Security Administration for Defense Programs.
        Before and after Madelyn's work at the NNSA, she worked on
    the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and her work
    on both the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and the
    Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of this
    committee are well known to all members. She has worked
    extensively on efforts to strengthen and improve threat
    reduction programs in the former Soviet Union, including the
    Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program.
        Indeed, I first encountered Madelyn when she was working
    for my colleague, Senator Sam Nunn, the former distinguished
    chairman of this committee.
        If confirmed, she will play a vital role in the globalizing
    of the Nunn-Lugar program to new countries in her capacity as
    the Assistant Secretary for Global Strategic Affairs. If
    confirmed, I look forward to hearing from her on a regular
    basis on the progress of these new efforts.
        Mr. Chairman, let me mention my interest in the growing
    importance of DOD programs over which she will preside and,
    thus, the growing importance of these positions. Over 2 years
    ago, the National Academy of Sciences issued a report urging
    DOD to enlarge the Nunn-Lugar CTR program beyond the states of
    the former Soviet Union to address newly emerging threats posed
    by materials and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
        The report identified the need for the CTR program to be
    made more flexible, more agile, more prepared to move more
    quickly if it were to be successful in its application outside
    the states of the former Soviet Union.
        Yet, despite the Academy's recommendation, despite the
    enactment of new legislation to provide the program with
    authorities to operate outside the former Soviet Union, and
    despite new presidential policy directives, including the
    global nuclear lockdown strategy and the release of PPD-2 on
    the threats posed by dangerous biological pathogens, the
    current pace of the work to meet these goals suggests that the
    President's objectives are unlikely to be met. These are part
    of the challenges facing our nominee, should she be confirmed.
        I appreciate the need to ensure that CTR forms of
    assistance are used appropriately to reduce WMD threats, that
    our partners can absorb and sustain the assistance, and that
    the actions of the U.S. Government are coordinated and
    effective. But I am concerned that in this round of
    administration, coordination, and planning meetings,
    certifications and determinations have resulted in paralysis,
    not progress, to the point where critical threat reduction and
    national security opportunities may be forfeited.
        The path to globalizing the CTR program beyond the original
    states of the former Soviet Union is open. The program is well-
    positioned to enter a new phase of global security engagement.
    It has the authority and the direction. What has been missing
    is the political and bureaucratic will to move forward with
    implementation.
        Indeed, I would suspect that one of the major challenges
    facing our nominee will be to work in close cooperation with
    the implementation of Nunn-Lugar Global Security Engagement to
    make each program as effective as possible.
        Lastly, Mr. Chairman, many committee members will recall
    the slogan associated with the North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization (NATO) expansion, namely, ``out of area or out of
    business''. The same may be said with regard to the CTR
    program, as efforts are undertaken to expand the original
    program to meet the threats of WMD, no matter their type or
    origin or geographical location.
        Two factors have led DOD to identify the importance of
    taking the CTR program to Africa, namely, the growing concern
    over bioterrorism and the natural prevalence of lethal
    pathogens in African nations.
        Indeed, terrorist activities on the African continent are a
    growing concern. U.S. Africa Command, the U.S. military command
    responsible for engagement in Africa, described the threat in
    its 2010 posture statement this way, ``In the last year, al
    Qaeda and terrorist groups in Africa appear to have
    strengthened their collaboration. Al Qaeda operatives are
    active in East Africa. The leaders of Somalia-based al Shabaab
    have publicly aligned themselves with al Qaeda. Al Shabaab
    continues to operate multiple terrorist training camps in
    Somalia with al Qaeda participation.''
        The CTR Global Security Engagement Program in Africa that
    our nominee will inherit is designed to help secure vulnerable
    facilities, promote cooperative research and transparency in
    handling dangerous pathogens, and help build an early-warning
    system capable of quickly detecting, diagnosing, and reporting
    infections to help determine if they are natural or man-made
    and to stop their spread.
        Last November, I invited several members of Madelyn's
    staff-to-be in the Pentagon to join me on a visit to East
    Africa, particularly the states of Uganda and Kenya, to look
    into the interface between biosecurity and public health issues
    and the means by which the Nunn-Lugar Global Security
    Engagement program might help to contain this threat. With
    their proximity to the Middle East and large swaths of weakly
    governed lands, like Somalia, biological virus and bacteria
    research facilities could be attractive targets for terrorist
    groups or black market traders.
        Moreover, public health boosts are important benefits to
    future security work of CTR Global. With the humanitarian
    interest in helping to prevent disease, such cooperative
    efforts to quickly detect, diagnose, and report dangerous
    infections are critical to stopping global pandemics.
        Our nominee will be required to practice all of her
    diplomatic skills in mentoring these programs in Africa. The
    CTR program is building on relationships established by the
    Centers for Disease Control and the U.S. Army medical research
    units to work with these laboratories as additional security
    and shared scientific research are performed.
        The intersection of public health issues with bioterrorism
    concerns will test the merits of the nominee. The selection of
    Madelyn to lead policy efforts in global strategic affairs is
    certainly a good one.
        Despite the broad nature of the public areas she will
    oversee, including countering WMD, nuclear forces, missile
    defense, cybersecurity, and space issues, she will be asked to
    ensure that the bedrocks of the CTR and Global Security
    Engagement components of our future counterproliferation
    efforts are not left to bureaucratic drudgery and interagency
    inertia. I know she understands that effective program
    execution relies on the collaboration of both the policy and
    implementation functions of DOD.
        For all these reasons, Mr. Chairman, I strongly support her
    nomination. I am honored to be before the committee this
    morning.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Lugar follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Senator Richard G. Lugar

        Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, members of the Armed
    Services Committee, it is an honor for me to introduce Madelyn Creedon,
    nominated to serve as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global
    Strategic Affairs in the Pentagon. However, I know she really needs no
    introduction to members of this committee.
        I am proud that the State of Indiana and the city of Indianapolis
    have produced an experienced and capable threat reduction and
    deterrence expert, and a longtime member of the staff of this
    committee, Madelyn Creedon. I support her nomination, and I am proud to
    recommend this distinguished Hoosier to the committee today.
        This is not the first time I have had the privilege of providing my
    support for Madelyn, and if confirmed, it will not be Madelyn's first
    time to serve in the executive branch in a Senate-confirmed position.
    In April 2000, I was pleased to express my support for her to this
    committee as the President's nominee to be Deputy Administrator of the
    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) for Defense Programs.
        Before and after Madelyn's work at the NNSA, she has worked on the
    staff of the Armed Services Committee. Her work on both the
    Subcommittees on Strategic Forces and Emerging Threats of this
    committee is well known to all members. She has worked extensively on
    efforts to strengthen and improve threat reduction programs in the
    Former Soviet Union, including the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
    Reduction (CTR) Program. Indeed, I first encountered Madelyn when she
    was working for my colleague Sam Nunn, the former distinguished
    chairman of this committee. If confirmed she will play a vital role in
    the globalizing of the Nunn-Lugar Program to new countries in her
    capacity as the Assistant Secretary for Global Strategic Affairs. If
    confirmed, I look forward to hearing from her on a regular basis on the
    progress of these new efforts.
        Mr. Chairman, let me mention my interest in the growing importance
    of the Department of Defense (DOD) programs over which she will preside
    and thus the growing importance of this position.
        Over 2 years ago, the National Academy of Sciences issued a report
    urging DOD to enlarge the Nunn-Lugar Threat Reduction Program beyond
    the states of the former Soviet Union to address newly emerging threats
    posed by weapons and materials of mass destruction. The report
    identified the need for the CTR Program to be made more flexible, more
    agile, and prepared to move more quickly if it were to be successful in
    its application outside the states of the former Soviet Union.
        Yet despite the Academy's recommendations, despite the enactment of
    new legislation to provide the program with authorities to operate
    outside the former Soviet Union, and despite new Presidential policy
    directives including the Global Nuclear Lockdown strategy and the
    release of PPD-2 on the threats posed dangerous biological pathogens,
    the current pace of the work to meet these goals suggests that the
    President's objectives are unlikely to be met. These are part of the
    challenges facing our nominee should she be confirmed.
        I appreciate the need to ensure that CTR forms of assistance are
    used appropriately to reduce WMD threats, that our partners can absorb
    and sustain the assistance, and that the actions of the U.S. Government
    are coordinated and effective. But I am concerned that endless rounds
    of administration coordination and planning meetings, of certifications
    and determinations, have resulted in paralysis, not progress, to the
    point where critical threat reduction and national security
    opportunities may be forfeited.
        The path to globalizing the CTR program beyond the original states
    of the former Soviet Union is open. The program is well positioned to
    enter a new phase of global security engagement; it has the authority
    and direction. What has been missing is the political and bureaucratic
    will to move forward with implementation. Indeed, I would suspect that
    one of the major challenges facing our nominee will be to work in close
    cooperation with the implementers of Nunn-Lugar Global Security
    Engagement to make each program as effective as possible.
        Lastly, Mr. Chairman, many committee members will recall the slogan
    associated with NATO expansion: namely, out of area or out of business!
    The same may be said with regard to the CTR program, as efforts are
    undertaken to expand the original program to meet the threats of
    weapons of mass destruction no matter their type or origin or
    geographical location. Two factors have led DOD to identify the
    importance of taking the CTR program to Africa: namely, the growing
    concern over bioterrorism and the natural prevalence of lethal
    pathogens in African nations.
        Indeed, terrorist activity on the African continent is a growing
    concern. Africa Command, the U.S. military command responsible for
    engagement in Africa, described the threat in its 2010 Posture
    Statement this way: ``In the last year, al Qaeda and terrorist groups
    in Africa appear to have strengthened their collaboration. Al Qaeda
    operatives are active in East Africa. The leaders of Somalia-based al
    Shabaab have publicly aligned themselves with al Qaeda . . . al Shabaab
    continues to operate multiple terrorist training camps in Somalia with
    al Qaeda participation.''
        The CTR Global Security Engagement program in Africa that our
    nominee will inherit is designed to help secure vulnerable facilities,
    promote cooperative research and transparency in handling dangerous
    pathogens, and help build an ``early warning system'' capable of
    quickly detecting, diagnosing, and reporting infections to help
    determine if they are natural or manmade and stop their spread.
        Last November, I invited several members of Madelyn's staff-to-be
    in the Pentagon to join me in a visit to East Africa, particularly the
    states of Uganda and Kenya, to look into the interface between
    biosecurity and public health issues and the means by which the Nunn-
    Lugar Global Security Engagement program might help to contain this
    threat.
        With their proximity to the Middle East and large swaths of weakly
    governed lands like Somalia, biological virus and bacteria research
    facilities could be attractive targets for terrorist groups or black-
    market traders. Moreover, public health boosts are important benefits
    to future security work of CTR Global. Along with humanitarian interest
    in helping to prevent disease, such cooperative efforts to quickly
    detect, diagnose, and report dangerous infections are critical to
    stopping global pandemics.
        Our nominee will be required to practice all of her diplomatic
    skills in mentoring these programs in Africa. The CTR program is
    building on relationships established by the Center for Disease Control
    and U.S. Army Medical Research Units to work with these laboratories as
    additional security and shared scientific research is performed. The
    intersection of public health issues with bioterrorism concerns will
    test the mettle of our nominee.
        The selection of Madelyn to lead policy efforts in Global Strategic
    Affairs is a good one. Despite the broad nature of the policy areas she
    will oversee--including countering weapons of mass destruction, nuclear
    forces, missile defense, cybersecurity and space issues--she will be
    asked to ensure that the bedrocks of the CTR and Global Security
    Engagement components of our future counter-proliferation efforts are
    not left to bureaucratic drudgery and interagency inertia. I know she
    understands that effective program execution relies on the
    collaboration of both the policy and implementation functions of DOD.
        For all of these reasons, Mr. Chairman, I strongly support her
    nomination. Thank you.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much for that introduction. It
    is very important to us and very important to Madelyn Creedon
    as well.
        We also know you have an important scheduling commitment to
    keep. You are free to leave, of course, as you wish.
        Thank you so much, Senator Lugar.
        We are delighted Senator Bingaman has joined us this
    morning. Formerly a member of this committee, he is the
    chairman of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee.
        We are counting on him to give us some more progress in the
    area of energy independence this year. But for this morning's
    purpose, he really is well-acquainted with Madelyn Creedon. We
    would call upon you, Senator Bingaman.

    STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF BINGAMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
                               NEW MEXICO

        Senator Bingaman. Yes, Mr. Chairman, thank you for letting
    me take just a couple of minutes to heartily endorse the
    nomination of Madelyn Creedon for this important position as
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs.
        I know this committee knows her work extremely well. She
    has been a stalwart of the professional staff on this
    committee, essentially during all the time that I served here
    and for many, many years.
        Some of that work was interrupted when she was Deputy
    Administrator for Defense Programs at NNSA, when it was first
    formed. She was also Associate Deputy Secretary of Energy for
    National Security Programs and General Counsel to the Base
    Closure and Realignment Commission.
        She has had broad experience in the executive branch as
    well as here in Congress, knows these issues extremely well, as
    all of us have come to realize.
        Most of my interaction with Madelyn has been in connection
    with the nuclear deterrent issues that come into play at our
    two national laboratories in New Mexico, Los Alamos and Sandia.
    But I know she is extremely well-informed as to the importance
    of maintaining the nuclear deterrent, also extremely well-
    informed on the international situation.
        I have had the good fortune to travel with her to Russia. I
    know she has traveled there and many other parts of the world
    extensively in the time she has worked here on the committee
    staff.
        I heartily recommend her, and I think the President should
    be complimented for an excellent choice.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Bingaman, for
    your very important and useful introduction of Madelyn Creedon.
        Now we will call upon our nominees for their opening
    statements. We will first call on Ms. Creedon.

      STATEMENT OF MADELYN R. CREEDON, NOMINATED TO BE ASSISTANT
           SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL STRATEGIC AFFAIRS

        Ms. Creedon. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, all the
    members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, it is a
    pleasure to be here this morning.
        I would also add that, as a long-time member of the
    committee staff, it is a little strange to sit on this side of
    the dais.
        Thank you, Senator Lugar, Senator Bingaman, for your kind
    and supportive words. Senator Lugar's leadership, along with
    that of former Senator Sam Nunn, at a time of great
    uncertainty, resulted in the establishment of the CTR program,
    which continues to be the keystone of the global proliferation
    prevention programs.
        Senator Bingaman has been a leader in emphasizing the
    importance of research and development and has supported all
    things nuclear. It has been a particular honor for me to have
    been able to support their goals.
        I am grateful for and humbled by President Obama's decision
    to nominate me to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Global Strategic Affairs. I would like to thank Secretary
    Gates, Secretary Panetta, Deputy Secretary Lynn, Under
    Secretary Flournoy, and Deputy Under Secretary Jim Miller for
    their support.
        If confirmed, I will be honored to serve as the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs.
        I would also like to thank my family for both supporting me
    and putting up with me over the last 30 years of my government
    service. I am proud to have with me this morning my husband and
    partner in all things, Jim Bracco, and our daughter and son-in-
    law, Meredith and Mike Walsh. Our son, John Bracco, lives in
    Atlanta and could not be here this morning.
        I would also like to acknowledge my parents, Marilyn and
    Dick Creedon, who live in Indianapolis, and who were also not
    able to be here this morning. Their devotion to charitable and
    public service, including my father's over 30 years as an Army
    Reserve officer, has always inspired me to do more.
        The position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global
    Strategic Affairs covers a range of complex and often
    controversial issues, including nuclear deterrence, missile
    defense, countering WMD, space, and cyberspace.
        If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the new policies
    and strategies that have been developed in these areas are
    implemented thoughtfully, expeditiously, and in a cost-
    effective manner. Most importantly, I would work to ensure that
    all the policies in these areas continue to support U.S.
    leadership and advantage.
        One of the most difficult of the policy areas in which I
    will work, if confirmed, is the area of cyberspace. Cyberspace
    presents new and unique challenges, as cyber capabilities are
    an integral part of almost everything we do personally,
    professionally, and as a country.
        Cyberspace provides both an advantage and a vulnerability.
    As the first man-made domain, it has no natural, geographic, or
    other boundaries, and few historic precedents. There are lots
    of questions, however, that, if confirmed, I would hope to
    begin to address.
        In closing, I have to thank all of the members of this
    committee on both sides of the aisle. If confirmed, I will have
    to leave the staff of this committee. While I look forward to
    the new challenge, it will be very difficult to leave.
        I hope that I will be able to continue to work with all the
    members and all of the great personal and committee staff in
    the same bipartisan way that this committee has always worked.
        Finally, Senator Levin, your leadership, endless hard work,
    and dedication to the men and women in Military Service are
    unequaled. It has been a pleasure, an honor, a privilege, and
    great fun to work for you.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Well, thank you for that great
    introduction. [Laughter.]
        We will miss you for many, many reasons, as I said.
        Mr. Estevez, you are next.

        STATEMENT OF ALAN F. ESTEVEZ, NOMINATED TO BE ASSISTANT
       SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL READINESS

        Mr. Estevez. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished
    members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to
    appear before you today.
        I am grateful for the confidence that President Obama has
    shown in me by nominating me to be the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness.
        I also want to thank Secretary Gates, Secretary Panetta,
    and Under Secretary Carter for supporting my nomination.
        I want to thank my family for their support, and I am happy
    to say that my wife, Susan Pearson, is here with me today. I
    want to thank her for her support, counsel, and understanding
    she has provided me over the last 8 years.
        I would also like to note that my father, who was a career
    Army officer and subsequently a teacher, and my mother spent
    many years in civil service. While they are both now deceased,
    they instilled in me the values that have led me to this point
    in my career, and I know that they would be proud.
        Having served for over 30 years in the government, the last
    several in the position of the Principal Deputy Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, and
    having made numerous trips to visit our men and women who are
    deployed in harm's way, I know firsthand how important it is to
    provide critical logistics support to our forces deployed in
    Iraq and Afghanistan.
        I had the opportunity to visit our forces in Afghanistan
    last month and saw how our ability to deliver and sustain key
    items--ranging from mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) all-
    terrain vehicles to aerostats--have improved our force
    protection and our warfighting capabilities.
        I appreciate that the President and Congress are working to
    ensure that the Department's equipment is being properly
    sustained, maintained, and reset to overcome the wear and tear
    and damage that are a result of our ongoing combat operations.
    I am hopeful that my words here today will show my continued
    dedication toward implementing a comprehensive end-to-end
    logistics strategy that provides effective support to our
    warfighters and provides value to the American taxpayers who
    pay for that support.
        In closing, I am deeply humbled and honored by this
    nomination. If confirmed, I will do my best to continue to
    provide quality support to the men and women of our Armed
    Forces while keeping a focus on affordability.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Estevez.
        Let me now ask you both the standard questions that we ask
    of all of our nominees.
        Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
    governing conflicts of interest?
        Ms. Creedon. I have.
        Mr. Estevez. I have.
        Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
    any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
    confirmation process?
        Ms. Creedon. No.
        Mr. Estevez. No.
        Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
    deadlines established for requested communications, including
    questions for the record in hearings?
        Ms. Creedon. I will, yes.
        Mr. Estevez. I will.
        Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
    and briefers in response to congressional requests?
        Ms. Creedon. Yes.
        Mr. Estevez. I will.
        Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
    reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
        Ms. Creedon. Yes.
        Mr. Estevez. Yes.
        Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
    testify upon request before this committee?
        Ms. Creedon. Yes.
        Mr. Estevez. Yes.
        Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
    including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
    timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
    to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good-
    faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
        Ms. Creedon. Yes.
        Mr. Estevez. Yes.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Why don't we try a 7-minute first round for questions, and
    if we need it, we will have, I am quite sure, an opportunity
    for a second round.
        Let me start with you, Ms. Creedon, on the issue of
    proliferation of WMD. Do you see any opportunities for reducing
    the dangers of that proliferation?
        Ms. Creedon. I do, sir. There has been an awful lot of work
    done under the CTR programs, both at DOD and the Department of
    Energy, and a lot of progress has been made.
        There has been a tremendous amount of progress in securing
    materials at their source. There has been a lot of progress
    made in what is referred to as the second line of defense, and
    that is developing mechanisms and capabilities to detect
    materials if they should be stolen or if they should be removed
    from where they are supposed to be and if they are trying to be
    transported across borders. There is a lot of work going on to
    enable other countries to facilitate and recognize when there
    are materials in transit.
        There is a lot of work that has been done, but there is a
    lot of work that is left to be done. A good part of that is
    dealing with not only the rogue elements who want to steal
    either weapons or materials, but also the broader issue of
    proliferation by state actors.
        There is a lot to be done. But I do think there is hope. I
    think the initiative to secure vulnerable, usable nuclear
    materials--materials that could be used in a nuclear weapon--in
    4 years is a good goal. Whether we meet it or not really
    depends on the cooperation of the international community, but
    it is a good goal.
        So I do think there is hope.
        Chairman Levin. On the cyberspace issue, Senator McCain
    made strong reference to the need for progress in this area.
    You, in your opening comments, likewise made reference to it.
        General Cartwright, in an interview last week, advocated a
    change in strategy from an emphasis on defense to an emphasis
    on offense, some form of retaliation to deter attacks. I am
    wondering whether you are in a position yet that you have an
    opinion on this issue as to whether we need to change the
    emphasis from defense to at least being able to threaten
    retaliation, to be in a position to retaliate in order to deter
    these growing number of attacks?
        Ms. Creedon. I have heard General Cartwright talk on this
    topic before, and I know that one of the issues is that right
    now our capabilities really are limited to defense. One of the
    areas where over time--and I don't know how to define ``over
    time,'' but probably some years possibly--that we need to shift
    from a mostly defensive position.
        General Cartwright has indicated that in his view it is
    about 90-10 right now, that we need to shift from a mostly
    defensive position to something where you also have at least
    50-50 on the part of the U.S. Government and probably on the
    part of DOD something that looks like 90 percent offense and 10
    percent defense.
        But it is one of those longer-term goals, as we understand
    more about this problem and how to deal with more active
    defenses, how to deal with more offensive capabilities.
        Chairman Levin. Mr. Estevez, let me ask you a couple of
    questions about Afghanistan. What kind of additional steps can
    we take to reduce our logistical footprint, either through
    improvements in energy efficiency or the increased use of
    renewable sources of power such as solar and wind?
        The dangers to our troops, the losses of lives which are
    involved in protecting these shipments of energy into
    Afghanistan, the huge cost of that energy in lives and in
    treasure, I think, require us to look for ways to reduce the
    logistical footprint for energy. Apparently, 80 percent of our
    ground convoys are dedicated to carrying just fuel and water.
    What would be your thoughts on that?
        Mr. Estevez. There are a couple of things we can do, and we
    are teaming up with Sharon Burke, who is the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Programs,
    on those things. When we look at things like our contract for
    sustainment of our bases, the Logistics Civil Augmentation
    Program, and what we need to do is require fuel-efficient
    generators, we need to ensure that we are putting up fuel-
    efficient housing, the containerized housing that we put up,
    that would reduce our energy footprint.
        We are doing some tests on things like solar power out on
    the battlefield, which in certain areas of Afghanistan could
    work. Obviously, a number of gallons of our fuel go to our
    mobility assets. Those are longer-term issues to deal with. But
    in the near term, working on our base infrastructure, our
    deployed base infrastructure can reduce our energy consumption
    on the battlefield, reducing our convoys to sustain that.
        Chairman Levin. It is an area that we need to pay much
    greater attention to. I know there has been attention paid to
    it, and it is not a new issue. But it is a huge issue.
        We hope that when you are confirmed, that this will be one
    of the first items on your agenda to look at. There is
    potential for huge progress here, and the costs have been
    incredible.
        Now, Mr. Estevez, if the Government of Iraq were to ask for
    the continued presence of U.S. forces beyond the end of this
    year, assuming they made that request and if we agreed to such
    an extension, either as requested or modified, what would be
    some of the more important logistical complications associated
    with interrupting our withdrawal and adjusting to some kind of
    a limited extension?
        Mr. Estevez. U.S. forces in Iraq right now have multiple
    plans based on those scenarios. Obviously, as we close bases
    and we remove our presence in those bases, going back to those
    bases would be difficult. We do have certain tripwires on
    those, and we do have alternatives to those plans.
        As we are moving equipment out, having to return that
    equipment back to Iraq would also be a logistics ripple.
    General Austin is holding forces back in Iraq right now. Again,
    it will be in the fall where those tripwires start to hit,
    which would increase our difficulty.
        We also have contracts that are drawing down for
    sustainment of food and fuel, base support in Iraq. We can turn
    the volume on those contracts back up. They are drawing down
    now.
        Most of those contracts will remain in place to sustain the
    Department of State presence in Iraq, as well as our foreign
    military sales and advisory presence. So it will be just
    extending those contracts and increasing the numbers that they
    support.
        Chairman Levin. You say General Austin was holding back
    forces?
        Mr. Estevez. Our drawdown plan starts in the fall, so late
    August, early fall. He has that ramp-down plan based on our
    current scenario.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Again, congratulations to the nominees.
        Mr. Estevez, in your answer to the advance policy
    questions, you stated you have, ``also worked extensively with
    the commercial sector to understand best logistic practices
    across a wide range of industrial and commercial activities.''
    What have you learned that DOD isn't doing?
        Mr. Estevez. When you look at some of the best commercial
    places--use a Wal-Mart----
        Senator McCain. Best Buy, Home Depot, all of the major
    retailers.
        Mr. Estevez. Yes. Right. Of course, they are in the retail
    business. So it is not exactly a match for us, but the way
    they----
        Senator McCain. But it is a match from getting much-needed
    whatever it is from one place to another in the most efficient
    fashion.
        Mr. Estevez. That's correct, Senator.
        Senator McCain. Go ahead, please.
        Mr. Estevez. Seeing how they collaborate with their supply
    base to understand what the demand and the forecast would be,
    they do that much better than we do. We are trying to copy
    their ways of doing that.
        They use third-party logistics more extensively than we do.
    They select where and how to do that. We have also implemented
    some of those practices.
        Senator McCain. For example, what practices? It is my
    understanding that these major entities that we discuss, they
    somehow are able to identify a need, and within a matter of
    hours, that particular need or requirement is fulfilled. The
    efficiencies is what makes them far more cost-effective as
    compared with smaller commercial enterprises is what I am
    trying to get at.
        What do we do in the Defense Department to emulate that?
        Mr. Estevez. They have the ability to shape demand that we
    can't. They have sales, and they can offer things. But we do
    have----
        Senator McCain. Maybe we need some sales. [Laughter.]
        Mr. Estevez. But we do need a better predictive capability.
    We need to work closer with our industrial base on them
    understanding what we are consuming so that they can provide
    that in advance. We are doing some of that. We need to do
    better, Senator.
        Senator McCain. I hope so. Because one of the recurrent,
    not complaints, but voiced requirements, that I hear in places
    like Kabul, Baghdad, Kandahar, and other places is that there
    is a significant delay. If they have to consume a certain
    amount of whatever they have, whether it be ammunition or food
    or whatever, unforeseen consumption of what they have on hand,
    that there is still, in their view, too long a delay.
        I am sure they would like to have it instantaneously, but I
    think that we might look again at what commercial enterprises
    do to react as quickly as they do.
        Ms. Creedon, as I mentioned earlier, General Cartwright
    said that DOD is spending 90 percent of its time playing
    defense against cyber attacks and 10 percent playing offense
    and that, in his view, the Department should invert this ratio
    to demonstrate there will be consequences to a cyber attack
    against the United States.
        To start with, do you agree with General Cartwright?
        Ms. Creedon. I do, sir, and he said over time that is where
    the Department has to be.
        Senator McCain. Give me an example of what the consequences
    would be, for example, of a cyber attack that shut down our
    defense logistics system in some way.
        Ms. Creedon. One of the things that he put in this context
    was that the constant building higher defenses, it becomes more
    and more expensive. The attacks are inexpensive, and the
    defenses are more expensive.
        So one of his constructs, and although he conceded that it
    was in a very hypothetical construct, is that someday we have
    to figure out that right now the attack just causes us to spend
    more money on defenses. What he is trying to say is that at
    some point, we have to make it clear that that attack, in fact,
    there is more to that attacker to pay than there is to us to
    pay for the higher defense.
        Senator McCain. I fully understand that. Now, what is the
    consequence?
        Ms. Creedon. How to get there is hard. Part of this is,
    like any other thing, you have to look at, what is the attack?
    What was the result of the attack? Then----
        Senator McCain. Well, I just gave you an example. What
    would be the consequence?
        Ms. Creedon.--and act appropriately on something like that.
    So, it doesn't----
        Senator McCain. What would be an appropriate action?
        Ms. Creedon. It wouldn't necessarily have to be a cyber
    attack. You also have the problem of figuring out who did it.
        Senator McCain. Will you give me an answer as to what the
    consequences would be?
        Ms. Creedon. For instance, on something like that, if we
    knew who did it, it could be something that would deal with
    their ability to attack us further. So it could be a response
    in cyber. Maybe it is taking out some of their computer
    systems.
        It depends on where they are. It depends on who is behind
    it. It could be a land-based attack. But again, it would have
    to be modulated based on the time, the duration, and the
    impact.
        Senator McCain. Thank you.
        Would you agree, now that you are free from your tenure
    here, that Congress, as much as we would like to hear from DOD
    and we like to hear proposals, as I just talked to you about,
    Congress really doesn't have its act together on this issue,
    for a variety of reasons, including the proliferation of
    committees of jurisdiction.
        Would you agree with that assertion that we really haven't
    been able to address it effectively, not because of lack of
    dedication of members, but simply the way the Senate functions?
        Ms. Creedon. I don't think anybody is unique in this. It is
    very new. It is very difficult, and it is very uncertain. Over
    time, again, I think there is going to have to be a lot of
    rethinking on how everybody addresses these issues.
        Far be it from me, after a lot of years up here, to try and
    either explain or understand or suggest how Congress should
    act, because in the end, it does always seem to get to the
    right conclusion.
        Senator McCain. It does?
        Ms. Creedon. I think, by and large, it does. But it is just
    sometimes really hard to get there.
        Senator McCain. But you would agree that because of cross-
    jurisdictional situation, that it makes it a little more
    difficult?
        Ms. Creedon. It does.
        Senator McCain. There is inherent sometimes competition
    between the committees for jurisdiction, which really should be
    resolved in one way or the other.
        Ms. Creedon. This is true.
        Senator McCain. I congratulate both of you on your
    nominations, and we look forward to confirming you as rapidly
    as possible.
        Thank you. I thank the witnesses.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me add my congratulations to our two nominees as well,
    and a very special thank you to Ms. Creedon for her support for
    the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, which I have been honored to
    chair.
        The responsibilities that you have helped me with include
    nuclear and strategic forces, ballistic missile defense,
    intelligence programs, space programs, information warfare
    programs, and Department of Energy defense-related nuclear and
    environmental programs, as you have led professional staff on
    these issues. It really is no surprise that your immense
    experience, knowledge, and expertise in these areas have
    resulted in your nomination to this extremely important
    position.
        If confirmed, you will be advising the Secretary of Defense
    on policy and strategy in these areas, and you have already
    mentioned cyberspace and countering WMD. It doesn't seem like
    much of a stretch for me that you would go from the Senate to
    DOD to work on this.
        From your work on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, I have
    no doubt that, if confirmed, you will work to develop and grow
    the relationships and knowledge necessary to provide policy
    guidance on these multitude of issues. It is no exaggeration
    that, if confirmed, we are going to miss you as well on the
    Strategic Forces Subcommittee.
        But I hope that, as I support your nomination, in spite of
    the fact of losing you in that position, we will be able to
    look forward to continuing our relationship once you take over
    these responsibilities.
        Both Senator John McCain and Senator Carl Levin have
    mentioned cyber. Given the fact that we have learned about the
    cyber leak most recently, obviously it is one of the most
    important things, and it is in the forefront of our minds about
    how do we begin to deal with this.
        It is perhaps a little bit unfair to ask you what your
    plans are to deal with this at this point in time, but if
    confirmed, do you have any initial thoughts about how we get to
    the bottom of what causes the leaks and what to do to prevent
    the leaks?
        Whether it is offense or defense, the first thing that we
    need to focus on is how do we get control over our cyber
    opportunities so that they don't become opportunities for our
    adversaries?
        Ms. Creedon. Thank you, Senator Nelson, and thank you for
    your kind words as well.
        The issue of cyberspace is incredibly complicated,
    obviously. From where I sit right now, I really have been on
    the receiving end of various briefings on what exactly these
    instances lately have been. RSA, the little secure token
    company, that is one of the most recent ones.
        But in looking at how to address these in the future, it is
    very clear that this is going to take lots of entities,
    including the private sector. The Defense Industrial Base Pilot
    is a good example of a good place to start, frankly, on how
    both government and industry have to work together to figure
    out how to both stop and counter these attacks.
        DOD is heavily reliant on commercial systems for much of
    what they do. It is absolutely essential that not only
    government resources be brought to bear, but also the
    commercial things.
        If I am confirmed, one of the things that I want to really
    dig down into and understand is what are the relationships that
    exist right now in the commercial sector? What are the
    commercial capabilities? What are the defensive capabilities
    that exist in the government? Where are the possibilities to
    bring these two things together?
        So that you don't have seams between the government
    approach and the industry approach, and really try to
    understand how this becomes an integrated function because, as
    we have discussed, this is not a geographically-constrained
    domain.
        A lot of times you can't even tell who the attacker is or
    where the attacker is coming from. Sometimes you can, and then
    it also is very hard to sort out even when it is state
    sponsored. Is it a terrorist? Is it a criminal? What is the
    motivation? What drove this?
        It is a complicated subject. I look forward to getting into
    it.
        Senator Nelson. It is very clear that our enthusiasm for
    cyber and for the benefits that we receive from being able to
    transmit information in the manner that we have been able to do
    it so effectively and efficiently has gotten us a little ahead
    of ourselves in terms of being able to protect that very
    important process at the same time as we have expanded it.
        We didn't build the firewalls that we would ordinarily
    build in the transfer and transmittal of information. Whether
    it is WikiLeaks or whatever it is, we have to tighten our
    capabilities of our controlling the very vital information that
    we have, military and national security data, so that this sort
    of attack can't occur. If we can firewall our information, then
    we are going to be less concerned about whether we take
    offensive means or otherwise because there won't be any need if
    we can get ahead of our adversaries.
        I hope that as you assume this position, if confirmed, that
    you will find ways to make certain that all the users are as
    enthusiastic about building the protection as they are about
    using the procedures that are there so easily available to pass
    information on from one group to another or to retain it for
    future use.
        If we don't do that, then I am in favor of going back to
    vaults and paper and the old way of doing things because that
    is one thing that you potentially, at least visually, can see
    you have some control over. The problem is we don't have the
    visual control over cyber.
        I wish you well in the new position. I hope that the Senate
    will act rather promptly to confirm both of you in your new
    positions.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Ayotte.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to congratulate both of you on your nominations, and
    very much appreciate your service, both to this committee and
    also in DOD.
        I want to ask Mr. Estevez about our Guard and Reserve
    because clearly in the conflicts that we have been engaged in,
    we have been using the Guard and Reserve as an operational
    force. Yet not all DOD systems and budget decisions have
    necessarily evolved to that place of where we are in terms of
    using the Guard and Reserve.
        A recent National Guard and Reserve equipment report found
    major item shortages for the Guard and Reserve. Despite some
    very important investments in modernization and maintenance,
    some Guard units still don't have sufficient equipment on hand
    to properly train or respond to domestic contingencies.
        If you are confirmed, I wanted to get your thoughts on
    where we are with respect to equipment to train and maintain
    readiness for our Guard and Reserve and how you expect to work
    on those issues going forward, given what we have asked our
    Guard and Reserve units to do in the conflicts we have been
    involved in.
        Mr. Estevez. The Guard and Reserve, as you noted, Senator,
    are part of our holistic force. They are part of the total
    force that we have out there.
        We are working to ensure that they have the same equipment,
    at the same level of readiness, as the Active Force. Certainly,
    any force that is deploying has the equipment that they need to
    deploy with or they are falling in on equipment in Afghanistan
    or Iraq, depending on where they are going, just as the Active
    units do. They don't bring their equipment anymore. They fall
    in on equipment.
        We do have work, as we rotate equipment around in the rear
    base, in the training base, and at home station, to ensure that
    people have that, and they do get in that training. We do have
    equipment, of course, that is forward deployed that will
    eventually come back, and that will be distributed to make the
    force whole again at the return.
        In the meantime, we are working hard to fill those gaps and
    ensure that we do have correct response capability for domestic
    incidents.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
        I wanted to follow up on an issue that I have been
    concerned about as a new member of this committee. I realize
    that your position is really dealing with logistics, materiel
    readiness, and that is what you will be focused on.
        But as I have been on the Readiness and Management Support
    Subcommittee, one of the issues that I have seen time and time
    again is the issues we have had with procurement overall,
    particularly in weapon systems. We have spent $46 billion over
    the past decade developing weapon systems that ultimately were
    never fielded, due to cost overruns or technical challenges, we
    weren't able to bring forward.
        Given the difficulties we have right now in terms of the
    fiscal challenges that our country faces, I wanted to get your
    thoughts on how we could improve the procurement process.
    Because I have also been very troubled by some of the terms
    that we agree to in the contracts that we have been involved in
    that aren't as beneficial as I think they should be to our
    interests.
        Mr. Estevez. As you note, as the logistician of the
    Department, that is not my main focus. However, I do have the
    pleasure of working with Dr. Carter and Mr. Kendall, the Under
    Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and his
    Principal Deputy, who have a major focus on that.
        Dr. Carter is leading a major effort inside the Department
    called Better Buying Power, which is full-focused on improving
    the way we buy. Part of that is looking at the requirements so
    that we go into the process knowing that we can achieve the end
    result of getting the capability we are trying to buy.
        As the logistician, I have a full seat at the table on
    that, and looking to ensure that what we buy is sustainable and
    affordable in that sustainment over the course of its life
    cycle. Frankly, 70 percent of the cost of an acquisition tends
    to be after the acquisition takes place in sustaining that
    piece of equipment over time.
        Senator Ayotte. In the maintenance costs?
        Mr. Estevez. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Ayotte. I would ask you, as you have that seat at
    the table, if there are issues that you see that you think we
    can help here to give you better tools so that we can improve
    that procurement process, would you let us know? I think that
    is very critical, given the fiscal challenges that we are
    facing. We can't continue to pour money into either weapons
    systems or other equipment that isn't going to serve its
    purpose.
        Mr. Estevez. I agree, ma'am.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
        Ms. Creedon, I wanted to ask you about a statement. I
    wanted to ask you about our nuclear force levels.
        Tom Donilon announced on March 29 that the administration
    would be preparing for the next round of nuclear reductions.
    DOD will review the strategic requirements and develop options
    for further reductions in our current nuclear stockpile.
        One of the issues that I wanted to ask you about is if we
    go below the New START force levels, that may require
    significant changes to the U.S. force structure, nuclear
    weapons, targeting guidance, and the nuclear doctrine. None of
    these changes, in my view, should be taken lightly.
        I believe that we need to take serious caution before the
    administration makes a commitment to further reductions below
    New START force levels, especially since recently General
    Chilton, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, told the
    Senate during its consideration of the New START treaty that,
    ``The arsenal we have is exactly what is needed to provide the
    deterrent.''
        Ms. Creedon, can you assure this committee that in your
    capacity as Assistant Secretary for Global Strategic Affairs,
    that you would help ensure that DOD conducts its strategic
    assessment in a manner consistent with our interests, rather
    just in the pure pursuit of reductions for the sake of
    reductions? Because my concern is that it is very important
    that we maintain a proper deterrent.
        Ms. Creedon. Yes, Senator, I agree.
        As the START treaty comes into effect, it is going to take
    about 7 years before all of the reductions, even under the
    START treaty, have been implemented. Yes, Senator, I will
    assure you that as, if I am confirmed and as I undertake this
    new responsibility, that I will make sure that as we review our
    deterrent, we will always make sure that the deterrent is safe,
    secure, reliable, and adequate to meet our national security
    requirements.
        Senator Ayotte. If we were to be in a position where we
    lower our nuclear force levels to a point where the assurances
    to our friends and our nuclear deterrence in terms of our
    enemies began to be called into question, what would be the
    impact, in your view, of that if we didn't take that seriously?
        Ms. Creedon. I absolutely agree with you. We do need to
    take that very seriously. Frankly, from my perspective here, I
    don't see that as part of any of the policy documents that have
    been outlined by the Department.
        Certainly, in the Nuclear Posture Review, which is, at this
    point, the overarching policy document for the administration,
    that document is very clear that we will maintain the triad,
    that we will maintain the stockpile at the current levels set
    out in the START treaty. That above all, we will maintain a
    deterrent, and it will be safe, secure, and reliable.
        It talked about the relationship with our regional allies
    and the importance of that extended deterrence and the
    importance of making sure that our allies are comfortable and
    that our deterrent is adequate to ensure that comfort level.
    Because if it is not, one of the concerns, obviously, that has
    long been out there and long been a worry is that if we are not
    adequately providing that regional comfort, that it could drive
    others to seek independent nuclear capabilities, which is
    clearly not where we want to head.
        Senator Ayotte. I couldn't agree more.
        Thank you both. I appreciate your testimony, and I look
    forward to your confirmation.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
        Senator Blumenthal?
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me add my thanks for your service, both of your service
    in the past, and congratulations on your future. I join in
    hoping that your confirmations will be prompt.
        I would like to ask Mr. Estevez a question about delivering
    power and fuel to our troops in the field. I know that you are
    aware, we all are, of the potential for fuel cell technology,
    which is a particularly important product in the State of
    Connecticut, to be used more frequently and in greater volume
    in the field. Is that correct?
        Mr. Estevez. I am not an expert on fuel cell technology.
    But, yes, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. I would like your assurance that you
    will, in fact, focus on fuel cell technology and its potential
    uses in delivering energy sources to our troops in the field.
        Mr. Estevez. To the point that Senator Levin made opening
    up, reducing our energy consumption on the battlefield is a
    force multiplier for us. It gives us more flexibility. We will
    certainly be looking at all capabilities to do that, including
    fuel cell technology, Senator.
        Senator Blumenthal. I think there are also opportunities
    for improving the efficiency of the existing capability that we
    have. I know that as the drawdown occurs in Afghanistan, we are
    going to be bringing back to this country many of the micro-
    generators that rely now on diesel, and there is a proposal or
    a plan to refurbish them, make them more efficient, link them
    in micro-grids.
        I am familiar with this plan because one of the potential
    companies that could be doing some of the work is located in
    Connecticut, DRS. The proposal, as I understand it, is to bring
    back those 12,000 generators, save 30 percent of their fuel,
    millions of dollars. The Army is finalizing those requirements.
    Are you familiar with that plan?
        Mr. Estevez. I am not, but I could certainly look into
    that. The mix of generators that are out there on the
    battlefield are generators that we, the U.S. military, owns as
    part of unit equipment and generators that our commercial
    sustainers are helping us put on the battlefield to build
    capability. The mix will come back.
        Senator Blumenthal. If you could report back, if I could
    ask you, respectfully, to report back on how the Army will be
    finalizing those requirements, I would appreciate it.
        Mr. Estevez. I will do so, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Department of Defense, and most notably the Army, has several
    initiatives aimed at improving the energy efficiency of its tactical
    power generation and distribution systems. For example, the Army has
    undertaken several efforts to design and evaluate micro-grids that save
    energy at fixed sites by better matching the production of power to
    required loads. The Army is also reviewing the specifications of its
    force provider systems--its deployable life support capabilities--in
    order to make them 30 percent more energy efficient than the current
    sets. The Army will accomplish this through enhanced power generation
    and distribution, improved shelters and appliances, systems that reduce
    water use, and the integration of renewable power sources. The Systems
    Integration Laboratory at Fort Devens, MA, is conducting side-by-side
    comparisons of existing equipment with new technologies, in a training
    environment with soldiers, in order to analyze and determine if the new
    technologies provide enhanced efficiencies and capabilities.
        Other ongoing energy efficiency initiatives include the Army's new
    generator program--the Advanced Medium-sized Mobile Power Sources
    (AMMPS)--which is presently going into production. The AMMPS generators
    consume 21 percent less fuel across the fleet than the Tactical Quiet
    Generators (TQG), and are between 100 to 500 percent (depending on
    size) more reliable than the TQGs. Because of these improvements, the
    Army is working to accelerate production and fielding of the new AMMPS
    to replace the TQGs currently used in Afghanistan.
        The Department's intent is to maximize the life of its equipment
    and provide economical upgrades that offer the best return on
    investment for taxpayers' dollars, while providing energy savings
    across the battlefield.

        Senator Blumenthal. Ms. Creedon, if I could ask you, one of
    the points that particularly interested me in the exchange
    involving Mr. Lynn and General Cartwright in their recent
    briefing, concerned the issue of when a cyber attack becomes an
    act of war and when a proportional and justified military
    response is appropriate.
        The theft or disruption of 24,000 files seems to me to be
    an act of war if it is done by a nation against DOD. Would you
    agree?
        Ms. Creedon. Sir, I think that is one of the areas where
    the policy is very uncertain. Frankly, I have not delved into
    this enough. Even General Cartwright said a lot of the
    discussion really right now is based on theoretical constructs
    as to what really would constitute an act of war.
        Obviously, there are lots of other existing legal documents
    that define ``act of war''. But that is certainly one of the
    things that I am going to have to look at very closely, if I am
    confirmed.
        Senator Blumenthal. General Cartwright, I think, himself
    said that an act of war, to some extent, is in the eye of the
    beholder. But at the same time, there are rules, standards, and
    guidelines.
        From a 30,000-foot level, if another nation goes into our
    DOD and takes 24,000 files or disrupts our defense capability
    in some way, I think the average American would say, ``That is
    an act of war.'' Would you agree?
        Ms. Creedon. Sir, again, I don't have enough background
    right now from where I sit here on the committee to make that
    conclusion and to make that statement. But this has to be, I
    think, as we look at all these things, put in the context of
    anything else and looking at an act of war.
        Part of the difficulty in all this, too, is really
    understanding who that actor was. Was it a state actor? Was it
    somebody acting on behalf of the state? Is this criminally
    motivated? Is it terrorist motivated? It gets very complicated
    in sorting out the attribution as well.
        Senator Blumenthal. Are you satisfied that we have the
    means and capability to determine who the perpetrator was in
    these instances?
        Ms. Creedon. From what I have been briefed on at the staff
    level, I can only say that I think it is a very complicated and
    difficult question, and in not all instances do I think we
    fully understand that.
        Senator Blumenthal. Are you satisfied that on our side
    there is a clear division of responsibility between DOD, the
    Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Justice
    since, as you have mentioned and others have, there is a law
    enforcement element here as well?
        Ms. Creedon. I think at a certain, 100,000-foot level, yes.
    The Department of Homeland Security has the dot-gov. DOD has
    the dot-mil. But to make it all work because even though, it is
    dot-mil, it also travels over commercial lines.
        To make it all work, it has to be much more coordinated and
    unified, and industry has to play a very large part in this. I
    think there is a lot of work to be done.
        Senator Blumenthal. Can you envision situations where a
    cyber attack on a utility or a bank or an Internet company
    could be interpreted as an act of war, if it is done by a
    nation to disrupt essential services or activities in this
    country?
        Ms. Creedon. This is one of those things that is really
    hard to speculate on in the abstract. But in the same way that
    if it were a kinetic attack, what would be the result? What
    would be the analysis? What would be the reaction to a kinetic
    attack that had a similar, if you would, effect, and how would
    we respond to that?
        I think at the moment we have to really look at these
    analogies and figure out, okay, just because it is cyber, is it
    different? If the bank were blown up, what is our reaction? If
    the bank is taken out by a cyber attack, what is our reaction?
        I think you have to look at these in the context of the
    effect as well as how it happened before you can make these
    decisions.
        Senator Blumenthal. My time is up. I know that I have
    nowhere near scratched the surface of these very complex and
    difficult issues. I do appreciate your very candid and
    forthright answers and your service, both of you.
        Thank you for being here and being willing to serve in the
    future as well. Thank you.
        Ms. Creedon. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Brown is next.
        Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Also, Ms. Creedon, thank you. First of all, congratulations
    to both of you.
        Just to follow up to Senator McCain's questions on
    cybersecurity. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services
    Committee earlier this year, General Alexander stated that he
    would give the military a ``C'' on its ability to defend DOD
    networks.
        Do you agree with his assessment? If so, what must be done
    in the near-term to improve the network defense?
        Ms. Creedon. Senator, I don't have any basis right now to
    disagree with that. I would have to really struggle to see if
    that is the case, although he is, given his position, in a good
    position to know.
        Senator Brown. If you find that when you are there, what
    would you, in fact, try to do?
        Ms. Creedon. I would certainly hope it is no worse. This is
    obviously one of those situations where I think whatever the
    grade is, it can always be better.
        As General Cartwright has said, or Deputy Secretary Lynn
    said, in the rollout of the new cyber strategy, we definitely
    need to get better. We, as a country, need to get better--not
    just DOD, but everybody needs to get better.
        Senator Brown. Section 934 of the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 required the Secretary
    of Defense to develop a cyber strategy and inform Congress on
    the policy for offensive and defensive operations by March 1,
    2011. Unfortunately, the strategy released last week fails to
    do so.
        If you are confirmed, do you intend to provide the
    requested answers to the comprehensive list of unanswered
    policy and legal questions regarding operating in cyberspace?
        Ms. Creedon. Yes, sir. I will certainly work on those,
    along with colleagues.
        Senator Brown. Finally, do you agree that irrespective of
    Russian objectives, the United States should remain committed
    to the continued development and deployment of the U.S. missile
    defense systems worldwide, including qualitative and
    quantitative improvements to such systems?
        Ms. Creedon. Yes, sir. I believe that is included in the
    administration's ballistic missile defense review and policy.
        Thank you.
        Senator Brown. Thank you.
        Mr. Estevez, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
    Assessments has published its analysis of the fiscal year 2012
    defense budget. Are you familiar with that study, sir?
        Mr. Estevez. I am not familiar with that one specifically,
    but I am familiar with a lot of assessments of the budget
    ongoing right now.
        Senator Brown. That being said, the study commented--just
    to let you know a little bit about what it said--about hollow
    growth that has resulted from a whole lot of defense spending
    over the past decade without actually gaining in readiness.
        It concluded that it has happened for several reasons. Half
    of the spending over the past decade was unrelated to the wars
    in Afghanistan and Iraq. Personnel costs have grown. Personnel
    costs have grown, while actual end strength has remained flat.
    Cost of peacetime operations has expanded, while the actual
    pace has gone down. Acquisition costs have ballooned, while the
    actual inventory has become smaller and older.
        Do you agree that DOD is spending more, but not getting
    more?
        Mr. Estevez. I did read an article this morning that
    pointed out that we spent $46 billion and did not achieve the
    acquisition side. Without having read that whole report, I
    can't make an assessment of that.
        I do know that, and I responded to Senator McCain earlier,
    on the logistics side we do need to put a focus on driving down
    our costs and adapting best practices in order to sustain our
    warfighters.
        Senator Brown. Because, with the significant DOD cuts over
    the next 12 years, it is obviously very important. What do you
    suggest the Department can implement in the areas of readiness
    and logistics policies to prevent these cuts from hurting our
    readiness and creating conditions of the so-called hollow
    force?
        Mr. Estevez. As I cited to Senator McCain, we need to do
    better on managing our inventory and how we spend our
    inventory. We took $366 million out of the Program Objective
    Memorandum last year. I think that is a down payment. We can do
    better.
        In order to do that, we need to understand our forecast.
    What is going to break on weapons systems? What do we need to
    buy? Focus our buy, and we need to do better in collaborating
    with our industrial base as we do that.
        We can also look to best practices, like use of third-party
    logistics support. We are doing that in our transportation area
    now to lower our costs.
        Senator Brown. Ms. Creedon, just to get back to Senator
    McCain's follow-up, he says, ``Well, what would happen if''--
    remember that question? He said, ``What would happen if that
    happened?'' He said, ``Yes, but what would happen?''
        Let me tell you what I would like to happen if we find
    somebody who is actually perpetrating a crime on the United
    States. I would like them to be held accountable. I would like
    them to be shut down. I would like them to get the maximum
    amount of penalties that are afforded by our laws.
        I think that is what he was looking for. Is that your
    position, if we find somebody, they should have the book thrown
    at them?
        Ms. Creedon. From a criminal perspective, which is
    obviously not the Defense Department, that is obviously a
    Justice Department perspective, but, yes. As I understand this,
    it gets quite complicated because, very often, the actor is not
    necessarily within the United States.
        Senator Brown. If there are problems, we need to know what
    they are. So if you identify what the complications are, we
    just can't continue to allow this to go willy-nilly.
        Mr. Estevez, when you are dealing with what you are doing,
    I am not opposed to making judicious, thoughtful cuts. But in
    the middle of two and a half wars, I want to make sure that
    whatever we are doing is going to ensure that our men and women
    cannot only serve and do their jobs effectively and safely but,
    in fact, come home.
        As a result of cuts that may affect that job performance
    and their safety, then I and others have a very real problem
    with that.
        Thank you. I wish you both well.
        Ms. Creedon. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Brown.
        Senator Hagan.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I just want to publicly acknowledge Ms. Madelyn Creedon and
    express my heartfelt endorsement for her nomination. I have
    been working closely with her, as with my duties in chairing
    the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the
    Senate Armed Services Committee.
        She is a true professional that I have worked so closely
    with. She is well-qualified to discuss the issues addressed in
    this hearing today. I offer her my sincerest congratulations on
    this nomination. I am proud that she stands to contribute to
    the immeasurable accomplishments of women serving in DOD.
        My first question for you, Ms. Creedon, is this spring the
    President released a statement on the Nuclear Posture Review,
    and he publicly stated that the United States intends to reduce
    the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy
    and focus on reducing the nuclear dangers for the 21st century.
        We will, however, maintain our current stockpile, while
    making substantial investments to improve infrastructure,
    strengthen science and technology, and retain the human capital
    to sustain our stockpile. I am very concerned about the
    science, technology, engineering, and mathematics workforce in
    our country.
        What are your thoughts, as far as DOD, what can DOD do to
    ensure that DOD continues to have access to future scientific
    and technical talents in our country?
        Ms. Creedon. Thank you, Senator.
        This is a very large concern. I have looked at it over the
    years within the confines of the nuclear arena, to some extent
    in the confines of the space arena. It is a problem that
    extends not only in DOD, but also to the Department of Energy,
    which also has a very large role in making sure that our
    deterrent remains safe, secure, and reliable.
        It is difficult to motivate students to stay with the
    science and technology career path and educational path.
    Motivating students early on is extraordinarily important. I am
    also aware that DOD has various programs to help these
    students, to provide scholarships for these students. The
    Department of Energy has some similar programs.
        Part of the problem is also making sure that we have enough
    Ph.D. graduates, master's degree candidates, bachelor's degree
    candidates in our requisite science and technology disciplines
    that actually can come to work for DOD. In many instances, this
    requires clearances. It's about making sure that they can get
    the clearances. Some of this then goes to their nationalities.
        DOD is looking at this. There are some very early programs
    looking at how to accelerate the citizenship path. But this is
    a very serious problem we have to face going forward.
        Senator Hagan. It is a serious problem.
        Mr. Estevez, thank you, too, for being here and your
    nomination. I look forward to both of your confirmations.
        I have met with many soldiers who have been severely
    injured or wounded in Afghanistan. A large number of our
    wounded warriors are exposed, obviously, to improvised
    explosive devices (IED) and to enemy attacks because of their
    involvement in moving supplies. It is of critical concern that
    our servicemembers have access to the necessary equipment,
    food, and resupplies, but I am concerned about supply
    movements, which are often the target of the enemy.
        Afghanistan is landlocked, and the road networks are hard
    to navigate, and the country has few airports. What, if any,
    changes do you think can be made to meet the mission of the
    warfighters but minimize their exposure to enemy attacks in
    logistical supply movements?
        Mr. Estevez. I share those concerns, Senator, again, having
    just come back from Afghanistan and looking at some of the
    things that we are doing to protect our soldiers on the
    battlefield.
        First of all, our movement in providing things like MRAP
    vehicles, and their all-terrain variant, are incredible
    lifesaving devices out there that allow us a level of
    protection. There is nothing that is full protection,
    unfortunately.
        Through our rapid acquisition initiatives that Dr. Carter
    is leading and that I am part of in sustaining that equipment,
    we are also providing things like mine rollers, intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, handheld devices that
    you can find IEDs on the road. We just need to do more of that.
        For internal transportation in Afghanistan, we are doing
    more air drop to our remote outposts. That takes convoys off
    the road or combat logistics patrols, as we prefer to call
    them, because those guys are out there doing combat as well and
    performing their logistics duties. More vertical lift,
    helicopter lift, both commercial and our own, can also help in
    that regard.
        Most of the movements in Afghanistan are actually
    commercial movements, using either Afghan national trucks or
    prime vendors who are contract. Now, those people also get
    wounded and killed out there. So taking them off the road is
    also beneficial. But commercial movements have better ability
    in some areas to get through than our own military convoys.
        Put all those things together, and we have focus on doing
    exactly what we both share in trying to take our folks off the
    road and provide safer movements.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you, because I have spent a lot of
    time with wounded warriors, and it is something that is of
    grave concern to me.
        Ms. Creedon, due to the rising threat of cyber attacks, DOD
    established the U.S. Cyber Command. Currently, much of the
    attacks on DOD networks involve theft, which include stealing
    password and information from secure networks.
        The cyber attacks on DOD are similar to the cyber attacks
    on large financial institutions and other major commercial
    industries that also face those attacks. How do you think DOD
    can work with the Department of Homeland Security and the
    private sector to protect critical national infrastructure,
    like the power-grid, the transportation system, and the
    financial sector?
        Ms. Creedon. It is important, obviously, that all of these
    sectors work together. DOD uses commercial communications
    capabilities. It relies on domestic power supplies in the
    United States. It relies on commercial fiber lines. It is
    absolutely essential that these entities work together.
        The difficulty, obviously, in getting three very disparate
    entities that are not often working together, that are not used
    to working together, working together is a difficult challenge.
    I know that this is a focus of the new cybersecurity strategy,
    the cybersecurity policy document that was just released.
        It is also one of the big focuses of the Defense Industrial
    Base Pilot really trying to partner with industry, particularly
    industry that is working with DOD and that has sensitive DOD
    materials, trying to figure out both the advantages of the
    commercial approaches, the advantages of DOD approaches, and
    figure out what is really the best actor in these instances.
        There are a lot of different ideas that I have heard. If
    confirmed, I look forward to really taking this on and trying
    to figure out how to improve our capabilities in this area.
        Senator Hagan. I will miss you on the committee, but I
    certainly do look forward to the confirmation of both of you.
        Thank you very much for your testimony.
        Ms. Creedon. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Hagan.
        Senator Begich.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        To both of you, thank you very much for your willingness to
    serve. I agree, I hope the nominations go smooth, and you can
    be in your new roles.
        First, Ms. Creedon, if I could ask you a couple questions.
    As you probably know, I am a big supporter of the Ground-Based
    Missile Defense (GMD) System, and I want to get your opinion of
    how you see the GMD that is currently assembled. Do you believe
    this is the only system at this point that is capable of
    defending the Nation against intercontinental ballistic missile
    attack?
        Ms. Creedon. Yes, sir, it is, and it needs to be
    maintained.
        Senator Begich. Let me add to that. When you say
    ``maintained'', can you elaborate a little bit on that? Where
    do you see the missile defense system for the United States in
    maintenance and/or expansion or other needs they may have?
        Ms. Creedon. My understanding that right now the Missile
    Defense Agency is focused on maintaining, updating, and
    upgrading the ground-based interceptors (GBI), so that they
    will eventually be in a common configuration, and to identify
    the root causes of the recent test failure and to make sure
    that once those are identified, that those fixes are
    incorporated across the land-based missile defense in Alaska.
        Senator Begich. In your advance policy questions, and this
    may go to what you just said--you had made the comment that
    need for additional interceptors. Is that what you are
    referring to or just elaborate a little bit more maybe?
        Ms. Creedon. My understanding is that as part of the
    overall review of the GBIs, and as part of the review that is
    now ongoing as a result of the test failures, as well as the
    continuing overall review as to what the threat looks like over
    time, and also the need to have a certain number of tests and
    replacement assets, that the combination of all that, from what
    I understand, it is looking at if there will probably be
    additional GBIs that will be needed over time. The amount, the
    timing of those, as I understand it, is still very much in the
    ``to be determined'' category.
        Senator Begich. Thank you for your comment.
        I want to let you know I agree with that. I have said that
    for the last 2\1/2\ years, that based on the schedule--
    actually, we had a hearing here maybe a year and a half ago
    with General O'Reilly, and we were talking about this. I made
    the comment that I think they are going to be short on how many
    they will need based on replacement.
        It sounds like there is a full review, and like you said,
    they are not sure when and how, but it is clear that there is
    an additional need of interceptors. When and how they will be
    placed is still up in debate. Is that fair?
        Ms. Creedon. That is my understanding at this point.
        Senator Begich. Very good.
        I don't know how much you are familiar in Alaska with the
    Kodiak Launch Complex and how it has been used or not been
    used, depends on the agency.
        Give me, if you could, some of your thoughts on how DOD
    will utilize their own systems, their own Federal facilities,
    as well as potentially facilities like this that are partially
    federally-funded, but State-operated. That is what this one is.
    It is not private, it is a quasi-government facility.
        Can you give me some thoughts on that? I am being very
    specific here around Kodiak launch facility, but in the broader
    perspective of other facilities that might be out there.
        Ms. Creedon. As you are well aware, we have been waiting
    for some time to get one of the TacSat satellites off. It looks
    like it is going to happen later this summer. That will be
    launched out of Kodiak.
        Senator Begich. Out of Kodiak.
        Ms. Creedon. That will be a good thing. We need that
    capability on orbit.
        Looking farther, looking broader at where we go with the
    smaller satellites is an issue that, if confirmed, I would hope
    to really look at some more. This committee has been very
    active in sponsoring the Operationally Responsive Satellite
    office, making sure that there is focus and attention paid on
    small satellites.
        Small satellites, I think, have an opportunity to play a
    very large role, both increasing our redundancy in space and
    also resiliency. It also has the added benefit of making more
    targets, if you will, which also has a deterrent effect on
    adversaries.
        Looking at other possibilities about disaggregating large
    satellites into small satellite components, these are all
    things that I think we need to do. If all of that pans out,
    then there become opportunities for smaller launchers, for the
    smaller launch sites. There is a launch site in Virginia that
    has also been very active in these smaller satellite launches.
    I think it is all very much tied with where we actually decide
    to go in small satellite operations.
        Senator Begich. The assumption is that you will be
    appointed and move forward in your new position, will you keep
    our office informed? Obviously, it is a great asset that the
    Federal Government has invested in, and we sure don't want to
    have it idle or not utilize it, what you might think is a
    possibility.
        But also, as you think of the long-term what your small
    satellite deployment might be, if there are issues that they
    need to deal with, please keep us informed and what we need to
    be doing there to make sure it is an asset that the military
    can utilize or not utilize, but at least be available to
    utilize.
        Ms. Creedon. I will, Senator.
        Senator Begich. Very good.
        Mr. Estevez, if I could ask you a couple questions. This
    one is DOD on Defense Personal Property System (DPS), which is
    a new system. It is Web-based. It helps manage personal
    property moves, and so forth.
        It has had some good changes, now you award these based on
    satisfactory performance, not just low bid, which I am a big
    believer in this, because sometimes the low bid is a garbage
    bid. Having a quality bid is a better bid. I think that is a
    good move.
        Here is the struggle. I know U.S. Transportation Command
    (TRANSCOM) is working on this, and I just ask you to look into
    this. Alaska is being treated a little differently in how the
    rate structure is being designed, and it is actually a
    disadvantage because of how you can't access 80 percent of the
    communities by roads.
        It is not like pulling up a moving van and hauling people
    out. It is a little different. Because of that, we have asked
    them to reexamine the rate structure.
        There is a group called Alaska Movers Association that has
    been aggressive in trying to figure this out. They are fine
    with the new Web base. They are all good with that. It is just
    the way they are developing the model is based on a lower 48
    model, actually is inconsistent, to some extent, with the lower
    48 model.
        I don't know how much you are familiar with this, but, if
    not, would you be willing to work with our office and the
    Alaska Movers Association and make sure we are on the right
    path here? We want to make sure that individuals aren't dipping
    in their own pocket, military personnel, because of the
    formula.
        We just had this problem with some housing issues, which is
    now being corrected, because of the uniqueness of Alaska
    housing costs.
        Mr. Estevez. Senator, I am very familiar with DPS. I am not
    familiar with the Alaska issue related to DPS. To your point,
    DPS is actually showing some pretty good results. This year,
    because of some bandwidth increases, it is actually working
    better than it did last year in returning savings.
        The transportation policy, the Deputy Assistant Secretary
    on the Logistics and Materiel Readiness staff, on the staff
    which I will lead, if confirmed, co-chairs an oversight board
    with TRANSCOM that looks at how DPS is structured. I will
    absolutely work with your staff to address disparities related
    to the Alaska Movers Association.
        Senator Begich. Great. We are looking just for fairness, we
    are not looking for anything special. It is just the uniqueness
    of the transportation challenges are a little different than
    maybe Fort McChord or any of that kind of activity.
        Let me end there. My time is expired.
        But one area I would like to touch on and you don't have to
    do it now, but maybe in the future, I would like to talk to you
    about rare earth materials. The comment I would make is with so
    much concentration in China, with, I think, 95, 96, 97 percent
    of our rare earth capacity, is to reexamine what we need to do.
    There are a lot of pieces of legislation floating now to try to
    figure out how do we deal with this from a defense perspective
    and a national security perspective.
        At some point, maybe as we move on some legislation or have
    these discussions raised, Alaska has several of these
    potentials for rare earth development. I would be curious about
    how you will handle that and deal with that in the future.
        But if you are confirmed, is this an area that will be of
    interest to you and willing to look at to make sure we are on
    the right path here?
        Mr. Estevez. It is not my primary area. Brett Lambert, our
    Deputy Assistant Secretary for Manufacturing and Industrial
    Policy, leads that. However, I do oversee the stockpile that
    the Defense Logistics Agency manages. We share that concern. I
    would be happy to work with you, Senator.
        Senator Begich. Great. I just want to make sure what
    stockpile you are looking at isn't empty, and so that is our
    goal.
        Thank you very much. Congratulations to both of you. I know
    I am saying that without the vote being done yet. But I hope
    you are confirmed, and thank you for your service.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Begich.
        On the missile defense system issue, first of all, Ms.
    Creedon, would you agree that operational missile defense
    systems should be operationally effective before they are
    deployed?
        Ms. Creedon. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. They should be cost effective?
        Ms. Creedon. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. As stated in the ballistic missile defense
    review.
        Now, the United States and NATO are exploring options for
    cooperation with Russia on missile defense in order to enhance
    mutual security against common missile threats from Iran. Do
    you believe it is worth exploring those options?
        Ms. Creedon. I do, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Russia has expressed concerns that our
    missile defense systems may undermine its strategic deterrent.
    Will you use your best efforts to dissuade them from that
    perspective?
        Ms. Creedon. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. On the cyber issues, which have been raised
    by a number of us, I think we should appreciate the caution
    that you use in terms of your response to these questions as to
    when is a cyber attack an act of war. But I think we also need
    to do what you and others have suggested we do, which is to
    sort out the elements of that question because these are
    vitally critical issues to our security, to our own
    cybersecurity, to our country's security.
        But when we are talking about acts of war, we are then
    talking about a necessity, if we can't deter, of responding to
    those acts. It seems to me that the question, if there is an
    intentional attack on our capability and our systems by another
    country and where that intention is to disrupt our systems,
    that the issue of what is an appropriate response is an open
    issue. What is proportionate, for instance.
        However, if you know who the actor is, and if it is another
    nation and if its purpose is not espionage--which we conduct as
    well, not just other nations that conduct acts of espionage. We
    conduct acts of espionage. We have spies out there, too.
        If we decide that the motive is not espionage or spying on
    us, but that the motive is to disrupt our systems, that then it
    may be that the issue we haven't sorted out is what is an
    appropriate response, but that the question of whether or not
    it is an act of war, it seems to me, is resolved by the way the
    question is framed.
        If it is a purposeful, intentional effort on the part of
    another nation to disrupt some system of ours, putting aside
    the response and what is appropriate, that does constitute an
    aggressive act of war against us.
        I know you are being cautious, and I admire that, and you
    should be. But I am trying to phrase a question in a way where
    it seems to me the issue becomes not how do you know. That is
    part of the question. It is the given. It is the assumption.
        The question isn't how do you respond? Set that aside. It
    is an important question, and proportionality is critically
    important. But I am trying to put everything into the question
    in a way that, yes, that sure sounds like an act of war to me,
    which it does to me, by the way. Would it not sound like an act
    of war to you, the way I phrased the question?
        Ms. Creedon. Sir, yes. I think part of this is
    understanding, and this is where I have trouble. I think this
    is where a lot of people have trouble, so you start with, okay,
    is it possible that a cyber act could be an act of war? I think
    that answer to that is absolutely yes. Just like any kinetic
    act could be an act of war.
        The question then is, okay, let us assume that it was. It
    is a cyber attack, and we have determined that it is an act of
    war. That still gets you back to, well, what are we going to do
    about it?
        Chairman Levin. No, but that is not the question.
        Ms. Creedon. But there is certainly a construct where an
    attack is an act of war. Whether it is a cyber attack or a
    kinetic attack, it can be determined an act of war.
        Chairman Levin. I am trying to construct an example. That
    is what I am trying to do is construct an example so we have a
    feel as to where you are.
        How would that not be? If the actor is known, it is a state
    actor. If the motive is known, its motive is to disrupt or
    destroy. Why would that not be an act of war?
        Ms. Creedon. It sure sounds like it is, but I don't know
    for sure that it is.
        Chairman Levin. Even with my givens and assumptions?
        Ms. Creedon. Yes, and I think some of this----
        Chairman Levin. How could it not be?
        Ms. Creedon. I think part of it, we would have to go back
    and look at what is understood international law as to what is
    an act of war. It is certainly a hostile act. It is certainly a
    hostile intent. It is where does it become an act of war? That
    is where I think that there is some uncertainty.
        Chairman Levin. The word ``disrupt'' doesn't answer that
    question?
        Ms. Creedon. I am not sure ``disrupt'' answers that. I am
    not sure ``disrupt''----
        Chairman Levin. If it is intentionally----
        Ms. Creedon. Maybe it is the size of the disruption. Maybe
    there is a proportionality.
        Chairman Levin. That is an issue of what the response is.
        Ms. Creedon. There is an intent as well.
        Chairman Levin. I have given the intent in my question. The
    intent is to disrupt.
        Ms. Creedon. I think there is a point at which it probably
    could be. I think it probably could be. I think it is just
    really hard in the abstract to say, okay, that specific example
    is, in fact, an act of war because there is a danger, I think,
    also in laying out red lines.
        If you say, ``Okay, this is it. You cross this line. It is
    an act of war.'' There is a danger there because it sets us up
    for some act that we might not necessarily be prepared to take.
        Chairman Levin. I think we have to sort that out pretty
    quick because it sounds to me with all of the qualifications
    that I put in there, that there is an intent to disrupt. It is
    not a side effect. It is not an unintentional consequence of an
    act of espionage. It is an intent to disrupt.
        That seems to me to go to the heart of the matter. But if
    it isn't, we sure better find that out fast because we could
    give a false signal as well if we are ambiguous about
    considering that to be a hostile act or an act of war, and I
    think we better end that ambiguity fast.
        The proportionality issue, that is always a problem. That
    is an issue after you have been attacked.
        Ms. Creedon. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. But if you know what the intent is, once
    you know that intent is to disrupt or destroy, it seems to me
    then the issue becomes what is the appropriate reaction. But it
    is not a question of whether there should be a response at that
    point.
        I think that your testimony indicates that there sure is a
    heck of a lot of work to do, and I think we better do some of
    the basic work quickly while we spend more time perhaps in
    trying to figure out how do we know and what do we do? Those
    are questions which may take a lot more time to figure out.
        But the question of whether we respond to an intentional
    act to disrupt, seems to me, should not be difficult. It should
    not be difficult as to whether we respond.
        We thank you both. We thank your families, those who are
    here and those who are not here. We look forward to a speedy
    confirmation.
        The committee will stand adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

        [Prepared questions submitted to Madelyn R. Creedon by
    Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
    follow:]

                            Questions and Responses

                                DEFENSE REFORMS

        Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD)
    Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
    strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
    enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
    of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
    commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments
    to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
    to the combatant commanders.
        Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
    provisions?
        Answer. No. The Goldwater-Nichols legislation has been very
    successful in improving operational and warfighting effectiveness.
        Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
    address in these modifications?
        Answer. I do not see the need to change this legislation.

                                 RELATIONSHIPS

        Question. If confirmed, what will be your relationship with:
        The Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. At the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Policy (USD(P)), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global
    Strategic Affairs (ASD/GSA) advises the Secretary of Defense on
    strategy and policy on issues relating to nuclear weapons, missile
    defense, countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the space
    and cyberspace domains.
        Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. The ASD/GSA provides support to the Deputy Secretary of
    Defense similar to the support provided to the Secretary of Defense.
        Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
        Answer. The ASD/GSA provides support to the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Policy similar to the support provided to the Secretary and
    Deputy Secretary of Defense.
        Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics.
        Answer. Under guidance of the USD(P), the ASD/GSA works with the
    Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
    (USD(AT&L)) in pursuit of the Secretary's objectives and ensures that
    policy execution is well-informed and supported appropriately. The ASD/
    GSA also provides policy input regarding acquisition and programmatic
    activities that relate to nuclear weapons, missile defense, countering
    WMD, and the space and cyberspace domains.
        Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
    Security Affairs.
        Answer. The ASD/GSA works collaboratively and collegially with the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to
    provide policy advice to the USD(P) and the Secretary on crosscutting
    global security strategy and policy issues, such as regional missile
    defense cooperation and NATO developments pertaining to GSA's
    functional expertise.
        Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific
    Security Affairs.
        Answer. The ASD/GSA works with the Assistant Secretary of Defense
    for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs to provide policy advice to the
    USD(P) and the Secretary on cross-cutting global security strategy and
    policy issues, such as containing North Korean proliferation of WMD.
        Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.
        Answer. The ASD/GSA works with the Assistant Secretary of Defense
    for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs to provide policy
    advice to the USD(P) and the Secretary on cross-cutting security
    strategy and policy issues, such as enhancing the survivability of
    critical cyberspace infrastructure.
        Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
    Operations, Low Intensity Conflict, and Interdependent Capabilities.
        Answer. The ASD/GSA works with the Assistant Secretary of Defense
    for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict to provide policy advice
    to the USD(P) and the Secretary on cross-cutting global security
    strategy and policy issues, such as countering the proliferation of WMD
    through improved synchronization of contingency plans.
        Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical,
    and Biological Defense Programs.
        Answer. The ASD/GSA works closely with the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (ASD/NCB)
    to provide policy advice to the USD(P) and the Secretary on cross-
    cutting global security strategy and policy issues. The ASD/NCB is
    responsible for implementing many of the activities for which the ASD/
    GSA develops policy guidance, such as chemical/biological defense,
    Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, and oversight of
    the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Therefore, the relationship
    between the two offices should be particularly close.
        Question. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff.
        Answer. At the direction of the USD(P), the ASD/GSA works with the
    Chairman (CJCS) and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
    provide support on matters that affect strategy and policy for nuclear
    weapons, missile defense, countering WMD, and the space and cyberspace
    domains.
        Question. The Service Secretaries.
        Answer. At the direction of the USD(P), the ASD/GSA works with the
    Military Department Secretaries on a broad range of policy issues.
        Question. The Service Chiefs.
        Answer. At the direction of the USD(P), the ASD/GSA works with the
    Service Chiefs on a broad range of policy issues.
        Question. The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command.
        Answer. At the direction of the USD(P) and in coordination with the
    CJCS, the ASD/GSA works with the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command on
    a broad range of issues that affect strategy and policy for nuclear
    weapons, missile defense, countering WMD, and the space and cyberspace
    domains.
        Question. The Commander of U.S. Cyber Command.
        Answer. At the direction of the USD(P) and in coordination with the
    CJCS, the ASD/GSA works with the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command on a
    broad range of issues that affect defense activities in cyberspace. As
    the OSD Principal Staff Assistant with responsibility for cyber policy,
    the relationship with U.S. Cyber Command should be very close to ensure
    appropriate coordination of this dynamic mission area.
        Question. The regional combatant commanders.
        Answer. In coordination with the CJCS, the ASD/GSA works closely
    with the geographic combatant commanders (GCC) to provide policy
    oversight of strategy, plans and operations relating to nuclear
    weapons, missile defense, countering WMD, and the space and cyberspace
    domains in support of the USD(P), the Secretary, and the President of
    the United States.
        Question. The Administrator and Deputy Administrators of the
    National Nuclear Security Administration.
        Answer. The ASD/GSA works with the Administrator and Deputy
    Administrators of the National Nuclear Security Administration to
    provide policy support to the USD(P) and the Secretary on strategy and
    policy issues, relating to nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear
    material security, U.S. nuclear stockpile matters, and related issues.

                                     DUTIES

        Question. The position for which you have been nominated has been
    substantially restructured over the last few years.
        What is your understanding of the duties that you will be assigned
    if you are confirmed?
        Answer. My understanding is that ASD/GSA is primarily responsible
    for advising and supporting the USD(P) and the Secretary on policy and
    strategy in the areas of U.S. nuclear weapons and missile defense,
    countering WMD, and the space and cyberspace domains.

                                 QUALIFICATIONS

        Question. What background and experience do you have that you
    believe qualifies you for this position?
        Answer. I have had over 30 years of experience in a variety of
    executive branch positions and as a member of the staff of the Senate
    Committee on Armed Services in the areas of responsibility assigned to
    the ASD/GSA.
        Question. What additional actions do you believe you need to take,
    if any, to fulfill the responsibilities of this position?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on understanding the many
    specific responsibilities and interactions that are necessary to ensure
    that I can effectively carry out the duties of the office of ASD/GSA.
    Many of the overarching policy documents governing nuclear, space, and
    missile defense policies have been issued. I will develop an
    understanding of the actions needed to implement these policies. The
    area of cyber policy will need particular attention and, if confirmed,
    I will work to develop and grow the relationships and knowledge
    necessary to provide policy guidance in this challenging issue area.

                         MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

        Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
    confront the Assistant ASD/GSA?
        Answer. Implementation of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR),
    Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) and Space Posture Review (SPR),
    as well as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the
    National Space Security Strategy, the DOD Cyber Strategy, and the
    President's nuclear security agenda and biosecurity strategy will all
    be significant challenges. Implementing these new policies and
    strategies under a constrained budget will be even more challenging.
        Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
    addressing these challenges?
        Answer. If I am confirmed as ASD/GSA, I will develop the close
    working relationships with key partners in DOD, with other relevant
    executive branch partners, and within Congress, to understand and
    address the various programs, issues, and concerns necessary to
    implement the new policies and strategies.
        Question. What do you anticipate will be the most serious problems
    in the performance of your responsibilities?
        Answer. At present I am not sure what will be the most serious
    problems that I would face if confirmed, but I am very concerned about
    ensuring that the new policies and strategies are implemented in a cost
    efficient manner.
        Question. If confirmed, what management action and timelines would
    you establish to address these problems?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the ASD/GSA staff and the
    USD(P) to identify, understand, and prioritize any problems impeding
    performance of my responsibilities, and to develop timelines to resolve
    these problems.

                                   PRIORITIES

        Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
    for the office to which you have been nominated?
        Answer. I understand that Under Secretary Flournoy has emphasized
    the importance of her team's support to the Secretary to improve
    interagency development of long-term national security policy options.
    If confirmed, I will ensure that staff of the ASD/GAS is equipped to
    support her and the Secretary in achieving these goals.

                             NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

        Question. If confirmed, what role will you play in overseeing and
    implementing the policies, strategies, and priorities established in
    the NPR?
        Answer. If confirmed, I understand that I would help to develop and
    oversee implementation of the agenda set forth in the NPR. This would
    include helping to frame key issues and decisions for the USD(P) and
    the Secretary in coordination with my colleagues in USD(AT&L), the
    Joint Staff, the Military Departments, and STRATCOM, as well as the
    NNSA and the National Security Staff.

                              SPACE POSTURE REVIEW

        Question. If confirmed, what role will you play in overseeing and
    implementing the policies, strategies, and priorities established in
    the Space Posture Review?
        Answer. If confirmed, I understand that I would support the USD(P)
    and the Secretary to continue implementation of President's 2010
    National Space Policy and the National Security Space Strategy, which
    included the Space Posture Review. In that regard, if confirmed, I
    understand that I would help to develop and oversee implementation of
    DOD policies related to space. This would include overseeing
    implementation of strategy and plans related to space forces, systems,
    and activities in close coordination with other DOD officials, as well
    as serving on the Defense Space Council.

                                 SPACE PROGRAMS

        Question. If confirmed, what role will you play in establishing
    architectures for various space systems, such as communications and
    Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR)?
        Answer. If confirmed, I expect to participate actively in the
    Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution system, as well as other
    DOD decisionmaking processes, to ensure space system architectures
    support our national security objectives effectively. I would expect
    that this would include support to effective, efficient, and well-
    coordinated communications, OPIR, and other essential national security
    space applications and programs.
        Question. If confirmed, what role will you play in developing a
    space protection strategy and improving space situational awareness?
        Answer. The United States is heavily reliant upon and gains unique
    benefits from its national security space capabilities. Continually
    improving space situational awareness underpins our ability to operate
    safely in the increasingly congested space environment and enables the
    protection of space assets. If I am confirmed, I will work to ensure
    appropriate and effective strategies are in place to increase our space
    situational awareness as well as to ensure that critical space
    capabilities are resilient and redundant to maintain the advantages
    provided by these capabilities.

                            SPACE RULES OF THE ROAD

        Question. Over the course of the last several years there has been
    discussion about establishing international space rules of the road to
    deal with, mitigate, and reduce generation of space debris.
        What are your views on establishing space rules of the road?
        Answer. Establishing norms for the responsible, peaceful, and safe
    use of space and preservation of the space environment are important
    issues for all space-faring nations. Rules of the road or other
    pragmatic guidelines for safe activity in space could help avoid
    collisions and other debris--producing events, reduce radiofrequency
    interference, and strengthen safety, stability, transparency, and
    security in the space domain.

                        INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION

        Question. Do you support arms control limitations on space
    capabilities?
        Answer. I support the principles outlined in the 2010 National
    Space Policy, which states that the United States will pursue bilateral
    and multilateral transparency and confidence-building measures to
    encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, space, and
    will consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they
    are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the national
    security of the United States and its allies.
        Question. Would you support the United States signing the so-called
    European Union Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities?
        Answer. I understand that the Department is currently evaluating
    the European Union's proposed international Code of Conduct for Outer
    Space Activities. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing this
    evaluation.
        Question. Given the concern about the increase in space debris, and
    the need to improve the ability to forecast and avoid potential
    conjunctions, in your view is there an opportunity to cooperate with
    Russia and other nations in the area of space debris analysis and
    warning?
        Answer. The significant increase in space debris presents
    challenges to all space faring nations. I believe that coordinated
    international efforts to develop and share information, particularly
    with respect to space debris, could help increase awareness and prevent
    mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust. I understand that the Department
    recently signed statements of principles on Space Situational Awareness
    sharing with Australia, Canada, and France. Additional such statements
    signed with other nations, and with commercial firms, would continue to
    enhance spaceflight safety for all parties.

                           NUCLEAR WEAPONS MANAGEMENT

        Question. Since the Air Force unknowingly flew nuclear weapons on a
    B-52 bomber from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air
    Force Base in Louisiana on August 30, 2007, the Air Force has taken a
    number of significant steps to increase its attention, discipline, and
    expertise on nuclear weapons management.
        If confirmed, what role, if any, will you play in ensuring that
    nuclear weapons are safe, secure, and accounted for, and that the
    Military Services have established a high level of attention,
    discipline, and conduct of operations with respect to nuclear weapons?
        Answer. Since the events of August 2007 the Air Force has made
    significant improvements in its management of the Air Force nuclear
    enterprise. If confirmed, I will work with the other stakeholders in
    OSD, the Joint Staff, the Military Departments, and combatant commands,
    as well as with NNSA, to ensure that the renewed senior-level focus and
    attention and new management approaches are sustained and
    institutionalized. It is vitally important that all aspects of our
    nuclear force and the nuclear weapons enterprise are positioned to
    ensure their long-term safety, security, accounting, and reliability.
        Question. The various reviews of the Air Force incident also
    exposed significant gaps in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    (OSD) with respect to the attention and expertise to deal with nuclear
    weapons issues.
        If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that there is
    sufficient attention to management of nuclear weapon matters in the
    OSD?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the USD(P), the ASD-NCB, the
    Military Departments and other key stakeholders to sustain senior-level
    attention on the safety, security, and reliability of our nuclear
    deterrent.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that
    there is sufficient technical expertise in OSD with respect to nuclear
    weapons?
        Answer. I would note that with the reorganization in the policy
    office and the creation of the ASD/GSA, a strong focus on nuclear and
    other relevant expertise was reestablished. If confirmed, I will
    continue to evaluate the expertise available to the ASD/GSA. Included
    in this evaluation will be the means to ensure that new technical and
    policy expertise relating to nuclear policy is ``grown'' in OSD since
    the aging nuclear workforce poses a challenge to our deterrent. If
    confirmed, I will continue OSD's traditional outreach to institutions
    such as the NNSA National Security Laboratories, in order to strengthen
    relationships and enlist on-site support through their experts detailed
    to OSD.

                            NUCLEAR WEAPONS COUNCIL

        Question. The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) is intended to be the
    joint DOD-Department of Energy (DOE) management organization for
    nuclear weapons matters.
        If confirmed, what responsibilities and interaction do you expect
    to have relative to the NWC?
        Answer. The NWC is a statutorily established entity with broad
    responsibility for nuclear weapons. The Under Secretary of Defense for
    Policy is a member of the NWC. If confirmed, I would expect to support
    the USD(P) in the work of the NWC.

                           STRATEGIC NUCLEAR PROGRAMS

        Question. The NPR established, among other things, nuclear force
    structure parameters prior to negotiation of the New START treaty. The
    administration has indicated that it is continuing to study future
    nuclear force levels, consistent with the NPR.
        If confirmed, what roles and responsibilities do you expect to have
    relative to policy development concerning future nuclear force
    structure and planning?
        Answer. If confirmed, I expect to help shape the development of
    policy for the nuclear force structure and the planning to implement
    the President's vision of a re-capitalized nuclear enterprise.

                        NEW START TREATY IMPLEMENTATION

        Question. The New START treaty entered into force in February 2011,
    and establishes limits on the deployed and nondeployed strategic
    nuclear forces of Russia and the United States. The treaty allows the
    parties up to 7 years to comply with the numerical limits of the
    treaty.
        If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in overseeing
    implementation of the New START treaty?
        Answer. If confirmed, I expect to work with the Air Force and the
    Navy, Strategic Command, the Joint Staff, the NNSA, and others to
    implement the New START treaty to meet the central limits of the New
    START treaty by 2018 while maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable
    nuclear deterrent.

                MODERNIZATION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ENTERPRISE

        Question. A principal issue in the debate of the New START treaty
    was ensuring that as we draw down the number of deployed nuclear
    warheads that we modernize our nuclear warhead production capability as
    well as their command and control systems and delivery platforms.
        If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in modernizing these
    three areas?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the Department's commitment
    to a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent. This includes
    sustaining and maintaining the nuclear stockpile, and modernizing the
    nuclear infrastructure and delivery systems.
        Question. Do you agree that the full funding of the President's
    plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to
    as the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Prior to completing this modernization effort do you
    believe it would be prudent to consider reductions below New START
    treaty limits for either the deployed or nondeployed stockpile of
    nuclear weapons?
        Answer. The most recent section 1251 report covers funding through
    2021, the term of the New START treaty, but these substantial
    investments in nuclear infrastructure must continue well beyond this
    timeframe. As a result, any proposed future reductions in deployed
    strategic warheads covered by the treaty, or deployed non-strategic
    warheads and non-deployed warheads, not covered by the treaty, must all
    be considered in a number of contexts, including the rate and progress
    of the complex modernization, the success of the life extensions, and
    the sustainment and modernization of the delivery systems, as well as
    the geopolitical environment. I would note that the NPR states that any
    future nuclear reductions must continue to strengthen deterrence of
    potential regional adversaries, maintain strategic stability vis-a-vis
    Russia and China, and maintain the reliability and effectiveness of our
    security assurances to our allies and partners. Ensuring that we are
    well-hedged against geopolitical or technical surprise also remains a
    key priority. If confirmed, I will support the Department's continuing
    assessment of the proper force size and the capabilities required for a
    safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent.
        Question. Without the construction of the Chemical and Metallurgy
    Research Replacement Facility at Los Alamos and the Uranium Production
    Facility at Y-12 and the other elements associated with the robust plan
    for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, do you believe reductions
    to the strategic hedge would be prudent?
        Answer. Ensuring that we are well-hedged against geopolitical or
    technical surprise remains a key priority of the NPR report with which
    I agree. Modernization of the nuclear complex, the success of the life
    extension programs, and the progress maintaining and modernizing
    nuclear delivery platforms, as well as the geopolitical environment,
    will all inform any future proposals to reduce the hedge. The NPR also
    stated that modernization of the nuclear weapons complex will
    eventually allow the United States to shift its ``hedging strategy''
    away from retaining large numbers of non-deployed warheads to a
    smaller, more responsive manufacturing infrastructure. If confirmed, I
    will support the Department's continuing assessment of the proper force
    size and the capabilities required for a safe, secure, and reliable
    nuclear deterrent.

                                 NUCLEAR POLICY

        Question. Do you support the President's vision for a world without
    nuclear weapons?
        Answer. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered
    into force in 1970, included as a goal the cessation of the nuclear
    arms race and set forth the commitment ``to undertake effective
    measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament.'' The President's
    ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons worldwide is consistent
    with the NPT. The President has also said, however, that while working
    toward that goal the United States will retains a safe, secure, and
    reliable nuclear deterrent, as long as nuclear weapons exist. I support
    both of these goals.
        Question. Do you believe this goal is a viable near- and/or long-
    term strategic strategy for the United States?
        Answer. The conditions that would ultimately permit the United
    States and others to give up their nuclear weapons without risking
    greater international instability and insecurity do not exist today. As
    a result I think the goal is a long-term one.
        Question. In a recent speech at the 2011 Carnegie International
    Nuclear Policy Conference, Thomas Donilon, the President's National
    Security Advisor, stated that the administration is currently ``making
    preparations for the next round of nuclear reductions'' and that DOD
    will ``review our strategic requirements and develop options for
    further reductions in our current nuclear stockpile.'' He continued by
    stating that in meeting these objectives, the White House will direct
    DOD to consider ``potential changes in targeting requirements and alert
    postures.''
        Do you believe the United States should pursue further reductions?
    Please explain why or why not.
        Answer. I would note that the NPR states that any future nuclear
    reductions must continue to strengthen deterrence of potential regional
    adversaries, maintain strategic stability vis-a-vis Russia and China,
    and maintain the reliability and effectiveness of our security
    assurances to our allies and partners. Ensuring that we are well-hedged
    against geopolitical or technical surprise also remains a key priority.
    If confirmed, I will support the Department's continuing assessment of
    the proper force size and capabilities required for a safe, secure, and
    reliable nuclear deterrent.
        Question. Do you believe it would be prudent for the United States
    to pursue unilateral nuclear reductions? Please explain why or why not.
        Answer. On balance I do not believe the United States should make
    unilateral reductions in the strategic nuclear systems covered under
    the New START treaty, while the treaty is in force. Reductions in
    nuclear systems not covered by the new treaty should be addressed on a
    case-by-case basis and should reflect geopolitical situations as well
    as the technical requirements associated with maintaining a safe,
    secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent.
        Question. Do you believe changes to well-established nuclear
    targeting requirements could negatively impact our ability to: (1)
    assure our allies; (2) discourage other countries from seeking
    strategic equivalence with the United States in nuclear weapons; and
    (3) hedge against future threats and uncertainties?
        Answer. While I understand that DOD continually assesses deterrence
    requirements, including potential changes in targeting requirements, I
    am not familiar with the specific targeting policy. If confirmed, I
    will continue to support a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear
    enterprise that maintains strategic deterrence and stability,
    strengthens regional deterrence, and assures our allies and partners.

                        BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW

        Question. In February 2010, the Defense Department issued its
    report on the first-ever comprehensive review of U.S. ballistic missile
    defense policy and strategy, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review
    (BMDR), as required by Congress. The BMDR established a number of
    policy priorities, including establishing defense against near-term
    regional missile threats as a top priority of missile defense plans,
    programs, and capabilities. It also stated the policy of sustaining and
    enhancing the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system to
    defend the Homeland against attack by a small number of long-range
    missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran.
        Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth
    in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. If confirmed, what role do you expect to have in
    implementing these policies, strategies, and priorities?
        Answer. If confirmed, I expect to provide oversight and guidance to
    implement the BMDR, and to participate in the development of related
    policies, as well as prioritization of resources.

                            PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH

        Question. In September 2009, President Obama announced that he had
    accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff to pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to
    missile defense in Europe. This approach is intended to defend all of
    Europe against existing and emerging threats from Iranian missiles,
    starting this year and increasing in capability with each of its four
    phases. Phase 4 of the European PAA is intended to provide a capability
    to defend against long-range missiles that could reach all of Europe or
    the United States, thus augmenting the existing Homeland missile
    defense capability.
        Do you support the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in
    Europe and, if confirmed, what role do you expect to have in
    implementing this approach?
        Answer. Yes, I support the European PAA and, if confirmed, I will
    continue the substantial U.S. efforts already underway to deploy all
    four phases of the European PAA. I would expect that a significant part
    of my role would include working with our allies and partners to ensure
    pragmatic and cost-effective cooperation, and providing oversight and
    guidance to the development and deployment of U.S. missile defense
    capabilities.

               ``FLY BEFORE YOU BUY'' APPROACH TO MISSILE DEFENSE

        Question. The two most recent flight tests of the Ground-based
    Midcourse Defense (GMD) system failed to intercept their targets. The
    Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has formed a Failure
    Review Board to determine the root cause of the most recent failure,
    and will devise a corrective plan that includes two flight tests to
    confirm the correction. Until the second flight test confirms the
    correction, the Director of MDA has suspended production of the Exo-
    atmospheric Kill Vehicles (EKV) of the type that failed last year's
    flight tests, in order to ensure that those EKVs are not deployed with
    a flaw that would need to be corrected later.
        Do you agree that it is essential to verify that the GMD flight
    test failure problem has been corrected before continuing production of
    the EKVs, and before delivering more Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs)
    or deciding how many additional GBIs may be needed in the future?
        Answer. Yes. I understand that although the exact number of
    additional GBIs will not be decided until the test failure problems are
    identified and resolved, it does appear that additional GBIs will be
    required.
        Question. Do you agree with the Defense Department's ``fly before
    you buy'' policy for missile defense that ``before new capabilities are
    deployed they must undergo testing that enables an assessment under
    realistic operational conditions against threat-representative
    targets'' to demonstrate that they will be effective and reliable?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you support the continued modernization and
    sustainment of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System?
        Answer. Yes.

                   HOMELAND MISSILE DEFENSE HEDGING STRATEGY

        Question. One of the elements of the BMDR is the policy of hedging
    our Homeland missile defense options in case the threat of future long-
    range ballistic missiles from countries like North Korea and Iran
    develops more rapidly or more robustly than expected, or if we
    encounter technical problems or delays in developing the Standard
    Missile-3 Block IIB interceptor. DOD has already decided to pursue a
    number of hedging options, and is considering others.
        Do you support the policy that the United States should maintain a
    hedging strategy for Homeland missile defense?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in
    overseeing our missile defense hedging strategy?
        Answer. If confirmed, I expect to monitor the ballistic missile
    threat and to be responsible for ensuring that we have the policies and
    strategies in place to address changes in the threat or unexpected
    delays in development of new technical capabilities.

                    MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA

        Question. The United States and NATO are exploring options to
    cooperate with Russia on missile defense. President Obama has announced
    that such cooperation would not limit U.S. or NATO missile defense
    capabilities.
        Do you agree that such cooperation could enhance the security of
    the United States, NATO, and Russia against common missile threats from
    nations such as Iran?
        Answer. I think that cooperation with Russia could strengthen the
    effectiveness of U.S. and NATO missile defenses, as well as those of
    the Russian Federation against Iran.
        Question. Do you believe that U.S.-Russian missile defense
    cooperation could send an important signal to Iran that the United
    States and Russia are unified in their determination to reduce the
    risks of Iran's nuclear and missile programs?
        Answer. Yes, missile defense cooperation with Russia could send an
    important signal to Iran that Russia and the United States are working
    together to counter the acquisition, deployment, and use of ballistic
    missiles. This in turn could further strengthen the international
    commitment to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
        Question. Do you agree that irrespective of Russian objections, the
    United States is committed to the continued development and deployment
    of U.S. missile defense capabilities, including qualitative and
    quantitative improvements to such capabilities?
        Answer. My understanding is that the United States is committed to
    this goal and to developing and deploying improved missile defenses
    against states such as Iran and North Korea.
        Question. If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in efforts
    to pursue missile defense cooperation with Russia?
        Answer. The administration is pursuing a broad agenda with Russia
    focused on shared early warning of missile launches, technical
    cooperation, and even operational cooperation. Cooperation with Russia
    could offer some important tangible benefits for the United States, our
    NATO allies, and Russia. If confirmed, I will support the efforts of
    the Defense Relations Working Group, established by Defense Secretary
    Gates and Defense Minister Serduykov, to further practical cooperation
    in a number of areas, including missile defense.

                        CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

        Question. One of the areas under the ASD/GSA is the Chemical and
    Biological Defense Program of the Defense Department.
        What do you believe are the principal challenges in chemical and
    biological defense, and what would be your priorities for the DOD
    Chemical and Biological Defense Program?
        Answer. As part of the Department's overall effort to counter WMD,
    the Office of the ASD/NCB manages the Chemical and Biological Defense
    Program. If confirmed, I would be responsible for development of
    policies to guide the program. I am informed that current priority
    issues include developing defenses against non-traditional chemical
    agents, and accelerating the ability to detect and attribute any
    chemical, nuclear, or biological materials used to attack or threaten
    the United States. These appear to be appropriate priorities. I would
    note that DOD, through the CTR and other programs, is developing a
    comprehensive toolkit of biological defense options for the Secretary
    that includes biosurveillance, vaccines, and other medical
    countermeasures to protect our forces against multiple threats.
        Question. Do you believe the Chemical and Biological Defense
    Program should be closely coordinated with related efforts of the
    Defense Department's CTR program focused on reducing biological
    threats?
        Answer. Yes. The Chemical and Biological Defense program and the
    CTR program are well-established components of the U.S. efforts to
    counter WMD. The two programs have related but distinct goals, but they
    should be closely coordinated for the best effect. If confirmed, I will
    ensure that these and other DOD biological defense policies are
    coordinated appropriately both within the DOD and with other relevant
    U.S. and international agencies.

                           CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION

        Question. DOD Directive 5160.05E states the DOD policy that ``DOD
    shall be in full compliance'' with the Chemical Weapons Convention
    (CWC) and the Biological Warfare Convention (BWC). In 2006, the
    Department announced that the United States would not meet even the
    extended deadline of April 2012 for destruction of its chemical weapons
    stockpile, as required under the CWC.
        Do you agree that DOD and the U.S. Government should be in full
    compliance with the terms and obligations of the CWC and the BWC,
    including the deadline for destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons
    stockpile under the CWC?
        Answer. I understand that in 2006, the United States informed the
    Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons that it did not
    expect to meet the 2012 deadline. Since then the United States has
    continued to follow a policy of transparency about the U.S. chemical
    weapons destruction program and stressed U.S. efforts to find ways to
    accelerate it. I understand that the Department is on track to destroy
    90 percent of the U.S. stockpile by the CWC deadline, and that the Army
    and the office of the USD(AT&L) are focusing significant senior
    leadership attention on this issue.
        Question. If confirmed, will you work to ensure that the Department
    takes steps needed to minimize the time to complete destruction of the
    U.S. chemical weapons stockpile, without sacrificing safety or
    security, and that the Department requests the resources necessary to
    complete destruction as close to April 2012 as practicable?
        Answer. Yes.

                              COUNTER-WMD EFFORTS

        Question. One of the issue areas under the ASD/GSA is the DOD
    effort to counter WMD, meaning nuclear, biological, and chemical
    weapons.
        What do you believe are the principal challenges in countering WMD,
    and what are your priorities for Defense Department efforts to counter
    WMD?
        Answer. President Obama made clear in his April 2009 speech in
    Prague that overcoming the twin dangers of WMD proliferation and WMD
    terrorism are the greatest threats facing our country and will require
    a comprehensive approach to reduce and counter these threats.
    Countering these threats takes commitment not only by the United States
    but also by the international community. One of the significant
    challenges is developing a sustained commitment among international
    partners to both recognize the threat and to take the actions necessary
    to reduce the dangers.
        Question. If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in the
    creation of policy for, and oversight of, Defense Department programs
    to counter WMD?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will pursue policies to reduce and
    eliminate WMD dangers at their source and in transit, while enhancing
    our ability to detect and respond to emerging threats. Another key
    priority is to continue refining policy guidance that ensures our
    forces and coalition partners can fight and win, in an environment
    contaminated by chemical, biological, and other hazards. I would
    support the USD(P) in developing these policies and coordinate the
    efforts within DOD with the Department of State, Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS), and DOE, and other entities that will be essential to
    execute this function successfully.

                       PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

        Question. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an
    international effort to identify and interdict WMD and related
    materials.
        If confirmed, would you recommend that the PSI program continue,
    and if so, do you believe that it should be modified in any way?
        Answer. I agree with the 2010 National Security Strategy and the
    NPR Report, which state that the PSI should become a ``durable
    international effort.'' If confirmed, I will support the Department's
    continued lead role in organizing U.S. support for PSI Operational
    Experts Group activities, including interdiction exercises.
        Question. The absence of funding specifically identified for the
    PSI program has made it difficult for the Department and Congress to
    provide appropriate oversight.
        If confirmed, would you seek to establish a separate budget account
    for PSI? If not, why not?
        Answer. I understand that congressional oversight of the PSI
    program has been difficult and that the PSI activities have not always
    been clear or well-understood by Congress. If confirmed, I would seek
    to improve understanding of the PSI and to ensure that Congress has
    whatever information it needs to conduct appropriate oversight of PSI
    activities.

                      COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

        Question. If confirmed, what will your role be in implementing and
    overseeing the CTR program?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will provide departmental policy guidance
    for activities of the CTR program. My understanding is that the ASD/GSA
    works closely with the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
    and the ASD/NCB to ensure that the execution of the CTR program
    activities is consistent with policy guidance.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
    to the CTR program, including changes in legislative authorities,
    programs, or funding?
        Answer. Congress has taken steps to streamline CTR's authorities
    over the past several years, and I believe this process should
    continue. Congress has authorized the CTR programs to expand its
    activities beyond the traditional geographic focus on the states of the
    former Soviet Union. In carrying out this expanded authority, the DOD
    CTR program has expanded its biological defense work to address those
    challenges around the world. If confirmed, I will work with CTR's many
    stakeholders in the administration and in Congress to ensure that this
    expansion is conducted in coordination with other relevant entities and
    that it is carried out in a cost effective manner.

                         COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

        Question. If confirmed, what role will you play in any efforts to
    obtain Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)?
        Answer. If the Senate takes up the CTBT for consideration, and if I
    am confirmed, I would expect to play a significant role in presenting
    the views of the DOD to the Senate.
        Question. Would you support and/or advocate for the administration
    to pursue the ratification of the CTBT?
        Answer. The President set forth his agenda for nuclear security
    during his April 2009 address in Prague, Czech Republic.
    Nonproliferation was a central goal of this agenda, and U.S.
    ratification of CTBT would play an important part in that agenda. The
    NPR reflected the Department's commitment to the goal of ratifying the
    CTBT. I support the CTBT. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting an
    effort to ratify the CTBT when the Senate decides to take up the CTBT.

                                     RUSSIA

        Question. What areas of opportunity and cooperation do you believe
    the United States could take to improve overall U.S.-Russian
    relationships?
        Answer. ASD/International Security Affairs (ISA) leads OSD's
    involvement in defense relations with Russia. If confirmed, I will work
    with ASD/ISA in support of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in
    those areas that fall under the ASD/GSA including nonproliferation,
    nuclear security, and missile defense. I believe that the historic
    cooperation with Russia under the CTR program could help guide such
    future cooperation.
        Question. Would you support an expansion of the U.S. and Russian
    military-to-military relationship?
        Answer. While I do support such cooperation, my understanding is
    that the office of the ASD/GSA has minimal involvement in military-to-
    military relations with Russia, and if confirmed, I would look to the
    ASD/ISA to guide such contacts and to support that office as needed.
        Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, on these
    issues?
        Answer. If confirmed, I expect to work with the ASD/ISA, U.S.
    European Command, and the Joint Staff as appropriate, on any issue
    relating to nuclear policy and arms control, missile defense
    cooperation, combating WMD, and the space and cyberspace domains.

                                 CYBERSECURITY

        Question. What are the main policy challenges facing DOD in the
    area of cybersecurity, both within the Department and with respect to
    the Federal Government as a whole?
        Answer. My understanding is that the Department's primary policy
    challenge is to determine how U.S. Government departments and agencies
    can best collaborate to provide for the cybersecurity of Federal
    Government systems and U.S. critical information infrastructure. The
    President's International Strategy for Cyberspace calls for a whole-of-
    government approach to cybersecurity while ensuring the continued
    promotion of an open, interoperable, secure and reliable information
    and communications infrastructure. I am told that the Department is a
    full partner in these efforts, which include a commitment to protect
    the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. citizens.
        Question. What should the Defense Department's role be in defending
    the Nation against cyber threats? Should the Department play the lead
    role in stopping attacks from abroad through cyberspace, just as the
    Department defends the Nation from attack by missiles, aircraft, or
    ships?
        Answer. DOD has cyberdefense capabilities that make it an
    invaluable player in defending the Nation against cyber threats, but it
    should not be the lead in non-DOD cybersecurity. My understanding is
    that DHS is the lead for U.S. Federal Government and critical
    information infrastructure security, a designation with which I agree.
    The challenge for DOD is to leverage its cybersecurity capabilities to
    ensure that other agencies, under DHS leadership, are synchronized
    appropriately for the best defense of U.S. Government networks and
    critical infrastructure.
        Question. What should be the role of law enforcement and DHS in
    directing operations to defend the Nation in cyberspace?
        Answer. I understand that the DHS is the lead for the cybersecurity
    of non-DOD U.S. Federal systems, and critical infrastructure, a
    designation with which I agree. Law enforcement can play a key role in
    U.S. cyber defense by assisting in development of complete forensic
    information regarding a cyber-intrusion and should maintain its
    criminal investigative responsibilities. This is an essential step in
    formulating a U.S. policy and operational response. I am told that DOD
    organizations such as the Defense Cyber Crime Center have been working
    to improve collaboration with various law enforcement agencies within
    DHS and the Department of Justice to ensure enhanced cybersecurity of
    federal and critical information infrastructure systems.
        Question. What organizational and operational construct would allow
    multiple departments and agencies to mount an effective, unified
    defense of the Nation's cyber networks and resources?
        Answer. My understanding is that the administration's current
    organizational construct allows multiple departments and agencies to
    develop, implement, and maintain an effective, unified defense of our
    federal and critical information infrastructure networks and the
    resources that reside or pass through those networks. DOD leads this
    effort, developing plans to secure Federal Government (.gov) systems.
    My understanding is that DOD is responsible for the security of its
    networks, some classified government networks, and is currently engaged
    with the defense industrial base, through a pilot program, to look at
    the appropriate role for DOD to protect defense industrial base
    information systems. I would note that the legislation recently
    submitted by the President would, if enacted, address many of these
    issues, including the ability to share information.
        Question. In your view, is there a need for a strategy and doctrine
    for deterring foreign adversaries from engaging in attacks on the
    United States through cyberspace, just as there is a nuclear deterrence
    strategy and doctrine based on the threat of retaliation?
        Answer. Yes. I believe there is a need to develop a deterrence
    strategy in cyberspace. The President's International Strategy for
    Cyberspace states, ``The United States will ensure that all risks
    associated with attacking or exploiting our networks vastly outweigh
    the potential benefits'' and reserves the right to defend vital
    national assets as necessary and appropriate. If confirmed, I would
    devote considerable attention to developing appropriate policies and
    guidance to ensure that all DOD components are coordinated closely in
    this rapidly evolving aspect of our national security posture.
        Question. Should the United States have the ability, and announce
    the intention, to undertake offensive operations in cyberspace, through
    DOD, in retaliation against, or to defeat, foreign aggression in
    cyberspace? Does such doctrine exist today, in your view?
        Answer. The President's recently announced International Strategy
    for Cyberspace states that the United States will maintain the full
    spectrum of options for cyber deterrence, and that the United States
    will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other
    threat to our country. The strategy highlights that nations' inherent
    right of self-defense applies to cyberspace. If confirmed, I would
    devote considerable attention to developing appropriate policies and
    guidance to ensure that all DOD components are coordinated closely in
    this rapidly evolving aspect of our national security posture.
        Question. When do you expect the Department to have a policy and
    rules of engagement for offensive operations in cyberspace?
        Answer. My understanding is that DOD and the executive branch have
    existing policies and rules of engagement for cyberspace, but that
    further development and clarification may be useful. The Strategy for
    Operating in Cyberspace provides guidance on DOD's role in cyberspace.
    If confirmed, I will work with senior leaders in OSD, U.S. Cyber
    Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and the Joint Staff to ensure that
    rules of engagement are consistent with applicable international laws,
    and drafted to allow us to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners,
    and our interests.
        Question. Defending cyberspace implies the need for conducting
    surveillance in cyberspace to achieve the ability to warn of threats
    and to characterize them.
        Can surveillance in cyberspace be conducted effectively without
    impinging on the privacy interests of the American people?
        Answer. While this is a challenge, the privacy of U.S. persons
    should be protected. Balancing requirements for surveillance in
    cyberspace against privacy interests of the American people is a
    critical element of any policy or strategy for government operations in
    cyberspace. The balance between national security and privacy is one we
    have confronted many times before in other security domains. If
    confirmed, I will ensure that the Department's senior leadership is
    fully invested in decisionmaking on this essential civil liberties
    challenge.
        Question. In your view, will it be necessary to publicly disclose
    more information about the government's plans and methods for
    conducting surveillance in cyberspace in order to explain how civil
    liberties and privacy will be protected?
        Answer. While the public's understanding of the threat is growing,
    it is not clear to me at this time whether there is a good
    understanding of the actions that are taken or could be taken by the
    U.S. Government. If confirmed, I will devote all necessary attention to
    ensure that policies and procedures are appropriate to support public
    confidence in DOD's cyberspace activities.

                            CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

        Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
    appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
    briefings, and other communications of information.
        Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
    this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
    committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
    information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
    with respect to your responsibilities as the ASD/GSA?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
    other communications of information are provided to this committee and
    its staff and other appropriate committees?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
    such documents?
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

                          PREVENTING ANOTHER WIKILEAKS

        1. Senator McCain. Ms. Creedon, a cyber defense, or shield, should
    defend against insider threats, such as the downloading of classified
    documents in Wikileaks. Setting Department of Defense (DOD) computers
    to prevent unauthorized downloading or transmission of data would seem
    to be a necessary systemic precaution. What role would you expect to
    play as the Assistant Secretary in countering these kinds of insider
    threats?
        Ms. Creedon. No matter how strong we make our external defenses, we
    will constantly face an insider threat. DOD's recently released Defense
    Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace outlines top-level requirements to
    mitigate that threat. The strategy states that in order to deter and
    mitigate insider threats, DOD will strengthen its workforce
    communications, workforce accountability, internal monitoring, and
    information management capabilities.
        As Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, I
    will work closely with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Intelligence and the DOD Chief Information Officer, as well as our
    military departments, defense agencies, and combatant command partners,
    as we implement our Defense Strategy for Cyberspace Operations and
    defend against insider threats.

                           NUCLEAR DECLARATORY POLICY

        2. Senator McCain. Ms. Creedon, the longstanding nuclear
    declaratory policy of calculated ambiguity has been embraced by past
    administrations on a bipartisan basis and was strongly endorsed by the
    Perry-Schlesinger Commission in their 2009 report. Unfortunately, this
    administration, in my opinion, recklessly abandoned this longstanding
    policy in its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) which asserted that the
    United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
    non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nonproliferation
    Treaty (NPT), a shift in policy which some argue will lead our enemies
    to rapidly develop chemical and biological weapons. Do you support this
    significant change in our declaratory policy?
        Ms. Creedon. I support the change in declaratory policy that sends
    a strong message to Iran and any other future states parties that fail
    to comply with the NPT. Under the previous U.S. ``negative security
    assurance,'' the United States indicated it would ``not use nuclear
    weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the [NPT].''
        The previous policy statement implied that the United States would
    not consider as an option the use of nuclear weapons against Iran, a
    non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT, ``except in the case of an
    invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its
    Armed Forces or other troops, its allies, or on a state towards which
    it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-
    nuclear-weapon state in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon
    state.''
        The revised negative security assurance in the 2010 NPR addresses
    this issue by committing that the United States ``will not use or
    threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that
    are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-
    proliferation obligations,'' thus leaving the door open to using or
    threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states parties
    to the NPT, like Iran, that are in violation of the NPT.
        U.S. declaratory policy, as stated in the 2010 NPR, has a number of
    distinct audiences, including both potential adversaries we wish to
    deter, and allies and partners we wish to reassure. With respect to
    potential adversaries, the NPR affirmed that ``any state eligible for
    the assurance that uses chemical or biological weapons (CBW) against
    the United States or its allies and partners would face the prospect of
    a devastating conventional military response.'' In addition, the NPR
    states that the United States reserves the right to make any
    adjustments to this assurance that may be warranted by the evolution
    and proliferation of the biological weapons threat, and U.S. capacities
    to counter that threat.
        In the case of states that possess nuclear weapons and states that
    fail to comply with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations, the NPR
    makes clear that there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which
    U.S. nuclear weapons still play a role in deterring conventional or CBW
    attack against the United States or its allies and partners. This
    statement makes clear what the risks and consequences may be for those
    states considering the use of CBW against the United States, or its
    allies and partners. As such, the 2010 NPR is less a significant
    departure from previous declaratory policy than a refinement that takes
    into account present day challenges and future risks, while preserving
    U.S. flexibility. This is an evolution that I support.

        3. Senator McCain. Ms. Creedon, how does the new policy make us
    safer and deter the growing nuclear ambitions of rogue nations like
    North Korea and Iran?
        Ms. Creedon. The revised declaratory policy proclaims that states
    that do not comply with the NPT are not covered by the U.S. ``negative
    security assurance''. This change in policy makes clear that, in
    addition to sanctions, pursuing nuclear proliferation carries the
    additional risk that the United States may consider the use of nuclear
    in response to nuclear or non-nuclear attack.
        The 2010 NPR states that ``the United States . . . would only
    consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend
    the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.''
    The NPR emphasizes that in cases where a country possesses nuclear
    weapons, but fails to comply with its nuclear nonproliferation
    obligations, there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which
    U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring conventional,
    chemical, or biological weapon attacks against the United States, or
    its allies and partners. Together, these statements make clear what the
    risks and consequences may be for states considering the use or
    threatening the use of nuclear weapons or CBW against the United States
    or its allies and partners.

                                 DEFENSE SPACE

        4. Senator McCain. Ms. Creedon, in your advance policy questions
    you were asked if you support arms control limitations on space
    capabilities. In your response, you stated that you support the
    principles outlined in the 2010 National Space Policy which clearly
    states that the administration will ``consider proposals and concepts
    for arms control measures if they are equitable, effectively
    verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United States and
    its allies.'' Do you agree that space capabilities--including the
    ground and space segments and supporting links--are vital to our
    national interests?
        Ms. Creedon. Yes. I agree with the President's 2010 National Space
    Policy statement that the sustainability, stability, free access to,
    and use of space are vital to U.S. national interests. Thus, any arms
    control measures should be evaluated in terms of our national interests
    to determine whether they would enhance our national security. If the
    terms of any such agreement would not enhance our national security
    objectives, I would not support the agreement.

        5. Senator McCain. Ms. Creedon, do you agree that freedom of action
    in space is as important to the United States as air power and sea
    power?
        Ms. Creedon. A key objective of the 2011 National Security Space
    Strategy, as I understand it, is to maintain and enhance the strategic
    national security advantages afforded to the United States by space in
    an environment that is increasingly congested, contested, and
    competitive. Space capabilities provide the United States and our
    allies unprecedented strategic advantages in national decisionmaking,
    military operations, and Homeland security. Similar to our air and
    naval systems, space systems provide national security decisionmakers
    with unfettered global access, and create an advantage by enabling a
    rapid and tailored response to global challenges. As the President's
    National Security Strategy makes clear, the sea, air, and space domains
    must be protected from those who would deny us access or use them for
    hostile purposes.

        6. Senator McCain. Ms. Creedon, are you committed to informing
    Congress prior to signing any multilateral commitments on space
    activities?
        Ms. Creedon. I am committed to keeping Congress fully informed in a
    timely fashion on efforts in this area.
                                     ______

                 Question Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss

                               FLY-BEFORE-YOU-BUY

        7. Senator Chambliss. Ms. Creedon, in your responses to the advance
    policy questions you commented on the Fly-Before-You-Buy approach to
    missile defense and, specifically, said that you agree that ``before
    new capabilities are deployed they must undergo testing that enables an
    assessment under realistic operational conditions against threat-
    representative targets to demonstrate that they will be effective and
    reliable.''
        While I don't necessarily disagree with the Fly-Before-You-Buy
    approach, I do believe that missile defenses are fundamentally
    different than other DOD systems and that therefore our criteria for
    testing and fielding them should also be different.
        For example, if 95 percent of the time a fighter plane took off it
    was able to land successfully, but 5 percent of the time it crashed,
    that would be unacceptable and we would never tolerate it. However, if
    95 percent of the time we launched a ballistic missile interceptor it
    hit its target, but 5 percent of the time it missed, in my view that is
    a good track record and infinitely better than having no missile
    defense system at all, particularly given the exceptional complexity of
    hitting a missile with another missile in outer space.
        What are your thoughts on this and do you believe that, when it
    comes to protecting our country from a possible nuclear attack, and
    given the choice between fielding a system which although not perfect
    is very effective--or instead--fielding no system at all, that it may
    be acceptable to have different standards for what represents
    operationally effective and reliable with respect to ballistic missile
    defense than we have for some other DOD programs?
        Ms. Creedon. I agree that we should take a common-sense approach to
    standards for assessing what constitutes an operationally effective and
    reliable system. Operationally realistic testing presents a picture of
    the operational capabilities of the system. When a system is deployed,
    the warfighter needs to know its capabilities. Operationally realistic
    testing would also inform any future modifications needed to improve
    the performance of the system, either before or after deployment. It is
    my understanding that DOD is pursuing a balanced approach that seeks to
    conduct operationally realistic missile defense testing to ensure such
    systems are reliable, effective, and responsive to warfighter
    requirements. This approach recognizes that even less than perfect
    defenses can strengthen both deterrence and the protection of deployed
    forces, the U.S. Homeland, and allies. Moreover, given the grave
    consequences of a ballistic missile attack with WMD, DOD is executing a
    rigorous test program that will continue to improve our missile defense
    systems to make them as reliable and effective as possible.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Madelyn R. Creedon follows:]
                        Nomination Reference and Report
                               As In Executive Session,
                                   Senate of the United States,
                                                        March 14, 2011.
        Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
    on Armed Services:
        Madelyn R. Creedon of Indiana, to be an Assistant Secretary of
    Defense, vice Michael Nacht.
                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of Madelyn R. Creedon, which was
    transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
    referred, follows:]
                   Biographical Sketch of Madelyn R. Creedon
    Education:
             University of Evansville

                     September 1969-June 1973
                     BA awarded June 1973

             Tulane University School of Law

                     September 1973-June 1974

             St. Louis University School of Law

                     September 1974-June 1976
                     JD awarded June 1976
    Employment Record:
             Senate Committee on Armed Services, Counsel, January
            2001-present
             U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security
            Administration, Assistant Administrator for Defense Programs,
            June 2000-January 2001
             Senate Committee on Armed Services, Counsel, March
            1997-July 2000
             U.S. Department of Energy, Associate Deputy Secretary
            for National Security, November 1995-March 1997
             Base Realignment and Closure Commission, General
            Counsel, November 1994-November 1995
             Senate Committee on Armed Services, Counsel, February
            1990-November 1994
             U.S. Department of Energy, Trial Attorney, July 1980-
            February 1990
             Private practice of law, September 1977-July 1980
             Alexandria City Attorney's Office, Law Clerk, March
            1977-September 1977 (Approximately)

    Honors and awards:
             Department of Energy, Secretary's Achievement Award,
            2001
             Department of Energy, Distinguished Service Award,
            1990
                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
    nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by Madelyn R.
    Creedon in connection with her nomination follows:]

                              UNITED STATES SENATE
                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                                  Room SR-228
                           Washington, DC 20510-6050
                                 (202) 224-3871
                        COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
          BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

        Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
    more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
    form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
    of your answer applies.

                        Part A--Biographical Information

        Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
    this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
    public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
    any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

        1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
        Madelyn Raub Creedon.

        2. Position to which nominated:
        Assistant Secretary of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of
    Department of Defense, Policy.

        3. Date of nomination:
        March 14, 2011.

        4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
        [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
    committee's executive files.]

        5. Date and place of birth:
        November 1, 1951; Indianapolis, IN.

        6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
        Married to James J. Bracco.

        7. Names and ages of children:
        Meredith Bracco Walsh, age 29.
        John Edward Bracco, age 26.

        8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
    dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
        Broad Ripple High School, 1964-1969, High School Diploma
        University of Evansville, 1969-1973, BA
        Tulane University School of Law, 1973-1974
        St. Louis University School of Law, 1974-1976, JD

        9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
    last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
    job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
        Counsel, Senate Committee on Armed Services, January 2001-present
        Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, National Nuclear
    Security Administration, July 2000-January 2001

        10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
    honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
    or local governments, other than those listed above.
        Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Energy, July 1980-February 1990
        Counsel, Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 1990-November
    1994
        General Counsel, Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission,
    November 1994-October 1995
        Associate Deputy Secretary of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy,
    October 1995-March 1997
        Counsel, Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 1997-July 2000

        11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
    officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
    or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
    business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
        None.

        12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
    professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
    other organizations.
        Daughters of the American Revolution
        Women in Aerospace

        13. Political affiliations and activities:
        (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
    any public office for which you have been a candidate.
        None.
        (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
    to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
    years.
        None.
        (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
    organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
    entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
        None.

        14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
    society memberships, military medals, and any other special
    recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
        DOE Secretary's Achievement Award, 2001
        DOE Distinguished Service Award, 1990

        15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
    books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
    written.
        None.

        16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
    speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
    copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
    been nominated.
        None.

        17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
        (a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
    conflicts of interest?
        Yes.
        (b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
    would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
        No.
        (c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
    deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
    for the record in hearings?
        Yes.
        (d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
    response to congressional requests?
        Yes.
        (e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
    testimony or briefings?
        Yes.
        (f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
    before this committee?
        Yes.
        (g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
    such documents?
        Yes.
                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
    committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
    forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
    Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                    ------

                               Signature and Date
        I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
    on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
    provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
    and complete.
                                                    Madelyn R. Creedon.
        This 13th day of April, 2011.

        [The nomination of Madelyn R. Creedon was reported to the
    Senate by Chairman Levin on August 2, 2011, with the
    recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
    was confirmed by the Senate on August 2, 2011.
                                  ----------

        [Prepared questions submitted to Alan F. Estevez by
    Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
    follow:]
                            Questions and Responses

                                DEFENSE REFORMS

        Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
    Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
    strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
    enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
    of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
    commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
    to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
    to the combatant commanders.
        Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
    provisions?
        Answer. Currently I see no specific changes in the act that I would
    recommend.
        Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
    address in these modifications?
        Answer. Currently I see no specific changes in the act that I would
    recommend.

                                     DUTIES

        Question. Section 138a of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness is
    to serve as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the
    Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
    (USD(AT&L)) on logistics and materiel readiness in the Department of
    Defense (DOD).
        If confirmed as Assistant Secretary of Defense, what would you view
    as your principal responsibilities to the Secretary and the Under
    Secretary?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would fulfill the statutory
    responsibilities of being the principal advisor on logistics and
    materiel readiness issues to the Secretary and the USD(AT&L), and
    serving as the principal logistics official for DOD. In this capacity,
    my responsibilities would include providing oversight and developing
    policy for all logistics, maintenance, materiel readiness, strategic
    mobility, and sustainment support programs.
        Question. If confirmed, what other duties do you expect that the
    Secretary and the Under Secretary would prescribe for you?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would remain responsive to changes of
    mission and leadership direction. I would work to provide superior
    logistics support to the warfighter and find new ways to provide the
    goods and services we offer in a more efficient and cost effective
    manner. I strongly believe that logistics has been and will always be a
    key enabler to the warfighter.
        Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
    believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
        Answer. I believe my extensive experience in a variety of positions
    as a DOD logistician qualifies me to perform the duties of this
    position. I am currently serving as the Principal Deputy Assistant
    Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Materiel Readiness). In this
    capacity, I am responsible for guiding the transformation of DOD
    logistics processes to ensure cost-effective joint logistics support to
    support the warfighter.
        Furthermore, I have served in every leadership position within the
    Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel
    Readiness during my tenure in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    (OSD). I understand fully the linkages between different logistics
    capabilities, as well as the relationship between the Department, the
    Services, our interagency partners, and Congress. My experience
    provides me with a grounded perspective and insight into DOD
    operations, allows me to quickly assess a diverse range of issues, and
    make the rapid but informed decisions needed to support our national
    interests. I have also worked extensively with the commercial sector to
    understand best logistics practices across a wide range of industrial
    and commercial activities.
        Question. Do you believe that there are any additional steps that
    you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform these duties?
        Answer. I believe I am prepared to commence these duties, if
    confirmed. I would embrace this position with enthusiasm and energy.

                                 RELATIONSHIPS

        Question. If confirmed, what would your relationship be with:
        The Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would serve as the principal advisor to the
    Secretary of Defense on logistics and materiel readiness issues within
    the DOD.
        Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would serve as the principal advisor to the
    USD(AT&L) on all logistics and materiel readiness issues in DOD. I
    would also monitor, review, and provide oversight of all logistics,
    maintenance, materiel readiness, and sustainment support programs
    within DOD, in accordance with applicable DOD policies. In addition, I
    would assist the USD(AT&L) in the performance of his duties relating to
    acquisition and technology (logistics and materiel readiness) in any
    other capacity that he might direct.
        Question. The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
        Answer. If confirmed, my relationship with the Principal Deputy
    USD(AT&L) would be the same as that described above in relation to the
    USD(AT&L).
        Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
    Readiness.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Under Secretary
    of Defense for Personnel and Readiness so that we can both carry out
    our statutory obligations relating to readiness.
        Question. The Director for Logistics (J4), the Joint Staff.
        Answer. If confirmed, my relationship with the Director for
    Logistics (J4), the Joint Staff, would be based on my role as principal
    advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the USD(AT&L) on logistics and
    materiel readiness in DOD, and as the principal advisor to the Chairman
    of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on logistics and materiel readiness.
        Question. The Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force
    Development (J7), the Joint Staff.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would coordinate and exchange information
    with the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development,
    the Joint Staff, to ensure that DOD logistics and materiel readiness
    policies are coordinated with operational planning and joint force
    development requirements.
        Question. The Director for Force Structure, Resources, and
    Assessment (J8), the Joint Staff.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would coordinate and exchange information
    with the Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment (J8),
    to ensure DOD logistics and materiel readiness policies are coordinated
    with force structure and resource requirements.
        Question. Commander, U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM).
        Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to continue to work closely
    with the Commander, TRANSCOM, to ensure seamless support to meet
    warfighter requirements.
        Question. The Defense Logistics Agency.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would exercise authority, direction, and
    control over the Defense Logistics Agency through its Director.
        Question. The Army Materiel Command.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would coordinate and exchange information
    with the Commanding General, Army Materiel Command, to ensure DOD
    logistics and materiel readiness policies are coordinated with Army
    materiel requirements.
        Question. The Naval Sea Systems Command.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would coordinate and exchange information
    with the Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, to ensure DOD logistics
    and materiel readiness policies are coordinated with Navy materiel
    requirements.
        Question. The Naval Air Systems Command.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would coordinate and exchange information
    with the Commander, Naval Air Systems Command, to ensure DOD logistics
    and materiel readiness policies are coordinated with Navy materiel
    requirements.
        Question. The Marine Corps Systems Command.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would coordinate and exchange information
    with the Commander, Marine Corps Systems Command, to ensure DOD
    logistics and materiel readiness policies are coordinated with Marine
    materiel requirements.
        Question. The Air Force Materiel Command.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would coordinate and exchange information
    with the Commander, Air Force Materiel Command, to ensure DOD logistics
    and materiel readiness policies are coordinated with Air Force materiel
    requirements.

                         MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

        Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
    the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel
    Readiness?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would anticipate the major challenges to
    be:

        (1)  Ensuring our warfighters engaged in contingency operations are
    provided with the best possible logistics support in an era of limited
    resources. While my key focus in this area would be on our drawdown of
    forces and transition to the Department of State in Iraq, and continued
    sustainment of our operations in Afghanistan, I would ensure that we
    have logistics capability to support any contingency or humanitarian
    operation.
        (2)  Integrating lifecycle management and long-term logistics
    planning into the acquisition process.
        (3)  Optimizing the DOD supply chain so that it is globally
    responsive to the demands of our warfighters.

        While focused on these priorities, I would work to ensure that
    support was seamless, cost-effective, and timely. I would strive to
    lower costs and continuously evaluate ways to improve support.
        Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
    addressing these challenges?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would:

        (1)  Continue to optimize all elements of the DOD's logistics
    community to include commercial partners and build on measures that
    would effectively support our warfighters at the best value to the
    American taxpayers.
        (2)  Continue to partner with our Services, the OSD agencies,
    program offices, and industry partners to integrate long-term lifecycle
    management considerations early on and throughout the acquisition
    process.
        (3)  Continue to manage supply chain policy and refine our
    logistics processes to ensure that the DOD operates at its optimum
    capacity while providing seamless support to the warfighter.

        I would continue to streamline operations and enhance capabilities,
    where appropriate. We continue to work to find more joint solutions
    from procurement to day-to-day logistics support. This is a natural
    progression from the way we fight as a joint force to the way we must
    jointly provision in the future.

           DEGRADATION OF EQUIPMENT READINESS DUE TO OPERATIONS TEMPO

        Question. The committee has received testimony from senior DOD
    officials and the Military Services citing the effects of operations
    tempo on the materiel readiness of equipment deployed in support of
    contingency operations.
        What is your understanding of the extent to which current
    operations are impacting the service life of major equipment items?
        Answer. The engagement of all Services during nearly 10 years of
    combat since September 11 does have lifespan implications. High usage
    of equipment based on an aggressive operational tempo, coupled with the
    harsh environments in which these systems operate, create logistical
    challenges that the Department must deal with on a continuing basis in
    order to ensure readiness of critical systems. This is especially true
    of ground combat equipment and helicopters, but also applies to key Air
    Force and Navy platforms.
        Question. If confirmed, what would your approach be to regenerating
    materiel readiness that has been degraded by operations tempo?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that we reset our
    systems to a level where we can adequately support the Nation's
    objectives. After 10 years of conflict we must realize that many of our
    systems have been degraded and are in need of extensive maintenance in
    order to bring them back to an acceptable level of operational
    readiness. DOD will need to make sure that dollars are spent wisely to
    gain the highest degree of readiness possible.

                      DRAWDOWN, RESET, AND RECONSTITUTION

        Question. The military departments face a major challenge in
    resetting and reconstituting their equipment as they draw down their
    forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army and the Marine Corps
    anticipate that this effort will continue for several years beyond the
    end of military operations.
        Do you believe that the Army and the Marine Corps have set aside
    adequate levels of funding in their budgets for fiscal year 2012 and
    future years to meet anticipated reset and reconstitution requirements?
        Answer. Reset and reconstitution of both Army and Marine Corps
    equipment is dependent upon Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) or
    supplemental funding, as baseline budgets are insufficient to cover
    these costs. We must expect to fund reset for 2 to 3 years beyond the
    end of major contingency operations.
        Question. If not, what steps do you believe the Department should
    take to ensure that this effort is successfully completed in a timely
    manner?
        Answer. Currently, the depots and reset facilities are workloaded
    to satisfy the Services' readiness requirements within available
    funding allocations. To ensure work is accomplished in a timely manner,
    we must continuously improve our processes while ensuring that adequate
    funding (from both base and OCO accounts) is available. If confirmed, I
    would ensure we request the appropriate resources, reduce logistics
    operating costs, reduce total maintenance and supply-chain cycle-times,
    and increase the effectiveness of all of our programs.

                     AIR FORCE AND NAVY MAINTENANCE FUNDING

        Question. In recent years, the Navy and Air Force appear to have
    significantly underfunded readiness accounts for maintenance and repair
    of ships and aircraft and relied upon Congress to provide additional
    funding in response to unfunded requirements lists. As the country
    faces an increasingly difficult budget situation, it is likely to
    become increasingly difficult for Congress to address these unfunded
    requirements.
        Do you believe that maintenance and repair of ships and aircraft
    has received an appropriate level of priority in the budget processes
    of the Navy and the Air Force?
        Answer. The Navy and the Air Force continue to plan for and request
    sufficient funding to manage the maintenance and repair of ships and
    aircraft.
        However, reset and reconstitution of both Navy and Air Force
    equipment is dependent upon OCO or supplemental funding, as baseline
    budgets are insufficient to cover these costs.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to
    address this issue?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work to ensure we request adequate
    resources to allow us to maximize readiness. I would make certain that
    we strive to reduce logistics operating costs, reduce total maintenance
    and supply-chain cycle-times, and increase the effectiveness of all of
    our programs.

                       DEPOT MAINTENANCE STRATEGIC PLANS

        Question. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported
    that the Military Services lack clear and comprehensive depot
    maintenance strategic plans addressing capital investment in facilities
    and equipment, implementation of a methodology to revitalize and
    resource organic depot facilities, public-private partnerships,
    workforce planning and development, and the integration of logistics
    enterprise planning systems.
        What is your understanding of the extent to which the Military
    Services have updated or revised their depot maintenance strategic
    plans to address current and future reset requirements, the type and
    mix of equipment expected to return for reset, equipping priorities,
    required reset funds for operations and maintenance, and the impact of
    contractor support work to reset equipment?
        Answer. The Military Services regularly update their depot
    maintenance strategic plans. I believe they are generally prepared to
    adjust to new equipping priorities and have been successfully
    performing reset and other maintenance functions for the past 8 years.
    The appropriate mix of organic and contractor support is also
    conforming to the 50/50 statute as well.
        Question. Do you believe that the steps taken by the Military
    Services are adequate, or are additional measures needed?
        Answer. Yes, I do believe that the steps the Services are currently
    taking are appropriate given the warfighting requirements and available
    resources. If confirmed, I would look for additional opportunities to
    seek efficiencies and increase effectiveness across the logistics
    enterprise.
        Question. What is your understanding of the extent to which the
    Military Services have assessed the effects of reset on the baseline
    budgets, competing demands to reset equipment to meet unit readiness
    goals, the preservation of core capabilities, and the risk level that
    organic depot maintenance facilities may be able to accommodate in
    order to complete reset workload requirements?
        Answer. Reset for all Services is reliant on OCO funding as well as
    on baseline budgets. Currently, the depots and reset facilities are
    workloaded to satisfy the Services' readiness requirements within
    available funding allocations. To ensure work is accomplished in a
    timely manner we must continuously improve our processes while ensuring
    that adequate funding (from both base and OCO accounts) is available.
    We must expect to fund reset for 2 to 3 years beyond the end of major
    OCOs.
        Question. Do you believe that the steps taken by the Military
    Services are adequate or are additional measures needed?
        Answer. I believe that the Services are taking appropriate steps
    and performing the correct activities to ensure long-term sustainment
    of equipment. If confirmed, I would ensure we request the appropriate
    resources, reduce logistics operating costs, reduce total maintenance
    and supply chain cycle times, and increase the effectiveness of all of
    our programs.
        Question. What is your understanding of the extent to which the
    depots' plans address the need to manage workload as current operations
    draw down and decreases in maintenance requirements when these
    operations end?
        Answer. As a Department, we are preparing to draw down prudently to
    ensure the warfighter is supported and equipped properly. Air Force and
    Navy requirements will change very little due to the nature of
    commitments placed on them in Operation New Dawn (OND)/Operation
    Enduring Freedom (OEF). However, the Army and Marine Corps requirements
    will decrease in direct proportion to the drawdown of deployed forces.
    There will be a 2- to 3-year enduring requirement during the post-
    drawdown phase to ensure that all reset and other maintenance work is
    completed and forces are readied for future requirements. If confirmed,
    I would look for additional opportunities to seek efficiencies and
    increase effectiveness across the logistics enterprise.
        Question. Do you believe that the steps taken by the Military
    Services are adequate or are additional measures needed?
        Answer. Yes, I do believe that the steps the Services are currently
    taking are appropriate given the warfighting requirements and available
    resources. If confirmed, I would continue to examine this issue closely
    to identify whether additional measures are needed.

                        ARMY UNIT EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS

        Question. As the pace of overseas operations declines, the Army is
    resetting equipment and rebuilding the readiness of its forces. Two
    documents--Modification Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE),
    and Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA)--provide the basic
    personnel and equipment requirements against which on-hand personnel
    and equipment are measured in determining unit readiness. During our
    operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. Central Command repeatedly
    requested force capabilities that did not align well with Army MTOEs.
        What is your understanding of the action the Army is taking to
    review and update unit requirements so that they better reflect the
    needs of the combatant commands?
        Answer. All Services, including the Army, continually adjust to
    meet the changing requirements of the mission. Multiple DOD/Service
    Centers ensure that the lessons learned are incorporated into Service/
    DOD doctrine, as appropriate. These efforts shape the current and
    future training of our men and women in uniform, as well as the
    equipment that they use. For example, when improvised explosive devices
    (IED) became the prevalent threat to the health and safety of our
    troops engaged in OND/OEF, service-specific tactics, techniques, and
    procedures (TTP) changed to meet that threat and the acquisition and
    logistics arms of the DOD partnered to produce multiple variants of the
    Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) family of vehicles. The Army has
    ongoing work to ensure its ability to sustain items acquired to meet
    urgent operational needs. The Department continues to work to train and
    equip units for emerging and nontraditional missions as outlined in the
    Quadrennial Defense Review.
        Question. Do you believe that this action is adequate or are
    additional measures needed?
        Answer. Yes, this action is appropriate.
        Question. If confirmed, how will you approach the task of ensuring
    that unit equipment requirement documents (MTOE and TDA) are updated in
    sufficient time to be considered in the development of future budget
    requests?
        Answer. This issue is largely a Service responsibility and they
    must determine what equipment they need to support the operational
    mission. However, I recognize that rapidly developing threats require
    the rapid fielding of systems to meet them. We are doing this now by
    integrating with organizations like the Joint Improvised Explosive
    Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), and with our Joint Rapid
    Acquisition Cell, where we address these types of issues early on to
    improve systems and support the warfighter. If confirmed, I would plan
    to continue this work.

                      AIRCRAFT CONDITION-BASED MAINTENANCE

        Question. DOD helicopters are under high demand and flying well
    beyond their anticipated flying hours, and the Army is currently
    engaged in an effort to install digital source collectors (DSC) on its
    manned aircraft (AH-64 A, AH64 D, CH-47 D, CH-47 F, MH-47 G, UH-60 A,
    UH-60 L, UH-60 M, MH-60 L, MH-6, and OH-58 D) in order to conduct
    Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM). The DSC are being installed on all
    new production utilizing procurement appropriations. However, the
    funding of the transmission, storage, and analysis of the data is
    minimally funded and heavily leveraged with OCO funding at this point.
    An Army Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology report released this
    month stated, ``there is clear evidence that CBM+ technologies and
    procedures have avoided at least three catastrophic Class A accidents
    that would have resulted in the total loss of the aircraft.''
        Do you believe the Army should extend the Product Improvement Pilot
    Program beyond fiscal year 2013? If so, why?
        Answer. The Army has taken advantage of the current authority and
    is in the process of completing an assessment of the Aviation Pilot
    Program. As requested by current legislation, the Army will provide a
    report and recommendation to Congress in fiscal year 2012. I believe
    the Army's current direction is prudent and will allow both the
    Department and Congress ample opportunities to take action and make
    corrections as necessary in the future.
        Question. What is your understanding of the Army's plans to fund
    the transmission, storage, and analysis of the data that are important
    to improving maintenance efforts, decreasing maintenance and spare part
    costs, and increasing readiness?
        Answer. The Army funds Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM) functions,
    such as CBM data storage, analysis, and transmission, within the budget
    cycle. The long-term strategy for CBM data transmission, storage, and
    analysis includes the integration of actionable logistics data in a
    future increment of the Global Combat Service Support-Army (GCSS-A).
    The engineering unique CBM data transmission and storage requirements
    to enable weapon system performance analyses are separately funded from
    the GCSS-A.
        Question. Do you believe that the planned level of funding is
    adequate for this purpose?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2012 President's budget request is
    sufficient to meet our Condition-Based Maintenance data storage,
    analysis, and transmission critical requirements. If confirmed, I would
    work with the Army to adequately fund Condition-Based Maintenance
    Programs.
        Question. What is your understanding of the results of the
    condition-based maintenance effort thus far in terms of readiness and
    cost-savings?
        Answer. The beneficial outcomes of the Army's Aviation Condition-
    Based Maintenance program include a 3 to 12 percent reduction in Non-
    Mission Capable Maintenance rate, a 5 to 8 percent increase in fleet
    readiness, and a 1 to 4 percent reduction in Maintenance Test Flight
    Hours. These results have increased the Army's combat power, reduced
    maintenance costs, and have provided critical information that avoided
    catastrophic failures during flight.
        Question. What do you believe should be the overall goal of the
    Condition-Based Maintenance effort in the Army?
        Answer. I believe the overall goal of Condition-Based Maintenance-
    Plus (CBM+) should be to increase combat power by performing
    maintenance and supply functions based upon evidence of need. The Army
    has set forth four CBM program objectives to meet this goal:

        (1)  Decrease the maintenance burden
        (2)  Increase platform availability and readiness
        (3)  Enhance safety
        (4)  Reduce operations and support costs

                            ARMY PREPOSITIONED STOCK

        Question. As contingency operations in Iraq wind down, the Military
    Services have begun reconstituting their prepositioned equipment. At
    the same time, the Military Services have begun to review future
    requirements for their prepositioned stocks. We also understand that
    DOD also intends to include prepositioned stock in some of its
    department-wide strategy planning, and has a number of initiatives
    underway to improve the mobility system, responsiveness to forces, and
    effectiveness of prepositioned capabilities.
        What is your understanding of the extent to which the Department is
    working with the Military Services to develop an integrated requirement
    for prepositioned stocks that is based on a Department-wide strategy?
        Answer. The Department is currently conducting a prepositioning
    study that has a high probability of reshaping the future landscape of
    prepositioning programs. This initiative, The Comprehensive Materiel
    Response Plan (CMRP), is a VCJCS-directed and TRANSCOM/DLA-led study
    aimed at developing a comprehensive plan for DOD materiel positioning
    and distribution.
        Question. Do you believe that the Army has adequately assessed
    which of the many pieces of nonstandard equipment that were purchased
    to meet urgent warfighter needs should be added to the prepositioned
    stock sets?
        Answer. The assessment of which equipment goes into prepositioned
    stocks is generally driven by operational vice logistics
    considerations. All non-standard equipment the Army has procured is
    being systematically reviewed as part of the Army's Capabilities
    Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT) process. One of the possible
    outcomes for materiel going through CDRT is to be selected for stockage
    in Army Prepositioned Stock (APS). Probably the best example of
    nonstandard equipment being selected for APS is the MRAP--in fact, the
    majority of the total MRAP vehicle population will be positioned into
    global APS sets.
        Question. What additional reset and sustainment resources will be
    needed to add to these stocks?
        Answer. In order for the Army to complete its APS Strategy 2015,
    sets used in support of current operations will require the
    continuation of OCO funding to ensure the reset of equipment for future
    use.
        Question. Do you believe that these new requirements are
    appropriately accounted for in the APS Strategy 2015?
        Answer. I believe the Army is incorporating new requirement in APS
    2015. Currently, new requirements in the Army's APS sets include MRAP
    vehicles, Long Term Armor Strategy (LTAS) Tactical Wheeled Vehicles,
    and Counter Measure Electronic Warfare equipment. The Army continues to
    modernize its APS in accordance with warfighting strategy and
    priorities.
        Question. In your view, has the Army identified adequate funding to
    meet its plan of reconstituting its prepositioned stocks around the
    world by 2015?
        Answer. The Army is counting on the reset of theater retrograded
    equipment from OND and OEF in order to fill its Army Prepositioned
    Stock strategic requirements. In order for the Army to complete its APS
    Strategy 2015, sets used in support of current operations will require
    the continuation of OCO funding to ensure the reset of equipment for
    future use. Most of the equipment will come to the Army's Army
    prepositioned stock inventory from depot stocks or equipment already
    purchased.
        Question. What steps, if any, would you take if confirmed to
    address this issue?
        Answer. Prepositioning decisions are based on warfghting strategy
    and requirements that are informed by logistics capabilities. If
    confirmed, I would shape the future of prepositioning strategy by
    leveraging efforts such as the Comprehensive Material Readiness Plan to
    ensure our policies on prepositioned equipment provide the Services
    with the overarching guidance they need to make informed programming
    decisions. L&MR is currently incorporating improvements, including new
    reporting procedures that will provide Congress with greater insight
    into the Services prepositioning program.

           DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY FULFILLMENT OF SPARE PARTS ORDERS

        Question. Air Force Logistics Centers (ALC) have expressed
    frustration over DLA's inability to deliver some parts on time to the
    ALCs. DLA achieves a 94 percent fill rate for spare parts, however, the
    remaining 6 percent can occasionally ground an aircraft. Some parts can
    take well over a year to arrive at the ALCs and it appears that DLA
    will not order parts until the aircraft reaches an ALC. As a result,
    the Air Force is sometimes forced to cannibalize a part off of one
    aircraft to repair another.
        What is your view of DLA's track record on delivering parts to the
    Air Force's ALCs?
        Answer. DLA has acknowledged that there is room for continued
    improvement in delivering parts to the Air Force ALCs. It is working
    closely with the Air Force to improve performance and is sharply
    focused on the supply chain management planning activity. To accomplish
    this, DLA conducts senior leadership engagements to review issues of
    major importance to the Air Force. These engagements have improved
    demand forecasting and helped to standardize critical planning
    processes.
        The Air Force and DLA must continue to partner with one another to
    improve demand and supply chain processes. While we still have a way to
    go to improve our collaborative demand planning processes, the focus is
    there and we are seeing benefits.
        Question. What changes, if any, do you think are needed to improve
    DLA's performance in this regard?
        Answer. DLA is continuously working with the Air Force to improve
    performance. The efforts to standardize critical planning processes
    have improved demand forecasting. The Air Force and DLA will continue
    to partner to improve the supply chain process through synchronizing
    workflows between the Air Force industrial customers and DLA's
    distribution points. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that DLA
    remains responsive to the Air Force's needs.
        Question. What is your view of the High Velocity Maintenance (HVM)
    program and the role that it can play in expediting needed parts for
    aircraft maintenance?
        Answer. I fully support the HVM program and believe it is extremely
    beneficial to both the Air Force and DLA. It will provide
    predictability for the respective System Program Office's plan to
    induct weapon systems (down to the specific tail number) for repair
    which will improve demand planning accuracy. Improved demand planning
    accuracy will allow DLA to optimize its supply chain response to future
    customer requirements.

            BALANCED SCORECARD AND LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

        Question. DOD's logistics leadership has adopted the Balanced
    Scorecard concept as one of the important components of logistics
    performance management. The process of adapting and implementing the
    Balanced Scorecard in DOD is almost 2 years old.
        In your view, what are the benefits of the Balanced Scorecard for
    logistics performance management?
        Answer. While the Department does not currently use a formalized
    Balanced Scorecard, we do apply a performance framework to logistics
    which has many of the same attributes and objectives of the Balanced
    Scorecard. Performance is monitored quarterly against defined goals and
    targets for response time to customer (warfighter) requests. These
    include the total time for a customer to receive an ordered item
    (Customer Wait Time) and the percentage of orders filled to customer
    specification (Perfect Order Fulfillment). This framework is
    implemented as part of the Department's Strategic Management Plan and
    Performance Budget, and the performance measurements are reviewed by
    senior logisticians in the Services and DLA, by logistics leadership in
    OSD, and by the Deputy Chief Management Officer, as part of the process
    of monitoring Department-wide performance goals.
        Question. Do you believe that implementation of the Balanced
    Scorecard in DOD can be accelerated?
        Answer. We do not intend to accelerate implementation of a
    formalized Balanced Scorecard. However, as described above, we apply a
    performance framework for logistics which has many of the same
    attributes and objectives of the Balanced Scorecard. Performance is
    monitored quarterly against defined goals and targets. To meet these
    goals and targets, we are implementing key initiatives such as the
    Comprehensive Inventory Management Improvement Plan, automated
    identification technology, and improved Operational Contract Support
    (OCS), and we continue to seek ways to accelerate the time to implement
    fully these key initiatives.

                        CORROSION PREVENTION AND CONTROL

        Question. Congress and DOD have significantly increased their
    emphasis on the prevention and management of corrosion in equipment and
    materiel of the Services. Actions to address corrosion challenges
    include establishment of a central corrosion program management office
    and the institutionalization of corrosion prevention and mitigation as
    a key component of the Department's Planning, Programming, Budgeting,
    and Execution process.
        What is your understanding of the challenge to the readiness of the
    Military Services as a result of corrosion in equipment and materiel
    and the extent to which the Services are coordinating their efforts?
        Answer. Corrosion has a negative impact on readiness, cost, and
    safety. The Department has completed analyses over the last 5 years
    which provide the Services with detailed data on the cost of corrosion
    for weapon systems.
        Clearly, corrosion is a growing challenge that every weapon system
    in the DOD faces and, as such, the Department is aggressively working
    to share knowledge between the Services and commercial entities all
    aimed at finding the best solutions at the least cost to the
    Department.
        Question. If confirmed, what would be your relationship with the
    Director of Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would collaborate with the Director of
    Corrosion Policy and Oversight in several activities. Since corrosion
    is closely linked to sustainment, I would continue to foster this
    partnership.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you assess the implementation and
    effectiveness of corrosion prevention and control efforts in programs
    under your purview and, working with other responsible officials,
    address identified areas of concern?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would aggressively attack this growing
    logistics issue by collaborating with the Director of Corrosion Policy
    and Oversight and through corrosion prevention control forums.

                         RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION

        Question. Congress has supported DOD's Radio Frequency
    Identification (RFID) program in order to improve the visibility and
    identification of, and access to, equipment and supplies.
        What experience and familiarity do you have with RFID technologies
    and their implementation?
        Answer. I have been a leader in DOD's efforts to implement RFID
    technologies since the early mid-1990s, implementing the world's
    largest active RFID network to provide in-transit visibility to
    combatant commanders and implementing satellite tracking and intrusion
    detection devices to reduce pilferage in hostile regions of the world.
    Under my leadership, we have leveraged commercial global RFID standards
    to align public and private sector standards, implemented passive RFID
    at strategic distribution depots, and continued to focus on the use of
    RFID to add enterprise business value.
        Question. In order for RFID technology to be effective, it must be
    used consistently throughout DOD and the Military Services. One of the
    problems highlighted in ongoing contingency operations is a lack of
    understanding of RFID technology and how to use the devices,
    particularly in field operations.
        If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that
    standardized training on the use of RFID and other tracking
    technologies is being provided to all necessary military and civilian
    logistics personnel?
        Answer. I continue to lead efforts to improve the tracking of key
    assets through the use of RFID across the spectrum of DOD operations,
    especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. I lead a senior-level summit with
    the Joint Staff J-4 to continue to improve in-transit visibility.
        Currently, our forces train on the use of RFID technologies. We
    apply active RFID tags to our sustainment shipments bound for overseas
    destinations even during peacetime, and use them at major training
    centers as a means to ensure soldiers are trained before they are
    deployed. If confirmed, I would continue to focus on ensuring our
    forces are properly trained on the use of our tracking capabilities.

                           DOD INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES

        Question. Each of the Military Departments has its own maintenance
    depots, shipyards, and air logistics centers to help maintain its
    equipment. The Military Departments also contract with the private
    sector for maintenance support. LMI recently completed a
    congressionally-directed review of depot maintenance issues and
    recommended significant changes.
        What are your views of the LMI study?
        Answer. The study made specific recommendations to DOD that it felt
    would improve the depot maintenance processes. Overall, the study
    provided DOD with a review of the organic depot maintenance environment
    and raised broad issues that we now must more fully assess in the
    context of the Department's related and ongoing logistics support
    improvements and efficiency initiatives. We are assessing their
    recommended follow-on policy and legislative implementation activities
    for feasibility.
        Question. What changes, if any, do you plan to institute, if
    confirmed, in response to the recommendations of the LMI study?
        Answer. Given the far-ranging and long-term implications of any
    changes, the Department is working through a very deliberate process to
    determine the most appropriate way forward. If confirmed, I would
    continue to shape this process.

         DATA VALIDATION FOR DEPOT MAINTENANCE PUBLIC-PRIVATE WORKLOAD
                              DISTRIBUTION REPORT

        Question. Section 2466 of title 10, U.S.C., directs the Secretary
    of Defense to submit a report to Congress by April 1 of each year
    outlining the percent distribution of depot-level maintenance and
    repair workload between the public and private sectors for the
    preceding fiscal year and the projected distribution for the current
    and ensuing physical years. One of the continuing problems noted in the
    preparation of this report is the validity and accuracy of data
    submitted by the Services. As a result, the actual percentage of work
    completed at public depots is less than what is reported by the
    department in some cases.
        If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure the accuracy of
    DOD public-private workload distribution reporting?
        Answer. The Department has taken steps to improve the accuracy of
    these reports. These steps include:

             Improved guidance and instructions. Detailed
            instructions now accompany our annual data call that supports
            this reporting;
             Third-party review by Military Service audit agencies
            is required;
             Emphasis on prompt and proper training for those
            responsible for developing the report; and
             The use of a 2 percent ``trigger'' for increased
            oversight--a Military Service must submit a plan to OSD
            identifying actions taken to ensure compliance if they are
            within 2 percent of the limitation.

        In their last audit in November 2006, the GAO found only one error
    in our reporting that amounted to approximately \1/2\ of 1 percent of
    the private sector share of the Army's workload.
        If confirmed, I would plan to send Congress the most accurate data
    available on depot maintenance and public-private workload
    distribution.

                        DEFENSE PERSONAL PROPERTY SYSTEM

        Question. After many years of costly development, DOD in 2009
    implemented the Defense Personal Property System (DPS) which is a web-
    based system for managing personal property moves for all DOD
    personnel. The DPS incorporates numerous improvements including
    contractual awards to movers based on satisfactory performance, not
    lowest bid; full replacement value as the standard for lost, stolen, or
    severely damaged personal property; on-demand web-based move
    counseling; and many other features. An important means of evaluating
    who the best and worst moving contractors are in DPS is satisfaction
    surveys that should be submitted by DOD personnel who have completed
    permanent change-of-station moves.
        What is your understanding of the cost-efficiency of the DPS and
    whether its reliance on web-based systems has produced any savings for
    the Services?
        Answer. DPS was intended as a quality-of-life initiative. However,
    DPS drives a more competitive rate environment and the Department has
    realized a savings of $300 million since implementation in April 2009,
    and continues to realize savings of more than $20 million per month.
        Question. What is your understanding of the current return rate of
    satisfaction surveys by DPS customers?
        Answer. The overall customer satisfaction survey return rate for
    the last 12 months has been gradually improving, and is now at 25
    percent.
        Question. If the rate is below 50 percent, to what do you attribute
    the inability to achieve a higher rate of return and do you believe
    that the current rate of return jeopardizes the ability to distinguish
    good and bad movers?
        Answer. Although the current 25 percent survey return rate is
    statistically valid and provides the Department with the ability to
    distinguish between good and bad movers, a higher return rate would
    optimize the carrier selection process by awarding more business to
    higher performing movers. The Department, in collaboration with
    industry, has set a new survey return goal of 35 percent, which we
    believe is achievable.
        Question. What methods do you think could properly be used to
    improve the survey return rate?
        Answer. In addition to setting a customer survey return rate goal
    of 35 percent, the Department is communicating the importance of
    completing the customer satisfaction survey via entitlement counseling,
    on-site inspections, 24/7 call centers, automatic email alerts,
    brochures, and overseas commercials on the Armed Forces Network. The
    Department is using every possible opportunity to remind customers
    about the importance of completing the customer satisfaction survey.
        Question. What is your understanding of actions being taken by
    TRANSCOM and the Services to improve the performance and utility of
    DPS?
        Answer. The Department is constantly looking for ways to improve
    DPS for all DOD and industry users. We established a General Office
    Steering Committee that meets regularly to prioritize work and to steer
    the program. An example of a recent improvement that TRANSCOM and the
    Military Services have made is increasing the bandwidth to allow more
    users on the system, which results in improved DPS response times.
    Another improvement is that the Department is leveraging DPS to
    transition household goods storage invoicing and payments from a manual
    to electronic process.

             LOGISTICS SUPPLY ROUTES FOR OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

        Question. Logistics supply for ongoing operations in Afghanistan
    present a number of difficult issues, including the difficulty of
    transporting cargo through neighboring countries, security issues on
    Afghan roads, unreliable transportation and security contractors,
    limited airfield infrastructure within Afghanistan, synchronizing
    arrival of units with equipment, and competing logistics priorities in
    a coalition environment.
        What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in addressing these
    logistics challenges?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to focus on operations in
    support of Afghanistan.
        While understanding that Afghanistan is a challenging logistical
    environment, we must continue to identify ways to improve our support
    to the warfighter. Working with our government and industry partners, I
    will work to ensure that strategic and in-theater logistics operations
    are synchronized. We will also focus on improving the visibility of
    assets and movements in order to better synchronize the arrival of
    units with equipment and supplies.
        Question. What steps, if any, do you plan to take, if confirmed, to
    address logistics supply challenges for ongoing operations in
    Afghanistan?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to monitor the delivery to
    and sustainment of materiel in Afghanistan. My goal would be to
    continuously improve our logistical support to the warfighter.
        L&MR has integrated logistics experts into the requirements process
    to ensure that sustainment considerations and solutions are
    incorporated into rapidly fielded programs. Additionally we have
    focused on programs such as the MRAP vehicle. We conduct MRAP Deep
    Dives quarterly in order to focus on the readiness of this key
    warfighting capability and ensure that all logistical requirements are
    addressed.
        Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe we can and
    should be taking to address the possibility that the southern supply
    route may become less available or more challenging in light of recent
    events in Pakistan?
        Answer. The Department continues to plan for contingencies that
    threaten any of our routes into and out of Afghanistan. We continue to
    look at ways to mitigate dependency on any one country's logistics
    support by expanding existing capabilities and developing new logistics
    routes. DOD has already increased the amount of cargo moving via the
    Northern Distribution Network and we continue to work to minimize the
    impact of any one route failure. We have also established viable multi-
    modal and airlift only alternatives to ground movement that can work in
    both directions.

           PLANNING FOR CONTRACTOR SUPPORT IN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

        Question. GAO recently reviewed DOD's OPLANs and found that only
    four such plans include an approved Annex W addressing contract support
    requirements, contractor management plans, contract oversight
    processes, and manpower requirements to execute contractor oversight.
    Moreover, GAO found that the few annexes that do exist merely ``restate
    broad language from existing OCS guidance'' and fail to identify
    military capability shortfalls that will require contract solutions or
    ensure that combatant commanders are aware of even the general scope
    and scale of contract support that will be needed for an operation.
        Do you believe that the current level of military planning for
    contractor support in military operations is adequate and appropriate?
        Answer. This is a complex issue and may be different for every
    mission. We have learned a lot and continue to improve and evolve our
    strategy regarding the use and management of contractors. In terms of
    forecasting and planning for contracted support, the Department is
    integrating contractor support estimates into existing adaptive
    planning systems. If confirmed, I would work through the Defense
    Logistics Agency to resource joint OCS planners for each of the
    combatant commanders. These planners have the background experience and
    expertise to address the shortfalls noted by the GAO study. The
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued guidance to include
    contractor deployment planning into Joint Operation Planning and
    Execution System (JOPES) and to ensure visibility of appropriate
    development of relevant Annex Ws. Additionally, the Department is
    ensuring that OCS requirements are considered in force planning
    scenario development and joint force assessments. To enhance these
    efforts, I would ensure that we continue to develop the automated tools
    to support Operational Contractor Support in adaptive planning under
    JOPES. We need the same level of fidelity in planning for OCS as we
    have for organic military forces.
        Question. What steps, if any, would you take, if confirmed, to
    improve military planning for contractor support in military
    operations?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to work with and support the
    Chairman in the development of automated tools use to plan for
    contractors during military operations. The Chairman is currently
    working on the development of a tool that estimates contractor
    requirements at the operational level. We are simultaneously developing
    a complementary type of tool that will allow DOD leaders to have
    insight into global and strategic requirements that include that
    availability, readiness, and capabilities of contractors. Both of these
    automation tools will allow senior decisionmakers to quickly and
    accurately assess the impacts, risks, and mitigating strategies for
    proposed changes to forces, capabilities, assignments, apportionments,
    and allocations/options. I would also continue to adequately resource
    joint OCS planners currently supporting each of the combatant commands.
    In addition, DOD expects to provide over 50 planners to support the
    Military Services and Defense Agencies, resourced through the Defense
    Acquisition Workforce Initiative as provided by the fiscal years 2012
    to 2016 Resource Management Directive 700A2. In coordination with the
    Chairman and Military Services, if confirmed, I would maintain
    visibility and oversight of these planners to ensure that they continue
    to be relevant for contingency contractor planning.

                          PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS

        Question. Federal agencies, including DOD, have spent more than $5
    billion for private security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan over
    the last decade. Over this period, there have been numerous reports of
    abuses by private security contractors, including allegations of
    contractors shooting recklessly at civilians as they have driven down
    the streets of Baghdad and other Iraqi cities. In September 2007,
    employees of Blackwater allegedly opened fire on Iraqis at Nisour
    Square in downtown Baghdad, killing more than a dozen Iraqis and
    wounding many more. More recently, the Senate Armed Services Committee
    reported on questionable activities by private security contractors in
    Afghanistan.
        What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in addressing issues
    relating to the use of private security contractors in OCOs?
        Answer. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Logistics, Materiel, and Readiness oversees the Operational Contractor
    Support capability along with the Director of Defense Procurement and
    Acquisition Policy. This is accomplished through the development of
    joint policies on requirements definitions, contingency program
    management, and contingency contracting and includes contracted
    security functions. If confirmed, I would expect that my role would be
    to ensure that this policy reflects the statutory requirements enacted
    by law and the values of DOD--consistent with other national and
    international laws and the enduring values of our Nation.
        Question. Do you believe DOD and other Federal agencies should rely
    upon contractors to perform security functions that may reasonably be
    expected to require the use of deadly force in highly hazardous public
    areas in an area of combat operations?
        Answer. Without a substantial increase in the force structure
    committed to contingency operations, the use of contractors for some
    security functions in contingencies is a necessity. However, these
    security contractors must be properly regulated and supervised and
    their roles must be carefully limited and defined. Contractors cannot
    engage in combat operations. Their use of force is limited to self
    defense and the defense of others against criminal violence and the
    protection of critical property. Under these circumstances, I believe
    that the limited use of security contractors in contingency operations
    is acceptable. It would be inappropriate for me to comment on their use
    by other departments and agencies. If confirmed, I would ensure that
    proper limitations on private security contractors are reflected in DOD
    instructions, regulations, and the processes that implement those
    instructions.
        Question. In your view, has the U.S. reliance upon private security
    contractors to perform such functions risked undermining our defense
    and foreign policy objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan?
        Answer. The use of force by contractors or military personnel can,
    if misapplied, undermine our policy objectives. Private security
    providers are a necessity in Iraq and Afghanistan and will likely
    continue to be so in future contingency operations. DOD has established
    policies and procedures to manage contractors effectively to prevent
    unnecessary violence that would be detrimental to our policy
    objectives. This is an area that requires constant attention and in
    which continued supervision and policy refinement are required.
        Question. What steps, if any, would you take, if confirmed, to
    ensure that any private security contractors who may continue to
    operate in an area of combat operations act in a responsible manner,
    consistent with U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that two actions are
    taken. First, policy for the management and oversight of private
    security contractors involved in military operations would be fully
    coordinated and understood across the Department and in the field. To
    this end I would work to ensure that DOD instructions remain current,
    clear, and aligned with combatant commander guidance and orders, and
    consistent with U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives.
        Second, there must be unified and consistent procedures for all
    private security contractors (PSC) that define the proper roles,
    limitations, and basic operating practices of PSCs among all U.S.
    Government agencies, coalition partners, and private sector customers
    of PSCs operating in contingency areas. If confirmed, I would continue
    to collaborate with the State Department and other governmental
    agencies to ensure consistent policy is developed and to promote a
    common international understanding of responsible use and oversight of
    private security services.
        Question. Do you support the extension of the Military
    Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act to private security contractors of
    all Federal agencies?
        Answer. I support steps to ensure that there is legal
    accountability for the actions of all contractors supporting the U.S.
    Government in contingency operations. DOD has consistently supported
    unambiguous application of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
    Act to all DOD contractors and all U.S. Government private security
    contractors who are supporting the DOD mission in a contingency area.
    If confirmed, I would consult with DOD's interagency partners
    concerning appropriate mechanisms to ensure such accountability.
        Question. What is your view of the appropriate application of the
    Uniform Code of Military Justice to employees of private security
    contractors operating in an area of combat operations?
        Answer. I support the use of appropriate civilian and military
    legal processes to enforce accountability for the actions of all
    contractors deployed to an area of combat operations. I believe that in
    the absence of an effective civil legal system, the application of the
    Uniform Code of Military Justice is one tool that can be employed
    effectively to hold contractors accountable for their actions if it is
    authorized.
        Question. OMB Circular A-76 defines ``inherently governmental
    functions'' to include ``discretionary functions'' that could
    ``significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of private
    persons''.
        In your view, is the performance of security functions that may
    reasonably be expected to require the use of deadly force in highly
    hazardous public areas in an area of combat operations an inherently
    governmental function?
        Answer. There are certain situations where this may be the case, or
    be so close to inherently governmental as to blur the distinction. For
    this reason, current defense instructions require combatant commanders
    to carefully assess the likelihood of an activity becoming involved in
    combat before authorizing the use of private security contractors. This
    is particularly true for tasks involving access control to military
    installations and protecting military supplies.
        Whether military or civilian contractors, it is critical that we
    ensure that all security elements are properly trained to a common
    standard, regardless of who they work for. Further, it is essential
    that these contractors are effectively supervised, under the control of
    competent authority, and accountable for their actions. To this end,
    DOD is facilitating the development of the business and operational
    standards for private security companies described in section 835 of
    the National Defense Authorization Act of 2011. DOD is also working
    with the State Department to develop international norms for private
    security provider conduct and oversight. If confirmed, I would ensure
    that as these efforts mature, and they are incorporated into DOD policy
    and contracting procedures.
        Question. Do you see a need for a comprehensive reevaluation of
    these issues now?
        Answer. The use, oversight, and management of private security
    contractors must be continually reviewed. The changing situation on the
    ground demands that we look to see if our policy remains relevant.
    International efforts, such as the Montreux Document, the International
    Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, and the current
    effort to write business and operational standards for private security
    service, also require us to regularly review our policies. The
    implementation of these policies must be reviewed as well. If
    confirmed, I would continue to review these issues to determine whether
    there is a need to reevaluate these policies.

                            CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

        Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
    appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
    briefings, and other communications of information.
        Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
    this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
    committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
    information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
    with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
    other communications of information are provided to this committee and
    its staff and other appropriate committees?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
    such documents?
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

                    USE OF CONTRACTORS AT DEPLOYED LOCATIONS

        1. Senator McCain. Mr. Estevez, I note in your advance policy
    answers regarding the use of contractors in support of overseas
    contingency operations that this is a complex issue and may be
    different for every mission. In your opinion, can the combatant
    commanders feasibly plan and carry out operations without the use of
    contractors?
        Mr. Estevez. The Department of Defense (DOD) has, and continues to
    utilize contractors for operational support during contingency
    operations. While the extent of our use of contractors depends in part
    on the size, scope, and complexity of the mission, DOD expects that
    future operations will require the integration of substantial
    contractor support. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review acknowledged
    that contractors are part of the Total Force. The Department has issued
    strategic planning guidance that significantly increases the
    requirement to include contracted support during the operational
    planning process. As part of operational planning, combatant commanders
    must factor in contractor support as a component of the Total Force.
    Planning for contracted support is essential and is now the norm where
    it was not in previous operations.

        2. Senator McCain. Mr. Estevez, what impact does the reliance on
    military contractors have on the idea of combat force multiplication on
    the battlefield?
        Mr. Estevez. As a result of the report produced by the Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff Task Force on Contractor Dependency (April
    2010), the Department is focused on operational contractor support and
    continues to assess implications with respect to force mix, contract
    support integration, planning, and resourcing. Contractors serve as
    force multipliers, performing non-inherently governmental functions
    while allowing military forces to focus on the operational mission.

        3. Senator McCain. Mr. Estevez, if confirmed, what would you do to
    reform contracting and oversight processes to ensure contingency
    contractors perform their tasks efficiently without waste of taxpayers'
    funds?
        Mr. Estevez. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics) exercises management and oversight of
    contingency contracting through the Office of Defense Procurement and
    Acquisition Policy in conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense (Logistics and Material Readiness) (ASD(L&MR)). Additionally,
    DOD has a functioning governance body which synchronizes the efforts of
    the Joint Staff, the Services, and other departmental staff agencies--
    the Operational Contract Support Functional Capabilities Integration
    Board which is chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Program Support, a key leader on the ASD(L&MR) staff, and includes the
    Service Operational Contract Support Program Managers, the Joint Staff,
    OSD offices, and defense agencies. This entity ensures that processes
    and policy are in place to effectively oversee contracted support
    during contingency operations and is the primary body that addresses
    findings and recommendations from other organizations such as the
    Commission on Wartime Contracting and the Defense Science Board.
    Furthermore, the ASD(L&MR), in conjunction with the Joint Staff, the
    Services, and DOD staff agencies, continues to update policies and
    procedures to incorporate lessons learned along with emerging
    legislative requirements, while assessing planning capability
    requirements, and updating business systems, in order to improve
    processes related to contingency contracting and contractor oversight.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss

                                 50/50 STATUTE

        4. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Estevez, the well-known 50/50 statute is
    codified in title 10, U.S.C. 2466, and states that ``Not more than 50
    percent of the funds made available in a fiscal year to a military
    department or a defense agency for depot-level maintenance and repair
    workload may be used to contract for the performance by non-Federal
    Government personnel of such workload for the military department or
    the defense agency. Any such funds that are not used for such a
    contract shall be used for the performance of depot-level maintenance
    and repair workload by employees of DOD.''
        The rationale for this statute as well as the companion core
    statute codified in title 10, U.S.C. 2464, is that the United States
    needs to ensure we have the organic capability and capacity to carry
    out critical depot maintenance activity, that the government's skills
    and capabilities in this area do not atrophy, and that we are always
    able to respond effectively and timely to a mobilization, national
    defense contingency, or other emergency requirement.
        What are your views of the core and 50/50 provisions and, if
    confirmed, will you be committed to retaining a robust organic
    capability and capacity for depot maintenance within DOD and the
    Military Services?
        Mr. Estevez. I believe robust, organic capabilities, shaped by core
    depot maintenance requirements, are essential in order to maintain the
    readiness of our force. The legislative framework provided by core and
    50/50 has served us well in the past and supports considerations we
    must address to ensure the continuation of appropriate organic depot
    maintenance capabilities and capacity. It is critical that we guarantee
    that a robust capability is available in the national industrial base,
    and as part of that, key capabilities must reside in the organic
    depots. Additionally, we must ensure that our commercial industrial
    base stays vital, and along with our organic base, is capable of
    surging to support our national security requirements. I am committed
    to the efficient utilization of both of these enablers and, indeed, to
    all aspects of logistical support throughout the industrial base.

        5. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Estevez, every area of the DOD budget is
    under scrutiny for savings and readiness, and logistics are no
    exception. What are your thoughts regarding how DOD and the Services
    might attain efficiencies and savings, specifically in the area of
    logistics, while still complying with the core and 50/50 provisions?
        Mr. Estevez. The tenets of core and 50/50 will serve as boundary
    conditions as we pursue efficiencies throughout the entire industrial
    base--both in the organic and commercial sectors. While doing so, we
    will actively monitor and assess the impacts of our initiatives on
    compliance with the provisions--and all initiatives will include, as a
    basic tenet, consideration of the health of both sectors. Our objective
    is to strengthen the depot maintenance industrial base by improving the
    efficiency of its operations, not to weaken it. This is true whether we
    are implementing initiatives that affect the organic sector, commercial
    sector, or both.

        6. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Estevez, is interservicing of workload a
    possible means of achieving savings and, if so, what are your views on
    interservicing of workload?
        Mr. Estevez. I believe that interservicing of workloads is one of
    many effective tools that may be used to achieve increased efficiency
    at DOD depots and DOD conducts substantive interservicing maintenance
    operations today. We need to give careful consideration to
    interservicing options during the ``source of repair decisionmaking
    process.'' Most notably, we must examine those decisions associated
    with new systems, where the establishment of a duplicate capability may
    be avoided, and where the Department can maximize on the use of
    existing capabilities. As DOD explores options related to
    interservicing of depot maintenance, we must fully consider
    responsiveness to our warfighters and maintain adequate robustness
    within our industrial base.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Alan F. Estevez follows:]
                        Nomination Reference and Report
                               As In Executive Session,
                                   Senate of the United States,
                                                         April 6, 2011.
        Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
    on Armed Services:
        Alan F. Estevez, of the District of Columbia, to be Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness. (New
    Position)
                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of Alan F. Estevez, which was
    transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
    referred, follows:]
                     Biographical Sketch of Alan F. Estevez
    Education:
             Rutgers University

                     September 1975-May 1979
                     Bachelor of Arts degree awarded May 1979

             Industrial College of the Armed Forces

                     August 1994-June 1995
                     Master of National Security Resource Strategy
                    degree awarded June 1995
    Employment Record:
        Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Logistics &
    Materiel Readiness), Department of Defense, Pentagon, Washington, DC,
    Nov. 2006-Present

             Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of
            Defense (Logistics & Materiel Readiness), April 2009-Present

        Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Supply Chain
    Integration), Department of Defense, Pentagon, Washington, DC, Oct.
    2002-Nov. 2006
        Acting Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Transportation
    Policy), Department of Defense, Pentagon, Washington, DC, Sept. 2001-
    Dec. 2001
        Deputy, Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
    (Transportation Policy), Department of Defense, Pentagon, Washington,
    DC, May 2000-Oct. 2002
        Assistant for Traffic Management, Office of the Assistant Deputy
    Under Secretary of Defense (Transportation Policy), Department of
    Defense, Pentagon, Washington, DC, Dec. 1995-May 2000
        Logistics Management Specialist, U.S. Army Strategic Logistics
    Agency, Alexandria, VA, May 1991-Dec. 1995
        Supervisory Traffic Management Specialist, Military Traffic
    Management Command, Falls Church, VA, Mar. 1989-May 1991
        Supervisory Traffic Management Specialist, Military Traffic
    Management Command, Western Area, Oakland, CA, July 1987-Mar. 1989
        Traffic Management Specialist, Military Traffic Management Command,
    Eastern Area, Bayonne, NJ, June 1981-July 1987
    Honors and awards:
             Presidential Rank Distinguished Executive Award (2011)
             Presidential Rank Meritorious Executive Award (2006)
             Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian
            Service (two awards--2005, 2009)
             Service to America Medal, National Security category
            (2005)
             Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for
            Exceptional Civilian Service, 2001
             Office of the Secretary of Defense Award for
            Excellence, 1997
             Defense Logistics Agency Superior Civilian Service
            Award, 1997
                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
    nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate, to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial. and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by Alan F.
    Estevez in connection with his nomination follows:]

                              UNITED STATES SENATE
                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                                  Room SR-228
                           Washington, DC 20510-6050
                                 (202) 224-3871
                        COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
          BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

        Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
    more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
    form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
    of your answer applies.
                        Part A--Biographical Information
        Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
    this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
    public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
    any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

        1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
        Alan Fredric Estevez.

        2. Position to which nominated:
        Assistant Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Materiel Readiness).

        3. Date of nomination:
        April 6, 2011.

        4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
        [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
    committee's executive files.]

        5. Date and place of birth:
        September 20, 1957; Kearny, NJ.

        6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
        Married to Susan Hideko Pearson (Ludrick).

        7. Names and ages of children:
        N/A.

        8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
    dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
        Industrial College of the Armed Forces/National Defense University,
    Masters of National Security Resources, 1994-1995
        Rutgers University, BA in Political Science, 1975-1979
        North Arlington High School, NJ, HS Degree, 1971-1975

        9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
    last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
    job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
        Principal Deputy assistant Secretary of Defense (Logistics &
    Materiel Readiness), Department of Defense, Pentagon, Washington, DC,
    Nov. 2006-Present

             Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary of
            Defense (Logistics & Materiel Readiness), April 2009-Present

        Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Supply Chain
    Integration), Department of Defense, Pentagon, Washington, DC, Oct.
    2002-Nov. 2006
        Acting Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Transportation
    Policy), Department of Defense, Pentagon, Washington, DC, Sept. 2001-
    Dec. 2001
        Deputy, Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
    (Transportation Policy), Department of Defense, Pentagon, Washington,
    DC, May 2000-Oct. 2002
        Assistant for Traffic Management, Office of the Assistant Deputy
    Under Secretary of Defense (Transportation Policy), Department of
    Defense, Pentagon, Washington, DC, Dec. 1995-May 2000
        Logistics Management Specialist, U.S. Army Strategic Logistics
    Agency, Alexandria, VA, May 1991-Dec 1995
        Supervisory Traffic Management Specialist, Military Traffic
    Management Command, Falls Church, VA, Mar. 1989-May 1991
        Supervisory Traffic Management Specialist, Military Traffic
    Management Command, Western Area, Oakland, CA, July 1987-Mar. 1989
        Traffic Management Specialist, Military Traffic Management Command,
    Eastern Area, Bayonne, NJ, June 1981-July 1987

        10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
    honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
    or local governments, other than those listed above.
        DOD Liaison to Board of Governors, Electronic Product Code Global
    (EPCGIobal), Global Standard 1 (GS1) (standard setting group), 2004-
    Present.

        11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
    officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
    or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
    business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
        Board Member/Chapter Treasurer, National Defense Transportation
    Association, Washington, DC, Chapter, 1992-Present.

        12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
    professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
    other organizations.
        Member, National Defense Industrial Association
        Member, Museum of Modern Art, NY
        Member, Defenders of Wildlife
        Member, Friends of the National Zoo
        Member, Corcoran Gallery
        Member, WETA
        Member, The Potomac Conservancy
        Member, Habitat For Humanity
        Member, National Parks Conservation Association
        Member, The Nature Conservancy
        Member, Rails to Trails
        Member, Chesapeake Bay Foundation
        Member, WAMU885
        Member, Philips Collection
        Member, Potomac Appalachian Trail Club
        Member, C&O Canal Trust

        13. Political affiliations and activities:
        (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
    any public office for which you have been a candidate.
        None.
        (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
    to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
    years.
        None.
        (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
    organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
    entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
        None.

        14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
    society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
    for outstanding service or achievements.
        Presidential Rank Distinguished Executive Award, 2011
        Presidential Rank Meritorious Executive Award, 2006
        Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian
    Service (two Awards--2005, 2009)
        Service to America Medal, National Security category, 2005
        Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian
    Service, 2001
        Office of the Secretary of Defense Award for Excellence, 1997
        Defense Logistics Agency Superior Civilian Service Award, 1997

        15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
    books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
    written.
        Estevez, A.F. and S. Geary (2006), ``RFID: The Future is Now,''
    Exceptional Release Magazine, Summer 2006, pp 26-29.
        Estevez, Alan F., (2005), ``RFID Vision in the DOD Supply Chain,''
    Army Logistician, May-June 2005, pp 5-9.
        Estevez, A.F. and S. Geary (2004), ``Lessons from the Desert,''
    Supply Chain Management Review, November/December 2004, pp. 38-43.

        16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
    speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
    copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
    been nominated.
        I speak in my official capacity at conferences and luncheons about
    once a month on topics ranging from Radio Frequency Identification
    technology implementation to general Department of Defense logistics
    programs. However, these are not formal speeches.

        17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
        (a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
    conflicts of interest?
        Yes.
        (b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
    would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
        No.
        (c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
    deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
    for the record in hearings?
        Yes.
        (d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
    response to congressional requests?
        Yes.
        (e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
    testimony or briefings?
        Yes.
        (f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
    before this committee?
        Yes.
        (g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
    such documents?
        Yes.
                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
    committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
    forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
    Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                    ------

                               Signature and Date
        I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
    on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
    provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
    and complete.
                                                       Alan F. Estevez.
        This 13th day of April, 2011.

        [The nomination of Alan F. Estevez was reported to the
    Senate by Chairman Levin on August 2, 2011, with the
    recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
    was confirmed by the Senate on August 2, 2011.]

     NOMINATIONS OF ADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
      THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
     STAFF; GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF
    GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY; AND GEN. WILLIAM M. FRASER
        III, USAF, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE
                     COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, JULY 21, 2011

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:41 a.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
    Akaka, Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Blumenthal, McCain,
    Sessions, Wicker, Brown, Ayotte, and Graham.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
    Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse,
    professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff
    member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J.
    Kuiken, professional staff member; Peter K. Levine, general
    counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet,
    professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional
    staff member.
        Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority
    staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Paul
    C. Hutton IV, professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner,
    professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional
    staff member; Michael J. Sistak, research assistant; Diana G.
    Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh,
    minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Brian F. Sebold and Breon N.
    Wells.
        Committee members' assistants present: Margaret Goodlander
    and Christopher Griffin, assistants to Senator Lieberman;
    Carolyn Chuhta and Elyse Wasch, assistants to Senator Reed;
    Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Ann Premer, assistant
    to Senator Nelson; Casey Howard, assistant to Senator Udall;
    Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Joanne
    McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; Jordan Baugh,
    assistant to Senator Gillibrand; Ethan Saxon, assistant to
    Senator Blumenthal; Anthony Lazarski, assistant to Senator
    Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde
    Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Joseph Lai,
    assistant to Senator Wicker; Charles Prosch, assistant to
    Senator Brown; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; Ryan
    Kaldahl, assistant to Senator Collins; and Sergio Sarkany,
    assistant to Senator Graham.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
    meets this morning to consider the nominations of three
    outstanding military officers for positions of leadership and
    command, among the most important in the Department of Defense
    (DOD).
        Our witnesses today are Admiral Sandy Winnefeld, U.S. Navy,
    to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); General
    Raymond Odierno, to be Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army; and
    General William Fraser III, USAF, to be Commander of the U.S.
    Transportation Command (TRANSCOM).
        We thank each of you for many decades of dedicated service
    to our Nation and your willingness to continue that service in
    these positions of great responsibility and challenge.
        Let me also extend on behalf of the committee our thanks to
    your families, whose support has been so important to the
    success that you have enjoyed, and whose support for you makes
    a difference for the Nation as well. As is a tradition that we
    particularly enjoy, we would invite each of you to introduce
    any family members or friends who may be here with you during
    your opening remarks.
        One of the first actions that all three of our nominees
    will carry out, if confirmed, will be immediately implementing
    the reduction of U.S. forces in Afghanistan by 10,000 by the
    end of this year, and removing the rest of 33,000 U.S. surge
    forces from Afghanistan by the end of the summer in 2012.
        These reductions are part of an ongoing process of
    transitioning, increasing responsibility for Afghanistan's
    security to the Afghanistan security forces, which by 2014
    would have leader responsibility for security throughout the
    country.
        The course which the President's decision sets provides a
    strategy for success in Afghanistan. The Afghan security forces
    have increased by almost 100,000 since the President announced
    the surge in December 2009, and that Afghan army will expand by
    another 70,000 security forces by the time all of the U.S.
    surge forces are brought home by September 2012.
        The growing capabilities of the Afghan security forces
    provide the Afghan people, but one Afghanistan elder in
    southern Afghanistan told me what they want the most, which is
    the ability to secure their own country themselves. Having
    Afghan forces in the lead puts to the lie to the Taliban's
    propaganda that international forces are there to occupy
    Afghanistan. The Afghans taking over their own security is the
    key to the strategy for success in Afghanistan.
        Admiral Sandy Winnefeld currently serves as the Commander
    of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and is Commander of the
    North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) with Canada.
    In this capacity, he has been responsible for defense of the
    Homeland, military support through civil authorities for
    domestic emergencies, as well as aerospace warning and control
    for North America.
        In his current capacity, he is the combatant commander
    responsible for the operation of the ground-based midcourse
    defense (GMD) system. If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the JCS,
    he would have a number of key roles and responsibilities
    related to missile defense.
        We would be interested in Admiral Winnefeld's views on
    whether he believes we should demonstrate correction of the two
    recent GMD flight test failures before resuming production or
    delivery of the kill vehicles for the GMD interceptors.
        The Vice Chairman of the JCS has a wide range of
    responsibilities, including playing a major role as Chairman of
    the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in defining and
    improving requirements for future acquisition programs, and
    monitoring the progress of ongoing programs.
        As we all know, most of the major acquisition programs at
    DOD are over budget and behind schedule. The F-35 Joint Strike
    Fighter is one dramatic example. As the Defense budget is
    reduced, the inability of the Department to acquire, and its
    contractors to provide, needed systems on time and on budget
    becomes an even more significant problem than it is already.
        A significant challenge related to the Vice Chairman's
    acquisition responsibility is in the area of cyber security.
    All of the systems, equipment, support, intelligence, and
    almost everything else that DOD does relies on is on networks.
    Making sure that the networks can support the operations
    reliably will be a large part of Admiral Winnefeld's
    responsibilities.
        There also are issues, such as when does a cyber attack on
    United States' activities or entities require or justify a U.S.
    offensive reaction, cyber or other. The Vice Chairman will
    surely be involved in addressing that issue as well.
        If confirmed, Admiral Winnefeld would also serve as a
    member of the Nuclear Weapons Council. Producing and
    maintaining nuclear weapons is expensive and technically
    challenging. Today the Nuclear Weapons Council is participating
    in the design of the nuclear deterrent for the next generation.
    If confirmed, one of the challenges would be to keep both the
    costs and the scope of maintenance and modernization within
    reason.
        Of course, a central part of the Vice Chairman's role will
    be to act as chairman of the Joint Chiefs in the chairman's
    absence.
        General Odierno is well known to this committee. He has
    been before us several times as a commander of U.S. forces in
    Iraq, and more recently when nominated for his current position
    as Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command.
        General Odierno will assume leadership of an Army that is
    battled tested and proven, but stretched by 10 years of war.
    The Army has met every challenge with the courage, dedication,
    and professionalism for which all of us are profoundly
    grateful.
        Over the next 4 years, under General Odierno's leadership,
    the Army will deal with many enduring and new challenges. First
    and foremost, the Army must continue to meet the demand for
    trained and ready forces in support of operations in
    Afghanistan and Iraq. As a commander with recent operational
    experience, we will be interested to hear General Odierno's
    views on the continuing demands for Army units in support of
    operations, their preparation, readiness, and performance, and
    how he would ensure that we continue to meet this challenge.
        The future beyond operations in Afghanistan and Iraq holds
    real questions about what we will need the Army to do, how it
    will be structured and equipped, and how we manage to keep a
    force that is as good and ready as it is today, modernizes to
    stay relevant for tomorrow, and that is at the same time
    affordable. We will be interested to hear General Odierno's
    views on how he will deal with the budget pressures that are
    already being felt throughout the Defense Department and that
    no doubt will result in funding challenges over the next
    several years.
        Perhaps the greatest leadership challenge that General
    Odierno will face is the 49,000 soldier end strength reduction
    planned for completion by 2017. The Army has reduced its size
    many times in its history, most recently at the end of the Cold
    War and Operation Desert Storm. The Army must plan and be able
    to manage its troop reductions and accompanying force structure
    changes to avoid hollowing out units and to remain as capable
    as it is today. We are interested to hear General Odierno's
    thoughts on end strength reduction, force structure changes,
    and how best to manage this change without losing the Army's
    hard won fighting edge.
        Finally, the Army must continue to work as hard as possible
    to deal with the human costs to soldiers and their families
    from the pressures and consequences of an army in continuous
    combat for 10 years. The Army has instituted significant
    programs to improve deployment predictability and reduce the
    stress of multiple rotations on soldiers and their families,
    improve care for our wounded soldiers and their families, and
    strive to deal with the heartbreaking incidence of suicides
    that continue in the Active-Duty Force, and have been
    increasing in our National Guard and Reserves. The committee
    will be interested to hear General Odierno's assessment and
    plans for the Army's efforts in those areas.
        General Fraser will also face critical challenges in his
    new position. The strategic mobility of our Armed Forces
    enables us to project power anywhere around the world.
    TRANSCOM, which encompasses the Air Force's Mobility Command,
    the Navy's Military Sealift Command, and the Army's Surface
    Deployment and Distribution Command, is the linchpin of that
    strategic mobility.
        General Fraser will also be dealing with the disparate
    components of the private transportation sector, including
    railroad, commercial air carriers, who participate in the Civil
    Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program, and commercial ship
    operators.
        One area where General Fraser will be immediately deluged
    is the growing challenge of logistical support for the
    Afghanistan theater of operations, concerns about over reliance
    on sometimes tenuous surface lines of communication through
    Pakistan, for logistic support into Afghanistan had led to over
    the past couple of years to the establishment of the Northern
    Distribution Network through Central Asia. However, these
    northern routes may need to be expanded to allow increased
    movement, both into and increasingly out of, Afghanistan if we
    are to maintain the quality and the timeliness of that support
    to our forces.
        We will be interested in General Fraser's views on that
    challenge.
        Again, gentlemen, our deepest thanks to you and to your
    families for all that you have done and will do for the Nation
    in the days ahead.
        Senator McCain.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome General
    Odierno, Admiral Winnefeld, General Fraser, and their families.
    A special thanks to their families, and I congratulate them on
    their nominations.
        I particularly want to recognize Mr. Tony Odierno, a
    distinguished wounded warrior and former soldier who is here
    today supporting his father.
        General Odierno, I strongly support your nomination to be
    the next Chief of Staff of the Army. Your critical role in
    Iraq, and I note that you are one of the very few officers to
    have commanded at the division, corps, and Army level during a
    single conflict, gives you a unique perspective on the
    capabilities of U.S. forces as you executed maneuver and
    counterinsurgency operations.
        Your service as Commander of the 4th Infantry Division, as
    Commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq, and U.S. Forces-Iraq,
    was instrumental in implementing the surge strategy and turning
    the tide of battle in Iraq.
        Your career of Army service and your various joint
    assignments, currently as Commander of U.S. Joint Forces
    Command, have provided you with an essential understanding of
    counterinsurgency operations, joint operations, and, most
    importantly, of soldiers and their families.
        We know that soldiers, Active Duty, reservists, and
    national guardsmen and their families have served gallantly and
    with a single-minded focus on victory under the most stressful
    conditions. As the Army has transformed itself into an
    expeditionary force while meeting the demands of two wars, we
    are enormously grateful for their service and sacrifices. The
    human costs of combat have been great.
        The comprehensive study completed last year under the Army
    Vice Chief's direction underline the effects of continuous
    combat rotations and the work that has to be done. But I
    applaud the efforts of senior military leaders in the Army and
    in DOD to understand these problems, provide the best medical
    care possible in responding to the needs of wounded soldiers,
    and to assist the families of all soldiers. If you are
    confirmed, there will be no higher priority than continuing
    this work.
        Winning the current fight in Afghanistan and preserving the
    hard-won gains in Iraq must continue to be the Army's top
    priority. In his few short months on the job, General Dempsey
    identified resolving the future mix of personnel and equipment
    as the Army's top priority. In this regard, you will be
    required to deliver honest assessments and make hard choices.
        As the Army decides upon the optimal number and type of
    vehicles and equipment and invests in recapitalization and
    modernization, I urge you to look carefully at recent history.
    Over the last decade, the Army embarked on a number of
    developmental procurement and modernization programs that were
    subsequently de-scoped, re-baselined, or cancelled outright. I
    am very interested in the specific steps you intend to take to
    improve the Army's procurement track record.
        The committee will be interested to know your views on the
    continued drawdown of our forces in Iraq, and under what
    conditions you would advise an enduring troop presence. I have
    expressed my concerns about the size and pace of the drawdown
    of troops in Afghanistan. I also want to hear your views about
    reducing Army manpower by 22,000 soldiers over the next 3
    years, and another 27,000 in future years, while absorbing a
    growing population of nondeployable soldiers.
        As you take the reins of Chief of Staff, we need to know
    how much risk the Army, and individual units and soldiers, are
    being required to absorb in this challenging environment.
        Admiral Winnefeld, congratulations on your nomination to be
    the next Vice Chief. I think you set a very high standard as
    Commander, NORTHCOM, improving our homeland defense
    capabilities and enhancing security in our southwestern border.
        There are still many challenges in this regard, and I hope
    that as Vice Chairman of the JCS, you will continue to
    participate in this important work.
        You are stepping into big shoes following General
    Cartwright. I thank him for his great service, and I hope he
    will continue to contribute his expertise to national security
    debates in the future.
        I urge you to focus immediately, upon confirmation, on
    improving the acquisition process. The Department and its
    industry partners have stumbled again and again in producing
    weapons systems at an affordable cost that, without question,
    the Services desperately need.
        Your involvement is also needed in furthering cyber defense
    strategy and nuclear strategy, in ensuring we achieve success
    in the Middle East and Libya, and in ensuring that the demand
    for budgetary reductions does not result in loss of
    capabilities and a military diminished and unable to respond in
    defense of our vital national interests.
        General Fraser, you are following in the steps of two
    outstanding leaders at TRANSCOM, General McNabb and General
    Schwartz. I am sure you will receive excellent mentoring and
    advice from them.
        Last year, DOD released the Mobility Capabilities and
    Requirements Study-2016 (MCRS-16), that found the Department's
    planned mobility capabilities are sufficient to support the
    most demanding projected requirements. Specifically, the study
    found that large cargo aircraft airlift capacity exceeds the
    peak demand in all the peacetime and wartime scenarios
    considered, which covered a broad spectrum of military
    operations.
        The study concluded that the military needs only 264 to 300
    large cargo aircraft. Eliminating the 316 large cargo aircraft
    for restriction  would  allow  the  Air  Force  to  retire  an
    additional  15 C-5A aircraft, and provide substantial savings
    by freeing up billions in taxpayers' dollars over the next few
    years. Given the current climate of fiscal austerity, which
    requires we look to all corners of the defense enterprise to
    determine how DOD can conduct itself more efficiently, this is
    a move in the right direction.
        I thank our witnesses again for their service and their
    willingness to serve in these key positions.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
        Let me now call first on Admiral Winnefeld.

          STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES A. WINNEFELD, JR., USN, FOR
     REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE VICE CHAIRMAN
                      OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

        Admiral Winnefeld. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and
    distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I
    am very honored to appear before you today as the President's
    nominee to become the Vice Chairman of the JCS.
        This nomination is especially humbling to me when I
    consider the eight exceptional officers who have previously
    held this position. I am very energized by the opportunity to
    continue serving alongside America's young men and women in
    uniform.
        It is also an honor to appear alongside two very special
    colleagues in Ray Odierno and General Will Fraser, with whom I
    have been so privileged to serve in the past, and whom I hold
    in such high regard. If we are confirmed, I look forward very
    much to the opportunity to continue working closely with them
    in the future.
        It goes without saying that we as a Nation face many
    serious near-term and long-term challenges, and that many of
    them fall inside the military's lane. If confirmed, I will do
    my part, do my best to ensure that our many ongoing operations
    around the world are concluded successfully, to assist the
    Secretary of Defense and the Chairman in crafting a way ahead
    for the Department to include operating in a challenging budget
    environment, the continued improvements in the requirements and
    acquisitions process that Senator McCain referred, and also to
    maintain the best possible stewardship of the young men and
    women that have been entrusted to our care.
        As such, I look forward to working with not only the senior
    leadership in DOD in Washington, but also with our combatant
    commanders and our friends and allies around the world, and
    also key members of the executive branch and Congress to
    include the members of this committee to do our best to make
    sure that we're defending the American people.
        If I am confirmed, I will be joined in Washington by my
    family, who unfortunately could not be here today. But I want
    to mention my incredible wife, Mary, who is so supportive of
    military families, and my two sons, L.J. and Jonathan, who I
    love dearly and I am very proud of.
        My parents were also unable to be here today, but I will
    forever be indebted to them for their love and support, and
    also for their service together with a 30-year Navy career.
        Thank you again very much for the opportunity to appear
    before you. Thank you for the ongoing support that you on this
    committee and your hardworking staff continue to provide to our
    men and women serving in uniform.
        I look forward to your questions. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Admiral.
        General Odierno.

    STATEMENT OF GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
        THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

        General Odierno. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, other
    distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
    thank you for allowing me to have the opportunity to appear
    before you today.
        Before I get started, I would like to introduce my family.
    I would first like to start out with my wife, Linda, who has
    been by my side for my entire 35-year career. She has dedicated
    herself to soldiers and family, leading family readiness groups
    at company, battalion, brigade, division, and corps levels,
    volunteering and leading to ensure our soldiers and their
    families are taken care of. But most importantly, I believe she
    served as a role model for all the young spouses throughout the
    military.
        Over the last 3 years, she has dedicated herself to
    championing and providing pet therapy to our wounded soldiers
    and taking this on as a great opportunity to help to continue
    to move forward with their lives. She has done all this while
    being the mother of three children and three grandchildren. I
    could not do it without her. She has been by my side the whole
    time, and she is, frankly, my personal hero and my partner.
        I am also blessed to have three wonderful children who are
    all here today. First, my youngest son, Michael, who is a
    senior at Texas Tech University, and who has probably had to
    live with more deployments than any other child in recent
    years, and has done so well in helping my wife as they have
    worked through these together.
        My daughter, Katie, and her wonderful husband, Nick, who
    are here today, they are from Baltimore. Katie is a mother and
    also works in interior architecture. They live in Baltimore,
    and they are so supportive of me.
        Finally, my oldest son, Tony, who many of you know, West
    Point graduate, served in Iraq, was injured in 2004. He has set
    such an excellent example for all of us through his
    perseverance and dedication. Today, Tony is married to
    Danielle. Unfortunately, she could not be here today. She is
    watching their twin boys and could not make it out today. He
    works for the Yankees, but he continues to----
        Senator Lieberman. You were doing so well until then.
    [Laughter.]
        General Odierno. But he continues to dedicate himself to
    wounded warriors as he is on the board of directors of the
    Wounded Warrior Project. It is an honor for me to have them
    here as they continue to serve me and our country.
        Mr. Chairman, if I could go on, over the last 10 years, our
    Army has proven itself in arguably the most difficult
    environment this Nation has ever faced. Our leaders at every
    level have displayed unparalleled ingenuity, flexibility, and
    adaptability. Our soldiers have displayed mental and physical
    toughness and courage under fire. They have transformed the
    Army into the most versatile, agile, rapidly deployable, and
    sustainable strategic land force in the world today.
        I am proud to be part of this Army with the opportunity to
    serve with these great men and women. I am humbled and honored
    that I have been nominated to be the 38th Chief of Staff for
    the Army.
        But today is like no other in our history. It is a time of
    uncertainty and historic change. We face a multitude of
    security challenges, such as transnational and regional
    terrorism in places like Yemen, Somalia, North Africa, and
    Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas. We have
    uncertainty surrounding the Arab spring, and the proliferation
    of nuclear weapons. We face the challenges of rising powers.
    But most importantly, all of this is underpinned by our own
    fiscal crisis.
        I know that if confirmed, we will face some very difficult
    resource decisions within DOD. As we determine those essential
    characteristics and capabilities which we will need on our
    Joint Force to meet our future security challenges, I pledge
    that I will work with everyone to make sure we come up with the
    right answer and mitigate the risks associated with such.
        But I do have a word of caution. We must avoid our
    historical pattern of drawing down too fast and getting too
    small, especially since our record of predicting the future has
    not been very good. As you make difficult resource decisions,
    you must be thoughtful in understanding the risks we incur to
    our Nation's future security.
        Today, the Army must continue to provide trained and ready
    forces to ensure we prevail in our current missions in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. In the future, we must ensure that our Army
    remains our national force of decisive action, a highly
    relevant and effective force across the spectrum of conflict.
        In order to do this, we must sustain our own volunteer Army
    today and in the future, providing depth and versatility to the
    Joint Force, an army that is more efficient in its deployment,
    provides greater flexibility for national security
    decisionmakers, and defense of our interests at home and
    abroad.
        Finally, and most importantly, if confirmed, it is my moral
    responsibility as Chief of Staff of the Army to be the number
    one advocate for our soldiers and their families. It is their
    dedication and sacrifice that has earned the respect and
    confidence of the American people as they continue to put their
    lives in harm's way for our Nation's security.
        I want to close by stating my appreciation to the
    committee, its unwavering support of our soldiers and their
    families throughout the last several years. We could not do it
    without that great cooperation.
        I promise you that if confirmed, I will dedicate myself to
    carrying out my duties to the best of my ability and continue
    to work openly with Congress to support our warfighters.
        I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. General, thank you so much.
        General Fraser.

          STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM M. FRASER III, USAF, FOR
    REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, U.S.
                         TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

        General Fraser. Senator Levin, Ranking Member McCain,
    distinguished members of this committee, I am indeed honored to
    appear before you today as the President's nominee to be the
    Commander of TRANSCOM.
        It is also a privilege to join two fine officers on this
    panel, Admiral Sandy Winnefeld and General Ray Odierno, with
    whom I have worked closely not only in my current command, but
    in previous assignments. It is an honor and a privilege to join
    them today.
        This morning I am joined, as I have been throughout my 37-
    year military career, by my wife, Bev, with whom I have been
    blessed to share this extraordinary experience of serving in
    the Armed Forces of this great Nation. Bev and I are indeed
    humbled to serve with the terrific men and women who have
    volunteered to serve our Nation, and we are grateful for this
    opportunity to continue serving, if confirmed, in this new
    capacity.
        As you all well know, the military is truly a family, and
    Bev and I are extremely proud that our family has been a part
    of it. Our son, Mack, served in the U.S. Marine Corps. Our
    daughter, Ashley, is a military spouse of an Air Force officer.
    They have blessed us with six grandchildren.
        Throughout my career, I have become increasingly
    appreciative of the team effort required of all military
    families. All families of our soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    marines, and Coast Guards members, they help us perform our
    mission on a day-to-day basis and make many sacrifices.
        The families of our servicemembers that make these
    tremendous sacrifices are doing it for their husbands, their
    wives, their fathers, their mothers, their sons, and their
    daughters to answer our Nation's call. I thank them for their
    priceless contribution to our freedom.
        If confirmed, I look forward to joining the TRANSCOM
    family, the more than 145,000 men and women who are dedicated
    to delivering, sustaining, and then returning our forces.
        In my current role as Commander, Air Combat Command, I know
    the critical importance of rapid, efficient, and timely global
    logistics. I also understand at the heart of that capability is
    the innovation and creativity of thousands of men and women who
    really make it happen.
        If confirmed, I pledge to enable our total force--soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardmen, and civilian team
    members--to build on the superior legacy of my friend and
    colleague, General Duncan McNabb. He has chartered a vision
    based on making our forces more effective and more efficient
    through rapid and responsive global logistical solutions and
    interagency, non-governmental, commercial, and international
    partnerships. We will always deliver.
        Finally, if confirmed, I look forward to working with this
    committee and all Members of Congress to ensure that TRANSCOM
    can continue to provide world class support through all of our
    incredible men and women.
        Once again, I am humbled to have been nominated by the
    President for this position. I appreciate the trust and
    confidence of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs in considering me for this command. I am grateful
    for the opportunity to appear before you today.
        I look forward to your questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General.
        Let me ask you the standard questions. You can all answer
    together.
        Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
    governing conflicts of interests?
        [All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
        Do you agree when asked to give your personal views, even
    if those views differ from the administration in power?
        [All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
        Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
    would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation
    process?
        [All three witnesses answered in the negative.]
        Will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines
    established for requested communications, including questions
    for the record in hearings?
        [All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
        Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
    response to congressional requests?
        [All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
        Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
    testimony or briefings?
        [All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
        Do you agree if confirmed to appear and testify upon
    request before this committee?
        [All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
        Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when
    requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with
    the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or
    denial in providing such documents?
        [All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
        Thank you all.
        Let us have an 8-minute first round of questions today.
        On June 22, President Obama announced his decision that the
    United States would draw down its forces in Afghanistan by
    10,000 by the end of this year, and the remaining 23,000 U.S.
    surge forces by the end of the summer 2012, for a total of
    33,000.
        Let me ask each of you, and start with you, Admiral. Are
    you comfortable with the President's decision relative to those
    reductions?
        Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir, I am.
        Chairman Levin. General Odierno?
        General Odierno. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. General Fraser?
        General Fraser. Yes, sir, I am.
        Chairman Levin. General Odierno, the now former Secretary
    of Defense, Secretary Gates, made a speech at West Point last
    February saying that the Army is going to be increasingly
    challenged to justify the number, size, and cost of its heavy
    formations. The Army's first major challenge will be how to
    structure itself, how to train-and-equip for the
    extraordinarily diverse range of missions that it's going to
    face in the future.
        Now, there were a number of other assertions by Secretary
    Gates, and I think you are familiar with them. But basically,
    how would you react to his statement that the Army is going to
    have difficulty justifying size, structure, and cost to the
    leadership of Congress and to the country?
        General Odierno. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have
    actually had several conversations with Secretary Gates about
    this. What I believe he was doing was challenging all of us as
    leaders to make sure that we are looking ahead, that we
    understand the future of conflict by being informed by the
    past, and the lessons we have learned in conflict. Because of
    that, we must make sure we shape our Army for the future to
    meet what we believe will be our future requirements. It is
    about identifying the right capabilities and characteristics
    that we need.
        I think what we have to do is become agile. We have to
    become more adaptable. We have to be able to respond to a wide
    variety of potential capabilities that national command
    authority will need the Army to do. He is challenging us to
    make sure we do that as we conduct our assessments. I am
    confident that the Army, as we are looking both at today and
    into the future, are conducting detailed assessments to decide
    what we should look like as we move forward. I will report this
    out as we review and make progress in this effort.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Let me ask you, Admiral, a couple of questions about
    Afghanistan and Pakistan as you undertake these major
    responsibilities. How important is it, in your judgment, to the
    success of our counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan that
    we maintain the process of transitioning more and more
    responsibility to the Afghan security forces for their
    country's security?
        Admiral Winnefeld. I think it is fundamental to the entire
    campaign that we transition responsibility for security to the
    Afghan National Security Forces. The ultimate goal in
    Afghanistan is establishing adequate stability so that al Qaeda
    and other extremist groups cannot return there and have a
    position from which to attack this country. Ultimately, the
    Afghans are going to have to step up and take that kind of
    responsibility for themselves. I think it is fundamental to the
    campaign.
        Chairman Levin. One of the challenges to that campaign is
    the Pakistanis' remaining reluctance to take on the Haqqani
    network. Do you have an assessment as to why they are refusing
    to take them on?
        Admiral Winnefeld. Of course, Pakistan is a very difficult
    partner, and we all know that. We do not always share the same
    world view or the same opinions or the same national interests.
    I believe it is very unfortunate that Pakistan years ago made a
    decision to go down a very risky road of using proxy groups to
    carry out some of its desires to protect what it views as its
    own national interests. Among those groups has been the Haqqani
    network.
        I think we need to keep continued pressure on Pakistan
    using all elements of pressure that we are able to apply to
    what really should be a friend, to get them to realize that the
    Haqqani network poses a threat to their own country, and to
    take the steps that we have asked to take and that they need to
    take in order to eliminate that as a threat, not only inside
    Pakistan, but equally importantly for us in Afghanistan.
        Chairman Levin. Relative to Pakistan, we have a real
    problem of resupplying our forces in Afghanistan, particularly
    as the Pakistan lines of communication are degraded or
    threatened or interrupted.
        When we met earlier, General Fraser, you indicated that we
    might have to rely more heavily on sealift with intra-theater
    airlift as the last leg of support for Afghanistan operations.
    Can you tell us about that, and what would be the problems
    associated with relying more heavily on that combination of
    sealift and intra-theater airlift if we have to resort to that?
        General Fraser. One of the things that in preparation for
    this hearing I have taken a hard look at is the expansion that
    we have had through the Northern Distribution Network. We have
    made progress there. If confirmed, I will continue to work that
    very aggressively to expand the opportunities there as an
    alternative mode for getting goods into the theater.
        We understand the challenges that may be presented with
    Pakistan if it was to shut down, and, therefore, that is why we
    are working hard to expand the network through the use of
    inter-theater lift, but once getting the supplies through the
    ports. Working with the countries in the Persian Gulf to have
    access to ports will allow us in to bring goods into the ports
    and then move them on from there with intra-theater lift.
        If it shuts down, I am confident that we will be able to
    satisfy the requirements in the theater.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        General Odierno, what is the operational urgency to field a
    new ground combat vehicle (GCV) in 7 years? How do you propose
    to manage the program risk which is associated with that kind
    of a fairly aggressive schedule through technology development
    or otherwise?
        General Odierno. Thank you very much.
        The Army for almost 10 years now has been on a path of a
    developing capability for light forces, medium force with the
    Stryker, and sustain our heavy forces with the Abrams battle
    tank and the Bradley fighting vehicle. There was a plan at one
    time for us in the future--2020, 2025--to convert all that to
    the Future Combat System (FCS).
        We all know that the FCS program specifically was not
    successful. So, we have to constantly look at what is going to
    be the vehicle that the Army uses as we bring our force
    together for the future?
        One of the potential vehicles is the GCV. What we have to
    do is continue to assess, look at the requirements that we have
    established for the GCV to see if it will meet the future
    requirements that we see for our Army in the future.
        We are constantly assessing and working that, and we will
    continue to work with the committee on that.
        Chairman Levin. Okay. Thank you all.
        Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Fraser, to follow up on Chairman Levin's question
    about what would happen if Pakistan cut off its supply routes,
    what percent of our logistics now goes through Pakistan?
        General Fraser. Sir, it is my understanding that
    approximately 35 percent moves through the ground, and the
    other is moving through the Northern Distribution Network,
    coupled with the lift as we bring in supplies by air.
        Senator McCain. How long would it take you to make up for
    that 35 percent? Suppose tomorrow Pakistan shut off those
    supply routes. How long would it take you to adjust to keep the
    same level of logistics into Afghanistan?
        General Fraser. If confirmed, I will certainly delve deeply
    into that.
        Senator McCain. You do not know.
        General Fraser. I have not gotten the details of that.
        Senator McCain. It cannot be right away, you know that much
    about it.
        General Fraser. Yes, sir.
        Senator McCain. So, there would be a period of time where
    we would not have the normal logistic supply.
        General Fraser. Sir, in my visits to the theater, I see
    the----
        Senator McCain. Is that true or false?
        General Fraser. I'm sorry, sir?
        Senator McCain. True or false. It would be a period where
    we would not be able to maintain the same level of supply.
        General Fraser. That is true, sir.
        Senator McCain. If we have to use airlift, airlift is
    approximately four or five times as expensive as the present
    mode of ground transportation, right?
        General Fraser. Sir, we are doing everything we can to
    reduce the costs through the multi----
        Senator McCain. Is it true that it is three or four or five
    times more expensive to use air to carry these logistics than
    the present mode of overland?
        General Fraser. Sir, I will delve deeply into those cost
    figures. I do not have them off of the top of my head. It is
    more expensive to go by air.
        Senator McCain. Thank you.
        Admiral Winnefeld, how big of a threat do the drug cartels
    in Mexico pose to the very government and country of Mexico?
        Admiral Winnefeld. I do not think they pose an existential
    threat to the central Government of Mexico, but it is very
    clear that in particular regions of Mexico, that they have
    coopted elements of the government, and that the Mexican
    Government is facing a very serious challenge in those areas.
    But in terms of the viability of the democracy of the central
    Government of Mexico, I am not overly concerned about that.
        Senator McCain. Do you believe that there's any law
    enforcement institution in Mexico that is untainted by
    corruption?
        Admiral Winnefeld. I think that the higher you go in the
    Mexican law enforcement realm, the less tainted they are. I
    have more confidence certainly in the Secretaria de Seguridad
    Publica (SSP), which is the federal police. They have made
    tremendous strides. They are working very hard. As you get down
    closer to the municipal level, there is a great deal of
    corruption, yes, sir.
        Senator McCain. Do you agree with the Government
    Accountability Office assessment that our border is about 44
    percent ``operationally secure''?
        Admiral Winnefeld. I do not have any facts that would
    dispute that conclusion.
        Senator McCain. Is it your view that there are some parts
    of our border that are still not operationally secure?
        Admiral Winnefeld. In terms of operationally secure,
    meaning being able to completely shut off the flow of illegal
    immigration, I would agree with you.
        Senator McCain. Maybe not completely, but operational
    control, I think you and I both share the same definition.
        Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir.
        Senator McCain. There are parts of our border that you
    agree are not operationally secure?
        Admiral Winnefeld. I would say that there are definitely
    parts that are very challenged in terms of their operational
    security. But I would hasten to add that there has been a lot
    of progress made over the last few years. I would defer to the
    Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to give you
    the real details on that.
        Senator McCain. General Odierno, today there is a report
    that a senior broad-base analyst says that al Qaeda is
    expanding in Yemen and Somalia, posing a new threat to U.S.
    military planning. The tactic could be part of the outfit's
    strategy of energizing its franchise with an objective of
    widening the areas of conflict, and hitting at its enemy, the
    United States, in places where such attacks are the least
    expected. Do you agree with that assessment, particularly in
    regards to Yemen and Somalia?
        General Odierno. I think for years we have been tracking
    the fact that al Qaeda has been trying to establish significant
    capability in Yemen. They are, I believe, starting to join
    other terrorist elements within Somalia, building a
    relationship with them in order for them to expand their
    organization as we continue to challenge them in other places.
        Senator McCain. In your view and most experts say that it
    is a growing threat, both Somalia and Yemen, particularly given
    the unrest in both those countries.
        General Odierno. It is a very big concern, Senator.
        Senator McCain. Should we not take that into consideration
    as we talk about massive cuts in defense?
        General Odierno. As I said in my opening statement,
    Senator, I believe the transnational and regional terrorist
    threat is a huge issue for us as we look forward. We have to
    consider that as we move forward with any reductions and what
    our policies and strategies are to go after these threats.
        Senator McCain. Let me ask you about a continuing presence
    in Iraq. You obviously have been disturbed by hearing about the
    published reports of increased weapons from Iran coming into
    Iraq, and Afghanistan as well, increased Iranian influence in
    southern Iraq. How important do you think it would be for us to
    maintain, with the agreement of the Iraqi Government, a troop
    presence, say, of about 10,000 people in Iraq, air defense, the
    Tikrit, the areas under dispute on the Kurdish border, and also
    for air defenses?
        General Odierno. I think that if the Government of Iraq
    were to request, as you said, I think it is important that we
    provide them with the support they think is necessary. It is
    clear that Iran is attempting to influence this decision with
    the actions they have taken, specifically over the last several
    months, in continuing to support, fund, train, and equip
    surrogates in southern Iraq and central Iraq, specifically
    going after the remnants of our U.S. presence inside of Iraq.
        It is important that we continue to support Iraq for their
    external security, both for air sovereignty, and also to help
    them in some of their security challenges, to include
    potentially some of the Kurdish areas. Those will be decisions
    that will be made by General Austin, the Ambassador, and
    General Mattis as they move forward.
        Senator McCain. You do agree that there is clear evidence
    of increased Iranian activity in Iraq in a broad variety of
    areas, including the supply of weapons?
        General Odierno. Absolutely, Senator.
        Senator McCain. Which makes one wonder if the Iranians
    believe that we are totally evacuating the area.
        Let me just mention again, you and I have talked about it a
    lot, but there are those of us who are deeply concerned about
    continued cuts in defense. I would like to have your views of
    the effects of significant cuts in defense, particularly in
    personnel areas.
        Again, a group chartered by the Secretary of the Army to
    look into how the Army procures major weapons systems found
    that every year since 1996, the Army has spent more than $1
    billion annually on programs that were ultimately cancelled.
    Since 2004, $3.3 billion to $3.8 billion per year of Army
    developmental testing and evaluation funding has been lost due
    to cancelled programs, including the now cancelled FCS program.
    It goes on and on. You are very aware of it.
        Does that not have to be one of your highest priorities of
    trying to get this procurement situation under control? Would
    it not be helpful if we gave legislative authority to the
    Service Chiefs to be more involved in the whole acquisition
    process?
        General Odierno. First off, I will work very closely with
    the Secretary of the Army on these issues. We have identified
    several issues. First, it takes us too long to develop
    programs, and as the length of time increases, we change the
    requirements, so it becomes more expensive. We have not been
    good at predicting the technologies that are available. We have
    to work at all this so we are not wasting money, and we are
    putting money in places that will be essential to us in meeting
    the future.
        I will have to think about the legislation about giving the
    Chiefs more authority, and I will certainly get back to you,
    Senator, on that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        I believe the authorities vested in the position of the Chief of
    Staff under title 10 sufficiently establish roles and responsibilities
    within the acquisition process. I pledge to work diligently with the
    Secretary of the Army and the Army leadership, along with the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense and Congress, to ensure a unified effort
    centered on effectiveness and efficiency that meets the capability
    needs of our force.

        Senator McCain. On the whole issue of defense cuts and its
    effect on personnel, I would like your comments.
        General Odierno. First off, in the Army, the Army is about
    soldiers. When we talk about defense cuts, you are talking
    about structure. You are talking about end strength of the
    Army, 42 percent of the budget is personnel costs in the Army
    budget. As we look at reductions, it will be about structure
    and personnel.
        It is important for us that we understand that as we go
    forward we are in a supply and demand business. It will depend
    on what the demand is for the use of our soldiers so we can
    continue to sustain our All-Volunteer Force, and we are able to
    continue to meet the commitments around the world. That must
    all be considered as we look at the characteristics and
    capabilities you want the future force to look at it, because
    the Army will pay a force structure because that is what we
    are, and that is what we provide to the joint force.
        Senator McCain. All right, thank you. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman, and I thank all the witnesses for their service. I
    would just like to add, again, I have had the honor of watching
    General Odierno lead the brave men and women under his command
    in Iraq, and there is no one that I think is a finer leader
    that I have encountered in the team of Odierno, Petraeus, and
    Crocker, as instrumental in our success in implementing the
    surge in Iraq.
        I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the witnesses.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, gentlemen,
    thank you for your service to the country, and to the families
    that have supported you, thank you very much.
        Admiral Winnefeld, one of your principle responsibilities
    will be in the requirements process, and ultimately that
    transitions into procurement. The former Secretary of the Navy,
    Gordon England, who I greatly admire and has great insights,
    suggested a procurement holiday, if you will, as we face a
    great deal of uncertainty in terms of what systems are going
    forward and how much money you will have.
        In the context of that proposal, how do you propose to get
    your hands around the reset that is necessary, the new
    innovative technologies that have to be incorporated, and a
    budget that is going to be extremely challenging, more so I
    think than I believe today.
        Admiral Winnefeld. Sir, I do not have the details of the
    proposal that you referred to regarding a procurement holiday.
    I think that would probably be unwise. We have future
    challenges in the world we need to continue to address and
    prepare ourselves for as a military, even as we resolve the
    conflicts that we have going on today.
        I think this is a big ship in terms of the acquisition
    programs and the processes and the embedded requirements
    process, that we need to turn into a much more favorable
    direction for the taxpayers. I will be the first one to agree
    with that.
        I think that we have a confluence of tools that are going
    to work for us. I think beginning with the Weapon System
    Acquisition Reform Act, which I think is good legislation, but
    it is going to take time for that to have its effect. I believe
    that Under Secretary Carter has a very good approach in better
    buying power that he is imposing on the Department to get more
    cost efficiencies, to provide incentives for industry, to
    provide more for competition and the like. Then I think that
    General Cartwright, if I am confirmed, has set me up for
    success to further improve the requirements process.
        I think those three things working together are going to
    get this ship turned in the right direction. We are going to be
    doing that, as you point out, sir, inside a very challenging
    budget environment.
        Senator Reed. Again, I do not want to presume to argue
    Secretary England's case, but what it suggested to me is at
    least the possibility of stepping back, and instead of
    continuing to procure what is in the pipeline of looking out
    strategically to what we might really want 10 years from now or
    15 years from now.
        Again, we have had the discussion with all three gentlemen
    privately that in times like this, we would like to think
    strategy drives the budget, the decisions, but most times it is
    the budget that drives things. Given this tight budget, this
    notion of looking ahead and maybe not simply doing what we're
    doing today, but a little less and a little less and a little
    less might be the appropriate approach. I do not know if you
    would consider that.
        Admiral Winnefeld. I think that the old adage, if you keep
    on doing the same thing you have been doing that is the
    definition of insanity, right? I think that we are going to
    have to take a very close look, especially in a very difficult
    budget environment. There are probably some of these programs,
    depending on the pressures, depending on the decisions that are
    made by the senior leadership of the Department based on
    ongoing comprehensive review, that may end up falling by the
    wayside.
        But I hope that those decisions can be made with a strategy
    in mind. That strategy, of course, lives in an environment with
    a changing world, with threats that are out in the world, but
    also budget realities that we have to live with. We have to get
    the balance just right.
        Senator Reed. Let me switch to General Odierno. First,
    again, I join my colleagues in commending all of you, but I
    have had the privilege to work with General Odierno for many
    years now. I personally commend him for his incredible service
    to the Nation, to the Army, and, most importantly, the troops
    he leads. Thank you, sir.
        One of the challenges you had, you talked about end
    strength. You talked about budgets. But one of the challenges
    you have is, how do you continue to maintain, develop, the
    talent, the enthusiasm, the energy of the superb officers and
    noncommissioned officers (NCO) that are the heart and soul of
    what you do, not the equipment, not the force structure, at a
    time they have been in combat, many of them, their entire
    careers, which no generation of American soldiers has ever
    experienced.
        That creates psychological pressures. It creates family
    pressures. It creates real, profound questioning within the
    profession. I think the profession is where these questions
    have to be addressed initially before they come to us about
    what do we do? What changes do we make?
        I know you have thought about this, but your comments today
    would be appreciated.
        General Odierno. Thank you, Senator Reed. I think one of my
    number one priorities is to first view leader development and
    how we are going to do leader development.
        One of the things we have learned over the last 10 years is
    the requirement that we have on our leaders has changed
    significantly and grown frankly--what we expect them to be able
    to do, how we expect them to adapt, how we expect them to be
    agile. We now have to infuse in our leader development program,
    how do we develop this from the time they start at Reserve
    Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) or West Point to their time as
    they develop as young officers to senior officers, and as well
    as NCOs.
        We have to dedicate ourselves to look at new ways, broaden
    their horizons so they are able to better react and better be
    prepared for the world situations that they will be placed.
        Second, we have to understand that we have a force that is
    very different now. We have majors and captains today that all
    they have experienced is war. We have to help and understand
    and make sure they understand the profession of arms and
    reinvigorate our thoughts on the profession of arms, and
    reinvigorate how we are going to continue to move forward with
    trust within our system to understand how we operate as
    professionals. We are going to reinvigorate this as we move
    forward, and I think these are important.
        We also have to understand we have to challenge them. This
    is about challenging these leaders who have had so many
    challenges and been so successful, that we have to be able to
    continue to challenge them because we are going to need them as
    we move forward in the future. If confirmed, I will dedicate
    myself and the Army leadership to putting programs in place
    that allow us to do this.
        Senator Reed. Let me ask a question for both you and
    Admiral Winnefeld. One would love to be able to conduct a full
    spectrum, panoply of training, operations, and anticipation.
    But in thinking back 40 years now, when I entered the Army in
    1967, it was all about counter-guerilla training, et cetera.
    When I left it in 1979, it was all about the major land air
    attack battle in Europe.
        It raises the question of, not only in terms of reaction to
    what we have been through, but in terms of resources, are you
    both going to emphasize full spectrum capabilities, or are you
    going to drive to shift one way or the other, presumably away
    from some of the recent activities and more to other
    activities?
        Admiral Winnefeld. Senator, I would say it is a very good
    question that speaks to reset for what? That is going to depend
    on the strategic environment. I think as we look out ahead of
    us in that environment, we are going to have to be ready for a
    very broad spectrum of potential conflicts.
        If you look at what a conflict might be like in a place
    like Korea as opposed to other places, we are going to need to
    be prepared for that full spectrum of operations. That is going
    to be a big challenge, not only resetting the equipment for
    that, but also resetting our people for that, and making sure
    that we don't myopically focus on one type of conflict over
    another, but that we are prepared as well as we can be for
    whatever comes across the plate, but as General Odierno pointed
    out earlier, we do not have a very good track record of
    predicting what comes next.
        Senator Reed. General Odierno?
        General Odierno. Senator, as we look to the future, we are
    determining what we are now calling hybrid threat. I think this
    is the basis on how we move forward. Hybrid threat consists of
    irregular/regular terrorists and criminality. We have to
    understand that that is going to be more and more part of what
    we face no matter where we go.
        What we have to do is then develop the programs and the
    capabilities that allow our formations to adapt depending on
    where they will have to operate.
        I think that is what we have to focus on. I think there are
    some basic fundamentals that we must always train on. They must
    always be able to understand their weapons systems and be able
    to execute with their weapons systems with lethality any time.
    But they also must understand that the environment that they
    are going to operate in is going to be very different, and they
    have to be able to adapt and adjust. That is why we talk about
    leader development as well as part of this.
        Senator Reed. General Fraser, we had a chance to talk in
    the office, and you have, I think, a central role because
    without TRANSCOM, these folks do not have soldiers, sailors,
    marines, and ammo to do the job. I appreciate what you are
    doing.
        The challenges ahead, I think, are similar, which is in a
    tight budget to manage your resources very well. I think you
    are inheriting from General McNabb a quite effective
    organization, and I know you are going to carry on in that
    tradition. Let me just commend you for your service.
        Just to simply ask, because we have had a discussion about
    strategy, budgets, et cetera, any comments you might have on
    this issue as it affects TRANSCOM.
        General Fraser. Sir, if confirmed for the position, I will
    certainly work as hard as I can to continue to ensure that we
    not only effectively support the warfighter in the field, but
    do it in the most efficient manner. That is going to be
    partnering with our commercial partners, international
    partners, and working through other agencies. I look forward to
    that opportunity, should I be confirmed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Brown.
        Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Fraser, I agree with Senator McCain's concerns
    about the logistic network through Pakistan. Do we have other
    options that you are aware of that we can rely on?
        General Fraser. Sir, I have not delved deeply into the
    plan. I know ongoing planning is happening. I know there would
    be a disruption. But if confirmed, I would delve deeply into
    that plan to ensure that any disruption that we have is
    minimal, to ensure that we continue to provide that effective,
    yet efficient, support for the warfighter.
        We would also have the ability to tap into strategic
    airlift from the United States, too. It is not just intra-
    theater, but is also inter-theater. Intra-theater, it is also
    using ships. It would be a holistic look that we would have to
    address, sir, and I will delve deeply into that.
        Senator Brown. Based on Senator McCain's initial foray, I
    would suggest that you do that probably sooner rather than
    later. I know you are at a disadvantage, so I am sure you are
    going to assess what the risks of those other logistical
    avenues will be. I look forward to maybe offline touching base
    when you get settled. I think it is an important issue.
        General Odierno, I met with you yesterday, and you failed
    to include your Yankees connection as you were looking at my
    Red Sox memorabilia in the room. [Laughter.]
        But it is okay. It is okay.
        Chairman Levin. You are speaking for yourself when you say
    it is okay, by the way. [Laughter.]
        Senator Brown. I am speaking for two people actually, sir.
        Sir, obviously I asked a lot of questions yesterday and was
    obviously satisfied with those answers. I was just wanting to
    take a further question.
        The Army recently requested to reprogram procurement
    dollars away from the modular handgun system into the
    lightweight .50 caliber machine gun. It was based upon a
    decision to delay the procurement of the Army pistol to the
    fiscal year 2014, as well as changes to the requirement
    documents. Do you have any comments on that at all?
        General Odierno. I do not know the specifics of the
    reprogramming, but what I would say is that I think we are
    fairly happy with the handgun, and we think that we can
    continue to work and satisfy our needs through 2014. I think
    that we feel it is more of a need for the light machine gun,
    and that is why that was done.
        Senator Brown. Okay. Admiral, if I could shift over to you,
    one of the challenges facing the National Guard in its Homeland
    mission while at the same time it continues its obligations as
    an operational reserve that will continue to experience the
    stresses and strains resulting from today's global threat. If
    you could comment on that.
        Admiral Winnefeld. Thank you, Senator. First of all, I
    think it goes without saying that the National Guard has been
    absolutely fantastic over the last decade in stepping up to
    support operations overseas in places like Iraq and Afghanistan
    at the same time they continue to maintain their homeland
    security disaster relief-type responsibilities. They have just
    done a magnificent job.
        The process over the last year, I have grown very close to
    the Guard. I think I understand them better than I ever did as
    naval officer certainly, and they do face challenges.
        We are doing a much better job of equipping them, I think,
    that former Secretary Gates quoted going from 40 to 70-
    something percent. I think we need to continue that progress to
    equip the Guard.
        I think that we need to make sure that we account for the
    same challenges that a guardsman has when he or she deploys
    regarding being a wounded warrior, regarding their families,
    and making sure that we support those people who tend to be
    dispersed around the country. We cannot lose sight of their
    family needs as we try to do the best we can to take care of
    the Active Forces' need, which tends to be, as hard as it is, a
    little bit easier.
        I think those are our challenges, and I think we just need
    to make sure that we continue to strike the right balance
    between the Homeland mission and maintaining the Guard as an
    Operational Reserve.
        Senator Brown. General Odierno, I was going to submit that
    question for the record. I apologize for asking that first
    question. But I did have a question, one that I forgot to ask
    yesterday. I understand that the Humvee will serve as the
    majority of the Army's and Marine Corps' light tactical vehicle
    fleet for the next 20 or 30 years with nearly 100,000 vehicles
    slated for recapitalization and modernization.
        However, it fails to include scalable solutions and provide
    lightweight and affordable protection capabilities.
    Nonetheless, these scalable solutions seem to be a key design
    feature for both the GCV and the joint light tactical vehicle
    (JLTV).
        Do you think the Humvee recapitalization program should
    also incorporate scalable protection solutions and rocket
    propelled grenade protection similar to the GCV and the JLTV
    programs?
        General Odierno. I think we constantly have to conduct
    these assessments. Obviously the protection of our troops and
    how we use these vehicles is important. We always try to
    include the most protection that we can, either in the original
    design or some sort of armor that can be attached later on to
    protect them.
        Now, I will get back with you, Senator, on this to give you
    a more specific answer than that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Yes, but given the light weight of a high mobility multipurpose
    wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), the scalable solution may not be as robust as
    that on a Ground Combat Vehicle or Joint Light Tactical Vehicle.
    Scalable protection is a very important tenet of our Tactical Wheeled
    Vehicle Strategy. We have seen how rapidly technology and the threat
    can change, so we have adapted a strategy to acquire vehicles with an
    inherent protection level we refer to as an A-kit, to optimize
    protection with other essential capabilities such as mobility,
    transportability, and payload. Supplemental protection in the form of a
    B-kit may be added as required. We remain conscious of cost and only
    plan to buy a fraction of the total requirement to meet our essential
    Army Force Generation need, while reserving the opportunity to insert
    future improvements in protection. The Army, with congressional
    approval, has initiated the Modernized Expanded Capacity Vehicle
    (MECV)/HMMWV Competitive RECAP Program that will incorporate scalable
    protection and plan for additional protection against rocket propelled
    grenades. The final MECV design will depend largely on solutions
    proposed by industry to meet our requirements within the cost
    constraints established as affordable.

        Senator Brown. Thank you. Admiral Winnefeld, sir, initially
    there was a conversation where Secretary Gates ordered us to
    find $100 billion, and then several months ago the President
    advocated a plan to cut $400 billion. Then there is a potential
    plan to cut $800 billion, and there is another senator who
    said, let us do a trillion.
        Sir, at what point do these cuts affect our operational
    readiness and then prohibit our men and women from not only
    getting the equipment, tools, and resources they need to do
    their job, but in fact do it safely and come home. Is there a
    number that you have a feeling is a good number? I just wanted
    to explore that a little bit.
        Admiral Winnefeld. From my current vantage point as the
    Commander of NORTHCOM and NORAD, I do not have a specific
    number in mind.
        Senator Brown. How would those cuts affect you and your
    present command position?
        Admiral Winnefeld. It depends on how they were applied. I
    think that your question is a very good one, and it highlights
    the importance of doing this in a strategy-based manner rather
    than just driving into individual programs and cutting out the
    ones that people like or do not like.
        As we get to a higher and higher number, we are going to
    find that the strategies that we currently have are going to
    reach inflection points where we are just going to have to stop
    doing some of the things that we are currently able to do,
    because what we cannot afford is to have any kind of a cut
    result in a hollow force. We cannot afford to have a cut result
    in irreversible damage to our industrial base. We have to make
    sure that the All-Volunteer Force remains viable and we take
    care of these young men and women.
        I think we are going to find strategic inflection points. I
    do not have an exact number for you, Senator.
        Senator Brown. Of course not.
        Admiral Winnefeld. But we are going to have to explore that
    very carefully and articulate it very carefully as these
    decisions come forward.
        Senator Brown. No, and I would ask that you do articulate
    it to the chairman and us so we can advocate and/or criticize,
    depending on what it is, and then help in that effort. We would
    be happy to do what we can certainly to provide that safety and
    security for our troops.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        To my knowledge, the Department has not evaluated what an $800
    billion or greater budget reduction would entail. In my judgment, cuts
    of this magnitude to defense spending would likely require us to
    reexamine our national security and military strategies. Based on that
    examination, we would need to look both across and within the many
    roles our military plays in protecting our Nation's vital and important
    interests based these adjustments to strategy. Such an examination is
    likely an iterative process, and would have to consider both capability
    and capacity within each role, and then determine how the role itself
    might change or how we might accept risk therein. We would need to
    ensure any force structure and modernization cuts do not come at the
    expense of readiness in order to avoid migrating into a hollow force.
    We also need to take care to protect our industrial base in a way that
    can adjust to potential future needs. As Vice Chairman, I will work to
    ensure any cuts to the defense budget are made in a way that sustains a
    responsive and versatile Joint Force.

        Senator Brown. Just one final question. General Fraser, the
    Guard and Reserve airlift and transport capabilities, how does
    that figure into your overall strategy?
        General Fraser. Sir, the total force is a key and integral
    part of our accomplishment of this mission, not only as they
    look forward towards TRANSCOM, but also in my current position
    as Air Combat Commander. It takes a total force to get the job
    done. There are men and women who are on a day-to-day basis
    making tremendous contributions. I am very appreciative of
    that, and I thank them for their service.
        Senator Brown. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Brown.
        Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
    add my welcome to our witnesses this morning and want to wish
    them well, and especially their families as well, because we
    know their families really make a difference in helping our
    witnesses in their work and also our country.
        Admiral Winnefeld, the Air Force and Navy predict that
    significant savings can be achieved by leveraging research
    efforts in the Globalhawk and Broad Area Maritime Surveillance
    (BAMS) program. There are other examples of the Services
    working jointly to take advantage of efficiencies. You have
    been working on that as well.
        Admiral, do you see additional opportunities for
    efficiencies and eliminating duplication?
        Admiral Winnefeld. Senator, thank you. I believe this
    speaks to what former Secretary Gates spoke to as the different
    bins where we approach the problem of decreasing potentially
    our budget. One of those is reducing redundancies and programs
    that just aren't working for us. The example you point to of
    the Globalhawk and the BAMS is a very good one.
        I do not have any specific instances in mind, but if
    confirmed, I can promise you that I will be doing my part to
    look for those because there may be some fertile ground there
    for us find greater efficiencies. Absolutely.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you. I am glad you are looking forward
    to that.
        General Odierno, as the Department continues to look for
    efficiencies and savings, I want to ensure that our troops have
    the necessary equipment and training to accomplish their
    missions.
        General, while I think the Active Duty will continue to
    fare well, I have some concern about resources for the Guard
    and Reserves. What will you do to ensure that they receive the
    training and equipment needed so that they can be ready
    whenever they are called upon?
        General Odierno. Thank you very much, Senator. As you are
    well aware, over the last 10 years, the National Guard and
    Reserve component have played such an integral role in all of
    our war efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, other places around the
    world. They are a part of what we do. As we get into budget
    decisions, they will become more of a part of what we have to
    do.
        The operationalization of the National Guard and Reserve
    component in my mind has had a significant impact on our
    capability and the depth that we need to execute operations.
    Based on this, it is important that we keep them equipped.
        Part of the things we have to look is in the future as we
    come out of Iraq and Afghanistan, we believe we still need to
    have an operational capability within the National Guard and
    the Reserve component. We have to identify what that will look
    like. We have to ensure we have access to the National Guard
    and Reserve component.
        All of this will enable us then to ensure that they get the
    training and equipment necessary to meet the requirements that
    we will place on them as we move forward. This is critical to
    us in our success.
        I promise you that, if confirmed, we will constantly
    assess, study, work very closely with the National Guard
    Bureau, with the Reserve component leaders in order to deal
    with these issues.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, General.
        General Fraser, in April, General McNabb testified that the
    CRAF is a critical component to rapidly deployed forces and
    equipment with response times between 24 and 48 hours after the
    mission is assigned.
        What are your thoughts on the future of this partnership
    with the civilian sector?
        General Fraser. Thank you, Senator. I agree with General
    McNabb that the CRAF, as it is called, is a significant part of
    what we have in our capabilities that are available to us. If
    confirmed, I will work my hardest to make sure that it stays
    viable, and that means reaching out and working with our
    commercial partners, and doing everything I can in working with
    this committee and Congress along those lines to keep it
    viable.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
        General Odierno, the Military Leadership Diversity
    Commission was formed to look at the policies and practices
    that shape diversity among military leaders. One of the
    recommendations was that senior leadership within the Services
    and DOD personally commit to making diversity an institutional
    priority.
        General, can you share your thoughts on this topic as well
    as potential efforts you would undertake, should you be
    confirmed?
        General Odierno. Senator, first off, I will tell you that I
    believe this is the strength of our Sevices, and I will speak
    to the Army specifically, is its diversity. That is what gives
    us the strength. It gives us people from all backgrounds, all
    capabilities that enables us to be very successful.
        In my mind, we become stronger the more diverse that we
    become. It is important that we have programs in place, both in
    our recruiting, in our ROTC programs, in our military
    academies, that then gets carried on as we continue to develop
    our leaders through our training programs.
        Now, we have to monitor this. We have to make sure that
    everyone is being fairly treated. But most important, we have
    to make sure everybody is given the opportunities to do the
    jobs that are career enhancing. We have to track this regularly
    to ensure that happens.
        I will be dedicated to that, if confirmed, to ensure that
    we understand the importance of diversity, include that in all
    of our developmental programs both for our leaders and all the
    soldiers within the Army.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Ayotte is next.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank all of you for your outstanding service to
    our country. The three of you are incredible leaders, and we
    are so fortunate to have you, and particularly want to thank
    all of the soldiers and sailors, our service men and women who
    serve underneath you for what they do for our country to keep
    us safe.
        Admiral Winnefeld, if confirmed to be the Vice Chairman of
    the JCS, you will have a very important role in advising the
    Chairman, the Secretary of Defense, and the President regarding
    a variety of DOD policies.
        In your written testimony, you discussed al Qaeda and the
    Arabian Peninsula, as well as al Shabbab, and you called al
    Qaeda a growing threat to our Homeland, and noted that al
    Shabbab is planning to conduct attacks against United States'
    interests in East Africa.
        During the hearing on June 28, I had the opportunity to ask
    Vice Admiral McCraven if it would be helpful 10 years into the
    war on terror to have a designated long-term detention and
    interrogation facility for terrorists from groups like al Qaeda
    in the Arabian Peninsula and al Shabbab. He said that he
    thought it would be very helpful. What is your opinion about
    that?
        Admiral Winnefeld. I would share, I think, both Secretary
    Panetta's and Bill's opinion on that, that it would be helpful
    to have a long-term detention facility. For now, we are making
    due, as Bill pointed out. We recently apprehended somebody, got
    pretty good interrogation of that person, and I think we got
    the information we needed. But it would be much better for us
    to have a longer-term solution.
        Senator Ayotte. I believe, Admiral, you were referring to
    Orsami, who was held on a ship for nearly 2 months and was
    interrogated on the ship, and then has been brought for trial
    within the United States.
        I remain concerned about the fact that we could have put an
    individual like that in Guantanamo versus having to rely on
    keeping individuals on ships because if we get to a situation
    where we need longer than a couple of months to interrogate
    someone, a ship does not become a viable option. Would you
    agree with me?
        Admiral Winnefeld. It is a lot less convenient to put them
    on a ship. It is a burden on the ship. But we did just fine
    with Orsami, and we may have to do that from time to time in
    the future. I do agree that would be a good idea to have a
    longer-term solution if we can find one. If I am confirmed, I
    will drill into that more obviously and work with the committee
    as required to see what the options are.
        Senator Ayotte. Can I ask you a question? There was an
    Associated Press report about a man named Ali Musa Daqduq, who
    is a senior Hezbollah operative, who has been held by the
    United States in Baghdad as a top threat to American troops. He
    has been accused of working with Iranian agents, basically with
    their Shi'ite militias, to fight Americans.
        The article noted that this dangerous Hezbollah terrorist
    could be turned over to the Iraqi authorities within days, and
    within the article, if it is purported to be true, U.S.
    security officials are worrying that he could escape or even be
    freed from the Iraqis.
        Admiral, are you familiar with this situation?
        Admiral Winnefeld. No, ma'am, I am not familiar with that
    specific situation.
        Senator Ayotte. I would ask you to follow up either here or
    in a classified setting an answer to what is the situation with
    this individual. It brings to mind to me, again, the concern
    with the lack of a long-term detention facility for individuals
    that remain dangerous to us.
        I firmly believe that Guantanamo is a top rate facility
    having visited it and should be that facility. We end up making
    decisions, like turning over people to other countries that are
    not prepared to assure their security, and then they end up in
    the battle against us again. It is one of the reasons I would
    like a follow-up on this particular individual. But, again, why
    I think it is so important that we establish this. I think we
    have a facility. It works well.
        I hope as you go forward in this role that you will be
    focused on this as you advise the President.
        Admiral Winnefeld. Senator, I will provide an answer for
    the record on that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Currently, we examine all options for persons captured outside of
    Afghanistan and Iraq on a case-by-case basis to determine an
    appropriate disposition. As part of that analysis, we consider long-
    term detention as one of the possible disposition options. If a
    decision is made to detain a future capture in long-term detention, we
    would necessarily address an appropriate detention location. In
    reference to your specific question about Ali Musa Daqduq, he currently
    remains in U.S. forces' custody in Iraq, and we are looking at all
    options for his ultimate disposition.

        Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much.
        I also wanted to ask both General Odierno and you, Admiral,
    as well about the President's recommendations in terms of
    withdrawal from Afghanistan, and his plan that he has brought
    forth.
        I know a number of us have shared concerns. I am deeply
    concerned about one particular aspect of it, and that is the
    plan to fully remove the surge troops during September 2012 as
    opposed to at end of the fighting season. The fighting season,
    as I am sure both of you know, is generally from April through
    October. We are going to be withdrawing troops during July and
    August as we are in the middle of the fighting season. As far
    as I can see, there does not appear to be a strategic or
    operational reason to do it at that particular time.
        As we go forward towards 2012, Admiral, if it becomes
    apparent to you that based on the recommendations of General
    Allen and General Mattis that it is necessary to change that
    recommendation, or to stop the Afghanistan troop withdrawal in
    terms of the timing given that we are going to be in the middle
    of the fighting season, would you be willing to recommend to
    the President and the chain of command a change in that
    deadline based on conditions on the ground?
        Admiral Winnefeld. Senator, throughout the nomination
    process, it has been made very clear to me from the senior
    leadership of the Department and the Nation that they expect
    candor from me, and I intend to provide that candor. I do, in
    consultation certainly with the theater commander and with the
    combatant commander, if it becomes apparent that conditions on
    the ground warrant some sort of a shift, I would not hesitate
    to make a different recommendation.
        Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, I appreciate your
    leadership in Iraq, and obviously the key leadership that you
    provided working with General Petraeus and a successful surge
    in Iraq.
        I first wanted to get your view. Do you have an opinion
    whether there was any strategic, operational, or tactical
    advantages to the September withdrawal versus at the end of the
    fighting season?
        General Odierno. I am not privy to conversations that went
    on and what General Petraeus' recommendations, General Mattis',
    and now General Allen's recommendation had been. I am not privy
    to that.
        What I would say, though, is that this does remind me a bit
    of where we were in Iraq in 2008. Although Iraq and Afghanistan
    are different, the situations are somewhat the same.
        In 2008, we still had some violence. Although the surge had
    started to bring violence, we still had violence in Iraq. But
    we did have to begin to withdraw the surge forces for no other
    reason that we could no longer continue to supply the surge
    force because we did not have the capability to back fill surge
    forces.
        But what this does, I believe the most important thing in
    this plan is it provides flexibility now to General Allen to
    decide how he withdraws those forces, when he withdraws them. I
    think that is what is most important because that enables us to
    buy down risk. This is about risk. It is about how some people
    are concerned that we are assuming high risk at the end of the
    fighting season, August/September/October potentially as we
    withdraw. But at least the President and the Secretary of
    Defense and General Mattis have given him the flexibility of
    when he will bring these troops out.
        I would just say a year is a long time, so I think we have
    to wait. I think we have to see how he is able to execute this.
    I think it is doable, but he will be the one who has to
    determine the risk and then provide us input as it moves
    forward.
        Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, just a follow-up. Given
    your experience in Iraq, would you agree with me that General
    Allen's recommendations about the conditions on the ground are
    really what should determine the timing there?
        General Odierno. I think, again, yes. I think how he
    withdraws with what he has been given, I think, will be based
    on conditions. If he believes at some time the conditions do
    not warrant it, it is incumbent on him to bring that forward
    through General Mattis.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you. I appreciate it.
        My time is up, but if I could ask just one quick question,
    Mr. Chairman? Thank you.
        General Fraser, I just wanted to follow up. Ranking Member
    McCain asked you about the strategic airlift capacity level. We
    just recently had a hearing before the Subcommittee on Seapower
    with General McNabb. Do you fully agree with his
    recommendations that we can meet our capacity at approximately
    300?
        General Fraser. Thank you, Senator. I have taken a look at
    the MCRS-16, and discussed with General McNabb and others, and
    I do support it.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
        Senator Udall.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for your service and
    willingness to take on even additional responsibility.
        If I might indulge in a bit of personal commentary, Admiral
    Winnefeld, it has been terrific to have you in Colorado heading
    NORTHCOM. You are going to be missed, but you are going to add
    an enormously capable voice, presence to the Joint Chiefs, and
    you will always have a home in Colorado. I hope you know that.
        General Odierno, we have phenomenal presence with the Army
    at Fort Carson. We are really proud of our soldiers. We are
    looking forward to the arrival of the combat aviation brigade.
    I also wanted to point out that General Dave Perkins, who is
    deployed right now, and along with General Doherty, who has
    taken his place, and Colonel McLaughlin. The Army has been very
    well represented.
        You and I talked about the Pinon Canyon situation, and I
    know that we are committed to working with you and the ranching
    community to see if we can put that issue to rest.
        General Fraser, I do not know you as well, but I am
    reminded of an adage I have heard, at least quietly shared
    among the ranks of military leaders, and that is as follows:
    ``Tactics are for amateurs. Strategy is rank amateurs. But
    logistics is for the true professional.'' We are excited to
    have you on the verge of taking the helm of this important
    command.
        General Odierno, if I could turn to the dwell time
    question. I understand in the current Army force generation
    cycle, we are just not going to be able to provide that optimal
    ratio of 2 years at home for every year deployed. My question
    is, we know that the quantity of time at home station will be
    limited. What steps might you be able to take as chief to
    improve the quality of that time at home?
        General Odierno. Thank you, Senator.
        First off, we are moving closer and closer to that goal. We
    are not there yet as you stated. As we stay engaged in Iraq and
    Afghanistan, we will work towards trying to achieve that goal
    because we know that is one of the key factors of ensuring that
    we sustain our soldiers and their families as we continue to
    ask them to sacrifice.
        There are other things that we can do. What we have to do
    first is we have to be more predictable to them while they are
    home, predictable where they will be stationed, predictable on
    what kind of training cycle they are in as they are preparing
    to redeploy in 2 years, so they can have more predictability
    with their families.
        That is an area we have to focus. It is about having
    resiliency centers that allow them to go and discuss issues and
    their families to discuss issues as they work with the
    reintegration and the stresses of repeated deployments. It is
    things like this that we have to continue to do that helps us
    to improve the quality of life of our soldiers and families, as
    well as continue to work towards increasing our dwell time
    home. Those are things we have to continue to focus on as we
    move forward, sir.
        Senator Udall. I look forward to working with you in that
    area, and I know how important it is, and I know you know that.
        Admiral Winnefeld, in your capacity as the NORTHCOM
    Commander, you have a unique understanding of the capabilities
    and the contributions of the Military's Reserve components. We
    all know since September 11, the Guard and the Reserve have
    played a vital role here at home and overseas.
        As we begin to transition out of Iraq and Afghanistan, do
    you anticipate there will be a need to adjust Reserve component
    force structure or the missions they currently perform?
        Admiral Winnefeld. I have not had a chance to really
    participate in the comprehensive review, Senator, that is going
    on right now that will consider that very question. I wouldn't
    want to get out in front of that or pre-judge it. We are going
    to have to take a closer look at it, but I really do believe
    that we need to strike the right balance between maintaining
    the Guard as an Operational Reserve, as well as maintaining
    their capability to conduct the day-in and day-out work that
    they do so well inside the States.
        There is an overlap there in terms of equipment and
    training, but there also is uniqueness there. We are going to
    need to strike the right balance as they come home.
        Senator Udall. If I could, let me add a question for the
    record as you undertake that survey. The question is as
    follows, if the current budget constraints and the reduced
    number of deployed troops would cause DOD to either cut into
    the Reserve or additional missions in order to maintain Active-
    Duty Force structure and capabilities, how would you end up
    answering that question? I'll ask for the record.
        Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir, I will take that for the
    record.
        Senator Udall. That would be terrific.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Force structure is not necessarily best viewed as a stark Active
    component versus Reserve component trade-off. To cut into the Reserve
    simply to maintain Active-Duty Force structure and capabilities would
    not serve our national security interests well.
        Over the last 10 years, we have seen a tremendous interdependency
    develop between Active and Reserve Forces. The success of this
    transformation is not only a result of the tremendous investment made
    in training, equipping and deploying Reserve Forces, but also our
    strategic policy commitment to employ an Operational Reserve. Moving
    forward, it is crucial to capitalize on these investments and the
    ``value proposition'' presented by an operationally capable Reserve
    component.
        As we face a resource-constrained fiscal environment, the
    Department must take a comprehensive approach that will likely involve
    a rebalancing of the Total Force. There are many capabilities residing
    in the Reserve component that can be provided in a more cost effective
    manner than in the Active component. Conversely, there are capabilities
    that require very short timelines, or have such a significant demand
    signal and require such a high degree of training and currency, that
    they are best suited to reside in the Active component. We will need to
    strike a balance that best addresses the strategic environment we will
    likely face, while minimizing cost.
        The Office of the Secretary of Defense is currently conducting a
    Front End Assessment to provide a comprehensive analysis of our Total
    Force mix as we complete our draw downs in Iraq and Afghanistan. I look
    forward to working with the committee and Congress to implement their
    recommendations.

        Senator Udall. Let me turn to cyber. You and I talked about
    this the other day, and, again, your responsibilities at
    NORTHCOM have linked you to that very important and new concern
    we all have.
        The Comprehensive National Cyber Security Initiative that
    the President initiated has identified cyber as one of the most
    serious economic and national security challenges that we face.
        I know there is a limit to what we can discuss here, but
    can you discuss what you believe DOD's role should be in
    defending the United States and our vital assets against cyber
    attack? Then would you talk, if you think you can, about where
    a kinetic military response might be justified?
        Admiral Winnefeld. Clearly, DOD has a role in cyber defense
    of the country. The first and easiest thing to talk about is
    defense of our own networks within the dot.mil domain.
        We also have a role, I believe, in supporting the
    Department of Homeland Security in their role of helping defend
    the rest of government and the rest of the country. That is a
    complex relationship. I believe that former Secretary Gates and
    Secretary Napolitano struck a very good, solid agreement.
    General Alexander, my counterpart over at U.S. Cyber Command,
    is doing a very good job, I believe, of working with the
    Department of Homeland Security to construct how that support
    would work to include making sure that we have respect for
    civil liberties as we do that.
        That is a growth industry, to be sure, that we need to pay
    very close attention to.
        Regarding your question on offensive capability, it is very
    clear that an element of deterrence, one of the several
    elements of deterrence, is the ability to respond to an attack,
    and to make that attack so costly for an attacker that they are
    unwilling to conduct it. I believe that we have to consider the
    full range of potential responses to an attack, not only, by
    the way, military responses, but also the full range of
    diplomatic and using force as a last resort, as it were. But I
    would never want to rule anything out in responding to a
    serious cyber attack on this country offensively. It could be a
    cyber response or it could be a kinetic response, depending on
    the nature of the attack and the circumstances that surround
    it.
        Senator Udall. I would like to acknowledge the tremendous
    work that General Cartwright has done in this area. I know you
    will build on what he has learned and what he has proposed.
    This committee had an opportunity to sit in secured settings
    and learn more and more about the threats and also the
    responses that we have available to us.
        Before my time runs out, I want to turn to energy. I
    visited with all three of you about the opportunities and also
    the challenges we have in the energy space. Admiral Mullen, I
    think, put it quite well recently when he said, energy needs to
    be the first thing we think about before we deploy another
    soldier and before we build another ship or plane. He also said
    saving energy saves lives. I know you all three know that
    acutely.
        General Fraser, would you care to comment on any thoughts
    you have in regards to how we can do a better job and enhance
    our national security, and perhaps also develop some
    technologies that will have great application in the civilian
    sector.
        General Fraser. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate it.
        The Air Force is doing a lot in the area to certify our
    aviation assets to run on alternative fuels. We continue to
    move forward in a number of different platforms. In fact, just
    this year, at the Andrews air show, the F-16s that flew as a
    part of the Thunderbirds, we had an aircraft that was on
    alternative fuel. I think that we need to continue to move
    forward in that area.
        Right now, we also need to see about making it more
    economical. It is very costly, and so I think as more get in
    line and we find out that there are opportunities there, there
    is a competition for it that will drive costs down, and it may
    be an opportunity to look forward into the future to using
    these blends and these mixes or biofuels.
        I also feel that there are some technologies that we need
    to continue to explore with respect to our engines. Alternative
    engines, as we look to the future, are the things from the
    engineering and design perspective that we can get more
    efficient use out of our engines in the future? That ought to
    be something that is taken into consideration as we move
    forward to the future in everything that we do.
        Energy is an integral part of our analysis, and I look
    forward as I move into this position, if confirmed, to continue
    to move forward, ensure that we are doing things in a most
    efficient and effective manner.
        A couple of things that I have already been made aware of
    that we are doing is utilizing tools to maximize the assets
    that we have. There is a route planning tool that is used that
    has actually increased the efficiency along routes by upwards
    of 15 percent. There is an air optimization tool that has also
    been used to increase our ability by up to about 10 percent.
        It is these types of things I look forward to delving into
    even greater if confirmed and moving into my next position.
    Thank you very much, sir.
        Senator Udall. Thank you for that update. Again, I look
    forward to working with all of you on this important
    opportunity when it comes to saving energy and developing new
    energy technologies.
        Thanks again for your service.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
        Senator Graham.
        Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all for your service. I am sure you will be
    confirmed, and congratulations on being nominated by the
    President to very important jobs at a critical time.
        Admiral Winnefeld, whatever number of transport aircraft we
    have available as a Nation, do you agree with me that over the
    last decade we have been flying the wings off these things?
        Admiral Winnefeld. Sir, did you mean that for General
    Fraser?
        Senator Graham. Yes, General Fraser, I am sorry. I
    apologize.
        General Fraser. Sir, we are indeed flying at a higher rate
    with respect to a large number of our platforms, whether it is
    tactical air or strategic air. Our assets have been deeply
    engaged in today's fight.
        Senator Graham. As a matter of fact, the operational tempo
    is probably unheard of maybe since World War II. Is that
    correct?
        General Fraser. Sir, it is a high ops tempo across all of
    our platforms.
        Senator Graham. When we look at numbers, we all need to
    understand from the committee's point of view, I believe, that
    we are really aging these airplanes pretty quickly because of
    the demands.
        Admiral, as Vice Chairman, do you believe that the term
    ``war on terror'' is a correct term for the threats we are
    facing?
        Admiral Winnefeld. That is a very good question. I think
    that term has passed out of vogue with a number of people, but
    I think we are still so much in a fight with al Qaeda and their
    related extremist groups that it sure feels like a war, yes,
    sir.
        Senator Graham. That is a good response, I think. What do
    you tell the public? Is it close to being over? Is it just
    beginning? Are we in the middle? Or we don't know?
        Admiral Winnefeld. I think I would echo Secretary Panetta
    when he was asked a question about this, and he said we are
    close to being able to strategically defeat al Qaeda. To me,
    that means their message being bankrupt, a lack of financial
    support that enables them to conduct operations and the like,
    that ultimately causes them to unravel from their internal
    contradictions, much the same way the Soviet Union did.
        But that said, al Qaeda is morphing. It is less of a
    centrally-controlled organization. There are more home grown
    terrorists out there that are ascribing to the ideology in some
    cases.
        This is not yet over. It is not even close. We still have a
    fight on our hands in places like Yemen and Somalia, and even
    ensuring, with the cooperation of our law enforcement partners,
    that of course we manage this at home.
        It is going to be a long struggle.
        Senator Graham. What would you call the potential threat we
    face from a nuclear armed Iran? Is that part of the war on
    terror, or is that a different threat all together?
        Admiral Winnefeld. Unless Iran were to hand a nuclear
    weapon over to an extremist, then I would consider it a
    completely different animal.
        Senator Graham. What do you think the odds are that if the
    Iranians developed a nuclear capability they would indeed hand
    it to an extremist group?
        Admiral Winnefeld. I think the Iranians understand that if
    they handed it to an extremist group, it probably would not be
    very difficult for us attribute any use of that weapon to Iran.
    I think they know that they would suffer grave consequences if
    that occurred.
        Senator Graham. Do you think they believe they would suffer
    grave consequences if they developed one at all?
        Admiral Winnefeld. I believe that they are going to
    understand that they are going to feel the effects of all
    elements of national and international power applied to them as
    required if and when they continue this development.
        Senator Graham. Do you believe that all the efforts of
    international power being applied is deterring the Iranians
    from obtaining a nuclear weapon?
        Admiral Winnefeld. It remains to be seen, Senator. It is a
    very good question. It certainly, I believe, slowed them down,
    but there is more pressure, I think, that could be and probably
    should be applied eventually.
        Senator Graham. In terms of the threats we face in the
    future, if Iran acquired a nuclear capability, what kind of
    threat and what would be the likely consequences of that event
    to our national security?
        Admiral Winnefeld. I think it would be grave if they
    acquired a nuclear weapon and the ability to deliver it.
        Senator Graham. Right.
        Admiral Winnefeld. Of course, we need to watch that very
    carefully and pace that so that we can----
        Senator Graham. That takes us to missile defense and to
    suppress the Iranian nuclear threat could require some pretty
    sophisticated military capability. Do you agree with that?
        Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. That the idea of attacking Iran with a
    single strike and neutering their nuclear capability if the
    President chose to do that is probably not going to happen. It
    would be a more sustained effort if we went down that road?
        Admiral Winnefeld. I would not want to rule anything out,
    Senator, at this point.
        Senator Graham. That is why F-35s and F-22s have become
    important, is that correct?
        Admiral Winnefeld. The F-35 and the F-22 certainly
    represent a very important capability.
        Senator Graham. That is why air refueling capability
    becomes important. That is why bases in the region become
    important.
        The reason I ask these questions is to get to what kind of
    threats the Nation faces. I would argue that the fight against
    al Qaeda has been successful, but not nearly over. It is
    morphing, that the Pakistani border is more unstable than it
    has been in the past. That when you look at the amount of money
    which we spend to defend the Nation, you have to look at the
    threats. We have not even gotten to North Korea yet.
        My question for all of you, is it fair to use gross
    domestic product (GDP) spending on defense as a guide to what
    is sufficient? Is that a good measuring device?
        Admiral Winnefeld. Senator, I think it is an indicator, a
    comparative indicator. But it is also very often comparing
    apples to oranges. If you look at what we spend as a percentage
    of GDP in World War II, it does not even compare to what we are
    spending now.
        Senator Graham. Right. Secretary Gates identified GDP as a
    benchmark for defense spending. I associate myself with that.
    When you look at World War II spending, you are right. We went
    up to 42 percent at the height of the war of GDP. Korea was
    8.23 to 13 percent; Vietnam was 7.65 to 10.8 percent. In 2010,
    we are spending 5.78 percent of our GDP on defense.
        If you believe it is a benchmark, would you agree that it
    is on the low end of conflicts in recent memory?
        Admiral Winnefeld. I would say factually it is on the low
    end GDP-wise, yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. General, can the Army withstand 49,000
    troop reductions and deal with some of the threats we have just
    talked about?
        General Odierno. The 49,000 troop reduction depends on our
    commitments, and I think the assumption in that reduction is
    our commitments to Afghanistan will go away. Our commitments in
    Iraq will go away and there will be no new more commitments
    generated.
        Senator Graham. Do you think it is logical for this country
    to assume in the future that we are not going to have to use
    the Army in some kind of role in the future operations in the
    war on terror?
        General Odierno. As I said earlier, we have never been good
    at predicting the future. We must have an Army that is capable
    of responding to worldwide issues.
        Senator Graham. When we respond, we want to respond with
    overwhelming force. We are not looking for a fair fight here,
    right?
        General Odierno. We are not looking for a fair fight, no,
    Senator.
        Senator Graham. Now, you mentioned to Senator Ayotte's
    questions that you believe that General Allen had flexibility
    in terms of withdrawal. Are you suggesting to the committee the
    President's dictate that we will remove all surge forces out of
    Afghanistan by September 2012 is conditions based?
        General Odierno. What I was suggesting is that he has
    flexibility within the timeline that was set for him by the
    President.
        Senator Graham. But my question is, it is not condition-
    based. As I understand the policy, all troops will be removed
    by the end of September.
        General Odierno. What I was discussing was the flexibility
    he has within those dates of removing troops.
        Senator Graham. I guess he could bring 30,000 out on
    September 15 but that would be pretty hard to do.
        General Odierno. He could.
        Senator Graham. I just want to thank you all. As the
    committee inquires into what is enough to defend America, we
    are going to need your counsel and advice. There is a budget
    problem we are all facing. Defense spending has to be on the
    table. But I do not want to America to lose sight, Mr.
    Chairman, of the threats we are facing.
        This is not a time to seek a peace dividend because we are
    nowhere near peace. The way to avoid war is to be able to deter
    it. When you go into it, end it quickly, and we need capability
    as far as the eye can see.
        Thank you all and God bless.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
        Senator Begich.
        Senator Begich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
    your service and your willingness to serve. Thank all of you
    for most recently and some over the last few months having
    conversations about what is important to Alaska.
        Let me, if I can, to Admiral Winnefeld. Again, thank you
    for moving to this level. As Senator Udall said, we will miss
    you in regards to your role in NORTHCOM. I know I owed you a
    call back from your call to me, but thank you for figuring out
    who is in charge in the Arctic. We appreciate that more than
    you can imagine, per our conversation that we had.
        On that issue, if I can walk through a concern, and we have
    talked about this before. In dealing with the Arctic, which is
    now becoming more and more apparent to almost all aspects, it
    does not matter if it is military, industry, environmentalists,
    you name it, the Arctic is becoming a pretty important piece of
    the puzzle for our country. Of course, for Alaska, it is a
    critical piece.
        One of the pieces of this puzzle is the Law of the Sea that
    has been delayed or we are one of the few countries that have
    not signed on. One, I would be interested in your thoughts on
    that. Two, the concerns that we hear from people, and a very
    small amount of people, as we have talked about before, is it
    that somehow we will lose our sovereignty by signing on to the
    Law of the Sea.
        First, can you respond to the importance of the Law of the
    Sea from your perspective? Then this whole issue of sovereignty
    and that we would be giving up our role? Admiral?
        Admiral Winnefeld. Sir, I think the Law of the Sea Treaty
    is important to us, both from a strategic perspective, and also
    inside the military perspective. From the strategic
    perspective, specifically to the Arctic, it gives you a seat at
    the table when other nations are starting to step forward and
    assert their claims in the Arctic. We want to be there as part
    of the international community to participate in that process
    to make sure that that is adjudicated properly.
        Senator Begich. Can I hold you there for a second? Could I
    just read to you, and it might have been over the last month
    that Russia is moving aggressively with military operations
    potentially in the Arctic. Did I read that correctly?
        Admiral Winnefeld. They have made a number of statements,
    for example, putting a couple of brigades up in the Arctic. It
    remains to be seen where they go, what they do, and how they
    are configured. I am withholding judgment on that a little bit.
    But it is a significant statement on their part.
        Regarding the military piece of the Law of the Sea, there
    is nothing in the Law of the Sea that prevents us from
    exercising any of the standard operations that we need to be
    able to do--straights passages, freedom of navigation, and that
    sort of thing. If anything, it more formally codifies it and
    gives us a seat at the table as they might be modified in the
    future.
        I fully support accession to the Law of the Sea Treaty.
        Senator Begich. It does not, again, to the main question,
    limit or reduce our rights and sovereignty in the areas that we
    control?
        Admiral Winnefeld. As far as I can tell, and reading the
    treaty and consulting with our people, it does not. There are
    mechanisms that we have in place where if that were attempted,
    we would be able to avoid any kind of a limitation on our
    freedoms or sovereignty.
        Senator Begich. The military supports the effort to get the
    Law of the Sea Treaty resolved.
        Admiral Winnefeld. I do not know of anybody in the Defense
    Department, including the Navy, that is not in favor of
    acceding to it.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much. I just wanted to make
    sure that is, again, on the record. I know we talked about it
    several months ago, and I just wanted to make sure.
        The second is, if I can shift here to, I sit also on the
    Veterans' Affairs Committee, and one of the big issues is
    transition from DOD, military operations, individuals, and then
    going into veterans' programs, and that transition. I can only
    speak for the last 2\1/2\, 3 years that I have been here, but I
    know there was concerns in the past that transition was not as
    smooth as it could have been. Can you give me some general
    comments of what you think, and how that is improving? The
    reason I ask, I come to the Armed Services Committee here, talk
    to the Active Duty members and hear pieces. Then I go to the
    Veterans' Affairs Committee and hear pieces. Not all the time
    do they meet. But I am seeing some progress, at least in my 3
    years here. But maybe you could respond to that and tell me
    what you think, and is there some areas of room for improvement
    in that arena?
        Admiral Winnefeld. Senator, it is a very good question. It
    is something that I would need to dive into deeply, if
    confirmed.
        I do know that there have been, as you point out correctly,
    problems in the past where we have not stitched together those
    two systems as we well we probably should have. I also know
    cursorily that the Department is determined to work with the
    Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to stitch that together the
    way it should be. I can assure you that if I am confirmed, I
    will look into that.
        Senator Begich. I appreciate that. I know as we talked
    about what the future is in end strength, there will be less in
    the Active end and more in the veteran end. We want to make
    sure that transition works very smoothly.
        Very parochial, but yet a more broad sweep, and that is how
    the Defense Department will work with nonprofit organizations,
    organizations that are important to family support. What I mean
    by that is I know in Alaska we have a program, Alaska
    Assistance Dogs, that are important for many of our veterans
    and wounded warriors. It is basically run by a nonprofit
    organization. I know sometimes the Defense Department is very
    rigid in their access or allowability of access from
    nonprofits.
        One, do you see these organizations as important for the
    long term, especially with our wounded warriors? Two, can you
    make a commitment here that you will aggressively look at how
    we ensure these non-profit organizations really do integrate
    their services or provide these services that the military just
    cannot?
        Admiral Winnefeld. Sir, I think that Chairman Mullen has
    done an exceptional job of outreach into the country through
    his conversations with the country and a number of other
    initiatives that he has had in place to reach out and leverage
    every capability that the Nation can muster to try to help our
    families and our wounded warriors.
        I would be committed to continuing that. I think it
    involves a number of different bins, if you will, of awareness
    within the population and certainly businesses and schools in
    the country of what military families' needs are. It includes
    employment. It includes education. It includes wellness. It
    includes what I believe are quality of services that we provide
    to our military individuals. I think that non-profits can have
    a key role to play in that.
        I do not know the exact details, whether there are any
    particular limitations on non-profits being able to participate
    in that. But if confirmed, I will make it a matter of priority
    to continue to support Chairman Mullen's program in that
    regard.
        Senator Begich. If you see areas that, just because of
    regulatory or old systems that we put in place through
    legislation, that limits their ability, even though it sounds
    like a good idea to include them, please let me know or let
    others know, because I think we want to engage the community
    because I think the community is very interested and want to
    help as much as possible.
        Admiral Winnefeld. Senator, I relish cutting through red
    tape like that. As long as I can do it legally and ethically, I
    will be all over it.
        Senator Begich. On the legal end, if you see laws that need
    to be changed, that is our job, so please feel free to tell us.
    It may take longer than we want, but let us see what we can do.
        Thank you very much. To General Odierno, let me ask you a
    couple of questions.
        I know we had a great conversation regarding family support
    and the need to ensure--and there is no question in my mind
    after our conversation, your strong interest to have a strong
    Army, you need to have a strong family component to it.
        One area we talked about a little bit was education and how
    and what we need to do. Can you give me your thoughts--and I
    know I talked to you about ensure that our DOD facilities are
    properly maintained, but I thought it was very interesting your
    conversation about the community part of it and how you can
    kind of see this balance. Could you respond a little bit?
        General Odierno. As I have my three children here who all
    grew up in DOD schools as well as community schools, I think
    the important part about this is there are places where there
    is no other choice, but you have to have DOD schools. I think
    in those places, it is important that we support the
    infrastructure in order so our children can continue to be
    educated.
        But there are many programs around in many places, and I
    will use Killeen, TX, as an example, out of Fort Hood where
    there is a partnership where the Killeen school district is
    taking over the infrastructure on post in order to have our
    kids get a good education. I think these partnerships are
    important.
        My personal opinion is inside the United States, we should
    really continue to build these partnerships, and that should be
    the way ahead for our education. I think it brings more
    resources. It brings more capability to our children.
        If you could just indulge me, if I could just comment on
    the question you just asked. It is absolutely critical that we
    have the opportunity for non-profit organizations to supplement
    our support to our soldiers and families, wounded warriors.
    There are so many of them out there who do so many great things
    for our soldiers. It is important. We have to have that, and it
    is so important. Sometimes it is difficult for us to reach out
    them, and I think we have to look at ways at how we can do this
    legally and ethically in such a way where they can provide more
    support to our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and their
    families in order to provide them what they need as we go
    through this time of war. I think that is a very important
    effort, and I would like to work with you and the committee on
    that, if confirmed.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much. Thanks for those
    comments. I will just throw an idea, and then my time is up
    here, and that is, it just dawned on me as you were talking. I
    wonder if the military when the school board associations meet
    on an annual basis, they meet, I think, a couple of times a
    year, all the school boards from across the country. If the
    military actually participates in those meetings.
        General Odierno. I would tell you in a couple of ways.
    First, in the community I was involved with, there are four or
    five communities. Frankly, I met once a month with all the
    superintendents.
        Senator Begich. Excellent.
        General Odierno. They would come in together, and we had a
    program where I met personally with them. Those are the kind of
    relationships I think we have to have. But I think in many
    places that is in fact the case, but we have to continue at
    things like that.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much. General Fraser, we had
    a great conversation. I have run out of time. But I would say I
    know you have been run ragged a little bit on logistics in
    Afghanistan and Pakistan and what could happen there. But from
    our conversation, I have faith that you are not going to leave
    the troops hanging out there without the right logistic support
    they will need to do their job. I just want to put that on the
    record.
        I know we talked about a little bit about a plan B. As you
    get confirmed, you will be engaging in that in an aggressive
    level. I want to at least reassure people who might be watching
    us that there may be slight gaps, but it is not about a total
    gap. The goal is to have a full plan to make sure all logistics
    are dealt with wherever our troops are, Afghanistan being one
    of the places obviously now. You do not have to respond. I just
    want to put that out there.
        Thank you very much to all three of you, and to the
    families that are behind you, thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Begich. Senator, if you
    will look into the issue that you raised about the National
    Association of School Boards and whether or not there is a
    connection at those national meetings, I would be happy to join
    with you. Perhaps the committee could even, if it is not
    already the case, suggest to them that it be the case.
        Senator Begich. I think that is a great idea, Mr. Chairman.
    Why it dawned on me when I was with U.S. Conference of Mayors,
    they never had one, and we created one because it was critical
    that mayors have that connection, so it just dawned on me. I
    will do that.
        Chairman Levin. It was a good idea.
        Senator Begich. We will do it.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you. Thank all of you, and
    congratulations on your appointments and nominations. I expect
    to support you and continue to support you after confirmation,
    which I am certain will happen.
        I truly believe we have the greatest military the world has
    ever known. It is large. It is mobile. It is courageous. It is
    well led by the finest operations corps we have ever had, and I
    believe the finest NCO corps. It is just a remarkable thing.
        As the ranking member of the Senate Budget Committee,
    things are going to be tighter in the years to come. I would
    just say that we have to tighten our belts, but do it in a way
    that does not damage this fabulous morale and spirit and
    capability that the military has accomplished. I just would say
    that in opening comments.
        General Odierno, Senator Ayotte, a former prosecutor like I
    have been, asked you about prisoners, prosecutions, and jails.
    Those are fundamental things. I truly think we are going to
    have to examine how we are detaining dangerous individuals.
        I am aware that there are problems in Afghanistan now with
    some very dangerous individuals being arrested and being
    detained and then being released rather rapidly. Are you aware
    of that? Is it a concern? If you need assistance in bringing
    that to the right level, let us know.
        General Odierno. I am not aware of any of the specifics in
    Afghanistan, specific cases, but I would make a general comment
    on this.
        What we have learned over the last 5 to 6 years
    specifically is that the ability to detain those dangerous
    individuals for long-term detention is critical to us in
    getting the information we need to prosecute our campaigns. It
    was the case in Iraq. It was the case in Afghanistan, and we
    found that to be important.
        I think it is important that we take a look at this. I
    clearly agree with Admiral McCraven's assessment of this, that
    it is important that we take a hard look at this because it
    does have a significant impact in us getting the information
    necessary to continue to prosecute our operations around the
    world against terrorism.
        Senator Sessions. I just agree. I think policies in Iraq
    changed. I think we did a better job of identifying using
    normal police techniques, fingerprints, biometrics, and bomb
    characteristics to identify people. They have to be detained.
    It is very demoralizing and dangerous to release someone who is
    going to go back to the war and kill people. We would not do
    that in the United States.
        My observation is that undeveloped nations are consistently
    deficient in being able to detain people in prison for long
    periods of time. I suppose that is one reason they had a death
    penalty so much. They did not have the ability. My observation
    is that people tend to get out. They either pretend to talk.
    They either bribe their way out. They either escape, or they
    are released because there is not room for them.
        I do think that you should give attention to that, and if
    we need more resources, I hope you would call on us.
        With regard to our forces in Europe, the original plan was
    to bring back two Army brigades, General Odierno, from Europe.
    I understand those plans are now on hold. According to Stars
    and Stripes, in April, the Army will return only 1 brigade, and
    that only represents 5,000 soldiers out of 80,000 U.S. troops
    in Europe.
        I think it is time for us to have a serious heart-to-heart
    with the Europeans on their defense expenditures. In Germany, I
    understand they are about 1.2 percent of GDP. Other countries
    are at that level in Europe. Very few are meeting their goal of
    2 percent of GDP on defense as a North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization obligation, while we are at about 4 to 5 percent
    of GDP on defense.
        Are you aware of this discussion? Maybe Admiral Winnefeld
    would be, and I just have to say it means a lot economically to
    Germany or other places where we have people spending money in
    their economy. It means a lot to our Nation when our people are
    at home spending money in our economy, number one. Number two,
    if they do not need to be there for serious strategic reasons,
    I think we should look to bring more home and reduce our
    presence.
        General Odierno. Senator, my understanding of that decision
    is similar to yours, the most recent decision.
        I would just say as we go through these budget reductions
    potentially, we have to review all of this again. In my
    opinion, it will have to be reassessed. Where this will all be
    part of where we put Army force structure, where we most need
    it depending on what is left based on the budget realities that
    we are facing over the next 10 years. That will have to be part
    of the discussion.
        I am assuming we will have to continue to look at this,
    continue to look at strategically what is best in order for us
    to execute our policies. We certainly will continuously review
    this as we move forward over the next several years.
        Senator Sessions. I was in a security conference some
    months ago, and the British told us they were reducing their
    defense spending 8 percent. Frankly, they are not spending
    enough now. I responded, I guess you feel okay because the
    United States will be there to take care of you. But we need to
    have this kind of conversation with our allies. They have to
    participate more.
        I see Senator Lieberman relooking at the budget numbers. A
    lot of people have complained that our deficit is a result of
    our military efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Looking at the
    numbers, that is not really so. We have spent a tremendous
    amount of money on those two efforts, about $1.5 trillion,
    maybe a little less. The deficit has increased about $15
    trillion during this time.
        At this point, we are projected, this year we are spending
    about $150 billion on the military effort, $158 maybe, this
    fiscal year, going to $118 next fiscal year. But our deficit
    this year is $1,500 billion. Those numbers would come down to
    $118 billion and continue to drop under the plan that we have
    seen and I am hopeful that we can adhere to.
        But I just want to say that while every dollar has to be
    managed carefully, the reason we have a severe financial crisis
    in America is not because of our military effort. It may be a
    part of it, but it is about 10 percent. We will have to look at
    it.
        You do represent about half of the non-defense
    discretionary spending. In the last 2 years, non-defense
    discretionary spending has increased 24 percent. Military
    spending is about 2 or so percent, maybe 3. It is projected to
    stay at 2 or 2\1/2\ percent the next decade, and I do not think
    it will. I do not think we can have that big an increase,
    frankly. But we have had much, much larger surges in non-
    defense spending than defense spending, and certainly in recent
    years.
        How we work our way through that, I do not know, but I call
    on all of you to realize that we are at a level of spending,
    borrowing 40 cents of every dollar we spend, that cannot be
    sustained. You represent about half of the discretionary
    spending budget of the United States, separate from Social
    Security and Medicare. You will have to be part of the belt
    tightening, there is just no doubt about it.
        General Odierno, you have had such tremendous on-the-ground
    experience in Iraq and in that area. I know you are fully aware
    of the requirement to give your honest and best judgment to
    Congress when you are called upon to do so. You have to respect
    the Commander in Chief and the civilian defense officials. But
    you have led those men and women in combat. Many of them have
    lost limbs. Many of them have lost their lives. I am sure you
    feel an obligation to speak for them to avoid unwise decisions
    that could inadvertently give away the things they fought and
    too many of them have died for.
        Will you share with us that first and foremost that you
    will give us your best military advice regardless of the
    consequences, that you will just give us your best leadership,
    because I think uniquely as the chief of staff have the kind of
    experience that could help us make the difficult decisions that
    we will be facing.
        General Odierno. Senator, I absolutely always give my
    honest and frank opinion, especially when it comes to taking
    care of our soldiers and their families, but on all issues when
    asked. I will continue to do that.
        Many of the issues that we deal with are not black and
    white; they are very gray, as you are well aware. There are
    many second, third order effects that impact decisions as well
    as opinions on issues. It is my job, I believe, from a military
    perspective to always identify the issues, identify what the
    risks are, and give my opinion how to mitigate those risks and
    be successful in accomplishing our missions. I will always do
    that when I am in front of the committee or any other forum
    that I participate in within the government.
        Senator Sessions. I know our soldiers and their families
    and Americans are happy that we can draw down our force
    presence as rapidly as possible. But what impact would it have,
    in your opinion, if we drew down too fast and ended up
    undermining the success that we have gained, and maybe
    suffering a strategic loss that was not necessary as a result?
    What impact would that have on our morale of our men and women,
    as well as strategically?
        General Odierno. Senator, my assessment is, it obviously
    would have a huge impact. But I would just say I do not think
    there is anybody who believes that is the case.
        Senator Sessions. I understand. My question to you is, but
    if we did so, if events occurred unlike something you expect
    this moment, and we unwisely did not handle the situation based
    on a goal just to reduce troop levels regardless, it would have
    an adverse impact on the men and women who put their lives at
    risk for us, would it not?
        General Odierno. I would just say obviously that for many
    who have participated in the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
    other places around the world, obviously they believe in what
    they are doing. That's why they continue to reenlist. That is
    why they continue to go back on multiple, multiple deployments.
        It is our duty as leaders to ensure that we do everything
    we can to ensure their success and safety. We will never stop
    from doing that. If that becomes the case, it would obviously
    have an impact on morale as we move forward.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
    begin by thanking each of you for your extraordinary service to
    our Nation, and thank your families as well as others have done
    who share in the sacrifice that you have made. I know some of
    them are here today, and I would just like to assure them that
    we share in the gratitude of the country for their as well as
    your service.
        General Odierno, you have talked very eloquently and
    powerfully about your caring and attention to all of our
    warriors, our wounded warriors and those who are serving now in
    theater. Most especially to the need for better care when it
    comes to traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress. I
    understand from your testimony and our conversations that you
    will continue to seek to upgrade and improve the kind of care
    that the military provides to those warriors. Am I correct with
    that assumption?
        General Odierno. Absolutely, Senator.
        Senator Blumenthal. So far as particularly the problem of
    suicide, which you again have spoken to very eloquently and
    powerfully in your written testimony, and I was very impressed
    by it. Would you have plans to try to upgrade the kind of
    preventive care that is provided to our warriors?
        General Odierno. The work that General Pete Chiarelli has
    done, the Vice Chief of Staff for the Army, has been
    tremendous, but it is not done yet. There is much more that we
    have to do. We have identified factors, but now we have to
    figure out how we mitigate those factors that we believe are
    responsible for suicides and all the components of the Army and
    the Armed Forces themselves. We still have a lot of work to do,
    and we are dedicated to doing all we can to reduce this
    terrible risk that we have today.
        Senator Blumenthal. Do you have any thoughts that you could
    share with us about potentially the causes of those increased
    rates of suicide, the stress factors and so forth?
        General Odierno. Senator, it is a combination of things. It
    has to do with dwell time and the number of deployments. It has
    to do with family stress. It has to do with uncertainty. It has
    to do with many other issues that we deal with. It has to do
    with physical injuries that affect individuals mentally. It has
    to do with sometimes the home environment that they are
    involved with. It is all of these things.
        The main thing is we have to understand what those risk
    factors are, how many are applying, and when does it become
    critical. It is about us training our young leaders to
    understand the signs, to understand the factors. The Army
    specifically, I will talk to, has done a lot of work in helping
    our leaders to understand these issues.
        But then it is about the individuals themselves feel
    comfortable in identifying that they do have their own issues,
    and they do come forward, and they do ask for assistance and
    help. That is so important in this part of this process is that
    they feel comfortable doing that. We have to create an
    environment that allows them to do this, and that is the key
    that we want to continue to move forward in and accomplish,
    sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. I do not mean to put you on the spot
    here, but part of the popular view of making a frank and candid
    self-reporting of problems more effective and more frequent,
    and making it more acceptable many people have debated might
    involve the condolence letters that are sent by the President.
    I wonder if you could share with the committee your view as to
    whether those letters should be provided more broadly, more
    frequently, to the families of individuals who might be
    affected?
        General Odierno. I will not comment specifically on the
    President, but I will comment that as a commander in Iraq at
    the division, corps, and theater level, I sent letters to all
    to include those who committed suicide because they were such
    an integral part of our force. They are a part of our family,
    our Army family, and they are our comrades. Although they might
    have struggled with the situation they were in, we still owe
    them the utmost respect and honor for their service.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. You also have commented in
    your written testimony, and again, in other forums about the
    need for better transition for our wounded warriors to the VA.
    Maybe you could expand on that point.
        General Odierno. First off, the Army has done some good
    work, and they have 70 teams out around the country,
    specifically located with VA centers. They are helping us to do
    a better transition as they transition out of the Army into the
    Veterans Affairs.
        From anecdotal discussions that I have actually had
    recently with several wounded warriors who are getting ready to
    transition, one of the things we have to continue to work is
    the discussion between treatment of a military doctor to a
    Veterans Affairs doctor, because one of the things that bothers
    them and sometimes becomes traumatic is that they use different
    treatment regimens, and it makes them feel uncomfortable. We
    have to work this piece.
        I think we have the administration piece taken care of. We
    now have to look at the medical transition itself as they
    transition from military medical care to Veterans Affairs
    medical care.
        Senator Blumenthal. I thank you and commend you and welcome
    your attention to this problem. I know it comes from a genuine
    caring, and I think that is extraordinarily impressive. Any way
    that I can be helpful or I am sure members of the committee, we
    will be there.
        General Fraser, I wanted to follow up, if I could, on a
    couple of the questions that Senator Udall mentioned, and some
    of the comments in your testimony about cyber security, and
    your comment in your testimony that you move lots of
    information. I think the American public does not appreciate
    how much information is part of what you transport, so to
    speak.
        I wonder if you could share with the committee your view as
    to whether more does need to be done of an offensive or
    deterrent nature to make invasions or intrusions more costly,
    as Admiral Winnefeld commented, for any enemy that has an
    intention to do so.
        General Fraser. Thank you, Senator. The cyber domain and
    protection of our data is a high focus area, certainly of mine
    in my current position, but as I look forward and moving
    possibly, if confirmed, into TRANSCOM's realm in which they
    deal not only in the .mil, but also the .com domain. The reason
    I mention that is because there is a seam there, and there has
    to be a partnership to ensure that the right data is getting to
    the right place with the information at the right time.
    Protection of that data is something that I will certainly be
    focused on, if confirmed, and move to TRANSCOM.
        I think behind the defense and the .mil domain and the
    active defense that we have, that we are doing a lot. What I
    would be doing is then going out and engaging our commercial
    partners to ensure that they are protecting their data as much
    as possible. That is going to have to be a collaborative effort
    that we will have to work together to ensure that we are able
    still to accomplish the mission. Cyber will be very high, if I
    move into this position, to ensure the protection of that data.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. My time has expired, but I
    would just like to suggest in closing that at some point these
    attacks obviously have to be viewed as an act of war on this
    country, whether it is on .mil or .com, if the attacks on the
    .com area so impact our infrastructure, our utilities, our
    banking system that they in effect constitute an act of
    hostility toward this country. I welcome your thinking about
    that topic, as you have indicated you are doing, and look
    forward to working with you.
        I am sure you will be confirmed. You certainly have earned
    it, and the country deserves and will need your service. I want
    to thank you in advance. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I am really sorry
    I could not get here earlier this morning, but I am glad I
    could get here while we are still in session to welcome the
    three nominees, to thank you for your extraordinary service to
    our country, and to say that I think President Obama could not
    have made better selections.
        I have known the three of you in your previous positions,
    particularly in the case of General Odierno and Iraq, and
    Admiral Winnefeld at NORTHCOM. I know you have done really, not
    just good work, but great work, really transformational work,
    and I appreciate it. We are lucky to have you in our service.
        In the case of General Odierno, getting here while you are
    in still in session gives me the opportunity to welcome his
    family, at least one of whom had the wisdom to marry a woman
    from Connecticut and to become my constituent. He also is
    living out my childhood fantasy of working for the greatest
    sports franchise in the history of American sports, that is the
    New York Yankees. [Laughter.]
        With Senator Blumenthal and me here, I think we have a
    majority on the committee to support that conclusion.
    [Laughter.]
        Senator Blumenthal. I would second that observation.
    [Laughter.]
        Chairman Levin. The quality of our dismay outweighs the
    quantity of your support. [Laughter.]
        Senator Lieberman. Okay, enough of that.
        I know that many of my colleagues earlier have talked about
    the impact of budget cuts on the military. This is a real
    serious challenge.
        We are the Armed Services Committee, so I suppose we
    understandably feel a special protectiveness of the military
    budget, but we should. To me, it is, after all is said and
    done, the first responsibility of our National Government,
    which is to protect our security. If we do not have security,
    the American people do not have anything else that matters. We
    do not have our freedom, and nor we do have the economic
    opportunity that has been part of what it has meant to be an
    American.
        Everybody has to give in this crisis. As Admiral Mullen
    said a while ago, our national debt has become a national
    security problem, and, therefore, we have to work together to
    cut it down. But we have to be really careful about the impact
    of these cuts on our military.
        We all have to understand that the classic members'
    district advocacy has to be tempered by the national interests
    of getting our government back into fiscal balance. But beyond
    that, I think, and this is what I want to focus on in my
    questions, how we treat the military personnel, the men and
    women in uniform, and the numbers we have, are critically
    important, and are beyond parochial district level or State
    level concerns. These are what I want to focus on.
        A lot of us on this committee, including myself, spent a
    fair amount of time in recent years trying to make sure that
    the two Services that have been most stressed, under most
    demand in Iraq and Afghanistan, namely the Army and the Marine
    Corps, had end strength increase in recent years, and
    fortunately that happened.
        Now, the Army has been directed to carry out a reduction
    from the 570,000 essentially that we reached in Active Army
    numbers down to 520,000 or 521,000 over the next 5 years. I
    know the Army, General Odierno, has said they will do that. I
    think we have to be really careful about going beyond that.
        But you said something, sir, in your answers to the
    questions that the committee asked, written answers, that when
    I read, I was so glad to see you say it, and I agree 100
    percent. Here is the quote: ``End strength reductions should
    not be automatic. They are conditions based and will require
    periodic assessment.'' We are not operating in a static
    universe. Things are changing all the time with regard to our
    national security.
        I wanted to ask you, General, if you would discuss what are
    some of the conditions that as Chief of Staff of the Army you
    will ask be weighed before these end strength reductions are
    carried out?
        General Odierno. Thank you, Senator.
        As I look at this, I believe that the reduction down to
    520,000 has been based on the temporary end strength increase
    of 22,000, which was put into place to account for frankly many
    of the wounded warriors and other non-availables that we have
    had that has taken away from meeting our requirements, of
    filling our units.
        The other 27,000 is based on the fact that the assumption
    that we will continue to come out of Afghanistan on time by
    2014. Because of that, we will be able to maintain a dwell time
    deployment ratio that is something that we can sustain over a
    long period of time.
        If those conditions change, if we decide to stay in
    Afghanistan longer or if another contingency comes up that
    requires deployment of Army units, then that would be something
    that could impact that force reduction, because what it could
    then do is significantly again increase and go after the dwell
    time, and put even more pressure on the Army itself.
        Those are the kind of things that we have to understand,
    and those are the kind of things that we have to constantly
    reassess based on reality and what is going on around the
    world.
        Senator Lieberman. Okay. I appreciate that answer. Just one
    follow-up on it.
        Am I right that the 22,000 number of non-deployables,
    including wounded warriors, has not gone down?
        General Odierno. In fact, it continues to go up.
        Senator Lieberman. It goes up. That also puts stress on you
    as you try to go down.
        General Odierno. It does.
        Senator Lieberman. Yes. I think we have to follow that
    carefully, and I hope there may be a way, and I will work with
    the chairman on this, to see if in the defense authorization
    bill when it comes to the floor, we can state some of these
    conditions, because just as we say, our drawdowns in Iraq and
    Afghanistan have been conditions based. It seems to me it is
    fair to say that the drawdown of our end strength, how many
    people we have in uniform, ought to be conditions based as
    well.
        I wanted to ask about Iran. I do not believe this has been
    asked before. General Odierno, because we have talked about
    this when you were in Iraq, Army personnel and others in Iraq
    at different times over the last years have come out and
    specifically said, publicly, I am not revealing anything
    classified, we know that Iran has been training and equipping
    Shia extremists who have then gone back into Iraq and are
    responsible really for the murders, for the death of hundreds
    of American soldiers
        I guess people could argue about whether it is hundreds. I
    believe it is, but it is certainly some, and the wounding of a
    lot of others, and the killing of thousands of other Iraqi
    soldiers and civilians.
        I was really encouraged by that. I know a lot was going on.
    In a sense, you would say that if a far nation is training
    people to come in and kill our soldiers, classically it is a
    causus belli. It is cause for war. But I understand there was a
    lot going on.
        I was very encouraged about a week ago, both Secretary
    Panetta and Admiral Mullen made statements. Admiral Mullen
    said, ``Iran is very directly supporting extremist Shia groups
    which are killing our troops.'' Secretary Panetta said, ``We
    are very concerned about Iran and the weapons they are
    providing to extremist in Iraq.''
        We cannot simply stand back and allow this to continue to
    happen. This is not something we are going to walk away from.
    It is something we are going to take on head-on.
        Admiral Winnefeld, as you begin a new chapter in your
    career as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, I wanted to
    ask you to comment on, do you agree with Secretary Panetta and
    Admiral Mullen about this behavior by Iran?
        Admiral Winnefeld. Sir, I absolutely agree with it. I would
    not want to take away any options or anything like that, but I
    would say that they are testing our patience to be sure. We
    always would use force as a last resort. There are plenty of
    instruments of national power that can be applied. But it is a
    very serious problem, and I fully support what Secretary
    Panetta and Chairman Mullen said about it.
        Senator Lieberman. I thank you for your statement. I do not
    have to say to any of you because you have been on the
    battlefield, and you know how important it is. But we have now
    escalated our identification of what the Iranians are doing. I
    think if they do not stop, our credibility with them and a lot
    of others in the region, if not the world, is going to go down
    if we do not do something about it. I appreciate your
    statement, and I am encouraged by the others. None of us want
    to have more conflict, but we are not asking for it by our
    behavior. In this case, they clearly are.
        Anyway, I thank the three of you. I look forward to working
    with you. I would say that, if I may paraphrase an old
    political slogan. The great thing to say is that not only are
    the three of you extraordinary, but you are as extraordinary as
    the people you are leading. In other words, this is a bottom
    up, top rate, high quality military we have. To me, it is the
    one institution in our country that I always say look at it
    when people tell me that America's best days are behind us. I
    wish I could say that as you look at the U.S. Congress. I
    cannot quite say that at this moment, but they can look at the
    military. I thank you for that.
        Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman. I
    share your thoughts and comments very deeply.
        Just a couple of quick questions. One, General Odierno,
    about Iraq. You have indicated you would support retaining some
    U.S. forces in Iraq beyond the December 31 deadline if there is
    a request. How much longer does Iraq have to make a request for
    us to consider?
        General Odierno. Every day it makes it more difficult
    because it is not only us. I know General Austin has built a
    lot of flexibility in his plan for the final withdraw of our
    troops, but he has to do some planning.
        But, more importantly, there has to be some work done on
    some sort of a status of forces agreement between our two
    countries. It has to be done soon because it could take a
    little bit of time to get that. I cannot give you a specific
    date, Mr. Chairman, but I would say it has to be the sooner for
    us in order to make this appropriate transition.
        Chairman Levin. You said something before, which I think
    you did not exactly mean, but let me probe you on it. You said
    it is important we provide Iraq with the support they think is
    necessary. I assume it would be a joint decision, not only they
    think is necessary, but that we are willing to provide.
        General Odierno. Yes. I think we have done a joint
    assessment where we identified gaps in their capabilities, and
    that has been done jointly and driven by us.
        Chairman Levin. So, it is not only what they think.
        General Odierno. It is not just what they think. It is a
    joint assessment.
        Chairman Levin. Now, General, relative to the importance of
    keeping the Guard equipped, you indicated very strong feelings
    about the importance of doing that because there are
    requirements we place on them, in your words, among other
    things.
        We have in the Army, the main battle tank, the M1-Abrams, a
    tank which is going to remain in the inventory. As it currently
    stands, it is going to end production of upgraded M-1A2 version
    vehicles in 2013. The Active Army now has the M-1A2 version of
    the tank, and most of the Guard has the M-1A1 version. Stopping
    that production will mean stopping of the equipping of the
    Guard with the M-1A2.
        Here is the issue. The Army is going to begin the next
    Abrams upgrade modernization effort in 2016, and they are going
    to end the production of the upgraded M-1A2 in 2013 as it now
    stands. There is going to be a 3-year gap there between
    production of the upgraded M-1A2 in the next upgrade program.
    But we know there is going to be an upgrade program. That is a
    given as I understand it.
        The Army has initiated a comprehensive cost benefit and
    risk analysis of the impact of that gap in production on our
    armored vehicle production facility, which is in Ohio, and the
    supporting industrial base. The final results of the analysis
    are expected at the end of the year. We are not going to have
    the results of the analysis until the end of the year.
        In considering the costs of closing and restarting the
    production line, which we know is going to be restarted, should
    we not consider the increased capability in the National Guard
    tank units which would result from continuing this production
    during this gap?
        General Odierno. Certainly, Senator, we will take a look at
    it.
        The problem we have is we will have several other factors
    maybe that could impact on this. It has to do with budget
    reductions and force structure reductions and the mix that we
    decide we need in the force. It could be that we decide that
    potentially the number of heavy units reduce, and we are able
    to push more M-2A2s to the Guard out of the Active component.
    That could be one solution. Part of this problem is waiting to
    see what we are going to have to do with our force mix and
    force structure as we think about this problem.
        But I understand the issue, Senator. We will look at it
    very carefully, and we will work with you on this issue.
        Chairman Levin. All right, because there is a question as
    to whether or not it pays us to terminate the cost to restart
    and whether those costs are not better.
        General Odierno. I am not completely familiar with all the
    details of that, but I will certainly get back to you, Senator.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The M1A1 SA remains one of the best tanks in the world, providing
    overmatch against known threats and digital command interoperability
    within the Heavy Brigade Combat Team formation. The Army does not plan
    to immediately replace this very capable and relatively young portion
    of the Abrams fleet. The Army National Guard began receiving the M1A1
    SA tank in August 2008 and will complete fielding in June 2014.
        The Army has a young Abrams fleet. By 2013, when the Army fully
    meets the Abrams tank requirement for the Heavy Brigade Combat Team,
    the average Abrams fleet age will only be 2- to 3-years-old. Because of
    this, the Army will not need to begin modernizing through
    recapitalization of the Abrams tank fleet until approximately 2016. Our
    analysis indicates that total costs would not exceed $822 million for a
    3- to 4-year shutdown and restart of Abrams tank production. These
    costs include the impact on the supplier base; government-furnished
    materiel; storage, preservation, manpower and equipment; re-qualifying
    vendors; a Production Verification Test and the impact to Anniston Army
    Depot. In comparison, maintaining a production rate of 70 tanks per
    year during fiscal years 2012-2016 will cost approximately $2.67
    billion.
        Analysis of the most cost-effective approaches to sustain the
    required combat vehicle industrial base capabilities during the
    upcoming production gaps is ongoing. This analysis is expected to be
    complete by December 2011, and the results will help shape and begin to
    right-size the industrial base in an effort to maximize more cost-
    efficient capabilities within the industrial base.
        Given that the Army can save approximately $1.85 billion by
    shutting down and restarting production, the Army must stop Abrams tank
    production with the last M1A2 System Enhancement Program v2 tank
    delivery in June 2013.
        I would be happy to have my staff provide an update to your office
    once this analysis is complete in order to provide you with the Army's
    plan for the Abrams tank and the industrial base.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        This is for Admiral Winnefeld. Do you agree that missile
    defense systems should be operationally effective and cost
    effective and should be tested in an operationally realistic
    manner before deployment?
        Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir, I do. We are also in a
    simultaneous training test and development phase.
        Chairman Levin. Finally for the admiral, you have
    experienced as the combatant commander responsible for the GMD
    system that currently provides protection of the Homeland
    against the threat of a limited missile attack from nations
    like North Korea and Iran. You also have experience working in
    a cooperative manner with Russian military officials.
        If we could work out something in a cooperative manner with
    Russia on missile defense, that would enhance our security
    against common missile threats from Iran. Would you agree?
        Admiral Winnefeld. Yes, sir, absolutely.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Lieberman?
        Senator Lieberman. Nothing more for me, thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Gentleman, we are all in your debt, and the
    Nation is in your debt. We are in debt to your families. We
    thank you and them profusely. We will do this confirmation just
    as speedily as we can, given the U.S. Senate. You never know
    for sure, but I think all of us are pretty darn confident that
    it will happen very quickly.
        Thank you. We will stand adjourned.
        Senator Lieberman. Hear, hear.
        [Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

        [Prepared questions submitted to ADM James A. Winnefeld,
    Jr., USN, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
    supplied follow:]

                            Questions and Responses

                                DEFENSE REFORMS

        Question. Previously you have answered the committee's policy
    questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in
    connection with your nomination to be Commander of U.S. Northern
    Command (NORTHCOM).
        Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of
    these reforms changed since you testified before the committee at your
    most recent confirmation hearing?
        Answer. No. I have served in various joint capacities throughout my
    naval career and witnessed first-hand the tremendous advancements this
    landmark legislation has created, not only among our Nation's military
    and civilian leadership, but as a whole within the joint services and
    interagency environment. As such, I do not see a need to change the
    provisions of this legislation.
        Question. In your previous response to a question concerning
    whether you saw a need for modifications of Goldwater-Nichols in light
    of the changing environment, you indicated that you would ``take a hard
    look at ways NORTHCOM does business to determine if changes in the
    legislation are warranted.''
        In light of your experience as Commander of NORTHCOM do you see any
    need for modifications to Goldwater-Nichols? If so, what areas do you
    believe it might be appropriate to address in these modifications?
        Answer. I do not believe changes to Goldwater-Nichols are necessary
    at this time. However, if confirmed, I will remain alert to
    opportunities or shortcomings that might indicate that changes to the
    legislation are warranted.

                           DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS

        Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in
    the duties and functions of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff as set forth in section 154 of title 10, U.S.C., and in
    regulations of the Department of Defense (DOD) pertaining to functions
    of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
        Answer. None at this time.
        Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
    believe qualifies you to perform the duties of the Vice Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff?
        Answer. It has been my honor to serve for 33 years in a diverse set
    of positions that I believe have prepared me to serve as Vice Chairman
    of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have experience on the Joint Staff and
    Navy staff; served as a joint, combined, and combatant commander; and
    have worked closely with Congress on a variety of issues. My technical
    background should be useful in my role, if confirmed, as the Chairman
    of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). As the Director for
    Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff, I gained insight into
    the conduct of joint, combined, and international operations. In my
    current position as Commander of NORTHCOM and the North American
    Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), I command forces in the execution of
    Homeland defense and civil support operations. In this position, I have
    seen first-hand the importance of the Total Force in defending our
    Nation's interests at home and abroad.
        Question. Is there anything that you need to do to better prepare
    yourself to perform the duties of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff?
        Answer. Although there are always opportunities for additional
    learning in advance of assuming a new position, I feel well-prepared to
    serve as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

                                 RELATIONSHIPS

        Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of
    the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the following
    officials:
        The Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. The Vice Chairman performs the duties assigned to him and
    other such duties as may be assigned by the Chairman, with the approval
    of the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, in the absence or disability
    of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as the Chairman and performs
    the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or until the
    absence or disability ceases. These duties would include providing
    military advice to the Secretary of Defense. The Vice Chairman may also
    provide the Secretary of Defense advice upon the Secretary's request in
    his capacity as a military adviser.
        Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has been delegated full
    power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense on any matters
    upon which the Secretary is authorized to act. As such, the
    relationship of the Vice Chairman with the Deputy Secretary is similar
    to that with the Secretary.
        Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        Answer. The Vice Chairman performs the duties assigned to him as a
    member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other duties as assigned
    by the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. When
    there is a vacancy in the office of the Chairman, or during the absence
    or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and
    performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or
    the absence or disability ceases. If confirmed, I look forward to a
    close working relationship with the Chairman.
        Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
    Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)).
        Answer. Title 10, U.S.C. and current DOD directives establish the
    Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and
    advisers to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional
    areas. With particular regard to the USD(AT&L), the Vice Chairman
    serves on many deliberative panels focused on resource decisions,
    including the Deputies Advisory Working Group as its Vice Chair and as
    Chairman of the JROC. If confirmed, I look forward to working very
    closely with the USD(AT&L) on continuing improvements to the
    requirements process and providing senior-level focus on key
    acquisition programs.
        Question. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C)).
        Answer. I recognize the importance of the Vice Chairman working
    closely with the USD(C) in appropriately managing and providing
    oversight of the budgetary and fiscal processes of the Joint Staff
    required to achieve the budgetary goals prescribed by the Secretary of
    Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)).
        Answer. With regard to the duties of the Vice Chairman as they
    relate to the USD(P), the Vice Chairman co-chairs the Policy and
    Strategy Committee, serves as a member of the Counter-proliferation
    Council, represents military interest in Interagency Affairs, and
    provides oversight and direction on behalf of the Chairman in areas
    such as use allocation and use of military forces. The Vice Chairman
    and USD(P) serve together on the Deputies Committee. If confirmed, I
    plan to have frequent interaction with the USD(P).
        Question. The other Under Secretaries of Defense.
        Answer. Within their assigned areas, Under Secretaries exercise
    policy and oversight functions and interact frequently with the Joint
    Staff. They may issue instructions and directive-type memoranda that
    implement policy approved by the Secretary. These instructions and
    directives are applicable to all DOD components. In carrying out their
    responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of
    Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the
    unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
    Under Secretaries of Defense.
        Question. The Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation.
        Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., and current DOD directives establish the
    Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation as a principal
    advisor to the Secretary of Defense and other senior officials of the
    DOD on cost assessment and program evaluation. If confirmed, I look
    forward to working closely with the Director under the auspices of the
    Vice Chairman's resourcing and requirements functions, as well as
    benefitting from the extensive and independent analysis provided by the
    Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office towards making informed
    resourcing decisions.
        Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
        Answer. With the exception of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense
    for Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, and for Networks and
    Information Integration, all Assistant Secretaries of Defense are
    subordinate to one of the Under Secretaries of Defense. In carrying out
    their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and
    Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to
    commanders of unified and specified commands are transmitted through
    the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will work
    closely with the Assistant Secretaries in a manner similar to that of
    working with the Under Secretaries.
        Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
        Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., section 165 provides that, subject to the
    authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and
    subject to the authority of the combatant commanders, the Secretaries
    of Military Departments are responsible for administration and support
    of forces assigned to unified and specified commands.
        The Chairman, or Vice Chairman when directed or when acting as the
    Chairman, advises the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which
    program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military
    Departments conform with priorities in strategic plans and with the
    requirements of the combatant commanders. The Vice Chairman has
    numerous interactions with the Service Secretaries in the various
    management forums within the Department. Finally, in his role as the
    Chairman of the JROC, the Vice Chairman has considerable interaction
    with the Service Secretaries' acquisition staffs. If confirmed, I look
    forward to a close and productive working relationship with the Service
    Secretaries and their staffs.
        Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
        Answer. The Service Chiefs serve two significant roles. First, they
    are responsible for the organization, manning, training, and equipping
    of their respective Services. Without the full support and cooperation
    of the Service Chiefs, no combatant commander can be ensured of the
    readiness of his assigned forces for missions directed by the President
    and Secretary of Defense. Second, as members of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, they are advisors to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense
    as the senior uniformed leaders of their respective Services. The
    Service vice chiefs play a key role on the JROC, chaired by the Vice
    Chairman. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Service chiefs and
    their vice chiefs to fulfill the combatant commanders' warfighting and
    operational requirements and on other relevant policy matters.
        Question. The Combatant Commanders.
        Answer. The combatant commanders fight our wars and conduct
    military operations around the world. The Chairman provides a vital
    link between the combatant commanders and other elements of DOD and, as
    directed by the President, may serve as the means of communication
    between the combatant commanders and the President or Secretary of
    Defense. When there is a vacancy in the office of Chairman or in the
    absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as
    Chairman when interacting with the combatant commanders. Having served
    as a combatant commander, I have clear insight into the capabilities
    and limitations of combatant command (COCOM) staffs. If confirmed, I
    will work closely with the combatant commanders to enable their
    warfighting capabilities and provide other support as required.

                         MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

        Question. What are the major challenges that you see facing the
    Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
        Answer. The principal challenge I will face, if confirmed, will be
    in assisting the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff in formulating their recommendations to the President
    regarding balancing the national security imperative of regaining our
    fiscal solvency against the national defense imperatives of winning our
    current fights and maintaining our ability to deter or defeat a broad
    spectrum of potential threats to our Nation's vital and important
    interests.
        Our most important near term task is to ensure our service men and
    women deployed and in combat overseas--and their families and those who
    return wounded, ill, or injured--are supported to the best of our
    ability as a nation.
        The spectrum of potential threats against which we must defend
    within an increasingly constrained budget environment includes:

             Violent extremism, which is the only threat that
            currently possesses both the capability and active intent to
            harm the United States and our allies and friends;
             Regional instability, including the uncertainty caused
            by recent turmoil in the Arab world, that could threaten the
            United States' or allies' vital or important interests or that
            poses a grave threat of human disaster;
             Self-alienated nations whose leaders view acquisition
            of weapons of mass destruction as an insurance policy for
            preserving their status and increasing their regional
            influence;
             Powerful states, to include those with strategic
            offensive capability, that could threaten the survival or vital
            interests of the United States or our allies;
             The growing threat of cyber attack against defense or
            civilian infrastructure posed by individuals and nations;
             Transnational criminal organizations (TCO) that
            produce serious corrosive effects within the United States and
            among our friends and allies; and
             The constant threat of natural and manmade disasters.

        We must also work to ensure the American people maintain their
    connection to and support for our Armed Forces.
        Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
    addressing these challenges?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary, the
    Chairman, the other Joint Chiefs, the combatant commanders, and other
    key national security officials to ensure our national defense remains
    strong by:

             Ensuring our service men and women in combat are fully
            and properly supported;
             Making appropriate recommendations when the use of
            U.S. military force is being contemplated;
             Contributing to policy discussions regarding the
            trajectories of threat capabilities and capacities, their
            implications for U.S. vital and important interests, and the
            relative priority, cost, posture, and temporal aspects of
            ensuring U.S. capabilities and capacities are able to defeat
            them;
             Continuing ongoing efforts to improve the requirements
            system--ensuring the combatant commanders are properly
            represented therein, among other imperatives--as well as
            ensuring the system is well-synchronized with budgeting and
            acquisition processes;
             Continuing the search for greater efficiency and
            effectiveness in the way we do business within the Department;
             Working collegially within the U.S. interagency to
            synchronize our efforts to advance the security interests of
            our Nation;
             Strengthening our relationships with our allies and
            friends; and
             Ensuring our families and wounded warriors are
            properly cared for.

        As always, the national security leadership will need to make
    difficult choices. Thus, I intend to contribute to the collaborative
    and collegial approach that will be required--among what I view to be
    an exceptional group of Joint Chiefs, combatant commanders, and other
    stakeholders in the executive branch and Congress--to accomplish these
    difficult tasks in an increasingly constrained budget environment.

                      JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL

        Question. As the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if
    confirmed, you would be the Chairman of the JROC. The JROC has the
    responsibility to review and validate Service requirements.
        Are there any recommendations that you would make to modify the
    JROC or its authority or the requirements process?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continue on the current trend in line
    with recent changes to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
    for Fiscal Year 2011 of empowering the combatant commanders in
    providing the warfighter a clear voice in the requirements process.
    Additionally, I would continue to streamline the Joint Capabilities
    Integration and Development System (JCIDS) to provide more informed
    decisionmaking of the JROC. Currently there are two requirements
    processes: Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) and JCIDS. The JUONs
    process provides the warfighter in combat a quick way to procure a
    system that prevents loss of life and critical mission failure due to
    direct enemy action. JCIDS is utilized for all other Joint acquisition
    systems--both long-term large and near-term small programs use the same
    requirements process. I believe we need to develop a system that better
    addresses the continuum of requirements and acquisition programs. It is
    my understanding that such a system is currently being designed, and if
    confirmed, I will continue that effort.
        Question. During the confirmation of General Cartwright for the
    position of Vice Chairman, the committee asked him a variety of
    questions about problems, challenges, and recommendations for
    improvements in the requirements process and the workings of the JROC.
    General Cartwright emphasized his view of the importance of enhancing
    the role of the combatant commanders in the JROC beyond what was
    mandated in the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009.
    Specifically, he recommended that the combatant commanders become
    members of the JROC, along with representatives from the offices of
    USD(P), USD(AT&L), and USD(C). He also suggested that the Vice Chairman
    be authorized to delegate authority to functional combatant commanders
    to approve certain specific types of requirements. Section 841 of the
    Ike Skelton NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 makes changes to the JROC
    authorizing statute, based on General Cartwright's recommendations.
        What are your views on General Cartwright's specific
    recommendations?
        Answer. I fully support General Cartwright's specific
    recommendations that have been written into section 841 of the NDAA for
    Fiscal Year 2011.
        Question. What are your views on the changes made by section 841?
        Answer. As a currently-serving combatant commander, I am pleased
    with General Cartwright's recommendations that were written into
    section 841 to empower the combatant commanders in the requirements
    process. If confirmed, I will investigate whether there is even more we
    can do in this regard, subject to the capacity and expertise of the
    combatant commander staffs to participate.
        Question. What is your understanding of the status of proposed
    guidance to implement the changes made by section 841?
        Answer. My understanding is that these changes have been fully
    implemented. On 26 April 2011, I sat on the JROC as a voting member
    specifically for an Initial Capability Document briefing in which my
    COCOM had specific interest.
        Question. What are your views on the proposed guidance?
        Answer. The combatant commander now has a clear voice in the
    requirements process with his vote on the JROC, though I acknowledge
    that it is not always easy for combatant commanders to participate.
    Also, adding the additional advisors to the JROC provides a wide
    breadth of expertise and experience. However, I believe we must
    continue to pursue ways to further include combatant commanders in the
    requirements process.
        Question. General Cartwright was also asked about the role of the
    requirements process in the acquisition process after requirements have
    been initially approved and a program begins engineering and
    manufacturing development. General Cartwright noted that in 2007, the
    JROC established what he called a ``trip-wire'' process to ``bring
    troubled programs back to the JROC for a review and to consider
    performance trade-offs to mitigate further cost growth and/or schedule
    delays before the program faced a Nunn-McCurdy review.''
        To your knowledge, has this review mechanism been regularly
    employed on large programs that have experienced significant cost
    growth and schedule delays?
        Answer. Yes, the first ``trip-wire'' review was conducted in 2007
    and this mechanism has been used regularly for several defense
    programs. I personally observed, while attending a JROC meeting as the
    NORTHCOM Commander, this process in action in scrutinizing a troubled
    program. If confirmed, I will continue this practice.
        Question. Has the JROC altered requirements, either for performance
    or procurement quantities, as a result of such reviews?
        Answer. My understanding is that the ``trip-wire'' review forces an
    assessment of the relationship between requirements and program cost
    drivers, allowing the JROC to weigh the cost benefit of reducing a
    requirement to control cost growth. It is a maturing process as cited
    in a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report. My
    understanding is that a recent example where the JROC altered
    requirements is the Joint Tactical Radio System.
        Question. WSARA required the Secretary of Defense to ensure that
    trade-off analyses are conducted on cost, schedule, and performance as
    part of the requirements development and approval process. Such
    analyses enhance the Department's understanding of what performance
    factors are the critical ones driving costs and schedules.
        In your view does the Joint Staff have the operations research
    expertise to determine where the cost ``knees in the curve'' lie for
    weapons systems performance?
        Answer. Currently the Joint Staff relies on CAPE as an advisor to
    the JROC for their operations research expertise to determine where the
    cost ``knees in the curve'' lie for weapons systems performance. The
    Joint Staff then utilizes that data to determine proper tradeoffs
    regarding Key Performance Parameters (KPP). The ongoing review of JCIDS
    is addressing this and will provide recommendations on increased Joint
    Staff analytical expertise on cost, schedule, and performance
    considerations.
        Question. In your view has the Department effectively integrated
    the operations research and cost estimating resources across the Joint
    Staff, the Office of Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE), and
    the Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and
    Logistics (OSD(AT&L)) to conduct these trade-off analyses?
        Answer. It is my understanding that synergistic staffing between
    the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) CAPE, and
    OSD(AT&L) has been effective.
        Question. What is your view of the modifications to the JROC
    process made by the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009?
        Answer. Implementation of a ``trip-wire'' process helps inform the
    JROC of critical cost growth of Major Defense Acquisition Programs.
    This enables the JROC to properly inform the Secretary of Defense of
    potential Critical Breaches. When there is a breach, these programs
    must report to the JROC for validation and to review program cost,
    schedule, and performance. I fully support these modifications, which
    have been codified into the JROC process.
        Question. What additional steps do you believe that Congress or the
    Department should take to ensure that trade-offs between cost,
    schedule, and performance objectives for major weapon systems are made
    at an appropriately early point in the acquisition process?
        Answer. It is my observation that the Department is already moving
    to make assessments of cost, performance, and technical readiness of
    weapon systems earlier in the acquisition process. I believe that the
    JROC should work to synchronize its decision points to better inform
    the acquisition milestone decisions. One course being considered is for
    the JROC to review Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) from major defense
    acquisition programs and provide advice to the milestone decision
    authority in support of milestone A. This also addresses a key
    recommendation made in a recent GAO report.
        Question. Are there any other recommendations that you would make
    to modify the JROC or its authority or the requirements process?
        Answer. I believe the changes in the Ike Skelton NDAA for Fiscal
    Year 2011 captured several positive changes to the JROC and should be
    allowed to mature for a period of time to assess the implementation of
    those changes. If confirmed, I will remain alert to opportunities to
    improve this process.
        Question. How would you assess the effectiveness of the JROC in the
    DOD acquisition process?
        Answer. I believe the JROC is an effective partner with OSD in the
    acquisition process. Through participation in many common forums, such
    as the Defense Acquisition Board and the Deputies Advisory Working
    Group, JROC members are able to identify disconnects early and make the
    necessary course corrections.
        Question. What is your vision for the role and priorities of the
    JROC in the future?
        Answer. First and foremost, if confirmed, I will continue to ensure
    the warfighter's voice is heard and supported in the requirements
    process. Additionally, as we move into a period where it appears there
    will be great downward pressure on the defense budget, I believe the
    JROC and joint requirements process will need to play a key role in
    prioritizing what capabilities are most important to the Department.
    This will enable the JROC to make informed decisions to ensure the
    Department's most important warfighting capabilities remain intact. I
    also believe we must do a better job of controlling requirements creep
    within programs, and that tight synchronization between requirements,
    budgeting, and acquisition will become even more important in the
    coming years.
        Question. Do you believe the JROC process is sufficient to
    understand and identify where there are opportunities for multi-Service
    collaboration or where programs could or should be modified to take
    advantage of related acquisition programs?
        Answer. Recent implementations of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011
    have provided a broader look into current programs and future
    collaboration, not only among Services but between COCOMs. There is
    always room for improvement, but generally I believe the JROC is
    effective in ensuring collaboration among the major stakeholders.
        Question. What principles guide your approach to inviting, and
    helping ensure the sufficient participation of other stakeholders in
    the JROC?
        Answer. I believe transparency and honesty are crucial to the
    effective determination of joint requirements in order to meet
    warfighter needs. If confirmed, I will fully support the
    recommendations made by General Cartwright, to include advice from any
    organization with a stake in the requirements being validated.

             JOINT CAPABILITIES INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT SYSTEMS

        Question. There have been longstanding concerns about the lack of
    flexibility and responsiveness within DOD's complex process of
    addressing the needs of the warfighters. Recently, GAO reported that
    the JCIDS has evolved to provide many opportunities for combatant
    commanders to express their capability gaps, but that combatant
    commanders are frustrated with the lengthy, staff intensive advisory
    process that results in investments driven by Service priorities.
        As a combatant commander, what is your perspective on the
    responsiveness of the JCIDS process in addressing joint capabilities
    needs?
        Answer. JCIDS is a deliberate requirements process, designed to be
    analytical to ensure Service proposals are aligned with Joint Concepts
    of Operations and strategic guidance. It is also designed to ensure the
    Department complies with applicable laws by fully supporting
    acquisition and budgetary processes.
        As concept of operations and missions have rapidly evolved to
    support the current security environment, and as acquisition and budget
    processes were adjusted to be more responsive to urgent warfighter
    needs, a parallel requirements process (supporting acquisition of
    JUONs) was created to ensure joint needs were met in the short term
    (preventing loss of life or mission failure).
        I have experienced frustration as a combatant commander in being
    caught between these two processes. However, the Joint Staff in this
    case proved to be very responsive in accelerating the JCIDS process to
    meet my needs, though final resolution of my requirement is pending. As
    stated above, the Joint Staff, with inputs from all COCOMs and
    Services, continues to make adjustments to both processes based on
    inputs from users, lessons learned, and changes in law, to ensure
    responsiveness to critical joint capabilities needs. I believe the
    ongoing JCIDS review will provide solid recommendations to improve the
    responsiveness and decision support to the JROC, COCOMs, Services, and
    Defense Agencies.
        Question. What level of involvement in the joint requirements
    process and the JROC do you believe is appropriate for the COCOMs?
        Answer. COCOMs continue to play an important role in the
    requirements process. They have always been able to act as a sponsor,
    identifying capability gaps for consideration by the JROC for
    validation. COCOMs have always had an open invitation to attend and
    participate in any JROC meeting, to ensure their equity was considered
    on any subject.
        Since the changes mandated by the Weapon System Acquisition Reform
    Act, and the changes in the structure of the JROC mandated by the 2011
    NDAA, the COCOMs' role on the JROC is now equivalent to that of a
    Service. Because of this, the COCOM voice is able to be heard in all
    levels of the joint requirements process. The expansion of the COCOM
    role, and the active participation of COCOM commanders in the JROC, is
    completely appropriate, and I applaud the work General Cartwright has
    done to bring this to fruition.
        However, I believe the COCOMs still have work to do to grow into
    this role, as their limited capacity and expertise, as well as limited
    senior officer bandwidth, makes it challenging to fully participate in
    this process. If confirmed, I will search for ways to not only provide
    the rule set that permits COCOM participation, but to provide the means
    for them to do it. I believe this is the next step in improving this
    process.
        Question. Section 862 of the Ike Skelton NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011
    directs the GAO to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of
    designating a COCOM to provide a Joint Evaluation Task Force to
    participate in the development of a material solution for a new
    requirements document.
        Do you think that such a Joint Evaluation Task Force would improve
    the dialogue between COCOMs and the Services' acquisition communities?
    Why or why not?
        Answer. I believe that the current requirements process already
    provides a mechanism for joint dialogue between COCOMs and acquisition
    communities. The challenge is not in establishing a process, it is in
    enabling COCOMs to participate in it. My concern is that establishment
    of a Joint Evaluation Task Force may result in an additional layer of
    coordination and staffing between the existing requirements and
    acquisition processes, further delaying the identification of
    capability gaps and the subsequent fielding of systems addressing those
    gaps.
        Question. What additional steps do you think need to be taken to
    improve coordination and better integrate the warfighters into a
    requirements development process that is controlled by the Services?
        The process known as the Senior Warfighter Forum (SWarF), led by
    the COCOM Vice Commanders, provides a consolidated COCOM voice in
    prioritizing the attributes of capability needs in identified mission
    areas. An additional step that is being recommended as part of the
    ongoing JCIDS review is to formalize the SWarF process to better inform
    JROC decisionmaking to further integrate and coordinate requirements
    efforts of services and COCOMs.
        Question. As Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
    Cartwright directed the Joint Staff to begin an effort to overhaul the
    JCIDS process to make it more responsive to warfighter needs, have a
    stronger voice, and to develop a methodology for setting investment
    priorities across the Department.
        Do you think that JCIDS needs to be changed? If so, what are your
    views on the how it could be improved to make the process more
    responsive to users' needs while efficiently investing resources in a
    fiscally constrained budget environment?
        Answer. Yes, JCIDS continues to change as the agencies that support
    it (Services, COCOMs, Joint Staff), and that it supports (acquisition
    and budgeting) continue to evolve. The work that has been going on
    since last summer has produced several significant recommendations to
    revise the joint requirements process. These recommendations take into
    account recent efficiencies gained by the disestablishment of U.S.
    Joint Forces Command, the Joint Staff J-6, and the office of the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Network Integration and Information
    (ASD/NII), as well as the changes ongoing in the acquisition community
    with the revision of the DOD Directive 5000.02.
        The fundamental idea behind JCIDS--that is, to assist the JROC in
    identifying and assessing joint military capability needs--will not
    change. The process used by the Joint Staff, and the content of the
    submissions, will move away from a document-centric toward a data-
    centric model, with more time spent on analysis of the risks associated
    with cost, schedule, and performance considerations to meet the urgency
    of the requirement. Staffing time and redundancy will be significantly
    reduced. It will also enable the JROC to make a better informed
    decision on the validation and prioritization of joint military
    requirements.
        Question. How do you envision your role, if confirmed, as the
    Chairman of the JROC?
        Answer. The Vice Chairman, as JROC Chairman, co-chairman of the
    Deputies Advisory Working Group, and a member of the Defense
    Acquisition Board, is the only person who sits at the intersection of
    both requirements and acquisition processes at the executive level. The
    JROC controls the requirements process through exercise of their
    validation authority. The JROC Chairman, therefore, must ensure the
    needs of the warfighter are met within the fiscal constraints placed on
    the Department.
        Question. What are your thoughts on the need for a joint force
    model to guide the development of requirements by each of the Services
    and the fielding of capabilities?
        Answer. Our move from threat-based planning to capabilities-based
    planning has enabled a joint assessment of capabilities that are
    interoperable and supportable across the joint force. Requirements are
    based on strategic guidance, which is constantly being revised to meet
    the current and anticipated threat. Services, as the principal sponsors
    of requirement submissions, identify capability gaps that are aligned
    with strategic guidance. The current capabilities-based planning model
    is sound, yet is it prudent that we continue to review the model to
    ensure our highest priority joint military requirements are being
    fielded to meet the needs of our joint force.
        Question. The requirements development process is not a stand-alone
    process, but instead is required to work collaboratively with the
    acquisition and budgeting processes.
        What steps are needed to better align the requirements development
    process with the acquisition and budgeting processes to make for a more
    efficient and effective process for delivering capabilities?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the ongoing JCIDS review
    evaluated several areas for improvement, and the Joint Staff has been
    working together with the Office of the Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OSD/AT&L) to implement these
    improvements.
        The implementation of expanded requirements manager certification
    training, through courses designed and conducted by the Defense
    Acquisition University, ensures responsible managers from both the
    requirements and acquisition communities have a common understanding of
    the needs of both processes, an awareness of the touch points between
    the two communities, and can work together effectively.
        The move to a data-centric requirements generation model, partly
    facilitated by the creation of Capability Development Tracking and
    Management software, was mandated on 30 June of this year. This has the
    potential to provide acquisition communities greater visibility of
    requirements earlier in the process.
        Another recommendation from the JCIDS review is for Joint Staff
    requirements experts to advise the Director of Cost Assessment and
    Program Evaluation (OSD/CAPE) and the OSD/AT&L by conducting a Joint
    Staff review of the results of the AOAs to better inform the Milestone
    ``A'' acquisition decision. This will facilitate a better competitive
    prototyping strategy and allow a joint assessment of AOA results prior
    to the establishment of KPP.
        Question. How soon do you anticipate that reforms to the JCIDS
    could be implemented?
        Answer. It is my understanding that some improvements to JCIDS have
    already been implemented and final recommendations will be approved in
    the coming months. We anticipate implementation of major reforms by the
    end of this year.
        Question. Do you anticipate that the drawdown of U.S. combat forces
    in Iraq and Afghanistan will affect efforts to overhaul the system, and
    if so, how?
        Answer. I do not anticipate that changes in existing force
    deployment levels will significantly affect the reforms to the joint
    military requirements process.
                 acquisition reform and acquisition management
        Question. What is your view of the changes made by the Weapon
    Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009?
        Answer. I fully support the changes made in the Weapons Systems
    Acquisition Reform Act, and if confirmed, will work to implement any
    necessary changes in the requirements process.
        Question. What role have you played, and do you expect to play, if
    confirmed, in the implementation of that Act?
        Answer. I have played no direct role in the act's implementation in
    the billets I have held since its passage. However, I have read the act
    and fully support it--if confirmed, I will work within the authority
    vested in the Chairman of the JROC to implement any changes to the
    requirements process necessary to support implementation of the act.
        Question. What role, if any, do you believe the JROC should play in
    the oversight and management of acquisition programs after requirements
    have been established?
        Answer. I believe the JROC should continue to monitor acquisition
    program execution to identify areas where requirements may drive cost
    growth and schedule delays. The JROC should play a key role in
    determining the appropriate balance between the performance of weapons
    systems and the resources needed to develop and procure them.
        Question. What role if, any, do you believe the JROC should play in
    reviewing the progress of major defense acquisition programs or other
    acquisition programs?
        Answer. I believe the JROC should continue to review the progress
    of major defense acquisition programs and other programs of joint
    interest to fulfill its role in achieving appropriate balance between
    capability, schedule, and cost.
        Question. Do you see a need for any change in the role of the
    Chairman or the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the
    requirements determination, resource allocation, or acquisition
    management processes?
        Answer. Not at this time.
        Question. What is your view of the role played by Configuration
    Steering Boards in preventing cost growth due to requirements creep?
        Answer. I believe the Configuration Steering Boards are still
    maturing, but are increasingly providing a forum that promotes control
    of requirements and cost growth.
        Question. What do you see as the proper relationship between
    Configuration Steering Boards and the JROC in managing requirements for
    acquisition programs?
        Answer. In my view, when the Configuration Steering Board
    recommends adjusting requirements in order to mitigate cost or schedule
    growth, the requirements community should consider the impact of the
    adjustment and provide guidance in support of the recommendations that
    balances the priority of the requirement with the program cost and
    schedule.
        Question. What is your view of the Nunn-McCurdy requirements for
    Major Defense Acquisition Programs that fail to meet cost, schedule,
    and performance objectives?
        Answer. I support the Nunn-McCurdy requirements. I believe they
    force the Department to take a critical look at poor performing
    programs and reassess the path to achieving valid warfighter needs.
        Question. What do you see as the proper relationship between the
    JROC and those DOD officials charged with implementing the Nunn-McCurdy
    requirements?
        Answer. I believe the role of the JROC as military advisor to the
    Milestone Decision Authority is appropriate when assessing Nunn-McCurdy
    breaches.

                             URGENT NEEDS PROCESSES

        Question. Section 804 of the Ike Skelton NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011
    requires DOD to develop a comprehensive approach for managing all of
    its various urgent needs processes that would, among other things,
    define roles, responsibilities, and authorities, and designate a
    senior-level focal point for urgent needs.
        Do you agree that DOD should develop DOD-wide guidance that better
    defines roles, responsibilities, and authorities and designates a
    senior-level focal point for urgent needs?
        Answer. Yes, and I am aware that efforts are underway to address
    those concerns. The Department has recently made positive steps in
    addressing JUONs with the establishment of the warfighter Senior
    Integration Group (SIG) co-chaired by the USD(AT&L) and the Joint Staff
    J3. This group is providing a streamlined and tightly integrated
    approach to expedite the resolution of issues associated with rapid
    fielding to include requirements, funding, acquisition, sustainment,
    and performance. The JUONs process has been very successful in recent
    years in providing much needed capability to our warfighters, and the
    process is continuously being improved.
        Question. In your view, what specific steps should the Department
    take to better manage the joint urgent needs process?
        Answer. I believe the Department should continue to streamline the
    urgent needs process to quickly respond to urgent needs. Establishment
    of the SIG is a positive step and Joint Staff refinements to the
    validation process will continue to enhance the Department's support to
    the warfighter.
        I also believe we should continue to build a process that bridges
    the gap between urgent needs and the formal JCIDS process. Many
    requirements are not urgent enough to require the full court press of a
    JUONs process, but should be subject to the same process that
    establishes requirements for and procures a large weapons system.
        Question. What is your sense of where the DOD might consolidate
    urgent needs entities and/or processes and how cost savings could be
    achieved through such consolidation?
        Answer. I believe that the warfighter SIG has the potential to
    become DOD's permanent oversight body of Urgent Operational Needs
    (UON). This has potential for significant cost savings since the SIG
    can monitor the Services and various agencies to minimize the
    duplication of effort on urgent needs.
        Question. Do you believe that the Joint Staff should take steps to
    integrate the Joint Urgent Needs process with the individual Services'
    processes? If so, please explain?
        Answer. I believe it is important that the distinction between
    Service UONs and JUONs remain in place so that the combatant commander
    has an effective channel to ensure joint warfighter needs are promptly
    addressed. Execution of Service UONs and JUONs are already largely an
    integrated process as, both requirements generally flow to directorates
    with the requisite expertise to resolve all urgent needs.

                            NUCLEAR WEAPONS COUNCIL

        Question. If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, you would serve as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council
    (NWC).
        What would your priorities be for the NWC?
        Answer. Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal is
    a key priority in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), central to the
    responsibilities of the NWC. If confirmed, I will work with the members
    to review the NWC work plan and execute it in accordance with the
    President's guidance in the NPR.
        I will also work with the members of the NWC to pursue sound
    Stockpile Management for extending the life of U.S. nuclear weapons,
    ensuring a safe, secure, and effective deterrent.
        Additionally, I will work with NWC members to ensure the
    modernization of our aging nuclear facilities and investment in human
    capital, to enable a substantial reduction to the number of nuclear
    weapons that need to be retained as a hedge against technical or
    geopolitical surprise, to accelerate dismantlement of retired warheads,
    and to improve our understanding of foreign nuclear weapons activities.
        Question. What changes if any would you recommend to the
    organization, structure, or function of the NWC?
        Answer. U.S.C., title 10, section 179, sets forth the organization,
    structure and function of the NWC. I have no recommendations at this
    time. However, if confirmed, I will work with the NWC chairman and
    members to assess the organization, structure and function of the NWC,
    and where warranted, provide recommendations for change to increase
    effectiveness and value in support of the nuclear mission for national
    security.

            LEGISLATIVE GAPS IN DEFENSE SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES

        Question. The Department continues to lack statutory authority to
    order Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps Reserve personnel to
    Active Duty in order to provide support in response to a natural
    disaster. Despite determined efforts by you, as Commander, NORTHCOM,
    and the Council of Governors to address concerns of State Governors
    about operational control of Federal forces during naturally causes
    emergencies, no resolution that would facilitate a legislative change
    has been achieved.
        From a contingency planning perspective, how necessary, in your
    view, is modification of title 10, U.S.C., to allow reservists
    involuntarily to be called to Active Duty to respond to natural
    disasters?
        Answer. I believe it is important for DOD to be able to plan for
    and access title 10 Federal Reserve capabilities to ensure adequate
    speed, capability, and capacity in responding to natural disasters in
    support of the American people. Title 10 Federal Reserve Forces possess
    significant capabilities to mitigate the effects of major disasters or
    emergencies, whether natural or manmade. Federal Reserve Forces are
    geographically dispersed throughout the Nation and are often located
    closer to the incident site than Active-Duty Forces. A high percentage
    of skill sets and capabilities needed during response to natural
    disaster is contained in the Federal Reserves.
        Question. What is the current status of negotiations with State
    Governors, and what unresolved issues remain that stand in the way of
    an agreement?
        Answer. In the 2009 NDAA, Congress recommended that DOD ``engage
    with the community of governors to work out an understanding of unity
    of effort during domestic terrorist events and public emergencies.''
    The President established a Council of Governors in 2010 to address
    this and other issues. The Council has already made important progress
    in approving a concept that provides dual chains of command to ensure
    unity of effort in response to disasters.
        Proposed legislation to address access to the Federal Reserve
    Forces has been a priority topic of discussion in the Council over the
    past year. The members of the Council have worked hard to ensure we get
    the language right.
        Based upon the 17 July 2011 Council of Governors meeting that I
    attended in Salt Lake City, I believe there are no more unresolved
    issues. My understanding is that there is now full concurrence among
    the Council, the Department of Homeland Security, and the DOD for the
    National Governors Association regarding language to recommend to
    Congress for inclusion in NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012.
        Question. If confirmed, what role, if any, would you play in
    ensuring the Department addresses what is clearly a significant
    vulnerability?
        Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to the opportunity to continue
    to support the Council of Governors and the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs as they
    finalize work on a legislative proposal to gain access to Federal
    Reserve Forces for domestic incidents that can increase the speed of
    response and deliver necessary capabilities to our citizens in need. I
    believe we are close to positive resolution of this matter.

                           HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT POLICY

        Question. The ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010,'' enacted
    on December 22, 2010, provides for the repeal of the current DOD policy
    concerning homosexuality in the Armed Forces, to be effective 60 days
    after the Secretary of Defense has received the DOD's comprehensive
    review on the implementation of such repeal, and the President,
    Secretary, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff certify to the
    congressional defense committees that they have considered the report
    and proposed plan of action, that DOD has prepared the necessary
    policies and regulations to exercise the discretion provided by such
    repeal, and that implementation of such policies and regulations is
    consistent with the standards of military readiness and effectiveness,
    unit cohesion, and military recruiting and retention.
        What is your view on repealing the current DOD policy?
        Answer. I support repeal of the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy in the
    manner that the repeal has been crafted. I believe the Armed Forces are
    prepared to implement the repeal of 10 U.S.C. 654, consistent with the
    Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-321). I have
    expressed to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in writing that
    NORTHCOM is prepared for implementation.
        Question. What effect do you anticipate the repeal will have on
    readiness and discipline in the Armed Forces?
        Answer. We have the policy and regulations needed for
    implementation, consistent with standards of military readiness,
    military effectiveness, unit cohesion, and recruiting and retention. I
    am confident that we are ready now to affect repeal while sustaining
    military effectiveness, even in our current conflicts.

                     SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

        Question. The Department has in recent years developed
    comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and
    response to incidents of sexual assaults, including providing
    appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault. However,
    numerous incidents of sexual misconduct involving military personnel in
    combat areas of operation and at home stations are still being
    reported. Victims and their advocates claim that they are victimized
    twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by unresponsive
    or inadequate treatment for the victim. Despite the leaders' commitment
    to ``zero tolerance,'' the view is held by some that the Department has
    not done enough to provide the resources and policies needed to prevent
    sexual assaults.
        Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures,
    particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective?
        Answer. I believe current policies and programs designed to address
    sexual assault have allowed the Department to both care for victims and
    hold offenders accountable. That said, I believe that, until no sexual
    assaults occur within our forces, we should continue to look for ways
    to improve the system.
        Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in
    which confidential reporting procedure has been put into operation?
        Answer. I am not personally aware of any problems in the
    implementation of the restricted reporting option. Confidential
    reporting allows victims who wish to remain anonymous to obtain the
    support they need following an assault. I will remain alert and
    receptive to reported flaws in the program and support taking prompt
    action to improve the system.
        Question. What is your view of the steps the Services (including
    the Reserve components) have taken to prevent and respond to sexual
    assaults in combat zones, including assaults against contractor
    personnel and assaults by foreign nationals?
        Answer. No sexual assault is acceptable anywhere in our Armed
    Forces, whether deployed or not. I believe the Services have procedures
    in place to address the challenges of preventing and responding to
    sexual assaults in an operational environment to include working with
    host governments and our international partners. Every effort is made
    to take care of all victims and hold offenders accountable. However, as
    I stated above, until no sexual assaults occur within our Armed Forces,
    we should continue to look for ways to improve prevention and response.
        Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
    resources the Services have in place to investigate and respond to
    allegations of sexual assault?
        Answer. Our investigators and first responders are well trained.
    All Services recently enhanced their resources for investigating and
    prosecuting sexual assault cases.
        Question. What do you see as the most difficult problems commanders
    must contend with in holding assailants accountable for their acts?
        Answer. I believe building and maintaining victim confidence to
    assist in the investigation can often be difficult for commanders
    trying to take appropriate command action against assailants.
    Commanders are also frequently confronted with the challenge that
    alleged sexual assaults are also often accompanied by other lesser
    misconduct on the part of both the victim and the alleged assailant
    that is easier to prove than sexual assault.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure senior
    level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to
    sexual assaults?
        Answer. Senior leadership focus on this important topic is
    critical. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chiefs to monitor
    progress in eradicating sexual assault in the military.

                            ACTIVE-DUTY END STRENGTH

        Question. Former Secretary of Defense Gates announced this year
    that the Army would reduce its end strength by 22,000 through fiscal
    year 2013, including 7,400 in fiscal year 2012. This end strength was
    part of the temporary increase authorized in 2009 and was intended to
    more fully fill out the existing force structure. Beginning in fiscal
    year 2015, depending on conditions on the ground, the Army and Marine
    Corps plan to reduce their permanent end strength and force structure
    by 27,000 soldiers and at least 15,000 marines, respectively.
        Does the foregoing statement accurately reflect current planning?
        Answer. The statement appears to be consistent with remarks made by
    Secretary Gates. It is also my understanding that the Army and the
    Marine Corps need a bit more time to confirm these projected personnel
    numbers and the timeframe for their implementation, particularly for
    the out-years.
        Question. How would you describe the risk in adhering to these
    reductions?
        Answer. Given current trends in Iraq and Afghanistan, including
    reduced demand for ground forces in Iraq, the risk is manageable, but
    dynamic. This process will require careful monitoring and potential
    management flexibility during the drawdown.
        Question. Can the Army accelerate to 2012 more of its planned
    reduction in its temporary overstrength?
        Answer. Though I currently do not have the information I need in
    order to reach a firm conclusion, I believe it would be difficult to
    accelerate a reduction in ground forces prior to concluding the Afghan
    campaign. Accelerated reductions would likely increase the stress on
    the force and could introduce unacceptable risk to other COCOMs that
    have ground force requirements. If confirmed, I will pay close
    attention to the pace at which force structure changes are planned for
    our ground forces.
        Question. What are the assumptions regarding ``conditions on the
    ground'' that will allow for the planned reductions beginning in 2015
    to occur on time?
        Answer. In general, I would expect such a decision to depend to a
    significant degree on our assessment of progress against security
    objectives in specific theaters and the elements of key strategic
    decisions regarding potential future contingencies as 2015 approaches.
    I would solicit the advice of our combatant commanders and DOD's senior
    military and civilian leaders to inform my recommendations on such
    decisions.
        Question. The Navy and Air Force, while not currently facing the
    same level of planned reductions in their Active Duty end strengths in
    the coming years, are concerned about exceeding their end strength
    authorizations due to higher than expected retention. Consequently,
    both Services are seeking force management tools that require
    congressional authorization and relying on involuntary separations to
    reduce their forces.
        What tools do the Department and the Services need to get down to
    authorized strengths by the end of this fiscal year, and which of these
    require congressional authorization?
        Answer. I understand that some of the authorities used during
    previous force reductions have expired or are expiring soon. DOD is
    seeking to renew these authorities and is requesting new legislation to
    size and shape the force. My view is that DOD should make maximum use
    of voluntary authorities; however, great care should be taken to ensure
    those who leave are not going to be needed in the near term. If
    confirmed, I will study this issue closely and rely on the advice of
    both civilian and military professionals within DOD.

                  RESERVE COMPONENTS AS AN OPERATIONAL RESERVE

        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Reserve
    components as an Operational Reserve, as opposed to its longstanding
    traditional role as a Strategic Reserve?
        Answer. Sustained engagement in combat operations has transformed
    the Reserve components of our Armed Forces from a purely strategic
    force to one that also provides operational, full-spectrum capabilities
    to the Nation. Repeated combat deployments, as well as peacekeeping,
    humanitarian relief, and Homeland defense missions, have produced a
    force more operationally capable and experienced than any time in our
    Nation's history. Given sufficient predictability of the ``next''
    deployment, the vast majority of Reserve component forces and
    capabilities can be accessed systematically long into the future.
    National Guard and Reserve members expect to deploy periodically to
    meet the Nation's security needs, and all have volunteered to remain a
    part of the force with this ``new normal.'' This operational force is a
    direct result of the substantial investment in resourcing commitments
    and the personal sacrifice of members, their families, and their
    civilian employers. I expect that as budget pressures tighten, the
    Reserve component role will evolve along with that of the Active
    component in a strategy-driven process, which could alter the current
    shape of the Reserve component in ways not yet clearly understood.
        Question. In your view, what are the major challenges to
    maintaining and enhancing the National Guard and Reserves as a relevant
    and capable Operational Reserve?
        Answer. Two key challenges that come to mind are access to the
    Reserve components and sustained funding for their operation. Since
    September 11, the Department has relied on the provisions of the
    Presidential Declaration of National Emergency to gain involuntary
    access to the Reserve components. This declaration must be extended
    annually for the provisions to remain in effect. The Reserve component
    is no longer considered a solely strategic capability to call upon in a
    national emergency. Therefore, to ensure continued access, I understand
    that DOD is working with the Armed Services Committees within the 2012
    NDAA to enable and facilitate periodic and recurring use by granting
    the Secretaries limited mobilization authority for up to 365 days for
    non-named contingency operations. This would better satisfy Joint Force
    Commanders' requirements.
        In addition to access, and depending on available resources, the
    Department will need to program sufficient resources to use the Reserve
    component on a predictable and periodic basis to meet requirements,
    preserve readiness gains, avoid snapping back to a purely Strategic
    Reserve, and capitalize on cost efficiencies inherent in Reserve
    component employment. As an operationally experienced and capable
    force, requiring only a small portion of defense funds, the Reserve
    components can provide solid solutions to the significant fiscal
    challenges our military and our Nation face.
        Question. What are your views about the optimal employment in
    generating forces for combat missions of the National Guard and
    Reserve?
        Answer. We've seen a significant change in Reserve component use
    over the past 20 years and have developed a Total Force--Active,
    National Guard, and Reserve--to meet sustained combatant commander
    requirements around the globe. This evolution, combined with the
    current era of conflict and the broad range of security challenges on
    the horizon requires us to make smart decisions about Total Force
    capabilities and capacities to make sure we have the forces needed to
    defend and advance our national interests. To that end, the Secretary
    of Defense directed a Reserve component front end assessment that will
    inform the 2013 Program Budget Review and should be completed in
    September. I would want to read that assessment before making any firm
    commitments. I believe those findings, combined with recommendations
    articulated in the Department's Comprehensive Review of the Future Role
    of the Reserve component, will present and shape optimum mix and
    employment models for our Total Force.
        Question. In your view, should Homeland defense or other global or
    domestic civil support missions be assigned exclusively to the National
    Guard?
        Answer. No, I believe each component of the Total Force--Active,
    Guard, or Reserve--has an important, layered, and interdependent role
    in the successful execution of Homeland defense and civil support
    missions.

                                 NATIONAL GUARD

        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of changes in
    the global and domestic roles and mission of the Army National Guard,
    the Air National Guard, and the National Guard Bureau?
        Answer. The roles of the Army National Guard, Air National Guard,
    and the National Guard Bureau in domestic missions have not changed
    over the last few years. The National Guard continues to be the first
    military response to a community-based event. Meanwhile, the National
    Guard has performed exceptionally well in our conflicts overseas during
    the past 10 years, and is a combat-seasoned force.
        If confirmed, I look forward to participating in the discussion of
    how the National Guard will evolve its dual role of supporting domestic
    missions while remaining a relevant contributor to global missions in
    support of an evolving national military strategy.
        Question. What is your assessment of the effect, if any, of
    increasing the grade of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to
    General (O-10)?
        Answer. From my experience as Commander, NORTHCOM, I believe
    elevating the grade of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to
    the rank of General has proven to be the right decision. In my current
    capacity, I have benefitted from being able to interact with a four-
    star officer leading the NGB, and we have formed a solid partnership.
    The National Guard is an indispensable component of the operational
    military and the Chief serves as a bridge for the States to the Federal
    Government and the Active components of the military.
        Question. In your view, should there be a requirement that the
    position of Commander, NORTHCOM or Commander, U.S. Army North, the Army
    component commander, be filled only by a National Guard officer? Please
    explain.
        Answer. While I absolutely welcome the possibility that a National
    Guard officer could be assigned to either position, I do not believe
    there should be a mandated requirement for either position to be filled
    by a National Guard officer. I believe the best-qualified officer,
    regardless of status as Active, Guard or Reserve, should be selected as
    Commander, NORTHCOM and Commander, U.S. Army North.
        Question. In your opinion, should the Chief of the National Guard
    Bureau be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
        Answer. I have developed a strong relationship with--and am a big
    believer in--America's National Guard and I would, if confirmed, give
    such a change the serious consideration it deserves. Although, like the
    Commandant of the Coast Guard, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau
    already attends most meetings of the JCS, I do see potential advantages
    to this initiative, to include bringing his unique insights more
    formally into this forum. However, before making such a recommendation,
    I would want to gain a better understanding of its implications, to
    include: what it means for the rest of the Reserve component and
    whether they would feel disempowered, how it would affect the existing
    balance on the Joint Chiefs or would be redundant, whether other
    organizations with a title 10 role would subsequently require full
    membership, the potential implication that the National Guard would
    evolve into separate Services, and other implications of which I may
    not yet be aware.
        Question. What steps need to be taken, in your view, to ensure that
    a ``deep bench'' of National Guard general officers is continually
    being developed?
        Answer. I believe there should be more joint education and training
    opportunities for National Guard general officers. Additionally, I am
    encouraged by the Air Force's recent elevation of the 1st Air Force/Air
    Forces Northern Commander position to three stars and filling it with
    an Air Guard officer. I support reestablishing the three-star position
    of Vice Chief of the National Guard in order to develop National Guard
    lieutenant generals for promotion. As Commander of NORTHCOM and NORAD,
    I have benefitted by having National Guard officers assigned to my
    headquarters, which has surely contributed to their development, and I
    would encourage expansion of this program. The program under which we
    temporarily bring National Guard general officers into NORAD and
    NORTHCOM headquarters to fill in for Active Duty officers attending the
    CAPSTONE senior officer course has been a major success. If confirmed,
    I will continue to seek opportunities to grow and develop our bench of
    National Guard officers.

                             WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

        Question. In the past year, the Navy has opened on submarines to
    women, the Marine Corps has expanded opportunities for women in
    intelligence specialties, and the Army is reviewing its assignment
    policy for female soldiers. The issue of the appropriate role of women
    in the Armed Forces is a matter of continuing interest to Congress and
    the American public.
        Do you believe additional warfare specialties currently closed to
    women members should be opened for by women?
        Answer. I have always believed in opening the door to additional
    roles for women in the Services. Current policies provide DOD
    sufficient flexibility under current law to make changes to assignment
    policy for women. I believe the Services should continue to assess
    their combat needs in order to make those determinations and notify
    Congress accordingly as required by statute (10 U.S.C., Sec. 652 and/or
    Sec. 6035).
        Question. Do you believe any changes in the current policy
    regarding women in combat are needed or warranted?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Department's policies and
    practices that restrict assigning female members are being reviewed at
    this time as mandated by section 535 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011.
    I would want to have access to the facts from that review before making
    a recommendation.

                          RISING COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE

        Question. In testimony presented to Congress in February 2009, the
    Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office asserted that
    ``medical funding accounts for more than one-third of the growth
    projected for operations and support funding between 2009 and 2026.''
    In April 2009, then Secretary of Defense Gates told an audience at
    Maxwell Air Force Base that ``health care is eating the Department
    alive.''
        What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising medical
    costs on future DOD plans?
        Answer. The continuing cost growth trend will pose a greater
    problem for the Department the longer it remains unresolved. Rising
    costs of medical care will require the Department to balance the costs
    of the health care system against risks in warfighting capability. This
    may either require increased strategic and military risk or the
    acceptance of changes in the system of health care.
        If confirmed, I will help to ensure the health care system is
    flexible, efficient, and cost-effective to meet the requirements of the
    Military Departments, Services, and combatant commanders to achieve our
    military objectives. I will also consider the critical importance of
    the medical system for our people--military members, retirees, and
    their families.
        If confirmed, I look forward to continuing our efforts with
    Congress and DOD to find effective ways to improve the cost-
    effectiveness of the Military Health System.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you initiate or
    recommend to mitigate the effect of such costs on the DOD top-line?
        Answer. The rising cost of health care is clearly an issue we need
    to work and will require the close support of Congress. Based on my
    current position, I do not have any specific initiatives in mind at
    this time. However, if confirmed, I will support the Secretary of
    Defense as he works with both the health care leadership of the
    Department, the health care industry, and veterans groups to examine
    new ways to ensure military beneficiaries are provided the highest
    quality care possible while managing cost growth. Although this may
    require some adjustments to the program, I will keep in mind the
    critical importance of the medical system for our people--military
    members, retirees, and their families. It is especially important that
    we provide the most advanced system of care possible in our combat
    theaters and provide for our forces who are returning with both
    ``seen'' and ``unseen'' combat injuries.
        Question. What reforms in infrastructure, benefits, or benefit
    management, if any, do you think should be examined in order to control
    the costs of military health care?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will assist the Secretary of Defense, as he
    leads the Department's ongoing effort to explore all possibilities to
    control the costs of military health care. This may include an analysis
    of benefit payment structures, organizations, systems, and policies for
    the military health system. I would also support a strong push for the
    potential long-term gains available through the promotion of healthy
    life styles and prevention among our beneficiaries to help reduce the
    demand for health services.

                        PERSONNEL AND ENTITLEMENT COSTS

        Question. In addition to health care costs, personnel and related
    entitlement spending continues to grow and is becoming an ever
    increasing portion of the DOD budget. Secretary Panetta, in his
    confirmation process, advocated for a comprehensive review of military
    compensation, saying ``everything must be on the table,'' including
    military retirement.
        Do you believe the time is right to begin discussing reform of
    military compensation and retirement benefits?
        Answer. I agree with Secretary Panetta about the need to conduct a
    comprehensive review of military pay and benefits. I believe that it is
    possible to restructure our military pay and benefits in a way that
    continues to attract, support, and retain our men and women in uniform
    and their families while containing cost.
        Question. Other than reducing Active Duty and Reserve end strength,
    what actions do you believe can be taken to control the rise in
    personnel costs and entitlement spending?
        Answer. I understand that personnel-related costs represent a
    growing percentage of the DOD's limited resources. I'm also concerned
    about the fact that our current military compensation system is deep-
    seated in structures established decades ago. To control the rise in
    personnel costs and entitlement spending, I believe it is appropriate
    to conduct a comprehensive review of the military pay and benefits
    structure to determine where costs can be contained. However, while I
    support a review of military pay and benefits, we must do so in a
    manner that supports and sustains the all volunteer force.

                              MILITARY RETIREMENT

        Question. The 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation
    proposed a new defined benefit retirement plan that more resembles the
    benefits available under the Federal Employee Retirement System than
    the current military retirement benefit. Many other studies have
    questioned the affordability, feasibility, and fairness of the current
    ``cliff vesting'' system.
        While it is often said that the military retirement benefit
    encourages retention after the 10-year point, do you believe it
    provides any significant boost to recruitment? Do 17-18 year olds, in
    your experience, care about retirement benefits when deciding to
    enlist?
        Answer. My understanding is that recruit surveys show retirement
    benefits are often not a driving factor to enlist for those who are 17-
    18 years old, but I believe it may be appropriate to review the
    military retirement system for needed changes and efficiencies that
    encourage retention and boost recruitment. I understand that the
    Defense Business Board is reviewing military retirement and I look
    forward to reviewing their proposed alternatives to the current
    military retirement system in order to make an informed recommendation,
    if confirmed.
        Question. How might the military retirement system be modernized to
    reflect the needs of a new generation of recruits, while easing the
    long-term retirement cost to the government?
        Answer. There are many proposed alternatives to the current
    military retirement system. As General Cartwright has stated, changes
    these benefits tend to only impact on the Department's budget
    requirements in the long term. Any changes should be carefully
    considered, as they will have far-reaching and long-lasting effects on
    our force. I have no specific suggestions to offer at this time, but if
    confirmed, will closely review, along with the rest of the Joint
    Chiefs, those proposals and their impact in order to make an informed
    recommendation.

                    SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED WARRIORS

        Question. Members who are or have been wounded and injured
    performing duties in Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and
    New Dawn deserve the highest priority from their for support services,
    healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to
    duty, successful transition from Active Duty when appropriate, and
    continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Despite the
    enactment of legislation and continuing emphasis, many challenges
    remain in both the Active and Reserve components in responding to the
    needs of wounded, ill, and injured members under current law and
    regulations.
        What is your assessment of the progress made to date by DOD, the
    Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Services to improve the care,
    management, and transition of seriously ill and injured members and
    their families?
        Answer. Since the institution of the Wounded, Ill, and Injured,
    Senior Oversight Council in 2007, DOD and VA have been working on
    multiple ways to improve the care, management, and transition of our
    wounded warriors and their families. DOD has established Wounded
    Warrior Units and Program oversight offices through which individual
    and family medical, mental, and social-economical needs are addressed.
    I understand DOD and VA have established several Centers of Excellence
    for development of diagnostic tools, treatment modalities, education,
    and training for care providers, wounded warriors, and family members
    to provide treatment for the multiple facets of injuries or illness our
    seriously wounded warriors face.
        Question. What are the strengths upon which continued progress
    should be based?
        Answer. I have been advised that we should continue to expand upon
    the research and treatment baselines established both within the
    private medical research and health care sector (e.g. Johns-Hopkins
    University on Traumatic Brain Injury, Mayo Clinic on Biomechanics,
    University of Utah and University of Massachusetts on Limb
    Regeneration) and the Centers of Excellence which fall under the
    Defense Center of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic
    Brain Injury. These groups are making daily strides in providing the
    best level and quality of care to our wounded warriors and their
    families. If confirmed, I will continue to support their efforts and
    work to ensure that they receive the support (both financial and
    manpower) required for them to continue their important work
        Question. What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?
        Answer. One weakness is clinical case management through the period
    when members transition from the Active Force to DOD retiree or
    eligible veteran status. For example, a single electronic health record
    is needed, and is in development but is still not deployed.
    Additionally, the improvement of the transition process and tracking
    for wounded warriors with unseen psychological wounds is an area of
    special concern. We must strive for continued process improvement for
    our wounded warriors--if confirmed, I will work to coordinate with all
    stakeholders to develop systems and processes to close these gaps.
        Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and
    resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded members
    and their families, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty
    or to civilian life?
        Answer. I would continue to capitalize on the many non-profit
    programs and organizations that fall within ``the Sea of Goodwill''.
    There are hundreds of these organizations and programs that have come
    to the aide of the wounded warriors and their families to provide for
    everything from assistive devices (e.g. wheel chairs, house ramps), to
    conducting research on medical treatments, to providing direct economic
    aid. The Chairman's Office of Warrior and Family Support has been at
    the forefront on coordinating with a number of these organizations,
    cataloging those which provide the best quality and quantity of
    assistance to our wounded warriors and their families. I will also
    encourage continued work between the Federal and State governments on
    this important topic via the Council of Governors and other potential
    forums.
        Question. Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at WRAMC
    pointed to the need to reform the disability evaluation system (DES). A
    DES pilot program, and now an Integrated DES program, have been
    established to improve processing of members.
        What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and
    improve the Integrated DES?
        Answer. I agree with the need to streamline the current Integrated
    Disability Evaluation System (IDES). It is my understanding that
    earlier this year, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the
    Veteran's Administration established an IDES Tiger Team. Since May, the
    Tiger Team initiated a reform program and has set in motion a campaign
    plan to reduce the IDES total process time. The goal is to eventually
    reduce the IDES total process time to 90 days or less. This will
    require close coordination with Congress for legislative change. This
    will reduce the total number of warriors in the evaluation process,
    thus reducing the overall cost to the system and the burden on our
    wounded warriors.
        Question. If confirmed, how will you address any need for change?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will support current IDES reform
    initiatives as set forth by the secretaries and, if necessary, make
    recommendations to ensure the appropriate levels of disability rating
    and compensation are provided our Wounded Warriors.
      suicide prevention, high-risk behavior, and mental health resources
        Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services has
    increased in recent years. The Army released a report entitled ``Army
    Health Promotion Risk Reduction Suicide Prevention'' in June 2010 that
    analyzed the causes of its growing suicide rate and examined disturbing
    trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high risk behaviors. In
    addition, mental health surveys conducted by the Army of soldiers and
    marines in theater document declines in individual morale and increases
    in mental health strain, especially among those who have experienced
    multiple deployments.
        In your view, what role should the Joint Chiefs of Staff play in
    shaping policies to help prevent suicides both in garrison and in
    theater and to increase the resiliency of all members and their
    families?
        Answer. The rising suicide rate amongst Active Duty personnel is
    deeply concerning. In response to the 2010 DOD Task Force Report on
    Prevention of Suicide, the DOD is developing an action plan to address
    the 13 foundational and 76 targeted recommendations in the report.
    Expeditious implementation and resourcing of the particular
    recommendations the services have identified as high priority would
    benefit DOD commitment to reducing suicides. If confirmed, I will
    continue to work closely with Congress, our military leaders, Veterans
    Affairs, and other Federal and civilian organizations to see that our
    members' and families' psychological health and mental health issues
    are addressed.
        Question. What is your understanding of the action taken in
    response to the June 2010 Army report, and the data in Chapter 3 (``The
    Lost Art of Leadership in Garrison'') in particular?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Army continues to evaluate
    and modify programs and services that are related to health promotion,
    risk reduction, and suicide prevention. Early identification of ``high
    risk'' behavior, such as substance abuse and behavior problems, should
    allow leaders to intervene early. I understand that the Army has
    engaged leaders at all levels to improve education and awareness of
    behavioral health issues and high-risk behaviors. The Army has
    increased behavioral health providers at the brigade level in Active,
    National Guard, and Army Reserve units; required increased behavioral
    health screening before and after deployments; improved training for
    chaplains and suicide prevention coordinators; and improved training
    for primary care medical providers to identify and respond to
    behavioral health issues.
        Question. What actions, if any, should the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    take with respect to Army policies regarding detection of and response
    to illegal drug abuse?
        Answer. On 1 November 2010, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff outlined several initiatives to improve the detection and
    response to illegal drug abuse. The DOD Biological Testing Advisory
    Board, which has Army representation, has been working to jointly
    address the recommendations identified and to discuss additional
    actions that would be beneficial. However, I understand that funding
    remains a constraint to immediate implementation of identified
    improvements.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that
    sufficient mental health resources are available to members in theater,
    and to the members and their families upon return to home station?
        Answer. Personal mental health issues cannot be ignored and, as an
    institution, DOD must continue to directly address this issue. My
    understanding is that there are three areas that must be addressed to
    ensure sufficient resources are available to members and their
    families.
        First, we must ensure that members are comfortable seeking
    treatment and using the resources that are available. A DOD Instruction
    will be issued soon to address this directly. This new instruction will
    positively affect command notification reducing the stigma associated
    with receiving mental health treatment. Second, we must continue
    working to develop additional and more effective mental health
    therapies. Third, we must ensure that we have the necessary resources
    available, including trained mental health professionals. We must
    continue to coordinate closely with our VA and civilian counterparts to
    ensure consistent staffing of mental health professionals across the
    continuum of care.

                            MILITARY QUALITY OF LIFE

        Question. In January 2009, the Department published its second
    Quadrennial Quality of Life Review, which focused on the importance of
    key quality of life factors for military families, such as family
    support, child care, education, health care, and morale, welfare, and
    recreation services.
        How do you perceive the relationship between military and family
    readiness and quality of life improvements and your own top priorities
    for the Armed Forces?
        Answer. I expressed in a previous question that I will work closely
    with the Secretary and his staff, the Chairman, the other Joint Chiefs,
    and the combatant commanders to ensure our national defense remains
    strong by, among other things, ensuring our families and wounded
    warriors are cared for properly. We cannot protect this country unless
    we have healthy, personally-secure fighting men and women who are
    willing to put their lives on the line. A key component of this is
    ensuring we do everything possible and appropriate to meet their
    personal needs.
        Question. If confirmed, what further enhancements, if any, to
    military quality of life would you consider a priority in an era of
    intense downward pressure on budgets, and how do you envision working
    with the Services, combatant commanders, family advocacy groups, and
    Congress to achieve them?
        Answer. I understand the importance of quality of life programs on
    the wellness of the total force. If confirmed, I will encourage
    proactive management of the key areas such as access to counseling,
    fitness opportunities, child care support and spouse employment
    opportunities. Though basic quality of items such as satisfaction with
    PCS moves are largely issues, I have a keen interest in ensuring they
    are looked after properly. I look forward to working with advocacy
    groups and Congress to efficiently close gaps and reduce overlaps in
    programs and to communicate effectively with families to ensure that
    they know how to access available support when they need it.

                                 FAMILY SUPPORT

        Question. Military members and their families in both the Active
    and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous
    sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military
    leaders have warned of growing concerns among military families as a
    result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations
    that go with them.
        What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
    issues for members and their families, and, if confirmed, how would you
    ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately
    resourced?
        Answer. I believe family readiness is tethered to family
    resilience. It is DOD's responsibility to ensure families are well-
    prepared to meet the challenges that come with deployment and service.
    Through focusing on the psychological, social, financial, and
    educational well-being of military families, DOD can continue to build
    family resilience. I understand that strides have been made in
    improving access to resources for families through such programs as
    Military OneSource, and the Yellow Ribbon Program, but there is always
    room for improvement.
        Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
    light of global rebasing, BRAC, deployments, and growth in end
    strength?
        Answer. It is DOD's responsibility to ensure that all available
    resources, including those in health care, education, and employment,
    are available to families at the required level and location. In order
    to accurately address the needs of these families in a changing
    environment, it is also critical to DOD's success to build community
    partnerships between all Federal agencies and with local governments,
    businesses, and nonprofit organizations that are stakeholders in
    addressing the stressful aspects of military life. I also believe we
    need to encourage continued progress among individual states'
    legislative initiatives to ease recognition of professional
    accreditation of family members and support for various school programs
    transferring children. If confirmed, I will monitor the changing needs
    of our military families closely.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support to Reserve
    component families related to mobilization, deployment and family
    readiness, as well as to Active Duty families who do not reside near a
    military installation?
        Answer. DOD has a duty to ensure that every family has access to
    quality resources, regardless of location. These resources should
    provide information, access, referrals, and outreach to all military
    members and their families. This needs to be underwritten by a
    coordinated, community based network of care encompassing DOD, VA,
    State, local, nonprofit, and private providers. It is my understanding
    that DOD's Yellow Ribbon Program has been successful in addressing
    these needs. If confirmed, I will assess this program to ensure that it
    is properly focused and funded to address the issues faced by Active
    Duty, Guard, and Reserve members and their families.
        Question. If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to
    enhance family support?
        Answer. I understand there are many excellent State programs that
    support members and their families. If confirmed, I would like to
    explore these further and see if they can be expanded across all
    States. If confirmed, I would encourage the implementation of flexible
    family support programs that meet the needs of our members and their
    families, whether they live on military installations, near military
    installations, or far from military installations

                       DEFENSE READINESS REPORTING SYSTEM

        Question. In June 2002, the Department issued a directive to
    replace the current readiness reporting system, yet that replacement is
    yet to be fully operational.
        What challenges still remain in the transition from the Global
    Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) to the Defense
    Readiness Reporting System (DRSS) and what is the plan to fully
    implement DRRS?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the transition from the GSORTS
    to the DRRS faces challenges associated with management, acquisition
    practices, definition of requirements, and testing. The transition is
    scheduled to be complete the end of fiscal year 2012. I also understand
    that as part of the DRRS governance structure, the Joint Staff is
    working with the Under Secretary of Defense (USD) for Personnel and
    Readiness to develop an executable implementation plan, including
    milestones, performance goals and quantifiable, measurable validated
    requirements. On 6 June 2011, the DRRS was placed under Director,
    Operational Test and Evaluation, and USD Acquisition Test and Logistics
    Developmental Test and Evaluation oversight.
        Question. Have any delays or obstacles been attributed to
    technological maturity or changing requirements?
        Answer. I understand the Joint Staff was informed by the DRRS
    Implementation Office (DIO) during normal governance processes of some
    technological challenges. These included challenges associated with the
    ability of the DRRS to connect to strategic command and control systems
    and connections within the DRRS enterprise. I also understand that
    changing requirements have also contributed to delays in the
    development of a long-term DRRS program, and the transition from
    GSORTS. Additionally, since the originally planned Full Operational
    Capability (FOC) date of 2007, challenges remain with clearly defining
    measurable requirements. When combined with growing lists of
    requirements that still require prioritization or validation, efforts
    to develop executable plans have been delayed. Work continues to define
    FOC criteria, finalize dates for transition, and complete the
    accompanying implementation plan.
        Question. GAO has reported that significant shortfalls remain in
    the implementation of DRRS, stability of requirements, adequacy of
    testing, and overall management and oversight of the program.
        What is your view on their findings?
        Answer. I concur with the specified findings of the 2009 GAO
    report. I support the DRRS oversight related findings in GAO-11-256,
    ``Military Readiness: Army and Marine Corps Reporting Provides
    Additional Data, but Actions Needed to Improve Consistency'' report.
    Specifically, I believe steps are needed to achieve interoperability,
    oversight, and execution. Additionally, I concur with the GAO
    assessment that an independent program risk assessment is needed to
    improve program organization.
        Question. With respect to DRRS development and implementation, to
    what extent, if any, has the USD for Personnel and Readiness, worked or
    coordinated with the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and
    the Chief Information Officer of DOD?
        Answer. I am aware of a report and corresponding memorandum
    produced for the Defense Committee as directed by the NDAA for Fiscal
    Year 2010. I understand the USD for Personnel and Readiness and the
    Director of Defense Research and Engineering produced the report. I do
    not believe the September 2010 report, ``Preliminary Technology
    Readiness Assessment Report on the DRRS,'' and accompanying memorandum
    to the committee, ``DRRS--Response to the Request Made on Page 111 of
    Senate Report 111-35'' was coordinated with or endorsed by the Joint
    Staff. I am aware the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Networks and
    Information Integration/DOD Chief Information Officer coordinates with
    the USD for Personnel and Readiness through participation in the DRRS
    governance process.

                          AIR FORCE TACTICAL AVIATION

        Question. As the head of the JROC, you would be responsible for
    overseeing the development and validation of requirements for major
    weapons systems. Some have raised concerns that many of the problems
    within the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program derive from growth in
    requirements.
        Do you agree that this is a problem with the JSF program?
        Answer. I understand that issues with the JSF program have been
    addressed through a deliberate requirements and acquisition review
    process, and that requirements growth has been an issue. A high level
    replan was approved in January 2011, and the program expects to deliver
    a fully-compliant weapon system. I am taking steps to gain in-depth
    familiarity with the JSF program, intend to give the program my close
    personal attention, and fully support continuing JROC reviews of the
    program.
        Question. What actions would you propose to take to prevent
    requirements growth on major weapons systems?
        Answer. Requirements growth requires continued vigilance, which
    will be especially important in an increasingly constrained budget
    environment. If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize current checks
    and balances that are in place to include the ``trip-wire'' process and
    Configuration Steering Boards. Additionally, I understand that one of
    the core elements of the ongoing JCIDS review is to strengthen
    requirements synchronization with the acquisition process, which will
    serve to improve control of requirements growth.
        Question. If the JROC cannot control requirements growth on the
    largest acquisition program in the DOD portfolio, what prospect is
    there that the JROC could control requirements growth on any other
    major acquisition programs?
        Answer. I fully acknowledge the committee's concern regarding
    requirements growth. I have confidence that the JROC maintains adequate
    authorities and processes to manage requirements growth, and if
    confirmed, I will continue General Cartwright's emphasis on imposing
    discipline on such growth.
        Question. At a hearing earlier this year, the committee received
    testimony from senior DOD officials that there really is no alternative
    to continuing the JSF program.
        What actions would you propose to take to prevent DOD from finding
    that future major acquisition programs that run into cost schedule or
    performance problems leaves us with no alternative but to continue the
    troubled programs?
        Answer. I do not believe any program is too big to fail or should
    be fenced. That said, we need to work hard to ensure programs,
    including the JSF, are successfully executed. Process improvements
    resulting from the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act and JCIDS
    review should reduce the risk of similar circumstances in the future.
    If confirmed, I will work closely with my and OSD(AT&L) counterparts to
    properly manage current and future program development to balance cost,
    schedule, and performance in the best interest of the taxpayer.

                              IRAQ LESSONS LEARNED

        Question. What do you believe are the major lessons learned from
    the Iraq invasion and the ongoing effort to stabilize the country?
        Answer. While there are other lessons to be sure, perhaps the most
    important lesson is that in executing a major contingency, we must
    remain prepared for the difficult work that occurs in the wake of major
    combat. This will manifest itself in two ways. First, in framing future
    strategic and force sizing constructs, we must account for the fact
    that conflicts are never as compact as predicted, and that the notion
    of rapidly swinging forces from one conflict to another must be viewed
    with healthy skepticism. Second, we must plan and train with our
    civilian counterparts and be prepared to operate effectively in all
    phases of conflict. That said, the military should also be prepared to
    undertake critical non-military tasks when civilian agencies cannot
    operate effectively, either due to the security environment or due to
    lack of capacity. Indeed, the need for greater capabilities and
    capacity in civilian agencies has been a recurring lesson for the
    entire U.S. Government. Finally, we need to obtain better situational
    awareness of the underlying political, cultural, and economic drivers
    within a host nation to ensure our actions meet our objectives and not
    trigger unintended consequences.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the
    Department's adaptations or changes in policy, programs, force
    structure, or operational concepts based upon the lessons learned?
        Answer. The Iraq war has led to deep and far-reaching changes in
    all of the areas listed above. For example, counterinsurgency doctrine
    has been completely revised, culminating in the publication of
    Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24. Force structure changes include
    the development of the Advise and Assist Brigade. Additionally, the
    Department better understands that in Irregular Warfare, the strategic
    center of gravity is a population, and not necessarily a nation-state.
    The Department has demonstrated the ability to learn and adapt across
    Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education,
    Personnel, Facilities, and Policy.
        Question. If confirmed, what additional changes, if any, would you
    propose making to policy, programs, force structure, or operating
    concepts based on the lessons of combat and stability operations in
    Iraq?
        Answer. I understand that most of the lessons from Iraq are in the
    process of being integrated into DOD policy and doctrine. However, I do
    believe we need to be cautious in not over-correcting into a force that
    is exclusively prepared for an Iraq-type of conflict.
        Question. What is your understanding of the role of the Joint Staff
    in supporting and resourcing efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
    elsewhere to foster commitment to the ``Rule of Law'' as part of
    stability operations and doctrine?
        Answer. The principle of respect for the rule of law is thoroughly
    embedded in our military forces and is reinforced throughout joint
    doctrine with regard to stability operations. Stability operations are
    a core military mission and our support to other U.S. Government
    agencies is a significant force multiplier. Indeed we recognize that it
    is often the establishment of the rule of law, and a security sector
    that can enforce it, that will permit the redeployment of the joint
    force when supporting a stabilization effort in a failed or failing
    state. Even in a non-combat theater, at NORTHCOM we maintain an
    extensive relationship with the Mexican military on human rights and
    the rule of law that, with the support of Congress, is fully supported
    by counternarcotics funding.
        I understand that a portion of the OSD's Operations and Maintenance
    budget has been designated to support continued strategic planning,
    programming, and interagency training for rule of law operations and
    that the Joint Staff recently assisted the Under Secretary of Defense
    for Policy in gathering information to draft a rule of law report that
    soon will be delivered to Congress.

                                DRAWDOWN IN IRAQ

        Question. Do you support the plan for the drawdown of U.S. forces
    from Iraq consistent with the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement?
        Answer. I support the current plan for the drawdown of U.S. forces
    from Iraq in accordance with the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. It
    is important that we fulfill our obligations under this bilateral
    agreement and we are on track to complete the drawdown by December 31,
    2011.
        Question. What is your assessment of the Department's planning for
    the withdrawal of troops and equipment out of Iraq consistent with the
    December 2011 deadline of the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement?
        Answer. The drawdown of troops and equipment in Iraq is on track
    due to solid planning and the discipline, training, and dedication of
    our deployed forces. My understanding is that the Joint Staff closely
    tracks the progress of the drawdown on a daily basis. Since this
    process began in 2010 with the force reduction from 159,000 to 50,000
    troops, we have closed hundreds of bases and outposts and turned them
    over to our Iraqi partners in better condition than we inherited them.
    Our logisticians have moved mountains of equipment. The plan is on time
    and on schedule for a complete withdrawal by the December 2011 deadline
    of the Security Agreement.
        Question. It's been reported that the administration is considering
    options for a U.S. force to remain in Iraq beyond December 2011 should
    the Iraqi Government request the continuing presence of U.S. forces.
        If a continuing U.S. troop presence in Iraq beyond the end of this
    year is requested by the Government of Iraq (GOI), would you support
    the deployment or retention of additional troops in Iraq beyond the
    present deadline for U.S. troop withdrawal?
        Answer. If the GOI requests the presence of U.S. forces beyond
    2011, I will consider the missions the GOI is asking our forces to
    perform, the risks our forces will face, the willingness of the GOI to
    take action against militias and other extremist groups that could
    target U.S. forces, the benefit it might bring to Iraq and the U.S.-
    Iraq relationship, and the cost of the mission. If confirmed, and if
    these factors support retention of U.S. forces, I would make such a
    recommendation.

                         LEAD AGENCY TRANSITION IN IRAQ

        Question. Responsibility for lead U.S. agency in Iraq is scheduled
    to transition from DOD to the Department of State (DOS) by October
    2011. However, a May 2011 State Department Inspector General report
    found that progress in effectively transitioning to a civilian-led
    presence in Iraq is slipping in a number of key areas, including the
    establishment of the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq to manage
    the defense relationship between the U.S. Government and the GOI.
        What is your assessment, if any, of the planning and progress in
    executing the transition from DOD to DOS? In your view, what are the
    sources of greatest risk to the current plan and the successful
    implementation of the transition?
        Answer. My understanding is that the transition from DOD and DOS is
    on track. DOD, DOS, and other agencies and offices have undertaken
    unprecedented levels of coordination and planning for the transition in
    Iraq. We have an excellent working relationship with our State
    Department colleagues and are working together at all levels to achieve
    a successful transition. As one would expect with a transition of this
    scope and complexity, challenges exist, but it is my understanding that
    we are working together to overcome them and remain on schedule. Fully
    funding the State mission to its completion is vital to this effort.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
    to the current plan or the implementation of transition?
        Answer. The transition plan is solid, and my understanding is that
    we are on track to fully implement it. Normal operational challenges
    remain as we close bases and move personnel and equipment, but we
    anticipate no issues meeting the deadline in accordance with the
    transition plan. However, should the Iraqis request a continued U.S.
    presence beyond 2011, I would want to be closely involved in subsequent
    planning efforts.

                        U.S.-IRAQ STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

        Question. In your view, what will be the nature of our strategic
    relationship with Iraq after December 31, 2011?
        Answer. Our stated goal has always been to establish a long-term
    strategic partnership with Iraq. We support an Iraq that is sovereign
    and self-reliant; that has a just, representative, and accountable
    government; that denies support and safe haven to terrorists; that is
    integrated into the global economy; and that contributes to regional
    peace and security. All these elements of our desired strategic
    relationship with Iraq were codified in the 2008 Strategic Framework
    Agreement established between Iraq and the United States. If confirmed,
    it is my intention to closely monitor the status and progress of our
    relationship.

                              AFGHANISTAN STRATEGY

        Question. Do you agree with President Obama's strategy for
    Afghanistan and Pakistan announced at West Point in December 2009?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. On June 22, 2011 President Obama announced his decision
    to draw down 10,000 U.S. troops from Afghanistan by the end of this
    year and to withdraw the remaining 23,000 ``surge'' force by September
    2012, for a total announced drawdown of 33,000.
        Do you support the President's decision to begin reducing U.S.
    forces in July 2011? Why or why not?
        Answer. While I have not been focused on the mission in Afghanistan
    while executing my duties at NORAD and NORTHCOM, it is my understanding
    that we have made significant gains as a result of deploying the surge
    force. This force increase has allowed us to arrest Taliban momentum,
    establish security in previously-held Taliban areas such as Central
    Helmand and Kandahar (areas of historic importance to the insurgency),
    and expand Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) capacity and
    capability. It is my understanding that the theater and combatant
    commander have expressed that we can drawdown and continue to manage
    the risk, as long as we retain flexibility if circumstances on the
    ground change. Commencing the drawdown in July 2011 has the benefit of
    sending an important signal to the Afghan Government that international
    support is not open-ended.
        Question. Do you support the President's decision regarding the
    size and pace of reductions in U.S. forces? Why or why not?
        Answer. Yes. It is my understanding that this decision does not
    represent a change in our strategy--the ends, ways, means, and boundary
    conditions outlined for the mission in Afghanistan remain the same. It
    appears to me that we have reached a point in the campaign where a
    responsible drawdown in U.S. forces is possible. Once surge forces are
    removed, there will still be more than 68,000 U.S. troops and thousands
    of international forces in Afghanistan--not to mention the addition of
    some 70,000 Afghan forces that will join the fight during the next 15
    months. At the same time, the international community has demonstrated
    its intention to support Afghanistan until at least 2014, and the U.S.
    and NATO are both discussing some form of long-term partnership
    relationship with Afghanistan.
        Thus, I agree with the President's decision. If confirmed, I will
    remain abreast of conditions on the ground in Afghanistan and, should I
    determine the situation has changed, I will provide such advice to the
    Chairman and the Secretary.

                       SECURITY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

        Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation
    in Afghanistan?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the security situation in
    Afghanistan continues to improve though, as General Petraeus has said,
    it is fragile and reversible. Insurgent momentum has been halted in
    most of the country and reversed in many key areas like Helmand and
    Kandahar. For example, May and June mark the first time since 2006 that
    insurgent attacks have decreased when compared to the same months the
    year prior. The enemy is resilient and retains lethal capacity as well
    as the ability to regenerate over time. However, even in the wake of
    recent attacks, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
    (GIRoA) and the ANSF have also proven their resilience and it appears
    that they will continue to push forward for a secure and stable
    Afghanistan. Our forces, partnering with the ANSF, should help to
    further pressure the enemy by degrading support networks and further
    reduce support for the enemy among the Afghan population. Nonetheless,
    numerous security challenges remain, and there will be tough fighting
    in the years ahead as we transition security to Afghan lead by the end
    of 2014.

               BEGINNING OF TRANSITION OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY

        Question. The transition of lead security responsibility to Afghan
    security forces is set to begin in mid-July, with the initial phase to
    be completed by the end of this year. In March President Karzai
    announced the first tranche of provinces and municipal districts
    designated for the transition of security responsibility to an Afghan
    lead. President Karzai has called for the transition of security
    responsibility throughout Afghanistan to be completed by 2014, and
    International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) members endorsed this
    goal at the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010.
        Do you support the decision to transition the lead security
    responsibility to the Afghan security forces in the areas announced by
    President Karzai beginning this month?
        Answer. Yes, based on support from our commander on the ground.
        Question. In your view, how important is it to the
    counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan that the transition of security
    responsibility begin in July 2011?
        Answer. Transitioning to Afghan-led security responsibility is the
    next step in our comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) effort in
    Afghanistan. It will not be easy, and there will likely be setbacks as
    well as progress. However, as we seek to eliminate safe havens from
    which al Qaeda or its affiliates can launch attacks against our
    homeland or our allies, the Afghan Government must step up its ability
    to protect its people and move forward with actions to build a more
    stable, economically viable country in the future. We should remain
    committed to working with the Afghan Government and our coalition
    partners in executing the transition phase of the NATO/ISAF
    comprehensive COIN strategy in order to transfer lead security
    responsibility to the Afghan Government by the end of 2014.
        Question. What is your assessment of the capacity of the Afghan
    security forces to assume the lead for security in the areas designated
    for this initial round of transition?
        Answer. I believe that the Afghans are prepared to assume the lead
    for security in the areas designated in the first tranche based on my
    understanding of the current size and capability of Afghan security
    forces. Afghan security forces are already in the lead in some places,
    such as Kabul and Panshir. It goes without saying that our support will
    be critical, especially in the early days of the transition, but the
    Afghan National Security Forces must step up, and these areas are a
    good place to start.

                  BUILDING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

        Question. There are approximately 100,000 more Afghan soldiers and
    police now than there were in November 2009 and by September 2012
    another 70,000 personnel will be added to the ANSF. A new ANSF target
    end strength of 352,000 by 2012 is awaiting final approval by the Joint
    Coordination and Monitoring Board.
        In your view, is the target end strength level for the ANSF
    sufficient to provide security and stability in Afghanistan?
        Answer. I believe the Afghan National Army and Afghan National
    Police should be capable of achieving the lead for security by the end
    of 2014 if the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board approves the
    352,000 ANSF target end strength and if that end-strength is achieved.
        Question. What in your view are the greatest challenges to building
    the capacity of the ANSF to assume responsibility for Afghanistan's
    security?
        Answer. I believe the primary challenges to ANSF capacity building
    are: building literacy, reducing attrition, developing leaders,
    eliminating insider threats, and provision of key enablers such as
    logistics, maintenance, and intelligence capability.
        Question. There remains a shortfall in the number of training
    personnel required for the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A)
    and in the number of embedded training teams, the Operational Mentoring
    and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) embedding with Afghan Army units and the
    Police OMLTs (POMLTs) embedding with Afghan Police units.
        In your view, to what extent should U.S. forces be used to source
    the shortfall in NTM-A trainers?
        Answer. Fielding professional and capable ANSF is critical to our
    long-term success in Afghanistan. This is a priority for ISAF and NTM-
    A. U.S. personnel are currently filling numerous training and
    partnership requirements throughout Afghanistan. Our forces will
    continue to support the ANSF as required in order to achieve our
    mission objectives. This may require shifting U.S. forces into
    positions to cover trainer shortfalls if required by the commanders in
    the field.
        Question. What more should be done to get NATO members and other
    coalition partners to meet the ISAF requirements for additional NTM-A
    trainers and OMLTs and POMLTs?
        Answer. Training shortfalls are a longstanding issue best addressed
    by continued engagement with our partners by all elements of the U.S.
    Government--including Congress--as well as by NATO/SHAPE HQ, HQ ISAF,
    and representatives of the NATO training mission. Our allies and
    contributing nations with operational commitments are being encouraged
    to reinvest any combat troop reductions with trainers, as has recently
    occurred with our Canadian partners. Personnel with specialized skills
    such as police, logisticians, medical, and maintenance specialists are
    essential. We continue to work on filling all training requirements,
    while also developing more Afghan trainers, in order to realign
    coalition trainers.
        Question. A key component of efforts to build the capacity of
    Afghan security forces is partnering ANSF units together with ISAF
    units in the field.
        In your view, how effective has partnering been in building the
    capacity of the Afghan Army and Afghan police?
        Answer. Partnering is an essential component of building Afghan
    security force capacity in order to allow Afghans to assume the lead
    for security across the country by the end of 2014. It is my
    understanding that we have made significant strides with our baseline
    training while, at the same time, focusing on our partnership efforts.
    This has proven to be the most effective way of increasing Afghan
    capability, confidence, and professionalism in the field. Afghan units
    that are partnered with ISAF elements continue to develop more rapidly.
    Partnered units are more effective in the field, have a better
    understanding on how to sustain their forces and have fewer incidents
    of corruption.
        Question. Would you support moving to a partnership ratio of ISAF
    and ANSF forces below 1:1 (less than one ISAF soldier for every ANSF
    soldier) as the capability of Afghan security forces improves?
        Answer. My understanding is that we intend to do this as we
    transition security responsibility. This is part of the process of
    building ANSF capacity and then putting them in the lead. Developing
    units will require greater partner support, while effective units will
    have less partner support. Balancing partner efforts increases their
    capacity. Partner ratios will change dramatically as we move to
    complete Afghan control. My understanding is that there are several
    units now below a 1:1 partner ratio, and there are increasingly more
    areas where Afghans are in the lead or operating independently.
          relationship between counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
        Question. In your view, what is the proper relationship between
    counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan?
        Answer. The mission in Afghanistan is to degrade, disrupt, and
    destroy al Qaeda and to provide sufficient stability so that
    Afghanistan can never again become a safe haven for terrorists. As
    such, counterterrorism directly targets al Qaeda networks themselves,
    including leadership, thereby addressing the first imperative. It also
    supports the counterinsurgency campaign, which in turn intends to
    eliminate the conditions in which al Qaeda can exist. Special
    operations forces are vital in both roles.

                AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE/VILLAGE STABILITY OPERATIONS

        Question. Secretary Panetta and others have emphasized the
    importance of the Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police
    programs to the strategy in Afghanistan.
        What has been the effect of these programs on rural Afghan
    populations and what has been the response from the Taliban?
        Answer. My understanding is that the Afghan Local Police (ALP)
    program and Village Stability Operations (VSO) have had a measurable
    and positive effect on security in Afghanistan. Since the program's
    inception by Afghan presidential decree in August 2010, ALP has grown
    to over 6,700 patrolmen operating at 44 validated sites. ALP is a means
    of extending legitimate security where ISAF forces are scarce or non-
    existent. VSO, of which ALP is a component, builds the connection
    between the village, the province, and the central government. The
    program is intended to jump-start local governance and also mobilize
    communities, a key condition for local populations to resist Taliban
    predation. The enemy has explicitly targeted VSO because they fear its
    effectiveness and ALP members have successfully fought off Taliban
    attacks in a number of recent incidents. The ALP program and VSO
    continue to grow, and Afghans across the country are eager for the
    program to come to their area.
        Question. Do you believe the availability of U.S. special
    operations teams is a limiting factor in expanding these programs to a
    point where they can have a strategic impact in Afghanistan?
        Answer. My understanding is that the number of ALP and VSO sites we
    can establish in Afghanistan is limited by the availability of Special
    Operations teams. This is because Special Operations teams embed and
    live where VSO/ALP has been established. In order to expand the VSO/ALP
    program, Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-
    Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) has operational control of two U.S. Army
    Infantry battalions. The deployment of these two battalions under
    CFSOCC-A control has allowed us to thicken the Special Operations
    forces and free up more special forces personnel for new ALP/VSO
    missions. We expect that this will allow us to continue to increase the
    ALP program, even as the number of Special Operations in Afghanistan
    remains fairly constant.
        Question. How do indirect approaches like Village Stability
    Operations and Afghan Local Police Programs compliment direct action
    counterterrorism missions within the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan?
        Answer. I understand that the VSO/ALP program methodology includes
    full-time embedded partnership between Special Operations Forces and
    local villagers. Local villagers have among the best insight into
    insurgent actors, intentions, and their support structures. Special
    Operations forces conducting VSO/ALP and those conducting precision
    strike operations habitually cooperate and share information. The
    combination of these two efforts has had significant synergistic
    effects for the overall campaign and have made key areas of Afghanistan
    inhospitable to the Taliban and other insurgent groups.

                                    PAKISTAN

        Question. The relationship between the United States and Pakistan
    has often been described as tumultuous. Recent reports indicate
    Pakistan has expelled approximately 90 out of 135 special operations
    personnel who were deployed there to train the Frontier Corps and other
    Pakistani security forces to fight al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other
    associated groups. Also the United States has announced that some aid
    to Pakistan's military will be suspended.
        What is your assessment of the military-to-military relationship
    between the United States and Pakistan?
        Answer. Militaries in general tend to respect the common ethos
    associated with serving their nations' interests through the profession
    of arms. This general appreciation applies to how we regard Pakistan's
    military: since 2001, they have incurred roughly 12,000 casualties
    (3,000 KIA, 9,000 WIA) fighting violent extremists. We respect their
    courage and commitment to the defense of their nation. Relationships
    ebb and flow based on a combination of national interests,
    communications, and events. It is no surprise that our relationship is
    undergoing a turbulent period at present. The Pakistan military
    leadership has concluded that, for a variety of reasons, we should
    reduce our footprint inside their country, and we will of course abide
    by their decision, which will result in withholding some related aid.
    But we take our Pakistani counterparts at their word that this
    footprint reduction is temporary in nature.
        Even though this is a difficult partnership, it is an important
    one. We cannot afford to return to the days when there was no
    partnership at all and a generation of Pakistani officers grew up with
    no contact with the United States. This professional relationship will
    continue to evolve at the most senior levels in Islamabad and
    Rawalpindi, and along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border at the tactical
    and operational levels.
        Question. In your view does the presence of nuclear weapons in
    Pakistan and the security of these weapons have any effect on the
    military-to-military relationship between the United States and
    Pakistan and if so, how is that best addressed?
        Answer. The fact that Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state that faces
    internal threats from extremist organizations makes it even more
    important to maintain a solid military to military relationship.
    Although the nature of the Pakistani state makes it unreasonable for us
    to expect routine access and perfect transparency, through military
    relationships we can offer perspectives on modernization, engagement
    with regional partners, and professionalism that will further develop
    our shared interests and shared approaches. From a DOD perspective, we
    have confidence in the caliber of officers Pakistan has charged with
    maintaining their strategic weapons systems. Should Pakistan desire, I
    believe we stand ready to support additional efforts to improve the
    security and safety of their nuclear weapons, and I believe we would
    welcome increased engagement in this facet of the security arena.
        Question. Do you believe the current difficulties, including
    reported reductions in U.S. trainers, are temporary or lasting?
        Answer. Difficulties and opportunities ebb and flow; we have a good
    measure of both right now. Certainly the reduction of our footprint and
    training capacity are one of the difficulties. No doubt we will
    continue to maintain some of the more constructive aspects of our
    relationship, and I believe the relationship will recover. I am unable
    to discern whether or when Pakistan will invite our Special Forces
    Trainers back in at the levels we believe would best benefit their
    efforts to counter violent extremists bent on overthrowing their
    government and threatening the United States and our allies.
    Nonetheless, we continue to have productive engagements in other
    venues, including coordination between units on both sides of the
    border.
        Question. In your assessment, how important is the U.S.-Pakistan
    military-to-military relationship to the success of our
    counterterrorism strategy?
        Answer. U.S. strategic interests in Pakistan encompass both our
    relationship with Pakistan itself and Pakistan's role in the campaign
    against al Qaeda and its adherents and affiliates. Because our efforts
    in Afghanistan have eliminated it as a safe haven, al Qaeda and other
    extremists use Pakistan as a base for the movement's overall ideology
    and to plot and prepare attacks against the United States and our
    allies and partners. These safe havens also pose a major challenge to
    our campaign in Afghanistan. Pakistan's efforts in eliminating these
    safe havens are dependent in some measure on U.S. support, which
    implies the need for a strong military-to-military relationship. Their
    full commitment to this effort would mark a new era of deeper
    partnership in which we share the mission of defeating terrorists and
    extremists.
        Question. What is your assessment of U.S. programs to build the
    capacity of the Pakistan Army and the Pakistan Frontier Scouts to
    conduct counterinsurgency operations in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border
    region, including train and equip programs under the Pakistan
    Counterinsurgency Fund?
        Answer. Enabling the Pakistani Army and the Frontier Corps to
    eliminate extremist safe havens is the premise of our outreach through
    the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund, intended to add additional
    capability to Pakistani courage and competence that already exists.
    Pakistan's senior military and civil leaders must in turn demonstrate
    the willingness to aggressively take on this mission.
        I understand that PCF-funded training, equipment, and
    infrastructure have produced some important initial results for the
    Frontier Scouts, Special Services Group, and other organizations
    involved. The quality of Pakistani Army and Frontier Corps units'
    tactical maneuver, communications, marksmanship, and intelligence have
    demonstrably improved for participating small units. These programs
    have only begun to fully operate, and they remain vulnerable to
    disruptions of funding or access
        Question. In your view, to what extent does the Pakistan military
    recognize that militant extremists groups pose a threat to Pakistan's
    own national security interests, including such groups as the Haqqani
    network, the Afghan Taliban operating in and around Quetta, and
    Lashkar-e-Taiba?
        Answer. The Pakistani nation will always act in its own interests,
    which are often different from our own. Pakistan has viewed India
    itself and Indian (or any other nation's) domination of Afghanistan as
    an existential threat, and has taken steps it believes are necessary to
    counter this threat, including developing nuclear weapons and nurturing
    extremist groups to fight proxy irregular warfare. That the Pakistani
    military benefits from presenting India as a threat, and that there are
    many in the military who sympathize with the extremist views of these
    groups, only reinforces this tendency. Moreover, these groups fought
    hard against the Soviets during their invasion of Afghanistan, and thus
    the military bears a certain loyalty to them. However, in both
    supporting and tolerating these groups, the Pakistani military has
    grabbed the tail of a tiger that they may or may not be able to
    control. Military and civilian leadership seem to have gained in recent
    years a greater appreciation for the costs and dangers of such
    tolerance. For that reason, Pakistan has increasingly proven ready to
    act against extremist groups that target their own government. We are
    working, with limited success, to convince our Pakistani partners that
    they must take externally-focused terror groups just as seriously as
    domestic terror groups, that in fact all such groups form a linked
    syndicate of sorts.

                                 CYBERSECURITY

        Question. In a recent interview with Defense News, Admiral Mullen
    stated that ``The single biggest existential threat that's out there, I
    think, is cyber.''
        Do you agree with Admiral Mullen and, if you do, do you believe
    this threat is receiving appropriate focus and resources within DOD?
        Answer. I agree on both counts. Both state and non-state actors
    have or are developing the capability to severely impact both our
    national infrastructure and our ability to execute command and control
    and other military functions that have become dependent on cyber
    capability. It is a serious threat. Last year the Secretary of Defense
    created a new, sub-unified command, U.S. Cyber Command, to address this
    issue and help preserve the Nation's freedom of action in cyberspace.
    The launch of the DOD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace on 14 July
    2011 is also a clear indicator that the Department is focused on the
    cyber threat. With the implementation of the strategy's five strategic
    initiatives, the Department is focusing its resources both internally
    and externally to organize, train, and equip our forces to take full
    advantage of cyberspace's potential; employ new defense operating
    concepts to protect DOD networks and systems; partner with other U.S.
    Government departments and agencies and the private sector to enable a
    whole-of-government cybersecurity strategy; build robust relationships
    with U.S. allies and international partners to strengthen collective
    cybersecurity; and leverage the Nation's ingenuity through an
    exceptional cyber workforce and rapid technological innovation.
        Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in the
    development of DOD's cybersecurity policy, strategy, and planning?
        Answer. Our reliance on cyber capabilities, the many and varied
    threats, and the rapid rate of technological change all demand we shine
    a spotlight on defense of our information networks. If confirmed, I
    will advocate within the Department, and with Federal agencies and
    Members of Congress, for appropriate policies and resources regarding
    cyberspace. Although the Department just released the DOD Strategy for
    Operating in Cyberspace, there is still a great deal of work to do,
    including placing greater focus on interagency relationships,
    authorities, and building flexible and responsive capabilities. We also
    need to protect our warfighting mission, strengthen and expand
    partnerships in the domain, build capability to conduct full-spectrum
    cyberspace operations, and develop processes to integrate cyberspace
    capabilities into COCOM operations and plans.
        Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role for NORTHCOM
    in providing support to civil authorities in the cyber domain in
    relation to U.S. Cyber Command?
        Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the lead
    Federal agency for national cyber security policy and programs. As
    such, the DHS will manage and lead a fully-coordinated response to a
    significant cyber incident to minimize impact, restore operations, and
    reduce the risk of future occurrence of the event or events. DOD
    organizations may be asked to support the federal cyber response, if
    military resources are needed to address the specific situation.
    NORTHCOM's position is that U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and its
    subordinate sub-unified COCOM, U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), should be
    in the lead for DOD support to civil authorities for the technical
    aspects of recovery from a cyber attack. CYBERCOM and DHS have
    established a strong relationship for exactly this purpose. NORTHCOM's
    role would be in assisting the DHS in mitigating the physical effects
    of such an event. For example, if a cyber attack disables our Nation's
    electrical grid for an extended period of time, the effects could
    devastating. In such a situation, NORTHCOM could provide transportation
    and other logistical support using military capabilities. STRATCOM,
    NORTHCOM, and CYBERCOM would coordinate closely throughout such an
    event.

             COORDINATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        Question. After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
    Congress established the Department of Homeland Security, and DOD
    established the NORTHCOM and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs.
        What is your assessment of the current level of cooperation and
    coordination between DOD and DHS on homeland security matters, and what
    will be your goals in this regard if you are confirmed?
        Answer. Cooperation and coordination between the DOD and the DHS is
    very strong and constantly improving. DOD staffs are tightly connected
    with the DHS and its component agencies through continued exchange of
    department representatives, to include DOD COCOMs and DHS headquarters
    and subordinate agencies. As the Commander of NORTHCOM, I have directly
    observed and benefitted from such cooperation, notably including close
    partnerships with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Customs and
    Border Protection, and the U.S. Coast Guard. There continues to be a
    significant increase in the overall collaboration in deliberate and
    crisis action planning, policy decisions, and applicable directives
    impacting homeland security matters. The many correlations in our
    mission sets demand this collaboration. If confirmed, I will help the
    DOD continue to mature and strengthen our relationship with the DHS
    through information sharing, exercises, operations, and planning.
        Question. What do you believe is the appropriate mechanism for DOD
    to respond to the needs of domestic agencies for DOD support--whether
    through new or modified programs within DOD or otherwise?
        Answer. I believe the current Request For Assistance (RFA)
    mechanism for Federal agencies to obtain assistance from the DOD,
    through the exchange of Executive Secretary memoranda, is appropriate.
    The DOD has unique capabilities that have supported domestic agencies
    such as the U.S. Coast Guard and the Department of Interior for the
    Deep Water Horizon oil spill, Federal Emergency Management Agency for
    Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, and the National Interagency Fire Center for
    wildland forest fires. In domestic natural disasters, DOD is always in
    support of a Primary Agency. If confirmed, I will continue to seek ways
    to respond more quickly and effectively to requests from our Federal
    partners, to include expanded use of pre-scripted mission assignments.

                              COMBATING TERRORISM

        Question. The administration recently released its National
    Strategy for Counterterrorism. This strategy highlights the need to
    maintain pressure on al Qaeda's core while building the capacity of
    partners to confront mutual threats. The strategy also underscores the
    need to augment efforts to counter threats from al Qaeda-linked threats
    ``that continue to emerge from beyond its core safe haven in South
    Asia.''
        How do you view the Department's role under the new National
    Strategy for Counterterrorism?
        Answer. DOD plays a significant role within the government-wide
    global fight against al Qaeda (AQ) and its adherents primarily through
    partner nation capacity-building and enabling efforts, targeted
    counterterrorism (CT) operations, and countering violent extremist
    messaging. Building competent, professional and responsive CT forces
    that protect populations and strengthen the rule of law reinforces the
    legitimacy of partner governments, creates sustainable security, and
    reduces AQ's ability to establish safe havens. Targeted CT operations
    are focused on eliminating near-term threats, creating space and time
    to develop partner nation capacity, and supporting the development of
    sustainable host nation government institutions.
        Question. Do you believe the National Strategy for Counterterrorism
    modifies the Department's role in combating the threat posed by al
    Qaeda and affiliated groups?
        Answer. The National Strategy for Counterterrorism further codifies
    DOD's priorities and roles as part of the whole of government global CT
    approach. The new strategy is closely aligned with our existing
    priorities and does not significantly modify our ongoing efforts.
        Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role for the
    Department in countering threats from al Qaeda and affiliated groups
    outside of South Asia?
        Answer. Building partner nation capacity and enabling partner
    forces is the primary role for DOD in countering threats from al Qaeda
    (AQ) and affiliated groups. DOD also conducts limited targeted CT
    operations as directed in order to eliminate imminent threats to the
    United States and U.S. interests and to create space and time for the
    very challenging development of enduring host nation solutions to CT
    problems. Building strong and enduring partnerships based upon shared
    understanding of the threat and common objectives is essential for
    success. DOD also supports other efforts led by interagency partners,
    which focus on the development of better governance and supplying basic
    needs, thereby reducing the underlying causes that enable AQ to recruit
    from vulnerable populations.
        Question. Are there steps the Department should take to better
    coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other Federal
    departments and agencies?
        Answer. The level of interagency coordination that occurs in the
    global CT fight is greater than it has ever been, but must be
    continually emphasized and prioritized. To succeed at both the tactical
    and strategic levels, we must foster a rapid, coordinated, and
    effective CT effort that reflects the full capabilities and resources
    of our whole government. I will continually emphasize the need for
    transparency and interagency communication and prioritize the existing
    NSS-led CT planning and decisionmaking venues.

                    SPECIAL OPERATIONS PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

        Question. Vice Admiral McRaven, USN, Commander of Joint Special
    Operations Command, has argued that the Commander of U.S. Special
    Operations Command (SOCOM) should have greater influence on special
    operations personnel management issues including assignment, promotion,
    compensation, and retention of Special Operations Forces. One proposal
    would modify section 167 of title 10, U.S.C., to change the role of the
    SOCOM Commander from ``monitoring'' the readiness of special operations
    personnel to ``coordinating'' with the Services on personnel and
    manpower management policies that directly affect Special Operations
    Forces.
        What is your view about the authority of Commander, SOCOM in this
    regard?
        Answer. I support the coordination between SOCOM and the Services
    related to personnel issues. To improve this coordination, DOD
    Directive (DODD) 5100.01, ``Functions of the Department of Defense and
    Its Major Components,'' was published in December 2010. Currently,
    subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of
    Defense, Commander SOCOM, is responsible for, and has the authority
    necessary to conduct, in addition to those specified, all affairs of
    command relating to special operations activities, including:
    coordinate on Military Department and Military personnel management
    policy and plans as they relate to accessions, assignments,
    compensation, promotions, professional development, readiness,
    retention, sustainment, and training of all Special Operations Forces
    personnel. This coordination shall not interfere with the title 10
    authorities of the Military Departments or Military Services.

                    SPECIAL OPERATIONS ENABLING CAPABILITIES

        Question. The Commander, SOCOM, has described the ``non-
    availability'' of enabling capabilities as SOCOM's ``most vexing issue
    in the operational environment.'' The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
    (QDR) sought to balance previously mandated growth in Special
    Operations Forces with additional enabling capabilities.
        What do you believe are the greatest shortages in enabling
    capabilities facing Special Operations Forces?
        Answer. In the recent past, rotary wing lift has been one of the
    special operations community's biggest shortfalls. The Department is
    mitigating these shortages by growing SOF forces through fiscal year
    2015 by several thousand personnel and adding additional rotary wing
    units to SOF.
        Question. Do you believe additional enabling capabilities, beyond
    those mandated by the QDR, are required to support Special Operations
    Forces?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Services and SOCOM are
    increasing enabling capabilities as mandated by the QDR. The Force
    Sufficiency Assessment should inform our senior leaders in deciding
    whether more enabling capabilities are needed.
        Question. Do you believe the process for Special Operations Forces
    to request enabling capabilities from the Services, when required,
    should be formalized? If so, how?
        Answer. This process is formalized in the Global Force Management
    Board (GFMB) Force Allocation process. COCOMs submit their SOF and
    enabling capability rotational requirements annually through the GFMB.
    The COCOMs also submit their emergent SOF and enabling capability
    requirements as a request for forces through the force allocation
    process.
        Additionally, it is my understanding that SOCOM is incorporating
    SOF-enabler requirements in the Strategic Analysis products, which
    support senior-leader force development decisionmaking, and the
    Services are integrating SOF-enabler support into their Force
    Generation Models.

                          SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS

        Question. In recent years, Special Operations Forces have taken on
    an expanded role in a number of areas important to countering violent
    extremist organizations, including those related to information and
    military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant
    changes to SOCOM's title 10 missions to make them better reflect the
    activities Special Operations Forces are carrying out around the world.
        Do you believe any modifications to SOCOM's title 10 missions are
    appropriate? If so, what modifications would you suggest?
        Answer. I believe SOCOM's title 10 authorities are structured
    properly and that no modifications are required at this time.

                           INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION

        Question. The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces,
    general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and
    agencies has played a significant role in the success of
    counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years.
    However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.
        What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from
    interagency collaboration on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
    operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?
        Answer. Information sharing, leveraging the strengths of
    interagency partners, and collaboration during the planning and
    execution of operations has led to increasingly successful results.
    Organizationally, the innovation of forming purpose-built task forces
    that draw upon expertise from among the interagency community has
    provided a high level of agility and efficiency in the conduct of
    civil-military operations. The practice of flattened, agile
    communications, extensive senior leader involvement across the U.S.
    Government and allies, and leveraging information dominance provided by
    these subject matter experts and their systems are among our key
    lessons learned.
        Question. How do you believe these efforts can be improved?
        Answer. Preserving the lessons learned of the interagency task
    force in doctrinal publications, properly resourcing future task
    forces, continuing our efforts to raise the state of the art of
    intelligence and operations fusion, and applying the lessons learned in
    future challenges will be among the ways we continue to improve upon
    the many hard fought insights made during the last decade. Our ability
    to address future complex challenges through the application of faster,
    flatter interagency organizations will be key.
        Question. How can the lessons learned in recent years be captured
    in military doctrine and adopted as ``best practices'' for future
    contingency operations?
        Answer. Codifying our work is key. I believe it is critical that
    doctrinal publications such as Joint Pub 3-08, ``Interagency,
    Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization
    Coordination During Joint Operations'' capture the best practices of
    these horizontal interagency teams.
        Our centers of and joint excellence are charged with making changes
    institutional across the military, and they will do this by integrating
    doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development and
    education, personnel, and facilities across all levels of command, from
    Joint Force Commanders to component commands to the unit level.

      CAPABILITIES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

        Question. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review called for increased
    counter insurgency, counterterrorism, and security force assistance
    capabilities within the general purpose forces. These missions have
    traditionally been within the purview of Special Operations Forces.
        What actions, if any, do you believe need to be taken in order to
    allow special operations and general purpose forces to successfully
    share these missions in the future?
        Answer. I believe the 2010 QDR's strategic shift toward expanding
    general purpose forces' capabilities and capacity for these
    contingencies makes sense. The overall flexibility of our Armed Forces
    can be greatly improved by investing in key enablers within our
    conventional force, such as strengthening and expanding capabilities
    for security force assistance; increasing the availability of rotary-
    wing assets; expanding manned and unmanned aircraft systems for
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; improving counter-
    improvised explosive device capabilities; and enhancing linguistic,
    cultural, counterinsurgency, and stability operations competency and
    capacity.
        Question. Are there certain mission areas that should be reserved
    for Special Operations Forces only?
        Answer. Special Operations Forces are a unique component of our
    U.S. Armed Forces that are trained to conduct operations in areas under
    enemy control or in politically-sensitive environments, including
    counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, direct action, special
    reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, and counter-proliferation of
    weapons of mass destruction. In such environments, Special Operations
    Forces provide a unique and essential capability.

                                     LIBYA

        Question. Do you support the limited U.S. military mission in
    Libya?
        Answer. Yes. We are operating in Libya as a part of an
    international coalition enforcing United Nations Security Council
    Resolution (UNSCR) 1973. Our role is to support and assist our partners
    in preventing the mass killing of innocent civilians in Libya. The U.S.
    military provides unique capabilities to this effort such as electronic
    warfare; aerial refueling, intelligence, surveillance and
    reconnaissance support, and unmanned strike drones. In my view, we
    should maintain pressure until the goals agreed by NATO allies and
    partners are met.
        Question. Do you support broadening the military mission to include
    regime change?
        Answer. The goal of our military effort, and the mandate of the UN
    resolution, is very clear: we are protecting the Libyan people. I
    believe the regime's attacks on its own people will continue unless
    Colonel Qadhafi relinquishes power, and that such attacks will
    dramatically increase if pressure is removed. To this end, while to my
    knowledge forced regime change is not specified in the military
    mission, this mission complements other instruments of power and will
    add significant pressure on Colonel Qadhafi over time to step down.
        Question. Do you believe the United States should provide arms and
    training to the Libyan rebels?
        Answer. Since the purpose of our military action is grounded in
    UNSCR 1973, which specifies protection for the Libyan people in
    population centers like Benghazi from a massacre at the hands of
    Colonel Qadhafi's forces, any such assistance should be for that
    purpose. Because this is not a unique U.S. capability, and we are
    heavily engaged in other locations, I believe other countries should be
    the first to provide such assistance.

                                  ARAB SPRING

        Question. The Arab Spring has changed--and will likely continue to
    change--the political and military dynamics in the Middle East and
    North Africa for many years to come. These changes may require the
    United States to adjust our military-to-military and defense civilian
    relations engagements in this region.
        In your personal view, what adjustments--if any--should be made to
    U.S. military-to-military and defense civilian relations in the region?
        Answer. It is clear this is a moment of profound transformation and
    change in the Middle East and North Africa. People in this region seek
    greater individual rights, political reform, and economic
    opportunities. These calls for reform are gaining momentum across the
    region and are likely irreversible. Although we can expect instability
    as this region transforms, we have a unique opportunity to support
    these reform movements through our military relationships.
        Military-to-military relationships offer important policy influence
    opportunities with our partners. We have very strong relationships with
    our military partners in the region, which has helped us keep pace with
    the transitions and to be in position to offer advice and assistance. A
    good example of this is our relationship with the Egyptian Military and
    their Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). Throughout the
    political transition in Egypt, we have kept in close contact with Field
    Marshall Tantawi (Minister of Defense), Lieutenant General Enan (Chief
    of Defense Forces) and other members of the SCAF. These personal
    relationships have allowed us to engage on behalf of the U.S.
    Government and keep track of the events in Egypt.
        Although our military relationships throughout the region are
    strong, these reform movements give us an opportunity to review our
    security cooperation and assistance policies to ensure they support and
    complement these democratic transitions. We are working closely with
    OSD and our COCOMs to review our programs and policies and ensure they
    help our partners continue to develop military forces that respect the
    rule of law and human rights.

              STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS

        Question. Over the past decade, DOD has funded an increasing number
    of military information support operations and influence programs.
    While the Department does not have any separate budget documentation
    outlining its strategic communication activities, GAO reports that DOD
    ``spent hundreds of millions of dollars each year'' to support its
    information operations outreach activities. Many of these programs are
    in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but Military
    Information Support Teams (MISTs) from SOCOM are also deploying to U.S.
    embassies in countries of particular interest around the globe to
    bolster the efforts of the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for
    International Development. Further, the geographic COCOMs--at the
    theater and regional level--are moving into this operational space.
        What are your views on DOD's military information support
    operations and influence programs?
        Answer. DOD communication strategy and the unique capabilities of
    Military Information Support Operations play an important role in DOD
    communications efforts. I view Military Information Support Operations
    as traditional military activities that a global combatant commander
    uses to support Theater Security Cooperation and underpin the essential
    shaping operations required to support achievement of Theater Campaign
    Plan objectives, and (if needed) contingency operations in an area of
    hostilities. Influence programs and activities are one method by which
    DOD can support U.S. foreign policy objectives. In a world dominated by
    information purveyors and consumers, information-related capabilities
    have grown significantly in importance. Through Military Information
    Support Operations, we have a tremendous opportunity to shape the
    environment in support of a broad range of activities to include
    security cooperation and deterrence efforts. At the same time, it is
    critical that such activities be conducted in a synchronized manner
    with other U.S. Government departments.
        Question. What was your experience with these types of operations
    in your capacity as the Commander of NORTHCOM?
        Answer. NORTHCOM uses multiple communication methods to reach
    audiences outside the borders of the United States that are within our
    area of responsibility. We have used web sites, magazines, personal
    engagements, and blogs as tools, and have worked hard to improve
    internal DOD (and to some extent, external) understanding of the best
    ways, including the most appropriate messages, to communicate publicly
    about our partnership with Mexico, in particular. These operations are
    vital tools for enhancing military-to-military relationships and
    achieving our Theater Campaign Plan goals. Of course, these have to be
    well-integrated with other U.S. agencies, the Country Teams, and
    neighboring global COCOMs to ensure a whole-of-government effort.
        Question. In your view, are DOD's programs adequately integrated
    into overall U.S. foreign policy activities?
        Answer. Every effort is made to integrate DOD programs into U.S.
    foreign policy activities. A ``whole-of-government'' approach is
    critical in achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives. DOD's information
    and influence activities support DOD policy guidance and military
    objectives established by a theater's combatant commander. Activities
    conducted outside areas of hostility are often led by and always
    coordinated with our interagency partners. Activities conducted inside
    areas of hostility are similarly coordinated when they touch other
    activities of the U.S. Government or other activities of partner
    nations.
        Question. In 2005, al Qaeda's Ayman al-Zawahiri declared that ``We
    are in a battle, and more than half of it is taking place in the
    battlefield of the media.'' Last year, a non-partisan study highlighted
    the lack of a U.S. strategy to counter radical ideologies that foment
    violence.
        In your view, what are the appropriate roles of DOD, the
    Intelligence Community (IC), and the State Department in information
    operations to counter violent extremist ideology?
        Answer. Ultimately, it is our collective actions that send the
    strongest messages to populations across the globe regarding radical
    ideologies and extremist groups. However, DOD also works closely with
    the CIA, the Department of State (principally its Center for Strategic
    Counterterrorism Communications), and the National Counterterrorism
    Center, in an interagency effort to coordinate programs and deconflict
    activities aimed at delegitimizing radical extremist ideology and its
    messages. The respective roles of all government departments and
    agencies involved in this campaign are defined by their legal
    authorities, institutional functions, and operational capabilities.
    DOD's global presence and outreach opportunities enable it to engage
    with local populations and develop relationships with credible
    interlocutors to counter the messaging and discredit the appeal of
    violent extremist movements.
        Question. In your view, what is the most effective means to counter
    radical ideologies that foment violence?
        Answer. I believe that the most effective means to counter radical
    extremist rhetoric is through delegitimizing the leaders and ideology
    behind it to the point that these movements collapse under the weight
    of their own contradictory messages and actions. This is a war of ideas
    and ideals, and optimally moderating ideas are communicated by local
    voices. Our activity in this area must be persistent and long-term,
    focused foremost on clearly communicating our strategic narrative--our
    national interests, values, and policies--through both words and
    actions. An essential component of this effort is an adaptive
    communication framework that enables leaders at all levels to send
    coherent messages through credible messengers to key audiences using
    mediums that resonate at the right time. Our overarching objective is
    to truthfully and consistently demonstrate the efficacy of our policies
    and values, influencing our intended audiences to challenge and
    ultimately reject the sociopathic inducement to terrorism and violence
    that radical Islamist ideologies propagate.
        Question. Defense Secretary Gates launched the Minerva Program in
    2009 to develop deeper social, cultural, and behavioral expertise for
    policy and strategy purposes in the Middle East and the Far East. What
    do you believe this program contributes to broader DOD and U.S.
    Government efforts to counter violent extremist groups and their
    ideologies?
        Answer. Although I've not had an opportunity to be closely
    associated with the Minerva program, I fully endorse the imperative of
    understanding the perceptions, attitudes, ethnic identities, religious
    beliefs, and predispositions of the audiences we seek to reach. Indeed,
    in my role as the NORTHCOM Commander, I have found that our efforts
    with Mexico have benefitted in proportion to the degree to which we
    understand Mexican outlooks and sensitivities. The same applies in
    other parts of the world. Commanders and leaders at all levels need to
    appreciate not only how radical Islamist ideology and its messages
    resonate with its intended audiences, but how their own words and
    actions are processed through foreign cultural receptors. Our ability
    to effectively challenge the legitimacy of violent extremist groups
    depends on our appeal to the core interests and values of our target
    audiences, and that requires an in-depth understanding of their
    perspectives.

                      EAST AFRICA--AL QAEDA AND AL SHABAAB

        Question. Somalia is a failed state with a weak government unable
    to project either power or stability or to provide basic services to
    its people. Somalia is also a training and operations hub for al
    Shabaab and other violent extremists; pirates operating in the Indian
    Ocean and Arabian Peninsula; illicit traffickers of weapons, humans,
    and drugs; and remnants of the al Qaeda East Africa cell that was
    responsible for the destruction of our embassies in Dar es Salaam and
    Nairobi in August 1998.
        What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda and al
    Shabaab to the U.S. and Western interests in East Africa and to the
    U.S. Homeland?
        Answer. I anticipate al Shabaab is planning to conduct attacks
    against U.S. interests in East Africa. I also expect the May death of
    al Qaeda emir Osama bin Laden increased al Shabaab's planning against
    U.S. targets in East Africa, despite its primary focus on internal
    Somali issues, which include repelling a regionally-backed Transitional
    Federal Government (TFG) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
    offensive. I further expect al Qaeda associated al Shabaab foreign-
    fighters will continue planning attacks against U.S. and Western
    targets. I remain concerned that individuals who successfully travel to
    Somalia and receive training from al Shabaab could become further
    radicalized and return to the United States to conduct operations
    without al Shabaab's guidance
        Question. What is your understanding of DOD's role in countering
    the threat posed by al Qaeda in East Africa and al Shabaab?
        Answer. Al Qaeda has clearly set their sights on this region as
    potential safe haven from which to plan and to train for future attacks
    both within and outside the region. I am increasingly concerned about
    as well as about al Qaeda's growing influence on and near the Arabian
    peninsula, including al Shabab's growing ties to al Qaeda and its
    transregional ambitions.
        As we do elsewhere, we have provided--and congressional support
    will continue to provide--assistance to regional partner nation forces
    to counter threats from violent extremists in East Africa. DOD assists
    these efforts in concert with interagency partners, by focusing our
    approach on populations, security capacity, and basic human needs. Some
    of that support is also aimed directly at improving counter-terrorism
    capabilities. I cannot get into the specifics about operations we are
    supporting, but the work remains critical to our goal of disrupting and
    dismantling al Qaeda and their affiliates, and is having a significant
    impact on the terror network's leadership, planning and resourcing
    efforts.
        Question. What is your understanding of DOD's supporting role to
    other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government in this region?
        Answer. DOD supports other U.S. department and agency efforts in
    the region, such as the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for
    International Development through the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of
    Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti. The CJTF-HOA's mission in the East
    Africa region is to build partner nation capacity in order to promote
    regional stability, prevent conflict, and protect U.S. and coalition
    interests. These activities directly support each country team's
    objective of good partner nation governance by focusing on improving
    its security institutions' professionalism and commitment to human
    security. As part of the overall ``3-Ds'' whole-of-government
    approach--Diplomacy, Development, and Defense--the CJTF-HOA's role is a
    long-term commitment to regional stability through population-centric
    activities that strengthen both internal and international counter-
    violent extremist organization relationships.
        Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to DOD's
    current role in East Africa?
        Answer. I believe we must view Somalia from a regional East Africa
    perspective, not least because most of the U.S. Government's
    traditional security cooperation tools are restricted from being used
    in Somalia. I understand that DOD is reviewing the status of Joint Task
    Forces to determine if any should transition to more permanent Joint
    Interagency Task Forces. In addition, U.S. Africa Command is looking at
    how best to direct our military efforts in the region to work in
    concert with our interagency partners. The ultimate goal is a strategy
    under which security assistance, capacity building, cooperation with
    regional partners, and counterterrorism actions are fully integrated to
    provide security and stability in East Africa.

                  YEMEN AND AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

        Question. A number of senior U.S. officials have indicated the most
    significant threat to the U.S. Homeland currently emanates from Yemen.
        What is your assessment of the current U.S. strategy in Yemen and
    what is your understanding of the role of DOD within that strategy?
        Answer. The current strategy in Yemen, as outlined in the State
    Department's fiscal year 2011 Mission Strategic Plan, remains our best
    option for achieving a stable Yemen, one in which violent extremists
    cannot operate. The near-term goal of containing and degrading al Qaeda
    in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), while pursuing long-term initiatives
    to create a stable Yemen that can provide internal security, remain
    valid.
        DOD's role within this strategy is two-fold. First and foremost,
    U.S. Central Command works with interagency partners to build Yemen's
    counterterrorism (CT) capacity and enhance CT partnerships. Separately,
    select elements work with the Yemeni Government to disrupt near-term
    threats to the U.S. Homeland. This effort is intended to provide time
    and space for the Yemeni security forces to increase their
    effectiveness and eventually eliminate Yemen as an al Qaeda safe haven.
        Question. Given the ongoing political upheaval and splintering of
    the military in Yemen, what are your views on the United States
    continuing to provide security assistance--most significantly DOD
    section 1206 funding--to Yemeni counterterrorism forces?
        Answer. My understanding is that, given the growing AQAP presence
    in Yemen, its threat to the Homeland, the ongoing unrest that has
    already weakened the Yemeni Government and the economy and allowed AQAP
    to expand its influence, we continue to closely evaluate our security
    assistance programs in Yemen--particularly those provided under section
    1206. The Republic of Yemen Government currently remains a critical
    partner in the war against al Qaeda, and we remain particularly alert
    to the continued and growing threat to the Homeland from AQAP. I
    understand that we believe the likelihood of continued counterterrorism
    cooperation with the Yemeni Government will remain high during and
    after any future political transitions, but are prepared to reevaluate
    our partnership as necessary to address the changing military
    situation.

               DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERNARCOTICS ACTIVITIES

        Question. On an annual basis, DOD's counternarcotics (CN) program
    expends approximately $1.5 billion to support the Department's CN
    operations, building the capacity of certain foreign governments around
    the globe, and analyzing intelligence on CN-related matters. In a
    recent GAO report, GAO found that DOD ``does not have an effective
    performance measurement system to track the progress of its
    counternarcotics activities.'' This is the second such finding relating
    by GAO to DOD CN in the last decade.
        What is your assessment of the DOD CN program?
        Answer. Drug trafficking and associated organized crime are a
    multi-dimensional threat to the United States. In addition to the
    impact on our Nation's public health and economy, drug trafficking and
    other forms of transnational organized crime provide a funding source
    for terrorists and insurgents, undermine legitimate government
    institutions, and contribute to international instability.
        As the Commander of NORTHCOM, I have had the opportunity to work
    with the DOD's interagency and foreign partners to ensure that our
    counternarcotics programs achieved positive results that were aligned
    with the goals of the National Security Strategy and the National Drug
    Control Strategy. If confirmed, I look forward to applying my
    experience in North America to the global DOD counternarcotics program.
        Question. In your personal view, should DOD continue to play a role
    in stemming the flow of illegal narcotics?
        Answer. Based on my experience, confronting this issue requires
    that all agencies work closely together to confront the flow of illicit
    narcotics. This whole-of-government approach has been critically
    important to the progress we have made since the 1980s and should
    continue. While the effort should largely be led by law enforcement,
    DOD has unique capabilities to bring to bear to this important effort.
    Moreover, DOD's existing partnerships with countries throughout the
    world can help support U.S. Government efforts to confront this
    problem.
        Question. In your position as the Commander of NORTHCOM, what was
    your assessment of the DOD CN program as it related to Mexico and the
    Caribbean?
        Answer. The DOD CN program is critical to the success of NORTHCOM
    efforts in both Mexico and the Caribbean. Resourcing has improved over
    the last year, which has considerably improved our ability to assist
    our Mexican partners in their struggle against TCOs. Mexican security
    organizations are gradually transforming from a force principally
    focused on natural disasters into one able to integrate intelligence
    and operations in support of law enforcement operations that fully
    respect human rights and the rule of law. Counternarcotics funding is a
    key enabler of that effort. Recognizing that the threat posed by TCOs
    extends well beyond drugs, and that there are complex challenges
    associated with defeating them, future increased collaboration with
    mission partners and adequate resourcing are essential.
        Question. In your position as the Commander of NORTHCOM, were there
    any activities that you had hoped to be able to conduct using DOD CN
    funding, but were not able to do and that you, if confirmed, would
    recommend DOD seek the authority to conduct?
        Answer. Current authorities are appropriate and sufficient for
    successful execution of the NORTHCOM counternarcotics mission and the
    support we provide to our mission partners. Should I be confirmed, and
    should my view change based on the evolution of our relationship with
    regional partners or the perspectives I gain as Vice Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will work with the Committee to suggest
    potential improvements.

                    INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING CONTRIBUTIONS

        Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign
    Affairs on July 29, 2009, Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the
    United Nations, stated that the United States ``is willing to consider
    directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers,
    civilian police, and other civilian personnel--including more women I
    should note--to U.N. peacekeeping operations.''
        What is your view on whether the United States should contribute
    more military personnel to both staff positions and military observers
    in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?
        Answer. In my previous duty as director for Strategic Plans and
    Policy on the Joint Staff, I had the privilege of concurrently serving
    as senior member of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. Military Staff
    Committee. In that role, I gained a first-hand appreciation of the
    valuable contributions our members make in support of U.N. peacekeeping
    missions. Keeping in mind our continuing troop commitments in Iraq and
    Afghanistan, I believe the United States can and should consider
    assigning a modest number of additional personnel to peacekeeping
    missions. Even in small numbers, U.S. members make a special
    contribution to these activities by virtue of their experience,
    training, and special skills.
        Question. What are the advantages and disadvantages of contributing
    additional military personnel to U.N. operations?
        Answer. Some of the compelling benefits of providing U.S. personnel
    to these missions include:

             Delivering combat-tested expertise in logistics,
            intelligence, planning, and other key military functions where
            they are most needed;
             Providing our members with valuable experience in
            working shoulder to shoulder with international troops--a
            critical skill at the heart of our operations in Afghanistan,
            Iraq, and elsewhere; and
             Sending an unmistakable signal that the United States
            values U.N. peacekeeping operations--and because they are far
            more cost-effective than unilateral American interventions.

        Among potential disadvantages, I would cite our significant troop
    commitments to Iraq and Afghanistan, which take priority and continue
    to subject our force to stress. I would also point out that, in some
    cases, U.S. personnel on the ground are not what a U.N. mission most
    needs. Local sensitivities will sometimes lead us to contribute to
    peacekeeping in other, less visible ways.
        Question. If confirmed, would you support identifying methods
    through which the DOD personnel system could be more responsive to
    requests for personnel support from multilateral institutions like the
    United Nations?
        Answer. The personnel management systems of our armed services do
    not perfectly align with the needs of multinational organizations like
    the United Nations. If confirmed, I would explore alternate mechanisms
    to respond to the requests of these institutions within the demands of
    our ongoing operations elsewhere in the world. In particular, we should
    examine how our Reserve components, whose personnel have recently
    delivered specialized, hard-to-find skills to Iraq and Afghanistan with
    such distinction, can make a greater contribution in this area.

                       GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS INITIATIVE

        Question. The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) was
    established after the 2004 G8 Sea Island Summit to address growing gaps
    in international peace operations. In most cases, DOD plays a
    supporting role in the implementation of this train and equip program.
        What is your understanding and assessment of this program?
        Answer. GPOI is an important part of our government's strategy to
    build the capabilities of U.S. partners in peacekeeping operations.
    Through comparatively small investments in training and equipment, we
    can help those countries that want to contribute to peacekeeping
    operations. Over 80,000 military personnel have been trained under GPOI
    since 2005--a significant achievement. I also consider GPOI to be a
    strong example of the results we obtain when the Departments of State
    and Defense collaborate to promote our Nation's security.
        Question. Would you support additional DOD contributions--in the
    form of U.S. military trainers--to support this program?
        Answer. From my perspective, GPOI has been successful in building
    partnership capacity because of its flexibility. The program has given
    our combatant commanders the freedom to tailor assistance to the
    specific needs of individual partners. If confirmed, I would consider
    recommending provision of additional military trainers under the GPOI
    program subject to the demands of our other operations overseas.

                             COUNTER THREAT FINANCE

        Question. A number of officials in DOD and the IC have called for
    investing significantly more resources in identifying and tracking the
    flow of money associated with terrorist networks and illicit
    trafficking.
        What are your views on the role of DOD in counter threat finance
    activities?
        Answer. Terrorists, drug and weapons traffickers, and other
    adversaries rely heavily on legal and illegal funding sources to
    support their activities, which routinely work against U.S. interests.
    It is critical to engage all U.S. Government tools to track and halt
    the flow of money associated with these organizations. It is my
    understanding that DOD has capability to identify and disrupt our
    adversaries' finances while working with our interagency counterparts
    both in countering terrorism and illicit trafficking. Counter Threat
    Finance is a cost-effective measure because both licit and illicit
    finances are often exposed through Western banking and customs
    processes and are subsequently vulnerable to interdiction, sanctions,
    and other law enforcement action. DOD is not the U.S. Government lead
    agency in counter threat finance but, it plays a supportive role by
    working with other departments and agencies--and with partner nations--
    to counter our adversaries' ability to use global financial networks.
        Question. In your view, should DOD seek to expand its support to
    other U.S. Government departments and agencies conducting counter
    threat finance activities?
        Answer. Recent DOD efficiencies decisions directed the creation of
    a Joint Threat Finance Intelligence Office to consolidate the counter
    threat finance intelligence functions resident in the Department, and
    this new office is expected to be operational in fiscal year 2012 under
    the direction of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Although this effort
    does not seek to expand DOD's role in CTF, it is my opinion that it
    streamlines the DOD's efforts with the intent of improving support to
    other U.S. departments and agencies.
        Question. TCOs in Central America and Mexico are having a
    debilitating impact on the ability of our foreign partners to govern
    their nations and provide opportunities for their people.
        Do you think expanded Counter Threat Finance activities in this
    region would be beneficial? If so, what role--if any--should DOD play
    in those activities?
        Answer. Expanding the scope and scale of counter threat finance
    activities in the Central and North American regions would be
    beneficial, and DOD has a strong supporting role in those activities.
    NORTHCOM and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) are helping to shape and
    leverage unique capabilities in support of our foreign and domestic
    mission partners. Rather than attempting to conduct this mission in
    isolation, the correct approach is to understand the unique
    intelligence analysis capability that DOD can bring to this effort and
    then leverage it in support of other lead agencies, such as the
    Treasury Department. This will enable all stakeholders to achieve unity
    of effort in gaining leverage against potentially significant TCO
    vulnerability.

                           CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO

        Question. During a recent Senate Armed Services Committee hearing,
    the Commander of SOUTHCOM and you--in your capacity as the Commander of
    NORTHCOM--discussed the increasingly dangerous region along the
    northern and southern borders of Mexico and the devastating impact TCOs
    are having on the people and security of southern Mexico, Guatemala,
    Belize, Honduras, and El Salvador. The United States has increased its
    assistance in this region, but--to date--DOD has had only a small role.
        What are your views on the threats posed by TCOs in this region?
        Answer. The corrosive effects of TCO-fostered drug abuse are taking
    an increasingly severe toll on our economy and our human capital. The
    presence of TCO distribution networks in many of our cities increases
    the scale and complexity of gang activity in our urban areas. The
    pervasive activity and influence of TCOs among our friends and
    neighbors in North and Central America are directly and negatively
    impacting their prosperity and security--to include increased violence,
    decreased real economic activity, and increased drug abuse--which
    carries its own indirect impact on the United States. The TCOs are
    vicious in the extreme, better-armed than many police forces, very
    well-financed, diversified, and increasingly adaptable and
    sophisticated in their methods. Their criminality extends far beyond
    drugs to extortion, robbery, kidnapping, trafficking in firearms and
    persons, and many other illegal activities. Currently, TCOs are using
    military grade equipment and tactics, including sophisticated assault
    weapons, sniper rifles, grenades, aircraft, improvised armored
    vehicles, and even submarines to move illegal drugs.
        Question. What is your assessment of DOD's current activities in
    Mexico and Central America?
        Answer. I believe that DOD's current activities in Mexico and
    Central America are having a positive impact. The scope and depth of
    our military-to-military relationships with most regional nations,
    including Mexico, have reached unprecedented levels. While continuing
    to emphasize the importance of the sovereignty of regional nations,
    NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM have dramatically increased senior level
    interactions, subject matter expert exchanges, human rights training,
    mobile training teams, intelligence support, and exercises. Within the
    NORTHCOM area of responsibility, while Mexico deserves great credit for
    its own work, we are beginning to see the positive effects of our
    support, to include more Mexican emphasis on intelligence-operations
    fusion, greater tactical proficiency, jointness, and willingness to
    work with interagency partners. These nations' security forces are
    often out-gunned by the TCOs, but they are making progress on all
    fronts in their ability to confront the serious threat of TCOs.
        Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to DOD's
    current activities in this region?
        Answer. I believe we need to further tighten the already-close
    cooperation among U.S. Government agencies, to include a willingness to
    expose regional militaries--beginning with Mexico--to more of the
    lessons learned and capabilities we have used overseas in the past
    decade. In so doing, we need to continually reinforce the need to fully
    respect the sovereignty of our partner nations. We should also support
    in any way we can the parallel activities that fall under other
    departments' missions, such as strengthening justice institutions and
    building strong and resilient communities. Counter threat finance is an
    area we could better exploit to disrupt the funding streams fueling the
    TCOs. Finally, I have always believed we are better able to support
    observance of human rights by building close partnerships with our
    partners' forces. Our activities in supporting human rights training
    have been highly successful and I would support more engagements of
    this type as requested by partner nations, and more freedom to interact
    with nations that have troubled histories in human rights.
        Question. If DOD expands its activities in Mexico and Central
    America, where--in your view--can U.S. assistance have the greatest
    impact?
        Answer. The greatest DOD impact will be felt in increasing regional
    militaries' ability to conduct effective intelligence-driven
    operations--that are fully meshed with law enforcement and that respect
    human rights and democratic ideals--against the TCOs. This will involve
    assisting them in improving their ability to integrate intelligence and
    operations at the highest levels of proficiency while fully respecting
    their sovereignty in the process.
        Question. What is your assessment of the current situation along
    the border of the United States and Mexico?
        Answer. I believe we have made significant progress in securing our
    southwest border over the past couple years. As a nation, we have
    joined forces with our Mexican partners in dedicating increased
    manpower, technology, and infrastructure to counter the corrosive
    effects of TCOs, and we are seeing positive results. Seizures of
    contraband (illicit drugs, weapons, and bulk cash) have risen, illegal
    immigration attempts have decreased, and crime rates in southwest
    border communities have remained steady or dropped in recent years. In
    spite of this progress, I remain concerned about TCO-related violence
    in Mexico and the potential for spillover violence in the United
    States. If confirmed, my intent is to continue DOD's strong support of
    our law enforcement partners to enhance their efforts to make the
    southwest border even more secure.
        Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the
    Department's support to civilian agencies operating along the southern
    border?
        Answer. DOD support to civilian agencies operating along the U.S.
    southern border has a long history of collaboration and is on the rise
    as NORTHCOM and our Federal partners seek additional opportunities to
    partner. Through Joint Task Force North, NORTHCOM provides a wide array
    of training, assistance, and resources to support our partner agencies'
    efforts. NORTHCOM has made progress over the past year through closer
    collaboration at senior leadership levels (to include our first-ever
    staff talks with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) senior
    leadership), increased agency presence (including CBP, Immigration and
    Customs Enforcement, Drug Enforcement Administration and others) in
    NORTHCOM headquarters, increased agency participation in planning,
    exposure to CBP of tactics and techniques the DOD has accumulated
    overseas, and direct provision of support. If confirmed, I will
    emphasize the need to understand partner agency plans, priorities, and
    concerns to aid the DOD in identifying areas where we can provide
    additional support to these agencies within DOD's authorities and
    capabilities.

                          U.S. ASSISTANCE TO COLOMBIA

        Question. Since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided
    more than $7 billion to support Colombia's efforts to counter the
    threat of narcotics and various insurgent groups.
        In light of budget conditions, do you believe more significant
    reductions in U.S. security assistance to Colombia are advisable?
        Answer. A significant reduction in U.S. assistance to Colombia
    would be ill-advised at this critical juncture of Colombia's fight
    against TCOs and insurgent groups. Unquestionably, Colombia has made
    great strides, enabled by U.S. assistance, in its effort against TCOs
    and the illicit drug trades that feeds them. However, the Colombians
    have not defeated this threat. Any precipitous drop beyond the United
    States and Colombia coordinated and synchronized glide path reductions
    in our assistance is likely to inhibit achievement of a final
    negotiated settlement.

                                      IRAN

        Question. What options do you believe are available to the United
    States to counter Iran's growing influence in the Middle East region?
        Answer. Nearly every source of instability or other challenge in
    the Middle East--including support for terrorism, threats to the
    internal stability of regional nations, weapons proliferation, mischief
    in Iraq and Afghanistan, and overt and covert threats to Israel--may be
    traced in some manner back to Iran. We should encourage Iran to take
    its rightful place in the international community as a force for peace,
    stability, and prosperity in the Middle East. Until that occurs,
    however, every element of national and international power should be
    brought to bear to pressure Iran to change its behavior. Among other
    possible actions, these elements include:

             Diplomacy to maintain international resolve and
            overcome objections from both major states and non-aligned
            nations to taking firmer action, as well as continued attempts
            to engage Iran in responsible dialogue;
             Economic sanctions to place greater pressure on all
            sectors of Iran's government;
             Financial sanctions on individuals within Iran who
            support activity such as weapons proliferation, terrorist
            activity, and support for groups that target U.S. forces;
             Intelligence sharing to bring Iran's activities into
            sharper focus;
             Coherent information strategies to expose Iran's
            destabilizing behavior to the world at large;
             Law enforcement to curtail criminal activity on the
            part of Iranian surrogates and proxies;
             Close cooperation with regional militaries to ensure
            Iran is aware that aggression will be met by a capable and
            coherent response; and
             Continued presence of U.S. forces in the region to
            bolster our partners and deter Iran from taking irresponsible
            action.

        Question. Do you believe that a protracted deployment of U.S.
    troops in Afghanistan, beyond 2014, would increase, decrease or have no
    effect on Iran's influence in the region?
        Answer. I do not believe a protracted U.S. deployment in
    Afghanistan after 2014 would measurably change Iran's influence in the
    region. Because such a deployment would serve as an irritant to Iran,
    that nation would support any group in Afghanistan that resists U.S.
    presence, but this influence would not likely extend far beyond
    Afghanistan. Should Afghanistan achieve greater stability, it is
    possible that Iran's influence could slightly decrease. On the other
    hand, Iran could claim some sympathy within the region under the banner
    of U.S. occupation.
        Question. In your view, does Iran pose a near-term military threat
    to the United States by way of either its missile program or its
    nuclear program?
        Answer. Iran openly states its intent to use its missile program as
    a deterrent against the United States as well as Israel and other
    regional nations. Iranian research, development, and testing continues
    for short and medium-range missiles, along with its pursuit of an anti-
    ship ballistic missile capability. These systems pose a near-term
    threat to U.S. forces in the Middle East, including in the Arabian Gulf
    region, as well as a threat to our vital interests in the region.
        In the near- to mid-term, Iranian space program advancements
    include dual-use technologies that can be applied to development of
    long-range ballistic missiles that could carry a nuclear warhead. Iran
    also continues to pursue activities to improve its ability acquire
    nuclear weapons. Iran continues to enrich uranium at the Natanz
    facility in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions, and has
    announced its intent to build additional enrichment facilities. In
    June, Iran announced it would triple its production of 20 percent
    uranium enrichment at the previously covert Qom enrichment facility by
    the end of this summer. Additionally, the International Atomic Energy
    Agency continues to assert that Iran has not provided sufficient
    answers to the possible military dimensions of their nuclear program.
        Question. If you believe either of these programs pose a near-term
    threat, what in your view are the best ways to address such a threat?
        Answer. For the near term, we should deter Iran by continuing
    robust regional security cooperation efforts in the Middle East region,
    to include assistance and cooperation efforts with the Gulf States,
    Iraq, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other allies and partners. This would
    include continuing our commitment to air and ballistic missile
    defenses, shared early warning systems, counterterrorism, and counter-
    piracy programs, as well as programs to build partner capacity and
    protect critical infrastructure. Iran should have no doubt that we are
    committed to regional stability--we should thus maintain presence in
    the region to reassure our partners and persuade Iran that aggressive
    actions will come with a high cost.
        An Iran with a nuclear weapon is extremely destabilizing and could
    precipitate a nuclear arms race in the region. I support the current
    U.S. position--that we cannot accept Iranian acquisition of a nuclear
    weapon. We should maintain a robust international consensus using all
    elements of power, including robust sanctions and targeting the
    finances of those involved in Iran's nuclear program, to place pressure
    on Iran to reject its nuclear program and its other destabilizing
    activities.
        Question. Other than nuclear or missile programs what are your
    concerns, if any, about Iran?
        Answer. Malicious Iranian activities throughout the region include
    the use of proxies to extend Iranian influence into sovereign nations
    by providing increasingly sophisticated weapons, training, and finance.
    We are concerned Iran's activities will negatively impact stability and
    erode the regional economy. It is important to maintain and strengthen
    our relationships with our regional partners and allies by continuing
    to build their security capacity.
        Additionally, Iran supports Shia militant groups whose attacks on
    U.S. forces in Iraq are increasing in frequency, scope, and lethality.
    Asaib Ahl al-haqq's recent attack (15 June 2011) is an example of
    increased lethality based on Iranian technological partnerships.
        Meanwhile, Iranian mischief elsewhere in the region continues. They
    have supported the Taliban with weapons shipments to enable Taliban
    attacks against U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. Iranian
    support to Lebanese Hizballah and Syria directly counters U.S.
    interests regionally and threatens Israel. Finally, the Iranian
    Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy has the ability to threaten shipping in
    the Strait of Hormuz. In Iran's recent Noble Prophet 6 exercises, Iran
    publicly stated that their intent was to demonstrate the ability to
    attack U.S. naval forces with anti-ship missiles.

                           U.S. RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

        Question. U.S. relations with Russia, although previously strained
    over a variety of issues, have recently improved in some areas.
        If confirmed, do you believe that there are any opportunities to
    improve relations through military-to-military programs, or other
    actions that you would recommend be taken?
        Answer. We have already taken many positive steps to improve
    military-to-military relations between the United States and the
    Russian Federation, and we will continue to pursue improved relations
    in the future. Following the creation of the Military Cooperation
    Working Group in January 2010, we held several joint exercises,
    exchanges, and working group meetings to improve cooperation and
    transparency between our two countries. To illustrate, during 2010,
    NORTHCOM and NORAD held a joint field training exercise that
    demonstrated the ability of our forces to work together against
    airborne terrorist activities (Vigilant Eagle 2010). In my view, we
    have more work to do in order to make these types of exchanges more a
    matter of routine and less transactional. However, I look forward to
    continued exchanges and dialogue between the United States and Russia,
    which will help formulate and reinforce the trust and respect necessary
    to promote continued cooperation and increased transparency between our
    two nations.
        Question. In January of this year you indicated that you would like
    to open a dialogue with Russian military officials and that you would
    welcome the opportunity to host a Russian counterpart.
        If confirmed, would you still welcome dialogue with your Russian
    counterpart?
        Answer. Yes. As the NORTHCOM Commander, I have hosted several
    Russian delegations, and I strongly believe such exchanges can improve
    our communications and understanding and enhance our mutual security.
    Although there is no direct counterpart to the Vice Chairman's position
    on the Russian General Staff, I welcome engagement on behalf of the
    Chairman with the Chief of the General Staff and with other members of
    the General Staff.
        Question. What issues do you consider to be most important to
    address?
        Answer. We have made great strides over the last year on improving
    the formal lines of communication between the U.S. and Russian
    militaries. Our communications must remain candid and constructive to
    ensure continued cooperation in areas such as the Northern Distribution
    Network in support of the Afghanistan effort and to close gaps in
    mutual understanding in areas such as missile defense. We should
    continue to cooperate on combating terrorism and piracy, and there is
    room for discussions regarding cyber security. Perhaps most
    importantly, we should make greater strides in establishing routine
    contact between many different levels of our military forces, as such
    contacts build trust and confidence and grow future leaders who will be
    on a familiar basis with their partners. However, this will require
    greater willingness on the part of the Russian Federation Armed Forces
    to allow such communication.

                         INTEGRATION OF SPACE PROGRAMS

        Question. What is your view on the need to institute a more
    integrated approach to both the military and intelligence sides of the
    space community?
        Answer. I agree with the need to better integrate military and
    intelligence space capabilities. Members of both communities
    participate in a number of joint forums and I believe that progress is
    being made. We are jointly developing programs, and at senior levels
    have very integral relationships. However, when the needs of either
    side diverge to the extent that solutions impose impractical cost on
    the government, consideration should be given to potential independent,
    but complimentary solutions.

                            SPACE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

        Question. In many instances the military and intelligence space
    programs have experienced technical, budget, and schedule difficulties.
    In some instances these difficulties can be traced to problems with
    establishing realistic, clear, requirements and then maintaining
    control over the integrity of the requirements once established. If
    confirmed as chairman of the JROC you will be involved in determining
    these requirements.
        How in your view can or should the space systems requirements
    process be improved?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that space system requirements
    process improvements are considered within the context of the Joint
    Capability Integration and Development Systems (JCIDS) process review
    in collaboration with the Director of National Intelligence.
        Question. In general, space programs take many years to move from
    conception to launch. The result is that the technology in the
    satellites is significantly outdated by the time the satellites are
    launched and operational, which in turn, can lead to a decision to
    terminate a program early, and look to a newer technology. This vicious
    cycle results in significantly increased costs for space systems as
    sunk costs are never fully amortized.
        How in your view can this cycle be addressed?
        Answer. I believe shorter cycle times from concept to launch that
    are based on less complex system requirements can provide more frequent
    opportunities to infuse technology as it is determined to be mature
    enough for operational use.

                               SPACE COOPERATION

        Question. Do you support arms control limitations on space
    capabilities?
        Answer. I support the principles outlined in the 2010 National
    Space Policy, which states that the United States will pursue bilateral
    and multilateral transparency and confidence-building measures to
    encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, space. We
    should only consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures
    if they are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the national
    security of the United States and its allies.
        Question. Would you support the United States signing the so-called
    European Union Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities?
        Answer. I understand that the Department is currently evaluating
    the European Union's proposed international Code of Conduct for Outer
    Space as a pragmatic first set of guidelines for safe activities in
    space. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing this evaluation and
    considering appropriate steps to establish rules of the road for space
    operations.

                         OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE

        Question. Do you support the concept of operationally responsive
    small satellites and what do you see as the most promising
    opportunities for small satellites?
        Answer. The concept of providing operationally responsive space
    capabilities to address emergent warfighter needs when existing
    capabilities cannot is sound. I understand that the recent launch of
    the first Operationally Responsive Space satellite is a good first step
    along the road to low cost, responsive space capabilities.
        Question. Do you believe that smaller less complicated less
    expensive satellites can play a role in providing resiliency or
    redundancy for space systems?
        Answer. I believe smaller, simpler, lower cost satellites can
    certainly play a role in providing resiliency for space systems. The
    specific role will depend on the priority of the mission, the state of
    technology, and the cost. The potential benefits include better
    availability of capability for the warfighter, and a more stable
    industrial base.

                              PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE

        Question. DOD is currently working on technologies that if
    successful could lead to the decision to develop and deploy
    conventional, non-nuclear, prompt global strike capability.
        Do you believe that a prompt global strike capability should be
    developed and deployed?
        Answer. I believe DOD should continue to study and test
    technologies relevant to Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS)
    capabilities, with an eye towards future acquisition. Affordable CPGS
    weapons would provide the Nation with a unique capability to strike
    time-sensitive targets without using nuclear weapons, so that distant,
    heretofore inaccessible locations will no longer provide sanctuary to
    adversaries.
        Question. If your answer to the previous question is yes, what is
    your vision of the capability that should be developed for prompt
    global strike and the types of targets that would underpin the need to
    develop the capability?
        Answer. CPGS systems could be useful in scenarios involving
    regional adversaries considering an imminent attack using weapons of
    mass destruction or against high-priority non-state adversaries. More
    broadly, CPGS may be the only system available in situations where a
    fleeting, serious threat was located in a region not readily accessible
    by other means. Fielding this capability strengthens deterrence by
    providing a credible means of responding to potential threats without
    resorting to the use of nuclear weapons.

                                NUCLEAR WEAPONS

        Question. If confirmed, you would become a member of the Nuclear
    Weapons Council, and work closely with the National Nuclear Security
    Administration and its Stockpile Stewardship Program.
        What, in your view, are the longer-term Stockpile Stewardship
    Program goals and what are the key elements that should be addressed
    from a DOD perspective?
        Answer. Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program with
    the aim of creating the computational capabilities and experimental
    tools needed to allow for the continued certification of the nuclear
    weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable without the need for
    nuclear weapons testing. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy are
    statutorily required to certify annually to Congress the continued
    safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
        It is my understanding that stockpile stewardship is effective;
    today's stockpile has been certified and does not require further
    nuclear testing. But the stockpile is aging. I understand that there
    are challenges in identifying and remedying the effects of aging on the
    stockpile. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the Department
    of Energy to maintain the critical skills, capabilities, and
    infrastructure needed to ensure the safety, reliability, and security
    of the stockpile, within a constrained budget environment.
        Question. In your view is the Stockpile Stewardship Program
    providing the tools to ensure the safety, reliability, and security of
    the nuclear weapons stockpile without testing and if not what tools are
    needed?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to study options for
    ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of nuclear warheads on a
    case-by-case basis, consistent with the congressionally-mandated
    Stockpile Management Program. It is important that the full range of
    life extension programs be considered to include: refurbishment of
    existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads,
    and replacement of nuclear components.
        Question. Do you believe the administration's 1251 report sets
    forth an appropriate road map for the modernization of the nuclear
    weapons complex and the strategic delivery systems?
        Answer. I do believe the administration's 1251 report details the
    right roadmap for ensuring the future safety, security, and reliability
    of the nuclear stockpile and associated delivery platforms as well as
    for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex. The 1251 report details a
    strong commitment to the nuclear mission and is an important element of
    assurance that the U.S. deterrent remains strong.
        Question. Do you agree that the full funding of the President's
    plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to
    as the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority?
        Answer. I agree that the full funding of the 1251 report is a
    critical national security priority. As stated by Secretary Gates and
    Secretary Chu in their joint 1251 transmittal letter to Chairman Levin,
    `` . . . an increase of $4.1 billion in the Department of Energy's
    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) budget highlights the
    administration's strong commitment to the long-term effort to maintain
    the safety, security, and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent and
    the NNSA infrastructure that supports it. We look forward to continuing
    the modernization and sustainment of our nuclear weapons delivery
    systems, stockpile, and infrastructure.''
        Question. Prior to completing this modernization effort do you
    believe it would be prudent to consider reductions below New START
    Treaty limits for either the deployed or nondeployed stockpile of
    nuclear weapons?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the 2010 NPR Report stated that
    we would pursue additional reductions in strategic and non-strategic
    nuclear weapons with Russia, and a key aspect of implementing the 2010
    NPR, as with previous such reviews, is conducting follow-on analysis.
    In determining U.S. objectives in future negotiations with Russia, our
    subsequent analysis will consider multiple factors in the effort to
    secure an outcome that best advances U.S. objectives for reductions in
    the numbers of deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons, both
    strategic and non-strategic, in a manner that supports the President's
    commitment to strengthen deterrence of potential regional adversaries,
    strategic stability with Russia and China, and assurance of our allies
    and partners. I believe that the status of the modernization effort
    will play a role in these deliberations.
        Finally, the Senate noted in its resolution of advice and consent
    to ratification of the New START Treaty, and certified by the
    administration, that we must seek to initiate negotiations with Russia
    on a new arms control agreement by February 2012.
        If confirmed, as we complete follow-on analysis required by the
    NPR, I will support the Department's continuing assessment of the
    proper force size and capabilities required for an effective nuclear
    deterrent.
        Question. Without the construction of the Chemical and Metallurgy
    Research Replacement (CMRR) Facility at Los Alamos and the Uranium
    Production Facility (UPF) at Y-12 and the other elements associated
    with the robust plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, do
    you believe reductions to the strategic hedge would be prudent?
        Answer. Without CMRR, UPF, and other elements to modernize the
    nuclear weapons complex, the United States will not have sufficient
    infrastructure or capability to sustain the nuclear stockpile, nor will
    it have the capability to address a critical failure in a weapon type.
    Without the ability to correct deficiencies and failures, no matter how
    remote, careful analysis and the potential acceptance of risk would be
    required to enable or accept reductions in the strategic hedge.
        Without construction of CMRR, the Nuclear Weapons Enterprise will
    not have essential tools to manufacture or assess the special nuclear
    materials required to produce or rebuild pits and other components.
    Aging facilities, long past their useful life and already partially
    condemned, cannot be sustained to meet ongoing requirements for the
    U.S. nuclear stockpile. CMRR is an important key to sustaining the U.S.
    nuclear stockpile and enabling reductions to the strategic hedge.
        UPF at Y-12 is also key to the ability of NNSA and the National
    Security Laboratories to sustain the existing U.S. nuclear stockpile
    and provide capability to rebuild secondaries as long as a nuclear
    stockpile is required. As at Los Alamos, aging facilities, long past
    their useful life and already partially condemned, cannot be sustained
    to meet ongoing requirements for the U.S. nuclear stockpile. UPF is
    essential to sustaining the U.S. nuclear stockpile and enabling
    reductions to the strategic hedge.

                     NEW START TREATY AND FUTURE REDUCTIONS

        Question. Earlier this year the New START treaty entered into
    force. Under the terms of the treaty both sides have 7 years to come
    into compliance with the treaty.
        Do you believe that there is any opportunity to come into
    compliance in less than 7 years and what would be the conditions under
    which such compliance could be achieved?
        Answer. The treaty requires both parties to ensure their strategic
    offensive forces are at levels within the treaty's three central limits
    7 years after entry into force, which will occur on February 5, 2018.
    DOD is undertaking efforts to ensure we will comply with our treaty
    obligations. For instance, to date, all B-1B bombers have been
    converted to conventional use and all Minuteman II Intercontinental
    Ballistic Missile (ICBM) launchers have been eliminated or converted
    into Minuteman III ICBM launchers, thereby removing these formerly
    accountable items from being counted under the treaty's central limits.
        Question. Do you believe that reductions in the total number of
    warheads, both Reserve and operationally deployed, is feasible prior to
    the expiration of the New START treaty and, if so, under what
    conditions?
        Answer. The Article II central limit of 1,550 warheads applies only
    to warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear
    warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers. Seven years after entry
    into force (February 5, 2018), the New START treaty requires both State
    Parties to ensure total numbers of deployed strategic warheads are
    within this central limit. The DOD is undertaking efforts to ensure the
    United States will comply with our treaty obligations.
        The New START treaty does not address non-deployed strategic
    nuclear warheads, e.g., nuclear warheads in the U.S. stockpile. Thus,
    any reductions in these weapons would be subject to a different
    analytical process that would consider stockpile reliability,
    modernization of our nuclear infrastructure, and other factors.

                          NUCLEAR TRIAD MODERNIZATION

        Question. Under the NPR, the administration has committed to begin
    modernization of each leg of the nuclear triad including development of
    new nuclear cruise missiles and extending the life of nuclear weapons.
    This process will continue over the next 30 years and longer, and will
    be very expensive.
        If confirmed, would you agree to review the requirements and cost
    of these initiatives, identify any opportunities for cost savings, and
    report back to the committee on a periodic basis if you identify such
    opportunities?
        Answer. Yes, this will fall under my responsibilities, if
    confirmed, as Vice Chairman, and I would be pleased to report any
    opportunities for cost savings to the committee.

                                 NUCLEAR POLICY

        Question. Do you support President Obama's vision for a world
    without nuclear weapons?
        Answer. I share the President's vision to ``seek the peace and
    security of a world without nuclear weapons.'' I also share the
    President's commitment to a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
    deterrent capability as long as nuclear weapons exist.
        Question. Do you believe this goal is a viable near- and/or long-
    term strategic strategy for the United States?
        Answer. The President recognized, and I agree, that such an
    ambitious goal could not be reached quickly and perhaps, as he said,
    not in his lifetime. He also pledged that as long as nuclear weapons
    exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective
    arsenal, both to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies
    and other security partners that they can count on America's security
    commitments.
        A commitment to a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent
    means sustaining our nuclear deterrent through life extension programs
    for warheads and modernization of delivery systems. I believe that
    providing necessary resources for nuclear modernization should be a
    national strategic priority.
        When considered in total, I believe this is a viable long-term
    strategy.
        Question. In a recent speech at the Carnegie Endowment the
    President's National Security Advisor stated that the administration is
    currently ``making preparations for the next round of nuclear
    reductions'' and that DOD will ``review our strategic requirements and
    develop options for further reductions in our current nuclear
    stockpile.'' He continued by stating that in meeting these objectives,
    the White House will direct DOD to consider ``potential changes in
    targeting requirements and alert postures.''
        Do you believe the United States should pursue further reductions?
    Please explain why or why not.
        Answer. I believe the United States should carefully consider
    future reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons--deployed and
    nondeployed, strategic and non-strategic. Ideally, U.S. reductions
    would be associated with reductions in Russian nuclear forces, and they
    should continue to support U.S. commitments to stability, deterrence,
    and assurance. Any reductions in these weapons should consider non-
    Russian threats, stockpile reliability and other factors in addition to
    the status of any planned or ongoing negotiations with Russia.
        Question. Do you believe it would be prudent for the United States
    to pursue unilateral nuclear reductions? Please explain why or why not.
        Answer. I believe the size and composition of Russia's nuclear
    forces will remain a significant factor in determining how much and how
    fast the United States is prepared to reduce its forces; therefore, we
    should place importance on Russia joining us as we move to lower
    levels.
        Any future reductions must continue to strengthen deterrence of
    potential regional adversaries, strategic stability vis-a-vis Russia
    and China, and assurance of our allies and partners.
        Question. Do you believe changes to well-established nuclear
    targeting requirements could negatively impact our ability to assure
    our allies, to discourage other countries from seeking strategic
    equivalence with the United States in nuclear weapons, and hedge
    against future threats and uncertainties?
        Answer. I believe the United States is committed to maintaining a
    credible nuclear deterrent and reinforcing regional security
    architectures and that we will continue to reassure our allies and
    partners worldwide of our security commitments to them. I have observed
    that no significant changes to such DOD policies occur without thorough
    analysis and review. National Security Advisor Donilon has stated the
    next round of nuclear reductions will be accompanied by such a review
    to include targeting policy. If confirmed, I look forward to
    participating in this review.

                              FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES

        Question. During the Cold War, DOD pursued three key technologies
    to offset the numerical superiority of Soviet conventional forces:
    precision guided munitions, stealth technology, and satellite-based
    navigation. These three technologies have given U.S. forces
    unparalleled superiority until now. Our technology edge, however, in
    these areas is beginning to erode.
        What do you think are key technologies that DOD should be pursing
    in order to maintain a technological edge?
        Answer. The Department recently published seven strategic science
    and technology priorities. I believe focusing efforts in these areas
    are key to maintaining a technological edge. These priorities include:

             Data to Decisions to reduce cycle time and manpower
            needs;
             Engineering Resilient Systems for agile manufacturing
            of trusted and assured systems;
             Cyber Science and technology for effective cyber
            capabilities;
             Electronic Warfare and Protection to protect across
            the electro-magnetic spectrum;
             Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction;
             Autonomy for reliable and safe autonomous systems; and
             Human Systems to enhance human machine interfaces.

                UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

        Question. Do you support U.S. accession to the United Nations
    Convention on the Law of the Sea?
        Answer. Yes, I strongly support U.S. accession to the United
    Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as the best possible means for
    maximizing the rights of our Armed Forces to move freely through and
    over the world's oceans. I believe that joining the Convention will
    strengthen our military's ability to conduct operations.
        Question. How would you answer the critics of the Convention who
    assert that accession is not in the national security interests of the
    United States?
        Answer. Accession to the Convention would more permanently secure
    the global mobility rights that are of vital importance to ongoing and
    future national security operations and humanitarian assistance
    missions. From the right of unimpeded transit passage through straits
    used for international navigation, to reaffirming the sovereign
    immunity of our warships, to providing a framework for countering
    excessive claims of other states, to preserving the right to conduct
    military activities in exclusive economic zones, the Convention
    provides the stable and predictable legal regime we need to conduct our
    operations today and in the future. The Convention codifies fundamental
    benefits important to our operating forces as they train and fight,
    supports the operational maneuver space for combat and other operations
    of our warships and aircraft, and enhances our own maritime interests
    in our territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and
    continental shelf. Further, amendments made to the Convention in the
    1990s satisfied many of the concerns that opponents have expressed.
        Among the vital rights provided by the Convention that accession
    would place on a more secure footing are:

             Innocent Passage through territorial seas;
             Archipelagic sea lanes passage through island nations;
             Transit passage through, under and over international
            straits;
             Warship right of approach and visit; and
             Laying and maintaining of submarine cables.

        For example, in the ongoing tensions over rights in the South China
    Sea, the United States is in a weaker position in both bilateral and
    multilateral discussion by not having ratified the treaty. As another
    example, absent joining the Convention, we will lose the opportunity to
    influence key international decisions that will be made in the coming
    years regarding Arctic resource claims.
        Accession would eliminate the need for the United States to assert
    that vital portions of the Convention addressing traditional uses of
    the oceans are reflective of customary international law. As the Law of
    the Sea continues to be developed, there is a need to lock in the
    Convention's provisions as a matter of treaty law while we still can as
    a bulwark against customary law drifting in a negative direction.
    Accession would give the United States a seat at the table as the
    world's nations deliberate the future direction of the Law of the Sea.
        The Convention provides the only internationally-accepted process
    for nations to establish legal title to a continental shelf beyond 200
    nautical miles from their coasts. Only by submitting its claim of an
    extended continental shelf to the Commission set up under the
    Convention can the U.S. guarantee international acceptance of its claim
    to an extended continental shelf off its coasts, including sovereign
    rights to potentially vast energy resources in the Arctic.
        Finally, joining the Convention will enable us to shape the future
    evolution of the Law of the Sea Treaty by placing U.S. nominees in key
    positions within important bodies, including those currently
    interpreting the Convention.

                             TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

        Question. The Constitution, laws, and treaty obligations of the
    United States prohibit the torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading
    treatment or punishment of persons held in U.S. custody.
        If confirmed, will you take steps to ensure that all relevant DOD
    directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures applicable
    to U.S. forces fully comply with the requirements of section 1403 of
    the Detainee Treatment Act and with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
    Conventions?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
    specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
    22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, DOD
    Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
        Answer. Yes.

                           BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

        Question. In September 2009, President Obama announced that he had
    accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff to pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to
    missile defense in Europe. This approach is intended to defend all of
    Europe against existing and emerging threats from Iranian missiles,
    starting this year and increasing in capability with each of its four
    phases. Phase 4 of the European PAA is intended to provide a capability
    to defend against long-range missiles that could reach the United
    States, thus augmenting the existing homeland missile defense
    capability.
        Do you support the Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense in
    Europe?
        Answer. I support the President's policy on European Phased
    Adaptive Approach and, if confirmed, I will ensure DOD supports the
    program's full implementation.
        Question. In February 2010, DOD issued its report on the first-ever
    comprehensive review of U.S. ballistic missile defense policy and
    strategy, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), as required by
    Congress. The BMDR established a number of policy priorities, including
    establishing defense against near-term regional missile threats as a
    top priority of missile defense plans, programs, and capabilities. It
    also stated the policy of sustaining and enhancing the ability of the
    Ground-based Midcourse Defense system to defend the Homeland against
    attack by a small number of long-range missiles by countries such as
    North Korea and Iran, and of hedging against future uncertainties.
        Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth
    in the BMDR?
        Answer. I support the policies, strategies, and priorities as set
    forth in the BMDR. If confirmed, I will implement the policy priorities
    of the BMDR, including sustaining and enhancing defense of the
    Homeland, while increasing our capability against growing regional
    threats.
        Question. As the Commander of NORTHCOM, you are the combatant
    commander responsible for the operation of the Ground-based Midcourse
    Defense (GMD) system to defend the homeland against potential limited
    missile attacks from nations like North Korea and Iran. The most recent
    GMD flight test, in December 2010, failed, and the Missile Defense
    Agency is working to fully understand and correct the problem that
    caused that flight test failure.
        Do you agree that it is essential to correct the problem that
    caused the December 2010 flight test failure, and to verify the success
    of that correction through extensive testing, including flight testing,
    before continuing production and delivery of additional Exo-atmospheric
    Kill Vehicles (EKV) for the GMD system?
        Answer. Verifying and correcting the problems with the EKVs prior
    to continuing production is prudent and supports the administration's
    policy to ``fly before you buy'' in order to improve reliability,
    confidence, and cost control of U.S. missile defense systems.
        Question. Do you support the continued modernization and
    sustainment of the GMD system?
        Answer. Yes. The United States is currently protected against the
    threat of limited ICBM attack from states like North Korea and Iran. It
    is important that we maintain this advantage by continuing to improve
    the GMD system and ensuring we have adequate capacity to counter
    limited threats as they evolve.
        Question. The United States and NATO are seeking options to
    cooperate with Russia on missile defense. President Obama has announced
    that such cooperation would not limit U.S. or NATO missile defense
    capabilities.
        Do you agree that such cooperation could enhance the security of
    the United States, NATO, and Russia against common missile threats from
    nations such as Iran?
        Answer. Yes, cooperation with Russia would strengthen the
    effectiveness of U.S. and NATO missile defenses, as well as those of
    the Russian Federation. In this particular case, effective ballistic
    missile defenses devalue Iran's ballistic missile arsenal by reducing
    its confidence that an attack would be successful.
        Question. What do you believe would be the security benefits of
    such missile defense cooperation, and what types of cooperation do you
    believe would be beneficial?
        Answer. Cooperation could offer tangible benefits to the United
    States, Europe, and Russia in the form of stronger protection against
    missile threats and a greater insight into our respective missile
    defense plans, which could strengthen strategic stability. As President
    Obama stated, this cooperation can happen ``even as we have made clear
    that the system we intend to pursue with Russia will not be a joint
    system, and it will not in any way limit United States' or NATO's
    missile defense capabilities.'' Pursuing a broad agenda with Russia
    focused on shared early warning of missile launches, technical
    cooperation, operational cooperation and planning, and joint exercise
    would be beneficial cooperative efforts.
        Question. The Vice Chairman of the JCS is a member of the Missile
    Defense Executive Board, and the Chairman of the JROC. This gives the
    Vice Chairman a unique perspective on the oversight and management of
    the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), including its requirements
    component.
        Are there additional steps that you believe would make the BMDS
    more responsive to the operational needs of the combatant commanders,
    and are there additional steps that you believe would improve the
    requirements process for missile defense?
        Answer. I believe that we must continue to involve the combatant
    commanders in the acquisition process to ensure that their operational
    needs are considered as we develop and field systems to support the
    joint warfighter. To that end, we continually review these processes to
    ensure that we are doing the best job that we can to support the
    warfighter. While recognizing that BMD systems developed by the Missile
    Defense Agency are not subject to the JROC, the unique position of the
    Vice Chairman as a member of both the Missile Defense Executive Board
    and JROC provides the oversight to ensure that we are integrating all
    of the development and requirements of missile defense.

                FUTURE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

        Question. In your view, what existing or new missions should be the
    focus of NATO's strategic efforts over the next 5 years?
        Answer. The focus of NATO's strategic efforts should be to
    collectively secure our Nations through collective defense, crisis
    management and cooperative security. NATO must complete its current
    missions in Afghanistan, Libya, the Mediterranean, off the Horn of
    Africa, and in the Balkans. We must also maintain the flexibility to
    respond to emergent threats such as ballistic missiles, nuclear
    proliferation, terrorism, and cyber attacks.
        Question. In your view, how should NATO proceed on the issue of
    further enlargement of the alliance over the next 5 years?
        Answer. This is clearly a decision reserved for NATO Heads of State
    and Government. However, in accordance with Article 10 of the NATO
    treaty, I believe that any Transatlantic State that is in a position to
    further the principles of the NATO treaty and that is willing and able
    to contribute to the security of the NATO Atlantic area commensurate
    with its capacity should be favorably considered for NATO membership.
        Question. At a NATO Defense Ministers meeting in June, then-
    Secretary of Defense Gates warned that NATO was at risk of losing U.S.
    financial support for an alliance ``on behalf of nations that are
    apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the
    necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own
    defense.'' He criticized the ``significant shortcomings in NATO--in
    military capabilities, and in political will.'' He worried that NATO
    would turn into a ``two-tiered alliance'' consisting of ``those willing
    and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of alliance commitments,
    and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership.''
        Do you share Secretary Gates' concerns regarding NATO capabilities?
    Why or why not?
        Answer. Yes, I do share former Secretary Gate's concerns. Most
    allies (due to limited resources made available to defense ministries)
    have been forced to make critical choices between spending money on
    transforming their militaries or on contributing to alliance
    operations.
        Many allies have been able to strike a delicate balance between
    these two competing demands. However, it has resulted in an overall
    loss of effectiveness, which initially was minor but has now been
    compounded by time.
        The current economic climate has added to this as all allies
    envisage budget reductions. This lack of resources is the biggest
    threat to the alliance's ability to accomplish its core missions.
        Question. What steps, if any, could or should NATO take, in your
    view, to reduce tensions with Russia?
        Answer. I believe that NATO should continue to engage actively and
    positively with Russia on issues of mutual interest through the NATO
    Russia Council. This Council serves as a valuable forum not only to
    discuss issues on which we agree, but also to discuss issues on which
    we disagree. This engagement has facilitated NATO-Russia cooperation in
    numerous areas such as counter-piracy, combating-terrorism, non-
    proliferation, search and rescue at sea, and disaster response. The
    continuation of this type of cooperation is important not only from a
    military perspective, but it remains an essential means by which to
    enhance transparency and therefore avoid or reduce tensions.
        Question. What is your view of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
    (CTBT)? If confirmed, would you advocate ratification of the treaty?
        Answer. The CTBT is an important tool that will help counter
    nuclear proliferation. An in-force CTBT would limit the development of
    more advanced and destructive nuclear weapons and inhibit the ability
    of non-nuclear weapons states from developing their own programs. I
    understand that it has been assessed that CTBT would have no impact on
    U.S. military confidence in its nuclear stockpile. If confirmed, I
    would support ratification of the CTBT with adequate safeguards
    regarding stockpile stewardship and verification.

                            CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

        Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
    appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
    briefings, and other communications of information.
        Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
    this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
    even if those views differ from the administration in power?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
    committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
    information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
    with respect to your responsibilities as the Vice Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
    other communications of information are provided to this committee and
    its staff and other appropriate committees?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
    such documents?
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

               Question Submitted by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman

                                BORDER SECURITY

        1. Senator Lieberman. Admiral Winnefeld, Joint Task Force (JTF)-
    North is the sole Department of Defense (DOD) organization tasked to
    support the Nation's Federal law enforcement agencies in the
    identification and interdiction of suspected transnational threats
    within and along the approaches to the Continental United States
    (CONUS). While the potential threats vary, they can include narco-
    trafficking, smuggling, weapons of mass destruction, and other threats
    to our security. The Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) for Force
    Protection and Intelligence Analysis program was created in order to
    research, exploit, analyze, and disseminate unclassified information on
    cartels and transnational criminal organizations along the U.S./Mexico
    border. What is your assessment of the OSINT program administered by
    JTF-North and whether it provides value to our interagency border
    security and counter-narcotics efforts?
        Admiral Winnefeld. As the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
    Commander, I have seen the important mission contributions that OSINT
    provides, including those to NORTHCOM's JTF-North component. I
    understand that funding for the continuation of the OSINT for Force
    Protection and Analysis program is currently under review, but assure
    you that the critical merits of this program will be reviewed before a
    final decision is made. I would defer to Department of Homeland
    Security for an assessment of the value of OSINT to its border security
    mission and to the Drug Enforcement Administration for the impact of
    OSINT on counter-narcotics trafficking.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

                               HEALTH CARE COSTS

        2. Senator McCain. Admiral Winnefeld, in a modest attempt to
    control DOD's health care costs, former Secretary Gates sought to apply
    a medical inflation factor to TRICARE Prime enrollment fees for
    working-age retirees beginning in fiscal year 2013. Unfortunately, our
    committee balked at that idea, and reported a bill that would
    permanently tie DOD's hands to annual increases to the annual increase
    in retired pay, which has been minimal.
        TRICARE fees haven't changed since they were established in 1995.
    At that time, according to DOD, working age retirees paid about 27
    percent of their total costs when using civilian care. Today, out of
    pocket expenses for working age retirees represent less than 9 percent
    of the total cost of the family's health care costs. Some argue that
    health care benefits to retirees have been eroded over time. Do you
    agree?
        Admiral Winnefeld. DOD provides generous health benefits to
    retirees while maintaining TRICARE enrollment fees that are still well
    below the inflation-adjusted out-of-pocket costs set in 1995. However,
    rising medical costs add pressure to the Department's budget, which
    make modest attempts to control DOD's health care costs applied fairly
    to veterans necessary.
        The health benefits we provide to retirees are a significant part
    of the military quality of life. This commitment to caring for our men
    and women in uniform also provides the opportunity to recruit and
    retain the highest caliber personnel the Nation has to offer. I intend
    to continue our efforts to identify effective ways to improve the
    quality and cost-effectiveness of the Military Health System.

        3. Senator McCain. Admiral Winnefeld, do you support the
    administration's modest goal of linking future increases in fees for
    working age retirees to a factor that relates to rising national
    medical costs?
        Admiral Winnefeld. I believe that the proposed health care
    efficiencies, including modest increases in beneficiaries' cost shares,
    are sensible efforts to control DOD's health care costs while
    maintaining the same level of care.
        If confirmed, I will continue to identify cost-effective
    improvements to the Military Health System. Such an examination would
    include consideration of future changes in fees related to national
    medical costs.

        4. Senator McCain. Admiral Winnefeld, do you see the rise in health
    care costs as a threat to readiness and if so, what would you do or
    recommend, if confirmed, to address this very serious issue for DOD?
        Admiral Winnefeld. I believe that the rise in health care costs is
    a threat to readiness, as projected rising costs of medical care could
    demand an increasing share of a decreasing top line for DOD.
        Our uniformed servicemembers make great sacrifices for the Nation
    and deserve a quality of health care that is both commiserate with
    their quality of service and ensures they are ready for whatever we ask
    of them. Additionally, the generous health benefits we provide to their
    families and retirees are a significant contribution to our ability to
    recruit, and even more significantly, retain the best our Nation has to
    offer which directly correlates to our future readiness.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss

                                   CYBERSPACE

        5. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Winnefeld, DOD's recently released
    its report ``Strategy for Operating in Cyber-Space'' which portrays a
    bleak outlook for our Nation's network security and highlights the need
    for increased defensive operations. However, the strategy sidesteps the
    question of retaliation measures the United States can take against
    attackers, as well as how to locate the culprits in order to punish
    them. General Cartwright stated that this strategy is ``too
    predictable'' and expressed dismay that it outlined a defensive plan
    without mentioning an offense. In unveiling the strategy, Deputy
    Secretary of Defense Lynn disclosed that, in March, DOD discovered that
    a foreign intelligence service stole 24,000 computer files related to a
    weapons system under development. While the President has said large-
    scale attacks such as knocking out a power grid would be subject to
    full-scale retaliation by the U.S. military, smaller attacks such as
    data theft and security breaches are far more rampant and serious today
    and apparently have no defined consequences. What are your thoughts on
    this issue?
        Admiral Winnefeld. We must ensure our adversaries understand the
    consequences of a cyber-attack against the United States. As with more
    traditional domains, we must make a determination of when espionage
    crosses the line into hostile intent or a hostile act. While it can be
    more challenging to make this determination in cyberspace, as stated in
    the President's International Strategy for Cyberspace, when warranted,
    the United States will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we
    would to any other threat to our country. DOD is prepared to defend
    U.S. national security interests through all available means, if so
    directed. At the same time, we are addressing our vulnerabilities in
    cyberspace and the efforts of state and non-state actors to gain
    unauthorized access to our networks and systems.

        6. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Winnefeld, do you agree that DOD
    needs an offensive as well as a defensive strategy for cyberspace?
        Admiral Winnefeld. Yes. DOD requires a strategy for cyberspace
    operations that includes both offensive and defensive components. To
    this end, the Department must strike a balance between offensive and
    defensive cyber capabilities. This balance includes continuing with our
    cyberspace deterrent strategy; collaborating with the interagency
    community and international partners to increase our cyber security
    posture; continuing the ongoing executive level interagency review of
    the current offensive policy; and supporting efforts with the
    Department of Homeland Security, which protects U.S. networks, to
    develop the procedures to identify and mitigate threats.

                           NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

        7. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Winnfeld, the statutory functions of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff relate primarily to planning, providing
    advice, and policy formulation, particularly related to the strategic
    direction of the Armed Forces and strategic plans. In this capacity,
    not later than January 1st of each odd-numbered year, the Chairman is
    required to submit to the Secretary of Defense his assessment of the
    nature and magnitude of the strategic and military risks associated
    with executing the missions called for under the National Military
    Strategy (NMS). Not later than February 15 of each even-numbered year,
    the Chairman is required to submit to the Senate and House Defense
    Committees a comprehensive examination of the NMS. While I realize you
    have been nominated for Vice Chairman, not Chairman, nevertheless you
    will be involved in these discussions and your views will carry great
    weight.
        With that in mind, I would appreciate your views on our current
    NMS, whether you believe the Armed Forces are adequately postured and,
    if not, what changes we need to make to improve our posture with
    respect to our global responsibilities and global threats.
        Admiral Winnefeld. At this time, I believe the current NMS meets
    our requirements and is appropriately nested with the National Security
    Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review. The Joint Force remains fully
    engaged executing that strategy. That includes major combat operations
    in Iraq and Afghanistan, conducting strategic and conventional
    deterrence, defending the Homeland, countering terrorism and piracy,
    and operating with our key allies and partners. As U.S. Northern
    Command Commander, I participated in the development of Admiral
    Mullen's 2011 Chairman's Risk Assessment, and fully support his
    conclusion that we face a number of challenges in holding down
    strategic and military risk in this uncertain security and funding
    environment. However, based on the growing national security imperative
    of deficit reduction and how this may impact resources available to
    DOD, we may need to reexamine our strategy. As Vice Chairman, I will,
    along with the Chairman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and combatant
    commanders continue to work with the Secretary of Defense to develop a
    strategic approach that best mitigates these risks including how we
    posture our forces.

        8. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Winnefeld, in light of pending
    reductions in all aspects of Federal spending including defense, do you
    have any thoughts on what commitments, responsibilities, and tasks you
    believe the U.S. military should consider stop doing?
        Admiral Winnefeld. The Department is continuing its Comprehensive
    Defense Review to ensure our spending decisions are strategy-based,
    risk-informed, and defend and advance our national interests given the
    range of threats we face in the current and projected security
    environment. We are taking a close look at those essential missions we
    must undertake today and in the future to meet our national security
    needs. We are also reviewing the capabilities, force structure,
    posture, and resources required for those missions, considering
    throughout the process what we should stop doing, or do less of, to not
    sacrifice the readiness and training of our forces.
        In the current environment, I believe we can achieve our financial
    imperative through a combination of efficiencies and, essentially,
    ``doing less of the same.'' It goes without saying that the latter will
    involve increased risk. Should additional funding reductions be
    mandated, we will likely be forced into a strategic inflection point
    that would cause us to migrate towards less balance among the
    ``prevent,'' ``prevail,'' and ``prepare'' imperatives of the
    Quadrenniel Defense Review, while maintaining our commitment to the
    ``preserve'' imperative. The Chairman and I, in close consultation with
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders, are closely
    examining every issue as part of this review, and will provide our
    military advice on where we think we can assume additional strategic
    and military risk resulting from reductions in the defense budget.
                                     ______

                   Question Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte

      HIGH MOBILITY MULTIPURPOSE WHEELED VEHICLE RECAPITALIZATION PROGRAM

        9. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Winnefeld, regarding the High Mobility
    Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) Recapitalization Program, the
    currently submitted P-forms show volumes between 1,300 and 2,900
    vehicles expected to go through the program annually with a budget
    allocation of approximately $161 million per year. With a target price
    for HMMWV recapitalization between $160,000 and $180,000 each, this
    would only equate to about 1,000 vehicles recapitalized annually. Can
    you explain this potential discrepancy? Based on this, what is the
    expected timeline to complete all 60,000 HMMWVs slated for
    recapitalization?
        Admiral Winnefeld. The discrepancy in question arises from
    different cost assessments for each variant of the HMMWV. Specifically,
    we intend to procure 1,362 Up-Armored HMMWVs (UAHs) in fiscal year 2012
    at the unit cost of $101,000 as shown on the P-form. The vehicle
    quantity of 2,963 per year depicted for fiscal year 2013-2016 was based
    purely on non-armored HMMWVs at approximately half the cost of the UAHs
    per unit.
        As indicated on the P-form, the Army was initiating plans for UAH
    RECAP Modernization effort beginning in fiscal year 2013 to add
    improved performance and protection to the UAHs which aligns with the
    $160,000-$180,000 referenced in the question. Upon successful
    completion of the integration and testing of these efforts, the
    recapitalization of UAHs will migrate to the UAH RECAP Modernization
    Program. With better knowledge of the scope of this effort, the BES-13
    submission will reflect a mix of UAH RECAP Modernization and non-
    armored HMMWVs.
        An ongoing assessment of the state of the HMMWV fleet and available
    funding will inform the overall vehicle quantity and mix, as well as
    the final timeline to completion.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Susan M. Collins

                                 313-SHIP NAVY

        10. Senator Collins. Admiral Winnefeld, the U.S. Navy currently has
    the fewest number of ships since before World War I. In fact, the Navy
    has established a requirement for fiscal year 2024 of having a force of
    94 multi-mission large surface combatants, but the Navy's fiscal year
    2012 30-year shipbuilding plan projects the Navy will only achieve the
    94-ship goal for BMD-capable ships in 2020 and 2012, with force levels
    declining thereafter. Furthermore, a February 2011 Navy report on
    Surface Ship Readiness found that 60 percent of the fleet is underway
    at any given time and 43 percent forward deployed, both of which
    represent historically high percentages, and negatively impacts
    material readiness and service life capacity. As national security
    requirements demand more from our ships, it is increasingly unlikely
    our surface combatants with programmed 35-year service lives will reach
    that goal. Do you support the Navy's plan to eliminate the gap between
    the 285-ship Navy we have today and the 313-ship Navy that has been
    described by the current Chief of Naval Operations as the minimum
    number of ships needed to meet the national security requirements?
        Admiral Winnefeld. I support the Navy's current plan to eliminate
    the gap between the 285-ship Navy we have today and the 313-ship Navy
    needed to meet the national security requirements of our current
    strategy. However, I also acknowledge that it may be necessary to
    adjust our strategy to match the national security imperative of
    deficit reduction with our investments in national defense. Thus it may
    be difficult to achieve the 313-ship goal. In any case, I will work to
    ensure that the Navy's shipbuilding plan continues to provide a battle
    force capable of meeting our national security requirements and that is
    properly balanced against risk and cost.

                 COMBATANT COMMAND MISSILE DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS

        11. Senator Collins. Admiral Winnefeld, as Vice Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff, you will chair the Joint Requirements Oversight
    Council (JROC) which is responsible for ensuring our warfighters have
    the capabilities they need to achieve the National Security Strategy.
    Many of us are concerned about the number of missiles and ships
    required to deploy an adequate ballistic missile defense (BMD) for our
    Nation and our allies. In March 2011, General Mattis testified before
    the Senate Armed Services Committee that he does not expect his
    requirements in U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) for these assets will be
    fully satisfied now or in the future. He said, ``There simply are not
    enough assets to deal with the global threat.'' I would anticipate the
    other combatant commanders in Europe and in the Pacific would say
    something similar. How will you ensure the combatant commanders' BMD
    requirements are met through the JROC process?
        Admiral Winnefeld. As a sitting combatant commander, I am
    intimately aware of both the importance of understanding combatant
    command equities in the JROC process and ensuring we deliver necessary
    capabilities to our warfighters. From that experience, I believe
    involving the commanders in the acquisition process ensures their
    operational needs are considered as we develop and deploy future
    systems.
        If confirmed, I will have a role in the resourcing of our BMD
    capability as a member of the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB),
    but specific requirements for BMD fall outside of the JROC and are
    instead managed by the Missile Defense Agency with MDEB oversight. I
    also recognize that the Vice Chairman is uniquely suited to ensure
    combatant command BMD requirements are met as a member of both the MDEB
    and JROC and through his general involvement in the budget process. I
    look forward, if confirmed, to ensuring we deliver for the warfighter
    in this valuable mission set.

                          SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRIAL BASE

        12. Senator Collins. Admiral Winnefeld, in their fiscal year 2012
    budget testimony, former Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen identified
    shipbuilding as one of the two components of the defense industrial
    base that worried them, in particular. Secretary Gates stated, ``A
    number of the Navy ships that were built during the Reagan years will
    basically reach the end of their planned life in the 2020s, and where
    the money comes from to replace those ships is going to be a challenge
    . . . there are some tough choices in terms of big capabilities that
    are coming down the road.'' Do you agree with that assessment and the
    importance of sustaining the shipbuilding industrial base?
        Admiral Winnefeld. A healthy industrial base is critical in all
    areas of defense acquisition to ensure delivery of the industrial
    capacity and quality necessary to meet our national security
    requirements. I agree that a number of ships will reach their planned
    life in the 2020s. The Navy's long-term shipbuilding plan includes
    retirement of 105 ships from 2020 to 2029. During the same period, the
    Navy plans to take delivery of 94 ships. Based on the Comprehensive
    Review and expected defense spending reductions, I will work to ensure
    that the Navy's shipbuilding plan continues to provide a force capable
    of meeting our national strategic objectives. As we work through the
    difficult decisions we will face due to ongoing deficit reduction
    efforts, maintaining an adequate industrial base must, in my view,
    remain a priority.

                                  SAFE HAVENS

        13. Senator Collins. Admiral Winnefeld, on July 17, 2011, Maine
    lost another one of its proud soldiers, Private First Class Tyler
    Springmann, to an improvised explosive device that exploded in
    Afghanistan. Given the tremendous sacrifice that our service men and
    women are making, I want to be sure that the strategy currently being
    pursued can work. The President has stated the core goal of the U.S.
    strategy in Central Asia is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda
    in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent their return to either
    country in the future. Earlier this year, Admiral Mullen testified that
    one of the necessary conditions to achieve that goal was to neutralize
    insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan, but that insurgent groups currently
    operate unhindered in those sanctuaries. Yet, General Mattis recently
    testified that he does not expect Pakistan will reverse its current
    approach and eliminate the safe havens that exist there. He said that
    ``satisfactory end-states are attainable in Afghanistan, even if the
    sanctuaries persist.'' Even if there is a satisfactory end-state in
    Afghanistan, how can we achieve the President's goal of preventing the
    return of al Qaeda fighters to Afghanistan and Pakistan so long as they
    can take advantage of the safe havens enjoyed by the Quetta Shura and
    the Haqqani network just across the border in Pakistan?
        Admiral Winnefeld. The loss of Private First Class Tyler Springmann
    and others like him exemplifies the challenges our forces currently
    face; a challenge exacerbated by sanctuaries in Pakistan and by
    Pakistan's apparent unwillingness to fully engage these extremist
    networks.
        A satisfactory end state in Afghanistan should make it more
    difficult for extremists finding safe haven in Pakistan to operate in
    Afghanistan. We have found that areas in Afghanistan in which security
    and economic progress are achieved tend to reject the presence of these
    extremists. Moreover, we intend to continue our efforts to persuade
    Pakistani leaders that extremist groups operating in Pakistan,
    including some that exist as proxies of the Pakistani government, pose
    a threat to regional stability and to Pakistan itself, and should be
    disrupted and dismantled.

                                SUCCESS METRICS

        14. Senator Collins. Admiral Winnefeld, the fiscal year 2012 budget
    request documents state the top strategic goal for DOD is to prevail in
    today's wars. I am surprised that the budget documents include only six
    metrics to measure whether DOD is prevailing in today's war in
    Afghanistan. Two of the metrics look at the number of trained Afghan
    security forces. Another metric evaluates whether CENTCOM has the
    resources to conduct military operations. The last three of the six DOD
    metrics are tied to contracting actions in theater. I am concerned that
    most of these metrics fail to address the major challenges in
    Afghanistan: eliminating the Pakistan safe havens, reducing corruption,
    building a robust agriculture economy, and improving governance. The
    metrics do not even include how many al Qaeda members are present in
    either country. Given that prevailing in today's wars is the most
    important goal of DOD, do you believe the current metrics allow you and
    the rest of the Services to adequately measure success in Afghanistan
    and Pakistan?
        Admiral Winnefeld. As part of a budget document, the fiscal year
    2011 and fiscal year 2012 DOD-wide priority performance goals in the
    fiscal year 2012 Defense budget are specifically related to business
    operations and logistics support to overseas contingency operations.
    The specific metrics for evaluating progress and measuring success in
    Afghanistan and Pakistan, including the two DOD-assigned objectives,
    are spelled out in Annex B of the NSC's 2009 strategic implementation
    plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
        Examples, among many others, include the extent of militant-
    controlled areas in Pakistan, the effectiveness of Pakistani border
    security efforts, measures of population security at all levels
    including the number of districts or extent of area under insurgent
    control, the size and capability of the Afghan National Army and Afghan
    National Police, and effectiveness of Afghan National Security Forces-
    International Security Assistance Force partnered counterinsurgency
    operations.
        While I believe these metrics, indicators, and submetrics are
    sufficient, we continue to work with the interagency to refine our
    criteria as the environment changes.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of ADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr.,
    USN, follows:]
                        Nomination Reference and Report
                               As In Executive Session,
                                   Senate of the United States,
                                                          June 6, 2011.
        Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
    on Armed Services:
        The following named officer for appointment as the Vice Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appointment to the grade indicated while
    assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10,
    U.S.C., sections 601 and 154:

                                 To be Admiral

        ADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr., 0000.
                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of ADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr.,
    USN, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
    nomination was referred, follows:]
        Biographical Sketch of VADM James Alexander Winnefeld, Jr., USN

        24 Apr. 1956..........................  Born in Coronado, CA
        07 June 1978..........................  Ensign
        07 June 1980..........................  Lieutenant (junior grade)
        01 July 1982                            Lieutenant
        01 Sep. 1988..........................  Lieutenant Commander
        01 Sep. 1992..........................  Commander
        01 Sep. 1997..........................  Captain
        01 Oct. 2003..........................  Rear Admiral (lower half)
        06 May 2006...........................  Designated Rear Admiral
                                                 while serving in billets
                                                 commensurate with that
                                                 grade
        01 Aug. 2006..........................  Rear Admiral
        14 Sep. 2007..........................  Vice Admiral
        19 May 2010...........................  Admiral, Service continuous
                                                 to date

    Major duty assignments:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Assignments and duties                  From          To
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Naval Station, Annapolis, MD (Division           June 1978    Nov. 1978
     Officer).....................................
    Naval Aviation Schools Command, Pensacola, FL    Nov. 1978    Apr. 1979
     (DUINS)......................................
    Training Squadron Six (Student)...............   Apr. 1979    June 1979
    Naval Aviation Schools Command, Pensacola, FL    June 1979    June 1979
     (DUINS)......................................
    Training Squadron Two Three (Student).........   June 1979    Dec. 1979
    Training Squadron Two Two (Student)...........   Dec. 1979     May 1980
    Fighter Squadron One Two Four (Replacement       June 1980    Apr. 1981
     Pilot).......................................
    Fighter Squadron Two Four (Power Plants Branch   Apr. 1981    Nov. 1983
     Officer).....................................
    Naval Fighter Weapons School, San Diego, CA      Nov. 1983    Jan. 1987
     (Quality Assurance Officer)..................
    Fighter Squadron One Two Four (Replacement       Jan. 1987    Apr. 1987
     Naval Aviator)...............................
    Fighter Squadron One (Operations Officer).....   Apr. 1987    Jan. 1990
    Joint Staff (Action Officer, EUCOM/CENTCOM       Feb. 1990    July 1991
     Branch, J3)..................................
    Joint Staff (Senior Aide-De-Camp to the          July 1991    Aug. 1992
     Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).......
    Fighter Squadron One Two Four (Student).......   Aug. 1992    Jan. 1993
    XO, Fighter Squadron Two One One..............   Jan. 1993    Apr. 1994
    CO, Fighter Squadron Two One One..............   Apr. 1994    Mar. 1995
    Naval Nuclear Power Training Command, Orlando,   Mar. 1995    Feb. 1996
     FL (Student).................................
    Prospective Executive Officer, USS John C.       Feb. 1996    Mar. 1996
     Stennis (CVN 74).............................
    Naval Reactors, Department of Energy,            Mar. 1996    Aug. 1996
     Washington, DC (Student).....................
    XO, USS John C Stennis (CVN 74)...............   Aug. 1996     May 1998
    CO, USS Cleveland (LPD 7).....................    May 1998    Feb. 2000
    CO, USS Enterprise (CVN 65)...................   Feb. 2000    Mar. 2002
    Office of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations     Mar. 2002    July 2003
     (Executive Assistant)........................
    Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (Director,        July 2003    Dec. 2004
     Warfare Programs and Readiness) (N8).........
    Commander, Carrier Strike Group Two...........   Dec. 2004    June 2006
    Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (Director   June 2006    Aug. 2007
     of Joint Innovation and Experimentation, J9).
    Commander, Sixth Fleet/Commander, Striking and   Sep. 2007    Aug. 2008
     Support Forces NATO/Deputy Commander, U.S.
     Naval Forces Europe/Commander, Joint
     Headquarters Lisbon..........................
    Joint Staff (Director, Strategic Plans and       Aug. 2008     May 2010
     Policy) (J5)/Senior Member, U.S. Delegation
     to the United Nations Military Staff
     Committee....................................
    Commander, Northern Command/Commander, North      May 2010      To date
     American Aerospace Defense Command...........
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Medals and awards:
        Distinguished Service Medal
        Defense Superior Service Medal
        Legion of Merit with two Gold Stars
        Bronze Star Medal
        Defense Meritorious Service Medal
        Meritorious Service Medal
        Air Medal with First Strike/Flight Award
        Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with one Gold Star
        Joint Service Achievement Medal
        Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal
        Joint Meritorious Unit Award
        Navy Unit Commendation with one Bronze Star
        Navy ``E'' Ribbon with ``E'' Device
        National Defense Service Medal with one Bronze Star
        Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with two Bronze Stars
        Southwest Asia Service Medal with one Bronze Star
        Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal
        Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
        Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with one Silver Star and one Bronze
    Star
        Expert Pistol Shot Medal

    Special qualifications:
        BS (Aerospace Engineering) Georgia Institute of Technology, 1978
        Designated Naval Aviator, 1980
        Capstone, 2004-3
        Designated Level IV Joint Qualified Officer, 2009

    Personal data:
        Wife: Mary Alice Werner of Menomonie, WI
        Children: James A. Winnefeld II (Son), Born: 29 November 1995
                 Jonathan J. Winnefeld (Son) Born: 11 May 1998.

    Summary of joint duty assignments:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Assignment                       Dates              Rank
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Joint Staff (Action Officer, EUCOM/  Feb. 90-July 91.......           LCDR
     CENTCOM Branch, J3).
    Joint Staff (Senior Aide-De-Camp to  July 91-Aug. 92.......            CDR
     the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
     of Staff).
    Commander, U.S. Joint Forces         June 06-Aug. 07.......        RADM
     Command (Director of Joint
     Innovation and Experimentation,
     J9).
    Commander, Sixth Fleet/Commander,    Sep. 07-Aug. 08.......        VADM
     Striking and Support Forces NATO/
     Deputy Commander, U.S. Naval
     Forces Europe/Commander, Joint
     Headquarters Lisbon.
    Joint Staff (Director, Strategic     Aug. 08-May 10........        VADM
     Plans and Policy) (J5)/Senior
     Member, U.S. Delegation to the
     United Nations Military Staff
     Committee.
    Commander, Northern Command/         May 10-to date........         ADM
     Commander, North American
     Aerospace Defense Command.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
    military officers nominated by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by ADM James A.
    Winnefield, Jr., USN, in connection with his nomination
    follows:]

                              UNITED STATES SENATE
                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                                  Room SR-228
                           Washington, DC 20510-6050
                                 (202) 224-3871
                        COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
          BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

        Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
    more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
    form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
    of your answer applies.

                        Part A--Biographical Information

        Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
    this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
    public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
    any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

        1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
        James A. Winnefield, Jr. (Nickname: Sandy).

        2. Position to which nominated:
        Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

        3. Date of nomination:
        June 6, 2011.

        4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
        [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
    committee's executive files.]

        5. Date and place of birth:
        24 April 1956; Coronado, CA.

        6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
        Married to Mary Alice Winnefeld, Maiden name: Werner.

        7. Names and ages of children:
        James A. Winnefeld II; age 15.
        Jonathan Jacob Winnefeld: age 13.

        8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
    honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
    or local governments, other than those listed in the service record
    extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
        None.

        9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
    officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
    or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
    enterprise, educational or other institution.
        My wife and I participate in two limited liability corporations
    (LLC) with her sister, Dr. Sarah Werner of Denver, CO, in ownership of
    two real estate properties in Breckenridge, CO. One LLC is for a
    vacation residence that is offered for rent when not being used by the
    owners and for which my wife and I earned moderate income ($1,006) in
    calendar year 2010. The other LLC is for an unimproved lot that we
    intend to build a vacation residence on. These LLCs are closely-held
    family entities, and I do not serve on a compensated basis in the
    management of them. There are no conflicts of interest associated with
    these arrangements.

        10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
    professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
    other organizations.
        Member (otherwise referred to as a Trustee) of the U.S. Naval
    Academy Foundation: Athletic and Scholarships Program (a nonprofit
    organization).

        11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
    society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
    service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
    extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
        None.

        12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
    if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
    constituted committee of the Senate?
        Yes.
        13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
    constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
    those views differ from the administration in power?
        Yes.
                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
    committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
    forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
    Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                    ------

                               Signature and Date
        I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
    on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
    provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
    and complete.
                                                James A. Winnefeld, Jr.
        This 6th day of June, 2011.

        [The nomination of ADM James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN, was
    reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on August 2, 2011,
    with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
    nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 2, 2011.]
                                  ----------

        [Prepared questions submitted to GEN Raymond T. Odierno,
    USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
    supplied follow:]

                            Questions and Responses

                                DEFENSE REFORMS

        Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
    Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
    strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
    enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
    of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
    commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments
    to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
    to the combatant commanders.
        Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
    provisions?
        Answer. No.
        Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
    address in these modifications?
        Answer. None. In my view, the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been very
    effective in making the armed services an integrated joint force.

                           DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS

        Question. Section 3033 of title 10, U.S.C., establishes the
    responsibilities and authority of the Chief of Staff of the Army.
        What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Chief
    of Staff of the Army?
        Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Army is the senior military
    advisor to the Secretary of the Army. In addition to his role as an
    advisor, the Chief of Staff is responsible for the effective and
    efficient functioning of Army organizations and commands in executing
    their statutory missions. The Chief of Staff shall also perform the
    duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    under section 151 of title 10.
        Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect
    that the Secretary of the Army would prescribe for you?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would expect Secretary McHugh to assign me
    the following duties:

        (a)  Serve as the senior military leader of the Army and all its
    components;
        (b)  Assist the Secretary with his external affairs functions,
    including presenting and justifying Army policies, plans, programs, and
    budgets to the Secretary of Defense, executive branch, and Congress;
        (c)  Assist the Secretary with his compliance functions, to include
    directing The Inspector General to perform inspections and
    investigations as required;
        (d)  Preside over the Army Staff and ensure the effective and
    efficient functioning of the headquarters, to include integrating
    Reserve Component matters into all aspects of Army business;
        (e)  Serve as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and provide
    independent military advice to the Secretary of Defense, Congress, and
    the President. To the extent such action does not impair my
    independence in my performance as a member of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, I would keep the Secretary of the Army informed of military
    advice that the Joint Chiefs of Staff render on matters affecting the
    Army. I would inform the Secretary of the Army of significant military
    operations affecting his duties and responsibilities, subject to the
    authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense;
        (f)  Represent Army capabilities, programs, policy, and
    requirements in Joint Forces;
        (g)  Supervise the execution of Army policies, plans, programs, and
    activities and assess the performance of Army commands in the execution
    of their assigned statutory missions and functions; and
        (h)  Task and supervise the Vice Chief of Staff, Army, the Army
    Staff and, as authorized by the Secretary of the Army, elements of the
    Army Secretariat to perform assigned duties and responsibilities.

        Question. What background and experience do you have that you
    believe qualifies you for this position?
        Answer. I have over 35 years of experience in the Army with joint
    and combined operations. I have commanded at every level from platoon
    to theater level. I had the distinct privilege to command at the
    division, corps, and theater level in the Iraq combat theater. I have
    participated in Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, supported the
    operations in Bosnia as the V Corps Chief of Staff, and deployed to
    Albania in support of the war in Kosovo. In Iraq, I've had the
    opportunity to apply the full range of Army, joint, and combined force
    capabilities against a broad range of complex environments as well as
    to establish strong civil military relationships to achieve unity of
    effort. My considerable service in joint as well as Army positions has
    given me a unique perspective of the Army, its processes and
    capabilities. The combination of all these things as well as my
    experience in working with the great young soldiers that we have in the
    Army today will enable me to lead the Army to meet our current and
    future missions and requirements.
        Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
    enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Chief of Staff of the
    Army?
        Answer. If confirmed, my tenure as Chief of Staff will be marked by
    continuous self-assessment of my ability to perform my duties. As I
    believe necessary, I will enact measures which will improve my ability
    to lead the Army. It is essential in this complex environment that we
    continue to learn and adapt to ensure that our skills remain current so
    we remain viable to meet our future challenges.
        Question. What duties and responsibilities would you plan to assign
    to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army?
        Answer. If confirmed as Chief of Staff of the Army, I would ensure
    the Vice Chief of Staff is responsible for providing me advice and
    assistance in the execution of my duties, specifically with regard to
    manpower and personnel; logistics; operations and plans; requirements
    and programs; intelligence; command, control, and communications; and
    readiness.

                                 RELATIONSHIPS

        Question. If confirmed, what would be your working relationship
    with:
        The Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. The Secretary of Defense, as the head of the Department of
    Defense (DOD) and the principal assistant to the President in all
    Department of Defense matters, provides guidance and direction to the
    military departments. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the
    Secretary of Defense and his Deputy, through the Secretary of the Army,
    for the operation of the Army in accordance with the Secretary of
    Defense's guidance and direction. If confirmed, as a member of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will serve as a military adviser to the
    Secretary of Defense as appropriate. I will cooperate fully with the
    Secretary of Defense to ensure that the Army properly implements the
    policies established by his office. In coordination with the Secretary
    of the Army, I will communicate with the Secretary of Defense in
    articulating the views of the Army.
        Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense performs such duties and
    exercises such powers as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe. The
    Secretary of Defense also delegates to the Deputy Secretary of Defense
    full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense and
    exercise the powers of the Secretary on any and all matters for which
    the Secretary is authorized to act pursuant to law. If confirmed, I
    will be responsible to the Secretary of Defense, and to his deputy,
    through the Secretary of the Army, for the operation of the Army in
    accordance with the Secretary's guidance and direction. Also, in
    coordination with the Secretary of the Army, I will communicate with
    the Deputy Secretary in articulating the views of the Army. I will work
    closely with them to ensure that the Army is administered in accordance
    with the guidance and direction issued by the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense.
        Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
        Answer. Acting on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, the Under
    Secretaries perform responsibilities that require them, from time to
    time, to issue guidance--and in the case of the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, direction--to the
    military departments. If confirmed, in coordination with the Secretary
    of the Army, I will communicate with the Under Secretaries in
    articulating the views of the Army. I will work closely with the Under
    Secretaries to ensure that the Army is administered in accordance with
    the Office of the Secretary of Defense's guidance and direction.
        Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal
    military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and
    the Secretary of Defense. Subject to the authority, direction, and
    control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman
    plans the strategic direction and contingency operations of the Armed
    Forces; advises the Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and
    budgets that the combatant command commanders identify; develops
    doctrine for the joint employment of the Armed Forces; reports on
    assignment of functions (or roles and missions) to the Armed Forces;
    provides for representation of the United States on the Military Staff
    Committee of the United Nations; and performs such other duties as the
    law or the President or Secretary of Defense may prescribe.
        In conjunction with the other members of the Joint Chiefs, the
    Chief of Staff of the Army assists the Chairman in providing military
    advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the
    Secretary of Defense. If confirmed as a member of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, I will provide my individual military advice to the President,
    the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. If
    confirmed, it would be my duty as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    to provide frank and timely advice and opinions to the Chairman to
    assist him in his performance of these responsibilities. If confirmed,
    and as appropriate, I will also provide advice in addition to or in
    disagreement with that of the Chairman. I will establish and maintain a
    close and professional relationship with the Chairman, and I will
    communicate directly and openly with him on any policy matters
    impacting the Army and the Armed Forces as a whole.
        Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        Answer. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assists the
    Chairman in providing military advice to the Secretary of Defense and
    the President. If confirmed, it would be my duty as a member of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure that the Vice Chairman receives my
    frank views and opinions to assist him in performing his
    responsibilities.
        Question. The chiefs of the other Services.
        Answer. If confirmed, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it
    would be my duty to engage in frank and timely exchanges of advice and
    opinions with my fellow Service Chiefs. I look forward to developing
    strong working relationships with these colleagues, if I am confirmed.
        Question. The combatant commanders.
        Answer. Subject to the direction of the President, the combatant
    commanders perform their duties under the authority, direction, and
    control of the Secretary of Defense, and are directly responsible to
    the Secretary of Defense for their commands' preparedness to execute
    missions assigned to them. As directed by the Secretary of Defense, the
    Service Secretaries assign all forces under their jurisdiction to the
    unified and specified combatant commands or to the U.S. element of the
    North American Aerospace Defense Command, to perform missions assigned
    to those commands. In addition, subject to the authority, direction,
    and control of the Secretary of Defense and the authority of combatant
    commanders under title 10, U.S..C., section 164(c), the Service
    Secretaries are responsible for administering and supporting the forces
    that they assign to a combatant command. If confirmed, I will cooperate
    fully with the combatant commanders in performing these administrative
    and support responsibilities. I will establish close, professional
    relationships with the combatant commanders and I will communicate
    directly and openly with them on matters involving the Department of
    the Army and Army forces and personnel assigned to or supporting the
    combatant commands.
        Question. The Army component commanders of the combatant commands
        Answer. The Army component commanders of the combatant commands
    exercise command and control under the authority and direction of the
    combatant commanders to whom they are assigned and in accordance with
    the policies and procedures established by the Secretary of Defense.
    The combatant commanders normally delegate operational control of Army
    forces to the Army component commander. The Secretary of the Army
    generally delegates administrative control of Army forces assigned to
    the combatant commander to the Army component commander of that
    combatant command. The Army component commander is responsible for
    recommendations to the joint force commander on the allocation and
    employment of Army forces within the combatant command. If confirmed, I
    will cooperate fully with the combatant commanders and Army component
    commanders in performing these responsibilities.
        Question. The Secretary of the Army.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will establish a close, direct, and
    supportive relationship with the Secretary of the Army. Within the
    Army, one of my primary responsibilities as Chief of Staff would be to
    serve as the Secretary's principal military adviser. My
    responsibilities would also involve communicating the Army Staff's
    plans to the Secretary and supervising the implementation of the
    Secretary's decisions through the Army Staff, commands, and agencies.
    My actions would be subject to the authority, direction, and control of
    the Secretary. In my capacity as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
    I would also be responsible for appropriately informing the Secretary
    about conclusions reached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and about
    significant military operations, to the extent this would not impair my
    independence in performing my duties as a member of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely and in concert
    with the Secretary of the Army to establish the best policies for the
    Army, taking into account national interests.
        Question. The Under Secretary of the Army.
        Answer. The Under Secretary of the Army is the Secretary's
    principal civilian assistant. The Under Secretary of the Army performs
    such duties and exercises such powers as prescribed by the Secretary of
    the Army. The Under Secretary's responsibilities require him, from time
    to time, to issue guidance and direction to the Army Staff. If
    confirmed, I will be responsible to the Secretary and to the Under
    Secretary for the operation of the Army in accordance with such
    directives. I will cooperate fully with the Under Secretary to ensure
    that the policies that the Office of the Secretary of the Army
    establishes are implemented properly. I will communicate openly and
    directly with the Under Secretary in articulating the views of the Army
    Staff, commands, and agencies.
        Question. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.
        Answer. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army serves as the principal
    advisor and assistant to the Chief of Staff. If confirmed, I will
    establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with Vice
    Chief of Staff, Army.
        Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army.
        Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army have functional
    responsibilities that, from time to time, require them to issue
    guidance to the Army Staff and to the Army as a whole. If confirmed, I
    will establish and maintain close, professional relationships with the
    Assistant Secretaries in order to foster an environment of cooperative
    teamwork between the Army Staff and the Army Secretariat as we address
    the Army's day-to-day management and long-range planning requirements.
        Question. The General Counsel of the Army.
        Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the
    Department of the Army. The duties of the General Counsel include
    coordinating legal and policy advice to all members of the Department
    regarding matters of interest to the Secretariat, as well as
    determining the position of the Army on any legal question or
    procedure, other than military justice matters, which are assigned to
    The Judge Advocate General. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain
    a close, professional relationship with the General Counsel to assist
    in the performance of these important duties.
        Question. The Inspector General of the Army.
        Answer. The Inspector General is responsible for inspections and
    certain investigations within the Department of the Army, such as
    inquiring into and reporting to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief
    of Staff regarding discipline, efficiency, and economy of the Army with
    continuing assessment of command, operational, logistical, and
    administrative effectiveness; and serving as the focal point for the
    Department of the Army regarding DOD Inspector General inspections and
    noncriminal investigations, as well as the DOD inspection policy. If
    confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional
    relationship with the Inspector General of the Army to ensure effective
    accomplishment of these important duties.
        Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Army.
        Answer. The Judge Advocate General is the military legal advisor to
    the Secretary of the Army and all officers and agencies of the
    Department of the Army. The Judge Advocate General provides legal
    advice directly to the Chief of Staff and to the Army Staff in matters
    concerning military justice; environmental law; labor and civilian
    personnel law; contract, fiscal, and tax law; international law; and
    the worldwide operational deployment of Army forces. The Chief of Staff
    does not appoint The Judge Advocate General, and does not have the
    personal authority to remove him. This enables The Judge Advocate
    General to provide independent legal advice. If confirmed, I will
    establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the The
    Judge Advocate General as my legal advisor and I will assist him in the
    performance of his important duties as the legal advisor to the
    Secretary of the Army.
        Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
        Answer. The National Guard Bureau is a joint activity of DOD. The
    Chief National Guard Bureau is appointed by the President, he serves as
    a principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters concerning non-Federalized
    National Guard forces. He is also the principal advisor to the
    Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff on matters relating to the
    National Guard. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close,
    professional relationship with the Chief, National Guard Bureau to
    foster an environment of cooperative teamwork between the Army Staff
    and the National Guard Bureau, as we deal together with the day-to-day
    management and long-range planning requirements facing the Army.
        Question. The Director of the Army National Guard.
        Answer. The Director, Army National Guard is responsible for
    assisting the Chief, National Guard Bureau in carrying out the
    functions of the National Guard Bureau, as they relate to the Army
    National Guard. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close,
    professional relationship with the Director, Army National Guard to
    foster an environment of cooperative teamwork between the Army Staff
    and the National Guard Bureau. This will be essential as we deal
    together with the day-to-day management and long-range planning
    requirements facing the Army to sustain and improve the Army National
    Guard's operational capabilities.
        Question. The Chief of the Army Reserve.
        Answer. The Chief, Army Reserve is responsible for justifying and
    executing the Army Reserve's personnel, operation and maintenance, and
    construction budgets. As such, the Chief, Army Reserve is the director
    and functional manager of appropriations made for the Army Reserve in
    those areas. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close,
    professional relationship with the Chief, Army Reserve as we deal
    together with the Army's day-to-day management and long-range planning
    requirements in order to sustain and improve the Army Reserve's
    operational capabilities.

                             VISION FOR THE FUTURE

        Question. What is your vision for the Army of today and the future?
        Answer. My vision is of an All-Volunteer Army today and in the
    future that provides depth and versatility to the Joint Force, is
    efficient in its employment and provides flexibility for national
    security decisionmakers in defense of the Nation's interests at home
    and abroad.
        Question. What roles do you believe the Army should play in
    contingency, humanitarian, and stability operations?
        Answer. I believe our Army must maintain the right capabilities and
    amount of capability (depth) to provide our national leaders with
    trained and ready forces that can perform missions across the spectrum
    of conflict. We are capable of executing contingency, humanitarian or
    stability operations as directed by the President or Secretary of
    Defense under the control of the appropriate combatant commander.
        We are also capable of assisting our international partners in
    building their own operational capacity. Through theater engagement and
    Security Force Assistance, we have the capability to increase the
    capacity of partner nations to uphold the rule of law, ensure domestic
    order, protect its citizens during natural disasters, and avoid
    conflicts, which would otherwise require U.S. military support.
        Question. Do you see any unnecessary redundancy between Army and
    Marine Corps ground combat forces, particularly between Army combat
    battalions, regiments/brigades, and divisions and the equivalent Marine
    Corps formations?
        Answer. No, we each have unique but complementary capabilities that
    provide the National Command Authority flexibility. We have proven over
    the last 10 years, specifically, the flexibility and the adaptability
    of the Army and the Marine Corps to complement each other in a variety
    of operations and environments.

                        MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

        Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
    confront the next Chief of Staff of the Army?
        Answer. In a potentially resource constrained environment, we must:

        (1)  Continue to provide trained and ready forces to meet current
    wartime requirements and other worldwide contingencies;
        (2)  Continue to reset the Army to meet future challenges;
        (3)  Continue to adapt and develop a more effective and efficient
    force to meet our Nation's future challenges; and
        (4)  Right-size the Army and sustain the All-Volunteer Army by
    ensuring programs are in place to care for and develop our soldiers and
    their families.

        Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
    addressing these challenges?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with Congress
    to address these challenges. We will continue to refine and update our
    training programs to ensure all our soldiers are fully prepared to
    deploy to combat. We will continue to review our reset, force
    modernization and acquisition programs in order to more efficiently
    meet the needs and requirements of today and the future. I will work
    closely with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, and
    combatant commanders to identify the capabilities needed to provide
    depth and versatility to the Joint Force in order to provide more
    effective and flexible forces for employment. I will continue to adjust
    our leader development programs in order to develop thinking, adaptable
    decisionmakers necessary to operate in an increasingly complex and
    unpredictable environment. I will review our soldier and family
    programs to ensure we are meeting their needs.
        Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
    the performance of the functions of the Chief of Staff of the Army?
        Answer. At this point, I am not aware of any problems that would
    impede the performance of the Chief of Staff of the Army.
        Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would
    you establish to address these problems?
        Answer. I will ensure that management systems are in place. I will
    continue to monitor and to assess those processes, and I will
    specifically reinforce and review our management processes to ensure
    stewardship of the precious resources we are given to accomplish our
    mission.
        I am committed to the wise stewardship of our limited and valuable
    resources. Having just completed the disestablishment of Joint Forces
    Command, I understand the tough choices that must be made to operate
    within fiscal constraints, while minimizing risk to operational
    capability. If confirmed, I will carry this experience and ethos into
    this position.
        Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish?
        Answer. I will work closely with the Secretary of the Army to lay
    out the priorities of the Army. Within the framework of the Secretary
    of the Army's vision, here are my priorities:

             Develop and articulate a vision of the Army that
            addresses the needs of the Nation;
             Keep faith with our All-Volunteer Force;
             Focus on leader development to ensure our future
            leaders remain resilient;
             Explore, outline, and implement tangible methods to
            become more efficient and effective; and
             Reinvigorate the Profession of Arms.

                              U.S. FORCES IN IRAQ.

        Question. If the Government of Iraq were to ask for the continued
    presence in Iraq of U.S. forces beyond the end of 2011, would you
    recommend to the President the deployment or retention of additional
    troops in Iraq beyond the current deadline for U.S. troop withdrawal?
        Answer. Based on the information I have available to me now, my
    personal opinion is that I would recommend that the United States
    continue to support the Government of Iraq as it assumes responsibility
    for security. Our assessments indicate that Iraq is well on its way to
    being capable of providing for its own security, but they must have the
    opportunity to ensure their systems are fully capable of meeting their
    needs. If asked by the Government of Iraq, I would recommend a
    continued presence focused on training and filling any gaps in external
    security as required, combined with a variety of continued engagements,
    exercises, and other mutual security arrangements. Our commitment to
    Iraq is a signal of our commitment to the region, which is closely
    linked to our national interests.
        Question. The Army has recently announced the extension in Iraq of
    elements of the 25th Infantry Division beyond the normal 12-month
    deployed limit.
        What is your understanding and assessment of this extension and its
    potential impact on Army, unit, and family morale, well-being, and
    future rotation cycles?
        Answer. As we withdraw from Iraq, there remain some critical
    requirements and issues that necessitate continuity and experience. I
    understand that this 30-day extension of the of 25th ID Headquarters
    specifically, was fully reviewed by U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I), U.S.
    Central Command (CENTCOM), and the former Secretary of Defense and
    steps were taken to minimize any negative impacts on the soldiers and
    the families.
        Although extensions are always difficult, I expect that this
    extension may have only a minimal effect due to its relatively short
    duration and the nature of redeployment. To mitigate the impact when
    approving the extension, the Secretary of Defense also directed that
    the maximum number of soldiers, with consideration of special family
    issues, redeploy prior to the holiday period.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you monitor the redeployment of
    these troops to ensure that the requirements of the U.S.-Iraq security
    agreement are met and that delay of their return home is avoided?
        Answer. This extension was approved by the Secretary of Defense at
    the request of USF-I and CENTCOM. The Army continually monitors the
    deployment and redeployment of soldiers rotating or taking leave. If
    confirmed, we will do everything we can to facilitate the redeployment
    and ensure that we maintain accountability of all soldiers to ensure
    their safety and well being while accomplishing the mission. We will
    monitor the redeployment of these soldiers as we do all others and
    provide whatever support is needed to U.S. Pacific Command as they
    redeploy to Hawaii.
        Question. Is it your understanding that those soldiers who are
    extended will be compensated for their additional deployed time in the
    same manner as those who have been extended in the past?
        Answer. Yes, the Army will provide compensation for those soldiers
    whose deployments are extended in a similar manner to those who have
    been extended in the past.
        Question. What is your understanding of how the Army will address
    the needs of those families who have incurred nonrefundable expenses
    based upon original redeployment plans?
        Answer. If mission conditions dictate extending soldiers beyond
    scheduled redeployment dates and families have incurred nonrefundable
    expenses, the Army has a claims process they can use to address the
    situation. Additionally, the Army does provide monthly compensation for
    soldiers who are involuntarily extended.
        To mitigate the impact when approving the extension, the Secretary
    of Defense also directed that the maximum number of soldiers, with
    consideration of special family issues, redeploy prior to the holiday
    period.

       DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EFFICIENCY INITIATIVES AND BUDGET TOP LINE
                                   REDUCTIONS

        Question. The Army's share of the DOD efficiency initiatives in the
    near-term is about $29.5 billion that the Army will keep for
    reinvestment in its own programs. The Army's plan to achieve these
    savings is based on reorganizations and consolidations of management
    activities, deferral of military construction costs, and cancellation
    of some major weapons programs. DOD has also reduced its planned top-
    line by $78.0 billion over fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2016 and
    will achieve this goal, in part, with end strength reductions in the
    Army.
        What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD efficiency
    initiatives and the additional $78.0 billion cut to the top line?
        Answer. The Army must do its part in our national effort to reduce
    the Federal budget deficit and improve our economic posture. The Army
    exceeded Secretary Gates' efficiencies guidance target of $28.3 billion
    by achieving over $29.5 billion in efficiencies and applied these
    savings to enhance capabilities and improve quality of life for our
    soldiers and families.
        Question. In your view, what are the major risks for the Army
    associated with these reductions and, if confirmed, how would you
    propose to manage those risks?
        Answer. The projected reductions in the Army's permanent Active-
    Duty end strength that are part of the DOD's $78 billion top-line
    decrease are based on an assumption that America's ground combat
    commitment in Afghanistan would be reduced by the end of 2014, in
    accordance with the President's strategy. As we reduce end strength, we
    must continue to assess the impacts to our current and future
    requirements. This also applies to our civilian workforce. If I am
    confirmed, I will continue to review the status of efficiencies with
    particular focus on areas we assess as medium to high risk of
    implementing. The Army reviews status of efficiencies with particular
    focus on areas we assess as low to high risk of implementing. Reviews
    are conducted monthly to ensure that we are able to evaluate plan
    development, milestone achievement, and resource execution.
        Question. Harvesting savings through process improvements and
    efficiencies has a mixed record of success in DOD. In your view, how
    likely is it that the planned savings will be achieved?
        Answer. I do know that the Army is working to ensure successful
    implementation or continuation of all efficiencies and related
    initiatives. As I understand it, comprehensive Capability Portfolio
    Reviews and the Task Forces commissioned by the Secretary of the Army
    and the Chief of Staff on such key topics as the Generating Force,
    utilization of the Reserve components, and improved installation
    management are aggressively pursuing these efficiencies. If confirmed,
    I will be in a better position to determine if the Army's objective
    will be achieved. I feel strongly, however, that we have to make sure
    that we achieve real savings through realistic and obtainable methods
    and goals.

                                   MODULARITY

        Question. Modularity refers to the Army's fundamental
    reconfiguration of the force from a division-based to a brigade-based
    structure. Although somewhat smaller in size, modular combat brigades
    are supposed to be just as, or more capable than the divisional
    brigades they replace because they will have a more capable mix of
    equipment--such as advanced communications and surveillance equipment.
    To date, the Army has established over 90 percent of its planned
    modular units, however, estimates on how long it will take to fully
    equip this force as required by its design have slipped to 2019.
        What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's modularity
    transformation strategy?
        Answer. I know the Army is almost complete with transformation and
    is currently assessing the effort. I personally believe that modular
    transformation has increased the Army's ability to meet combatant
    commander requirements and national security strategy objectives by
    providing tailored formations and leaders who are accustomed to
    building teams based on changing requirements. It has enabled us to
    sustain operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. But after almost 6 years
    since the beginning of the modularity transition, we must incorporate
    and capitalize on lessons learned.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions or changes, if any, would you
    propose relative to the Army's modular transformation strategy?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to review Army plans and
    strategies, including the modular transformation strategy, force
    structure, and modernization to ensure the Army continues to provide
    the joint force with the best mix of capabilities to prevail in today's
    wars, and engage to build partner capacity, support civil authorities,
    and deter and defeat potential adversaries.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
    employment and performance of modular combat brigades and supporting
    units in Operations Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn, and Enduring Freedom?
        Answer. As the Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Multi-National Force-
    Iraq, and U.S. Forces-Iraq commander, I was extremely pleased with the
    employment and performance of the modular brigades. Soldiers from
    across the combat, combat support, and combat service support
    formations were able to adapt, change, and react to the ever-changing
    operational environment. We also learned some key lessons that must be
    reviewed. If confirmed, we will review and incorporate these lessons
    into the modular force.
        Question. What changes, if any, would you propose to the modular
    design, the mix of combat and supporting brigades, or modular unit
    employment to improve performance or reduce risk?
        Answer. We are currently working with current and former commanders
    to examine our organizations to see if they are the best we can
    provide. We are continuously looking at alternate force designs and
    force mixes to see how we can improve, in both effectiveness and
    efficiency, our force structure. If confirmed, I will ensure that we
    look at span of control and training and readiness oversight paradigms
    in order to provide the most effective and efficient force to the
    combatant commanders.
        Question. With respect to the Army's modular combat brigade force
    structure design, General Dempsey's June 2011 pamphlet titled: ``CSA's
    Thoughts on the Army's Future,'' directs the Army to assess the
    feasibility of adding a third maneuver battalion to each heavy and
    infantry brigade where there are only two maneuver battalions now.
        What is your understanding and assessment of the need to add a
    third maneuver battalion to the modular heavy and infantry brigades?
        Answer. The Army is currently conducting analysis on this potential
    organizational change through a deliberate and holistic process. I am
    personally in favor of a third maneuver battalion based on my
    experience in combat, stability, and humanitarian missions, but I will
    wait to see the results of the ongoing analysis in order to make a more
    informed decision.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to implement a
    decision to add a third maneuver battalion to the heavy and infantry
    combat brigades? What force structure or capabilities would you propose
    to reduce in order to increase maneuver forces within the combat
    brigades?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review the analysis of the modular
    brigade designs and the associated force mix, including the number and
    type of brigades. I will discuss this with commanders in order to make
    an informed decision on the future force structure and design of our
    combat brigades.

                            ACTIVE-DUTY END STRENGTH

        Question. The Army has increased its Active-Duty end strength over
    the last several years to meet current, and what was believed to be
    future, demands of operational requirements. Authorized Active-Duty
    Army end strength is now 569,400. The Secretary of Defense has
    announced Army Active-Duty end strength reductions beginning this year
    through 2014 of 22,000 soldiers followed by another 27,000 beginning in
    2015. The fiscal year 2012 budget starts this reduction by requesting
    7,400 fewer soldiers.
        In your view, what is the appropriate Army Active-Duty end strength
    needed to meet today's demand for deployed forces, increase non-
    deployed readiness, build strategic depth, and relieve stress on
    soldiers and their families?
        Answer. I know the Army is continuously assessing the factors that
    affect end strength including assigned missions, operational demands,
    unit readiness, soldier and family well-being, Reserve component
    capability and capacity, and fiscal constraints in order to determine
    required Active-Duty end strength. If confirmed, I will work with the
    Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army to determine the
    appropriate Army Active-Duty end strength based on our National
    Military Strategy and contributions to the Joint Force.
        Question. In your view, what is the appropriate Army Active-Duty
    end strength needed to meet the likely future demand for deployed
    forces, maintain non-deployed readiness, ensure ground force strategic
    depth, and avoid increasing stress on soldiers and their families?
        Answer. I am not yet prepared to provide you with an answer on
    future Army end strength. If confirmed, this will be a priority focus
    of mine.
        Question. Plans for the reduction of Army end strength assumes that
    the cuts will be made gradually over several years.
        What, in your view, are the critical requirements for the
    management of this end strength reduction to ensure that should
    strategic circumstances change the cuts can be stopped and, if
    necessary, reversed?
        Answer. End strength reductions should not be automatic. They are
    conditions based and will require periodic assessment. If confirmed, I
    will work with Secretary McHugh and the Army leadership to develop a
    plan that will allow us to accomplish current and projected missions,
    balance the well-being of soldiers and families, and keep us prepared
    to meet unforeseen operational demands by retaining the best leaders
    and sustaining the optimal force structure.
        Question. The gradual reduction of end strength may provide a hedge
    against an unforeseen contingency requiring sufficient and available
    Army forces, however, savings from the reduction of forces could be
    realized sooner and with greater long-term advantages with faster
    implementation.
        What, in your view, are the most important advantages and
    disadvantages of faster end strength reductions?
        Answer. I believe the Army's deliberate and responsible draw-down
    plans should proceed at a pace necessary to ensure mission success, the
    well-being of soldiers and families, compliance with directed resource
    constraints and flexibility for unforeseen demands.
        The advantage of drawing down faster would be the flexibility to
    invest in other required areas. The disadvantages lie in the reduced
    flexibility for meeting unforeseen demands and the ability to maintain
    the skills and quality of the remaining force.
        We want to be able to make sure that we have the force necessary to
    meet the needs of the National Command Authority.
        Question. End strength reductions totaling 49,000 soldiers are
    likely to require force structure reductions.
        If confirmed, how would you propose to reduce Army force structure,
    if at all, to avoid the problems associated with a force that is over-
    structured and under-manned?
        Answer. I would continue to implement the Total Army Analysis
    process to ensure Army force structure contains required capability and
    capacity to meet current and future operational requirements. I am
    dedicated to ensuring that we have a quality force that is trained and
    equipped to meet the needs of our future security challenges.
        Question. How will these planned end strength reductions impact the
    Army's plans for overseas basing of its units?
        Answer. In my present position, I have not had a chance to examine
    the potential impact of end strength reductions on overseas basing. If
    confirmed, I will address this as part of the Army's continuing force
    structure assessment.
        Question. The Army has had two other major post-conflict end
    strength reductions in the last 40 years: after Vietnam and after
    Operation Desert Storm.
        What, in your view, are the critical elements of the planning and
    management of a major force reduction to ensure that the Army as a
    whole is not crippled, impacting ongoing operations or general
    readiness?
        Answer. Today's environment is very different than the one
    following Operation Desert Storm. There are significant uncertainties
    in many regions. We are facing a significantly greater number of
    regional and transnational threats and hot spots that could pose a
    concern for our national security; a sharp and distinct contrast to the
    early 1990s. Therefore, end strength reductions must be conditions
    based, well thought out and executed deliberately and responsibly. The
    Army's plan should ensure accomplishment of its assigned missions,
    operational readiness for future demands, and resource constraints
    while ensuring the sustainment of the All-Volunteer Force.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that
    the planning and management of an end strength reduction minimizes the
    negative impact on the readiness of the Army and soldier families?
        Answer. Whatever decisions are made, we must ensure that we have a
    decisive, quality Army that is trained, ready, and optimally equipped
    while sustaining a healthy environment for our soldiers and families
    which allows them to thrive and grow.
        Question. Does the Army have the legislative authority it needs to
    properly shape the force as part of the personnel drawdown?
        Answer. I am not aware of any specific issues, but if confirmed, I
    will assess this area to ensure the Army has the appropriate
    authorities necessary. Should I determine the need for changes, I will
    work with Secretary McHugh and Congress to identify any needed
    authorities.

                                 STRATEGIC RISK

        Question. Do you believe that the extended pace and scope of
    operations in Iraq and Afghanistan create increased levels of strategic
    risk for the United States based on the lack of available trained and
    ready forces for other contingencies?
        Answer. It is well known that the extended pace and scope of combat
    and other contingency operations over the last 10 years have created a
    demand on our forces that exceeded the previously programmed available
    mission forces. As the Army looks to drawdown in both theaters and
    adjust the boots-on-the-ground to dwell ratios, units will have more
    time to reset, train, and prepare for full spectrum operations. This in
    turn will allow for greater flexibility to meet our national security
    challenges.
        Question. If so, how would you characterize the increase in
    strategic risk in terms of the Army's ability to mobilize, deploy, and
    employ a force for a new contingency? In your view, is this level of
    risk acceptable?
        Answer. The Army would be challenged to generate responsive combat
    power for an additional unforeseen contingency. A concerted effort to
    reduce risk created by unsustainably high deploy-to-dwell ratios is
    required to ensure we maintain a high state of readiness and restore
    strategic depth in our force given these demands. The Army's plan to
    reduce this risk to the force is contingent upon achieving sustainable
    deploy-to-dwell ratios over the long-term, maintaining assured access
    to the Reserve component, adequately providing for soldiers, civilians,
    and families, and receiving reliable, timely, and consistent funding to
    reset depleted equipment sets.
        Question. What is the impact of the decision to decrease Army
    forces committed to Afghanistan on our ability to meet our security
    obligations in other parts of the world?
        Answer. As we continue to reduce our commitments in Iraq and
    Afghanistan, it allows us the ability to reset and train forces to make
    them available to meet other world-wide contingencies and thereby
    reduce the risk. But this will take some time.
        Question. How and over what periods of time, if at all, will
    reductions to Army end strength increase or aggravate this risk?
        Answer. Any potential reductions beyond the 27,000 will be
    thoroughly assessed through our Total Army Analysis modeling efforts to
    understand the risks involved given anticipated mission requirements.
    We must be prudent in our approach to budget cuts and ensure we
    adequately man, train, and equip without hollowing out the force. With
    tightening budgetary constraints, our intent is to arrive at the right
    mix of capabilities to meet current demands as well as future
    challenges and ensure we continue to provide national leaders options
    in a crisis. We will achieve this by ensuring our forces have the
    greatest possible versatility while maintaining core capabilities. Any
    of these reductions must be tied to consideration of the actual
    drawdown of forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
        Question. If confirmed, what additional actions would you take, if
    any, to reduce or mitigate this strategic risk?
        Answer. As we look to the future, it is my view that we have to
    develop an Army that provides depth and versatility to the Joint Force,
    is more efficient in its employment, and provides greater flexibility
    for our national security decisionmakers. Our efforts must be tied to
    the National Military Strategy and our anticipated strategic and
    operational environment.

                INSTITUTIONALIZING SUPPORT FOR IRREGULAR WARFARE

        Question. A major objective of the Department over recent years has
    been increasing emphasis on lower-end, irregular, counterinsurgency,
    and stability-type operations. All of which are areas that place a high
    premium and demands on Army capabilities. In order to ensure that a
    rebalance achieves this objective, and perhaps more importantly is then
    sustainable, Secretary Gates has stressed the need for the Department
    to ``institutionalize and finance'' the support necessary for the
    irregular warfare capabilities that have been developed over the last
    few years and will be needed in the future.
        What, in your view, does it mean to institutionalize capabilities
    and support for irregular warfare capabilities in the Army?
        Answer. Institutionalizing Irregular Warfare means developing the
    appropriate doctrine, organizations, materiel solutions, leader
    developments, personnel assignments and facilities (DOTMLPF) into the
    Army. Thus far, we have institutionalized Irregular Warfare into the
    Army through our Leader Development, Individual, and Collective
    Training and Doctrine Development.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of Army efforts
    to date to institutionalize and support these capabilities?
        Answer. The Army is in the process of creating specified proponents
    responsible for the institutional management for key tasks associated
    with Irregular Warfare:

        1.  The U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
    at Carlisle Barracks charged with maintaining our doctrine on stability
    operations and coordinating with other government agencies to
    facilitate interagency cooperation required to ensure a whole-of-
    government approach to the conduct of stability operations.
        2.  The Army Irregular Warfare Fusion Cell at Fort Leavenworth
    charged with coordinating all IW activities within TRADOC, but in
    particular with maintaining and training doctrine on counterinsurgency.
        3.  The U.S. Army Information Operations Proponent at Fort
    Leavenworth charged with maintaining doctrine on Inform and Influence
    Activities and conducting a course to train officers specifically on
    information operations.
        4.  We are creating a proponent for Cyber/Electromagnetic
    Activities at Fort Leavenworth to write doctrine for Cyber/
    Electromagnetic Activities and manage the entire DOTMLPF process for
    Cyber/EM.
        5.  The Security Force Assistance Proponent provides input on
    working by, with and through host nation security forces to increase
    our partners' capability and capacity. This proponent is located at
    Fort Leavenworth, KS.

        From a doctrine standpoint we have made significant strides in
    creating a mindset that treats all of the above mentioned activities as
    central to how the Army conducts operations. Specifically, within
    doctrine we have done the following:

        1.  The Army's senior operations manual, FM 3-0, has elevated
    stability tasks to be co-equal with combat tasks, in line with DODD
    3000.05. FM 3-0 also designates inform and influence activities and
    cyber/electromagnetic activities as key tasks within the mission
    command warfighting function.
        2.  We published a separate FM on Stability Operations that goes
    into great detail on the tasks of stability operations and how they fit
    within a broader construct of the whole-of-government approach. Further
    we are in the process of writing an additional manual on stability
    tasks that goes into more detail on the specifics at the tactical level
    of tasks directly related to stability operations.
        3.  We published FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, that laid out a new
    and innovative approach to the conduct of counterinsurgency campaigns.
        4.  We published an FM on Information Operations tactics,
    techniques, and procedures, that is currently being updated to account
    for lessons learned in our current conflicts.
        5.  We published an FM on Security Force Assistance that lays out
    guidelines and specific tasks for conducing security force assistance
    operations to build partnership capacity. This manual too is being
    updated based on the latest lessons learned from active operations.
        6.  We are writing doctrine on the conduct of Cyber/Electromagnetic
    Activities.

        The Center for Army Lessons Learned has collected, collated, and
    distributed numerous Handbooks and Newsletters on Irregular Warfare
    related topics, to include:

        1.  The Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines handbook sharing
    best practices and lessons learned from Special Operations Forces that
    are assisting Philippine Military and Police forces conducting
    Counterinsurgency.
        2.  The Army Security Force Assistance handbook that shares best
    practices and lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, Horn of Africa,
    Trans Sahel, and the Philippines.

        The information collected by the Center for Army Lessons Learned
    helps to inform what should be incorporated into new Doctrine and
    Tactics manuals.
        From an organizational standpoint we have also made significant
    changes in our organizational structure to account for all of the
    general tasks mentioned above:

        1.  All of our division, corps, and theater Army headquarters have
    been given additional staff structure specifically to address, inform,
    and influence activities, increased civil affairs capability, increased
    engineer staff to support infrastructure development, and restoration
    of essential services.
        2.  We have created the 1st Information Operations Brigade to
    assist units in the conduct of inform and influence activities, the
    Army Asymmetric Warfare Group to support rapid adaptation to the
    activities of hybrid threats, and U.S. Army Cyber Command to execute
    cyber/electromagnetic activities for the Army.
        3.  We created a specialized training brigade to prepare
    individuals and units to conduct security force assistance missions.
        4.  We are active participants in the Joint Improvised Explosive
    Device Defeat Organization.

        Training the Army starts with the time that soldiers enter the
    Army, all the way through their Professional Military Education (PME).
    We've incorporated Irregular Warfare into basic training scenarios for
    use during initial military training by both soldiers and officers, and
    have counterinsurgency training and education for students attending
    the War College. Irregular Warfare is part of our preparation for units
    deploying to Afghanistan and Iraq:

        1.  Scenarios at our collective training centers include Stability
    Operations, Security Force Assistance, Counterinsurgency, and
    Counterterrorism.
        2.  All Brigade Combat Teams attend a 5-day Counterinsurgency
    seminar at Fort Leavenworth taught by the Army's Counterinsurgency
    Center.

        Question. In your view, what are the obstacles, if any, to
    institutionalizing this kind of support, and what will be necessary to
    overcome them?
        Answer. The biggest obstacles will be downsizing the right
    formations for our mission and requirements. As pressures for cuts in
    defense spending and force structures increase, we will have to assess
    which of these capabilities we retain and at what level. Finding the
    right mix will be a challenge. We can maintain our doctrine and lessons
    learned databases fairly easily, but retaining all of the necessary
    force structure will be more challenging.
        Question. While force structure and program changes may be
    necessary, they are unlikely to prove sufficient to achieve full
    institutionalization. The greater challenge may be found in changing
    Army culture, attitudes, management, and career path requirements and
    choices, for example, through adjustments to organization, training,
    doctrine, and personnel policies.
        In your view, what are the most important changes, if any, that
    might be necessary to complement programmatic changes in support of the
    further institutionalization of capabilities for irregular warfare in
    the Army?
        Answer. The most important thing we need to do is to ensure that we
    educate our leadership through professional military education about
    the conduct of irregular warfare, to include COIN, stability
    operations, inform and influence activities, cyber/EM activities, and
    security force assistance. We must also maintain our doctrine and
    lessons learned that we've gained from almost a decade of active
    operations. We need to keep this knowledge-base updated, based on only
    our own operations, but also those of our coalition partners. Through
    education and maintaining a sound knowledge base, we'll be able to
    respond effectively to a wide range of tasks in the future. Much as the
    Army did between the two world wars, we must have a highly professional
    education system that educates future leaders on the hard earned
    lessons of this past decade so we don't repeat the mistakes of post-
    Vietnam of thinking these kinds of operations are behind us.
        We have to retain the flexibility, adaptability, and agility to
    operate both in missions requiring maneuver over-extended distances and
    in missions requiring the establishment of security over wide areas
    regardless of what kind of threats populate the battlefield.
        Question. Institutionalizing support for irregular,
    counterinsurgency, and stability capabilities in the force does not
    mean ignoring the requirement for the Army to be trained, equipped, and
    ready for major combat at the high-end of the full spectrum of
    operations.
        If confirmed, how would you propose to prioritize and allocate the
    Army's efforts and resources to ensure that the force is prepared for
    major combat while at the same time it increases and institutionalizes
    support for irregular, counterinsurgency, and stability operations?
        Answer. The future battlefield will be populated with hybrid
    threats--combinations of regular, irregular, terrorist, and criminal
    groups. We must train and educate our leaders and units to understand
    and prevail against hybrid threats. We are training and educating our
    soldiers to understand that they must be capable of both combined arms
    maneuver and wide area security in this hybrid threat environment. In
    training, we must replicate the threats and conditions they are likely
    to face in their next mission. For 10 years, that has meant irregular
    threats and conditions common in the wide area security role that
    supports counterinsurgency operations.
        Question. Do you anticipate that the Army will continue to train
    and equip general purpose force brigades for the ``advise and assist
    brigade (AAB)'' mission after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan come to
    an end?
        Answer. I was involved in developing the initial requirements for
    the advise and assist brigades when I was the Multi-National Force-Iraq
    commander. The flexibility of the modular brigades allowed us to
    organize, train, and equip for Security Force Assistance activities. I
    anticipate that there will be an ongoing requirement for Security Force
    Assistance activities of the type carried out by these brigades into
    the future. If confirmed, I will continue to assess requirements and
    work with Congress to ensure we have the resources and flexibility
    required to accomplish these missions.
        Question. If so, what mission essential task list or other training
    guidance changes do you plan to institutionalize this mission set in
    training for the general purpose force brigades?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with our joint partners to
    identify the mission essential tasks for Security Force Assistance and
    incorporate them into the Unified Joint Task List and Army Unified Task
    List.
        Question. Do you foresee that general purpose force brigades or
    other formations will be regionally aligned to carry out an AAB-type
    mission? If so, what changes to unit training and equipping based on
    the requirements of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model will be
    necessary to support regional alignment?
        Answer. As we look to the future, I believe some brigades may be
    regionally aligned. This will depend on combatant command requirements.
    The number and type of brigades will depend upon what we have available
    after meeting the operational requirements in the CENTCOM AOR. If
    confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh to determine the best
    allocation to support operational requirements. The ARFORGEN model and
    our modular design are well-suited to the kind of adaptations that will
    be required to meet Security Force Assistance requirements in the
    future.

                                LESSONS LEARNED

        Question. What do you believe are the major lessons that the Army
    has and should have learned from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF),
    Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and Operation New Dawn (OND) regarding
    its title 10, U.S.C., responsibilities for manning, training, and
    equipping the force?
        Answer.

        1.  We must ensure that our future leaders understand their
    environment. A combination of socio-economic, political, cultural, and
    military factors will affect operations at all levels. We must develop
    leaders who are adaptable and flexible in solving complex problems.
        2.  We have learned that soldiers require more than a year to fully
    recover from extended deployments and to prepare for another
    deployment. We must do better at identifying and incorporating lessons
    learned at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. We have
    learned that the ability to adapt rapidly is the key to success in
    current and future operational environments.
        3.  We must have a fully integrated Reserve component to meet our
    operational needs.
        4.  ARFORGEN works, but must constantly be reviewed and adjusted to
    the operational environment.

        Question. If confirmed, which of these lessons, if any, would you
    address as a matter of urgent priority?
        Answer. They are equally important and all must be addressed in
    order to ensure our Army remains as effective and efficient in the
    future.

                             EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY

        Question. Both deploying and non-deploying Active and Reserve
    component Army units are training without all their required equipment.
    Deploying units do not receive some of their equipment until late in
    their pre-deployment training cycle or as they arrive in theater.
        In your view, has deployment of additional brigades to Afghanistan
    increased the strain on maintenance systems and further reduced
    equipment availability for training?
        Answer. With our commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have a
    significant requirement and responsibility to ensure the most modern
    and capable equipment is available to our forces in combat. This has at
    times limited equipment availability for training. ARFORGEN has helped
    us to manage the movement of equipment for training. It is our
    responsibility to ensure units are properly trained upon deployment. As
    force generation requirements reduce, this will mitigate some of the
    risk.
        Question. What do you expect will be the impact, if any, of our
    drawdown from Iraq and Afghanistan in this regard?
        Answer. The drawdown from Iraq has already improved availability of
    equipment for units to conduct predeployment training. The future
    drawdown in Afghanistan will also help if we sustain the resources to
    do reset.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
    availability of modern equipment to fully support the predeployment
    training and operations of deploying units?
        Answer. With our commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have a
    significant requirement and responsibility to ensure the most modern
    and capable equipment is available to our forces in combat. This has at
    times limited equipment availability for training. ARFORGEN has helped
    us to manage the movement of equipment for training. It is our
    responsibility to ensure units are properly trained upon deployment. As
    force generation requirements reduce this will mitigate some of the
    risk.
        Question. What do you see as the critical equipment shortfalls, if
    any, for training and operations?
        Answer. I understand that the Army is short Unmanned Aerial Systems
    and some non-Line of Sight communications equipment. I am told that
    light infantry equipment shortfalls in Afghanistan are being addressed
    through existing processes. As we continue to reset equipment returning
    from Iraq we will see a steady improvement in on-hand equipment for
    units training for and deploying in support of operational missions.
        Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address these
    shortfalls and ensure that units have what they need to train and
    operate?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the ARFORGEN Model
    of phased equipping through which the Army intensively manages our
    equipment on-hand to ensure next deploying units, from all components,
    have sufficient equipment for training and deployment. If confirmed, I
    will continue our capability portfolio reviews to evaluate our
    priorities against mission requirements and adjust our resource
    allocations to ensure the Army continues to strike the critical balance
    between having enough modern equipment to fully support pre-deployment
    training and operations in theater.

                             EQUIPMENT REPAIR/RESET

        Question. Congress provided the Army with approximately $15 to $17
    billion annually to help with the reset of nondeployed forces and
    accelerate the repair and replacement of equipment. However, the amount
    of reset funding requested for DOD in fiscal year 2012 decreased to
    $11.9 billion from the fiscal year 2011 request of $21.4 billion.
        In your view, is this level of funding sufficient to not only
    prepare Army forces for operations in Afghanistan but to also improve
    the readiness of non-deployed forces for other potential contingencies?
        Answer. The level of funding appears sufficient. In my experience,
    Congress has been very supportive of the Army's reset requests,
    providing the Army with what we require to reset our redeploying
    forces. It is true that in fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011, the
    Army was appropriated approximately $10 billion for reset, and in
    fiscal year 2012, the request is less than half that. However, with the
    drawdown in one theater and more efficient management of materiel
    moving in and out of Afghanistan, our annual reset requirements have
    decreased. The Army will continue requiring reset funding 2 to 3 years
    beyond end of operation in both theaters to move all materiel through
    repair programs.
        Question. Is it your understanding that our repair depots are
    operating at full capacity to meet rebuild and repair requirements for
    reset?
        Answer. It is my understanding that our repair depots are currently
    fully engaged and have the ability to meet a surge in our repair
    requirements as necessary.
        Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe could be
    taken to increase the Army's capacity to fix its equipment and make it
    available for operations and training?
        Answer. The Army has the needed capacity through certain measures,
    such as adding additional shifts, contract augmentation or rebalancing
    workload that could be used to increase production at our facilities.
    This will, of course, also increase cost. At this time, I do not know
    if such measures are necessary. If confirmed, I will look into this
    matter further.
        Question. What impact is this level of funding likely to have, if
    any, on the ability of Army National Guard units to respond to Homeland
    defense and support to civil authorities' missions?
        Answer. I am told that the decrease in the Army's reset funding
    requirements for fiscal year 2012 should have no impact on the Army
    National Guard's ability to respond to Homeland defense missions and
    provide support to civil authorities. I also understand that Reserve
    component reset requirements are fully funded.

                         DEPLOYMENT AND ROTATION CYCLES

        Question. Over the last year, the Active Army's ratio of time spent
    deployed to time at home station has improved from 1:1 to 1:1.6--that
    is for each year deployed a soldier spends about 1\1/2\ years at home
    station. The previously stated Active Army objective was 1:2 whereby
    soldiers could expect to be home for 2 years for each year deployed.
    The Reserve component objective is 1:5 where soldiers can expect to be
    home for 5 years for each year deployed. In General Dempsey's June 2011
    pamphlet titled ``CSA's Thoughts on the Army's Future,'' he sets a new
    dwell time goal of 27 months at home for every 9 months deployed as
    soon as possible.
        What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's near- and
    intermediate-term plans for deployment length (or boots-on-the-ground
    (BOG)) and dwell time?
        Answer. The Army utilizes a rotational ARFORGEN readiness model
    that effectively and efficiently generates trained and ready forces for
    combatant commanders at sustainable levels. ARFORGEN also provides
    ready forces for unforeseen contingencies. Starting in fiscal year
    2012, the Army's intermediate goal for BOG is 1 year deployed to 2
    years dwell at home station for the Active component and 1 year
    deployed to 4 years dwell at home station for Reserve component
    soldiers. The Army's long-term goals are 1 year deployed with 3 years
    at home station for the Active component and 1 year deployed with 5
    years at home station for Reserve component soldiers. The Army is
    moving to a 9-month BOG, which I support. It should begin to reduce
    some of the strain on our soldiers and families. If confirmed, we will
    constantly monitor the implementation of the 9-month BOG and its impact
    on dwell.
        Question. What impact do you expect the proposed troop reductions
    in Iraq and Afghanistan to have on the dwell time of Army soldiers? Is
    it possible that the reduction of demand for Army forces in Iraq alone
    will allow the Army to achieve the 1:2 dwell time goal by the end 2011,
    or the 1:3 dwell time goal (whether in terms of months or years) by
    2014?
        Answer. Utilizing Operation New Dawn (Iraq) drawdown planning
    assumptions, projections show corps, divisions, and Brigade Combat
    Teams will continue to improve BOG/dwell and move closer to achieving
    our goals.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
    potential impact of the decision to decrease Army end strength on the
    rotation schedule and meeting the near-term dwell goal of 1:2 for
    Active-Duty Forces?
        Answer. The Army will plan to reduce its end-strength and
    restructure its force mix consistent with reductions in overseas
    contingency operations commitments and in conjunction with the needs of
    the Department and the combatant commanders. Our intent is to arrive at
    the right mix of capabilities to meet current demands as well as future
    challenges, within budgetary constraints. Based on the current
    strategic guidance and projected future requirements, the Army should
    be able to maintain its progress to reach its Boots on Ground to dwell
    ratio goal and have sufficient troops to respond to unforeseen events.
    But if our overseas contingency operations commitments differ from
    those planned, it will impact BOG/dwell and availability of forces.
        Question. How, in your view, will the proposed reductions in Iraq
    and Afghanistan impact the demand on Army Reserve and National Guard
    troops? In your view, how might a reduction in demand, if any, for Army
    Reserve and Guard troops impact their availability to respond to
    contingencies for Homeland defense and support to civil authorities?
        Answer. The return of these Army National Guard forces to State
    control should provide the Governors and Adjutants General with
    increased forces to conduct Homeland defense, disaster response, and
    defense support of civil authorities. These forces will be better
    trained and more experienced due to their Iraq and Afghanistan combat
    deployments. Although the National Guard has been able to meet all
    disaster relief requirements, the return of forces will allow more
    flexibility to accomplish local missions.
      capabilities of special operations forces and general purpose forces
        Question. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) called for
    increased counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and security force
    assistance capabilities within the general purpose forces (GPF).
        What is your assessment of the QDR with regard to the mix of
    responsibilities assigned to GPF and SOF, particularly with respect to
    security force assistance and building partner military capabilities?
        Answer. The report of the 2010 QDR struck an appropriate balance
    between the capabilities and capacity of our special operations and
    multipurpose forces. Today's demand for security force assistance and
    building partner military capabilities exceeds the capacity of our
    Special Operations Forces requiring the integration of our multi-
    purpose forces with our Special Operations Forces to accomplish the
    mission. Additionally, some of the security force assistance missions,
    such as those related to building national institutions like military
    academies and logistics systems, are typically more appropriate for our
    multipurpose forces and our generating force institutions.
        Question. Do you believe that our general purpose forces need to
    become more like SOF in mission areas that are critical to countering
    violent extremists?
        Answer. Over the last 10 years our multipurpose ground forces have
    developed many of the capabilities once only inherent in our Special
    Operations Forces. Just as our multipurpose forces have improved their
    capabilities, so too have our Special Operations Forces. Both forces
    are national capabilities that must be sustained and continuously
    enhanced. They increase our flexibility and agility. The needs of our
    combatant commanders will continue to inform the degree of overlap or
    specialization required between our special operations and multipurpose
    forces.
        Question. What actions, if any, do you believe need to be taken in
    order to allow SOF and GPF to successfully share these missions in the
    future?
        Answer. In all of the geographic commands, close collaboration and
    planning between SOF and GPF will ensure optimum use of all available
    forces. Additionally, we have a process within DOD whereby combatant
    commanders identify their future needs and request the allocation of
    forces to accomplish specific tasks. Through this process--the Global
    Force Management Process--we integrate the demands and allocation of
    special operations and multipurpose forces to fill combatant commander
    needs. We should integrate combatant commander needs for both special
    operations and multipurpose forces, including their supporting forces,
    into this common process.
        Question. Are there certain mission areas that should be reserved
    for SOF only?
        Answer. Generally speaking, mission areas that require minimal
    footprint or recognized presence, operations independent of larger
    ground forces in the immediate area, or operations that place a premium
    on regional cultural awareness and negotiation skills appear best
    suited for our Special Operations Forces. While our special operations
    and multipurpose forces share much of the same skills, equipment, and
    tactics, our Special Operations Forces are generally more mature, at a
    higher skill level in these common skills, and also equipped and
    trained in unique capabilities. Where that difference is needed for
    mission success, that is where we should employ our Special Operations
    Forces.

                    SPECIAL OPERATIONS ENABLING CAPABILITIES

        Question. The Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
    has described the ``non-availability'' of force enablers as the ``most
    vexing issue in the operational environment'' for SOF. A recent report
    required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010
    (Public Law 111-84) indicated that adequately enabling SOF in the
    future will require improvements to ``the process by which SOF gains
    access to enabler support, and by synchronizing efforts with the
    Services.'' The report also stated that ``Currently, SOF units divert
    scarce organic resources to satisfy enabler requirements and accomplish
    the assigned mission. In future operating environments, the effects of
    enabler shortfalls will be further exacerbated unless SOCOM and the
    Services can better forecast the need for support, codify support
    through formal agreements, and eventually get SOF units and their GPF
    counterparts training together throughout the deployment cycle.''
        If confirmed, how would you work with the Commander of SOCOM to
    address the enabling requirements of Army SOF throughout the deployment
    cycle?
        Answer. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and general purpose forces
    have made great strides in providing integrated sourcing solutions to
    increase the overall combat effectiveness of the force. It is the early
    identification of the right mix of forces that will allow units to
    properly integrate. It is my understanding that U.S. Army Special
    Operations Command (ASOC) is refining its force generation methodology
    to build appropriate enabling support into existing ASOC formations and
    integrating requirements into the ARFORGEN process. Through this
    effort, SOF and critical enabling support will be better integrated on
    a more sustained and predictable basis. If I am confirmed, I will work
    with SOCOM and ASOC to ensure the effective and efficient
    accomplishment of our enabling requirements.
        Question. Vice Admiral William McRaven, Commander of Joint Special
    Operations Command, has stated that SOCOM needs greater personnel
    management authority to shape mid- and senior-grade SOF operators to
    meet SOCOM-defined requirements. In his view, promotions, selection for
    command, selection for advanced educational opportunities, foreign
    language testing policy, and foreign language proficiency bonus payment
    policy all differ significantly by Military Services and are all
    primarily crafted to support Services' needs.
        Do you agree that Army special operations personnel should be
    managed by SOCOM? Please explain.
        Answer. No. The Army must consider both operational needs and
    career management in order to ensure the best possible force for the
    future and not limit flexibility in managing its force. Throughout its
    operations, Special Operations Forces (SOF) have demonstrated a unique
    ability to operate in a joint and multinational environment. There are
    also Service-specific career milestones and development opportunities
    that vary based upon the individual soldier. Given these unique needs,
    the Army should retain management of all members of its force. However,
    we must work closely with SOCOM to identify those skills and
    opportunities needed so we can incorporate appropriate leader
    development programs to meet their needs.

                                 ARMY READINESS

        Question. How would you characterize Army readiness in its deployed
    and non-deployed units?
        Answer. Simply stated, I believe that Army readiness is out of
    balance between deployed and non-deployed units. Deployed and deploying
    Army units are given every priority for manning, equipping, and
    training in order to achieve the combatant commander's mission
    requirements. Due to excessive demand, non-deployed Army units are used
    to provide the additive resources to ensure that deployed and deploying
    Army units can meet mission requirements. Routinely, non-deployed
    commanders are providing personnel and equipment to support deployed
    and deploying units. The effect of these actions on the force and on
    specific operational plans, in specific terms, is amply covered in the
    Chairman's Comprehensive Joint Assessment.
        Question. Do you believe the current state of Army readiness is
    acceptable?
        Answer. No. However, the Army and DOD senior leadership recognize
    that the Army operates in a fiscally constrained environment. The
    readiness of Army units, while of utmost concern to the Senior
    Leadership, must be balanced with other national security and domestic
    priorities. In light of those competing priorities, the Army has
    developed a force generation model that synchronizes available soldiers
    and resources with units during periods of predictable availability.
        Question. How do you see operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
    impacting the readiness of Army forces that may be called upon to
    respond to an attack or another contingency?
        Answer. Clearly, the current demand for Army forces coupled with
    the cumulative effect of nearly 10 years of conflict impacts the Army's
    ability and reduces our flexibility to provide forces to respond to an
    attack or other incident or disaster inside the United States. The Army
    has ``surged'' to meet additional contingencies in the past and will do
    so again in the future--but those ``surge'' operations impact the
    readiness of Army units for months and even years after completion. I
    concur with the specific and well-documented effects and examples
    covered in the Chairman's Comprehensive Joint Assessment.

                       DEPLOYMENTS AND STRESS ON THE ARMY

        Question. Many soldiers are on their fourth and some their fifth
    major deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Beginning in August 2008 DOD
    policy has been to limit deployments for Active component soldiers and
    mobilization of Reserve component soldiers to not longer than 12
    months.
        What is your assessment of the impact of multiple deployments of
    troops to Afghanistan and Iraq on retention, particularly among young
    enlisted and officer personnel after their initial Active Duty
    obligated service has been completed?
        Answer. The Army monitors retention very closely, as I do as a
    commander given the high operational demand and multiple deployments
    that soldiers are experiencing. Statistics reveal that multiple
    deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq are not adversely impacting
    retention.
        Since fiscal year 2005, retention rates of initial term and mid-
    career enlisted soldiers in deploying units has remained above Army
    goals while retention rates among officers continue to exceed historic
    rates and outpace the preceding decade. Continuous improvements to Army
    benefits, such as world class health care advances for wounded
    soldiers, enhancements in family support programs, and additional
    monetary bonuses have encouraged large numbers of our soldiers to
    continue their commitments beyond their obligated service periods. The
    Army is focused now on retaining the highest quality soldiers and
    officers as we move forward into a period of tightly constrained
    resources decreased operational demands, and reductions in authorized
    end strength.
        Question. What are the indicators of stress on the force, and what
    do these indicators tell you about that level of stress currently? In
    addition to any other stress indicators that you address, please
    discuss suicide and divorce rates, drug and alcohol abuse, AWOLs, and
    rates of indiscipline.
        Answer. The indicators of stress on the force that the Army tracks
    continuously include: reenlistments, chapter separations, divorce,
    domestic violence, sexual assault, enlisted desertion, AWOL offenses,
    drug and alcohol enrollments, drug use, courts-martial, and suicides.
        I understand that Army discipline and misconduct rates, including
    desertion, absence without leave and courts-martial, have remained
    steady or declined in the past year while other indicators of stress on
    the force, such as substance abuse and domestic violence have
    increased. However, the significant increase in the number of soldier
    suicides is of the greatest concern. Soldiers and their families
    continue to make significant personal sacrifices in support of our
    Nation. If confirmed, I am committed to providing soldiers and families
    with a quality of life commensurate with their service and to
    continuing Army efforts to develop multi-disciplinary solutions
    directed at mitigating risk behaviors and enhancing soldier and family
    fitness and resilience.
        Question. For how long do you believe these levels of commitments
    can continue before there will be significant adverse consequences for
    the Army?
        Answer. I am very concerned about the long-term health of the force
    if we are unable to achieve the appropriate deployment to dwell ratio
    for our soldiers. Adequate dwell time should help the visible and
    invisible wounds of this protracted conflict. If confirmed, I will
    closely monitor indicators of stress on the force and work to ensure
    that the Army has plans and programs to confront these issues
    appropriately.

    FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY, GENERAL CASEY, STATED THAT THE ARMY
                            WAS ``OUT OF BALANCE.''

        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the concept
    and efforts to achieve ``balance'' for the Army?
        Answer. I understand balance to be the Army's ability to sustain
    the Army's soldiers, families, and civilians, prepare forces for
    success in the current conflict, reset returning units to rebuild the
    readiness consumed in operations and to prepare for future deployments
    and contingencies, and transform to meet future demands. With the help
    of Congress we have made progress over the past 3 years to restore
    balance. If confirmed, I will continue to work with Congress on this
    issue.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you take to
    achieve and sustain Army ``balance''?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh and Army
    leadership to adopt measures and strategies to achieve and sustain
    balance. Building and maintaining resilience among our forces will be
    one of my highest priorities.

                ``TOXIC'' LEADERSHIP IN THE ARMY (G1, ASA M&RA)

        Question. A recent press report outlined the results of an Army
    survey of leadership and morale that found 80 percent of Army officers
    and noncommissioned officers had observed and 20 percent had worked for
    a ``toxic'' leader in the last year. According to the press report, the
    survey, conducted by the Center for Army Leadership at Fort
    Leavenworth, KS, concluded that toxic leadership ``may create a self-
    perpetuating cycle with harmful and long-lasting effects on morale,
    productivity, and retention of quality personnel.'' They also note
    that, ``there is no indication that the toxic leadership issue will
    correct itself.''
        What is your understanding and assessment of ``toxic'' leadership
    in the Army and its impact or potential impact, if any, on morale,
    productivity, and retention of quality personnel?
        Answer. Throughout my career my top priority has been to create an
    environment where individual soldiers and leaders feel empowered and a
    central part of the organization to which they are assigned. Leadership
    built on trust, values and standards is essential to our success. Our
    Army leaders must be disciplined, positive, tolerant, supremely
    competent, and exemplars of our system of values. Anything less
    negatively impacts morale, unit effectiveness, and individual soldiers'
    willingness to continue service.
        If confirmed, we will review and assess how we continue to prepare
    our leaders for command and will develop practices that will allow us
    to identify ``toxic'' leader environments and take action to correct.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you propose to take, if
    any, to deal with the risk to the Army posed by ``toxic'' leadership?
        Answer. Leadership education is a critical component in ensuring a
    positive command climate. The Army's professional military education
    curricula and pre-command specific training address this important
    aspect of leadership. If confirmed, I will work with my staff to ensure
    that the Army continues looking at itself to determine if it is placing
    appropriate emphasis at all levels of military education on the
    interpersonal dynamics of positive command climate.
        Question. What are your views on the benefits and risks of
    incorporating input from both subordinates and peers, also known as
    ``360-degree'' evaluations, into the officer and non-commissioned
    officer evaluation and promotion selection systems?
        Answer. Constructive criticism from peers and subordinates can be
    an invaluable tool to help leaders see themselves from different
    perspectives. It is my understanding that the Army is currently
    evaluating options for revision of its Performance Evaluation System
    and that a tool utilizing the Army's Multi-source assessment and
    feedback/360 degree will be incorporated beginning on 1 October of this
    year. There will also be a requirement to discuss the 360 degree
    assessment feedback as part of periodic performance counseling. The
    Army is also considering inclusion of a 360 degree assessment into the
    Brigade Command Selection process. I look favorably on changes to our
    performance evaluation system that enhance the development of leaders
    without risking fair and equitable treatment of all our soldiers.

                  RESERVE COMPONENTS AS AN OPERATIONAL RESERVE

        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's
    Reserve components as an Operational Reserve, as opposed to its
    longstanding traditional role as a Strategic Reserve?
        Answer. The demand for U.S. ground forces over this past decade has
    required continuous use of Active component and Reserve component
    forces in order to meet the Army's operational requirements. The
    Reserve component is no longer solely a Strategic Reserve. Current and
    projected demand for Army forces will require continued access to the
    Reserve component. Mobilization and operational use of the Reserve
    component will continue for the foreseeable future.
        Question. In your view, what are the major challenges to
    maintaining and enhancing the Army Reserve and Army National Guard as a
    relevant and capable Operational Reserve?
        Answer. In my opinion, the Army must ensure continued access to the
    Reserves as an essential part of the Total Force. If confirmed, I will
    work to ensure they have the necessary training and equipment to
    accomplish all missions. Maintaining an appropriate level of resourcing
    for the Operational Reserve and mobilizing these forces on a
    predictable and recurring basis will be important to our success.
        Question. What are your views about the optimal role for the
    Reserve component forces in meeting combat missions?
        Answer. Reserve component forces play a critical role in enabling
    the Joint Force Commanders to meet assigned missions. Today's force is
    structured to balance maneuver capability in the Active component with
    a majority of the enablers in the Reserve component. This balance
    should provide capabilities to meet operational requirements in
    sustained operations.
        In addition, the Reserve components are well-suited for those
    operational missions that are recurring and predictable, such as
    enduring overseas contingency operations, support of treaty
    obligations, Homeland defense and theater security cooperation
    requirements.
        Question. In your view, should DOD assign Homeland defense or any
    other global or domestic civil support missions exclusively to the
    Reserve?
        Answer. Reserve component forces are uniquely positioned to be the
    first responder to these missions, however, the Army's Total Force must
    be able to execute Homeland defense or other global domestic support
    missions.
        Through experience we've found that the Army works best as a Total
    Force, sharing requirements and responsibilities across the formation
    and between components. Although Reserve component forces are uniquely
    positioned to be the first military responder to these missions, the
    Army's Total Force must be able to execute Homeland defense as well as
    other global and domestic support missions.
        Question. In your view, how will predictable cycles of 1-year
    mobilized to 5 years at home affect the viability and sustainability of
    the All-Volunteer Reserve Force?
        Answer. Once the Army can restore its balance and stress on the
    force has been significantly reduced, a predictable cycle that ensures
    full recovery and training will support the viability and
    sustainability of the All-Volunteer Reserve Force. The Army's long-term
    goal of 1-year deployed to 5 years at home station for Reserve
    component units is optimal in supporting both the unit's ability to
    effectively generate readiness, and to ensure soldier and family well-
    being and employability.
        Question. Advocates for the National Guard and Reserve assert that
    funding levels do not meet the requirements of the Reserve components
    for operational missions.
        Do you agree that the Army's Reserve components are inadequately
    resourced, particularly in view of the commitment to maintaining an
    Operational Reserve?
        Answer. Nine years of mobilization and employment for current
    contingencies has produced the most experienced, ready Reserve
    component forces in history and yielded unprecedented readiness levels.
    The Army must continue to adequately resource the Reserve command for
    training and operational requirements. Failure to resource an
    Operational Reserve may result in unit and enabler shortfalls to the
    total Army.

                             NATIONAL GUARD ISSUES

        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of changes in
    the global and domestic roles and missions of the Army National Guard
    and the National Guard Bureau in the last decade?
        Answer. The Army National Guard is and will remain a critical
    component of the Army. It provides depth to the Army and links us to
    the local U.S. population. During the last 10 years, the Army National
    Guard has transformed from a Strategic Reserve to an operational force,
    a trend which should continue with predictable operational use of the
    Reserve components. The Army National Guard, with direction and
    oversight provided by the National Guard Bureau, has proven to be
    integral to the Army's Total Force.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's
    commitment to fully fund Defense Department requirements for Army
    National Guard equipment?
        Answer. The Army is committed to fully equipping the Army National
    Guard to DOD requirements, and I understand significant progress in
    achieving both modernization and interoperability has been made as the
    Army National Guard has transformed to an operational force. If
    confirmed, I will maintain emphasis on the importance of the Army
    National Guard and its readiness as a part of the Army Total Force.
        Question. In your view, do Army processes for planning,
    programming, budgeting, and execution sufficiently address these
    requirements for National Guard equipment?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will examine the funding of the Army
    National Guard to ensure it receives the appropriate level of resources
    as a part of the Army's Total Force.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that these equipment
    needs of the Army National Guard are fully considered and resourced
    through the Army budget process? In your view, what is the appropriate
    role for the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in this regard?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chief, National
    Guard Bureau to ensure that Army National Guard requirements and needs
    are considered, and appropriately synchronized with Army priorities and
    resourcing strategy.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the effect,
    if any, of increasing the grade of the Chief of the National Guard
    Bureau to General (O-10)?
        Answer. The increase in grade reflects the importance of the
    National Guard to our Total Force and the significant responsibilities
    of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. I have had the opportunity
    to work closely with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau on several
    issues as Commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq and U.S. Joint Forces
    Command.
        Question. In your opinion, should the Chief of the National Guard
    Bureau be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
        Answer. I am aware of this topic, but have not had any discussions
    regarding the Chief of the National Guard Bureau becoming a member of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will consider this important
    question further before forming my opinion.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the role and
    authority of the Director of the Army National Guard, and, in your
    view, how does this compare with the role and authority of the Chief of
    the Army Reserve?
        Answer. The Director of the Army National Guard leads the Army
    National Guard Directorate of the National Guard Bureau, and assists
    the Chief, National Guard Bureau in carrying out the functions of the
    National Guard Bureau as they relate to the Army. The Director, Army
    National Guard serves as a member of the Army Staff and as a Reserve
    component chief in similar fashion to the Chief, Army Reserve.
        Question. In your view, should the Director of the Army National
    Guard be ``dual hatted'' as a Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army?
        Answer. I have not had the opportunity to fully consider this issue
    before, but if confirmed, will be better able to understand the duties
    and responsibilities of Director, Army National Guard as they relate to
    the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Army Staff.
        Given my understanding of the National Guard Bureau, however, the
    Chief, National Guard Bureau is the principal advisor to the Chief of
    Staff of the Army on National Guard matters, while the Director, Army
    National Guard assists the Chief of National Guard Bureau in carrying
    out the functions of the Bureau as they relate to the Army.
        If confirmed, I will continue to study the duties and
    responsibilities of Director, Army National Guard as they relate to the
    Chief of Staff of the Army and the Army Staff and make recommendations
    as appropriate.
        Question. In your view, should there be a requirement that the
    position of Commander, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) or Commander,
    U.S. Army North, the Army component commander, be filled only by a
    National Guard officer? Please explain.
        Answer. No. We want to sustain flexibility to ensure we have the
    most experienced and capable leaders. In my opinion, we should not be
    restricted to Reserve component or Active Duty component when selecting
    a commander to fill either of these positions. Recognizing the roles of
    NORTHCOM and Army North, however, it is logical to conclude that Army
    National Guard leaders should be considered for senior command and
    staff positions.

               GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM RECEIVERS AND EQUIPMENT

        Question. As a major user of global positioning system (GPS)
    receivers, what is your understanding and assessment of the Army's
    participation, if any, in testing GPS receivers and equipment that use
    GPS signals with respect to potential interference or disruptions
    associated with commercial broadband services?
        Answer. The Army is a major acquirer of GPS systems both stand
    alone or embedded in other weapon systems that require position
    location information. I understand that the Army has tested these
    systems to verify their requirements, including their GPS
    functionality. The Army has been a partner with the Air Force,
    developers of the GPS constellation, since the inception of the
    program, and has participated extensively in development and
    operational testing throughout the life of the program.
        Question. Has all Army equipment utilizing GPS signals been tested?
        Answer. The Army has tested all GPS equipment it provides to the
    field either through independent development tests, operational tests,
    in partnership with other services and in participation in the prime
    contractor test efforts. The Army will continue to conduct testing in
    this manner to address continuing equipment developments, the
    introduction of new GPS features, and evolutionary changes to the GPS
    system.
        Question. Is there specific equipment, if any, that has not been
    tested for which interference or disruption is not known?
        Answer. I am not aware of any. The GPS program continues to evolve,
    as it must, to address changes in technology and to address any
    disruptions or attempts by adversaries to deny us the use of GPS. The
    Army will participate in the testing of new GPS equipment and waveform
    (signaling) changes to verify systems performance. New GPS security,
    space segment, and waveform changes meant to improve GPS performance
    will be tested as those program enhancements mature and proceed through
    their development cycles.
        Question. In your view, has the time allotted for testing been
    adequate?
        Answer. Yes, based on my current understanding, the time allotted
    to testing has been adequate.
        Question. What are the preliminary results, if any, from testing?
        Answer. All equipment testing is meant to verify performance of the
    systems against the requirements levied upon them prior to providing
    them to the field. Testing has been successful and any issues resulting
    from tests are addressed and any fixes are verified and incorporated
    via software or hardware changes as necessary.

                                WOMEN IN COMBAT

        Question. What is your view of the appropriate combat role for
    female soldiers on the modern battlefield?
        Answer. Because of the distributive nature of the battlefield in
    Iraq and Afghanistan, women's exposure to combat conditions has changed
    significantly. We must conduct constant reviews and assess how women
    can continue to improve our capabilities and flexibility and maximize
    their contributions to the Army.
        Female soldiers have been and continue to be an integral part of
    our Army team, contributing to its success and overall readiness, as
    they perform exceptionally well in specialties and positions open to
    them and remain critical to the success of ongoing missions in Iraq and
    Afghanistan.
        Question. In your view, should the current Army policy prohibiting
    the assignment of women to ground combat units be revised or clarified
    in any way to reflect changing roles for female soldiers and the
    changing nature of warfare?
        Answer. I believe we must constantly assess the role of women,
    especially considering the changing nature of war and our experiences
    over the last 10 years. A review of current policies and regulations is
    ongoing in concert with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
    (Personnel and Readiness), as directed in the Women in the Service
    Restriction (WISR) under section 535, National Defense Authorization
    Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2011. If any changes are determined to be
    appropriate, required notice would be provided to Congress prior to
    implementing any changes to current policy.
        Question. Do you believe that it is appropriate for female soldiers
    to serve in positions in which they may be exposed to combat?
        Answer. Women in the Army continue to make tremendous contributions
    as well as demonstrate their selfless-service and sacrifices in roles
    and responsibilities critical to the safety and security of our Nation
    and to the readiness of the Army. The contemporary operating
    environment finds our female soldiers serving in positions that have
    exposed them to combat and they have proven that they are up to any
    task, regardless of their occupational specialty, when freedom is
    threatened and when their country calls.

                                    SUICIDES

        Question. The committee continues to be concerned about the
    continuing increase in soldier suicides, especially the increase in
    Reserve component suicides. In June 2010, the Army released a report on
    Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention that analyzed
    the causes of suicides in the Army and in Chapter III (``The Lost Art
    of Leadership in Garrison'') reported disturbing trends in drug use,
    disciplinary offenses, high risk behaviors, and inadequate responses by
    Army leaders.
        In your view, what is the cause of this apparent increase in the
    number of suicides of Reserve component members?
        Answer. I am concerned about suicide as an issue for the Total
    Army, including both the Active component and the Reserve component.
    The Army is focusing attention on the differences between our Active
    component and Reserve component suicides because there may be unique
    variables at play for Reserve component soldiers not serving on Active
    Duty, including: economic and civilian job-related stress; military
    service factors; and access to medical and behavioral health care. The
    economic recession has added additional stress to those Reserve
    component soldiers who find it increasingly difficult to find or
    sustain employment whether as a result of a military deployment or
    merely the prospect of one. Within their military units, Reserve
    component soldiers are often only involved with their chain of command
    during battle assemblies and have fewer opportunities to form ``buddy
    teams'' of peers. In terms of access to medical and behavioral health
    care, Reserve component soldiers generally do not have the same access
    to base and family support services, such Army Substance Abuse Program,
    Family Life Chaplains, and other Services that Active Duty soldiers
    utilize.
        Question. What is your assessment of the Army's response to the
    continuing increase in suicide rates?
        Answer. Leaders across the Army have taken aggressive steps to
    improve the health of the force, decrease high risk behavior, and stem
    the increasing rate of suicides in our formations. This is a very
    complex issue and it is going to take fully engaged leadership to
    modify programs and policies, fully understand the causes for this
    increase, identify the indicators, and implement appropriate
    intervention measures. After nearly a decade of war, we are working to
    keep pace with the expanding needs of our strained Army, and
    continuously identify and address the gaps that exist in our policies,
    programs, and services. The Army Health Promotion, Risk Reduction and
    Suicide Prevention Report 2010, along with the DOD Task Force on the
    Prevention of Suicide by Members of the Armed Forces and other
    strategic reports, serve as the foundation for our systemic effort to
    improve.
        Question. What is the Army doing to address the disciplinary and
    other issues raised in the report on Health Promotion, Risk Reduction,
    and Suicide Prevention?
        Answer. The Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide
    Prevention (HP/RR/SP) report was a focused 15-month effort by a
    multidisciplinary team (leader/medical/personnel/law enforcement) to
    better understand the increasing rate of suicides in the force. This
    candid report informed and educated Army leaders on the importance of
    identifying and reducing high risk behavior related to suicide and
    accidental death, and promoting help-seeking behavior. Important issues
    raised in the report include: gaps in the current policies, processes
    and programs necessary to mitigate high risk behavior; an erosion of
    adherence to existing Army policies and standards; an increase in
    indicators of high risk behavior including illicit drug use other
    crimes, suicide attempts, and an increased operational tempo.
        To address gaps in the current policies, processes and programs
    necessary to mitigate high risk behavior, the Army has taken actions
    such as establishing policies that limit the duration of prescriptions
    for controlled substances to 6 months, which addresses the issue of
    abuse of pharmaceutical drugs.
        To address the erosion of adherence to existing Army policies and
    standards, the Army has established policies emphasizing the Army's
    current policies and systems for assessment, detection, and
    intervention of high risk behavior. This has already increased our
    compliance and utilization rates across numerous proven policies and
    processes.
        To address the complex stressors associated with an increased
    operational tempo, the Army has increased the number of chaplains,
    behavioral health providers, substance abuse counselors and military
    family life consultants. These care providers work with soldiers and
    their families during high-stress periods, both prior to deployment/
    mobilization and during reintegration upon return from deployment.
        Question. What is your assessment of the status of the Army's
    Resiliency Program in ensuring the readiness and well being of the
    Total Force?
        Answer. The Army's Resiliency Program, Comprehensive Soldier
    Fitness, initiated in 2008, has been fully deployed beginning in fiscal
    year 2009. This is a long-term strategy that better prepares the Army
    community--including all soldiers, family members, and Department of
    the Army civilian workforce--to not only survive, but also thrive at a
    cognitive and behavioral level in the face of protracted warfare and
    the everyday challenges of Army life that are common in the 21st
    century. It has made developing psychological strength as much a part
    of Army culture as becoming physically fit and technically proficient.
        The program, based on 30-plus years of scientific study and
    results, uses individual assessments, virtual training, classroom
    training, and embedded resilience experts to provide the critical
    skills our soldiers, family members, and Army civilians need. There is
    now solid scientific evidence that a well-implemented resilience
    program increases good coping, adaptability, and decrease catastrophic
    thinking among soldiers, especially young soldiers. A robust program
    evaluation is continuing to ensure we continue to provide the best
    education and training for our force.
        Question. The National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) is
    currently performing a 5-year, $50 million study on suicides in the
    Army (referred to as the Study to Assess Risk and Resilience in
    Servicemembers) (STARRS). According to NIMH, preliminary data reveal
    several potential predictors for suicide as well as a three-fold
    increase in suicide rates among women who have deployed.
        In light of this information, and based on your own experience as
    commander, what actions will you take, if confirmed, to enhance the
    Army's suicide prevention program?
        Answer. It is important to recognize that the problem of the
    increasing suicide rate is complex. The findings from Army STARRS are
    being used to inform the Force, raise awareness, and promote help-
    seeking behavior. The Army STARRS team will continue to work with Army
    leadership to analyze and integrate context into the research that is
    being conducted. This is an enduring problem that requires enduring
    solutions. If confirmed, I will sustain the extensive leader focus on
    this issue and its challenges.

                          SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED SOLDIERS

        Question. Wounded soldiers from Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi
    Freedom, and New Dawn deserve the highest priority from the Army for
    support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation
    for return to duty, successful transition from Active Duty, if
    required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet,
    as the revelations at Fort Stewart in 2003 and Walter Reed in 2007
    revealed, the Army was not prepared to meet the needs of returning
    wounded soldiers.
        In your view, what were the most critical shortcomings in warrior
    care since 2001?
        Answer. The quality of military medical care has and continues to
    be superb. I have seen first-hand how innovations such as the combat
    application tourniquet and combat gauze have saved hundreds of lives on
    the battlefield, allowing severely wounded soldiers to avoid bleeding
    to death before additional medical care is able to get to them. At the
    outset of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the Army's
    infrastructure in garrison was lacking in the area of housing and
    managing outpatient care for returning wounded, ill, and injured
    soldiers. Additionally, we identified shortcomings in traumatic brain
    injury, post-traumatic stress, behavioral health, and pain management.
    Since 2001, we have invested significant research and resources to
    learn how to better care for these injuries and as a result have
    developed formal programs to improve warrior care. If confirmed, I will
    work with Secretary McHugh to ensure we continue to assess and enable
    procedures, processes, and care for our soldiers.
        Question. What is your assessment of the Army's response?
        Answer. With the support of Congress, the Army has improved in the
    housing of wounded and injured soldiers, developed well-resourced
    Wounded Warrior Transition Units (WTU) and more effectively centralized
    our Army programs under the Warrior Transition Command. If confirmed, I
    will work with Secretary McHugh to assess and monitor procedures,
    processes, and care of our soldiers.
        Question. How does the Army provide follow-on assistance to wounded
    personnel who have separated from Active Service?
        Answer. In 2004, the Army created the Wounded Warrior program to
    provide follow on assistance to wounded personnel who separated from
    service. Under the program, the Army maintains contact with soldiers to
    provide a continuum of care and support.
        Question. How effective, in your view, are those programs?
        Answer. With more than 190 advocates stationed around the country
    in Department of Veteran Affairs medical facilities, at WTUs, and
    everywhere severely injured Army veterans reside, the Army Wounded
    Warrior (AW2) Program has continued to progress in support of our
    wounded warriors. These advocates enhance the Veteran Affairs Federal
    Recovery Care Coordinators to ensure seamless support for our most
    seriously wounded. As part of the Warrior Transition Command, AW2 is
    now positioned to ease the transition from soldier to veteran as part
    of a continuum of care and support that stretches from the battlefield
    to where they reside today. We still have some work to ensure seamless
    medical care as we transition our wounded warriors to the VA. We will
    continue to assess and make adjustments.
        Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and
    resources that you would pursue to increase the Army's support for
    wounded personnel, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty
    or to civilian life?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continuously assess the efficiency and
    appropriateness of the Army's support for wounded personnel. I would
    implement strategies and seek resources as needed to ensure that the
    Army meets the needs of wounded soldiers.
        Question. Studies following the revelations at Walter Reed point to
    the need to reform the Army's disability evaluation system.
        What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's disability
    evaluation system?
        Answer. The Disability Evaluation System (DES) is better than it
    was 4 years ago; legislative changes and the new Integrated Disability
    Evaluation System has made the system less adversarial; provided
    greater consistency between military and VA ratings; reduced the time
    it takes to start receiving VA benefits after separation. However, the
    DES remains complex, disjointed, and hard to understand. We must do
    better to achieve a sustainable system that is understood and better
    serves our wounded warriors. I also believe the rehabilitation and
    disability evaluation systems deserve a broader national and
    interagency discussion which focuses on the holistc care of our wounded
    warriors as they transition from the Army to the VA.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you direct to
    address needed changes in this system, including the Army's growing
    population of non-deployable injured, ill, or wounded soldiers?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the other Services, DOD, the
    Department of Veterans Affairs to bring real reform to the process and
    get the Services out of the disability evaluation business.

              ARMY WARRIOR CARE AND TRANSITION PROGRAM (OTSG, G1)

        Question. In February, the Pittburgh Tribune-Review published a
    series of articles that alleged that the Army's 38 WTUs had become ``a
    dumping ground for criminals, malingerers, and dope addicts'' creating
    an imbalance of soldiers who need complex medical case management and
    soldiers that commanders do not want to take on combat deployment.
        Does the Army have adequate guidelines to ensure that only those
    soldiers with qualifying medical needs are assigned to WTUs?
        Answer. I am concerned that WTUs maintain the focus on complex
    medical care management and support those soldiers with a genuine need.
    If confirmed, I will continuously assess guidelines to ensure that only
    soldiers with qualifying needs are assigned to the WTUs.
        Question. In your view, are the WTUs serving the purpose for which
    they were created?
        Answer. Over the past 4 years, the Warrior Care and Transition
    Program has significantly improved the quality of care and support
    soldiers and families have received.
        Question. If confirmed, do you plan to make any changes to the
    criteria for assignment to a WTU?
        Answer. While I do not have plans to change the criteria for
    assignment to WTUs at this time, this is an issue I will thoroughly
    assess, if confirmed. Also, I will continually assess the effectiveness
    of the Warrior Care and Transition Program to ensure it provides the
    level of care and support our wounded warriors deserve.
        Question. Staffing of WTUs has been a major issue, especially at
    installations experiencing surges of redeploying troops.
        In your view, are the WTUs staffed with sufficient numbers of
    qualified personnel?
        Answer. While not fully informed concerning existing staffing
    levels in WTUs. I know that the Army Staff led by the Director of Force
    Management, in coordination with key leaders from the U.S. Army Medical
    Command and the Warrior Transition Command, reviews the structure and
    staffing of the WTUs on a quarterly basis. I will, if confirmed, learn
    more about this area and ensure that the WTUs are appropriately
    resourced to support the soldiers under their care.
        implementation of the repeal of ``don't ask don't tell'' policy
        Question. What is your assessment of the Army's readiness and
    capability to implement the repeal of the ``Don't Ask Don't Tell''
    (DADT) policy?
        Answer. Per the Chief of Staff, Army memorandum for Director, Joint
    Staff, subject: Assessment of Preparedness for Implementation of the
    Repeal of Don't Ask, Don't Tell, dated July 6, 2011: Based on both
    objective and subjective criteria, it is the CSA's judgment that the
    Army is prepared for implementation of the repeal of Don't Ask, Don't
    Tell consistent with the standards of military readiness, military
    effectiveness, unit cohesion, and the recruiting and retention of the
    Armed Forces. I concur in this assessment. Policies have been reviewed
    and training conducted to prepare for repeal within 60 days after
    certification.
        Question. What in your view are the major challenges, if any, that
    could confront the Army in implementing the repeal of DADT? If
    confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose taking to deal with
    these challenges?
        Answer. The most important challenge has been educating our
    soldiers who are in combat situations with a minimum of disruption and
    risk and we have already successfully trained over 92 percent of the
    soldiers currently in theater with expected completion by mid-August.
    Although we have done some training with currently deployed units, we
    have made it our priority to train units prior to deploying and upon
    redeployment, and have allowed deployed units the maximum time to
    complete training. We will follow up with deployed units to ensure that
    all soldiers receive the required training upon their return from
    deployment.
        Question. What measures has the Army taken to focus training on
    combat units and other deployed units and ensure that repeal of the
    current policy does not adversely affect combat operations?
        Answer. The Army is using a chain teach methodology, where each
    commander is responsible for educating his/her subordinates and they in
    turn train their soldiers. Commanders and leaders are carefully
    managing deployed units' training to minimize impact on the mission.
    The Army continues to make every effort to train units prior to
    deployment.
        Question. If confirmed, what conditions or circumstances would you
    expect to be achieved, if any, before recommending that the Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs certify that DADT can be repealed without adversely
    affecting the Army?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would base my recommendation on the input I
    receive from commanders and leaders, various assessments on chain
    teaching and propensity to serve consistent with the requirements
    established by Congress and the DOD leadership. The Army is completing
    training according to Army guidance.

                          ARMY ROLE IN THE JOINT FORCE

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on the role of the Army as a part of
    the joint force.
        We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may
    incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your
    answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may
    have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the
    views expressed by General Dempsey.
        Answer. I generally concur with General Dempsey that the Army best
    contributes to improved joint military capabilities while preserving
    its service unique capabilities and culture by providing forces for
    prompt and sustained combat operations on land and making permanent the
    advantages gained by the joint forces.
        I would add, however, that I will continue to look closely at what
    capabilities the Joint Force and Nation require of its Army. We have
    learned to fight well as a Joint Force over the past decade and to
    leverage our sister service strengths and unique capabilities. If
    confirmed, one of my charters will be to ensure the Army continues to
    look outwardly at its role as a member of the Joint Force.

                               ACQUISITION ISSUES

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on the poor performance and
    challenges of major defense acquisition programs and the Army's efforts
    with its capability portfolio review process.
        We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may
    incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your
    answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may
    have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the
    views expressed by General Dempsey.
        Answer. I generally concur with General Dempsey's answers to the
    acquisition issues raised in the advance policy questions. The Army
    must have carefully refined contract requirements, a sound program
    strategy, and stable funding to be successful in fielding major weapons
    systems and any other large acquisition programs. We also need to take
    a hard look at our acquisition process overall in an effort to shorten
    the delivery time, reduce costs, and improve our record of delivering
    the capability we require. Building a degree of flexibility to react to
    emerging requirements during production may be one area to consider but
    I would need to study this issue further before I make any specific
    recommendations for change.
        I believe the Army is a learning organization and it continues to
    look for ways to improve itself in the acquisition arena, through both
    internally directed reviews like the Decker-Wagner study commissioned
    by the Secretary of the Army and external reviews like the Comptroller
    General's assessment referenced in the acquisition questions. As
    General Demspey pointed out, we are already making progress with future
    programs and I am confident in our ability to continue to improve in
    our future acquisitions.
        If I am confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the results of these
    assessments and I pledge to work diligently with the Secretary of the
    Army and the Army leadership, along with the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense and Congress, to ensure a unified effort toward acquisition
    effectiveness and efficiency that meets the capability needs of our
    force.
        Question. If so, what steps do you believe the Department of the
    Army should take to address these problems?
        Answer. The Department of the Army has already begun taking steps
    to address these concerns. There is a renewed emphasis on collaboration
    between the requirements and acquisition communities in the development
    of new programs. Last year, Secretary McHugh commissioned a thorough
    review of the Army's acquisition process led by Hon. Gil Decker and Gen
    (Ret.) Lou Wagner that provides a blueprint for improvements to the
    acquisition process. I understand the Army is now studying these
    recommendations and developing a plan to implement those that help our
    process. As a whole, the Department must continue to build on these
    efforts to avoid unnecessary cost and delay in our programs.

                               ARMY MODERNIZATION

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on Army modernization efforts over
    the last decade and the findings of a recent modernization study done
    for the Secretary of the Army by former Assistant Secretary of the Army
    Gilbert Decker and retired Army General Louis Wagner.
        We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may
    incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your
    answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may
    have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the
    views expressed by General Dempsey.
        Answer. I concur with General Dempsey's assessments of the Army's
    modernization efforts over the last decade. We have had success when it
    comes to equipping our soldiers, but we have also learned some valuable
    lessons including the importance of carefully and rigorously reviewing
    programs before we initiate them. If I am confirmed, I pledge that I
    will study the Army's acquisition process, and the results of the
    recent reviews of the process, and work closely with Secretary McHugh
    to identify areas where we can improve our modernization efforts and
    the acquisition process. I will definitely look hard at our capability
    as an Army to meet all potential threats and to operate in the variety
    of environments we are sure to find ourselves.
        I recognize that all of my decisions and recommendations with
    respect to vision, structure, force mix, and modernization will be made
    against a backdrop fiscal constraint. However, I also agree with
    General Dempsey in that every decision and recommendation for trade-
    offs must be made only after considering and consciously acknowledging
    an acceptable level of risk.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to
    take to achieve a genuinely stable modernization strategy and program
    for the Army?
        Answer. I recognize that a stable modernization strategy and
    program is an important component to both a balanced Army and to
    exercise good stewardship of resources entrusted to the Services. If
    confirmed, I will work closely with Secretary McHugh on how to achieve
    this.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's
    current modernization investment strategy?
        Answer. While it is true that several of our major modernization
    efforts over the past decade have been unsuccessful, I would submit
    that the American soldier today is the best equipped and enabled
    soldier this country has ever fielded. Successes such as the Stryker
    vehicle, world class body armor, soldier night vision equipment,
    soldier weapons, Precision fire systems such as Excalibur and HIMARS,
    and vehicles such as the Family of Medium Trucks all suggest to me that
    the Army has had some tremendous success in modernization.
        I believe the Army has learned and continues to learn some
    important and valuable lessons in its processes and mindset to more
    carefully and rigorously review programs both before we initiate them
    and while they are in progress. We will have to do better as we move
    forward. This will be an area I will assess more deeply if I am
    confirmed as Chief of Staff and will periodically give this committee
    my frank assessments.
        Question. Do you believe that this strategy is affordable and
    sustainable?
        Answer. If confirmed, I plan to closely examine this strategy to
    ensure it is affordable and sustainable.

                          ARMY WEAPON SYSTEM PROGRAMS

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on several specific major Army
    research, development, and acquisition programs.
        We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may
    incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your
    answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may
    have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the
    views expressed by General Dempsey.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure to monitor the progress and
    validity of each of these programs with respect to our current and
    future capability requirements.

         1.  Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV). In the development of the Ground
    Combat vehicle--the replacement for the Bradley Infantry Fighting
    vehicle--the Army is fully committed to the ``Big Four'' imperatives:
    Soldier protection; soldier capacity (squad plus crew); the capability
    to operate across the Full Spectrum of operations; and Timing (7 years
    to the first production vehicle from contract award). The Ground Combat
    Vehicle will be the first vehicle that will be designed from the ground
    up to operate in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) environment.
    Modular armor will allow commanders the option to add or remove armor
    based on the current threat environment. The Ground Combat Vehicle will
    be designed with the capacity for Space, Weight, and Power growth to
    incorporate future technologies as they mature. The Army is using an
    incremental strategy for the Ground Combat Vehicle with the first
    increment being an Infantry Fighting Vehicle. The Army is currently
    reviewing proposals from vendors for Technology Development contracts.
         2.  Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T). I believe
    that the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical is one of the Army's
    most important programs. It provides the broadband backbone
    communications for the tactical Army. Warfighter Information Network-
    Tactical Increment 1 (formerly Joint Network Node) began fielding in
    2004 to provide a satellite based Internet Protocol network down to
    battalion level. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 2
    begins fielding in fiscal year 2012 to provide an initial On the Move
    capability, extending down to company level. Warfighter Information
    Network-Tactical Increment 3 will provide improved capabilities,
    including higher throughput, three to four times more bandwidth
    efficiency, and an aerial transmission layer, to all 126 brigades/
    division headquarters with an on-the-move requirement.
         3.  E-IBCT Network Integration Kit (NIK). The E-IBCT investment
    provides the infrastructure that will allow the Army to grow the
    tactical network capability, and an opportunity for both large and
    small companies to support the Army's tactical network strategy. The
    NIK is a necessary bridge solution that allows the Army to continue
    evaluation and development of incorporated network technologies.
         4.  Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) including the Ground Mobile
    Radio (GMR) and Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit (HMS) radios.
    Joint Tactical Radio System is the Services' future deployable, mobile
    communications family of radios. They provide Army forces dynamic,
    scalable, on-the-move network architecture, connecting the soldier to
    the network. Fiscal year 2012 procurement funding supports fielding of
    Joint Tactical Radio System capability to 8 Infantry Brigade Combat
    Teams to meet fiscal years 2013/2014 network requirements. The Ground
    Mobile Radio is the primary vehicular radio capability using the
    Wideband Networking Waveform and Soldier Radio Waveform to meet
    tactical networking requirements. The Man Pack and Rifleman Radio are
    the primary Joint Tactical Radio System capability for battalion and
    below tactical operations. The man pack supports the Soldier Radio
    Waveform and interoperates with legacy waveforms (Single Channel Ground
    and Airborne Radio Systems, Ultra High Frequency Satellite
    Communications). Rifleman Radio primarily serves the dismounted
    formation and utilizes the Soldier Radio Waveform to provide voice and
    individual location information from the dismounted soldier to the
    leader. The combination of the three radios helps the Army to push the
    network to the individual soldier.
         5.  Stryker combat vehicle, including the Double-V Hull
    initiative, procurement of more flat-bottom vehicles, and the Stryker
    mobile gun variant. The current Stryker vehicle has exceeded its Space,
    Weight and Power and Cooling (SWaP-C) limits due to add-on applique
    (armor and devices) required for ongoing combat operations. In the near
    term, it is imperative to increase crew protection with the Double-V
    Hull (DVH) Stryker. In the mid-term, Stryker modernization will improve
    protection and mobility by recouping SWaP-C, enabling future growth and
    allowing integration of the emerging network for all Stryker variants.
    Fleet-wide modernization for all variants upgrades protection, counter-
    IED, drive train, suspension, electrical power generation and
    management, and digital communications and network integration. Double-
    V Hull: Stryker Double-V Hull (DVH) is on track for June 2011 fielding.
    The initial DVH test results are positive, indicating the vehicle will
    be ready for fielding as scheduled. Non-Double V Hull and NBCRV: The
    Army will procure 168 Stryker NBCRVs in fiscal years 2012 and 2013 for
    a total quantity of 284 (an ARFORGEN rotation quantity). These vehicles
    are in normal Hull configuration. The Stryker NBCRV provides a unique
    capability to the Joint Force including a critical mission of Homeland
    defense, for which DVH protection is a lesser consideration. Stryker
    Mobile Gun System (MGS): The Army has procured and fielded 142 of 335
    MGS. In August 2009, the Army decided to not pursue additional MGS
    procurement at this time with forthcoming fleet-wide modernization.
         6.  Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). The JLTV is a joint
    program with the USMC, Navy and the Army; the Australian Army is also
    currently a partner in the Technology Development phase. I believe that
    the JLTV is a vital program to fill the force protection and payload
    gaps not currently satisfied by HMMWV. It will also fill the mobility,
    transportability, and communication architecture gaps not satisfied by
    the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles being used in Light
    Tactical Vehicle (LTV) roles. The Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicle
    Strategy plans for the JLTV to replace about a third of the LTV fleet,
    which is roughly 46,000 vehicles. The Army is currently examining the
    attributes of the JLTV program to ensure it meets our needs for the
    future Army light tactical fleet, especially in terms of protection.
         7.  Armed Aerial Scout (AAS). I agree the Army has an enduring
    requirement for an armed aerial scout as was reaffirmed after the
    termination of the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) program. This
    requirement will be validated by the ongoing AAS Analysis of
    Alternatives whose findings are scheduled for release in the third
    quarter of fiscal year 2011.
         8.  M1 Abrams tank modernization. In my view, the Abrams
    modernization is necessary and will initially enable integration of the
    emerging network and provide ability to fire the next generation of
    120mm ammunition. Future modernization will provide capability
    improvements in lethality, protection, mission command, mobility, and
    reliability intended to maintain the fleet's combat overmatch and
    restore space, weight, and power margins to keep the tank relevant
    through 2050. The Abrams modernization program is funded in the fiscal
    year 2012 budget request. If confirmed, I will be able to offer an
    assessment as the program matures.
         9.  M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle modernization. The
    Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) will be replaced by the Ground
    Combat Vehicle beginning in 2018. Bradley Non-Infantry Fighting Vehicle
    (Cavalry, Engineer and Fire Support variants) modernization will
    address recoupment of space, weight, and power to provide platform
    growth and enable improvements in protection, mobility, and ability to
    integrate the emerging network.
        10.  Logistics Modernization Program (LMP). Logistics Modernization
    Program (LMP). I understand that LMP is the Enterprise Resource
    Planning (ERP) system used by the Army Materiel Command for national-
    level (wholesale) logistics, including the operation of our depots and
    arsenals. LMP has 25,000 users and completed its final deployment in
    October 2010, making it the first fully-deployed Army ERP. Based on
    commercial off-the-shelf SAP software technology, LMP provides the Army
    with an integrated end-to-end supply chain solution at the national
    level that improves overall synchronization of information. I concur
    with the Army's vision to achieve a seamless, end-to-end modernized
    business enterprise and to develop and implement an enterprise
    logistics architecture. To support that vision, LMP integrates with
    other Army ERPs, including the General Funds Enterprise Business System
    (GFEBS), and Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-Army), to provide
    a seamless enterprise-wide logistics environment spanning the factory
    to the foxhole in accordance with the Army's overall ERP Strategy.
        11.  Paladin Integrated Management Vehicle program. I understand
    that the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) program is an effort to
    address an existing capability gap in the self-propelled artillery
    portfolio brought about by an aging fleet and the termination of prior
    howitzer modernization efforts (Crusader and Non-Line of Sight-Cannon
    (NLOS-C)). The PIM program provides upgrades that allow the Army to
    meet existing and future needs, and leverages the commonality with the
    Bradley Fighting Vehicle chassis and automotive components. PIM should
    provide growth potential in space, weight, and power and capacity for
    network expansion to accommodate future howitzer related needs, to
    include the addition of such force protection packages as add-on armor.
        12.  M4 Carbine Upgrades/Individual Carbine Competition. The Army
    continues to make improvements and upgrades based on operational
    lessons learned through the M4 Product Improvement Program. The Army's
    effort is designed to integrate full automatic firing, an ambidextrous
    selector switch and a more durable ``heavy'' barrel. Simultaneously,
    the Army has initiated a full and open competition to confirm the best
    possible Individual Carbine solution. Results of the competition are
    expected in fiscal year 2013.

                MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED (MRAP) VEHICLES

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on the future of the Army's large
    MRAP and MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle fleets.
        We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may
    incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your
    answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may
    have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the
    views expressed by General Dempsey.
        Answer. I generally concur with General Dempsey that the Army
    should try to provide MRAP levels of protection to deploying forces
    worldwide commensurate with the mission assigned.

                           QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on the 2010 report of the Quadrennial
    Defense Review (QDR), its guidance with regard to the sizing of
    military forces for the future, and the military departments'
    orientation on six key mission areas.
        We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may
    incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your
    answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may
    have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the
    views expressed by General Dempsey.
        Answer. I agree with General Dempsey's assessment that the Army's
    size and structure have proven adequate to meet the demands of our
    defense strategy, although the toll on our soldiers and families has
    been high. When trying to predict future size or structure changes, we
    need to maintain some flexibility.
        It is difficult to predict what our future commitments will be and
    we need to account for our wounded warriors and nondeployables which
    will continue to increase over the next several years as we continue to
    engage in Afghanistan. Like General Dempsey, if I am confirmed, I
    pledge to work closely with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
    the Army, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and our combatant
    commanders to match end strength, structure, and tempo in our ARFORGEN
    rotational model to meet demands as they change.
        Question. If confirmed, what size or structure changes would you
    pursue, if any, to improve or enhance the Army's capability to meet
    these requirements?
        Answer. The nature of the strategic environment requires the Army
    to continuously assess its capabilities and force requirements. It's
    taken 10 years to achieve a size, structure, and capability that we can
    reasonably describe as balanced. We are accustomed to change, and we
    will undoubtedly need to continue to change. As we do we must seek to
    maintain a balance of capabilities that are available to meet the
    Nation's needs at a sustainable tempo.
        I concur with each of General Dempsey's assessments of the improved
    capabilities required in the six key mission areas discussed in the
    attached reference. I also agree with his assessment that the Army is
    currently capable of supporting these mission requirements, but there
    are areas where we need to restore our proficiency and improve our
    training. If confirmed, I will study the QDR further and better
    evaluate areas where additional emphasis may be needed.
        Question. The QDR report particularly emphasizes the requirement
    for improved capabilities in the following six key mission areas. For
    each, what is your assessment of the Army's current ability to provide
    capabilities to support these mission requirements?
        If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you pursue to improve the
    Army's capabilities to support:
        Defense of the United States.
        Answer. The Army is fully capable of fulfilling its responsibility
    to defend the Homeland through detection, deterrence, prevention, and
    if necessary, the defeat of external threats or aggression from both
    state and non-state actors. A specific program recently undertaken to
    enhance this ability include the fielding of the enhanced Stryker
    Nuclear Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle. This provides
    us with a much improved technical assessment and decontamination
    capability.
        Question. Support of civil authorities at home.
        Answer. The Army is well-postured to provide support to civil
    authorities. We are organized and trained to provide responsive and
    flexible support to mitigate domestic disasters, CBRNE consequence
    management, support to civilian law enforcement agencies, counter WMD
    operations, and to counter narcotics trafficking activities. We
    continue to address the challenges associated with this mission set
    including unity of command, integration with civilian authorities, and
    the integration of title 10 and title 32 forces.
        Question. Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and
    counterterrorism operations.
        Answer. We are highly proficient in counterinsurgency, stability
    and counterterrorism operations. This has been the focus for the Army
    for much of the last 10 years and we have institutionalized lessons
    learned across the operating and generating force.
        Question. Build the security capacity of partner states (including
    your views, if any, on the use of general purpose forces in the
    security force assistance role).
        Answer. General Purpose Forces have a clear role in building
    sustainable capability and capacity of partner nation security forces
    and their supporting institutions. Peace time engagement is our best
    opportunity to shape the future operating environment. General Purpose
    Forces are well-suited to support these activities through Security
    Force Assistance.
        Question. Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments.
        Answer. The Army's ability to deter and defeat aggression in anti-
    access environments as part of the joint force is adequate to meet the
    demands of the current security environment. That said, there are some
    tasks and skills to which we have not trained due to the demands of our
    ongoing conflicts. We must restore our proficiency in those tasks. We
    work with our sister Services to assess our capabilities to conduct
    entry operations as part of the joint force and watch closely the
    improved anti-access/area denial capabilities being developed by
    potential adversaries.
        Question. Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass
    destruction (WMD).
        Answer. The Army provides highly trained and ready forces with
    capabilities to support combatant commander requirements to counter the
    proliferation of WMD. Current capabilities include operating
    effectively within a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
    environment, specialized teams to locate and neutralize WMD, and an
    operational headquarters with expertise in eliminating WMD.
        Question. Operate effectively in cyberspace.
        Answer. We are on the right glide path to support U.S. Cyber
    Command and our geographic combatant commanders to operate effectively
    in cyberspace. On 1 October 2010, the Army stood up a new three-star
    command (U.S. Army Cyber Command/2nd Army), to direct the operations
    and defense of all Army networks, and when directed, provide full-
    spectrum cyberspace operations. The Army is bringing the forces of
    network operations, defense, exploitation, and attack under one
    operational level command to integrate and synchronize global
    operations for the first time.

                                MISSILE DEFENSE

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on air defense missile programs and a
    recent proposal to transfer a number of Army air and missile
    development programs to the Missile Defense Agency.
        We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may
    incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your
    answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may
    have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the
    views expressed by General Dempsey.
        Answer. I agree with General Dempsey's responses involving the
    Army's missile defense program and his understanding of the Army's
    relationship with the Missile Defense Agency. In addition to protection
    of our deployed forces, I would add defense of our Nation's national
    security interests as one of the priorities of this program.
        Yes. The Army has confirmed on many occasions that Air and Missile
    Defense is a core competency. Defense of our Nation's national security
    interest and protection of our deployed forces is the priority. The
    Army provides this protection in coordination with our sister Services
    and coalition partners.
        I concur with General Dempsey in that the Army needs to continue to
    monitor the threat and prioritize required future capabilities to
    ensure we provide effective affordable solutions in a timely manner to
    our forces.

                                     SPACE

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on Army support to Strategic Command
    in getting space based communications to the warfighter and the
    apparent lag in the acquisition of ground and other terminals to work
    with new satellite systems.
        We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may
    incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your
    answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may
    have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the
    views expressed by General Dempsey.
        Answer. Similar to General Dempsey, I am not currently in a
    position to provide an informed assessment of what needs the Army could
    address from space or what my vision for future Army space forces would
    be. I certainly appreciate, however, the importance of the Army's role
    in space and of ensuring that the Army does not fall behind or fail to
    be a complimentary contributor to the Joint Force in this domain. The
    Army depends on capabilities from space-based systems such as global
    positioning satellites, communication satellites, weather satellites,
    and intelligence collection platforms for the effective execution of
    full spectrum operations. I experienced some of the challenges the Army
    has with respect to the lag in acquiring required space technology in
    theater, but I would need to examine this issue more closely, if I am
    confirmed, before I can determine the real cause of any lag or
    recommend future action.

                         LOW-DENSITY/HIGH-DEMAND FORCES

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on low-density/high-demand forces.
        We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may
    incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your
    answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may
    have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the
    views expressed by General Dempsey.
        Answer. I concur with General Dempsey that the Army needs to use
    the Total Army Analysis (TAA) to identify the capabilities necessary,
    within resource constraints, to achieve the full spectrum of missions
    expected of the Army. This process allows us to identify requirements
    while still managing acceptable risk for all forces, in both Active and
    Reserve components. I am not aware of any necessary functional changes
    that should be made between the components at this time, but if I am
    confirmed, I will continue to evaluate this matter. I also intend to
    continue to reinforce the great interaction seen between the Active and
    Reserve components of the Army that we have seen in the past 10 years.

         MOBILIZATION AND DEMOBILIZATION OF NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on the challenges associated with the
    mobilization of Army National Guard and Reserve Forces.
        We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may
    incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your
    answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may
    have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the
    views expressed by General Dempsey.
        Answer. I have seen firsthand throughout my career how critical our
    Reserve component soldiers are to the Total Force. With increased
    deployments in the last decade, the Army has learned a lot about
    mobilizing and demobilizing these forces, and it will continue to learn
    from our experiences and to improve our processes. I understand the
    Army is currently reviewing all of its mobilization policies to ensure
    that the systems in place are effective and responsive to meet the
    Army's needs and the needs of our Reserve component soldiers and their
    families. If confirmed, I will continue to support these efforts.
        I share General Dempsey's understandings and assessments of Reserve
    Force management policies and changes to how the Army uses the ARFORGEN
    model to build unit readiness for mobilization requirements. If I am
    confirmed, I will continue to assess the validity and effectiveness of
    this model over time and to work with Secretary McHugh to identify
    areas where changes may be needed. At present though, I am not aware of
    any required changes.

                            INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on accessing the Individual Ready
    Reserve (IRR).
        We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may
    incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your
    answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may
    have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the
    views expressed by General Dempsey.
        Answer. I concur with General Dempsey that the IRR has proven to be
    an invaluable asset to all Army components in support of contingency
    operations around the world and it is a critical source of highly-
    skilled soldiers. I continue to be amazed at the incredible talent
    resident across our Total Force. I am not aware of any changes that
    need to be made to the mobilization or recall policies of our IRR. If I
    am confirmed, I will learn more about these policies before making any
    final assessment.
        In response to the recent studies showing higher rates of suicide
    among the IRR, I concur with General Dempsey's response and acknowledge
    the gravity of this particular issue. If confirmed, I will continue to
    support the Army's effort to pursue all avenues available to assure the
    well being of our Total Force.

                        PERSONNEL AND ENTITLEMENT COSTS

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on the challenges of personnel and
    entitlement cost growth.
        We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may
    incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your
    answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may
    have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the
    views expressed by General Dempsey.
        Answer. I agree with General Dempsey that in order to take control
    of the Army's personnel costs and entitlement spending, we need to
    strike a balance between preserving the All-Volunteer Force,
    accomplishing operational missions, and retraining an Army that is
    affordable to the Nation. I am not familiar with a requirement to
    reprogram money to cover current personnel costs.
        I also understand that the Military Personnel Army (MPA)
    appropriation was passed by Congress in April 2011; and both the MPA
    OCO and Active component base force requirements are adequate to meet
    current personnel costs.

     MEDICAL AND DENTAL READINESS OF ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMY RESERVE
                                   PERSONNEL

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on medical and dental readiness of
    Reserve component personnel.
        We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may
    incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your
    answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may
    have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the
    views expressed by General Dempsey.
        Answer. I concur with General Dempsey and believe the Army should
    develop and resource mechanisms to routinely identify, screen, and
    assess Reserve component medical readiness. I also believe that the
    health and fitness of the Reserve component is a very important issue.
    In addition to the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program already
    discussed by General Dempsey, the Army is also moving forward with a
    Soldier Medical Readiness Campaign Plan that seeks to improve health
    and fitness, increase soldier resilience, and reduce injury rates. If
    confirmed, I would work with the Army's Active and Reserve component
    leadership to continue these important initiatives and to develop
    policies for more effectively identifying ready and medically non-ready
    soldiers across the force.

                          ARMY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on Army the value and management
    science and technology programs.
        We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may
    incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your
    answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may
    have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the
    views expressed by General Dempsey.
        Answer. As General Dempsey stated, the Army's science and
    technology investment strategy is shaped to foster invention,
    innovation, and demonstration of technologies for the current and
    future warfighter. I believe that a strong Army science and technology
    program has already provided many advanced capabilities demonstrated in
    the past 10 years of war.
        Technological innovations have resulted in the rapid development
    and deployment of lightweight and adaptable armor solutions, jammers,
    unmanned air vehicles, unmanned ground vehicles, surveillance systems,
    communications devices, and day/night vision systems. All of these
    technology enabled capabilities have significantly improved our
    warfighters' capabilities in recent operations. If I am confirmed, then
    like General Dempsey, I would use metrics that demonstrate improved
    warfighters' capabilities; improve acquisition programs; and align
    technology development to warfighters' requirements, to judge the value
    and investment level in Army science and technology programs. I do not
    currently envision any specific new science and technology areas for
    the Army to pursue, but I would welcome the opportunity to study this
    matter further.
      army laboratories and research, development, and engineering centers
        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on the Army's commitment to and
    investment in its laboratories and research, development, and
    engineering centers.
        We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may
    incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your
    answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may
    have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the
    views expressed by General Dempsey.
        Answer. As General Dempsey stated, Army laboratories are science
    and technology performing organizations that play a major role in
    supporting current operations with best capabilities available and
    providing critical new capabilities for soldiers particularly in key
    strategic science and technology areas.
        I concur with General Dempsey that the Army laboratories and
    research and development centers need to maintain the resources
    required to continue initiatives and advancements that support the
    warfighters. If confirmed, I will learn more about their operations and
    support efforts to improve best practices and workforce quality
    necessary for mission accomplishments.

                        ARMY TEST AND EVALUATION EFFORTS

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on the Army's failure to meet test
    and evaluation range investment certification requirements from the DOD
    Test Resource Management Center.
        We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may
    incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your
    answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may
    have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the
    views expressed by General Dempsey.
        Answer. I have reviewed General Dempsey's answer and concur with
    his response, that testing is a crucial capability for maintaining the
    Army's combat edge and modernizing the force. I fully recognize the
    value of testing to ensure new technologies and equipment address the
    capabilities our warfighters need. If confirmed, I will work closely
    with the Army test and evaluation community and the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense test and evaluation leadership to ensure the
    Army's test and evaluation infrastructure is adequately resourced to
    address testing requirements and maintain robust test capabilities.

                      ARMY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on Army information technology
    management, consolidation, and efficiencies initiatives.
        We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may
    incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your
    answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may
    have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the
    views expressed by General Dempsey.
        Answer. I concur with General Dempsey's response and believe the
    Army needs to implement and enforce technical standards, make
    acquisition of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) or near-COTS technology
    easier, and field new technology to operational forces more quickly.
    This is in line with the congressional mandate you gave us in section
    804 of the 2010 NDAA.
        The center for network integration at Fort Bliss, TX--the Army
    Evaluation Task Force (AETF) will serve as the Network's primary test
    unit with a two-fold intent, to remove the integration burden from the
    operational units and to provide an operational venue to evaluate new
    technologies and network capabilities prior to fielding to operational
    units. The new capabilities they develop should ultimately provide the
    impetus for future acquisition and equipping decisions.

                             HUMAN TERRAIN SYSTEMS

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on Army's plans to institutionalize
    its Human Terrain System program.
        We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may
    incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your
    answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may
    have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the
    views expressed by General Dempsey.
        Answer. I concur with General Dempsey and I understand the Army has
    institutionalized the Human Terrain System as an enduring capability
    assigned to Training and Doctrine Command and funded capability
    starting in the fiscal year 2011. I also believe there is merit to
    developing a joint capability. In September 2010, General Dempsey
    directed a Training and Doctrine Command capability-based assessment of
    all socio-cultural capabilities throughout the combatant commands and
    Services. The intent is to identify other ongoing socio-cultural
    initiatives, to determine potential synergies and best practices in
    order to develop and evolve an enduring joint capability. The results
    of this assessment have been compiled, and if confirmed, I will make
    this part of my review.

                               OPERATIONAL ENERGY

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on the Army's operational energy
    program and its lack of quantitative metrics against which to measure
    progress.
        We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may
    incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your
    answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may
    have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the
    views expressed by General Dempsey.
        Answer. I concur with General Dempsey's response that the most
    important issue with operational energy is the amount of fuel used to
    meet our operational needs. Most of our fuel is used in generation of
    electricity. The Army has implemented, and accelerated deployment, of
    generators that use less fuel as well as microgrid systems that tie
    generators together to operate more efficiently. We are developing more
    efficient motors for helicopters and vehicles to reduce our operational
    energy footprint and, ultimately, wars are won or lost by dismounted
    soldiers, so the Army is addressing excessive soldier loads, driven in
    large part by energy and power constraints. If confirmed, I will
    continue efforts currently underway to increase our energy efficient
    capabilities in theater and emphasize energy awareness through the
    military chain of command, and across the Army, to foster a more
    energy-aware culture.
        Question. What is your understanding of the Army's progress with
    respect to testing and deploying operational energy technologies?
        Answer. As General Dempsey stated, the Army is taking advantage of
    every avenue, to include industry, to help us develop technologies that
    can reduce our operational energy footprint. Renewable energy systems
    and insulated tentage are some of the systems being piloted and tested.
    We are also evaluating technologies that will help lighten soldier
    loads and reduce the amount of batteries and fuel we must procure and
    deliver to theater. We will continue to pursue more efficient devices,
    emphasize energy conservation, and employ energy management
    capabilities that are essential to retain energy as an operational
    advantage.
        Question. What is your understanding of how the Army is taking
    advantage of its labs and research, engineering, and development
    centers to further its operational energy and security goals?
        Answer. I concur with General Dempsey's response that the Army has
    integrated the national laboratories with Department of Energy and Army
    laboratories to develop solutions to a range of operational energy,
    power, and security needs. Some of the initiatives include research to
    reduce the size and weight of components, broadening alternative energy
    sources, leveraging various emergent energy efficient technologies.
    These new technologies will increase energy efficiency and improve
    power supplies for contingency bases, forward operating bases and
    equipment carried by individual soldiers. If confirmed, I will work to
    ensure that the research conducted at Army facilities continues to
    focus on meeting the operational energy needs of the current and future
    Army and to support DOD's high priority program to increase energy
    efficiencies.

                          INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on decades of under-investment in
    installation infrastructure that have led to increasing maintenance
    backlogs and substandard living and working conditions.
        We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may
    incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your
    answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may
    have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the
    views expressed by General Dempsey.
        Answer. I concur with General Dempsey's statement that since fiscal
    year 2007, with Base Realignment and Closure, Transformation, and Grow
    the Army initiatives, the Army has made significant military
    construction investments in its infrastructure. Additionally, a variety
    of public-private partnership initiatives have complemented direct Army
    investments. If confirmed, I will work with the Assistant Secretary of
    the Army, Installation, Energy and Environment, the Assistant Chief of
    Staff for Installation Management, and the Commanding General at
    Installation Management Command to assess our infrastructure
    investments.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to
    increase resources to reduce the backlog and improve Army facilities?
        Answer. The proper stewardship of our facilities portfolio requires
    the Army to fully sustain current facilities, dispose of our excess
    facilities, improve the quality of our worst facilities, and build-out
    our largest and most critical shortages, all at a level adequate to
    support the mission. The Army is utilizing programs in which it
    leverages private financing to upgrade infrastructure and ensure more
    sustainable, efficient, and reliable mission support. If confirmed, I
    will evaluate the proper balance of funding, to include evaluating
    privatization opportunities and whether the Army should increase
    operation and maintenance funding for restoration and modernization and
    proper stewardship of our facilities portfolio requires the Army to
    fully sustain the current facilities, dispose of our excess facilities,
    improve the quality of our worst facilities, and build-out our largest
    and most critical shortages, all at a level adequate to support the
    mission.

                 ARMY POLICIES REGARDING DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on the Army drug and alcohol abuse
    policies and programs.
        We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may
    incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your
    answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may
    have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the
    views expressed by General Dempsey.
        Answer. I concur with General Dempsey that Army policy directs
    commanders to initiate administrative separation for all soldiers
    involved in trafficking, distribution, possession, use, or sale of
    illegal drugs. While the policy requires initiation of separation,
    commanders have the authority to retain or separate a soldier. I concur
    with this policy as it has proven effective in allowing commanders
    necessary discretion in treating each soldier and incident on its
    merits while balancing the needs of the Army.
        Question. What is your understanding of the Army's policy with
    respect to rehabilitation and retention on Active Duty of soldiers who
    have been determined to have used illegal drugs or abused alcohol or
    prescription drugs? Do you agree with this policy?
        Answer. I agree with General Dempsey. Army policy requires the
    separation authority consider a soldier drug offender's potential for
    rehabilitation and further military service allowing effective
    management of the Army's personnel and discipline needs. To effectively
    enforce this policy, soldiers who commit drug and alcohol offenses are
    required to be evaluated by a certified substance abuse counselor
    through the Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP). The ASAP counselor's
    recommendation is considered by the commander when determining a
    soldier's potential for rehabilitation and retention. I concur with
    this policy.
        Question. Do you believe that the Army has devoted sufficient
    resources to implementation of its rehabilitation policies and
    objectives since 2001? If not, in what ways?
        Answer. I have served at numerous command levels since 2001. In my
    experience, sufficient resources are devoted to the Army's
    rehabilitation policies and objectives. If confirmed, I will assess and
    closely monitor the level of resourcing for this important area.
        Question. What measures are being taken to improve the Army's
    performance in responding to problems of drug and alcohol abuse?
        Answer. The Army is very adept at analyzing itself to determine a
    better way ahead. The Army's policy is a comprehensive approach
    bringing together the skills and experience of commanders, law
    enforcement, and the medical community for drug and alcohol abuse
    incidents. The Army continues working on improving systems for
    detecting drug and alcohol abuse as well as on improving intervention
    systems so that we can help our soldiers who selflessly sacrifice for
    our Nation. One method through which the Army builds resiliency in the
    force is through the continually expanding Comprehensive Soldier
    Fitness Program. By encouraging a more resilient force and through
    awareness of available confidential programs, the Army's goal is to
    promote help seeking behavior by soldiers.

                   MEDICAL PERSONNEL RECRUITING AND RETENTION

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on significant shortages in
    critically needed medical personnel in both the Army's Active and
    Reserve components.
        We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may
    incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your
    answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may
    have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the
    views expressed by General Dempsey.
        The Army continues to face significant shortages in critically
    needed medical personnel in both Active and Reserve components.
        What is your understanding of the most significant personnel
    challenges in recruiting and retaining health professionals in the
    Army?
        Answer. I concur with General Dempsey, there continues to be a
    national shortage of medical professionals that challenges the Army's
    efforts to recruit and retain health care professionals. We are
    concerned that escalating need in the civilian sector will impact the
    demand for these critically short professionals. To take care of our
    soldiers, the Army must continue evaluating initiatives and programs to
    attract and retain the most skilled and talented health care providers.
        Question. If confirmed, would you undertake a comprehensive review
    of the medical support requirements for the Army, incorporating all new
    requirements for 2011 and beyond?
        Answer. Like General Dempsey stated, I also believe it is important
    to review medical support requirements on a regular, recurring basis.
    If confirmed, this review will allow me to assess whether the Army is
    meeting its medical support requirements and, if not, determine where
    improvements can be implemented to better serve our soldiers.
        Question. If confirmed, what policies or legislative initiatives,
    if any, are necessary in order to ensure that the Army can continue to
    fulfill ongoing medical support requirements?
        Answer. I do not believe additional legislative authorities are
    needed to ensure the Army fulfills medical support requirements. Like
    General Dempsey, the policy initiatives currently underway and the
    changes implemented by the National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2011 at this time, allow the Army to serve the needs of its
    soldiers. If confirmed, this will be an area I closely monitor. If any
    additional authorities are identified as necessary to maintain this
    goal, I will work closely with the administration and Congress to
    address the needs.

                          FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on foreign language policy, doctrine,
    and building capabilities for both military and civilian personnel.
        We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may
    incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your
    answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may
    have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the
    views expressed by General Dempsey.
        A Foreign Language Transformation Roadmap announced by DOD in March
    2005, directed a series of actions aimed at transforming the
    Department's foreign language capabilities to include revision of
    policy and doctrine, building a capabilities based requirements
    process, and enhancing foreign language capability for both military
    and civilian personnel.
        What is your assessment of the progress the Army has made in
    increasing its foreign language capabilities in operations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan?
        Answer. I concur with General Dempsey that the Army has increased
    in foreign language capabilities in support of OIF/OEF. The Army
    revolutionized its recruiting processes to enlist native and heritage
    speakers into vital interpreter/translator positions. Overall, these
    initiatives have provided enhanced capabilities for counterinsurgency
    operations and building partner capacity overseas.
        Like General Dempsey, I also believe a high priority for DOD should
    be the continued support of the Defense Language Institute Foreign
    Language Center, which provides Culturally Based Language Training to
    all Services and DOD components.

               PROTECTION OF U.S. FORCES AGAINST INTERNAL THREATS

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on a DOD review of the attack at Fort
    Hood concluding that the Department was poorly prepared to defend
    against internal threats, including radicalization of military
    personnel.
        Answer. I concur with General Dempsey that the lessons learned are
    invaluable to the Army as we strive to improve the Army Protection
    Program for individuals and units against emerging threats. If
    confirmed, and as General Dempsey also stated, I will ensure that we
    continue to integrate and synchronize the many Army Protection Programs
    that protect our soldiers, family members, and Department of the Army
    civilians by ensuring that commanders and leaders have the information
    and tools needed to address the ever changing threat environment.

                              RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on a DOD review of the attack at Fort
    Hood observation that ``DOD policy regarding religious accommodation
    lacks the clarity necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate
    religious practices from those that might indicate a potential for
    violence or self-radicalization'' and recommended that the policy be
    updated.
        Answer. I concur with General Dempsey that there are established
    policies for religious accommodation in wear and appearance of Army
    uniforms and insignia and because the Army is a diverse, professional
    force, committed to treating all soldiers with dignity and respect,
    that our policies must be clear and provide appropriate guidance to
    both soldiers and commanders. Like General Dempsey, I also believe that
    current Army policies provide commanders with adequate flexibility to
    balance accommodation for religious beliefs and maintain good order and
    discipline. To this end, if confirmed, I will assess the current policy
    and determine if further changes are necessary.

                                 FAMILY SUPPORT

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on the Army Family Action Plan and
    its success in identifying and promoting quality of life issues for
    Army families.
        We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may
    incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your
    answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may
    have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the
    views expressed by General Dempsey.
        Answer. I concur with General Dempsey's statement that the most
    pressing family readiness issues include sustaining the Army Family
    Covenant and improving communication and awareness of the extensive
    range of available support programs and services the Army has to
    improve soldier and family quality of life. The Army Family Action
    Plan, Survey of Army families, and other studies revealed that soldiers
    and families may not be aware of the myriad of available support
    services.
        To address this concern, the Army is transforming Army Community
    Service (ACS) to help connect soldiers and families to the right
    service at the right time. The Army has begun piloting ACS
    transformation and anticipates completion by October 2011. I also will
    endeavor to ensure that Army family programs reach out to all soldiers
    and their families, regardless of component, geographic location or
    deployment status. I will work to ensure that family program platforms
    and delivery systems keep pace with a mobile Army and utilize
    technological advances and social networking so services are available
    to the soldiers and families who need them.
        I am highly interested in the results of the ACS pilot and if
    confirmed, I will continue to strengthen our support services and
    ensure our programs efficiently meet the needs of the soldiers and
    families who use them.

                          MENTAL HEALTH ADVISORY TEAMS

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on the Army's Mental Health Advisory
    Team (MHAT) studies in Iraq and Afghanistan and their value in
    identifying the extent of mental health conditions and resource and
    training challenges being experienced in combat theaters.
        We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may
    incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your
    answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may
    have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the
    views expressed by General Dempsey.
        Answer. I concur with General Dempsey that the MHAT studies have
    played a key role in proactively identifying how changes in the
    operational environment impact the ability to provide behavioral health
    care. Both MHAT VI OEF and VII OEF recommended several critical measure
    that we have put into effect, namely the number of behavioral health
    personnel in theater to number of soldiers. One of the most valuable
    findings from the MHATs has been to document that soldiers suffering
    multiple deployments and/or short dwell times report higher mental
    health problems. Overall, the willingness to take a systematic look at
    the behavioral health care system and the behavioral health status of
    soldiers through programs such as the MHATs has ensured that the Army
    is being responsive to the needs of deployed soldiers. If confirmed, I
    will ensure that the Army continues to develop and synchronize the
    expeditionary components of health promotion, risk reduction, and
    suicide prevention programs and services.

                     SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on policies and procedures to improve
    the prevention of, and response to, incidents of sexual assault,
    including providing appropriate resources and care for victims of
    sexual assault and addressing the challenges that remain.
        We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may
    incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your
    answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may
    have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the
    views expressed by General Dempsey.
        Answer. Like General Dempsey, I am very concerned about reports of
    sexual assault in our Army, whether deployed or otherwise. We cannot
    tolerate this behavior wherever it occurs. The Army is committed to
    providing victims in all units with appropriate medical care,
    resources, and support while ensuring that our prevention and response
    programs are fully available and prepared. The Army's SHARP program is
    a formidable effort at dealing with this issue. There is no doubt that
    this is a challenging problem that will require leadership and constant
    vigilance at all levels, and if confirmed, I will continue to look
    closely at the Army's sexual assault program, to ensure there is trust
    and faith in the Army's programs and system, and that there is
    continuous oversight and leadership involvement.

                        MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

        Question. The committee's advance policy questions for General
    Dempsey raised a series of issues on Morale, Welfare, and Recreation
    (MWR) programs critical to the enhancement of military life for members
    and their families.
        We ask that you respond to the same questions. In doing so, you may
    incorporate General Dempsey's responses by reference, or provide your
    answer in the form of an explanation of any differences that you may
    have from, or areas in which you would like to further amplify, the
    views expressed by General Dempsey.
        Answer. I concur with General Dempsey that the Army has taken steps
    to ensure we care for and retain families through a broad range of
    meaningful initiatives, to include many family and MWR programs and
    services. The criticality of these programs is immeasurable and I feel
    we cannot afford to lose such a key enabler of our Force.
        The challenge will be in our resource-constrained environment to
    sustain a consistent level of funding for these programs. If confirmed,
    I will consult with commanders, soldiers, and families to ensure that
    these programs are adequate and meet their needs.

                          DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS

        Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7,
    2006, memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that
    all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
    procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
    Conventions?
        Answer. Yes. The U.S. military will continue to follow the
    principles of humane treatment outlined in Common Article 3. These
    basic rules of the law of armed conflict will continue to guide our
    conduct toward detainees, no matter how they were captured or how the
    conflict is characterized.
        Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
    specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
    22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the DOD
    Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
        Answer. Yes. Both of these documents provide effective, practical
    guidance, and direction to the field on critically important issues
    relative to detainee treatment, detainee operations training, and the
    interrogation of detainees.
        Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective military
    operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of
    Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
        Answer. Yes. Common Article 3 has long provided the minimum
    standards of conduct for the U.S. military. Our forces have adhered to
    the humane treatment protections outlined in this article and they have
    been a part of U.S. policy on the law of war for many years.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that U.S. forces in
    Iraq and Afghanistan comply with the standards in the Army Field
    Manual, the DOD Directive, and applicable requirements of U.S. and
    international law regarding detention and interrogation operations?
        Answer. First, the Army is committed to adherence to the law of war
    and the humane treatment of detainees. The value of adherence to the
    rule of law in our operations cannot be underestimated--it ensures the
    trust and respect of the American people, enhances our international
    credibility, and establishes our professional credentials. Our
    professional and ethical conduct on the battlefield also earns the
    respect of the civilian populace we are sworn to protect on this
    asymmetric battlefield.
        I intend to emphasize the importance of conducting disciplined
    military operations, characterized by adhering to the laws of war,
    treating detainees humanely, and showing compassion and restraint on
    the modern battlefield.
        I would also seek to sustain and improve our existing systems for
    helping our soldiers to understand and adhere to the proper standards
    for detainee treatment, detention operations, and interrogations.
        Finally, when allegations of wrongdoing by soldiers surface, the
    Army will continue to fully investigate and hold soldiers accountable,
    as appropriate and consistent with the Uniform Code of Military
    Justice, if misconduct is substantiated.

                            CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

        Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
    appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
    briefings, and other communications of information.
        Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
    this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
    even if those views differ from the administration in power?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
    committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
    information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
    with respect to your responsibilities as Chief of Staff of the Army?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
    other communications of information are provided to this committee and
    its staff and other appropriate committees?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
    such documents?
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Note: General Martin E. Dempsey's responses to his Advance
    Policy Questions from his nomination hearing dated March 3,
    2011, to be Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, appear at the end
    of this transcript, located at Annex A.]
                                    ------

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

                                  ARMY FORCES

        1. Senator Levin. General Odierno, in your advance policy
    questions, you note that ``during the last 10 years, the Army National
    Guard has transformed from a Strategic Reserve to an Operational
    Force.'' When considering the relationship between the Army's Active
    component and its Reserves and National Guard, in your view, what
    distinguishes a ``Strategic Reserve'' from an ``Operational Reserve''
    and from an ``Operational Force''?
        General Odierno. We structure the Army--Active, National Guard, and
    Army Reserve--as a Total Force, responding together to meet the
    requirements of the combatant commanders. An important distinction
    between Strategic Reserves and Operational Reserves is readiness and
    length of time and resources required to deploy a unit to a theater of
    operation. Continuous investment in a Strategic Reserve is considerably
    less than that of an Operational Reserve because the Strategic Reserve
    has no immediate or short-term expectation of deployment; however, any
    rapid need for this force requires unprogrammed resources. The
    Operational Reserve has an assigned mission and must be at a higher
    state of readiness, similar to an Active Duty unit.
        The demand for U.S. ground forces over this past decade has
    highlighted the need for the Army to maintain an Operational Reserve to
    meet both current and future operational requirements. Reducing our
    presence in Iraq and Afghanistan will not alleviate the responsibility
    of the Army to be prepared to rapidly participate in the full spectrum
    of contingency operations across the globe. Maintaining an appropriate
    level of resourcing for the Operational Reserve coupled with Army Force
    Generation (ARFORGEN) will allow the mobilization of these forces on a
    predictable and recurring basis. It will be the enabling edge that
    ensures our success in a complex security environment. The operating
    force consists of the units (both Active and Reserve) whose primary
    missions are to participate in combat and the integral supporting
    elements thereof.

        2. Senator Levin. General Odierno, how would you treat each with
    respect to resource requirements and allocation if they are
    distinguished by different standards of readiness in manning,
    equipping, and training?
        General Odierno. We do not distinguish components by different
    standards of readiness. We structure the Army--Active, National Guard,
    and Army Reserve--as a Total Force, responding together to meet the
    requirements of the combatant commanders. To meet joint force
    requirements for rotational and contingency operations in the new
    security environment, the Army moved to the sustainable ARFORGEN
    system. Under ARFORGEN, standards of readiness in manning, equipping,
    and training of units are synchronized to meet their respective
    operational deployment mission and training/readiness timeline. We
    ensure that any unit, regardless of component, is resourced to
    accomplish its assigned mission. To enable us to keep all units ready
    we need continued assured access to the Reserves, and the resources to
    sustain readiness.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

                     ARMY MAJOR WEAPONS PROCUREMENT PROCESS

        3. Senator McCain. General Odierno, as you likely know, a group
    chartered by the Secretary of the Army to look into how the Army
    procures major weapons systems found that, every year since 1996, the
    Army has spent more than $1 billion annually on programs that were
    ultimately cancelled. Since 2004, including the now-cancelled Future
    Combat System program, $3.3 billion to $3.8 billion (or 35 percent to
    42 percent) per year of Army developmental testing and evaluation
    funding has been lost to cancelled programs. The Center for Strategic
    Budgetary Assessments just recently came out with a similarly harsh
    assessment of how poorly major Army weapons programs have performed as
    promised. Do you agree that the Army cannot afford to continue losing
    funds in this manner? If so, how would you address it, if confirmed as
    the Army Chief of Staff?
        General Odierno. I agree that the Army must exercise very careful
    stewardship of the taxpayers' dollars, particularly in this time of
    budgetary constraints. Although the Army has clearly faced challenges
    with the development of major weapons systems, Secretary McHugh has
    undertaken an unprecedented review of the Army acquisition process. The
    Decker-Wagner panel examined weapons system procurements from ``cradle-
    to-grave'' with a key focus on properly defining requirements. I
    understand that many of the Army's development and procurement problems
    stemmed from pursuing requirements that ultimately did not match the
    needs of the soldier, were cost prohibitive or were technologically
    infeasible. The Army has been working to implement many of the
    recommendations of the Decker-Wagner panel and many of these
    recommendations are already reflected in the acquisition strategy for
    the new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV).
        If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Army to
    ensure a unified effort to improve the effectiveness of the process to
    meet the capability needs of our force.

        4. Senator McCain. General Odierno, in your view, what are the
    lessons learned from the Army's experience with these failed major Army
    weapons programs?
        General Odierno. In my view, the most important lesson learned from
    past experience is that materiel solutions require diligent and
    complementary efforts throughout the acquisition lifecycle among the
    requirements, acquisition, and resourcing communities in pursuit of
    affordable and achievable solutions. Affordability and risk must be
    addressed from the earliest stages of requirements development
    throughout the execution of acquisition programs with an emphasis on
    what we can realistically afford and develop. The lessons learned from
    recent conflicts and prior acquisition efforts will help the Army
    invest limited fiscal resources in a responsible manner.

        5. Senator McCain. General Odierno, if confirmed, how would you
    help to ensure that the enormously expensive lessons learned from these
    failed major Army programs are brought to bear on the GCV program?
        General Odierno. I understand the Army acquisition community has
    already applied some of these lessons learned on the GCV program. Under
    the leadership of the Army Acquisition Executive, the Army assembled a
    team of senior subject matter experts as they refined the 900-plus GCV
    requirements and revised the original Request for Proposals. The Army
    team, which included members of the requirements, resourcing,
    contracting, and program management communities, developed a set of
    tiered requirements that distinguish critical must-have capabilities
    and provide industry with the necessary flexibility to develop vehicle
    designs that meet the Army's strict cost and schedule constraints. In
    addition, the GCV acquisition strategy implements innovative measures
    designed to keep the program on schedule and on budget, to include
    fixed price incentive fee contracts in the 2-year technology
    development phase, an increased emphasis on mature technologies and
    reliance on competition throughout the program as an incentive. In
    short, GCV is an example of the Army's implementation of acquisition
    reform.

                               ARMY MEADS PROGRAM

        6. Senator McCain. General Odierno, as you probably know, this
    committee declined to authorize the President's request for $407
    million to continue U.S. participation in the Army's troubled Medium
    Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program. During the previous
    administration, the United States partnered with Italy and Germany to
    develop this aspect of the missile defense program in Europe. But,
    since then, this development effort dramatically overran in cost and
    has failed to perform as promised. Considerably frustrated with the
    program's failure and how the program addressed ``termination
    liability'' as to the United States, this committee zeroed out the
    administration's funding request for the program for fiscal year 2012.
    However, a few days ago, a top German defense official reportedly had
    strong words for the United States and the likelihood that it would
    unilaterally withdraw from the program. This official indicated that
    such a withdrawal was ``not an option'' and called on the Department of
    Defense (DOD) to uphold U.S. ``contribution commitments--even beyond
    the development phase''. What is your reaction to the German officials'
    comments and how this committee addressed the administration's funding
    request for the program?
        General Odierno. The President's fiscal year 2012 budget request
    funds MEADS development in fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013 in
    accordance with the international agreement with Italy and Germany. The
    funding will complete a Proof of Concept effort to mature advanced air
    and missile defense technologies under the MEADS MOU and will culminate
    with two intercept flight tests in fiscal year 2013 using the PAC-3
    Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) missile. The Proof of Concept is
    intended to place the program on sound footing should Germany and Italy
    wish to continue to production. Per recent correspondence to Dr. Carter
    from both German and Italian government officials, both partners have
    agreed that refocusing the remaining MEADS development as a Proof of
    Concept, as reflected in the President's budget, is the proper course
    of action and that is the course that we strongly recommend pursuing.

        7. Senator McCain. General Odierno, as far as you know, DOD's
    current plan is only to participate in the program inasmuch as it is
    restructured as a Proof of Concept program, as opposed to a larger
    development effort. But, the German official is clearly calling for the
    United States to modify its plan. Are you aware of any current interest
    whatsoever among leadership at the Army, or the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense (OSD), to change its approach as the German official
    suggested?
        General Odierno. No, the Army continues to support OSD's decision
    that DOD will participate only through the completion of the Proof of
    Concept approach.

                                personnel costs
        8. Senator McCain. General Odierno, what percentage of the U.S.
    Army is non-deployable due to medical conditions, being on a temporary
    retired status, or awaiting disability determinations prior to
    separation from military service?
        General Odierno. About 10 percent of soldiers currently serving in
    the Active Army are nondeployable due to medical conditions; this
    includes soldiers awaiting disability determinations and soldiers with
    temporary conditions. Soldiers on the Temporary Disability Retired List
    (TDRL) are retired and considered veterans, so they do not count
    against end strength.

        9. Senator McCain. General Odierno, do you know if that number has
    increased or decreased in recent years?
        General Odierno. Since January 2008, the number of soldiers in the
    Army's Disability Evaluation System (DES) has increased 169 percent
    (6,948 to 18,671). In the last year, we have seen a 50 percent increase
    in this population (12,419 to 18,671) and currently we have over 18,000
    soldiers in the DES. We currently have over 11,000 soldiers on the
    TDRL. Soldiers on the TDRL are retired and considered veterans, so they
    do not count against end strength, but we do use limited medical
    resources conducting their disability reevaluation. Since January 2008,
    the number of soldiers on the TDRL has increased 127 percent (4,959 to
    11,049), and in the last year we've seen an increase of 15 percent
    (9,586 to 11, 049). Normally, soldiers on the TDRL receive a medical
    reevaluation at least once every 18 months, and at any given time we
    have a third undergoing a medical reexamination.

        10. Senator McCain. General Odierno, do these prolonged processes
    represent costs that could be avoided in the personnel arena, and
    applied to other readiness requirements?
        General Odierno. The Army has 18,671 soldiers in the DES. Apart
    from the impact these nondeployable soldiers have on our ability to man
    contingency forces at 90 percent, the DES process diverts limited
    medical resources. Medical requirements for DES population increasingly
    compete for care with deploying SM, family members, and those
    recovering from wounds and injuries; the DES pulls limited medical
    resources away from treatment and rehabilitation.
        Additionally, there has been a significant increase in the number
    of administrative staff required to prepare for and manage the board
    process and to provide direct support to the soldiers going through the
    disability evaluation process.

        11. Senator McCain. General Odierno, as Chief of Staff of the Army,
    what actions do you think are necessary to address this issue?
        General Odierno. The DES is better than it was 4 years ago.
    Legislative changes have improved the consistency between Military and
    VA ratings, and the new joint DOD/VA DES has reduced the time it takes
    for soldiers separated for a disability to start receiving the VA
    benefits. However, the process remains complex, adversarial, not fully
    integrated, and takes far too long to complete.
        While the two departments have merged their separate disability
    systems, each still must follow the laws and policies specific to their
    own department. This dichotomy produces differing results. The military
    compensates only for conditions related to being unfit to serve while
    the VA compensates for all Service-connected conditions. Military
    conditions related to unfitness are a subset of all Service-connected
    conditions; so the military's combined rating is usually going to be
    less than VA's combined rating. This creates confusion, and causes
    soldiers to believe the Army does not recognize their complete medical
    condition in a deliberate effort to minimize disability compensation
    and limit access to other valuable benefits.
        As long as this system of dual adjudication exists, we are not
    going to have an integrated process. In a fully integrated process, the
    Military Services would determine fitness.

                               health care costs
        12. Senator McCain. General Odierno, in a modest attempt to control
    DOD's health care costs, former Secretary Gates sought to apply a
    medical inflation factor to TRICARE Prime enrollment fees for working-
    age retirees beginning in fiscal year 2013. Unfortunately, our
    committee balked at that idea, and reported a bill that would
    permanently tie DOD's hands to annual increases to the annual increase
    in retired pay, which has been minimal.
        TRICARE fees haven't changed since they were established in 1995.
    At that time, according to DOD, working age retirees paid about 27
    percent of their total costs when using civilian care. Today, out of
    pocket expenses for working age retirees represent less than 9 percent
    of the total cost of the family's health care costs. Some argue that
    health care benefits to retirees have been eroded over time. Do you
    agree?
        General Odierno. Health care costs are increasingly becoming a
    larger part of everyone's budget including DOD's annual budget.
    Military health care costs have increased due to an expansion of
    benefits rather than an erosion, increased use of TRICARE, and no
    change to TRICARE premiums since the program began in 1995. Because of
    DOD's low enrollment costs compared with private health insurance,
    there has been a steady increase in retirees enrolling in TRICARE. The
    Army believes these proposals to raise the TRICARE enrollment fees for
    working age retirees and adjust future increases to be modest, gradual,
    and responsible. Even with this proposed fee change, TRICARE would
    remain one of the Nation's very best health benefits and beneficiaries
    would continue to have less out-of-pocket costs in comparison to
    Federal, State, and private health plans.

        13. Senator McCain. General Odierno, do you support the
    administration's modest goal of linking future increases in fees for
    working age retirees to a factor that relates to rising national
    medical costs?
        General Odierno. The Army, in partnership with DOD, is committed to
    preserving this health care benefit while recognizing that continued
    increases in costs are not sustainable. I support DOD efforts to work
    with Congress to find ways to help control escalating health care costs
    including fee increases for working age retirees that can be adjusted
    in some way to reflect rising national medical costs.

        14. Senator McCain. General Odierno, do you see the rise in health
    care costs as a threat to readiness, and if so, what would you do or
    recommend, if confirmed, to address this very serious issue for DOD?
        General Odierno. I share former Secretary of Defense Gates'
    concerns about the rise of DOD's health care expenditures and its
    impact on the overall DOD budget including readiness. I support DOD
    efforts to work with Congress to find ways to help control escalating
    health care costs. The Army, in partnership with DOD, is committed to
    preserving this health care benefit while recognizing that continued
    increases in costs are not sustainable. Even with the proposed fee
    changes DOD recommended for fiscal year 2012, TRICARE would remain one
    of the Nation's very best health benefits and beneficiaries would
    continue to have less out-of-pocket costs in comparison to Federal,
    State, and private health plans. I believe this proposal balances our
    commitment to preserve readiness while slowing future growth in health
    care costs.

                             ground combat vehicle
        15. Senator McCain. General Odierno, please describe the
    operational urgency driving a GCV by 2017.
        General Odierno. Lessons from the last 10 years of sustained combat
    operations indicate that the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) is
    no longer capable of fully meeting the necessary levels of protection,
    fire power, and mobility requirements that our infantrymen will need as
    they face both current and future hybrid and conventional threats. We
    will counter that threat by building a GCV IFV that has the mobility to
    keep up with, communicate with, and survive alongside the improved
    Abrams Main Battle Tank. We believe the Bradley IFV will have reached
    its capacity to improve in these areas upon completion of its next
    modernization efforts. The GCV's research, development, test, and
    evaluation and production timeline (7 years from technology development
    contract award) should provide vehicles that have the increased
    protection, mobility, and network capability to maneuver and fight
    alongside the Abrams, meet our near-term threats, and have the capacity
    to grow in the future.

        16. Senator McCain. General Odierno, would GCVs be employed within
    Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) as part of GCV/Bradley mixed fleet?
        General Odierno. Yes. The GCV will replace the Bradley IFV in the
    Heavy BCTs as unit sets.

                                 mrap vehicles
        17. Senator McCain. General Odierno, what is the Army's plan to
    recapitalize and incorporate thousands of mine resistant ambush
    protected (MRAP) vehicles into the wheeled vehicle fleet?
        General Odierno. In accordance with the Army's Tactical Wheeled
    Vehicle Strategy and the Army Campaign Plan, the Army plans to
    incorporate most of the MRAP Family of Vehicles (FOV) into enduring
    force structure, while divesting a small number of low-density and
    under-utilized variants such as the RG33L, MAXXPro XL, and Caiman CAT
    II XM1220. The Army will work closely with the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense and the MRAP Joint Program Office to reset/recapitalize the
    MRAP variants selected for retention. The reset/recapitalization will
    incorporate upgrades to standardize variants to a common baseline as
    vehicles are retrograded from theater. The upgrades will infuse
    commonality, increase survivability, mobility, and sustainability to
    meet emerging hybrid threats. Today the MRAP FOV is comprised of 25
    variants delivered by 6 different manufacturers. With the required
    resources, these upgrades will reduce the MRAP FOV to nine variants
    produced by four manufacturers and provide soldiers with the greatest
    capability available. The Army plans a balanced distribution of MRAP
    vehicles with 37 percent going into units and training bases, 59
    percent into Army Prepositioned Stocks, and 4 percent going into Army
    War Reserve and Contingency Retention Stocks.

        18. Senator McCain. General Odierno, where do these vehicles fit
    into the force structure?
        General Odierno. The Army plans a balanced distribution of MRAP
    vehicles into units, training bases, Army Prepositioned Stock, Army War
    Reserve, and Contingency Retention Stocks. This distribution of MRAPs
    maximizes their capabilities (primarily protection) based on
    operational needs by making MRAPs available to deployed formations in
    sets configured to their needs. They will also fill specific mission
    roles in Army units where there are gaps.

                             nondeployable soldiers
        19. Senator McCain. General Odierno, what is the total number of
    nondeployable soldiers currently serving?
        General Odierno. There are about 92,000 soldiers currently serving
    in the Active Army that are nondeployable for one or more reasons; the
    majority of these are temporary conditions.

        20. Senator McCain. General Odierno, of this total, how many have a
    permanent profile which would prevent them from ever deploying?
        General Odierno. There are about 15,000 soldiers currently serving
    in the Active Army who have a permanent (P3 or P4) profile. More than
    90 percent of these soldiers will be separated from service upon
    completion of their Medical Evaluation Board (MEB)/Physical Evaluation
    Board (PEB).

        21. Senator McCain. General Odierno, what is your intent with
    regard to permanently non-deployable soldiers?
        General Odierno. Ninety-nine percent of soldiers identified as
    permanently nondeployable for other than medical reasons are in the
    process of separating from the Army. Of the soldiers with permanent (P3
    or P4) profiles who are referred to the MEB/PEB process, more than 90
    percent will ultimately be separated from service. For those who are
    retained, the Army is currently exploring options to more heavily
    weight deployability as a criterion for retainability.

        22. Senator McCain. General Odierno, how would you characterize the
    efficiency of the Army's medical review board process?
        General Odierno. The Army's medical review board process is very
    complex, lengthy, and confusing. The transformation from legacy
    disability processing to the Integrated Disability Evaluation System
    (IDES) has been a gradual process in the Army since November 2007. The
    DES is better than it was 4 years ago. Although legislative changes and
    the new IDES have made the system less adversarial, it has not made the
    process more efficient.
        IDES facilitates soldiers/veterans receiving VA disability ratings
    in concurrence with the Service's disability process. IDES has provided
    greater consistency between Military and VA ratings, reduced the time
    it takes for a soldier to start receiving VA benefits after separation,
    and increased soldiers' satisfaction. But the amount of time to process
    veterans under IDES has actually increased due to the many additional
    VA exams that were not required under the previous process.

                                  end strength
        23. Senator McCain. General Odierno, former Secretary of Defense
    Gates previously announced that Army end strength will be reduced by
    some 49,000 troops over the next 5 to 10 years, beginning with 7,400
    fewer troops in 2012. Do these reductions introduce risk to continued
    operations in Afghanistan?
        General Odierno. No, the initial end strength reductions in 2012
    are a portion of the planned decrease of the temporary end strength
    increase approved in 2009. For the remaining end strength reductions,
    the Army will use a deliberate process and take into consideration
    operational demands, unit readiness, and those actions necessary to
    sustain and care for the All-Volunteer Force. Our plan will proceed at
    a pace necessary to ensure mission success and retain flexibility to
    respond to unforeseen demand.

        24. Senator McCain. General Odierno, what is the personnel
    reduction threshold for force structure change?
        General Odierno. Army force structure is dependent on the Army end
    strength limit. Any reduction in Army end strength drives reductions to
    force structure. The Army is coordinating end strength reductions with
    its deliberate Total Army Analysis (TAA) process to ensure Army force
    structure contains the required capability and capacity to meet current
    and future operational requirements within its authorized end strength.

        25. Senator McCain. General Odierno, in your view, what is the
    optimal end strength number to meet worldwide commitments?
        General Odierno. The Army continuously analyzes current and
    projected factors such as assigned missions, operational demands, unit
    readiness, soldier and family well-being, Reserve component capability
    and capacity, and fiscal constraints in order to achieve the required
    Active-Duty end strength. The highly analytical process to determine
    force structure is called the TAA. The focus of our TAA process is to
    answer this very question while considering the uncertainty of future
    operational requirements. The answer to your question is dependent on
    what America is asking its Army to do; it is entirely driven by demand.
    For today, the Active Army end strength is 569,400; end strength in the
    future could be higher or lower depending on missions assigned. As
    worldwide commitments change, our optimal end strength number will
    change as well.

        26. Senator McCain. General Odierno, what does dwell-time for the
    average soldier look like in a post-Iraq environment?
        General Odierno. Individual dwell time varies greatly among grades
    and specialties and is largely a function of demand. As the demand for
    our forces decreases, we expect most soldiers will continue to
    experience dwell periods of longer duration.

                                 guard/reserve
        27. Senator McCain. General Odierno, what practical changes will be
    implemented to transition the Army National Guard and Army Reserve into
    operational forces?
        General Odierno. This year, DOD requested a change in title 10,
    U.S.C., section 12304, that would allow the Reserve components to be
    involuntarily activated with prior coordination at the service chief
    level, and provide the necessary budgetary authority to support the
    deployment. This will allow for the continued critical contributions of
    the Reserve component. This proposal would ensure that DOD is able to
    utilize the National Guards' unique capability throughout the world and
    codify the requirement for the National Guard as an operational force.
        In addition, by continuing the use of the ARFORGEN cycle, the Army
    can maintain an Operational Reserve that is more integrated into the
    day-to-day military operations, and participates at a higher level of
    operational missions. The Army, in coordination with the National Guard
    Bureau, has also developed a training strategy for units to participate
    in collective training, including additional inactive duty training,
    annual training, and Active Duty days. This strategy achieves company
    level proficiency for all units as they move into the available force
    pool.
        Estimates for the cost of the Reserve's operational role vary.
    Overseas contingency operation accounts currently fund much of the
    Reserve component deployments, training, and family support. To ensure
    continued funding to support the Reserve component as an operational
    force, the Army has included the National Guard's operational role in
    its future budget planning.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
                      army modular transformation strategy
        28. Senator Chambliss. General Odierno, in one of the advance
    policy questions regarding what actions or changes, if any, would you
    propose relative to the Army's modular transformation strategy, you
    replied that ``if confirmed, [you] will continue to review Army plans
    and strategies, including the modular transformation strategy, force
    structure, and modernization to ensure the Army continues to provide
    the joint force with the best mix of capabilities to prevail in today's
    wars, and engage to build partner capacity, support civil authorities,
    and deter and defeat potential adversaries.'' In your opinion, are we
    lacking any capabilities within the joint force to prevail in today's
    wars? If so, what are they?
        General Odierno. The Army, as part of the joint force, has
    sufficient capability to prevail in today's wars. Building partner
    capacity, stability operations, and counter insurgency operations have
    been primary missions of the Army for the past 10 years and we have
    incorporated lessons learned across the entire force. We are
    exceedingly proficient in these operational missions with the current
    force in support of today's wars. There are concerns regarding the
    downsizing of Army force structure associated with our ability to meet
    the continued demand, and our ability to be proactive in order to
    prevent and prevail in future conflicts. We have to ensure that the
    drawdown of our force structure is coordinated with the reduction in
    forces committed to ongoing operations. Additionally, we have to ensure
    that the drawdown will not adversely affect the ability of the Army to
    train for full spectrum operations to provide strategic flexibility for
    the Nation.

        29. Senator Chambliss. General Odierno, is the Army's current mix
    of capabilities properly apportioned to accomplish the tasks we must do
    now, such as building partner capacity, supporting civil authorities,
    and deterring and defeating potential adversaries?
        General Odierno. The Army's sustainable capacity for steady-state
    combatant command requirements is known as the Mission Force, currently
    comprised of one corps headquarters, five division headquarters, 20
    brigade combat teams, and approximately 90,000 troops worth of enabling
    capabilities. A Mission Force of this size satisfies steady-state
    combatant command demands, meets the national military strategy
    objectives, and facilitates the Army's dwell-time goals to allow time
    for reset, training, and troop recovery.
        The Mission Force is currently operating at a greater velocity than
    designed because higher than expected demand by combatant commanders.
    These satisfied demands include the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns,
    global posture requirements in Korea, the Army contribution to the
    Global Response Force and DOD Homeland defense requirements, and other
    missions such as Multi-National Force and Observers force in the Sinai.
    As the Army completes its Iraq force draw down and begins its
    Afghanistan force draw down, the Mission Force will begin to build
    toward its dwell goals and be better postured to satisfy combatant
    command demands related to building partnership capacity and other
    security cooperation activities outside the Central Command area of
    responsibility.
        While the Army will be able to meet all combatant commander
    requirements, it will take a few challenging years to fully reset
    equipment, replenish prepositioned stocks, reintegrate Army families,
    and train forces for full spectrum operations. At that point the Nation
    will have true strategic flexibility and will have reduced both
    strategic and military risk in the mid- to long-term.

        30. Senator Chambliss. General Odierno, in a resource-constrained
    environment, could embedding critical, indirect enablers responsible
    for building partner capacity and providing support to civil
    authorities, such as civil affairs personnel, within BCTs help the Army
    accomplish these critical tasks and save precious Army resources?
        General Odierno. Enabling capabilities such as medical, legal, and
    civil affairs are vital augmentation to the BCT's capabilities.
    Augmenting the BCTs with modular, cohesive unit enabling capabilities
    ensures that the right augmentation is fully capable to support the
    commander, can be tailored to the specific mission, and allows rapid
    increase or decrease depending on the environment. Some indirect
    enablers such as medical and legal personnel have a role in building
    partner capacity and providing support to civil authorities but also
    serve a day-to-day function within the BCTs. Other enablers such as
    civil affairs and foreign area officers don't have a day-to-day
    function inside the BCT but have a role in building partner capacity
    and providing support to civil authorities. Therefore, the Army is
    effectively and efficiently served by civil affairs forces that can
    support multiple BCTs, as needed. We are working on attaining the
    correct balance of enablers between the Active component and Reserve
    component.

        31. Senator Chambliss. General Odierno, if the Army continues to
    build a second Civil Affairs Brigade to support the General Purpose
    Forces, what then do we do with the preponderance of the Nation's
    tactical Civil Affairs force structure located in the Army Reserve?
        General Odierno. The ability of the Army to provide sufficient
    Civil Affairs tactical capability to the General Purpose Force for two
    or more simultaneous conflicts has been significantly enhanced by the
    inclusion of the 85th Civil Affairs Brigade to the nine Reserve Civil
    Affairs Brigades. Over the past 10 years, the Army Reserve had to make
    up for a shortage of Active component Civil Affairs by deploying
    Reserve units more often than any other type of Reserve unit. While a
    second Active component brigade will provide Civil Affairs capability
    on a more rapidly available and rotational basis, the Army Reserve
    Civil Affairs will continue to provide support for the long-term with
    planned, predictable missions of Building Partner Capacity throughout
    the world. In addition, the Army Reserve will continue to provide the
    capacity to surge as missions require.
        The new Active Duty Civil Affairs Brigade will enable the Army to
    concentrate the Reserve component Civil Affairs Units on their
    functional skills and redevelop the capability to conduct Transitional
    Military Authority (Military Government) while providing the capacity
    to support maneuver brigades and geographical combatant commanders in
    phase zero operations.

        32. Senator Chambliss. General Odierno, how do we further integrate
    Army Reserve Civil Affairs forces and their vitally important civilian
    skills and expertise into the future Army?
        General Odierno. Army Reserve Civil Affairs forces bring unique
    skill sets and experience to augment the capabilities of the Army.
    These skills and experience enable the United States to fulfill its
    obligations under the Geneva Conventions to provide for the care and
    governance of the areas we occupy pending transfer of this
    responsibility to other authority. Army Reserve Civil Affairs forces
    should be the vanguard of our Nation's capability to provide for the
    care and governance of ungoverned populations and to provide training
    to our partner nations to do the same. The specific functional skills
    such as agriculture, education, and economics will be valuable to the
    combatant commands in operations supporting building partner capacity.
                                     ______

                   Question Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
                       private first class bowe bergdahl
        33. Senator Ayotte. General Odierno, Private First Class (PFC) Bowe
    Bergdahl, U.S. Army, was captured by the Taliban over 2 years ago, on
    June 30, 2009, in Paktika province in eastern Afghanistan. As the only
    known U.S. soldier held captive in Afghanistan by enemy belligerents, I
    want to ensure that we are doing everything we can to obtain his
    release. What is PFC Bergdahl's status, and what is DOD doing to obtain
    his release?
        General Odierno. Sergeant (then-PFC) Bowe R. Bergdahl, of Hailey,
    Idaho, was declared Missing-Captured on July 3, 2009, after he was
    discovered missing from his combat outpost in Afghanistan on June 30,
    2009. At the time of his capture, SGT Bergdahl was assigned to 1st
    Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, 4th BCT, 25th Infantry
    Division.
        Sergeant Bergdahl is one of two U.S. military members, both U.S.
    Army soldiers, currently listed by DOD as having the duty status
    ``Missing-Captured,'' the other soldier being SSG Ahmed Altaie. U.S.
    Central Command is responsible for the ongoing efforts in theater to
    recover both soldiers. For the safety and security of the soldiers and
    units involved, the details of these efforts remain classified.
        Sergeant Bergdahl's parents continue to receive regular updates
    from DOD regarding significant developments in the efforts to recover
    their son.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
                                fort hood attack
        34. Senator Collins. General Odierno, as ranking member of the
    Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, I worked
    with Senator Lieberman to investigate the U.S. Government's failure to
    prevent the Fort Hood attack. One of the most distressing aspects of
    this report was that it found the Army and the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation ``collectively had sufficient information necessary to
    have detected Major Hasan's radicalization to violent Islamist
    extremism but failed both to understand and to act on it.'' In light of
    the Fort Hood attack and the findings in this report, what steps has
    the Army taken to improve personnel oversight such that warning signs
    of individual problems are identified and acted on as early as
    possible?
        General Odierno. The Army has implemented over 20 of the
    recommendations proposed by the DOD's Independent Review Panel and the
    Army's Internal Review Team and continues to improve its ability to
    identify and quickly respond to potential insider threats to the force.
        In January 2011, the Army established the Army Protection Program
    (APP) to better manage risks relative to the safety and security of our
    soldiers, families, civilians, infrastructure, and information. The
    program provides a strategic management framework to synchronize,
    prioritize, and coordinate Army protection policies, resources, and
    activities.
        As part of the APP, the Army is developing a Security Resiliency
    Program to strengthen security policies, processes, and systems, and
    provide the Army an enterprise approach to addressing the ``insider
    threat''. One of the key components of the strategy is to focus on
    deterring and preventing insider threats through improved personnel
    security and suitability screenings, counterintelligence and security
    awareness training, improved information sharing, and an Automated
    Continuous Evaluation System to proactively alert and flag issues of
    concern for cleared personnel.
        The Army also established a Counterintelligence/Security Fusion
    Cell to review and flag security background investigations to identify
    threat, security, and other high-risk behavioral concerns.
    Additionally, the Army expanded the Threat Awareness and Reporting
    Program and the Security Education Training and Awareness Program.
    These programs increase awareness of potential adverse behaviors and
    provide a systematic approach to threat reporting and educating all
    commanders and leaders on their roles and responsibilities for
    reporting adverse information.
        The Army revised its policy regarding command-directed mental
    health evaluations. Behavioral health providers are now required to
    report to the soldier's chain of command within 24 hours, those
    individuals who may present a risk to the protection of classified
    information, and commanders must notify the Army Central Clearance
    Facility when concerns are noted.
        The Army has reinforced, through Army-wide messages, commander and
    soldier roles and responsibilities to report threat-related incidents
    and behaviors deemed detrimental to good order and discipline
    (including violent behavior and prohibited activities). The goal is to
    improve knowledge of which behaviors to report, who to report them to,
    and the importance of Army leaders taking appropriate action when
    behavior or activity is reported. The result will be a better awareness
    of potential insider threats, early intervention, and a safer
    environment for our Army community, installations, and activities.
        The Army has improved its behavior health screenings for new Army
    applicants by requiring medical personnel to conduct face-to-face
    screenings at all 65 Military Entrance Processing Centers utilizing
    five questions that better assess the potential behavioral health
    issues. The Army is consulting with national experts (e.g., Columbia
    University, Harvard University, National Institute of Mental Health, et
    cetera) to develop, test, evaluate, and deliver improved behavior
    health screening tools.

                                   dwell time
        35. Senator Collins. General Odierno, the Army plans to reduce its
    end strength by 22,000 soldiers in 2013 and 27,000 soldiers in 2015 and
    beyond as we draw down forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Army officials
    and mental health experts have repeatedly said that a dwell time of 2
    years at home for every 1 year deployed is the minimum time necessary
    to preserve the long-term mental and physical well-being necessary to
    sustain our soldiers and our Army over the long-term. Can you assure me
    that the Army's manpower reductions will not be made until the Army has
    reached its target dwell time of 2 years at home for every 1 year
    deployed for soldiers, and specifically for those soldiers who are in
    the combat arms, who have served on the frontlines for the last 10
    years of war?
        General Odierno. Boots-on-the-ground (BOG) time to dwell time
    ratios are largely based on demand; given the current strategic
    guidance and the associated projected future requirements, the Army can
    achieve and sustain 1:2 BOG to dwell ratio for high demand and low
    density units. The Army expects to improve on this ratio and have
    sufficient troops to respond to unforeseen events. With current and
    projected force demand consistent with current strategic guidance, and
    with some exceptions, the Army will adopt shorter deployment periods (9
    months) for division-level-and-below units in 2012.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
                                dod budget cuts
        36. Senator Cornyn. General Odierno, in the President's April
    speech on debt reduction, he targeted security spending for $400
    billion in cuts over the next 12 years, the preponderance of which is
    expected to come from the DOD budget. However, news reports are now
    indicating that DOD is bracing for much deeper cuts, potentially
    reaching $800 billion or more over the next decade. In your opinion,
    what impact would deeper cuts have on our ability to adequately meet
    our national security requirements, maintain our Nation's historic
    military superiority, and provide the requisite resources and support
    for our soldiers?
        General Odierno. Deeper cuts would impact the level of risk, both
    to soldiers and to mission accomplishment. Based on the challenges we
    faced in finding efficiencies to make $400 billion in cuts, I believe
    that $800 billion in cuts would be extremely high risk. The Army is
    committed globally, and we must be able to accomplish the unforeseen
    when called to do so. We will reduce the size of our Army by ensuring
    we remain in balance with synchronized adjustments of manpower,
    modernization, training, maintenance, and infrastructure. We are also
    determined to honor our commitments to the force by fully resourcing
    the most important family programs, transitioning to a 9-month BOG
    commitment and holding, as a minimum, a 1:2 BOG-dwell ratio. Our end
    state is to provide a force capable of meeting the current National
    Military Strategy with enough flexibility to provide the National
    Command Authority the greatest possible number of options for an
    uncertain future.

                            army acquisition reform
        37. Senator Cornyn. General Odierno, according to the final report
    of the 2010 Army Acquisition Review, between 1990 and 2010, the Army
    terminated 22 major acquisition programs before completion, totaling at
    least $32 billion--which represents almost one-third of the Army's
    budget for creating new weapons. The report notes that, ``Every year
    since 1996, the Army has spent more than $1 billion annually on
    programs that were ultimately cancelled.'' Since 2004, $3.3 billion to
    $3.8 billion per year (35 percent to 45 percent) of the Army's
    Developmental, Test, and Evaluation funding has been lost to cancelled
    programs. In my view, this represents extremely poor stewardship of
    taxpayers' dollars. In your opinion, what are the primary problems in
    the Army's acquisition process that have caused these program
    cancellations, and what can be done to end this decade-long trend of
    sinking billions of dollars into trying to develop weapons systems that
    will never be fielded?
        General Odierno. I understand the Army acquisition community has
    already applied some of these lessons learned on the GCV program. Under
    the leadership of the Army Acquisition Executive, the Army assembled a
    team of senior subject-matter experts as they refined the 900-plus GCV
    requirements and revised the original Requests for Proposals. The Army
    team, which included members of the requirements, resourcing,
    contracting, and program management communities, developed a set of
    tiered requirements that distinguish critical must-have capabilities
    and provide industry with the necessary flexibility to develop vehicle
    designs that meet the Army's strict cost and schedule constraints. In
    addition, the GCV is the first major program to implement innovative
    measures designed to keep the program on schedule and on budget, to
    include fixed price incentive fee contracts in the 2-year technology
    development phase, an increased emphasis on mature technologies as well
    as reliance on competition throughout the program as an incentive. We
    will continue to monitor the GCV and assess these acquisition reform
    initiatives. I am committed to continue acquisition reform to assure
    effectiveness in attaining our future capability requirements.

                             army basing in europe
        38. Senator Cornyn. General Odierno, earlier this year, the Army
    announced its decision to reduce the number of Army BCTs it has in
    Europe from four to three after 2015. This development is a change from
    the 2004 plan, which called for withdrawing two of the BCTs and leaving
    two in Europe. Reports have indicated the original plan was suspended
    due to concerns that it would hamper the U.S. military's ability to
    respond to trouble in Africa and the Middle East, leave it unable to
    fulfill its commitments to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
    or leave it unable to engage effectively with European allies.
    Maintaining large units like BCTs overseas is very expensive,
    especially when substantial new military construction funding is
    involved, as with the Army plan for maintaining BCTs in Europe. With
    the Army budget under increasing pressure, keeping so many BCTs in
    Europe will involve trade-offs elsewhere in the Army budget. Would it
    not be more cost-effective to bring additional BCTs home to posts in
    CONUS, especially when the Army has posts in CONUS that already have
    the infrastructure and facilities in place to support another BCT and
    provide training opportunities far superior to those reasonably
    available in Europe?
        General Odierno. The Army is considering the disposition of BCTs in
    Europe as part of TAA 14-18 and Program Objective Memorandum (POM)
    deliberations. No decisions have been made. The cost-effectiveness of
    BCT stationing decisions will be considered as part of this process.

        39. Senator Cornyn. General Odierno, do our European allies not
    have their own capable militaries to provide for their national
    defense?
        General Odierno. Our European allies have modern militaries, but
    with limited capabilities because they are not designed to provide
    stand-alone, 360-degree national defense. Their militaries, through the
    NATO Defense Planning Process, are designed to provide their nation's
    contribution to the collective defense of all 28 members of the NATO
    alliance, as stipulated by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

                              afghanistan drawdown
        40. Senator Cornyn. General Odierno, on June 22, 2011, President
    Obama announced he would withdraw 10,000 troops from Afghanistan by the
    end of this year and another 23,000 by next summer, resulting in a
    complete drawdown of the 33,000 troop surge by September 2012.
    Following the President's announcement, Admiral Mullen testified to the
    House Armed Services Committee that: ``the President's decisions are
    more aggressive and incur more risk than I was originally prepared to
    accept.'' Do you agree with Admiral Mullen's statement? If so, what
    pace of drawdown do you believe will incur an acceptable level of risk?
        General Odierno. The National Command Authority has directed the
    surge recovery of troop strength in Afghanistan. The Army is postured
    to support the drawdown. The drawdown in Afghanistan will enable the
    Army to better posture itself for potential contingency operations and
    future operations as determined by the National Command Authority.
        As the Army completes its responsible drawdown from Iraq and begins
    its Afghanistan force recovery, it will achieve the higher dwell time
    goals it has sought and be better-postured to satisfy combatant command
    demands related to building partnership capacity and other security
    cooperation activities.
        While the Army will continue to be able to meet all combatant
    commander requirements, it will take a few challenging years to fully
    reset equipment, replenish prepositioned stocks, reintegrate Army
    families, and train forces for Full Spectrum Operations. At that point
    the Nation will have true strategic flexibility and will have reduced
    both strategic and military risk in the mid- to long-term.

                                     libya
        41. Senator Cornyn. General Odierno, in the early 1990s, then-
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, laid out
    his policies for conducting military operations, which have since come
    to be known as the Powell Doctrine. General Powell stated that: ``We
    should always be skeptical when so-called experts suggest that all a
    particular crisis calls for is a little surgical bombing or a limited
    attack. When the surgery is over and the desired result is not
    obtained, a new set of experts then comes forward with talk of just a
    little escalation . . . history has not been kind to this approach to
    warmaking.'' Regarding the air war over Libya, do you believe that a
    vital U.S. national security interest was or is threatened there?
        General Odierno. The stability of the region, especially following
    the transformational effects of the Arab Spring, is a national security
    interest for the United States.

        42. Senator Cornyn. General Odierno, does the United States have a
    clear, attainable objective in Libya? If so, what is that objective?
        General Odierno. Yes, the goal of the NATO-led military effort and
    the mandate of the U.N. resolution is very clear: to protect the Libyan
    people. While forced regime change is not specified in the military
    mission, this mission complements other instruments of power and will
    add significant pressure on Colonel Qadhafi over time to step down.

                               army surface fleet
        43. Senator Cornyn. General Odierno, the Army currently operates a
    fleet of over 100 ships, used mostly for logistics purposes. The
    vessels range from large landing ships to medium-sized and smaller
    utility landing craft, to a force of tugboats and barges. Those vessels
    are operated by over 2,000 soldiers and another 200 civilians in
    support roles. A 2010 report by Defense News stated that the Army was
    in discussions with the Navy over the potential transfer of the Army's
    watercraft mission and its vessels. In today's Joint Service, does it
    make sense for the Army to continue operating a fleet of over 100
    ships?
        General Odierno. While it is true that the Army was in discussions
    with the Navy over potential transfer of the Army's watercraft mission
    and its vessels over the past year, we have mutually concluded that it
    makes sense for the Army to continue operating a fleet of over 100
    watercraft.
        Army watercraft are a critical maneuver element that enable Army
    logistics operations and bridge the sea-land gap. We envision expanded
    roles and missions for Army watercraft in the 21st century, and we can
    gain better efficiencies in partnering our capabilities with the Navy
    versus combining them.
        However, the Army and Navy did agree to transfer the Joint High
    Speed Vessel (JHSV) program, in which the Army was to receive five
    JHSVs starting in 2012, to the Navy. A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to
    that effect has been signed by the Secretaries of both Services, and
    appropriate budget transfers have been made.
        Joint doctrine directs the Army to prepare for land combat and
    provide watercraft support in a theater of operations. In sourcing
    watercraft support for land combat ashore, the Army will be called upon
    to perform the post-assault resupply mission for joint and combined
    operations that may also include coastal and inland waterway
    transportation. Army watercraft also supports Joint Logistics-Over-The-
    Shore operations, requiring Army watercraft to be capable of performing
    a wide range of ship-to-shore cargo transfer and harbor utility
    functions in support of full fixed ports, partial fixed ports, or bare
    beach operations.
        The mission of Army watercraft is different from the mission of
    Navy watercraft. Army watercraft executes a tactical port mission,
    conducting distribution and operational maneuverability within a
    theater in support of combatant commanders. The Army is also
    responsible for operating common user ports, and the watercraft are
    critical to performing that function. These are not carriers,
    destroyers, or the submarines that immediately come to mind when one
    envisions the Navy. The Navy watercraft that are similar to Army
    vessels assist in the establishment of beachheads for the U.S. Marine
    Corps. In today's joint environment, these capabilities complement one
    another rather than create redundancies. The Army watercraft support
    all Services based on combatant commanders' theater support
    requirements.
        Over the past few years, the Army has conducted three separate
    capabilities-based assessments associated with watercraft requirements
    in the joint environment. The results from all three of those
    assessments repeated the same message: the need exists for the Army to
    continue to operate a small amount of watercraft to support Army and
    joint operations.

        44. Senator Cornyn. General Odierno, please comment on the proposed
    transfer of this mission and assets from the Army to the Navy, and
    provide a status update.
        General Odierno. While it is true that the Army was in discussions
    with the Navy over potential transfer of the Army's watercraft mission
    and its vessels over the past year, we have mutually concluded that it
    makes sense for the Army to continue operating a fleet of over 100
    watercraft.
        Army watercraft are a critical maneuver element that enable Army
    logistics operations and bridge the sea-land gap. We envision expanded
    roles and missions for Army watercraft in the 21st Century, and we can
    gain better efficiencies in partnering our capabilities with the Navy
    versus combining them.
        However, the Army and Navy did agree to transfer the JHSV program,
    in which the Army was to receive five JHSVs starting in 2012, to the
    Navy. An MOA to that effect has been signed by the Secretaries of both
    Services, and appropriate budget transfers have been made.
        Joint doctrine directs the Army to prepare for land combat and
    provide watercraft support in a theater of operations. In sourcing
    watercraft support for land combat ashore, the Army will be called upon
    to perform the post-assault resupply mission for joint and combined
    operations that may also include coastal and inland waterway
    transportation. Army watercraft also supports Joint Logistics-Over-The-
    Shore operations, requiring Army watercraft to be capable of performing
    a wide range of ship-to-shore cargo transfer and harbor utility
    functions in support of full fixed ports, partial fixed ports, or bare
    beach operations.
        The mission of Army watercraft is different from the mission of
    Navy watercraft. Army watercraft executes a tactical port mission,
    conducting distribution and operational maneuverability within a
    theater in support of combatant commanders. The Army is also
    responsible for operating common user ports, and the watercraft are
    critical to performing that function. These are not carriers,
    destroyers, or the submarines that immediately come to mind when one
    envisions the Navy. The Navy watercraft that are similar to Army
    vessels assist in the establishment of beachheads for the U.S. Marine
    Corps. In today's joint environment, these capabilities complement one
    another rather than create redundancies. The Army watercraft support
    all Services based on combatant commanders' theater support
    requirements.
        Over the past few years, the Army has conducted three separate
    capabilities-based assessments associated with watercraft requirements
    in the joint environment. The results from all three of those
    assessments repeated the same message: the need exists for the Army to
    continue to operate a small amount of watercraft to support Army and
    joint operations.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA,
    follows:]
                        Nomination Reference and Report
                               As In Executive Session,
                                   Senate of the United States,
                                                          June 6, 2011.
        Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
    on Armed Services:
        The following named officer for appointment as the Chief of Staff,
    U.S. Army, and appointment to the grade indicated while assigned to a
    position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C.,
    sections 601 and 3033:

                                 To be General

        GEN Raymond T. Odierno, 0000.
                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA,
    which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
    nomination was referred, follows:]
               Biographical Sketch of GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA
    Source of commissioned service: USMA

    Educational degrees:
        U.S. Military Academy, BS, No Major
        North Carolina State University, MS, Engineering, Nuclear Effects
        U.S. Naval War College, MA, National Security and Strategy

    Military schools attended:
        Field Artillery Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
        U.S. Naval Command and Staff College
        U.S. Army War College

    Foreign languages: None recorded.

    Promotions:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Dates of appointment
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2LT.......................................  2 June 76
    1LT.......................................  2 June 78
    CPT.......................................  1 Aug. 80
    MAJ.......................................  1 Dec. 86
    LTC.......................................  1 Feb. 92
    COL.......................................  1 Sep. 95
    BG........................................  1 July 99
    MG........................................  1 Nov. 02
    LTG.......................................  1 Jan. 05
    GEN.......................................  16 Sep. 08
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Major duty assignments:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  From                        To              Assignment
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Oct. 76.........................  Jan. 78...........  Support Platoon
                                                           Leader, later
                                                           Firing Platoon
                                                           Leader, C
                                                           Battery, 1st
                                                           Battalion, 41st
                                                           Field Artillery,
                                                           56th Field
                                                           Artillery
                                                           Brigade, U.S.
                                                           Army Europe and
                                                           Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany
    Jan. 78.........................  Aug. 78...........  Survey Officer,
                                                           1st Battalion,
                                                           41st Field
                                                           Artillery, 56th
                                                           Field Artillery
                                                           Brigade, U.S.
                                                           Army Europe and
                                                           Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany
    Aug. 78.........................  Oct. 79...........  Aide-de-Camp to
                                                           the Commanding
                                                           General, 56th
                                                           Field Artillery
                                                           Brigade, U.S.
                                                           Army Europe and
                                                           Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany
    Nov. 79.........................  July 80...........  Student, Field
                                                           Artillery
                                                           Advanced Course,
                                                           Fort Sill, OK
    Aug. 80.........................  Dec. 80...........  Liaison Officer,
                                                           1st Battalion,
                                                           73d Field
                                                           Artillery, XVIII
                                                           Airborne Corps,
                                                           Fort Bragg, NC
    Dec. 80.........................  Dec. 82...........  Commander, Service
                                                           Battery, later A
                                                           Battery, 1st
                                                           Battalion, 73d
                                                           Field Artillery,
                                                           XVIII Airborne
                                                           Corps, Fort
                                                           Bragg, NC
    Dec. 82.........................  May 83............  Assistant S-3
                                                           (Operations), 1st
                                                           Battalion, 73d
                                                           Field Artillery,
                                                           XVIII Airborne
                                                           Corps, Fort
                                                           Bragg, NC
    June 83.........................  May 84............  S-3 (Operations),
                                                           3d Battalion, 8th
                                                           Field Artillery,
                                                           XVIII Airborne
                                                           Corps, Fort
                                                           Bragg, NC
    June 84.........................  Aug. 86...........  Student, North
                                                           Carolina State
                                                           University,
                                                           Raleigh, NC
    Sep. 86.........................  June 89...........  Nuclear Research
                                                           Officer, later
                                                           Chief,
                                                           Acquisition
                                                           Support Division,
                                                           Defense Nuclear
                                                           Agency,
                                                           Alexandria, VA,
                                                           later detailed as
                                                           Military Advisor
                                                           for Arms Control,
                                                           Office of the
                                                           Secretary of
                                                           Defense,
                                                           Washington, DC
    June 89.........................  June 90...........  Student, U.S.
                                                           Naval Command and
                                                           Staff Course,
                                                           Newport, RI
    July 90.........................  Dec. 90...........  Executive Officer,
                                                           2d Battalion, 3d
                                                           Field Artillery,
                                                           3d Armored
                                                           Division, U.S.
                                                           Army Europe and
                                                           Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany
    Dec. 90.........................  June 91...........  Executive Officer,
                                                           Division
                                                           Artillery, 3d
                                                           Armored Division,
                                                           U.S. Army Europe
                                                           and Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany and
                                                           Operations Desert
                                                           Shield/Storm,
                                                           Saudi Arabia
    June 91.........................  May 92............  Executive Officer,
                                                           42d Field
                                                           Artillery
                                                           Brigade, V Corps,
                                                           U.S. Army Europe
                                                           and Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany
    June 92.........................  June 94...........  Commander, 2d
                                                           Battalion, 8th
                                                           Field Artillery,
                                                           7th Infantry
                                                           Division (Light),
                                                           Fort Ord, CA
                                                           (relocated to
                                                           Fort Lewis, WA)
    June 94.........................  June 95...........  Student, U.S. Army
                                                           War College,
                                                           Carlisle
                                                           Barracks, PA
    June 95.........................  June 97...........  Commander,
                                                           Division
                                                           Artillery, 1st
                                                           Cavalry Division,
                                                           Fort Hood, TX
    June 97.........................  Aug. 98...........  Chief of Staff, V
                                                           Corps, U.S. Army
                                                           Europe and
                                                           Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany
    Aug. 98.........................  July 99...........  Assistant Division
                                                           Commander
                                                           (Support), 1st
                                                           Armored Division,
                                                           U.S. Army Europe
                                                           and Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany to
                                                           include duty as
                                                           Deputy Commanding
                                                           General for
                                                           Ground
                                                           Operations, Task
                                                           Force Hawk,
                                                           Operation Allied
                                                           Force, Albania
    July 99.........................  July 01...........  Director, Force
                                                           Management,
                                                           Office of the
                                                           Deputy Chief of
                                                           Staff for
                                                           Operations and
                                                           Plans, U.S. Army,
                                                           Washington, DC
    Oct. 01.........................  Aug. 04...........  Commanding
                                                           General, 4th
                                                           Infantry Division
                                                           (Mechanized),
                                                           Fort Hood, TX and
                                                           Operation Iraqi
                                                           Freedom, Iraq
    Aug. 04.........................  Oct. 04...........  Special Assistant
                                                           to Vice Chief of
                                                           Staff, U.S. Army,
                                                           Washington, DC
    Oct. 04.........................  May 06............  Assistant to the
                                                           Chairman of the
                                                           Joint Chiefs of
                                                           Staff, Office of
                                                           the Joint Chiefs
                                                           of Staff,
                                                           Washington, DC
    May 06..........................  Dec. 06...........  Commanding
                                                           General, III
                                                           Corps and Fort
                                                           Hood, Fort Hood,
                                                           TX
    Dec. 06.........................  Feb. 08...........  Commander, Multi-
                                                           National Corps-
                                                           Iraq, Operation
                                                           Iraqi Freedom,
                                                           Iraq/Commanding
                                                           General, III
                                                           Corps
    Feb. 08.........................  Sep. 08...........  Commanding
                                                           General, III
                                                           Corps and Fort
                                                           Hood, Fort Hood,
                                                           TX
    Sep. 08.........................  Dec. 09...........  Commander, Multi-
                                                           National Force-
                                                           Iraq, Operation
                                                           Iraqi Freedom,
                                                           Iraq
    Jan. 10.........................  Sep. 10...........  Commander, U.S.
                                                           Forces-Iraq,
                                                           Operation Iraqi
                                                           Freedom/New Dawn,
                                                           Iraq
    Oct. 10.........................  Present...........  Commander, U.S.
                                                           Joint Forces
                                                           Command, Norfolk,
                                                           VA
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Summary of joint assignments:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Assignment                    Date                Grade
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Nuclear Research Officer, later     Sep. 86-June 89                    Captain/Major
     Chief, Acquisition Support
     Division, Defense Nuclear
     Agency, Alexandria, VA, later
     detailed as Military Advisor
     for Arms Control, Office of the
     Secretary of Defense,
     Washington, DC.................
    Assistant to the Chairman of the     Oct. 04-May 06   Lieutenant General
     Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office
     of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
     Washington, DC.................
    Commander, Multi-National Corps-    Dec. 06-Feb. 08   Lieutenant General
     Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
     Iraq/Commanding General, III
     Corps..........................
    Commander, Multi-National Force-    Sep. 08-Dec. 09             General
     Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
     Iraq...........................
    Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq,        Jan. 10-Sep. 10             General
     Operation Iraqi Freedom/New
     Dawn, Iraq.....................
    Commander, U.S. Joint Forces        Oct. 10-Present             General
     Command, Norfolk, VA...........
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Summary of operations assignments:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Assignment                    Date                Grade
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Executive Officer, Division          Dec. 90-May 91               Major
     Artillery, 3d Armored Division,
     U.S. Army Europe and Seventh
     Army, Operations Desert Shield/
     Storm, Saudi Arabia............
    Deputy Commanding General for       Apr. 99-June 99   Brigadier General
     Ground Operations, Task Force
     Hawk, Operation Allied Force,
     Albania........................
    Commanding General, 4th Infantry    Apr. 03-Mar. 04       Major General
     Division (Mechanized),
     Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq..
    Commander, Multi-National Corps-    Dec. 06-Feb. 08   Lieutenant General
     Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
     Iraq/Commanding General, III
     Corps..........................
    Commander, Multi-National Force-    Sep. 08-Dec. 09             General
     Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
     Iraq...........................
    Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq,        Jan. 10-Sep. 10             General
     Operation Iraqi Freedom/New
     Dawn, Iraq.....................
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    U.S. decorations and badges:
        Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
        Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
        Defense Superior Service Medal
        Legion of Merit (with five Oak Leaf Clusters)
        Bronze Star Medal
        Defense Meritorious Service Medal
        Meritorious Service Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
        Army Commendation Medal
        Army Achievement Medal
        Combat Action Badge
        Office of the Secretary of Defense Identification Badge
        Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
        Army Staff Identification Badge
                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
    military officers nominated by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by GEN Raymond T.
    Odierno, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
                              UNITED STATES SENATE
                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                                  Room SR-228
                           Washington, DC 20510-6050
                                 (202) 224-3871
                        COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
          BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
        Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
    more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
    form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
    of your answer applies.
                        Part A--Biographical Information
        Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
    this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
    public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
    any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

        1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
        Raymond T. Odierno.

        2. Position to which nominated:
        Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Washington, DC.

        3. Date of nomination:
        6 June 2011.

        4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
        [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
    committee's executive files.]

        5. Date and place of birth:
        8 September 1954; Rockaway, NJ.

        6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
        Married to Linda Marie Odierno. (Maiden Name: Bukarth).

        7. Names and ages of children:
        Tony Odierno, age 32.
        Kathrine Funk, age 30.
        Mike Odierno, age 24.

        8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary
    or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local
    governments, other than those listed in the service record extract
    provided to the committee by the executive branch.
        None.

        9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
    officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
    or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
    business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
        None.

        10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
    professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
    other organizations.
        Association of the U.S. Army
        Field Artillery Association
        VII Corps Association
        9th Regiment Association
        4th Infantry Division Association
        1st Cavalry Division Association
        American Legion
        Veterans of Foreign Wars
        The Lotos Club (Honorary for 2011-2012)
        Union League Club of New York City (Honorary)
        Union League Club of Chicago (Honorary)
        Union League Club of Philadelphia (Honorary)

        11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
    society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
    service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
    extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
        Ryan C. Crocker Award
        Abraham Lincoln Award
        USO's Distinguished Service Award
        U.S. News & World Report: America's Best Leaders of 2009
        Romanian National Order For Merit in Rank of Grand Officer, For War
        Naval War College Distinguished Graduate Leadership Award
        Union League Club of NYC Leadership Award
        Morris Hills Regional District Hall of Fame
        National Italian American Foundation (NIAF) Special Achievement
    Award
        Secretary of State Distinguished Service Medal
        No Greater Sacrifice Freedom Award

        When responding to questionnaires in support of previous
    nominations, I was advised that I needed to list only those awards,
    honors, et cetera, that were totally outside of my military service, of
    which I have none (i.e., all of the above awards were given in
    recognition of my service as a senior U.S. military officer). However,
    while preparing this nomination package, I was advised differently that
    this question was meant to include all outside awards and honors,
    regardless of the capacity in which they were presented to me. Based on
    that, all outside awards and honors I have received are now listed
    above.
        Of note, I received the Ryan C. Crocker Award, the Abraham Lincoln
    Award, and the Union League Club of NYC during my current tour of duty
    as Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command.
        Additionally, in June 2009, while serving as Commander, Multi-
    National Forces Iraq, I received the Romanian National Order For Merit
    in Rank of Grand Officer, For War. This foreign decoration has been
    approved by the U.S. Army Human Resources Command as required by Army
    Regulation 600-8-22.

        12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
    if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
    constituted committee of the Senate?
        Yes.

        13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
    constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
    those views differ from the administration in power?
        Yes.
                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
    committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
    forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
    Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                    ------

                               Signature and Date
        I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
    on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
    provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
    and complete.
                                                    Raymond T. Odierno.
        This 1st day of June, 2011.

        [The nomination of GEN Raymond T. Odierno, USA, was
    reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on August 2, 2011,
    with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
    nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 2, 2011.]
                                  ----------

        [Prepared questions submitted to Gen. William M. Fraser
    III, USAF, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
    supplied follow:]
                            Questions and Responses
                                defense reforms
        Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
    Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
    strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
    enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly
    delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities
    and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). These
    reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and
    the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and
    education and in the execution of military operations.
        Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
    provisions?
        Answer. No. Goldwater-Nichols has transformed the Department of
    Defense (DOD) and the military for the better. I have completed six
    joint assignments and can personally say that now as Commander of Air
    Combat Command (ACC), I have seen first-hand how we continue to
    institutionalize ``jointness'' within our Armed Forces. The reforms of
    Goldwater-Nichols remain an essential part of the DOD fabric and the
    efficient and effective way we employ forces.
        Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
    address in these modifications?
        Answer. I have no suggested changes to Goldwater-Nichols; however,
    if confirmed, I will work closely with Congress, the Secretary of
    Defense, and other senior leaders of our military to continually review
    Goldwater-Nichols and then implement any changes that are needed.
                                     duties
        Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
    the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)?
        Answer. The mission of the Commander, TRANSCOM, is to provide air,
    land, and sea transportation for DOD, in peace, crisis, and war. The
    Commander relies on his component commands--Air Mobility Command (AMC),
    Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the Military Surface Deployment and
    Distribution Command (SDDC)--to accomplish this mission. The Commander
    also has the Distribution Process Owner (DPO) mission to improve the
    worldwide DOD distribution system. As DPO, the Commander works closely
    with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the Services to identify
    inefficiencies, develop solutions, and implement improvements
    throughout the end-to-end distribution system. The TRANSCOM team blends
    Active and Reserve Forces, civilian employees, and commercial industry
    partners to provide the mobility forces and assets necessary to respond
    to the full range of military operations.
        Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
    believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
        Answer. My entire Air Force career has been filled with a variety
    of opportunities and experiences that prepared me for this job. This
    includes operational tours commanding strategic bomber units which
    deployed, employed, and returned home. But also tours as the Air Force
    Vice Chief of Staff, Commander, ACC, and six joint assignments to
    include time as Assistant to the Chairman, JCS.
        As the Assistant to the Chairman, JCS, I traveled the globe with
    the Secretary of State working to build partnerships with foreign
    governments and international and non-governmental organizations. I
    also participated in numerous interagency deputies meetings at the
    National Security Council.
        As the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, I interacted frequently with
    the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the JCS, combatant commanders,
    and Service Chiefs on major issues facing our military.
        Finally, in my current capacity as Commander, ACC, I organize,
    train, equip, and maintain combat-ready air forces of more than 1,000
    aircraft and 79,000 Active-Duty and civilian personnel in the Air
    Force's largest command. When mobilized, the Air National Guard and Air
    Force Reserve contribute more than 700 aircraft and 49,000 people to
    ACC. This includes the logistics of preparing airmen to deploy around
    the globe, a complex task I have led for various organizations at
    virtually all Air Force levels. In doing so, I've worked with some of
    the military's finest logisticians and they have taught me well.
        If confirmed, it will be my distinct honor to lead the men and
    women of TRANSCOM in their world-wide mission.
        Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
    take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander,
    TRANSCOM?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will personally engage the component
    commands, agencies, and commercial partners to better grasp the scope
    of the issues they face in order to execute this critical duty. I need
    a complete understanding of current DOD and national transportation
    issues, including the challenges facing the commercial transportation
    industry and other national partners upon who we so heavily rely.
                                 relationships
        Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
    chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
    and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other
    sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important
    relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your
    understanding of the relationship of the Commander, TRANSCOM, to the
    following offices:
        The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has full power and
    authority to act for the Secretary of Defense when serving as his
    designated representative in the Secretary's absence. As such, the
    Commander, TRANSCOM, will report to and through the Deputy Secretary
    when serving in that capacity.
        Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
        Answer. Under Secretaries of Defense coordinate and exchange
    information with DOD components, including combatant commands, which
    have collateral or related functions. In practice, this coordination
    and exchange is normally routed through the Chairman of the JCS. If
    confirmed as a combatant commander, I will act accordingly.
        Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        Answer. The Chairman is established by title 10 as the principal
    military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense. The
    Chairman serves as an advisor, and is not, according to the law, in the
    chain of command, which runs from the President through the Secretary
    to each combatant commander. The President normally directs
    communications between himself and the Secretary of Defense to the
    combatant commanders via the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff. This
    keeps the Chairman fully involved and allows the Chairman to execute
    his other legal responsibilities. A key responsibility of the Chairman
    is to speak for the combatant commanders, especially on operational
    requirements. If confirmed as a Commander, I will keep the Chairman and
    the Secretary of Defense promptly informed on matters for which I would
    be personally accountable.
        Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        Answer. Although the Vice Chairman does not fall within the
    combatant command chain of command, he is delegated full power and
    authority to act for the Chairman in the Chairman's absence. If
    confirmed as a combatant commander, I will keep the Chairman informed,
    but if the Vice Chairman is representing the Chairman I will keep him
    informed as I would the Chairman.
        Question. The Director of the Joint Staff.
        Answer. The Director of the Joint Staff assists the Chairman in
    managing the Joint Staff. The Director of the Joint Staff does not fall
    within the combatant commander's chain of command. However, he enables
    important decisions to be made as the combatant commander's staff
    interacts with the Joint Staff. The Director is also a key interface
    with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) principles and
    interagency leadership, and can assist combatant commanders working
    issues below the Chairman's level.
        Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
        Answer. Close coordination with each Service Secretary is required
    to ensure that there is no infringement upon the lawful
    responsibilities held by a Service Secretary.
        Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
        Answer. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services organize, train, and
    equip their respective forces. No combatant commander can ensure
    preparedness of his assigned forces without the full cooperation and
    support of the Service Chiefs and their respective Reserve components.
    As members of the JCS, the Service Chiefs have a lawful obligation to
    provide military advice. The experience and judgment the Service Chiefs
    provide is an invaluable resource for every combatant commander. If
    confirmed, as Commander, TRANSCOM, I will pursue an open dialogue with
    the Service Chiefs and the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard.
        Question. The other combatant commanders.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will maintain open dialogue with the other
    combatant commanders to foster trust and build mutual support. Today's
    security environment requires us to work together to execute U.S.
    national security policy.
                        major challenges and priorities
        Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
    the next Commander, TRANSCOM?
        Answer. The next commander's near-term challenge will be
    maintaining today's warfighter support, including redeployment of
    forces, while building and sustaining alternative strategic lines of
    communication in case we lose any of our current primary routes. Long-
    term challenges include preparing for a future with a wide range of
    adversaries in an ever-changing, more complex and distributed
    battlespace. Even as the Department prepares for a broad range of
    military crises, we know we will face disaster-related humanitarian
    crises like those that have occurred here at home, as well as in Haiti,
    Japan, and elsewhere. We will need to do this in a more expeditionary,
    yet fiscally constrained environment than ever before.
        The real strength of TRANSCOM--as with any military organization--
    is evident in the unique talents and skills of its people. There is no
    more important challenge to a commander than proper stewardship of this
    resource. TRANSCOM's components rely heavily on Reserve elements.
    TRANSCOM includes multi-Service Active Military and large amounts of
    Reserve personnel, government civilians, and contractors. If confirmed,
    I would take an active role in preserving and enhancing the quality and
    expertise of TRANSCOM's personnel resources.
        Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
    challenges?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will address these challenges by improving
    our global end-to-end ability to deliver to the point of need in the
    most cost-effective way possible--projecting power where our national
    interests dictate. To do this, I will work with our commercial partners
    and the interagency to expand capacity and continue TRANSCOM efforts
    around the world to secure diplomatic and physical accesses to ground
    and airspace infrastructure for logistics. I will also leverage ongoing
    multi-modal efforts to optimize our operations to support the
    warfighter while improving the performance and efficiency of deployment
    and distribution enterprise. Working closely with CYBERCOM, I will
    ensure our networks remain secure as TRANSCOM's Agile Transportation
    for the 21st century (AT 21) program is brought to operational status.
    This will provide decisionmakers with automated tools to improve the
    end-to-end movement and distribution of forces and sustainment.
        Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish?
        Answer. If confirmed, TRANSCOM's number one priority will remain to
    support the warfighter with whatever is needed to meet national
    objectives; including deployment, sustainment, rapid maneuver,
    aeromedical evacuation, redeployment, and humanitarian crisis response.
    Always mindful of our resources, I will continue process improvements
    and enterprise synchronization efforts through relationships within the
    Department, around the U.S. Government, and with commercial and
    international partners.
        Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
    the performance of the functions of the Commander, TRANSCOM?
        Answer. TRANSCOM has done a world-class job supporting the Nation
    and our military forces over the years. Its stock with the warfighter
    has never been higher, earned through deployments, sustainment,
    redeployments, surges, drawdowns, and humanitarian crises like the
    recent calamity in Japan or the earthquake in Haiti. TRANSCOM's human
    enterprise is large, diverse, and global, and there will always be
    things we wish we can do better. The most significant area I would
    focus on would be improving the coordination and synchronization of the
    entire Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE). The JDDE is
    a vast network of organizations both in and out of DOD that relies
    heavily on commercial partnerships with industry. General McNabb has
    made great strides toward this end, and if confirmed, I will continue
    this work by aligning JDDE authorities and resources commensurate with
    responsibilities, improving our ability to rapidly build strategic
    lines of communication, and institutionalizing best practices learned
    during the last decade.
        Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would
    you establish to address these problems?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will reach outside of the command early to
    deepen strategic relationships with my fellow combatant commanders,
    TRANSCOM's components, commercial and international partners, leaders
    within the interagency, and with Members of Congress. As we move
    forward, we will balance our desire for perfection with the art of what
    is possible across a highly diverse enterprise, proceeding smartly
    after considering the options and balancing their costs and benefits.
                  experience in managing logistics operations
        Question. Unlike the current Commander of TRANSCOM, you have not
    had extensive experience in managing transportation forces. Much of
    your operational experience has been in bomber units.
        What steps do you believe you need to take to achieve a more
    complete understating of the logistics operations that TRANSCOM and the
    component commands within command manage for DOD?
        Answer. I will work diligently to increase my knowledge of DOD and
    national transportation issues, including the challenges facing the
    commercial transportation industry and other national partners. If
    confirmed, this will include ensuring the TRANSCOM staff works to
    enhance my understanding of logistics operations and the mission of the
    command. I will also personally engage our interagency,
    nongovernmental, commercial, and multi-national partners to learn and
    discuss improvements to our shared logistics priorities.
                           distribution process owner
        Question. In September 2003, following a review of logistics
    operations, the Secretary of Defense designated the Commander,
    TRANSCOM, the Distribution Process Owner (DPO). As the DPO, TRANSCOM
    was tasked to improve the overall efficiency and interoperability of
    distribution related activities--deployment, sustainment, and
    redeployment support during peace and war.
        What is your understanding of TRANSCOM's responsibilities as the
    DPO?
        Answer. The mission of TRANSCOM as the DPO is twofold: first, to
    coordinate and oversee the DOD distribution system to provide
    interoperability, synchronization and alignment of DOD-wide, end-to-end
    distribution; and, second, to develop and implement distribution
    process improvements that enhance the Defense Logistics and Global
    Supply Chain Management System.
        Question. What is your assessment of the progress TRANSCOM has made
    in improving the distribution process?
        Answer. The Command has made significant progress in transforming
    DOD distribution. In collaboration with the COCOMs, Services, DLA, and
    GSA, TRANSCOM has matured the DPO governance structure to use a robust
    performance measurement framework, with common metrics and negotiated
    Time Definite Delivery (TDD) standards which establish expectations,
    identify where the system needs improvement, and prioritize resources
    to making improvements.
        TRANSCOM has made improvements through the DPO Strategic
    Opportunities (DSO) initiatives, which is a collaborative effort
    between TRANSCOM, DLA, GSA, the Services, and COCOMs to move
    sustainment through the distribution network faster and cheaper. For
    fiscal year 2011, these combined initiatives have delivered
    approximately $280 million in savings through July.
        For example, the Strategic Surface Route Plan maximized 40 foot
    container utilization and improved velocity on key routes by 15
    percent. Strategic Air Optimization has improved aircraft cargo
    utilization by 10 percent by employing the full array of airlift
    services, improving Aerial Port pallet build processes and better
    matching airlift capacity with demand. Lastly, by applying lean
    principles to air and surface cargo distribution processes, TRANSCOM
    improved velocity by up to 40 percent across multiple COCOM
    distribution lanes.
        Looking forward, there are always ways to institutionalize process
    improvements and efficiencies through business process reengineering.
    One example is the AT 21 program, which uses industry best-practices
    and government and commercial off-the-shelf optimization and scheduling
    tools to deliver best value, end-to-end distribution and deployment
    solutions. Business process reengineering improves transportation
    planning, forecast accuracy, and on-time delivery of forces and
    sustainment to combatant commanders at a lower cost to the Services.
        Question. Do you believe that the current system needs any changes
    to enhance the ability of TRANSCOM to execute the responsibilities of
    the DPO?
        Answer. No. I believe the Commander of TRANSCOM has the necessary
    authorities to execute his responsibility as the DPO. If confirmed, I
    will continue to build on the hard work and successes achieved to date.
    I will emphasize reducing costs by exploring new areas in the DOD
    supply chain that emphasize a total cost management view, balancing
    efficiency with effectiveness to achieve best value and visibility for
    the warfighters and the taxpayers. I will enhance unity of effort by
    promoting the Joint Deployment Distribution Enterprise and pursuing
    opportunities to remove barriers to reinvesting enterprise cost
    savings.
                               strategic airlift
        Question. The requirement for organic strategic airlift needed to
    support wartime requirements has been set at a level of 32.7 million
    ton-miles per day. This requirement is somewhat smaller than the
    capability of 222 C-17s and 111 C-5s which could carry roughly 35
    million ton-miles per day. With that situation in mind, the Air Force
    intends to retire some portion of the C-5A fleet of aircraft.
        Do you agree with the DOD proposal to eliminate the strategic
    airlift force structure floor of 316 aircraft?
        Answer. Yes. Our national defense strategy requires a viable fleet
    of about 300 organic strategic airlift aircraft, which would provide
    the 32.7 million ton-miles per day peak wartime requirement as
    established in the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study-2016
    (MCRS-16). The C-17 will continue to be our premier airlifter, and our
    modernized C-5s are achieving their expected levels of mission
    readiness. However, in order to achieve the correct mix of C-17 and C-5
    aircraft, and take full advantage of our aircrews, maintainers, and
    aerial porters, the Air Force should be given the authority to retire
    the oldest, least capable C-5As. This action would improve aircraft
    availability by removing aircraft with the lowest mission capable rates
    from the fleet and will allow the Air Force to focus their critical
    personnel and resources on the right-sized fleet.
        Question. What is your view of the requirements in peacetime for
    such organic airlift aircraft?
        Answer. The MCRS-16 established the organic strategic airlift
    requirement at 32.7 million ton-miles per day. This requirement
    includes steady-state (peacetime) requirements as well as wartime
    requirements. Proactive management of the Guard and Reserve
    participation and commercial augmentation allows TRANSCOM to respond
    rapidly to sudden changes in the peacetime requirements. If confirmed,
    I will work to ensure our partnership with the Guard, Reserve, and CRAF
    carriers remain strong for our national security.
        Question. Do you believe that the Air Force could, at reasonable
    costs and within reasonable timeframes, reactivate some portion of the
    32 C-5 aircraft that will have been retired under the Air Force's
    current plans, if later we find out that 301 strategic airlift aircraft
    is not sufficient to meet our peacetime and wartime needs?
        Answer. Based on the MCRS-16, the Air Force does not anticipate the
    requirement for strategic airlift to exceed 32.7 million ton-miles per
    day, which equates to about 300 aircraft. If, at some point in the
    future, we determine that the requirement is greater than anticipated,
    TRANSCOM will support the Air Force to find the best solution, which
    might include reactivation of aircraft.
        Question. Does possible closure of Pakistan lines of communication
    supporting Afghanistan operations change your assessment of airlift
    requirements, and if so, how?
        Answer. No. The possible closure of Pakistan lines of communication
    would not change the requirement of about 300 organic strategic airlift
    aircraft. Improving throughput at existing airports and expanding
    capacity in our surface networks which supply Afghanistan has again
    been a centerpiece of our efforts in 2010. The Northern Distribution
    Network (NDN) remains a priority for TRANSCOM. In 2010, two additional
    routes were added through the Baltics and Central Asia and continue to
    improve the processes, facilitating a faster, less costly cargo flow.
    In addition to the NDN improvements, capacity was added at intermodal
    Persian Gulf locations. Realizing that more capacity was needed to
    support the surge of forces into Afghanistan and the movement of
    thousands of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles, TRANSCOM
    worked closely with CENTCOM and the Department of State to secure
    access to additional airfields and seaports in the Persian Gulf. Using
    a concept called multi-modal operations, large volumes of cargo and
    thousands of vehicles were moved by sea to locations in closer
    proximity to the CENTCOM area of operations, by truck from the seaports
    to the nearby airfields and then by air to Afghanistan.
                         northern distribution network
        Question. The Defense Department has plans to expand its use of air
    and ground supply routes along the NDN to deliver equipment and
    supplies to Afghanistan, in part to reduce the U.S. reliance on supply
    routes through Pakistan. Yet significant portions of the NDN go through
    certain countries, particularly in Central Asia, that have extremely
    poor track records on human rights and corruption.
        What do you see as the major challenges to expanding the use of the
    NDN to deliver supplies to Afghanistan?
        Answer. The primary challenges we face with expanding the NDN are
    access and types of cargo allowed to transit. Receiving necessary and
    timely transit permissions from partner nations, particularly those in
    Central Asia, has been a challenge. Additionally, the current transit
    agreements only allow non-lethal cargo to transit the NDN. This
    limiting factor leads to heavier reliance on the Pakistan ground lines
    of communication for some military equipment and airlift for delivery
    of lethal and critical or sensitive cargo.
        Question. To what extent, if any, should concerns about the human
    rights and corruption records of authoritarian regimes, particularly in
    Central Asia, be taken into account in negotiating expanded access to
    supply routes along the NDN?
        Answer. It is in the national interests of the United States to
    advance and protect fundamental human rights, and to promote democratic
    institutions that are responsive and accountable to its citizens. These
    strategic priorities should be taken into account and balanced against
    other strategic priorities in our dealings with foreign governments. We
    need to work with the whole-of-government to take a holistic approach
    to our bilateral relationships, and it is in this context that
    negotiations to expand needed NDN supply routes should be considered.
                               strategic sealift
        Question. Strategic sealift has always played a significant role in
    providing support to our forces overseas. Typically, we have seen
    strategic sealift delivering 95 percent of the equipment transported to
    overseas contingencies.
        Are there any initiatives that you believe are necessary, if
    confirmed, in the area of strategic sealift?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the U.S. Navy and our
    commercial sealift partners to develop initiatives such as Joint
    Seabasing and Joint High Speed Vessels, which may play a role in
    enhancing strategic sealift. Strategic sealift continues to play a
    vital role in the transportation of equipment and supplies for DOD. The
    MSC, the SDDC, and U.S. Maritime Administration, working in partnership
    with the U.S. maritime industry, have done a superb job at meeting the
    performance requirements of strategic sealift as we execute Operations
    Enduring Freedom and New Dawn and support other military missions
    around the globe.
                           maritime security program
        Question. Through programs like the Maritime Security Program
    (MSP), the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA), and the
    Voluntary Tanker Agreement (VTA) administered by the Maritime
    Administration, DOD has maintained access to U.S. commercial
    capabilities and transportation networks while ensuring the continued
    viability of both the U.S.-flag fleet and the pool of citizen mariners
    who man those vessels.
        What is your view of the importance of these Maritime
    Administration programs?
        Answer. The MSP, VISA, and VTA are all vital components of the
    overall strategic sealift capability required to meet the Nation's
    strategic sealift requirements. The MSP maintains a modern U.S. flag
    fleet providing military access to vessels and vessel capacity, as well
    as a total global, intermodal transportation network. This network
    includes not only vessels, but logistics management services,
    infrastructure, terminals facilities and, perhaps most importantly,
    U.S. citizen merchant mariners to crew the government owned/controlled
    and commercial fleets.
        Question. What changes in these programs, if any, do you believe
    are appropriate and would make them more effective or more efficient in
    supporting DOD transportation requirements?
        Answer. TRANSCOM is coordinating with the Maritime Administration
    on proposed enhancements to the MSP that would allow an opportunity for
    cost efficient recapitalization of our organic surge sealift fleet. As
    force drawdowns continue in Operations New Dawn and Enduring Freedom,
    so will the deployment and sustainment cargoes which have become such a
    valuable piece of our commercial partners' business plans. If
    confirmed, I will work to mold these programs to respond to the ever
    changing global strategic and economic environment maintaining our U.S.
    flag fleet, our precious pool of U.S. citizen merchant mariners, and
    the industrial base which supports them.
                            civil reserve air fleet
        Question. With the expansion of military operations since September
    11, 2001, the Air Force's mobility requirements have increased. The Air
    Force has in the past, and may very well in the future, rely heavily on
    the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) to supplement its organic airlift.
        Do the changes in the commercial airline industry, characterized by
    bankruptcies and a move toward smaller and shorter-range aircraft,
    bring into question the future viability of the CRAF system?
        Answer. Several recent studies indicate that the airline industry
    will continue to provide sufficient numbers of large, long-range
    aircraft to meet our defense needs. In this past year, through
    discussions with our commercial industry partners, TRANSCOM has made
    the most sweeping changes to the CRAF program in 15 years. These
    changes will result in a stronger, more viable program and address
    congressional mandates to improve predictability of DOD commercial
    requirements and incentivize carriers to use modern aircraft.
        To ensure the CRAF partnership remains strong, TRANSCOM created the
    Executive Working Group (EWG), modeled after a similar venue with our
    sealift partners. The CRAF EWG brings together TRANSCOM and AMC leaders
    with Chief Executive Officers, Presidents, and other representatives of
    the commercial airline industry to discuss issues with the CRAF
    program. The CRAF EWG will continue to meet on a regular basis to
    discuss additional changes to this vital program. If confirmed, I will
    continue to work with our CRAF partners to ensure the business
    relationships are solid and the contracts support DOD requirements.
        Question. How much should we be relying on CRAF aircraft to meet
    our peacetime and wartime airlift requirements?
        Answer. The CRAF is a critical component in our ability to rapidly
    deploy forces and equipment. We must balance and integrate all the
    tools of American power, to include our industrial capacity and
    partners, to succeed in ensuring our national security.
        The CRAF is intended to augment wartime capability to carry
    passengers and bulk air cargo, which it is very efficient in doing,
    allowing the organic fleet to focus on missions for which they are
    better suited. It is a win-win for our Nation.
                           joint command and control
        Question. Initial reporting from recent military operations
    indicate joint command and control capabilities have greatly improved
    in recent years.
        What is your assessment of the performance of TRANSCOM's global and
    theater command and control (C2) systems?
        Answer. TRANSCOM's global C2 systems work well, as evidenced by
    their timely support of warfighter requirements. If confirmed, I will
    work to improve TRANSCOM's C2 systems to focus on enhancing situational
    awareness, rapid decisionmaking, and end-to-end distribution
    optimization.
        Question. What interoperability challenges remain between Service-
    to-Service and Service-to-joint C2 systems?
        Answer. There is a need to improve information exchanges across the
    various classification boundaries and between Services and combatant
    commanders, while simultaneously improving information sharing with our
    commercial and coalition partners. Information sharing is crucial to
    successful and safe mission accomplishment, but there are security
    risks that require constant attention.
        To enhance Service-to-joint C2 systems, TRANSCOM is working to
    identify key processes and information technology solutions that best
    integrate Service unique or stand-alone applications to enhance the
    delivery of timely, accurate, and complete data. TRANSCOM is teaming
    with commercial partners and individual Services to ensure these
    interoperability risks are addressed. If confirmed, I will continue to
    improve TRANSCOM's superior service to their customers, and most
    importantly, our warfighters.
        Question. What role should the TRANSCOM Commander play in ensuring
    the development of reliable, interoperable, and agile C2 systems?
        Answer. As DPO, the TRANSCOM Commander plays a preeminent role in
    the integration of C2 systems across boundaries and domains from one
    end of the distribution chain to the other. Commercial partners, DLA,
    Joint Staff, combatant commanders, Services, and coalition partners all
    have unique logistics systems that serve their mission.
        If confirmed, I will work with distribution partners and customers
    to make C2 improvements which will allow protected and unconstrained
    sharing of information across these domains. This is a clear challenge,
    but necessary, if we are to maximize the combat multiplying effects of
    logistics for the warfighters.
                       cyberspace operations and security
        Question. TRANSCOM must communicate over the unclassified Internet
    with many private-sector entities that are central to DOD's force
    generation and deployment operations--in the transportation and
    shipping industries in particular. Much of the rest of the critical
    communications and operations of DOD can be conducted over the
    classified DOD internet service, which is not connected to the public
    Internet and is therefore much more protected against eavesdropping and
    disruption by computer network attacks. General McNabb has been quoted
    as stating that TRANSCOM is the most attacked command in the
    Department.
        What do you believe are the critical needs of TRANSCOM for cyber
    security?
        Answer. TRANSCOM not only moves cargo and passengers, but vast
    amounts of information between our military and commercial partners.
    Command and control systems must get the right information to the right
    people at the right time, while protecting it from exploitation and
    attack. If confirmed, I will work to protect the command's information
    from new technologies that exploit and attack, reduce costs by
    eliminating duplication of data, systems, or processes, and set data
    standards across the enterprise to build trust, security, and
    efficiency.
        Question. What plans do you have for addressing these critical
    needs?
        Answer. TRANSCOM will need to continue addressing these issues on
    multiple fronts. Keeping command and control systems secure and
    protecting them from attack is a huge challenge. TRANSCOM has been
    partnering with CYBERCOM, industry, and academia to introduce
    innovative technologies and methodologies to protect essential systems
    and information. To reduce costs and boost security, the command is
    implementing architectures to leverage new technologies, eliminate
    duplication of data, and better protect its command and control
    systems. To improve the accuracy and trust of our information, TRANSCOM
    is partnering with military and commercial partners to define standards
    for the processing and handling of data. Implementation of these
    standards streamlines information flow, provides better transparency to
    authorized users, and leverages new technologies. The results are
    trusted and timely information supporting a more responsive
    transportation enterprise. If confirmed, I will focus on cyber security
    by working with our components, the Department, and industry experts to
    develop innovative solutions that maintain our freedom of operations
    through data security.
        Question. Is DOD taking adequate steps to address your special
    needs?
        Answer. Yes. TRANSCOM is engaged with the Principal Deputy Under
    Secretary of Defense for Policy, DOD Chief Information Officer, U.S.
    Cyber Command, the Cyberspace Integration Group, and COCOM Senior
    Warfighter Forums in a concerted effort to enhance cyberspace
    operations security posture and countering cyber threats to our
    enterprise networks and information.
                             aeromedical evacuation
        Question. Following the cancellation of the C-9A aircraft for
    medical evacuation in 2003, the AMC adopted a new operational approach
    to its worldwide mission of aeromedical evacuation. The concept employs
    other airlift, such as cargo and aerial refueling aircraft, for the air
    evacuation of wounded and ill patients.
        Based on lessons learned in OIF, OEF, and Operation New Dawn, are
    you satisfied that the current model ensures the highest quality of
    aeromedical evacuation support for our severely injured or ill
    personnel?
        Answer. I am extremely satisfied with the high quality of
    aeromedical evacuation support TRANSCOM provides for our severely
    injured or ill personnel. The current approach using designated versus
    dedicated aircraft has transformed our global patient movement
    capability. The transition from the C-9A to cargo and aerial refueling
    aircraft provided access to a greater variety of airframes globally
    while offsetting the cost of maintaining a dedicated air fleet solely
    for aeromedical evacuation. This also provides greater flexibility to
    respond to urgent and priority patient needs with In-system Select
    missions that can land at airfields not accessible by a C-9A. Ten years
    of experience and lessons learned has led to significant advancements
    in mission operations, technology, and medical capability. Patient
    support pallets and specially trained critical care teams are just two
    examples of enhancements that made cargo and aerial refueling aircraft
    suitable for aeromedical evacuation. This has allowed safe movement of
    severely injured and ill patients more effectively through the enroute
    care system. In addition, the Civilian Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is able
    to provide additional aeromedical evacuation capability if patient
    movement requirements exceed current system capacity. If confirmed, I
    will continue to ensure the highest quality of aeromedical evacuation
    support for our severely injured or ill personnel. I believe this is a
    critical pillar to conduct combat operations and to sustaining an
    exceptional All-Volunteer Force.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you continuously evaluate the
    quality standards of aeromedical evacuation?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would support an integrated approach to
    evaluate the quality standards of aeromedical evacuation. This includes
    expanding the use of aeromedical evacuation data from the Patient
    Movement Quality Reporting System and the TRANSCOM Regulating and
    Command and Control Evacuation System to pinpoint opportunities to
    optimize patient care. Integrating other existing patient safety
    databases used by the Services, COCOMs, USTC/AMC aeromedical evacuation
    patient safety monitors, the Critical Care Air Transport Performance
    Improvement Team, and the Joint Theatre Trauma System would further
    enhance patient safety and quality standards. In addition, I would
    support development and deployment of a user-friendly electronic
    medical record that captures patient information and care data all the
    way from point of injury, through care in the air, to the medical
    treatment facility or rehabilitation facility.
                            research and development
        Question. TRANSCOM's budget includes funding for a research and
    development (R&D) activity designed to allow for examination and
    improvement of the entire supply chain as part of TRANSCOM's role as
    DPO.
        What are the major capability gaps related to TRANSCOM's mission
    that need to be addressed through R&D efforts?
        Answer. Increased demands on TRANSCOM's global mission and the
    ability to execute those responsibilities in an ever-increasing
    contested cyberspace environment represent challenges that require
    innovative solutions to maintain critical communication with the
    distribution community including our commercial partners. Additionally,
    new technologies may increase the efficiency and effectiveness of our
    distribution options. If confirmed, TRANSCOM's R&D investment focus
    will explore technologies that improve efficiencies and lower the
    operating cost of our Nation's joint logistics enterprise. Some
    examples include:

             Point of Need Delivery--improve delivery speed,
            volume, and accuracy of airdropped cargo, as well as leverage
            unmanned and hybrid airlift capabilities in operationally
            relevant conditions and synchronize strategic and theater
            delivery capabilities to meet increasingly dynamic customer
            needs;
             Joint Sea Basing--capability to safely and efficiently
            move vehicles, containers, and cargo in a sea base environment;
             Command and Control (C2)/Decision Support Tools--
            improve visibility, decisionmaking, and collaboration within
            DOD's logistics chain;
             Ability to Operate in All Environments--improve
            expeditionary operations for environments that feature anti-
            access, austere conditions, adverse weather, and contested
            cyberspace; and
             Fossil Fuel Dependency Reduction--explore energy
            alternatives to enhance our ability to employ our Nation's
            airlift and aerial refueling capacity and reduce cost relative
            to warfighter requirements.

        Question. What unique processes and technologies do you feel
    TRANSCOM needs to develop through its own program and investments?
        Answer. TRANSCOM is investing in process reengineering as part of
    the AT 21 program to institutionalize improvement opportunities that
    are repeatable and reliable. Examples include the Strategic Surface
    Route Plan, and Strategic Air Optimization, which use demand, capacity,
    and other factors to maximize utilization of containers and pallets
    while maintaining desired service levels. In addition, TRANSCOM
    continues to enhance warfighter support with technologies ranging from
    precision airdrop to exploring the potential of hybrid airships. If
    confirmed, I will examine the entire R&D portfolio to find innovative
    solutions to enhance enterprise support to the warfighter.
        Question. How will you work with other R&D organizations to ensure
    that TRANSCOM's current and future capability gaps are addressed?
        Answer. Nearly 75 percent of TRANSCOM's RDT&E projects are
    collaboratively funded efforts that place proven capabilities in the
    hands of the warfighter within 2 to 3 years. If confirmed, I will work,
    in partnership with the Services, DLA, the combatant commands, OSD, and
    the Joint Staff, to identify, validate, and recommend RDT&E projects to
    explore emerging technologies that close validated capability gaps.
                             technology priorities
        Question. Serving the needs of the combatant commanders both in the
    near-term and in the future is one of the key goals of the Department's
    science and technology executives, who list outreach to commanders as
    an activity of continued focus.
        What do you see as the most challenging technological needs or
    capability gaps facing TRANSCOM in its mission to provide air, land,
    and sea transportation to DOD?
        Answer. Of utmost concern is the need to improve the Department's
    ability to provide timely and precise delivery of sustainment to our
    warfighters as well as humanitarian aid and relief anywhere and anytime
    and to do so in a fiscally responsible manner. Additionally, we need to
    explore information security and assurance as well as new cyber
    technologies to ensure greater efficiency and mission accomplishment.
    Mitigating fossil fuel dependency also remains a major focus area.
        Question. What would you do, if confirmed, to make your technology
    requirements known to the department's science and technology community
    to ensure the availability of needed equipment and capabilities in the
    long-term?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on enhancing Department/industry
    partnerships to rapidly develop and field proven technologies. Within
    DOD and the interagency, I will work through the established processes
    to ensure our support to the warfighter continues.
                             technology transition
        Question. TRANSCOM has been active in the Joint Concept Technology
    Development (JCTD) process.
        What are your views on the JCTD process as a means to spiral
    emerging technologies into use to confront changing threats and to meet
    warfighter needs?
        Answer. The Department's JCTD program is an extremely effective
    tool that COCOMs can use to insert emerging technologies into the
    warfight. It provides the joint community an agile means to deliver
    mature technology addressing warfighter gaps. Building on TRANSCOM's
    past record of success, if confirmed, I will strongly advocate for
    technologies that rapidly enhance warfighter support and success.
        Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to enhance the
    effectiveness of technology transition efforts within your command and
    in cooperation with other Services and defense agencies?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to apply the Command's RDT&E
    investments, in partnership with other COCOMs, Services, defense
    agencies, academia, and industry to advance our Nation's warfighting
    capabilities. I will leverage the Department's many programs (JCTD,
    Coalition Warfare Program, Joint Test & Evaluation, Small Business
    Innovative Research, et cetera) to develop and field, in collaboration
    with our government, coalition, industry, and academic partners, the
    rapid development and transition of proven technologies. Specifically,
    I will include the Services, COCOMs, JDDE partners, OSD, and the Joint
    Staff in the JCTD and RDT&E project selection process to ensure buy-in
    and avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. Finally, I will ensure
    that all projects have a program of record identified for transition
    and emphasize rapid fielding from day one.
                             deployment challenges
        Question. Multiple studies by TRANSCOM and the Army, and direct
    experience in Afghanistan and elsewhere, demonstrate that the airlift
    strategy and airlift platforms developed for the Cold War confrontation
    in Central Europe are not ideal to support operations in third-world
    regions. Unlike Europe, most of the world has few airfields with long
    runways, and there are fewer still that have parking space for more
    than a couple of cargo aircraft to unload at one time. This ``Maximum-
    on-Ground'' or MOG metric is the critical measure of throughput
    capacity at airfields. The few airfields with MOG greater than 2 are
    scarce and are located within major urban areas, usually far from where
    ground forces would be employed. Traditional fixed-wing airlifters--
    even flexible ones like the C-17--cannot be effectively employed in
    large numbers to deploy and support ground forces in these regions
    because of these infrastructure limitations.
        TRANSCOM is now completing a Future Deployment and Distribution
    Assessment that documents this capability gap and evaluates
    alternatives to traditional fixed-wing transports. The alternatives
    that scored very high are heavy-lift airships and heavy vertical take-
    off and landing (VTOL) rotorcraft. These alternatives would deploy more
    forces faster, save lots of fuel, and increase sustainment. Because
    they deliver troops and supplies directly to the point of need, they
    reduce the number of trucks on the road that are vulnerable to IEDs, as
    well as the length of supply lines. In other words, they would also
    reduce the vulnerability of our supply lines and save lives.
        The Air Force and the Army are conducting an Analysis of
    Alternatives (AOA) for a replacement of the C-130. We understand that
    the Army favors a heavy lift second generation tilt-rotor that would
    provide VTOL capabilities.
        Do you support development of such a platform?
        Answer. The AOA you refer to is the Joint Future Theater Lift
    Technology Study (JFTL TS), and it is due to be completed within the
    next year. The AOA is ongoing, and it is unclear what platform or
    platforms will provide the best warfighter value for DOD. The intent of
    the JFTL TS is not to replace the C-130 but to supplement the C-17, C-
    130, and C-27 capabilities to deliver medium weight combat vehicles
    into very austere environments. The JFTL TS is assessing the overall
    value and cost of a cadre of fixed wing aircraft, hybrid airships, and
    tilt-rotor platforms as to how they might perform in emerging, future
    intra-theater airlift missions. Upon completion of the AOA, OSD in
    concert with the Air Force and the joint partners will develop
    conclusions and recommendations.
        Question. TRANSCOM has apparently assessed the airships in this
    review to be much more mature technology. This assessment also agrees
    with other independent assessments.
        Do you think that DOD should develop and produce such platforms, or
    do you think the government could buy or lease them from the private
    sector to acquire a capability sooner?
        Answer. At this time, a hybrid airship configured for heavy cargo,
    equivalent to legacy lift platforms, does not exist. Industry has
    developed an ISR hybrid airship, which may serve as the basis for
    further expansion as a cargo carrying platform. Initial flight testing
    of this platform is scheduled to begin in early 2012. I believe the DOD
    should partner with industry as we go forward advancing this
    transportation modal option.
        Question. In natural disasters such as the Haiti earthquake or
    Hurricane Katrina, the airfields, roads, and bridges that are required
    to fly in and distribute relief forces and supplies were destroyed by
    the disaster. Fixed-wing transports that need functioning airfields are
    not much use, but vertical lift aircraft or airships have the potential
    for continuing effective operations.
        Do you believe that the TRANSCOM analyses have adequately factored
    disaster relief into their assessments?
        Answer. TRANSCOM is conducting studies and analyses to ensure we
    can respond across the full range of military activities. They are
    working with industry partners through the use of Cooperative Research
    and Development Agreements with specific focus on humanitarian
    assistance and disaster relief and contingency sustainment
    (Afghanistan) operations. These look to determine the feasibility of
    using hybrid airships as a modal option for the transportation
    distribution system. In order to continue or increase TRANSCOM's
    capability to support the warfighter and nations in need with effective
    and efficient distribution, this team is engaged to ensure situations
    such as Haiti's earthquake and other natural disasters are analyzed for
    the use of the hybrid airship.
                        defense personal property system
        Question. For over 10 years, TRANSCOM and its subordinate command,
    Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, have been working to
    improve the process of moving servicemembers' household goods and
    gaining the support of the transportation provider industry for needed
    changes. Implementation of the new system--Defense Personal Property
    System (DPS)--uses a ``best value'' approach to contracting with movers
    that focuses on quality of performance, web-based scheduling and
    tracking of shipments, servicemember involvement throughout the moving
    process, and a claims system that provides full replacement value for
    damaged household goods. Successful implementation of this system
    depends on replacement of the legacy Transportation Operational
    Personal Property Standard System (TOPS) with the web-based DPS.
        What do you view as the most significant challenges that remain in
    continuing to implement DPS?
        Answer. The DPS is now booking over 90 percent of all household
    goods shipments, with Active Duty, Reserve, and civilian members taking
    advantage of on-line self-counseling. Awards to move their personal
    property are made on a best-value basis to transportation service
    providers (TSPs). Based on the 17 Mar 11 DPS Cost Savings Analysis, DPS
    has saved approximately $153 million in fiscal year 2011 personal
    property movement costs through the use of more competitive rates and
    best-value scoring. Although the program has come a long way, some
    final implementation steps remain. TRANSCOM is currently incorporating
    the last remaining functionality, such as Domestic Small Shipments,
    Intra-Country Moves, and Non-Temporary Storage, into the DPS software
    while continuing to enhance the overall system performance and the user
    experience.
        Question. What is your assessment of the success of DPS in
    achieving the requirement for full replacement value for damaged or
    missing household goods claims?
        Answer. Full replacement value (FRV) is implemented across the
    Services, and is now in place for all modes of shipments in support of
    the Defense Personal Property Program (DP3). If confirmed, I will
    ensure process improvements are in place so claims submission
    procedures become more straightforward for the DPS Claims module user.
        Question. What is your understanding under DPS of the percentage of
    valid personal claims for damage or loss of household goods that is
    currently paid for by DOD and the percentage that is paid for by the
    movers who caused the damage?
        Answer. Based on metrics provided by the Military Claims Offices
    (MCOs), the percentage of claims paid by the DOD is approximately 52
    percent. However, when a MCO pays a claim to a servicemember, the next
    step in the MCO process is to initiate collection of those funds from
    the mover who caused the damage.
        Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of the response
    rate on customer satisfaction surveys as a method for identifying best
    and worst performers?
        Answer. Customer satisfaction survey response rates have risen to
    27 percent. It is clear the survey response rates are key to ensuring
    only quality service providers participate in the program. If
    confirmed, I will work closely with the Service Headquarters to
    increase the response rate.
        Question. If confirmed, what role would you play in ensuring that
    DPS is fully funded and implemented and will you make every effort to
    ensure this program is successful in meeting its goals?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will leverage DPS to continue to improve
    our business processes for household goods and services. I will work to
    ensure the DPS program successfully meets its goals and full funding is
    obtained. OSD and the Services have committed to fully fund the DPS
    program. In May of this year, the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
    Capability Assessment and Program Evaluation office validated the
    fiscal years 2012 to 2017 funding required for DPS development and
    sustainment. In addition, OSD, Joint Staff, and the Services have
    indicated their support to fund DPS.
            air force ability to respond to worldwide contingencies
        Question. What impact, if any, do you see on the Air Force's
    ability to respond to worldwide contingencies as a consequence of the
    demands of current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?
        Answer. The Air Force has the right people, skills, and equipment
    to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as a full partner. The
    continued operations tempo does however take its toll. Continued
    deployments place stress upon our people and their families. Our
    equipment is also being stressed and aged at an accelerated rate.
    Despite this, the Air Force is proud to be serving alongside our sister
    Services in protecting the future of this great country.
        Question. How much additional risk has the United States assumed in
    this regard?
        Answer. Our forces engaged in combat today are ready to perform
    their missions, but many Air Force capabilities require modernization
    to help us shape and respond to a very challenging future. We must
    retain an enduring technological edge that flows from our unmatched
    ability to research, develop, operate, and sustain the world's premier
    Air Force. The Air Force remains committed to recruiting and retaining
    the highest caliber airmen and sustaining the quality of service for
    them and their families, and we must continue to ensure we are able to
    set the conditions for America's success against emerging threats in an
    uncertain future.
                              joint cargo aircraft
        Question. Subsequent to the Air Force assuming full responsibility
    for the direct support airlift mission capability for the Army, the Air
    Force decided that a total program of 38 C-27Js would be sufficient to
    meet their responsibility for providing that capability. The Air Force
    based this conclusion on: (1) an analysis of the Army's demand for the
    direct support mission; (2) a Mobility Capability Requirements Study
    conclusion that the programmed Air Force fleet of 401 C-130 aircraft
    exceeded maximum demand for intra-theater airlift in any wartime
    scenario by 66 C-130 aircraft; and (3) an analysis that showed that a
    supply of 38 C-27J aircraft, along with 20 C-130 aircraft diverted from
    an intra-theater airlift mission to the Army direct support mission,
    would meet the Army's needs.
        Should the Air Force consider buying more C-27Js specifically for
    meeting the Army direct support mission requirements, rather than
    recapitalizing C-130 inventory that may be excess to intra-theater
    airlift requirements, since the cost per flying hour for a C-27J should
    be much less expensive than that for a C-130J aircraft?
        Answer. No. The Air Force Intra-Theater Airlift Force Mix Analysis
    accomplished by RAND in 2008 demonstrated the C-130J as being
    consistently most cost-effective in accomplishing the spectrum of
    theater lift missions. C-130s and C-27Js have comparable short-field
    access and soft-field performance. The C-27J has a niche for small
    loads (3 pallets or fewer) and is well-suited to perform that role with
    the current plan to acquire 38 aircraft. The continued recapitalization
    of the C-130 fleet offers the warfighter greater and more cost-
    effective capability and flexibility.
        Question. The Defense Department also has requirements for
    supporting domestic missions, such as those from the Department of
    Homeland Security. Absent other information, it would appear to the
    committee that the Department merely assumes that it can muster the
    appropriate support for domestic missions from within those forces that
    are derived from warfighting requirements. Just as it has turned out
    that the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq were not exactly the
    ``lesser included contingencies'' that previous defense planning had
    assumed, it is altogether possible that the same would be true for
    meeting whatever domestic demands may be placed on the Department.
        How would you propose to ensure that TRANSCOM forces are able to
    meet domestic mission requirements?
        Answer. MCRS-16 concluded intra-theater airlift was adequate in
    supporting each of the three cases studied. Each case contained not
    only a major contingency campaign but also included worldwide
    commitments, training, and Homeland defense scenarios.
                        space available travel policies
        Question. DOD, in consultation with TRANSCOM, submitted a report to
    Congress on Space Available Travel for Certain Disabled Veterans and
    Gray-Area Retirees in December 2007. The report concluded that
    increases in space available eligibility would significantly impact
    DOD's ability to accomplish effectively the airlift mission and
    negatively affect support to Active Duty military space-available
    travelers. Additionally, the report concluded that adding to the
    eligibility pool would increase support costs and displace the current
    policy that mandates that space-A travel not incur additional costs to
    DOD.
        Do you consider the conclusions and recommendations of the December
    2007 report to still be valid?
        Answer. I believe the conclusions and recommendations remain valid.
    The potential for expanding the eligibility pool cited in the report by
    nearly 2 million individuals (a 27 percent increase) cannot be
    accommodated without having a detrimental impact to our Active Duty
    members. The space-A travel system's primary objective is to enhance
    the morale and welfare of our Active-Duty Force.
        Question. What are the constraints in today's operational
    environment of expanding the categories of individuals eligible for
    space available travel?
        Answer. Given current operational requirements, I do not believe
    DOD has the global ability to support this expansion. The expansion
    would increase support costs for security identification,
    administration, processing, baggage handling, safety equipment,
    training, personnel, and facilities, and would undermine the current
    policy that execution of the space-A travel is at no cost to DOD. An
    expansion places additional stress on heavily tasked DOD aircrews and
    support personnel because of wartime commitments.
        Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have regarding
    changes to the existing policies controlling space available travel
    eligibility?
        Answer. Due to the current operational requirements, I do not see
    space-A expansion as advisable.
                            congressional oversight
        Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
    appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
    briefings, and other communications of information.
        Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
    this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
    even if those views differ from the administration in power?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
    committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
    information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
    with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, TRANSCOM?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
    other communications of information are provided to this committee and
    its staff and other appropriate committees?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
    such documents?
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
                         northern distribution network
        1. Senator Levin. General Fraser, a major concern has been our
    significant reliance on supply routes through Pakistan which have been
    subject to attack by militant extremists. Currently, nearly 40 percent
    of surface cargo to Afghanistan arrives from the north, and military
    planners reportedly intend to expand to 75 percent the share of surface
    cargo coming into Afghanistan along the northern network. While the
    growth of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) has reduced concerns
    about vulnerable supply lines through Pakistan, it has also raised
    concerns about U.S. dependence on authoritarian regimes in Central Asia
    with high levels of corruption. Given the levels of corruption in a
    number of Central Asian countries, what steps has U.S. Transportation
    Command (TRANSCOM) taken to ensure that its contractors and their
    subcontractors operate in a manner that safeguards against corrupt
    practices that result in U.S. tax dollars being siphoned off?
        General Fraser. There is a continual dialogue between TRANSCOM and
    our commercial carriers who transport cargo into Afghanistan as part of
    the Universal Services Contract (USC). By using our commercial
    carriers, who have established commercial networks and subcontracts
    throughout the NDN, the rates for TRANSCOM transportation are
    competitive and considered reasonable in comparison to commercial
    tariffs in those countries. With our rates being comparable to both
    commercial and NATO cargo rates, we believe the opportunity for funds
    being siphoned off through corruption is minimal. The USCs contain a
    clause requiring contractors to have a business code of ethics and
    conduct, along with all the required U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
    Contracting Command clauses. Additionally, the prime contractors have a
    vested interest in ensuring all business conducted in these countries
    is above board and free of any corruption. They have international
    brands with untarnished reputations--reputations they want to maintain.
    We work closely with our prime contractor and by maintaining continuous
    communications, we remain alert to any potential corruption. In
    addition, our embassies have provided guidance to local carriers
    regarding the legitimacy of transit fees charged by Central Asian
    governments to ensure all charges are valid.

        2. Senator Levin. General Fraser, in Kyrgyzstan, questions have
    arisen regarding payments under a contract to provide fuel to the Manas
    Transit Center that may have been diverted to relatives of two
    presidents. What is the status of any Department of Defense (DOD)
    investigations into allegations of possible corruption in connection
    with fuel contracts relating to the Manas Transit Center?
        General Fraser. The Office of the Secretary of Defense
    (OSD)(Policy) and Defense Logistics Agency-Energy are currently engaged
    with the Government of Kyrgyzstan concerning the fuel contract to
    support Manas Transit Center, and the contractual process continues to
    move gradually forward.
        Regarding allegations of possible corruption, the December 2010
    congressional report ``Mystery at Manas'' was critical of Departments
    of State and Defense oversight of fuel contracts in Central Asia due to
    the high risk of corruption in the region and concern that negative
    public perception may be detrimental to U.S. efforts. However, the
    House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs uncovered
    no credible evidence that Mina Corporation and Red Star Enterprises
    were linked to corrupt activities and we are not aware of any further
    DOD investigations at this time.
        Manas Transit Center continues to be a critical hub for strategic
    airflow as TRANSCOM provides continuous support to CENTCOM operations
    in Afghanistan.
                                     ______

              Question Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
                        stewart air national guard base
        3. Senator Gillibrand. General Fraser, as I'm sure you are aware,
    Stewart Air National Guard Base (ANGB), NY, is the proud home of the
    105th Airlift Wing. Rich in history and tradition, Stewart ANGB employs
    more than 660 full-time and part-time military members and some 1,700
    traditional guardsmen.
        Earlier this year I was pleased with the decision by the Air Force
    to replace the 12 retiring C-5A Galaxy aircraft with the C-17. However,
    I was surprised to learn only eight C-17 are going to be based at
    Stewart ANGB. I've asked the Air Force for an explanation and received
    a response indicating they were currently researching the issue and
    promised me a more detailed answer upon completion of their review.
        I understand the 8 C-17s destined for Stewart ANGB are coming from
    Charleston Air Force Base (AFB), SC, and McChord AFB, WA, both of which
    already have in excess of 50 aircraft. With another 13 C-17s still to
    be delivered to the Air Force, I believe basing an additional 8 C-17s
    (for a total of 16) with the 105th Airlift Wing will not only maximize
    the capability of Stewart ANGB and its highly trained and dedicated
    personnel, it will increase the geographic distribution of this
    important national asset, and increase available ramp space at
    Charleston and McChord AFBs, relieving any potential overcrowding. With
    the retirement of the C-5As, Stewart ANGB has the infrastructure,
    personnel, and community desire to accommodate more than eight C-17s.
        While I was unable to attend your confirmation hearing due to a
    conflict in my schedule, I have reviewed your testimony and appreciated
    your comments on the importance of the Air National Guard and Air Force
    Reserve. As the President's nominee to command TRANSCOM, I would
    appreciate your thoughts on maximizing the capabilities of Stewart ANGB
    by increasing the number of C-17s based there.
        General Fraser. TRANSCOM recognizes the importance of the Air
    National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) to the
    strategic airlift mission. The continued contributions of the Stewart
    ANGB airmen are invaluable to the Air Force, as they complete the
    transition from C-5As to C-17s. The Air Force is responsible for the
    basing of strategic airlift assets which is accomplished through the
    Secretary of the Air Force's Strategic Basing Process. The process is
    deliberate, repeatable, and transparent, with defined roles and
    responsibilities designed to find the appropriate location for aircraft
    and personnel basing.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
                            support for afghanistan
        4. Senator McCain. General Fraser, our relations with Pakistan have
    hit new lows since the raid that killed Osama bin Laden in early May.
    Pakistan has insisted that some of our training and assistance forces
    be withdrawn, and has continued to create delays and uncertainty in
    authorizing visas for a wide variety of Americans to enter Pakistan.
    How concerned are you about our logistics routes that support our
    troops in Afghanistan that run through Pakistan?
        General Fraser. All of our lines of communication are vital and we
    must continue with our best diplomatic efforts to maintain them and
    keep them open. It is mutually beneficial for the United States and
    Pakistan to promote a stable Afghanistan. Pakistan remains an important
    ally in that effort. Our logistical networks within Pakistan are just a
    portion of a vast network of supply lines serving Afghanistan.

        5. Senator McCain. General Fraser, what alternatives could we use,
    if needed?
        General Fraser. TRANSCOM, in coordination with U.S. European
    Command and CENTCOM, has built a network of routes to support
    operations in Afghanistan.
        Surface cargo supporting Afghanistan travels via the Pakistan road
    network or the NDN road and railway routes. TRANSCOM is working with
    our commercial and international partners to further expand NDN
    capability by seeking approval to transport wheel armored vehicles and
    their spare parts.
        Cargo requiring airlift travels via Pakistan or the northern air
    corridors transiting Central Asia. TRANSCOM is continually developing
    and maturing multi-modal locations throughout the Middle East and in
    Europe to include the recent addition of a 100 percent commercial
    multi-modal hub in Dubai and the recently completed 172nd Brigade
    Combat Team deployment via commercial assets through Romania. TRANSCOM
    continues to seek multi-modal opportunities to reduce airlift costs
    while improving overall asset utilization and velocity.
        These routes are designed to overlap and maintain the ability to
    surge if one node is restricted due to unforeseen events while keeping
    the warfighter supported within Afghanistan.

        6. Senator McCain. General Fraser, how confident are you that
    TRANSCOM will be able to fully support the movement of troops and
    equipment that will be needed to implement our strategy in Afghanistan?
        General Fraser. As a land-locked country with remarkable
    topography, logistical support into and out of Afghanistan is extremely
    challenging. Over the last 10 years we have learned many lessons and
    have worked to build as many land, air, and sea routes to support the
    warfighter in Afghanistan as possible. TRANSCOM and CENTCOM both assess
    that we will continue to be able to sustain the current force level
    within Afghanistan. Together, we have worked hard to create a robust
    and efficient logistical network with multiple overlapping routes that
    fosters competition in the commercial industry to help keep costs in
    check while providing sufficient logistical capacity.

        7. Senator McCain. General Fraser, under the President's
    Afghanistan withdrawal strategy, do the caps or limits on the numbers
    of troops authorized in Afghanistan provide a challenge for TRANSCOM
    forces as they move equipment in, out, and around Afghanistan and
    continue to support our remaining combat forces there?
        General Fraser. TRANSCOM has sufficient military and commercial
    logistical personnel on the ground to successfully sustain current
    operations within Afghanistan.

                           u.s. funds to the taliban
        8. Senator McCain. General Fraser, reportedly, a year-long
    military-led investigation recently concluded that U.S. taxpayers'
    money has been indirectly funneled to the Taliban under a $2.2 billion
    ground transportation contract. Yet U.S. and Afghan efforts to address
    the problem have been slow and ineffective, and all eight of the
    trucking firms involved in the work apparently remain on the U.S.
    payroll. According to reports, DOD found that four of the eight
    transportation contracts in Afghanistan are funding the insurgents
    there and that six of the eight companies were associated with
    ``fraudulent paperwork and behavior.'' Despite these findings by the
    Government Accountability Office and DOD, in March, the Pentagon
    extended the contract for another 6 months. In your view, how much of a
    problem is our unwittingly contracting with the enemy in Afghanistan--
    particularly with regard to transportation contracts?
        General Fraser. Any funds being siphoned off to the enemy is a
    problem. The Host Nation Trucking contracts referred to in these
    reports fall under the responsibility of CENTCOM and do not correlate
    to the inter-modal transportation contracts managed by TRANSCOM.
    TRANSCOM assessed potential risk upon receipt of the Warlord Inc.
    report and found minimal risk to our contracts. We have provided this
    report to Universal Services Contract carriers for their reference when
    subcontracting transportation services in Afghanistan. We also
    forwarded a 25 July 2011 Washington Post article, titled: ``U.S. Cash
    Said to be Reaching Taliban'', to our commercial partners and the
    carriers confirmed they are not doing business with the companies cited
    in the article. As the TRANSCOM commander, I will ensure we work hard
    to assist CENTCOM in their efforts to address this issue.

        9. Senator McCain. General Fraser, how do you intend to address
    this issue?
        General Fraser. TRANSCOM will continue to work with contractors to
    mitigate risk concerning this issue, when acquiring transportation
    services into Afghanistan. We shared the Warlord Inc. report with our
    contractors providing transportation services in Afghanistan, asking
    them to compare their operations to those of the Host Nation Trucking
    contract carriers and assess the risk. Based on the Warlord Inc. report
    and our carriers' feedback, it appears most of the risk of money going
    to the Taliban was associated with subcontracted security for convoys.
    Our carriers are using Afghanistan Ministry of the Interior vetted
    companies for their convoy security. Additionally, we will continue to
    work with CENTCOM and the various task forces established to identify
    and eliminate this type of corruption.

        10. Senator McCain. General Fraser, at General Petraeus' request,
    this committee adopted legislation in the National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012 that would give military
    commanders additional powers to investigate and cancel contracts in
    which insurgent ties have been found. It also imposes an affirmative
    obligation on contractors doing business with CENTCOM to conduct the
    due diligence necessary to determine if malign actors are benefitting
    from these contracts. Are you aware of these possible authorities?
        General Fraser. Yes, I understand the new legislation adopted by
    the Senate Armed Services Committee for inclusion in the proposed NDAA
    for Fiscal Year 2012. As Commander, I will work to help ensure the
    TRANSCOM commercial partners are aware of these authorities and my
    acquisition staff will execute them appropriately.

        11. Senator McCain. General Fraser, do you think they may be
    helpful with respect to contracting for transportation in Afghanistan?
    Please explain your answer fully.
        General Fraser. Yes. Further, the Commander, International Security
    Assistance Force published the Counterinsurgency Contracting Guidance
    in September 2010 which emphasized contracting within a contingency
    environment is a commander's business and leaders must be aware of
    contracting activities that are occurring within their areas of
    responsibility. If not properly monitored, contract and donor funds
    could be diverted from their intended purpose and fuel corruption,
    finance insurgent organizations, or strengthen criminal networks. Being
    able to terminate a contract when this occurs will stop the flow of
    funds immediately, and facilitate the ability to look into records of
    contractors and subcontractors at any tier. This will assist Task Force
    2010 which was established to ensure the money spent by the coalition
    is delivering the intended purpose and that contract efforts are linked
    to implementing the counterinsurgency strategy effectively.

                               airlift capability
        12. Senator McCain. General Fraser, a major reason why the Air
    Force has excess large cargo aircraft is because the Senate and House
    Appropriations Committees in recent years have earmarked 44 additional
    C-17s for the Boeing Company that were not requested by DOD nor
    authorized by the Senate and House Armed Services Committees. Does the
    programmed fleet of 300 large cargo aircraft provide enough capacity to
    meet wartime and peacetime requirements?
        General Fraser. Yes. The most demanding scenario in the Mobility
    Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16) generates a
    strategic airlift fleet requirement of 32.7 million ton miles per day
    (MTM/D). A fleet of 222 C-17s, 52 C-5Ms, and 27 C-5As meets the 32.7
    MTM/D requirements.

        13. Senator McCain. General Fraser, in your view, what is the
    budgetary impact to the Air Force if restricted from executing
    programmed C-5A retirements?
        General Fraser. The fiscal year 2012 President's budget recommends
    retiring 10 C-5As. Without relief from the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010's
    316 airlift floor restriction, these 10 C-5As, as well as the remaining
    5 from the fiscal year 2011 President's budget (15 C-5As in total)
    would be restricted from retirement. To continue to operate and
    maintain these aircraft drives a $1.23 billion Future Years Defense
    Program bill. Of this $1.23 billion, $844 million is operations and
    maintenance funding for flying hours and depot level maintenance. This
    funding is not included in the fiscal year 2012 President's budget and
    would have to be sourced from other Air Force programs.

        14. Senator McCain. General Fraser, in your view, where will the
    funding come from to pay for maintaining and flying the extra aircraft
    if the Air Force is not allowed to retire them?
        General Fraser. Assuming a fixed or declining defense budget for
    the foreseeable future, funding to pay for maintaining and flying the
    extra C-5A aircraft would have to be sourced from other Air Force
    programs.

        15. Senator McCain. General Fraser, the President has announced we
    will begin to withdraw from Afghanistan. Is there adequate airlift to
    support this endeavor and the continued withdrawal from Iraq?
        General Fraser. Yes. There is adequate airlift capacity to support
    the withdrawal from Afghanistan. The MCRS-16 determined the strategic
    airlift requirement to be 32.7 MTM/D. That determination is based upon
    a requirement to support two overlapping large-scale land campaigns
    occurring in different theaters, and still handle the steady-state
    requirements of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. As an
    illustration, while supporting both the troop withdrawal from Iraq and
    the surge into Afghanistan, TRANSCOM's busiest day in Air Mobility
    Command was March 23, where they performed 16.6 MTM/D of lift. The
    difficulty in planning the withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq is
    determining the rate of withdrawal, which will be directed by our
    national leadership.

        16. Senator McCain. General Fraser, what limitations are there and
    how do you intend to overcome them, if confirmed?
        General Fraser. First and foremost, TRANSCOM will always deliver,
    and we have the capability to do that today. We must continue to
    support the warfighter, in all locations and climates, without fail.
    While doing so, we must remain good stewards of the taxpayers' money,
    and continue our efforts to locate faster, less-expensive ways to
    deliver the forces and support, and bring our troops home. I intend to
    overcome any limitations by relying upon the hard work and innovation
    of the men and women of TRANSCOM, our component commands and commercial
    partners, and by encouraging efforts to find new and efficient ways of
    doing business. This will also require support from Congress to
    complete the right-sizing of the airlift fleet to facilitate
    efficiencies. As Commander, I look forward to working with Congress on
    this issue.

                               health care costs
        17. Senator McCain. General Fraser, in a modest attempt to control
    DOD's health care costs, former Secretary Gates sought to apply a
    medical inflation factor to TRICARE Prime enrollment fees for working-
    age retirees beginning in fiscal year 2013. Unfortunately, our
    committee balked at that idea, and reported a bill that would
    permanently tie DOD's hands to annual increases to the annual increase
    in retired pay, which has been minimal.
        TRICARE fees haven't changed since they were established in 1995.
    At that time, according to DOD, working age retirees paid about 27
    percent of their total costs when using civilian care. Today, out-of-
    pocket expenses for working age retirees represent less than 9 percent
    of the total cost of the family's health care costs. Some argue that
    health care benefits to retirees have been eroded over time. Do you
    agree?
        General Fraser. I believe military retiree health benefits are well
    deserved and are important to all retirees. The Assistant Secretary of
    Defense Health Affairs and TRICARE Management Activity (TMA) should
    address any possible erosion of DOD health care benefit.

        18. Senator McCain. General Fraser, do you support the
    administration's modest goal of linking future increases in fees for
    working age retirees to a factor that relates to rising national
    medical costs?
        General Fraser. This question relates to DOD Health Care Benefits
    and belongs in the purview of Assistant Secretary of Defense Health
    Affairs and/or TMA.

        19. Senator McCain. General Fraser, do you see the rise in health
    care costs as a threat to readiness and if so, what would you do or
    recommend, if confirmed, to address this very serious issue for DOD?
        General Fraser. This question relates to DOD Health Care Benefits
    and belongs in the purview of Assistant Secretary of Defense Health
    Affairs and/or TMA.

                        defense personal property system
        20. Senator McCain. General Fraser, in your advance policy question
    regarding Defense Personal Property System (DPS), you indicated that
    DOD currently is paying approximately 52 percent of all claims from
    servicemembers for lost or damaged household goods in connection with
    permanent change of station (PCS) moves. This is a surprisingly high
    number given the assurances from Surface Deployment and Distribution
    Command (SDDC) and TRANSCOM when the DPS was proposed and justified to
    Congress that the movers and shippers, who cause the damage, would be
    required by the terms of their contracts to reimburse the servicemember
    directly at full replacement value. Please explain why DOD is currently
    paying such a high percentage of household goods claims for lost or
    damaged property.
        General Fraser. Although 52 percent of claims are paid through the
    Military Claims Office (MCO), this figure is a fraction of all DOD
    shipments in fiscal year 2010, whether moved in the DPS or the legacy
    system, the Transportation Operational Personal Property Standard
    System (TOPS). During fiscal year 2010, approximately 55 percent of
    shipments were transferred through TOPS, which partially accounts for
    the high percentage of shipments settled by the DOD.

        21. Senator McCain. General Fraser, what is the dollar figure of
    the amount, per year, that DOD is paying out in claims in connection
    with PCS moves, and what percentage of that amount is DOD actually
    collecting after-the-fact from movers?
        General Fraser. The DOD amount paid and recovery amounts are not a
    one-on-one, per claim, correlation. DOD could pay an amount on a claim
    during 1 fiscal year, and the recovery could very well be in the next
    fiscal year. Due to reasons such as, but not limited to, appeal
    processes (negotiating, rebutting, going back and forth with the
    Transportation Service Provider (TSP)), previous lack of offset
    capability, and MCO consolidations, providing a consolidated monetary
    comparison which ties a fiscal year payout to the same fiscal year for
    recovery is not a possible task.
        The claims payments and recoveries vary slightly between Services,
    but the individual recovery rate(s) are approximately 95 to 97 percent.
    As of 31 July 11, DOD MCOs collectively paid out approximately $3.9
    million and collected approximately $3.3 million. However, it must be
    reiterated that the collections reflected above do not correlate to the
    claims paid during this fiscal year for the reasons previously stated.

        22. Senator McCain. General Fraser, are meritorious claims being
    paid by DOD to servicemembers being paid at depreciated value or full
    replacement value of the items lost or damaged?
        General Fraser. A meritorious claim is one that meets all the
    statutory and regulatory criteria for payment and they are the only
    kind the Services pay. Initial payment to the servicemember is
    depreciated value; however, when the MCO is successful at recouping
    from the TSP full replacement value and additional monies are
    recovered, those additional monies are provided back to the customer.

        23. Senator McCain. General Fraser, PCS moves involving
    international travel present unique challenges because of the numbers
    of movers and shippers involved and the time and distance involved in
    the shipments. Last year, DOD requested and received statutory
    authority for DOD to pay full replacement value claims of this kind.
    What is your assessment of DOD and SDDC's practical and legal ability
    to require reimbursement of claims at full replacement value from
    movers and shippers for international moves?
        General Fraser. The SDDC's assessment is that claims are being
    processed and settled internationally at the full replacement value as
    detailed in the policy guidance.

        24. Senator McCain. General Fraser, is there a solution for this
    aspect of the DPS claims system, or is this a cost DOD and the Services
    must plan on absorbing?
        General Fraser. There is no additional cost to DOD for claims
    associated with DPS.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
                  contracting airlift from russia and ukraine
        25. Senator Chambliss. General Fraser, the Air Force is proposing
    to retire additional C-5As for a total of 32 aircraft because they
    believe these aircraft are excess to the Air Force's needs. It has been
    estimated that between 2005 and 2009, DOD spent $1.7 billion
    contracting airlift from the Russians and Ukrainians. This is a good
    deal more than the amount of resources the Air Force hopes to save by
    retiring additional C-5s. Do you think it makes sense and is a good
    expenditure of U.S. taxpayers' resources to retire U.S. aircraft when
    we are already relying on foreign aircraft to meet our needs and are
    spending billions of dollars contracting with the Russians and
    Ukrainians for these aircraft?
        General Fraser. Contracting for oversize/outsize commercial airlift
    using our Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet (CRAF) carriers and their
    commercial partners is a prudent use of taxpayers' dollars. When not
    operating at full war-time capability and utilization rates, as in
    current operations today, it is 25 percent less costly to move Mine
    Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles by AN-124s than by C-5s.
    Furthermore, by contracting for foreign strategic airlift today, we
    extend the useful life of our strategic airlift fleet into the future,
    increasing our system capacity, operational flexibility, and
    strengthening relationships with our commercial partners.

        26. Senator Chambliss. General Fraser, are Russian and Ukrainian
    aircraft available worldwide or just in limited locations?
        General Fraser. Foreign airlift is available worldwide to support
    TRANSCOM requirements when U.S. flag capabilities are not suitable due
    to cargo constraints or destination restrictions.

        27. Senator Chambliss. General Fraser, how, or does, the United
    States account for the fact that, based on the specific requirement the
    Russians and Ukrainians are asked to support, they might decline to do
    so, similar to how some countries where we have troops or assets
    stationed have denied over-flight rights or denied those troops or
    assets being used for certain purposes?
        General Fraser. There is a distinction between resources we use for
    our planned war-time capability and those we use in current operations.
    Our planned war-time capability does not rely upon any foreign source
    of airlift. By contracting for foreign strategic airlift today, we
    extend the useful life of our organic inventory into the future.
    Additionally, TRANSCOM use of foreign airlift via subcontracts with our
    CRAF partners increases system capacity and flexibility, is a prudent
    use of taxpayers' dollars as these capabilities are often less costly
    to utilize than organic assets, and serves to strengthen our important
    relationship with our commercial partners.

            mobility capabilities and requirements study reliability
        28. Senator Chambliss. General Fraser, in 2008, DOD conducted a
    Strategic Airlift Review and concluded that the then current program of
    record was the most cost effective and there was no need for additional
    C-17s. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council also established a
    requirement for 33.95 million-ton-miles (MTM) organic capability and
    stated that any reduction in strategic airlift capability would
    increase risk to unacceptable levels and jeopardize DOD's ability to
    adequately support the combatant commands.
        In 2008, OSD also certified the need for 316 strategic airlifters.
    In 2009, a congressionally-directed airlift review conducted by the
    Institute for Defense Analyses concluded that the current program of
    record (316 aircraft) met all requirements and that retiring C-5As to
    buy/operate additional C-17s was not cost effective. Air Force
    leadership also testified to Congress that 316 strategic airlift
    aircraft was ``the sweet spot''.
        In 2009, the MCRS established a new 32.7 MTM worst-case requirement
    which was lower than previous studies in recent years. The Air Force's
    desire to retire 30+ C-5As which could drive the strategic airlift
    fleet below 300 aircraft is based on this most recent study.
        Over the last 3 to 4 years, DOD and the Air Force have changed
    their position several times on what the strategic airlift requirement
    is. How do you compare the results of these studies and which study is
    most correct?
        General Fraser. All previous DOD-level studies you reference were
    correct. History has shown a need to update such studies every
    quadrennial review cycle and we respond to those validated and reviewed
    changes each time we submit a new Program Objective Memorandum (POM).
    The MCRS-16 is the most current and now serves as the foundation for a
    requirements demand signal extending to fiscal year 2016.
        Based on MCRS-16, we know that the peak demand signal for 32.7 MTM/
    D of strategic organic airlift capacity can be met with approximately
    300 aircraft. Our program of record for 222 C-17s, 52 RERPed C-5Ms, and
    27 C-5As assures we can address the most demanding validated needs of
    the Nation with this force structure.

        29. Senator Chambliss. General Fraser, how do we know that you have
    it right this time and that we are not incurring unacceptable or
    unnecessary risk?
        General Fraser. The MCRS-16 is the most current assessment of the
    need for mobility assets based on 2 years of studying three demanding
    cases involving the integration of scenarios to simultaneously protect
    the Homeland, posture our Nation to respond to events around the globe,
    and be prepared to address significant overlapping combatant campaigns
    in response to threats to our national interests. These DOD validated
    scenario sets are continuously being reviewed and updated to assure we
    can respond to world events and address conflicts with acceptable
    levels of risk. Each year we submit our programming actions based upon
    the most current family of scenario sets and demands approved by the
    Department.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Gen. William M. Fraser III,
    USAF, follows:]
                        Nomination Reference and Report
                               As In Executive Session,
                                   Senate of the United States,
                                                         June 16, 2011.
        Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
    on Armed Services:
        The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Air Force
    to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and
    responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

                                 To be General

        Gen. William M. Fraser III, 0000.
                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of Gen. William M. Fraser III,
    which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
    nomination was referred, follows:]
            Biographical Sketch of Gen. William M. Fraser III, USAF
        Gen. William M. Fraser III is Commander, Air Combat Command, with
    headquarters at Langley Air Force Base, VA, and Air Component Commander
    (ACC) for U.S. Joint Forces Command. As the commander, he is
    responsible for organizing, training, equipping, and maintaining
    combat-ready forces for rapid deployment and employment while ensuring
    strategic air defense forces are ready to meet the challenges of
    peacetime air sovereignty and wartime defense. ACC operates more than
    1,000 aircraft, 22 wings, 13 bases, and more than 300 operating
    locations worldwide with 79,000 Active-Duty and civilian personnel.
    When mobilized, the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve contribute
    more than 700 aircraft and 49,000 people to ACC. As the Combat Air
    Forces lead agent, ACC develops strategy, doctrine, concepts, tactics,
    and procedures for air and space power employment. The command provides
    conventional and information warfare forces to all unified commands to
    ensure air, space, and information superiority for warfighters and
    national decisionmakers. ACC can also be called upon to assist national
    agencies with intelligence, surveillance, and crisis response
    capabilities.
        General Fraser entered the Air Force in 1974 as a distinguished
    graduate of the Texas A&M University Reserve Officers' Training Corps
    program. His operational assignments include duty as a T-37, B-52, B-1,
    and B-2 instructor pilot and evaluator. General Fraser has commanded an
    operations group and two bomb wings. His staff duties include tours on
    the Air Staff, Joint Staff, and Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
    at Offutt Air Force Base, NE. He has also served as Chief of the
    Nuclear Requirements Cell at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe,
    Chief of Staff for U.S. Strategic Command, and as the Assistant to the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        General Fraser has extensive war time, contingency, and
    humanitarian relief operational experience. During Operation Enduring
    Freedom he led an intelligence fusion organization that provided direct
    support to the warfighter. Prior to assuming his current position,
    General Fraser served as the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff.

    Education:

    1974......................................  Bachelor of Science degree
                                                 in engineering technology,
                                                 Texas A&M University
    1977......................................  Squadron Officer School,
                                                 Maxwell AFB, AL
    1980......................................  Master of Science degree in
                                                 management information
                                                 systems, University of
                                                 Northern Colorado, Greeley
    1983......................................  Marine Corps Command and
                                                 Staff College, Quantico, VA
    1985......................................  Armed Forces Staff College,
                                                 Norfolk, VA
    1987......................................  National Security Management
                                                 Course, Syracuse
                                                 University, NY
    1991......................................  Air War College, Maxwell
                                                 AFB, AL
    1995......................................  Executive Development
                                                 Program, Johnson Graduate
                                                 School of Management,
                                                 Cornell University, Ithaca,
                                                 NY
    1999......................................  Combined Force Air Component
                                                 Commander Course, Maxwell
                                                 AFB, AL
    1999......................................  Senior Information Warfare
                                                 Applications Course,
                                                 Maxwell AFB, AL
    2000......................................  National Security Leadership
                                                 Course, National Security
                                                 Studies, Maxwell School of
                                                 Citizenship and Public
                                                 Affairs, Syracuse
                                                 University, NY
    2002......................................  Executive Program for
                                                 Russian and U.S. General
                                                 Officers, John F. Kennedy
                                                 School of Government,
                                                 Harvard University,
                                                 Cambridge, MA
    2002......................................  Joint Flag Officer
                                                 Warfighting Course, Maxwell
                                                 AFB, AL
    2002......................................  Senior Intelligence Fellows
                                                 Program, Wye River, MD
    2003......................................  Program for Senior
                                                 Executives in National and
                                                 International Security,
                                                 John F. Kennedy School of
                                                 Government, Harvard
                                                 University, Cambridge, MA
    2005......................................  Leadership at the Peak,
                                                 Center for Creative
                                                 Leadership, Colorado
                                                 Springs, CO

    Major duty assignments:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  From                        To              Assignment
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    November 1974...................  October 1975......  Student,
                                                           undergraduate
                                                           pilot training,
                                                           Williams AFB, AZ
    October 1975....................  March 1976........  Student,
                                                           instructor pilot
                                                           training,
                                                           Randolph AFB, TX
    March 1976......................  February 1978.....  T-37 instructor
                                                           pilot and T-37
                                                           check pilot, 96th
                                                           Flying Training
                                                           Squadron,
                                                           Williams AFB, AZ
    March 1978......................  March 1980........  T-37 instructor
                                                           pilot and flight
                                                           examiner, 82nd
                                                           Flying Training
                                                           Wing, Williams
                                                           AFB, AZ
    March 1980......................  October 1980......  Operational
                                                           Support Aircraft
                                                           Program Element
                                                           Monitor, Air
                                                           Staff Training
                                                           Program,
                                                           Headquarters U.S.
                                                           Air Force,
                                                           Washington, DC
    October 1980....................  April 1981........  Worldwide Military
                                                           Command, Control
                                                           and
                                                           Communications
                                                           Program Element
                                                           Monitor, Air
                                                           Staff Training
                                                           Program,
                                                           Headquarters U.S.
                                                           Air Force,
                                                           Washington, DC
    May 1981........................  October 1981......  B-52H student,
                                                           4017th Combat
                                                           Crew Training
                                                           Squadron, Castle
                                                           AFB, CA
    October 1981....................  March 1983........  B-52H aircraft
                                                           commander, later
                                                           B-52G aircraft
                                                           commander and
                                                           instructor pilot,
                                                           46th Bomb
                                                           Squadron, Grand
                                                           Forks AFB, ND
    March 1983......................  December 1984.....  Chief, B-52G
                                                           Standardization
                                                           and Evaluation
                                                           Branch, 319th
                                                           BombWing, Grand
                                                           Forks AFB, ND
    January 1985....................  June 1985.........  Student, Armed
                                                           Forces Staff
                                                           College, Norfolk,
                                                           VA
    June 1985.......................  March 1986........  Chief, European
                                                           Single Integrated
                                                           Operational Plan
                                                           Tactics, Joint
                                                           Strategic Target
                                                           Planning Staff,
                                                           Offutt AFB, NE
    April 1986......................  October 1987......  Executive officer
                                                           to the Strategic
                                                           Air Command Chief
                                                           of Staff,
                                                           Headquarters SAC,
                                                           Offutt AFB, NE
    October 1987....................  July 1990.........  Chief, Nuclear
                                                           Requirements
                                                           Cell, SHAPE,
                                                           Mons, Belgium
    July 1990.......................  July 1991.........  Student, Air War
                                                           College, Maxwell
                                                           AFB, AL
    July 1991.......................  July 1993.........  Deputy Commander,
                                                           384th Operations
                                                           Group, McConnell
                                                           AFB, KS
    July 1993.......................  January 1995......  Commander, 509th
                                                           Operations Group,
                                                           Whiteman AFB, MO
    January 1995....................  August 1995.......  Vice Commander,
                                                           509th Bomb Wing,
                                                           Whiteman AFB, MO
    August 1995.....................  January 1997......  Special Assistant
                                                           to the Supreme
                                                           Allied Commander
                                                           Europe, SHAPE,
                                                           Mons, Belgium
    February 1997...................  May 1998..........  Commander, 28th
                                                           Bomb Wing,
                                                           Ellsworth AFB, SD
    May 1998........................  May 1999..........  Chief of Staff,
                                                           U.S. Strategic
                                                           Command, Offutt
                                                           AFB, NE
    May 1999........................  December 2000.....  Commander, 2nd
                                                           Bomb Wing,
                                                           Barksdale AFB, LA
    December 2000...................  December 2002.....  Deputy Director
                                                           for National
                                                           Systems
                                                           Operations, the
                                                           Joint Staff;
                                                           Director, Defense
                                                           Space
                                                           Reconnaissance
                                                           Program; and
                                                           Deputy Director
                                                           for Military
                                                           Support, National
                                                           Reconnaissance
                                                           Office,
                                                           Washington, DC
    January 2003....................  October 2004......  Director of
                                                           Operations,
                                                           Headquarters
                                                           AETC, Randolph
                                                           AFB, TX
    November 2004...................  February 2005.....  Special Assistant
                                                           to the Commander,
                                                           Air Force Command
                                                           and Control,
                                                           Intelligence,
                                                           Surveillance and
                                                           Reconnaissance
                                                           Center, Deputy
                                                           Chief of Staff
                                                           for Warfighting
                                                           Integration,
                                                           Langley AFB, VA
    February 2005...................  May 2006..........  Vice Commander,
                                                           Air Combat
                                                           Command, Langley
                                                           AFB, VA
    May 2006........................  October 2008......  Assistant to the
                                                           Chairman of the
                                                           Joint Chiefs of
                                                           Staff,
                                                           Washington, DC
    October 2008....................  September 2009....  Vice Chief of
                                                           Staff,
                                                           Headquarters U.S.
                                                           Air Force,
                                                           Washington, DC
    September 2009..................  Present...........  Commander, Air
                                                           Combat Command,
                                                           Langley AFB, VA,
                                                           and Air Component
                                                           Commander for
                                                           U.S. Joint Forces
                                                           Command
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Summary of joint assignments:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  From                        To              Assignment
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    June 1985.......................  March 1986........  Chief, European
                                                           Single Integrated
                                                           Operational Plan
                                                           Tactics, Joint
                                                           Strategic Target
                                                           Planning Staff,
                                                           Offutt AFB, NE,
                                                           as a major
    October 1987....................  July 1990.........  Chief, Nuclear
                                                           Requirements
                                                           Cell, SHAPE,
                                                           Mons, Belgium, as
                                                           a lieutenant
                                                           colonel
    August 1995.....................  January 1997......  Special Assistant
                                                           to the Supreme
                                                           Allied Commander
                                                           Europe, SHAPE,
                                                           Mons, Belgium, as
                                                           a colonel
    May 1998........................  May 1999..........  Chief of Staff,
                                                           U.S. Strategic
                                                           Command, Offutt
                                                           AFB, NE, as a
                                                           colonel
    December 2000...................  December 2002.....  Deputy Director
                                                           for National
                                                           Systems
                                                           Operations, the
                                                           Joint Staff;
                                                           Director, Defense
                                                           Space
                                                           Reconnaissance
                                                           Program; and
                                                           Deputy Director
                                                           for Military
                                                           Support, National
                                                           Reconnaissance
                                                           Office,
                                                           Washington, DC,
                                                           as a brigadier
                                                           general
    May 2006........................  October 2008......  Assistant to the
                                                           Chairman of the
                                                           Joint Chiefs of
                                                           Staff,
                                                           Washington, DC,
                                                           as a lieutenant
                                                           general
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Flight information:
        Rating: Command pilot
        Flight hours: More than 4,200
        Aircraft flown: T-37, T-38, T-1, KC-135R, B-1B, B-2, B-52G/H, and
    C-21

    Major awards and decorations:
        Defense Distinguished Service Medal
        Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
        Defense Superior Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters
        Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters
        Defense Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
        Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
        Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster
        Air Force Achievement Medal
        Secretary's Distinguished Service Award, Department of State
        National Intelligence Medal of Achievement
        Combat Readiness Medal
        National Defense Service Medal with bronze star
        Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
        Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
        Armed Forces Service Medal
        Military Outstanding Volunteer Service Medal

    Other achievements:
        Officer training award, undergraduate pilot training
        Top graduate, T-37 pilot instructor training
        T-37 Instructor Pilot of the Year
        Distinguished graduate, B-52 G/H combat crew training
        Air Force Public Affairs Directors Special Achievement Award for
    commander support
        Joseph A. Moller Award, Outstanding Wing Commander, ACC
        Gold Medal, National Reconnaissance Office

    Effective dates of promotion:

      Second Lieutenant.......................  November 8, 1974
      First Lieutenant........................  November 8, 1976
      Captain.................................  November 8, 1978
      Major...................................  October 1, 1983
      Lieutenant Colonel......................  June 1, 1988
      Colonel.................................  January 1, 1992
      Brigadier General.......................  January 1, 2000
      Major General...........................  October 1, 2003
      Lieutenant General......................  February 3, 2005
      General.................................  October 8, 2008

                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
    military officers nominated by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by Gen. William
    M. Fraser III, USAF, in connection with his nomination
    follows:]
                              UNITED STATES SENATE
                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                                  Room SR-228
                           Washington, DC 20510-6050
                                 (202) 224-3871
                        COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
          BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
        Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
    more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
    form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
    of your answer applies.
                        Part A--Biographical Information
        Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
    this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
    public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
    any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

        1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
        William M. Fraser III.

        2. Position to which nominated:
        Commander, U.S. Transportation Command.

        3. Date of nomination:
        June 16, 2011.

        4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
        [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
    committee's executive files.]

        5. Date and place of birth:
        17 August 1952; Lakeland, FL.

        6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
        Married to Beverly Anne Fraser (Maiden Name: Copeland).

        7. Names and ages of children:
        William M. Fraser IV; age 34.
        Ashlee Fraser Cain (Maiden name: Ashlee Jeanette Fraser); age 32.

        8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary
    or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local
    governments, other than those listed in the service record extract
    provided to the committee by the executive branch.
        None.

        9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
    officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
    or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
    enterprise, educational, or other institution.
        None.

        10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
    professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
    other organizations.
        Air Force Association (member)
        Order of Daedalians (member)
        Texas A&M University Association of Former Students (member)
        15th Air Force Association (member)
        Army and Air Force Mutual Aid Association (member)
        Military Officers Association of America (member)
        American Association of Retired Persons (member)

        11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
    society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
    service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
    extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
        None.

        12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
    if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
    constituted committee of the Senate?
        Yes.

        13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
    constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
    those views differ from the administration in power?
        Yes.
                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
    committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
    forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
    Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                    ------

                               Signature and Date
        I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
    on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
    provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
    and complete.
                                                 William M. Fraser III.
        This 15th day of February 2011.

        [The nomination of Gen. William M. Fraser III, USAF, was
    reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on August 2, 2011,
    with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
    nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 2, 2011.]
                                    ------

                                ANNEX A

        [General Martin E. Dempsey's responses to his advance
    policy questions from his nomination hearing dated March 3,
    2011, to be Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army follow:]
                            Questions and Responses
                          army role in the joint force
        Question. The U.S. military fights as a joint force and strives to
    achieve realistic training in preparation for military operations. The
    Army provides trained and equipped forces for joint military
    operations.
        How do you believe the Army can best contribute to improved joint
    military capabilities while preserving its service unique capabilities
    and culture?
        Answer. The Army works our relationships with Sister Services
    diligently while maintaining our unique values, culture, and
    traditions. The Army provides forces for prompt and sustained combat
    operations on land as a component of the Joint Force. Through sustained
    operations on land and among populations, we make permanent the
    advantages gained by joint forces.
                               acquisition issues
        Question. Major defense acquisition programs in the Department of
    the Army and the other military departments continue to be subject to
    funding and requirements instability.
        Do you believe that instability in funding and requirements drives
    up program costs and leads to delays in the fielding of major weapon
    systems?
        Answer. A variety of factors contribute to increased risks of cost
    increase and delay, depending on the program, the technologies
    involved, and the acquisition strategy employed. However, I agree that
    the foundation for any successful large acquisition program rests on
    carefully refined requirements, a sound program strategy, and funding
    stability.
        Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Army should take
    to address funding and requirements instability?
        Answer. Requirements must be carefully refined to meet realistic
    and affordable objectives, and they must account for the rate of
    technological and scientific change in meeting needed capabilities.
        Question. What is your view of the Configuration Steering Boards
    required by statute and regulation to control requirements growth?
        Answer. I support efforts by Congress to control costs, refine
    requirements, and reduce program risk in our major acquisition
    programs. The Configuration Steering Boards play a significant role in
    oversight of acquisition programs and compliment Army efforts to
    validate requirements and eliminate redundancies through Capability
    Portfolio Reviews. In tandem, these oversight processes help the Army
    avoid cost increases and delays in our programs.
        Question. What role would you expect to play in these issues, if
    confirmed as Army Chief of Staff?
        Answer. If confirmed as Chief of Staff, I will work diligently with
    the Secretary of the Army and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
    Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology to ensure that all oversight
    mechanisms for acquisition programs are used effectively to reduce cost
    and schedule risk. In the area of requirements, I will work with TRADOC
    to refine requirements to meet affordable and achievable acquisition
    strategies.
        Question. The Comptroller General has found that DOD programs often
    move forward with unrealistic program cost and schedule estimates, lack
    clearly defined and stable requirements, include immature technologies
    that unnecessarily raise program costs and delay development and
    production, and fail to solidify design and manufacturing processes at
    appropriate junctures in the development process.
        Do you agree with the Comptroller General's assessment?
        Answer. I agree that this assessment is valid with respect to some
    of the Army's past programs. However, the Army has already adopted
    different approaches in the development of more recent programs. I
    understand that prior to the release of the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV)
    Request for Proposals (RFP) in November 2010, the program's
    requirements were carefully reviewed, prioritized and weighted in the
    RFP to avoid reliance on immature technologies, mitigate cost and
    schedule risk, and provide an achievable and affordable framework for a
    new vehicle. The GCV program involved close coordination between
    acquisition, requirements and resourcing experts to provide a solid
    program foundation. The Army is vigorously working to avoid the
    characterizations in the Comptroller General's assessment in future
    programs.
        Question. If so, what steps do you believe the Department of the
    Army should take to address these problems?
        Answer. The Department of the Army has already begun taking
    significant steps to address these concerns. There is a renewed
    emphasis on collaboration between the requirements and acquisition
    communities in the development of new programs. Last year, Secretary
    McHugh commissioned a thorough review of the Army's acquisition process
    led by The Hon. Gil Decker and Gen (Ret.) Lou Wagner that provides a
    blueprint for improvements to the acquisition process. I understand the
    Army is now studying these recommendations and developing a plan to
    implement those that help our process. As a whole, the Department must
    continue to build on these efforts to avoid unnecessary cost and delay
    in our programs.
        Question. What role would you expect to play in these issues, if
    confirmed as Army Chief of Staff?
        Answer. If confirmed as Chief of Staff, I will continue to work
    with Department of the Army leadership to implement any necessary
    changes to ensure that the Army's acquisition programs succeed in
    providing needed capabilities to our soldiers.
        Question. Beginning in 2010, the Army began a series of
    capabilities portfolio reviews that have contributed to the
    rationalization of the Army's modernization plans and resulted in
    significant programmatic decisions, including the termination of major
    weapons programs.
        What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's
    capabilities portfolio reviews and process?
        Answer. The capabilities portfolio reviews have been successful in
    identifying redundancy and finding efficiencies across system
    portfolios. The Army is now studying how to best institutionalize the
    capabilities portfolio reviews process to identify additional
    efficiencies, and then work to achieve them.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take, if any, to
    institutionalize the portfolio review process within the Army?
        Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the studies to
    institutionalize portfolio review process to identify and achieve
    further Army efficiencies.
                               army modernization
        Question. In general, major Army modernization efforts have not
    been successful over the past decade. Since the mid-1990s, Army
    modernization strategies, plans, and investment priorities have evolved
    under a variety of names from Digitization, to Force XXI, to Army After
    Next, to Interim Force, to Objective Force, to Future Combat System and
    Modularity. According to press reports, a recent modernization study
    done for the Secretary of the Army by former Assistant Secretary of the
    Army Gilbert Decker and retired Army General Louis Wagner found that
    the Army has spent $3.3 billion to $3.8 billion annually since 2004 on
    weapons programs that have been cancelled.
        What is your assessment, if any, of the Army's modernization
    record?
        Answer. Over the last 10 years, our Army has achieved a remarkable
    degree of modernization in areas such as improving soldier protection,
    increasing battlefield intelligence, and bringing the network to
    individual soldiers. At the same time, we have nearly completed the
    modular conversion of over 300 brigade level organizations and to
    complete the conversion of our division and higher level headquarters
    to enable mission command in the operational environments we anticipate
    in the first half of the 21st century. If confirmed, I look forward to
    studying the Decker-Wagner recommendations to identify areas where we
    can improve.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to
    take to achieve a genuinely stable modernization strategy and program
    for the Army?
        Answer. I recognize that a stable modernization strategy and
    program is an important component to both a balanced Army and to
    exercise good stewardship of resources entrusted to the Services. If
    confirmed, I will work closely with Secretary McHugh on how to achieve
    this.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's
    current modernization investment strategy?
        Answer. While it is true that several of our major modernization
    efforts over the past decade have been unsuccessful, I would submit
    that the American soldier today is the best equipped and enabled
    soldier this country has ever fielded. Successes such as the Stryker
    vehicle, world class body armor, soldier night vision equipment,
    soldier weapons, precision fire systems such as Excalibur and High
    Mobility Artillery Rocket System, and vehicles such as the family of
    medium trucks all suggest to me that the Army has had some tremendous
    success in modernization.
        I believe the Army has learned some valuable lessons and now has
    both the processes and the mindset to more carefully and rigorously
    review programs both before we initiate them and while they are in
    progress. This will be an area I will assess more deeply if I am
    confirmed as Chief of Staff and will periodically give this committee
    my frank assessments.
        Question. Do you believe that this strategy is affordable and
    sustainable?
        Answer. If confirmed, I plan to closely examine this strategy to
    ensure it is affordable and sustainable.
        Question. In your view does the Army's current modernization
    investment strategy appropriately or adequately address current and
    future capabilities that meet requirements for unconventional or
    irregular conflict?
        Answer. From my current position, I believe the current
    modernization investment strategy strikes an appropriate balance
    between current and future capabilities. If confirmed, I look forward
    to studying this further with the Army staff.
        Question. Does the investment strategy appropriately or adequately
    address requirements for conventional, high-end conflict with a peer or
    near-peer enemy?
        Answer. From my current position, I believe the current
    modernization investment strategy appropriately and adequately
    addresses requirements for conventional, high-end conflict with the
    peer or near-peer enemy we can reasonably foresee in the fiscal year
    2012-2016 FYDP time horizon.
        Question. If confirmed, what other investment initiatives, if any,
    would you pursue with respect to unconventional or conventional
    capabilities?
        Answer. I have not yet formulated investment initiatives particular
    to either conventional or unconventional capabilities that are
    different from those the Army is currently pursuing, but I look forward
    to doing so, if confirmed.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to
    ensure that all these initiatives are affordable within the current and
    projected Army budgets?
        Answer. To be good stewards of the resources provided, the Army
    must continue to internalize a ``cost culture'' that considers
    ``affordability'' as an essential element of all (not just
    modernization) initiatives. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with
    the Secretary to ensure future initiatives are affordable within
    current and projected budgets.
        Question. In your view, what trade-offs, if any, would most likely
    have to be taken should budgets fall below or costs grow above what is
    planned to fund the Army's modernization efforts?
        Answer. While I do not have that information at this time, I
    believe trade-offs must occur after all areas of risk are carefully
    considered and coordinated with the Secretary of Defense and Congress.
                          army weapon system programs
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
    following research, development, and acquisition programs?
        Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV).
        Answer. In the development of the Ground Combat vehicle--the
    replacement for the Bradley Infantry Fighting vehicle--the Army is
    fully committed to the ``Big Four'' imperatives: soldier protection;
    soldier capacity (squad plus crew); the capability to operate across
    the Full Spectrum of operations; and Timing (7 years to the first
    production vehicle from contract award). The Ground Combat Vehicle will
    be the first vehicle that will be designed from the ground up to
    operate in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) environment. Modular
    armor will allow commanders the option to add or remove armor based on
    the current threat environment. The Ground Combat Vehicle will be
    designed with the capacity for Space, Weight, and Power growth to
    incorporate future technologies as they mature. The Army is using an
    incremental strategy for the Ground Combat Vehicle with the first
    increment being an Infantry Fighting Vehicle. The Army is currently
    reviewing proposals from vendors for Technology Development contracts.
        Question. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T).
        Answer. I believe that the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical
    is one of the Army's most important programs. It provides the broadband
    backbone communications for the tactical Army. Warfighter Information
    Network-Tactical Increment 1 (formerly Joint Network Node) began
    fielding in 2004 to provide a satellite based Internet Protocol network
    down to battalion level. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical
    Increment 2 begins fielding in fiscal year 2012 to provide an initial
    On the Move capability, extending down to company level. Warfighter
    Information Network-Tactical Increment 3 will provide improved
    capabilities, including higher throughput, three to four times more
    bandwidth efficiency, and an aerial transmission layer, to all 126
    brigades/division headquarters with an on-the-move requirement.
        Question. Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT) Network
    Integration Kit (NIK).
        Answer. The E-IBCT investment provides the infrastructure that will
    allow the Army to grow the tactical network capability, and an
    opportunity for both large and small companies to support the Army's
    tactical network strategy.
        The NIK is a necessary bridge solution that allows the Army to
    continue evaluation and development of incorporated network
    technologies.
        Question. Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) including the Ground
    Mobile Radio (GMR) and Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit (HMS)
    radios.
        Answer. Joint Tactical Radio System is the Services' future
    deployable, mobile communications family of radios. They provide Army
    forces dynamic, scalable, on-the-move network architecture, connecting
    the soldier to the network. Fiscal year 2012 procurement funding
    supports fielding of Joint Tactical Radio System capability to eight
    Infantry Brigade Combat Teams to meet fiscal years 2013/2014 network
    requirements.
        The Ground Mobile Radio is the primary vehicular radio capability
    using the Wideband Networking Waveform and Soldier Radio Waveform to
    meet tactical networking requirements.
        The Man Pack and Rifleman Radio are the primary Joint Tactical
    Radio System capability for battalion and below tactical operations.
    The man pack supports the Soldier Radio Waveform and interoperates with
    legacy waveforms (Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems,
    Ultra High Frequency Satellite Communications). Rifleman Radio
    primarily serves the dismounted formation and utilizes the Soldier
    Radio Waveform to provide voice and individual location information
    from the dismounted soldier to the leader. The combination of the three
    radios helps the Army to push the network to the individual soldier.
        Question. Stryker combat vehicle, including the Double-V Hull
    initiative, procurement of more flat-bottom vehicles, and the Stryker
    mobile gun variant.
        Answer. The current Stryker vehicle has exceeded its Space, Weight
    and Power and Cooling (SWaP-C) limits due to add-on applique (armor and
    devices) required for ongoing combat operations. In the near term, it
    is imperative to increase crew protection with the Double-V-Hull (DVH)
    Stryker. In the mid-term, Stryker modernization will improve protection
    and mobility by recouping SWaP-C, enabling future growth and allowing
    integration of the emerging network for all Stryker variants. Fleet-
    wide modernization for all variants upgrades protection, counter-IED,
    drive train, suspension, electrical power generation and management,
    and digital communications and network integration.
        Double-V Hull: Stryker Double-V Hull (DVH) is on track for June
    2011 fielding. The initial DVH test results are positive, indicating
    the vehicle will be ready for fielding as scheduled.
        Non-Double V Hull and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
    Reconnaissance Vehicle (NBCRV): The Army will procure 168 Stryker
    NBCRVs in fiscal years 2012 and 2013 for a total quantity of 284 (an
    Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model rotation quantity). These
    vehicles are in normal Hull configuration. The Stryker NBCRV provides a
    unique capability to the Joint Force including a critical mission of
    Homeland Defense, for which DVH protection is a lesser consideration.
        Stryker Mobile Gun System (MGS): The Army has procured and fielded
    142 of 335 MGS. In August 2009, the Army decided to not pursue
    additional MGS procurement at this time with forthcoming fleet-wide
    modernization.
        Question. Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).
        Answer. The JLTV is a joint program with the U.S. Marine Corps,
    Navy, and the Army; the Australian Army is also currently a partner in
    the Technology Development phase. I believe that the JLTV is a vital
    program to fill the force protection and payload gaps not currently
    satisfied by the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle. It will
    also fill the mobility, transportability and communication architecture
    gaps not satisfied by the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)
    vehicles being used in Light Tactical Vehicle (LTV) roles. The Army
    Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy plans for the JLTV to replace about a
    third of the LTV fleet, which is roughly 46,000 vehicles. The Army is
    currently examining the attributes of the JLTV program to ensure it
    meets our needs for the future Army light tactical fleet, especially in
    terms of protection.
        Question. Armed Aerial Scout (AAS).
        Answer. I agree the Army has an enduring requirement for an armed
    aerial scout as was reaffirmed after the termination of the Armed
    Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) program.
        This requirement will be validated by the ongoing Armed Aerial
    Scout Analysis of Alternatives whose findings are scheduled for release
    in third quarter fiscal year 2011.
        Question. M1 Abrams tank modernization.
        Answer. In my view, the Abrams modernization is necessary and will
    initially enable integration of the emerging network and provide
    ability to fire the next generation of 120mm ammunition. Future
    modernization will provide capability improvements in lethality,
    protection, mission command, mobility, and reliability intended to
    maintain the Fleet's combat overmatch and restore space, weight, and
    power margins to keep the Tank relevant through 2050. The Abrams
    modernization program is funded in the fiscal year 2012 budget request.
    If confirmed, I will be able to offer an assessment as the program
    matures.
        Question. M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle modernization.
        Answer. The Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) will be
    replaced by the Ground Combat Vehicle beginning in 2018. Bradley Non-
    Infantry Fighting Vehicle (Cavalry, Engineer and Fire Support variants)
    modernization will address recoupment of Space, Weight and Power to
    provide platform growth and enable improvements in protection, mobility
    and ability to integrate the emerging network.
        Question. Logistics Modernization Program (LMP).
        Answer. I understand the LMP is an Enterprise Resource Planning
    (ERP) system in the Operation and Support phase of its life-cycle.
        Based on commercial off-the-shelf SAP Corporation software
    technology, LMP provides the Army with an integrated end-to-end supply
    chain solution at the national level that improves overall
    synchronization of information.
        I concur with the Army's vision to achieve a seamless, end-to-end
    modernized logistics enterprise and to develop and implement logistics
    enterprise architecture with joint interoperability. To support that
    vision, the LMP will integrate with other Army ERPs, including General
    Funds Enterprise Business System (GFEBS), and Global Combat Support
    System-Army (GCSS-A), to provide a seamless enterprise-wide logistics
    environment spanning the factory to the foxhole in accordance with the
    approved Army ERP Strategy.
        Question. Paladin Integrated Management Vehicle program.
        Answer. I understand that the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM)
    program is an effort to address an existing capability gap in the self-
    propelled artillery portfolio brought about by an aging fleet and the
    termination of prior howitzer modernization efforts [Crusader and Non-
    Line-of-Sight-Cannon (NLOS-C)]. The PIM program provides upgrades that
    allow the Army to meet existing and future needs, and leverages the
    commonality with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle chassis and automotive
    components. PIM should provide growth potential in Space, Weight and
    Power and capacity for network expansion to accommodate future howitzer
    related needs, to include the addition of such Force Protection
    packages as add-on armor.
        Question. M4 Carbine Upgrades/Individual Carbine Competition.
        Answer. The Army continues to make improvements and upgrades based
    on operational lessons learned through the M4 Product Improvement
    Program. The Army's effort is designed to integrate full automatic
    firing, an ambidextrous selector switch and a more durable ``heavy''
    barrel. Simultaneously, the Army has initiated a full and open
    competition to confirm the best possible Individual Carbine solution.
    Results of the competition are expected in fiscal year 2013.
                mine resistant ambush protected (mrap) vehicles
        Question. If confirmed, what would you propose should be the Army's
    long term strategy for the utilization and sustainment of its large
    MRAP and MRAP-All Terrain Vehicle fleets?
        Answer. The Army needs to continue to provide the best level of
    protection for our deploying soldiers. Given what we have learned
    during the last 10 years, I believe we should attempt to provide MRAP
    levels of protection to deploying forces worldwide commensurate with
    the mission assigned. The Army will integrate MRAPs into the force.
                           quadrennial defense review
        Question. The 2010 report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
    provides guidance that military forces shall be sized to prevail in
    ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the war against al Qaeda as
    well as for conducting foundational activities that prevent and deter
    attacks or the emergence of other threats.
        What is your assessment of the Army's current size and structure to
    meet the QDR report's guidance?
        Answer. The Army's size and structure have proven adequate to meet
    the demands of our defense strategy as we know them today, although a
    very heavy demand has been placed upon soldiers and their families for
    nearly 10 years. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretary
    of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs, and our combatant commanders to match end strength, structure,
    and tempo in our ARFORGEN rotational model to meet demands as they
    change.
        Question. If confirmed, what size or structure changes would you
    pursue, if any, to improve or enhance the Army's capability to meet
    these requirements?
        Answer. The nature of the strategic environment requires the Army
    to continuously assess its capabilities and force requirements. It's
    taken 10 years to achieve a size, structure, and capability that we can
    reasonably describe as balanced. We are accustomed to change, and we
    will undoubtedly need to continue to change. As we do we must seek to
    maintain a balance of capabilities that are available to meet the
    Nation's needs at a sustainable tempo.
        Question. The QDR report particularly emphasizes the requirement
    for improved capabilities in the following six key mission areas.
        For each, what is your assessment of the Army's current ability to
    provide capabilities to support these mission requirements?
        If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you pursue to improve the
    Army's capabilities to support:
        Defense of the United States.
        Answer. The Army is fully capable of fulfilling its responsibility
    to defend the homeland through detection, deterrence, prevention, and
    if necessary, the defeat of external threats or aggression from both
    state and non-state actors. A specific program recently undertaken to
    enhance this ability include the fielding of the enhanced Stryker
    Nuclear Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle. This provides
    us with a much improved technical assessment and decontamination
    capability.
        Question. Support of civil authorities at home.
        Answer. The Army is well postured to provide support to civil
    authorities. We are organized and trained to provide responsive and
    flexible support to mitigate domestic disasters, CBRNE consequence
    management, support to civilian law enforcement agencies, counter WMD
    operations and to counter narcotics trafficking activities. We continue
    to address the challenges associated with this mission set including
    unity of command, integration with civilian authorities, and the
    integration of Title 10 and Title 32 forces.
        Question. Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and
    counterterrorism operations.
        Answer. We are highly proficient in counter insurgency, stability
    and counter-terrorism operations. This has been the focus for the Army
    for much of the last 10 years and we have institutionalized lessons
    learned across the operating and generating force.
        Question. Build the security capacity of partner states (including
    your views, if any, on the use of general purpose forces in the
    security force assistance role).
        Answer. General Purpose Forces have a clear role in building
    sustainable capability and capacity of partner nation security forces
    and their supporting institutions. Peace time engagement is our best
    opportunity to shape the future operating environment. General Purpose
    Forces are well-suited to support these activities through Security
    Force Assistance.
        Question. Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments.
        Answer. The Army's ability to deter and defeat aggression in anti-
    access environments as part of the joint force is adequate to meet the
    demands of the current security environment. That said, there are some
    tasks and skills to which we have not trained due to the demands of our
    ongoing conflicts. We must restore our proficiency in those tasks. We
    work with our sister Services to assess our capabilities to conduct
    entry operations as part of the joint force and watch closely the
    improved anti-access/area denial capabilities being developed by
    potential adversaries.
        Question. Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass
    destruction.
        Answer. The Army provides highly trained and ready forces with
    capabilities to support combatant commander requirements to counter the
    proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Current capabilities
    include operating effectively within a chemical, biological,
    radiological, and nuclear environment, specialized teams to locate and
    neutralize weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and an operational
    headquarters with expertise in eliminating WMD.
        Question. Operate effectively in cyberspace.
        Answer. We are on the right glide path to support U.S. Cyber
    Command and our geographic combatant commanders to operate effectively
    in cyberspace. On 1 October 2010, the Army stood up a new three star
    command (U.S. Army Cyber Command/2nd Army), to direct the operations
    and defense of all Army networks, and when directed, provide full-
    spectrum cyberspace operations. The Army is bringing the forces of
    network operations, defense, exploitation, and attack under one
    operational level command to integrate and synchronize global
    operations for the first time.
                                missile defense
        Question. The Department of Defense recently decided to terminate
    the Army's Surface-Launched Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile,
    and not to proceed with procurement and fielding of the tri-national
    Medium Extended Air Defense System, two Army air and missile defense
    systems.
        Do you consider missile defense to be one of the Army's core
    missions?
        Answer. Yes. The Army has confirmed on many occasions that Air and
    Missile Defense is a core competency. Protection of our deployed forces
    is the priority. The Army provides this protection in coordination with
    our sister Services and coalition partners.
        Question. How do you believe the Army should manage the risks that
    result from these decisions?
        Answer. I believe the Army needs to continue to monitor the threat
    and prioritize required future capabilities to ensure we provide
    effective affordable solutions in a timely manner to our forces.
        Question. The Army has recently proposed transferring a number of
    its air and missile development programs to the Missile Defense Agency
    (MDA).
        In your view, what is of the proper relationship between the Army
    and the Missile Defense Agency?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Army relies on the MDA to
    develop and produce the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). The
    Army works with MDA to provide those BMDS capabilities to the combatant
    commanders. The Army maintains a relationship with MDA through the
    Army/MDA Board of Directors and its four standing committees.
        Question. The Army has recently completed a review of its air and
    missile defense portfolio.
        In your view, what are or should be the Army's responsibilities, if
    any, with respect to development, procurement, and operation of missile
    defense systems?
        Answer. The Army's responsibilities depend on the type of missile
    defense system being developed and guidance from the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense.
               protection of u.s. forces against internal threats
        Question. One year ago, 13 people were slain and scores wounded
    during a shooting rampage allegedly carried out by a U.S. Army Medical
    Corps officer. A Department of Defense review of the attack concluded
    that the Department was poorly prepared to defend against internal
    threats, including radicalization of military personnel.
        What is your assessment of the lessons learned from the tragedy at
    Fort Hood?
        Answer. The lessons learned are invaluable to the Army as we strive
    to improve the Army Protection Program for individuals and units
    against emerging threats. Through a holistic Protection approach, the
    Army is aggressively fielding material and nonmaterial solutions to
    address internal and external threats.
        Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to
    prevent and mitigate such threats in the future?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that we continue to integrate
    and synchronize the many Army Protection Programs that protect our
    soldiers, family members, and Department of the Army civilians by
    ensuring that commanders and leaders have the information and tools
    needed to address the ever changing threat environment.
                              religious guidelines
        Question. The DOD Independent Review Related to Fort Hood observed
    that ``DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity
    necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious
    practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or
    self-radicalization'' and recommended that the policy be updated.
        What is your view of the need to clarify the policy regarding
    religious accommodation in the Army?
        Answer. The policies for religious accommodation in the Army are
    published in AR 600-20, Army Command Policy. The policy must be clear
    and provide appropriate guidance to both soldiers and commanders
    regarding how the Army accommodates for religious beliefs and
    practices. To this end, if confirmed, I will assess the current policy
    and determine if further changes are necessary.
        Question. Are you concerned that the attack at Fort Hood could lead
    to harassment or even violence against Muslims in the Army?
        Answer. Your question raises a valid concern. However, the Army is
    a diverse force. As soldiers in the profession of arms, we understand
    the key role that good order, discipline, morale, and safety have in
    ensuring units are at all times ready to defend this nation. The Army
    has long been a place where people from all walks of life can serve
    proudly and where the many become one--a U.S. Army soldier.
        Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to
    address the potential for harassment or violence against Muslims in the
    Army?
        Answer. The Army has a longstanding commitment to treat all
    soldiers with dignity and respect. Treating soldiers with dignity and
    respect requires continuous leader emphasis and vigilance.
        Question. Do Army policies regarding religious practices in the
    military accommodate, where appropriate, religious practices that
    require adherents to wear particular forms of dress or other articles
    with religious significance?
        Answer. Regulations regarding wear of religious clothing or items
    are found in two regulations (AR 600-20, Army Command Policy and AR
    670-1, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia). The policy
    provides the authority to wear religious jewelry, apparel or articles
    if they are neat, conservative, and discreet and compliant with these
    regulations.
        Question. In your view, do these policies accommodate the free
    exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on those who
    have different beliefs, including no religious belief?
        Answer. In my opinion, current Army policies provide commanders
    with adequate flexibility to balance accommodation for religious
    beliefs and maintain good order and discipline.
        Question. In your opinion, do existing policies and practices
    regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of
    formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a
    chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious
    beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs,
    including no religious beliefs?
        Answer. The Army does not have a policy regarding public prayer by
    military chaplains. As a matter of practice, however, chaplains are
    encouraged to be considerate of the audience.
                                 family support
        Question. The Army Family Action Plan has been successful in
    identifying and promoting quality of life issues for Army families.
        What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
    issues in the Army, and, if confirmed, what role would you play to
    ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately
    resourced?
        Answer. In my view the most pressing family readiness issues
    include sustaining the Army Family Covenant and improving communication
    and awareness of the extensive range of available support programs and
    services the Army has to improve soldier and family quality of life.
        In 2007, the Army Family Covenant was unveiled to improve quality
    of life by providing programs and services that enhance soldier and
    family strength, readiness, and resilience. Since then, the Army has
    made great progress and continues to fulfill its commitment to provide
    soldiers and families a quality of life commensurate with the quality
    of their service.
        The Army Family Action Plan, Survey of Army Families, and other
    studies revealed that soldiers and families may not be aware of the
    myriad of available support services. To address this concern, the Army
    is transforming Army Community Service (ACS) to help connect soldiers
    and families to the right service at the right time. This
    transformation will create a more streamlined and modular support
    structure that better supports our modular Army at every installation.
    The Army has begun piloting ACS transformation and anticipates
    completion by October 2011.
        The Army has made great progress in building a wide range of
    support capabilities over the last few years, but the strain on the
    force continues. If confirmed, I will continue to strengthen our
    support services and ensure our programs efficiently meet the needs of
    the soldiers and families who use them.
        Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
    light of global rebasing, BRAC, and lengthy deployments?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will endeavor to ensure that Army Family
    programs reach out to all soldiers and their families, regardless of
    geographic location or deployment status. I will also work to ensure
    that family program platforms and delivery systems keep pace with a
    mobile Army and utilize technological advances and social networking so
    services are available to the soldiers and families who need them.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support of Reserve
    component families related to mobilization, deployment and family
    readiness, as well as active duty families who do not reside near a
    military installation?
        Answer. I am committed to ensuring soldiers and families remain
    connected to Army Family services and programs, whether by internet,
    telephone, or in person regardless of geographic location or Component.
    Army OneSource (www.MyArmyOneSource.com) is the website of choice for
    information on Army Family programs and services. Army OneSource
    highlights Active and Reserve Component Family Programs, is publicly
    accessible, and thus available to all components and immediate and
    extended family members.
        The State Joint Force Headquarters is the platform for support of
    geographically dispersed servicemembers and families. This platform
    projects the Joint Family Support Assistance Program resources, ARNG
    Family Assistance Centers (FACs), ARNG Family Readiness Support
    Assistants, and the ARNG Child and Youth program in support of Reserve
    component families and Active component families that do not reside
    near the installation. Additionally, Army sponsored programs including
    Operation Military Kids and Community Based Child Care and Respite Care
    programs build community capacity for the geographically dispersed Army
    population. These programs offer similar services and assistance to
    geo-dispersed Reserve component families as would be available on
    installations and are connected to local resources that soldiers and
    families are eligible to use.
                                     space
        Question. The Army Space support to Strategic Command works closely
    with Air Force Space Command in getting space based communications to
    the warfighter. Recently the Army has begun to look at the possibility
    of expanding the scope of data that could be provided to the last
    tactical mile from space.
        In your view, what are the needs that the Army could address from
    space, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that this is coordinated
    with OSD?
        Answer. While I am not yet in a position to provide an informed
    assessment, I understand that the importance of space programs
    continues to increase across DOD, and the Army needs to keep pace to
    fully leverage capabilities and ensure that space systems are
    appropriately prioritized within both DOD and the Department of the
    Army.
        Question. If confirmed, what would be your vision for the Army
    space forces in the future?
        Answer. While I am not yet in a position to provide an informed
    assessment, one of my priorities, if I am confirmed, is to position the
    Army to keep pace to fully leverage capabilities and ensure that space
    systems are appropriately prioritized and resourced.
        Question. The Army, as do all the Services, tends to lag behind in
    the acquisition of ground and other terminals to work with new
    satellite systems. Acquisition of GPS M-code capable equipment is just
    one example of where there is needed capability on orbit but terminals
    will not be available in a timely fashion to utilize the capability.
        What is your view on this lag and, if confirmed, what actions would
    you propose taking to resolve the lag?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would need to examine this issue more
    closely. While I understand that all of the Services have specific
    requirements to meet specific needs for their forces and that the Army
    depends heavily on these systems, I am not yet in a position to provide
    an informed assessment.
                         low density/high demand forces
        Question. If confirmed, how would you address the Army's management
    of low density units such as Special Operations Forces, military
    police, civil affairs, and others which are in extremely high demand in
    this new strategic environment?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would use the Total Army Analysis (TAA) to
    identify the capabilities necessary, within resource constraints, to
    achieve the full spectrum of missions expected of the Army. When
    requirements for additional low density/high demand capabilities are
    identified through this process, they are resourced within acceptable
    risk. This process will help determine where these capabilities should
    reside: the Active component, the Reserve component, or a mix of both.
    The Army balances the inventory of these low density units to ensure
    availability of an affordable mix of flexible forces capable of
    accomplishing the missions required within the most likely security
    environment.
        Question. Are there functional changes among the Active and Reserve
    components that you believe should be made?
        Answer. I am not yet aware at this time of any changes that may be
    necessary.
         mobilization and demobilization of national guard and reserves
        Question. In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001,
    the National Guard and Reserves have experienced their largest and most
    sustained employment since World War II. Numerous problems arose in the
    planning and procedures for mobilization and demobilization, e.g.,
    inadequate health screening and medical readiness monitoring, errors
    caused by antiquated pay systems, limited transition assistance
    programs upon demobilization, and lack of access to members of the
    Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Reserve Force management policies and
    systems have been characterized in the past as ``inefficient and
    rigid'' and readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment
    stay-behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies.
        What is your assessment of advances made in improving Army Reserve
    component mobilization and demobilization procedures, and in what areas
    do problems still exist?
        Answer. I understand the Army is currently reviewing all of its
    mobilization policies to ensure that the systems in place are effective
    and responsive for Reserve component soldiers. I believe Reserve
    components are a critical part of the Total Force, and if confirmed, I
    will continue the effort to ensure that Reserve component soldiers are
    mobilized and demobilized in the most effective and efficient way
    possible and that their needs and the needs of their families and
    employers are met.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
    sufficiency of current Reserve Force management policies?
        Answer. As I understand current Reserve Force management policies,
    the goal is to manage the force to produce a supply of units to the
    combatant commanders with a short-term goal of 1 year of mobilization
    every 5 years with a long-term goal of 1 year of mobilization every 6
    years. The challenge the Army has faced has been that demand has been
    greater than the supply and has caused the need for more frequent
    mobilizations. As operations in Iraq and Afghanistan start to draw-
    down, the Army should be better able to attain the mobilization to
    dwell goals.
        Question. What do you consider to be the most significant enduring
    changes to the administration of the Reserve components aimed at
    ensuring their readiness for future mobilization requirements?
        Answer. The Army Force Generation Model fundamentally changes the
    way the Army builds unit readiness for mobilization requirements. The
    ARFORGEN model presents a structured progression of readiness through a
    multi-year long cycle.
        Question. Do you see a need to modify current statutory authorities
    for the mobilization of members of the National Guard and Reserves?
        Answer. At present, I am not aware of a need to modify current
    statutory authorities to facilitate mobilization of the National Guard
    and Reserves. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary McHugh to review
    the statutory authorities to determine if they are sufficient.
                            individual ready reserve
        Question. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves has
    found that accessing the IRR as a viable source of manpower for the war
    was problematic, and that using the IRR as a solution for unit manning
    is a failed concept.
        What is your assessment of the value of the IRR to the All-
    Volunteer Force?
        Answer. I believe the IRR has proven an invaluable asset to all
    Army components to support contingency operations around the world.
        Question. What are your views on the proper role of the IRR in Army
    force management planning?
        Answer. The IRR can serve as a source of experienced and highly-
    skilled soldiers to help the Army meet critical skill and grade
    requirements.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, do you foresee making
    to the Army's IRR recall policy?
        Answer. At this time, I do not have sufficient information to
    recommend changes to this policy. If confirmed, I will consider input
    from all components to determine the best IRR recall policy.
        Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of the system in
    place for members in the IRR receiving orders to active duty to request
    a delay or exemption for that activation, including the procedures in
    place for appealing the Army's decision on that request?
        Answer. While this is an important part of the IRR mobilization, I
    do not have sufficient familiarity with this policy to recommend
    changes.
        Question. Recent studies of Army suicides show higher rates among
    the IRR.
        What should the Army and DOD do to address this concern?
        Answer. Suicides in the IRR are often more difficult to address
    because those soldiers are not affiliated with a unit. If confirmed, I
    will consider all methods to integrate IRR soldiers into the Army's
    Health Promotion/Risk Reduction efforts.
                        personnel and entitlement costs
        Question. In addition to health care costs, personnel and related
    entitlement spending continues its steep upward growth and is becoming
    an ever increasing portion of the DOD budget.
        If confirmed, what actions would you take to control the rise in
    the Army's personnel costs and entitlement spending?
        Answer. We need to strike a balance between preserving the All-
    Volunteer Force, accomplishing operational missions and retraining an
    Army that is affordable to the Nation. If confirmed, I will work with
    the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense on how best to
    achieve it.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to avoid a
    requirement for massive end-of-year reprogramming to cover personnel
    costs?
        Answer. My understanding is the President's budget is adequate to
    meet current personnel costs.
        Question. What would be the impact of a year-long continuing
    resolution on Army personnel funding?
        Answer. If the Army is given the flexibility to manage total
    resources (both Base and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds)
    to pay its force, then fiscal year 2011 continuing resolution will have
    minimal impact on military pay and allowances.
     medical and dental readiness of army national guard and army reserve
                                   personnel
        Question. Medical and dental readiness of Reserve component
    personnel has been an issue of significant concern to the committee,
    and shortfalls that have been identified have indicated a need for
    improved policy oversight and accountability.
        If confirmed, how would you seek to clarify and coordinate
    reporting on the medical and dental readiness of the Reserves?
        Answer. I believe the Army should develop and resource mechanisms
    to routinely identify screen and assess Reserve component medical
    readiness. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary of the Army, the
    Chief of Army Reserves, the Director of the Army National Guard, and
    the Surgeon General to develop policies for more effectively
    identifying personnel that are nondeployable for medical reasons.
        Question. How would you improve upon the Army's ability to produce
    a healthy and fit Reserve component?
        Answer. This is a very important issue, and I will work with the
    Army's Active and Reserve component leadership to assess whether there
    are challenges in this area. The Army is moving forward with a
    Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program. If confirmed, I would determine
    how this program applies to Reserve component and National Guard
    soldiers.
                          army science and technology
        Question. What do you see as the role that Army science and
    technology programs will play in continuing to develop capabilities for
    current and future Army systems?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Army's science and
    technology investment strategy is shaped to foster invention,
    innovation, and demonstration of technologies for the current and
    future warfighter. The science and technology program should retain the
    flexibility to be responsive to unforeseen needs identified through
    current operations.
        Question. What in your view have been the greatest contributions,
    if any, of Army science and technology programs to current operations?
        Answer. I believe the most significant contribution the Army
    science and technology community has offered to current operations is
    the ability to use technology to significantly improve warfighter
    capabilities. Technological innovations have resulted in the rapid
    development and deployment of lightweight and adaptable Armor solutions
    that have been critical to addressing emerging threats, enhancing
    intelligence capabilities, and better protecting our deployed forces.
        Question. What metrics would you use, if confirmed, to judge the
    value and the investment level in Army science and technology programs?
        Answer. To judge the value and investment level in Army science and
    technology programs, I would use metrics that demonstrate improved
    warfighter capabilities; improve acquisition programs; and align
    technology development to warfighter requirements.
        Question. What new science and technology areas do you envision the
    Army pursuing, for instance to lighten soldier load, and to improve the
    survivability and combat effectiveness of dismounted soldiers and
    ground vehicles?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will engage the Army's science and
    technology program and its stakeholders, including the acquisition
    community, Training and Doctrine Command and the combatant commanders
    to discuss the needs of the warfighter and the ``art of the possible''
    for future technology-enabled capabilities to ensure the Army remains
    the best equipped force in the world.
      army laboratories and research, development and engineering centers
        Question. How will you balance the role of Army laboratories
    between long-term fundamental research, support to current operations
    and the development of new capabilities to support current and future
    Army missions?
        Answer. The Army laboratories are science and technology performing
    organizations and as such have and will continue to play a major role
    in supporting current operations with best capabilities available.
    Through their broad range of investments in key strategic science and
    technology areas, they also provide critical new capabilities for
    soldiers.
        Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Army
    laboratories and R&D centers have the highest quality workforce,
    laboratory infrastructure, resources, and management, so that they can
    continue to support deployed warfighters and develop next generation
    capabilities?
        Answer. Army laboratories and Research and Development Centers need
    to maintain the resources required to continue initiatives and
    advancements that support the warfighter. If confirmed, I will learn
    more about their operations and support efforts to improve best
    practices and workforce quality necessary for mission accomplishments.
                        army test and evaluation efforts
        Question. In the past, the DOD Test Resource Management Center did
    not certify the Army's test and evaluation (T&E) budget due to
    identified shortfalls in T&E range sustainment, operations, and
    modernization.
        If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Army's T&E
    infrastructure is robust enough to test new systems and technologies
    and reliably verify their combat effectiveness and suitability?
        Answer. Testing is a crucial capability for maintaining the Army's
    combat edge and modernizing the force. I fully recognize the value of
    testing to ensure new technologies and equipment address the
    capabilities our warfighters need. If confirmed, I will work closely
    with the Army T&E community and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    T&E leadership to ensure the Army's T&E infrastructure is adequately
    resourced to address testing requirements and maintain robust test
    capabilities.
                   army information technology (it) programs
        Question. What major improvements, if any, would you like to see
    made in the Army's development and deployment of major information
    technology systems?
        Answer. I believe the Army needs to implement and enforce technical
    standards, make acquisition of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) or near-
    COTS technology easier, and field new technology to operational forces
    more quickly. This is in line with the congressional mandate you gave
    us in section 804 of the 2010 NDAA.
        As Commanding General for Training and Doctrine Command, I helped
    establish a center for network integration at Fort Bliss, TX--the Army
    Evaluation Task Force (AETF). It will serve as the Network's primary
    test unit with a two-fold intent, to remove the integration burden from
    the operational units and to provide an operational venue to evaluate
    new technologies and network capabilities prior to fielding to
    operational units. The new capabilities they develop should ultimately
    provide the impetus for future acquisition and equipping decisions.
        Question. How will the consolidation of IT systems announced under
    Secretary Gates efficiency initiative reduce the IT support cost per
    user to the Army?
        Answer. I understand the two primary Army initiatives that fulfill
    Secretary Gates' mandate are Enterprise Email and consolidation of Army
    data centers. Implementation of these initiatives should help reduce
    the cost of information technology support to the Army.
                             human terrain systems
        Question. What is your understanding of the Army's plans to
    institutionalize the Human Terrain System (HTS) program? Given the
    proliferation of such capabilities across the Services, what are your
    views, if any, on developing a joint HTS capability?
        Answer. The Army has institutionalized the Human Terrain System as
    an enduring capability assigned to Training and Doctrine Command and
    funded capability starting in the fiscal year 2011. I believe there is
    merit to developing a joint capability. In September 2010, I directed a
    Training and Doctrine Command capability based assessment of all Socio-
    cultural capabilities throughout the combatant commands and Services.
    The intent is to identify other ongoing socio-cultural initiatives, to
    determine potential synergies and best practices in order to develop
    and evolve an enduring joint capability. The results of this assessment
    are due in the spring of 2011.
                               operational energy
        Question. Prior to and since the creation of the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Program, a number
    of the Services have made progress addressing concerns associated with
    operational energy. The Army has announced its operational energy
    aspirations for the future but, unlike the other Services, the Army's
    five strategic energy security goals appear vague and lack quantitative
    metrics against which to measure progress.
        If confirmed, how would you propose that the Army address its
    operational energy challenges, requirements, and opportunities in the
    immediate short-term?
        Answer. The most important issue with operational energy is the
    amount of fuel used to meet our operational needs. Most of our fuel is
    used in generation of electricity. The Army has implemented, and
    accelerated deployment, of generators that use less fuel as well as
    microgrid systems that tie generators together to operate more
    efficiently. We are developing more efficient motors for helicopters
    and vehicles to reduce our operational energy footprint and,
    ultimately, wars are won or lost by dismounted soldiers, so the Army is
    addressing excessive soldier loads, driven in large part by energy and
    power constraints. As the Commanding General of the Army Training and
    Doctrine Command, I'm a charter member of the Army's Senior Energy and
    Sustainability Council, which is responsible for addressing energy
    challenges across the Army. If confirmed I will continue efforts
    currently underway to increase our energy efficient capabilities in
    theater and emphasize energy awareness through the military chain of
    command, and across the Army, to foster a more energy-aware culture.
        Question. What is your understanding of the Army's progress with
    respect to testing and deploying operational energy technologies?
        Answer. The Army is taking advantage of every avenue, to include
    industry, to help us develop technologies that can reduce our
    operational energy footprint. Renewable energy systems and insulated
    tentage are some of the systems being piloted and tested. We are also
    evaluating technologies that will help lighten soldier loads and reduce
    the amount of batteries and fuel we must procure and deliver to
    theater. We will continue to pursue more efficient devices and employ
    energy management capabilities that are essential to retain energy as
    an operational advantage.
        Question. What is your understanding of how the Army is taking
    advantage of its labs and research, engineering and development centers
    to further its operational energy and security goals?
        Answer. The Army has integrated the national laboratories with
    Department of Energy and Army laboratories to develop solutions to a
    range of operational energy, power and security needs. Some of the
    initiatives include research to reduce the size and weight of
    components, broadening alternative energy sources, leveraging various
    emergent energy efficient technologies. These new technologies will
    increase energy efficiency and improve power supplies for contingency
    bases, forward operating bases and equipment carried by individual
    soldiers. If confirmed I will work to ensure that the research
    conducted at Army facilities continues to focus on meeting the
    operational energy needs of the current and future Army.
                          investment in infrastructure
        Question. Witnesses appearing before the committee in recent years
    have testified that the military Services under-invest in their
    facilities compared to private industry standards. Decades of under-
    investment in our installations have led to increasing backlogs of
    facility maintenance needs, created substandard living and working
    conditions, and made it harder to take advantage of new technologies
    that could increase productivity.
        What is your assessment of Army infrastructure investment?
        Answer. Since fiscal year 2007, with BRAC, Transformation, and Grow
    the Army initiatives, the Army has made significant MILCON investments
    in its infrastructure. If confirmed, I will work with the Assistant
    Secretary of the Army, Installation, Energy and Environment, and the
    Commanding General at Installation Management Command to assess our
    infrastructure investments.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to
    increase resources to reduce the backlog and improve Army facilities?
        Answer. Proper stewardship of our facilities portfolio requires the
    Army to fully sustain the current facilities, dispose of our excess
    facilities, improve the quality of our worst facilities and build-out
    our largest and most critical shortages, all at a level adequate to
    support the mission.
        If confirmed, I will evaluate the proper balance of funding, to
    include evaluating whether the Army should increase operation and
    maintenance funding for restoration and modernization and Demolition.
                 army policies regarding drug and alcohol abuse
        Question. What is your understanding of the Army's policy with
    respect to disciplinary action and administrative separation of
    soldiers who have been determined to have used illegal drugs? Do you
    agree with this policy?
        Answer. Army policy directs commanders to initiate administrative
    separation for all soldiers involved in trafficking, distribution,
    possession, use, or sale of illegal drugs. While the policy requires
    initiation of separation, commanders have the authority to retain or
    separate a soldier.
        I concur with this policy.
        Question. What is your understanding of the Army's policy with
    respect to rehabilitation and retention on active duty of soldiers who
    have been determined to have used illegal drugs or abused alcohol or
    prescription drugs? Do you agree with this policy?
        Answer. Army policy requires that the separation authority consider
    a soldier drug offender's potential for rehabilitation and further
    military service. For this reason, soldiers who commit drug and alcohol
    offenses are required to be evaluated by a certified substance abuse
    counselor through the Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP). Commanders
    consider the recommendation of ASAP counselors when determining a
    soldier's potential for rehabilitation and retention.
        I concur with this policy.
        Question. Do you believe that the Army has devoted sufficient
    resources to implementation of its rehabilitation policies and
    objectives since 2001? If not, in what ways?
        Answer. My personal experience at various command levels since 2001
    has been that the Army devotes sufficient resources to implement these
    objectives. If confirmed, I will assess and closely monitor the level
    of resourcing for this important area.
        Question. What measures are being taken to improve the Army's
    performance in responding to problems of drug and alcohol abuse?
        Answer. Army policy requires a comprehensive approach by
    commanders, law enforcement and the medical community for drug and
    alcohol abuse. The Army is working diligently to improve its
    surveillance, detection, and intervention systems for drug and alcohol
    abuse.
        The Army investigates all reported drug and alcohol incidents to
    assist commanders in properly adjudicating the offense. The Army is
    also enhancing detection capabilities through the Drug Suppression
    Teams.
        The Army is also working to improve intervention systems. In
    addition to increasing the number of ASAP counselors to accommodate the
    increasing demand, the Army continues to expand the Comprehensive
    Soldier Fitness program to build resiliency in the force. The Army is
    also conducting the Confidential Alcohol Treatment and Education Pilot
    program at six installations to promote help seeking behavior by
    allowing soldiers to confidentially seek help for alcohol problems.
                   medical personnel recruiting and retention
        Question. The Army continues to face significant shortages in
    critically needed medical personnel in both Active and Reserve
    components.
        What is your understanding of the most significant personnel
    challenges in recruiting and retaining health professionals in the
    Army?
        Answer. There continues to be a national shortage of medical
    professionals that challenges the Army's efforts to recruit and retain
    health care professionals. The Army competes with governmental and non-
    governmental agencies, as well as private health care organizations to
    attract and retain the most skilled and talented health care providers,
    in a uniformed or civilian capacity. The Army continues to evaluate
    initiatives to provide more flexibility to allow the Army to adequately
    compete in these areas.
        Question. If confirmed, would you undertake a comprehensive review
    of the medical support requirements for the Army, incorporating all new
    requirements for 2011 and beyond?
        Answer. I believe it is important to review medical support
    requirements on a regular, recurring basis. With that in mind, if
    confirmed I will assess whether the Army should undertake a
    comprehensive review of the medical support requirements for the Army.
        Question. If confirmed, what policies or legislative initiatives,
    if any, are necessary in order to ensure that the Army can continue to
    fulfill ongoing medical support requirements?
        Answer. Given the policy initiatives currently underway and the
    changes implemented by the National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2011 at this time, I do not believe additional legislative
    authorities are needed to ensure that the Army fulfills medical support
    requirements. If confirmed, I will closely monitor this area and will
    work closely with the administration and Congress to seek any
    additional authorities identified as necessarily to maintain this goal.
                          foreign language proficiency
        Question. A Foreign Language Transformation Roadmap announced by
    the Department of Defense in March 2005, directed a series of actions
    aimed at transforming the Department's foreign language capabilities to
    include revision of policy and doctrine, building a capabilities based
    requirements process, and enhancing foreign language capability for
    both military and civilian personnel.
        What is your assessment of the progress the Army has made in
    increasing its foreign language capabilities in operations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan?
        Answer. As Commanding General for the Training and Doctrine
    Command, I witnessed a tremendous increase in foreign language
    capabilities in support of OIF/OEF. The Army revolutionized its
    recruiting processes to enlist native and heritage speakers into vital
    interpreter/translator positions. Pre-deployment training for the
    General Purpose Force Soldiers and Civilians has transformed to include
    Afghanistan/Pakistan Hands Program, Language Enabled Soldiers training,
    the Rapport Program, and other Soldiers and Civilians with Culturally
    Based Language Training. The Reserve Officer Training Corps has
    introduced a very successful Culture and Language Program, which
    provides incentives and immersion opportunities for cadets who take
    foreign language and related cultural studies. Overall, these
    initiatives have provided enhanced capabilities for counterinsurgency
    operations and building partner capacity overseas.
        Question. In your view, what should be the priorities of the
    Department of Defense, and the Army in particular, in responding to the
    need for improved foreign language proficiency and improving
    coordination of foreign language programs and activities among Federal
    agencies?
        Answer. In my opinion, one of the highest priorities for the
    Department of Defense should be the continued support of the Defense
    Language Institute Foreign Language Center, which provides Culturally
    Based Language Training to all Services and Department of Defense
    Components. With the increasing demand for Pashto and Dari instructors,
    and foreign language professionals in general, the Department of
    Defense must coordinate with Federal agencies to ensure best practices
    are shared to recruit and retain personnel with these critical skills.
                          mental health advisory teams
        Question. The Army's Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) studies in
    Iraq and Afghanistan have been valuable in identifying the extent of
    mental health conditions and resource and training challenges being
    experienced in combat theaters. The most recent report, MHAT VI, stated
    that multiple deployments were related to higher rates of acute stress
    and psychological problems, that servicemembers on their third and
    fourth deployment ``reported using medications for psychological or
    combat stress problems at a significantly higher rate,'' and that
    ``soldiers with short dwell-time report high mental health problems,
    high intent to leave the military and low morale.''
        Based on the findings of MHAT VI that soldiers experience increased
    stress due to multiple deployments and short dwell time, what actions
    would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that appropriate mental health
    resources are available to soldiers in theater, as well as upon their
    return?
        Answer. The MHAT studies play a key role in proactively identifying
    how changes in the operational environment impact the ability to
    provide behavioral health care. Since OEF MHAT VI, the number of
    behavioral health personnel in theater was significantly increased to
    improve the ratio of behavioral health specialists to soldiers.
    Specifically, the MHAT team recommended one behavioral health personnel
    should be deployed for every 700 soldiers, and this ratio was met.
    Second, the MHAT team recommended a redistribution of behavioral health
    personnel to ensure that each BCT had one additional dedicated provider
    to augment their organic provider. This ``dual provider'' model was
    designed to ensure that a provider would be available to travel to
    remote outposts to see soldiers who had limited access to the larger
    Forward Operating Bases. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Army
    continues to develop and synchronize the expeditionary components of
    health promotion, risk reduction, and suicide prevention programs and
    services.
        Question. What do you think have been the most valuable findings of
    the Army's Mental Health Advisory Teams, and what are the lessons which
    can be applied to future deployments?
        Answer. One of the most valuable findings from the MHATs has been
    to document that soldiers on multiple deployments report higher mental
    health problems. This finding was first observed in 2005 (MHAT III),
    and has been replicated in every subsequent MHAT. Another valuable
    finding noted in the question was the observation that mental health
    problems are related to dwell-times. Specifically, short dwell-times
    are associated with a heightened increase in reports of mental health
    problems. Other key findings include the observation that deployment
    length is strongly associated with reports of mental health problems
    and deployments have put a strain on marital relationships. Overall,
    the willingness to take a systematic look at the behavioral health care
    system and the behavioral health status of soldiers through programs
    such as the MHATs has ensured that the Army is being responsive to the
    needs of deployed soldiers to include refining behavioral health care
    delivery models.
                     sexual assault prevention and response
        Question. Numerous cases of sexual misconduct involving soldiers in
    Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan have been reported over the last several
    years. Many victims and their advocates contend that they were
    victimized twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by
    unresponsive or inadequate military treatment. They asserted that the
    Army failed to respond appropriately by providing basic services,
    including medical attention and criminal investigation of their charges
    and, ultimately, appropriate disciplinary action.
        What is your understanding of the resources and programs the Army
    has in place in deployed locations to offer victims of sexual assaults
    the medical, psychological, and legal help that they need?
        Answer. I am very concerned about reports of sexual assault
    anywhere in our Army but especially in deployed locations. We cannot
    tolerate this behavior wherever it occurs. While the deployed theatres
    pose special challenges, the Army is committed to providing victims in
    deployed units with appropriate medical care, resources and support.
    The Army has taken a number of significant steps to improve the
    assistance to victims of sexual assault, including enhanced recognition
    of the special circumstances posed by deployed soldiers. The Army's
    Sexual Harassment Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program
    includes medical, advocacy, chaplain, investigative and legal services.
    This program requires every brigade sized unit to appoint and train a
    deployable sexual assault response coordinator and every battalion to
    appoint and train unit victim advocates.
        Question. What is your view of the steps the Army has taken to
    prevent additional sexual assaults at deployed locations as well as
    home stations?
        Answer. In 2008, the Army implemented its I. A.M. (Intervene, Act,
    Motivate) Strong Sexual Assault Prevention Campaign. The campaign
    includes strategic, operational and tactical level execution of the I.
    A.M. Strong Campaign, with heavy emphasis on soldiers' commitment to
    intervene and protect their fellow soldiers from the risk of sexual
    assault and from the risk of sexual harassment. The campaign places
    additional emphasis on establishing a command climate that deters
    sexual harassment and assault.
        Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
    resources the Army has in place to investigate and respond to
    allegations of sexual assault?
        Answer. While increasing emphasis to prevent sexual assaults before
    they occur, the Army continues to emphasize victim services and
    response capabilities, to include enhancements to investigation and
    prosecution resources.
        The SHARP Program is a great start to managing strategies, policies
    and resources necessary to adequately prevent and respond to incidents
    of sexual assault. This is a challenging problem that will require
    leadership and constant vigilance at all levels.
        Question. Do you consider the Army's current sexual assault
    policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting,
    to be effective?
        Prior to implementation of the I. A.M. Strong Prevention Campaign,
    the focus of the Army program was primarily on victim response. Part of
    that response focus was the implementation of confidential reporting,
    or restricted reporting, which is an effective way to allow a victim to
    come forward and have their personal needs met without fear that may be
    associated with a criminal investigation. If confirmed, I will continue
    to look closely at the Army's sexual assault program.
        Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in
    which the confidential reporting procedures have been put into effect?
        Answer. Getting victims to trust the system and come forward can be
    challenging; however, I am not aware of any specific problems with the
    current reporting procedure. Confidential reporting, or restricted
    reporting, allows a victim to come forward and have their personal
    needs met without fear that may be associated with a criminal
    investigation.
        Question. What is your view of the appropriate role for senior
    military and civilian leaders in the Secretariat and the Army staff in
    overseeing the effectiveness of implementation of new policies relating
    to sexual assault?
        Answer. Perhaps the most important role of any Senior Army Leader
    is to ensure there is an adequate assessment of an organizational
    climate, where such behavior is not tolerated and where victims feel
    free to report incidents without fear of reprisal.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure
    senior management level direction and oversight of Departmental efforts
    on sexual assault prevention and response?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will have an active role in the oversight
    and implementation of the Army's Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and
    Prevention (SHARP) Program. I will work with the Secretary and the Army
    leadership to ensure the Army's SHARP program continues to receive the
    appropriate level of supervision, guidance, and support needed to
    drastically reduce incidents of this unacceptable crime.
                        morale, welfare, and recreation
        Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are
    critical to enhancement of military life for members and their
    families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments.
    These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users,
    including Active Duty and Reserve personnel, and their eligible family
    members.
        What challenges do you foresee in sustaining and enhancing Army MWR
    programs and, if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to
    achieve?
        Answer. The Army has taken steps to ensure we care for and retain
    Families through a broad range of meaningful initiatives, to include
    many family and MWR programs and services. In October 2007, the Army
    leadership unveiled the Army Family Covenant, which institutionalized
    the Army's promise to provide soldiers and their families with a
    quality of life that is commensurate with their service to the Nation.
    The Soldier Family Action Plan provided the original roadmap to
    implement the Army Family Covenant, and includes such important
    programs as Soldier Family Assistance Centers, Survivor Outreach
    Services, improved services to the geographically dispersed,
    Exceptional Family Member respite care, Army OneSource, Child, Youth
    and School Services, Child Development Center and Youth Center
    construction, and more.
        A challenge will be to sustain a consistent level of funding for
    these programs. If confirmed, I will consult with commanders, soldiers
    and families to ensure that these programs are adequate and meet their
    needs.
                                   __________

      NOMINATION OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
        GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, JULY 26, 2011

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room
    SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman), presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
    Akaka, Webb, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Manchin, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, McCain, Sessions, Chambliss, Wicker,
    Brown, Portman, Ayotte, Collins, and Graham.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Jessica L. Kingston,
    research assistant; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K.
    Levine, general counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael
    J. Noblet, professional staff member; Russell L. Shaffer,
    counsel; William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority
    staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Paul
    C. Hutton IV, professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner,
    professional staff member; Lucian Niemeyer, professional staff
    member; Michael J. Sistak, research assistant; Diana G. Tabler,
    professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority
    counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles and Christine
    G. Lang.
        Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Griffin,
    assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to
    Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Ann
    Premer, assistant to Senator Nelson; Gordon I. Peterson,
    assistant to Senator Webb; Casey Howard, assistant to Senator
    Udall; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Joanne
    McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; Chad Kreikemeier,
    assistant to Senator Shaheen; Elena Broitman, assistant to
    Senator Gillibrand; and Ethan Saxon, assistant to Senator
    Blumenthal; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe;
    Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde Taylor
    IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Joseph Lai, assistant to
    Senator Wicker; Charles Prosch, assistant to Senator Brown;
    Brent Bombach, assistant to Senator Portman; Brad Bowman,
    assistant to Senator Ayotte; Ryan Kaldahl, assistant to Senator
    Collins; and Sergio Sarkany, assistant to Senator Graham.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
    meets this morning to consider the nomination of General Martin
    Dempsey to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was not
    long ago that General Dempsey came before us for his nomination
    hearing to become Chief of Staff of the Army. We welcome him
    back, with thanks again for his 36 years of dedicated service
    to our Nation and his willingness to serve as Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        As we know from those decades of service, General Dempsey
    is an exceptionally well qualified American soldier and leader.
    As we were reminded at his last hearing, he is also a proud
    husband, father, and grandfather. General Dempsey, we remain
    grateful for the sacrifices that you and your family have made
    over the years, for the devotion of your beloved wife Deanie,
    and the military service of your daughters and your son. As is
    our tradition, at the beginning of your testimony we would
    welcome your introducing to us any family members and friends
    who may be with you this morning.
        General Dempsey will replace Admiral Mike Mullen as
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the most senior military
    adviser in the Department of Defense (DOD). Admiral Mullen's
    service over the last 4 years during the daunting challenges of
    the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has been truly remarkable and
    the Nation owes him our deepest gratitude.
        It is appropriate at today's hearing also to note the
    passing last week of former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff retired Army General John Shalikashvili. General
    Shalikashvili's personal story is well known, rising from post-
    World War II immigrant youth to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
    His example of patriotism, leadership, and selfless service to
    the Nation and our Armed Forces inspired the generation that
    leads our military today. For those of us who knew him, we
    treasured his professionalism, his candor, and his deep love
    for America and our men and women in uniform.
        General Dempsey's confirmation will help complete the
    transition to President Obama's new national security team,
    which has seen significant changes in the last few months. The
    next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will face complex
    and demanding challenges as operations in Afghanistan and Iraq
    continue at the same time the fiscal realities that confront
    the Nation will put tremendous pressures on the Defense
    Department's budget.
        Those fiscal realities require us, when considering defense
    planning and programs, to take into consideration historic
    budgetary constraints. Admiral Mullen has said that: ``Our
    national debt is our biggest national security problem.'' Most
    everyone agrees that the Defense Department cannot be immune
    from efforts to bring our fiscal house in order.
        We have been told that the Department is conducting a
    comprehensive program review and that the details are not yet
    known, but it is likely that this review will include
    significant additional suggested reductions in the 2012 budget
    request, cuts that are even more than the $6 billion reduction
    to the Department's request that this committee recently
    reported in our fiscal year 2012 authorization bill.
        The Department will have to make tough funding choices and
    we will need our military's best advice on how to reduce
    spending that realistically manages risk in ways that
    adequately addresses our top national security challenges. We
    will be interested in hearing General Dempsey's thoughts on
    defense spending and in particular whatever he can tell us
    about the comprehensive national security review that I
    referred to.
        The next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs will also have to
    manage the transition of security responsibility and the
    drawdown of U.S. forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq,
    the coming months will be crucial, leading up to the December
    2011 deadline for the withdrawal of our remaining 49,000 U.S.
    troops. Even though there are still concerns in Iraq over their
    security forces' capacity to assume full responsibility for
    Iraq's security, Iraq's political leaders have yet to request
    that the United States consider retaining a U.S. troop presence
    there beyond the end of the year deadline set by President Bush
    for complete military withdrawal. We will be interested to hear
    what General Dempsey's recommendations would be if the
    Government of Iraq makes a timely request for a continuing U.S.
    troop presence beyond 2011.
        In Afghanistan, the President has set a course for
    transitioning increased security responsibility to the Afghans
    and drawing down U.S. forces, beginning with the withdrawal of
    10,000 U.S. troops by the end of this year and bringing the
    balance of 33,000 U.S. surge forces home by next summer. I
    applaud the President for sticking to the July 2011 date that
    he set in his West Point speech 1\1/2\ years ago for the
    beginning of the drawdown. Doing so offers the best chance of
    success for the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. That
    is, getting Afghan security forces in the position to take
    principal charge of that nation's security.
        The sense of urgency that this timetable created at the
    highest levels of the Afghan Government contributed to a surge
    of some 100,000 additional Afghan security forces in just the
    last year and a half. Over the next 15 months, the Afghan
    security forces will be increasingly in the lead in operations,
    while another 70,000 Afghan soldiers and police will be added
    to their ranks.
        At the same time, General John Allen, the commander of
    coalition forces in Afghanistan, stated that the campaign plan
    calls for more and more Afghan security forces to be partnered
    in operations with fewer coalition forces. The growth in the
    capabilities of the Afghan security forces, both in quantity
    and professionalism, has already made possible the first phase
    of transition to an Afghan lead for security in a number of
    provinces and areas around Afghanistan.
        A significant challenge to achieving our goals in
    Afghanistan remains Pakistan's failure to act against militant
    extremists like the Haqqani network in North Waziristan, the
    Afghan Taliban around Quetta, and other militant extremists. We
    will be interested in hearing General Dempsey's thoughts on how
    to get the Pakistan military to go after terrorist groups
    finding sanctuary in Pakistan's Tribal Regions.
        Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen and al Qaeda
    elements of al Shabab in Somalia continue to take advantage of
    failing and failed states to train their operatives and to plan
    attacks against the United States and our interests. It is
    critical that we continue to apply significant pressure to
    these terrorist organizations and to work with governments and
    international organizations in the region to address the long-
    term problems.
        Iran remains probably the greatest risk to world peace and
    to regional stability. We share the concerns of many nations
    about Iran's continued support of terrorist activities beyond
    its borders, development of its missile programs, and refusal
    to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Commission
    with respect to its nuclear program. While we have seen
    evidence that the international sanctions have put stress on
    Iran, more remains to be done to pressure Iran to give up its
    nuclear weapons ambitions.
        In Libya, our Armed Forces continue to provide unique
    enabling capabilities to our North Atlantic Treaty Organization
    (NATO) and regional partners as they carry out the United
    Nations mandate to protect Libyan civilians from a dictator
    bent on killing his own people and destroying a country simply
    to preserve his grip on power.
        In the dynamic Asia Pacific region, we are committed to
    working with our many allies and partners to maintain peace and
    stability and to align our forces in a way that is both
    strategically sound and fiscally responsible. This is not only
    true in Northeast Asia, where the United States is realigning
    its forces in Korea and Japan, but it is also true in South and
    Southeast Asia.
        General Dempsey's leadership will be critical in
    determining how the Defense Department and indeed the Nation
    addresses the many and growing threats to our cyber security.
    All of our military communications, weapons systems, support,
    intelligence, and virtually everything else that DOD does
    relies on cyber networks. Making sure that we have the
    policies, practices, and technologies to reliably support
    military operations is a matter of increasing urgency. A recent
    critical Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
    emphasized the urgency of having a clear and coordinated cyber
    policy put in place.
        General Dempsey no doubt will also be called upon to help
    develop national cyber security policies, such as when does a
    cyber attack on activities or entities in the United States
    require or justify a U.S. offensive response, cyber or
    otherwise. We'll be interested in hearing General Dempsey's
    views on that.
        Repeated deployments of our military over the last decade
    has resulted in many of our service men and women being away
    from their families and homes for many tours, stressing our
    servicemembers and their families. Reducing the demand for
    deployed forces is essential to increasing time at home
    station, increasing unit readiness, and reducing our strategic
    risk in the event of an unforeseen contingency. We look forward
    to hearing General Dempsey's views on how best to manage both
    the demand for rotational forces and how we meet that demand
    while restoring our strategic depth, that is the readiness of
    our non-deployed forces.
        The Nation could not be more proud of their families. We
    are grateful for General Dempsey's leadership and his
    willingness to assume greater responsibility for the readiness,
    employment, and care of all of our forces and the families that
    support them.
        Senator McCain.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I add my welcome
    to General Dempsey and his family, his wife, and congratulate
    him on this nomination.
        I first want to express my condolences to the family of
    General John Shalikashvili, who passed away last Saturday.
    General Shali was born in Poland of Georgian parents in 1936,
    fled from the advancing Soviets near the end of World War II,
    came to the United States as a teenager, and rose in the ranks
    to become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1993 to
    1997. He was a great American patriot and Army leader.
        General Dempsey, just 3 months ago on April 11, you became
    the Chief of Staff of the Army. You're now poised to become the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Your impressive history
    of assignments I believe has prepared you well to become the
    principal military adviser to the President and the leader of
    the Joint Chiefs. Without question, your combat experience and
    career military leadership, your service as Acting Commander of
    U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and your thorough understanding
    of our transforming force stressed by a decade of combat will
    serve you well as strategic decisions regarding Iraq and
    Afghanistan must be made and we face hard calls about our
    priorities in the future.
        We're conducting this hearing at a time when Americans are
    deeply frustrated over the enormous debt we've accumulated and
    the effects of runaway entitlement spending on our economy and
    on our future. In this very difficult fiscal environment,
    there's no doubt that the defense budget will be constrained in
    the years ahead as we seek to solve our debt crisis.
        Clearly, DOD cannot afford to waste taxpayers' resources on
    Pentagon programs that are over cost, behind schedule, or fail
    to provide an increase in warfighting capability to our troops.
    However, I hope the President and the Secretary of Defense,
    with your assistance, advice, and counsel, will realize that
    defense expenditures following the attacks of September 11,
    which were preceded by nearly a decade of drastic reductions in
    military personnel, equipment, and readiness, are not the cause
    of the economic dilemma we find ourselves in today.
        Congress and the President must address the issue of
    unsustainable deficit spending and unprecedented debt in
    nondefense spending and entitlements which will impact the
    future of our military during your term. Since this year began,
    the President has already asked the Defense Department to cut
    more than $178 billion by finding efficiencies and taking top-
    line reductions in proposed defense spending over the next 5
    years. But, even the current direction by the President to cut
    an additional $400 billion in defense spending by 2023 has been
    eclipsed by some debt reduction proposals that include $800
    billion to a trillion dollars in cuts in defense spending over
    the next 10 years.
        I'd be the first to suggest that the Defense Department
    budget could be responsibly reduced and reasonable people can
    disagree over how deep those cuts should be. But what concerns
    me most about our current debate is that the defense cuts being
    discussed have little to no strategic or military rationale to
    support them. They are simply numbers on a page. Our national
    defense planning and spending must be driven by considered
    strategy, not arbitrary arithmetic.
        The defense cuts currently proposed reflect minimal, if
    any, understanding of how they will be applied or what impacts
    they will have on our defense capabilities or our national
    security. While Secretary Panetta has made it clear that a
    comprehensive review will precede any decision of further
    defense cuts, Congress currently has no specific indication of
    how the current proposals would impact the size of our military
    forces, what changes they would require to our compensation
    system, what equipment and weapons would have to be cancelled
    as a result, or what additional risks to the readiness and
    modernization of our forces and their equipment we would have
    to accept.
        If Congress is to make informed decisions about our
    national defense spending, we need information like this. I
    hope, Mr. Chairman, that we can begin holding hearings on this
    important subject.
        I also hope that you will carefully monitor Department
    contracting and expenditures. Your frankness and candor on how
    money is spent by the Department will be much needed by
    Congress as we assess how to direct Pentagon spending.
        General Dempsey, obviously I'm confident you will be
    confirmed. I hope you and Secretary Panetta will avoid
    misguided and excessive reductions in defense spending that cut
    into the muscle of our military capabilities. Defense spending
    is not what is sinking this country into fiscal crisis, and if
    Congress and the President act on that flawed assumption they
    will create a situation that is truly unaffordable--the
    hollowing out of U.S. military power and the loss of faith of
    our military members and their families.
        I trust that you will have the ability and confidence to
    advise the President and Congress on your views regarding the
    health of our military and the ability of our forces to meet
    our cooperative security commitments with our allies around the
    world. We will need an honest and forthright military
    assessment of the impacts of funding decisions.
        I look forward to your opinions today and on these matters
    and your vision of the way forward. Again, my congratulations.
        Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
        General Dempsey.

     STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
    THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
                                 STAFF

        General Dempsey. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain,
    distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
    I'm honored by the opportunity to appear before you today in
    support of my nomination as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff. I want to thank the President and both Secretaries,
    Gates and Panetta, for their confidence in me. I also want to
    compliment Admiral Mike Mullen for his remarkable service over
    more than 4 decades as he nears the end of a distinguished
    career. I would as well like to add my condolences to the
    family of General John Shalikashvili. He was truly an
    accomplished soldier and a great American.
        As always when something important is happening in my life,
    I am joined this morning by my wife Deanie. I met Deanie 41
    years ago and she's been my wife for just over 35 of those
    years. I have asked a lot of her and she's always given more
    than I've asked. We have three wonderful children, three near-
    perfect grandchildren, and three more on the way.
        We're also blessed to have several brigades' worth of young
    men and women in uniform and their families with whom we've
    served and who we consider our extended family and it's on
    their shoulders that I have been lifted up today to be
    considered for this position.
        But it won't surprise you to know that the glue that holds
    all of that together is Deanie, and I can't thank her enough
    for her love and support and for her dedication to our
    military, its families, and our Nation.
        I appeared before this committee just a few short months
    ago and as far as I can tell my tenure as 37th Chief of Staff
    of the Army hasn't changed me very much. However, now that I'm
    nominated as Chairman, the images that drive me are beginning
    to change. I'll share just one of those images.
        In 2008, as the Acting Commander of CENTCOM, I visited the
    aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln in the Indian Ocean and
    observed flight operations there that were being conducted in
    support of ground operations in Afghanistan. As I watched these
    brave young men and women departing on their missions, I saw
    looming in the background on the superstructure of the aircraft
    carrier the imposing profile of Abraham Lincoln, and inscribed
    above that image were the words ``Shall Not Perish,'' taken, of
    course, from Lincoln's Gettysburg Address. It occurred to me
    then, as it reminds me now, that those who volunteer to serve
    our country in uniform understand what's at stake when we send
    them into harm's way.
        I relate this story simply to assure you that I know what
    this nomination means and I will do my best to live up to the
    responsibility. If confirmed, I will work with the Joint Chiefs
    to ensure that this Nation has the military it needs.
        It's clear we have work to finish in the current conflicts
    and it should be just as clear that we have work to do in
    preparing for an uncertain future. Our work must result in a
    joint force that is responsive, decisive, versatile,
    interdependent, and affordable. We must keep faith with service
    men and women, their families, and our veterans.
        We're all very proud of the military forces of the United
    States and this committee has been instrumental in making it
    the finest force ever assembled anywhere at any time. We are
    also aware that a new fiscal reality confronts us.
        In 1973, as Chief of Staff of the Army, General Creighton
    Abrams led us out of the Vietnam conflict and he said that it
    was the enduring role of the Army to ensure that America
    remains immune from coercion. That benchmark remains as true
    today as it was 38 years ago, and it applies, of course, not
    only to our Army, but to all our Services.
        I look forward to working with the Joint Chiefs, with our
    civilian leaders, and with the members of this committee to
    adapt the U.S. military to a new fiscal reality while ensuring,
    as my primary responsibility, that America remains immune from
    coercion. Should you confirm me as Chairman, you have my solemn
    commitment to those tasks.
        Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General Dempsey.
    Again, thanks to Deanie.
        General, the committee has a series of standard questions
    that we ask all of our nominees and I'll ask them of you. Have
    you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
    conflicts of interest?
        General Dempsey. I do, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Do you agree, when asked, to give your
    personal views, even if those views differ from the
    administration in power?
        General Dempsey. I will.
        Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
    any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
    confirmation process?
        General Dempsey. I have not.
        Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
    deadlines established for requested communications, including
    questions for the record in hearings?
        General Dempsey. I will.
        Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
    and briefers in response to congressional requests?
        General Dempsey. I will.
        Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
    reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
        General Dempsey. They will, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
    testify upon request before this committee?
        General Dempsey. I do.
        Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
    including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
    timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
    to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
    faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
        General Dempsey. I do.
        Chairman Levin. Let us have a 7-minute first round of
    questions. I understand there's a vote at around 12:15.
        General, first relative to Afghanistan. On June 22,
    President Obama announced his decision that the United States
    would draw down its forces in Afghanistan by 10,000 by the end
    of this year and the remaining 23,000 U.S. surge forces by the
    end of the summer in 2012, for a total drawdown of 33,000. Do
    you agree with the President's decision on these reductions?
        General Dempsey. I do, Senator. I've been in contact with
    both General Petraeus and now General Allen and, based on their
    military judgments and the options they've presented, I do
    agree with the decision taken.
        Chairman Levin. How important is it to the success of the
    counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan that we maintain the
    momentum for transitioning more and more responsibility to the
    Afghan security forces for their country's security?
        General Dempsey. As it was in Iraq and is now in
    Afghanistan, it is the transition at the end of the day that
    will determine our successful outcome. Of course, it does take
    a great deal of thought, a great deal of deliberation and
    collaboration, to understand the capabilities as they are
    accrued by security forces of those nations where we task
    ourselves to build those security forces.
        Chairman Levin. A recent Defense Department report called
    the extremist Haqqani network ``the most significant threat in
    eastern Afghanistan''. Yet, the Haqqanis continue to find safe
    haven across the border in Pakistan and the Pakistan army has
    so far refused to conduct major operations to eliminate the
    Haqqani sanctuary in the tribal area of North Waziristan.
        Will you press the Government of Pakistan to take the fight
    to the Haqqani network in North Waziristan?
        General Dempsey. I will, Senator. As the Acting Commander
    of CENTCOM, in those days we talked about four particular
    networks that existed along the Afghan-Pakistan border, and we
    encouraged our Pakistani counterparts to press them. They have
    pressed some of those groups, but not all. It's not always been
    clear to us exactly why they press some, but not all. But I
    will continue to work with Pakistan to reduce the safe haven on
    the Pak border.
        Chairman Levin. In answers to your advance policy
    questions, you state that in working with Pakistan on security
    cooperation we should not push programs the Pakistanis do not
    want, because doing so dilutes the value of U.S. cooperation,
    and you call for a frank and respectful dialogue in order for
    our security cooperation to be successful.
        Can you give us your assessment on the DOD programs of
    assistance to Pakistan, in particular the coalition support
    funds and the Pakistan counterinsurgency fund, and to tell us
    whether or not those are programs that the Pakistanis want or
    whether or not we've been pushing them on Pakistan, which has
    reduced Pakistan's buy-in to those assistance programs?
        General Dempsey. I'd reflect back on my tour as the Acting
    Commander of CENTCOM in answering this question. I'm not
    current on the state of the coalition support funds and the
    programs you described as they've evolved. But I will tell you
    it's always been a matter of discussion between us and our
    Pakistan counterparts about what threats are most serious to
    them and to us. They persist in the idea that India poses an
    existential threat to their existence, while the terrorists
    that operate with some impunity in the Northwest Frontier
    Province and in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas are
    less threat to them, and therefore they allocate their
    resources accordingly and they embrace different engagement
    activities with us differently.
        We have been, over the course of time, working to convince
    them that the terrorist threat, the extremist threat, to their
    west is as great a threat and probably a greater threat to them
    than any threat that India might pose. But it's on that basis,
    it's on that intellectual disagreement about what is most
    threatening to them, that these programs are viewed. We would
    tend to view programs to improve counterinsurgency capability
    in their general purpose forces, policing and security role for
    their Frontier Corps, we would tend to view those as more
    important than the higher end processes and programs. It's just
    one of those things we have to continue to work through.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        There's been a great deal of discussion about standards of
    interrogation and detainee treatment, and some of the language
    in our authorization bill relates to that subject. First, do
    you support the standards for interrogation and detainee
    treatment which are specified in the Army Field Manual on
    Interrogations?
        General Dempsey. I do, Senator.
        Chairman Levin. Would you tell us why?
        General Dempsey. I had a hand in preparing them and so I
    have a certain sense of ownership for them. But I do think that
    they articulate the nexus of the importance of gaining
    intelligence with the importance of preserving our values as a
    Nation and as an Army.
        Chairman Levin. Would you agree that the standards for
    detainee treatment should be based on the principle of
    reciprocity, in other words that the manner in which we treat
    detainees that are under our control may have a direct impact
    on how U.S. troops are treated should they be captured in
    future conflicts?
        General Dempsey. I do believe that reciprocity should
    absolutely be one of the principles on which our approach to
    detainee operations should be based.
        Chairman Levin. A number of us--many, probably all of us on
    this committee--are increasingly concerned about cyber attacks.
    It's a subject of, obviously, great and increasing concern for
    our country. One of the questions is whether or not when we are
    a victim of cyber attack, as to how we should respond. Of
    course, I guess the real question is whether or not we can
    identify the attacker as being a state actor and whether or not
    an attack is intentional or not. It could be an act of
    espionage which we engage in ourselves. We engage in espionage
    and other countries engage in espionage, and those acts
    apparently are not considered to be acts of war.
        On the other hand, if something intentionally damages,
    destroys, a facility or an entity in another country that it
    would seem to me at least to be an act of war or an aggressive
    act which requires a response.
        Can you give us your thinking about the whole growing
    emerging issue of cyber attacks and how should the Defense
    Department participate in determining what the response is to
    those attacks?
        General Dempsey. I can, Senator, but I'll confess at the
    start that my thinking on this is nascent at best. It has been
    suggested to me that, if confirmed, the issue of cyber and
    cyber warfare, the cyber domain, will probably be one of a
    handful of issues that define my tenure as Chairman. I'm taking
    a greater interest in it. But I have some thoughts on it right
    now as well.
        The decision about whether something is an act of war or
    whether we would respond to it is, of course, a political
    decision, and it's the role of the Department and, if
    confirmed, with my advice as Chairman, on how to respond to it.
    At this point my greater interest is in determining what
    capabilities we must provide the Nation to be prepared to
    respond should we be attacked and should the determination be
    made that it was a hostile act or an act of war.
        You've described the challenge very articulately. It's very
    hard to trace fingerprints and threads back through the cyber
    domain because of the ability to use servers at remote
    locations. It's a place, it's a domain, where anonymity is more
    an issue than it might be in the domains of space, air, land,
    or sea.
        That said, we have done a lot of work. You know that the
    President published a policy in May 2011. That was followed up
    just a week ago, actually, by a DOD declaration by Deputy
    Secretary of Defense Lynn, and at this point I'm in the process
    of studying that. I have a series of meetings scheduled, if
    confirmed, between the time I'm confirmed and when I take the
    job, with those who are delivering that capability today to
    better understand it.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
        Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Again, congratulations, General. Just to follow up on what
    Chairman Levin said, you want to assess the capabilities, but
    you have to develop a strategy and a policy before. That comes
    before the capabilities, in all due respect.
        Look, this is a serious issue. Congress has not done its
    job, but certainly DOD has not done its job, and to just say
    we're going to assess our capabilities--we have to develop a
    strategy. This is a serious, serious issue that hardly when we
    pick up the newspaper every week or so that somebody hasn't
    been hacked into, not always military, but industrial, which
    obviously are key to our Nation's economic and military
    success.
        I suggest you start working on a policy, and I also suggest
    we here in Congress start working on legislation which would
    implement that policy.
        I hate to keep going back to this issue of the withdrawal
    from Afghanistan. Now, the President announced the drawdown,
    and you said you supported it. Was it recommended by any
    military leader, the President's schedule for the drawdown?
        General Dempsey. Senator, my understanding is that General
    Petraeus proposed three options. I haven't talked to him about
    how he felt about those options, but no military man would
    propose an option he considered to be infeasible. The President
    chose one of those three options. So I can only say----
        Senator McCain. General Petraeus did not give him this
    option of the accelerated withdrawal so that they didn't have
    two fighting seasons, General. I'm sure you know that.
        General Dempsey. No, I do not know that, Senator.
        Senator McCain. You do not know that?
        General Dempsey. I do not.
        Senator McCain. General, I'll send you the testimony of
    General Petraeus before this committee, and I'm disappointed
    that you didn't know that, because it was not recommended by
    any military leader, nor would it be. In fact, General Petraeus
    and others have testified that it increased the risk. Do you
    share that view?
        General Dempsey. I think it did increase the risk, yes.
        Senator McCain. Thank you. An unnecessary risk in my view.
        I want to talk about budget cuts. You just left as Chief of
    Staff of the Army and I understand the President has called for
    $800 billion in budget cuts; is that correct?
        General Dempsey. The current number we're targeting is $400
    billion, Senator, over 12 years.
        Senator McCain. Have you developed any plans as to how to
    implement that?
        General Dempsey. We are working on that even as we speak.
    We have a task from the Department to look at what the impact
    of that budget cut would be.
        Senator McCain. When could we expect to have that
    assessment, since the appropriations process moves on here?
        General Dempsey. Senator, back to your point about
    strategy, we have a task to try to keep strategy running
    parallel with resource decisions, and the comprehensive
    strategy that the chairman mentioned is due for completion some
    time in late September, early October.
        Senator McCain. So we have announced cuts without the
    commensurate strategy to go along with it? Not comforting.
        General Dempsey. Senator, what I would describe is we've
    announced a target and we're trying to determine what the
    impact would be to meet that target, and we are looking at
    that.
        Senator McCain. In most cases that I've seen, the strategy
    has been developed and then the budget for it is arrived at,
    not the other way around.
        General Dempsey. Sir, I can speak as the Chief of Staff of
    the Army. Because the cuts are articulated over 10 or 12 years,
    it'll affect four program operating memorandums. Decisions
    taken in 2013-2017 would not be binding on the following three
    targets, but would certainly affect that program operating
    memorandum.
        Senator McCain. But we are talking about $80 billion
    developed for next year; is that correct?
        General Dempsey. Potentially, sir.
        Senator McCain. Potentially?
        General Dempsey. Again, sir----
        Senator McCain. Isn't that what the President has called
    for?
        General Dempsey. He has, sir, but we have not provided the
    analysis back to the Secretary of Defense on what the impact
    would be as yet.
        Senator McCain. Which brings me again full circle. We have
    announced cuts without a commensurate assessment of the impact
    of those cuts. In your view, what would an $800 billion to $1
    trillion cut in defense spending over the next 10 years do to
    our readiness, General?
        General Dempsey. Senator, I haven't been asked to look at
    that number, but we have looked and we are looking at $400
    billion. I would react in this way. Based on the difficulty of
    achieving the $400 billion cut, I believe $800 billion would be
    extraordinarily difficult and very high risk.
        Senator McCain. I forgot to mention at the beginning of our
    conversation an article yesterday: ``U.S. drawdown, internal
    crises, fuel fears for Afghanistan. The start of the U.S. troop
    drawdown, overlapping security, political, and economic crises
    are fueling fears that Afghanistan could sink into wholesale
    turmoil and even civil war as the U.S.-led international combat
    mission winds up at the end of 2014.''
        Are you concerned about that?
        General Dempsey. Yes, sir, I am.
        Senator McCain. On the supply routes for Afghanistan, our
    relations with Pakistan have hit in the view of most observers
    an all-time low. Have you assessed and looked at, in your
    previous role, the impact on our ability to supply the forces
    in Afghanistan if the Pakistanis cut off those supply routes
    across Pakistan?
        General Dempsey. Yes, Senator, we have.
        Senator McCain. What's been your conclusion?
        General Dempsey. The conclusion is that we would have to
    rely more on what we describe as the Northern Supply Route,
    which does exist, and that it would be more expensive.
        Senator McCain. Suppose tomorrow Pakistan cut it off, what
    would be the period of time between then and when you would be
    able to maintain the same level of supply through the northern
    routes or air resupply?
        General Dempsey. It would be a classified issue of how many
    days of supply we maintain inside the country. But beyond that,
    we believe that if that Southern Supply Route were cut off that
    we could react.
        Senator McCain. You could react. There would be a delay?
        General Dempsey. Yes, sir, but in a way that would not
    jeopardize the mission.
        Senator McCain. Would not jeopardize the mission.
        A group chartered by the Secretary of the Army to look into
    how the Army procures major weapons systems found that every
    year since 1996 the Army has spent more than $1 billion
    annually on programs that were ultimately cancelled. Since
    2004, $3.3 billion to $3.8 billion per year of Army
    developmental testing and evaluation funding has been lost to
    cancelled programs, including the now-cancelled Future Combat
    System program.
        As we know, the cost of the F-35 has lurched completely out
    of control. The few short months after the awarding of the
    contract to Boeing for the new tanker, it is now another
    additional billion dollars in cost, and the list goes on and
    on. What's the level of your concern and what do you think we
    ought to be doing about it?
        General Dempsey. Senator, as we discussed when I was here a
    few months ago, it would be impossible to sit here and justify
    the current process, given that it has not delivered the
    capabilities we've required within the resources available to
    do so. I think that we're in a point where we absolutely have
    to seek acquisition reform. I know that the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Acquisition is seeking that. I know we were helped
    by the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act. You know that the
    Department, based on that, is seeking the Better Buying Power
    Initiative. We're working toward it.
        Right now there's probably a reason to consider a different
    role for the Service Chiefs in acquisition. Right now it's kind
    of bifurcated. Service Chiefs do requirements, acquisition does
    material solution. That hasn't worked and I think it has to be
    revisited.
        I completely agree with your assessment of our current
    state. Nevertheless, we need capabilities. It will be my role,
    if confirmed, to argue for that fifth generation fighter, but a
    fifth generation fighter that the Nation can afford. Therefore,
    the way to that is through acquisition reform.
        Senator McCain. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Thank you, General.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General Dempsey, for your service to the Army
    and to the Nation. I have every confidence you're going to be a
    superb Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I'm going to
    recognize Deanie and your family. I think I properly pointed
    out to the chairman that, although you were high school
    sweethearts, you married after West Point. I just want to make
    sure of that because it's problematic otherwise.
        I also want to salute Admiral Mullen for his extraordinary
    service and join my colleagues in recognizing the extraordinary
    service of General John Shalikashvili. General Shalikashvili
    proudly said he was a citizen of only one country, the United
    States of America, despite where he was born and where he
    traveled. He was the consummate citizen soldier, and to his
    family my deepest sympathies.
        The issue that is before us, and it's been alluded to and
    talked about in your previous hearing for Chief of Staff of the
    Army, is the budget. With the sake of risking
    oversimplification, there's at least three major categories
    that you have to deal with: force structure, including pay and
    allowances, in this context the Reserve Forces and the retired
    forces and the National Guard, but particularly retirees;
    equipment, procurement, how much it costs, what do you need,
    can you suspend acquisitions; and finally, the issue of
    operations and training, where we're going to go in an
    operational sense and how are we going to train.
        With that as a very broad context, can you comment upon the
    approach you're going to take with respect to these issues and
    the budget you face?
        General Dempsey. Yes, Senator. I think the important point
    to make in the question of how to absorb reductions or debt
    total obligating authority is really to reinforce that it must
    touch each of the things you mentioned. We will not be able to
    change the size and the capability of the force--and I'll speak
    for the Army because I'm immersed in it now--unless we do so by
    touching each of those areas you talked about.
        For example, if we try to artificially preserve manpower we
    will suffer the consequences in modernization and in
    operations, maintenance, and training. Conversely, if we go
    after just manpower, it won't make any sense to have the kind
    of resources in operations, maintenance, and training.
        This really requires us to maintain balance as we make any
    changes that become necessary by virtue of budget support. I'll
    also say that includes pay, compensation, retirement, and
    health care, because it's important that we place everything on
    the table, assess the impact, and then request the time to do
    it in a deliberate fashion, so that we can maintain balance at
    whatever level we end up at.
        Senator Reed. When you address the issue of pay and
    allowances, retirement compensation, health care, there are two
    factors. One is the relationship between funding those programs
    and funding troops in the field, equipment in the field,
    etcetera. Do you propose to make that very explicit,
    particularly to the retirement community, that with the top
    line there's no longer the possibility of simply adding more
    money, that there has to be tradeoffs between operations,
    training, troops in the field, their safety, and some of the
    benefits that have accrued to retirees?
        General Dempsey. I think what I would say--yes. If I could,
    I'll just elaborate for a moment.
        Senator Reed. Yes, sir.
        General Dempsey. I think it's very important that we
    maintain an open dialogue with all parts of this total force,
    Active, Guard, Reserve, families, retirees, to help them
    understand the challenge. The challenge is simply this, and
    again I'm speaking just for the Army. Right now our manpower
    costs consume approximately 42 percent of our budget. Left
    unabated, that is to say left unaddressed, that will rise to
    approximately 47 or 48 percent by 2017. That is not
    sustainable.
        The question then comes back, what should we do about it
    and how can we do so in a way that maintains the trust we've
    established with our force over time. I'll say one other thing.
    What makes this budget discussion different--I'm a student of
    history, and I've studied the post-Vietnam period, I've studied
    the post-Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield period. What
    makes this period different is we're doing all this while we're
    still actively engaged in conflict and we have young men and
    women in harm's way. That adds a degree of complexity and a
    degree of uncertainty that I think we can't discount.
        Senator Reed. A final point with respect to this whole
    issue of how do you rebalance the personnel costs, etcetera. I
    presume your view would be to lead from the top, that senior
    officers and senior personnel would be the first ones to stand
    up and say: If it's going to have to happen, it'll happen with
    us. Is that fair?
        General Dempsey. Did you have to ask me that question in
    front of my wife, Senator? [Laughter.]
        But the short answer is: Absolutely. I think it's leading
    from the top individually, but I also think it's leading from
    the top at examining our structure, which tends to be rather
    top-heavy and in fact historically, again if you look through
    conflicts, headquarters grow in ways that have to be
    reconsidered and reformed after conflict.
        Senator Reed. Let me slightly change the subject, but I
    think it relates to what we've been saying, that we are on our
    way out of Afghanistan, as we are in Iraq. Going forward, you
    have to be prepared to successfully hand over significant
    activities to the Department of State, to the U.S. Agency for
    International Development, et cetera. Your success in
    transition is a function of the resources they must receive. My
    perception being here is that when the defense budget is
    reduced, the State Department budget is decimated.
        Do you, one, have those concerns; and two, consciously, if
    we are going to maintain a credible security force beyond 1 or
    2 years, we're going to have to internationally provide
    resources to Afghan national forces. Is that going to be one of
    your priorities? My only historic hook here is that Najibullah,
    the last Soviet-era leader, survived 2-plus years after the
    Soviets withdrew, but when the resources--and not just for the
    military, but for everything--dried up, his days were literally
    numbered.
        General Dempsey. Yes, sir. We certainly don't want to be
    guilty of reprising the epilogue of Charlie Wilson's War. I
    take your point completely. My job will be, given the strategic
    objectives in Afghanistan, to determine how best to meet them.
    If and when U.S. force structure reduces, what is it that
    compensates for that. Is it other agencies of government?
        The measure of national power is the aggregate of economic
    strength, diplomatic strength, and military strength. All three
    of those have to participate in these outcomes and all three of
    these have to be considered as we look at these reductions to
    make sure we stay in balance in that way as well.
        Senator Reed. Thank you for your service and thank you for
    your family's service. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General Dempsey, for your leadership and your
    commitment, your willingness to serve in harm's way. I notice
    just looking at your bio--I looked at it because I remember
    seeing you in Iraq and coming back and you were still there. I
    notice you were there the first tour 16 months, came home to
    Germany and were deployed there for 10 months, and back for 21
    months. That's the kind of deployment that a number of our
    military people have made serving their country in dangerous
    areas of the globe. I just want to personally thank you for
    your commitment, and I think it reflects the kind of commitment
    many other enlisted people, many other of our leaders in the
    military, have exhibited.
        Mrs. Dempsey, it's good to see you, and thank you for being
    a good partner in those difficult years.
        I just want to follow up on Senator McCain's comments about
    the budget. We've had a lot of people believe that the deficit
    is caused by the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. It certainly was
    not inexpensive. It's been an expensive process. Last year was
    one of our highest years, $158 billion committed to that
    effort. But our deficit--I say ``last year''; the year we're
    in, we're projected to spend $158 billion. It looks like our
    deficit this year will be $1,500 billion. A little more than 10
    percent only, if you eliminated the war, of our deficit would
    be eliminated. Over the period of time, that percentage has
    been fairly accurate about the cost of the war.
        I also am a bit troubled that some of the projections for
    our spending go from, next year we're projected to drop from
    $158 to $118 billion for the overseas contingency operations
    (OCO). Is that your understanding?
        General Dempsey. It is, Senator.
        Senator Sessions. I think is it the next year, 2013, that
    it's projected to go to just $50 billion?
        General Dempsey. I have seen that number, but I'm more
    confident in the $118 billion than I am in the follow-on years.
        Senator Sessions. It would be a dramatic drop to $50
    billion that quickly. I don't think that is likely to be
    achieved and I'm concerned about it. The President's budget
    projects $50 billion for the rest of the decade there for
    spending. I don't know if that's accurate or not.
        I would say that we can't let numbers like that drive the
    agenda. The agenda has to be if we can draw down our forces,
    good, let's do it in a strategic, smart way that does not put
    our soldiers or the goals they've put their lives at risk for
    in jeopardy just to meet that kind of goal. I hope and expect
    that you would advise us if you think that number is not
    acceptable. Would you?
        General Dempsey. I wonder, Senator, if I could--I mentioned
    earlier that I'm not a man of numbers necessarily or charts and
    wiring diagrams, but rather images. Could I ask my staff to
    pass out an image to you by way of answering your question, if
    I could?
        [The information referred to follows:]

        General Dempsey. While the staff is handing this image out,
    one of the things we've said consistently, my predecessor and
    his predecessor as Chief of Staff of the Army, is that when
    this conflict ends, however we define ``ends'', it'll take 2
    years for us to reset the force because of the stress and
    strain on equipment and people. It'll take us 2 years to reset,
    and that reset should be in my judgment funded by OCO and
    therefore it will be my responsibility, on behalf of all the
    Services, to define what will it take to reset the force once
    we have the opportunity to do so.
        If I could just ask you to glance at the picture. I've done
    a lot of thinking about what is it that will get us through,
    has gotten us through this last 10 years, because frankly if
    someone had suggested to me 10 years ago that we would be able
    to fight a war for 10 years with an All-Volunteer Force, I
    honestly would have been skeptical about it. We have gotten
    through that, and not only have gotten through it, but we've
    actually flourished. The force is extraordinarily healthy.
        Whatever we do, it's important to remember we're doing it
    from a foundation of great strength. It is truly the finest
    military force we've ever had, all components.
        The reason I like that picture--my sergeant major, by the
    way, doesn't like it because the soldier's not wearing his eye
    protection and he has his sleeves rolled up. But I asked him to
    get beyond that for a moment, because that picture speaks to
    me, that image speaks to me, on the issue of trust.
        It's trust because, as you see, there's a soldier
    protecting that soldier's flank. He's wearing a wedding band,
    so it reminds us that they're married and they trust that we'll
    take care of their families both now and into the future.
        Here's the point. He's on the radio and he's calling for
    something, and we don't know what it is. It could be a medevac,
    it could be close air support, it could be artillery. It's
    likely to be another Service that delivers it. But here's the
    profound point not to forget: What makes us unique is that
    noncommissioned officer (NCO) believes he's going to get what
    he asks for. We are the only army on the face of the Earth that
    believes that when you ask for something because you need it to
    prevail in the environment we place you, you're actually going
    to get it.
        As we do whatever we have to do with this force based on
    the resources, the one thing we cannot lose is that
    relationship of trust that exists, that what that soldier,
    airman, sailor, marine, or coast guardsman needs to do the
    things we ask him to do, they have to have it. That's what
    carries us through.
        In answer to your question about budget numbers, I don't
    know. But what I do know is that I will not allow that
    relationship of trust to be violated.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you. I think this is a very
    critical point, that we have the finest military the world's
    ever assembled. They are courageous. They put their lives on
    the line. They've lost their lives in significant numbers and
    been injured significantly. But they do have to be confident
    the people of this country are behind them, and sometimes that
    means money, dollars, that get them the things that they need.
    I appreciate your comments on that.
        General Dempsey, on a specific matter, I notice in your
    answers to the advance policy questions you note that you
    supported the decision to retain three brigade combat teams in
    Europe and this is the answer--I'm sure staff helped you put it
    together, since I notice you have a master's in English at
    Duke, typical of our high quality and highly educated officer
    corps. But it says: `` . . . to meet a wide array of
    engagement, building partner capacity, and interoperability
    objectives while being prepared to support a full range of
    military operations needed for plausible European and global
    contingencies.''
        I'm not sure what that means, but I don't think we need
    three brigades to do it there. The plan was to bring it to two.
    I understand we're talking about a new hospital for Lanstuhl,
    which if, we pray, we're successful in drawing down, maybe that
    can be scaled down. But that's the kind of things I think we
    need to ask about when our allies are spending about 1.2
    percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, 1.3, only a
    few of our NATO allies are meeting the goal or coming close to
    the goal of 2 percent, while we're over 4 percent of GDP on
    defense. I think we have to ask ourselves, can we continue to
    maintain that kind of forward deployment of brigades when we
    were supposed to be reducing to two?
        My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
        I know you've given that answer that you support the three,
    but I'd like you to say that you will at least reconsider that
    in the months to come.
        General Dempsey. First of all, Senator, I apologize for the
    run-on sentence. That one got past me, apparently.
        But I will say I am an advocate of forward presence--I want
    to be clear about that--for all the things it does for us, not
    just for our allies. Second, I am a strong advocate of
    maintaining a strong relationship with our current allies,
    because they've been tried and true. I know that we sometimes
    look at, compare an individual NATO country to us, but the
    reality is that in the aggregate they commit about $300 billion
    a year to defense in the aggregate, and they are serving very
    bravely and courageously with us in Afghanistan. Notably, I was
    at a ceremony at the French embassy last night where the French
    presented five of their equivalent of Silver Stars to our
    soldiers who had served alongside of them in Kapisa Province,
    and the French were very proud to note that they have a French
    battalion under our command without caveat in Afghanistan.
        I think we should not, in the midst of our current budget
    challenges, undervalue our relationships overseas. Now, that
    said, the comment about whether it's two or three brigades in
    Europe was made when we were shooting for $178 billion in
    reductions, not $400 billion. I would restate my earlier
    message in discussion with Senator Reed: Everything is back on
    the table.
        Senator Sessions. I would agree. Secretary Gates noted that
    our allies, with exasperation--he's urged them to do better and
    share better, and been disappointed that they have not.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        Senator Webb.
        Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, I apologize for having had to step out for a few
    minutes, and I missed your exchange with Senator Reed and the
    beginning of your exchange with Senator Sessions. I hope these
    questions aren't redundant to those.
        First of all, we are going to be entering into a period of
    reformulation of our national strategy and our posture around
    the world in many cases with the wind-downs in Iraq and
    eventually in Afghanistan. I've not seen anything on your views
    with respect to sea power as an instrument of national
    strategy, not simply in terms of supporting ongoing ground
    operations, which was one of your comments earlier about
    visiting the USS Lincoln, but actually in its historical role
    as a direct instrument of deterrence on a larger scale.
        General Dempsey. Sir, both because of my time in the joint
    world and now as a member of the Joint Chiefs, I am enormously
    proud of our Navy and cognizant of and respectful of its role.
    I think that one of the questions we have to ask ourselves in
    this strategic review is where are the new power centers across
    the globe? The Navy has a traditional role in protecting the
    global commons with respect to, obviously, the maritime domain,
    as the Air Force does in the aviation domain.
        I would say that my views on sea power are about the same
    as they are on land power, and that is that we should never get
    to the point where we have to choose between a particular
    domain and another. We should be increasingly interdependent.
        I am concerned, by the way, about the Navy shipbuilding
    program and the fact that we're sitting at 280 ships with a
    suppressed demand for 313, and some of the acquisition problems
    we've had are making it more difficult to get there.
        I'm a big fan of the Navy, with one important exception,
    and that is on that Saturday in November when we play the Army-
    Navy football game.
        Senator Webb. Having gone from the Naval Academy into the
    Marine Corps, I don't watch that game very often. [Laughter.]
        But it does seem to me that we are at the end of another
    inevitable historical cycle here, when we have these extended
    ground combat deployments that expand the size of the Active
    Duty Army and of the Marine Corps, at the expense very often of
    what I would call national strategic assets, like our
    operational Navy.
        I think I'm hearing from you the same thing I heard from
    Secretary Panetta, that the 313-ship goal for the Navy is a
    reasonable goal. Would that be correct?
        General Dempsey. My engagements with Gary Roughead over the
    past 3 months suggest to me that it is. But again, I think we
    had a conversation a bit earlier about how do we keep strategy
    apace with resource decisions. That comprehensive strategy
    review that we're doing should, it seems to me, either
    reinforce that or cause us to think differently about it.
        One of the things I think will happen is, to the question
    of whether we can absorb $400 billion, I don't know the answer
    to that as I sit here today. I don't know for the Army and I
    certainly don't know for the joint force. But as we look at it,
    we will reach a point where we have to make a determination,
    can we execute the strategy we have today, which is what the
    313-ship shipbuilding program is built to? Can we continue to
    execute that strategy or do we have to change our strategy?
    That's the kind of questions and the answers to those questions
    that we owe you as a member of this committee.
        Senator Webb. I would hope that part of the reexamination
    of the strategy is a realization that the model that we put in
    place in Afghanistan is not going to be the model of the
    future. It's enormously costly, in more ways than show up in
    the direct DOD budget.
        One of the concerns that I've had since I've been here in
    the Senate is with what I can only call a deterioration of the
    management aspects in the Pentagon. I hope you will really take
    a look at that, items such as data collection that's necessary
    to have debates on different issues. I could give you a whole
    string, as someone who worked over there as a manpower person
    and was used to some fast turnarounds when data was requested,
    where this wasn't. It took us a year to get attrition data from
    the Services that were necessary to analyze what percentage of
    the military actually left the military on or before the end of
    their first enlistment, which was vitally important in the way
    that I was trying to advance the GI Bill as a readjustment
    benefit, which it had been traditionally.
        I just held a hearing as chairman of the Personnel
    Subcommittee and part of it was asking for courtmartial and
    discharge data, and the Army was not able to tell me with a
    week's notice how many honorable, general, and other than
    honorable discharges it had issued over the past year. The
    other data kind of fluctuated day to day.
        This is the kind of stuff that when I was a committee
    counsel up here a few years ago you could literally get in 24
    hours. I hope you will get on top of it. I think it's a
    management issue. I don't think people are so busy that they
    can't keep that kind of data, and certainly the size of the
    military and the retention rate--the size of the military is
    lower. The retention rates are higher. It shouldn't be
    difficult data to keep.
        One of the pieces of data that jumped out at me goes to the
    number of general/flag officers Service by Service. I used this
    as a starting point when we were looking at an issue of whether
    the Air Force should be able to keep seven--I believe it's
    seven--six flag officers as Judge Advocates General (JAGs).
    I'll give these numbers really quickly. The Army has 569,400
    people on Active Duty as of this week, the Navy 328,000, the
    Marine Corps 202,000, the Air Force 332,000. Do you find it
    curious that the Air Force has more four-star generals than any
    of the other Services?
        General Dempsey. I'm not sure how to answer that question,
    Senator.
        Senator Webb. Let me give you a couple more data points.
        General Dempsey. It does surprise me. I've never looked.
        Senator Webb. The Air Force has 332,000. This isn't a knock
    on the Air Force. I see your assistant is getting a little
    nervous over there. But it's a question of how you properly
    manage the force.
        The Air Force has more brigadier generals than any of the
    other Services, by far. They have the same number of three-
    stars. They have almost the same number of two-stars as the
    Army and more than the Navy and the Marine Corps combined. As I
    said, this is not a hit on the Air Force. It's just a question
    of how do you come up with this?
        General Dempsey. Your point's a good one, Senator. By the
    way, the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Gates, did take a look
    at general officer strength and required each Service--I think
    our number for the Army was we had to eliminate nine general
    officer billets. That's not the last state of that.
        Not by way of justifying it, I'll tell you how some of this
    has grown up. You've talked about Iraq and Afghanistan--when we
    build up new headquarters, they tend to be magnets for flag
    officers to run particular capabilities and functions within
    those headquarters.
        But if you're suggesting we should see ourselves and
    determine if we have our ratios right, I take the point.
        Senator Webb. I absolutely think you should, because the
    other piece of it is when force structure is reduced it's very
    hard to give up flag commands or flag billets. I would really
    hope you take a look at it.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Webb.
        Senator Wicker.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
        I appreciate your service, General Dempsey, and look
    forward to working with you.
        One of Secretary Gates' final actions as Secretary before
    his retirement was a very important speech before NATO about
    NATO's future back in June. I want to point out some of the
    most important facts that he mentioned and ask you to respond
    to that, if you will. For one thing, he worried openly about
    NATO turning into a two-tiered alliance, where some members are
    willing to do the soft tasks and others the hard combat
    missions.
        He also said there is a very real possibility of collective
    military irrelevance and in light of this member nations must
    examine new approaches to boosting combat capabilities. He went
    on to point out that now, 2 decades after the fall of the
    Berlin Wall, the United States' share of NATO defense spending
    has now risen to more than 75 percent.
        Then he concluded with this very key point, and I will
    quote him directly: ``Indeed, if current trends in the decline
    of European defense capabilities are not halted or reversed,
    future U.S. political leaders, those for whom the Cold War was
    not the formative experience that it was for me, may not
    consider the return on America's investment in NATO worth the
    cost.''
        Now, it's often valuable for someone to be able to speak
    very frankly toward the end of a career, and I think Secretary
    Gates did just that. You're about to embark on a new aspect of
    your career, in which perhaps you have to be a little more
    diplomatic and more careful. But I would appreciate your
    responding to the points that Secretary Gates made.
        I wonder if you have any new ideas about reversing this
    continued trend and if you have any suggestions to this
    committee or this Congress as to what we might do to reverse
    this trend?
        General Dempsey. I'll take your caution about trying to
    figure out whether I'm at the beginning of the next 4 years or
    the end of my career.
        Senator Wicker. I'm assuming you're about to embark on a
    very important part of your career.
        General Dempsey. What you can count on, Senator, is that
    I'll answer and let the chips fall where they fall in that
    regard.
        I think that we have some competing narratives that we
    should acknowledge. On the one hand, we have a narrative that
    says we have to, based on the reality of a new fiscal
    environment, we have to do less and therefore rely on allies to
    do more. That is one narrative and we have to acknowledge it.
        Then we have the other narrative that you just described,
    which is they're not doing enough to sustain what they're doing
    now. The question is, as we go forward in determining whatever
    adaptations we make to our strategies, we have to do it in a
    way that doesn't paper over potential problems.
        One of the problems we could paper over is what can our
    allies provide. Now, in terms of new ideas, we've talked about
    ourselves as a joint force of being interdependent for years.
    How do we rely on each other and eliminate redundancies? This
    budget reality is going to cause us to look at that again, and
    I think it should cause us to look again at that issue vis-a-
    vis our allies. It may be that we would enter into a discourse
    with our allies about capabilities that they provide that we
    may not provide, and in so doing we actually may have to become
    dependent on them for that.
        Now, I'm not advocating that. I am not even advancing it
    yet. But it may be that if there's a new idea out there in a
    new fiscal environment, it may be something to do with
    establishing an interdependent relationship with close allies.
    Is there risk there? Absolutely. Is there potential opportunity
    there? I think so. But in answer to your question, I think
    that's where we find ourselves today.
        Senator Wicker. Let's take that down, then, to the specific
    instance of Libya and the frustration that many of us felt in
    coming to a consensus over there. Do we risk our adversaries or
    our competitors finding ways to place the interests of NATO
    member countries against each other in arriving at consensus,
    and what observations would you draw from your general
    statement down to the specific situation that we're in right
    now with Libya?
        General Dempsey. I think you've touched on it, Senator. As
    a consensus organization, it is far more difficult to find end
    states that are acceptable and achievable to all members.
    That's the nature of an organization of that size that's built
    on consensus.
        On the other hand, when you can achieve consensus with an
    organization like NATO, it's pretty powerful and pretty
    compelling and pretty persuasive. I think as we go forward, as
    I mentioned, we have to be clear-eyed about not making
    assumptions that could from their very inception be proven
    inaccurate. I think it's going to require a different kind of
    transparency.
        Senator Wicker. I wish you very much success in that
    regard, and I hope if you have further suggestions for this
    Congress you will work with us on that, because I share
    Secretary Gates' concern and I don't know when the tipping
    point might be. But we do have budget concerns in this country
    and we're bumping up against them within a week. For the United
    States to expend 75 percent of the combat funds seems to me a
    situation that has to change.
        Let me ask you a very specific question about the culture
    that Services nurture among our young officers and NCOs with
    regard to foreign language study and programs that enhance
    global awareness. Do you have any ideas about how we might do a
    better job of incentivizing activities across the Services? My
    son happens to be a second lieutenant in the U.S. Air Force
    with a Mandarin language proficiency. Do you think we're using
    the universities and the great resources of our country enough,
    or is there a different way that we can be achieving a larger
    cultural awareness and language proficiency across the
    Services?
        General Dempsey. I absolutely do, Senator. I think to the
    extent we can develop our young leaders to have the kind of
    global awareness, even if it is manifested in particular
    regional expertise, whether it's Asia or wherever, I think we
    will do two things: One, we will make ourselves far better
    prepared for an uncertain future. We found ourselves short in
    cultural awareness and language capability in Iraq and
    Afghanistan for a very long time. I think that as we now have
    the time to commit to the kind of things you're talking about,
    we should. That is absolutely, I would describe it as one of
    the adaptations we need to make to our leader development
    programs.
        The other thing we'll do in so doing is we'll keep these
    kids interested. They want to know what it is we need them to
    do, and it's not just about turning wrenches or providing
    lethal effects. They want to know that they are developing,
    that they are growing, and that development and growth is
    valued inside the Service.
        The last point I'll make is I think we're going to be able
    to do exactly what you say. The reason we haven't in the last
    10 years is we've been meeting ourselves coming and going.
    We've been extraordinarily busy and so we haven't taken the
    time necessary, in particular in expertise outside of Iraq and
    Afghanistan.
        Second, our promotion boards, for example, in wartime
    always tend to value most the current fight. I can only speak
    for the Army, but if you look at our promotion boards they have
    tended to reward time in the saddle in Iraq and Afghanistan
    disproportionate to potentially what we need for the deeper
    future. My commitment to you is that, if confirmed, I will be
    not only the Chairman, but I will believe myself to be the
    steward of our profession, that is the profession of arms, for
    all Services and look dutifully and carefully at how we're
    developing our leaders for the future.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, sir. Tell us what you need and
    we'll try to provide it for you.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker.
        Senator Udall.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good morning, General. Good morning, Deanie. It's been a
    treat to get to know the two of you in this process and
    discover your connections to Colorado and your love of our
    wonderful State, the Centennial State, and I look very much
    forward to working with you when you're confirmed.
        If I might, let me pick up on Senator Wicker's line of
    questioning and discussion, General. I had a chance to ride in
    yesterday from the airport with former Senator Hart, who's well
    known for his strategic thinking along with a lot of other
    retired Senators in both parties, and of course retired
    military officers.
        What have you learned about the last 10 years? What do you
    think are the most important lessons that stare us in the face
    and some that aren't so obvious, because it is easy to fight
    the last war, and yet the world is undergoing enormous change
    from the Middle East to the events we see in China, and on and
    on.
        If you'd share for a couple minutes your thoughts on some
    of the lessons.
        General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator. Again, these are very
    personal lessons, not to be interpreted as criticism of
    predecessors or anything else, because, by the way, in some
    cases I was the one who fumbled a ball here or there. I think
    that one of the lessons of the last 10 years of war ought to be
    that we can't look at issues through a soda straw, in
    isolation. They don't exist that way.
        Looking back on it, at least my own personal view about
    Iraq in 2003 was that Iraq had a particular problem and it was
    a regime that was destabilizing the region and that we should
    take action. It was my recommendation that we should take
    action to change the dynamic inside of Iraq and that the region
    itself would become more stable. I'm not sure it turned out
    that way. Probably it is, but it didn't happen exactly as we
    intended it, and that's because I don't think we understood--
    let me put it differently.
        I didn't understand the dynamic inside that country,
    particularly with regard to the various sects of Islam that
    fundamentally on occasion compete with each other for dominance
    in Islam, so the Shia sect of Islam, the Sunni sect of Islam.
    When we took the lid off of that, I think we learned some
    things and I'm not sure we could have learned them any other
    way. I don't know. I've reflected about that a lot.
        But I learned that issues don't exist in isolation. They're
    always complex. I've been scarred by rereading a quote from
    Einstein, who said: ``If you have an hour to save the world,
    spend 55 minutes of it understanding the problem and 5 minutes
    of it trying to solve it.'' I think sometimes, in particular as
    a military culture, we don't have that ratio right. We tend to
    spend 55 minutes trying to solve the problem and 5 minutes
    understanding it. That's one of the big lessons for me in
    developing leaders for the future, not only in the Army, but,
    if confirmed, in the joint force.
        Another one is the degree to which military operations in
    particular, but probably all of them, have been decentralized.
    You'll hear it called various things: decentralized,
    distributed operations, empowering the edge. Whatever we call
    it, we have pushed enormous capability, responsibility, and
    authority to the edge, to captains and sergeants of all the
    Services. Yet our leader development paradigms really haven't
    changed very much. They are beginning to change.
        But I think that second lesson, on the enormous
    responsibility that we put on our subordinates' shoulders, has
    to be followed with a change in the way we prepare them to
    accept that responsibility. I think those would be the two big
    lessons for me.
        Senator Udall. Thank you for sharing those, and I look
    forward to hearing more of your insights. You're right, we ask
    particularly personnel on the front lines now to be educators,
    be diplomats, be aware of civil affairs, cultural, and
    historical trends, and on and on and on and on. Every single
    soldier, marine, airman, and sailor presents the face of
    America. I look forward to working with you on what I see as an
    opportunity.
        Let me turn to a related distributed concept, which is in
    energy. It's a real interest of mine. I think increasingly the
    committee is spending more time looking at how we use energy
    more effectively. We know that saving energy saves lives, as
    Admiral Mullen has put it so well. We know that a good quarter
    of our casualties have been tied to fuel convoys and other
    kinds of convoys.
        How do we help you develop a strategy where we have more
    fight with less fuel? Please share your thoughts on energy with
    the committee.
        General Dempsey. First of all, I agree with you, Senator.
    Again, I'm at a bit of a disadvantage in this regard, speaking
    just about the Army now, but that's what I've been working. We
    have some energy goals that both DOD have established, but that
    we've established for ourselves as well. In the two broad areas
    of institutional energy--that's how we manage our posts, camps,
    and stations--we have six, maybe more, prototype installations
    that we want to achieve a net zero energy status. One of them
    happens to be in your State. We're moving along to try to see
    how we can improve our standing vis-a-vis institutional energy.
        The other one is operational energy. That's really the one
    you're speaking to most clearly with how do we keep soldiers
    off the road in supply convoys because we've become more energy
    efficient. Every one of our recent acquisitions and certainly
    every one going forward for vehicles or other equipment that
    have an energy demand are always done with a key systems
    attribute, is the term, related to energy. The Ground Combat
    Vehicle has an energy target for its design.
        But that's sort of the upper end of it. The lower end of it
    is batteries. I'll give you one vignette that might fascinate
    you. In pushing responsibility to the edge, we've pushed all
    kinds of emitters--I'll just call them ``emitters'', but it
    could be a Blue Force Tracker, it could be a data collector, it
    could be a full-streaming video, it could be a set of optics, a
    night vision device, whatever it is. But they all have a power
    demand.
        In so doing, we see the benefit to the soldier and it makes
    him more capable, but we often don't see what it does in the
    aggregate to their ability to carry the batteries. An infantry
    platoon today for a 72-hour mission has to carry 400 pounds of
    batteries. Now, what they do, of course, is they don't carry
    them. You can follow them in some cases like breadcrumbs
    through the Hindu Kush.
        We have to get better at that and figure out what is the
    energy requirement, how do you deliver it at a lighter load, in
    a more efficient manner, so that the soldier both becomes more
    capable and we don't overburden him. I can just assure you we
    are actively pursuing this, and I think it has implications
    across the joint force as well.
        Senator Udall. I agree. When we find some of these
    breakthrough applications for batteries, there will also be
    utility in the civilian sector as well. I forecast that the
    military will lead us more broadly to more energy self-
    reliance.
        I'll end on this note. My time's expired. I think you're
    well aware of the couple of Marine Corps ex-forward operating
    bases that are now being utilized, and in the end they're
    actually creating an environment that is much more than
    experimental. Those environments, I'm learning, are more
    secure. They have a smaller footprint noise-wise, light-wise,
    energy-wise, and therefore the mission is more easily
    performed.
        I look forward to working with you on this.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
        Senator Brown.
        Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Sir, we've already met and discussed a lot in private. I
    have just a few follow-up questions. Senator Ayotte and I
    actually plan to have a bill and are deeply concerned about the
    evidence that taxpayer money that was intended to be used for a
    transportation contract has in fact ended up in the hands of
    the Taliban, and we want it to stop. Not only are we trying to
    fund our own needs; I guess we're funding the Taliban's needs,
    too.
        I was wondering if you could comment on that and what your
    thoughts are about lowering the risk involved with our reliance
    on contractor support and the money trail that goes along with
    it.
        General Dempsey. Yes, thanks, Senator. I saw the same
    report in the media. I haven't yet had time to get the GAO
    report and understand the details. But I'll tell you, I share
    that concern completely. In fact, in Iraq when serving as the
    Commander of Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq,
    now called NATO Training Mission Iraq, and having approximately
    $5 billion a year to build the Iraqi Security Forces, it was
    among my gravest concerns.
        I had a concern about building them. I had a concern about
    enabling them and integrating them with our forces. But there
    wasn't a day went by that I didn't worry about where the money
    was going, because it's a very opaque culture in which we deal
    in Iraq and Afghanistan.
        Now, what we've done. We've increased the number of
    contractors enormously. We've formed Contracting Command.
    Again, I'm speaking for the Army, but I know the other Services
    are doing this as well. In our captains' career courses,
    they're taught contract oversight.
        I probably should have mentioned, in response to the former
    question, what are one of the big lessons of the last 10 years
    of war? One of the big lessons of the last 10 years of war is
    that when we apply these kind of resources we have to have the
    right kind of contract oversight.
        I hope what I find in the GAO report is that it's a lagging
    indicator, in other words that it might be a couple of years
    ago, before we took the measures I just mentioned. But I don't
    know. I share your concern about it.
        Senator Brown. Thank you, sir.
        Also, I want to just touch upon and follow up with Senator
    McCain and others: $100 billion was the initial, now it's $400
    billion, $800 billion; I'm hearing $1 trillion. As someone
    who's still serving, I see in the Guard and Reserves a certain
    amount of things we could probably do better and more
    efficiently. But I'm deeply concerned that hasty, across-the-
    board cuts will dramatically affect the safety and security of
    the men and women serving.
        I would echo Senator McCain's general premise, in that
    whatever you're planning on doing or whatever recommendations
    you're considering making, I know we're trying to reach a
    number, but when it comes to the safety and security of our men
    and women I don't think I can put a number on that. I think we
    need to, if we're going to commit to these wars and we're going
    to commit our men and women to do it, we have to give them the
    assets to do just that.
        Not really a question, but my hope is if you're running
    into roadblocks or you need to adjust and adapt, then please
    come back to the committee so we can work with you in trying to
    do it differently and shift maybe the burden to other areas of
    the government before we start jeopardizing the safety and
    security of our men and women.
        That being said, I am in the Guard and I do know that the
    Guard and Reserves perform a function at a fraction of the cost
    of the money used for the Active Army and all other Services.
    We're somewhat leveraging the skills and experience of our
    citizen-soldiers and airmen. What's your plan? Is there a plan,
    in order to save money, to potentially shift and expand Guard
    and Reserve opportunities, or is that in the bailiwick or what?
        General Dempsey. Senator, we are closer to our Reserve
    component--that's both the National Guard and the U.S. Army
    Reserve. I'm speaking for the Army, but I'm sure that General
    Schwartz would echo this. We're closer to the Guard and Reserve
    than we've ever been. The question now becomes, as the demand
    goes down and as potential resource constraints collapse around
    us, how do we maintain that relationship, how do we articulate
    what capabilities have to be available in the Active component,
    which capabilities have to be available in the Guard and
    Reserve?
        One of the things I mentioned in the response to the
    advance policy questions, was I think there is an opportunity
    here to reconsider and adapt our relationship with the Guard
    and Reserve, so that as we become smaller, which seems to me to
    be inevitable at any one of the numbers you mentioned. It's not
    just taking the existing structures and the existing
    relationships and shrinking them, but rather adapting them to
    actually give the Nation options, because that's ultimately our
    responsibility, is to provide options for the Nation in meeting
    its security needs.
        My commitment to you is that the issue of the future
    relationship of Active, Guard, and Reserve will be at the
    forefront of any decisions we make in responding to these
    budget issues.
        Senator Brown. I would also ask, if the goalposts used to
    measure our national objectives in Afghanistan change, which
    they apparently are, and if you need a new set of requirements
    based on those changes before the end of the summer, I'm
    hopeful you'll let us know, so we can help in that regard, as
    Senator Wicker pointed out, too. Let us know what the needs
    are.
        Finally, I have noticed, being on the Veterans Affairs
    Committee as well, that many of the soldiers that are coming
    home--and the unemployment rate amongst military folks, Guard
    and Reserve in particular, is dramatically higher. Even though
    many of them have higher technical expertise, leadership
    skills, and military experience, they feel they're ultimately
    disqualified for lack of civilian equivalent certificates.
        I hear it over and over again. I'm wondering if there's a
    system or if there's something that you will be able to do that
    will help members translate their military-specific skills and
    vocational experience and expertise to the civilian sector?
    Nothing for today, but just something to think about, if
    there's a way we can have someone reach out and work that
    through, because when you look, the State of Israel does it.
    Employers actually seek out those folks because they have a
    higher work ethic, many times they're more experienced. Yet
    here, especially because of the fear of redeployment, there's
    an artificial wall, I feel, sometimes. Just a thought, and I
    wish you well, General.
        Thank you.
        General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator. One of your colleagues
    is helping us with some legislation that might help with that,
    in regard of transition for veterans. Some of the reason that
    we're having this problem is that we haven't paid as much
    attention as we need to our Army again, career and alumni
    program.
        Senator Brown. You can talk about the Army all you want.
    [Laughter.]
        General Dempsey. But anyway, we're alert to the challenge,
    working both internal to the Army as well as with this
    committee to try to determine how we can do a better job.
        Senator Brown. Thank you, sir. Good luck.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Brown.
        Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks, General Dempsey. Just having the opportunity to sit
    here and listen to you, you've been really impressive today.
    We're lucky to have you in the service of our country. I think
    you are a student of history. You know the details of reality
    that the military faces, and when you don't you're honest
    enough to say you don't. I'm very grateful that the President
    has nominated you and I'll be proud to vote to confirm you, I
    suppose unless you say something from here to the end of the
    hearing that I think is over the edge. But I doubt that.
        This is a very moving picture and you used it to tell a
    powerful story of trust, the trust of his family back home,
    trust of the others in his unit, and the trust that he has when
    he calls somebody is going to be there.
        I was thinking, as I lead into the first topic I wanted to
    talk about, there's another element and it wouldn't be called
    trust, it's the certainty, a different kind of certainty, which
    is the certainty that those who wish us ill, our enemies, have
    that if they cross lines that we will respond, that they won't
    get away with it. That's not trust, but it's a certainty that
    we're credible.
        In that regard, I was really struck by your response to one
    of the advance policy questions submitted by the committee, in
    which you spoke about the threat posed to the United States by
    Iran, and you said, ``With its nuclear activities and its
    surrogate activities in southern Iraq, there is a high
    potential that Iran will make a serious miscalculation of U.S.
    resolve.''
        I totally agree with you and I do think in the case of
    southern Iraq, where the Iranians have been training and
    equipping Shia extremists, who then go back and have been
    responsible for the deaths of a lot of Americans, that they
    have been making a miscalculation. In some sense it's been
    based, unfortunately, on the fact that they haven't paid a
    meaningful price up until now for doing the things that they've
    done that have been so harmful to so many Americans in uniform.
        I wanted to say, one, I appreciated the statement. Two, I
    wanted to ask you to elaborate on what you meant when you said
    that there was a high potential that Iran will make a serious
    miscalculation of U.S. resolve.
        General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator. Again, I've been out
    of Iraq for about 4 years now. But that doesn't mean I've lost
    touch with it or the leaders with whom I have remained engaged.
    It's their observation, in some cases supported by
    intelligence, but it's their observation that Iran's activities
    in southern Iraq are intended to produce some kind of Beirut-
    like moment and in so doing to send a message that they have
    expelled us from Iraq.
        What I wanted to make clear in my response, and as well
    today, is that, while we have soldiers in southern Iraq--and,
    my view is that when you put the U.S. military, whatever
    Service you place, but you place them someplace, it is the
    clearest signal of national resolve we have.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Dempsey. As long as we have those soldiers there,
    we're going to do whatever we have to do to protect them, and I
    want to make sure that's clear to everyone.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate it. I agree with you. It
    follows on some pretty strong statements made in the last
    couple of weeks by Admiral Mullen and Secretary Panetta about
    the risk that Iran is taking by this behavior in supporting the
    Shias who are going back into southern Iraq and killing our
    people. Obviously, it's important once the people at the top of
    our military, like the three of you, say that, that Iran takes
    it seriously or suffers consequences.
        I thank you for that, and I know you're a serious man and I
    know your word is credible. I hope the Iranians understand
    that.
        I wanted to spend just a few minutes on the budget
    questions. I thought you said something, if I heard it right
    earlier, that was really interesting and important for all of
    us to think about. Obviously, we're facing a big budget crunch
    and everybody is being asked to contribute to helping the
    country get back into balance. As far as the military is
    concerned, this is not like the period at the end of the Cold
    War, because we are actually still involved in combat in Iraq
    and Afghanistan, where we're drawing down our troops. But the
    larger war with the Islamist extremists who attacked us on
    September 11 goes on on many different fronts in the world.
        I wanted to make sure that I caught you right, that's what
    you were intending to say, that this is a tough time to cut the
    military budget drastically because we are at war.
        General Dempsey. That is my professional judgment, Senator.
    If I could reflect my own anxieties with you; can I share my
    anxieties with you for just a moment?
        Senator Lieberman. Yes, just lay down on the couch.
    [Laughter.]
        General Dempsey. This is a three-legged stool. On the one
    hand, it is the responsibility of the military to provide the
    Nation options, and that means we have to have capabilities of
    a certain size, of a certain quality, and in a certain quantity
    because of the rotational requirement to sustain our effort.
    That's one leg of the stool, if you'll permit me.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Dempsey. The other leg of the stool, though, is we
    demonstrate that we are sensitive to the challenges of the
    broader Nation. We're all citizens as well as soldiers.
        Senator Lieberman. Right.
        General Dempsey. If we don't show that we recognize that
    the Nation has a significant economic problem and then do our
    part, whatever that part may be, to help solve it, we will be
    seen as simply putting up barriers and defending ourselves
    against what Eisenhower famously called the military-industrial
    complex. That's the second leg of the stool.
        The third leg of the stool is we have an All-Volunteer
    Force with whom we must keep faith. It is that element of trust
    that I described earlier that will keep that All-Volunteer
    Force in the fight, inspired, in the service of their country
    over time.
        As we go forward, kind of the way I will assess how much of
    a budget reduction we can absorb will be on the basis of that:
    How much capability does it provide? Are we contributing
    something, so that we remain connected to America? Can we
    preserve the All-Volunteer Force? On that basis, I think we'll
    be able to make a pretty clear determination.
        Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that. That's a very
    balanced answer and I think you have your anxieties well in
    control and I would certify to your mental health.
        Thanks very much, General. Good luck.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman.
        Senator Ayotte.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I very much want to thank you, General Dempsey and Deanie,
    for your service, and appreciate your coming before the
    committee today.
        I wanted to echo on the question that Senator Brown had
    asked you about the Guard and Reserve and the role of the Guard
    and Reserve. I notice from your written comments you
    acknowledge what I think we all have seen has been the case,
    that really we haven't used the Reserve as a Strategic Reserve
    in these conflicts; we used them as an operational force.
        There was a need to do it, but there's also been some need
    to cost-effectively use the Guard. As we go forward in this
    difficult fiscal climate, how do you anticipate preserving that
    readiness that we have as a result of having the Guard and
    Reserve acting as an operational force, and how do you
    anticipate working with the Guard and Reserve to seek their
    feedback as you make some of these difficult choices going
    forward?
        General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator.
        We are working very closely with the Guard and Reserve. If
    there's something we're withholding from them, it's not
    apparent to me, because I've said that it's back to this
    relationship of trust. It also exists in our Army. It has to
    exist, and the other Services as well with their Reserve
    components.
        I would like to just elaborate a bit on what you said about
    the cost-effectiveness, because there is a certain cost-
    effectiveness to the Guard and Reserve, but truthfully that's
    not why we have them. We've had them for centuries, but after
    Vietnam, General Creighton Abrams made the conscious decision
    that we would never allow ourselves to go to war again without
    the Reserves. He did that because he recognized that as we
    transitioned to an All-Volunteer Force the Guard and Reserve
    are an extraordinarily important part of our ability to stay
    connected with America.
        As we sit here today, the choice before us is not will we
    have the participation of the Guard and Reserve. The reality
    is, Senator, we cannot go anyplace, cannot, without the Guard
    and Reserve. We've built our structures that way. Two-thirds of
    our combat power is in the Active component, a third in the
    Guard. But two-thirds of our sustainment capability is in the
    Guard and Reserve and only a third of it in the Active
    component.
        We built our Army consciously that way so that we would
    never again go to war without America. As we go forward with
    these budget issues, it's not about are we going to make a
    stark decision to favor one component over the other. We have
    to find a way to balance them.
        Senator Ayotte. That would include, obviously, readiness
    across the Active Duty as well as the Guard and Reserve, as the
    holistic view of our readiness in the future.
        General Dempsey. Yes, Senator. Again, to be completely
    transparent here, we have built some expectations on the back
    of OCO, for example, on the level of readiness we can have in
    all components. We've never had, really never had an army any
    component, Active included, that was 100 percent ready to go
    all the time. That was also true in the Guard and Reserve.
        But with OCO now, we've been able to raise the level of
    equipping, of training, and every aspect for all components.
    All of that will be affected to some degree as we lose the
    ability to apply OCO to our Army. But it'll be applied fairly,
    equally, and with a specific outcome in mind, I promise you
    that.
        Senator Ayotte. I thank you and appreciate your comments
    about how important the Guard and Reserve is to our readiness
    and to our country and our national security.
        I also wanted to ask you, as the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff, one of the roles, very important role that you
    have, of course, is advising the Secretary of Defense and the
    President on a variety of Defense Department issues and
    policies. An issue that I've been very concerned about is our
    detention policy, our interrogation policy.
        During a June 28 hearing I asked Admiral McCraven if it
    would be helpful, 10 years into the war on terror, to have a
    designated long-term detention and interrogation facility for
    terrorists, for groups like al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
    and al Shabab. I wanted to ask you if you agree whether it
    would be helpful to have a designated long-term detention and
    interrogation facility, because it seems to me that we've had
    to make some ad hoc decisions and that puts our military
    leaders in a difficult position.
        General Dempsey. It could be, Senator. I'm not being
    elusive. I'm reflecting my own, where I am in my understanding
    of the issues. I say it could be because I think where these
    individuals are placed and whether what we have in our
    detention of them rises to the level of evidence vice simply
    intelligence, because there's a huge difference, if you want to
    talk about the rule of law, on what's based on intelligence and
    what's based on evidence. I think we have to understand how
    agile we need to be and whether our current policies and
    locations allow us to do it.
        The other issue that plays as well is recidivism. That is
    to say, when we have these individuals in custody, return them
    to their nations, do they just simply return back to the fight?
        This is another one of those issues where I, because I
    haven't been involved with it, I haven't studied it to the
    extent I need to to engage you as articulately as I should, but
    I will.
        Senator Ayotte. I appreciate it. I just want to highlight I
    think a couple of examples--the case of Warsame, who is a
    member of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and al Shabab, who
    was kept on a ship for 2 months for interrogation and then
    brought to the United States. I think we basically, as Admiral
    Winnefeld said, for now we're making do, and I don't think that
    making do is good enough, particularly since we're not going to
    be able to keep every single individual on a ship. That is a
    short-term type of fix.
        I would hope that you would look at this as a very
    important security issue. As you mentioned, the recidivism
    rate, 25 percent of those that have been released from
    Guantanamo have gotten back in the fight against us.
        In that vein, I wanted to ask you--my time is almost up,
    but about a particular case, to ask you to look into. That is
    Ali Dakduk, who is someone that myself and 18 other Senators,
    many of whom serve on this committee, he is an individual that
    was being held in Iraq and is also accused of collaborating
    with Iranian agents and Shiite militias to kill American
    troops. We received a report that he was going to be released
    back to the Iraqis. People are very concerned. The 19 Senators
    that signed that letter, we're concerned that releasing him
    back to the Iraqis is like releasing him back into the theater.
        This is again another case I would ask you to look
    carefully at, because it is one that demonstrates again why we
    need a detention facility that ensures the security of these
    individuals so that they don't just go back to other countries
    that will just release them and then we'll be fighting them
    again.
        General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you, General.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
        Senator Manchin.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General and Deanie, very much for your kind
    hospitality. We appreciated it very much the other day,
    stopping by unannounced, and you're very kind.
        Sir, with that, I would concur with Senator Lieberman that
    you're a sound person and I think things will be very well. I'd
    like to ask a few questions.
        One is following up on Senator Ayotte. She asked about the
    Guard. I know there's been discussions and concerns about would
    the Guard ever have a post on the Joint Chiefs of Staff or be
    of equal footing on that. I know you've been a little bit
    receptive in thinking about that, and I didn't know what you
    thought impediments might prevent that from happening or if
    there's a possibility.
        General Dempsey. I would describe my current position as
    being open-minded, Senator, but concerned. I'll express concern
    on two fronts. One is, of course, I just finished, rather
    inelegantly perhaps, describing how close we are, speaking
    again for the Army, but the need for the Guard. I just don't
    know what that would do to the relationship if we had now two
    four-stars overseeing the same force, because we aspire to be
    one force.
        The other one is more pragmatic, and that is what gives me
    my authority as the chief, is the budget. If it weren't for the
    budget, no one would even pay attention to me. But they pay
    attention to me because I have to deliver something for the
    Nation using the resources I'm given. I'm held accountable for
    delivering it.
        I don't know what that would mean to a potential National
    Guard role. All the Service Chiefs, by the way, are in that
    same situation. They derive their authority both from the
    title, but also from the fact that they manage their Service's
    budget. If we have a National Guard four-star on the Joint
    Chiefs, he's not accountable because he doesn't have anything
    with which to deliver capability, and so I'd have to understand
    how that would be sorted out.
        Senator Manchin. The other is concerning financial
    responsibility, but also the situation that we have, and I
    think that Senator Brown touched on, the $10 million a day that
    was reported leaving Kabul in suitcases and never got to where
    it was needed--which is about $3.6 billion a year, and not able
    to have a handle on that.
        I think you've seen or you've been hearing about our debt
    discussions that we've had. Both Democrats and Republicans have
    anticipated a trillion dollars or more in savings if it's not
    spent on the war, another $400 billion in savings on interest
    that you would be spending on the trillion. That doesn't make a
    lot of sense to me because we were never anticipated to be
    there that long. Someone anticipated that we were going to
    spend that much and now they're taking it as a savings.
        Can you give me your thoughts on that? Does it make sense
    to you at all that we would be saving something we shouldn't
    have been spending and now they're all counting it and booking
    it?
        General Dempsey. Senator, if you would allow me, I would
    take personal pleasure in telling you I'm not an economist nor
    a lawyer, and so I can't go anywhere near that question. But I
    will say that we have done a great deal of work to try to
    figure out how to get on top of this issue of spending in Iraq
    and Afghanistan, and I'd be happy at some point to come and
    chat with you about that.
        Senator Manchin. Do you have an idea basically of how you
    can secure the corruption that's going on? As we know,
    Afghanistan--and I think you know my personal feeling is that
    we should get out as quickly as we possibly can. It's not going
    to get any better, and they'll steal as much as they can get
    their hands on, and they've proven it every chance they've had.
    But how we can stop this blatant type of thievery?
        General Dempsey. Yes, sir. We do have some programs. I sent
    probably our best brigadier general over about a year ago,
    Brigadier General H.R. McMaster, to stand up an anti-corruption
    task force and campaign. It's made some progress. In fact, I
    ought to have him come back and chat with you about what he's
    accomplished.
        I wouldn't suggest that anyone would ever drive corruption
    in that part of the world to zero, but we can certainly get a
    lot closer to zero.
        Senator Manchin. You and I both talked about contracting,
    the amount of contracting that goes on in the Defense
    Department, and the cost of contracting and a lot of fraud,
    abuse, and waste there. I think you've shown a desire where you
    want to look into that in a much more critical way.
        I would say also on the flight services, I know that we're
    contracting all of our flight services out to take our goods
    into that area. With that, with NATO also, has there been any
    types of decisions or discussions on how we could best curtail
    that or use our own equipment, or are we just too strapped for
    that?
        General Dempsey. I don't know the specifics, sir. I would
    simply say that I think we have to keep a contracting option
    open because we would very quickly and very clearly overwhelm
    our ability to transport the things we need, ground or air,
    with our own organic resources. I think the issue is really not
    walking away from contractor support. I think it's getting it
    under control.
        Senator Manchin. Finally, I would ask a question--and I
    truly believe that--on the draft, what your opinions may be or
    if you have a position, but just your thoughts on the draft. Of
    course, those of us sitting on this side, living through
    Vietnam, the draft pretty much brought that skirmish to an end.
    I would assume that if we had the draft today we would be
    taking a much more critical look at what we're doing over there
    than we are as we proceed on now. So your thoughts on the
    draft?
        General Dempsey. Sir, this comes up from time to time
    throughout my career. That would very clearly be a political
    decision, to go back to a system of universal suffrage. What I
    would offer you at this point in a discussion would be that I
    think the Nation is better served by an All-Volunteer Force,
    and I could elaborate on why I believe that. But I think we are
    better served by an All-Volunteer Force and would seek to find
    ways to preserve it in an era of fiscal constraint, rather than
    move at this point to a draft.
        Senator Manchin. My reasoning for that question was because
    of all the deployments that the people, families, are basically
    going through. It's a tremendous hardship, I know, to them and
    their families, especially in the Guard back home and to our
    small States that have a great dependency on the Guard. But
    with that happening and the pressure that's put upon them and
    now with three wars going on, there comes a time when we spread
    ourselves so thin that the draft is the only option that I
    think that we would have if that's the policy we continue down,
    unless we intervene and stop these senseless wars.
        General Dempsey. Without commenting on the wars, because
    sometimes I think, Senator, wars choose you, you don't choose
    them. That's just a professional judgment. But I think that as
    we look at the lessons of the last 10 years of war, I think
    we'll find that the All-Volunteer Force actually performed
    better and more resiliently than I think its crafters thought
    it would back in the early 1970s.
        But I think we need other options for the Nation when we
    enter into conflict that can escalate and that can take longer
    than we thought.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
        Senator Begich.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
        General, thank you for your willingness to continue your
    service at this level, and I look forward to approving you and
    again looking forward to your service. I first want to say
    thank you.
        I'm actually going to do one quick thing on Afghanistan to
    follow up on Senator Manchin. Tell me, from your perspective in
    regards to the security forces that we and our allies are
    working to train and ensure that they have their own security
    force. The question I always have--I know they are growing
    them, but what is their retention rate of those folks that,
    once trained by us and doing the service for security at
    different levels, what's the retention rate that they're able
    to maintain? At the same time, are they increasing their
    literacy rate? Because I know we were very successful in Iraq
    because the literacy rate was also very high. Here it's very
    low. Can you comment on both those elements, retention and
    their literacy rate?
        General Dempsey. Yes, I can, sir. Retention has shifted
    over time, for two reasons. One is in the early days we were
    paying them at a rate that I think was probably too low to keep
    them. That was changed about 2 years ago.
        The other factor is seasonal. We have to remember that
    these young men in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent in Iraq,
    but absolutely in Afghanistan, they're agrarian and so when the
    planting and harvesting seasons come and go, the attrition
    rates wax and wane accordingly.
        Now, that said, General Caldwell, who is currently in
    charge of our NATO Training Mission-Iraq, monitors the
    attrition issue constantly. We also think the literacy issue is
    related to attrition.
        Senator Begich. Absolutely.
        General Dempsey. I don't have the number committed to
    memory, Senator, but it's more than 10,000 and growing, the
    number of soldiers we've risen or helped achieve an eighth
    grade, as I recall it, level of literacy.
        These issues are all related, but your concerns about
    attrition are shared by us, as well as the concern for how we
    develop leaders, because you can develop a basic rifleman; it's
    a little more challenging to develop the leaders to lead them.
        Senator Begich. Can you share--you don't have to do it
    right now, obviously, but if you could get to my office--maybe
    what you see those trend lines look like over the last several
    years and where we're going in literacy attainment within our
    security force that Afghanistan has, as well as the retention
    rate?
        General Dempsey. Yes, sir.
        Senator Begich. Will you do that?
        General Dempsey. Yes. The last time I touched on it the
    trend line on attrition was trending positive, which means we
    were gaining control of it. The trend line on literacy training
    was also trending positive, but that is an enormous slope to
    climb, for all the reasons you suggested. But both trends are
    positive.
        Senator Begich. Good. If you could share that with us that
    would be great.
        [The information referred to follows:]
    Attrition:
        Attrition is an ongoing issue within the ANSF. ANA attrition rates
    from June 2010 to June 2011 averaged 2.5 percent or 3,817 personnel per
    month. ANA recruiting rates averaged 4.2 percent or 6,241 personnel per
    month. Attrition will not prevent the ANA from achieving their
    projected manning fiscal year 2011 goal of 171,600 personnel. This
    graph displays ANA strength, manning goals, recruiting and attrition
    from June 2010 to June 2011.

        ANP attrition rates from June 2010 to June 2011 averaged 1.4
    percent or 1,682 personnel per month. ANP recruiting rates averaged 2.8
    percent or 3,248 personnel per month. Attrition will not prevent the
    ANP from achieving their projected manning fiscal year 2011 goal of
    134,000 personnel. This graph displays ANA strength, manning goals,
    recruiting and attrition from June 2010 to June 2011.

    Literacy:
        Illiteracy is one of our greatest challenges in developing the
    ANSF. NTM-A is building a National Army and National Police force out
    of a population that has a 28 percent literacy rate.
        Approximately 86 percent of all new recruits coming into the ANSF
    are illiterate. In order to address this issue, NTM-A has established
    literacy programs throughout the ANSF. The literacy program began in
    October 2009. At the time there were approximately 13,941 ANSF (7,596
    ANA and 6,345 ANP) literate at a 1st grade level. On 28 July 11, the
    100,000th ANSF student graduated from 1st grade level literacy
    training. These students completed training and passed a certification
    exam. The ANA increased the number of personnel with 1st grade literacy
    by 634 percent since October 2009. The ANP increased the number of
    personnel with 1st grade literacy by 934 percent since October 2009.
        New recruits going through their initial training receive literacy
    training. Soldiers attending NCO and Officer training receive
    additional literacy training. There are training programs in place at
    ANSF forward operating bases throughout Afghanistan.

        Senator Begich. You just made me think of something
    additionally. Because I know the military does this. They
    always have a contingency plan about everything, plan A, B, C,
    all the way to Z. I'm assuming somewhere, and maybe it's not
    within DOD, but maybe it's a combo between DOD, State, and
    others: Assume the scenario we're out of Afghanistan; there is
    a financial cost that we're going to be committed to at some
    point, for all the reasons. Their economy can't sustain the
    security forces that we're training for and everyone else is
    training for. They don't have the money.
        Is there somewhere within DOD, State Department, or a
    combo, or one of the other agencies, that has looked at a
    scenario X that, out of Afghanistan, here is the U.S.
    commitment financially?
        General Dempsey. Yes, and I would add NATO.
        Senator Begich. NATO.
        General Dempsey. Because it's very clear that as we reach
    2014 that, as you suggested, there will be a lingering economic
    challenge for Afghanistan and we will have to assist. I say
    ``we'' again meaning not just the United States.
        Senator Begich. The combination.
        General Dempsey. Right.
        Senator Begich. But we'll have a commitment.
        General Dempsey. I believe we will, yes, sir.
        Senator Begich. Do you know, is that something that's
    available at this point to review and what those costs might
    be? Is that something that you could get back to me, at least,
    with and determine where I need to direct that question?
        General Dempsey. Let me contact, if I could, Senator, the
    CENTCOM commander, who would essentially, as the combatant
    commander for that region, oversee that effort, and I'll see if
    I can put him in touch with you or if he can communicate with
    you through me.
        Senator Begich. That would be great. Thank you very much.
        Let me walk through a couple other quick ones. Obviously,
    in Alaska we care greatly about missile defense system, and I
    know the military has done some additional work and they're
    continuing to make some additional plans of finishing up some
    of the fields there and also some additional interceptors.
        Can you give me your opinion of the missile defense system
    that's currently in Alaska, but also let me add another caveat
    to this. As we know, the system there deals with North Korea,
    the Pacific Rim, so forth, but also has reach to the east
    coast, but very last minute, last second kind of Iran issue.
        It's a two-part question: One, your thoughts on ground-
    based midcourse defense for Alaska; but also, is there a need
    for a complementary system on the east coast to then finish the
    efforts of not only North Korea, but more robust in dealing
    with Iran? If you could answer those two pieces of the
    question?
        General Dempsey. Yes, sir. The current strategy calls for
    replicating what you would describe as an air defense
    capability on the West Coast, but replicating that in Europe
    because of the flight plan of any missile that might be
    launched from Iran. There's also some, I'll describe them as
    very early, nascent discussions with Russia about sharing early
    warning and things that could be very positive.
        I think this work is ongoing and important, and I'll give
    it my full interest.
        Senator Begich. The system we have up in Alaska is
    important. You see where I'm going here.
        General Dempsey. I do, sir, and it is.
        Senator Begich. Very good.
        Let me move to another issue, the Law of the Sea Treaty.
    Some members that were here last week up for nomination for
    different positions within DOD, I was asking them the same
    question. We're one of the few countries that haven't signed
    onto this treaty. We're hanging out with Syria, Iran, and
    Libya. Those are the people that we're in company with who
    haven't signed also, which is not the company I care to keep
    and I'm sure you don't care to keep either.
        Can you tell me just your thoughts on the Law of the Sea
    Treaty from a military perspective? The complaint people have
    is that this gives up our sovereignty if we sign this treaty. I
    disagree with that. I think this helps our sovereignty,
    strengthens our sovereignty. Can you give me your thoughts on
    that?
        General Dempsey. I support the other leaders who have
    testified and attested to the fact that I think it will improve
    our standing and our security if we enter into the Law of the
    Sea Convention.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
        My time is up. I have one question which I'll submit for
    the record. It's in this very tight budgetary time, where I sit
    on the Budget Committee--the military budget is a big
    challenge. We've dealt with some cuts that have to be dealt
    with. But how we balance that between personnel and assuring
    that we have a robust volunteer system and ensure that pay and
    benefits and retirements are there, at the same time how do we
    balance against some of the infrastructure. I have a more
    detailed question. I'll submit it to the record, but that's the
    gist of it, how you will manage that to make sure we have the
    fighting men and women that we need, but at the same time deal
    with some severe budget constraints. I'll just submit that for
    the record, if that's okay.
        General Dempsey. Okay, Senator. Thanks.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much. Good luck.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Begich.
        Senator Graham.
        Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Congratulations on your nomination. I know you will do a
    good job and your family's proud. This is a special time in
    your life.
        Iraq. There are increasing reports coming from Iraq that
    Iran is introducing weapons into Iraq, into Shia militia hands,
    explosively formed penetrators and more lethal rockets. Is that
    generally true?
        General Dempsey. I've heard both General Austin and others
    state that they have intelligence that suggests that is true,
    yes, Senator.
        Senator Graham. The argument is that they're trying to
    claim they drove us out of Iraq, the Iranians. Do you generally
    agree with that assessment?
        General Dempsey. I obviously can't speak for their
    motivations, but I will say that my contact with my colleagues
    in Iraq--and I'm talking about my Iraqi colleagues--many of
    them believe that's the case.
        Senator Graham. What is your message to Iran, General
    Dempsey?
        General Dempsey. It would be a gross miscalculation to
    believe that we will simply allow that to occur without taking
    serious consideration or reacting to it.
        Senator Graham. I think that is a very sound position. I
    doubt if the Iranians are watching, but they need to be
    listening, because I think it would be a gross miscalculation
    on the Iranian part to believe that you can be involved in
    killing Americans and nothing comes your way.
        Iraq. If the Iraqi Government requested additional troops
    to remain in 2012 in Iraq, do you think it would be wise for us
    to agree to that request?
        General Dempsey. I do, Senator.
        Senator Graham. I think there's plans in the works to try
    to come up with a formulation somewhere around 10,000; is that
    correct?
        General Dempsey. I don't know the number, Senator, but it
    would be a number where we could provide the capability that
    they would request, that we would be able to protect ourselves,
    and it would have to meet both of our Nations' mutual interest.
        Senator Graham. Right. One, they'd have to ask and we'd
    have to agree. But one of the concerns is the forces that we
    have along the Kurdish-Arab fault lines have paid dividends.
    There has been no real fighting, but there have been some
    skirmishes. I guess one of the things you would want to look at
    in terms of future troop presence is to have sort of a referee
    along those lines; is that correct?
        General Dempsey. I have heard discussion of that as one of
    the capabilities we might be able to provide for them if asked.
        Senator Graham. Now let's move to Afghanistan. There's a
    lot of talk about 2014. My view is that the drawdown of all
    surge forces by September 2012 has reignited the debate in
    Afghanistan and the region, is America leaving, and the enemy
    is seizing upon that drawdown schedule. But one thing that we
    could do in my view to reset that debate is to enter into a
    relationship with the Afghans, if they request it, post-2014.
        Several months ago I asked Secretary Gates about his view
    as to whether or not he believes it would be wise to have an
    enduring military, economic, and political relationship with
    the Afghans if they requested such a relationship past 2014.
    What he said regarding the security agreement, he said: ``A
    security agreement with Afghanistan that provided for a
    continuing relationship and some kind of joint facilities and
    so on for training, for counterterrorism, and so on beyond 2014
    I think would be very much in our interest. I think it would
    serve as a barrier to Iranian influence coming from the west. I
    think it would serve as a barrier to reconstitution of the
    Taliban and others coming from the border areas of Pakistan. So
    I think it would be a stabilizing effect, not just in
    Afghanistan, but in the region.''
        Do you agree with that?
        General Dempsey. I do, Senator.
        Senator Graham. As I understand, there are some ongoing
    negotiations between the Afghans and our government to have a
    stabilizing, enduring joint relationship on the military side
    past 2014; is that correct?
        General Dempsey. I've read that in the open press, Senator.
    I have not been brought into that dialogue, but I've read the
    same reports.
        Senator Graham. But as the senior military adviser to the
    President, if you get this job you would recommend that we go
    down that road to send the right signal to the Afghans and to
    the region; is that correct?
        General Dempsey. I would, Senator. That's without putting
    any assumptions about how long or how big, but I think that
    simply the thought that we would have an enduring relationship
    could send the right signal.
        Senator Graham. Let's look at this photo again, this photo
    of this NCO basically calling for assistance. It's called
    ``Trust'' and I think it's a great photo.
        One of the things that I worry about is that allies of the
    United States, partners of the United States, need to trust us.
    Do you agree with that?
        General Dempsey. Absolutely.
        Senator Graham. A lot of people in Afghanistan and Iraq
    have taken on radical Islamic extremists and they've paid a
    heavy price; is that true?
        General Dempsey. They have, Senator.
        Senator Graham. The Afghan and Iraqi people have paid a
    very heavy price fighting for their freedom. What I'm trying to
    impress upon people back home, I'm going to at noon get asked
    about, why would you invest money in a schoolhouse in
    Afghanistan when we need improvements in our schools in South
    Carolina? How would you answer that question?
        General Dempsey. I'd probably say that it's important to
    remember that we went to Afghanistan for our national interest,
    not theirs, and there is a residual requirement for that for
    how long as we deem our ability to do so. But this isn't about
    doing things just for them. It's in some way about doing things
    for us.
        Senator Graham. One way to defeat radical Islam is to
    provide an education to young women and young men to give them
    the tools to fight back and chart a new course for Afghanistan;
    do you agree with that?
        General Dempsey. I do, sir, within means and capabilities.
        Senator Graham. Within means and capability. A schoolhouse
    may do more good for the long-term security of the United
    States than maybe a brigade in Afghanistan?
        General Dempsey. It could very well be, when we reach the
    point of stability.
        Senator Graham. Now, killing bin Laden was a seminal moment
    in the war on terror. I want to congratulate the President and
    our Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency and all
    those who stayed on the case. But I have a theory that killing
    terrorists only takes you so far when it comes to security. The
    ultimate security is partnerships; partnerships with people in
    the region who, if they had the capability to marry up with
    their will, they would fight back against these radical
    elements.
        I know it's more labor-intensive. I know it costs more
    money and in many ways it's deadlier. But I believe the payoff
    is greater.
        What is your view of our Nation's security being enhanced
    by having countries like Iraq and Afghanistan becoming stable,
    representative in nature, and generally aligned with us in
    rejecting radical Islam? Would that be a transformational event
    in the war on terror more than killing bin Laden?
        General Dempsey. I think it would have benefits beyond just
    the war on terrorism. I'm an advocate of building global
    relationships both to promote our values, to have partners who
    can help us when we encounter an uncertain future. I just think
    that we are better and we're a better army when we are out and
    about and interacting with our peers.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
        Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, first congratulations. I thank you for your many
    years of service and what was apparently one of the briefest
    tenures as the Army Chief of Staff in history, I think.
        Let me ask you a series of questions. The President's
    budget proposes that we move to a smaller Army and Marine
    Corps. In response to the advance policy questions, you
    indicated agreement with the reductions in end strength that
    are included in the President's long-range budget. My concern
    is that we have heard repeatedly from military officials and
    mental health experts that a dwell time of 2 years at home for
    every 1 year deployed is the minimum time necessary to preserve
    the long-term mental and physical health of our forces.
        Certainly the Army and the Marine Corps have borne the
    brunt of the two wars in which we are now engaged. We're not
    counting Libya as well. What will be the impact in your view of
    reducing the end strength on our ability to meet those dwell
    time goals?
        General Dempsey. Senator, my responsibility as the Service
    Chief, with my fellow Service Chiefs and the current Chairman,
    is to take the budget targets we've been given and to determine
    how we provide capabilities, how much force structure that
    involves, how much modernization, how much training,
    maintenance, and readiness--this is your point--at a rate which
    we can sustain the All-Volunteer Force.
        For the Army, it is in fact 1 year deployed to 2 year home
    boots-on-the-ground (BOG)-dwell ratio. As we do this, some of
    it is art and some of it's science. The science of it is to
    take that BOG-dwell ratio, apply the force you can afford, and
    see if you can sustain it. We're running those models and that
    analysis right now.
        Senator Collins. I hope that you will keep a very close
    watch on this. I think it's absolutely critical. I understand
    that we're drawing down our troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, but
    I'm very concerned about the strain and pressure of repeated
    deployments. This strikes me as the wrong time to be reducing
    the size of our force, and so I think we need to watch that
    very carefully.
        Let me turn to an issue that Senator Webb raised with you,
    and that is sea power. The fact is that our Navy currently has
    the fewest numbers of ships since before World War I. Now, our
    ships are clearly more capable than they used to be, but, as an
    admiral once told me, quantity has a quality of its own, and
    you do need to have a sufficient number of ships.
        I'm concerned by what we see in China, with an enormous
    buildup by the Chinese of their fleet. I'm concerned by a
    February 2011 report by the Navy on surface ship readiness that
    found that 60 percent of the fleet is underway at any given
    time and 43 percent is forward deployed. Those figures
    represent historic high percentages.
        Our national security demands are growing. The ships are
    now going to be playing a very important role in ballistic
    missile defense. The fact is that we have a gap between the
    285-ship Navy that we currently have and the 313-ship Navy that
    the Chief of Naval Operations has described repeatedly as the
    floor, as the absolute minimum.
        So first question: Do you support the Navy's goal of
    increasing the number of ships that we have to 313?
        General Dempsey. Against the current strategy, Senator, I
    do. I would only caveat it by saying that as we do this
    analysis of resources we may have to actually change our
    strategy. We may reach a point where we say as Joint Chiefs we
    cannot achieve the strategy, here's the recommendations we make
    on changing our strategy, whether it's forward presence,
    whether it's allocating resources or not, to building partner
    capacity.
        In other words, your point hits exactly at the challenge I
    face, we face, which is we have a strategy and we have the
    means to execute it today. The means will change. We'll make
    some adaptations on how we do things. But at some point we may
    reach a point where we have to recommend to the President that
    we have to adapt or revise our strategy. We're not there.
        In answer to your question, right now I absolutely do agree
    with the Navy's shipbuilding program. I'm aware how it supports
    their air-sea battle concept. I'm aware what it does for us
    with anti-access, denial activities. It's the right strategy
    with the right resources for today, and if the strategy changes
    then I'll change my opinion about it.
        Senator Collins. My concern is that the budget is at risk
    of dragging the strategy, rather than the other way around. The
    way we should be doing this is determining our military
    requirements and have that dictate our resources, not the other
    way around.
        There certainly are savings to be achieved. I'm going to
    submit a couple of questions for the record on overseas bases,
    military construction overseas, on some procurements that our
    Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee has looked
    at, that has to do with the enterprise resource programs, which
    are now sole source contracts and have enormous cost overruns.
        But let me use my remaining seconds to bring up a report
    that Senator Lieberman and I produced through our Homeland
    Security and Government Affairs Committee. It was on whether or
    not the Fort Hood shootings could have been prevented. I want
    to make sure to bring that report to your attention because,
    while we found that there was very poor communication between
    the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Army, we also found
    that the Army had sufficient evidence on its own of Major
    Hasan's increasing radicalization.
        We found that there was a flawed personnel evaluation
    process that was very troubling, because not only was his
    radicalization evident, but the fact is he wasn't a good
    doctor. Yet many times he received outstanding ratings. One of
    his supervisors actually told the people at Fort Hood: You're
    getting our worst. Yet that physician had an outstanding
    rating.
        I would ask you to take a look at the rating process
    throughout DOD. I think that's absolutely critical.
        General Dempsey. We actually are in the process of taking
    those lessons learned and adapting policies. But I will
    continue the work. You have my commitment for that.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Collins.
        Senator Hagan.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Dempsey, I just want to welcome you and I am
    looking forward to your confirmation. To Mrs. Dempsey, it's
    always a pleasure seeing you and I know this is definitely a
    team effort. Thank you for all your past service and sacrifice.
        Recently I joined several of my colleagues in sending a
    letter to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Gates, regarding
    findings of the Military Leadership Diversity Commission. This
    commission, established by Congress, issued a decision paper
    earlier this year. This is about women in combat. It stated
    that tactical and operational occupations and command
    assignments are important factors that increase opportunities
    for promotion to higher officer ranks, but women and minorities
    are underrepresented in tactical and operational career fields
    and in candidate pools for command assignments; and the most
    important barrier keeping women from serving in tactical and
    operational career fields is the DOD and Service policies that
    prohibit women from serving in occupations involving direct
    offensive ground combat.
        The commission recommended DOD and the Services conduct a
    phased elimination of combat exclusion policies for women. My
    question, General Dempsey, is what do you think are the
    opportunities and risks for eliminating combat exclusion
    policies for women?
        General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator. There is a DOD task
    force in fact looking at what have we learned over 10 years
    about the nature of the current conflicts. Of course, I don't
    have to explain this to you. You have visited. But the nature
    of current conflict is there's no front line and back line.
    Some of the rules we have in place on collocation, for example,
    are simply outdated and need to be revised. We're prepared to
    do that as an Army.
        Now again, the DOD task force is looking both at
    collocation issues, but also at the issue of changing access to
    particular military occupational specialties. That work should
    take place here in the fall. I fully support it. I think we
    will learn that there are additional opportunities to be made
    available, and my commitment to you is to keep that on my
    agenda.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you. I think from a fairness
    standpoint, from the promotion, it certainly has to be on a
    level playing field, so that we can have very talented people
    in the upper levels.
        I also wanted to ask on the role of Pakistan. Pakistan is a
    key regional actor in Central Asia, although right now our
    relationship with Pakistan is complicated. Pakistan is
    obviously an important player in terms of regional stability in
    Central Asia.
        Can you describe how the Pressler Amendment has affected
    our relationship with Pakistan and how do you feel the United
    States needs to interact currently with Pakistan and in the
    future? How do you feel we should use the aid as a weapon of
    influence, based on the current relationship that we have now
    with Pakistan?
        General Dempsey. Thank you, Senator. I think Pakistan is an
    enormously important country in the CENTCOM area of operations.
    In fact, when I was the Acting CENTCOM Commander I considered
    it to be among probably the top one or two countries to be
    addressed.
        We've had, as you described it yourself, a very complex
    relationship with them. But I think it's one we need to stick
    with. To your point about the Pressler Amendment, that was a
    period in our history where we made a determination that we had
    such stark differences with Pakistan, notably on the issue of
    nuclearization, that we would cut off not only all aid, but all
    contact. As a result, we have now a generation among the
    Pakistan military, we have a generation of officers--generally
    they are field-grade majors and lieutenant colonels--who not
    only know nothing about us, but actually are somewhat
    antagonistic toward us because they've had no contact with us,
    and they simply remember a period of time when they were
    prohibited from having contact.
        I think that's a mistake. The point would be as we go
    forward to Pakistan, I think we should continue to find areas
    of common interest. There are plenty of those. I think we ought
    to acknowledge where we have differences and there ought to be
    consequences for greater or lesser cooperation. But I think we
    have to stick with the relationship.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you.
        I also wanted to ask a question about the military
    assistance for education. I know that GAO released a report
    back in March that focused on the military transition
    assistance program. My understanding is that oversight of the
    education programs receiving tuition assistance funds is really
    lacking and that the for-profit schools in particular have used
    in some cases, not all, improper tactics to enroll troops.
        I'm also told that just this week the Pentagon has imposed
    some new rules for online-only schools, in which our military
    are using the tuition assistance dollars. This is a direct
    result from the findings of the GAO report. I think that's
    positive. But I also feel strongly that these rules need to go
    further.
        Shouldn't these rules--and we're talking about online--also
    apply to brick and mortar institutions, so that all of the for-
    profit institutions are held to the same standards, whether
    they're online or not? Additionally, with all of the fraud and
    abuse that we've seen, do you believe these rules should apply
    to all DOD and Veterans Affairs (VA) benefits and not just the
    tuition assistance programs?
        General Dempsey. It's an interesting point you raise. We
    are focused at this time on online education, but it certainly
    seems logical that we would be focused on making sure that
    these soldiers get best value for the money, whether they're in
    a brick and mortar schoolhouse or online.
        But this next generation is more likely to seek education
    opportunities online, so that's probably why we have chosen to
    start the process there. But I would support the idea that we
    should take a look at both.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Hagan.
        Senator Portman.
        Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, congratulations on your nomination, it's well
    deserved. I believe I am the one person standing between you
    and a very well-deserved break, so I will try to be succinct.
    I'm delighted you're willing to step forward, and you've had a
    very distinguished career and I look forward to working with
    you.
        Let me ask you a few questions, if I could, on the fiscal
    side, because we find ourselves in, unfortunately, very
    difficult economic and fiscal times. The current Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen, has talked about this. In
    January he said: ``The Pentagon's budget has basically doubled
    over the last decade and my own experience here is that in
    doubling we've lost our ability to prioritize, we've lost our
    ability to make hard decisions, to do tough analysis, to make
    trades.''
        He also issued this very famous quote that maybe has been
    brought up earlier today, which is: ``The single biggest threat
    to our national security is our debt.''
        Let me ask you a couple just quick comments, if you could,
    on that. One, do you agree with him on his famous quote about
    the debt being our biggest national security threat? Second, do
    you agree with him that we've lost our ability to prioritize,
    make hard decisions, and do tough analysis?
        General Dempsey. On the first, Senator, which is the idea
    that our economic condition is the greatest threat to national
    security, I don't agree exactly with that. I'm very----
        Senator Portman. Fiscal, he said, not economic.
        General Dempsey. Sorry?
        Senator Portman. Fiscal, so the debt.
        General Dempsey. The way I would prefer to describe it is
    the issue is national power. From what do we derive our
    national power? We derive our national power, our influence
    across the globe, our access to resources, global commons, that
    is all derived from the combination of three things. You can't
    pick or choose. You have to have strength in the military arm,
    the diplomatic arm, and the economic arm.
        So to the extent that he says our economic arm is weakened,
    therefore we are less capable across the globe, I buy that
    entirely. But I don't want to find myself in a position of
    voting that one or the other of those is more important than
    the other.
        On the issue, to the second part, about whether the
    Pentagon has lost the ability to prioritize, yes. I think I
    would probably say that you develop cultures over time. When
    times are flush with resources, the culture becomes that you
    just aren't forced to make those kind of decisions. Then when
    the cycle returns and resources are more constrained, it
    requires a change in culture. So yes, I agree with that.
        Senator Portman. Let me dig a little deeper on that in
    terms of one issue, which is the acquisition side of your
    future role and your current role as a Service Chief. I just
    left the Contracting Oversight Subcommittee, where I'm the
    ranking member on the Homeland Security and Governmental
    Affairs Committee, where we were talking about the tough fiscal
    conditions we face and how we need to have Government do more
    with less.
        In my time here on this committee, looking at various
    programs and witnessing some of the challenges we have in
    fielding capabilities for the Services in a timely way, it
    seems to me there are a few common themes. Surely there's a lot
    we can do in the acquisition process. The chairman and others
    have been involved with that over the years.
        But I hear just as often blame attributed to the way the
    Department develops requirements. I'm involved again on this
    contracting issue on a broader scale and looking at the Joint
    Strike Fighter, for instance, where now we're looking at
    projected cost overrun of $150 billion roughly--unbelievable.
        You and Admiral Winnefeld, who was up here last week, are
    going to be in the middle of all this. It seems to me attempts
    to look at the data and analysis and get away from some of the
    litany of documents and lockstep wickets is a good thing. I get
    the feeling a lot of this stuff early on in the programs is
    time-consuming. It's a lot of paperwork. It's a need to meet
    the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System review
    requirements. The intent is certainly the right one. We need to
    figure out what we need before we develop it.
        But something's not working here, and I just wonder if you
    could talk a little about this. Do you think the efforts being
    made to alter some of these processes are significant enough,
    and what would you do to ensure that real change occurs?
        General Dempsey. I completely agree that the status quo is
    unacceptable and that the system itself does require reform.
    The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Ash Carter is
    working diligently, based on some of the guidance we've
    received from the Congress of the United States.
        I think there are some answers actually. I think the
    Service Chiefs need to have a greater role throughout the
    process. Right now we tend to have a role in requirements
    determination, but then the process is handed over to find a
    material solution. I think we have to partner more closely
    throughout the process, from start to finish, with industry.
        I think we need to take a shorter time horizon on
    acquisitions. The way requirements creep is when we have
    decade-long programs, which allow the aperture to remain open
    and for guys like me to keep stuffing things through. I think
    the answer is greater collaboration between requirements
    determination, material solution, greater collaboration with
    industry earlier, and shorter time horizons, as a start, but
    there's probably other opportunities as well.
        Senator Portman. I think we're going to be forced to make
    some of those tough decisions, as you said, to prioritize.
        By the way, you said Ash Carter, in reaction to guidance
    from Congress, is looking at some of these issues. I can't help
    myself, Mr. Chairman, say that some of the guidance I think
    it's fair to say from Congress on the second engine on the
    Joint Strike Fighter is not being adhered to, and that is we
    want competition.
        General Dempsey. I had more in mind the Weapons System
    Acquisition Reform Act.
        Senator Portman. I know, yes. I just think we have to go to
    competition wherever possible, get the costs down, and be sure
    that it's open and fair.
        Financial management. I want to get your thoughts on this.
    We recently had a debate on this on the floor because the
    Senate chose not to have so many positions be confirmed through
    the normal advise and consent process, which is a good thing.
    We're streamlining it. I offered an amendment, supported by
    many on this committee, saying there are some folks in the
    Federal Government who ought to continue to go through a
    process because we want to give them the stature that comes
    with that and empower them, and that included the financial
    management officials at the Department, including the
    Comptroller and each Service branch's financial management
    officer.
        We were successful in getting that done. The reason we did
    it, again, was to be sure that those folks are listened to by
    others who are confirmed, and those who are in the civilian
    leadership at the Pentagon are usually the people we talk to
    about this issue. But I would tell you today that I think the
    auditing function, being sure that you have financial officers
    in every Service who are getting the attention from the
    leadership, is extremely important and I would hope that the
    uniformed leadership would continue to play a role, in fact, I
    would say even a more active role. I think some view those back
    office functions as not important to our fighting forces. I
    would say, particularly in these times, it's incredibly
    important.
        The Marine Corps recently showed this, I think. By focusing
    more on financial management, they claimed a three dollar rate
    of return for every dollar spent on financial management, for
    instance.
        As one member, I will tell you I would hope that you
    personally will get engaged in this issue. With the increasing
    pressure on the Pentagon's budget, we ought to be sure that
    every dollar is spent as intended and that we're freeing up
    funds for critical needs by focusing on financial management.
        Can you give me your quick thoughts on that as a Service
    Chief now and how you intend to approach this as Chairman?
        General Dempsey. As a Service Chief, I absolutely concur
    that we tend to look at--we describe them as Major Defense
    Acquisition Programs (MDAP), where the money is placed inside
    of our budget, and we tend to look at the top 10 percent of our
    MDAPs because that's where the big dollars are. Actually, it's
    17 percent of the MDAPs have about 50 percent of the financial
    management challenges. But that's where we tend to focus our
    sight because it's the big dollars.
        But there's another 50 percent out there in the smaller
    MDAPs, that total $3, $4, $5 million, and I think we're in one
    of those environments where we have to be paying attention to
    all of it.
        Then the other aspect of it is audit ability. We're on path
    to become auditable by 2017, and I'm committed to that.
        Senator Portman. Thank you, General. I appreciate it and
    again appreciate your willingness to step forward.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Portman.
        I would recommend to you, relative to the issue of
    contracting in Afghanistan, a report which was a major report
    of this committee in October 2010, entitled ``Inquiry Into the
    Role and Oversight of Private Security Contractors in
    Afghanistan.'' It was a long investigation, a detailed
    investigation, a very disturbing investigation, about the
    shortfalls of our private security contractors and the
    regulations and the policies needed to govern their operations.
        The article that we saw in the paper the other day about
    some of the funds ending up in the hands of our enemy was based
    on that investigation, made reference, as a matter of fact, to
    the investigation.
        But in terms of trying to put an end to some of the waste
    and worse that was going on and is going on relative to
    contractors in Afghanistan, I would recommend that very
    detailed report that we all worked so hard on.
        I was intrigued by your comment about how much personal
    pleasure you take from not being a lawyer, but I will not
    pursue that, being a lawyer, since I'm interested in your rapid
    confirmation.
        Unless there are any additional questions from Senator
    Portman, we will, with thanks to you and your bride, stand
    adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

        [Prepared questions submitted to GEN Martin E. Dempsey,
    USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
    supplied follow:]
                            Questions and Responses
                                defense reforms
        Question. You previously have answered the committee's policy
    questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in
    connection with your nomination to be the Chief of Staff, Army.
        Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of
    these reforms changed from the perspective of your nomination to become
    the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) or since you testified
    before the committee at your most recent confirmation hearing for the
    Chief of Staff, Army?
        Answer. Generally, no. Goldwater-Nichols made us the joint force we
    are today. However, if confirmed, I would examine the lessons of the
    past 10 years of war to determine if there are opportunities to make us
    an even more effective force.
                                     duties
        Question. Section 151 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the CJCS
    is the principal military adviser to the President, the National
    Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.
        What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the CJCS?
        Answer. The CJCS performs duties as prescribed in law and as
    assigned by the Secretary of Defense. These duties include being the
    principal military adviser to the President, the National Security
    Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman also heads and
    regularly convenes the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and regularly consults
    with combatant commanders. Where the advice of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff differs, the Chairman conveys dissenting opinions in rendering
    his advice.
        Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect
    that Secretary Panetta would prescribe for you?
        Answer. I anticipate the Secretary will assign duties consistent
    with the law and designed to support the requirements of the Secretary
    and the President.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes to section 151, if any, would
    you recommend?
        Answer. If confirmed, I do not anticipate recommending any changes
    to the law. I will, however, be attuned to issues and opportunities
    that might suggest consideration of potential changes to the law in the
    future.
        Question. Sections 152 through 155 of title 10, U.S.C., relate to
    the duties, organization, and functions of the Chairman and Vice CJCS,
    and the organization and operation of the Joint Staff.
        If confirmed, what changes to sections 152 through 155, if any,
    would you recommend?
        Answer. If confirmed, I do not anticipate recommending any changes
    to the law. I will, however, be attuned to potential issues and
    opportunities for improvement that might suggest consideration for
    eventual changes in the law.
        Question. What duties, responsibilities, and priorities would you
    plan to assign to the Vice CJCS?
        Answer. The Vice Chairman performs the duties assigned to him as a
    member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other duties as assigned
    by the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. I have
    not yet determined any additional duty assignments beyond those
    prescribed in law. If confirmed, I intend to discuss potential duties
    with the Vice Chairman as part of our close working relationship.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the most
    critical functions and performance of the Joint Staff? If confirmed,
    what changes, if any, would you propose to enhance the performance of
    the Joint Staff?
        Answer. The Joint Staff is independently organized and operated to
    support the Chairman and Vice CJCS in discharging their duties as
    assigned by law. Among these duties, serving as the principal military
    adviser to the Secretary of Defense and President of the United States
    is paramount. This requires close collaboration and coordination with
    the staffs of the Secretary of Defense, Service Chiefs, and combatant
    commanders as well as other interagency offices and foreign military
    staffs. One ongoing change to the Joint Staff is the integration of
    certain functions and responsibilities that currently reside in Joint
    Forces Command. In addition to managing this transition, I will be
    alert to other opportunities to improve Joint Staff performance.
                                 qualifications
        Question. What background and experience do you have that you
    believe qualifies you for this position?
        Answer. I've been the beneficiary of assignments both with the
    Joint Force and within the Institutional Army that provide an important
    perspective on national security issues. Specifically, I've served as
    General Hugh Shelton's special assistant when he was the CJCS, as a
    Division Commander in combat, in a security assistance/building partner
    capacity role in both Saudi Arabia and Iraq, as Deputy and then Acting
    Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), as Commander of U.S. Army
    Training and Doctrine Command, and as Chief of Staff of the Army.
        Question. Do you believe there are actions you need to take to
    enhance your ability to perform the duties of the CJCS?
        Answer. Yes. It seems clear we are entering a future environment
    that is more complex, less predictable, and faster paced. It is also
    clear we are entering a new fiscal environment. To be effective in that
    environment, I will need to establish strong relationships with the
    Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, the President, and Congress. I
    will also have to ensure that as a military we learn faster and adapt
    more quickly than our potential adversaries. Finally, if confirmed, I
    will be the senior military officer in the Nation. With that comes
    responsibility as the steward of our profession. Therefore, I will take
    personal interest in the development of our force as professionals in
    the service of our Nation.
                                 relationships
        Question. Other sections of law and traditional practice establish
    important relationships between the Chairman and other officials.
    Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the CJCS to
    the following officials:
        The Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. The CJCS must have a close working relationship with the
    Secretary of Defense. Under title 10, the Chairman is assigned several
    duties that guide the relationship to include serving as the principal
    military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and
    the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman also performs other duties
    assigned by the Secretary of Defense.
        Question. The National Security Advisor.
        Answer. The National Security Advisor is a special assistant and
    direct advisor to the President. As the role of the Chairman is to
    serve as the principal military advisor to the President, National
    Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and Secretary of Defense,
    if confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the National
    Security Advisor to ensure our efforts are synchronized across the
    interagency and for the purpose of implementing presidential decisions.
        Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. Under existing directives, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
    has been delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of
    Defense on any matters upon which the Secretary is authorized to act.
    As such, the relationship of the Chairman with the Deputy Secretary is
    similar to that with the Secretary.
        Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
        Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., and current Department of Defense (DOD)
    directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal
    staff assistants and advisers to the Secretary regarding matters
    related to their functional areas. Within their areas, Under
    Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions. They may issue
    instructions and directive type memoranda that implement policy
    approved by the Secretary. These instructions and directives are
    applicable to all DOD components. In carrying out their
    responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of
    Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the
    unified and specified commands are transmitted through the CJCS.
        Question. The General Counsel of DOD.
        Answer. Under title 10, U.S.C., section 140, the DOD General
    Counsel serves as the chief legal officer of DOD. In general, the DOD
    General Counsel is responsible for overseeing legal services,
    establishing policy, and overseeing the DOD Standards of Conduct
    Program, establishing policy and positions on specific legal issues and
    advising on significant international law issues raised in major
    military operations, the DOD Law of War Program, and legality of
    weapons reviews. The office of the DOD General Counsel works closely
    with the Office of Legal Counsel to the CJCS, and communications with
    the combatant commanders by the DOD General Counsel are normally
    transmitted through the CJCS.
        Question. The DOD Inspector General.
        Answer. The DOD Inspector General performs the duties, has the
    responsibilities, and exercises the powers specified in the Inspector
    General Act of 1978. If confirmed, I will cooperate with and provide
    support to the DOD Inspector General as required.
        Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        Answer. The Vice CJCS performs the duties prescribed for him as a
    member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such other duties as may be
    prescribed by the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of
    Defense. When there is a vacancy in the Office of the Chairman or in
    the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as
    Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is
    appointed or the absence or disability ceases.
        Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
        Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., section 165 provides that, subject to the
    authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and
    subject to the authority of the combatant commanders, the Secretaries
    of Military Departments are responsible for administration and support
    of forces that are assigned to unified and specified commands. The
    Chairman advises the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which
    program recommendations and budget proposals of the military
    departments conform to priorities in strategic plans and with the
    priorities established for requirements of the combatant commands.
        Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
        Answer. Because of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Service Chiefs
    are no longer involved in the operational chain of command. However,
    this does not diminish their importance with respect to title 10
    responsibilities. Among other things, they serve two significant roles.
    First, they are responsible for the organization, training, and
    equipping of their respective Services. Without the full support and
    cooperation of the Service Chiefs, no combatant commander can assure
    the preparedness of his assigned forces for missions directed by the
    Secretary of Defense and the President. Second, as members of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs are advisers to the Chairman and the
    Secretary of Defense as the senior uniformed leaders of their
    respective Services. In this function, they play a critically important
    role in shaping military advice and transforming our joint
    capabilities. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the
    Service Chiefs to fulfill warfighting and operational requirements.
        Question. The combatant commanders.
        Answer. The combatant commanders fight our wars and conduct
    military operations around the world. By law, and to the extent
    directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman serves as spokesman
    for the combatant commanders and is charged with overseeing their
    activities. He provides a vital link between the combatant commanders
    and other elements of DOD, and as directed by the President, may serve
    as the means of communication between the combatant commanders and the
    President or Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will work closely
    with the combatant commanders to enable their warfighting capability
    and to provide support.
        Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
        Answer. The Chief of the National Guard heads a joint activity of
    DOD and is the senior uniformed National Guard officer responsible for
    formulating, developing and coordinating all policies, programs, and
    plans affecting more than half a million Army and Air National Guard
    personnel. Appointed by the President, he serves as principal adviser
    to the Secretary of Defense through the CJCS on National Guard matters.
    He is also the principal adviser to the Secretary and Chief of Staff of
    the Army and the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force on all
    National Guard issues. As National Guard Bureau Chief, he serves as the
    Department's official channel of communication with the Governors and
    Adjutants General. If confirmed, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau
    will continue to have full access to the upper echelons of the Joint
    Staff and me.
        Question. The Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
        Answer. There is no command relationship between the Special
    Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and the U.S. military.
    However, because of the critical importance of coordinating State
    Department and DOD activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan to advance
    U.S. policy objectives in the region, if confirmed, I will work closely
    with him to ensure our efforts are synchronized.
        Question. The Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan.
        Answer. Although the CJCS is the principal military advisor to the
    President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council,
    he is not in the chain of command of the Commander, U.S. Forces-
    Afghanistan (USFOR-A). The Commander, USFOR-A reports to the Commander,
    CENTCOM, who, in turn, reports directly to the Secretary of Defense.
    This reporting relationship is prescribed in title 10 U.S.C. section
    164(d)(1). The Commander, USFOR-A does not have a formal command
    relationship with the CJCS, but he coordinates with him through the
    Commander, CENTCOM on a regular basis. The Commander, USFOR-A sends his
    advice and opinions on military operations to the Commander, CENTCOM,
    who, in turn, presents them to the Chairman.
        Question. The Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq.
        Answer. Although the CJCS is the principal military advisor to the
    President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council,
    he is not in the chain of command of the Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq
    (USF-I). The Commander, USF-I reports to the Commander, CENTCOM, who,
    in turn, reports directly to the Secretary of Defense. This reporting
    relationship is prescribed in title 10 U.S.C. section 164(d)(1). The
    Commander, USF-I does not have a formal command relationship with the
    CJCS, but he coordinates with him through the Commander, CENTCOM on a
    regular basis. The Commander, USF-I sends his advice and opinions on
    military operations to the Commander, CENTCOM, who, in turn, presents
    them to the Chairman.
                        major challenges and priorities
        Question. What is your vision for the Armed Forces of today and the
    future?
        Answer. We have the finest military in the world today, and we must
    maintain it as the finest military in the future. We must provide the
    Nation with the military it needs, and that means we must provide our
    leaders with options. The force must be responsive, decisive,
    versatile, interdependent, and affordable. We are likely to be somewhat
    smaller, but in doing so we must remain capable of providing what the
    Nation needs. Delivering a force such as I've described will require us
    to reform many of our current processes including but not limited to
    the acquisition and procurement processes as well as our training and
    leader development strategies. It will likely be necessary to establish
    a different relationship among the Active and Reserve components of our
    Armed Forces, and it is likely that we will have to establish a
    different relationship among our closest allies and partners.
        Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
    confront the next CJCS?
        Answer. The next Chairman must achieve the Nation's objectives in
    the current conflicts, shape the international security environment,
    prepare the force for an uncertain future, respond to a changing fiscal
    reality, and do all of that while preserving the All-Volunteer Force.
        Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
    addressing these challenges?
        Answer. Addressing these challenges starts with a clear-eyed look
    at the mid-future and the determination of what the Nation needs in its
    military. Stated another way, we must decide what military capabilities
    we need in 2020 and determine how we will deliver them.
        Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish?
        Answer. We have to provide whatever it takes to achieve our
    national objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have to maintain
    pressure on those state and non-state actors who threaten us. We have
    to maintain and build alliances and partnerships. We have to stay
    connected to the American people, and we have to keep faith with
    soldiers, families, and veterans. As I said earlier, the Joint Force
    for 2020 must be responsive, decisive, versatile, interdependent, and
    affordable.
                                chain of command
        Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
    chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
    and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Section
    163(a) of title 10 further provides that the President may direct
    communications to combatant commanders be transmitted through the CJCS
    and may assign duties to the Chairman to assist the President and the
    Secretary of Defense in performing their command function.
        Do you believe that these provisions facilitate a clear and
    effective chain of command?
        Answer. The current chain of command provides a clear and effective
    means for employing our Nation's military. The combatant commanders,
    under the orders of the Secretary of Defense, fight our wars and
    conduct military operations around the world. As the principal military
    advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman
    provides a vital link between the President, the Secretary of Defense,
    the combatant commander, and the Service Chiefs. If confirmed, I may
    inform decisions and transmit directions, but there will be no question
    that the combatant commanders receive their orders from the Secretary
    of Defense.
        Question. The recent successful mission against Osama bin Laden was
    executed using military forces of DOD, under the control of the Central
    Intelligence Agency, and presumably under the authorities in title 10,
    U.S.C.
        Are there circumstances in which you believe it is appropriate for
    U.S. military forces to be under the operational command or control of
    an authority outside the chain of command established under title 10,
    U.S.C.?
        Answer. I believe the chain of command established by title 10 is
    the appropriate mechanism for the command and control of military
    operations. Without commenting on the bin Laden operation in
    particular, it is my understanding that in general there are
    circumstances in which military capabilities should be made available
    temporarily to support an activity of a non-DOD U.S. Government
    department or agency. In these instances, it is appropriate for the
    head of such department or agency to direct the operations of the
    element providing that military support. The President remains at the
    top of the chain of command and at all times has overall command and
    responsibility for the operation. The military units supporting such an
    operation are still governed by the laws of armed conflict and, as an
    administrative matter, the military personnel remain accountable to the
    military chain of command, including for matters of discipline under
    the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
        Question. In your view, what are the advantages, disadvantages, and
    risks, if any, in utilizing U.S. military personnel for missions under
    the authorities contained in title 50, U.S.C.
        Answer. Non-DOD Federal departments and agencies may, in carrying
    out their duties, occasionally require support that resides in the U.S.
    Armed Forces and does not exist in the department or agency conducting
    the operation. It sometimes is therefore preferable to make an
    appropriate military capability temporarily available to support the
    operations of other departments and agencies. The advantage of this
    authority is that it allows for specialization and division of labor
    across departments and agencies and can prevent the development of
    under-utilized, military-like capabilities in other agencies. A
    potential disadvantage or risk is of sharing capabilities is that the
    department or agency receiving the support may not be sufficiently
    organized, trained, or equipped to most effectively direct the
    employment of the military capability. In all cases, however, we work
    to minimize any disadvantages and risk.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
    authorities and agreements which are in place to allow U.S. military
    personnel to carry out missions under the authorities contained in
    title 50, U.S.C.? Do you believe any modifications to these authorities
    are necessary?
        Answer. As noted above, consistent with title 50 of the U.S.C., the
    President may authorize departments, agencies, or entities of the U.S.
    Government to participate in or support intelligence activities. As
    stated above, military personnel in support of any such activities
    remain subject to the laws of armed conflict and the Uniform Code of
    Military Justice while operating under the direction of the head of a
    non-DOD Federal department or agency. I believe that existing
    authorities are sufficient to facilitate DOD's providing appropriate
    support under title 50 while ensuring necessary oversight.
        Question. Please explain your views on the preferred chain of
    command structure for counter terrorism operations conducted outside of
    Iraq and Afghanistan.
        Answer. I believe the chain of command established under title 10
    is appropriate for command of U.S. military operations regardless of
    the location. The determination of whether chain of command structure
    for a specific counterterrorism operation is appropriate will depend on
    the nature of the contemplated operation and the circumstances specific
    to the time and place of that operation.
           advice of the service chiefs and the combatant commanders
        Question. Section 163 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the CJCS
    serves as the spokesman for the combatant commanders, especially on the
    operational requirements of their commands. Section 151 of title 10
    provides for the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit
    their advice or opinion, in disagreement with or in addition to the
    advice or opinion of the Chairman, and requires the Chairman to provide
    that advice at the same time that he presents his own advice to the
    President, National Security Council, or Secretary of Defense.
        What changes to section 151 or 163, if any, do you think may be
    necessary to ensure that the views of the individual Service Chiefs and
    of the combatant commanders are presented and considered?
        Answer. I believe the legislation is well-crafted and is sufficient
    to ensure that differing viewpoints are offered to our national
    leadership, while preserving the Chairman's role as the principal
    military advisor. It has been my experience that this relationship
    works well, and I see no need to change the law. If confirmed, I will
    maintain the very effective and collaborative environment that
    currently exists.
        Question. Do you believe the Chief of the National Guard Bureau
    should be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Please explain your
    position.
        Answer. While I am open-minded to the possibility, I have
    significant concerns about this proposal. The Services have never been
    closer to their Reserve components, and separating them by title risks
    creating unnecessary friction in the ranks. Furthermore, the authority
    of the Service Chiefs is built on the foundation of their budget
    responsibility. Stated another way, they are accountable for the
    military advice they provide by virtue of their control of their
    Service budgets. The Chief of National Guard, if appointed as a member
    of the JCS, will have authority without accountability. This would
    concern me.
                        security strategies and guidance
        Question. In your view, is the Nation's defense strategy
    appropriate for the threats we face today and could face in the coming
    decades?
        Answer. I believe the strategy is appropriate for the threats we
    face today, although I am alert to concerns that it might be under-
    resourced over the mid- to long-term. It is my understanding that the
    ongoing comprehensive review is being careful to ensure it is strategy-
    based and risk-informed. If confirmed, I will ensure that we clearly
    identify the specific risks commensurate with revised resource levels.
        Question. What changes, if any, should be considered?
        Answer. In my judgment, a good strategy is dynamic and adaptive to
    changes in the strategic environment the threat, and the needs of our
    Nation. I believe the existing strategy addresses known threats while
    posturing for less well-defined or understood threats and contingencies
    that might arise.
        Question. In your view, is our broad defense strategy and current
    establishment optimally structured, with the roles and missions of the
    military departments appropriately distributed, and U.S. forces
    properly armed, trained, and equipped to meet security challenges the
    Nation faces today and into the next decade?
        Answer. Overall, I would say yes, but I would also be careful about
    the word ``optimal'', because it implies some static ideal. I would say
    that as our strategy evolves, so too must our organizations,
    approaches, and forces. I think we do that well. We continually examine
    whether our forces are appropriate to the missions at hand. A recent
    example is the stand up of U.S. Cyber Command in response to challenges
    in cyberspace.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to
    the structure, roles, and missions of the defense establishment?
        Answer. The Defense Department conducts continuous security
    analysis that results in the periodic publication of strategic
    evaluations and plans intended to guide all elements of the defense
    establishment in its strategic and operational planning, programming
    and budgeting, and for the development and employment of military
    forces. These evaluations and plans include: the National Security
    Strategy, the National Strategy for Counterterrorism, the National
    Military Strategy, the Unified Command Plan, the Quadrennial Defense
    Review (QDR), the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review, the Nuclear
    Posture Review (NPR), the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, and the
    Global Defense Posture Review.
        If confirmed, I will examine our current status and provide my best
    military judgment on what needs to be adapted. Title 10 requires the
    Secretary to conduct a Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review and submit
    it to Congress prior to the budget submission in 2013. One of my
    statutory responsibilities will be to provide an assessment of roles,
    missions, and functions to inform that review. I would do so in
    collaboration with the Joint Chiefs and Combatant Commanders.
        Question. What is your assessment of the most current versions of
    these strategic evaluation, guidance, and report documents?
        Answer. My assessment is that these documents derive from a common
    understanding of a complex strategic environment, and that their
    strategy objectives and tasks are integrated, consistent, and
    appropriate to advancing U.S. national security. The simultaneity of
    the multiple reviews enhanced the ability for these reviews to
    complement each other. For example, the QDR was informed by early NPR
    findings.
        Question. What, in your view, is or should be the relationship, if
    any, of each document to the Department's annual and long range budget
    request and plans?
        Answer. Budget plans and requests must be informed by national
    strategies as strategies must be resource informed. The security
    strategies and guidance inform the Program, Planning, Budget, and
    Execution (PPBE) process and allow the Department to align resources
    with the execution of strategy, guidance, and policies. The PPBE
    process allows us to revisit decisions that need review due to changing
    world situations, and it enables the Department to adjust resources as
    needed.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to
    the strategic analysis and approval processes or to the reports and
    guidance contained in each?
        Answer. If confirmed, I do not anticipate recommending any
    immediate changes, but I retain the right to change my mind. The
    Department conducts rigorous strategic analysis, which informs
    strategic discussions and provides options. The approval processes
    ensures that multiple perspectives are captured prior to final
    direction being provided.
                                 strategic risk
        Question. Do you believe that the extended pace and scope of
    operations in Iraq and Afghanistan create increased levels of strategic
    risk for the United States based on the lack of available trained and
    ready forces for other contingencies?
        Answer. No. Our service men and women have gained enormous combat
    experience in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. I think our military and
    civilian leaders have managed the risks associated with our extended
    campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan well. That said, there are skills
    that have atrophied, and we must address them as time to train permits.
        Question. If so, how would you characterize the increase in
    strategic risk in terms of the military's ability to mobilize, deploy,
    and employ a force for a new contingency? In your view, is this level
    of risk acceptable?
        Answer. I believe the Services have done a tremendous job
    maintaining the readiness of our military to respond to contingencies--
    evidenced, in part, by our rapid ability to plan and execute military
    operations in Libya, respond to the earthquake and tsunami in Japan,
    and maintain a credible deterrence against potential aggressors across
    the globe. The temporary increases in end strength authorized by
    Congress played an important role in this, and recently, the drawdown
    in Iraq has made more forces available. I believe any risk we have
    assumed to be acceptable, because while training in some areas has
    suffered, our forces are actually the most experienced they have ever
    been. The focus now needs to be on resetting and reconstituting
    degrades capabilities.
        Question. What is the impact of the decision to decrease U.S.
    forces committed to Afghanistan on our ability to meet our security
    obligations in other parts of the world?
        Answer. We are meeting our current global security obligations.
    Given the size of the drawdown scheduled for this year and next year,
    there will be little initial impact on our ability to meet these
    obligations. As we reset and reconstitute our military, we will be
    better able to meet any additional and emergent security obligations.
        Question. How and over what periods of time, if at all, will
    reductions to Army and Marine Corps end strength increase or aggravate
    this risk?
        Answer. An unpredictable and/or hasty timeline to reduce ground
    forces would damage both the institution and increase military and
    strategic risks to the Nation. The current planned reductions and
    timelines, coupled with efficiency efforts are executable with what I
    consider acceptable risk.
        Question. If confirmed, what additional actions would you take, if
    any, to reduce or mitigate this strategic risk?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will address risks by advising on the
    employment of the Joint Force to maximum effect, working closely with
    allies and partners, and integrating coordinating to integrate military
    actions with other elements of national power. Furthermore, I would use
    my first annual risk assessment to clearly identify the risks that
    require mitigation.
                                 transformation
        Question. Military ``transformation'' has been a broad objective of
    the Armed Forces since the end of the Cold War.
        What is your understanding and assessment of the progress made by
    the Department, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint
    Staff, toward transforming the Armed Forces?
        Answer. Transformation can have many different meanings, but in
    general it implies fundamental organizational change. Such change has
    certainly occurred over the last decade even as we have preserved our
    core values and retained the trust of the American people. The Joint
    Force is more battle-tested and integrated across Services and
    components than at any time in our history. It has changed its
    structure, doctrine, education, exercises, training, material, leader
    focus, and posture to account for changing threats in diverse theaters.
    If confirmed, I will work to ensure we continue to change in a way that
    strengthens joint warfighting capabilities over time.
        Question. If confirmed, what goals, if any, would you establish
    regarding military transformation in the future?
        Answer. As we adjust our posture and missions in Iraq and
    Afghanistan, I would like to see a balanced force that is capable
    across the full spectrum of missions vice optimized for any particular
    mission set. If confirmed, I would also work to further advance
    affordable and versatile joint capabilities.
        Question. Do you believe the Joint Staff should play a larger role
    in transformation? If so, in what ways?
        Answer. The areas of concept development and experimentation,
    strategy development, requirements development, and the doctrine
    development processes. The assumption of many Joint Forces Command
    responsibilities will ensure that Joint Staff plays an even larger role
    in the future.
                               economic security
        Question. Current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Michael
    Mullen, asserted in January that the Pentagon's ``budget has basically
    doubled in the last decade. My own experience here is in that doubling,
    we've lost our ability to prioritize, to make hard decisions, to do
    tough analysis, to make trades.'' Most recently on July 10th, Admiral
    Mullen stated that ``the single-biggest threat to our national security
    is our debt''.
        Do you agree with Admiral Mullen's assessments regarding the
    relationship between U.S. security and debt?
        Answer. I wouldn't describe our economic condition as the single
    biggest threat to national security. There are a lot of clear and
    present threats to our security in the current operational environment.
    That said, there is unquestionably a relationship between U.S. security
    and the debt. However, national security didn't cause the debt crisis
    nor will it solve it. I agree that the national debt is a grave
    concern. Our national power is the aggregate of our diplomatic,
    military, and economic influence. We have to address our economic
    stature, but that doesn't mean we can neglect the other instruments of
    national power.
        Question. If so, in your view, how does this relationship impact
    the Defense Department and, if confirmed, what changes, if any, would
    you propose to ensure that, in building a military capable of meeting
    our strategic objectives, the defense budget does not at the same time
    undermine our national security?
        Answer. DOD is currently conducting a comprehensive review directed
    by the President to determine the strategic implications of a $400
    billion reduction in spending. If confirmed, I will focus on delivering
    the military force the Nation needs while endeavoring to be a good
    steward of our national resources.
        Question. Do you agree with Admiral Mullen that the Defense
    Department has lost the ability to prioritize and make the tradeoffs
    that come with tough decisions?
        Answer. Over the last decade in an era of relatively unconstrained
    resources, DOD has not had to make difficult decisions about budgetary
    tradeoffs. While we may have lost some of the ``muscle memory'' for
    such decision-making, I am confident we can adapt to a changing
    security and fiscal environment. If confirmed, I will build on current
    efforts to strengthen the analytical processes needed for making hard
    choices. More importantly, I will reinforce a culture of cost
    discipline that will ensure we remain good stewards of our national
    resources.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to
    regain the Department's ability to objectively analyze its
    requirements, prioritize to meet national security needs, and make the
    tough choices in allocating resources to meet those needs?
        Answer. The next Chairman--whoever he or she is--will clearly have
    to balance ends, ways, and means more proactively than his immediate
    predecessors to deliver a military that will meet the needs of the
    Nation. This is not about changing process; it's about managing change.
                      national security budget reductions
        Question. The President has called for $400 billion in reductions
    to security spending over a 10-year period starting in 2013, and has
    asked the Secretary of Defense to lead a review to provide
    recommendations on where to make those cuts.
        What is your understanding of the current status of that review?
        Answer. The review is ongoing. I participate in the review now as a
    Service Chief, and if confirmed, I welcome the opportunity to continue
    to collaborate with the Secretary of Defense, Service Chiefs, and
    combatant commanders to achieve a more affordable Joint Force.
        Question. What is your view as to how such cuts should be
    distributed among the various components of security spending?
        Answer. While some distribution of cuts among various components of
    security spending is both inevitable and appropriate, we should avoid
    simply making formulaic, across-the-board cuts. Reductions in one area
    have implications in others. Therefore, we must carefully calibrate
    cuts to ensure the result is a strengthened Joint Force. The precise
    distribution of cuts across components of security spending is still
    being determined, but I understand it to be a fundamental consideration
    for the ongoing review.
        Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in guiding
    the review and in determining what cuts, if any, should be made to the
    defense budget?
        Answer. If confirmed, I expect to play a prominent role in this
    review, and I will work closely with both the Secretary of Defense and
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide my best judgments on how what cuts
    should be made.
        Question. Do you believe that a national security spending
    reduction of this magnitude can be accomplished without significant
    adverse impact on our national security?
        Answer. The review is ongoing, and it will help inform the risks
    associated with prospective cuts to our defense budget. If confirmed, I
    will work with the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff to
    ensure an affordable Joint Force that meets our national security
    needs.
        Question. If confirmed, how will you prioritize the objectives of:
    making needed investments in the future force, addressing pressing
    requirements for completing the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan,
    meeting ongoing operational commitments across the globe, resetting of
    the force, and achieving the level of savings proposed by the
    President?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to prioritize funding to
    support our troops fighting in our conflicts abroad while helping to
    assure we are conducting operations in fiscally responsible manner.
    Given that the review is ongoing, I do not want to prejudge how to
    prioritize among the other categories listed; however, it is my
    judgment that we can achieve the level of proposed savings in a way
    that strengthens the Joint Force over time.
                             use of military force
        Question. The question as to whether and when U.S. forces should
    participate in the use of force is one of the most important and
    difficult decisions that the national command authorities have to make.
    Prior Secretaries of Defense and Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    have proposed criteria to guide decision-making for such situations.
        What factors would you consider in making recommendations to the
    President on the use of force?
        Answer. If confirmed, in making recommendations to the President on
    the use of force, I would consider the threat to our national
    interests, the role of non-military means to achieve our objectives,
    the ability of military means to contribute to our political
    objectives, and the likely outcome from the use of military force. If
    it is determined that the use of military force is appropriate, I would
    propose its use in a precise and principled manner. I would pursue the
    cooperation and assistance of our allies and partners and adhere to
    international standards and treaty agreements while still reserving the
    right to act alone if necessary.
        Question. What circumstances should pertain for you to recommend
    that the President employ preemptive force?
        Answer. If adversaries challenge our vital interests with the
    threat of force, and both deterrence and diplomacy fail, the United
    States must be prepared to consider preemptive force. If confirmed,
    some of the key factors I would consider in recommending the employment
    of preemptive force include the vital national interests at stake, the
    degree to which other options have been exhausted, the probability of
    an attack by our adversary, the potential results of the enemy attack,
    and the consequences of our preemptive action.
        Question. What degree of certainty do you believe is necessary
    before the United States would use preemptive force?
        Answer. While I believe the degree of certainty necessary before
    the United States should employ preemptive force should be high, it is
    not reasonable to articulate a pre-existing standard. Rather, it should
    take into account the imminence and severity of the threat and the
    likely outcomes of the use of preemptive force.
                                   dwell time
        Question. While dwell time is improving as our forces draw down in
    Iraq, many active duty military members are still not experiencing the
    dwell-time goal of 2 years at home for every year deployed.
        In your view, under what conditions and when will dwell-time
    objectives be met for the Active and Reserve components?
        Answer. All Services are making progress toward achieving objective
    dwell rates based on guidance issued in the Global Employment of Forces
    document. While the Army is now averaging about a 1:1 dwell time, we
    expect to reach 1:2 by the end of this year. I understand the other
    Services are at about 1:2 already and that dwell times will continue to
    improve for both the Active and Reserve components through fiscal years
    2012-2014. Our goal remains to optimize the quality of life for every
    soldier, sailor, airman, and marine while still meeting mission
    requirements. If confirmed, I will closely monitor this important
    issue.
                            active duty end strength
        Question. Under current planning, the Army will reduce its end
    strength by 22,000 through fiscal year 2013, including 7,400 in fiscal
    year 2012. This end strength was part of the temporary increase
    authorized in 2009 and was intended to enable the Army to cease relying
    on the so-called ``stop-loss'' authority and to make up for a growing
    population of nondeployable soldiers. Beginning in fiscal year 2015,
    depending on conditions on the ground, the Army and Marine Corps plan
    to reduce their permanent end strength and force structure by 27,000
    soldiers and at least 15,000 marines, respectively.
        Do you agree with this Active Duty end strength reduction plan?
        Answer. Yes. End strength reductions are conditions based and
    require periodic reevaluation. If confirmed, I will work with Secretary
    Panetta and support the Army leadership's plan to accomplish current
    and projected missions, balance the well-being of soldiers and
    families, and keep the Army prepared to meet unforeseen operational
    demands.
        Question. What is your view of how these planned end-strength
    reductions will affect dwell-time ratios?
        Answer. The planned end strength reductions are intended to take
    advantage of reduced demand to support ongoing operations in
    Afghanistan and Iraq. It is my understanding that if the draw-downs
    continue as planned, the end strength reductions should allow our
    forces to achieve and sustain acceptable dwell ratios.
        Question. What effect would inability to meet dwell-time objectives
    have on your decision to implement the planned end strength reductions?
        Answer. Should an unforeseen event change our assumptions about end
    strength assumptions, I would review all options and provide my best
    military advice in adapting existing plans.
        Question. In your view, can the Army accelerate to 2012 more of its
    planned reduction in its temporary over-strength without an adverse
    impact on national security?
        Answer. Army force structure is directly linked to the pace of
    ongoing operations. We will manage end strength reductions to ensure
    that we do not incur excessive risk. If confirmed, I will work closely
    with the Army and the Marine Corps to determine our appropriate end
    strength and the associated timing.
        Question. What would be the effect on dwell time of accelerating
    the Army's force reduction plan?
        Answer. Currently, our plans for end strength reductions are well
    integrated with our dwell-time projections. Any changes to current
    timelines for end strength reductions would need to be assessed against
    our current and projected operational requirements and our dwell-time
    goals.
        Question. What are the assumptions regarding ``conditions on the
    ground'' that will allow for the planned reductions beginning in 2015
    to occur on time?
        Answer. We're tracking the: (1) transition of tasks to our Afghan
    counterparts in the security forces and various government
    institutions; and (2) the responsible drawdown of our surge forces
    within the parameters set by the President. The planned reductions in
    end strength are based on achieving these drawdown objectives in
    Afghanistan. As 2014 approaches, we will have to assess our enduring
    strategic interests in the region to determine the appropriate size and
    nature of force presence in Afghanistan after 2014.
        Question. The Navy and Air Force appear to be on pace to exceed
    authorized strengths for fiscal year 2011, and to address this
    overstrength, the Department has requested congressional authorization
    of force management tools to avoid exceeding end strength limits and
    save money.
        In your view, what tools do the Department and Services need to get
    down to authorized strengths in the future, and which of these require
    congressional authorization?
        Answer. I am not yet familiar with the full extent to which the
    authorities used during previous force reductions have expired or will
    soon expire. If confirmed, I will work closely with the senior military
    and civilian leadership of the Department to identify any additional
    tools and associated legislation that may be needed to help us meet our
    authorized end strengths.
             institutionalization of counterinsurgency capabilities
        Question. The 2010 report of the QDR provided that military forces
    shall be sized to prevail in ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq,
    and the war against al Qaeda as well as for conducting foundational
    activities that prevent and deter attacks or the emergence of other
    threats. The QDR report particularly emphasizes the requirement for
    improved capabilities in key mission areas such as counterinsurgency,
    stability, and counterterrorism operations, as well as building the
    security capacity of partner states.
        What is your understanding and assessment of the current ability of
    each Service to provide capabilities to support these mission
    requirements and, if confirmed, what changes, if any, would you pursue
    to improve these capabilities?
        Answer. My belief is that we have adapted extraordinarily well.
    Over the past decade, our forces have made tremendous advances in
    developing their counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism
    capabilities. Leaders have put a tremendous amount of effort into
    actually learning and applying the lessons learned from operations in
    Iraq and Afghanistan. Just as I did during my tenure with Training and
    Doctrine Command, it is my understanding that all the Services are
    continuously incorporating those lessons into doctrine and training
    regimes. In turn, these lessons are being adapted by our forces in
    combat, as I witnessed on more than one occasion in Iraq. If confirmed,
    I will continue to support those recurring and continuous improvement
    efforts that bring the right mix of capabilities and force structure to
    address future requirements. I will also continue to assess and balance
    risk across the spectrum of operations.
        Question. A major objective of the Department over recent years, as
    well as guidance in the QDR report, has been toward increasing emphasis
    on and institutionalization of lower-end, irregular, counterinsurgency,
    and stability type operations.
        What is your understanding and assessment of the Department's
    efforts to date to institutionalize and support these capabilities?
        Answer. During over 10 years of continuous operations in these
    areas, DOD has made remarkable progress toward developing and
    institutionalizing joint capabilities for irregular warfare,
    counterinsurgency, and stability operations. We have further supported
    these capabilities by adopting lessons learned and resetting and
    maintaining the equipment that facilitates those operations. The United
    States will continue to face challenges from non-state adversaries and
    regions threatened by terrorist or insurgent violence. If confirmed, I
    will closely examine our efforts to develop the right capabilities at
    the right price effectively counter these threats.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to redistribute the
    Department's efforts and resources, if at all, to ensure that the force
    is prepared for force-on-force combat at the same time it increases and
    institutionalizes capabilities and support for irregular,
    counterinsurgency, and stability operations?
        Answer. The 2010 QDR recognized the need to balance future military
    capabilities to meet a broad range of threats across a wide spectrum of
    adversary capabilities and operating environments. In a period of
    potentially significant budget constraints, it will be imperative to
    appropriately balance risk across the spectrum of potential operations.
    If confirmed, I will support existing and ongoing efforts and processes
    to assess the impact of these constraints and ensure our forces retain
    the appropriate size and mix of capabilities. I am committed to
    preserving the appropriate mix of hard-won, joint capabilities and
    experiences for our decade-plus of war.
                           defense acquisition reform
        Question. Two years ago, Congress enacted, without a dissenting
    vote in either House, the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act
    (WSARA). WSARA is designed to ensure that new defense acquisition
    programs start on a sound footing, to avoid the high cost of fixing
    problems late in the acquisition process.
        What are your views regarding WSARA and the need for improvements
    in the Defense acquisition process?
        Answer. I welcome WSARA. WSARA mandated much needed reforms to the
    defense acquisition process. I support its requirements for DOD to
    examine cost, schedule and performance trade-offs to reduce cost-
    growth. I am also aware that DOD has pursued significant additional
    improvements to the acquisition process to include examining the
    requirements process. If confirmed, I will not only work to implement
    the changes required by law, but I will continue to pursue improvements
    to defense acquisitions processes.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you improve all three aspects of
    the acquisition process B requirements, acquisition, and budgeting?
        Answer. The 2009 Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act was an
    important step forward in improving defense acquisition. It is my
    understanding, that DOD has made significant progress toward
    implementing its requirements and achieving our shared interest in
    deriving better value for every dollar spent. I fully support the DOD
    ``Better Buying Power'' initiative to coordinate the requirements,
    acquisition, and budget processes in a way that mandates affordable
    requirements to ensure programs start from a solid foundation. If
    confirmed, I would work to enhance the quality of interaction among
    these processes and promote greater participation by the warfighter
    throughout the acquisition lifecycle.
        Question. Do you believe that the current investment budget for
    major systems is affordable given increasing historic cost growth in
    major systems, costs of current operations, and asset recapitalization?
        Answer. While I am not yet familiar with the entirety of the
    defense budget, my sense is that the current investment budget for
    major systems is not affordable in this fiscal and operational
    environment. Certain progress was made on this front under the
    leadership of Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen leading to a leaner
    major weapons system portfolio. But, we are not finished pursuing cost
    control and affordability. Given historic cost growth and current
    budget pressures, we must closely manage existing programs, and start
    new programs smartly, so that cost growth does not make them
    unaffordable. If confirmed, I will continue to examine the investment
    budget closely for opportunities to achieve greater cost savings and
    improve overall weapon systems affordability.
        Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue and
    guard against the potential impact of weapon systems cost growth?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will address weapons system cost growth in
    several mutually supportive ways. I will directly leverage the Joint
    Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) ``trip-wire'' process to monitor
    for cost growth and schedule delays in Major Defense Acquisition
    Programs. This process also helps ensure I am prepared to properly
    advise the Secretary of Defense with regard to the Nunn-McCurdy
    certification process and participate in the still maturing
    Configuration Steering Boards. Additionally, balancing system
    performance and cost will continue to be a central goal of the ongoing
    Joint Capabilities Integration and Development process review. Program
    and portfolio affordability will be important factors in performance
    trade-off decisions.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you propose, if any, to
    ensure that requirements are realistic, and prioritized?
        Answer. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011
    implemented requirements process changes that I would allow to mature
    if confirmed. For example, the addition of combatant commanders as
    voting members of the JROC is proving its value to ensure that Service
    and Joint priorities are properly aligned. A further improvement is the
    requirement that JROC validations specify cost, schedule, performance,
    and quantity to ensure we get the capabilities we need in a responsive
    and reasonable timeframe. As the Joint Capabilities Integration and
    Development Systems (JCIDS) review goes forward, I anticipate several
    reform recommendations that will improve our ability to establish
    increasingly realistic and properly prioritized requirements.
                         contractors on the battlefield
        Question. U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have
    relied on contractor support to a greater degree than previous U.S.
    military operations. According to widely published reports, the number
    of U.S. contractor employees in Iraq and Afghanistan has often exceeded
    the number of U.S. military deployed in those countries.
        Do you believe that DOD has become too dependent on contractor
    support for military operations?
        Answer. While I am not yet in a position to render a judgment about
    whether we have become too dependent on contractors, my instincts
    suggest that this is the case. Recently as a result of a study by the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense issued a
    memorandum to DOD directing a wide range of changes to improve
    operational contracting support along with guidance for the assessment
    high-risk contracted capabilities. If confirmed, I will review this
    study and the military departments' assessments.
        Question. What risks do you see in the Department's reliance on
    such contractor support? What steps do you believe the Department
    should take to mitigate such risk?
        Answer. The most significant risk is in contract oversight. DOD's
    recent experience supporting contingency operations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan has shown that poor contractor management can increase the
    potential for fraud, waste, and abuse. Additionally, interaction of
    contractors with local communities, along with their potential use of
    force, has a direct impact on the operational mission. Therefore, it is
    imperative for DOD to properly plan for, use, and manage contractors in
    the operational environment. As with any situation, understanding the
    current problems and their risks are the first step in mitigation. It
    is my judgment that the CJCS and the Secretary of Defense have set the
    department on the right path and if confirmed, I look forward to
    reviewing ongoing assessments and continuing efforts to improve the use
    and oversight of contractors.
        Question. Do you believe the Department is appropriately organized
    and staffed to effectively manage contractors on the battlefield?
        Answer. I'm not sure. I recognize that initially DOD was not
    properly organized and staffed to effectively manage contractors in the
    ongoing contingency operations, but corrective actions have been
    implemented over the last several years. Operational contracting
    support efforts will enhance our ability to modify the way we source
    and oversee contracting. If confirmed, I will review ongoing efforts to
    ensure that DOD institutionalizes its contingency contracting
    capabilities and that the lessons learned from our experiences in Iraq
    and Afghanistan are applied to future operations.
        Question. What steps if any do you believe the Department should
    take to improve its management of contractors on the battlefield?
        Answer. DOD has made significant progress in institutionalizing
    effective management of contractors during contingency operations
    through several ongoing efforts. DOD's management of contractors on the
    battlefield has evolved from a more reactionary approach toward pro-
    active theater-wide management. As an example, DOD stood up Task Force
    2010 and Task Force Spotlight to improve contractor management and
    oversight in Afghanistan. Furthermore, we are using the task force
    efforts to shape how the department will continue the
    institutionalization of contractor management in future operations. If
    confirmed, I will review these efforts and ensure they are adequate and
    effective, and I will continue to champion effective management
    processes.
        Question. Do you believe DOD and other Federal agencies should rely
    upon contractors to perform security functions that may reasonably be
    expected to require the use of deadly force in highly hazardous public
    areas in an area of combat operations?
        Answer. Based on current force structure and the level of
    operations tempo, the use of contractors for some security functions is
    necessary. We can mitigate the risk that this accrues if we properly
    plan for contractor use and have a clear designation of their mission
    and assigned tasks. Furthermore, we must ensure they have the necessary
    skills and training to perform these tasks. Finally, we must have the
    proper oversight in place. Contractor use of force should remain
    limited to self-defense and the defense of others against criminal
    violence and the protection of critical property. With proper planning,
    contractor capability, and government oversight, I think that the
    limited use of security contractors by DOD in contingency operations is
    acceptable. It would be inappropriate for me to comment on their use by
    other departments. If confirmed, I will ensure that proper limitations
    on DOD private security contractors are in place and enforced.
        Question. In your view, has the U.S. reliance upon private security
    contractors to perform such functions risked undermining our defense
    and foreign policy objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan?
        Answer. No. The use of contractors to perform security functions
    remains a viable DOD option and has been necessary in Iraq and
    Afghanistan. As with all security forces, the inappropriate use of
    force remains the greatest risk to our policy objectives. Contracted
    private security, used correctly with proper management and oversight,
    preserves DOD's ability to achieve defense and foreign policy
    objectives. If confirmed, I welcome the opportunity to continue to
    examine and improve DOD's procedures to manage and provide oversight of
    these contractors.
        Question. What steps, if any, would you take, if confirmed, to
    ensure that any private security contractors who may continue to
    operate in an area of combat operations act in a responsible manner,
    consistent with U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work to further institutionalize two
    primary initiatives already underway. First, the use of private
    security contractors in any area of combat operations must be fully
    planned, coordinated, and synchronized with the Joint Force Commander
    of the designated area of responsibility. Furthermore, commanders on
    the ground must have the authority and flexibility to restrict security
    contractors' as the operations dictate. Second, we must continue to
    hold private security contractors accountable and work with our host
    nation partners to ensure rigorous licensing procedures and enforcement
    of their laws.
        Question. Do you support the extension of the Military
    Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act to private security contractors of
    all Federal agencies?
        Answer. Individuals who provide support to U.S. agencies in our
    vital missions overseas should not be allowed to operate with legal
    protection. They should be held accountable for any criminal activity.
    This is especially true as we work to support the Rule of Law in
    operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. If confirmed, I would support
    further study in order to investigate the most effective legal method
    to ensure private security contractor accountability.
        Question. What is your view of the appropriate application of the
    Uniform Code of Military Justice to employees of private security
    contractors operating in an area of combat operations?
        Answer. Individuals who provide support to the U.S. military
    operations as private security contractors should not be allowed to
    operate with impunity. They should be held accountable for any criminal
    activity. This is especially true as we work to support the Rule of Law
    in Iraq and Afghanistan. If confirmed, I will remain open to all
    recommendations for ensuring accountability of private contractors.
                                  future army
        Question. In a speech at West Point last February, former Secretary
    Gates argued that it is unlikely that the Nation will commit large land
    forces to future conflicts, and that the Army must ``confront the
    reality that the most plausible, high-end scenarios for the U.S.
    military [will be] primarily naval and air engagements.'' The Army's
    first major challenge, he stated, is ``how will it structure itself--
    how will it train and equip--for the extraordinarily diverse range of
    missions it will face in the future?'' Former Chief of Staff of the
    Army, General George Casey Jr., said he expected that over the next 10
    years we will still have 50,000 to 100,000 soldiers deployed in combat.
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Michael Mullen said that for
    planning purposes the Department assumes 6 to 10 combat brigades will
    likely be deployed.
        Do you agree that high-end military operations will primarily be
    naval and air engagements such that the Army will have difficulty
    justifying the size, structure, and cost of its heavy formations?
        Answer. I believe that the strength of our military is in the
    synergy and interdependence of the joint force. My experience of 37
    years suggests that single-component solutions to security challenges
    is at best risky and at worst foolhardy.
        Question. In your view, what are the most important considerations
    or criteria for aligning the Army's size, structure, and cost with
    strategy and resources?
        Answer. Our Nation needs a versatile Army that can conduct
    operations across the spectrum of conflict. We need an Army that can
    win conventional fights, remains adept at conducting counterinsurgency
    and stability operations, and that can work shoulder to shoulder with
    the ground forces of our partner states to impart the necessary skills
    that can help them bring security and stability to their own countries
    and regions. I understand that some tradeoffs across the force may be
    required to meet cost-savings goal. If confirmed, I will work closely
    with military and civilian leaders to balance these risks and help
    develop a versatile Army for a versatile Joint Force.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to
    properly align the Army's size and structure with the requirements of
    security strategies and the likely availability of resources?
        Answer. Our Army, like our other Services, must provide options to
    the national command authority. It must be responsive, decisive,
    versatile, interdependent, and affordable. In sizing it, we must
    address three fundamental questions: what do you want it to do, how
    often, and for how long. This requires a comprehensive analysis of the
    security environment and a detailed assessment of the relationship of
    the Active, Guard, and Reserve components.
                           tactical fighter programs
        Question. Perhaps the largest modernization effort that we will
    face over the next several years is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
    program to modernize our tactical aviation forces with fifth generation
    tactical aircraft equipped with stealth technology.
        Based on current and projected threats, what are your views on the
    requirements for and timing of these programs?
        Answer. The Department has the necessary fighter aircraft capacity
    in the near-term to support our Nation's security needs. Based on the
    current and projected threats, I am convinced that we must transition
    to a fifth generation tactical aviation capability across the U.S.
    Military Services.
        Question. What is your assessment of whether the restructuring of
    the JSF program that we have seen over the past 2 years will be
    sufficient to avoid having to make major adjustments in ether cost or
    schedule in the future?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the issues with the JSF program
    have been addressed through a deliberate requirements and acquisition
    review process. A high level plan was approved in January 2011, and the
    program expects to deliver a fully compliant weapon system. If
    confirmed, I will closely monitor the progress of the program to ensure
    affordability.
                             information assurance
        Question. Protection of military networks, information, and
    communications is critical to DOD operations.
        What is your understanding and assessment of the cyber security
    posture of the Department's critical information systems?
        Answer. The DOD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (DSOC) lays
    out a roadmap for DOD to effectively conduct the defense of critical
    information systems and strengthen overall cyber security. The
    Department is working aggressively with national agencies to assess
    current and future threats while ensuring the availability, integrity,
    and confidentiality of critical information systems.
        Question. What Department-wide policies, guidance, or changes in
    legislation do you believe are necessary to address information and
    cyber security challenges for current and future systems?
        Answer. DOD recently released the first DOD Strategy for Operating
    in Cyberspace which addresses information and cyber security challenges
    along with the ways and means for employing defense capabilities to
    meet these challenges. Furthermore, I understand that DOD supports the
    administration's recommendations for cyber legislation recently
    provided to Congress. If confirmed, I will work with the administration
    to provide recommendations to Congress on any additional legislation
    that may be required to address information and cyber security
    challenges.
                           ballistic missile defense
        Question. In September 2009, President Obama announced that he had
    accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff to pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to
    missile defense in Europe. This approach is intended to defend all of
    Europe against existing and emerging threats from Iranian missiles,
    starting this year and increasing in capability with each of its four
    phases. Phase 4 of the European PAA is intended to provide a capability
    to defend against future long-range missiles from Iran, including those
    that could reach the United States, thus augmenting the existing
    homeland missile defense capability.
        Do you support the Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense in
    Europe?
        Answer. I support the President's policy on European Phased
    Adaptive Approach (EPAA).
        Question. In February 2010, the Defense Department issued its
    report on the first-ever comprehensive review of U.S. ballistic missile
    defense policy and strategy, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review
    (BMDR), as required by Congress. The BMDR established a number of
    policy priorities, including establishing defense against near-term
    regional missile threats as a top priority of missile defense plans,
    programs and capabilities. It also stated the policy of sustaining and
    enhancing the ability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system to
    defend the homeland against attack by a small number of long-range
    missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran, and of hedging
    against future uncertainties.
        Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth
    in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review and, if confirmed, will you
    implement them?
        Answer. I support the administration's policies, strategies, and
    priorities in concert with this review. If confirmed, I will implement
    the policies set forth including those that sustain and enhance our
    Nation's defense while increasing our capability against the growing
    regional threats.
        Question. The two most recent flight tests of the Ground-based
    Midcourse Defense (GMD) system failed to intercept their targets. The
    Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has formed a Failure
    Review Board to determine the root cause of the most recent failure and
    will devise a plan to correct it, including two flight tests to confirm
    the correction. Until the second flight test confirms the correction,
    the Director of MDA has suspended production of the Exoatmospheric Kill
    Vehicles (EKVs) of the type that failed last year's flight tests, in
    order to ensure that those EKVs do not contain a flaw that would need
    to be corrected later.
        Do you agree that it is essential to correct the problem that
    caused the December 2010 flight test failure, and to verify the success
    of that correction through extensive testing, including flight testing,
    before continuing production and delivery of additional EKVs for the
    GMD system?
        Answer. I agree that it is essential to have confidence and
    reliability in the EKVs prior to continuing production in order to
    control costs and ensure the United States has an effective missile
    defense system.
        Question. Do you support the continued modernization and
    sustainment of the GMD system?
        Answer. Yes. The GMD system currently protects the United States
    from the threat of a limited ICBM attack. It is important to maintain
    this advantage by continuing to improve the GMD system.
        Question. The United States and NATO are seeking options to
    cooperate with Russia on missile defense. President Obama has announced
    that such cooperation would not limit U.S. or NATO missile defense
    capabilities.
        Do you agree that such cooperation could enhance the security of
    the United States, NATO, and Russia against common missile threats from
    nations such as Iran?
        Answer. Yes. Russia's cooperation could improve the effectiveness
    of U.S. and NATO missile defenses as well as those of the Russian
    Federation. An effective multi-partner ballistic missile defense system
    has the potential to deter aggression and strengthen regional security.
        Question. What do you believe would be the security benefits, if
    any, of such missile defense cooperation, and what types of cooperation
    do you believe would be beneficial?
        Answer. Cooperation could result in tangible benefits to the United
    States, Europe, and Russia in the form of a more robust common defense
    against missile threats, which could strengthen strategic stability and
    transparency. U.S. cooperation with Russia along the lines of shared
    early warning of missile launches, technical exchanges, operational
    cooperation and planning, and joint exercises would be mutually
    beneficial.
        Question. Do you agree that irrespective of Russian objections, the
    United States is committed to the continued development and deployment
    of United States missile defense systems, including qualitative and
    quantitative improvements to such systems?
        Answer. Yes, the United States is committed to continued
    development, improvement, and deployment of U.S. missile defense
    systems in order to enhance our defense capabilities. Cooperation with
    Russia on missile defense has the potential to enhance U.S and NATO
    security.
                                     space
        Question. China's test of an anti-satellite weapon in 2007 was a
    turning point for the United States in its policies and procedure to
    ensure access to space. As a nation heavily dependent on space assets
    for both military and economic advantage, protection of space assets
    became a national priority.
        Do you agree that space situational awareness and protection of
    space assets should be a national security priority?
        Answer. Yes. Space situational awareness underpins our ability to
    operate safely in an increasingly congested space environment. It is
    vital that the United States protect national space assets to maintain
    the benefits and advantages dependent on our access to space.
        Question. In your view should China's continued development of
    space systems inform U.S. space policy and programs?
        Answer. Yes. The United States should ensure its space policy and
    programs address China's continued development of space systems as well
    as systems of other space-faring nations. Our National Security Space
    Strategy acknowledges space is vital to U.S. national security and our
    ability to understand emerging threats, project power globally, conduct
    operations, support diplomatic efforts, and enable the global economy.
    We are and should seek opportunities to co-operate in space and lead in
    the formation of rules and behaviors for benefit of all nations. I
    support development of U.S. space capabilities which preserve the use
    of space for the United States and our allies, while promoting the
    principles of the 2010 National Space Policy.
        Question. If confirmed would you propose any changes to National
    Security space policy and programs?
        Answer. I am not in a position to recommend any proposed changes at
    this time. If confirmed, I would continue implementation of the
    President's 2010 National Space Policy and the supporting National
    Security Space Strategy.
        The Federal Communications Commission is currently considering
    licensing a telecommunications provider who plans on using a signal
    that has the potential to interfere with GPS signals and GPS receivers.
        Question. If confirmed, would you look into this matter to
    understand the impact of the proposal to national security GPS signals
    receivers and commercial receivers used by the national security
    community?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Joint Staff is currently
    reviewing this issue, and if confirmed, I will ensure continued
    emphasis. We are committed to working within DOD and with various
    government agencies and the FCC to ensure that GPS remains a secure and
    reliable national asset.
        Question. What is your view on weapons in space and the merits of
    establishing an international agreement establishing rules of the road
    for space operations?
        Answer. I support the principles outlined in the 2010 National
    Space Policy, which states that the United States will pursue bilateral
    and multilateral transparency and confidence-building measures to
    encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, space. I
    understand the Department is currently evaluating the European Union's
    proposed international Code of Conduct for Outer Space as a pragmatic
    first set of guidelines for safe activities in space. If confirmed, I
    look forward to continuing this evaluation for space operations.
                               strategic systems
        Question. Over the next 5 years DOD will begin to replace or begin
    studies to replace all of the strategic delivery systems. For the next
    15 plus years, DOD will also have to sustain the current strategic
    nuclear enterprise. This will be a very expensive undertaking.
        Do you have any concerns about the ability of the Department to
    afford the costs of nuclear systems modernization while meeting the
    rest of the DOD commitments?
        Answer. I share the President's and the Secretary's commitment to
    maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
    Sustainment of our nuclear deterrent requires modernization of delivery
    systems and life extension programs (LEP) for warheads. Successfully
    accomplishing this will require balancing our current commitments with
    our national interests and strategic priorities.
        Question. If confirmed will you review the modernization and
    replacement programs to ensure that they are cost effective?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support our commitment to
    sustaining and modernizing a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
    deterrent that supports strategic stability in an efficient and cost
    effective manner while strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring
    allies and partners.
                               readiness funding
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the methods
    currently used for estimating the funding needed for the maintenance of
    military equipment?
        Answer. Each of the Military Services uses costing models to
    estimate funding for maintenance of equipment at various levels of
    readiness, including support of overseas contingency operations. Their
    estimates are based on readiness metrics such as system miles, steaming
    hours, or flying hours. It is also my understanding that the Joint
    Staff evaluates readiness across the Joint Force.
        Question. Do you believe that we need an increased investment to
    reduce the backlog in equipment maintenance and improve readiness?
        Answer. My primary concern is with reset funding for equipment
    readiness that currently comes out of Overseas Contingency Operations
    (OCO) funding. If confirmed, I will examine this issue further. At this
    juncture, however, it is my understanding that we will need OCO funding
    2 years after the end of the conflict in order to ensure all equipment
    is reset. Without OCO funding, there will be significant pressure on
    the base budget maintenance accounts to cover those costs, which could
    impact long-term readiness.
                          operational energy budgeting
        Question. The committee recently received the fiscal year 2012
    budget certification report from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Operational Energy Plans and Programs. The certification report
    highlighted several failures by the Services to fund significant energy
    efficiency and renewable energy programs, such as: smart and green
    energy (SAGE), tactical fuel managers defense (TFMD), near-term and
    mid-term modifications to legacy systems to increase efficiency and
    reduce operational energy demand, and tent foaming efforts at forward
    operating bases.
        Do you believe the Department should increase funding for
    operational energy requirements, renewable energy opportunities, and
    energy efficiency demands?
        Answer. My understanding is that DOD certified the 2012 budget
    submission as adequate to implement operational energy strategic goals.
    As identified by DOD's Operational Energy Strategy, many operational
    energy improvements do not necessarily require increased funding and
    could ultimately save DOD money. If confirmed, I plan to closely
    monitor the implementation of the Operational Energy Strategy. Overall,
    I think DOD needs to improve the incorporation of energy considerations
    into our strategic planning and force development processes. In doing
    so, the Department will inherently make investments in energy
    efficiency, alternative energy, and reliability to increase operational
    effectiveness.
                                      iraq
        Question. What do you believe are the major lessons learned from
    the Iraq invasion and the ongoing effort to stabilize the country?
        Answer. Perhaps the most important lesson is that our country must
    remain prepared for the difficult work that occurs in the wake of major
    combat. Future strategic and force sizing constructs must account for
    all phases of conflict. We must plan and train with our civilian
    counterparts and be prepared to operate effectively both at peace and
    during post combat. Furthermore, our political objectives are best
    achieved when all the instruments of national power are coordinated
    toward a common purpose. Finally, I am reminded of the importance of
    working with allies and partners, none more important than the host
    nation populace, in order to attain our objectives.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the
    Department's adaptations or changes in policy, programs, force
    structure, or operational concepts based upon these lessons learned?
        Answer. The Iraq War has led to deep and wide-ranging changes in
    all of the areas listed above. For example, the Department better
    understands and is better at Irregular Warfare and Stability
    Operations. Our shared goal across the Department is to learn and apply
    these important lessons and experiences to strengthen the Joint Force.
    The military has demonstrated the ability to learn and adapt across
    many areas, and if confirmed, I will continue to integrate that
    valuable knowledge into future doctrine, training, and readiness.
        Question. If confirmed, what additional changes, if any, would you
    propose making to policy, programs, force structure, or operating
    concepts based on the lessons of combat and stability operations in
    Iraq?
        Answer. Simply stated, we must learn faster and understand more
    deeply than our adversaries. If confirmed, I will closely monitor the
    process by which lessons translate into the development of the Joint
    Force.
        Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation
    in Iraq?
        Answer. The overall security situation is relatively stable. I am
    concerned about increased violence in southern Iraq, about the
    inability of the Iraqi Government to appoint security ministers, and
    about the enduring potential for Arab-Kurd violence in Kirkuk and
    Mosul.
        Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda
    in Iraq?
        Answer. Al Qaeda in Iraq still poses a significant threat within
    Iraq. Al Qaeda in Iraq continues to pursue an attack strategy focused
    on Iraqi government officials and security forces personnel, Shia
    civilians, and Sunnis who oppose the terrorist group's agenda. However,
    the ISF demonstrates improving counter-terrorism capability and the
    capacity for maintaining internal security despite occasional high-
    profile attacks.
        Question. What are the main challenges to stability and security in
    Iraq over the coming months?
        Answer. In the coming months, the main threats to Iraqi stability
    and security are attacks by Sadrist and Iran-sponsored forces against
    departing U.S. forces and the unresolved status of territories claimed
    by the Kurdistan Regional Government.
        Question. Do you support the current plan for the drawdown of U.S.
    forces from Iraq consistent with the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement of
    2008 signed by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki?
        Answer. I support the current plan for the drawdown of U.S. forces
    from Iraq in accordance with the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. It
    is important that we fulfill our obligations under this bilateral
    agreement, and we are on track to complete the drawdown by December 31,
    2011.
        Question. Responsibility and authority for lead U.S. agency in Iraq
    is scheduled this year to transition from DOD to Department of State
    (DOS). By October 2011, the Department of State is supposed to achieve
    an initial operating capability as lead agency and achieve full
    operating capability by December.
        What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the planning
    and progress on executing this transition from DOD to DOS? In your
    view, what are the sources of greatest risk, if any, to the current
    plan and successful implementation of this transition?
        Answer. My understanding is that the transition from the DOD and
    DOS is on schedule. The DOD, DOS, and other agencies have undertaken
    unprecedented levels of coordination and planning for the transition in
    Iraq. As one would expect with a transition of this scope and
    complexity, challenges exist, but it is my understanding that we are
    collaborating well to overcome them in order to meet our objectives. Of
    concern, failure to support fiscal year 2012 State Department budget
    requirements for Iraq increases the risk for a successful transition of
    responsibilities.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to
    the current plan or actions for implementation of the transition?
        Answer. I wouldn't anticipate any changes at present but will
    remain vigilant.
        Question. In your view, what will be the nature of the U.S.-Iraq
    strategic relationship after December 31, 2011?
        Answer. In my judgment, a long-term strategic partnership with Iraq
    is in our national interest. As stated by the President, we support an
    Iraq that is sovereign and self-reliant; that has a just,
    representative and accountable government; that denies support and safe
    haven to terrorists; that is integrated into the global economy; and
    that contributes to regional peace and security. All these elements of
    our desired strategic relationship with Iraq were codified in the 2008
    Strategic Framework Agreement. If confirmed, it is my intention to
    closely monitor the status and help to advance our relationship.
        Question. If the Government of Iraq were to ask for the continued
    presence in Iraq of U.S. forces beyond the end of 2011, would you
    support the deployment or retention of additional troops in Iraq beyond
    the current deadline for U.S. troop withdrawal?
        Answer. I am not in a position to recommend such a proposal at this
    time. If confirmed, I would provide my best military advice to the
    Secretary of Defense and President after considering all relevant
    factors.
        Question. What do you see as the greatest challenges for that
    relationship over the coming years?
        Answer. The greatest challenges will be maintaining U.S. engagement
    and support for Iraq during a time of change. Recent turmoil in the
    broader Middle East highlights the importance of active U.S. engagement
    and maintaining strategic partnerships with regional partners based on
    mutual interests and mutual respect. We must maintain focus on Iraq in
    order to advance broader U.S. objectives of peace and security in the
    region.
                        stability and support operations
        Question. The U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has
    underscored the importance of planning and training to prepare for the
    conduct and support of stability and support operations in post-
    conflict situations.
        In your view, what are the appropriate roles and responsibilities
    of DOD and other departments and agencies of the Federal Government in
    the planning and conduct of stability operations?
        Answer. In my judgment, stability operations are a core U.S.
    military mission which we should be prepared to conduct with a
    proficiency equivalent to combat operations. Stability operations cut
    across all phases of conflict. The military often operates in a
    supporting role to other Federal Government agencies. However, when
    directed, we have taken a lead role in stability operations activities
    to establish civil security and control, restore essential services,
    repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian
    assistance. In these cases, our objective is to transition the lead
    responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies, the host nation or
    international organizations as the situation dictates. As seen in
    recent operations, experts from the State Department, U.S. Agency for
    International Development (USAID), Justice Department, and other
    agencies are needed to build host nation capacity to improve economic
    development, establish effective governance, and institute the ``rule
    of law'' which are essential for stability.
        Question. Do you believe that the U.S. Government needs to
    establish new procedures to manage stability operations? If so, why?
        Answer. We should certainly capture the lessons of 10 years of
    conflict. DOD policy regarding stability operations adequately
    clarifies roles and responsibilities. We now treat stability operations
    as a core U.S. military mission and are prepared to conduct those
    operations on par with major combat operations in support of other U.S.
    Government departments and agencies. If confirmed, I will continue to
    assess our ability to conduct stability operations, and I will remain
    open to ideas and issues that might suggest needed change.
        Question. In Afghanistan, the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force
    435 works in partnership with the Government of Afghanistan, the U.S.
    interagency, and international partners to conduct detention and
    corrections operations and promote the rule of law and judicial sector
    reform.
        What role do you believe DOD should play in providing training and
    advocacy for ``rule of law'' development in Iraq and Afghanistan?
        Answer. With respect to Iraq and Afghanistan, the ``rule of law''
    is essential for the creation of stable and enduring democratic
    governments that can prevent the return of terrorists. I strongly
    support the State Department's lead in building rule of law capacity in
    both of these countries. DOD has the capability and capacity to provide
    ``rule of law'' related training in a supporting role for civilian and
    military leaders.
                     afghanistan counterinsurgency strategy
        Question. Do you support the counterinsurgency strategy for
    Afghanistan? In your view, is that the right strategy?
        Answer. Yes. Over the past 18 months we have made significant gains
    in halting Taliban momentum and reversing it in many places. The surge
    has allowed us to establish security in previously held Taliban areas
    such as Central Helmand and Kandahar, areas of historic importance to
    the insurgency, and to expand Afghan National Security Force capacity
    and capability. As we drawdown our surge force in Afghanistan and
    partner with Afghan forces, this will serve to expand the Afghan
    National Security Forces' responsibilities and their control of
    Afghanistan.
        Question. If confirmed, are there changes you would recommend to
    the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan? For example, would you support an
    increase in counterterrorism action in Afghanistan?
        Answer. In my judgment, the current U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is
    on track. Counterterrorism forces support the ISAF campaign plan and
    are certain to remain an integral part of this effort. If confirmed,
    and if conditions on the ground warranted a reevaluation of an aspect
    of the current strategy, I would unhesitatingly provide my
    recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and President.
        Question. What is your assessment of the progress of the
    counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan?
        Answer. We have made important gains over the past 18 months, and
    we have reached a point in the campaign where a responsible drawdown in
    U.S. surge forces is possible. An increasing number of Afghan forces
    will join the fight in protecting Afghanistan over the next 15 months,
    and the international community has demonstrated its intention to
    support Afghanistan until at least 2014.
        Question. In your view, how significant an impact does the death of
    Osama bin Laden have on the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan?
        Answer. The death of Osama bin Laden is important as it
    demonstrated our ability to deny safe haven to al Qaeda (AQ) members
    and our commitment to disrupt, dismantle and defeat AQ. While it is too
    early to fully understand the long term impact of his death, I believe,
    the mutual relationship between AQ and the Taliban has been dealt a
    severe blow and that we have an opportunity to prevent Afghanistan from
    once again becoming a safe haven and staging area for AQ.
      transition of security responsibility in afghanistan and u.s. troop
                                   reductions
        Question. On June 22, President Obama announced his decision to
    draw down 10,000 U.S. troops from Afghanistan by the end of this year
    and to withdraw the remaining 23,000 ``surge'' force by September 2012,
    for a total drawdown of 33,000.
        Do you support the President's decision to begin reducing U.S.
    forces in July 2011? Why or why not?
        Answer. Yes, I agree with the President's decision. If confirmed, I
    will constantly monitor and assess the situation in consultation with
    the theater commanders and should it be determined that the situation
    has changed, I will advise Secretary of Defense and President.
        Question. Do you support the President's decision regarding the
    size and pace of reductions in U.S. forces? Why or why not?
        Answer. Yes. I support the President's announced drawdown goals for
    a condition-based withdrawal of surge forces. As these surge forces are
    withdrawn, the ANSF will continue to grow in capacity and capability
    while assuming more responsibility. This component of the strategy is
    designed to safeguard the significant gains made possible by the surge.
    I believe the strategy is working at this time. If confirmed, and if
    conditions on the ground warranted a reevaluation of both the pace and
    scope of the draw down, I would unhesitatingly provide my
    recommendations.
        Question. At the NATO Summit in Lisbon last November, the
    participants in the International Security Assistance Force endorsed
    President Karzai's goal of the Afghanistan National Security Forces
    having the primary responsibility for providing security throughout
    Afghanistan by 2014. In March of this year, President Karzai announced
    the first tranche of provinces and municipal districts designated for
    the transition of security responsibility to an Afghan lead.
        Do you support the goal of transitioning responsibility for
    security throughout Afghanistan to the Afghan security forces by 2014?
        Answer. Yes. There is still a significant amount of work to be done
    but, I believe, the transition of security can be accomplished to meet
    this objective.
        Question. Do you support the decision to begin this month the
    transition of lead security responsibility to the Afghan security
    forces in the areas announced by President Karzai, with that initial
    transition of security lead to be completed by the end of the year?
        Answer. Yes. The first round of transition includes areas such as
    Lash Kar Gah in Helmand Province, an area where we significantly
    invested the surge force and has since seen a remarkable change in the
    security environment. ANSF is providing the bulk of security
    responsibility in Lash Kar Gah today. This is also true in places such
    as Kabul, Bamyan, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif, which are also part of the
    first tranche of the transition process. I would highlight that
    transition is conditional on the following: transitioned areas have
    sustainable ANSF who are responsible for population security and
    accountable to and serve the people; that ISAF is postured to provide
    over watch; that provincial governance is inclusive, accountable and
    acceptable to the Afghan people; and that the population has access to
    basic social services and adequate rule of law.
        Question. In your view, how important is it to the
    counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan that the transition of primary
    responsibility to the Afghan security forces for providing security
    throughout Afghanistan be completed by 2014?
        Answer. I think that momentum in Afghanistan has broadly shifted.
    The ANSF are on track to begin the transition process by assuming lead
    security responsibilities in several areas of the country. In my
    judgment, the transition of security will also aid in the
    legitimization of the Afghan government, removing some of the impetus
    behind insurgents who claim to only seek the departure of foreigners.
        Question. In your view, how important is it to the
    counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan that the initial round of
    transitioning security responsibility to the Afghan security forces
    begins in July and be completed by the end of the year?
        Answer. Transitioning to Afghan lead for security responsibility in
    the Tranche 1 areas is a critical part of our comprehensive civil-
    military campaign in Afghanistan. As we seek to eliminate safe havens
    from which al Qaeda (AQ) or its affiliates can launch attacks against
    our homeland or our allies, the Afghan Government must step up its
    ability to protect its people and move forward with actions to build a
    more stable, economically viable country. If confirmed, I will remain
    committed to supporting transfer of lead security responsibility to the
    Afghan Government by the end of 2014.
                      afghanistan national security forces
        Question. Approximately 100,000 more personnel have been added to
    the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) since November 2009 and by
    September 2012 another 70,000 Afghan Army and police personnel will be
    added. The NATO training mission is ahead of schedule for meeting its
    target end strength of 305,000 ANSF by October of this year. A new ANSF
    target end strength of 352,000 by 2012 is awaiting final approval by
    the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board.
        What is your assessment of the progress in developing a
    professional and effective ANSF?
        Answer. The ANSF continues to improve and is developing into a more
    professional and capable force with each passing day. In May 2011, the
    Afghan National Army (ANA) completed the fielding of all of their
    required infantry kandaks--the ANA equivalent of a U.S. battalion. With
    the fielding of the last infantry kandak, NATO Training Mission-
    Afghanistan (NTM-A) shifted its focus from force generation to force
    professionalization. The additional support from NTM-A will enable the
    ANSF to assume security lead of Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
        Question. If approved, will an ANSF end strength of 352,000 be
    sufficient in your view to enable the ANSF to assume lead
    responsibility for security in Afghanistan?
        Answer. Based on the current security environment, I believe so.
    Once all of the 352,000 personnel are fielded, the ANSF should be
    capable of assuming lead responsibility for security in Afghanistan by
    the end of 2014. If confirmed, however, I will closely monitor progress
    to assess whether the ANSF and Afghanistan Government are taking
    ownership of their responsibilities.
        Question. What do you see as the main challenges to building the
    capacity of the ANSF and, if confirmed, what recommendations, if any,
    would you make for addressing those challenges?
        Answer. The three primary challenges for the ASNF are literacy, the
    lack of enablers, and force attrition. We are assisting the ANSF by
    providing literacy training, supporting the development of branch
    schools, and helping with leader development programs. If confirmed, I
    will explore all options to increase ANSF capacity by working closely
    with Afghan, U.S. military and civilian leaders and our international
    partners.
        Question. There remains a shortfall in the number of training
    personnel required for the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A)
    and in the number of embedded training teams, the Operational Mentoring
    and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) embedding with Afghan Army units and the
    Police OMLTs (POMLTs) embedding with Afghan Police units. This
    shortfall may become more acute if the new end strength target of
    352,000 for the ANSF by 2012 is approved.
        What more should be done to get NATO members and other coalition
    partners to meet the ISAF requirements for additional NTM-A trainers
    and OMLTs and POMLTs?
        Answer. Our NATO allies and other coalition partners have
    demonstrated a strong commitment to the mission in Afghanistan over the
    years. As we move forward, we must continue to engage our partners on
    the importance and need for NATO/SHAPE HQ, HQ ISAF, and representatives
    of the NATO training mission. They share our view that a strong and
    capable ANSF is the key to achieve our objectives. Personnel with
    specialized skills such as police, logisticians, medical personnel, and
    maintenance specialists are essential. We must also engage coalition
    members to get their assistance in filling requirements for troops to
    partner with the ANSF.
        Question. If the 352,000 ANSF end strength target is approved, what
    challenges would this present in generating the necessary training
    personnel to build these Afghan security forces?
        Answer. There are obvious challenges associated with training a
    larger force. Although there is work being done to fill all vacant
    trainer requirements, a shortfall of trainers remains. While this
    shortage may delay the development of ANSF, it is my understanding that
    NTM-A is exploring all options to compensate for the shortfall.
        Question. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you
    have for meeting these challenges?
        Answer. The ANSF have made significant gains in creating Afghan
    trainers. The ANA and ANP are participating in Teach the Instructor
    (T2I) programs in order to build their own internal training capacity.
    The ANP have trained 474 instructors and are on track to have 900
    instructors trained by December 2011. Between the U.S., Coalition, and
    Afghan trainers, my understanding is that we will have sufficient
    capacity to meet most training requirements
        Question. A key component of efforts to build the capacity of
    Afghan security forces is partnering ANSF units together with ISAF
    units in the field. An April DOD report states that field reports
    suggest that a partnership ratio of greater than 3 ISAF personnel to
    one ANSF personnel ``reduces the effectiveness of the ANSF's
    participation'' and that ``ANSF are more motivated and, hence, more
    effective when the partnership ratio [between ISAF and ANSF personnel]
    is closer to even.''
        In your view, how effective has partnering been in building the
    capacity of the Afghan Army and Afghan police?
        Answer. We are committed to partnering. Partnering builds the
    capacity of Afghan security forces in terms of capability, confidence,
    and professionalism in the field. The last 18 months have seen
    significant strides in our baseline training, but our partnership
    efforts have proven to be the most effective training mechanism. The
    benefits of partnering work both ways. Our Afghan counterparts have
    made the most rapid improvements where we have higher partnering ratios
    and where our troops live and fight alongside their Afghan partners. In
    addition, our effectiveness increases since Afghan forces understand
    the human and cultural terrain in ways that we do not.
        Question. Would you anticipate ISAF-ANSF partnering moving to a
    partnership ratio below 1:1 (fewer than 1 ISAF soldier for every ANSF
    soldier) as the capability of Afghan security forces improves?
        Answer. Yes. Over time, we will move from partnered operations, to
    providing support with Afghans in the lead, and finally to coalition
    forces in strategic over-watch. There are units already below a 1:1
    partner ratio, and there are increasingly more areas where Afghans are
    in the lead or operating independently. For example, in Kabul Province,
    Afghans lead almost all operations.
                        reconciliation and reintegration
        Question. Under what conditions, if any, should reconciliation
    talks with the Taliban leadership be pursued?
        Answer. Ending the insurgency in Afghanistan will require some sort
    of political settlement between the Afghan Government and the Taliban.
    This settlement must be brokered among the Afghans themselves. To this
    end, I support an Afghan-led reconciliation effort consistent with U.S.
    policy for reconciliation as laid out by the Secretary of State. In
    particular, those who are willing to renounce violence, cut ties with
    al Qaeda, and respect the Afghan Constitution--to include the rights of
    women and ethnic minorities--should be welcomed as part of this
    process.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the current
    program for reintegrating insurgent fighters willing to lay down their
    arms? What additional steps, if any, should be taken to improve the
    reintegration program?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Afghan Peace and
    Reintegration Program (APRP) is an essential component of our
    comprehensive civil-military campaign. The goal of this Afghan program
    is to convince insurgents to join the peace process, accept the Afghan
    constitution, renounce violence, and rejoin Afghan society. Regarding
    additional steps to improve the program, it's important to note that
    this program is still relatively new in many provinces. One challenge
    among many is the capacity to channel funds from the Afghan national
    level down to the provincial level. Funding at the local level enables
    many of the reintegration opportunities as they emerge. If confirmed, I
    will more closely assess the status of this program.
                   u.s. strategic relationship with pakistan
        Question. What in your view are the key U.S. strategic interests
    with regard to Pakistan?
        Answer. Our strategic interests and national security goals remain
    to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its militant allies, and
    eliminate their capacity to threaten the United States and its allies
    in the future. Tactically, Pakistan secures our southern lines of
    communication into Afghanistan. We also have an interest in stable
    Pakistan and the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and technology.
    U.S. strategic interests in Pakistan encompass both our relationship
    with Pakistan itself and Pakistan's role in the campaign against
    violent extremists. Our partnership with Pakistan in the context of the
    greater South Asia region holds great potential for security, economic
    advancement, and stability.
        Question. What in your view are the key lessons from the operation
    to kill Osama bin Laden for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship?
        Answer. Our relationship must be pragmatic. Pakistan supports us in
    several key areas. We should leverage those areas and ``meter'' our
    support for them against their support of us. That said, I strongly
    believe we must maintain a relationship with Pakistan.
        Question. How significant do you believe military-to-military
    relations have been for the development of a strategic relationship
    between the United States and Pakistan?
        Answer. Our senior military engagements, and especially our
    security assistance and cooperation programs, have been essential to
    laying the foundations for effective military cooperation between our
    two countries. But these are only foundations. A true strategic
    relationship is only possible when our countries come to appreciate
    more closely the compatibility of our vital interests in the region.
    This can only come through a whole-of-government approach that
    strengthens civilian institutions, promotes the rule of law, and
    supports economic development.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
    for U.S. relations with Pakistan, particularly in terms of military-to-
    military relations?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would sustain the general approach to
    security cooperation endorsed by the Secretary of Defense and
    President. From my perspective, the guiding tenet of security
    cooperation is to assist in areas the host nation considers important,
    but that also respects the shared interests of the host nation and the
    United States. We should not push programs the Pakistanis do not want
    because doing so dilutes the value of U.S cooperation. Nor should we
    feel compelled to provide equipment or training just because we are
    asked. A frank and respectful dialogue is intrinsic to successful
    security cooperation.
        Question. Since 2001, the United States has provided significant
    military assistance to Pakistan, including foreign military financing
    and training and equipment through the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund
    to build the capacity of the Pakistan Army and Frontier Scouts to
    conduct counterinsurgency operations. In addition, the United States
    has provided significant funds to reimburse Pakistan for the costs
    associated with military operations conducted by Pakistan along the
    Afghanistan-Pakistan border and other support provided in connection
    with Operation Enduring Freedom.
        How effective, in your view, has this assistance been in improving
    Pakistan's efforts and commitment to counter terrorists in Pakistan?
        Answer. The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) has produced some
    important initial results for Pakistan's Frontier Scouts, the Special
    Services Group, and other organizations. The quality of tactical
    maneuver, communications, marksmanship, and intelligence fusion have
    improved survivability and performance in combat against extremist
    groups which threaten Pakistan and the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.
    U.S. programs offer the potential of exceptional value for both our
    countries, but cannot succeed without the buy-in and invitation of
    Pakistan's sovereign leadership and continued support of the U.S.
    Congress.
                                      iran
        Question. Iran continues to expand its nuclear program and has
    failed to provide full and open access to all aspects of its current
    and historic nuclear program to the International Atomic Energy Agency.
        What more do you believe the United States and the international
    community should be doing, if anything, to dissuade Iran from pursuing
    a nuclear weapons program?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will support the policy objectives for Iran
    established by the President. It is my understanding that we continue
    to apply pressure on Iran to make it clear that Iran's failure to meet
    its international obligations will make it less secure and prosperous.
    Concurrently, we should continue to encourage Iran to become a
    responsible member of the international community.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the military
    threat posed by Iran from its nuclear program and its ballistic missile
    program?
        Answer. Iran is a destabilizing influence in the region. It is my
    understanding that the Government of Iran continues to enrich uranium,
    pursue nuclear capabilities, enhance its ballistic missile program, and
    has failed to provide full and open access to all aspects of its
    current and historic nuclear program to the International Atomic Energy
    Agency. With its nuclear activities and its surrogate activities in
    southern Iraq, there is a high potential that Iran will make a serious
    miscalculation of U.S. resolve.
        Question. In your view, have the various sanctions that have been
    imposed by the international community reduced the military abilities
    of Iran?
        Answer. International sanctions have hindered Iran's weapons
    procurement efforts and driven up the costs associated with obtaining
    necessary components for its military. Sanctions also appear to have
    slowed Iran's progress on its nuclear program. It has also become
    increasingly difficult for Iran to import needed materials or skills
    for its military programs.
                          osama bin laden and al qaeda
        Question. If your view, will the death of Osama bin Laden have a
    significant impact on the conflict against al Qaeda and if so, how?
        Answer. The death of Osama bin Laden is a significant milestone in
    our campaign to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda. The successful
    operation does not mean we can rest, but rather we have a window of
    opportunity to make new gains toward the strategic defeat of al Qaeda.
    It is too early to assess the long term impact of his death, but it
    clearly conveys our persistence, determination, and capability to
    achieve our goals.
        Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda
    affiliates to the U.S. Homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and western
    interests more broadly? Which affiliates are of most concern?
        Answer. The killing of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden may increase
    the threat from al Qaeda's regional nodes to the U.S. Homeland and U.S.
    interests overseas. Each of the regional nodes--al Qaeda in the Islamic
    Maghreb, al Qaeda in Iraq, Somalia-based al Shabaab, and al Qaeda in
    the Arabian Peninsula--eulogized Bin Laden and vowed attacks against
    the United States in retaliation. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has
    demonstrated its intent and capability to carry out an attack targeting
    the U.S. Homeland,as evidenced by the group's 25 December 2009
    attempted bombing of a U.S. airliner on approach to Detroit. Each of
    the other three nodes remain largely focused on attacks within their
    respective regions, though each is likely capable of supporting
    operatives engaged in transnational attack planning against U.S. or
    western interests in Europe and possibly the United States.
                                  arab spring
        Question. The Arab Spring has changed--and will likely continue to
    change--the political dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa for
    many years to come. These changes will require the United States to
    adjust our military-to-military and defense civilian relations in this
    region. Some observers argue that the United States should reduce
    significantly our military-to-military contact in countries as a result
    of the ongoing changes and others advocate more robust and stepped-up
    contact with our partners in this region.
        In your view, what should be the posture of the U.S. Government on
    military-to-military and defense civilian relations in the region?
        Answer. In my judgment, we have a unique opportunity to support
    some of the Arab Spring reform movements through our military
    relationships. It is my understanding that the Department and our
    combatant commands are reviewing our policies and posture in the region
    to enhance our ability to promote responsible change. If confirmed, I
    will work to ensure our programs and policies further our national
    interests while strengthening our relations in the region.
                                     libya
        Question. Do you support the limited U.S. military mission in
    Libya?
        Answer. Yes. We are operating in Libya as part of an international
    coalition enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
    1973. Our role is to support and assist our partners in protecting
    innocent civilians in Libya. The U.S. military provides unique
    capabilities to this effort such as electronic warfare, aerial
    refueling, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and unmanned
    aerial systems.
        Question. Do you support broadening the military mission to include
    regime change?
        Answer. The purpose of our military mission, consistent with the
    U.N. Security Resolution 1973, is to protect innocent civilians. As
    directed by the President, we are using all non-military instruments of
    power to apply further pressure on the Qadhafi regime to end the
    conflict. If confirmed, I would consider a wide array of factors before
    providing my advice on whether the military mission should be changed
    for any reason.
        Question. Should the United States provide arms and training to the
    Libyan rebels?
        Answer. It is my understanding the administration has chosen not to
    provide arms or training to the rebels at this time. The purpose of our
    military action is grounded in UNSCR 1973, to protect the Libyan people
    in population centers like Benghazi from a massacre at the hands of
    Qadhafi's forces. If confirmed, I would assess the full range of
    implications for providing arms and training before making any
    recommendation.
                      east africa--al qaeda and al shabaab
        Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda
    and al Shabaab to the U.S. and Western interests in East Africa and to
    the U.S. Homeland?
        Answer. The al Shabaab threat to U.S. and western interests in East
    Africa is signficant. While al Shabaab remains focused on resisting the
    current Transitional Federal Government and African Union Mission in
    Somalia, the group has the capability to plan attacks against U.S. and
    western interests in East Africa. The April 2009 attacks in Kampala
    proved their capability to stage simultaneous suicide attacks, and
    senior al Qaeda in East Africa operative Harun Fazul had evidence of
    advanced plans to attack European allies with him at the time of his
    death. Finally, al Shabaab's effort to recruit U.S. persons increases
    the threat to the U.S. Homeland.
        Question. What is your understanding of DOD's role in countering
    the threat posed by al Qaeda in East Africa and al Shabaab? What is
    your understanding of DOD's supporting role to other departments and
    agencies of the U.S. Government in this region?
        Answer. It is my understanding that DOD in concert with interagency
    partners has provided security assistance to regional partner nations
    to counter threats from violent extremists. Some of that support is
    also aimed directly at improving counter-terrorism capabilities. I
    cannot provide detail about the operations we are supporting, but I can
    say the work remains critical to our goal of strategically defeating al
    Qaeda and its affiliates.
        Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to DOD's
    current role in East Africa?
        Answer. If confirmed, I do not anticipate making any immediate
    changes to DOD's role in East Africa. It is my understanding that U.S.
    Africa Command is looking at how best to direct our military efforts in
    the region to work in concert with our interagency partners. In my
    judgment, our goal is a strategy through which security assistance,
    capacity building, cooperation with regional partners, and counter-
    terrorism actions are fully integrated to provide security and
    stability in East Africa.
                  yemen and al qaeda in the arabian peninsula
        Question. What is your assessment of the current U.S. strategy in
    Yemen and what is your understanding of the role of DOD within that
    strategy?
        Answer. The current strategy in Yemen remains our best option. The
    near term goal of containing and degrading al Qaeda in the Arabian
    Peninsula (AQAP) while pursuing long term initiatives to create a
    stable Yemen that can provide internal security remain valid even
    amidst domestic turmoil. A stable, unified, and economically viable
    Yemen, free of violent extremist, remains in our best interest. My
    understanding of DOD's role is that CENTCOM works with interagency
    partners to build Yemen's counterterrorism capacity and enhance our
    partnerships. Separately, select elements within DOD work with the
    Yemeni Government to disrupt near-term threats to the U.S. Homeland.
    This effort is intended to provide time and space for the Yemeni
    security forces to increase their effectiveness and eventually
    eliminate Yemen as an al Qaeda safe haven.
        Question. Given the ongoing political upheaval and splintering of
    the military in Yemen, what are your views on the United States
    continuing to provide security assistance--most significantly DOD
    section 1206 funding--to Yemeni counterterrorism forces?
        Answer. The ongoing unrest has already weakened the Yemeni
    Government and economy and has allowed al Qaeda in the Arabian
    Peninsula (AQAP) to expand its influence. We will continue to closely
    evaluate our security assistance programs in Yemen, particularly those
    provided under section 1206. It is my understanding that we expect to
    continue counterterrorism cooperation with the Yemeni Government during
    and after any future political transitions, but that we are prepared to
    reevaluate our partnership as necessary to address the changing
    military situation. If confirmed, I will be attentive to the potential
    need to reconsider our approach.
                       north atlantic treaty organization
        Question. In a speech to allies in Brussels in June, then-Secretary
    of Defense Gates delivered a blunt warning about the North Atlantic
    Treaty Organization (NATO) becoming ``a two-tiered alliance''.
    Secretary Gates described a division between ``members who specialize
    in `soft' humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and talking tasks,
    and those conducting the `hard' combat missions,'' and between ``those
    willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of alliance
    commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership . . .
    but don't want to share the risks and the costs.'' He added, ``This is
    no longer a hypothetical worry. We are there today, and it is
    unacceptable.''
        In your view, how important is the NATO alliance to U.S. national
    security interests?
        Answer. The NATO Alliance is vital to the United States. It is a
    collective defense alliance and forum for security dialogue that has
    maintained the trans-Atlantic link and kept Europe peaceful for the
    past 60 years. NATO remains equally important today providing the
    foundation for European and supporting global security. NATO is the
    critical enabler for coalition operations in Afghanistan, and it is
    leading operations in Libya.
        Question. Do you agree with former Secretary Gates that NATO is
    today a two-tiered alliance?
        Answer. I have not been in a position to evaluate it in that way.
    What I do know is that some allies have made the political decision to
    limit the resources dedicated to defense. This has forced critical
    choices between spending money on transforming their militaries and
    contributing to alliance operations. It has also resulted in an overall
    loss of effectiveness, which, while initially minor, has compounded
    over time. Some allies remain capable partners, while others' past
    decisions now limit their ability to contribute to collective security.
        Question. Given the significant budgetary constraints facing many
    NATO allies, what in your view needs to be done to enhance the
    capabilities of the NATO alliance to undertake combat operations?
        Answer. Several NATO allies are planning further cuts to defense
    investment in order to sustain their operations in Afghanistan and
    elsewhere while coping with financial constraints. To enhance
    capabilities, Allies must prioritize, seek efficiencies and cost
    savings, and invest those savings into maintaining credible military
    power. Additionally, those countries that can afford to should expand
    their investment in defense. Investments should be coordinated among
    Allies, and we all must be mindful of threats and risks to collective
    security.
        Question. What are the greatest opportunities and challenges that
    you foresee for NATO in meeting its strategic objectives over the next
    5 years?
        Answer. NATO's new Strategic Concept is an important step in
    ensuring that NATO will continue to play its unique and essential role
    in ensuring the common security of its members as well as guide the
    next phase in NATO's evolution. Over the next 5 years, the top NATO
    challenges include: achieving durable progress on a successful
    transition in Afghanistan; implementing missile defense in Europe; and
    stemming the deterioration in European military capability. However,
    this is also an opportunity for allies to develop innovative multi-
    national solutions to deliver capabilities in a more cost-effective
    manner such as the C-17 Strategic Airlift Consortium.
        Question. In your view, is there a continuing requirement for U.S.
    nuclear weapons to be deployed in NATO countries?
        Answer. NATO's New Strategic Concept states NATO's commitment to
    the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear
    weapons. However, it also made clear that as long as there are nuclear
    weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance. NATO has
    initiated a review of its overall posture in deterring and defending
    against the full range of threats to the alliance. NATO's new Strategic
    Concept reflects allies' commitment to a nuclear alliance and to
    nuclear burden sharing as fundamental to deterrence and assurance in
    Europe.
                          u.s. force posture in europe
        Question. In April it was announced that following an extensive
    review of its force posture in Europe, the Department will revise its
    plans to withdraw two of four brigade combat teams (BCTs) from Europe,
    and instead retain three BCTs in Europe. The drawdown of one BCT from
    Europe will not be implemented until 2015, when a reduced demand on
    U.S. ground forces is projected.
        Do you support the decision to reduce the U.S. force posture in
    Europe by one BCT?
        Answer. I support the decision to retain three BCTs in Europe. It
    strikes the best balance between responding to a more constrained
    fiscal environment and the need to maintain a flexible and easily
    deployable ground force to meet Article 5 and other NATO commitments.
    This size force will also allow the United States to engage effectively
    with allies and partners and to satisfy other security objectives.
        Question. What do you see as the U.S. security priorities in Europe
    and would retaining three BCTs in Europe beyond 2015 serve those
    security priorities? Why or why not?
        Answer. U.S. security priorities in Europe are focused on meeting
    our Article 5 NATO security commitments, building partnership capacity,
    and engaging with allies and partners. Additionally, the U.S. and NATO
    allies are preparing to meet a broad range of 21st century threats,
    including new challenges such as missile defense, cyber security,
    countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and terrorism at home and
    abroad. In my judgment, retaining three distinct types of BCTs in
    Europe (Heavy, Stryker, and Airborne) enables U.S. European Command to
    meet a wide array of engagement, building partner capacity, and
    interoperability objectives while being prepared to support a full
    range of military operations needed for plausible European and global
    contingencies.
                 u.s. force posture in the asia pacific region
        Question. The Defense Department's 2010 report of the QDR states
    that the United States needs to ``sustain and strengthen our Asia-
    Pacific alliances and partnerships to advance mutual security interests
    and ensure sustainable peace and security in the region,'' and that, to
    accomplish this, DOD ``will augment and adapt our forward presence'' in
    the Asia-Pacific region.
        Do you agree that the United States needs to augment and adapt our
    presence in the Asia-Pacific?
        Answer. Yes. The Nation's strategic priorities and interests will
    increasingly emanate from the Asia-Pacific region. The rise of new
    powers with their growing share of global wealth, the expanding
    influence of non-state actors, and the potential spread of WMD will
    create a security environment that poses profound challenges to
    international security. The U.S. military should maintain an enduring
    military presence in the Asia-Pacific region that provides tangible
    reassurance that we are committed to Asia's security and the prosperity
    essential to the region's success.
        Question. If so, what specific capabilities or enhancements are
    needed in your view?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review our military's force posture in
    Asia and make appropriate recommendations on any enhancements. In
    general, U.S. presence must remain capable of reassuring our allies and
    partners in the region while positioning us to deter against--and if
    necessary, defeat--the full range of potential threats. Our actions in
    the Asia-Pacific region should encourage greater regional security
    cooperation by strengthening and expanding our bilateral and
    multilateral relationships so that we preserve stability in Northeast
    Asia while investing new attention and resources in Southeast and South
    Asia.
        Question. What do you see as the U.S. security priorities in the
    Asia-Pacific region?
        Answer. Our alliances in Asia have provided the bedrock for
    security and economic prosperity in the region. We must continue to
    deepen these alliances while evolving them to face current and emerging
    threats. Our security priorities in this region should promote regional
    peace and stability while combating such threats as terrorism, the
    proliferation of WMD, piracy, and cyber security threats. Additionally,
    we must work to maintain free and open access to the maritime, air, and
    space domains.
                                  north korea
        Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation
    on the Korean peninsula?
        Answer. North Korea remains the primary threat to security in
    Northeast Asia. The security situation on the peninsula has reached
    high levels of tension over the past year with the attack on the
    Cheonan and the artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. North Korea
    continues to improve its asymmetric capabilities including WMD,
    ballistic missiles, Special Operations Forces, and cyber capabilities.
    Absent evidence of fundamental change, North Korea will remain a
    serious security threat in the region and a significant concern for the
    United States and the international community.
        Question. In your opinion, what should be the U.S. role in the
    South Korean response to any future North Korean attacks or
    provocations?
        Answer. The U.S. role as part of a combined force with the Republic
    of Korea (ROK) is to deter North Korean aggression and if deterrence
    fails, fight and win. This mission is accomplished through the
    employment of agile and well-trained forces within the ROK-U.S.
    Alliance.
        Question. In your view does the lack of progress in diplomatic
    efforts to persuade North Korea to verifiably dismantle its nuclear
    weapons program inform or guide U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy in the
    region?
        Answer. In my judgment, the U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy has
    helped prevent the resumption of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula
    for more than half a century. Successful deterrence creates the space
    within which diplomacy can operate. The success of diplomatic efforts,
    however, will ultimately hinge on the willingness of North Korea to
    comply with the agreements it makes.
        Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United
    States and its allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD
    capabilities and the export of those capabilities?
        Answer. North Korea's missile and WMD programs are increasingly a
    direct threat to the United States. These programs already pose a
    serious and real threat to U.S. regional allies and partners. The
    United States must continue to monitor North Korea's capabilities and
    related proliferation, while collaborating with our partners and
    allies, to ensure contingency planning remains adaptive and responsive.
        Question. In your view are there additional steps that DOD could
    take to ensure that North Korea does not proliferate missile and
    weapons technology to Syria, Iran and others?
        Answer. Proliferation of missile and weapon technology by North
    Korea is a regional and global threat. In my judgment, there may be
    additional steps that can be taken consistent with the President's
    policy. If confirmed, I will work to ensure continued coordination and
    cooperation between DOD, other U.S. agencies, and our international
    partners to strengthen international consensus against proliferation,
    invest in capacity building programs with partner nations, and find
    ways to increase WMD-related information sharing with international
    partners.
                               republic of korea
        Question. What is your understanding of the current U.S. security
    relationship with the Republic of Korea (ROK)?
        Answer. The ROK-U.S. alliance is one of the most successful
    alliances in the world and serves the interests of both of our Nations.
    The United States is committed to the security of the peninsula and
    ensuring the alliance remains a comprehensive, strategic partnership
    with bilateral, regional, and global scope. The alliance's resolve has
    never been stronger, and we should continue to advance the alliance in
    terms of both capability and commitment.
        Question. If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to
    improve the U.S.-ROK security relationship?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to maintain close contact
    with my South Korean counterpart to promote the continuation of a
    strong U.S.-ROK security relationship. DOD and the ROK should continue
    to work closely to realign U.S. forces on the Peninsula and prepare for
    the transition of wartime operational control to the ROK by December
    2015. U.S forces should continue the plan to reposition south of Seoul,
    making the U.S. presence less intrusive to the Korean People and
    improving force readiness and quality of life.
        Question. What is your view regarding the timing of turning over
    wartime operational command to the ROK?
        Answer. The South Korean military is a highly capable and
    professional force and is increasing its ability to lead the defense of
    its country. I appreciate that the United States and the ROK have a
    shared understanding on a comprehensive way forward for the transfer of
    wartime operational control by December 2015. If confirmed, I will
    continue to work with my ROK counterpart to advance this process.
        Question. Do you believe that current planning regarding tour
    normalization in the ROK should be reconsidered in view of the high
    cost of the plan and the risks associated with significantly higher
    numbers of dependents on the Korean peninsula?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to evaluate the associated
    costs and benefits of implementation and make recommendations based
    upon proposed force posture and best way forward. I understand the goal
    of tour normalization is to enhance the quality of life for our
    forward-stationed forces and their families. A stable family improves
    operational readiness. DOD's long-term goal remains full tour
    normalization with the timeline to be determined based upon
    affordability.
                                     china
        Question. From your perspective, what effect is China's expanding
    economy and growing military having on the region at-large and how is
    that growth influencing the U.S. security posture in Asia and the
    Pacific?
        Answer. In my judgment, we should welcome a strong, prosperous, and
    successful China that plays a responsible role in world affairs.
    China's economic growth has been a key factor for the Asia-Pacific
    regions' economic growth and development. Its economic growth has also
    allowed China to embark upon a comprehensive transformation of its
    military forces. However, a lack of transparency into the pace and
    scale of China's military modernization raises concerns within the
    region. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor China's military
    development and engage China to promote stability.
        Question. What do you believe are the objectives of China's
    military modernization program?
        Answer. If confirmed, my new responsibilities will allow me to more
    closely examine this issue. From my current perspective, China appears
    to be building the capability to fight and win short duration, high-
    intensity conflicts along its periphery, with a near-term focus on
    preparing for potential contingencies involving Taiwan. This appears to
    include an emphasis on anti-access and area denial capabilities. China
    is also devoting increasing attention and resources to conducting
    operations beyond Taiwan and China's immediate periphery as evidenced
    by public revelations about their aircraft carrier program. China is
    modernizing its nuclear forces and strengthening its nuclear deterrence
    capability, while enhancing its strategic strike capabilities, such as
    space and counter-space operations and computer network operations.
    Additional military missions include humanitarian assistance, non-
    combat evacuation operations, and counter-piracy support.
        Question. How do you believe the United States should respond to
    China's military modernization program?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to use our interactions with
    China's military to encourage a constructive role in addressing common
    security challenges. Force posture, presence, capability developments,
    and actions that strengthen our alliances and partnerships will
    demonstrate our ability and commitment to maintain peace and stability
    in the Asia-Pacific.
        Question. Do you support the sale of F-16 C/D aircraft to Taiwan?
        Answer. I have not yet had the opportunity to study in detail
    Taiwan's defense needs; however, in accordance with the Taiwan
    Relations Act, we have a responsibility to make available to Taiwan
    defense articles and services necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a
    sufficient self-defense capability. Our China policy has been
    consistent for the past eight U.S. administrations, and supports the
    Three Joint U.S.-PRC Communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act.
        Question. In the past 6 months, the United States and China have
    had a series of high level military-to-military engagements beginning
    with Secretary Gates' visit to China in January which was followed by
    Chinese General Chen Bingde's visit to the United States in May. Most
    recently, Admiral Mullen traveled to China to meet with General Chen
    and to visit Chinese military sites. Nonetheless, the U.S.-China
    military-to-military dialogue has been strained over the past several
    years and efforts to establish and maintain mutually beneficial
    military relations has been hampered by China's propensity for
    postponing or canceling military engagements in an apparent effort to
    influence U.S. actions.
        What is your general experience with U.S.-China military-to-
    military relations?
        Answer. My experience so far has been fairly limited during my
    short tenure as Chief of Staff of the Army. My interactions with my PLA
    counterpart and other senior leaders have focused on the positive
    aspects of a military-to-military relationship to increase cooperation
    between our Nations.
        Question. What is your view of the relative importance of sustained
    military-to-military relations with China?
        Answer. I firmly believe that healthy, stable, reliable, and
    continuous military-to-military relations between the United States and
    China are very important.
        Question. Do you believe we should make any changes in the quality
    or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what changes
    and why?
        Answer. I understand General Chen's recent visit to the United
    States and Admiral Mullen's trip to China to signify progress in the
    relationship. If confirmed, I will certainly strive to further improve
    the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship, both in terms of
    quantity of exchanges and, more importantly, the quality of the events.
        Question. What is your understanding of U.S. military operations in
    the proximity of the South China Sea and do you think the United States
    should make any changes in those operations?
        Answer. The U.S. military is committed to maintaining peace and
    stability, freedom of navigation, open access, and respect for law in
    international waters, including the South China Sea.
               department of defense counternarcotics activities
        Question. On an annual basis, DOD's counternarcotics (CN) program
    expends approximately $1.5 billion to support the Department's CN
    operations, building the capacity of certain foreign governments around
    the globe, and analyzing intelligence on CN-related matters. In a
    recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, GAO found that
    DOD ``does not have an effective performance measurement system to
    track the progress of its counternarcotics activities.'' This is the
    second such finding by GAO related to DOD CN in the last decade.
        What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD CN program?
        Answer. Drug trafficking and transnational organized crime
    continues to be a complex threat to the United States and its interests
    abroad. I have not had an opportunity to assess the DOD's
    counternarcotics program fully. If confirmed, I look forward to
    ensuring the DOD's program supports our Nation's interests and our
    foreign partners, aligns with the National Drug Control Strategy, and
    strives to achieve measureable results.
        Question. In your personal view, should DOD continue to play a role
    in attempting to stem the flow of illegal narcotics?
        Answer. Based on my experience, confronting this issue requires a
    whole-of-government approach to confront the flow of illicit narcotics,
    associated transnational organized criminal activity, and potential
    terrorist connections. Interagency collaboration has been critically
    important to the progress made since the 1980s and should continue.
    Additionally, DOD's existing partnerships with countries throughout the
    world contribute considerably to U.S. Government efforts to confront
    this global problem.
                           counter-piracy operations
        Question. Since January 2009, the U.S. Navy has been patrolling the
    waters of the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia as part of the
    international coalition engaged in counter-piracy operations. While
    there have been some high profile interdictions and arrests, data
    suggests that the number of pirate attacks has not been diminished in
    any meaningful way. To the contrary, piracy in that region remains a
    significant problem.
        What is your assessment of the counter-piracy mission to date?
        Answer. The presence of the coalition navies continues to deter and
    prevent individual pirate attacks, reducing the success rates of pirate
    attacks by 15 percent in the Horn of Africa region.
        Question. What changes, if any, do you believe are necessary in
    terms of the level of effort by the U.S. and coalition countries and
    also in terms of strategy and tactics?
        Answer. It is my understanding that current DOD and coalition
    tactics and procedures are proving effective, especially when executed
    in conjunction with commercial vessels adhering to industry Best
    Management Practices. Due to the size of the affected region,
    additional naval vessels would not necessarily provide significant
    increase in return on the investment. However, using other instruments
    of government power, such as disrupting pirates' financial networks or
    increasing the judicial capacity and capability throughout East Africa,
    would likely have a greater return on U.S. Government investment.
        Question. Do you think DOD should continue the counter-piracy
    mission, as it has been conducted over the past few years, and, if so,
    how long do you think the Navy can continue the mission without
    experiencing any adverse effect on other missions?
        Answer. Yes. As articulated in the President's Maritime Security
    Policy and the NSS Counter Piracy Action Plan, the United States has a
    unique leadership role in protecting high seas freedom and global sea
    lines of communication, noting that piracy threatens U.S. security and
    economic interests and contributes to regional instability. of pirated
    vessels.
                    international peacekeeping contributions
        Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign
    Affairs (July 29, 2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the
    United Nations, stated that the United States ``is willing to consider
    directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers,
    civilian police, and other civilian personnel--including more women I
    should note--to U.N. peacekeeping operations.''
        What is your view on whether the United States should contribute
    more military personnel to both staff positions and military observers
    in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?
        Answer. Our troop commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan remain
    substantial and take first priority in my judgment. As these
    commitments change, however, I believe that we should consider
    opportunities for U.S. personnel to contribute to U.N. peacekeeping
    missions. Experience shows that even a small number of trained and
    experienced American servicemembers can have a significant, positive
    effect on U.N. operations.
        Question. What are the advantages and disadvantages of contributing
    additional military personnel to U.N. operations?
        Answer. I regard U.N. peacekeeping operations as a cost-effective
    alternative to unilateral U.S. military action. These missions save
    civilian lives, promote stability, and support American interests
    around the world. U.S. servicemembers can have a very positive impact
    on U.N. operations, especially in areas where our troops can deliver
    hard-to-find expertise, like logistics and intelligence. If confirmed,
    I would carefully weigh the advantages of additional participation in
    U.N. peacekeeping against potential costs including an increase in the
    operational tempo of our force. I would also acknowledge the reality
    that in some cases, U.S. boots on the ground may not be supportive of
    the mission's desired end state. In these cases, we may be able to
    achieve our objectives in other ways.
        Question. If confirmed, would you support identifying methods
    through which the DOD personnel system could be more responsive to
    requests for personnel support from multilateral institutions like the
    United Nations?
        Answer. I'm not aware that we have been unresponsive. If confirmed,
    I will seek to learn more about this issue.
                             counter threat finance
        Question. A number of officials in DOD and the Intelligence
    Community (IC) have called for investing significantly more resources
    in identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorist
    networks and illicit trafficking.
        What are your views on the role of DOD in counter threat finance
    activities?
        Answer. To defeat a network it must be attacked in each of its
    components including leadership, operations, supply, and financing. DOD
    has an important role in counter threat finance activities. Terrorist
    activities and illicit networks that traffic narcotics, WMD, or
    improvised explosive devices can and will leverage funding to further
    resource and expand their operations. DOD policy is to effectively
    deny, disrupt, degrade, and defeat our adversaries' ability to attain
    and utilize financial resources. To penetrate the financial networks of
    our adversaries, we must leverage the full capabilities of our Nation
    while simultaneously attaining vital assistance from our allies. If
    confirmed, I will further this effort by working with other U.S.
    Government departments and agencies, as well as with our partner
    nations, in order to effectively counter threat finance activities.
        Question. In your view, should DOD seek to expand its support to
    other U.S. Government departments and agencies conducting counter
    threat finance activities?
        Answer. In my judgment, DOD should continue to work with and
    support other U.S. Government departments and agencies to conduct
    counter threat finance activities. If confirmed, I do not anticipate an
    immediate need to expand the support that DOD is providing, but we
    certainly must ensure that we are fully engaged in the interagency
    process to counter threat finance activities.
        Question. Transnational criminal organizations in Central America
    and Mexico are having a debilitating impact on the ability of our
    foreign partners to govern their nations and provide opportunities for
    their people.
        Do you think expanded Counter Threat Finance activities in this
    region would be beneficial? If so, what role--if any--should DOD play
    in those activities?
        Answer. NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM are helping to shape and leverage
    unique capabilities in support of our foreign and domestic mission
    partners. If confirmed, I will examine this issue carefully.
                           central america and mexico
        Question. During a recent Senate Armed Services Committee hearing,
    the Commanders of U.S. Northern Command and Southern Command discussed
    the increasingly dangerous region along the northern and southern
    borders of Mexico and the devastating impact transnational criminal
    organizations are having on the people and security of southern Mexico,
    Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, and El Salvador. The United States has
    increased its assistance in this region, but--to date--DOD has had only
    a small role.
        What are your views on the threats posed by transnational criminal
    organizations in this region?
        Answer. Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) operating
    throughout Mexico and Central America are better-armed than many police
    forces and demonstrate increasing adaptability and sophistication in
    their methods. Their criminality extends far beyond drugs to extortion,
    robbery, kidnapping, trafficking in firearms and persons, and many
    other illegal activities. All of these activities, coupled with the
    fear, corruption and violence they engender, are having a considerably
    negative impact on the prosperity and security of our partners in the
    region.
        Question. What is your assessment of DOD's current activities in
    Mexico and Central America?
        Answer. U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and U.S. Southern Command
    (SOUTHCOM) have been assisting our regional partners through increased
    senior level interactions, subject matter expert exchanges, human
    rights training, mobile training teams, intelligence support, and
    exercises. Our overall military-to-military relations with Mexico have
    expanded considerably as have our relationships with Central American
    nations.
        Question. What changes, if any, would you propose to the DOD's
    current activities in this region?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would closely examine all aspects of our
    activities in the region.
                          anti-access and area denial
        Question. Over the past few years, much has been made of the
    emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities of certain countries
    and the prospect that these capabilities may in the future limit the
    U.S. military's freedom of movement and action in certain regions.
        Do you believe emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities
    are a concern and, if so, what should the U.S. military be doing now
    and in the next few years to ensure continued access to all
    strategically important areas?
        Answer. The proliferation of anti-access and area denial
    capabilities are of growing concern to the U.S, threatening assured
    access and our freedom of maneuver on land, sea, air, and space. They
    also potentially inhibit global commerce by controlling passage through
    regional chokepoints. If confirmed, I will focus on developing joint
    capabilities to counter these threats while working with our allies and
    partners to deter those who would attempt to deny access to the global
    commons.
                           interagency collaboration
        Question. What do you believe are the most important lessons
    learned from the collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan,
    Iraq, and elsewhere?
        Answer. Among other lessons, it seems clear to me that we have
    learned that countering insurgent and terrorist threats demands the
    integration of all instruments of national power toward a common
    purpose.
        Question. How do you believe these efforts can be improved?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will pursue opportunities for early and
    regular interagency engagement to foster enduring partnerships and to
    develop the planning, training, and education necessary for complex
    operations. We should seek new opportunities to collaborate and
    identify common mission tasks and related core training objectives. We
    should seek opportunities to leverage DOD joint training venues and
    resources to build capacities that improve our ability to work
    together.
        Question. How can the lessons learned in recent years be captured
    in military doctrine and adopted as ``best practices'' for future
    counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations?
        Answer. As part of the recurring revision of joint doctrine, there
    is a direct link to joint lessons learned and best practices. If
    confirmed, I will continue to invest in the ability of our joint force
    to learn and adapt.
        Question. Section 944 of the Ike Skelton National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (P.L. 111-383) required the
    Secretary of Defense and the CJCS to submit a report on the
    organizational structures of the headquarters of the geographic
    combatant commands (GCCs). DOD's report, dated June 2011, highlights
    the role of ``interagency'' (i.e., non-DOD, non-intelligence community)
    representatives at each of the GCCs. Stronger and more effective
    interagency integration was a central theme in the establishment of
    U.S. Africa Command and has apparently also informed re-organizations
    at U.S. Southern Command and other GCCs. Yet a number of observers have
    suggested that there is still room for improvement in both the nature
    and extent of interagency integration at the regional level.
        In your view, what is the importance, if any, of interagency
    integration to the ability of DOD's GCCs to execute their missions?
        Answer. Interagency integration is critical to the ability of the
    COCOMs to execute their missions. It enables the U.S. Government to
    build international support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent
    operations that efficiently achieve shared national and international
    goals.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you envision the appropriate
    roles of ``interagency'' representatives at GCCs?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Executive Branch's
    Interagency Process of national security policy development and
    implementation integrates all aspects of U.S. national security in a
    whole-of-government approach to advance our national security
    interests. If confirmed, I will continue to advocate the roles of
    interagency representatives at the COCOMs in a similar fashion.
                           responsibility to protect
        Question. The U.S. Government has recognized the ``responsibility
    to protect'' (R2P)--that is, the responsibility of the international
    community to use appropriate means to help protect populations from
    genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, by
    encouraging states to protect their own populations, by helping states
    build the capacity to do so, and by acting directly should national
    authorities fail to provide such protection. In its 2010 QDR, DOD names
    ``preventing human suffering due to mass atrocities'' as one of a long
    list of potential contingencies that DOD might be called on to address.
    DOD has begun to explore some of the implications of R2P, by
    considering ``mass atrocity prevention and response operations''.
        In your view, how high a priority should the ``responsibility to
    protect'' be for the U.S. Government as a whole?
        Answer. Maintaining the will and the ability of the United States
    to prevent human suffering is not only a moral imperative but also an
    important means to promote our values and increase our influence around
    the globe. This doesn't seem to me to be an issue of prioritization. A
    well trained and well led Joint Force can accomplish this mission if
    called upon to do so.
        Question. In your view, what should be the role of DOD, if any, in
    fulfilling the responsibility to protect?
        Answer. Given our global reach and organizational capabilities, DOD
    can play a role in responding to humanitarian disasters including mass
    atrocities. DOD has played an effective role in support of the efforts
    of the State Department, USAID, and other agencies to prevent mass
    atrocities from occurring.
                           special operations forces
        Question. The previous two QDRs have mandated significant growth in
    our Special Operations Forces and enablers that directly support their
    operations.
        Do you believe that we should further increase the number of
    special operations personnel? If so, why, and by how much?
        Answer. The current growth of 3 to 5 percent in special operations
    personnel is appropriate. If confirmed, I will examine if additional
    growth of Special Forces is needed.
        Question. In your view, how can the DOD increase the size of
    Special Operations Forces while also maintaining the rigorous
    recruiting, selection, and training standards for special operators?
        Answer. Although SOF has nearly doubled since September 11,
    recruitment, assessment, selection, and training standards have not
    been altered or lowered.
        Question. Do you believe any modifications to U.S. Special
    Operations Command's (SOCOM) title 10, U.S.C., missions are
    appropriate? If so, what modifications would you suggest?
        Answer. In my judgment, no modifications are required at this time.
    If confirmed, I remain open to issues and ideas that might suggest
    modifications should be considered.
        Question. What can be done to ensure that indirect special
    operations missions with medium- and long-term impact, such as
    unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, receive as much
    emphasis as direct action, and that they receive appropriate funding?
        Answer. The Commander, SOCOM, continues to emphasize the importance
    of the indirect SOF mission profiles and insures that SOF trains to
    these mission profiles. It is my understanding that we have grown our
    SOF Civil Affairs and Military Information Support forces to insure we
    have extra capacity to conduct indirect operations. If confirmed, I
    will work with our SOF commanders to ensure that an appropriate balance
    is maintained.
                           special operations forces
        Question. The previous two QDRs have mandated significant growth in
    our Special Operations Forces and enablers that directly support their
    operations.
        Answer. The Commander of SOCOM has described the ``non-
    availability'' of enabling capabilities as SOCOM's ``most vexing issue
    in the operational environment''. The 2010 QDR sought to balance
    previously mandated growth in Special Operations Forces with additional
    enabling capabilities.
        Question. What do you believe are the greatest shortages in
    enabling capabilities facing Special Operations Forces?
        Answer. Rotary wing aircraft is the single most significant
    shortage, and we are taking steps to address it. If confirmed, I will
    work with our SOF commanders to identify and resolve other critical
    shortfalls.
        Question. Do you believe additional enabling capabilities, beyond
    those mandated by the QDR, are required to support Special Operations
    Forces?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Services and SOCOM are
    increasing enabling capabilities as mandated by the QDR. The Force
    Sufficiency Assessment should inform our senior leaders in deciding
    whether more enabling capabilities are needed.
        Question. Do you believe the process for Special Operations Forces
    to request enabling capabilities from the Services, when required,
    should be formalized? If so, how?
        Answer. This process is formalized in the Global Force Management
    Board Force Allocation process. The SOCOM Commander and I are in
    discussion about adapting the process for the Army based on the lessons
    of the past 10 years. If confirmed, I will closely monitor these
    processes to ensure SOF requirements for critical enabling capabilities
    are being addressed.
        Question. Some have argued that the Commander of SOCOM should have
    greater influence on special operations personnel management issues
    including assignment, promotion, compensation, and retention of Special
    Operations Forces. One proposal would modify section 167 of title 10,
    U.S.C., to change the role of the SOCOM Commander from ``monitoring''
    the readiness of special operations personnel to ``coordinating'' with
    the Services on personnel and manpower management policies that
    directly affect Special Operations Forces.
        What is your view of this proposal?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will closely examine this proposal;
    however, it is my judgment that the law does not need to change at this
    time. The recently implemented DOD Instruction 5100.01 requires the
    Services to coordinate their personnel policies and plans with SOCOM.
    The ``coordination'' policy will provide SOCOM more visibility into
    personnel policy changes and initiatives.
                              combating terrorism
        Question. The administration recently released its National
    Strategy for Counterterrorism. This strategy highlights the need to
    maintain pressure on al Qaeda's core while building the capacity of
    partners to confront mutual threats. The strategy also underscores the
    need to augment efforts to counter threats from al Qaeda-linked threats
    ``that continue to emerge from beyond its core safe haven in South
    Asia''.
        How do you view the Department's role under the new National
    Strategy for Counterterrorism?
        Answer. Elements: antiterrorism, or defensive measures;
    counterterrorism, or offensive actions; and consequence management, or
    measures to recover from terrorist attacks. Each of these components of
    combating terrorism has its own policies and strategies, developed in
    close coordination with interagency partners. DOD plays a significant
    role within the government-wide global fight against al Qaeda and its
    affiliates primarily through partner nation capacity-building and
    enabling efforts, targeted counterterrorism operations, and countering
    violent extremist messaging.
        Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role for the
    Department in countering threats from al Qaeda and affiliated groups
    outside of South Asia?
        Answer. In my judgment, DOD's primary role is to pursue the
    ultimate defeat of al Qaeda (AQ) and its affiliates as part of a whole-
    of-government counterterrorism approach. We accomplish this through
    security force assistance, building strong and enduring partnerships,
    and when directed, conducting targeted counterterrorism operations in
    order to eliminate imminent threats to the United States and U.S.
    interests. We also support other efforts led by interagency partners
    who focus on the development of better governance and supplying basic
    needs thereby reducing the underlying causes that enable AQ to recruit
    from vulnerable populations.
        Question. Are there steps the Department should take to better
    coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other Federal
    departments and agencies?
        Answer. It's my personal experience that the level of interagency
    coordination that occurs in the global counterterrorism (CT) fight is
    greater than it has ever been. But that does not mean we can rest in
    continually improving our coordinated efforts to bring the full weight
    of our national power to bear in the defense of our interests. If
    confirmed, I will work to ensure we collectively put forth the most
    effective approach to combat terrorism.
        Question. What do you view as the role of the Department in
    countering al Qaeda and affiliated groups in cyberspace?
        Answer. The Department acts in support of the Nation's strategic
    objective to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda (AQ) and its
    affiliates. In cyberspace, this includes directing DOD information
    networks operations, planning against designated cyberspace threats,
    and executing cyberspace operations as directed. DOD also employs cyber
    defense measures to prevent intrusions and defeat adversary (including
    AQ) activities on DOD networks and systems.
                            section 1208 operations
        Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), as amended
    by subsequent bills, authorizes the provision of support (including
    training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces,
    and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S.
    Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.
        What is your assessment of this authority?
        Answer. Combatant commanders have repeatedly confirmed section 1208
    as a key tool in this ongoing fight. The ability for Special Operations
    Forces to leverage willing partners who possess access to areas,
    people, and information that are denied to our forces is critical to
    tactical and strategic success. We have been able to respond quickly to
    global challenges due to this authority while maintaining the
    appropriate civilian oversight, including Secretary of Defense approval
    and congressional notification. The Department is appreciative of
    Congress's continued support for this authority and if confirmed, I
    will continue to keep you informed through our annual report and
    briefings.
      capabilities of special operations forces and general purpose forces
        Question. The 2010 QDR called for increased counterinsurgency,
    counterterrorism, and security force assistance capabilities within the
    general purpose forces.
        What is your understanding and assessment of the QDR's guidance
    with regard to the mix of responsibilities assigned to general purpose
    and Special Operations Forces, particularly with respect to security
    force assistance and building partner military capabilities?
        Answer. The 2010 QDR emphasized expanding general purpose forces'
    capabilities and capacity for these missions. Our general purpose
    forces have always performed some security force assistance and built
    partner capacity; however, this strategy increases that emphasis and
    expands the range of missions. This approach is also consistent with
    the 2010 QDR emphasis on allies and partners.
        Question. Do you believe that our general purpose forces need to
    become more like Special Operations Forces in mission areas that are
    critical to countering violent extremists?
        Answer. Our conventional forces should continue to become more
    versatile, adopting some special capabilities, particularly in areas
    such as cultural awareness, linguistic capabilities, information
    operations, and in the ability to operate in a decentralized, widely
    dispersed environment. Doing so will improve general purpose force
    capabilities across mission areas including counterinsurgency and
    stability operations.
        Question. In your view, what mission areas, if any, should be
    reserved for Special Operations Forces only?
        Answer. In my judgment, Special Operations Forces provide unique
    abilities and are an essential component of our U.S. Armed Forces. In a
    very unpredictable security environment, they must remain versatile as
    well. Unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, special reconnaissance,
    foreign internal defense, and counter-proliferation of WMD are some of
    the unique mission areas in which they excel and provide an essential
    capability.
                   dod's cooperative threat reduction program
        Question. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which is
    focused historically on accounting for, securing, or eliminating Cold
    War era WMD and materials in the states of the former Soviet Union, has
    started to expand its focus to other countries. With this expansion the
    CTR program is widening its focus to biological weapons and
    capabilities including biological surveillance and early warning; and
    encouraging development of capabilities to reduce proliferation
    threats.
        Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among the U.S.
    Government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts, e.g., DOD,
    the Department of Energy, and the State Department?
        Answer. My understanding is that effective interagency coordination
    has been a defining characteristic of the CTR program since its
    inception, which has directly contributed to the program's success. We
    should continue to evaluate the program's objectives in alignment with
    our national security interests. If confirmed, I will evaluate whether
    interagency coordination can be improved.
        Question. If confirmed, would you make any changes in the current
    programs or goals of the CTR program?
        Answer. The CTR program has contributed significantly to reducing
    residual Cold War stockpiles of WMD and associated materials within the
    states of the former Soviet Union. However, such threats continue to
    exist, both within the Eurasia region and throughout the world. I
    support the continued expansion of this program to other regions of the
    world in order to build global partnerships. Where governments are
    unable to mitigate this threat on their own, we should consider working
    with them to secure all WMD and related materials.
                              prompt global strike
        Question. The 2010 QDR concluded that the United States will
    continue to experiment with prompt global strike prototypes. There has
    been no decision to field a prompt global strike capability as the
    effort is early in the technology and testing phase.
        In your view, what is the role for a Conventional Prompt Global
    Strike (CPGS) capability in addressing the key threats to U.S. national
    security in the near future?
        Answer. There has been no decision to field a CPGS capability;
    however, the concept has merit in a variety of scenarios. If confirmed,
    I will closely examine CPGS in order to provide recommendations on its
    future development.
        Question. What approach to implementation of this capability would
    you expect to pursue if confirmed?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will support continued research,
    development, test, and evaluation of critical technologies. I will also
    assess the formal establishment of follow-on Service acquisition
    programs and a concurrent effort to improve the Nation's intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities necessary to
    support a future CPGS capability.
        Question. In your view what, if any, improvements in intelligence
    capabilities would be needed to support a prompt global strike
    capability?
        Answer. As with other weapons systems, effective employment of CPGS
    weapons depends on the collection, analysis, and dissemination of
    timely and accurate intelligence information. Currently, DOD is
    conducting assessments of the adequacy of present and future ISR to
    support strikes using a CPGS weapon system. If confirmed, I will use
    these assessments to inform the performance requirements for CPGS, just
    as assessed CPGS performance will shape future ISR requirements.
                   nuclear weapons and stockpile stewardship
        Question. Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program
    with the aim of creating the computational capabilities and
    experimental tools needed to allow for the continued certification of
    the nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable without the
    need for nuclear weapons testing. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy
    are statutorily required to certify annually to Congress the continued
    safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
        As the stockpile continues to age, what do you view as the greatest
    challenges, if any, with respect to assuring the safety, security, and
    reliability of the stockpile?
        Answer. To sustain a safe, secure, and effective stockpile today,
    we must prudently manage our nuclear stockpile and related LEPs, while
    cultivating the nuclear infrastructure, expert workforce, and
    leadership required to sustain it in the future. If confirmed, I will
    consider the full range of LEP approaches to include refurbishment of
    existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads,
    and replacement of nuclear components.
        Question. If the technical conclusions and data from the Stockpile
    Stewardship Program could no longer confidently support the annual
    certification of the stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable, would you
    recommend the resumption of underground nuclear testing? What
    considerations would guide your recommendation in this regard?
        Answer. Our current stockpile stewardship is assessed as effective.
    Today's stockpile has been certified and does not require further
    nuclear testing. However, the stockpile is aging. I understand that
    there are challenges in identifying and remedying the effects of aging
    on the stockpile. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the
    Department of Energy to maintain the critical skills, capabilities, and
    infrastructure needed to ensure the safety, reliability, and security
    of the stockpile within a constrained budget environment.
        Question. Do you agree that the full funding of the President's
    plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to
    as the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority?
        Answer. Yes. The administration's 1251 report details the roadmap
    for ensuring the future safety, security, and reliability of the
    nuclear stockpile and associated delivery platforms as well as for
    modernizing the nuclear weapons complex. It demonstrates a strong
    commitment to the nuclear mission and is an important signal that the
    U.S. deterrent remains strong.
        Question. Prior to completing this modernization effort, do you
    believe it would be prudent to consider reductions below New START
    treaty limits in the deployed stockpile of nuclear weapons?
        Answer. The 2010 NPR Report stated that the United States would
    pursue additional reductions in strategic and non-strategic nuclear
    weapons with Russia, and a key aspect of implementing the 2010 NPR is
    conducting follow-on analysis. The Senate also noted in its resolution
    of advice and consent to ratification of the New START treaty that we
    must seek to initiate negotiations with Russia on a new arms control
    agreement by February 2012. The analysis of further reductions would
    inform my judgment, if confirmed, on whether it is prudent to reduce
    nuclear weapons below New START treaty limits.
        Question. If confirmed, would you recommend any changes to the non-
    deployed hedge stockpile of nuclear weapons?
        Answer. As detailed in the administration's section 1251 report,
    the National Nuclear Security Administration is pursuing a multi-year
    program to build critical plutonium and uranium facilities that will
    give the Nuclear Weapons Enterprise the ability to correct identified
    stockpile deficiencies. Without these infrastructure improvements and
    the ability to correct stockpile deficiencies and failures, careful
    analysis would be required to enable or accept reductions in the
    strategic hedge. If confirmed, I would assess this analysis before
    recommending any changes to the non-deployed hedge stockpile.
                           law of the sea convention
        Question. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is
    pending consideration in the U.S. Senate.
        What is your view on whether or not the United States should join
    the Law of the Sea convention?
        Answer. I support the United States becoming party to the Law of
    the Sea Convention. This Convention provides U.S. Armed Forces the best
    possible means to maximize its rights to move freely on, through, and
    over the world's oceans. I also think that joining the Convention will
    allow the United States to strengthen our military's ability to conduct
    operations.
        Question. How would being a party to the Law of the Sea convention
    help or hinder the United States' security posture?
        Answer. In my judgment, accession to the Convention would more
    permanently secure our Nation's global mobility rights, which are
    critical to America's ongoing and future national security operations
    and humanitarian assistance missions.
         mobilization and demobilization of national guard and reserves
        Question. In support of the current ongoing conflicts, the National
    Guard and Reserves have experienced their largest and most sustained
    employment since World War II. Numerous problems have arisen over time
    in the planning and procedures for mobilization and demobilization,
    e.g., inadequate health screening and medical response to service-
    connected injuries or illnesses, antiquated pay systems, limited
    transition assistance programs upon demobilization, and inefficient
    policies regarding members of the Individual Ready Reserve. Reserve
    Force management policies and systems have been characterized in the
    past as ``inefficient and rigid'' and readiness levels have been
    adversely affected by equipment shortages, cross-leveling, and reset
    policies.
        What is your assessment of advances made in improving Reserve
    component mobilization and demobilization procedures, and in what areas
    do problems still exist?
        Answer. At this point, I can speak only for the Army Reserve
    component, but we have made significant progress in this area and
    eliminated or improved many ``inefficient and rigid'' procedures. In
    doing so, we have been able to better sustain the vital employment of
    the National Guard and Reserves. Some of the direct results of these
    improvements are: increased deployment predictability, earlier
    mobilization notifications, stabilized dwell times, and reintegration
    and transition services throughout the deployment cycle. Deliberate
    investments and policy commitments to this Operational Reserve have
    resulted in the best trained, best equipped, and best led Reserve
    component in our history. There remains room for improvement, such as
    achieving a single, standardized pay system and providing first-rate
    medical care before and after deployment. If confirmed, I look forward
    to working with Congress on the shared goal of providing our Total
    Force the most capable and best cared for military force in the world.
        Question. What do you consider to be the most significant enduring
    changes to the enabling of an operational Reserve aimed at ensuring
    Reserve component readiness for future mobilization requirements?
        Answer. The future fiscal environment will present significant
    challenges as we seek to program sufficient resources to preserve the
    readiness gains of the Reserve component while continuing to use them
    on a predictable and periodic basis to satisfy our national security
    requirements. Meeting this challenge will require the commitment of
    both the Department and Congress.
        Question. Do you believe the Reserve components should be
    Operational or Strategic Reserves?
        Answer. The reality is that the Reserve components of our Armed
    Forces have transformed from an exclusively Strategic Reserve to one
    that also provides operational, full-spectrum capabilities to the
    Nation. Repeated combat deployments, as well as peacekeeping,
    humanitarian relief and Homeland defense missions, have produced a
    Reserve component far more operationally capable and experienced than
    at any time in our Nation's history. Returning to a strictly Strategic
    Reserve role for the Reserve component would not be in the Nation's
    best interest.
        Question. Do you see a need to modify current statutory authorities
    for the mobilization of members of the National Guard and Reserves to
    further enhance their ability to perform various national security
    missions?
        Answer. Over the past 10 years, the Department has primarily relied
    on the provisions of the Presidential Declaration of National Emergency
    to gain involuntary access to the Reserve components. If confirmed, I
    think it would be prudent to explore more effective and potentially
    more decentralized authorities to involuntarily access and mobilize
    Reserve and National Guard Forces. To that end, I understand DOD is
    working with the Armed Service Committees to include new mobilization
    authorities in the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act. These
    authorities would allow Service Secretaries limited mobilization
    authority, of up to 365 days, for non-named contingencies. Such a
    change would allow us to better support the requirements of the Joint
    Force Commanders. Additionally, the recent agreement between DOD and
    the Governors, which will allow Reserve and National Guard Forces to
    respond to a domestic emergency or disaster when requested by a
    Governor, is a positive step forward.
                  medical and dental readiness of the reserves
        Question. Medical and dental readiness of Reserve component
    personnel has been an issue of significant concern to the committee,
    and shortfalls that have been identified have indicated a need for
    improved policy oversight and accountability.
        If confirmed, how would you seek to clarify and coordinate
    reporting on the medical and dental readiness of the Reserves?
        Answer. Medical and dental readiness of Reserve component personnel
    remains an issue of significant concern. If confirmed, I will continue
    to support the Reserve Health Readiness Program (RHRP), which provides
    Periodic Health Assessment (PHA), Post-Deployment Health Reassessment,
    and other Individual Medical Readiness services--both medical and
    dental--to all Reserve component forces. In addition to these programs,
    command emphasis on meeting standards and the integration of RHRP data
    with our existing readiness systems will improve both reporting
    accuracy and overall readiness. If confirmed, I will work to improve
    Reserve readiness across the Department.
        Question. How would you improve upon the Department's ability to
    maintain a healthy and fit Reserve component?
        Answer. Improving the Department's ability to maintain a healthy
    and fit Reserve component requires senior leadership involvement and
    individual accountability. Strong command emphasis must be in place to
    produce necessary improvements. If confirmed, I will work with the
    Defense Safety Oversight Council and the Medical and Personnel
    Executive Steering Committee to advance health and safety promotion and
    injury/illness prevention.
                              recruiting standards
        Question. Recruiting highly qualified individuals for military
    service during wartime in a cost-constrained environment presents
    unique challenges. The Army has been criticized in past years for
    relaxing enlistment standards in tough recruiting environments with
    respect to factors such as age, intelligence, weight and physical
    fitness standards, citizenship status, tattoos, and past criminal
    misconduct. On the other hand, as the Deputy Chief of Staff of the
    Army, G-1, testified earlier this year that less than 25 percent of all
    17-24 year olds are eligible to enlist, primarily due to physical and
    educational requirements.
        What is your assessment of the adequacy of current standards
    regarding qualifications for enlistment in the Armed Forces?
        Answer. From my perspective as CSA, the current enlistment
    qualification standards are well-defined and have stood the test of
    time. They are driven by the need to provide the Services with men and
    women who are prepared to adapt to the rigors of military life and meet
    performance requirements. To that end, the Services carefully screen
    applicants who come from all walks of life. The traditional high school
    diploma remains the best single predictor of attrition. That said, some
    standards may change over time. As an example, I personally believe
    that the enlistment process should include an open-source social media
    screening and have asked the Department of the Army to consider whether
    we have the necessary authorities and whether it is feasible to do so.
        Question. In your view, is there any way to increase the pool of
    eligible enlistees without sacrificing quality?
        Answer. Again, speaking from the Army perspective, we are not
    currently challenged by recruiting and retention. There is an adequate
    pool of eligible enlistees. However, we are alert to challenges other
    than quality such as ensuring a reasonable geographic diversity of
    recruits so that we remain reflective of American society. If
    confirmed, I will work with the Services to continually find new ways
    to improve recruitment.
        Question. Are there any enlistment requirements or standards that
    are overly restrictive or which do not directly correlate to successful
    military service?
        Answer. My current assessment is that our military enlistment
    standards are not overly restrictive. The Services employ fitness,
    adaptability, and aptitude standards which correlate to the physical,
    disciplined, regulated lifestyle and cognitive demands needed to
    succeed in the Armed Forces. If confirmed, I will continue to evaluate
    this issue closely.
        Question. Current recruiting policies define three tiers of high
    school diploma credentials, aimed at minimizing attrition during the
    initial enlistment term. At the height of OIF, the Army was
    particularly forward-leaning in advocating for more GED holders and
    non-traditional high school graduates to meet recruiting goals. Pending
    legislative proposals would treat all graduates of State-recognized
    programs equally for recruiting eligibility.
        Do you believe the current ``tier'' system for evaluating potential
    enlistees has outlived its usefulness in today's All-Volunteer Force?
        Answer. The Services track the attrition rates of military recruits
    by a variety of credential types. Traditional high school diploma
    graduates have lower rates of attrition than any other type of
    credential holder. I am aware of the proposals that would classify
    graduates of online public schools as ``Tier I'' candidates for
    military enrollment, and if confirmed, I will give it careful
    consideration.
        Question. What do you consider to be the most important indicators
    of future successful Active Duty military service in a new recruit?
        Answer. The fitness, adaptability, and aptitude standards which the
    Services employ have historically correlated to the physical,
    disciplined, regulated lifestyle and cognitive demands needed to
    succeed in the Armed Forces. Young men and women who are motivated to
    serve their country and desire to excel will have that opportunity
    through military service.
                           homosexual conduct policy
        Question. The ``Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010'', enacted
    on December 22, 2010, provides for the repeal of the current DOD policy
    concerning homosexuality in the Armed Forces, to be effective 60 days
    after the Secretary of Defense has received DOD's comprehensive review
    on the implementation of such repeal, and the President, Secretary, and
    CJCS certify to the congressional defense committees that they have
    considered the report and proposed plan of action, that DOD has
    prepared the necessary policies and regulations to exercise the
    discretion provided by such repeal, and that implementation of such
    policies and regulations is consistent with the standards of military
    readiness and effectiveness, unit cohesion, and military recruiting and
    retention.
        What effect do you anticipate the repeal will have on readiness and
    discipline in the Armed Forces?
        Answer. We have the policies and regulations needed for
    implementation, and they are consistent with standards of military
    readiness, military effectiveness, unit cohesion, and recruiting and
    retention. I have considered both objective and subjective measures,
    and it is my judgment that with our training and preparation nearly
    complete, we are now ready to affect repeal while sustaining military
    effectiveness.
               protection of u.s. forces against internal threats
        Question. On November 5, 2009, a gunman opened fire at the Soldier
    Readiness Center at Fort Hood, Texas, killing 13 people and wounding or
    injuring 43 others. A DOD review of the attack released in January 2010
    concluded that the Department was poorly prepared to defend against
    internal threats, including radicalization among military personnel.
        What, in your view, are the lessons learned from the tragedy at
    Fort Hood?
        Answer. Fort Hood revealed areas that require corrective action.
    Specific lessons include: (1) identifying and monitoring potential
    threats through gathering, analyzing, and acting on information and
    intelligence; (2) providing time-critical information to the right
    people through the sharing and merging of key indicators; and (3)
    planning for and responding to incidents through immediate emergency
    response as well as the long-term care for victims of attacks and their
    families.
        Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to
    prevent and mitigate such threats in the future?
        Answer. As a result of the tragedy at Fort Hood, the Department
    will strengthen its policies, programs, and procedures to mitigate
    internal threats, ensure force protection, enable emergency response,
    and provide care for victims and families. If confirmed, I will work
    to: (1) address workplace violence; (2) ensure commander and supervisor
    access to appropriate information in personnel records; (3) improve
    information sharing with partner agencies and among installations; (4)
    expand installations' emergency response capabilities; (5) integrate
    force protection policy, and clarifying force protection roles and
    responsibilities; and (6) ensure that we provide top quality health
    care to both our servicemembers and our healthcare providers.
                              religious guidelines
        Question. The Independent Review Related to the Tragedy at Fort
    Hood observed that ``DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks
    the clarity necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate
    religious practices from those that might indicate a potential for
    violence or self-radicalization.'' Recommendation 2.7 of the Final
    Recommendations urged the Department to update policy to clarify
    guidelines for religious accommodation and Recommendation 2.8 urged the
    Department to task the Defense Science Board to ``undertake a multi-
    disciplinary study to identify behavioral indicators of violence and
    self-radicalization . . . ''
        What is your view of these recommendations?
        Answer. I understand the Independent Review Related to the Tragedy
    at Fort Hood issued recommendations based on their findings, and that
    the Fort Hood Follow-on Review prepared an implementation plan in
    response to these. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor
    implementation and track the progress being made to protect our
    servicemembers from harm while ensuring DOD policies, programs, and
    procedures appropriately accommodate the free exercise of religion.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of current
    policies and programs of DOD regarding religious practices in the
    military?
        Answer. The right of servicemembers to observe their respective
    religious faiths has always been highly valued by all of the Services.
    It is my current judgment that our policies and programs reflect this
    value and provide commanders with adequate flexibility to balance
    accommodation for religious beliefs and maintain good order and
    discipline. If confirmed, I will remain open to issues and ideas that
    might suggest any change in policy or programs.
        Question. In your view, do these policies appropriately accommodate
    the free exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on
    those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?
        Answer. Yes, I believe our policies appropriately accommodate the
    free exercise of religion.
        Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices
    regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of
    formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a
    chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious
    beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs,
    including no religious beliefs?
        Answer. Yes, I think existing policies and practices strike the
    proper balance. I admire our military chaplains for their work
    ministering amidst the pluralistic environment of the military. Even as
    chaplains express their faith, they and their commanders also are asked
    to be as inclusive as possible when ministering to an interfaith group.
    Our chaplains can voluntarily participate, or not participate, in
    settings which conflict with their faith traditions while remaining
    mindful of the requirement for inclusiveness. If confirmed, I will
    remain open to issues and ideas that might suggest improvement to
    policy and practices.
        Question. If confirmed, will you work to ensure that a scientific
    fact-based approach to understanding radicalization will drive the
    Department's relevant policies on this topic?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that our force is protected by
    a reliance on scientific, fact-based approach to countering
    radicalization. I understand Defense Science Board study on violent
    radicalization has been commissioned by DOD and that there are plans to
    commission two additional clinical studies focused on identifying any
    potential indicators of violent behavior in military personnel. I
    believe the results of these studies can help inform future policies
    and programs on radicalization.
        Question. Current policy in the Department gives discretion to
    military leaders to decide whether requests to waive uniform and
    appearance standards should be granted based on religious beliefs. The
    Department has submitted a legislative proposal that would clearly
    exempt the armed services from the requirements of the Religious
    Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).
        What is your view of the manner in which DOD policies accommodate
    religious practices that require adherents to wear particular articles
    of faith?
        Answer. I understand the important and delicate balance that we
    must strike between accommodating religious practices that require
    adherents to wear particular articles of faith and maintaining the
    military's uniform grooming and appearance standards. My understanding
    is that wearing particular articles of faith are permissible so long as
    the articles are neat and conservative, do not negatively impact the
    readiness, and good order or discipline of the unit and the mission is
    not jeopardized. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring an
    appropriate balance between maintaining the military's uniform grooming
    and appearance standards and accommodating particular articles of
    faith.
        Question. Do you believe that the Armed Forces need to be exempted
    from the strictures of RFRA? If so, why?
        Answer. Yes. It is my understanding that the RFRA has the effect of
    ensuring that a ``rational basis'' standard in the specific area of
    military grooming and appearance is applied by the courts instead of by
    the Armed Forces. The DOD legislative proposal will restore a more
    appropriate balance between maintaining the military's uniform grooming
    and appearance standards and approving requested religious
    accommodations.
                          muslims in the u.s. military
        Question. Are you concerned that the attack at Fort Hood could lead
    to harassment or even violence against Muslims in the military?
        Answer. First and foremost, the events related to the attack at
    Fort Hood are a tragedy for all involved. While it is possible that
    such a tragic act could spur harassment and violence as a means of
    retaliation, I have confidence in the professionalism of our men and
    women in the Armed Forces. Furthermore, our military leaders and
    supervisors at all levels take precautions to prevent such occurrences
    while maintaining good order and discipline.
        Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to
    address the potential for harassment or violence against Muslims in the
    U.S. military?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would focus on sustaining the
    professionalism of our All-Volunteer Force. I would also advocate open
    communications, decisive action on the part of military leaders and
    supervisors, and command emphasis on our standards for maintaining good
    order and discipline. It's worth noting that the vast majority of our
    force has lived and worked among Muslims for the past 10 years and is
    very culturally aware.
                     sexual assault prevention and response
        Question. The Department has in recent years developed
    comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and
    response to incidents of sexual assault, including providing
    appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault. However,
    numerous incidents of sexual misconduct involving military personnel in
    combat areas of operation and at home stations are still being
    reported. Victims and their advocates claim that they are victimized
    twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by unresponsive
    or inadequate treatment for the victim. They assert that their command
    fails to respond appropriately with basic medical services and with an
    adequate investigation of their allegations followed by a failure to
    hold assailants accountable.
        Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures,
    particularly those on confidential or restricted reporting, to be
    effective?
        Answer. I do, but am also acutely aware that we must continue to do
    more. Current policies and programs designed to address sexual assault
    have allowed the Department to both care for victims and hold offenders
    accountable. However, until we have zero sexual assaults within our
    forces, we should continue to look for ways to improve the system. If
    confirmed, I will continue to engage and emphasize the importance of
    addressing sexual assault, of caring for victims, and of holding
    offenders accountable.
        Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in
    which the restricted reporting procedure has been implemented?
        Answer. Getting victims to trust the system and come forward can be
    challenging. Confidential reporting, or restricted reporting, allows a
    victim to come forward and have their personal needs met without fear
    that may be associated with a criminal investigation. I will remain
    alert and receptive to any reported flaws in the program and take
    prompt action to improve the system.
        Question. What is your view of the steps the Services have taken to
    prevent and respond to sexual assaults in combat zones, including
    assaults by or against contractor personnel?
        Answer. I am very concerned about reports of sexual assault against
    anyone in any location. We will not tolerate this behavior. The
    services have procedures in place to address the challenges of
    preventing and responding to sexual assaults in an operational
    environment to include working with host governments and our
    international partners. The Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
    (SAPR) Program requires larger units, such as brigades, to appoint and
    train a deployable sexual assault response coordinator and every
    battalion or squadron to appoint and train unit victim advocates. Until
    no sexual assaults occur within our Armed Forces, we will continue to
    look for ways to improve prevention and response.
        Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
    resources the Services have in place to investigate and respond to
    allegations of sexual assault?
        Answer. DOD is committed to addressing sexual assault in a
    comprehensive, integrated and uniform manner. All the Services have
    been directed to establish guidelines for a 24-hour, 7 day a week
    sexual assault response capability for all locations, including
    deployed areas. Our investigators and first responders are well
    trained. All services recently enhanced their resources for
    investigating and prosecuting sexual assault cases.
        Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of the
    Services to hold assailants accountable for their acts?
        Answer. The Services have the willingness and ability to hold
    assailants accountable. Moreover, senior leaders are very aware of the
    importance of establishing a positive organizational climate. Sexual
    assault is personally destructive for the victim while also undermining
    organizational climate, unit discipline and morale. When sexual
    assaults do occur, leaders must ensure victims feel free to report
    incidents without fear of reprisal, while appropriately applying
    available resources to investigate and punish assailants.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure senior
    level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to
    sexual assaults?
        Answer. DOD has a zero tolerance policy for sexual assault, and we
    have assigned a General/Flag Officer with operational experience to
    provide direct oversight of the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
    Program office. If confirmed, I will constantly evaluate policies to
    ensure the safety, dignity, and well being of all members of the Armed
    Forces.
                             women in the military
        Question. In recent years, the Navy has opened service on
    submarines to women, the Marine Corps has expanded service
    opportunities for women in intelligence specialties, and the Army is
    currently reviewing its assignment policy for female soldiers. The
    issue of the appropriate role of women in the Armed Forces is a matter
    of continuing interest to Congress and the American public.
        Do you believe additional specialties should be eligible for
    service by women?
        Answer. DOD is currently conducting a comprehensive review of the
    role of women in combat. We are participating in this review, and if
    confirmed, I will continue to monitor combat needs as Services
    recommend expanding combat roles for women and notify Congress
    accordingly as required by statute (10 U.S.C., Sec. 652 and/or
    Sec. 6035). Any decision regarding opening additional specialties for
    service by women will be based on our obligation to maintain a high
    state of mission readiness of our All-Volunteer Force.
        Question. Do you believe any changes are needed or warranted in the
    current assignment policies regarding women?
        Answer. I support the DOD review and welcome the opportunity to
    determine what we've learned in 10 years of combat.
                          rising costs of medical care
        Question. In testimony presented to Congress in February, 2009, the
    Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office asserted that
    ``medical funding accounts for more than one-third of the growth
    projected for operations and support funding between 2009 and 2026.''
    In April, 2009, then Secretary of Defense Gates told an audience at
    Maxwell Air Force Base that ``health care is eating the Department
    alive''. The administration has proposed health care efficiencies to
    save nearly $8.0 billion through 2016.
        Do you agree with the proposed health care efficiencies?
        Answer. As they have been described to me, I believe that the
    proposed health care efficiencies are sensible efforts to control DOD's
    health care costs while maintaining the same level of care. I also
    believe the modest increases in beneficiaries' cost shares are
    reasonable and still compare favorably to private sector healthcare
    plans.
        Question. What reforms in infrastructure, benefits, or benefit
    management, if any, do you think should be examined in order to control
    the costs of military health care?
        Answer. Before reforms can be initiated, detailed analysis must be
    done. This must include a look at benefit payment structures,
    organizational structure, systems, and policies for the military health
    system. If confirmed, I will assist the Secretary of Defense, as he
    leads the Department's ongoing effort to explore all possibilities to
    control the costs of military health care. I am also an advocate for
    the potential long-term gains available through the promotion of
    healthy life styles and prevention among our beneficiaries to help
    reduce the demand for health services.
        Question. What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising
    medical costs on future DOD plans?
        Answer. The medical cost growth trend will continue to add pressure
    to the Department's budget the longer it remains unresolved. Our
    uniformed servicemembers make great sacrifices for their Nation and the
    quality of their health care is a critical component to having a fit
    and ready force to accomplish the National Security Strategy.
    Additionally, the generous health benefits we provide to their families
    and retirees are a significant part of the quality of life which allows
    the military to recruit and retain the highest caliber personnel the
    Nation has to offer. If confirmed, I will continue our efforts with
    Congress and DOD to find effective ways to improve the cost-
    effectiveness of the Military Health System.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you initiate or
    recommend to mitigate the effect of such costs on the DOD top-line?
        Answer. I'm not in a position to make specific recommendations at
    this time. If confirmed, I will work closely with health care
    leadership in DOD to continue the administration's efforts to examine
    every opportunity to ensure military beneficiaries are provided the
    highest quality care possible while managing cost growth.
                        personnel and entitlement costs
        Question. In addition to health care costs, personnel, and related
    entitlement spending continues to grow and is becoming an ever
    increasing portion of the DOD budget.
        What actions do you believe can and should be taken, if any, to
    control the rise in personnel costs and entitlement spending?
        Answer. The cost related to personnel and entitlements is an
    increasing portion of DOD's available resources. Our current military
    compensation system is rooted in structures established a generation
    ago. In order to control the rise in costs related to personnel and
    entitlements, it is appropriate to conduct a comprehensive review of
    the military pay and benefits structure to determine where costs can be
    contained. If confirmed, I would coordinate with the Secretary of
    Defense on any review in a manner that supports and sustains the All-
    Volunteer Force.
        Question. In your view, can the Department and the Services
    efficiently manage the use of bonuses and special pays to place high
    quality recruits in the right jobs without paying more than the
    Department needs to pay, or can afford to pay, for other elements of
    the force?
        Answer. In my judgment, recruiting and retention bonuses are cost-
    effective tools to achieve DOD's personnel strength and experience
    objectives, but we must continually monitor these tools to ensure they
    are being used efficiently as well as effectively. It has been my
    experience that the Services adjust enlisted bonus levels to ensure we
    get the right numbers of personnel in the corresponding specialties. If
    confirmed, I would be open to a review of the utilization and efficacy
    of bonuses as part of any comprehensive review of the military pay and
    benefits structure.
                              military retirement
        Question. The 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation
    proposed a new defined benefit retirement plan that more resembles the
    benefits available under the Federal Employee Retirement System than
    the current military retirement benefit; increasing TRICARE fees for
    retirees; and the adoption of dependent care and flexible spending
    accounts for servicemembers. Secretary Panetta has called for a
    comprehensive review of the military retirement benefit.
        While it is often said that the military retirement benefit helps
    retention after the 10-year point, do you believe it provides any
    significant boost to recruitment? Do 17-18 year olds care when deciding
    to enlist?
        Answer. Surveys show that retirement benefits are often not a
    driving factor to enlist 17-18 year old men and women. I agree with
    Secretary Panetta that it is time to review the military retirement
    system for needed changes and efficiencies that will still encourage
    retention and recruitment.
        Question. How might it be modernized to reflect the needs of a new
    generation of recruits, while easing the long-term retirement cost to
    the Government?
        Answer. There are many proposed alternatives to the current
    military retirement system. I am unable to make recommendations at this
    time, but if confirmed, I will closely study proposals and their impact
    as part of a comprehensive review process.
                    systems and support for wounded warriors
        Question. Servicemembers who are wounded or injured performing
    duties in Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn
    deserve the highest priority from their Service for support services,
    healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to
    duty, successful transition from Active Duty if required, and
    continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet, as the
    revelations at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) in 2007
    illustrated, the Services were not prepared to meet the needs of
    significant numbers of returning wounded servicemembers. Despite the
    enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis, many challenges remain,
    including a growing population of servicemembers awaiting disability
    evaluation.
        What is your assessment of the progress made to date by DOD and the
    Services to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously
    ill and injured servicemembers and their families?
        Answer. The Wounded, Ill, and Injured, Senior Oversight Council DOD
    formed in 2007 has provided the necessary consistent focus on these
    issues, and has made excellent progress. DOD, in collaboration with the
    Services and the Department of Veterans Affairs, has been working on
    multiple ways to improve the care, management, and transition of our
    wounded warriors and their families. The Services' Wounded Warrior
    Units and Program oversight offices have made dramatic improvements
    through which individual and family medical, mental, and social-
    economical needs are addressed.
        Question. What are the strengths upon which continued progress
    should be based?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to build upon the successes
    of the Services' Wounded Warrior Units. By continuing to appropriately
    resource and staff these organizations with high quality personnel we
    can further improve the transition processes and overall well being of
    our wounded warriors. Additionally, we should continue to expand upon
    the research and treatment by continued collaboration between the
    private medical research and healthcare sector and the Centers of
    Excellence which fall under the DCoE (Defense Center of Excellence for
    Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury). These groups are
    making daily strides in providing the best level and quality of care to
    our wounded warriors and their families, and if confirmed, I will
    continue to place the highest priority on these efforts.
        Question. What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?
        Answer. The Services' have taken great strides to improve care to
    our wounded servicemembers. However, continuous improvement is needed.
    One area to further improve is individual case management when a
    servicemember transitions from the Active Force to DOD retiree or
    eligible veteran status. The key components of this process are the
    implementation of a single electronic health record, which follows the
    servicemember through transition and a single tracking tool for case
    management. If confirmed, I will work to improve collaboration with our
    Department of Veterans Affairs partners to expedite fielding of this
    system. The transition process and tracking for wounded warriors with
    unseen psychological wounds is an area which requires continued
    development as well.
        Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and
    resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded
    servicemembers and their families, and to monitor their progress in
    returning to duty or to civilian life?
        Answer. Yes. For example, if confirmed, I would continue to take
    advantage of generous support the Department has received from the many
    non-profit programs and private organizations who have reached out to
    support our returning veterans. There are hundreds of these
    organizations and programs that have come to the aide of wounded
    warriors and their families to provide for everything from assistive
    devices (wheel chairs, house ramps, et cetera), to conducting research
    on medical treatments, to providing direct economic aid. I would also
    continue the Joint Staff's role in providing the Department with
    evaluation and analysis across the Services in order to share best-
    practices and lessons learned.
        Question. Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at WRAMC
    pointed to the need to reform the disability evaluation system (DES). A
    DES pilot program, and now an Integrated DES program, has been
    established to improve processing of servicemembers.
        What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and
    improve the integrated DES?
        Answer. It is my belief that the current Integrated Disability
    Evaluation System has made significant progress but needs further
    reform. If confirmed, I would facilitate the Secretary of Defense and
    the Secretary of the Veterans Administration's collaboration via the
    IDES Tiger Team. In order for IDES to reach its full potential, DOD may
    need to closely coordinate with Congress for legislative change.
    Ultimately, this will reduce the total number of warriors in the
    evaluation process, thus reducing the overall cost to the system and
    the burden on our wounded warriors.
        Question. If confirmed, how will you address any need for change,
    particularly the Army's growing population of servicemembers awaiting
    disability evaluation?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will support current IDES reform
    initiatives and, if necessary, assist the Secretary of Defense with
    recommendations to Congress on legislative adjustments to the
    disability rating and compensation system. Additionally, I would
    continue support for the Services Wounded Warrior units, where
    significant improvements are being made to the quality of care for our
    wounded warriors.
                 suicide prevention and mental health resources
        Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services has
    increased in recent years. The Army released a report entitled ``Army
    Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, Suicide Prevention'' in July 2010
    that analyzed the causes of its growing suicide rate and examined
    disturbing trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high risk
    behaviors. In addition, studies conducted by the Army of soldiers and
    marines in theater are showing declines in individual morale and
    increases in mental health strain, especially among those who have
    experienced multiple deployments.
        In your view, what should DOD do to shape policies to help prevent
    suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase the resiliency
    of all servicemembers and their families, including members of the
    Reserve components?
        Answer. I am very concerned about the suicide rate. Suicide is a
    problem that cuts across the Army family, affecting our servicemembers,
    our Veterans, and their families. If confirmed, I will continue to work
    closely with Congress, our military leaders, Veterans Affairs, and
    Federal and civilian organizations to see that our members' and
    families' psychological health is addressed. DOD has developed an
    action plan to address the 13 foundational and 76 targeted
    recommendations outlined in the 2010 DOD Task Force Report on
    Prevention of Suicide. Resourcing and implementing recommendations set
    forth by the Services will improve resilience in the force in hopes of
    ultimately lowering suicide rates.
        Question. What is your understanding of the action that the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense and the Army are taking in response to the
    July 2010 Army report, and the data in Chapter 3 in particular?
        Answer. Early identification of ``high risk'' behavior and issues
    such as marital problems, substance abuse, and behavior difficulties
    are at the forefront of the Services' proactive interventions. This has
    allowed leaders to intervene on the leading edge. We are seeing
    increased unit resilience in soldiers and marines, and though it is
    still a factor the stigma regarding mental health care is dissipating.
    The Army and the Marine Corps continue to evaluate and modify services
    related to health promotion, risk reduction, and suicide prevention
    including increased behavioral health providers at the brigade level in
    Active and Reserve units, allowing engaged leaders to improve education
    and awareness of behavioral health issues. In addition, the Army has
    required increased behavioral health screening before and after
    deployments; improved training for chaplains and suicide prevention
    coordinators; and for primary care medical providers to identify and
    respond to behavioral health issues.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that
    sufficient mental health resources are available to servicemembers in
    theater, and to the servicemembers and their families upon return to
    home station?
        Answer. As an institution, DOD must continue to directly address
    mental health issues because they directly affect the wellness of our
    force. There are three key areas that must be addressed to ensure
    sufficient resources are available to members and their families.
    First, we must continue to reduce stigma and ensure that members are
    comfortable seeking treatment and using the resources that are
    available. Second, we must continue to develop effective mental health
    therapies that are relevant and appropriate for the experiences of our
    forces and their families. Third, the necessary resources must be
    available to include trained mental health professionals.
                            military quality of life
        Question. In January 2009, the Department published its second
    Quadrennial Quality of Life Review, which focused on the importance of
    key quality of life factors for military families, such as family
    support, child care, education, health care and morale, welfare, and
    recreation services.
        If confirmed, what further enhancements to military quality of life
    would you consider a priority, and how do you envision working with the
    Services, combatant commanders, family advocacy groups, and Congress to
    achieve them?
        Answer. Quality of life programs are important to the wellness of
    the total force. If confirmed, I will encourage continued improvements
    and effective management in key areas such as access to counseling,
    fitness opportunities, child care support, and spouse employment
    opportunities. I look forward to working with advocacy groups and
    Congress to efficiently close gaps and reduce overlaps in programs and
    to communicate effectively with families to ensure that they know how
    to access available support when they need it.
                                 family support
        Question. Military members and their families in both the active
    and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous
    sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military
    leaders have warned of growing concerns among military families as a
    result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations
    that go with them.
        What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
    issues for servicemembers and their families?
        Answer. I share the common judgment that family resilience is tied
    to family readiness. We must ensure military families are well prepared
    to meet the challenges that come with deployment and service. Through
    focusing on the psychological, social, financial, and educational well-
    being of military families, we can continue to build family resilience.
    Great strides have been made in improving access to resources for
    families through such programs as Strong Bonds, MilitaryOne Source and
    the Yellow Ribbon Program. If confirmed, I will continue to focus on
    these and other initiatives to promote family readiness.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness
    needs are addressed and adequately resourced?
        Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Services,
    the Department, and other agencies on improving resources for benchmark
    Service programs as well as access to other programs such as
    MilitaryOne Source and the Yellow Ribbon Program. I believe it is DOD's
    responsibility to ensure that appropriate resources, including those in
    health care, education, and employment, are available to families at
    the level they need wherever they may be located.
        Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
    light of global rebasing, base realignment and closure, deployments,
    and future reductions in end strength?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will monitor the changing needs of our
    military families closely to ensure that all available resources are
    available to families at the required level and location. In order to
    accurately address the needs of these families in a changing
    environment, it is critical that we build community partnerships
    between all Federal agencies and with local governments, businesses,
    and non-profit organizations that are stakeholders in addressing the
    stressful aspects of military life. I also believe we need to encourage
    continued progress among individual states' legislative initiatives to
    ease recognition of professional accreditation of family members and
    support for various school programs transferring children.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support to Reserve
    component families related to mobilization, deployment and family
    readiness, as well as to Active Duty families who do not reside near a
    military installation?
        Answer. We have a duty to ensure every family has access to quality
    resources, regardless of component or location. These resources should
    provide information, access, referrals, and outreach to all military
    members and their families. This needs to be underwritten by a
    coordinated, community-based network of care encompassing DOD, VA,
    State, local, non-profit and private providers. It is my understanding
    that DOD's Yellow Ribbon Program has been successful in addressing
    these needs. If confirmed, I will assess this program and others to
    ensure it is properly focused and funded to address the issues faced by
    Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve members and their families.
        Question. If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to
    enhance family support?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would encourage the implementation of
    flexible family support programs that meet the needs of our members and
    their families whether they live on, near, or far from military
    installations. I understand there are many excellent State programs
    that support members and their families. If confirmed, I would like to
    explore these further and see if they can be expanded across all
    States.
        Question. If confirmed, in your view, are the recent increases in
    military family support (which have risen to $8.3 billion in the fiscal
    year 2012 President's budget) sustainable in future years?
        Answer. We will have to review family programs with respect to
    efficiencies just as every other program in DOD will be reviewed
    against the overall needs of the Department. In so doing, the focus
    should be on the efficiency and quality of Family Support programs
    along with the leveraging of community-level organizations and citizens
    who desire to help their military-connected neighbors. DOD
    efficiencies, along with community partnerships and cooperation, are
    key to meeting the long-term needs of our military families in a
    fiscally constrained environment.
                           detainee treatment policy
        Question. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006,
    memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all
    relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
    procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
    Conventions?
        Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would continue to support the Deputy
    Secretary of Defense's 7 July 2006 memorandum which states that all
    relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
    procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
    Conventions.
        Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
    specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
    22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
    Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
        Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would continue to support the
    standards for detainee treatment specified in the Army Field Manual on
    Interrogations and DOD Directive 2310.01E.
        Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies
    promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence
    interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply
    with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field
    Manual on Interrogations?
        Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure all DOD
    policies and plans related to intelligence interrogations, detainee
    briefings, and tactical questioning comply with Common Article 3 of the
    Geneva Conventions and the Army Field Manual on Interrogations.
        Question. Do you share the view that standards for detainee
    treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that
    we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat
    our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S.
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be
    captured in future conflicts?
        Answer. Yes. I share the view that the way in which we treat
    detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. forces
    are treated should they be captured in future conflicts.
                            congressional oversight
        Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
    appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
    briefings, and other communications of information.
        Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
    this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
    even if those views differ from the administration in power?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
    committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
    information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
    with respect to your responsibilities as CJCS?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
    other communications of information are provided to this committee and
    its staff and other appropriate committees?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
    such documents?
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
                       relationships in the armed forces
        1. Senator Levin. General Dempsey, in response to an advance policy
    question about your vision for the Armed Forces of today and the
    future, you responded, in part, that ``It will be necessary to
    establish a different relationship among the Active and Reserve
    components of our Armed Forces, and it is likely that we will have to
    establish a different relationship among our closest allies and
    partners.'' Can you elaborate on what you meant in terms of what might
    be different in the relationship among the Active and Reserve
    components of our Armed Forces and among our closest allies and
    partners?
        General Dempsey. In my judgment, it is reasonable to expect the
    relationship among the Active and Reserve components of our Armed
    Forces as well as among our closest allies and partners to evolve.
    Fiscal constraints, for example, will challenge our ability to program
    and budget sufficient resources to preserve the readiness investments
    made to the Reserve components. Constrained resources will also drive
    us to look at new approaches for how we maintain forward presence and
    build partnerships. As Chairman, I will work with the Secretary of
    Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff to sustain a versatile and affordable
    Joint Force that preserves the strong relationship between our Active
    and Reserve components and with our allies and partners.

                         nominees with joint experience
        2. Senator Levin. General Dempsey, recently, the committee became
    aware in the case of nominees for Service chief and combatant command
    that there was a need for secretarial waivers for promotion to flag
    rank and for presidential waivers for such assignments because of a
    lack of joint experience. Are you committed to ensuring that nominees
    for these positions of importance and responsibility have the requisite
    joint qualifications?
        General Dempsey. I am wholly committed to a Joint Force led joint
    qualified leaders. Overall, our senior flag officers have substantial
    joint experience. Eligibility to pin on the rank of brigadier general
    or rear admiral is contingent on being a Joint Qualified Officer. It is
    my understanding that waivers are increasingly less frequent as our
    military continues to progress under Goldwater-Nichols.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich
                           military retirement system
        3. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, Secretary Panetta has called
    for a review of the military retirement system. Senior military
    leadership has vocalized support for a review of the military
    retirement system since personnel costs are a significant portion of
    the Department of Defense's (DOD) budget. DOD is going to have to work
    with constrained resources, however, we have the greatest military in
    the world because of the people who serve in it and they should be
    compensated their service--especially if they serve long-term. While
    studies may show retirement benefits are not a driving factor for young
    recruits, they certainly become a driving factor with age. Any
    proposals to Congress to modify the current retirement system must
    still provide appropriate compensation and recognition for long-term
    service, especially to retain the best and the brightest. Even the
    current discussions regarding military retirement are causing alarm
    among the force and may impact retention. In the midst of three ongoing
    operations overseas, is now the right time to evaluate and possibly
    modify the military retirement system?
        General Dempsey. I share in your conclusion about your military
    being the finest in the world. Sustaining our force at this level
    requires, in part, an assessment of how best to structure compensation
    and benefits to include retirement. In the era of fiscal constraints,
    we should review the military retirement system for efficiencies and
    effectiveness. However, any proposal should address the potential
    effect on recruitment, retention, and sustainment of the All-Volunteer
    Force.

        4. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, if confirmed, how do you
    propose to ensure discussions regarding modifications to the retirement
    system and any proposed modifications do not result in significant
    recruiting and retention issues or impact the ability to retain the
    best and the brightest among our servicemembers?
        General Dempsey. Our force management and compensation policies and
    programs are being assessed as part of the comprehensive review. The
    current statutory and policy framework has served us well during recent
    conflicts. However, fiscal constraints require us to examine options
    for a more affordable compensation structure that will not compromise
    the readiness of the All-Volunteer Force. As Chairman, I will ensure
    that all options under consideration include an assessment of the
    likely impact on recruiting and retention. Most importantly, I am
    committed to ensuring any potential changes do not break faith with our
    servicemembers, veterans, and their families.

        5. Senator Begich. General Dempsey, as the discussion continues,
    how will you and other senior leaders communicate with the force about
    pay, benefits, and retirement?
        General Dempsey. As Chairman, I will communicate directly with the
    Joint Force. I will encourage all our senior military leaders to
    conduct regular outreach through a variety of mediums to include media
    engagements, townhalls, journal articles, and social media. Our goal
    will be to share information openly and widely. I expect that the
    Service Chiefs will play an especially vital role.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
                      national debt and national security
        6. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, the impact of the ongoing
    financial crisis over deficit spending and the Nation's enormous debt
    unquestionably will have an impact on defense budgets and how we
    respond to the many national security threats we face. I agree with
    Secretary Panetta who recently said that DOD would ``continue to be
    accountable to the American people for what we spend, where we spend
    it, and what the results are.'' Do you view the $14 trillion deficit
    and projections for significant increases in this amount in the future
    as a national security threat?
        General Dempsey. There is a relationship between our national
    security and our economic prosperity. Our national power is the
    aggregate of our diplomatic, military, and economic influence. In this
    respect, the national debt is a serious concern.

        7. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, what's the remedy for Admiral
    Mullen's belief that DOD has ``lost the ability to prioritize, to make
    hard decisions, to do tough analysis, to make trades''?
        General Dempsey. In my judgment, our acquisition system needs
    significant improvement. In particular, I will look closely for ways to
    improve accountability. This likely means a more prominent role for
    Service Chiefs early in the process. Another option under consideration
    is making assessments of cost, performance, and technical readiness of
    weapon systems even earlier in the acquisition process. As Chairman, I
    will ensure that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council synchronizes
    its decision points to better inform these earlier acquisition
    decisions. Through an improved Joint Capabilities Integration
    Development System, we will also work to ensure more focus on
    affordability through the analysis of risk versus cost, schedule,
    performance, and the urgency of the requirement.

        8. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, discussions on defense spending
    cuts as part of negotiations on raising the debt ceiling have,
    according to media reports, ranged from the $400 billion over 12 years
    that President Obama had already announced, to as much as $800 billion
    over 10 years, and in some cases $1 trillion over 10 years. None of
    these numbers assigned to defense cuts has been accompanied by any sort
    of strategic analysis. In other words, no one seems to be asking:
    ``What do we need to spend for what we want our military to do?''
        In your opinion, what would a cut of $80 billion to $100 billion a
    year over 10 years mean in terms of impact on DOD? What sort of things
    would we have to be willing to cut? What sort of missions would we have
    to consider giving up or cutting back?
        General Dempsey. I would echo the Secretary of Defense who stated
    that ``cuts that deep would damage our national defense''. Most likely,
    such reductions would require changing our national security
    strategies, and would probably result in a different force than we have
    today. The force would likely be smaller and less able to address
    multiple, simultaneous contingencies.

        9. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, what are your top priorities
    for programs or missions you would protect?
        General Dempsey. As Chairman, my top priority is to protect the
    homeland and the American people. As mentioned in my hearing testimony,
    I will work to keep America immune from coercion. To this end, I am
    committed to developing a decisive, responsive, interdependent,
    versatile and affordable Joint Force that can deliver options for the
    Nation. As we make the force affordable, I am focused on keeping faith
    with our servicemembers, veterans, and their families.

        10. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, where do you think DOD can
    achieve the most savings?
        General Dempsey. The Department is placing renewed emphasis on
    creating a cost culture in both our military and civilian leadership.
    We are expecting significant savings from efficiencies announced and
    enacted last year. However, efficiencies are unlikely to be sufficient
    to achieve directed spending reductions. We are currently working
    through a comprehensive review to identify where additional savings can
    be achieved. Recommendations will be first provided to the President
    and eventually submitted through the budget request.

        11. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, how would you convince
    Congress that personnel and heath care costs are going to have to be
    part of any major reduction in defense spending?
        General Dempsey. Our health care and personnel costs have increased
    substantially over the past several decades. We have to invest in
    manpower, training, equipment, and infrastructure. We know what
    percentage of our total obligating authority we can invest into each
    account and remain in balance. It is on this basis that we will
    communicate with Congress.

        12. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, some plans currently under
    discussion claim to achieve a $1 trillion reduction in defense spending
    simply by reducing the baseline the Congressional Budget Office has
    been using for the cost of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan from an assumed
    level of about $150 to 160 billion per year for an indefinite period
    into the future. In your opinion, is DOD already planning for the
    spending on Iraq and Afghanistan to come down significantly in the
    future?
        General Dempsey. The President's recent announcement of troop
    drawdown in Afghanistan will change the Department's fiscal year 2012
    budget requirements for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), but the exact
    change will depend on the commanders' determination of the pace of the
    drawdown and/or adjustment of the forces mix. The Department is in the
    process of reformulating its Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
    requirements for OEF for fiscal year 2012, and developing its OCO
    funding requirements for fiscal year 2013. Given that the Forces in
    both OEF and Operation New Dawn (OND) are being reduced over time, a
    reduction in the OCO request logically follows. However, the costs for
    resetting the force that will extend beyond the drawdown dates.

        13. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, how much do you think we will
    need to spend in Iraq and Afghanistan to sustain our operations there
    after 2012? In other words, what is a reasonable level of spending for
    Iraq and Afghanistan to assume for the near-term future?
        General Dempsey. Spending levels will depend on the results of
    several pending decisions. Discussions over the structure of our future
    security relationship with Iraq are ongoing. For Afghanistan, planning
    is underway to determine the pace of withdrawing the first 33,000
    troops. The schedule for reducing remaining forces has not yet been
    determined. The OCO budget is a bottom-up budget preparation each year
    that is configured to support the military strategy. We will continue
    to work to achieve a reasonable estimate of spending.

                     troubled defense acquisition programs
        14. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, 2 weeks ago Congress was
    informed that the Government share of the cost overruns on the first 3
    lots of 28 aircraft for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) was a
    whopping $771 million. The next week, we learned that the prime
    contractor, Lockheed Martin, will face a bill for $283 million for
    their share of these cost overruns. Adding everyone's share together,
    including the additional expenses associated with ``concurrency''--
    which means costs associated with trying to develop the aircraft and
    build production jets simultaneously--raises the total cost of these
    first 28 jets by just over $1 billion to a new estimate now of about
    $8.1 billion. That's a 15 percent cost increase for the first three
    lots of production aircraft. In April, the Government Accountability
    Office (GAO) projected as of last June that the total cost of
    development and procurement for the F-35 program would be about $383
    billion. DOD's latest estimate of the sustainment cost for the F-35
    over its projected life span is an unaffordable $1 trillion. In my
    view, even without 15 percent cost overruns, these costs are
    unsustainable in this fiscal environment. How can these costs be
    reduced?
        General Dempsey. My understanding is that the Department's plan to
    reduce production costs includes continued use of fixed price contracts
    and applying aggressive ``Should Cost'' analysis in our negotiations.
    This will limit the Department's liability for future cost growth,
    incentivize the contractor to control costs, and enable low rate
    initial production negotiations to result in the lowest price
    achievable. The approach to drive down operations and sustainment (O&S)
    costs focuses on reducing costs associated with Depot Level Repairables
    and implementation of cost reduction initiatives being developed in the
    Affordability Management Plan (AMP).

        15. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, does DOD have a ``Plan B'' if
    the costs of the F-35 cannot be significantly reduced?
        General Dempsey. The Department's focus for the F-35 is cost
    reduction and fielding an affordable 5th generation aircraft. Even as
    we do so, we will continue to assess ways to meet warfighter needs and
    our security objectives within the realities of today's fiscal
    environment.

        16. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, what would you do as Chairman
    to ensure that a program as expensive as the F-35 does not siphon away
    resources from other defense priorities?
        General Dempsey. I am committed to ensuring a balanced approach to
    defense priorities with regard to current operations and future
    capability requirements. As part of the ongoing comprehensive review,
    and institutionally through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
    and other processes, I will work to ensure that we balance and align
    our resources to the highest defense priorities.

        17. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, we also recently learned from
    various media reports that the Air Force and Boeing are now expecting
    that the first four development aircraft for the replacement aerial
    refueling tanker, the KC-46A, are estimated to cost between $1 billion
    to $1.3 billion more than the contract's target cost. I'm particularly
    concerned that the taxpayers' share of that first $1 billion over
    target cost is 60 percent, or $600 million. Can you explain how it is
    that we contract for something using what is supposed to be a fixed
    price type contract, but before the metal is bent on the first aircraft
    the taxpayers are told they will face a bill for $600 million over the
    target cost?
        General Dempsey. My understanding is that the KC-46A tanker is a
    Fixed Price Incentive Firm contract with a ceiling price of $4.9
    billion. The intent is to get the best value for the taxpayer. Boeing
    acknowledges that its current cost estimate is $5.2 billion, $300
    million more than the contract ceiling price. Boeing absorbs this cost
    under the contract.

        18. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, when you tell the American
    people and Congress that the target cost for a program is a certain
    amount, what does that mean?
        General Dempsey. Generally, the target price is included in
    contracts as an element of the incentive structure. As the contractor
    reduces cost from the ceiling price to the target price, the
    contractor's profit increases with the government getting a share of
    the cost savings.

        19. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, according to media reports
    citing Boeing and DOD sources, the current estimated cost of this first
    development contract is $4.9 billion to $5.2 billion. The target cost
    of the contract was $3.9 billion. When the contract was announced, the
    official DOD press release, dated February 24, 2011, described the
    contract value as being ``more than $3.5 billion''. Can you explain why
    a contract value that was announced as $3.5 billion has now swelled to
    as much as $5.2 billion in 5 months?
        General Dempsey. It is my understanding that the contract includes
    both a ceiling price and a target price. The ceiling price of $4.9
    billion represents the maximum government liability for the development
    of the KC-46A. Any additional costs associated with developing the KC-
    46A will be borne by Boeing. The announced value reflected a best case
    should Boeing maximize incentives contained in the contract.

        20. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, if confirmed, what will you do
    as Chairman to ensure that Congress and the American people are not
    asked to pay huge cost overruns on defense programs that are simply not
    affordable?
        General Dempsey. When I assume the office of Chairman, I will work
    with other Department officials to improve affordability early in the
    development of new joint capabilities. I will be attentive to
    requirements overreach or pursuit of insufficiently mature technologies
    without compromising innovation. Overruns will also be addressed with
    the Joint Requirements Oversight Council's trip-wire process. Through
    this process and others, we will continue to examine performance trades
    to mitigate cost growth and schedules delays, advise the Nunn-McCurdy
    certification process, and participate in Configuration Steering Boards
    and the Defense Acquisition Board.

                                  afghanistan
        21. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, Admiral Mullen viewed the
    President's timetable to take the surge forces out of Afghanistan as
    more aggressive and incurring more risk than he was originally prepared
    to accept. What will be the impact of this troop withdrawal on our
    ability to keep the Taliban on its heels and protect the population?
        General Dempsey. As we recover the surge force, we will continue to
    maintain the pressure on the Taliban while simultaneously protecting
    the population. The surge force allowed us to reverse Taliban momentum,
    and to that end we have been largely successful, particularly in key
    districts that were once Taliban safe havens. Concurrent to these
    operations, we have steadily built Afghan National Security Forces
    (ANSF) capacity and capability to the point where we are now confident
    that they are increasingly able to take the lead in security in many
    areas.

        22. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, what are the goals in the year
    ahead to continue to reduce the influence and resiliency of the
    Taliban?
        General Dempsey. Our comprehensive civil-military strategy in
    Afghanistan will sustain pressure on the Taliban while expanding
    security for the populace. We will do this through coalition military
    operations and increasingly through partnered and independent
    operations by ANSF. Concurrently, we will help grow the Afghan capacity
    for governance and security as we transition full security
    responsibility by the end of 2014.

        23. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, are you aware of any military
    leader who recommended the withdrawal strategy the President adopted?
        General Dempsey. When the President announced the troop surge in
    December 2009, he also stated that these additional forces would begin
    to come home within 18 months. Those 18 months have elapsed and, true
    to his word, the President has made the decision to begin withdrawal of
    our surge forces beginning in July 2011 to be completed by summer of
    2012. It is my understanding that the withdrawal strategy announced by
    the President was ``within the range of options'' that military leaders
    presented. After the recovery of the surge force, there will be 68,000
    U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

                                      iraq
        24. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, what do you consider to be the
    ``point of no return'' for the Maliki Government to request the
    continued presence of U.S. troops to assist in their efforts to defeat
    al Qaeda and provide a national defense?
        General Dempsey. On 2 August 2011, Prime Minister Maliki received
    approval from the Iraqi Council of Representatives to begin
    negotiations with the United States for a continued U.S. presence after
    2011. This important step by the Government of Iraq signifies their
    desire to maintain an enduring strategic relationship with us. As we
    continue to draw down our forces, the ability to support an Iraqi
    request for a continued U.S. presence becomes increasingly problematic,
    especially after 30 September 2011.

                                  hollow force
        25. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, how would you define a hollow
    force?
        General Dempsey. While there is no consensus definition, the hollow
    force construct is useful for thinking about what we must avoid as we
    shape the future Joint Force. Generally, something hollow appears to
    have characteristics or capabilities that, in fact, it lacks.
    Essentially, a hollow force disproportionately retains force and
    organizational structure at the expense of proper training and fully
    functional equipment. This creates the illusion of readiness for the
    full range of military operations.

        26. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, if confirmed, what data or
    signs would you look for to determine if we are trending towards a
    hollow force?
        General Dempsey. Given the broad meaning often ascribed to what
    constitutes a ``hollow force'', we should focus on general trends
    across multiple indicators. This will best enable us to assess our
    ability to meet the military objectives outlined in national security
    strategies. Examples of relevant indicators include dwell time, unit
    readiness, and recruitment and retention rates. I will also be focused
    on the overall health of the force to include trends in personal and
    family data like divorce rates and suicide.

        27. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, in your opinion, do the
    Military Services have adequate benchmarks or other measuring criteria
    to determine how levels of funding affect overall readiness?
        General Dempsey. It is my understanding that each of the Military
    Services use costing models to estimate funding for required levels of
    readiness, including support of OCOs. Their estimates are based on
    adequate readiness metrics such as system miles, steaming hours, or
    flying hours. The Services then report readiness through the Defense
    Readiness Reporting System. The Joint Staff then evaluates readiness
    across the Joint Force through the Chairman's Readiness System.

        28. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, if confirmed, do you have
    confidence you will be able to tell the Secretary of Defense or the
    President that defense cuts above a certain level raise the risk of a
    hollow force?
        General Dempsey. I am confident that I will be able to define both
    strategic and institutional risk.

                                     yemen
        29. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, is al Qaeda in the Arabian
    Peninsula (AQAP) in a stronger position to plan and launch an attack
    against the United States or our allies given the sustained political
    and security unrest in Yemen?
        General Dempsey. It seems clear that AQAP is attempting to exploit
    the political unrest in Yemen to strengthen its position. It is also
    clear that AQAP retains aspirations to plan and launch a transnational
    attack against us or our allies.

                                    somalia
        30. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, General Carter Ham, Commander
    of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), has stated that al Qaeda and its
    affiliates in East Africa--to include al Shabaab--have experienced a
    ``dramatic increase'' in their influence in the region. In response to
    advance policy questions posed by the committee, you stated that al
    Shabaab has the capability to plan attacks against the United States
    and Western interests and that the group's efforts to recruit U.S.
    persons increases the threat to the U.S. Homeland. Do you agree with
    General Ham's assessment?
        General Dempsey. I do. Al Shabaab has increased its influence in
    East Africa by merging with like-minded Islamic groups and establishing
    Islamic administrations southern districts of Somalia. Despite their
    recently reported withdrawal from Mogadishu, I do not consider the
    threat they pose has diminished.

        31. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, what is your understanding of
    the extent of al Shabaab's efforts to recruit U.S. and Western citizens
    for terrorist activity?
        General Dempsey. To my understanding, it is likely that over 40
    Americans have traveled to Somalia to join al Shabaab. A majority of
    these U.S. persons are ethnic Somalis who have joined al Shabaab for
    nationalistic reasons. Additionally, al Shabaab supporters in the
    United States have been known to conduct recruiting and fundraising
    activities within their communities.

        32. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, what is the role of DOD in
    combating these recruitment efforts?
        General Dempsey. It is my understanding that DOD supports efforts
    to identify, disrupt, and disable extremist networks that drive al
    Shabaab's recruiting. We support all interagency actions against
    extremist networks by applying unique military capabilities consistent
    with our legal authorities. We should take all legal means possible to
    disrupt the recruitment of extremists into the al Shabaab network.

        33. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, to what extent does al Shabaab
    coordinate with al Qaeda?
        General Dempsey. Al-Shabaab first publicly aligned itself with al
    Qaeda leaders in Pakistan in 2008. In 2010, al Shabaab declared its
    loyalty to al Qaeda with the release of a video called ``At Your
    Service, O Usama.'' More recently, al Shabaab pledged to follow the new
    al Qaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri following bin Laden's death. There is
    also reason to conclude that al Shabaab has established a foreign
    fighter training program in Somalia, and portrayed itself as playing a
    role in the international jihad.

                                     mexico
        34. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, what is your assessment of the
    security situation in Mexico?
        General Dempsey. I am concerned about violence in Mexico and how it
    affects our security. Violent Transnational Criminal Organizations
    threaten innocent civilians, the Government of Mexico, and the United
    States. The Mexican security forces face a well-armed and financed
    adversary with regional, if not global reach. The people and Government
    of Mexico, including their security forces, are to be admired for their
    resilience and determination in confronting this threat. Our
    increasingly strong partnership with Mexico is one way we are sharing
    in the responsibility to address this dynamic security challenge.

        35. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, in what ways can DOD expand
    its support to President Calderon and his government to combat the
    cartels and other transnational criminal organizations operating in
    Mexico and throughout the region?
        General Dempsey. The scope and depth of our military-to-military
    relationship with Mexico has grown as part of the overall U.S.
    Government approach for assisting the Government of Mexico against
    these criminal organizations. As we further strengthen our relationship
    with Mexico, we will continue to respect their sovereignty and provide
    the assistance we can in response to their requests. Among other
    initiatives, we should continue with subject matter expert exchanges,
    exercises, and the sharing of information and lessons learned. The
    sharing of information and intelligence, where appropriate, is
    particularly valuable as a way to enable operations against these
    threats to our mutual security.

                                 nuclear triad
        36. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, earlier this month, General
    Cartwright suggested that DOD must re-examine the future role of each
    leg of the nuclear triad--bomber aircraft, intercontinental ballistic
    missiles (ICBM), and submarine-launched missiles--so that desired
    capabilities and quantities are maintained, rather than determined by
    budget-cutting drills. General Cartwright told reporters that ``nothing
    is off the table'' as DOD looks to cut at least $400 billion from the
    budget through fiscal year 2023. Do you agree with General Cartwright's
    statement?
        General Dempsey. As we shape the future Joint Force, our assessment
    should include consideration of what is required for an effective,
    reliable nuclear deterrent. It is my understanding that includes
    examining how the nuclear triad might be adapted to the security
    environment and our national security strategy. As Chairman, I will
    remain committed to a safe, secure, and effective nuclear force at
    levels that maintain strategic deterrence and stability vis-a-vis
    Russia and China, strengthens regional deterrence, and reassures U.S.
    allies and partners.

        37. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, the administration has
    identified over $120 billion over the next 10 years for the sustainment
    and modernization of the triad. Much of that funding is dedicated to
    the development and procurement of our next-generation ballistic
    missile submarine and bombers. One of the biggest unanswered questions
    is the future of the ICBM force, which will need to be replaced by
    2030. Do you believe it is essential to sustain the nuclear triad and
    commit the resources to fulfill the recapitalization of each leg? If
    not, do you believe it is in our strategic interest to forgo one or
    more legs of the triad?
        General Dempsey. I believe we must sustain and modernize a safe,
    secure, and effective nuclear deterrent that is also affordable. I also
    believe we must do this in a manner that maintains strategic deterrence
    and stability, strengthens regional deterrence, and assures our allies
    and partners. To this end, I am supportive of the conclusions of the
    2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Report, which stated that the U.S.
    nuclear Triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers will
    be maintained under the New Start treaty. When Chairman, the Joint
    Staff will continue to assess what is required for an effective nuclear
    deterrent as part of a future Joint Force.

                                 cyber security
        38. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, after the release of the DOD
    cyber strategy last week, General Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that DOD is spending 90 percent of its
    time playing defense against cyber-attacks and 10 percent playing
    offense and that DOD should invert this defense-offense ratio to assert
    that there will be consequences to a cyber-attack against the United
    States. Do you agree with General Cartwright's statements?
        General Dempsey. Consistent with my support of the Department's
    Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, I agree that we need to ensure
    our adversaries understand there are consequences to a cyber-attack
    against the United States. To this end, the Department must strike a
    balance between offensive and defensive cyber capabilities and
    capacity. We should do this while continuing our deterrent posture and
    collaborating with our interagency and international partners to
    enhance our cyber security posture. We should continue to examine
    offensive capabilities and the policies required to enable their
    appropriate use.

        39. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, what do you view as the
    appropriate direction DOD should be headed with respect to cyber
    strategy?
        General Dempsey. The recently released DOD Strategy for Operating
    in Cyberspace provides the foundation for our cyber strategy. I endorse
    its overall objectives and strategic initiatives. Moreover, it clearly
    prioritizes reducing our own vulnerabilities as essential to execute
    this new strategy.

        40. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, do you view this as a matter
    of urgency?
        General Dempsey. Yes. As the recently released DOD Strategy for
    Operating in Cyberspace articulates, the Department and the Nation have
    vulnerabilities in cyberspace. The continuing growth of networked
    systems, devices, and platforms means that cyberspace is an integral
    part of an increasing number of capabilities upon which DOD relies to
    complete its missions. We must leverage the opportunities cyberspace
    presents to advance our capabilities and national security objectives.

                           further nuclear reductions
        41. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, recent statements by the
    President's National Security Advisor have prompted new questions
    regarding the administration's intent to pursue additional reductions.
    In his speech before the Carnegie Endowment, National Security Advisor
    Thomas Donilon stated that the administration is currently ``making
    preparations for the next round of nuclear reductions'' and that DOD
    will be directed to ``review our strategic requirements and develop
    options for further reductions in our current nuclear stockpile.''
    Donilon continued by stating that in meeting these objectives, the
    White House will direct DOD to consider ``potential changes in
    targeting requirements and alert postures.''
        The New START Treaty entered into force only 5 months ago. Do you
    believe it is prudent for the United States to pursue further
    reductions? If so, why?
        General Dempsey. I believe the United States should carefully
    consider the implications of future reductions in the numbers of
    nuclear weapons. As Chairman, I will continue to assess the proper
    force size and capabilities required for an effective nuclear
    deterrent. Any potential reductions should consider the full range of
    potential threats and continue to support U.S. commitments to
    stability, deterrence, and assurance.

        42. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, what conditions in your
    opinion must exist for the additional near-term reductions; do you
    believe it would require a fundamental shift in the geopolitical
    environment?
        General Dempsey. Any future reductions must continue to strengthen
    deterrence of potential regional adversaries, enhance strategic
    stability as it relates to Russia and China, and assure our allies and
    partners. In my judgment, the size and composition of Russia's nuclear
    forces will remain a significant factor in determining how much and how
    fast we are prepared to reduce our nuclear forces. As we engage Russia
    and China in strategic dialogue, we will continue to assess the proper
    force size and capabilities required for an effective nuclear
    deterrent.

        43. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, focusing on the reckless
    ambitions of North Korea and Iran and the fact that every current
    nuclear weapons state is currently modernizing its nuclear arsenals, do
    you agree that any reductions to the size and scope of the stockpile
    should be multilateral and involve not only other nuclear powers but
    also in serious consultation with our key non-nuclear allies dependent
    on U.S. nuclear forces?
        General Dempsey. We will continue, and expand as appropriate,
    consultations with nuclear and non-nuclear allies and partners to
    address how to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the U.S.
    nuclear deterrent.

        44. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, during our committee's
    hearings on the New START treaty, General Chilton, the former Commander
    of U.S. Strategic Command, testified that the force level under the New
    START Treaty (1,550 warheads on 700 deployed delivery vehicles) was
    ``exactly what is needed today to provide the deterrent.'' We received
    extensive briefings from General Chilton and other senior DOD officials
    during consideration of the treaty last year. Do you agree with General
    Chilton's assessment? If so, do you believe that the global threat
    environment has changed in any way since General Chilton made these
    comments to merit a near-term reduction in the size or scope of our
    nuclear deterrent?
        General Dempsey. The U.S. nuclear strategy and force structure
    continually evolves with the global strategic environment. Going
    forward, and as part of the Nuclear Posture Review Report follow-on
    analysis, we will continue to evaluate changes to the environment that
    might impact on our force structure. We are committed to sustaining and
    modernizing a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent in an
    efficient and cost effective manner.

                            research and development
        45. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, in the current fiscal
    environment, some in Congress have suggested that funding for research
    and development (R&D) within the Services and for defense-wide agencies
    should be dramatically reduced to find savings. Do you agree that R&D
    funding should be cut? If so, please explain. If not, please explain
    why you disagree and outline what you see as a path forward for R&D
    funding, particularly with regard to the fiscal situation.
        General Dempsey. A balanced approach is needed that considers
    today's operational commitments and tomorrow's anticipated threats
    within fiscal constraints. We should be cautious about cuts from any
    account, including R&D. The ongoing comprehensive review will develop
    guidelines and recommendations on our path forward for R&D funding.

        46. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, if you had to make cuts to R&D
    lines, what would you consider a responsible budget reduction?
        General Dempsey. My expectation is that the Department's ongoing
    comprehensive review will provide guidelines and recommendations on
    responsible budget reductions given today's fiscal realities.

        47. Senator McCain. General Dempsey, what criteria would you use to
    determine what R&D programs should be cut?
        General Dempsey. The Department's ongoing comprehensive review will
    provide guidelines and recommendations on responsible budget
    reductions. This review will take into account our need to protect our
    core national security interests and provide a set of defense programs
    that will meet the threats present today and anticipated tomorrow.
    Within this review, heavy scrutiny will be applied to those programs
    that are not meeting cost, schedule, and requirements goals.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                  boycotts of certain u.s. defense contractors
        48. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, in recent years, global
    activists, foreign business enterprises, and certain governments have
    demonstrated an increased willingness to advance de facto foreign
    boycotts on contractors and subcontractors of DOD that provide certain
    products to DOD. If successful, such actions would not only harm the
    U.S. defense industrial base, but also impede the military strategy and
    tactics of our Armed Forces and allies in regions where our forces are
    deployed or our interests are at stake.
        Such endeavors include a recent effort to classify the Sensor Fuzed
    Weapon (SFW) as a prohibited weapon under the terms of the Convention
    on Cluster Munitions (CCM), and ongoing attempts today to pressure
    investors and suppliers to terminate their relationships with U.S.
    manufacturers that provide key SFW components to DOD. Meanwhile,
    similar but less reliable weapons possessed by other governments are
    permitted for use under the CCM.
        The motivations and efforts of those now seeking to enforce the
    CCM--which was forged outside recognized international bodies--contrast
    sharply with ongoing efforts by our Government and others to address
    the true humanitarian impact of cluster munitions while recognizing the
    SFW's enduring and critical importance to our military strategy on the
    Korean Peninsula, Persian Gulf, and other sensitive regions.
        I understand that in the coming weeks U.S. diplomats will have an
    important opportunity to advance a responsible course of action with
    regard to cluster munitions during preparations for a review of the
    United Nations (UN) Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
    Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). Given the potential negative
    impact of the CCM on the SFW, its role in our military strategy, the
    defense industrial base, and foreign military sales to allies in key
    regions, what actions will you take to support and reinforce U.S.
    diplomatic efforts to achieve tangible progress on an alternative
    agreement under the auspices of the CCW?
        General Dempsey. We are not a party to the Convention on Cluster
    Munitions (CCM or Olso Treaty); however, we are participating in
    ongoing negotiations to develop a comprehensive and binding Convention
    on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). We intend for this protocol to
    align with DOD policy on the use, transfer, stockpile, and destruction
    of cluster munitions. The CCW protocol under negotiation addresses the
    legitimate military need to maintain stocks of cluster munitions for
    national security and defense purposes while reducing the risk of
    unintended harm to civilians. When Chairman, I will ensure that the
    Joint Staff fully supports the DOD policy and negotiations to conclude
    a CCW protocol.

                        global security contingency fund
        49. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, our military-to-military
    (1206), civilian-to-civilian (1207), small-scale Special Forces (1208),
    Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), and Combatant
    Commander's Initiative Fund (CCIF) have been incredibly successful in
    aiding developing nations, fighting terrorism, and providing resources
    for emergency situations. Now the Global Security Contingency Fund,
    which would be authorized under this committee's version of the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, would supply
    the Department of State (DOS) with authority to use a $300 million fund
    drawn from authorities like section 1206 to bolster the security of our
    allies. My belief is that the key to these programs has been the
    combined efforts of both DOD and DOS . . . Chiefs of Mission and
    combatant commanders working together to increase the capabilities of
    our partner nations to provide for their own security, increasing
    stability in their region and around the globe. What value do these
    funds provide our warfighters?
        General Dempsey. The programs you mention are highly valuable to
    our ability to respond to emergent challenges and opportunities. The
    provision of timely assistance can help promote stability, combat
    terrorism, enable partners, and respond to urgent humanitarian relief
    and reconstruction requirements. Capable partner nations reduce the
    need for U.S. forces while enhancing security. To this end, the Global
    Security Contingency Fund makes DOD and DOS collaboration the norm in
    order to ensure our security assistance programs are as effective as
    possible. Funding is required from both DOD and DOS, and expenditure of
    funds requires consultation and concurrence from both departments.

        50. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, what is the future of the
    partnership between DOD and DOS when it comes to foreign security
    assistance?
        General Dempsey. DOD's relationship with DOS is certain to remain
    strong on multiple fronts to include our collaboration on security
    assistance. The proposed Global Security Contingency Fund is just one
    example of how we can increase cooperation in the delivery of security
    sector assistance. As Chairman, I will continue to seek ways to
    strengthen our partnership with DOS and others to ensure a whole-of-
    government approach.

                             traumatic brain injury
        51. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, traumatic brain injury (TBI)
    continues to be one of the most prevalent wounds from operations in
    Iraq and Afghanistan. The ability to diagnose and treat TBI continues
    to be problematic despite the priority Congress and the Army have given
    to this wound. I remain concerned that we are not adequately screening
    our soldiers prior to deployment and when they return. Once diagnosed
    with TBI, we need to be able to treat our wounded warrior and ensure
    that treatment is continued as long as needed, to include transition to
    Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) care. Various alternative
    treatments for TBI may have promise and are used in the private sector
    but few of these treatments have been approved for use by Army
    soldiers. In a report by National Public Radio (NPR), General Chiarelli
    expressed frustration about the pace of the vetting of these
    treatments. Are you satisfied with the pace with respect to identify
    TBI and treatment to include alternative treatments?
        General Dempsey. I share General Chiarelli's sense of urgency to
    find effective solutions to these problems. I am committed to ensuring
    early detection of concussion and finding state of the science
    treatments for wounded warriors with TBI. To my knowledge, we are fast
    tracking any available treatment strategies that have proven to be safe
    and effective to our military members. There is considerable work
    occurring in the civilian academic, industry and VA medical research
    communities. We are working very closely with our civilian counterparts
    to vet the outcomes of these studies, and when the clinical results
    become available, quickly transition treatment protocols to our wounded
    military.

        52. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, what frictions are delaying
    the vetting of alternative treatments?
        General Dempsey. I am committed to fielding alternative treatments
    to our wounded warriors as quickly as possible. In doing so, we have a
    responsibility to make sure that any treatment alternatives have been
    tested and found to be safe and effective. Good research to determine
    the clinical effectiveness of any treatment is both time and resource
    intensive. There are also clinical issues which cloud the blanket
    adoption of civilian research findings. For example, post-traumatic
    stress and chronic pain are not seen with such frequency in the
    civilian sector. However, we are engaged with our civilian counterparts
    in an effort to appropriately adopt alternative treatment strategies
    for the care of our wounded warriors.

        53. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, what can we do to speed up the
    process of the vetting better ways of diagnosing and treating TBI?
        General Dempsey. We have made tremendous progress, but we must
    continuously seek ways to improve the process. For example, it is my
    understanding that we are undertaking a comprehensive review of over
    400 studies on TBI. In-process-reviews are conducted on each of the
    topics, which allow a deep dive analysis of specific treatment
    strategies. This year, for example, we have reviewed new studies on
    neuroimaging, non-invasive diagnostics in mild TBI, blast brain
    research, and biomarker findings. This review process allows us to
    quickly assess what strategies work and just as important, what
    strategies do not work.

        54. Senator Inhofe. General Dempsey, what types of equipment
    solutions are being developed, procured, and fielded to help prevent,
    measure, and identify TBI?
        General Dempsey. We have developed a program to evaluate and field
    devices and equipment that can aid in the prevention, identification,
    and assessment of TBI. Among many others are a portable
    electroencephalogram (EEG) for battlefield use and an eye tracking
    device to assess attention/concentration deficits. In addition, we are
    working with the materiel community to improve helmet design to help
    mitigate blast effects and prevent head injuries. As Chairman, I will
    support efforts to aggressively identify, evaluate, and disseminate
    best practices, equipment, and programs for our wounded warriors with
    TBI.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
                            kiowa warrior helicopter
        55. Senator Wicker. General Dempsey, it worries me that a series of
    upgrades to extend the service life of the legacy Kiowa Warrior
    helicopter appear to be conveniently organized into individual programs
    that will escape the rigor and oversight required under ACAT-1D
    programs. Can you assure me that, if confirmed, you will exercise your
    responsibilities as Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight
    Council to personally look into this issue and make sure the Army is on
    a path that will get the best value from our investment?
        General Dempsey. As Chairman, you can be assured that the Joint
    Requirements Oversight Council will ensure the appropriate cost and
    capability trades are being made to deliver the best value to the
    Department.

        56. Senator Wicker. General Dempsey, I am aware that the Analysis
    of Alternatives (AOA) for this program is complete, yet we have not
    been briefed on the results. Would you please provide me with the
    results of the AOA and what the acquisition plan is for replacing the
    legacy scout fleet with a modern capability?
        General Dempsey. Although the Analysis of Alternatives for the
    Armed Aerial Scout is complete, the final report is still in
    development. To date, the analytical results were briefed to the Joint
    Senior Advisory Group and to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. The
    Army is currently assessing the path forward for the Armed Aerial Scout
    given the new fiscal environment. As Chairman, I look forward to
    working with this committee to ensure we are developing an affordable
    future Joint Force.

                            alternative armed scout
        57. Senator Wicker. General Dempsey, will you assure me that the
    Alternative Armed Scout program will include competition as a
    fundamental element of the procurement strategy?
        General Dempsey. Should the Army decide to pursue a new solution to
    fulfill the requirements of the Armed Aerial Scout, I will advocate for
    a competitive process consistent with current acquisition policies to
    derive the best value for the U.S. taxpayer.

                     foreign language and culture training
        58. Senator Wicker. General Dempsey, I am a strong proponent of
    foreign language and cultural training at the military academies and
    for Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) cadets and midshipmen. To
    date these efforts have been limited to a few institutions, for
    example, the University of Mississippi. To what extent do you believe
    that education and training in foreign languages and cultures are
    important in preparing the next generations of military officers, and
    how would you use the chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
    further this agenda?
        General Dempsey. Our future officers will operate in a global
    environment where national security interests are inextricably linked
    to the greater international community. Knowledge of foreign languages
    and culture is essential to building partnerships and multilateral
    operations. As Chairman, I will work with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
    through our joint officer development programs to optimize foreign
    language and cultural training and education. I will also support DOD
    efforts authorized under Section 529 of the 2010 National Defense
    Authorization Act to establish Language Training Centers at accredited
    universities to accelerate the development of expertise in critical and
    strategic languages.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Scott P. Brown
                              2013 fighting season
        59. Senator Brown. General Dempsey, in light of the debate
    regarding the significance of a missed fighting season in the summer of
    2013 due to the President's proposal to withdraw 33,000 troops by the
    end of next August, does a summer 2013 fighting season matter?
        General Dempsey. The 2013 summer season does matter. Our ability to
    maintain pressure on the Taliban will be sustained as the surge force
    is withdrawn. Even as we reduce forces, the ANSF are gaining in
    capacity and capability. In addition, Afghan special forces and their
    coalition partnered forces will continue to degrade Taliban mid- and
    senior leadership by capturing or killing them wherever they operate in
    Afghanistan.

                             afghan contract fraud
        60. Senator Brown. General Dempsey, according to yesterday's
    Washington Post, a year-long investigation conducted by the U.S.
    military uncovered definitive evidence that taxpayers' money intended
    to fund a $2.16 billion transportation contract in Afghanistan ended up
    in the hands of the Taliban through fraud, kickbacks, and money
    laundering. Another report released last week by the Special Inspector
    General for Afghanistan Reconstruction found that U.S. agencies still
    have limited visibility over the circulation of these funds, leaving
    them vulnerable to fraud, waste, or diversion to insurgents. Can you
    comment on this and tell me how we can lower the risk involved with our
    reliance on contractor support?
        General Dempsey. Contractors provide critical logistical and
    services support to operations in Afghanistan. The use of local
    national contractors is integral to our civil-military campaign.
    Despite the capabilities enabled by contractors, corruption remains a
    challenge. In light of several investigative reports, DOD and U.S.
    Central Command established several task forces to address contracting
    accountability and institute mechanisms to enhance performance
    monitoring. Additionally, our management of contractors on the
    battlefield evolved from an initial approach toward pro-active theater-
    wide management. Together, these broad initiatives-and many others-are
    improving the way we use contractor support. But clearly more needs to
    be done.

                             employment of veterans
        61. Senator Brown. General Dempsey, last June, 13.3 percent of
    veterans were unemployed--4 percent higher than the national average,
    which means approximately 260,000 people in real numbers are out of
    work. You noted that one area where we can improve is individual case
    management when a servicemember transitions from the Active Force to
    veteran status. Can you comment on the ways in which DOD and the VA are
    collaborating to improve the transition of wounded warriors and their
    families into the VA system, particularly when it comes to employment?
        General Dempsey. To strengthen and improve transition of service
    men to civilian life, DOD is working with the Veterans Administration
    (VA) and the Department of Labor (DOL) to re-engineer, redesign, and
    transform the current program in a way that will better meet the needs
    of servicemembers and their families. The enhanced Transition
    Assistance Program (TAP) is a collaborative effort where each agency
    will improve its component of TAP through a number of initiatives to
    include leveraging technology and improving curriculum, staffing, and
    training. We are also developing ways to make information accessible
    24/7. DOD is also collaborating with the VA, DOL, and the Office of
    Personnel Management on an Education and Employment Initiative (E2I) to
    address employment concerns. The goal of the E2I pilot is to engage
    servicemembers early in their recovery to identify skills they have,
    the skills they need, and the employment opportunities to which those
    skills can be matched.

        62. Senator Brown. General Dempsey, I continue to hear from
    veterans who--despite their technical expertise, leadership skills, and
    military experience--feel as though they are ultimately disqualified
    for civilian positions due to a lack of civilian equivalent
    certifications. I hear it over and over again. They're told while on
    Active Duty that their veteran status and military experience will put
    them ahead of their civilian peers when they transition out of the
    military simply because they've proven themselves as reliable leaders.
    Unfortunately, this is not always the case. Is DOD working on a system
    to help servicemembers translate their military-specific skills and
    vocational expertise to the civilian sector?
        General Dempsey. I am absolutely convinced that our servicemembers
    possess valuable skills that should translate well to the civilian
    sector. To my knowledge, there are many initiatives underway. For
    example, servicemembers can go to Career One Stop to find information
    on exploring careers, salary and benefits, education and training,
    resume and interviews, and licensure and certification (http://
    www.careeronestop.org). The Workforce Credentials Information Center
    provides a wealth of licensure and certification information. The
    member can also access the Occupational Information Network called
    O*NET (www.onlineonetcenter.org). O*NET helps the servicemember to
    crosswalk his or her Military Occupational Code and the civilian
    equivalency of that code, linking the member to the Standard
    Occupational Classifications in the civilian workforce. These tools
    will help, but they are just part of what must be a more comprehensive
    solution. As Chairman, I will continue to collaborate with our partners
    in the DOL to address this critical issue.

                                    suicides
        63. Senator Brown. General Dempsey, in 2010 alone, there were 468
    suicides throughout the military. It's estimated that between 2005 and
    2009, one servicemember committed suicide every 36 hours. More men and
    women committed suicide in 2010 than died in combat. Do you agree that
    the military is facing a suicide epidemic, and what are we doing about
    it?
        General Dempsey. I remain deeply concerned about the suicide rate
    among servicemembers. As Chairman, I will support the action plan
    resulting from the 2010 DOD Task Force Report on Prevention of Suicide.
    The plan will address the 13 foundational and 76 targeted
    recommendations in the report. It is my understanding that DOD intends
    to update Congress once the plan is implemented this fall. In my
    judgment, expeditious implementation and resourcing of these
    recommendations will go a long way to ensuring that our servicemembers'
    and families' psychological health and mental health issues are
    addressed.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
                        deployment cycle support program
        64. Senator Ayotte. General Dempsey, the New Hampshire National
    Guard has developed the Deployment Cycle Support Program (DCSP) to help
    prepare and support servicemembers and their families during the full
    cycle of mobilization, deployment, and reintegration. It is a cost-
    effective public-private partnership between the New Hampshire National
    Guard, New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, Easter
    Seals, and civilian and veteran service organizations. The DCSP
    combines public funding and private resources to establish an
    integrated, sustainable, and fiscally-responsible service delivery
    framework that delivers measured results. The National Guard has found
    that military members involved in DCSP are eight times more likely to
    be treated for previously untreated mental health issues, four times
    more likely to stay married, four times more likely to stay in the
    military, and five times less likely to be homeless. The program also
    provides licensed support to all servicemembers and their families
    considered at risk for suicide.
        Once you are confirmed, do you commit to work with me and Congress
    to support and learn from best practices for this important program in
    order to ensure all servicemembers and their families--especially those
    in the Reserve component who are often far from bases and established
    support networks--have access to the quality, full-cycle support they
    deserve and that our Nation's military readiness demands?
        General Dempsey. One of my highest priorities is the care of our
    servicemembers and their families. We need to confront these challenges
    through innovative government and private sector partnerships like the
    Deployment Cycle Support Program. Such initiatives will become more
    valuable in a fiscally constrained environment. They clearly enable us
    to attend to the unique challenges faced by our community-based and
    geographically-dispersed Reserve components. I am committed to working
    closely with Congress, our Service Chiefs, Federal partners like the
    Department of Veterans Affairs, and State, local, and private
    organizations to leverage best practices like the ones you highlight.

                       medium extended air defense system
        65. Senator Ayotte. General Dempsey, I am concerned about the DOD
    problems in recent years in the area of procurement. One of the more
    recent failures is that of the Medium Extended Air Defense System
    (MEADS). After the investment of $1.5 billion of taxpayer money, DOD
    concluded earlier this year that the program remains a high risk for
    both cost and schedule. Despite these cost and schedule failures, DOD
    decided to not terminate the program because the Memorandum of
    Understanding on which the program is based commits the United States
    to continued funding up to an agreed cost even if the United States
    withdraws from the program. As a result, DOD has requested $804 million
    over fiscal years 2012 to 2013 for the continued development of a
    system it has no intention of fielding due to technical challenges,
    cost overruns, and schedule delays. What is your assessment of the
    MEADS?
        General Dempsey. It is my understanding that the Department's
    options are constrained by a 2004 MEADS agreement with our German and
    Italian partners. Funding MEADS up to the existing ceiling established
    in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) enables all partners to
    harvest technology and proven concepts from investments thus far. This
    would also place the development on sufficiently stable footing to
    support Germany and Italy in continued MEADS development and production
    after the MoU funding is expended. It would also provide the same
    options to us should our air defense plans change.

        66. Senator Ayotte. General Dempsey, do you believe it makes sense
    to spend $804 million over the next 2 fiscal years on a program we are
    not going to field?
        General Dempsey. In light of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
    with our German and Italian partners, and based on extensive analysis
    and deliberations, our best option is to complete the lower cost
    restructured Proof of Concept effort. This will enable the Department
    and our MEADS partners to harvest technology from our work to date.
    Additionally, it places the program on stable footing to support
    Germany and Italy in their plans to continue MEADS while honoring the
    MoU. It would provide options to the United States should our air
    defense plans change. The Department is committed to maximizing the
    return on remaining funds and prior investments.

        67. Senator Ayotte. General Dempsey, do you believe we should push
    our allies to work with us to limit our financial obligation and
    terminate this program multilaterally?
        General Dempsey. The Department's senior leadership has explored
    mutual termination with Italy and Germany, and our partners have
    clearly stated they have no interest in pursuing this course of action.
    The German National Armaments Director continues to express German
    support for the program and has recently restated their plans to field
    MEADS after a successful Proof of Concept effort. Our Italian partners
    have also confirmed their continued commitment. Faced with these facts,
    a multilateral withdrawal is not an option, and the United States would
    be forced to execute a unilateral withdrawal from the program. A
    unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the program would entail significant
    termination costs for the United States.

        68. Senator Ayotte. General Dempsey, how can we work together to
    avoid procurement failures like this in the future?
        General Dempsey. As Chairman, I look forward to working with
    Congress and this committee to mitigate program risk and maximize
    program success rates. Development and procurement of new weapons
    systems must be carefully assessed to ensure funds are spent wisely.
    For my part, I will ensure that the Joint Requirements Oversight
    Council sustains a robust requirements validation process and closely
    monitors cost growth through the trip-wire process. Participation in
    Configuration Steering Boards will further shape affordable solutions
    for the Joint Force.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Susan M. Collins
                                fort hood attack
        69. Senator Collins. General Dempsey, as ranking member of the
    Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, I worked
    with Senator Lieberman to investigate the U.S. Government's failure to
    prevent the Fort Hood attack. One of the most troubling findings was
    that it found the Army and Federal Bureau of Investigation
    ``collectively had sufficient information necessary to have detected
    Major Hasan's radicalization to violent Islamist extremism but failed
    both to understand and to act on it.'' In light of the Fort Hood attack
    and the findings in this report, what steps has the Army taken to
    improve personnel oversight such that warning signs of individual
    problems are identified and acted on as early as possible?
        General Dempsey. The Army has implemented over 20 of the
    recommendations proposed by the DOD's Independent Review Panel and the
    Army's Internal Review Team. Among many initiatives, the Army recently
    established the Army Protection Program to better manage risks relative
    to the safety and security of our soldiers, families, civilians,
    infrastructure and information. The Army has also revised its policy
    regarding command-directed mental health evaluations. Behavior health
    screenings for new Army applicants is also required using face-to-face
    physician screenings at all 65 Military Entrance Processing Centers.
    Underpinning all of this is leadership accountability.

                                  safe havens
        70. Senator Collins. General Dempsey, on July 17, 2011, Maine lost
    another one of its proud soldiers, Private First Class Tyler
    Springmann, to an improvised explosive device (IED) that exploded in
    Afghanistan. Given the tremendous sacrifice that our servicemen and
    women are making, I want to be sure that the strategy currently being
    pursued can work. The President has stated the core goal of the U.S.
    strategy in Central Asia is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda
    in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent their return to either
    country in the future. Earlier this year, Admiral Mullen testified that
    one of the necessary conditions to achieve that goal was to neutralize
    insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan, but that insurgent groups currently
    operate unhindered in those sanctuaries. Yet, General Mattis recently
    testified that he does not expect Pakistan will reverse its current
    approach and eliminate the safe havens that exist there. He said that
    ``satisfactory end-states are attainable in Afghanistan, even if the
    sanctuaries persist.'' Even if there is a satisfactory end-state in
    Afghanistan, how can we achieve the President's goal of preventing the
    return of al Qaeda fighters to Afghanistan and Pakistan so long as they
    can take advantage of the safe havens enjoyed by the Quetta Shura and
    the Haqqani network just across the border in Pakistan?
        General Dempsey. The loss of Private First Class Tyler Springmann
    and other servicemembers is a tragic example of the challenges our
    forces face. This challenge is exacerbated by sanctuaries in Pakistan
    that Islamabad has not always been willing or able to engage to our
    satisfaction. That said, military actions are being taken on both sides
    of the border to minimize this threat and reduce the effect of
    sanctuary in Pakistan. For their part, Pakistan's military has and
    continues to conduct disruptive counterinsurgency operations against
    mutual threats throughout the border region. Diplomatically, the U.S.
    Senior Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan has made control and
    elimination of IED precursor materials emanating from Pakistan a
    priority in all discussion with Pakistani officials. We have also
    sought to make it clear that Pakistan is itself threatened when violent
    non-state actors are selectively permitted the free space to engage in
    hostile actions. We are also helping to build Afghan security forces
    that can contest the presence of hostile groups even if some safe
    havens persist.

                          enterprise resource programs
        71. Senator Collins. General Dempsey, DOD's Enterprise Resource
    Programs (ERP) have been the subject of significant negative GAO
    reports. DOD has spent billions on nine ERP information technology
    systems that are intended to be part of DOD's solution to its fiscal
    problems and achieve audit readiness by 2017. However, according to GAO
    reports, six of the nine ERPs have experienced schedule delays ranging
    from 2 to 12 years and five have incurred cost increases ranging from
    $530 million to $2.4 billion. DOD is currently funding non-competitive
    ERP contract-writing system pilots. I have become increasingly
    concerned with the way DOD has managed these programs. If confirmed,
    what will you do to address the ERP cost overruns, schedule slips, and
    a lack of competition as additional capabilities and functionalities
    are added to existing ERPs?
        General Dempsey. When Chairman, I will leverage multiple processes
    and forums to address these shortfalls. For example, I will rely on the
    Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the trip-wire process to
    monitor for cost growth and schedule delays in Major Defense
    Acquisition Programs. Additionally, balancing system performance and
    cost will continue to be a central goal of the ongoing Joint
    Capabilities Integration and Development process review. Program and
    portfolio affordability will be important factors in performance trade-
    off decisions.

                          shipbuilding industrial base
        72. Senator Collins. General Dempsey, in their fiscal year 2012
    budget testimony, former Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen identified
    shipbuilding as one of the two components of the defense industrial
    base that worried them, in particular. Secretary Gates stated, ``A
    number of the Navy ships that were built during the Reagan years will
    basically reach the end of their planned life in the 2020s, and where
    the money comes from to replace those ships is going to be a challenge
    . . . there are some tough choices in terms of big capabilities that
    are coming down the road.'' Do you agree with that assessment and the
    importance of sustaining the shipbuilding industrial base?
        General Dempsey. The Navy's long-term shipbuilding plan includes
    retirement of 105 ships from 2020 to 2029. During the same period, the
    Navy plans to take delivery of 94 ships. Based on the comprehensive
    strategy review and expected defense spending reductions, I will ensure
    that the Navy's shipbuilding plan continues to provide a force capable
    of meeting our national strategic objectives. Moreover, sustainment of
    the shipbuilding industrial base is carefully considered with each Navy
    acquisition decision. A healthy industrial base is critical in all
    areas of defense acquisition to ensure appropriate capacity and quality
    is available to meet our national security requirements. A robust
    industrial base should also enable competition in order to drive down
    cost and enhance affordability. For its part, the industrial base must
    be innovative and efficient if it is going to remain relevant to our
    national security needs.

                                overseas basing
        73. Senator Collins. General Dempsey, shortly after the issuance of
    the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, Under Secretary for Policy,
    Michele Flournoy, indicated a comprehensive review of roles and
    missions as it relates to the U.S. military's global presence would be
    forthcoming in 2012. This review is potentially critical to our
    understanding of funding overseas basing and force structure. Recent
    polls indicate the vast majority of American citizens support the
    closure of U.S. military bases overseas where there is no strong
    foreign policy objectives involved, to save the cost for maintaining
    these troops, and to protect investment and sustainment accounts for
    ships, aircraft, and other equipment. Given our increasing ability to
    project power from further distances, can you comment on whether or not
    you believe all of the overseas military bases are still necessary?
        General Dempsey. We continually assess our overseas posture to
    determine the optimal mix of forward stationed and deployed forces
    needed to meet current threats, deter conflict, and assure allies. In a
    fiscally constrained environment, we must carefully calibrate our
    forward presence and overseas activities. I will ensure the issue is
    prominent in our comprehensive strategic review.

                            phased adaptive approach
        74. Senator Collins. General Dempsey, under the phased adaptive
    approach (PAA) to missile defense, we plan to protect our forward-based
    troops, as well as our allies, in addition to protecting the U.S.
    Homeland. According to current plans, North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization (NATO) countries will commit $200 million Euros to
    establish the European PAA. The United States contributes about 40
    percent to NATO activities. This $200 million Euro commitment is much
    lower than the commitment from the Japanese, who have invested $1
    billion in the R&D for ballistic missile defense (BMD) in the Pacific.
    Our European allies, to my knowledge, have made no similar degree of
    financial commitment, even as BMD is a shared NATO goal. Do you think
    our European partners should be contributing more to this significant
    mission?
        General Dempsey. Our European partners make significant
    contributions to the NATO integrated air and missile defense mission.
    They do so by acting as host nations, providing national air and
    missile defense sensor and interceptor assets, and funding the Active
    Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Programme. This program will
    provide the command and control structure for the NATO capability to
    accept control of U.S. missile defense assets. The U.S. European Phased
    Adaptive Approach is our contribution to the NATO integrated air and
    missile defense mission. As the threat and our own capabilities evolve,
    we should continue to assess the need for additional resource
    investments by all parties.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
                                     taiwan
        75. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, according to DOD's 2010
    report, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's
    Republic of China (PRC), ``China's military build-up opposite the
    island [Taiwan] continued unabated. The People's Liberation Army (PLA)
    is developing the capability to deter Taiwan independence or influence
    Taiwan to settle the dispute on Beijing's terms, while simultaneously
    attempting to deter, delay, or deny any possible U.S. support for the
    island in case of conflict.'' Under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the
    United States is statutorily obligated to make available to Taiwan such
    defense articles and defense services ``as may be necessary to enable
    Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.'' What is your
    assessment of our recent record of fulfilling our obligations under the
    TRA?
        General Dempsey. It is my understanding that we have fulfilled our
    recent obligations in a way that is consistent with the legislation and
    that enhances Taiwan's self-defense capability without upsetting the
    cross-Strait balance. Of note, Taiwan's annual defense spending is
    approximately one-tenth of the Chinese defense budget. Since Taiwan
    cannot match China's arms procurement, we continue to encourage Taiwan
    to develop joint capabilities, streamline more effective and less
    costly defense programs, and seek low-cost innovative and asymmetric
    solutions that complement traditional military capabilities.

        76. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, according to DOD's 2010
    report, the PRC has a total of approximately 2,300 operational combat
    aircraft, including 330 fighters and 160 bombers, stationed within
    range of Taiwan. An unclassified January 2010 Defense Intelligence
    Agency report on Taiwan's air force concluded that, although Taiwan has
    an inventory of almost 400 combat aircraft, ``far fewer of these are
    operationally capable''. In your opinion, does Taiwan need more modern
    replacement fighters to maintain a credible air force?
        General Dempsey. It is my understanding that upgrades to Taiwan's
    F-16 A/B airframes will provide a stop-gap measure for the Taiwan air
    force to continue performing its basic defense functions. However,
    Taiwan will likely need to recapitalize its air force since its F-5s,
    Indigenous Defense Fighters, and Mirage airframes reach end-of-service
    life toward the end of this decade. Even then, Taiwan will still face a
    numeric disadvantage to China's air force, but the modernization of
    current airframes will allow Taiwan to maintain its current air defense
    capability.

        77. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, does this deterioration of
    Taiwan's air force indicate that the United States has failed to uphold
    our obligations under the TRA?
        General Dempsey. The TRA calls for the United States to make
    available to Taiwan defense articles and defense services in such
    quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient
    self-defense capability. Multiple factors affect the cross-Strait
    balance beyond the specific state of Taiwan's air force. That said, it
    is my understanding that the modernization of current airframes will
    allow Taiwan to maintain its current air defense capability. We
    continue to encourage Taiwan to develop joint capabilities, purse more
    effective and less costly defense programs, and seek lower-cost
    innovative solutions to complement traditional military capabilities.
    Among these initiatives are efforts to improve the Taiwan air force's
    survivability, assist with the professionalization of Taiwan air
    force's enlisted ranks, and improve the Taiwan air force's current
    aircraft defensive capabilities.

        78. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, how does Taiwan's airbase
    survivability compare to other air forces in the region?
        General Dempsey. Given the nature of the missile threat posed
    against Taiwan, the survivability and operational capability of
    airbases on Taiwan are at significant risk. Taiwan is undertaking
    measures, many classified, to enhance the survivability of its airbases
    and the ability to continue operating its aircraft in case of conflict.

        79. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, since 2006, the Taiwanese
    Government has made clear its desire to purchase new F-16 C/Ds from the
    United States to augment its aging air force and regain dominance, or
    at least restore balance, in the airspace over the Taiwan Strait. In
    your opinion, would these additional F-16s bolster Taiwan's ability to
    conduct maritime interdiction in a blockade scenario?
        General Dempsey. Taiwan's ability to conduct maritime interdiction
    in a blockade scenario is effected by several factors to include, but
    certainly not limited to the quality and quantity of its air force.
    More important than the number of any particular airframe, is the
    ability of the airframe, its pilot, and those in support to execute
    their mission. In this respect, modernizing Taiwan's air force and air
    defense systems may be just as valuable for a range of scenarios Taiwan
    could face.

        80. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, if the administration denies
    Taiwan's pending request, and it becomes impossible for Taiwan to
    purchase these new F-16s, what would be the impact on Taiwan's ability
    to defend its own skies?
        General Dempsey. It is my understanding that Taiwan's older
    airframes (F-5, Taiwan's Indigenous Defense Fighters, and Mirage 2000)
    reach end-of-service-life by the end of this decade. Without
    modernization, or possibly replacement aircraft, Taiwan will face the
    challenge of performing basic peacetime defense functions with a less
    capable air force. As Chairman, I will work to ensure that we recommend
    options for the best way forward on Taiwan defense capabilities and
    requirements.

        81. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, what would be the impact on
    U.S. interests in the region?
        General Dempsey. The United States remains committed to engagement
    in Asia that promotes stability and access to the global commons. The
    sale of appropriate defense capabilities to Taiwan is required by law
    and can contribute to peace and stability across the Strait and in the
    region. Failure to honor our commitments may cause regional partners to
    lose confidence in the United States as a reliable security partner.

                                     china
        82. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, a National Ground Intelligence
    Center report that was recently declassified provides concerning
    details regarding China's development of electromagnetic pulse (EMP)
    weapons for use against U.S. aircraft carriers, as well as Taiwan's
    electronic infrastructure, in the event of any potential conflict over
    Taiwan. In your opinion, what effect would such an attack have on U.S.
    aircraft carrier operations?
        General Dempsey. The U.S. military, including the U.S. Navy, has
    prepared to withstand the effects of EMP weapons since the Cold War.
    U.S. aircraft carriers and carrier strike groups train to operate in
    nuclear and EMP attack scenarios. We will continue to monitor the
    development of Chinese military capabilities, particularly as they
    relate to anti-access/area denial capabilities and strategies.

        83. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, does the United States
    currently have adequate measures in place to defend against such an
    attack?
        General Dempsey. The U.S. military continually conducts extensive
    analysis, evaluation, and testing of military systems and equipment to
    ensure they are resistant to the effects of EMP weapons. Critical
    pieces of equipment are also retrofitted to be made more EMP resistant
    before they are fielded. After an EMP attack, critical infrastructure
    and communications would continue to operate, and our forces will still
    have adequate operational capability.

        84. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, according to DOD's 2010 report
    on China's military power, ``U.S.-China military-to-military relations
    improved in 2009, based on the commitment of President Obama and
    President Hu to deepen and improve ties, and to take concrete steps to
    advance sustained and reliable military-to-military relations.'' Given
    that the Chinese readily terminated this contact over political issues,
    as we saw in January 2010 following the Obama administration's
    announcement of its intent to sell defensive arms and equipment to
    Taiwan, what is your assessment of the overall value China places on
    this type of engagement?
        General Dempsey. The leaders of both countries have all committed
    to improving our military-to-military relationship. Though our
    relationship has only recently been renewed, the PLA has stated its
    desire for improved defense relations as well as made steps to follow
    up. For example, we have agreed to advance planning on various
    initiatives to include first ever cooperative exchanges in counter-
    piracy this year and exercises in humanitarian assistance and disaster
    relief next year. We have exercised our defense telephone link several
    times this year and have agreed to more routinely use the system.

        85. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, how is China benefitting from
    the military-to-military relations, and what does the United States
    gain?
        General Dempsey. Greater military cooperation between the United
    States and China benefits both countries. We jointly face a complex
    international security environment and our two militaries operate more
    frequently in close proximity. Our exchanges increase opportunities for
    positive cooperation, lower the risk of miscalculation, and more
    effectively communicate our resolve to maintain peace and stability in
    the Asia-Pacific region. These exchanges provide China opportunities to
    understand the U.S. military's role in contributing to global and
    regional security, while providing the U.S. military opportunities to
    impress upon China the importance of international law and common
    safety practices in military operations. Our military-to-military
    contacts and exchanges are based on the principles of transparency,
    balance, and reciprocity.

                              defense budget cuts
        86. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, in his April speech on debt
    reduction, the President targeted security spending for $400 billion in
    cuts over the next 12 years, the preponderance of which seems likely to
    come from the DOD budget. However, news reports are now indicating that
    DOD is bracing for much deeper cuts, potentially reaching $800 billion
    or more over the next decade. During your confirmation hearing, in
    response to Senator McCain's question regarding defense cuts in the
    range of $800 billion to $1 trillion, you responded that ``based on the
    difficulty of achieving the $400 billion cut, I believe $800 billion
    would be extraordinarily difficult and very high risk.'' Please
    elaborate on why cuts of this magnitude ($800 billion or greater) would
    be very high risk.
        General Dempsey. We have not evaluated what an $800 billion or
    greater reduction would entail. In my judgment, cuts of this magnitude
    to defense spending would likely require us to review and possibly
    adjust our national security and military strategies. It is reasonable
    to expect our capacity to shrink, which would affect our ability to
    meet global security commitments and potentially increase strategic
    risk. I am also concerned that deeper cuts directed in a compressed
    timeline could create a hollow force, lacking the training, readiness,
    equipment, and modernization it needs to accomplish all its objectives.
    This said, as Chairman, I will work to ensure any defense cuts are made
    in a way that sustains a responsive and versatile Joint Force.

        87. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, in your opinion, what impact
    would cuts deeper than $400 billion have on our ability to adequately
    meet our national security requirements, maintain our Nation's historic
    military superiority, and provide the requisite resources and support
    for our soldiers?
        General Dempsey. In my judgment, cuts beyond $400 billion would
    likely require us to review and possibly adjust our national security
    and military strategies. It is reasonable to expect our capacity (size
    which equates to frequency) to shrink, which would affect our ability
    to meet global security commitments and potentially increase strategic
    risk. As Chairman, I will work to ensure any defense cuts are made in a
    way that sustains a responsive and versatile Joint Force without rival.
    I will also remain committed to sustain a strong All-Volunteer Force
    that keeps faith with our servicemembers, veterans, and their families.

        88. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, will it be possible for our
    military to maintain its current capabilities while absorbing $800
    billion or more in cuts?
        General Dempsey. We have not yet evaluated the implications of an
    $800 billion cut. It seems reasonable, however, to expect that cuts of
    this magnitude would not enable us to maintain our current military
    capabilities. It would likely require us to reconsider on national
    security and military strategies. As Chairman, I will remain committed
    to ensuring that any size cuts result in a strong Joint Force that
    continues to protect the Homeland and American people.

        89. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, in your estimation, how much
    damage would defense spending cuts of that magnitude do to our national
    interests around the world?
        General Dempsey. While we have not studied cuts of that magnitude,
    deeper cuts would impact the way we protect and promote our national
    interests around the world. As Chairman, I will work to ensure that any
    cuts do not imperil the ability of the Joint Force to protect the
    homeland and secure our national interests.

                               acquisition reform
        90. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, according the final report of
    the 2010 Army Acquisition Review, between 1990 and 2010, the Army
    terminated 22 major acquisition programs before completion, totaling at
    least $32 billion--which represents almost one-third of the Army's
    budget for creating new weapons. The report notes that, ``Every year
    since 1996, the Army has spent more than $1 billion annually on
    programs that were ultimately cancelled.'' Since 2004, $3.3 billion to
    $3.8 billion per year (35 percent to 45 percent) of the Army's
    Developmental Test and Evaluation funding has been lost to cancelled
    programs. In my view, this represents extremely poor stewardship of
    taxpayers' dollars. Unfortunately, this poor stewardship is not limited
    to the Army, and there are clear examples of it across DOD. In your
    opinion, what are the primary problems in the DOD acquisition process
    that have caused these program cancellations, and what can be done to
    end this decade-long trend of sinking billions of dollars into trying
    to develop weapon systems that will never be fielded?
        General Dempsey. I share your concerns about cost overruns and
    cancelled programs. I am also aware that program cancellations can stem
    from many causes to include changing national security priorities,
    overreaching requirements, immature technology, and insufficient
    attention to overall affordability at program inception. Congress has
    taken important steps in the 2009 Acquisition Reform Act and the
    Department has adopted a better buying program initiative to address
    these issues. As Chairman, I will support DOD efforts to improve
    Defense Acquisition processes within my authorities in order to develop
    the most capable and affordable Joint Force possible.

                             air-sea battle concept
        91. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, the Air-Sea Battle concept has
    been described by some as a new way for the Navy and Air Force to work
    together to fight future wars against major powers. In today's budget
    environment, such coordination between our Military Services is more
    important than ever. As I understand it, the Air-Sea Battle concept is
    aimed at maintaining U.S. dominance of the air and sea domains and to
    overpower any nation-state that might try to defeat our military forces
    through the use of advanced missiles, stealth aircraft, and/or a blue-
    water naval fleet of its own. Please describe the importance of the
    Air-Sea Battle concept in our future operations.
        General Dempsey. The proliferation of anti-access and area denial
    strategies and capabilities by potential adversaries threatens our
    assured access to the global commons. It is a challenge of growing
    concern. Defeating these strategies and capabilities will require the
    Joint Force to better integrate core military competencies across all
    domains. Developing joint interdependencies, capabilities, concepts,
    and strategies--such as Air-Sea Battle--is an important initiative
    within the context of this overall effort.

        92. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, what are the implications for
    the Air-Sea Battle concept if draconian budget cuts force the Air Force
    to abandon or curtail the new long-range strike aircraft or the Navy to
    cut its number of aircraft carrier battle groups?
        General Dempsey. We are currently studying the impact of a wide
    range of potential budget cuts on the Joint Force's ability to protect
    U.S. interests around the globe. Any cuts that negatively affect our
    ability to project U.S. military power, protect our access to the
    global commons, and maintain freedom of maneuver, particularly at sea
    or in the air, must be carefully considered with respect to the
    strategic and military risks involved.

                              afghanistan drawdown
        93. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, on June 22, 2011, President
    Obama announced he would withdraw 10,000 troops from Afghanistan by the
    end of this year and another 23,000 by next summer, resulting in a
    complete drawdown of the 33,000 troop surge by September 2012.
    Following the President's announcement, Admiral Mullen testified to the
    House Armed Services Committee that: ``the President's decisions are
    more aggressive and incur more risk than I was originally prepared to
    accept.'' What pace of withdrawal do you believe would incur an
    acceptable level of risk?
        General Dempsey. In my judgment, the projected pace of the surge
    recovery is within acceptable risk. The recovery of the surge will be
    complete by summer of 2012. At that point, there will be about 68,000
    U.S. troops in Afghanistan. There will be greater than 70,000
    additional ANSFs fielded. If conditions on the ground change this
    judgment, I will advise the Secretary of Defense and President.

                                     libya
        94. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, in the early 1990s, then-
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, laid out
    some basic guidelines for conducting effective military operations,
    which have since come to be known as the Powell Doctrine. General
    Powell stated that: ``We should always be skeptical when so-called
    experts suggest that all a particular crisis calls for is a little
    surgical bombing or a limited attack. When the `surgery' is over and
    the desired result is not obtained, a new set of experts then comes
    forward with talk of just a little escalation . . . History has not
    been kind to this approach to war-making.'' Regarding the air war over
    Libya, do you believe that a vital, U.S. national security interest was
    or is threatened there?
        General Dempsey. The stability of the region and the range of
    potential outcomes of the Arab Spring are clearly in our national
    security interest. As President Obama has stated with regard to Libya,
    ``Our safety is not directly threatened, but our interests and values
    are.'' In this respect, it is consistent with our national interest to
    protect Libyan civilians in accordance with the President's policy and
    United Nations Security Council resolutions.

        95. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, does the United States have a
    clear, attainable objective in Libya? If so, what is that objective?
        General Dempsey. The goal of the NATO-led military effort, and the
    mandate of the U.N. resolution, is clear. The United States is
    supporting NATO in protecting the Libyan people. Forced regime change
    is not the purpose of the military mission; however, military
    operations do complement other instruments of power that are being used
    to pressure for the eventual departure of Qadhafi.

        96. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, how does the Powell Doctrine
    apply or not apply with regard to the Libya campaign?
        General Dempsey. The Powell Doctrine is certainly an appropriate
    source of counsel for any potential use of force. When writing about
    the use of force in Foreign Affairs (1992), it is my understanding that
    General Powell did not intend for a rigid application of his words. He
    did, however, argue that military force ``should be restricted to
    occasions where it can do some good and where the goodwill outweighs
    the loss of lives and other costs that will surely ensue.'' In my
    judgment, this is just one example of how the Powell Doctrine might be
    applicable to the NATO led effort in Libya.

                               army surface fleet
        97. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, the Army currently operates a
    fleet of over 100 ships, used mostly for logistics purposes. The
    vessels range from large landing ships to medium-sized and smaller
    utility landing craft, to a force of tugboats and barges. Those vessels
    are operated by over 2,000 soldiers and another 200 civilians in
    support roles. A 2010 report by Defense News stated that the Army was
    in discussions with the Navy over the potential transfer of the Army's
    watercraft mission and its vessels. In today's Joint Service, does it
    make sense for the Army to continue operating a fleet of over 100
    ships?
        General Dempsey. As Chairman, I will work to develop and align
    joint capabilities in a way that leads toward a more interdependent,
    affordable, responsive, and versatile Joint Force. The Army-Navy
    Warfighter Talks, conducted in December 2010 to address the issue you
    raise, worked toward a similar goal. As a result of these talks, the
    Services agreed to transfer the Army's share of the Joint High Speed
    Vessel program to the Navy. The objective is to optimally align Service
    core competencies for strategic movement and reduce Total Ownership
    Costs. The transfer of management oversight to the Navy does not change
    the joint character of the mission set, and the Navy-operated vessels
    will support Army missions as directed by the combatant commanders. It
    was also decided to undertake a thorough examination of the potential
    transfer of the remaining Army watercraft missions to the Navy in light
    of changing requirements and fiscal constraints.

        98. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, please share your view on the
    desirability of the proposed transfer of this mission and assets from
    the Army to the Navy, and provide a status update.
        General Dempsey. The Army and Navy leadership have assessed the
    potential to gain efficiency in this area while minimizing risk. They
    have determined that it may be feasible to consolidate watercraft roles
    and missions in response to changes in future global military posture.
    However, further analysis will be required to fully assess any long-
    term efficiencies or costs, and identify capability gaps or overlaps
    that could result. This is not unlike other areas where we are seeking
    to gain efficiency, but doing so in a deliberate manner that does not
    compromise national security.

                              joint strike fighter
        99. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, the F-35 JSF will replace the
    aging tactical jet fleets of A-10s, F-16s, F-18s, and AV-8s. In
    prepared remarks to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Under
    Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated that ``its [F-35's]
    importance to our national security is immense. The F-35 will form the
    backbone of U.S. air combat superiority for generations to come.'' In
    the past, some major acquisition programs (such as the B-2 and F-22)
    have experienced large cost increases and other problems so significant
    that DOD has had to greatly reduce the number of aircraft ultimately
    procured. Can you comment on the importance of JSF to our national
    defense?
        General Dempsey. The F-35 is indeed foundational to our national
    security. This 5th generation aircraft will preserve our decisive
    advantage over potential adversaries for a generation. I also recognize
    that controlling cost is central to our ability to procure the
    appropriate quantity of F-35s. As Chairman, I will work to ensure an
    affordable F-35 program that meets our national security requirements.

        100. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, what steps will you take to
    ensure the JSF does not meet the same fate as the B-2 and F-22?
        General Dempsey. As Chairman, I will work directly with the Office
    of Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Services, and Congress to deliver
    the most affordable JSF possible. The Vice Chairman and I will rely on
    improved joint requirements and acquisition processes to regularly
    review the JSF program in conjunction with OSD. We will aggressively
    assess capability and cost trades, closely monitor cost growth through
    the trip-wire process, and participate in Departmental Boards.

                       size of general/flag officer corps
        101. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, during your confirmation
    hearing, Senator Webb made the following statement regarding the number
    of general officers in the Air Force: ``The Air Force has more
    brigadier generals than any of the other Services, by far. They have
    the same number of three stars. They have almost the same number of two
    stars as the Army and more than the Navy and the Marine Corps
    combined.'' According to a May report by the Air Force Times, in the
    last 7 years alone, the Air Force cut nearly 43,000 airmen but added 44
    generals. The efficiencies initiative led by former Secretary Gates
    touted that it would cut 102 general/flag officer billets. However,
    roughly 40 percent of that cut comes as a result of ending the wars in
    Iraq and Afghanistan. In your opinion, where can DOD find further
    efficiencies within its general/flag officer ranks?
        General Dempsey. As mentioned, many of the efficiencies have come
    from the elimination of joint positions associated with the transition
    of our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. These cuts impact the
    Services by reducing the available number of joint general/flag officer
    positions. In turn, this reduces the number of such officers each
    Service is authorized to maintain. There are also Service-specific cuts
    that go beyond these joint cuts that are being considered and
    implemented. On assuming the office of Chairman, I will continue to
    examine the issue and seek opportunities for additional reductions.

        102. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, in light of anticipated cuts
    to the DOD budget, should the Services look at reducing their numbers
    of general/flag officers before reducing overall force structure?
        General Dempsey. As you may be aware, we have already initiated the
    reduction of 130 general/flag officer positions across DOD. The size
    and composition of the general/flag officer ranks should continue to
    face scrutiny as we shape the overall force structure.

        103. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, how else can we prioritize
    tooth over tail when it comes to force structure?
        General Dempsey. In my current role as Chief of Staff of the Army,
    we are examining the echelons of command as well as the size of higher
    headquarters. I will say that ``staff power'' and ``intellectual
    bandwidth'' are as important as combat power and lethal effects. As
    Chairman, I will seek the right balance.

                                 military bands
        104. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, the fiscal year 2012 DOD
    budget request included $320 million for military bands, which many
    think are of questionable value in bolstering national security. Given
    the current budgetary crisis and impending cuts to the defense budget,
    what is your assessment of the importance of military bands?
        General Dempsey. I am a strong advocate of our military bands. My
    own 1st Armored Division Band was among my greatest heroes for their
    service in Iraq in 2003-2004. Our U.S. military bands have had a long
    and distinguished place in our Nation's history. Through ceremonies,
    national tours, public concerts, and recordings, our military bands
    continue to inspire patriotism, elevate esprit de corps, and support
    recruiting efforts. These bands have also made a significant
    contribution to preserving our Nation's musical heritage and projecting
    a positive image of the U.S. military at home and overseas. I am
    sensitive to our current budget constraints and think we can take a
    balanced approach that protects our national security priorities while
    recognizing the important contributions military bands continue to make
    to our Nation.

        105. Senator Cornyn. General Dempsey, what plans do you have to
    recommend cuts and efficiencies in this area, to ensure that our
    Military Services prioritize tooth over tail?
        General Dempsey. At this time, I am not aware of specific
    recommended cuts to military bands. However, the ongoing comprehensive
    review is looking at the entire defense structure. As Chairman, I will
    remain committed to ensuring we have a strong Joint Force capable of
    meeting our national security objectives.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
                                 law of the sea
        106. Senator Vitter. General Dempsey, it's my understanding that
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Navy have long supported U.S.
    accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
    (UNCLOS). The primary claim is that U.S. membership would guarantee or
    otherwise secure the navigational rights and freedoms set forth in the
    convention. However, it is my understanding that the Navy has
    maintained its global presence despite the fact that the United States
    has remained outside of UNCLOS. Could you provide me with an example of
    a situation or operation where the Navy was unable to successfully
    complete a mission due to the fact that the United States is not a
    party to UNCLOS?
        General Dempsey. The decision not to accede to the UNCLOS has not
    prevented the U.S. Navy from successfully completing any missions.
    Since 1983, the U.S. Navy has conducted operations consistent with
    UNCLOS provisions on navigational freedoms, in accordance with then
    President Reagan's Oceans Policy. Those provisions are vital to our
    Armed Force's global mobility and must not be allowed to erode. An
    accession to UNCLOS provides the United States a stronger leadership
    voice to guide and influence future law of the sea developments instead
    of relying on UNCLOS provisions only as a matter of customary
    international law. Becoming a party to UNCLOS closes a seam with our
    partners and allies.

        107. Senator Vitter. General Dempsey, has access to a key
    international strait--such as Hormuz, Malacca, Bab el-Mandeb, or
    Gibraltar--ever been denied to the Navy due to the fact that the United
    States is not a party to UNCLOS?
        General Dempsey. The decision of the United States not to accede to
    UNCLOS has not denied our Navy access to any key international straits
    to date. For this, we rely on the regime of transit passage, a key
    provision of UNCLOS. An accession to UNCLOS would enable the United
    States to guide and influence future law of the sea developments and
    protects its key provisions, like the regime of transit passage. We
    must ensure these provisions are not eroded in order to preserve our
    robust navigational freedoms and provide our Armed Forces abroad the
    highest degree of global mobility.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA,
    follows:]
                        Nomination Reference and Report
                               As In Executive Session,
                                   Senate of the United States,
                                                          June 6, 2011.
        Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
    on Armed Services:
        The following named officer for appointment as the Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff and appointment to the grade indicated while
    assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10,
    U.S.C., sections 152 and 601:

                                 To be General.

        GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, 0000.
                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA,
    which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
    nomination was referred, follows:]
               Biographical Sketch of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA
    Source of commissioned service: USMA

    Educational degrees:
        U.S. Military Academy - BS - No Major
        Duke University - MA - English
        U.S. Army Command and General Staff College - MMAS - Military Arts
    and Sciences
        National Defense University - MS - National Security and Strategic
    Studies

    Military schools attended:
        Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
        U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
        National War College

    Foreign language(s): French

    Promotions:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Promotions                       Date of Appointment
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2LT.......................................  5 Jun 74
    1LT.......................................  5 Jun 76
    CPT.......................................  8 Aug 78
    MAJ.......................................  1 Sep 85
    LTC.......................................  1 Apr 91
    COL.......................................  1 Sep 95
    BG........................................  1 Aug 01
    MG........................................  1 Sep 04
    LTG.......................................  8 Sep 05
    GEN.......................................  8 Dec 08
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Major duty assignments:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  From                        To              Assignment
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Jan 75..........................  May 76............  Platoon Leader, B
                                                           Troop, 1st
                                                           Squadron, 2d
                                                           Armored Cavalry,
                                                           U.S. Army Europe
                                                           and Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany.
    May 76..........................  Sep 77............  Support Platoon
                                                           Leader, 1st
                                                           Squadron, 2d
                                                           Armored Cavalry,
                                                           U.S. Army Europe
                                                           and Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany.
    Sep 77..........................  Jun 78............  S-1 (Personnel),
                                                           1st Squadron, 2d
                                                           Armored Cavalry,
                                                           U.S. Army Europe
                                                           and Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany.
    Jul 78..........................  Jan 79............  Student, Armor
                                                           Officer Advanced
                                                           Course, U.S. Army
                                                           Armor School,
                                                           Fort Knox, KY.
    Apr 79..........................  Jan 80............  Motor Officer, 1st
                                                           Squadron, 10th
                                                           Cavalry, 4th
                                                           Infantry Division
                                                           (Mechanized),
                                                           Fort Carson, CO.
    Jan 80..........................  Oct 80............  Commander, A
                                                           Troop, 1st
                                                           Squadron, 10th
                                                           Cavalry, 4th
                                                           Infantry Division
                                                           (Mechanized),
                                                           Fort Carson, CO.
    Oct 80..........................  Jun 81............  S-3 (Operations),
                                                           1st Squadron,
                                                           10th Cavalry, 4th
                                                           Infantry Division
                                                           (Mechanized),
                                                           Fort Carson, CO.
    Jun 81..........................  Jul 82............  Commander,
                                                           Headquarters and
                                                           Headquarters
                                                           Troop, 1st
                                                           Squadron, 10th
                                                           Cavalry, 4th
                                                           Infantry Division
                                                           (Mechanized),
                                                           Fort Carson, CO.
    Aug 82..........................  May 84............  Student, Duke
                                                           University,
                                                           Durham, NC.
    Jun 84..........................  Jul 87............  Instructor, later
                                                           Assistant
                                                           Professor,
                                                           Department of
                                                           English, U.S.
                                                           Military Academy,
                                                           West Point, NY.
    Aug 87..........................  Jun 88............  Student, U.S. Army
                                                           Command and
                                                           General Staff
                                                           College, Fort
                                                           Leavenworth, KS.
    Jul 88..........................  Sep 89............  Executive Officer,
                                                           4th Battalion,
                                                           67th Armor, 3d
                                                           Armored Division,
                                                           U.S. Army Europe
                                                           and Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany.
    Sep 89..........................  May 91............  S-3 (Operations),
                                                           later Executive
                                                           Officer, 3d
                                                           Brigade, 3d
                                                           Armored Division,
                                                           U.S. Army Europe
                                                           and Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany and
                                                           Operations Desert
                                                           Shield/Storm,
                                                           Saudi Arabia.
    Jul 91..........................  Jun 93............  Commander, 4th
                                                           Battalion, 67th
                                                           Armor, 1st
                                                           Brigade, 1st
                                                           Armored Division,
                                                           U.S. Army Europe
                                                           and Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany.
    Jul 93..........................  Jun 95............  Chief, Armor
                                                           Branch, Combat
                                                           Arms Division,
                                                           Officer Personnel
                                                           Management
                                                           Directorate, U.S.
                                                           Total Army
                                                           Personnel
                                                           Command,
                                                           Alexandria, VA.
    Aug 95..........................  Jun 96............  Student, National
                                                           War College, Fort
                                                           Lesley J. McNair,
                                                           Washington, DC.
    Jul 96..........................  Jul 98............  Commander, 3d
                                                           Armored Cavalry
                                                           Regiment, Fort
                                                           Carson, CO.
    Jul 98..........................  Oct 99............  Assistant Deputy
                                                           Director for
                                                           Politico-Military
                                                           Affairs, Europe
                                                           and Africa, J-5,
                                                           The Joint Staff,
                                                           Washington, DC.
    Oct 99..........................  Aug 01............  Special Assistant
                                                           to the Chairman
                                                           of the Joint
                                                           Chiefs of Staff,
                                                           The Joint Staff,
                                                           Washington, DC.
    Sep 01..........................  Jun 03............  Program Manager,
                                                           Saudi Arabian
                                                           National Guard
                                                           Modernization
                                                           Program, Saudi
                                                           Arabia.
    Jun 03..........................  Oct 04............  Commanding
                                                           General, 1st
                                                           Armored Division,
                                                           U.S. Army Europe
                                                           and Seventh Army
                                                           Operation Iraqi
                                                           Freedom, Iraq.
    Oct 04..........................  Jul 05............  Commanding
                                                           General, 1st
                                                           Armored Division,
                                                           U.S. Army Europe
                                                           and Seventh Army,
                                                           Germany.
    Aug 05..........................  May 07............  Commander, Multi-
                                                           National Security
                                                           Transition
                                                           Command-Iraq/
                                                           Commander, NATO
                                                           Training Mission-
                                                           Iraq, Operation
                                                           Iraqi Freedom,
                                                           Iraq.
    Aug 07..........................  Mar 08............  Deputy Commander,
                                                           U.S. Central
                                                           Command, MacDill
                                                           Air Force Base,
                                                           FL.
    Mar 08..........................  Oct 08............  Acting Commander,
                                                           U.S. Central
                                                           Command, MacDill
                                                           Air Force Base,
                                                           FL.
    Dec 08..........................  Mar 11............  Commanding
                                                           General, U.S.
                                                           Army Training and
                                                           Doctrine Command,
                                                           Fort Monroe, VA.
    Apr 11..........................  Present...........  Chief of Staff,
                                                           U.S. Army,
                                                           Washington, DC.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Summary of joint assignments:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Assignments                    Date              Grade
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Assistant Deputy Director for          Jul 98-Oct 99                   Colonel
     Politico-Military Affairs, Europe
     and Africa, J-5, The Joint Staff,
     Washington, DC....................
    Special Assistant to the Chairman      Oct 99-Aug 01                   Colonel
     of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The
     Joint Staff, Washington, DC.......
    Commander, Multi-National Security     Aug 05-May 07  Lieutenant General
     Transition Command-Iraq/Commander,
     NATO Training Mission-Iraq,
     Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.....
    Deputy Commander, U.S. Central         Aug 07-Mar 08  Lieutenant General
     Command, MacDill Air Force Base,
     FL................................
    Acting Commander, U.S. Central         Mar 08-Oct 08  Lieutenant General
     Command, MacDill Air Force Base,
     FL................................
    Executive Officer, 3d Brigade, 3d      Jan 91-Feb 91        Lieutenant Colonel
     Armored Division, U.S. Army Europe
     and Seventh Army, Operations
     Desert Shield/Storm, Saudi Arabia.
    Commanding General, 1st Armored        Jun 03-Oct 04  Brigadier General/
     Division, U.S. Army Europe and                           Major General
     Seventh Army, Operation Iraqi
     Freedom, Iraq.....................
    Commander, Multi-National Security     Aug 05-May 07  Lieutenant General
     Transition Command-Iraq/Commander,
     NATO Training Mission-Iraq,
     Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.....
    Deputy Commander, U.S. Central         Aug 07-Mar 08  Lieutenant General
     Command, MacDill Air Force Base,
     FL................................
    Acting Commander, U.S. Central         Mar 08-Oct 08  Lieutenant General
     Command, MacDill Air Force Base,
     FL................................
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    U.S. decorations and badges:
        Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
        Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
        Defense Superior Service Medal
        Legion of Merit (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
        Bronze Star Medal with ``V'' Device
        Bronze Star Medal
        Meritorious Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
        Joint Service Commendation Medal
        Army Commendation Medal
        Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
        Combat Action Badge
        Parachutist Badge
        Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
    military officers nominated by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by GEN Martin E.
    Dempsey, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
                              UNITED STATES SENATE
                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                                  Room SR-228
                           Washington, DC 20510-6050
                                 (202) 224-3871
                        COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
          BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
        Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
    more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
    form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
    of your answer applies.
                        Part A--Biographical Information
        Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
    this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
    public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
    any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

        1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
        Martin E. Dempsey.

        2. Position to which nominated:
        Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.

        3. Date of nomination:
        6 June 2011.

        4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
        [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
    committee's executive files.]

        5. Date and place of birth:
        14 March 1952; Jersey City, NJ.

        6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
        Married to Diane Sullivan Dempsey.

        7. Names and ages of children:
        Christopher, 32.
        Megan, 31.
        Caitlin, 28.

        8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary
    or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local
    governments, other than those listed in the service record extract
    provided to the committee by the executive branch.
        None.

        9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
    officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
    or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
    business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
        None.

        10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
    professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
    other organizations.
        Member, Veterans of Foreign Wars.
        Member, Association of the U.S. Army.

        11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
    society memberships, and any other special recognition for outstanding
    service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
    extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
        None.

        12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
    if confirmed, to appear and testify before any duly constituted
    committee of the Senate?
        I, Martin E. Dempsey agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify
    upon request before any duly constituted commitee of the Senate.

        13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
    constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
    those views differ from the administration in power?
        I, Martin E. Dempsey, agree, when asked before any duly constituted
    committee of Congress, to give my personal views, even if those views
    differ from the administration in power.
                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee
    questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
    the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
    are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                    ------

                               Signature and Date
        I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
    on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
    provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
    and complete.
                                                     Martin E. Dempsey.
        This 6th day of June, 2011.

        [The nomination of GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, was reported
    to the Senate by Chairman Levin on August 2, 2011, with the
    recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
    was confirmed by the Senate on August 2, 2011.]

    NOMINATIONS OF ADM JONATHAN W. GREENERT, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
     GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS; AND LTG CHARLES
     H. JACOBY, JR., USA, TO BE GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN
          COMMAND/COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, JULY 28, 2011

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room
    SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Udall,
    Hagan, Begich, Blumenthal, McCain, Sessions, Wicker, Brown,
    Portman, Ayotte, and Collins.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
    Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton
    Greene, professional staff member; and Jessica L. Kingston,
    research assistant.
        Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority
    staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
    Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; and Richard F.
    Walsh, minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Kathleen A.
    Kulenkampff, Brian F. Sebold, and Bradley S. Watson.
        Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta,
    assistant to Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator
    Akaka; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Casey
    Howard, assistant to Senator Udall; Lindsay Kavanaugh,
    assistant to Senator Begich; Joanne McLaughlin, assistant to
    Senator Manchin; Ethan Saxon, assistant to Senator Blumenthal;
    Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Joseph Lai,
    assistant to Senator Wicker; Charles Prosch, assistant to
    Senator Brown; Brent Bombach, assistant to Senator Portman;
    Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte; and Ryan Kaldahl,
    assistant to Senator Collins.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. Today the
    committee meets to consider the nominations of two
    distinguished senior military officers: Admiral Jonathan
    Greenert, U.S. Navy, the nominee to be Chief of Naval
    Operations (CNO); and Lieutenant General Charles Jacoby, Jr.,
    U.S. Army, the nominee for Commander, U.S. Northern Command
    (NORTHCOM) and Commander, North American Aerospace Defense
    Command (NORAD).
        The long hours and the hard work that are put in by our
    senior military officials at the Department of Defense (DOD)
    require commitment and sacrifice not only from our nominees,
    but also from their families. We greatly appreciate the
    willingness of our nominees to carry out their new
    responsibilities and we also appreciate the support that they
    have from their families. Without that support, these nominees
    could not possibly do what they've been asked to do throughout
    their careers and what they're going to be asked to do when
    they are confirmed. Our nominees should feel free to introduce
    their family members when they make their opening remarks this
    morning.
        The nominees have impressive qualifications and suitability
    for their positions. Admiral Greenert has served as Vice CNO,
    Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Deputy Commander of the
    Pacific Fleet, and Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.
        General Jacoby has served as the Commanding General of the
    Multinational Corps in Iraq, the Commanding General of ICOR,
    and the Commanding General of U.S. Army-Alaska. He has also
    served as the Commander of U.S. Southern Command's Joint Task
    Force Bravo in Honduras, which provided counterdrug support,
    and he led relief operations for Hurricane Mitch, missions that
    are directly relevant to NORTHCOM's missions.
        I would also note that he is a native of Michigan, he holds
    a master's degree in history from the University of Michigan,
    so from my perspective that seals the deal. The fact that
    Admiral Greenert's wife hails from Michigan should not hurt his
    chances, either.
        If confirmed, each of our nominees will be responsible for
    helping DOD face critical challenges. The ongoing use and
    possible future use of our military forces overseas, as well as
    the defense of our Homeland, make it critically important that
    we choose military leaders for DOD who can provide a vision for
    dealing with a number of critical issues that confront DOD.
        These challenges include balancing force structure and
    modernization needs against the costs of supporting ongoing
    operations, and to do so in an increasingly constrained fiscal
    environment.
        Those fiscal constraints are likely to get tighter as we
    deal with whatever agreement comes from the ongoing debt
    ceiling-deficit reduction discussions. The President announced
    a reduction in security funding of some $400 billion over the
    next 12 years. The actual reduction could be significantly
    greater, and if that happens this is going to amplify the
    challenges that you will face.
        Admiral Greenert would be the 30th CNO. He will face the
    difficult tasks of recruiting and retaining a quality force and
    maintaining current readiness to conduct the ongoing war on
    terrorism, while at the same time transforming the Navy's force
    structure to deal with the threats of the future in the face of
    difficult cost and scheduling problems with the Navy's major
    acquisition programs.
        Many of the ongoing challenges facing the Navy center on
    acquisition programs. As CNO, Admiral Greenert would be leading
    the Navy in defining requirements for the acquisition community
    to fill. There are some programs that have been proceeding
    reasonably well, such as ramping up the two attack submarines
    per year.
        But too many acquisition programs are mired down in
    problems which, unless resolved, will make it difficult, if not
    impossible, to reach our goal for the size of the fleet.
        NORTHCOM is responsible for the defense of the Homeland and
    for providing defense support to civil authorities in response
    to domestic natural or manmade disasters. Its area of
    responsibility includes all of North America, including Mexico.
    General Jacoby would be dual-hatted as the Commander of NORAD,
    our binational command with Canada, which has the mission to
    provide aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime
    warning for North America.
        When confirmed, General Jacoby would face a number of
    significant challenges. These challenges include working with
    the Mexican military to help them defeat the transnational
    criminal organizations that are causing high levels of violence
    in Mexico, which pose a threat within Mexico and to the
    security of our southern border.
        As part of the mission of providing defense support to
    civil authorities, NORTHCOM must work closely and cooperatively
    with other Federal agencies and with all the States on plans
    and coordination for emergency response to domestic disasters,
    including potential incidents involving weapons of mass
    destruction.
        General Jacoby will need to work with the State Governors
    and National Guard Forces to improve the capabilities of State
    and Federal military forces to work together to support the
    Governors' needs for disaster assistance.
        NORTHCOM is also the combatant command responsible for the
    operation of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system,
    whose mission is to help defend the Homeland against the threat
    of a limited ballistic missile attack from nations such as
    North Korea and Iran. The GMD system has had two consecutive
    flight test failures, most recently last December. We look
    forward to hearing General Jacoby's views on what we need to do
    to make the system work reliably and effectively, including
    adequate testing.
        We all look forward to hearing your testimony this morning
    on these and other issues and the kinds of issues that you are
    going to be facing in your new assignments.
        Senator McCain.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I welcome Admiral Greenert and General Jacoby and their
    families and I congratulate them on their nominations. Admiral
    Greenert, in a nomination hearing on Tuesday for General Martin
    Dempsey, nominated to be the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff, we discussed the likelihood of deep cuts in future
    defense budgets and the uncertainty about how these cuts will
    affect defense personnel, equipment, readiness, and
    capabilities.
        General Dempsey expressed his appreciation for the role of
    sea power in our national defense strategy and the Navy's
    enduring role in protecting our economic and national security
    interests in vast and vital areas, such as the Asia Pacific.
    Indeed, with the increasing importance of this geopolitical and
    maritime space, the roles and responsibilities of the Navy are
    becoming even more critical.
        General Dempsey also acknowledged, however, that if
    adequate funding is not provided by Congress, DOD strategy will
    have to change to reflect the resources that are made
    available. Clearly, each of the Services stands to be affected
    by the budget decisions made in the days ahead. But in my
    judgment, the Navy, with its capital-intensive shipbuilding and
    aircraft procurement and maintenance accounts, could be the
    Service that would be most adversely affected.
        This puts huge additional pressure on the Navy to design
    and produce on time and on budget, reliable, battle-ready
    ships, submarines, and aircraft, a task in which I'm sad to say
    the Navy's recent track record has been less than admirable. If
    the Navy's performance in the design and procurement of its
    weapons systems doesn't improve, I'm worried that the Service
    could lose the commitment and support of American taxpayers and
    Congress, which would be a long-term disaster for the Navy and
    our Nation.
        While I'm confident you will be confirmed, Admiral, you
    will have many difficult challenges ahead. The Littoral Combat
    Ship (LCS) heads the list. I continue to think the Navy
    misjudged in going forward with a dual-source block buy
    strategy for the LCS and that the true life cycle costs of
    buying and sustaining both LCS variants will be considerably
    more than what the Navy has estimated.
        In recent days we have learned that one of the newly
    commissioned LCS ships has experienced unacceptable cracking of
    its steel hull, while the other variant suffers from aggressive
    galvanic corrosion that will require repair and backfitting to
    ensure the safety and durability of its aluminum hull. I'm sure
    you share my frustration that following an $8 billion taxpayer
    investment in the LCS program, the Navy continues to lack a
    single ship that is operationally effective or reliable.
        Similarly with the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program,
    we're all too familiar with its continued cost overruns and
    schedule slips. After nearly 10 years in development and a $56
    billion investment to date, the program has produced a handful
    of test and operational aircraft. We've recently learned that
    the government's share of the most recent cost overruns for the
    first 28 production aircraft stands at three-quarters of a
    billion dollars, in addition to a requirement for an additional
    33 months and $7.4 billion as a result of recent program
    restructuring decisions.
        The overall estimated cost of the program, $383 billion,
    and an estimated sustainment cost of $1 trillion, make it the
    most expensive acquisition program in history. I remain deeply
    concerned about the affordability of this program and I don't
    think the taxpayers and Congress will have a lot more tolerance
    for additional cost increases and schedule slips.
        The same is true with the LPD-17 San Antonio-class of
    amphibious ships. Plainly, the Navy faces many difficult
    challenges. But if we can be confident in one thing without a
    doubt, it is the performance and commitment of our sailors and
    that of their families over the last 10 years of constant
    conflict. They give us reason to redouble our efforts to solve
    these problems and they make us proud every day, and they
    deserve better. So do the taxpayers.
        General Jacoby, I congratulate you on your nomination. I'm
    interested in what your priorities will be if confirmed to
    ensure NORTHCOM is able to accomplish its missions and navigate
    an increasingly complex security environment.
        The current situation in Mexico should be of concern to all
    of us, and I'm interested in your assessment of what steps need
    to be taken to strengthen the partnership between our two
    nations to combat the increasingly capable and ruthless
    transnational criminal organizations. President Calderon
    continues to act with great courage in this fight and he has
    achieved significant successes with the capture or killing of
    several powerful cartel kingpins. However, the situation
    remains dire. More than 35,000 Mexicans have lost their lives
    in drug-related violence since 2006, and this violence
    continues to rage in many areas in Mexico, threatening the
    safety and security of Mexican and American citizens alike.
        Finally, I'm interested in your views on an increasingly
    grave threat to both American military and economic security,
    the growing proliferation of attacks in cyberspace. There isn't
    a week that goes by without media reports of major intrusion or
    compromise of cyber networks in the United States, both
    military and commercial.
        We need to focus our attention and act with a real sense of
    urgency. I think we are long overdue in developing an
    understanding of how to respond to cyber attacks and when to
    shift from defense to offense. I've been and remain greatly
    concerned about the lack of a clear strategy that establishes
    coordinated, unambiguous command and control relationships that
    have real capability to effectively respond to cyber attacks
    within DOD.
        In short, I don't think we have answered a host of
    fundamental questions involving cyberspace, despite recent
    efforts. I look forward to hearing the role you believe
    NORTHCOM should play in protecting the Homeland against our
    cyber threats and what must urgently be done to ensure the
    roles and responsibilities for protecting the United States are
    clearly defined and established both within DOD and across the
    interagency framework.
        Thank you both for your willingness to serve in these
    important leadership positions.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
        Let me now ask you to give us your opening statements, if
    you would. Let me first call on Admiral Greenert.

       STATEMENT OF ADM JONATHAN W. GREENERT, USN, NOMINATED FOR
    REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF NAVAL
                               OPERATIONS

        Admiral Greenert. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
    good morning. Senator McCain, distinguished members of the
    committee: it is indeed an honor, a great honor, to appear
    before you as the nominee to be our Navy's CNO. I am thankful
    for the confidence placed in me by President Obama and
    Secretaries Panetta and Mabus and Admiral Roughead.
        But I'm most grateful for those people behind me who for
    years have given me great support, understanding, and
    inspiration, especially my wife Darlene, who is with us today,
    as you've acknowledged earlier, Mr. Chairman. We've been
    married for 30 great years. Darlene has been steadfast and, for
    heaven's sakes, she's been patient. She's a caring Navy spouse
    and the greatest mother three children could ever have.
        Joining us also today is my daughter, Sarah, who's really
    the apple of my eye, and my son, Bryan. He's obviously the
    lieutenant behind us. He's just completed a 4-year tour as a
    Navy surface warfare officer, serving on two destroyers in
    Japan. Regrettably, Mr. Chairman, our oldest son, Jonathan,
    could not be here. He too serves our Navy, as a Navy Criminal
    Investigative Service special agent, and he's currently
    underway in the Western Pacific on the aircraft carrier George
    Washington as their special agent.
        More than anything, I am grateful for the opportunity to
    continue serving as a sailor in the U.S. Navy. To me there is
    nothing more meaningful and honorable than to wear the cloth of
    our Nation and serve alongside today's magnificent Navy men and
    women. They are committed, they are tough, adaptive, and
    innovative, and therefore they deserve wisdom, clear direction,
    and understanding from their leadership.
        The sailors we send into harm's way today could not do what
    they do without the support they receive from their families at
    home. As the Vice Chief, I have been honored to meet many
    thousands of Navy family members in an effort to understand how
    our institution can serve them better. I am grateful for their
    dedication, their resiliency, and their selflessness.
        Today, 50 percent of our ships are underway and 43 percent
    are deployed. We have over 12,000 sailors on the ground in U.S.
    Central Command (CENTCOM) and about 10,000 sailors on
    individual augmentee assignments. Mr. Chairman, these numbers
    were almost identical to the numbers that Admiral Roughead
    reported to you almost 4 years ago. Your Navy remains ready. It
    is agile and it's global, and it has been relentlessly busy.
    Operating tempo has been high. Our missions have evolved, and
    changes are occurring in our world, particularly the Middle
    East, at a pace we couldn't previously imagine.
        In spite of all that has taken place around us, one key
    element endures and I believe will endure: we must assure the
    security and freedom of the seas in all the domains, so that
    the economies of the world can flourish. To do this, I believe
    our Navy must be forward in order to influence events, assist
    our allies and partners, and provide our Nation an offshore
    option.
        If confirmed, my priorities will be to remain ready to meet
    the current challenges today; build a relevant and capable
    future force; continue to take care of our sailors, our
    civilians, and their families, and institute a manning strategy
    that recruits and nurtures a motivated, relevant, and diverse
    future force.
        Meeting these challenges in today's budgeting environment
    will not be easy. Going forward, we must be clear-eyed in
    communicating what we will and what we won't be able to provide
    the Nation in the future.
        I recognize there will be rough seas ahead, but with the
    help of the Navy and DOD leadership and the support of this
    committee, I am confident we will succeed.
        Mr. Chairman, if confirmed as the next CNO, I will give you
    and the magnificent sailors in our Navy my best efforts. You
    rightfully expect it, they absolutely deserve it. I look
    forward to your questions. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Admiral.
        General Jacoby.

     STATEMENT OF LTG CHARLES H. JACOBY, JR., USA, NOMINATED TO BE
     GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND/COMMANDER,
                NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

        General Jacoby. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain,
    distinguished members of the committee: it is a great honor and
    distinct privilege to appear before you today. I'm honored and
    humbled that President Obama has nominated me to be Commander
    of NORTHCOM and NORAD. I thank all of you for this opportunity.
        Thank you, sir, for your kind words about our families.
    Today I'm joined by my wonderful wife, Grace, my faithful
    partner of almost 22 years, who was raised in an Army family
    and originally hails from Puerto Rico. As a retired U.S. Army
    officer, Grace knows and understands the sacrifices of our
    servicemembers and their families, and has worked tirelessly on
    their behalf. She has also raised three great young men. I know
    she'll be prepared to give me a comprehensive after-action
    review at the completion of this hearing. Thank you,
    sweetheart. [Laughter.]
        Chairman Levin. One of the benefits of marriage.
    [Laughter.]
        General Jacoby. Yes, sir. [Laughter.]
        I'm very proud of my three sons. Mike, a middle schooler,
    and Vic, a high schooler, are both at camps today; and our
    eldest, CJ, is a third-year West Point cadet, currently
    completing his summer duties. I'm blessed with a terrific Army
    family. I thank the committee for inviting them here today.
        Mr. Chairman, over the past year, Admiral Sandy Winnefeld
    has led the NORTHCOM and NORAD team with distinction. His
    leadership, vision, and drive will leave a legacy of continuous
    improvement which, if confirmed, I hope to build upon.
        Before fielding your questions, I'd like to emphasize just
    two points. First, as a leader who has devoted much of his
    service life to combatting threats outside of the United
    States, I can think of no greater responsibility now than
    leading our military in defense of the Homeland, while
    providing support to our citizens at the Federal, State, and
    local levels in times of their greatest needs. I view the
    NORTHCOM and NORAD mission simply as a sacred trust.
        Second, in my current role as Director for Strategic Plans
    and Policy on the Joint Staff, I observed no other command and
    certainly no other combatant command in which cooperation with
    and support for partners is more important than with NORTHCOM
    and NORAD. If confirmed, I will reinforce the critical
    importance of a close partnership and teamwork with, first and
    foremost, the National Guard, the Reserve, other combatant
    commanders and Service Chiefs, the Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS), and all other interagency, State, local, and
    nongovernmental partners, as well as our close friends and
    neighbors, Canada, Mexico, and the Bahamas.
        I look forward to working with the members of this
    committee and your superb staffs. Your countless visits to
    support our troops in theater, many of which I personally
    benefited from in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with your
    steadfast commitment to providing for their requirements and
    your unprecedented support for our families, are greatly
    appreciated.
        I look forward to your questions.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General.
        First, some standard questions that we ask of all of our
    nominees. Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
    governing conflicts of interest?
        Admiral Greenert. I will.
        General Jacoby. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Do you agree, when asked, to give your
    personal views even though those views differ from the
    administration in power?
        Admiral Greenert. I do.
        General Jacoby. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
    any actions that appear to assume to outcome of the
    confirmation process?
        Admiral Greenert. No, sir.
        General Jacoby. No, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Will you ensure that your staff complies
    with deadlines established for requested communications,
    including questions for the record, in hearings?
        Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir.
        General Jacoby. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
    and briefers in response to congressional requests?
        General Jacoby. Yes, sir.
        Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
    reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
        General Jacoby. Yes, sir.
        Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
    testify upon request before this committee?
        Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir.
        General Jacoby. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
    including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
    timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
    to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
    faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
        General Jacoby. Yes, sir.
        Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        We'll have a 7-minute round for our first round. Admiral,
    let me start with you. You appeared at a House Armed Services
    Committee hearing earlier this week, I believe, to discuss
    total force readiness and much of the discussion,
    understandably, centered around potential budget reductions. I
    believe that, in an exchange with Mr. Forbes, you pointed out
    that combatant commander requirements already exceed the Navy's
    ability to meet those requirements.
        Can you outline for us what are the greatest risks to the
    Navy if there are large budget reductions forthcoming?
        Admiral Greenert. Mr. Chairman, right now the fleet is
    stressed. We are operating at a tremendous operating tempo and
    we are seeing some indicators of decreasing readiness. So I
    think we're operating at a pretty high rate today and we are at
    a limit.
        If given a large budget reduction that we had to take, when
    I look at the global force management in the future that we
    might have to meet, I can't reconcile that without some change
    to that global force management plan. Our options are limited.
    We can't hollow the force, so the future force has to be ready.
    As I said before, we have to keep the faith and trust our
    sailors. We can't go to our personnel. Our Navy hasn't changed
    much since 2008 in our manning level and our manning plan.
        If we reduce force structure, that would exacerbate the
    problem we already have. If we reduce modernization, that is
    going to the shipbuilding and aircraft accounts, I'm concerned
    about the industrial base.
        So we have a conundrum here and I believe that this needs
    to be a strategic approach to such a large reduction.
        Chairman Levin. Cost increases in our shipbuilding have
    meant that we're spending more and not making much progress in
    building the size of the fleet. The next major shipbuilding
    program over which the Navy has an opportunity to control
    requirements to keep the ship affordable is the Ohio-class
    replacement, the SSBN-X.
        Admiral, are you supportive of the design decisions that
    the Navy has made on the SSBN-X program to constrain costs?
        Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir, I am.
        Chairman Levin. The committee's been concerned, very
    concerned, with the cost growth in the F-35 JSF program. At a
    hearing earlier this year, several members asked: What are the
    alternatives to the F-35 program if it is just unaffordable, we
    just run into new trouble, and we just don't see it working out
    the way we planned and the way it needs to work out?
        Some of the witnesses said we just have no alternative,
    which of course troubles many of us. Admiral, what are the
    options for modernizing tactical aviation facing the Navy and
    the Marine Corps?
        Admiral Greenert. Mr. Chairman, the F-35 provides us a
    fifth generation strike fighter, which is really a measure of
    its stealth, its capability. The F/A-18 Hornet, our primary
    strike fighter right now, is a fourth generation fighter. We
    have no alternative in the Navy and Marine Corps with regard to
    an aircraft that will bring that capability.
        If for some reason we were unable to bring the F-35 in, we
    would have to look at the capabilities, the weapons that we
    could produce and design for the Hornet, a more standoff
    weapon, so that we could get a better output from that.
        Chairman Levin. Admiral, in your written response to the
    advance policy questions you talked about the U.S. accession to
    the Law of the Sea Convention. Can you tell us whether or not
    you believe it's important to our national security to join
    this treaty?
        Admiral Greenert. Mr. Chairman, I believe it is important
    to the national security. The legal certainty and the public
    order that it would bring, our ability to have a dialogue in an
    international forum for issues such as freedom of navigation,
    excessive exclusive economic zone claims, and also our
    continental shelf issues, such as in the Arctic, I think would
    be enhanced greatly by our accession to the Law of the Sea.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        General, the last two flights, as I mentioned, of the GMD
    system failed and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is working
    to understand and fix the problem, including plans to conduct
    two flight tests to verify any fix. Until that happens, MDA has
    suspended production of the interceptor-kill vehicles. Do you
    support the need to take the time necessary to fully understand
    and to fix the problem, to conduct all necessary testing to
    confirm the fix and to demonstrate that the system works?
        General Jacoby. Senator, yes, I do.
        Chairman Levin. General, last year NORAD conducted the
    first annual exercise with Russia, called Vigilant Eagle, in
    which both countries practiced passing control for monitoring
    and escorting a simulated hijacked aircraft into each other's
    air space. Can you tell us whether that exercise was a success
    and whether you believe that these kind of cooperative
    exercises enhance U.S. security, and if so, how?
        General Jacoby. Senator, I believe Vigilant Eagle was a
    success. It is an annual exercise. It is a practical exercise.
    As we saw in this last run-through with the Russian Federation,
    there really was benefit in that transparency that took place
    in the handoff of a hijacked aircraft, that really builds trust
    and confidence in a relationship and contributes to U.S.
    national security interests.
        So with the Russian Federation, of course, we work with our
    eyes wide open. But there are areas of cooperation that are
    mutually beneficial and I think Vigilant Eagle is a perfect
    example of how we can both gain in the security realm by
    cooperating together.
        Chairman Levin. Would that possible cooperation also be or
    might be helpful in the area of missile defense with Russia in
    terms of enhancing our security, particularly against Iranian
    missile threats?
        General Jacoby. Senator, I know there are important
    discussions going on right now in seeking ways to cooperate
    with the Russian Federation on missile defense. I know
    Ambassador Rogozin just recently visited NORTHCOM-NORAD command
    centers. I know that we've been in extensive dialogue with
    them.
        So again, finding places and venues and capabilities where
    we can cooperate with the Russian Federation can contribute not
    just to both nations' mutual security needs, but regional
    security needs as well.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, both.
        Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the
    witnesses again.
        Admiral, I don't know if you had a chance to see the Wall
    Street Journal this morning and other periodicals. The headline
    is ``China Says Carrier Won't Alter Naval Strategy.'' The first
    paragraph says: ``China's defense ministry said its first
    aircraft carrier would be used for research experiments and
    training and would not affect its defensive naval strategy, in
    an apparent attempt to ease regional concerns that the vessel
    could be used to enforce territorial claims.''
        I have never viewed an aircraft carrier as a method to
    employ a defensive strategy. I don't believe that's what
    carriers are intended to. I'm curious of your impression. We've
    known that this aircraft carrier was in the phase of being
    refurbished for a long period of time. What's your view of the
    impact of this very significant move on the part of the
    Chinese?
        Admiral Greenert. Senator, I believe it's clearly a
    prototype for what they ultimately want to have, which is a
    better aircraft carrier, indigenously built and tailored to
    their needs.
        Senator McCain. What do you think of the overall meaning of
    it?
        Admiral Greenert. By virtue of being an aircraft carrier,
    it's typically offensive. It's made to project power.
        Senator McCain. What is your view of the significance as
    far as what you think the Chinese thinking is?
        Admiral Greenert. The Chinese say they built it for
    defensive measures. There's some question as to what their
    intent is. It's hard to gauge their intent. They could use it
    for defensive reasons, but as we just stated, this is a power
    projection.
        Senator McCain. When you look at their statements about the
    South China Sea, about economic zones that are theirs, the near
    conflicts they've had with their neighbors, their assertion
    about the oil resources out in the South China Sea, and their
    new research ship that just reached new depths that exceeded
    that of the United States, doesn't all this put together a
    picture for you?
        Admiral Greenert. It puts together a picture of a navy that
    is interested in expanding its operations to blue water.
        Senator McCain. Thereby extending its influence.
        Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir.
        Senator McCain. Thank you.
        In a House hearing yesterday, in response to a question
    about the possibility of drastic defense budget cuts ranging
    from $400 billion to $1 trillion over the next 10 years, you
    said: ``Without a comprehensive strategy review, a fundamental
    look at what we are asking our forces to do, without a change
    in activity, we won't be able to meet the global force
    management plan today.''
        As Vice Chief, are you taking part in DOD's comprehensive
    strategic review?
        Admiral Greenert. We are not in the major deliberations of
    that. We are providing some data, but we have been told we
    would be part of any final decision process in this
    comprehensive review.
        Senator McCain. How would you view a $400 billion, $600
    billion, $800 billion, or $1 trillion cut in defense over the
    next 10 years? Do you have an assessment of what the impact
    that would be on our most capital-intensive Service?
        Admiral Greenert. Given that size of budget reduction and
    assuming it was apportioned to the Navy in accordance with our
    current ratio, we cannot go hollow, Senator, so we have to
    sustain our current force. Our personnel levels are not an area
    we can go to make further reductions. We've done about the best
    we can with efficiencies. There's some more overhead.
        My concern is the cuts at that level, we'd have to go into
    force structure and modernization, and my concern is about the
    industrial base and our shipbuilding plan.
        Senator McCain. You are already concerned about the
    downward trend in ship maintenance funding and commensurate
    rise in ship inspection failures; is that true?
        Admiral Greenert. I am, yes.
        Senator McCain. It's already a serious problem.
        Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir. We are making some progress,
    but it remains a concern.
        Senator McCain. I won't go into my rant about the F-35 or
    the LCS. I will spare you that. But I am deadly serious about
    the fact that the costs of both of these programs are simply
    unsustainable. I'm not the only one that holds that view. So I
    strongly recommend that you give both the LCS and the JSF your
    serious attention as you assume your new serious
    responsibilities.
        General, give us an assessment of the situation in Mexico
    vis-a-vis the drug cartels. Is the situation improving, is it
    deteriorating, is it the same? Is it an area of concern for
    ranging from American tourists to the threats of increased
    violence along our border?
        General Jacoby. Senator, Mexico and the United States have
    tremendous shared mutual interests, security interests as well
    as other interests, along our border, but specifically with
    regards to countering the transnational criminal threats that
    are shared by both countries. We both share responsibilities to
    counter those threats.
        Senator McCain. I'm curious about your view of the
    seriousness of those threats and whether we are making progress
    or if it's basically stagnant or if it's a standoff between the
    cartels and the Mexican Government. I'd like to have your
    assessment of that.
        General Jacoby. Yes, Senator. It's my understanding that
    progress is being made on both sides of the border. I know the
    Mexican Government and security forces have made courageous
    political, moral, and physical commitments to countering the
    transnational criminal organizations. I know that we have made
    progress. I know there is much more work to do.
        I think recently the President has released an executive
    order declaring a national emergency regarding the threat of
    transnational criminal organizations, highlighting them as an
    unusual and extraordinary threat to the U.S. foreign policy,
    our economy, and our security. I think that that accurately
    describes the seriousness of the threat.
        Senator McCain. The Government Accountability Office has
    recently stated that the border is approximately 44 percent
    under operational control. Would you agree with that
    assessment?
        General Jacoby. Senator, DHS is responsible for those
    assessments. I don't know of any counter to that report in
    terms of percentages under control or not under control. I know
    that it is a long border. I'm sure there is much work to be
    done along the border and at different places.
        So if confirmed, it would be a priority for me to work
    closely with DHS to understand and to see how NORTHCOM could
    support DHS and other agencies in gaining effective control of
    the border.
        Senator McCain. I can tell you one thing and that is the
    use of Predator aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), has
    been extremely effective and helpful. I think you would agree.
        General Jacoby. Yes, Senator, I'd agree. We have found UAVs
    to be a multiplier across the board in all DOD endeavors and
    certainly can assist in law enforcement operations as well.
        Senator McCain. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and for the service
    of your families. The chairman indicated he had a threshold
    level, which is some connection to Michigan. I too have a
    threshold level and you've both passed it. Admiral Greenert
    commanded a submarine and General Jacoby commanded the First
    Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment. So I'll ask a few
    questions, but I think you've already done fine.
        Admiral, both the chairman and Senator McCain have brought
    up the issue of the maintenance issues that are confronting the
    Fleet. Some reports suggest that some destroyers, for example,
    will not reach their 30-year expected life or be able to be
    extended to a 40-year life. With these budget pressures, one of
    your most obvious responses is to keep the ships at sea. So can
    you comment generally in terms of will that be a first
    response? Will that require additional money for maintenance?
    Are you making any progress there? Because, as much as we all
    like to see additional platforms, you very well might have to
    curtail that, which obviously implies keeping the ships at sea
    longer.
        Admiral Greenert. Senator, the foundation of reaching our
    30-year shipbuilding plan and our inventory is to make sure
    that the ships that we have reach their expected service life.
    To do that you have to do the right maintenance at the right
    time. That was something we didn't have right until recently.
    We were in our surface ship maintenance, we would fully fund a
    year's worth of maintenance and still not get the right things
    done in drydocking or otherwise.
        We've made some good progress and the key now is we have to
    schedule it, allow them the time to do the maintenance, so that
    we can ensure ourselves that the ships make their full life.
        Senator Reed. Is part of this recent response turning more
    responsibility over to the Navy and to the crews, rather than
    contractors? Is that part of it, too?
        Admiral Greenert. Senator, that's part of it, because first
    of all, it's good for the crew. It's good for a crew to
    understand their ship, to understand how to operate it, and do
    that maintenance. That's what the commanding officers of the
    ship have said: We need more time to do that maintenance and
    get to know the equipment, and when you operate it right it'll
    last.
        Senator Reed. Admiral, the chairman also mentioned the
    Ohio-class program, which is in the stages of design
    finalization requirements. One of the issues that I've
    addressed with Admiral Roughead is given the pressures on the
    shipbuilding budget, that this, as well designed and as
    efficient as you can build it, is going to be an expensive
    proposition.
        There's been ongoing discussions, because of its strategic
    role, of having some costs shared by DOD, not exclusively the
    Navy. Are those discussions still underway?
        Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir, they are. If confirmed, I
    intend to try to continue those discussions. In the 2020s we
    will have a phenomenon, an unfortunate one, where many of the
    ships built in the 1980s will now come due for retirement.
    That's right when the Ohio replacement comes in. So we'll work
    very hard to make sure we got the requirements right. We'll
    work very hard with the acquisition community to drive that
    cost down.
        But we may, even so, need some assistance in the
    shipbuilding budget if we're going to meet our goals.
        Senator Reed. The British Government has still fully
    committed to buying the Ohio-class ship, which should help,
    perhaps not decisively, but should help in terms of the cost
    allocation; is that correct?
        Admiral Greenert. Yes, Senator. They are all in on the
    missile compartment agreement that we had.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        General Jacoby, and I'll ask the Admiral also to comment,
    one of the most interesting developments in your theater of
    operations is the fact that the Navy predicts by 2020 that the
    Arctic Ocean will be navigable for commercial traffic at least
    1 month a year and perhaps longer, which opens up a whole new
    space that you and the Navy have to operate in.
        Can you comment upon your views as to what we should be
    doing now and what we can anticipate?
        General Jacoby. Yes, Senator. In the most recent unified
    command plan, 2011, NORTHCOM received the responsibility for
    Arctic Ocean areas. It's shared with U.S. European Command
    (EUCOM) as EUCOM picks up country responsibilities on the other
    side. But NORTHCOM is the advocate for the requirements and for
    the capabilities that will be needed as the Arctic becomes
    increasingly open.
        The Secretary has directed that NORTHCOM ensure the
    peaceful and responsible opening of the Arctic, with a special
    emphasis on future transit lanes and potential choke points. I
    think there is also quite a bit of emphasis that this should be
    an international effort and that our efforts in the Arctic
    should strengthen international agreements and a sense of the
    peaceful opening of the Arctic.
        So if confirmed as the NORTHCOM commander, it will again be
    about building relationships and ensuring that, eyes wide open,
    we do the right things in the Arctic as it opens up over time.
        Senator Reed. Admiral, 20 years ago, I don't think the CNO
    was thinking, how do I support a unified commander with ships
    in the Arctic Ocean for the transit of commercial vessels. So
    any thoughts?
        Admiral Greenert. Yes, Senator. I believe we need to think
    about the Arctic as we think about other attributes when we
    bring in new programs. It's going to be a fact of life that we
    may have to operate up there. I'm taken back to when we first
    started operating in the Persian Gulf. That was a unique
    experience. We didn't plan this into our equipment, so we had
    air conditioning issues and other issues with dust, et cetera.
        There are unique challenges in the Arctic and I think it
    needs to become an attribute when we consider requirements. We
    also need to consider it in our concept of operations (CONOPS)
    when we talk about what a ship needs to be able to do. Chem-bio
    and those kind of things; cold weather is another thing and it
    needs to be built into the CONOPS.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, sir.
        General Jacoby, you have significant responsibilities with
    respect to National Guard and Reserve. There is an ongoing and
    very healthy debate about whether these units' primary
    responsibility should be for DOD missions or for homeland
    security missions, given the fact that they are State militias
    as well as federalized forces that deploy constantly on the
    orders of the President of the United States.
        Can you give us an idea of where you are in terms of that
    debate?
        General Jacoby. Yes, Senator. I think the verdict is in.
    They're important for both. They're integral to both. As the
    Commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq and deputy in
    Afghanistan, we could not have accomplished our mission without
    the effective, properly trained, equipped, and manned Reserve
    component forces, primarily National Guard, that we fought
    side-by-side with over the last 10 years.
        So as we look at the challenges in the future and balancing
    our requirements against resources, the National Guard and the
    Reserves become even more important in our calculus.
        Just as well in the Homeland, Senator. They're absolutely
    essential. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and just good
    common sense have driven us to look to the Guard for more of a
    role in things like chemical, biological, radiological, and
    nuclear consequence management. I think that is the proper
    place for that to grow, and of course as the NORTHCOM
    Commander, if confirmed, one of the things that I'll advocate
    strongly for are the resources that the Guard and Reserve need
    to accomplish those missions, and I look forward to that
    opportunity.
        Senator Reed. Thank you both, gentlemen, for your service.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Reed.
        Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral, I enjoyed having the opportunity to participate
    with you last week as we honored the outstanding
    servicemembers. Although you are not from the State of Maine,
    and don't have the ties that you do to the home States of other
    members, I'm confident that, based on our discussion, that you
    fully understand the critical role that the great State of
    Maine plays for our Navy, with Bath Iron Works and also the
    Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and a Survival, Evasion, Resistance,
    and Escape training facility as well. I look forward to having
    you come to Maine to see all of those firsthand.
        I want to follow up on the questions that the chairman and
    the ranking member asked you about shipbuilding and your
    testimony earlier this week. You testified that the Navy would
    need approximately 400 ships to meet all of the combatant
    commanders' demands, a number which is 115 ships more than are
    in our Fleet today. So that is of great concern to me.
        Could you be more specific on what are the unmet
    requirements of the combatant commanders as they relate to Navy
    ships?
        Admiral Greenert. Senator, in my statement I was referring
    to an unconstrained combatant commander input, which is what we
    get in DOD as part of the process. For those that aren't
    validated, if you will, by the Joint Staff and make the global
    force management plan, they tend to be theater security
    cooperation activity in theaters outside of U.S. Pacific
    Command and CENTCOM. Those tend to be our centers of operations
    for the global force management plan.
        These are important operations. They help preclude
    conflict. They help build partnership capacity. But,
    regrettably, in our force structure limitations we can't meet
    some of those.
        Senator Collins. Among those is there a significant gap,
    for example, in ballistic missile defense (BMD), anti-piracy
    efforts? Are those some of the unmet needs of the combatant
    commanders?
        Admiral Greenert. BMD is a limit, Senator, but it is really
    based on the amount of force structure, writ large, we have. It
    isn't as if we have a destroyer that would be available for BMD
    and we don't provide. We provide the combatant commanders all
    those that are capable today.
        Counter-piracy, we do as much as we can in counter-piracy
    operations, particularly in the CENTCOM and the U.S. African
    Command areas of responsibility.
        Senator Collins. General, the Senate Homeland Security and
    Governmental Affairs Committee, on which I am the ranking
    member and former chairman, did an in-depth investigation into
    the failed response to Hurricane Katrina. One of our
    astonishing findings was that NORTHCOM had so little
    situational awareness about what was going on in Louisiana and
    Mississippi.
        I know that there has been considerable progress made since
    that time. Military support to civil authorities during a major
    disaster relief is absolutely critical to effective response
    and recovery, as I'm sure you're aware. What are your goals for
    strengthening the cooperation between NORTHCOM and the Federal
    Emergency Management Agency, the State National Guard units,
    and the State emergency managers? Specifically, will you
    continue the program to train dual-status commanders?
        General Jacoby. Senator, I think you've nailed it right on
    the head in terms of situational awareness. That's been my
    personal experience in large-scale disasters. It's really a
    challenge to know exactly what's happening to you and to gain
    that. I think under Admiral Winnefeld's leadership it's my
    understanding that great strides have been made in improving
    its ability to see and understand what the requirements are,
    and more importantly, to anticipate those requirements. That's
    another part of the question you asked. I think it's about
    building strong, cooperative partnerships and effective
    relationships prior to an incident, so you're not exchanging
    business cards after the hurricane strikes; you're doing it
    beforehand.
        That comes down to trust and confidence, and trust and
    confidence have been built by Admiral Winnefeld in a way that I
    think is unprecedented. Reflecting that is the initiative by
    the Council of Governors on dual-status commanders. I think
    it's a tremendous and overdue initiative. It's something that's
    been tried and worked before in special, national special
    security events, and I think that it will serve us well in
    times of disasters in the future. If confirmed, I will continue
    to put energy and power behind the back wheels of that program
    as best I can, supporting State and local authorities.
        Senator Collins. Thank you. I look forward to working with
    you to advance that goal.
        Admiral, I want to talk further with you about
    shipbuilding. Admiral Roughead said many times that he
    considered 313 ships to be the absolute minimum that is really
    needed for the Fleet. There are other studies, such as the QDR
    and the independent, bipartisan Perry-Hadley panel, that
    suggest that the number really should be in the neighborhood of
    346 ships.
        What is your judgment on the minimum number of ships that,
    unconstrained by budget, we should have in our Fleet?
        Admiral Greenert. Senator, I believe that the 313-ship
    floor remains the right number to deliver the capability needed
    to meet the challenges in the 2020 timeframe.
        Senator Collins. Finally, and my time has expired, one way
    that we can reduce the cost per ship is to increase the rate of
    procurement. We've seen that in the past with the DDG-51
    program. In fact, at one point when DDG-51 contracts were being
    awarded, at a rate of three per year, it saved nearly $800
    million.
        Do you have any thoughts on whether we would be able to
    increase the procurement rate and thus lower the cost per ship?
        Admiral Greenert. Senator, at every opportunity we will
    pursue multi-year procurement of a DDG-51. As you said, it's an
    efficient way. You get economic order quantity. It's good for
    the builder, it's good for the Navy. As we balance resources
    across the shipbuilding portfolio and all accounts, we'll be
    looking for that opportunity.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Collins.
        Senator Udall.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for being here.
        Admiral, I look forward to working with you. Colorado is
    landlocked, but there are certainly important developments in
    the world that will be under your purview. I note that a book
    titled ``Monsoon,'' which I think you've probably seen--and
    General Jacoby talked about this the other day--presents a
    fascinating way, an insightful way, of looking at the Indian
    Ocean and that part of the world, in which we're very involved.
    I look forward to carrying on those conversations with you.
    Thanks for your willingness to serve.
        If I might, I'd like to turn to General Jacoby and talk
    about NORTHCOM. We have been well-served by your predecessors,
    General. We had a chance to talk about their accomplishments
    and successes the other day. Thank you for taking the time to
    come by and see me.
        Would you just touch on your top priorities and concerns as
    you begin to take a look at the command you're going to assume
    here in the near future?
        General Jacoby. Senator, as I look across the portfolio of
    the NORTHCOM Commander, it really consists of three groupings:
    defense support for civil authorities in case of natural and
    manmade disasters; defense of the Homeland; and security
    cooperation with our neighbors. In all of those mission areas,
    complex relationships are the key to effectiveness,
    particularly in support to civil authorities and defense of the
    Homeland.
        There are many stakeholders in the comprehensive defense of
    the Homeland and support to civil authorities. So without
    delving immediately into a set of things to do, it's my
    understanding and as I've watched Admiral Winnefeld command so
    effectively, it's really building trust and confidence in those
    relationships, building effective partnerships, ahead of the
    problem, that will allow NORTHCOM to play its critical
    supporting role in most of those activities.
        Of course, the defense of the Homeland is the
    responsibility of the NORTHCOM Commander. But so much of the
    rest of the mission set folds into that and supports that
    mission that really, I think, getting down to business means
    rolling up your sleeves and paying attention to the critical
    partners that are required to really effectively support and
    defend our people and its interests.
        Senator Udall. Let me build on those comments, as well as
    those of Senator Collins. You talk about creating those
    relationships beforehand. We talked about the dual-status
    command opportunity and Senator Collins just brought it up as
    well. I just want to underline my support for working with the
    Guard, particularly those Guard leaders, the State adjutants
    general (TAG), who know their home States, who know those
    relationships in the civil and the military world.
        I just really encourage you to move in every way possible
    to firm that up and take advantage of those relationships. I
    know that's your intention, but I want to work with you and
    really make that happen.
        General Jacoby. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Udall. If I could, let me turn to cyber. Would you
    share your thoughts on where we are, and talk a bit about the
    discussion we're having about kinetic and nonkinetic responses;
    how do you determine which is most appropriate? I'd appreciate
    it.
        General Jacoby. Senator, like members of this committee and
    senior leaders across the military, we are recognizing the
    cyber domain as being critical to our national security. Within
    the realm of DOD, we rely heavily on the cyber domain for
    something as significant and fundamental as command and
    control, but also for all the supporting infrastructure that
    makes DOD run and supportive of our national security
    interests.
        So it is an absolute requirement that we become effective
    in that domain and that we have the right strategies, the right
    policies, and the right authorities to conduct the full range
    of activities required in the cyber domain for now and in the
    future.
        For NORTHCOM specifically, the NORTHCOM responsibilities
    lie primarily in the physical domain. The technical side is
    really a comprehensive issue that involves the lead with DHS,
    but a very close partnership with the U.S. Cyber Command and
    U.S. Strategic Command. NORTHCOM's role will be to not only
    protect critical physical infrastructure outside DOD, if
    requested by local and State authorities, but also DOD
    facilities as well.
        Then in the event of an incident that would certainly have
    some kind of physical consequences, NORTHCOM would then go into
    its mode as a supporting element of providing DOD resources in
    support of civil authorities that are dealing with the
    consequences of such an incident. I think that all of us can
    imagine pretty significant consequences as a result of a
    deliberate cyber attack.
        Senator Udall. I think we have more work to do on the
    civilian side with the vulnerabilities, but also strengths.
    Again, I look forward to working with you in that regard.
        Admiral, I want to turn to China. I'm sure you're familiar
    with the piece that Admiral Mullen penned recently. I thought
    he had some interesting insights into how we interact with
    China. I'm somebody who thinks we ought to communicate,
    collaborate, and compete with China. We ought to be careful,
    though, about getting ourselves into conflicts with China that
    involve the use of force.
        Would you share any of your thoughts on that relationship?
    Then in particular, a piece of good news is what we're doing in
    the Gulf of Aden. Sino-American efforts there to counter piracy
    I think maybe present a model that we might move forward.
        Admiral Greenert. Senator, I think Admiral Mullen had it
    pretty much exactly right. We need to continue the dialogue.
    It's a long, grinding affair, but in my experience in the
    Pacific, especially at Seventh Fleet, I found that we can make
    some headway. We can't be naive.
        What I found was, especially in special mission ships
    operating in and around China, an understanding of a
    proportional response. I think we have an opportunity with the
    desire of both nations for a peaceful resolution of the Korean
    Peninsula. I think we should leverage that. You've already
    mentioned the piracy. So there's a few areas that I think we
    can leverage and continue on. But we can't be naive. We have to
    be clear and deliberate.
        Senator Udall. Well put.
        Thanks again for your service. I look forward,
    particularly, General, to having you out in Colorado with your
    great wife. So looking forward to it. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
        Senator Brown.
        Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral, what's the current strike fighter shortfall?
        Admiral Greenert. The predicted current strike fighter
    shortfall for the Navy will be 65.
        Senator Brown. Is it your opinion that the Navy needs 28
    Super Hornets in fiscal year 2012 to alleviate that shortfall?
        Admiral Greenert. With the 28 Hornets in 2011, that would
    be the shortfall, Senator.
        Senator Brown. So the cost of a Super Hornet is about $54
    million and, just to kind of pick up a little bit on what
    Senator McCain didn't want to talk about, the JSF right now is
    about $132.8 million. Do you think that the Super Hornet and
    getting those would be the plan B, the safe hedge against
    further slips in growth costs of the F-35 JSF for your
    purposes?
        Admiral Greenert. Senator, that would get us a temporary
    measure for the strike fighter shortfall. But I go back to the
    requirement for fifth generation. Eventually we need to move
    ahead in capability to the fifth generation, that stealth, that
    ability to deliver the range and the weapon capacity.
        Senator Brown. First of all, congratulations to both of you
    for, obviously, having this opportunity, and I look forward to
    voting, as well as probably everybody up here, for your
    confirmation.
        General, what sort of relationship will you have with the
    Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) in terms of
    coordination between NORTHCOM and NGB? Are there any
    improvements that you think we can make?
        General Jacoby. Senator, if confirmed, it will be a top
    priority to develop a relationship, an effective and a strong
    trusting relationship with NGB. I've watched General McKinley
    with great respect over the last year. He provides invaluable
    assistance and advice to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the
    NORTHCOM Commander. I've watched the current NORTHCOM
    Commander, Admiral Winnefeld, forge those bonds, develop those
    relationships that allowed them to make these bold initiatives
    like the dual-status command opportunity.
        So if confirmed, I'll commit to you that I will continue to
    develop those relationships and have that strong, trusting
    working partnership that's required for support to the States
    and the civil authorities and for the defense of the Homeland.
        Senator Brown. In your view, how and when will dual-status
    commanders be utilized?
        General Jacoby. Senator, in the past we've proven the
    concept. Dual-status commanders have worked effectively in
    support of national special security events. So this leap
    forward is saying, why do we need 6 months to put in place a
    dual-status commander? Why can't we do that in advance?
        So the training program, the designation in advance of
    dual-status commanders, and the marrying up of dual-status
    commanders with a deputy from the other authority, I think
    those are tremendous initiatives that need to carry forward,
    and I think that can be used across a broad spectrum of support
    to civil authorities in response to incidents around the
    country. It makes a lot of sense. It's about unity of effort.
        Senator Brown. When you're dealing with the Mexican-U.S.
    border, and the use of guardsmen, some of the concerns are the
    fact that they don't have the ability to actually defend
    themselves, like we would in a war situation. I would argue
    that what's happening down there is pretty darn close to being
    a war, a war on drugs, and a form of terror.
        What's your position as to giving them the authority to
    protect themselves when it comes to life and death?
        General Jacoby. Senator, I'm not familiar with the exact
    rules of engagement or the arrangements that have been made for
    the guardsmen that are serving in a terrific manner along our
    southwest border. I know that the States have requested that
    and have implemented that program, and the Guard's mobilized
    very effectively to support it.
        I also know that DHS is training agents to eventually
    replace those guardsmen. I would say that, as just a matter of
    professional opinion, any time we put a soldier, sailor, or
    marine in harm's way, we need to make arrangements for their
    personal security.
        Senator Brown. Thank you, sir.
        Admiral, just getting back to you, you said you predict
    that there's a 68-strike fighter shortfall. Why is that a
    prediction?
        Admiral Greenert. It's when we take into account the number
    of hours on an airframe that we have today, hours flying by
    tail number, and look at operations and extrapolate it out.
        Senator Brown. The usual that we've talked about.
        Admiral Greenert. It's the throughput, yes, sir.
        Senator Brown. One final question. The Navy's business case
    analysis of its dual LCS award strategy indicated that it can
    demonstrate overall cost savings of around $1 billion. Is that
    still accurate?
        Admiral Greenert. Senator, I would like to take a look at
    those numbers and get back to you on the precise number.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Yes, the cost savings generated by the Littoral Combat Ship award
    of the dual block buy included savings of approximately $1 billion
    (Then Year) which is directly attributable to the dual award versus the
    original down select strategy. This number is still an accurate
    representation of the savings. This strategy is assessed to achieve
    overall procurement savings of $2.9 billion when compared to the
    Department's fiscal year 2011 President's budget Future Years Defense
    Program through fiscal year 2016 for 20 Littoral Combat Ships.

        Senator Brown. Great. Thank you, sirs.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Brown.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Congratulations to both of you. We appreciate your service
    and value that tremendously. We have a magnificent military and
    as we go through the financial challenges that we all face we
    want to be sure that we keep the most magnificent military in
    the world, and I trust that you will help us achieve that, and
    also cost savings wherever they can be achieved.
        General Jacoby, as NORTHCOM Commander, you will be the
    person to pull the trigger if we were to have an incoming
    missile attack. You have the GMD system and other systems that
    are on the drawing boards. I am a strong believer that the GMD
    system we have presently will work to protect the country. I do
    believe that we need to enhance its kill vehicle to be more
    sophisticated, and that's being worked on, although we did have
    a defect in that in a test failure, which will mean we'll have
    to take a little longer and cost more money to work that out.
        My first question to you is: Will you tell us and commit to
    us that you'll master that program and will keep us advised on
    any shortfalls or problems that occur and will work to ensure
    that we properly spend the money to deploy the system that
    we've invested substantially in over several decades?
        General Jacoby. Senator, yes, I will.
        Senator Sessions. Will you give us your best military
    judgment when asked about that?
        General Jacoby. Senator, if confirmed as the commander
    responsible and accountable, I will.
        Senator Sessions. You've had some experience with the
    National Guard and you told me yesterday your respect for that
    institution. Would you share with us your understanding of the
    partnership between Active Duty and the Guard and how that can
    benefit the Nation?
        General Jacoby. Yes, Senator, I will. It's been my
    privilege to serve side-by-side with guardsmen from my days as
    a second lieutenant out in the woods at Fort A.P. Hill, VA, on
    annual training, right up until last year in command of Multi-
    National Corps-Iraq, where tens of thousands of guardsmen
    served side-by-side with Active Forces in the accomplishment of
    a single mission.
        It's also been my privilege to serve with guardsmen around
    the world in support of humanitarian assistance and disaster
    relief, particularly in Central America and South America. So I
    have an abiding respect and admiration for the Guard. They
    bring special talents to every endeavor and they make special
    and unique sacrifices, as do their families, when we call upon
    them, both in their home States and abroad, to serve the
    Nation.
        So I believe that this is all about working together. I
    think it's about taking advantage of unique skills and
    opportunities. I believe it's about responding locally first
    and then piling on as required. So there is a very special
    supporting role that NORTHCOM can provide State Governors and
    TAGs, and I think that in order to be the most effective in
    doing that you have to have that relationship with the Guard.
        I think exercising, training, and fighting together, those
    are the keys to building those relationships and bonds that you
    can't break.
        Senator Sessions. I agree. I know you'll be working with
    the 167th Theater Support Command out of Alabama, and I know
    they look forward to that, and I hope and believe you'll have a
    positive relationship.
        Admiral Greenert, we're at 285 ships in the Navy today. The
    requirement is for 313. The CNO previously called that a floor
    for the Navy. We'll have to work hard to get there. I believe
    that is a reasonable amount for the Navy and hope that we can
    be able to support you maintaining that.
        I know you were asked earlier about the LCS. They're just
    beginning to be produced and the plan calls for 55 of those to
    be a part of that Fleet. I understand the personnel required to
    man the ship is only about 40. How do you see that in terms of
    being able to help us achieve the Fleet size we need with a
    cost improvement as compared to conventional ships that we now
    have in service?
        Admiral Greenert. Senator, I had the pleasure of spending
    an overnight on the Freedom and I went from stem to stern on
    the Independence, and I am very impressed with the potential
    that those ships will bring. They have speed, volume, agility,
    and the ability to adapt. They are coveted by Special Forces.
    The Marine Corps wants to get involved as we are putting
    together packages.
        So with the mission modules, with anti-submarine warfare,
    with mine warfare, and surface warfare mission modules, the LCS
    will be a key and essential part of our future fleet. We just
    have to bring them in on time, budget, and schedule.
        Senator Sessions. Compared to the other ships that would be
    most comparable to it, they would be a lot more expensive and
    require a lot more personnel to operate, do they not?
        Admiral Greenert. That would be correct, yes, sir. The
    closest thing that I know of to the LCS is the National
    Security Cutter. It has a different mission, but nonetheless
    costs a little bit more, the cutter, and its crew is larger
    than the LCS.
        Senator Sessions. The DDG-1000 or -51s, some of their
    missions could be reduced, and they're substantially more
    expensive and have much larger crews; is that not correct?
        Admiral Greenert. That's correct.
        Senator Sessions. I think this is a smart Navy move. I
    remember when Admiral Clarke proposed it, and it came up when I
    was chairman of the Seapower Subcommittee. I thought it was a
    good step in the right direction. I will acknowledge that some
    of those ships now will be built in Alabama, so I'm watching it
    closely. But I do believe it was a good idea then as a cost-
    cutting, flexible, more mobile Navy capability with much varied
    capabilities.
        With regard to the corrosion matter that I think Senator
    McCain asked you about, I've looked into that. I don't know if
    you've had a chance to. I've talked to DOD people. It does
    appear that they checked them from stem to stern for corrosion
    and other problems. They found a bit of corrosion.
        For any ship that's in the oceans, corrosion is always a
    problem, is it not? Do you believe that when launching a ship,
    you wouldn't be surprised to see some corrosion problem appear;
    is that correct?
        Admiral Greenert. It has happened in the past. It is not a
    new problem, corrosion. As you said, with the turbulence of the
    water, any metal in sea water, you have that threat of
    corrosion.
        Senator Sessions. We've looked and talked with DOD
    officials and, while it may be this ship that's in the water
    may cost $1, $2, $3 million to fix that problem, once it's been
    identified there are techniques that can be employed for the
    new ships ongoing that would avoid that problem at a much, much
    more modest cost; is that correct?
        Admiral Greenert. That's correct, Senator.
        Senator Sessions. I just feel that you have a good ship
    there. I appreciate Senator McCain because he's going to be on
    top of it, and we should be on all our procurements. Your feet
    will be held to the fire. The contractors and the Navy will be
    held to the fire. But I don't think that this is a huge
    problem. It does not jeopardize the program financially or
    technologically, and I do believe that the LCS will be cheaper
    to operate and be a step forward for the Navy as we strive to
    create the 300-plus-ship Navy that we'd like to have.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions.
        Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General and Admiral, for your extraordinary,
    very distinguished service to our country, and thank you for
    your willingness to serve in the future. I apologize that I
    missed some of your testimony because of my appearing at other
    committee hearings. But I think I was here for probably some of
    the most important part, where you thanked your families, and I
    want to join in thanking them and recognizing their service to
    our country as well.
        In that spirit, Admiral, let me ask you my first question,
    which really centers on family support. I noted in your
    testimony your very important reference to the need for
    ``adequate oversight and sufficient funding'' for these
    programs. You say that you ``remain open to initiatives
    designed to further evolve existing programs and look for
    innovative ways to help our sailors and families become more
    resilient and ready to meet the enduring demand for Navy
    forces.''
        In that spirit, I would like to suggest perhaps to both of
    you that there really is a need for more family support,
    particularly in the employment area, where spouses are
    concerned, and where professional credentialing requirements
    are imposed that may limit employment for members of families
    at those bases where they move frequently, as you know much,
    much better than I, and career options are frequently blocked
    for frequently relocating military spouses.
        I'm sure you're familiar with this problem and I don't need
    to belabor it for you. But to the extent that we can help on
    this committee with that issue, certainly I would like to do
    so. One means of doing so might be to have an individual at
    bases responsible for those credentialing or professional
    licensing issues.
        But beyond that, perhaps, Admiral, you could speak to the
    issue of how family support more specifically can be provided
    to our Navy and perhaps the Navy as a model for the other
    Services.
        Admiral Greenert. Senator, I appreciate your offer of
    support. We have a Department-wide, joint effort in
    credentialing of spouse skills. We have, I believe, eight
    States where we have gone straight to the governments and the
    Governor in the case of the chairman, to form a coalition who
    will agree to accept the credentialing of our military spouses.
        We're working very vigorously on this and will be very
    vigilant. It's a joint effort and we're really mimicking the
    Army method and model to do that.
        I believe that family programs are the foundation for the
    support of the family, and without a strong family the sailor
    can't do what he or she needs to do. I'm committed, if I am
    confirmed, to ensure those programs are properly programmed and
    budgeted and that they execute properly and we share best
    practices.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        General, if you could address that same question I'd
    appreciate it.
        General Jacoby. Senator, I really thank you and the
    committee for taking this on. We are really finding that we've
    been testing the All-Volunteer Services here over the last 10
    years, and we're discovering their strengths and we're
    discovering things that we can continuously do better.
        One of the things that we've discovered is how critical
    families are. When we ask soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
    and our civilians to deploy over and over and over again in
    support of our national security interests, we're also asking
    their families to make tough commitments.
        I'm especially grateful for your consideration of the
    challenges that come from moving, and particularly true for the
    young families that are moving and young spouses that are
    seeking employment, and oftentimes that employment is central
    to running the household. So those initiatives are very, very
    important. I applaud the efforts and I thank all that are
    moving those family programs into the base, and I can tell you
    as a recipient and as a commander across my experience here
    during the last 10 years of conflict we have gotten better and
    better with the help of Congress.
        So thank you, sir.
        Senator Blumenthal. Another area where I found your written
    testimony very compelling was on the issue of better treatment
    for our wounded warriors, particularly those suffering from the
    less visible wounds of war, traumatic brain injury (TBI), and
    post-traumatic stress. If you could expound perhaps on some of
    the specifics, where I know that both the Navy and the Army are
    seeking to address those issues, which are not new to this
    conflict, but perhaps newly discovered in their importance and
    their priority.
        Admiral Greenert. Senator, I think we've made some strides.
    We need to continue to pursue the ability of our medical people
    to detect the potential for TBI in the field. If somebody gets
    bonked or has what might be perceived as a concussion, to be
    able to detect that and to document it and get that person off
    line and recognize it.
        Following up at the completion of a tour of duty, to be
    sure there are people who may suffer from post-traumatic
    stress, that we do the proper post-deployment health
    assessment; and particularly for our reservists, that those
    that feel different, they may have an issue, that we keep them
    on active duty, take care of them, do psychological outreach. I
    think that's a program that has done us well.
        Post-deployment returning warrior weekends, people get
    together, talk about how they feel, what's going on, they get
    great referrals there.
        Lastly, for the Navy we have what we call Navy Safe Harbor.
    When an individual is wounded, ill, or injured, combat or
    otherwise, they enter the Navy Safe Harbor. They're a member of
    Navy Safe Harbor until they choose to leave, go back to full
    duty, and voluntarily leave Safe Harbor, or they transition to
    a new lifestyle out of military service and their disability
    evaluation system is complete.
        Senator Blumenthal. My time has unfortunately expired and I
    may be one of the last of your questioners today. But again, I
    want to thank you for your service. I want to particularly
    support your observation, Admiral, in your written testimony,
    that ``An attack submarine force level below 48 will increase
    the risk of gaps in our coverage for indications and warnings
    of potential hostile actions, delay or reduce the arrival of
    submarines critical to the war fight, and potentially allow an
    adversary to create and maintain a safe haven.''
        I think that is a very powerful and eloquent statement in
    support of the kind of submarine force that we need. Again, I
    offer my strong support.
        So thank you for being here and thank you for your service,
    and I look forward to working with you. I have no doubt that
    you'll both be confirmed.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal.
        I just have a few questions for the second round and then
    if any other Senator wants to add to that they should come by.
        General, I've asked the Admiral about the question of
    whether the United States should join the Law of the Sea
    Convention. NORTHCOM is going to have new responsibilities for
    the Arctic. Can you tell us what your views are about whether
    the United States should join the Law of the Sea Convention?
        General Jacoby. Senator, I believe we should.
        Chairman Levin. Can you tell us why?
        General Jacoby. Senator, I think that when we look at the
    global commons in all of its domains, particularly at sea, it's
    important that the commons are disciplined, that there are
    international standards, and that those standards are agreed to
    across the international community. It's hard to sit at the
    table with any moral authority or standing when you're not a
    member of that treaty.
        It's my understanding as well that we had significant input
    in the design of it, and so I think our friends, allies,
    neighbors, and the rest of the community that travels the
    global commons would benefit from our ability to influence
    outcomes by being a member.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        You've been asked, General, about the cyber security issues
    and the growing threats of cyber attacks and the growing number
    of cyber attacks. You indicated in your prehearing questions
    that DHS is the lead Federal agency for the cyber security of
    the Nation and that NORTHCOM would operate in support of DHS.
        Can you expand just a bit on that? What is the
    relationship, if any, between the NORTHCOM mission to protect
    critical infrastructure and its cyber security mitigation role?
        General Jacoby. Senator, NORTHCOM would play a supporting
    role in mitigating consequences of a cyber attack. To that end,
    close coordination with DHS is a requirement.
        Where we have critical infrastructure associated with cyber
    elements on DOD property, then NORTHCOM would play a critical
    lead role in defending that or protecting that, with the
    Services, in protecting that infrastructure. Then, upon
    request, if there are Federal properties that require
    additional assistance in their protection, NORTHCOM would play
    a supporting role.
        But across a wide variety of potential impacts on our
    critical infrastructure, NORTHCOM could be called on to provide
    support to civil authorities in mitigating the results of a
    cyber attack. I think when you pull the thread on what could
    happen if there was a significant cyber attack on our
    electrical grid or other types of infrastructure that has not
    just maybe local, but regional implications, then you can see
    where a response of some significance might be required.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        We want to thank you both again and your families for your
    service. We're going to hope to get these nominations and other
    pending nominations acted on by the committee yet this week.
    That's our goal, and then to get you and the others confirmed
    next week, if not late this week. That's our hope and, even
    though there are some wild things going on in Congress these
    days, these nominations I think will not only be confirmed, but
    will, when people do realize the importance of these
    nominations and coming together on a bipartisan basis in
    support of our military efforts and our military families and
    people who wear our uniforms, these nominations are going to
    have a settling effort on the environment here in Congress.
        So that's our goal, and I will close with that optimistic
    note, and again with thanks to both of you.
        [Whereupon, at 11:07 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

        [Prepared questions submitted to ADM Jonathan W. Greenert,
    USN, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
    supplied follow:]
                            Questions and Responses
                                defense reforms
        Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
    Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
    strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
    enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
    of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
    commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    (CJCS). They have also clarified the responsibility of the military
    departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for
    assignment to the combatant commanders.
        Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
    provisions?
        Answer. Goldwater-Nichols has served us well, but in the past 20
    years the security environment has changed significantly and a review
    is worthy of consideration.
        Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
    address in these modifications?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of
    Defense and Secretary of the Navy if I see need for specific
    improvement.
                                 relationships
        Question. Section 5033 of title 10, U.S.C., discusses the
    responsibilities and authority of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).
    Section 151 of title 10, U.S.C., discusses the composition and
    functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), including the authority
    of the CNO, as a member of the JCS, to submit advice and opinions to
    the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of
    Defense. Other sections of law and traditional practice, also establish
    important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe
    your understanding of the relationship of the CNO to the following
    offices:
        Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. The Secretary of Defense is the principal assistant to the
    President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense (DOD).
    As a Service Chief and member of the JCS, the CNO is a military adviser
    to the Secretary of Defense, particularly regarding matters of naval
    warfare, policy, and strategy.
        Question. Deputy Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, on occasion, serves as
    acting Secretary in the absence of the Secretary. During these periods,
    the CNO's relationship with the Deputy Secretary will essentially be
    the same as with the Secretary. The Deputy Secretary is also
    responsible for the day-to-day operation of DOD. If confirmed, I will
    endeavor to interact regularly with him and provide him with my best
    possible professional military advice and the same level of support as
    I would the Secretary.
        Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
        Answer. Under current DOD Directives, Under Secretaries of Defense
    coordinate and exchange information with DOD components, to include the
    Services, in the functional areas under their cognizance. If confirmed
    as CNO, I will respond and reciprocate. If confirmed, I will use this
    exchange of information as I communicate with the CJCS and provide
    military advice to the Secretary of Defense.
        Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        Answer. The CNO is a member of the JCS and, as such, works with and
    through the Chairman in the execution of duties. Along with the other
    Service Chiefs, I will be a member of the JCS tasked with the
    responsibility for actively reviewing and evaluating military matters
    and offering professional military advice to the President, National
    Security Council, and Secretary of Defense.
        Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        Answer. When functioning as the acting Chairman, the Vice
    Chairman's relationship with combatant commanders is that of the
    Chairman. Also, the Vice Chairman has the same rights and obligations
    as other members of the JCS. If confirmed, I would exchange views with
    the Vice Chairman on any defense matter considered by the JCS. The Vice
    Chairman also heads or has a key role on many boards that affect
    readiness and programs and, therefore, the preparedness of naval
    forces. If confirmed, I will establish a close relationship with the
    Vice Chairman on these critical issues.
        Question. The Secretary of the Navy.
        Answer. The CNO is responsible, under the Secretary of the Navy
    (SECNAV), for providing properly organized, trained, and equipped
    forces to support combatant commanders in the accomplishment of their
    missions. In addition, the CNO assists the SECNAV in the development of
    plans and recommendations for the operation of the Department of the
    Navy. The Navy enjoys a productive, collaborative environment within
    the Department, and if confirmed, I will work closely with the SECNAV.
        Question. The Under Secretary of the Navy.
        Answer. The Under Secretary of the Navy is the principal assistant
    to the SECNAV and is first in line of succession. The Under Secretary
    performs such duties, and exercise such powers, as the Secretary shall
    direct. If confirmed, I look forward to establishing a close
    relationship with the Under Secretary and to working with him to
    achieve the Secretary's goals.
        Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Navy.
        Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of the Navy work with the Under
    Secretary to achieve the Secretary's goals. Like the Under Secretary,
    the Assistant Secretaries perform such duties, and exercise such
    powers, as the Secretary shall direct. If confirmed, I will work with
    the Assistant Secretaries to achieve the Secretary's goals.
        Question. The General Counsel of the Navy.
        Answer. The General Counsel of the Navy serves as legal advisor to
    the Department of the Navy and performs such functions as the SECNAV
    shall direct and as necessary to provide for the proper application of
    the law and effective delivery of legal services within the Department.
    If confirmed, I will work closely with the General Counsel to achieve
    the Secretary's goals.
        Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy.
        Answer. Under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 5148(d), the Judge Advocate General
    (JAG) of the Navy performs duties relating to any and all Department of
    Navy legal matters assigned to him by SECNAV. The JAG provides and
    supervises the provision of all legal advice and related services
    throughout the Department of the Navy, except for the advice and
    services provided by the General Counsel. It is important that the CNO
    receive independent legal advice from his senior uniformed judge
    advocates. If confirmed, I will work closely with the JAG and seek the
    JAG's legal advice.
        Question. The Commandant of the Marine Corps.
        Answer. A unique historical and operational relationship exists
    between the Navy and the Marine Corps. Many of our capabilities,
    programs, and personnel issues are inextricably linked. Our forces
    deploy together, and both must be ready on arrival. If confirmed as
    CNO, my relationship with the Commandant of the Marine Corps must be
    exceptionally close and I will be committed to making every facet of
    the Navy-Marine Corps team stronger.
        Question. The Chief of the Navy Reserve.
        Answer. Under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 5143, the Chief of the Navy Reserve
    serves on the staff of the CNO and is the principal adviser on Navy
    Reserve matters to the CNO and is the commander of the Navy Reserve
    Force. The Chief of the Navy Reserve has an essential role in advising
    CNO of Navy Reserve capabilities alignment to Navy's Total Force
    mission and operations. If confirmed, I am committed to working with
    the Chief of the Navy Reserve to continue and enhance the vast progress
    and Total Force synergies we have achieved.
        Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force.
        Answer. Our Armed Forces must work together to recognize each
    other's strengths and to complement each other's capabilities. We must
    achieve and maintain synergy in warfare, training, and procurement to
    ensure each Service contributes optimally to joint and combined
    operations. If confirmed, I am committed to working with my
    counterparts to enhance joint interoperability and other aspects of the
    joint relationship in order to improve the warfighting capabilities of
    the United States.
        Question. The combatant commanders.
        The CNO's responsibility as a Service Chief is to provide properly
    organized, trained, and equipped forces to the combatant commanders to
    accomplish their military missions. If confirmed, I will work to foster
    close working relationships with the unified and specified combatant
    commanders.
                                major challenges
        Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
    the next CNO?
        Answer. The major focus of the next CNO must be to maintain current
    readiness and provide ready, capable forces; to define and deliver a
    relevant naval force for the future; and to ensure we continue to
    attract a motivated, high-quality and diverse force of sailors and
    civilians. The CNO's enduring leadership covenant is to take care of
    those who serve today, including our wounded, ill and injured, and
    their families. The overarching challenge remains balancing priorities
    in a fiscally-constrained environment.
        Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
    challenges?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will remain committed to warfighting
    readiness to ensure we remain agile, capable, and ready forward. I will
    continue to employ our Fleet Response Plan while seeking to re-
    establish a sustainable level of operations consistent with our force
    structure. We must adapt our deployment models to ensure the viability
    of both current and future readiness, which involves reaching the
    expected service lives of our ships and aircraft at reasonable cost.
        In light of budget realities, our acquisition programs will face
    increasing pressure; therefore, it is more important than ever to
    meticulously review requirements throughout the acquisition process. We
    will stay in lockstep with the acquisition community and joint partners
    and be willing to change, adapt, and rescope to meet evolving threats.
    I intend to partner with the Commandant of the Marine Corps in
    establishing the finest naval force attainable within fiscal limits; a
    Naval Force ready to respond today to today's crises--anytime,
    anywhere. I also plan to remain open, transparent and collaborative
    with our fellow Services and OSD in efforts to seek cost savings while
    ensuring our Navy remains strong, effective and relevant. Internal to
    Navy, we will continue ongoing efforts to eliminate redundant
    processes, overhead, and costly infrastructures, as well as identify
    and adopt business best practices as standards for all.
        I intend to be unwavering in our obligation to take care of sailors
    and their families through sustained program oversight and support.
    They are the Navy's foundation. Attracting and retaining a diverse,
    high-quality Total Force will require innovative ways to communicate
    with the youth of our Nation. Once aboard, we will provide
    opportunities for individuals to rise as far as their talents and
    ambitions allow.
                             most serious problems
        Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
    the execution of the functions of the CNO?
        Answer. The Nation cannot have a strong defense without a strong
    economy; therefore I view the deficit crisis and corresponding deep
    cuts in defense as one of the most significant challenges to the entire
    national security community. Fiscal realities aside, every CNO faces
    the following challenges executing his duties: (1) properly balancing
    current resources allocated to sustain, train, and equip the Navy; (2)
    obtaining the necessary resources to build and man the future Navy; and
    (3) ensuring continuity among requirements, resourcing, and acquisition
    in the existing planning, programming, budgeting, and execution
    process. The Navy's larger imperatives are to remain whole (avoid
    decisions that create hollow capabilities) and maintain an
    international forward presence that offers our national leadership
    options to protect U.S. global interests.
        Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines
    would you establish to address these problems?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with my Navy senior
    leadership team, my fellow Service Chiefs, the CJCS, the SECNAV, and
    through him, the Secretary of Defense and Congress to develop balanced,
    fiscally-responsible approaches to addressing and solving these
    problems.
                           duties and qualifications
        Question. Section 5033 of title 10, U.S.C., describes the duties of
    CNO and requires that the person nominated to fill the job have had
    significant experience in joint duty assignments, including at least
    one full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment as a flag officer.
        What background and experience do you have that you believe
    qualifies you for this position?
        Answer. I believe the breadth and depth of my experience as a naval
    officer and joint warfighter qualifies me for this position. I had the
    privilege of five commands, including assignments as Commander U.S.
    SEVENTHFLT, where I served as a Joint Task Force Commander, Joint Force
    Maritime Component Commander, and Coalition Force Maritime Component
    Commander for two major Pacific war plans. As Commander, U.S. Fleet
    Forces Command, I was responsible for the Navy's Global Force
    Management and support to three combatant commanders. In my current
    position as Vice Chief of Naval Operations, one of my core
    responsibilities is to serve as Navy's representative for joint
    capabilities development. My five tours on the Navy headquarters staff
    and financial management specialization have provided me deep insight
    on integration of warfighting capabilities and resources; business
    operations; planning, programming, budgeting and execution; and cost
    reduction efforts in a fiscally constrained environment.
        Question. Do you meet the joint requirements for the position or
    did you require a waiver?
        Answer. Yes, I required a waiver. Per 10 U.S.C. section 5033(s)(3),
    the President may waive the joint requirements. My nomination is based
    in part on my joint duty assignment as a flag officer while serving as
    the U.S. Pacific Command Representative, Guam, Commonwealth of the
    Northern Mariana Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of
    Palau. The Secretary of Defense requested this waiver based on the
    recommendation of the SECNAV and the advice of the CJCS.
                united nations convention on the law of the sea
        Question. Officials of DOD, including previous Chiefs of Naval
    Operations, have advocated for accession to the Law of the Sea
    Convention.
        Do you support United States accession to the United Nations
    Convention on the Law of the Sea?
        Answer. Yes. The United States is the world's foremost maritime
    power and our security interests are intrinsically global in nature.
    Our Navy is deployed throughout the world. We have more to gain from
    legal certainty and public order in the world's oceans than any other
    nation. Joining the Convention will reinforce our Cooperative Strategy
    for 21st Seapower and the Naval Operations Concept 2010 to confront
    maritime security challenges.
        Question. How would you respond to critics of the Convention who
    assert that accession is not in the national security interests of the
    United States?
        Answer. I believe that accession to the Law of the Sea Convention
    is in our national security interests. The basic tenets of the
    Convention are clear and beneficial to the Navy. From the right of
    unimpeded transit passage through straits used for international
    navigation and reaffirming the sovereign immunity of our warships, to
    providing a framework for countering excessive claims of other states
    and preserving the right to conduct military activities in exclusive
    economic zones, the Convention provides the stable, predictable, and
    recognized legal regime we need to conduct our operations today and in
    the future.
        U.S. military forces must be able to operate freely on, over, and
    above the world's oceans. That freedom is critical to our national
    security interests, the military in general, and the Navy in
    particular. The Law of the Sea Convention codifies fundamental benefits
    important to our operating forces as they train, transit, and fight.
    Amendments made to the Convention in the 1990s satisfied many of the
    concerns that opponents have expressed. Also, joining the Convention
    will not subject the U.S. Navy to the jurisdiction of international
    courts, nor will it adversely affect the President's Proliferation
    Security Initiative (PSI) or United States intelligence activities.
        The Convention is the bedrock legal instrument underpinning public
    order for the world's oceans. By joining the Convention, we can best
    assert our leadership in oceans law and policy, and in conjunction with
    our Freedom of Navigation program, we can best protect the navigational
    rights and freedoms that are of such critical importance to our
    Nation's security and economic prosperity.
        Question. In your view, what impact, if any, would U.S. accession
    to the Law of the Sea Convention have on ongoing and emerging maritime
    disputes such as in the South China Sea and in the Arctic?
        Answer. The United States is the only permanent member of the U.N.
    Security Council and the only Arctic nation not a party to the Law of
    the Sea Convention. U.S. economic interests in the Arctic are
    significant, including natural resources, shipping and trade. The
    United States has an extended continental shelf (ECS) that is likely to
    be more than 1 million square kilometers--an area nearly half that of
    the Louisiana Purchase, with energy and mineral resources that have
    been estimated to value up to $1T and include mineral deposits and
    petroleum resources (oil, gas, gas hydrates).
        In the ongoing tensions over rights in the South China Sea, the
    United States will be in a stronger position of influence by joining
    the Convention that provides the legal regime for the oceans. U.N.
    Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) membership will put the full
    weight of U.S. political leadership behind the legal maritime framework
    it upholds. Application of the legal standards and framework as
    codified by UNCLOS is central to resolution of existing maritime
    disputes. Our friends and allies need our political leadership within
    UNCLOS to influence resolution of South China Sea disputes in
    accordance with the legal standards and customary maritime law as
    defined by UNCLOS.
                                 transformation
        Question. If confirmed, you would play an important role in the
    process of transforming the Navy to meet new and emerging threats.
        What are your goals regarding Navy transformation?
        Answer. The Navy is on a good course and speed regarding
    transformation initiatives and we have a good navigation plan for the
    future. If confirmed, my goals will remain largely consistent with our
    current efforts. For example, Navy has taken the lead within DOD in
    reshaping itself to meet current and future cyber threats and
    opportunities, but we have more work to do to capitalize on our
    progress to date and realize the full potential of our growing cyber
    force. We must continue to mature Navy's recently-formed Information
    Dominance Corps, which will help develop integrated solutions in
    unmanned ISR systems, Electronic Warfare, and C5I. We must continue to
    retain our advantage in the undersea domain in order to achieve joint
    assured access wherever it is needed. We will also focus on supporting
    the development of emerging technologies we think hold the greatest
    promise for future naval and joint warfighting (such as the railgun,
    Free Energy Laser, and Directed Energy).
        Underpinning all these goals is a need to transform our
    demographics within the Navy to ensure our personnel reflect the
    society we defend. I intend to pursue diversity goals within
    established policy guidelines, so that we can recruit, retain, and
    promote the best talent the Nation has to offer, regardless of color,
    creed, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or gender.
                                fleet readiness
        Question. Recently, there have been a number of ships that have
    failed inspections by the Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV),
    including Aegis cruisers and destroyers due to poor material condition.
    Some have suggested that these INSURV failures result from increased
    deployment demands supporting current operations. Others have suggested
    they are caused by deficiencies in the maintenance efforts or
    deficiencies of leadership in maintaining these ships.
        What do you believe has caused these increases in INSURV inspection
    failures, and what would you propose to do about it?
        Answer. The Navy has been aggressively tackling causal factors
    related to increases in INSURV inspections that have resulted in
    ``degraded'' or ``unsatisfactory'' findings. A major contributor to
    these problems has been our high operational tempo to support ongoing
    conflicts over the last decade. Frequent deployments, compounded by a
    decreasing fleet size, have constrained our ability to adhere to pre-
    planned maintenance schedules. Other causal factors include past
    decisions regarding ``optimum manning'' (excessive reductions in ship
    manning), technical training for sailors, material assessment training
    for senior officers, shifts in staffing of intermediate maintenance
    activities, and planning and execution of surface ship maintenance.
        We have initiated a number of activities to improve overall
    readiness of our surface ships over the long term. The Naval Sea
    Systems Command has established SEA-21, a directorate dedicated to
    managing the complete lifecycle support, maintenance and modernization
    for all non-nuclear surface ships operating in the Fleet. Another
    critical step forward is the improved research, planning, and execution
    of surface ship maintenance built upon the proven processes we use in
    the carrier and submarine communities. We are increasing the crew size
    of select ship classes, focusing on critical technical ratings,
    creating waterfront material assistance teams, and increasing the
    staffing of Regional Maintenance Centers. Technical training has been
    updated to increase hands-on experience and improve the balance between
    computer-based and instructor-led classes. We have partnered with the
    American Bureau of Shipping to improve our assessment of ship material
    condition and actions required to achieve the expected service life of
    each hull. These initiatives are resulting in tangible improvement in
    surface ship readiness, and improvement in functional areas in recent
    INSURV inspections, as attested to by recent Fleet reports. If
    confirmed, I intend to continue to promote and support these actions,
    which are expected to continue to have a positive impact on material
    readiness of our surface ships over the next several years.
                             acquisition management
        Question. Do you see a need for any change in the role of the
    Office of the CNO in the requirements determination, resource
    allocation, or acquisition management processes of the Department of
    the Navy?
        Answer. From my perspective, the role of the CNO in the
    requirements determination and resource allocation process is clear and
    appropriate. While the current cooperation among the CNO and
    acquisition officials is good, it should not be personality dependent.
    Service Chiefs should have a more formal role in acquisition management
    to ensure continuity among the requirements, resourcing and acquisition
    processes.
        Question. Do you see a need for any change in the structure or
    functions of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) or the
    role played by the CNO and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations in the
    JROC?
        Answer. I do not. I will continue to support the important work of
    the JROC. If confirmed, and after I have participated in the process, I
    will recommend changes as appropriate.
                            anti-access/area denial
        Question. Over the past few years, much has been made of the
    emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities of certain countries
    and the prospect that these capabilities may in the future limit the
    U.S. Navy's freedom of movement and action in certain regions.
        Do you believe emerging anti-access and area denial capabilities
    are a concern and, if so, what do you believe the Navy needs to be
    doing now and in the next few years to ensure continued access to all
    strategically important segments of the maritime domain?
        Answer. There are an increasing number of foreign capabilities that
    have the potential to slow or prevent the deployment of friendly forces
    into the theater, cause our forces to operate from distances further
    from a crisis than desired, or to disrupt friendly operations in
    theater by targeting our enabling capabilities. The Navy has and will
    continue to develop programs that provide capabilities and capacity to
    address emerging anti-access threats. Accordingly, we are strengthening
    our partnerships, modernizing our forces, fielding new capabilities and
    technologies, and developing new operational concepts. One specific
    initiative that will help preserve access and freedom of action in
    denied areas is implementation of the Air-Sea Battle Concept. This
    effort leverages advantages a particular service has in one domain in
    order to enable or enhance effects in another domain through integrated
    operations of networked naval and air forces. Air-Sea Battle
    implementation will ensure continued U.S. advantage against emerging
    anti-access threats.
                            recapitalizing the fleet
        Question. Despite the fact that Navy leadership has determined that
    it needs to have a 313-ship fleet to meet the maritime requirements of
    the National Military Strategy, it is currently operating with 284
    battle force ships. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has concluded
    that the Navy has underestimated the costs for building the 313-ship
    fleet by approximately 16 percent.
        Do you agree with the CBO's assessment that there is significant
    cost risk associated with the Navy's shipbuilding plan?
        Answer. The Navy and CBO are in relatively close agreement in our
    cost estimates for the first 10 years of the 30-year shipbuilding plan
    because we have a good understanding of the ships requirements and
    costs. In the second 10 years, our cost estimates begin to diverge
    because we lose some of the cost fidelity, and inflation factors come
    in to play. There is a difference between the way the Navy cost
    estimators account for inflation versus the way CBO accounts for
    inflation, which impacts the gap between CBO's estimates and the Navy's
    estimates. In the last 10 years of the 30-year plan, the gap increases
    are driven by this difference in inflation estimates, and by the
    assumptions made for the capabilities and costs of new ships. As the
    near term is most relevant from an execution perspective, the
    relatively small differences pose limited risk to the shipbuilding
    plan.
        Question. What actions do you believe are necessary to execute the
    Navy's shipbuilding plan within the Navy's budget estimates?
        Answer. In the near term, I anticipate the acquisition community
    will continue its efforts to promote efficiency and competition in the
    industrial base to gain best value for the Navy and the taxpayer. For
    the longer term, we will work to control changes in requirements and
    ensure requirements for new classes of ships are limited to essential
    or mandated capabilities.
        Question. How would you characterize the risks to mission
    performance posed by the current shortfall in battle force ships and
    the growing shortfall in tactical aircraft?
        Answer. The Navy is meeting critical Combatant Command (COCOM)
    demand for battle force ships and associated tactical aircraft. While
    not able to meet the cumulative annual global COCOM requirements, Navy
    is meeting all adjudicated demands through the Joint Global Force
    Management process, based on prioritized requirements defined by the
    OSD's Guidance for the Employment of the Force.
        Question. What adjustments to the respective programs are necessary
    and appropriate to reduce that operational risk?
        Answer. Based on our current strategy, I believe the President's
    budget reflects the best balance of resources across the totality of
    our requirements.
        Question. What further adjustments would you consider if the Navy's
    program comes under further pressure due to cost growth?
        Answer. Pending the outcome of the current strategic review, it is
    premature to identify where it might be most appropriate to adjust
    requirements.
                 alternative financing methods for shipbuilding
        Question. Navy leaders have testified that alternative financing
    methods must be found for shipbuilding.
        What are your views and recommendations on the benefits and
    feasibility of alternative financing methods, such as incremental
    funding and advance appropriations?
        Answer. The Navy currently has incremental funding authority for
    our most expensive ship class, nuclear carriers, and Congress has
    granted 2-year funding authority for some large amphibious ships. This
    authority has been helpful in mitigating the impact of the high levels
    of funding required by these ships on other ships which need to be
    procured to achieve required force levels and to more efficiently load
    the shipbuilding industrial base.
        Question. What is your assessment of the long-term impact of such
    alternative financing methods on the availability of funds for
    shipbuilding?
        Answer. Alternative financing methods allow the Navy to maintain
    the shipbuilding industrial base through more efficient management of
    SCN total obligational authority. Different financing periodicities
    provide greater flexibility in executing scarce resources and help
    avoid individual-year funding spikes. Whenever possible, the Navy
    remains committed to following a full-funding policy, where the entire
    obligation is provided upon contract award.
                         attack submarine force levels
        Question. The Navy's most recent statement of requirements for
    attack submarine force levels was 48 attack submarines. However, the
    Navy projects that the number of attack submarines will fall as low as
    39 boats and remain below the 48-boat requirement for almost two
    decades. The Navy is now claiming that it will be able to mitigate this
    shortage using three techniques: (1) building the new Virginia-class
    submarines faster by reducing the time between the start of
    construction to delivery from the current level of 86 months for the
    last boat to deliver to a level of 60 months; (2) extending the life of
    some boats currently in the fleet from 3 to 24 months; and (3)
    increasing the length of deployments
        What is your assessment of whether the three techniques listed
    above will yield a number of deployed attack submarines sufficient to
    meet the requirements of the combatant commanders and other
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance needs?
        Answer. The Navy has already made progress in shortening the time
    to build the Virginia-class SSN to 66 months for the most recent
    delivery, USS Missouri (SSN-780). The program is on schedule to meet
    its ultimate goal of a 60-month construction span. This has the effect
    of adding one submarine to the force, thereby delaying the onset of the
    SSN force structure trough which will begin in 2024. Projected life
    extensions of a limited number of SSNs is possible, but will relieve
    less than 20 percent of the force structure trough and its duration.
    Increasing the length of deployments can improve forward deployed
    presence for short-term periods but does not address the impending
    force structure trough. Taken together, although helpful, these three
    techniques will not be sufficient to meet the shortfall relative to
    combatant commander's requirements under current planning guidance.
        Question. What risks are being incurred by allowing the attack
    submarine force levels to remain below 48 for so long?
        Answer. Under current planning guidance, an attack submarine force
    level below 48 will increase the risk of gaps in our coverage for
    indications and warning of potential hostile action, delay or reduce
    the arrival of submarines critical to the war fight, and potentially
    allow an adversary to create and maintain a safe haven.
                             ohio-class replacement
        Question. A major cost risk facing the Navy at the end of this
    decade is the cost of replacing the Ohio-class strategic missile
    submarines. The acquisition process has already resulted in the Navy
    acquisition system making a number of cost vs. capability decisions to
    try to reduce those costs risks to the shipbuilding budget.
        Do you agree with the decisions that have been made about the
    capability of the Ohio-class replacement submarines?
        Answer. The Ohio Replacement Program Milestone ``A'' decision
    reflects cost versus capability trades that were jointly agreed on by
    the requirements and acquisition stakeholders in the Navy and DOD. I
    support these decisions.
        Question. How confident are you that the program will be able to
    produce an Ohio-class replacement vessel that meets current cost
    objectives?
        Answer. The Ohio Replacement Program has been thoroughly reviewed.
    All aspects of the program (warfighting requirements, program
    execution, design and construction efforts) were aggressively
    challenged to drive down non-recurring engineering and construction
    costs. The Navy estimates that the average Ohio Replacement cost for
    hulls 2-12 will be $5.6 billion with a goal of reducing this to $4.9
    billion.
        I believe these estimates are achievable in the context of the
    current shipbuilding plan due to the scrutiny on requirements and costs
    leading up to the Milestone ``A'' decision.
                                 sea-based isr
        Question. There is a documented Joint Urgent Operational Need for
    sea-based Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) to
    support missions by special operations forces in areas where land-based
    ISR is unavailable. The committee understands the Navy recently
    completed a proof of concept which demonstrated the value of such a
    capability to current combat operations, but does not intend to field a
    program-of-record solution until 2019.
        What is your understanding of the requirement for sea-based ISR
    capabilities to support special operations forces?
        Answer. Navy is planning and developing capabilities that will help
    satisfy legitimate ISR demands of Special Operations Forces. The intent
    is to procure ISR systems with multi-intelligence sensor modules, on
    station endurance and integrated weapons to support a broad range of
    missions from the sea.
        Question. Do you believe the responsibility for fielding sea-based
    ISR capabilities to support Special Operations Forces falls on the Navy
    or U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM)?
        Answer. Fielding sea-based ISR capabilities is a shared
    responsibility that begins with coordination over requirements and
    development of systems that can execute many types of ISR missions for
    operational commanders. Demands for service-specific ISR already in the
    field is managed through the Joint Staff Global Force Management
    Allocation Plan and Request for Forces. The Navy is investing in sea-
    based ISR support to SOF with programs of record such as the Small
    Tactical Unmanned Air System (IOC 2013) and the Medium Range Maritime
    Unmanned Air System (IOC 2019). While program development continues,
    the Navy is committed to supporting SOF from the sea with other
    capabilities to include Fire Scout, land-based Scan Eagle support,
    manned ISR aircraft and deployed combatants. The Navy is pursuing
    options to accelerate the fielding of an upgraded Fire Scout that will
    provide enhanced endurance and payload.
        Question. Do you believe the Navy's current timeline for fielding a
    program-of-record capability for sea-based ISR is appropriate?
        Answer. The Navy has embarked upon a transition to a future ISR
    ``Family of Systems.'' The Family of Systems will allow the Navy to
    transition from a limited number of multi-intelligence manned platforms
    to a greater number of systems that are tailorable and scalable to meet
    Navy, Coalition and joint warfighter requirements. We are making
    significant investments of over $8 billion across fiscal year 2012-
    fiscal year 2016 to address the Navy's future requirements, including
    funding for the following Unmanned Airborne Systems: Fire Scout ($1.1
    billion, IOC 2012), Broad Area Maritime Surveillance ($3.9 billion, IOC
    2015), Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike ($2.5
    billion, IOC 2018), and Medium Range Maritime Unmanned Aerial System
    ($1.1 billion, IOC 2019). These platforms with appropriate sensors and
    processing will recapitalize the capabilities currently provided by EP-
    3 and Special Projects Aircraft and are programmed for delivery to the
    fleet prior to EP-3/SPA end of service life in the 2019-2020 timeframe.
                    special operations personnel management
        Question. Some have argued that the Commander of SOCOM should have
    greater influence on special operations personnel management issues
    including assignment, promotion, compensation, and retention of Special
    Operations Forces. One proposal would modify section 167 of title 10,
    U.S.C., to change the role of the SOCOM Commander from ``monitoring''
    the readiness of special operations personnel to ``coordinating'' with
    the services on personnel and manpower management policies that
    directly affect special operations forces.
        What is your view of this proposal?
        Answer. I do not believe the proposal is necessary. Navy already
    coordinates with SOCOM--typically through the component SOF commander
    to SOCOM--on a wide variety of personnel policy/actions such as
    individual selection, assignments, promotion precepts, and command
    selection. It is vital that a Service is vested with final decision
    authority when it comes to personnel and manpower management policies.
      capabilities of special operations forces and general purpose forces
        Question. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review called for increased
    counter insurgency, counterterrorism, and security force assistance
    capabilities within the general purpose forces. These missions have
    traditionally been within the purview of Special Operations Forces.
        What actions, if any, do you believe need to be taken in order to
    allow special operations and general purpose forces to successfully
    share these missions in the future?
        Answer. The Navy continues to emphasize coordination and
    integration, where appropriate, of Navy's General Purpose Forces (GPF)
    and Special Operation Forces (SOF) for Counterterrorism (CT),
    Counterinsurgency (COIN) and Security Force Assistance (SFA) missions.
    These missions are shared in many parts of the world, whether using
    naval platforms for Afloat Forward Staging Bases in remote littoral
    areas, integrating sea-based ISR and fires support to augment SOF
    ``find, fix, finish'' operations, or using Naval Expeditionary Combat
    Command units to support SFA activities. We will continue to encourage
    increased coordination between GPF and SOF units in pre-deployment
    phases. Navy's inherent multi-mission focus continues to give
    operational commanders options to mix and match capabilities to best
    meet their mission needs in forward areas.
        Question. Are there certain mission areas that should be Reserved
    for special operations forces only?
        Answer. Unconventional Warfare and Direct Action missions in
    Counterterrorism should stay predominantly within the purview of SOF.
                         science and technology program
        Question. The budget request for defense Science and Technology
    (S&T) still falls short of the Defense Science Board's recommended goal
    of dedicating 3 percent of the total defense budget to S&T. In
    particular, the Navy S&T program, especially the investment in long-
    term, innovative work which has been so successful in confronting
    emerging threats, has declined significantly since the fiscal year 2006
    request.
        If confirmed, what metrics would you use to assess whether the Navy
    is investing adequately in S&T programs?
        Answer. Three key components exist to an effective S&T program: (1)
    a strong and focused investment in basic and early applied research to
    build the scientific foundation for future technologies, (2) an
    emphasis on key ``game changing'' initiatives that can provide
    disruptive technologies to the Navy and Marine Corps warfighter, and
    (3) an ability to transition S&T programs to the acquisition community
    and the Fleet. One way we assess the adequacy of our investments is to
    assess the balance of effort and output in each of these areas. A
    second metric is our success rate in transitioning viable and
    affordable S&T initiatives into the acquisition programs that make it
    to the Fleet.
        Question. How would you assess the value and appropriate investment
    level for basic research programs?
        Answer. Discovery and Invention (D&I) includes basic research (6.1)
    and early applied research (6.2) in areas with unique requirements
    essential to the naval mission and in areas that are undefined but hold
    promise for future application. D&I develops fundamental knowledge,
    provides the basis for future Navy/Marine Corps systems, sustains our
    scientist and engineer workforce, and contributes to long term DoN
    strategic goals. D&I constitutes the largest portion, approximately 40
    percent, of the Navy's $2 billion S&T investment. We believe this
    investment is appropriate for our needs.
                              technical workforce
        Question. A significant challenge facing the Navy today is an
    impending shortage of high quality scientific and engineering talent to
    work at Navy laboratories and technical centers.
        In your view, what are the pros and cons of having active-duty Navy
    personnel trained and working as scientists and engineers within the
    Navy research and acquisition system?
        Answer. The Department of the Navy's technical workforce has been
    the reason for the Navy's long-term technical success in developing and
    fielding advanced maritime systems. The current level of U.S. Navy
    talent is high--producing the world's top-ranked government patent
    portfolio, according to the Institute for Electrical and Electronics
    Engineers. Navy estimates that close to 50 percent of our S&T
    professionals will be retirement eligible by 2020. Attracting,
    recruiting, and retaining qualified scientific and engineering talent
    is critical to the Navy and the Nation's future.
        The use of uniformed military officers to fill potential shortfalls
    in our scientific community helps infuse an understanding of fleet
    operations and requirements, and strengthens the military-civilian
    partnership in our acquisition system; however, laboratories and
    technical centers are best served by a strong, stable cadre of civilian
    specialists who provide long-term, dedicated support in their highly
    specialized fields of study.
                           test and evaluation issues
        Question. What do you see as the role of the developmental and
    operational test and evaluation communities with respect to rapid
    acquisition, spiral acquisition, and other evolutionary acquisition
    processes?
        Answer. The developmental and operational test community role in
    rapid acquisition is the same as that of traditional acquisition.
    Adequate testing is critical to assess performance of systems in
    operationally realistic environments. Testing informs decision makers
    of the capabilities and limitations of systems and how they perform
    relative to the acquisition program requirements or the operational
    need. The goal is to do this as early as possible and before systems
    are fielded. The only significant difference between ``normal''
    acquisition processes and rapid acquisition or urgent needs is the
    flexibility and timeline for testing requirements and the oversight
    provided. In general, the test community has flexible policies which
    can be customized. A good example of this is the Quick Reaction
    Assessment on the Littoral Combat Ship, which allowed it to deploy
    earlier in support of Fleet needs.
        Question. Are you satisfied with the Navy's test and evaluation
    capabilities?
        Answer. Yes. Current T&E capabilities are adequately funded to meet
    acquisition program requirements and Navy Ranges and Labs are
    considered key to assessing system performance. The Navy has a robust
    process to evaluate current and future T&E capability needs. Through
    the Tri-Service T&E Reliance process, we work with the other Services
    and the OSD Test Resource Management Center to review existing test
    infrastructure, assess health, and ensure adequate test capabilities
    and capacity exist without unnecessary duplication.
        Question. In which areas, if any, do you feel the Navy should be
    developing new test and evaluation capabilities?
        Answer. We continue to look at emerging technologies and the T&E
    capability needed to test them. New focus areas may require future
    capability investments as systems are developed and their T&E needs and
    challenges are defined. Requirements for new technologies and programs
    of record will be used to determine shortfalls and build investment
    plans for Navy T&E Improvement and Modernization funding. We also work
    with OSD and the other Services to develop Joint T&E capabilities,
    where appropriate.
                           ballistic missile defense
        Question. The Navy will play an important role in defending the
    Nation against the threat of long range ballistic missile attack and in
    defending allies, friends, and deployed forces against theater
    ballistic missile threats.
        The Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2011 (Public Law 111-383) required the SECNAV to submit a report to the
    congressional defense committees on the requirements for major
    combatant surface vessels with respect to ballistic missile defense
    (BMD). The Navy report stated that the Navy has established a
    requirement for fiscal year 2024 of having a force of 94 multi-mission
    large surface combatants (including BMD capability).
        The Navy also delivered a copy of its 30-year shipbuilding plan to
    the committee. The Navy projects that they will achieve the 94-ship
    goal for BMD-capable ships in 2020 and 2021, although force levels will
    decline thereafter. Specifically, the Navy projects that they will
    have, at most, 92 BMD-capable ships in 2024 before declining to 65
    ships in 2034.
        Do you view BMD as a core Navy mission?
        Answer. Navy BMD is fully consistent with our Maritime Strategy,
    enhancing deterrence, supporting sea control and the conditions for
    power projection, all of which is achieved through forward presence.
    The Geographic Combatant Commanders recognize the value of this
    capability and have created a high demand for these assets, as
    demonstrated through the validation of an increase in the large surface
    combatant requirement from 88 to 94 in the current planning
    environment.
        Question. What options should the Navy be exploring to reduce the
    shortfall in meeting the stated requirement of having 94 BMD capable
    ships?
        Answer. The Navy has already embarked on an effort to increase the
    production of BMD capable large surface combatants through the restart
    of the DDG-51 production line, promoting competition in DDG production
    to improve cost, setting the conditions for a future DDG multi-year
    program, and adding an additional DDG in fiscal year 2014. The Navy has
    also embarked on a focused effort to control costs in the Ohio
    Strategic Ballistic Submarine replacement program to minimize impacts
    on other elements of the shipbuilding plan.
                            active-duty end strength
        Question. According to the latest data provided to the committee,
    the Navy remains on pace to exceed its 2011 authorized end strength and
    the problem is likely to continue into 2012, given the state of the
    economy and the fact that the Navy plans to reduce its active-duty end
    strength by 3,000 sailors in 2012. The other Services are facing
    similar problems as the Air Force is also overstrength and the Army and
    Marine Corps are planning significant force reductions. To address
    these issues, DOD is seeking force management tools that require
    congressional authorization.
        What force management tools does the Navy need to address these
    issues, and which of these require congressional authorization?
        Answer. Our strength projections show we will finish the fiscal
    year under our congressionally-authorized end strength. We have taken
    action to shape the force, such as reducing accessions, conducting a
    selective early retirement board and holding an enlisted retention
    board. High retention and low attrition continue to challenge our
    ability to keep a balanced force in terms of seniority, skill, and
    experience.
        I support the administration's fiscal year 2012 Defense
    Authorization Request that seeks approval for the following Force
    Management Authorities:

             Reinstatement of Enhanced Selective Early Retirement
            authority would expand the retirement eligible pool of officers
            to target to shape the force.
             Extension of Voluntary Separation Pay, to provide
            Secretaries of the military departments with temporary
            authority to continue using voluntary separation pay.
             Reinstatement of Temporary Early Retirement Authority
            (TERA) to target officers with between 15 and 20 years of
            service for early retirement.
             Voluntary Retirement Incentive (VRI) to provide a
            voluntary retirement incentive to servicemembers with 20 and 29
            years of active service, who would retire prior to their
            planned retirement dates without the need to force their
            retirement through involuntary means.
             Authority to Reduce Years of Service for Mandatory
            Retirement for certain Officers in the Grade of O-5 from 28
            years to 25 years.
             Authority to Reduce Years of Service for Mandatory
            Retirement for certain Officers in the Grade of O-6 from 30
            years to 27 years.

        Question. In addition to Enlisted Retention Boards, what methods
    does the Navy plan to use to reduce active-duty end strength from 2012
    through 2014?
        Answer. The objective of our force management policies is to
    preserve a balanced force based on seniority, skill sets, reward our
    best performers; and position the force to meet future manpower
    requirements for our projected force structure. We assess our end
    strength requirements each year as part of the budget submission
    process. For fiscal year 2012, Perform to Serve, our centralized
    reenlistment process, will be augmented by a Selective Early Retirement
    Board and an Enlisted Retention Board to meet our projected end
    strength. As we have yet to determine our end strength levels for
    fiscal year 2013 and beyond, it is too early to determine our required
    end strength target or assess methods we might use should a reduction
    be necessary. I anticipate we will make those decisions coincident to
    our fiscal year 2013 budget request.
                                  navy reserve
        Question. What is your vision for the roles and missions of the
    Navy Reserve, and, if confirmed, what objectives would you seek to
    achieve with respect to the Navy Reserve's organization, end strength,
    and force structure?
        Answer. The mission of the Navy Reserve is to provide strategic
    depth and deliver operational capabilities to our Navy and Marine Corps
    team and joint forces, from peace to war. Our vision for the Navy
    Reserve is to be a provider of choice for essential naval warfighting
    capabilities and expertise, strategically aligned with mission
    requirements and valued for its readiness, innovation, and agility to
    respond to any situation. Our Navy is carrying out this mission and
    working toward that vision.
        In the decade since the September 11, 2001, attacks on our Nation,
    our Navy Reserve has answered the call. Going forward, we face a
    changing global security and economic environment, and we will ensure
    our Navy Reserve remains aligned with mission requirements. Because our
    Navy Reserve is ready, innovative and agile, we can assign capabilities
    and missions to our Reserve component with confidence. Even as we
    reduce our presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, I see a continued need and
    desire to keep our Navy Reserve engaged as a full partner in Navy's
    Total Force. We will work together to ensure Navy's Total Force, Active
    and Reserve, delivers the right capabilities to the Nation at the best
    value to the taxpayer.
        Question. How do you anticipate the Navy will use new legislative
    authorities, if enacted, that would permit involuntary call-up of
    reservists for pre-planned, operational missions?
        Answer. As we move forward into a post-Overseas Contingency
    Operations (OCO) environment, the Navy Reserve should be a regular part
    of our worldwide deployment cycle, as well as performing the Navy's
    predictable, part-time missions, where appropriate. The new authority
    would provide the ability to fully use the Reserve components as a
    rotational, operational force to augment the Active component forces in
    the execution of planned missions in support of the President's
    national security strategy, as well as for operational missions. For
    instance, our Navy Reserve Seabees are currently part of the Navy's
    Total Force mobilized deployment cycle. They mobilize in a one in five
    cycle, which allows the active duty Seabees to maintain a 1-in-3 cycle.
    This provides a cost-effective model for both components while
    maintaining sufficient strategic depth in this capability. Post-OCO,
    without this legislation, our ability to continue to use some of the
    Reserve component as an operational force, as we currently are and
    described above, would be severely inhibited.
                            joint officer management
        Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the
    Goldwater-Nichols-required Joint Qualification System (JQS)?
        Answer. When the JQS was implemented on 1 October 2007, it
    recognized the skills that support U.S. military response to national
    security threats, interagency coordination, combat operations, and
    humanitarian crises. It also accounts for the intensity, environment,
    and duration or frequency of a joint experience. The JQS provides the
    opportunity to create and sustain the largest possible pool of fully-
    qualified and inherently joint leaders suitable for joint command and
    staff responsibilities in both the Active and Reserve components.
        Question. Do you think additional changes in law or regulation are
    needed to respond to the unique career-progression needs of Navy
    officers?
        Answer. The JQS effectively addresses the need of the military
    services to provide qualified Active and Reserve component personnel in
    support of joint missions. We will continue to evaluate the
    effectiveness of the JQS and will consider changes in law or
    regulations as required or needed. No changes are proposed at this time
        Question. In your view, are the requirements associated with
    becoming a Joint Qualified Officer, including links to promotion to
    general and flag officer rank, consistent with the operational and
    professional demands of Navy line officers?
        Answer. We have made solid progress in policy initiatives linking
    career progression and joint management policies within Navy line
    officer career paths. While it is challenging to meet these joint
    requirements, especially for nuclear-trained aviators commanding our
    aircraft carriers, we continue to assign high-quality line officers to
    joint billets. Our goal is to sustain a cadre of officers who are fully
    qualified and inherently joint leaders, suitable for joint command and
    staff responsibilities. We are meeting our joint promotion objectives
    and filling our joint assignments and JPME seats with high-caliber
    officers.
        Question. Do you think that career judge advocates in the Navy
    should be required to complete joint professional military requirements
    in connection with operational law requirements?
        Answer. I believe there is value for judge advocates to obtain
    Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). I understand that the JAG
    Corps intends to formalize JPME guidance that would strongly encourage
    judge advocates to complete JPME Phase I as part of JAG Corps training
    requirements. The feedback the Judge Advocate General will receive from
    this initiative will inform any decision that will be made regarding
    the desire to formalize judge advocate participation in the joint
    officer management program and joint qualification system.
                      selective early retirement authority
        Question. The Navy has requested that Congress reinstate enhanced
    authority for selective early retirement.
        What changes in existing law, if any, regarding selective early
    retirement, are needed in your view?
        Answer. Although Navy prefers to utilize voluntary force shaping
    methods before resorting to use of involuntary Selective Early
    Retirement (SER), we have determined that its employment will be
    necessary in fiscal year 2012 and beyond as Navy transforms to meet
    future warfighting requirements. Accordingly, Navy believes that
    Selective Early Retirement authority should be extended until December
    2018 and that enhanced authority should:

             permit consideration of members for early retirement
            more than once in any 5-year period;
             permit consideration for officers in the grade of O-5
            who have failed to select for promotion one time (rather than
            two or more times); and
             permit selective early retirement of officers in the
            grade of O-6 with greater than 2 years time in grade.
                             individual augmentees
        Question. The Navy continues to support non-traditional
    requirements through the use of individual augmentees (IAs). Admiral
    Roughead, in his written testimony for the Navy Posture Hearing earlier
    this year, stated that there were, at that time, more than 14,000
    sailors deployed in the CENTCOM Area of Operations on the ground, with
    some significant portion of these sailors serving as IAs.
        Will the Navy continue to be able to support these non-traditional
    assignments as it draws down its end strength?
        Answer. Properly manning our ships, squadrons and submarines while
    simultaneously supporting Overseas Combat Operations (OCO) and meeting
    end strength limits is increasingly challenging. Previous manpower
    programming provided additional end strength authorizations to support
    the OCO IA demand. In anticipation of the drawdown of operations in
    Iraq and Afghanistan, the Navy has phased out Non-Core and Adaptive
    Core billets from the baseline budget request, and is no longer
    authorized OCO-related supplemental end strength. In order to properly
    man our units, this will require the Navy to limit the number of
    sailors and officers it sends on OCO IA assignments in coming years.
        Question. What are the criteria being applied to determine which
    Active and Reserve officers and enlisted personnel are assigned duty as
    IAs?
        Answer. The Navy provides over half of its IA support in core skill
    areas, such as cargo handling, airlift support, and SeaBees. Navy also
    provides sailors for provincial reconstruction, detainee operations,
    civil affairs, customs inspection, and a variety of other ``non-core''
    missions. The joint sourcing process to meet both ``core'' and ``non-
    core'' requirements is deliberate and is currently focused on reducing
    IA requirements without unduly increasing the risk to mission success.
        Question. How do these assignments impact Navy readiness?
        Answer. Every sailor on an OCO IA assignment is a sailor away from
    his or her primary duty station. This has a direct impact on the
    manning of our operational units and ultimately could degrade
    readiness. Sailors on Non-Core OCO IA assignments are not maintaining
    their primary, or core Navy skill sets, potentially degrading future
    operational and material readiness. This requires a balance when
    considering IA assignments for our sailors so that we do not
    disadvantage them.
        Question. What benefit, if any, inures to the Navy as a result of
    these assignments?
        Answer. Sailors and officers who serve on OCO IA assignments gain
    valuable leadership skills and experience in joint, interagency, and
    nontraditional Navy skills. Many OCO IA assignments also provide
    coalition experience that further enhance professional skills and
    adaptability.
                  reserve components as an operational reserve
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Navy
    Reserve as an Operational Reserve, as opposed to its longstanding
    traditional role as a Strategic Reserve?
        Answer. The Navy Reserve is doing a magnificent job in both their
    operational and strategic roles. These missions are not mutually
    exclusive. The Navy Reserve can operate anywhere along the spectrum
    from strategic to operational, and as long as commanders have assured
    access to their Reserve component sailors, we can confidently assign
    missions to the Navy Reserve where it makes operational and fiscal
    sense.
        Question. In your view, what are the major challenges to
    maintaining and enhancing the Navy Reserve as a relevant and capable
    Operational Reserve?
        Answer. Our Navy Reserve is relevant and capable today because we
    have invested in our people and our equipment, we have assigned them
    real and meaningful work, and we have honored the support of our
    families and our employers. In the future, we need to ensure our
    sailors continue to have the training and equipment they need to
    maintain their readiness. Much of the Reserve's valuable training and
    operational support is funded with Active Duty for Training (ADT)
    dollars. We must maintain an appropriate level of ADT funding to ensure
    our sailors are a relevant and capable force. Obtaining congressional
    legislation allowing assured access of the Navy Reserve for routine
    deployments would further enhance the Reserve as a relevant and capable
    operational force.
        Question. What are your views about the optimal role for the
    Reserve component forces in meeting combat missions?
        Answer. The optimal role for the Reserve component is as a partner
    in the Navy Total Force, where we view missions in terms of
    capabilities first, and then decide where the capability should reside.
    For some capabilities, the Navy Reserve mirrors the Active component,
    in some cases the Navy Reserve complements the Active component, and in
    others, the Active component and the Reserve component augment each
    other.
        Question. In your view, should DOD assign Homeland defense or any
    other global or domestic civil support missions exclusively to the
    Reserves?
        Answer. We look at each mission from a Total Force perspective and
    decide what capabilities are needed, how often we need them, and what
    component is best suited to carry them out. As DOD assigns Navy to
    Homeland defense or domestic civil support missions, Navy will evaluate
    which component can best deliver those capabilities.
        Question. In your view, how will predictable cycles of 1 year
    mobilized to 5 years at home affect the viability and sustainability of
    the All-Volunteer Reserve Force?
        Answer. We view predictability as a key element of a viable and
    sustainable All-Volunteer Reserve Force. With predictability and a 1-
    in-5 dwell ratio, we can maintain the support of the three elements
    that make our Navy Reserve strong: sailors, families, and employers.
                mobilization and demobilization of the reserves
        Question. In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001,
    the Reserves have experienced their largest and most sustained
    employment since World War II. Across all of the Services, numerous
    problems arose in the planning and procedures for mobilization and
    demobilization, e.g., inadequate health screening and medical readiness
    monitoring, errors caused by antiquated pay systems, limited transition
    assistance programs upon demobilization, and lack of access to members
    of the Individual Ready Reserve. In the Reserve components, force
    management policies and systems have been characterized in the past as
    ``inefficient and rigid'' and readiness levels have been adversely
    affected by equipment stay-behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies.
        What is your assessment of advances made in improving Navy Reserve
    mobilization and demobilization procedures, and in what areas do
    problems still exist?
        Answer. The Reserve Force has seen improvements in the planning and
    notification time of sailors selected to mobilize. Internally, the
    Reserves have leveraged technology for process improvements via the
    Ready Mob Pool, Volunteer Portal, IA Portal and a Single Source
    Deployability metric.
        Sailor notification of impending mobilization has greatly improved
    from an average of 60 days in 2009 to 140 days (orders in hand) as of
    July 2011. The longer notification time directly translates into needed
    time for Navy families to plan for impending mobilizations and for our
    sailors to individually prepare themselves medically, physically, and
    administratively. This improvement is seen in the significant lowering
    of the administrative mobilization processing fall-out rate from 40
    percent to 15 percent of cancellations. It also allows employers more
    time to prepare for mobilized employees and eases tension in the
    workplace.
        The Navy Reserve has made a concerted effort to strengthen all
    phases of the deployment cycle to take the best possible care of
    sailors and their families. Predeployment Family Readiness Conferences,
    Command Individual Augmentee Coordinators (a Total Force program),
    Returning Warrior Workshops, the Psychological Health Outreach Program,
    and the Navy's Family Readiness programs minimize risk to Navy missions
    supported by Navy Reserve sailors. These programs enable servicemembers
    to focus on the mission by preparing them before, during, and after
    deployment, and reassuring them that their families are being cared for
    while they are away.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
    sufficiency of current Reserve Force management policies?
        Answer. Management policies as they relate to mobilization are
    sufficient. Colocation of Reserve Forces Command with Fleet Forces in
    Norfolk, VA, following the 2005 BRAC has improved integration and
    facilitated constant and consistent communications. The joint working
    space of the Individual Augmentee Portal allows for greater
    notification of requirements. Coupled with the increased volunteer
    rate, these have improved the ability to provide the Reserve sailor
    increased notification of impending mobilization to allow for improved
    preparation from individual readiness to family preparedness.
        Question. What do you consider to be the most significant enduring
    changes to the administration of the Reserve components aimed at
    ensuring their readiness for future mobilization requirements?
        Answer. Improvements in overall Reserve Force notification time has
    allowed Reserve sailors to seek additional resources earlier, which has
    improved the readiness of the Reserve Force.
        Question. Do you see a need to modify current statutory authorities
    for the mobilization of members of the Reserve component?
        Answer. Yes. The Reserve component has been used as a rotational,
    operational force during the past 10 years. DOD expects that there will
    be a continuing military requirement to augment the Active component to
    meet the force requirements of the combatant commanders as we execute
    the President's national security strategy. Since September 11, 2001,
    access to the Reserve component has been assured via Presidential
    action that initially invoked, and has annually extended, a declaration
    of national emergency that enables the use of the partial mobilization
    authority detailed in 10 U.S.C. 12302.
        DOD has proposed an amendment to section 12304 of title 10, U.S.C.,
    which would enable the President to access the Reserve component for
    all missions to support his national security strategy, not just
    operational missions, weapons of mass destruction scenarios, and
    terrorist threats or attacks.
        Question. Is the Navy Reserve currently meeting the dwell-time
    ration goal of 5 years at home for every year deployed?
        Answer. Yes. The Navy Reserve has no communities that are required
    to involuntarily mobilize any Reserve sailors inside a 1-to-5 dwell
    ratio. Between new accessions, volunteers and Navy Reserve sailors
    completing their dwell period, the Navy Reserve has had the necessary
    inventory to meet all missions assigned without violating the 1-to-5
    dwell period.
                            individual ready reserve
        Question. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves has
    found that accessing the IRR as a viable source of manpower for the war
    was problematic, and that using the IRR as a solution for unit manning
    is not feasible.
        What is your assessment of the value of the IRR to the Navy?
        Answer. The Navy has developed and implemented new objectives for
    its IRR, as well as changed the face of the current IRR population to
    provide improved training, manning, accountability and valuable support
    to gaining commands worldwide. During the past couple of years, we have
    strived to streamline the IRR by discharging sailors not able to
    mobilize and improving access to those members who remain qualified for
    mobilization and show a continued interest to serve.
        Question. What are your views on the proper role of the IRR in Navy
    force management planning?
        Answer. The role of the IRR is and should be a Strategic Reserve of
    members who are a valuable resource pool of trained veterans that can
    be mobilized individually or with an augmented Selected Reserve unit
    with minimal preparation.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, do you foresee making
    to the Navy's IRR recall policy?
        Answer. The Navy has been working for the past 2 years to sustain a
    ready pool of medically, physically, and training-ready IRR sailors in
    high demand, low supply skill sets. This right-sizing effort has paid
    tremendous dividends with the increased demand for IRR support staff at
    multiple gaining commands worldwide with noticeable results. Also, Navy
    has recently switched from physical musters of the IRR to completely
    virtual musters. We have found that the benefits of a physical muster
    were marginal when compared with the cost and manpower required to
    administer them.
        Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of the system in
    place for members in the IRR receiving orders to active duty to request
    a delay or exemption for that activation, including the procedures in
    place for appealing a denial of that request?
        Answer. Navy has not involuntarily mobilized members from the IRR
    and currently has no plans to do so. Should we change course with
    regard to this policy, we have the tools in place to fairly and
    efficiently recall our IRR sailors. The current delay or exemption
    process utilized for Selected Reserve sailors could be expanded to
    include IRR members.
             medical and dental readiness of navy reserve personnel
        Question. Medical and dental readiness of Reserve component
    personnel has been an issue of significant concern to the committee,
    and shortfalls that have been identified have indicated a need for
    improved policy oversight and accountability.
        If confirmed, how would you seek to clarify and coordinate
    reporting on the medical and dental readiness of the Navy Reserve?
        Answer. In the past 2 fiscal years, Navy has exceeded DOD readiness
    standards for fully and partially ready Reserve component workforce. We
    attribute our improved readiness status to process improvements in
    policy implementation and legislative changes. Examples including: (1)
    improved access to Navy Military Treatment Facilities, satellite
    clinics, Navy Operational Support Centers and Community healthcare via
    Reserve Health Readiness Program (RHRP) Point of Service to complete
    individual medical/dental screening requirements; (2) access to TRICARE
    Standard 6 months pre- and post-deployment has also contributed to a
    continuum of available clinical services for our RC sailors identified
    for mobilization; and (3) implementation of TRICARE Reserve Select, an
    affordable health plan option available to our selected reservists,
    enabling them to obtain required medical and dental services that have
    contributed to our high level of overall medical and dental readiness.
        If confirmed, ensuring timely and accurate medical and dental
    readiness of our Reserve component will remain a priority for me and
    Navy leadership. Moving forward, we will continue to focus on
    improvements in readiness reporting including use of Medical Reserve
    Readiness System (MRRS) as a single source capturing Medical/Dental
    Readiness indicators. We will also be assessing opportunities in
    developing interoperability capabilities that will standardize internal
    readiness processes.
        Question. How would you improve upon the Navy's ability to produce
    a healthy and fit Navy Reserve?
        Answer. Our sailors must be healthy, fit and mission capable. A
    healthy and fit Navy Reserve Force is not negotiable. We will
    continuously improve our screening process and work to ensure
    compliance with current individual medical readiness policies
    (including obtaining required periodic health assessments). Our focus
    will continue to be one of health promotion and disease prevention.
                 navy policies regarding drug and alcohol abuse
        Question. What is your understanding of the Navy's policy with
    respect to disciplinary action and administrative separation of sailors
    who have been determined to have used illegal drugs? Do you agree with
    this policy?
        Answer. Navy's policy on drug abuse is ``zero tolerance.'' Navy
    members determined to be using, possessing, promoting, manufacturing,
    or distributing drugs and/or drug abuse paraphernalia shall be
    disciplined as appropriate and processed for Administrative Separation.
    Members diagnosed as drug dependent shall be offered treatment prior to
    separation. I support this policy to preserve troop strength and
    mission readiness.
        Question. What is your understanding of the Navy's policy with
    respect to rehabilitation and retention on active duty of sailors who
    have been determined to have used illegal drugs or abused alcohol or
    prescription drugs? Do you agree with this policy?
        Answer. Our policies are sufficiently permissive to allow
    commanders the opportunity to assist servicemembers with treatment and
    recovery for both illegal drug use and alcohol abuse. Members diagnosed
    as drug dependent shall be offered treatment prior to separation.
    Commanding officers have the discretion to retain members determined to
    have abused alcohol. The separation authority may, under unusual
    circumstances, forward cases of illegal drug use or abuse of
    prescription drugs to Commander, Navy Personnel Command for retention.
    I agree that Navy policies ensure that the deterrence benefit of
    disciplinary action is balanced with--but not sacrificed to--the need
    to appropriately provide treatment and support.
        Question. What resources does the Navy have currently to respond to
    sailors who are alcohol or drug dependent and do you believe that the
    Navy has devoted sufficient resources to implementation of its
    rehabilitation policies and objectives since 2001? If not, in what
    ways?
        Answer. Navy maintains a steadfast commitment to resourcing our
    Substance Abuse Rehabilitation Programs (SARP). Our SARPs offer a broad
    range of services to include alcohol education, outpatient and
    intensive outpatient treatment, residential treatment, and medically
    managed care for withdrawal and/or other medical complications. We have
    expanded our existing continuum to include cutting-edge residential and
    intensive outpatient programs that address both substance abuse and
    other co-occurring mental disorders directed at the complex needs of
    returning Warriors who may suffer from substance abuse disorders and
    depression or post-traumatic stress disorder as well as implementing a
    web-based recovery management program available to servicemembers 24/7
    from anywhere in the world.
        Question. What measures are being taken to improve the Navy's
    performance in responding to problems of drug and alcohol abuse?
        Answer. Navy has taken an integrated approach across all of our
    sailor programs to emphasize positive lifestyle choices including
    physical and mental fitness, nutrition, healthy personal relationships,
    and alcohol free entertainment opportunities. Navy also emphasizes the
    significant negative outcomes associated with drug and alcohol abuse
    such as suicide, domestic abuse, sexual assault and other damaging
    personal and professional events.
                              religious guidelines
        Question. The DOD Independent Review Related to Fort Hood observed
    that ``DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity
    necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious
    practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or
    self-radicalization'' and recommended that the policy be updated.
        Has the Navy revised its policy regarding religious accommodation
    since the issuance of this report?
        Answer. No. We have coordinated with DOD and other Services on a
    policy that will apply uniformly across all the Services. Once we
    receive an updated DOD policy, we will work with the SECNAV to update
    our standing policy.
        Question. Are you concerned that the attack at Fort Hood could lead
    to harassment or even violence against Muslims in the Navy?
        Answer. No. I expect that all Navy personnel--both uniformed and
    civilian--will act professionally and treat their shipmates with
    dignity and respect. The Navy has a zero tolerance policy for
    harassment. All commanders and commanding officers routinely reiterate
    this policy to their personnel and closely monitor their commands for
    potential issues such as these.
        Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to
    address the potential for harassment or violence against Muslims in the
    Navy?
        Answer. I do not believe new strategies are required beyond
    reinforcement of existing policies, guidelines, and standards that
    emphasize dignity and respect for all.
        Question. Do Navy policies regarding religious practices in the
    military accommodate, where appropriate, religious practices that
    require adherents to wear particular forms of dress or other articles
    with religious significance?
        Answer. Current Department of the Navy policy is to accommodate the
    doctrinal or traditional observances of the religious faith practiced
    by individual members when these doctrines or observances will not have
    an adverse impact on military readiness, individual or unit readiness,
    unit cohesion, health, safety, discipline or mission accomplishment.
    Accommodation of a servicemember's religious practices cannot be
    guaranteed at all times and is subject to military necessity.
    Determination of necessity rests entirely with the commanding officer.
        When approved by competent military authority, religious apparel
    not visible or otherwise apparent may be worn with the uniform,
    provided it does not interfere with the performance of the member's
    military duties or interfere with the proper wearing of any authorized
    article of the uniform. Visible items of religious apparel will be
    authorized for wear with the uniform, except when the item is not neat
    and conservative (i.e. discrete, tidy and not dissonant or showy in
    style, size, design, brightness or color), its wearing will interfere
    with the performance of the member's military duties, or is
    specifically prohibited if the item impairs the safe and effective
    operation of weapons, military equipment or machinery; poses a health
    or safety hazard to the wearer or others; interfere with the wearing or
    proper functioning of special or protective clothing or equipment (e.g.
    helmets, flak jackets, flight suits, camouflage uniforms, gas masks,
    wet suits, and crash and rescue equipment). Furthermore, visible items
    of religious apparel shall not be worn while wearing historical or
    ceremonial uniforms; participating in review formations, parades, honor
    or color guards and similar ceremonial details and functions.
        Question. In your view, do these policies accommodate the free
    exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on those who
    have different beliefs, including no religious belief?
        Answer. Yes. It is Department of the Navy policy to foster mutual
    respect for diverse religious expressions (including no religious
    expression) and to accommodate the doctrinal or traditional observances
    of the religious faith practiced by individual members when these
    doctrines or observances will not have an adverse impact on military
    readiness, individual or unit readiness, unit cohesion, health, safety,
    discipline or mission accomplishment.
        Question. In your opinion, do existing policies and practices
    regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of
    formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a
    chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious
    beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs,
    including no religious beliefs?
        Answer. Yes. Title 10 Sec. 6031 says, ``An officer in the Chaplain
    Corps may conduct public worship according to the manner and forms of
    the church of which he is a member.'' Navy policy on public worship as
    set forth in SECNAVINST 1730.7D supports this Title 10 guarantee, i.e.
    ``a chaplain may conduct divine services `according to the manner and
    forms' of his or her Religious Organization.'' When inviting a chaplain
    to deliver religious elements such as prayer at a command function
    outside of public worship, a commander shall not compel the chaplain to
    pray in a way that is inconsistent with the tenets of his or her faith
    and the chaplain may choose not to participate without suffering
    adverse consequence.
        When religious elements are incorporated in command functions
    outside of public worship, such as changes of command, where all
    members of the command are required to be present, chaplains are
    instructed to be sensitive to the needs of the total audience.
        Question. Current policy in DOD gives discretion to military
    leaders to decide whether requests to waive uniform and appearance
    standards should be granted based on religious beliefs. The DOD has
    submitted a legislative proposal that would clearly exempt the armed
    services from the requirements of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
    (RFRA).
        Do you believe that the Navy needs to be exempted from the
    strictures of RFRA? If so, why?
        Answer. Our current policy provides our commanders adequate ability
    to provide religious accommodation and is supported. I am aware of this
    legislative proposal, but have not had the opportunity to assess the
    need for a change to our current policy.
                 support for wounded, injured, and ill sailors
        Question. Wounded servicemembers from Operations Enduring Freedom,
    Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn deserve the highest priority from the Navy
    for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation,
    evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty
    if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge.
    Yet, as the revelations at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) in
    2007 illustrated, all of the Services were not adequately prepared to
    meet the needs of returning wounded servicemembers. Despite the
    enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis, many challenges remain.
        In your view, what were the most critical shortcomings in warrior
    care since 2001 in the Navy?
        Answer. We have no higher priority than caring for Wounded, Ill and
    Injured shipmates. I believe we have made significant improvements in
    the care for our Wounded Warriors and their families; yet all of us
    remain concerned about the cumulative effects of stress, worry and
    anxiety due to a decade-long conflict on our sailors and their
    families. I also understand that preserving the psychological health of
    personnel is one of the greatest challenges we face today. We are
    learning more about injuries such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and
    Traumatic Brain Injury and ensuring our sailors have access to the best
    treatment available to support their recovery. Fortunately, we are
    seeing historically unprecedented survival rates and dramatic
    innovations in the combat casualty care on the battlefield. However,
    we, like the other Services, also are seeing more complex battle
    injuries as our personnel return to heal. We must continue to develop
    our systems of support and recovery for our sailors and families.
        Question. What is your assessment of the Navy's response?
        Answer. The Navy has made significant progress in developing
    programs that support the treatment, recovery and reintegration of our
    wounded sailors and their families. Our medical facilities are
    providing world-class care--and I am reminded of this each time I visit
    our wounded personnel. Our programs of support are in place and
    maturing as we adapt to the needs of our patients. Throughout the
    Fleet, we have developed an integrated health promotion and prevention
    program, Operational Stress Control, to help build resiliency at all
    levels. We have implemented targeted programs such as Families
    OverComing Under Stress (FOCUS), Returning Warrior Workshops and
    Psychological Health Outreach Program to ensure both our Active and
    Reserve component personnel and their families have access to support
    programs.
        Question. How does the Navy provide follow-on assistance to wounded
    personnel who have separated from active service and transition
    assistance to help sailors who are disabled find rewarding employment
    prior to separation?
        Answer. We recognize how important it is for our injured sailors to
    heal in body, mind and spirit and we honor our commitment to provide
    the support and resources to aid in their recovery and transition. We
    have significantly increased our medical case management resources at
    our treatment facilities to help our wounded, ill and injured personnel
    not only recover but also assist in the coordination of their care.
    These efforts extend to helping our sailors transition their medical
    care to the Veterans Administration or TRICARE networks/civilian
    clinician to provide better care and seamless service and support. Our
    Navy Safe Harbor program has responsibility for coordinating the non-
    medical care of wounded, ill, and injured sailors and their families.
    This program provides exceptional, individually-tailored assistance to
    our wounded, ill, and injured for the duration of their lives. We have
    increased our support for community reintegration through the Anchor
    Program, which pairs members with volunteer Reserve component sailors
    in their communities, and initiated the Adaptive Athletics Program,
    designed to support long-term recovery and rehabilitation through
    whole-body training and education. Additionally, we signed Memoranda of
    Agreement with the Departments of Labor and Veterans Administration to
    ensure greater access to employment services and support programs.
        Question. How effective, in your view, are those programs?
        Answer. I am pleased with the progress and effectiveness of all
    these programs. Assessing their efficacy, adapting to the needs of our
    personnel and their families and implementing best practices will
    remain priorities as we move forward. We are engaged and committed to
    ensuring resources will be in place to meet our commitments to sailors
    and their families.
        Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and
    resources that you would pursue to increase the Navy's support for
    wounded personnel, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty
    or to civilian life?
        Answer. We are grateful to the support that Congress has provided
    in this important area. I remain confident we have good programs in
    place that will continue to mature and improve. If confirmed, I will
    continue to build on the progress we have made within the Navy and our
    collaborative engagements with the VA and other Federal and private
    sector partners.
        Question. Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at WRAMC
    pointed to the need to reform the disability evaluation system (DES). A
    DES pilot program, and now an Integrated DES program have been
    established to improve processing of servicemembers.
        What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and
    improve the Integrated DES (IDES)?
        Answer. The IDES provides the process and administrative framework
    necessary to fulfill the requirements of Title 10 U.S.C., Chapter 61.
    Designed to function within existing laws, IDES leverages military core
    competencies to determine servicemember fitness for continued service
    via the Medical Evaluation Board and Physical Evaluation Board (PEB)
    processes. Under IDES protocols, the Veterans Administration leverages
    their core competencies to render the disability rating percentages
    needed to establish both title 10 and title 38 disability compensation.
    IDES brings these core competencies together to minimize duplicative
    burdens on the member and the departments while maximizing support
    through the seamless availability of post-service benefits for our
    wounded, ill, or injured (WII).
        While the IDES process delivers many significant improvements over
    the Legacy DES, it does not provide the desired end-state for
    disability processing because it takes too long to process
    servicemembers (avg 400 days). Navy supports ongoing OSD and VA efforts
    to compress the processing down to a more efficient and acceptable
    duration that limits undesirable personnel and operational impacts.
        Question. If confirmed, how will you address any need for change?
        Answer. A principle focus for change must be on reducing the amount
    of time consumed by the IDES process without affecting the quality of
    support to our WII servicemembers. We continue to support WII
    servicemembers and our mission needs by supporting process design
    changes in IDES that are under consideration, adequately resourcing
    capabilities such as PEB liaison officers at medical treatment
    facilities, and better leveraging capabilities that exist within Armed
    Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application (AHLTA).
           non-worldwide deployable sailors and disability evaluation
        Question. The Navy has used involuntary administrative separation
    for unsuitability as a means to remove from Active Duty sailors with
    medical conditions who were found fit for duty by physical evaluation
    boards. Previous Navy policies authorized denial of re-enlistment of
    sailors considered to be non-worldwide deployable, even if they had
    been found fit for duty, or had not been evaluated in the disability
    evaluation system.
        What is current Navy policy regarding the retention of sailors who
    are non-worldwide deployable due to physical or medical conditions?
        Answer. Section 534 of NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 restricts the
    involuntary administrative separation of personnel found fit by a
    Physical Evaluation Board if later found unsuitable due to the
    inability to deploy for the same medical condition. We are complying
    with the new law. SECNAV policy is that those retained on active duty
    after a finding of ``fit'' should not be denied reenlistment or other
    career progression simply because of the finding. These individuals
    shall receive the same opportunity to compete with other sailors for
    reenlistment and promotion.
        implementation of the repeal of ``don't ask don't tell'' policy.
        Question. The President, Secretary of Defense, and the CJCS have
    certified to Congress that repeal of the Don't Ask Don't Tell
    homosexual conduct policy will not harm military readiness, military
    effectiveness, unit cohesion, or recruiting and retention. The statute
    underlying the Don't Ask Don't Tell policy will be repealed on
    September 20, 2011, 60 days from the date of this certification.
        Do you support the repeal of the Don't Ask Don't Tell Policy?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. If confirmed, do you foresee any problems with
    implementing a repeal of the Don't Ask Don't Tell policy in the Navy?
        Answer. No.
        Question. What effect, if any, do you anticipate the repeal will
    have on readiness and discipline in the Navy?
        Answer. I have every confidence that the men and women of the U.S.
    Navy, with their character, discipline, and decency, will successfully
    implement this change in the law and continue to fulfill the U.S.
    Navy's mission with the utmost professionalism. As always, strong
    leadership remains essential to a successful transition. Navy leaders
    will continue to set a positive tone, create an inclusive and
    respectful work environment, and enforce our high standards of conduct
    as we serve the Nation.
                     sexual assault prevention and response
        Question. What is your understanding of the resources and programs
    the Navy has in place on ships, overseas, and in CONUS locations to
    offer victims of sexual assaults the medical, psychological, and legal
    help that they need?
        Answer. Sexual assault is a criminal act that has far-reaching
    consequences for all involved. It violates the Navy ethos, corrodes
    morale, undermines trust, and will not be tolerated. A DOD Safe Help
    line number is available to all and widely posted in command spaces and
    websites to ensure immediate ``hotline'' support. Our resources and
    programs are distributed so that all deployable Navy units have Sexual
    Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Victim Advocates (VAs) and SAPR
    Command Points of Contact (POCs) assigned. This ensures continuity of
    victim support regardless of whether the unit is shore based or at sea.
    Deployed units have ready access to medical, investigative and legal
    support, and the unit VAs have reachback to a Sexual Assault Response
    Coordinator (SARC).
        To ensure resource and program availability in a joint environment,
    joint protocols have been developed and joint SARCs meet regularly to
    outline, understand and mitigate differences in SAPR program
    requirements. The key is to ensure standardized coordination of SAPR
    responses across all Services.
        Individual Augmentees (IAs) receive pre-deployment briefings from
    IA Support/Deployment Specialists at the Fleet and Family Support
    Centers (FFSC) that include specific contacts for both sexual assault
    reporting options.
        Question. What is your view of the steps the Navy has taken to
    prevent sexual assaults?
        Answer. While significant progress has been made to date, we are
    continuing to implement further enhancements to contribute to ongoing
    efforts to eliminate sexual assault from the Navy:

             We are implementing Bystander Intervention training to
            teach sailors how to safely and effectively intervene to
            prevent sexual assault and other negative behaviors.
             Sexual Assault Response Coordinators have been
            provided 2 full days of training to better equip them in the
            collection of data and standardized training for prevention.
             Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) and the
            Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Navy have implemented
            specialized training to more effectively investigate and
            prosecute sexual assault cases.
             We are conducting a pilot prevention program,
            developed in collaboration with national experts, which uses
            multiple prevention modalities based on local demographics and
            circumstances. Rigorous pre- and post-pilot survey data will
            show the efficacy of these modalities and determine
            applicability to other locations.

        Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
    resources the Navy has in place to investigate and respond to
    allegations of sexual assault?
        Answer. Navy provides robust training for investigators and
    prosecutors of sexual assaults. All NCIS agents are trained to be
    ``first responders'' to sexual assaults and other criminal activity,
    and attend courses that combine prosecutors and investigators in a
    shared environment that enhances cross discipline understanding. NCIS
    agents have recently attended the U.S. Army's advanced course on sexual
    assault investigative techniques and several other seminars and courses
    taught by nationally recognized experts.
        Members of Navy's Judge Advocate General Corps attend a course on
    litigating sexual assault at Naval Justice School. JAGs also attend a
    course on prosecuting alcohol facilitated sexual assaults, prosecuting
    complex cases (which includes a section on Victim Witness Assistance
    Program). Navy has hired two nationally recognized experts on adult and
    child sexual assault and child physical abuse litigation to provide
    field-level legal training and case consultation, and provide policy
    support for the Navy SAPR program.
        Question. Do you consider the Navy's sexual assault policies and
    procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting, to be
    effective?
        Answer. Navy's policies and execution of confidential reporting
    (Restricted Reports) are effective. We continue to emphasize to
    sailors, SAPR stakeholders and leadership, the policy and importance of
    a restricted reporting option. A 2010 SAPR Quick Poll indicated that
    nearly 92 percent of respondents are aware victims can report sexual
    assault without command notification (Restricted Reporting).
        Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in
    which the confidential reporting procedures have been put into effect?
        Answer. Close-quarters environments such as controlled basic
    training educational environments and brigs for ``incarcerated''
    sailors provide a challenge with regards to confidential reporting.
    Solutions to address these situations are being investigated.
    California state law has also caused confusion due to state-mandated
    reporting for all medical personnel. Our California-based SARCs
    continue to educate leaders and responders to ensure compliance with
    policy and victim privacy when considering the ``restricted'' reporting
    option.
        Question. What is your view of the appropriate role for senior
    military and civilian leaders in the Navy in overseeing the
    effectiveness of implementation of new policies relating to sexual
    assault?
        Answer. Preventing sexual assaults is the job of all Navy
    leadership. It mandates a synergistic approach by military and civilian
    leaders. The Department of the Navy established a Sexual Assault
    Prevention and Response Office and Director in 2009 to serve as the
    principal point of accountability for all sexual assault matters,
    program support, and oversight. From the SECNAV on down, we are
    committed to eliminating sexual assault from our ranks. A key to
    success is the understanding and engagement by unit level leaders.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure
    senior management level direction and oversight of Navy efforts on
    sexual assault prevention and response?
        Answer. At a minimum, I intend to maintain strong and viable Family
    support programs by ensuring adequate oversight and sufficient funding.
    I will remain open to initiatives designed to further evolve existing
    programs and look for innovative ways to help our sailors and families
    become more resilient and ready to meet the enduring demand for Navy
    forces.
                                 family support
        Question. Sailors and their families in both the Active and Reserve
    components have made, and continue to make, tremendous sacrifices in
    support of operational deployments. Senior military leaders have warned
    of growing concerns among military families as a result of the stress
    of frequent deployments and the long separations that go with them.
        What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
    issues for sailors and their families, and, if confirmed, how would you
    ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately
    resourced?
        Answer. Family Readiness is critical to Fleet readiness and sailor
    retention. If confirmed, I intend to continue supporting Navy families
    with a variety of institutionalized programs and resources to meet
    their needs. Our existing programs cover everything from Exceptional
    Family Members and Respite care to deployment preparedness, ensuring
    our sailors and their families are cared for while deployed.
        Navy will continue to pursue opportunities to optimize services,
    including counseling, family and youth development programs, and
    deployment readiness to ensure our sailors continue to have access to
    the necessary resources that enable readiness while minimizing stress
    and impact to their loved ones at home.
        Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
    light of global rebasing, BRAC, deployments, and declining O&M budgets?
        Answer. Navy will preserve the current Family Readiness budget plan
    and has realigned funding from supplemental requests and overseas
    contingency funds to our baseline budget requests. We have consolidated
    oversight to ensure all Family Readiness programs are adequately
    sustained and fully resourced as required.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support to Navy
    Reserve families related to mobilization, deployment, and family
    readiness, as well as to active duty families who do not reside near a
    military installation?
        Answer. Navy supports geographically isolated servicemembers and
    their families through the nearest DOD facility whether a Navy
    Operational Support Center or other sister service installation. If a
    support site is not conveniently located nearby, then Navy provides
    remote support through our network of FFSCs and Military OneSource.
        In support of Individual Augmentee (IA) spouses and family members,
    FFSCs have developed programs tailored to their specific needs, such as
    IA Family Handbook, Deployment Readiness Briefs, IA Family Discussion,
    Family Connection Newsletter and Families of Warriors in Transition
    Homecoming Program, and Active and Reserve Command IA Coordinators
    (CIAC), whose primary responsibility is to serve as the Navy liaison to
    IA sailors and families.
        Question. If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to
    enhance family support?
        Answer. At a minimum, I intend to maintain strong and viable family
    support programs by ensuring adequate oversight and sufficient funding.
    I will remain open to initiatives designed to further evolve existing
    programs and look for innovative ways to help our sailors and families
    become more resilient and ready to meet the enduring demand for Navy
    forces.
                 suicide prevention and mental health resources
        Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services has
    increased in recent years. In addition, mental health surveys conducted
    in theater are showing declines in individual morale and increases in
    mental health strain, especially among those who have experienced
    multiple deployments.
        In your view, are Navy suicide prevention and resiliency programs
    adequate to help prevent suicides both in homeports and on deployment,
    and to increase the resiliency of sailors and their families?
        Answer. Yes. I am committed to doing everything possible to prevent
    the tragedy of suicide and provide our sailors, families, and leaders
    with the tools, training, and environment to allow them to successfully
    navigate the stress of Navy life and thrive personally and
    professionally. Within the past 6 months, Navy has significantly
    increased staffing and resources devoted to supporting Navy suicide
    prevention program and institutionalizing resilience building both
    ashore and within the Fleet. Resilience cannot be built in a day. It
    will require time to fully take root and grow. As our efforts continue
    to mature, ongoing assessment will guide further improvement.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that
    sufficient mental health resources are available to Navy personnel on
    deployment, and to their families upon return to home station?
        Answer. Navy is committed to fostering a culture that promotes
    resilience and wellness and empowers our leaders to ensure the health
    and readiness of our sailors and families. Our Psychological Health
    program supports the prevention, diagnosis, mitigation, treatment, and
    rehabilitation of post-traumatic stress disorder, and other mental
    health conditions, including planning for the seamless transition of
    such members throughout the recovery and reintegration process.
        Through active leadership, we are also working to reduce the stigma
    associated with seeking help. We have increased the size of our mental
    health workforce and continue to focus on recruiting and retention of
    our mental health providers. Our priority is ensuring we have the
    service and support capabilities for prevention and early intervention
    available where and when it is needed, including in operational
    environments. Embedded mental health providers provide coordinated,
    comprehensive primary and secondary prevention efforts throughout the
    deployment cycle, focusing on resilience training and stress reduction.
    In order to understand the behavioral health needs of our sailors
    serving in theatre, we deployed a Mobile Care Team to administer the
    Behavioral Health Needs Assessment Survey which allows real-time
    surveillance and intervention as needed.
        If confirmed, I will continue to ensure we have the proper number
    of mental health providers in place to address the medical, physical,
    psychological, and family readiness needs of our sailors and their
    families.
                        morale, welfare, and recreation
        Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are
    critical to enhancement of military life for members and their
    families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments.
    These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users,
    including Active Duty and Reserve personnel, and their eligible family
    members.
        What challenges do you foresee in sustaining and enhancing Navy MWR
    programs and, if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to
    achieve?
        Answer. The major challenges facing MWR are maintaining adequate
    funding, repairing or replacing aging infrastructure, and dealing with
    increased demand for certain core services, particularly in the area of
    child and youth programs. We have and will continue to take aggressive
    actions to address these challenges. In the area of child and youth
    programs, for example, Navy has funded dozens of new Child Development
    Centers that, by the end of fiscal year 2012, will increase capacity by
    over 7,000 spaces. When these centers are completed, we will have
    almost entirely eliminated unmet demand for child care spaces.
        I believe we should continue to expand our stable of partners in
    the private and public sector off base as we build on our past track
    record of success in ensuring Navy MWR programs measure up to the needs
    of our sailors and their families.
                             women in the military
        Question. In the past year, the Navy has opened service on
    submarines to women, and the issue of the appropriate role of women in
    the Armed Forces is a matter of continuing interest to Congress and the
    American public.
        What is the status on the implementation of the decision to allow
    service by women on submarines?
        Answer. In 2010, 18 female officers began their submarine officer
    pipeline training, which consists of nuclear power school, prototype
    training and the submarine officer basic course. Two officers deferred
    their training to complete follow-on graduate studies. The first 16
    officers will complete training and report to their submarines between
    November 2011 and February 2012. Eight female warfare-qualified supply
    officers have been selected to serve as department heads to provide
    senior female mentoring. We have applied lessons learned from
    integration of women in surface combatants and aviation squadrons in
    the mid-1990s and have incorporated those into our comprehensive women
    in submarines integration plan.
        Question. What challenges still exist and what proactive measures
    are submarine force leaders taking to enhance the success of female
    officers assigned to submarine duty?
        Answer. Submarine crews that are slated to be integrated will
    receive appropriate training on fraternization, berthing/privacy
    requirements, Navy's Equal Opportunity policy, prevention of sexual
    harassment, and sexual assault and rape prevention. Executive level
    training will ensure that commanding officers, executive officers and
    chiefs of the boat are prepared to lead an integrated crew. Independent
    Duty Corpsman assigned to each submarine to be integrated will receive
    refresher training on medical situations unique to women. A Command
    Climate Survey will be conducted on each crew prior to certification
    and again about 6 months after integration to evaluate and address any
    unanticipated concerns and challenges that may arise.
        Question. Do you believe additional specialties should be eligible
    for service by female sailors?
        Answer. Navy continues to examine opportunities for additional
    specialties for female sailors. Navy modified its policy in 2007 to
    allow the temporary assignment of women to units normally closed if the
    unit is not expected to conduct a combat mission during the period of
    temporary duty. Since that time the Navy Special Warfare (NSW) Command
    has deployed 10 to 15 females to the CENTCOM region with each NSW
    Squadron for support operations (intelligence, administrative, legal,
    information technology, and construction ratings). From 2008 through
    the present, certain NSW operational successes have been directly
    related to the rapport Navy females have been able to develop with both
    indigenous women and men. Leveraging unique cultural skills of women,
    NSW has been able to gain access, develop key relationships, calm tense
    situations, and locate individuals of interest.
        Question. Do you believe any changes are needed or warranted in
    current assignment policies regarding women?
        Answer. At present, the Navy's assignment policies for women are in
    the best interest of the naval service, accomplished per current
    Secretary of Defense guidelines, and are consistent with the principles
    of fairness and equal opportunity. However, we continue to evaluate
    opening other opportunities as appropriate. As part of our current
    review of restrictions on women in the Navy, we have identified a
    number of medical and chaplain support billets assigned to Marine Corps
    units that could potentially be opened to women.
                        personnel and entitlement costs
        Question. In addition to health care costs, personnel, and related
    entitlement spending continues to grow and is becoming an ever
    increasing portion of the DOD budget. Secretary Panetta has supported a
    comprehensive review of military compensation, saying ``everything must
    be on the table,'' including military retirement.
        What percentage of the annual Navy budget from 2011 to 2015 is
    devoted to personnel costs?
        Answer. The percentage of the annual Navy budget, from 2011 to
    2015, devoted to Active and Reserve military personnel costs is
    approximately 23 percent. This is comprised of the Military Personnel,
    Navy (MPN); and Reserve Personnel, Navy (RPN) payments to the Medicare-
    Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund (MERHCF).
        Question. Do you believe the time is right to begin discussing
    reform of military compensation and retirement benefits?
        Answer. I support Secretary Panetta's call for a comprehensive
    review of military compensation, including the retirement benefit. If
    confirmed, I will support the Navy's continued participation in ongoing
    efforts to assess the cost, value and effectiveness of all parts of the
    military compensation system.
        Question. Other than reducing Navy end strength, what actions do
    you believe can be taken by DOD and Navy leaders to control the rise in
    personnel costs and entitlement spending?
        Answer. Reviews of military compensation are currently ongoing. I
    will use the results of these reviews to inform my judgments.
                              military retirement
        Question. The 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation
    proposed a new defined benefit retirement plan that more resembles the
    benefits available under the Federal Employee Retirement System than
    the current military retirement benefit; increasing TRICARE fees for
    retirees; and the adoption of dependent care and flexible spending
    accounts for servicemembers. Both Secretary Gates and Secretary Panetta
    have called for a comprehensive review of the military retirement
    benefit.
        While it is often said that the military retirement benefit
    encourages retention after the 10-year point, do you believe it
    provides any significant boost to recruitment? Do 17 and 18 year olds
    care about the military retirement benefit when deciding to enlist?
        Answer. The current retirement benefit is better suited to enhance
    retention than to serve as an enlistment tool. While a generous
    retirement benefit relative to the private sector is a good recruiting
    point, the retirement benefit is not at the top of the list of things
    that attract new recruits to the Navy. During a recent poll of new
    recruits, military retirement ranked seventh among reasons for joining.
        Question. How might the retirement benefit be modernized to reflect
    the needs of a new generation of recruits, while easing the long-term
    retirement cost of the government?
        Answer. The overwhelming majority of those who enter military
    service never qualify for the 20 year military retirement, therefore,
    many servicemembers would benefit from some form of a defined
    contribution plan that offered vesting short of a full military career.
    Navy has not yet studied this option well enough to define how certain
    contribution plans might impact recruitment and retention.
                             judge advocate issues
        Question. In December 2010, the DOD Inspector General completed an
    evaluation of post-trial reviews of courts-martial within the
    Department of the Navy--triggered in part by the egregious case of
    United States v. Foster--documenting the persistence of serious post-
    trial processing problems within the Navy and Marine Corps for at least
    two decades.
        If confirmed, what actions will you take to address the post-trial
    processing issues identified by the DOD Inspector General?
        Answer. I am confident that given the improvements in structure,
    operating procedures, case tracking and oversight that have been
    undertaken to date, we have a military justice system that works as
    intended. I will continue to support all efforts to address the issue
    of post-trial processing.
        Question. The Inspector General concluded that current Navy and
    Marine Corps case-tracking systems do not provide the visibility needed
    to monitor case progress and timeliness throughout the post-trial
    process and recommended the development of a single Navy and Marine
    Corps military justice case processing and tracking system.
        What is the current plan for the development of a single Navy and
    Marine Corps military justice case processing and tracking system?
        Answer. Efforts are ongoing within the Department to develop a
    unified case-tracking system for the Navy and Marine Corps and a joint
    effort is currently in progress to formally establish a new acquisition
    program for the Naval Justice Information System (NJIS). In the
    interim, the Judge Advocate General's Corps has continued to use the
    Navy Case Management Tracking Information System (CMTIS) to track every
    case while the new systems are being developed.
        Question. Will this case tracking system be funded by the Navy?
        Answer. Yes, Navy will fund the system.
        Question. At the direction of Congress, the Secretary of Defense
    appointed an independent panel to review the judge advocate
    requirements of the Department of the Navy. This Panel issued a report
    in February, 2011, that concluded that ``there is a requirement in the
    U.S. Navy for approximately 950 active-duty judge advocates. The Panel
    noted that the Navy had 811 judge advocates on active duty at the end
    of fiscal year 2010, but had programmed further reductions in judge
    advocate manning over the next 5 years. The Panel expressed ``strong
    concern over the current and future manning levels for judge advocates
    in the Navy, believing those manning levels create an unacceptable
    legal risk to the Department of the Navy.'' Testimony at a recent
    hearing indicated that Navy leadership has now indicated an intent to
    fund 852 positions over the FYDP.
        What is your evaluation of the recommendations of the Independent
    Panel regarding the role and resources available to the Navy JAG Corps?
        Answer. I concur that we need to have adequate judge advocate
    manning to meet operational law and other requirements, including a
    first-rate military justice system. In the Navy, this issue is
    currently undergoing the required budget review process for
    implementation across the FYDP.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that
    the Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps is adequately manned to address
    the increasing complexity and intensity of the legal and policy
    environment in which commanders are required to operate?
        Answer. This issue is currently undergoing the required budget
    review process for implementation across the FYDP.
                defense incident-based reporting system (dibrs)
        Question. DIBRS is an information technology system funded and
    managed by the Defense Manpower Data Center and required under DOD
    Directive 7730.47. It is intended to provide more comprehensive data on
    the incidence and types of crimes committed within the Armed Forces.
    The Department of the Navy is developing a Department of the Navy
    Criminal Justice Information System (DONCJIS) to satisfy DIBRS
    reporting requirements but has been unable to predict when the system
    will be fully operational.
        What is the status of the Navy's implementation of DIBRS and
    DONCJIS?
        Answer. The DONCJIS was initiated but did not meet program
    requirements. The Department cancelled it in September 2010. Efforts
    are ongoing within the Department to develop a unified case-tracking
    system for the Navy and Marine Corps and a joint effort is currently in
    progress to formally establish a new acquisition program for the Naval
    Justice Information System (NJIS). As currently envisioned, this system
    will incorporate not only the Defense Incident-Based Reporting System
    (DIBRS) required data, but expand to include criminal justice case
    tracking and management.
        Question. What utility do you see for Navy's senior leaders in
    having the information available through DIBRS?
        Answer. The lack of such a functional database inhibits electronic
    interface and data sharing among all stakeholders of a criminal case
    and inhibits accurate data collection. We will continue to use the Navy
    Case Management Tracking Information System (CMTIS) to track every case
    while the new systems are being developed.
                          u.s. naval academy oversight
        Question. In November 2009, the Naval Inspector General submitted a
    report harshly critical of the financial management practices at the
    U.S. Naval Academy, which reflected a lack of oversight and supervision
    over the Academy's internal controls, regulatory compliance, and
    expenditure of appropriated and non-appropriated funds.
        What measures have been put in place to ensure that the financial
    management at the Naval Academy complies with the legal and regulatory
    requirements that apply to other comparable commands?
        Answer. The Naval Academy has worked closely with Navy leadership,
    including the Navy General Counsel and Office of the Judge Advocate
    General to improve meaningful oversight, improve guidance and foster
    continual self assessment of the Academy's financial management
    practices. After a series of reviews and audits, including the 2009
    Navy Inspector General report, 59 corrective actions were identified.
    To date, 49 of the 59 have been completed, including a comprehensive
    fiscal oversight review of Naval Academy Nonappropriated Fund
    activities by Commander, Navy Installations Command this month (July
    2011). In all, these efforts have resulted in improved and revised
    financial procedures, directives and instructions, including gift
    acceptance and expenditure guidance, ensuring the Academy is in
    compliance with relevant Navy and DOD instructions and policies.
        Question. What is your assessment of the changes that have been
    made to the Honor System at the Naval Academy following the review
    conducted last year by the Chief of Navy Reserve and what do you
    consider to be the most important reforms put into place?
        Answer. The changes to the Naval Academy Honor Concept have been
    very positive for the Brigade of Midshipmen and the Naval Academy as a
    whole. While several important reforms were adopted, improved
    educational understanding, process efficiency, consistent
    accountability and Brigade empowerment have been most notable.
    Specifically, the focus on refining the adjudication process has driven
    average adjudication time down to approximately 17 days, providing more
    immediate feedback to the Midshipmen on honor cases. Coupled with
    consistent application of the Honor Concept and increased ownership of
    the Honor Concept by the Brigade of Midshipmen, the Naval Academy has
    seen a significant drop in repeat honor offenses and honor offenses by
    upper classmen.
        Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend in the
    organization or functioning of the Naval Academy Board of Visitors?
        Answer. I wouldn't recommend changes in the organization or
    functioning of the Naval Academy Board of Visitors. Since the findings
    of the Navy IG, the Board of Visitors has taken an active and positive
    role in assisting the Naval Academy and providing oversight.
        Question. Following congressional direction, the DOD in August
    2007, established a policy regarding modification of the active-service
    obligation for service academy and ROTC scholarship graduates who are
    offered professional sports contracts. This policy is currently not
    being applied uniformly by the Departments of the Air Force, Navy, and
    Army.
        What is your personal view of the appropriate applicability of this
    DOD policy in the Navy?
        Answer. My view is that Navy personnel are first and foremost here
    to faithfully serve their country and fulfill their military commitment
    by completing their Active Duty Service Obligations (ADSO). I do
    believe however, in rare and exceptional cases, a Servicemember can use
    their exceptional talents in a mutually beneficial way to the Service
    and the member, after completing a shortened ADSO and then continue to
    actively engage in the military by participating in the Selected
    Reserves.
        The SECNAV recently updated the early release policy for the Navy
    and Marine Corps, removing a moratorium imposed in 2007 on applications
    for early release to participate in professional sports. This change in
    policy will again allow Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps and U.S.
    Naval Academy graduates to apply for early release from active duty
    after 2 years of service providing the requestor has relevant and
    proven special or unique talents that would aid in recruiting. This
    policy change aligns the Department of the Navy's application of the
    DOD policy with the Departments of the Air Force and Army. While the
    number of those allowed for an early release is expected to be small, I
    believe that those rare individuals with extraordinary abilities should
    be allowed to showcase their talents on a national stage when in the
    best interests of the Service.
                            independent legal advice
        Question. In your past assignments, you have had the opportunity to
    observe the working relationship between the Navy General Counsel, the
    Judge Advocate General of the Navy and judge advocates advising
    commanders in the field.
        What is your view of the need for the Judge Advocate General to
    provide independent legal advice to the CNO and the Commandant of the
    Marine Corps?
        Answer. The ability to provide independent legal advice is vital to
    the Navy. The law appropriately prohibits any officer or employee of
    DOD from interfering with the Judge Advocate General's independent
    legal advice to the SECNAV, CNO, and the Commandant of the Marine
    Corps.
        Question. What is your view of the responsibility of judge
    advocates within the services and joint commands to provide independent
    legal advice to military commanders?
        Answer. Commanders and commanding officers are obligated to discuss
    legal issues with their staff judge advocates. To provide legal
    solutions that address the legal challenges faced by our military
    commanders requires independence.
                             environmental concerns
        Question. The Navy has been involved in civil litigation over its
    use of mid-frequency active sonar during training exercises and its
    impact on the environment.
        What is the Navy doing to comply with environmental laws so it can
    continue to effectively train with mid-frequency active sonar?
        Answer. The Navy remains committed to accomplishing training goals
    while still achieving full compliance with all Federal environmental
    laws and regulations. Continued training with active sonar is
    absolutely essential in protecting the lives of our sailors and marines
    and defending our Nation. Increasingly quiet diesel-electric submarines
    continue to proliferate throughout the world, which requires our Navy
    to continue to train to counter them. Neutralizing this threat requires
    the ability to locate, track, and defeat these submarines; active sonar
    is the primary system to accomplish this task.
        The Navy continues to work closely with the National Marine
    Fisheries Service (NMFS) to receive annual permits under the Marine
    Mammal Protection Act and Biological Opinions under the Endangered
    Species Act. In 2002, the Navy began implementation of a comprehensive
    Phase I strategy to ensure compliance with applicable Federal laws. The
    process of completing this documentation, including the required
    analysis and public comment periods, was a multi-year effort and will
    continue indefinitely. As of July of this year, the Navy has completed
    environmental planning documentation for 13 of 14 Navy ranges and
    Operating Areas. This permitting process has ensured that the Navy
    mitigates its effect on the environment while still meeting national
    security requirements.
        The Navy has already begun work on Phase II at-sea Environmental
    Impact Statements and permits, significantly expanding the sound
    sources analyzed and including at-sea testing events that were not part
    of phase I permits and documentation. Consolidating the 14 Phase I Navy
    ranges and Operating Areas into 6 study areas will achieve greater
    consistency, efficiency, and integration of acquisition/military
    readiness/scientific research information in Navy environmental
    planning documentation and permits. The Navy continues to work closely
    with NMFS to ensure these Phase II documents and permits are informed
    by best available data, providing the most accurate representation of
    potential impacts to the marine environment. The first of these
    documents and permits is currently on track to be approved in early
    2014.
                            congressional oversight
        Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
    appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
    briefings, and other communications of information.
        Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
    this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
    even if those views differ from the administration in power?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
    committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
    information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
    with respect to your responsibilities as the CNO?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
    other communications of information are provided to this committee and
    its staff and other appropriate committees?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
    such documents?
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill
                           purchasing f/a-18 aircraft
        1. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Greenert, I have often noted we can
    get 80 percent of the F-35's capability for a fraction of the cost by
    buying the most advanced F/A-18 aircraft--something the Navy has
    largely acknowledged. The President's Fiscal Commission made a similar
    recommendation. What do you think about the recommendation from the
    President's Fiscal Commission and other similar proposals to basically
    substitute F/A-18s and F-16s for about half of the Air Force's and
    Navy's planned buys of the F-35? They say this change could save about
    $9.5 billion.
        Admiral Greenert. The Navy's TACAIR transition plan is centered on
    a balanced force of F-35 and F/A-18E/F. F-35 and F/A-18E/F capabilities
    are complementary, and together deliver a balance of versatility,
    lethality, survivability, and capacity that will pace the threat
    through 2025. The FA-18E/F provides a proven combat capability and
    higher weapons capacity at a known cost modeled throughout its service
    life with planned capability enhancements. The F-35 offers reduced
    signature with improved sensors and command and control. A mix of F/A-
    18 E/F and F-35 provides the capacity and capability to carry out the
    full range of tactical air operations and the requirement for both
    aircraft remains consistent with the DoN TACAIR transition plan.

        2. Senator McCaskill. Admiral Greenert, have you considered
    adopting the Fiscal Commission's option, and if not, why not?
        Admiral Greenert. Each year we consider modifications to the number
    of F-35 we purchase. This is part of our own budget deliberations and
    is also part of achieving the right mix of F-35 and F-18E/F aircraft in
    our future air wings. The Department of the Navy has historically
    managed its entire aircraft inventory in a purposeful and responsible
    manner, balancing future operational requirements with the need to
    maximize the utility of our current aircraft. The F-35 and FA-18E/F
    provide complementary capabilities across the spectrum of conflict and
    the requirement for both aircraft remains consistent with the DoN's
    TACAIR transition plan. Purchasing both aircraft represents a solution
    to the strike-fighter shortfall and provides proven conventional combat
    capability and capacity to support anticipated Carrier Strike Group
    mission requirements through 2025.
                                     ______

                   Question Submitted by Senator Mark Begich
                             arctic climate change
        3. Senator Begich. Admiral Greenert, the Navy has been at the
    forefront of Arctic issues and studying climate change. Your
    predecessor, Admiral Roughead, understood that Arctic requirements will
    fall largely on the Navy and he was already preparing for them,
    establishing a Task Force Climate Change and producing an Arctic
    Roadmap in 2009. The Arctic Roadmap called for a number of actionable
    items. If confirmed, do you intend to continue this work on the Arctic
    and climate change, to include executing the actionable items in the
    Arctic Roadmap?
        Admiral Greenert. Yes, I intend to continue the work initiated by
    Admiral Roughead on the Arctic and climate change. I believe that
    climate change and the Arctic will be a challenge to Navy. In my
    remarks at the Navy Climate Change and Energy Symposium in March of
    this year, I encouraged the Navy and industry to take the discussion
    and ideas generated from the symposium toward future programmatic
    options.
        The Navy views the Arctic as an emerging theater that may require
    new programs to face the unique challenges of the region. The
    challenges will be similar to those when the Navy first started
    operating in the Persian Gulf, where our equipment was not optimized
    for operations in the new environment. The Navy must also consider the
    Arctic in our concept of operations especially with respect to our
    surface ship capabilities in conducting cold weather operations. I
    recognize that the Navy has to balance preparation for an opening
    Arctic against other global commitments and fiscal pressures, but we
    are taking a deliberate approach to the Arctic. This includes
    conducting studies and assessments that will inform us of gaps in our
    capabilities to operate in the region, and yet not buying ahead of
    need.
        Outside of the Arctic, global climate change will present
    additional challenges to our Navy. We are beginning to study the
    effects that sea level rise and associated processes will have on our
    installations worldwide. We are closely monitoring the effects of
    changing precipitation and resource patterns around the world to
    determine how they may affect humanitarian assistance, and we are
    identifying partnerships that will ensure the Navy leverages a whole-
    of-government approach to climate change adaptation.
        The Arctic and Climate Change Roadmaps include action items that
    move the Navy forward in the efforts needed to meet these challenges.
    The roadmaps are vital tools for preparing the Navy for the future and
    ensuring that we are ready and capable to meet the mission requirements
    of the 21st century.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                      submarine support for special forces
        4. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Greenert, the four current Ohio-class
    cruise missile submarines (SSGN) are scheduled to be retired between
    fiscal years 2026 to 2028. These boats have been particularly useful in
    providing our combatant commanders with both additional strike
    capability and Special Forces support. I understand the Navy is
    considering adding, to at least some of the future Virginia-class subs,
    an additional mid-body section equipped with large-diameter vertical
    launch tubes suitable for cruise missiles to replace some of the strike
    capability lost with the end of the SSGNs. I am concerned there is no
    current plan to replace the SSGN's capability to support larger Special
    Forces Operations. Could you share with me the Navy's plans to
    accommodate future covert Special Forces Operations too large for
    Virginia-class submarines once the SSGNs reach the end of their service
    life?
        Admiral Greenert. While an individual Virginia-class attack
    submarine (SSN) does not provide the same volume as an SSGN for support
    of Special Forces, the Virginia-class is the first SSN class designed
    up front to support Special Forces. As a result, all Virginia-class
    SSNs have many of the same capabilities to support Special Forces as
    the SSGN including: the ability to host a Dry-Deck Shelter, the ability
    to conduct swimmer lock-in and lock-out, advanced ship control for
    slow-speed station keeping, and dedicated spaces for Special Forces
    fitness and stowage. In the future, as the SSGNs retire from the
    inventory, the entire Virginia-class will be ready to support a wide
    range of Special Forces Operations.
        The Navy will continue to work closely with Commander, Special
    Operations Command (SOCOM) to define the long-term requirements for
    undersea mobility of Special Forces. As the Navy evaluates options to
    restore undersea payload volume, such as the mid-body section described
    above, we will also continue to consider the need for enhanced Special
    Forces support.

                                public shipyards
        5. Senator Shaheen. Admiral Greenert, according to a 2009
    Government Accountability Office report, the Navy had a backlog of $3
    billion in unfunded, yet absolutely critical, infrastructure projects
    at the Nation's four public shipyards. At Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
    alone, the unfunded requirements were valued at $513 million. Going
    forward, how will the Navy prioritize investments and support
    modernization at each of the four public shipyards?
        Admiral Greenert. With workforce safety, health, and quality of
    life as top priorities, the Navy develops projects to improve shipyard
    efficiency and productivity, based on Infrastructure Condition
    Assessment Program (ICAP) and Asset Evaluation (AE) program data.
        Regrettably we are unable to address every shortfall in the desired
    timeframe due to fiscal constraints; therefore, shipyard projects are
    evaluated and prioritized with all other Navy infrastructure projects.
    Our shore investments are prioritized to best enable warfighting and
    Joint capabilities, minimize the decline of mission-essential and
    quality of life infrastructure, and optimize warfare enterprise outputs
    and quality of service.
        The Navy continues to invest in Naval Shipyard infrastructure
    within today's fiscally constrained environment through Sustainment
    (ST), Restoration and Modernization (RM), and Military Construction
    (MILCON). U.S. Code Title 10, Section 2476, requires that the Navy
    invest at least 6 percent of intermediate and depot maintenance funds
    (averaged over the previous 3 years) into the shipyard recapitalization
    program. The Navy spent 9.5 percent, 9.9 percent, and 15.6 percent of
    these funds on shipyard recapitalization in fiscal year 2008 through
    fiscal year 2010, respectively, and is in the process of investing 11.1
    percent in fiscal year 2011.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
                              defense budget cuts
        6. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, in a House of Representatives
    hearing yesterday you testified in response to a question about the
    possibility of drastic defense budget cuts ranging from $400 billion to
    a trillion dollars over the next 10 years that, ``without a
    comprehensive strategic review, a fundamental look at what we were
    asking our forces to do, without a change in activity, we won't be able
    to meet the global force management plan today.'' As Vice Chief of
    Naval Operations, are you taking part in DOD's comprehensive strategic
    review?
        Admiral Greenert. As Vice Chief of Naval Operations, I was
    personally involved in decisional and informational meetings associated
    with DOD's comprehensive strategy review. This review involves inter-
    Service working groups and initiatives including the Joint Staff
    ``Operational Availability 2012'' analysis, the Director, Cost Analysis
    and Program Evaluation (CAPE) ``Comprehensive Review,'' and Deputy
    Secretary of Defense Advisory Working Group (DAWG) meetings. These
    initiatives and analyses were helpful in establishing the impact on
    Joint Force Structure, missions, and capabilities associated with
    changing priorities or requirements inherent in today's DOD strategic
    and programmatic guidance. Until we revise today's strategy--what we
    are asking our forces to do--we will not have a sustainable global
    force management plan for the expected fiscal environment. Regardless,
    I remain personally committed to not allowing across-the-board cuts
    with unchanged operational demands to hollow out the force.

        7. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, is the review an objective
    look at our national security commitments or an exercise to find at
    least $400 billion to a trillion dollars?
        Admiral Greenert. The need to reduce Federal deficits initiated the
    review. The review is part of the ``ways and means'' to an end state of
    remaining within fiscal guidance.

        8. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, if the Navy is asked to
    significantly cut budgets during your tenure as Chief of Naval
    Operations (CNO), what programs or other current activities do you
    think you can cut or scale back?
        Admiral Greenert. There are no obvious programs or activities to
    make further reductions. Today, the Navy is unable to meet unrestrained
    combatant commander demands. In the fiscal year 2012 budget Navy
    proposes to cut overhead to reinvest in our ability to provide forces.
    It would be imprudent to make further overhead reductions without first
    evaluating the impact of these cuts. Going forward, we will have to
    make reductions based on an evaluation of the level of budget cuts and
    the strategic priorities DOD establishes to defend the Nation. In
    meeting this challenge, my intention would be to:

             Prioritize readiness to ensure the force we have is
            fully mission capable
             Ensure our sailors, civilians, and their families are
            properly supported
             Sustain relevant Navy-unique capabilities that support
            the Joint Mission
             Ensure a coherent balance of capability and capacity
            of the force, and
             Consider the stability of the industrial base

                              navy ship readiness
        9. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, I remain concerned about what
    I see as an overall downward trend in ship maintenance funding and a
    commensurate rise in ship inspection failures. In a House Armed
    Services Committee hearing this week you testified, ``there is a
    consistent, downward trend in some indicators of material readiness
    since 2007. I don't see how we can keep at the current tempo of
    operations. I'm concerned we will not reach the expected ship service
    lives planned for in our shipbuilding plan. I can't tell you for sure
    if we're at a tipping point. However, we're on the edge.'' What, in
    your view, has caused this dramatic increase in inspection failures?
        Admiral Greenert. The singular and significant indicator of reduced
    material readiness has been higher failure rates for surface ships
    during inspections by the Navy Board of Inspection and Survey. Recent
    readiness reports by the Fleet indicate that this trend is turning.
    However, we will remain vigilant and proactive. We conducted a review
    of surface force readiness, which identified a number of root causes.
    These include reduced surface ship and intermediate maintenance center
    manning and the disestablishment (by BRAC 1995) of the surface ship
    life cycle engineering organization. These changes stopped updates to
    ship Class Maintenance Plans (CMP); eliminated the technical support to
    plan maintenance periods, and reduced the ability of crews to complete
    required maintenance.
        In response, we put executive-level oversight in place and
    initiated a multi-prong plan to improve surface ship readiness. This
    plan includes increasing surface ship manning (in progress) and
    restoring organizations to plan and manage ship lifecycle maintenance,
    including technical support for planning and conducting maintenance
    periods. We also significantly increased the fiscal year 2011 and
    fiscal year 2012 baseline ship maintenance budget submissions (compared
    to fiscal year 2010). Today, Navy's maintenance account is fully
    funded.
        While our ability to plan and conduct maintenance is much more
    comprehensive, an additional factor affecting surface ship readiness is
    the high operational tempo of the last 10 years. Since 2001, underway
    days per ship increased by 15 percent while Fleet size decreased by 10
    percent. This reduces the time a ship is available in port to conduct
    maintenance--even if it is pre-planned and fully funded. The Navy is
    investigating options to improve the balance between presence and pre-
    deployment training and maintenance requirements, in order to achieve a
    sustainable level of operations that is consistent with the size of the
    fleet.

        10. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, how do you intend to fix it?
        Admiral Greenert. Numerous initiatives are currently underway to
    reverse the identified negative trends in Surface Force readiness, and
    to ensure our ships achieve their Expected Service Life (ESL). Most
    importantly, Navy has established:

             A surface ship life cycle manager--Naval Sea Systems
            Command (NAVSEA), Deputy Commander for Surface Warfare (SEA
            21);
             A Regional Maintenance Center (RMC) Command for
            waterfront maintenance oversight--Commander, Navy Regional
            Maintenance Center (CNRMC); and
             A surface ship life cycle engineering agent--Surface
            Maintenance Engineering Planning Program (SURFMEPP).

        With the establishment of SEA 21 and CNRMC, the Surface Force now
    has organizations in place to manage fleet maintenance and
    modernization. CNRMC leads the development and execution of
    standardized processes, policies, and training at the RMCs, and is
    improving the management of multi-ship/multi-option private industry
    maintenance contracts. Under NAVSEA's guidance, the maintenance
    philosophy for surface ships now parallels the engineering and life
    cycle processes currently in place for carriers and submarines, which
    traditionally meet or exceed their design service life.
        SURFMEPP reports directly to SEA 21, and will re-establish the
    engineered requirements and CMPs necessary for surface ships to reach
    their ESL. Additionally, they are creating life cycle maintenance plans
    for each ship, based on the CMP and actual ship condition. As a result,
    the Navy now has a better understanding of the impacts from, and the
    ability to accurately track, deferred maintenance that must be
    accomplished in the future.
        The Navy is incorporating best practices into how we evaluate and
    improve material condition. We partnered with the American Bureau of
    Shipping (ABS) to help assess the material condition of our surface
    ships. We established the Surface Warfare Enterprise Assessment
    Program, supported by technical experts from the RMCs, to conduct ship
    material condition assessments, and are focusing on development and
    demonstration of new corrosion control technology, materials, and
    processes. Corrosion control assistance teams have also been
    established in each Fleet concentration area.
        The Navy increased surface ship manning by 1,105 sailors in the
    fiscal year 2012 budget submission, and is increasing military and
    civilian manning at RMCs as well. With increased RMC manning, we are
    reestablishing some intermediate maintenance capabilities and expanding
    intermediate maintenance capacity. This also increases shore-duty
    opportunities for Fleet Sailors, who can then return to sea with
    journeyman-level maintenance skills.
        Since fiscal year 2010, the Navy added significant resources to
    annual ship maintenance budgets, specifically targeted at surface ship
    maintenance. While fiscal challenges in fiscal year 2012 have required
    that some risk be taken in ship depot maintenance, we will work to
    minimize the impacts and continue the gains made in surface ship
    readiness over the last several budget cycles.
        I intend to continue to support these programs and expect that, as
    they mature, Fleet material readiness will improve. I anticipate it
    will take a long-term deliberate effort to deliver consistent tangible
    improvements. The first depot maintenance availabilities planned under
    SURFMEPP are scheduled to occur in fiscal year 2012. I expect ships to
    meet Fleet standards and we will continue to closely monitor the
    Fleet's progress. I am confident that the improvements we are making,
    based on proven Navy and industry practices, are on the right course.

            navy's submarine programs--ohio-class and virginia-class
        11. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, I note in the answers to your
    advance policy questions you cite $5.6 billion for the first two hulls
    with a goal to reach $4.9 billion. The Ohio-class replacement SSGNs are
    expected to run about $6 billion each and the Virginia-class submarines
    cost about $2 billion each, under the current multi-year procurement
    plan. With more than half of the construction and development cost
    dollars being needed to build extraordinarily expensive nuclear
    submarines, I'm concerned that our commitment to submarines may be
    crowding out funding needed to modernize the surface fleet. Given a
    $400 billion target for reductions in the DOD budget, and potentially
    up to a trillion dollar cut, can we afford new submarines that cost
    that much money?
        Admiral Greenert. Although a significant capital investment,
    submarines are extraordinarily important to our Nation's security.
    Attack submarines (SSN) are uniquely capable and possess access-denial
    capabilities to gather intelligence or perform multiple combat
    missions--creating considerable strategic uncertainty for an adversary.
    Ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) are the most survivable leg of our
    Nation's nuclear deterrent triad.
        While we have reduced the cost of the Ohio Replacement SSBN
    substantially, our total shipbuilding budget will be pressurized in the
    2020s as we seek to recapitalize our surface and submarine forces while
    sustaining warfighting readiness and supporting our people. To
    accommodate SSBN recapitalization we are considering reducing (in the
    30-year Shipbuilding Plan) SSN procurement to one per year (from the
    current two) in the mid-2020s while maintaining the same approximate
    build rate for surface combatants. In that same timeframe however, many
    of our existing cruisers, destroyers, and SSNs will reach the end of
    their service lives. As a result, the number of surface combatants and
    SSNs may go below our current goal in the mid-2020s; while amphibious
    ships will remain above their goal until the 2030s.
        I am confident our near-term force structure plans provide the
    capability and capacity we need to meet demands today, but within this
    decade we must determine how to best resource the shipbuilding programs
    required in the 2020s. The Navy will continue to consider mitigation
    strategies for these anticipated changes.

        12. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, how does the Navy intend to
    ensure that overall surface ship production does not substantially
    decrease while it's building submarines?
        Admiral Greenert. The Navy remains committed to sustaining the
    force structure required to implement the Maritime Strategy. Our
    current shipbuilding plan continues to grow the fleet within available
    resources over the next decade.
        In the 2020s, several factors will challenge our ability to sustain
    the fleet capacity needed to meet today's level of operational demand.
    Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) must be recapitalized in
    that timeframe to sustain the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad
    while many of today's attack submarines (SSN) and large surface
    combatants will reach their end of service life and be decommissioned.
    During the years in which the new SSBN is being procured, construction
    of other ship types will be reduced, impacting our force size and the
    shipbuilding industrial base.
        To reduce costs and minimize the impact on other ship construction,
    the Ohio Replacement Program has been thoroughly reviewed. All aspects
    of the program (warfighting requirements, program execution, design,
    and construction efforts) were aggressively challenged to drive down
    non-recurring engineering and construction costs while still meeting
    the core military requirements for a survivable nuclear deterrent. In
    all shipbuilding programs, the Navy continually strives to reduce
    costs, specifically through designs that reduce total ownership and
    acquisition costs, establishment of reasonable operational and
    maintenance requirements, and prudent planning for future disposal.
        While the threats, demands, and mission requirements for mid to
    late 2020s are not well understood, we will continue to consider
    mitigation strategies for the anticipated shortfalls in fleet capacity.
    The Navy is planning to manage the service lives and modernization of
    existing ships during this period to minimize block obsolescence. As
    requirements, available resources, and the industrial landscape come
    into better focus, the Navy will procure the most appropriate mix of
    ships to address the anticipated mission needs of combatant commanders.

                           navy shipbuilding strategy
        13. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, last year the Navy submitted
    to Congress its 30-year shipbuilding plan, calling for a 313-ship
    battle force inventory as its baseline. However, building the required
    force structure will largely depend on controlling shipbuilding costs
    (including related combat systems) within an affordable range. Will the
    Navy be able to maintain stability in requirements, funding, and
    profiles in an effort to control costs?
        Admiral Greenert. The Navy remains committed to sustaining the
    force structure required to implement the Maritime Strategy. By
    identifying efficiencies within Navy's portfolio, the fiscal year 2012
    President's budget added five ships from fiscal year 2012 to fiscal
    year 2016 to provide more stability and sustainability to the
    industrial base and better maintain fleet capacity. Our combined
    efforts with Congress and industry to stabilize production of ships
    such as the Burke-class destroyer and Virginia-class submarine have
    paid off in lower per-unit costs and more rapid production.
        In the 2020s, however, the cost of replacing the Ohio-class
    ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) will impact other elements of the
    Navy's shipbuilding plan. Recapitalizing this most survivable leg of
    the nuclear deterrent triad will occur at the same time many of today's
    cruisers, destroyers and attack submarines will be retiring. As a
    result, the number of large surface combatants and SSNs may decrease
    below our current goal in the mid-2020s. This would challenge the
    Navy's ability to maintain today's level of operations--if that level
    is required in the future.
        To maximize our ability to recapitalize the fleet during SSBN
    procurement, the Navy will carefully manage the cost of future
    platforms. We will balance the operational and technical requirements
    of future platforms against their cost before they are contracted. We
    will continuously evaluate force structure requirements over the next
    decade to determine how the force should evolve in the 2020s while
    staying within available resources. We will continue to rely on proven
    designs and technology as much as possible to reduce technical risk and
    cost risk associated with new platforms.
        The Navy is committed to maintaining stability in requirements,
    funding and profiles in an effort to control costs. This will require
    the combined efforts of and collaboration between the Navy, Congress,
    the shipbuilding industry and the combat systems industry.

        14. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, controlling shipbuilding
    costs will require the combined efforts of the Navy, the shipbuilding
    industry, and the combat systems industry. What is the Navy doing to
    encourage fixed price contracts and ensuring that requirements are
    approved by the leadership will not change? Please give some discrete
    examples by program type.
        Admiral Greenert. The Navy addresses the acquisition strategy for
    new shipbuilding programs early in the acquisition process as part of
    the Material Development Decision and prior to initiation of the
    Analysis of Alternatives. The strategy includes a planned contract type
    based on a consideration of the risk associated with the program. To
    reduce costs in general, the Navy shipbuilding strategy leverages
    existing production designs. Because this also reduces risk, fixed
    price type contracts are more easily negotiated. If technical risk is
    considered high because of new program elements, we look for ways to
    invest in prototyping during technology development to mitigate the
    risk and achieve fixed price type contract terms prior to detail design
    and construction. Currently, all shipbuilding contracts are fixed-
    price, except for the CVN-78 aircraft carrier and DDG-1000 since both
    are lead ships.
        The Navy continues to refine its Two-Pass/Six-Gate Review process
    to ensure requirements are set early and balanced against cost, and
    that this balance is visible and managed throughout the acquisition
    process. The Navy has also strengthened acquisition policy to improve
    program oversight, control cost growth, and more effectively monitor
    contractor performance.
        For example, prior to Milestone A approval for the Ohio Replacement
    submarine, the Department evaluated numerous capability trades to
    reduce costs. As a result, the Navy (OPNAV and Secretariat staffs) made
    trades in the number of ballistic missile tubes, the diameter of those
    tubes, the number of torpedoes to be carried, acoustic sensors, and
    other defensive features throughout the design. These trades made the
    submarine more affordable while maintaining the necessary level of
    capability, resulting in a reduction of the projected cost to an
    objective cost of $4.9 billion (fiscal year 2010 $) for hulls 2-12.

                                    ddg-1000
        15. Senator McCain. Admiral Greenert, 13 years ago, the Navy began
    what we now call the DDG-1000 program and over that time taxpayers have
    invested over $10 billion. For that investment in time and money, we
    have to show one partially completed ship and no additional combat
    capability. At last report, the Navy and the builder of the DDG-1000
    class were at loggerheads over contract negotiations for the last two
    DDG-1000 ships. What is the status of this program and why shouldn't it
    be killed and the savings transferred to other shipbuilding programs,
    like the DDG-51 series ships that will have BMD capability that we have
    a growing need for?
        Admiral Greenert. Work on DDG-1000 and DDG-1001 at Bath Iron Works
    (BIW) is progressing well. DDG-1000 is over 50-percent complete and
    scheduled to deliver in fiscal year 2014 with an initial operating
    capability in fiscal year 2016. The second ship (DDG-1001) is more than
    20-percent complete.
        After careful and deliberate negotiations, Navy and General
    Dynamics BIW reached an agreement for pricing, terms, and conditions
    for construction of DDG-1001 and -1002. Details of the ship
    construction contract awards are expected to be finalized by the end of
    September. This agreement includes transitioning the partial
    construction contract for DDG-1001 into a full ship construction
    contract. The agreement also includes construction for DDG-1002. Both
    ships will be procured using fixed-price type contracts.
        DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class guided missile destroyers will be an
    optimally crewed, multi-mission surface combatant designed to provide
    long-range, precision naval surface fire support for ground forces and
    Marines conducting littoral maneuver and subsequent operations ashore.
    DDG-1000 features two 155mm Advanced Gun Systems (AGS) capable of
    engaging targets with the Long-Range Land Attack Projectile at a range
    of more than 63 nautical miles. In addition to providing vital precise
    and volume fires in support of ground forces and Marines, DDG-1000 will
    field advanced technologies such as signature reduction, active and
    passive self-defense systems, and enhanced survivability features that
    will, when appropriate, be incorporated into future ship designs.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
                            challenges in east asia
        16. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, please provide your
    assessment of our emerging security challenges in Asia.
        Admiral Greenert. I think you can divide our emerging security
    challenges in Asia into two broad categories: traditional and non-
    traditional.
        Addressing traditional challenges first, one of the most pressing
    concerns is stability on the Korean peninsula, especially in light of
    North Korea's impending leadership transition and continued economic
    decline. Shortages of fuel, food, and capital in North Korea could hit
    a ``tipping point'' in the near term that prompts large flows of
    refugees into South Korea or China. As last year's sinking of a South
    Korean naval ship and artillery strikes on a South Korean island
    demonstrate, North Korea's leaders remain unpredictable in the face of
    these challenges. We also continue to be concerned about North Korea's
    nuclear weapons, their developing ballistic missile capabilities, and
    their role in proliferating advanced weapons and associated technology
    abroad.
        The biggest issue worthy of vigilance in the region is China's
    emergence as a major power economically, politically and militarily. In
    my view, the PRC is still in the process of defining its role in the
    world. One key factor in this process is how the PRC leadership
    perceives the future U.S. role in the region. The U.S. Navy is
    important to reassuring regional allies and partners. But the Navy can
    also demonstrate to the PRC the benefits of international security
    cooperation in areas such as counterpiracy, disaster relief and non-
    proliferation.
        Beyond the Taiwan situation, there is increasing concern in East
    Asia about China's increasing assertiveness regarding maritime claims
    in the East China Sea and South China Sea. In both areas, U.S. naval
    presence plays an important role in reassuring our allies and ensuring
    that these disputes are settled peacefully, and that the fundamental
    rights of freedom of navigation and the flow of international trade are
    respected.
        Among nontraditional security challenges, two of the biggest long-
    term concerns are demographic trends and the potential effects of
    climate change. These will significantly influence the future foreign
    policy decisions of countries throughout Asia, and in some cases will
    challenge their internal stability.

        17. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, do such challenges require
    the United States to maintain adequate maritime and air assets in
    theater for the indefinite future?
        Admiral Greenert. Yes. As articulated in the Maritime Strategy, the
    Navy remains committed to advancing our national interests in the
    Western Pacific. Strong, consistent U.S. military presence is a
    critical symbol of U.S. commitment to the region, and a key ingredient
    of continued peace and stability there.
        Toward this end, we will remain vigilant, and evaluate and adapt
    our posture in the Western Pacific, including rotational deployments,
    forward stationing, and episodic operations with allies and partners.
    We also explore opportunities for more forward presence in the region
    that supports increased multilateral cooperation on maritime security
    and enhances our capabilities for assured Joint access to the sea, air,
    space, and cyberspace.

        18. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, as the United States faces
    growing challenges in East Asia and the need for budget austerity at
    home, what future role do you see amphibious ships and aircraft
    carriers playing in our force projection abroad?
        Admiral Greenert. Forward-stationed and rotationally deployed
    amphibious ready groups and carrier strike groups are essential to the
    U.S. Navy's ability to dissuade, deter and (if necessary) project power
    abroad. The synergistic application of the capabilities within these
    forces, while forward in the region, projects U.S. influence, responds
    to crises, and sustains key international relationships. Naval forces'
    posture--and inherent speed of response--show our commitment to the
    East Asia region, our partners and allies, and protect our vital
    national interests.

        19. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, this committee has long been
    interested in ensuring Taiwan's ability to defend itself. In your
    opinion, do continued arms sales and technical support to Taiwan's
    military lend to continued stability in the region?
        Admiral Greenert. Consistent with the provisions in the Taiwan
    Relations Act, the United States makes available to Taiwan defense
    articles and services in such quantity as may be necessary and
    appropriate. The United States Taiwan policy is based on our one China
    Policy, the three joint U.S.-China Communiques, and the Taiwan
    Relations Act and reflects longstanding U.S. policy towards Taiwan.

                         navy battle force requirements
        20. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, I believe investments in
    shipbuilding must be directed where necessary to ensure that the Navy's
    battle force remains equal to the challenges of today as well as those
    it may face in the future. Our shipbuilding program must represent a
    balance between the expected demands upon the naval fleet for presence,
    partnership building, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief,
    deterrence, and warfighting, as well as available future resources.
        With more than half of the construction and development cost
    dollars being needed to build extraordinarily expensive nuclear
    submarines, there is concern that our commitment to submarines may be
    crowding out funding needed to carry out ship modernization and
    construction of aircraft carriers as well as amphibious ships. This
    concern is exacerbated as the Navy faces an increasingly austere budget
    environment.
        I am concerned the financial resources may not exist in the coming
    years to maintain the long-time stated requirement of a 313-ship fleet.
    As such, how will the Navy ensure proper balance in our shipbuilding
    programs to ensure our combatant commanders have the ability to
    maintain security in their respective regions?
        Admiral Greenert. The Navy remains committed to sustaining the
    force structure required to implement the Maritime Strategy. Our
    current shipbuilding plan balances the projected demands for naval
    forces from combatant commanders against expected future resources,
    taking into account the importance of maintaining an adequate national
    shipbuilding industrial base. The plan strives to be realistic about
    the costs of future ships. It is also part of an overall budget
    submission that balances risk against available resources across the
    entire Navy portfolio.
        Today's fleet is unable to meet the unrestrained combatant
    commander demand for naval forces. Our current shipbuilding plan grows
    the fleet within projected resources over the next decade. While the
    Navy will continue to provide the best capability and capacity it can,
    combatant commanders will also have to explore innovative and
    alternative solutions to address the security challenges in their
    regions. We will collaborate with them in their endeavor.
        In the 2020s, several factors will challenge our ability to sustain
    the fleet capacity needed to meet today's level of operational demand.
    Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) must be recapitalized in
    that timeframe to sustain the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad
    while many of today's attack submarines (SSN) and large surface
    combatants will reach their end of service life and be decommissioned.
    During the years in which the new SSBN is being procured, construction
    of other ship types may be reduced, impacting our force size and the
    shipbuilding industrial base.
        To reduce costs and minimize the impact on other ship construction,
    the Ohio Replacement Program has been thoroughly reviewed. All aspects
    of the program (warfighting requirements, program execution, design,
    and construction efforts) were aggressively challenged to drive down
    non-recurring engineering and construction costs while still meeting
    the core military requirements for a survivable nuclear deterrent. In
    all shipbuilding programs, the Navy continually strives to reduce
    costs, specifically through designs that reduce total ownership and
    acquisition costs, establishment of reasonable operational and
    maintenance requirements, and prudent planning for future disposal.
        While the specific threats, demands, and mission requirements for
    mid- to late-2020s are not fully understood, we will continue to
    consider mitigation strategies for the anticipated shortfalls in fleet
    capacity. The Navy is planning to manage the service lives and
    modernization of existing ships during this period to minimize block
    obsolescence. As requirements, available resources, and the industrial
    landscape come into better focus, the Navy will procure the most
    appropriate mix of ships to address the anticipated mission needs of
    combatant commanders. The Department of Defense will also continue
    employing a comprehensive Global Force Management (GFM) process to most
    effectively allocate naval forces to the highest priority combatant
    commander requirements, and if necessary, re-task assets from other
    missions to support crisis response.

        21. Senator Wicker. Admiral Greenert, please give your view on the
    impact of submarine construction costs on surface-ship building,
    including amphibious ships, and how it may impact the shipbuilding
    industrial base.
        Admiral Greenert. Between 2011 and 2021, submarine construction
    should not impact our ability to sustain the surface fleet. According
    to our projected ship inventory, the number of large surface combatants
    will grow to 97, small surface combatants will return to today's levels
    after the retirement of the Perry-class frigates, and the amphibious
    fleet will reach our goal of 33 ship.
        Recapitalization of the Nation's sea-based strategic deterrent
    within the Navy shipbuilding account over a 15 year period (fiscal year
    2019-fiscal year 2033) creates significant challenges to Navy
    shipbuilding goals. While we have reduced the projected cost of the
    Ohio Replacement substantially, our total shipbuilding budget will be
    pressurized in the 2020s as we seek to recapitalize our surface and
    submarine forces while sustaining warfighting readiness and supporting
    our people. Pending funding relief from outside the Navy, to
    accommodate SSBN recapitalization we would plan to reduce our build
    rate for destroyers and cut our SSN procurement to one per year (from
    the current two) in the mid-2020s. In that same timeframe however, many
    of our existing cruisers, destroyers, and SSN may reach the end of
    their service lives. As a result, the number of destroyers and SSNs
    will go below our current goal in the mid-2020s, while amphibious ships
    will remain above their goal until the 2030s.
        While the threats, demands, and mission requirements for mid to
    late 2020s are unpredictable to some extent, we will continue to
    consider mitigation strategies for the anticipated shortfalls in fleet
    capacity. The Navy is planning to manage the service lives and
    modernization of existing ships during this period to minimize block
    obsolescence. As requirements, available resources, and the industrial
    landscape come into better focus, the Navy will procure the most
    appropriate mix of ships to address the anticipated mission needs of
    combatant commanders.
        It is difficult to predict the impact to the shipbuilding
    industrial base with any precision during the period the Ohio
    Replacement will be procured. The Navy remains committed to sustaining
    the force structure required to implement the Maritime Strategy and to
    work with industry to maintain a viable shipbuilding industrial base,
    since it is the key to our future adaptability.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Rob Portman
                                unmanned systems
        22. Senator Portman. Admiral Greenert, the Navy's unmanned systems
    master plan was released in 2004 and most recently updated in 2007.
    What are your intentions to update this plan and what priority will you
    accord planning, development, and acquisition of unmanned systems?
        Admiral Greenert. The Navy updated and integrated the 2004 and 2007
    unmanned system plans earlier this year. The 2004 Unmanned Undersea
    Vehicle Master Plan and the 2007 Unmanned Surface Vehicle Master Plan
    laid out a vision for development and employment of unmanned systems in
    the undersea and sea surface domains, respectively. Those documents
    were developed by the undersea and surface warfare communities,
    respectively, supported by their technical communities and fleet
    counterparts.
        With the establishment of Navy's Information Dominance Corps in
    2010, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance
    (N2N6) assumed responsibility for unmanned systems across all domains--
    over, on and under the sea. This alignment is consistent with a
    significant purpose of these systems to collect and transmit
    information to support the warfighter. In January 2011, N2N6 developed
    a single roadmap for unmanned systems that updates and integrates the
    preceding domain-specific documents as ``The U.S. Navy's Information
    Dominance Roadmap for Unmanned Systems.''
        This updated roadmap describes how unmanned systems will add
    significant capabilities to the Navy's Information Dominance systems
    and platforms and act as a force multiplier for long-endurance,
    hazardous or high-threat missions where humans are limited in achieving
    mission success. The roadmap also identifies where unmanned systems can
    provide a viable alternative to ``traditionally'' manned missions. It
    focuses on the years 2011-2020 and guides development, production, and
    fielding of unmanned systems and associated support systems into the
    fleet. I intend to continue placing priority on the planning,
    development and acquisition of unmanned systems as guided by this
    roadmap.

        23. Senator Portman. Admiral Greenert, what are your thoughts and
    plans for how to evolve Navy personnel and related programs to support
    the unmanned systems technology?
        Admiral Greenert. Navy currently operates the majority of its
    unmanned systems as adjuncts to manned warfare systems. For example,
    the helicopter community employs the Firescout vertical takeoff and
    landing unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and the maritime patrol community
    operates the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance UAV. This approach
    maintains the focus of unmanned systems and their operators on needed
    missions, capitalizes on commonalities between manned and unmanned
    systems, and leverages the knowledge and experience of personnel in
    existing warfare communities. We will expeditiously move from
    ``adjacent'' to full integration.
        Training for unmanned systems is planned to be modular, and will
    leverage best-practices developed to support similar manned systems.
    Modular training for Navy unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) will allow
    standardization in common subject areas between systems with the
    flexibility to address specific mission requirements for each UAS. This
    approach to training allows aviation and non-aviation personnel to
    attend only those training courses required to attain the necessary
    skill sets to operate a specific UAS.
        Navy is currently working with other services to develop joint
    operational and training concepts using unmanned systems, and to
    determine if commonalities between systems will create greater
    capabilities and increased efficiencies.
        As unmanned systems technologies mature and inventories increase,
    Navy will re-evaluate the need for a separate unmanned systems
    community. As each new unmanned system is developed and integrated
    within the fleet, Navy manpower and personnel officials will ensure
    proper community management and career development for personnel
    involved in these systems. The Navy will also continue to assess new
    missions and evolving technologies to determine whether new or
    additional training, education, or experience will be needed to provide
    the required skills and expertise to maximize our return on investment
    in unmanned systems.

        24. Senator Portman. Admiral Greenert, recently, Admiral Roughead
    made comments to the effect that unmanned systems might be able to
    reduce the needs for manned forces, specifically unmanned undersea
    vehicles (UUV) in place of manned nuclear submarines. Do you see UUVs
    as an eventual replacement for manned nuclear submarines or in
    particular, manned nuclear submarine missions?
        Admiral Greenert. UUVs are not specific replacements for manned
    nuclear submarines (SSN/SSGN). It is unlikely they will have the
    autonomy, range or endurance to conduct the range of current manned
    submarine missions for the foreseeable future. UUVs will complement
    submarines by expanding their reach or conducting specific missions for
    which UUVs are particularly well-suited. Especially in the littoral
    environment, UUVs have significant advantages in cost, size, and
    ability to conduct higher risk operations compared to manned
    submarines. This will allow UUVs to take on new missions we would not
    or could not do with a manned platform. UUVs can also take on some
    current undersea tasks, freeing manned submarines for other critical
    missions.
        Over the past decade, unmanned systems have evolved from unique,
    stand-alone systems to an integrated part of our warfighting
    capability. The introduction of UAVs into the fleet has been a great
    success and I believe that we can duplicate this success with UUVs. I
    share Admiral Roughead's concern regarding UUV endurance and autonomy.
    These hurdles are being addressed and I believe that UUVs will
    eventually serve as a force multiplier and complement to our manned
    nuclear submarine force, as well as service in other peacetime and
    warfighting requirements.
        There is a very high demand for our manned submarine force in a
    variety of mission areas and theaters. This sustained demand in the
    face of decreasing submarine force structure will result in a submarine
    capacity gap. UUVs can be used to mitigate this capacity gap in some
    cases by performing important missions that may be allocated to a
    mission-focused UUV, rather than a multi-mission manned submarine. By
    combining UUVs and manned submarines as part of an overall undersea
    network, missions can be performed across a much larger area and for
    extended periods of time at a significantly reduced cost.

                               budget constraints
        25. Senator Portman. Admiral Greenert, given the budget pressure on
    the Navy, what is your position on using multiyear service contracts
    for underway combat logistics force services?
        Admiral Greenert. We are examining multi-year ``fee-for-service''
    contracts in the T-AO(X) Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). We have asked
    OMB for an opinion how such a construct should be scored, since
    previous long-term operating lease/service contracts have been scored
    as capital, vice operating leases, and would not necessarily be cost-
    effective compared to direct acquisition.

        26. Senator Portman. Admiral Greenert, is this approach being
    considered in the analysis of alternatives for the T-AO(X) program?
        Admiral Greenert. Yes. The Fleet Replenishment Oiler Analysis of
    Alternatives Scope and Tasking Directive lists a variety of financing
    including, ``consider various leasing options for a commercial tanker
    modified to provide refueling at sea, to include a fee-for-service cost
    option.''

                          all-electric ship initiative
        27. Senator Portman. Admiral Greenert, what is your assessment of
    the progress being made with the All-Electric Ship Initiative?
        Admiral Greenert. The Navy is beginning to realize the benefits of
    all-electric ship technologies. The flexibility of transmitting
    electricity around the ship instead of fuel or steam allows power
    generating and conversion modules to be installed and connected to
    propulsion or combat systems in the arrangement that best supports the
    ship's mission at the lowest total ownership cost. We are currently
    fielding several new all-electric technologies such as hybrid electric
    drives, advanced energy storage modules, and Integrated Power Systems
    (IPS) to meet increasing electrical power demands, enhance operational
    flexibility, and reduce fuel requirements. The Navy is also pursuing an
    open architecture approach for the next generation IPS, including
    electric propulsion, power conversion, generation, storage and
    distribution components, to obtain simpler, more affordable and more
    capable shipboard systems.
        The Navy has begun adoption of the all-electric or IPS
    architecture. The Lewis and Clark-class (T-AKE) dry cargo ships are
    powered by a commercial IPS, realizing reduced acquisition and life
    cycle costs. USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000), now under construction, will be
    the first fully militarized IPS ship, providing 78 megawatts of
    installed power for propulsion and ship service in a single, unified
    electrical system. USS Makin Island (LHD-8) is the first amphibious
    ship built with gas turbine engines and hybrid electric drive. This
    system has demonstrated significant fuel savings as compared with steam
    driven LHDs. The Navy will be demonstrating both hybrid electric drive
    and energy storage module prototypes on DDG-51 class ships in 2012 as
    part of the Green Strike Group. Acquisition of both of these energy
    saving technologies for backfit into existing ships is beginning with
    production systems expected in the Fleet by 2016.

        28. Senator Portman. Admiral Greenert, do you assess that
    development and testing for the electrification of submarine actuation
    is progressing to meet program goals?
        Admiral Greenert. Yes I do. Although the migration to the ``all-
    electric'' submarine has been slowed by funding constraints and
    schedule imposed by delivery dates, significant progress is being made
    toward achieving this goal.
        In support of exploiting the benefits of electric actuation,
    several families of reliable electric actuation components, which will
    replace their hydraulic counterparts, are being installed this year on
    a Virginia-class submarine for evaluation purposes. These components
    will be cycled through realistic operational scenarios to the same
    degree that their hydraulic counterparts are typically cycled during a
    deployment. Additionally, a retractable bow plane electrically actuated
    control surface system is under development for Virginia-class.
        The Virginia-class and Ohio-replacement submarine programs are
    already leveraging these electric actuation development efforts.
    Additionally, a common, open architecture, multiplexing controller for
    these electric actuators is under development to facilitate lower
    acquisition and life cycle costs. Final implementation of these
    electric actuators and the common controller on Virginia-class and Ohio
    replacement will continue to undergo evaluation as analysis is
    conducted and specifics of the detailed design process for each
    platform are developed.
        In addition, a Project Arrangement between the United States and
    United Kingdom is under development to perform land based comparative
    performance testing of both countries' submarine control surface
    electric actuation systems. This Project Arrangement will include
    sharing of test data and insight into alternative electric actuation
    prototypes.
                                     ______

                   Question Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
                             budgetary constraints
        29. Senator Ayotte. Admiral Greenert, in your response to the
    advance policy questions, you state: ``The Nation cannot have a strong
    defense without a strong economy; therefore I view the deficit crisis
    and corresponding deep cuts in defense as one of the most significant
    challenges to the entire national security community.'' Do you agree
    with Chairman Mullen that, ``The most significant threat to our
    national security is our debt?'' Please explain your answer.
        Admiral Greenert. Over the long-term, history shows that a nation's
    economic strength is the foundation of its national security. This has
    been true of the United States, as evidenced by our success in two
    World Wars and the Cold War. If our national debt grows to the point
    where it begins to tangibly and significantly erode our overall
    economic position, I think it could become a detriment to our national
    security. But, I believe this effect would take time to manifest
    itself. Our current economic challenge is a result of many interrelated
    factors, of which the debt is one element.
        My concern today is balancing the need to reduce our current
    deficits while minimizing the possibility our national debt will rise
    to a damaging level. We need to do our part. That means we have to
    deliver whole and effective warfighting capability and capacity in the
    most affordable manner possible. Achieving this is one of our most
    significant challenges.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, USN,
    follows:]
                        Nomination Reference and Report
                               As In Executive Session,
                                   Senate of the United States,
                                                         July 22, 2011.
        Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
    on Armed Services:
        The following named officer for appointment as Chief of Naval
    Operations, U.S. Navy, and appointment to the grade indicated while
    assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10,
    U.S.C., sections 601 and 5033:

                                 To be Admiral

        ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, 0000.
                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, USN,
    which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
    nomination was referred, follows:]
           Biographical Sketch of ADM Jonathan William Greenert, USN

      15 May 1953.............................  Born in Butler, PA
      30 June 1971............................  Midshipman, U.S. Naval
                                                 Academy
      04 June 1975............................  Ensign
      04 June 1977............................  Lieutenant (junior grade)
      01 July 1979............................  Lieutenant
      01 Oct, 1983............................  Lieutenant Commander
      01 Sep. 1988............................  Commander
      01 Oct. 1994............................  Captain
      25 Sep. 1998............................  Designated Rear Admiral
                                                 (lower half) while serving
                                                 in billets commensurate
                                                 with that grade
      01 Oct. 1999............................  Rear Admiral (lower half)
      Nov. 2001...............................  Designated Rear Admiral
                                                 while serving in billets
                                                 commensurate with that
                                                 grade
      01 Nov. 2002............................  Rear Admiral
      01 Oct. 2004............................  Vice Admiral
      28 Sep. 2007............................  Admiral, Service continuous
                                                 to date

    Major duty assignments:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Assignments and duties                  From          To
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    USS Flying Fish (SSN-673) (Electronics           June 1975    Mar. 1976
     Material Officer)............................
    Naval Nuclear Power School, Naval Training       Apr. 1976    Sep. 1976
     Center, Orlando, FL (DUINS)..................
    Naval Nuclear Power Training Unit, Windsor, CT   Sep. 1976    Apr. 1977
     (DUINS)......................................
    Naval Submarine School, Groton, CT (DUINS)....   Apr. 1977    July 1977
    USS Tautog (SSN-639) (Electrical Division        July 1977    Aug. 1980
     Officer).....................................
    Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet   Aug. 1980    July 1982
     (Underwater Fire Control Systems Officer)....
    Submarine (NR 1) (Engineer Officer)...........   July 1982    Oct. 1985
    Naval Submarine School, Groton, CT (DUINS)....   Nov. 1985     May 1986
    Trident Training Facility, Bangor, WA (DUINS).    May 1986    June 1986
    XO, USS Michigan (SSBN-727)...................   June 1986     May 1988
    Office of the CNO (Head, Submarine Programs       May 1988    June 1990
     Section) (OP-80).............................
    Naval Reactors, Department of Energy (PCO        June 1990    Sep. 1990
     Course)......................................
    Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet   Sep. 1990    Dec. 1990
     (PCO Training)...............................
    CO, USS Honolulu (SSN-718)....................   Dec. 1990    July 1993
    Strategic Studies Group Fellow, Newport, RI...   July 1993    June 1994
    Office of the CNO (Head, Program Planning and    June 1994    June 1996
     Development Branch) (N801)...................
    Commander, Submarine Squadron Eleven..........   June 1996    June 1997
    Commander, Seventh Fleet (Chief of Staff).....   June 1997    Oct. 1998
    U.S. Pacific Command Representative, Guam,       Oct. 1998    Jan. 2000
     Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,
     Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of
     Palau/Commander, Naval Base, Guam............
    Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy    Jan. 2000    Aug. 2002
     for Financial Management and Comptroller
     (Director, Operations Division)/Office of the
     CNO (Director, Operations Division, Fiscal
     Management Division) (N821)..................
    Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (Deputy and        Aug. 2002    Aug. 2004
     Chief of Staff)..............................
    Commander, Seventh Fleet......................   Aug. 2004    Nov. 2006
    Office of the CNO (Deputy Chief of Naval         Nov. 2006    Sep. 2007
     Operations for Integration of Capabilities
     and Resources) (N8)..........................
    Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command..........   Sep. 2007    Aug. 2009
    Vice Chief of Naval Operations................   Aug. 2009      To date
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Medals and awards:
        Distinguished Service Medal with two Gold Stars
        Defense Superior Service Medal
        Legion of Merit with three Gold Stars
        Meritorious Service Medal with one Gold Bronze Star
        Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with three Gold Stars
        Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal with two Gold Stars
        Joint Meritorious Unit Award
        Meritorious Unit Commendation with two Bronze Stars
        Navy ``E'' Ribbon with ``E'' Device
        Navy Expeditionary Medal with one Bronze Star
        National Defense Service Medal with one Bronze Star
        Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
        Armed Forces Service Medal
        Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with three Bronze Stars
        Navy and Marine Corps Overseas Service Ribbon
        Coast Guard Special Operations Service Ribbon

    Special qualifications:
        BS (Engineering) U.S. Naval Academy, 1975
        Designated Qualified in Submarines, 1978
        Capstone, 2000-4
        Designated Level IV Joint Qualified Officer, 2009

    Personal data:
        Wife: Darleen E. Hodges of Kalamazoo, MI
        Children: Jonathan R. Greenert (Son), Born: 01 May 1983
        Brian L. Greenert (Son), Born: 21 January 1985
        Sarah E. Greenert (Daughter), Born: 12 November 1988

    Summary of joint duty assignments:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Assignment                       Dates              Rank
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    U.S. Pacific Command                 Oct. 98-Jan. 00.......        RDML
     Representative, Guam, Commonwealth
     of the Northern Mariana Islands,
     Federated States of Micronesia,
     Republic of Palau/Commander, Naval
     Base, Guam.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
    military officers nominated by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by ADM Jonathan
    W. Greenert, USN, in connection with his nomination follows:]
                              UNITED STATES SENATE
                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                                  Room SR-228
                           Washington, DC 20510-6050
                                 (202) 224-3871
                        COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
          BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
        Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
    more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
    form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
    of your answer applies.
                        Part A--Biographical Information
        Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
    this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
    public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
    any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

        1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
        Jonathan W. Greenert.

        2. Position to which nominated:
        Chief of Naval Operations.

        3. Date of nomination:
        July 22, 2011.

        4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
        [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
    committee's executive files.]

        5. Date and place of birth:
        15 May 1953; Butler, PA.

        6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
        Married to Darleen Elizabeth Greenert (Maiden Name: Hodges).

        7. Names and ages of children:
        Jonathan R. Greenert, age 28.
        Brian L. Greenert, age 26.
        Sarah E. Greenert, age 22.

        8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
    honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
    or local governments, other than those listed in the service record
    extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
        None.

        9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
    officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
    or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
    enterprise, educational or other institution.
        None.

        10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
    professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
    other organizations.
        Knights of Columbus
        U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association
        U.S. Naval Institute
        U.S. Navy League
        U.S. Navy Memorial
        U.S. Naval Submarine League
        American Legion

        11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
    society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
    service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
    extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
        Distinguished graduate award, Butler Area Senior High School,
    Butler, PA, received: Jun 22, 2002.
        ``Who's Who in the East'' award, received: 2000/2001.

        12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
    if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
    constituted committee of the Senate?
        Yes.
        13. Personal view: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
    constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
    those views differ from the administration in power.
        Yes.
                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee
    questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
    the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
    are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                    ------

                               Signature and Date
        I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
    on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
    provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
    and complete.
                                               J.W. Greenert, ADM, USN.
        This 29th day of June, 2011.

        [The nomination of ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, USN, was
    reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on August 2, 2011,
    with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
    nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 2, 2011.]
                                  ----------

        [Prepared questions submitted to LTG Charles H. Jacoby,
    Jr., USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers
    supplied follow:]
                            Questions and Responses
                                defense reforms
        Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
    Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
    strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
    enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly
    delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities
    and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These
    reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and
    the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and
    education and in the execution of military operations.
        Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
    provisions?
        Answer. My first combat operation as an Army officer was to command
    a parachute rifle company in the U.S. intervention in Grenada in 1983.
    I witnessed first-hand the problems, deficiencies, and challenges we
    faced in conducting joint operations. A little over a year ago, I
    completed a tour as the Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq.
    This time, I witnessed first-hand the tremendous power, integration,
    and the unsurpassed adaptability and dominance of our joint force. I
    attribute the foundation of this remarkable transformation to be the
    Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.
        At this time, I do not see a need to modify the provisions of the
    Goldwater-Nichols Act. If confirmed, I will recommend changes to this
    landmark legislation, if needed.
        Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
    address in these modifications?
        Answer. Not applicable.
                           duties and qualifications
        Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
    the Commander, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)?
        Answer. The Commander, NORTHCOM, is responsible for defending the
    people and territory of the United States against threats to our
    Homeland. The commander is also responsible for security cooperation
    with Canada, Mexico, and The Bahamas, as well as providing military
    support to Federal, State and local authorities in response to natural
    or manmade disasters. The Commander's newest responsibility is to
    advocate for Arctic capabilities as assigned in the 2011 Unified
    Command Plan (UCP).
        Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
    the Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)?
        Answer. The Commander of NORAD is responsible for aerospace
    warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning of North America.
    Reporting to both the President of the United States and the Canadian
    Prime Minister, the Commander of NORAD provides both governments
    tactical warning and attack assessment through an integrated aerospace
    threat picture.
        Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
    believe qualify you to perform these duties?
        Answer. It is my privilege to have served over 33 years in a
    variety of positions from platoon leader to Commanding General, I Corp.
    In Afghanistan, Iraq, and Central America, I guided combined and joint
    task force headquarters comprised of soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    marines, and Department of Defense (DOD) civilians, as well as
    interagency and coalition partners. My current position as the Director
    for Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff has given me a clear
    understanding of joint, combined, and international operations; the
    role a combatant commander plays in theater security cooperation; the
    importance of interagency teamwork; and the interdependent role of all
    components of the Total Force--Active, Guard, and Reserves--in
    defending our Homeland and supporting civil authorities in times of
    crisis.
        Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
    take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander,
    NORTHCOM, and Commander, NORAD?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will take advantage of every opportunity to
    build on my experience of homeland defense and civil support
    operations. I intend to deepen my understanding of the threat posed to
    the United States and our neighbors by transnational criminal
    organizations (TCO), as well as the whole-of-government approach to
    defeat them. Another near-term activity, if confirmed, will be to work
    closely with The Adjutants General, State Governors, and the leadership
    of key Federal agencies regarding the vital role of National Guard and
    Federal Reserve Forces in our Nation's response to natural and manmade
    disasters.
                                 relationships
        Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the
    chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense
    and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant
    commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however,
    establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please
    describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander,
    NORTHCOM, to the following officials:
        The Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. The Commander of NORTHCOM executes his missions under the
    authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. He is
    directly responsible to him for the preparedness of his Command and its
    ability to carry out assigned missions. If confirmed, I will ensure
    NORTHCOM continues the close working relationship it currently has with
    the Secretary of Defense.
        Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. The Commander of NORTHCOM ensures the Deputy Secretary has
    the information and support he needs to perform duties as directed by
    the Secretary of Defense. The Commander of NORTHCOM also coordinates
    with the Deputy Secretary on major homeland defense and civil support
    activities.
        Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
        Answer. The Commander of NORTHCOM works closely with the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Policy in coordinating and exchanging
    information on strategic policy issues involving homeland defense,
    defense support of civil authorities, and security cooperation. In
    addition, the Commander interacts with the Under Secretary to support
    her duties as a key advocate for NORTHCOM requirements.
        Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
        Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is the
    Secretary's principal advisor on intelligence and counterintelligence
    matters. The Commander of NORTHCOM coordinates and exchanges
    information with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to
    obtain threat estimates and timely warning of worldwide threats to the
    NORTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR).
        Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
    and Americas' Security Affairs.
        Answer. The Commander of NORTHCOM works closely with the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security
    Affairs on homeland defense, defense support of civil authorities, and
    security cooperation issues.
        Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        Answer. The Chairman is not in the chain of command of the
    Commander of NORTHCOM to the President and the Secretary; however,
    title 10 does allow for communications from combatant commanders
    through the Chairman. This keeps the Chairman informed so that he can
    execute responsibilities as the principal military advisor to the
    President and Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will communicate
    closely with the Chairman to enable him to perform his duties.
        Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
        Answer. The Secretaries of the military departments are responsible
    for organizing, training, and equipping forces assigned to all the
    combatant commands. The Commander of NORTHCOM works closely with the
    Secretaries to ensure homeland defense, civil support, and security
    cooperation requirements are met. This interaction is particularly
    important to ensure the Reserve component is prepared to respond to
    domestic crises.
        Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
        Answer. The Commander of NORTHCOM exchanges information with the
    Chiefs of Staff of the Services to support their responsibility for
    organizing, training and equipping forces for homeland defense and
    civil support operations, as well as security cooperation activities.
    Additionally, the Commander of NORTHCOM communicates with the Chiefs on
    force protection matters within the command's AOR. Similar to the
    Chairman, the Service Chiefs are valuable sources of judgment and
    advice for combatant commanders.
        Question. The other combatant commanders, particularly U.S.
    Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).
        Answer. The Commander of NORTHCOM maintains close relationships
    with the other combatant commanders, particularly SOUTHCOM, U.S.
    Strategic Command, U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Special Operations
    Command, and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). These relationships are
    characterized by mutual support, frequent contact, and productive
    exchanges of information on key issues. If confirmed, I will maintain
    open lines of communication with the other combatant commands to
    execute our National Military Strategy.
        Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
        Answer. National Guard forces are likely to be involved in almost
    all homeland defense and civil support missions. As such, close
    coordination between the Commander of NORTHCOM and the Chief of the
    National Guard Bureau is central to the success of these operations. If
    confirmed, I look forward to advancing this important relationship to
    strengthen our homeland defense and disaster response capabilities.
        Question. The State Governors and Adjutants General.
        Answer. State Governors and the Adjutants General play a critical
    role in NORTHCOM's homeland defense and defense support of civil
    authorities missions. If confirmed, I look forward to maintaining and
    developing strong relationships with these key partners, and especially
    sustaining the great teamwork and trusting relationships that Admiral
    Winnefeld has established.
        Question. If confirmed, in carrying out your duties, how would you
    work with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Homeland
    Security Council, and other Federal agencies, as well as state and
    local authorities and representatives from the private sector?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work operational issues with the DHS
    and other Federal agencies on a routine basis. If confirmed, I intend
    to communicate with local, State, and Federal agencies, as well as the
    private sector both personally and via the NORTHCOM Joint Interagency
    Coordination Group, to facilitate DOD assistance in accordance with the
    National Response Framework, and as directed by the President and the
    Secretary of Defense. I also look forward to having close working
    relationships with the senior leadership of each of these entities.
                         major challenges and problems
        Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
    confront the next Commander, NORTHCOM?
        Answer. I believe the biggest near-term challenge confronting the
    next Commander of NORTHCOM is the potential for an attack on our
    Homeland by violent extremists using asymmetric means or possibly
    weapons of mass destruction. Another immediate threat to our national
    security is the growing demand for illegal drugs in the United States,
    which is contributing to increasingly brutal and aggressive actions by
    TCOs in Mexico. In the longer term, the possibility of rogue nations
    acquiring nuclear weapons and the capability to use them against our
    Homeland may be a continuing challenge for the Commander of NORTHCOM.
        Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
    addressing these challenges?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure NORTHCOM's plans and operations
    effectively address the full spectrum of threats to its AOR. In
    addition, if confirmed, I will strengthen the command's already robust
    exercise program, involving participants from DOD, the National Guard,
    and the interagency community, as well as State and local officials, to
    challenge and improve our Nation's capability to detect, deter, and
    defeat threats to our Homeland.
                        mission of u.s. northern command
        Question. What is the mission of NORTHCOM?
        Answer. NORTHCOM conducts homeland defense and civil support
    operations within its assigned AOR in order to defend and secure the
    United States and its interests. In addition, the command is
    responsible for executing theater security cooperation with Mexico,
    Canada, and The Bahamas, with full respect for their sovereignty.
    NORTHCOM also advocates for Arctic capabilities in accordance with the
    2011 UCP.
        Question. How does NORTHCOM's mission relate to the mission of the
    DHS?
        Answer. DHS is responsible for preventing terrorist attacks, as
    well as response and recovery from natural and manmade disasters.
    NORTHCOM is responsible for detecting, deterring, and preventing
    external threats to the United States, and when directed by the
    President or Secretary of Defense, providing defense support of civil
    authorities. NORTHCOM works closely with the DHS at all levels to plan,
    train for, and execute homeland defense and civil support missions and
    bring a whole-of-government approach to each operational challenge.
        Question. Are there circumstances under which you would anticipate
    NORTHCOM would have the lead Federal role in responding to a domestic
    terrorist incident? Or do you believe NORTHCOM would operate only in
    support of other Federal departments and agencies?
        Answer. In the event of an armed terrorist attack against the
    United States, the President may direct that DOD have the lead role in
    defending the United States. As the geographic combatant command
    responsible for the homeland, the Commander of NORTHCOM would likely be
    designated the supported commander for such an event. However, for most
    terrorist incidents within the United States, NORTHCOM will be in
    support of a primary agency, such as DHS, the Department of Justice, or
    the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
        Question. What responsibility, if any, does NORTHCOM have with
    respect to the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program?
        Answer. I understand that NORTHCOM's responsibility is defined by
    the January 2010 Secretary of Defense directive on critical
    infrastructure, which designates NORTHCOM as ``responsible for
    preventing or mitigating the loss or degradation of DOD-owned critical
    assets within its AOR.''
                           organization and authority
        Question. NORTHCOM has been assigned responsibility for force
    protection and antiterrorism within its AOR.
        What actions would you take, if confirmed, to mitigate force
    protection vulnerabilities, and what force protection challenges do you
    anticipate you would face within NORTHCOM's AOR?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will place emphasis on executing a
    synchronized and coordinated antiterrorism program and force protection
    mission across the NORTHCOM AOR. As part of this, if confirmed, I will
    continue the progress made in the area of rapid force protection event
    notification, the use of the e-Guardian system, and the sharing of
    sensitive force protection threat information between law enforcement
    and DOD.
        If confirmed, I anticipate that a force protection challenge may be
    to synchronize and effectively execute emerging force protection and
    security-related policy that is new for DOD. Among the new policy
    initiatives are DOD's Mission Assurance Strategy, the Defense Security
    Enterprise, and potentially, a new emergency management policy
    resulting from the Fort Hood Independent Review process.
        Question. What actions would you take, if confirmed, to ensure
    efficiency in the use of funding for force protection and to prevent
    unnecessary duplication of efforts between NORTHCOM, the Military
    Services, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Homeland Defense?
        Answer. I believe a comprehensive resource management approach
    requires the linking of missions, risks, and force protection
    resources. Although NORTHCOM does not have ``oversight authority'' over
    how the Services execute funding, if confirmed, I will work closely
    with the Service components and DOD to identify and eliminate gaps in
    our force protection posture. Projects relating to biometrically-
    enabled installation access control, identity management, and
    mitigation of vulnerabilities relating to Defense Critical
    Infrastructure are a few examples where I believe force protection
    efficiencies can be identified. If confirmed, I will ensure all Service
    component requests for combatant commander initiative funds for force
    protection initiatives are properly validated and vetted before they
    are submitted for final approval.
        Question. What specific forces, if any, have been assigned to
    NORTHCOM?
        Answer. NORTHCOM's assigned forces include the Headquarters Staff,
    as well as the following subordinate and component commands: U.S. Army
    North, Marine Forces North, Air Forces Northern, Joint Task Force Civil
    Support, Joint Task Force North and Joint Force Headquarters National
    Capital Region.
        Question. How has the assignment of forces to NORTHCOM changed
    since NORTHCOM was established on October 1, 2002?
        Answer. NORTHCOM achieved full operational capability on 1 October
    2003, with forces assigned consisting of the Service component
    headquarters and two standing Joint Task Force headquarters. The
    following year, the Command stood up a third Joint Task Force, Joint
    Force Headquarters National Capital Region. In 2008, NORTHCOM was
    assigned forces in support of the standing Chemical, Biological,
    Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Consequence
    Management Execute Order for a period of 12 months (October 2008-
    September 2009). In October 2009, the decision was reversed and CBRNE
    Consequence Management forces converted back to an allocated status,
    per the 2010 Global Force Management Allocation Plan. In 2011,
    NORTHCOM's Standing Joint Forces Headquarters was disestablished and
    those resources were re-allocated within NORTHCOM's Operations
    Directorate.
                                     norad
        Question. What is the mission of NORAD?
        Answer. NORAD conducts aerospace warning, aerospace control, and
    maritime warning in the defense of North America. Aerospace warning
    consists of detection, validation, and warning of an attack against
    North America. Aerospace control consists of air sovereignty and air
    defense of United States and Canadian airspace. Maritime warning
    consists of processing, assessing, and disseminating maritime
    intelligence and information and warning of maritime threats to or
    attacks against North America.
        Question. How has NORAD's mission evolved since the creation of
    NORTHCOM?
        Answer. Since the creation of NORTHCOM in 2002, NORAD's mission has
    expanded to include warning of maritime threats to or attacks against
    North America. NORAD also provides ballistic missile warning to
    NORTHCOM to support its ballistic missile defense mission.
        Question. How does NORAD's mission relate to NORTHCOM's mission?
        Answer. The missions of NORAD and NORTHCOM are distinctly separate,
    but complementary. NORAD conducts operations in the air domain and
    provides NORTHCOM warning of maritime threats to or attacks against
    North America, as well as warning of ballistic missile attack. NORTHCOM
    conducts land and maritime defense, U.S.-only air missions, and civil
    support. The commands coordinate on many issues, operate within a
    common security environment, and share a largely integrated
    headquarters staff.
        Question. How does NORAD's mission relate to the mission of the
    DHS?
        Answer. NORAD supports DHS by deterring threats in the air and
    maritime domains and supporting law enforcement when called upon by
    civilian agencies.
        Question. Do you believe that NORAD should continue to have a
    combined operations and planning staff, and a consolidated command
    center, with NORTHCOM? Why or why not?
        Answer. At this time, I do not have an informed opinion on the
    merits of separate operations and planning staffs for NORAD and
    NORTHCOM. However, if confirmed, I will ensure the commands are
    structured to maximize operational effectiveness.
                           northcom joint task forces
        Question. Since the establishment of NORTHCOM, several multi-
    service task forces, e. g., Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS),
    Joint Task Force-North (JTF-North), have been placed under its
    authority.
        What is the current status of the Joint Task Force organizations
    under NORTHCOM in terms of mission, organization, planning, personnel
    allocation, and capability?
        Answer. NORTHCOM currently has two Joint Task Forces organized
    under U.S. Army North:

              JTF-CS provides command and control of DOD incident
            management forces that respond to catastrophic chemical,
            biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive
            events.
              JTF-North supports counterdrug and border patrol support
            along the United States-Canada and southwestern United States
            border, and other operations against transnational threats.

        Also, NORTHCOM's Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region
    provides land-based homeland defense, civil support, and incident
    management in the National Capital Region.
        These three task forces operate as multi-Service organizations
    under NORTHCOM's authority and are manned to conduct homeland defense
    and defense support of civil authorities operations, as directed by the
    President or the Secretary of Defense. Their planning efforts are
    guided through NORTHCOM's family of plans for homeland defense and
    defense support to civil authorities.
                           counter-narcotics efforts
        Question. Each year, DOD spends several hundred million dollars to
    counter the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, yet the
    availability of drugs on the street has not been significantly reduced,
    and some countries continue to face internal security challenges in
    responding to this threat. Some of these funds are executed within the
    NORTHCOM AOR, and some have questioned the effectiveness and focus of
    our counter-narcotics programs.
        What role does NORTHCOM play in DOD's overall counterdrug mission
    and organization?
        Answer. It is my understanding that NORTHCOM and its subordinate
    and component commands support the DOD counterdrug mission in both the
    domestic arena and with our international host nation partners.
    Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) are a regional,
    hemispheric, and global threat to national security and interests.
    These transnational threats include drugs and other illicit trafficking
    activities. NORTHCOM has a very close relationship with SOUTHCOM and
    continues to build closer relationships with the other combatant
    commands in sharing information and situational awareness of TCO
    activities. NORTHCOM also works very closely with its host nation
    partners within its AOR, including its Canadian partners and with The
    Bahamas on counterdrug matters.
        Question. What is your assessment of the ongoing counternarcotics
    operations within the NORTHCOM AOR and the geographic seam NORTHCOM
    shares with SOUTHCOM?
        Answer. As I understand it, counternarcotics operations in the
    NORTHCOM AOR are conducted at the local, State, Federal, and bi-lateral
    level. As Joint Interagency Task Force-South succeeds in interdicting
    an increasing amount of the traffic heading to North America, TCOs
    quickly adapt to continue the flow of illicit drugs. Drug demand is a
    significant challenge in our country and the United States, and our
    neighbors together are trying to approach this and the flow of drugs as
    a whole-of-government(s) approach to the problem.
        The geographic boundary between SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM is a key
    route for drugs to enter Mexico on their way to the United States. My
    understanding is that the two commands are working closely on a
    regional approach in support of Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize. The
    Mexican government's efforts against TCOs have forced drug trafficking
    activities further south in these border countries where those
    governments have limited capability and capacity to fight TCOs. If
    confirmed, I will work to ensure a synchronized, seamless effort across
    borders between the two areas of responsibility (AOR). If confirmed, I
    will also further strengthen the command's relationship between Joint
    Interagency Task Force-South and NORTHCOM's Headquarters and
    subordinate commands, and continue to facilitate coordinated efforts
    with interagency and host nation partners.
        Question. How are counterdrug operations coordinated across
    combatant command boundaries with PACOM?
        Answer. Counterdrug operations on the boundaries with PACOM are
    coordinated via shared intelligence information among combatant
    commands, interagency partners, and the National Interdiction Centers,
    which includes PACOM's Joint Interagency Task Force-West. I believe
    synchronization between combatant commands is critical to counterdrug
    operations, and even more important is bringing to bear the resources
    of the Nation (a whole-of-government approach) to truly achieve unity
    of effort. If confirmed, I will continue to foster a strong
    relationship with PACOM.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will examine NORTHCOM's relationship with
    the other combatant commands and determine if any changes are needed.
        Question. How would you recommend that the success of the
    Department's counter-narcotics programs be measured?
        Answer. As I've served in many capacities over the last 10 years of
    my career as a Commanding General, I've seen that being a commander is
    a time for assessing how command missions are being executed and then
    taking appropriate actions as needed. If confirmed, I commit to looking
    closely at the current capabilities and partnering efforts in place, as
    well as the resultant effects, and provide you my thoughts on this
    important effort.
        Question. Do you believe that the current programs that the
    Department is pursuing are the most effective for the region, or should
    the Department's efforts focus elsewhere?
        Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to developing my personal
    views regarding the Department's programs for Mexico and its neighbors
    to improve the success of countering the threats from TCOs.
        Question. Compared to other missions that you would be responsible
    for as Commander, NORTHCOM, if confirmed, where would you rank counter-
    narcotics in terms of its contribution to our national security and the
    ability of DOD to make a meaningful contribution?
        Answer. I believe that there is no higher priority mission for
    NORTHCOM than to defend the United States and its interests. Yet,
    countering the devastating effects related to the TCOs and its
    importance relative to U.S. national security is a very important
    mission for NORTHCOM, and thus I would rank NORTHCOM's role in
    counternarcotics high. If confirmed, I look forward to contributing to
    the counternarcotics effort within the authorities granted to NORTHCOM.
        Question. There has been a surge in drug-related violence in Mexico
    over the past year, which has increased the risk of cross-border
    violence into the United States. Much of the drug supply comes into
    Mexico across its southern border. The vast majority of Latin America,
    however, is in the SOUTHCOM AOR, so the security situation in Mexico is
    an example of the need for a well-coordinated effort between NORTHCOM
    and SOUTHCOM.
        What is your vision of how SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM could work
    together in a fully coordinated and seamless fashion with respect to
    Mexico and other security challenges?
        Answer. I support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's
    belief that efforts to disrupt illicit sources and transit zones must
    be coordinated across North, Central, and South America, and the
    Caribbean. If confirmed, I welcome the opportunity to work with
    SOUTHCOM, the interagency community, and my Mexican counterparts to
    develop a regional strategy that harnesses the valuable lessons learned
    from Joint Interagency Task Force-South and the Mexican military's
    experience in confronting TCOs.
        Question. The United States and Mexico announced in 2007, the start
    of a multiyear, bilateral security agreement called the Merida
    Initiative. This Initiative aims to combat drug trafficking and other
    criminal activity along the U.S.-Mexican border, as well as in Central
    America. The U.S.-Mexican border is viewed as especially important for
    U.S. counternarcotics efforts because Mexico is currently the primary
    point of entry for cocaine and other drug shipments smuggled into the
    United States.
        What is your understanding of the Merida Initiative as it relates
    to NORTHCOM?
        Answer. I believe the Merida Initiative has placed us on the road
    to success in terms of the strong U.S. commitment to shared
    responsibility in countering the threat from TCOs in North America. The
    military contribution to the Merida Initiative is a relatively modest
    portion of the total package of support, most of which is law
    enforcement-related and is now making a significant positive impact in
    Mexico. The long-term success will depend on Mexico's capacity to
    sustain and advance short-term gains, and to give communities the
    confidence that they can restore the rule of law.
        Question. What is your view of the appropriate role of DOD in
    countering transnational drug cartels and gangs?
        Answer. In my view, the Department's role in countering TCOs is one
    of support for other U.S. Government efforts and our Mexican partners
    as well. It is my understanding that NORTHCOM is focused on
    contributing to the success of the objectives framed by the Beyond
    Merida Initiative: disrupt TCOs; promote justice, and the rule of law;
    build strong and resilient communities; and create a 21st century
    border. To these ends, the Department is focused on contributing the
    necessary capabilities and support to disrupt, degrade, or defeat TCOs'
    abilities that would negatively affect the national security and
    interests of United States and partner nations.
                 security relationships with canada and mexico
        Question. The NORTHCOM AOR includes the land areas of the United
    States, Canada, and Mexico. The bi-national NORAD Command ensures close
    cooperation between the United States and Canada on security matters.
    NORTHCOM has been working with the Mexican military on security
    cooperation related to Mexico's efforts to counter TCOs that are
    involved in trafficking and causing extraordinary violence. Joint Task
    Force-North (JTF-N) has established itself as a active partner with
    U.S. law enforcement, mitigating cross border threats posed by
    trafficking in narcotics, weapons, and humans.
        What is your assessment of the current security relationship
    between the United States and Canada?
        Answer. Canada and the United States are close friends, allies, and
    trading partners. U.S. defense arrangements with Canada pre-date World
    War II and are one of our country's most extensive defense pacts.
    Canada and the United States view North American defense and security
    as shared responsibilities. NORAD is symbolic of this close defense
    relationship and has served as the epitome of the unique and long-
    lasting security cooperation relationship between our Nations for over
    53 years.
        I believe the NORAD and NORTHCOM relationship with Canada is
    exceptionally strong, especially the relationship that has been
    developed with Canada Command. If confirmed, I will be honored to
    contribute to the long-standing partnership our country shares with
    Canada.
        Question. What is your assessment of the current security
    relationship between the United States and Mexico?
        Answer. My view is that the current security relationship between
    the U.S. and Mexican military is at its highest level ever at all
    echelons of command. If confirmed, I look forward to building upon many
    personal and professional relationships that have been formed by
    NORTHCOM. As discussed between the Presidents of Mexico and the United
    States in March 2011, the countries are strategic partners with shared
    responsibilities in the fight against the TCOs affecting the safety and
    security of North America.
        Question. What is your assessment of the security challenges to the
    United States posed by TCOs in Mexico?
        Answer. I believe that in today's increasingly globalized world,
    the prosperity and security of our friends and neighbors in North and
    Central America directly impact the welfare of the United States.
    Narcotics continue to be a significant security challenge to the United
    States and as long as there is demand within our borders, cash and
    weapons will continue to find their way into the hands of TCOs. TCOs
    not only traffic illicit drugs, they are involved in other significant
    criminal activity, such as extortion, robbery, kidnapping, trafficking
    in firearms and persons, and as evident in the 400 percent increase in
    violence over the past 3 years, they are extremely ruthless and brutal.
    Many of the TCOs are better financed and armed than many of the Mexican
    law enforcement agencies. This situation presents a substantial
    security challenge to the United States as it devastates the
    communities of our Mexican friends.
        Question. What is your assessment of the security situation along
    the U.S.-Mexico border?
        Answer. Responsibility for security along the U.S.-Mexico border
    falls under the responsibility of DHS. If confirmed, I look forward to
    working with the DHS and many others in the interagency community and,
    when directed by the President and the Secretary of Defense, providing
    DOD support to civil authorities.
        Question. Would you characterize NORTHCOM's efforts to protect our
    southern border, specifically JTF-N's countering of TCOs, as a success?
        Answer. I believe that given the counternarcotics resources
    applied, yes, I would characterize NORTHCOM's efforts as successful and
    making a difference, but this remains an economy of force effort. If
    confirmed, I look forward to examining NORTHCOM's efforts to support
    civil authorities on the border and making a first-hand assessment.
        Question. What is your understanding of NORTHCOM's support to civil
    authorities operating along the southern border?
        Answer. It is my understanding that NORTHCOM supports civil
    authorities when directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense.
    NORTHCOM has partnered with U.S. Customs and Border Protection and
    other interagency community partners to provide DOD capabilities along
    the U.S. southern border.
        Question. What improvements in border protection capability, if
    any, would you recommend?
        Answer. Since DHS is responsible for advocating for border
    protection capabilities, I would defer this question to the DHS.
        Question. If confirmed, what would be your goals as Commander of
    NORTHCOM for improving security relations with Mexico, and how would
    you plan to achieve them?
        Answer. If confirmed, my primary goal will be to continue to
    support the Mexican military to combat the threat of TCOs as
    effectively as possible while fully respecting Mexican sovereignty. The
    Mexican military has been asked by its civilian leadership to actively
    support Mexican law enforcement agencies to combat TCOs, while
    respecting Mexico's democratic ideals and the Nation's commitment to
    the Rule of Law and Human Rights. Mexican Security Forces have
    exhibited exemplary moral, political, and physical courage in combating
    TCOs. This struggle is being conducted on Mexican soil and Mexican
    families are being impacted by the recent escalation in TCO-related
    violence. If confirmed, I support NORTHCOM plans to continue to
    increase senior level Distinguished Visitor engagements, Subject Matter
    Expert Exchanges, Mobile Training Teams, and exercises with the Mexican
    Military to better counter the TCO threat.
                            unmanned aerial vehicles
        Question. Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight within the
    continental United States is severely restricted including portions of
    the Canadian and Mexican borders. The Federal Aviation Administration
    is studying how to integrate unmanned systems and conventionally
    piloted aircraft in the same airspace.
        In your view, have airspace restrictions on unmanned aerial systems
    (UAS) hindered the development and evolution of these aircraft?
        Answer. In my view, airspace management is more of a challenge to
    UAV employment, than it is to development and evolution.
        Question. Would you recommend opening larger parcels of airspace
    within the continental United States to UAS/UAV over flight?
        Answer. It is my understanding that only the Secretary of Defense
    may approve the use of unmanned aircraft systems for defense support of
    civil operations, including Federal, State, local, and tribal
    government organizations. If confirmed, in that case, I would
    coordinate airspace requirements for an operation with the lead agency.
                            northcom-state relations
        Question. NORTHCOM has the primary military responsibility to
    provide defense support to civil authorities when directed by the
    President and the Secretary of Defense, including consequence
    management operations. Such military assistance would support Federal
    assistance to State and local emergency response units.
        Do you believe it is important for NORTHCOM to have an
    understanding of the emergency response capabilities and plans of the
    various States before a crisis arises, in order to optimize NORTHCOM's
    consequence management support to civil authorities?
        Answer. Yes. It is my belief that State forces for consequence
    management, including the new Homeland Response Forces (HRF), are
    integral components of the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and
    Nuclear (CBRN) Response Enterprise. It is my understanding that the
    State National Guards, the National Guard Bureau and interagency
    partners such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency have
    participated in NORTHCOM's development of a plan for CBRN response. I
    believe that this unprecedented level of cooperation will ensure the
    success of the CBRN Response Enterprise in the whole-of-government
    response to a CBRN attack or incident.
        Question. If so, how would you plan to ensure that NORTHCOM has
    sufficient knowledge of State emergency response capabilities,
    including capabilities of National Guard units, capabilities of title
    10 Reserve component forces, and a good working relationship with State
    emergency response leaders?
        Answer. I understand NORTHCOM has an array of initiatives and
    efforts to sustain awareness of civil support requirements, including
    robust relationships between Defense Coordinating Officers and Defense
    Coordinating Elements and State emergency officials within their
    Federal Emergency Management Agency regions; the establishment of the
    Regional Desk Officer program at NORTHCOM headquarters; direct
    interaction with their assigned states by Title 10 Deputy Commanders
    under the Dual-Status Commander concept; and participation in state
    planning for HRFs as part of the Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
    and Nuclear Response Enterprise. In addition, DOD has established the
    policy and procedures to share operational plans with mission critical
    partners, to include Title 10 Reserve component forces, the National
    Guard of the States, and the National Guard Dual-Status Commanders. It
    is my belief that these efforts will enhance shared awareness of state
    military response plans and requirements. If confirmed, I will continue
    to support unity of effort in this important area.
                          force provision for northcom
        Question. NORTHCOM has the mission of conducting military
    operations for homeland defense and, when directed by the President or
    Secretary of Defense, for providing military assistance to civil
    authorities, including consequence management for natural disasters and
    Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high-yield Explosive
    (CBRNE) incidents. Yet NORTHCOM has relatively few military forces
    assigned to it on a permanent basis.
        What is your understanding of how forces are planned to be
    allocated to NORTHCOM for its full range of mission requirements?
        Answer. It is my understanding that NORTHCOM's contingency plans
    and orders for all assigned missions contain force requirements that
    are allocated by joint force providers. Forces are not normally
    identified and sourced until just prior to a planned event or impending
    incident, or immediately after a no-warning incident. The exceptions
    are the standing Execute Orders for Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
    and Nuclear Consequence Management response forces and the Homeland
    Defense Quick Reaction Force/Rapid Response Force. Additionally, under
    the Defense Support of Civil Authorities Operations Standing Execute
    Order, the NORTHCOM Commander has the authority to place certain
    military capabilities on a 24-hour prepare-to-deploy order in advance
    of or in response to a contingency or national emergency.
        Question. If confirmed, how do you intend to ensure that NORTHCOM
    will have sufficient forces available to it, properly trained and
    equipped, to accomplish its assigned missions?
        Answer. If confirmed, I intend to use the established Force
    Allocation Process to identify NORTHCOM's force requirements for each
    of its unique assigned missions to the joint force providers to ensure
    that allocated forces are prepared to support homeland defense and
    civil support missions. If confirmed, I will ensure that those
    requirements are matched with trained, equipped, and ready forces that
    meet NORTHCOM's mission requirements, using the Defense Readiness
    Reporting System to review unit readiness and training metrics.
        Question. If confirmed, how will you monitor the personnel,
    equipment, and training readiness of U.S. military forces (Active and
    Reserve) for homeland defense mission-essential tasks in support of
    NORTHCOM's contingency plans, and for its defense support to civil
    authorities (DSCA) missions?
        Answer. I understand that NORTHCOM has the ability to track the
    readiness (personnel, equipment, and training) of all DOD forces within
    its AOR. This includes both Title 10 and Title 32 forces, using the
    Defense Readiness Reporting System. For units assigned to NORTHCOM
    missions, if confirmed, I will work with the Services and the National
    Guard Bureau to validate their readiness.
                           northcom-dhs relationship
        Question. DHS is still a relatively new Federal agency, and is
    continuing to improve its ability to meet its homeland security
    missions.
        As the DHS improves and matures its homeland security capabilities,
    do you expect that will reduce the demands on NORTHCOM to provide
    defense support to civil authorities, including support for crisis
    response planning?
        Answer. It is my understanding that DHS capabilities to respond to
    disasters continues to improve and that the relationship between DOD
    and DHS is very strong. However, I believe that NORTHCOM will have an
    enduring mission to provide DOD support and capabilities to civil
    authorities in accordance with the National Response Framework.
        Question. What do you consider to be the appropriate role for DOD
    and NORTHCOM's vis-a-vis DHS and State authorities in identifying and
    validating the dual-use equipment and other requirements associated
    with defense and homeland security missions?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the role of NORTHCOM, in close
    coordination with other DOD entities, identifies dual-use equipment
    required to support civil authorities in natural or manmade disasters.
    I believe this is an appropriate role for DOD and if confirmed, I look
    forward to working with DHS and the States to identify equipment
    requirements.
                  response to christmas day aircraft bomb plot
        Question. There has been considerable confusion about the events
    surrounding the attempted bombing of a commercial U.S. aircraft over
    Detroit on Christmas Day 2009.
        Do you believe that NORTHCOM or NORAD have any responsibility for
    apprehending, detaining, or interrogating a terrorist suspect who tries
    to destroy an aircraft in flight inside U.S. airspace? If so, what is
    that role?
        Answer. No. I believe U.S. law enforcement agencies have the sole
    responsibility for the apprehension, detainment, and interrogation of
    any individual alleged to have committed a criminal act within U.S.
    airspace.
                                 national guard
        Question. There is still debate about the role the National Guard
    should play in homeland security and defense. In an April 21, 2008,
    letter to the committee concerning the recommendations of the
    Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Admiral Mullen, the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote that, ``I have some
    concerns about the Commission's ideas on enhancing the Defense
    Department's role in the Homeland. While Reserve component civil
    support requirements are important, they should not be of equal
    importance to DOD combat responsibilities.''
        Do you agree with this view of Admiral Mullen?
        Answer. Yes. All of our Armed Forces are organized, trained, and
    equipped for their primary mission to fight and win our Nation's wars.
    There are key roles the Total Force plays in civil support missions and
    it is important that our forces remained postured that important
    mission.
        Question. Do you believe that defending the homeland or civil
    support should become the National Guard's primary missions?
        Answer. No. It is my belief that the National Guard as a part of
    the Total Force has a critical responsibility in homeland defense and
    civil support missions, but should not be limited from participating in
    other vital DOD missions.
        Question. What is the current status of the working relationship
    between NORTHCOM, the National Guard Bureau, and individual State
    National Guard headquarters?
        Answer. It is my understanding that Admiral Winnefeld has greatly
    enhanced the cooperation and collaboration among NORTHCOM, the National
    Guard Bureau, and individual States' Guard headquarters. If confirmed,
    one of my priorities will be to ensure that these relationships
    continue to expand and mature as a natural extension of planning and
    executing NORTHCOM's missions.
        Question. If confirmed, what type of liaison relationships for
    planning and operational purposes would you advocate between NORTHCOM,
    DHS, Federal, State, and local first responders, and National Guard
    units under State authority?
        Answer. My experience in Afghanistan and Iraq solidified my belief
    in strong and transparent relationships with liaisons at all levels to
    coordinate and collaborate for planning and operational details. If
    confirmed, I will continue to enhance existing partnerships between all
    of NORTHCOM mission partners, and where appropriate, forge new
    relationships.
                        dual-status command arrangement
        Question. The administration, including Defense Department and
    NORTHCOM leadership, has been working with the Council of Governors to
    define appropriate means for Federal military support to the states in
    the event of natural disasters or other disasters. This effort has
    apparently produced agreement on a Joint Action Plan, and on the
    concept for using ``dual-status commanders'' in each State to ensure
    that Federal military forces are able to support the needs of the
    Governors.
        What is your understanding of the Department's plan of action with
    respect to implementing the agreement on a Joint Action Plan?
        Answer. My understanding is that the Council of Governors, DHS, and
    DOD endorsed the Memorandum of Agreement with the States earlier this
    month, paving the way for a Dual-Status Commander in each of the States
    and territories. I believe that NORTHCOM supports the DOD position to
    endorse the Joint Action Plan.
        Question. Do you support this effort to establish appropriate
    command and control arrangements between the states and the Federal
    Government to ensure that Federal military forces, including the
    Reserves, are available to support the needs of the Governors in time
    of crisis?
        Answer. Yes. I understand the dual-status command construct has
    been agreed to by the Governors and the DOD as a mechanism to
    strengthen unity of effort and improve speed of response to domestic
    emergency operations when Federal support has been requested and
    approved. If confirmed, I intend to continue to support the rapid and
    effective delivery of capabilities to citizens in need in order to
    mitigate the effects of major disasters or emergencies, whether natural
    or manmade, when directed by the Secretary of Defense or the President.
        Question. If confirmed, would you plan to continue working with the
    Council of Governors to improve coordination and collaboration between
    the Federal and state levels of government on the use of military
    forces for emergency response?
        Answer. I believe that the Council of Governors has been integral
    in the formulation of the Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity of
    Effort, advancing the Dual-Status Commander Memorandum of Agreement,
    and supporting legislation to allow Reserve mobilization for events
    that require DOD support of civil authorities. If confirmed, I welcome
    the opportunity to work with the Council to continue important progress
    in many areas aimed at improving our ability to meet our mission
    requirements and the needs of the citizens we serve.
                          cbrne response capabilities
        Question. NORTHCOM has two primary missions: Homeland Defense and
    Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA), including preparation for
    and response to an incident or attack involving Chemical, Biological,
    Radiological, Nuclear, or high-yield Explosive (CBRNE) materials or
    weapons, in the NORTHCOM AOR.
        If confirmed, how would you approach the challenge of ensuring
    adequate military forces, capabilities, and plans to respond to such
    incidents in support of civil authorities?
        Answer. I fully understand that failure is not an option in any
    CBRN response, and that speed is essential when responding. Moreover, I
    also understand that our partnership with the National Guard Bureau,
    the States, and other Federal agencies is critical to success, both in
    planning and in execution.
        If confirmed, I intend to leverage my predecessor's efforts in
    continuing to work closely with the National Guard Bureau, the States,
    and the Services to ensure all forces established to accomplish this
    mission are, and remain, properly manned, trained, and equipped, and
    that response timelines and command and control relationships during
    execution of this mission are clearly understood and verified.
        Question. There are currently a variety of organizations and units
    intended for CBRNE response and consequence management, including JTF-
    CS, the Defense Consequence Management Response Force (DCMRF), the U.S.
    Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF),
    National Guard HRFs, National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force
    Package (CERFP) units, and National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction
    Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs).
        If confirmed, how would you plan to manage this mix of capabilities
    to ensure the best possible response force to support civil authorities
    in the event of a CBRNE incident, and to avoid unnecessary duplication?
        Answer. I understand the existing two CBRNE Consequence Management
    Response Forces (CCMRFs) have, to this point, provided a responsive and
    flexible capability with federally-controlled forces that are trained,
    equipped, exercised, evaluated, and employed by NORTHCOM to respond to
    near-simultaneous incidents. The existing CCMRFs will stand down at the
    end of this fiscal year to establish the new CBRN Response Enterprise,
    directed by the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).
        I am also aware that the 2010 QDR directed the establishment of
    regional CBRN response capability by the National Guard, called HRFs,
    in order to leverage geographic proximity to quicken the response. I
    understand that establishment of the HRFs is ongoing, and recognize
    that challenges are likely as we fully implement the CBRN response
    enterprise concept.
        If confirmed, I will closely partner with the National Guard
    Bureau, and the States, to ensure implementation of the new CBRN
    Response Enterprise is completed as directed by the 2010 QDR and that
    existing forces are ready to answer the call when needed.
        Question. What is your assessment of the ability of the revised DOD
    Consequence Management Response Forces (DCMRF), as currently
    constituted, to provide a significant capability to support Federal
    civil authorities in the event of a CBRNE incident?
        Answer. My assessment is that each of these forces presents
    complementary capabilities that enhance an overall CBRN Consequence
    Management response. I understand that the new Defense CBRN Response
    Force is a relatively large force (5,200 personnel) that contains the
    required centralized capabilities to integrate with and support a
    Federal response under the National Response Framework. These
    capabilities include search and extraction, patient decontamination,
    medical triage and stabilization, air and ground casualty evacuation,
    mortuary affairs, information dissemination, communications, logistics,
    and a command and control structure to support integration of follow on
    forces.
        If confirmed, I look forward to seeing the readiness and capability
    of these forces and I will report to the committee if I determine there
    are any significant concerns.
        Question. How would you ensure the necessary level of coordination
    and planning between the DCMRF and National Guard HRFs to ensure an
    adequate response to a CBRNE incident?
        Answer. I understand that under the new CBRN Response Enterprise,
    planning activities are linked between States hosting regional HRFs and
    NORTHCOM to ensure integration between State and Federal plans. HRF
    plans are designed to support the States within the Federal Emergency
    Management Agency (FEMA) Region and also a national response.
    Therefore, HRF plans support the NORTHCOM Concept Plan (CONPLAN) and
    likewise, the NORTHCOM CONPLAN supports regional HRF plans. As I
    understand it, the National Guard Bureau and U.S. Army North have been
    closely collaborating during the development of these plans and if
    confirmed, I intend to further strengthen planning relationships and
    integrate other activities, such as readiness exercises to ensure an
    adequate, effective, and integrated response.
        Question. Do you believe that U.S. military forces providing
    Defense Support to Civil Authorities in the event of CBRNE incidents
    should be under the command of the Commander, NORTHCOM?
        Answer. When Federal forces respond to a CBRN incident, it would be
    at the request, and in support of the State Governor(s). If title 10
    forces do respond, I believe the Dual-Status Command arrangement may
    also be identified as a way to command and control these forces to
    achieve unity of effort. During execution, Federal forces can
    anticipate mission assignments, as permitted under the National
    Response Framework, but must always remain in consultation with State
    Governors and the designated Federal primary agency.
                              wmd-csts and cerfps
        Question. There is now at least 1 National Guard Weapons of Mass
    Destruction-Civil Support Team (WMD-CST) in each of the 54 States and
    territories, and there are 17 National Guard CERFP units. In addition,
    there are 10 HRFs planned, 1 in each FEMA Region.
        Do you believe the WMD-CSTs and CERFPs are appropriately organized,
    sized, trained, and equipped to accomplish their assigned missions?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the States' WMD-CSTs are
    appropriately organized, sized, trained and equipped to accomplish
    their assigned mission. If confirmed, I will review how NORTHCOM
    supports the training and readiness of WMD-CSTs through its Army
    component, U.S. Army North to ensure that they can accomplish their
    missions.
        Question. If not, what changes do you believe are needed?
        Answer. If confirmed, as DOD implements the new CBRN Response
    Enterprise, I will look for opportunities to recommend adjustments to
    the Enterprise to ensure a rapid and effective response to mitigate the
    effects of a CBRN incident on our citizens.
                                 cybersecurity
        Question. DOD recently issued its cybersecurity strategy. Cyber
    threats could affect both our military and civilian sectors in the
    United States, public and private.
        What is NORTHCOM's current role in cybersecurity within its Area of
    Operations, and how does it relate to the cybersecurity role of DHS?
        Answer. DHS is the lead Federal agency for national security policy
    and programs. I understand NORTHCOM is in a supporting role to the DHS.
    STRATCOM and its subordinate command, U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM),
    will support the technical aspects of mitigating a major cyber attack.
    NORTHCOM, in its role of protecting critical infrastructure within the
    homeland, will provide physical support to the DHS as part of the
    defense support of civil authorities' mission. If confirmed, I will
    work with the DHS to further refine these relationships.
        Question. What is the relationship between NORTHCOM and CYBERCOM?
        Answer. My understanding is that NORTHCOM works with STRATCOM and
    CYBERCOM on cyber issues ranging from attack mitigation to network
    defense. NORTHCOM is generally in support of physical aspects, while
    CYBERCOM leads on the virtual front from within the .mil domain.
             western hemisphere institute for security cooperation
        Question. The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
    (WHINSEC), which replaced the School of the Americas in 2001, has the
    mission of contributing to theater cooperation activities through the
    education and training of students in the Western Hemisphere from
    Canada to Chile. If confirmed, you will be a member of the WHINSEC
    Board of Visitors.
        What is the relationship between NORTHCOM and WHINSEC?
        Answer. The Commander of NORTHCOM serves on the Board of Visitors
    (BoV) for WHINSEC, which provides for an opportunity to contribute to
    the curriculum and ensure compliance with U.S. laws and policy. If
    confirmed, I look forward to serving on the WHINSEC BoV.
        Question. In your view, does WHINSEC promote the national security
    interests of the United States in the Western Hemisphere?
        Answer. Yes. I see WHINSEC as a school that teaches and influences
    future Latin American leaders in military topics as well as human
    rights. It is my belief WHINSEC's education and training have had a
    significant impact on the Latin American leaders in attendance annually
    from military, law enforcement, and civilian institutions.
        Question. In your view, how should NORTHCOM participate in command
    oversight and curriculum development?
        Answer. It is my understanding that NORTHCOM is already
    participating in command oversight and curriculum development for
    WHINSEC. In addition, the Commander of NORTHCOM serves on the WHINSEC
    Board of Visitors (BoV), which reviews and advises on areas such as
    curriculum, academic instruction, and fiscal affairs of the Institute,
    and if confirmed, I will continue this support. I believe the WHINSEC
    BoV reviews provide an invaluable contribution to ensure relevance and
    consistency with U.S. policy, laws, regulations, and doctrine.
        Question. In your view, what more, if anything, does WHINSEC need
    to do to emphasize human rights in its curriculum?
        Answer. I believe that WHINSEC must continue to emphasize human
    rights in its curriculum and address the concerns of human rights
    organizations. If confirmed, I will take a close look at this critical
    portion of the curriculum and advocate for any changes, if needed.
        Question. In your view, how can WHINSEC improve its outreach
    efforts to individuals or groups interested in its activities,
    particularly those who have accused the school of contributing to human
    rights violations by former students?
        Answer. I have not formed an opinion on this critical issue. If
    confirmed, I look forward to serving on the Board of Visitors and
    developing initiatives for broadened outreach efforts in support of
    their overall mission.
        Question. If confirmed, will you attend the WHINSEC Board of
    Visitor's annual meeting?
        Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will be honored to serve on the
    WHINSEC Board of Visitors and attend the annual meetings.
                           intelligence sharing/nctc
        Question. What is NORTHCOM's role and involvement in developing
    intelligence assessments regarding terrorist threats?
        Answer. It is my understanding that NORAD and NORTHCOM's
    Intelligence Directorate receives raw reports, information and analysis
    from other intelligence agencies and organizations within the
    Intelligence Community and within DOD. Command terrorism analysts
    review this information for threats to the NORTHCOM AOR. This
    information is analyzed and then developed into original threat
    assessments that are provided to the Commander, NORAD and NORTHCOM and
    component commands, tailored to support unique NORAD and NORTHCOM
    missions and responsibilities. This analysis is also provided to the
    wider Intelligence Community (IC) at large to supplement analysis and
    assessments generated by the other elements of the IC, adding to the
    greater collective body of information.
        Question. What intelligence agencies are involved in providing
    input to U.S. NORTHCOM's staff for the development of intelligence
    assessments?
        Answer. I understand that NORTHCOM receives and has access to
    information from all members of the Intelligence Community, as well as
    members of select Federal law enforcement entities. This information
    provided by other mission partners is the basis for Command analytic
    assessments and intelligence products. Multiple Intelligence
    organizations also provide senior liaisons to NORTHCOM to ensure
    seamless integration of analysis and operations. NORTHCOM liaison
    officers are likewise embedded in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
    National Joint Terrorism Task Force, the DHS's Office of Intelligence
    and Analysis, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and Canadian
    Defence Intelligence staff to ensure a synchronized understanding of
    significant terrorist threats that could necessitate command responses
    or preparedness.
        Question. What is the current relationship between NORTHCOM and
    NCTC?
        Answer. It is my understanding that in addition to the terrorism
    analyst NORTHCOM assigns to the NCTC, NORTHCOM terrorism analysts work
    collaboratively and frequently with NCTC analysts focused on terrorist
    threats to North America. The Command frequently sends analysts to
    support NCTC working groups and conferences to ensure Command
    visibility into developing threats which may impact NORTHCOM mission
    sets, particularly Force Protection, threats to the aviation sector, or
    threats with potential Weapons of Mass Destruction and Consequence
    Management implications. Command terrorism analysts also periodically
    augment NCTC analytic elements during National Special Security Events
    or other special events as appropriate.
        Question. Does NORTHCOM have representatives located at the NCTC on
    a daily basis? If so, what are their functions and responsibilities? If
    not, why not?
        Answer. Yes. NORTHCOM has a full-time civilian intelligence officer
    billet assigned to the Directorate of Intelligence in the NCTC.
    Additionally, NORTHCOM has assigned an active duty officer as an
    operations representative to the Directorate of Strategic Operational
    Planning at the NCTC. The objectives for these arrangements are to
    produce homeland threat analysis for the NCTC, while ensuring the
    Command has visibility into homeland threats that may affect NORTHCOM
    mission sets.
        Question. Do you believe NORTHCOM representatives at NCTC have the
    access to intelligence needed to fully perform their functions?
        Answer. It is my understanding that NORTHCOM's analyst embedded in
    the NCTC has excellent access to terrorist threat information,
    including information not shared directly with the Command or other DOD
    elements. NORTHCOM continues to work with NCTC to find the balance
    between greater information sharing and protecting sensitive
    operations, investigations, and sources.
        Question. How do posse comitatus, privacy restrictions, and other
    laws and regulations concerning the collection of intelligence within
    the United States, affect the way U.S. NORTHCOM receives and uses
    intelligence?
        Answer. It is my understanding that NORTHCOM is extremely careful
    to comply fully with intelligence oversight law and policy in
    conducting all intelligence activities in support of its mission. If
    confirmed, I will work hard to ensure all intelligence activities
    conducted in support of NORTHCOM operations continue to be reviewed by
    intelligence oversight specialists, thus ensuring the Command
    completely complies with law and policy.
                           ballistic missile defense
        Question. One of NORTHCOM's missions is the defense of the United
    States against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack from
    nations such as North Korea and Iran. The February 2010 Ballistic
    Missile Defense Review report stated as one of its policy priorities:
    ``Before new capabilities are deployed, they must undergo testing that
    enables assessment under realistic conditions.''
        Do you agree that it is essential that our deployed ballistic
    missile defense systems are operationally effective?
        Answer. Yes. Our deployed missile defense system provides a
    defensive capability against a limited number of missiles launched by
    potential adversary rogue nations. The spiral development process used
    to develop this capability relies in part on ensuring the defensive
    capabilities we have are indeed operationally effective. If confirmed,
    I will continue to work with all responsible agencies to ensure the
    system is operationally effective.
        Question. Do you agree that it is important to conduct
    operationally realistic flight tests to demonstrate the operational
    capability and reliability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
    system?
        Answer. Yes. The ballistic missile defense capability now fielded
    used a capability-based development process. This process allowed the
    United States to rapidly field a capability to meet the emerging threat
    posed by rogue nations developing long-range ballistic missiles. An
    essential part of that development process is an operationally-
    realistic testing program to verify the capabilities being fielded and
    ensure a complete understanding of those capabilities by all of the
    commands and agencies who support this mission and will employ these
    systems. Because our missile defense capabilities were tested and then
    fielded following processes to ensure operational effectiveness, we
    have a more complete understanding of our missile defense capabilities,
    and can continue to improve those capabilities over time to ensure we
    outpace developments in the threat.
        Question. Do you support the continued modernization and
    sustainment of the GMD system?
        Answer. I believe that continued modernization ensures the Ground
    Missile Defense (GMD) system will pace ahead of the threat. Continued
    sustainment of the GMD system ensures that the capabilities the Missile
    Defense Agency (MDA) has already developed and fielded will be ready
    when needed.
        Question. Do you believe that understanding and correcting the GMD
    program should be the MDA's highest priority?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Director of the MDA to
    balance the needs to continually assess and maintain our current system
    with development of future capabilities, as I explain my requirements
    as the combatant commander responsible for operation of the ground
    missile defense system.
        Question. The GMD system has experienced two successive flight test
    failures, and the Director of the MDA is working to fully understand
    and correct the problems that caused the December 2010 flight test
    failure, including verifying the correction with two flight tests,
    before resuming production of the kill vehicles for GMD interceptors.
        Do you agree that we should verify the successful correction of the
    flight test failure problem through extensive testing, and demonstrate
    that the system works before resuming production of the interceptor
    kill vehicles?
        Answer. Yes. I understand the ballistic missile defense system is
    based on a design, test, fix, and deploy process. The MDA's efforts to
    do extensive analysis of the failure and follow that with several tests
    to verify the success of the fix prior to continuing production and
    delivery of new exoatmospheric kill vehicles (EKV) is in line with this
    process. Fixing the EKV problems now on the production line will ensure
    we do not need to potentially invest additional dollars in the future
    to repair faulty EKVs.
        Question. What priority would you give to the funding of planned
    work deferred as a result of such remediation efforts?
        Answer. The Ballistic Missile Defense Review stated homeland
    defense is the primary concern for any current or future Ballistic
    Missile Defense and Ground-Based Missile Defense programs. I understand
    the MDA continues to keep that foremost in their development of all
    ballistic missile capabilities. If confirmed, I will work with the MDA,
    as well as combatant commanders and agencies supporting missile defense
    capabilities, to ensure the systems we need for future threats is
    appropriately balanced against the risk of any deferment of work.
                    missile defense cooperation with russia
        Question. The United States and NATO are pursuing efforts at
    missile defense cooperation with Russia against common missile threats
    from Iran. President Obama has made clear that any such cooperation
    would not limit U.S. or NATO missile defense capabilities.
        Do you agree that missile defense cooperation with Russia could
    enhance our security and, if so, what security benefits do you believe
    might be available through such cooperation?
        Answer. Yes. The Ballistic Missile Defense Review outlined
    opportunities to partner with Russia to enhance overall missile defense
    security. Missile defense capabilities provide a mutually beneficial
    path to deter rogue nations and terrorist organizations from deploying
    and employing ballistic missiles. By cooperating with Russia, we can
    focus on the deterrence benefits that such capabilities provide and
    strengthen each nation's overall defensive capabilities without
    limiting either's national interests. I believe there is little
    political or defensive cost to pursuing such cooperation and much to be
    gained by doing so.
        Question. Do you believe that the United States is committed to the
    continued development of U.S. missile defense systems, including
    qualitative and quantitative improvements, should go forward without
    regard to Russian objections?
        Answer. It is my belief that the pace of our missile defense
    development should be based on how the threat develops in order to stay
    ahead of that threat. I believe there is great opportunity to work with
    the Russians, given our mutual concerns for the defense of our Nation's
    individual interests, while adequately addressing their concerns over
    the development of our defensive capability and capacity.
                     other military cooperation with russia
        Question. The United States and Russia are engaged in a variety of
    security cooperation efforts. Last year, the two nations conducted a
    joint exercise simulating a coordinated response to a hijacked aircraft
    crossing into our respective airspace, an exercise named ``Vigilant
    Eagle.''
        Do you believe such exercises and cooperative efforts enhance our
    security and, if confirmed, would you plan to continue such cooperation
    and other military-to-military contacts?
        Answer. Yes. I strongly believe cooperative exercises like Vigilant
    Eagle enhance national security, and if confirmed, I will fully support
    continuation and expansion of this type of military-to-military
    contact. Bilateral exercises enhance our security in a variety of ways
    and serve as a template for future exercise events. These efforts
    expand transparency and cooperation between NORAD and the Russian
    military, fostering shared understanding and mutual respect. From an
    operational perspective, these exercises serve a very real purpose by
    testing and validating procedures between NORAD and Russian Federation
    Air Force (RFAF) in the event of an airborne terrorist event (e.g., a
    hijacked aircraft that transits between the NORAD and RFAF Areas of
    Operations). If such an event would transpire, both NORAD and the
    Russian Federation will be much better prepared to deal with the
    emergency.
                             cruise missile defense
        Question. NORTHCOM and NORAD have responsibilities for warning and
    defending the United States against airborne threats, including cruise
    missiles.
        Relative to cruise missile defense, what do you believe should be
    the relationship between the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense
    Organization (JIAMDO) of the Joint Staff, on the one hand, and NORTHCOM
    and NORAD, on the other hand?
        Answer. I believe the work that the JIAMDO and NORAD and NORTHCOM
    are doing is inextricably linked. Previous commanders have developed a
    great working relationship with JIAMDO over the years and, if
    confirmed, I will continue to cultivate that partnership through our
    liaison officers and direct interaction at all levels.
        Question. Relative to the full spectrum of threats to the United
    States, how would you assess the cruise missile threat to the United
    States and its territories?
        Answer. I believe that although a cruise missile attack is
    possible, it is unlikely to occur from a nation state without
    significant indications, warnings, and a deterioration of
    relationships; I also believe terrorists will continue to focus on less
    technical and less expensive means to attack the United States. Based
    on that, I believe the threat of a cruise missile attack is low, but if
    confirmed, I will continue to pursue efforts to ensure we have a robust
    capability to defend against such attacks.
        Question. If confirmed, what capabilities would you prioritize to
    address this threat?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will consider numerous ongoing initiatives
    such as improvements to the Wide Area Surveillance network to meet
    cruise missile and other low altitude threats to North America. If
    confirmed, I would also continue to support ongoing efforts that the
    Services and interagency community are making to upgrade fighter
    aircraft and ground-based missile defense radars to detect and, if
    required, engage and destroy low radar-cross section and low altitude
    targets. In addition, if confirmed, I will emphasize the continued need
    for a rapidly-deployable integrated air and missile defense capability
    that can be used to protect national, high-interest security venues or
    critical infrastructure when required.
                            continental air defense
        Question. How has the continental air defense mission changed since
    the end of the Cold War and the events of September 11, 2001?
        Answer. Both the mission and threat have changed significantly.
    Prior to the end of the Cold War, and as recently as September 11,
    2001, NORAD was very much focused on looking to deter, detect, and
    defend against external threats approaching the United States and
    Canada from beyond our borders. However, since September 11, 2001,
    effectively executing the air defense mission now requires NORAD to
    look not only outward, but also within the borders of the United States
    and Canada to deter, detect, and defend against asymmetric threats
    originating from within our borders.
        Question. Do you believe that current U.S. continental air defense
    capabilities are adequate to meet national security needs?
        Answer. Yes. NORAD successfully defends the skies of the United
    States and Canada employing early warning radars, fighter aircraft,
    tanker aircraft, air/ground-based communication systems and ground-
    based missile systems as required to maintain aerospace control of the
    U.S. and Canada. NORAD also maintains a close relationship with the
    interagency community, sharing a network of vital information and
    intelligence necessary to provide a common operating picture to support
    air-control and air-intercept missions. NORAD continues to evaluate and
    upgrade its air defense capabilities to defend against not only
    tradition airborne threats, but new and emerging airborne threats.
        Question. If confirmed, what capabilities and programs would you
    prioritize to address any identified deficiencies?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will review NORAD's air defense
    capabilities to assess their ability to meet national security needs.
    Should I identify any deficiencies, I will work with the Joint Staff
    and the Services to validate those requirements.
                 maritime warning and maritime domain awareness
        Question. NORAD has gained the mission of Maritime Warning for
    North America. How does this mission fit into the larger Maritime
    Domain Awareness mission, and what role do you expect NORAD and
    NORTHCOM to have in Maritime Domain Awareness in the near term?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the NORAD Maritime Warning
    mission relies upon Maritime Domain Awareness to develop a
    comprehensive shared understanding of the maritime operational
    environment and to issue binational warnings of maritime threats or
    attacks against North America. The Commander of NORAD and NORTHCOM
    coordinates with adjacent geographic combatant commanders, U.S.
    Government partner agencies, adjacent nations, and the commercial/
    private sector to further expand MDA in the NORAD Area of Operations
    and the NORTHCOM AOR through information sharing agreements, plans
    development, cooperative training, and acquisition of Maritime Domain
    Awareness sensors/tools.
        If confirmed, I will look into the efficacy of the current NORAD
    Maritime Warning mission and provide the committee my views on this
    after I have had the opportunity to look at this further.
                             arctic region mission
        Question. The 2011 UCP realigned the boundaries of combatant
    command AOR in the Arctic region. NORTHCOM's AOR now includes the
    Bering Strait and the North Pole. NORTHCOM was also tasked to become
    DOD's advocate for Arctic capabilities.
        What is the practical effect of this assignment, and how has it
    changed NORTHCOM planning and operations?
        Answer. The April 2011 UCP expands the roles and responsibilities
    of NORTHCOM by identifying NORTHCOM as the DOD advocate for Arctic
    capabilities. The UCP also identifies two combatant commands with
    distinct AOR in the Arctic: U.S. European Command and NORTHCOM. If
    confirmed, I look forward to reviewing and validating the NORTHCOM
    Commander's Estimate on the Arctic, which I understand is in the final
    stages of coordination.
        Question. What specific programs, if any, will you put in place if
    confirmed to identify and develop capabilities to protect and defend
    American sovereignty and interests in the Arctic region?
        Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the
    Department, the interagency community, and international partners to
    examine what programs might be necessary to identify and develop
    capabilities needed to protect and defend our sovereignty.
                           law of the sea convention
        Question. Do you support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea
    Convention? If so, please explain why.
        Answer. Yes, I believe that joining the Convention protects and
    advances a broad range of U.S. interests, including navigational
    mobility and offshore resources. The Convention would protect and
    advance U.S. interests, bolster our national security, secure U.S.
    rights over extensive marine areas, and give the United States a seat
    at the table when our vital interests are at stake.
                            congressional oversight
        Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
    appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
    briefings, and other communications of information.
        Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
    this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views,
    even if those views differ from the administration in power?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
    committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
    information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
    with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, NORTHCOM, and
    Commander, NORAD?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
    other communications of information are provided to this committee and
    its staff and other appropriate committees?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
    such documents?
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich
                                   the arctic
        1. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Jacoby, your predecessor,
    Admiral Winnefeld, was crafting a commander's estimate on the Arctic
    for use within the Department of Defense (DOD) and examining how U.S.
    Northern Command (NORTHCOM) can best support interagency partners in
    this region with search and rescue assets, humanitarian assistance,
    disaster response capabilities, and support to law enforcement. If
    confirmed, will you complete the estimate and what is the timeline for
    completion?
        General Jacoby. It is my understanding that the initial NORTHCOM
    Commander's Estimate is complete. However, it should be noted that the
    Estimate process is continuous so as to consider the operational
    environment, the nature of anticipated operations, and national and
    multinational strategic direction. The Estimate is currently being
    coordinated throughout the Department of Defense in anticipation of its
    presentation to the Secretary of Defense before the end of 2011. Once
    approved by the Secretary, NORTHCOM will socialize the Estimate with
    interagency partners, as well as with Canadian military and policy
    counterparts in early 2012, prior to being briefed on the Hill.

        2. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Jacoby, Alaska needs to play
    a key role in these initiatives since it is the only U.S. State in the
    Arctic. The Armed Forces in Alaska are accustomed to the climate,
    distance, geography, and overall operating environment and have much to
    offer NORTHCOM and other agencies. How do you see Alaska fitting into
    NORTHCOM's support of interagency partners in the region?
        General Jacoby. If confirmed, a critical area I intend to study as
    part of NORTHCOM's ongoing Commander's Estimate for the Arctic is how
    Alaska fits into NORTHCOM's support of interagency partners. The 2011
    Unified Command Plan expanded the command's roles and responsibilities
    by identifying NORTHCOM as the DOD advocate for Arctic capabilities. We
    will continue to use the Arctic Estimate to help inform how we can best
    support the Department, our interagency partners, and international
    partners in order to advance security, safety, and stability in the
    Arctic region.

        3. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Jacoby, have you considered
    sustaining Joint Task Force (JTF) Alaska as an entity for NORTHCOM to
    carry out support of agency partners in the Arctic? Why or why not?
        General Jacoby. If confirmed, I will support sustaining the JTF-AK
    Support Element as NORTHCOM's operational command and control
    headquarters for operations in Alaska and the Arctic. I understand
    Admiral Winnefeld realigned 12 positions (8 military and 4 civilian)
    from the NORTHCOM staff in Colorado Springs to the Support Element to
    perform planning and interagency coordination functions in Alaska.
    This, coupled with the matrixed support provided by U.S. Pacific
    Command's (PACOM) Alaskan Command, appears to be a manageable solution.
    However, if confirmed, as organizational efficiencies are investigated
    within the Department, I expect there will likely be continued
    assessment to determine the most appropriate command and control
    arrangement to support accomplishment of NORTHCOM missions in Alaska
    and the Arctic.

        4. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Jacoby, 2008 saw a return of
    foreign flights on North American Aerospace Defense Command's (NORAD)
    northern areas. While the foreign aircraft have not violated U.S. or
    Canadian airspace, many of the flights are unannounced requiring a
    response from the fighters in the Alaska NORAD region. With continued
    activity and the growing interest in the Arctic, would you concur that
    sustaining the response resources--the F-22s--at Alaska NORAD region
    are of critical importance?
        General Jacoby. F-22s in Alaska enforce NORAD's Aerospace Control
    mission by conducting Air Defense and Air Sovereignty operations in the
    Alaskan NORAD Region. Part of the NORAD Aerospace Control mission
    includes identifying all air traffic entering North American airspace.
    Although indefinitely grounded at this time, when operational, F-22s
    provide advanced technological capabilities to track, intercept, and
    identify unknown aircraft in the Alaskan NORAD Region.

                           ballistic missile defense
        5. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Jacoby, the 2010 Ballistic
    Missile Defense (BMD) Review set forth priorities for missile defense.
    One of the priorities is defending the Homeland against an
    intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack by continuing to
    sustain and modernize the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system.
    Do you support the policy of ensuring our Homeland is protected from an
    ICBM attack by a rogue nation or non-state actor?
        General Jacoby. Yes. I support the policy of ensuring our Homeland
    is protected from an ICBM attack by a rogue nation or non-state actor
    following the priorities in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review
    (BMDR). The BMDR took a holistic view at the different aspects of the
    U.S. missile defense strategy and its programs and specified that
    homeland defense was top priority. The missile defense system now
    fielded protects our Homeland against ICBM attacks from rogue or non-
    state actors.

        6. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Jacoby, do you support
    continued modernization and sustainment of the GMD system in support of
    this policy?
        General Jacoby. Yes. The missile defense system that is now fielded
    protects our Homeland against ICBM attacks from rogue or non-state
    actors. I believe it is important to maintain this advantage by
    continuing to improve the GMD system and ensuring there are adequate
    capacity to counter limited threats as they evolve.

        7. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Jacoby, do you support the
    current hedge strategy for Homeland defense which includes the
    completion of Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely for additional capacity
    and development of the two-stage interceptor?
        General Jacoby. Yes. The current strategy gives the Nation a
    critical hedge beyond the program of record to respond to unforeseen
    threats, both in terms of capability and capacity for Homeland defense.

        8. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Jacoby, are you aware and
    supportive of the hedge strategy review that is currently underway to
    ensure risk is mitigated should the threat evolve sooner or more
    capable than anticipated?
        General Jacoby. Yes. As the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy
    on the Joint Staff, I have been very involved with the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), NORTHCOM, and
    U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) in the hedge strategy review. I
    support the efforts of this review to mitigate risk should the threat
    evolve sooner or if the threat is more capable than anticipated.

        9. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Jacoby, although the MDA is
    still reviewing the number of additional interceptors required, there
    is a need to enhance the ground-based interceptor (GBI) inventory to
    ensure there are adequate assets for testing and stockpile sustainment.
    Do you support the procurement of additional interceptors?
        General Jacoby. I believe it is prudent to continually reassess the
    number of GBIs we need as our capabilities and knowledge of potential
    threats mature. Based on the most recent threat assessment, it appears
    that the current number of 30 operational GBIs is sufficient.

        10. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Jacoby, do you support
    increasing protection of the east coast against an ICBM attack by
    building an In-Flight Interceptor Communications System (IFICS) Data
    Terminal (IDT) at Fort Drum?
        General Jacoby. Yes. An east coast IFICS IDT will significantly
    enhance our ability to communicate with in-flight GBIs for protection
    of the east coast.

        11. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Jacoby, are you confident
    the IDT is sufficient enough to protect the east coast from a limited
    ICBM?
        General Jacoby. Yes. Against today's threat, I believe an east
    coast IFICS IDT enhances our ability to communicate with in-flight GBIs
    for protection of the east coast.

        12. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Jacoby, as the threat
    matures and if the nature of the attack becomes less limited, would the
    current GMD system still be sufficient enough to protect the east
    coast?
        General Jacoby. Today, the current GMD system provides protection
    for the east coast. With the addition of the east coast IFICS IDT, that
    capability is enhanced. As the threat matures, or if the nature of the
    threat becomes less limited, and as we gain better understanding of
    that threat, we will engage with the Department and with the MDA to
    ensure the Nation is postured to stay ahead of that threat.

        13. Senator Begich. Lieutenant General Jacoby, if confirmed, will
    you continue to assess and evaluate options for defending the east
    coast as the threat evolves?
        General Jacoby. Yes. If confirmed, I will continue to assess and
    evaluate options for defending the east coast and I will engage with
    the Department and with the MDA to ensure the Nation is postured to
    stay ahead of that threat.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
                      national guard and northern command
        14. Senator Shaheen. Lieutenant General Jacoby, given the vital
    role the National Guard plays in NORTHCOM's operations, what benefits
    are there in having National Guard members in NORTHCOM's leadership
    positions and decisionmaking processes?
        General Jacoby. I understand that every day, there are close to 100
    National Guard soldiers and airmen supporting the NORTHCOM headquarters
    from as many as 20 States. This includes one three-star, two two-star,
    and three one-star National Guard officers who serve as the NORTHCOM
    Deputy Commander, subordinate commanders and direct advisors. I believe
    this allows the command to leverage National Guard expertise and
    experience in executing the full spectrum of homeland defense and civil
    support missions. The command also benefits from their understanding of
    National Guard policies and programs to ensure the command's planning
    and collaboration with National Guard forces are informed and
    effective.

                             state and local crises
        15. Senator Shaheen. Lieutenant General Jacoby, as you know well,
    NORTHCOM is charged with coordinating DOD resources with State/local
    first responders in the event of an attack or natural disaster. From my
    time as Governor, I know that all crises are local. It is critical that
    the Federal Government and NORTHCOM in particular reach out and develop
    relationships with State/local governments. Admiral Winnefeld had some
    important efforts with State Governors and National Guard units, but
    there is a lot that needs to be done to educate, understand, and
    partner with local cities and counties where appropriate. What
    specifically are your plans for working with State and local emergency
    responders?
        General Jacoby. I believe that developing great relationships and
    establishing open communications with state and local emergency
    managers prior to a crisis are essential to any successful disaster
    response operation. If confirmed, I will support recently-added
    initiatives to enhance communications, such as the stand-up of a 10-
    person Regional Desk Office in HQ NORTHCOM to work closely with each of
    the 10 NORTHCOM Defense Coordinating Officers (DCOs), who are Federal
    military officers that work on developing relationships with State and
    local officials on a daily basis. I believe that focus on understanding
    both State and Federal mission partners' crisis management
    organizations, knowing their plans, and integrating the command's
    planning process with those of NORTHCOM's many mission partners is a
    vital component to ensure success. It is my understanding that NORTHCOM
    DCOs continue to hone DOD support options and work closely with Federal
    Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regional planners and state
    officials in developing detailed response timelines to potential
    crises. For example, during the recent flooding along the Mississippi
    River in Louisiana, a NORTHCOM DCO team, in coordination with FEMA
    Region VI partners, helped State and local search and rescue officials
    develop a specific, all-domain rescue plan that incorporated 10
    Louisiana State agencies and 3 supporting Federal agencies. They also
    developed a Federal supporting plan that will be used during this
    year's hurricane season. I support continuing to develop these types of
    relationships with various State and local officials in close
    coordination with FEMA partners and the National Guard Bureau.

        16. Senator Shaheen. Lieutenant General Jacoby, how would you
    approach responding to a medium- to large-scale terrorist attack in a
    major U.S. city?
        General Jacoby. In the event of an attack, if confirmed, I would
    immediately begin posturing forces to respond to requests for
    assistance. As the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint
    Staff, I have seen over the past 18 months that the DOD has taken
    significant steps to improve its ability to support civilian
    authorities in responding to catastrophic incidents in major
    metropolitan areas, particularly weapons of mass destruction attacks,
    but also major industrial accidents (such as the recent nuclear power
    plant disaster in Japan). Approximately 13,500 National Guard and Title
    10 forces are now ready to respond, growing to 18,000 by 1 October
    2012. These forces are trained and equipped to provide critical search
    and extraction, decontamination, emergency medical care, and medical
    evacuation in support of the Primary Federal Agency, the affected
    State, and local incident commanders. Many of these forces are on a
    very rapid response timeline and are prepared to deploy within hours in
    order to save lives and minimize human suffering within the critical
    initial 72 hours after an incident.

        17. Senator Shaheen. Lieutenant General Jacoby, in the event of an
    attack, how do you envision your role and the chain of command?
        General Jacoby. In the event of a maritime or land attack on the
    U.S. Homeland, the Commander, NORTHCOM, would command and control Title
    10 forces responding to the event, as directed by the President or the
    Secretary of Defense. In the event of an air attack on the U.S.
    Homeland, Commander, NORAD, would command and control title 10 fighter
    aircraft and land-based air defense capabilities as directed by the
    President or Secretary of Defense.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
                                     cyber
        18. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, as I mentioned in my
    opening remarks, more must be done both here in Congress and across the
    executive branch on addressing the threats we face in the cyber domain.
    The recent findings from the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
    highlight some key areas that must be addressed. According to GAO,
    ``DOD's organization to address cyber security threats is decentralized
    and spread across various offices, commands, Military Services, and
    military agencies,'' and that the ``supporting relationships necessary
    to achieve command and control of cyberspace operations remain
    unclear.'' Do you agree with GAO's assessment?
        General Jacoby. I believe that the support relationships which are
    necessary to achieve command and control of cyberspace operations still
    need some clarity. However, it is my understanding that details of
    Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) and control are being worked and senior-level
    discussions should clarify DOD direction in the near-term. The stand-up
    of CYBERCOM demonstrates DOD's commitment to clearly lay out this
    complex mission and establish proper command and support relationships
    to succeed in the cyber environment.

        19. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, do you believe that
    NORTHCOM's role in support of a cyber attack is well defined and that
    the mechanisms exist for NORTHCOM, STRATCOM, and CYBERCOM to all
    operate in concert with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in
    the event of a serious domestic cyber attack?
        General Jacoby. I believe NORTHCOM's support role in the event of a
    serious domestic cyber attack is primarily to respond to second and
    third order physical effects in a ``response and recovery'' mode
    supporting civil authorities. This would likely involve supporting the
    DHS in a Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) role, utilizing
    the existing DSCA process, which also applies to the support provided
    by STRATCOM/CYBERCOM. I understand NORTHCOM has a good relationship
    with CYBERCOM via its liaison officer and daily collaboration through
    NORTHCOM's Theater Network Control Center and Network Operations
    Security Center. Further, NORTHCOM coordinates and collaborates with
    CYBERCOM in its situational awareness, planning, and exercises.
    Finally, NORTHCOM has included the DHS, STRATCOM, and CYBERCOM in a
    series of mission analysis and table-top exercises to build
    professional relationships and explore roles and responsibilities in
    cyberspace for both homeland defense and DSCA missions.

        20. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, in your answers to
    the committee's advance policy questions, you indicate that NORTHCOM's
    responsibility extends to defense of physical assets in the event of a
    cyber attack. Does that mean NORTHCOM helps put the fires out and picks
    up the pieces when the attack is over, or does NORTHCOM have the means
    and authority to defend against and respond to a cyber attack that
    results in physical damage to assets inside the United States?
        General Jacoby. Depending on the nature of a cyber attack, it is my
    understanding that NORTHCOM would most likely coordinate transportation
    and other physical recovery support using the capacities that we have
    as a military. Eighty-five percent of the cyber infrastructure that DOD
    and civil authorities use is owned by the private sector, which is
    largely responsible for its maintenance and protection. DHS, in
    partnership with other Federal Departments and Agencies; State, local,
    tribal and territorial governments; the private sector; and
    international partners, will manage and lead a fully coordinated
    response to a significant cyber incident to minimize impact, restore
    operations, and reduce the risk of future occurrence of the event or
    events. In accordance with a Memorandum of Agreement signed in 2010 by
    Secretary Gates and Secretary Napolitano, such a request would likely
    be directed to STRATCOM, with expertise provided by their subordinate
    command, CYBERCOM. As a supporting command, NORTHCOM will provide full
    support to STRATCOM's efforts.

        21. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, after the release of
    the DOD cyber security strategy last week, General Cartwright, the Vice
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that DOD is spending 90
    percent of its time playing defense against cyber attacks and 10
    percent playing offense and that DOD should invert this defense/offense
    ratio to assert that there will be consequences to a cyber attack
    against the United States. Do you agree with General Cartwright's
    statements?
        General Jacoby. I believe cyber operations that are entirely
    passive and defensive will fail and that we cannot simply hunker down
    in a defensive mode and wait for things to happen. That said, defensive
    measures must be continually evaluated and improved to keep up with the
    rapidly evolving threats we face, so understandably there may currently
    be an imbalance between defensive and offensive cyber operations. Cyber
    is a relatively new domain, thus more analysis is needed before the
    Department decides on a way ahead on balance of offensive/defensive
    cyber operations.

        22. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, what do you view as
    the appropriate direction DOD should be headed with respect to cyber
    strategy?
        General Jacoby. The DOD understands the importance of cyber, which
    is why it stood up CYBERCOM to focus the Department's efforts in
    operating and defending the Global Information Grid. The DOD has some
    of the brightest and most dedicated professionals working the
    challenges of operating in cyberspace, and I believe the underpinning
    for success will be the partnerships established throughout the U.S.
    Government, private sector, and internationally. Additionally, I
    believe it is essential that our military make command and control in
    cyberspace more responsive by developing policy, doctrine, and
    authorities to support combatant commander requirements.

        23. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, do you view this as
    a matter of urgency?
        General Jacoby. Absolutely. I believe the cyber security threat is
    one of the most serious national security, public safety, and economic
    challenges the Department faces. A whole-of-government approach is
    vital to address cyber threats across the DOD and the public and
    private sectors.

                                  budget cuts
        24. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, on Tuesday, General
    Dempsey stated that the President's proposed cut of $400 billion from
    defense spending over the next 12 years will be difficult to implement.
    He went on to say that recent calls for cuts of $800 billion or greater
    would be extraordinarily difficult and very high risk. Do you agree
    with General Dempsey that proposed cuts to defense of the magnitude
    being discussed will be of very high risk to our military capabilities?
        General Jacoby. I agree with General Dempsey's statement that
    reductions of this magnitude would be difficult to implement,
    particularly as we strive to minimize risk and ensure a continuing
    strong national defense. But, as we look strategically at the fiscal
    landscape, we should realize that reductions are in fact necessary and
    that we, in the Department of Defense, must do our part. The key is how
    we approach these reductions. I think a general reduction across all
    accounts would be inefficient. We need a continuation of the targeted
    reductions started under Secretaries Gates and Panetta to reach the
    $400 billion plateau. To go beyond this level, however, could cause
    serious readiness issues.

        25. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, do you believe the
    impact of such cuts would significantly degrade the readiness of our
    Armed Forces?
        General Jacoby. I believe we can minimize negative impacts with
    targeted reductions, focusing on areas where some additional risk could
    be assumed, of course depending on the level of cuts. At any level of
    cuts, I believe across-the-board reductions would be an inefficient way
    to proceed and more likely result in significant degradation to
    readiness.

        26. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, I understand from
    comments by General Dempsey earlier this week that DOD is in the
    process of analyzing the President's proposed $400 billion in cuts to
    defense and will develop commensurate military strategy. Do you believe
    we should develop a military strategy first and then formulate a budget
    to accomplish such a strategy, not the other way around?
        General Jacoby. We certainly need to be cognizant of both as we
    proceed, however, I believe we should focus principally on driving
    program and budget decisions from choices about strategy and risks.
    Such an approach is essential to ensure preservation of a superb
    defense force to meet national security goals, even given the existing
    fiscal environment.

                                  afghanistan
        27. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, I believe your time
    commanding soldiers in Afghanistan in 2004 and your recent tour as
    Commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq provides you with a unique
    perspective on our current engagements in both countries. On
    Afghanistan, do you believe the surge of forces has led to an improved
    security situation that is placing enormous pressure on the Taliban and
    affiliated groups?
        General Jacoby. Yes, I believe significant advances in Afghanistan
    have been made due to the surge of forces. The increased number of
    forces allowed the DOD to establish security in areas of importance to
    the insurgency such as Central Helmand and Kandahar. In addition, the
    surge allowed the Afghan National Security Force to expand their
    capacity, capability and control of Afghanistan. Most importantly, I
    believe the surge was a major factor in halting Afghanistan's potential
    regression into a refuge and training location for al Qaeda.

        28. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, do you believe that
    withdrawing these 33,000 U.S. forces by next summer places additional
    risk on our soldiers and our mission?
        General Jacoby. I agree with the theater and combatant commanders
    that we can drawdown, while continuing to mitigate risk given current
    circumstances. However, I believe there should be a continual
    assessment of situation to make adjustments if conditions on the ground
    deteriorate.

        29. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, do you believe, as
    it was reported yesterday in the Washington Post, that we are within
    reach of rendering al Qaeda incapable of launching large-scale attacks
    against the Homeland of the United States like we experienced on
    September 11? If so, what should we do to finish the job?
        General Jacoby. I believe al Qaeda is a dangerous threat that
    remains focused on attacking the United States and our interests
    abroad. I also believe that the death of Osama Bin Laden and the
    success of our Nation's counterterrorism campaign in the Afghanistan-
    Pakistan border region provide an opportunity to strike a blow to al
    Qaeda ability to conduct complex attacks on the United States. To
    defeat al Qaeda and prevent its return, we should continue to
    aggressively pursue our worldwide counterterrorism strategy.

                                      iraq
        30. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, if requested by the
    Iraqis, do you believe the United States should maintain a residual
    presence of military personnel in country?
        General Jacoby. I believe the United States should consider
    providing limited assistance to fill anticipated gaps in Iraqi Security
    Forces' capabilities, should the Government of Iraq request such
    support.

        31. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Jacoby, what do you believe
    would be a sufficient number of U.S. military personnel to assist in
    maintaining security in a number of key areas, such as Mosul?
        General Jacoby. The Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq determines U.S.
    military force requirements for security operations in Iraq. As such, I
    defer to General Lloyd J. Austin III for specifics regarding force
    structure in Iraq.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
                             budgetary constraints
        32. Senator Ayotte. Lieutenant General Jacoby, as Director for
    Strategic Plans and Policy, you are responsible for overseeing DOD's
    contingency plans. Please explain, generally and in an unclassified
    way, how $400 billion or even an $800 billion cut in defense over the
    next decade would impact DOD's ability to carry out these contingency
    plans that are essential to our national security?
        General Jacoby. As part of our ongoing Comprehensive Defense
    Review, we are assessing how defense cuts of $400 billion would impact
    the DOD's ability to carry out contingency plans. At the unclassified
    level, I can tell you that defense cuts would impact the concurrency
    with which the joint force is able to execute contingency plans. For
    example, as we reduce the joint force's capacity, we will also reduce
    the range of options available for the President, especially once the
    joint force is committed somewhere. This reduction of capacity covers
    the entire spectrum of missions in the Quadrennial Defense Review,
    including, conventional and strategic deterrence, countering terrorism,
    conducting counter-insurgency and stability operations, helping to
    build the capacity and commitment of our allies and partners, and DSCA.
    We are also examining the impact of further cuts in the Defense budget
    as to the level of risk in executing our plans, as well as our ability
    to conduct other operations and deter in other theaters. We have not
    initiated planning to defense cuts of up to $800 billion, but suffice
    to say that as $400 billion cuts will elevate risk in many areas,
    deeper cuts could pose an unacceptable risk to achieve our strategic
    security objectives.

                            threats to the homeland
        33. Senator Ayotte. Lieutenant General Jacoby, as Commander of
    NORTHCOM, you will be responsible for helping defend the people and
    territory of the United States against threats to our Homeland. Based
    on your nomination to serve as the Commander of NORTHCOM, as well as
    your current position as Director of Strategic Plans and Policy on the
    Joint Staff, what do you believe are the greatest threats to the
    Homeland and the people of the United States?
        General Jacoby. [Deleted.]

        34. Senator Ayotte. Lieutenant General Jacoby, do you believe that
    al Qaeda affiliated groups, such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,
    continue to constitute one of the most serious threats to Americans and
    the U.S. Homeland?
        General Jacoby. [Deleted.]

        35. Senator Ayotte. Lieutenant General Jacoby, in your professional
    military judgment, does it make sense to bring terrorists captured
    overseas by our military, in accordance with the law of war, to U.S.
    soil where they could ultimately be released into local populations?
        General Jacoby. I believe that the U.S. Government has the
    capability to detain captured international terrorists, either within
    or outside the United States. I do not believe that any captured
    terrorist would be released into a community in this country.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of LTG Charles H. Jacoby, Jr.,
    USA, follows:]
                        Nomination Reference and Report
                               As In Executive Session,
                                   Senate of the United States,
                                                         July 25, 2011.
        Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
    on Armed Services:
        The following named officer for appointment in the U.S. Army to the
    grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and
    responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

                                 To be General

        LTG Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., 0000.
                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of LTG Charles H. Jacoby, Jr.,
    USA, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
    nomination was referred, follows:]
             Biographical Sketch of LTG Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., USA
    Source of commissioned service: USMA

    Educational degrees:
        U.S. Military Academy - BS - No Major
        University of Michigan - MA - History
        U.S. Army Command and General Staff College - MMAS - Military Art
    and Sciences
        National Defense University - MS - National Security and Strategic
    Studies

    Military schools attended:
        Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
        U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
        School of Advanced Military Studies
        National War College

    Foreign language(s): Spanish

    Promotions:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Promotions                       Date of Appointment
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2LT.......................................  7 June 78
    1LT.......................................  7 June 80
    CPT.......................................  1 Jan. 82
    MAJ.......................................  1 July 89
    LTC.......................................  1 July 93
    COL.......................................  1 June 98
    BG........................................  1 July 02
    MG........................................  14 Nov. 05
    LTG.......................................  31 May 07
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Major duty assignments:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  From                        To              Assignment
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Dec. 78.........................  Oct. 80...........  Rifle Platoon
                                                           Leader, C
                                                           Company, 1st
                                                           Battalion
                                                           (Airborne), 325th
                                                           Infantry, 82d
                                                           Airborne
                                                           Division, Fort
                                                           Bragg, NC
    Oct. 80.........................  Feb. 81...........  Scout Platoon
                                                           Leader, 1st
                                                           Battalion
                                                           (Airborne), 325th
                                                           Infantry, 82d
                                                           Airborne
                                                           Division. Fort
                                                           Bragg, NC
    Feb. 81.........................  Aug. 81...........  S-3 (Air), 1st
                                                           Battalion
                                                           (Airborne), 325th
                                                           Infantry, 82d
                                                           Airborne
                                                           Division, Fort
                                                           Bragg, NC
    Sep. 81.........................  Aug. 82...........  Aide-de-Camp to
                                                           the Commanding
                                                           General. Joint
                                                           Special
                                                           Operations
                                                           Command, Fort
                                                           Bragg, NC
    Aug. 82.........................  Dec. 83...........  Commander, A
                                                           Company, 2d
                                                           Battalion
                                                           (Airborne), 325th
                                                           Infantry, 82d
                                                           Airborne
                                                           Division, Fort
                                                           Bragg, NC, and
                                                           Operation Urgent
                                                           Fury, Grenada
    Jan. 84.........................  July 84...........  Student, Infantry
                                                           Officer Advanced
                                                           Course, U.S. Army
                                                           Infantry School,
                                                           Fort Benning, GA
    Aug. 84.........................  May 86............  Student,
                                                           Department of
                                                           History,
                                                           University of
                                                           Michigan, Ann
                                                           Arbor, MI
    May 86..........................  May 89............  Instructor, later
                                                           Assistant
                                                           Professor,
                                                           Department of
                                                           History, U.S.
                                                           Military Academy,
                                                           West Point, NY
    July 89.........................  May 91............  Student, U.S. Army
                                                           Command and
                                                           General Staff
                                                           College, Fort
                                                           Leavenworth, KS
    June 91.........................  Jan. 92...........  Chief, G-3
                                                           (Operations),
                                                           25th Infantry
                                                           Division (Light),
                                                           Schofield
                                                           Barracks. HI
    Feb. 92.........................  June 93...........  S-3 (Operations),
                                                           1st Brigade, 25th
                                                           Infantry Division
                                                           (Light),
                                                           Schofield
                                                           Barracks, HI
    June 93.........................  Oct. 93...........  Chief, G-3
                                                           (External
                                                           Evaluation
                                                           Branch). 25th
                                                           Infantry Division
                                                           (Light),
                                                           Schofield
                                                           Barracks. HI
    Oct. 93.........................  Oct. 95...........  Commander, 1st
                                                           Battalion, 504th
                                                           Parachute
                                                           Infantry
                                                           Regiment, 82d
                                                           Airborne
                                                           Division, Fort
                                                           Bragg, NC
    Oct. 95.........................  Aug. 96...........  Staff Action
                                                           Officer,
                                                           Congressional
                                                           Activities
                                                           Division,
                                                           Management
                                                           Directorate,
                                                           Office of the
                                                           Chief of Staff,
                                                           U.S. Army,
                                                           Washington, DC
    Aug. 96.........................  June 97...........  Student, National
                                                           War College, Fort
                                                           Lesley J. McNair,
                                                           Washington, DC
    June 97.........................  Oct. 97...........  Student, Spanish
                                                           Language
                                                           Training, Defense
                                                           Language
                                                           Institute-
                                                           Washington
                                                           Office,
                                                           Washington, DC
    Nov. 97.........................  Feb. 99...........  Commander, Joint
                                                           Task Force-Bravo,
                                                           U.S. Southern
                                                           Command, Honduras
    Feb. 99.........................  Nov. 00...........  Deputy Chief of
                                                           Staff, later
                                                           Executive Officer
                                                           to the Commander
                                                           in Chief, U.S.
                                                           Southern Command,
                                                           Miami, FL
    Nov. 00.........................  July 02...........  Deputy Director
                                                           for Global/
                                                           Multilateral
                                                           Issues/
                                                           International-
                                                           American Affairs,
                                                           J-5, The Joint
                                                           Staff,
                                                           Washington, DC
    July 02.........................  Mar. 04...........  Assistant Division
                                                           Commander
                                                           (Operations),
                                                           later Assistant
                                                           Division
                                                           Commander
                                                           (Support), 25th
                                                           Infantry Division
                                                           (Light),
                                                           Schofield
                                                           Barracks, HI
    Mar. 04.........................  Mar. 05...........  Assistant Division
                                                           Commander
                                                           (Support), 25th
                                                           Infantry Division
                                                           (Light)/Combined
                                                           Joint Task Force-
                                                           76, Operation
                                                           Enduring Freedom,
                                                           Afghanistan
    Mar. 05.........................  June 05...........  Assistant Division
                                                           Commander
                                                           (Support), 25th
                                                           Infantry Division
                                                           (Light),
                                                           Schofield
                                                           Barracks, HI
    July 05.........................  May 07............  Commanding
                                                           General, U.S.
                                                           Army Alaska/
                                                           Deputy Commander,
                                                           U.S. Alaskan
                                                           Command, Fort
                                                           Richardson, AK
    May 07..........................  June 10...........  Commanding
                                                           General, I Corps
                                                           and Fort Lewis,
                                                           Fort Lewis, WA
    Apr. 09.........................  Dec. 09...........  Commanding
                                                           General, I Corps
                                                           and Fort Lewis/
                                                           Multi-National
                                                           Corps-Iraq,
                                                           Operation Iraqi
                                                           Freedom, Iraq
    Jan. 10.........................  Mar. 10...........  Commanding
                                                           General, I Corps
                                                           and Fort Lewis/
                                                           Deputy Commander
                                                           for Operations,
                                                           U.S. Forces-Iraq,
                                                           Operation Iraqi
                                                           Freedom, Iraq
    Mar. 10.........................  June 10...........  Commanding
                                                           General, I Corps
                                                           and Fort Lewis,
                                                           Fort Lewis, WA
    June 10.........................  Present...........  Director,
                                                           Strategic Plans
                                                           and Policy, J-5,
                                                           The Joint Staff/
                                                           Senior Member,
                                                           U.S. Delegation
                                                           to the United
                                                           Nations Military
                                                           Staff Committee,
                                                           Washington, DC
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Summary of joint assignments:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Assignments                    Date               Grade
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Commander, Joint Task Force-         Nov. 97-Feb. 99                   Colonel
     Bravo, U.S. Southern Command,
     Honduras........................
    Deputy Chief of Staff, later         Feb. 99-Nov. 00                   Colonel
     Executive Officer to the
     Commander in Chief, U.S.
     Southern Command, Miami, FL.....
    Deputy Director for Global/          Nov. 00-July 02                   Colonel/Brigadier
     Multilateral Issues/                                           General
     International-American Affairs,
     J-5, The Joint Staff,
     Washington, DC..................
    Assistant Division Commander         Mar. 04-Mar. 05  Brigadier General
     (Support), 25th Infantry
     Division (Light)/Combined Joint
     Task Force-76, Operation
     Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan...
    Commanding General, I Corps and      Apr. 09-Dec. 09  Lieutenant General
     Fort Lewis/Multi-National Corps-
     Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
     Iraq............................
    Commanding General, I Corps and      Jan. 10-Mar. 10  Lieutenant General
     Fort Lewis/Deputy Commander for
     Operations, U.S. Forces-Iraq,
     Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq...
    Director, Strategic Plans and        June 10-Present  Lieutenant General
     Policy, J-5, The Joint Staff/
     Senior Member, U.S. Delegation
     to the United Nations Military
     Staff Committee, Washington, DC.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Summary of operations assignments:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Assignments                    Date               Grade
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Commander, A Company, 2d             Aug. 83-Dec. 83                   Captain
     Battalion (Airborne), 325th
     Infantry, 82d Airborne Division,
     Operation Urgent Fury, Grenada..
    Assistant Division Commander         Mar. 04-Mar. 05  Brigadier General
     (Support), 25th Infantry
     Division (Light)/Combined Joint
     Task Force-76, Operation
     Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan...
    Commanding General, I Corps and      Apr. 09-Dec. 09  Lieutenant General
     Fort Lewis/Multi-National Corps-
     Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom,
     Iraq............................
    Commanding General, I Corps and      Jan. 10-Mar. 10  Lieutenant General
     Fort Lewis/Deputy Commander for
     Operations, U.S. Forces-Iraq,
     Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq...
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    U.S. decorations and badges:
        Defense Distinguished Service Medal
        Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
        Defense Superior Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
        Legion of Merit
        Bronze Star Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
        Defense Meritorious Service Medal
        Meritorious Service Medal (with five Oak Leaf Clusters)
        Joint Service Commendation Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
        Army Commendation Medal (with four Oak Leaf Clusters)
        Army Achievement Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
        Combat Infantryman Badge
        Expert Infantryman Badge
        Master Parachutist Badge
        Air Assault Badge
        Ranger Tab
        Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
    military officers nominated by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG Charles H.
    Jacoby, Jr., USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
                              UNITED STATES SENATE
                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                                  Room SR-228
                           Washington, DC 20510-6050
                                 (202) 224-3871
                        COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
          BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
        Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
    more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
    form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
    of your answer applies.
                        Part A--Biographical Information
        Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
    this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
    public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
    any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

        1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
        Charles H. Jacoby, Jr.

        2. Position to which nominated:
        Commander, Northern Command/North American Aerospace Defense
    Command, Peterson Air Force Base, CO.

        3. Date of nomination:
        July 25, 2011.

        4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
        [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
    committee's executive files.]

        5. Date and place of birth:
        June 19, 1954; Detroit, MI.

        6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
        Married to Grace A. Dorta.

        7. Names and ages of children:
        Charles H. Jacoby III, age 20.
        Victor D. Jacoby, age 16.
        Michael C. Jacoby, age 13.

        8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
    honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
    or local governments, other than those listed in the service record
    extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
        None.

        9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
    officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
    or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
    business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
        Limited partnership in a family LLC. Jacoby Land & Timber, LCC.
        Managing partner, Robert Jacoby, Brother).

        10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
    professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
    other organizations.
        Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA).
        Association of Graduates, U.S. Military Academy.
        Council on Foreign Relations.

        11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
    society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
    service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
    extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
        None.

        12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
    if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
    constituted committee of the Senate?
        Yes.

        13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
    constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if
    those views differ from the administration in power.
        Yes.
                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-E of the
    committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
    forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
    Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                    ------

                               Signature and Date
        I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
    on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
    provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
    and complete.
                                                 Charles H. Jacoby, Jr.
        This 21st day of July, 2011.

        [The nomination of LTG Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., USA, was
    reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on August 2, 2011,
    with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
    nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 2, 2011.]

     NOMINATION OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER TO BE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

                                  ----------

                          TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2011

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room
    SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman), presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
    Nelson, McCaskill, Hagan, Begich, Shaheen, Blumenthal, McCain,
    Inhofe, Sessions, Wicker, Brown, Portman, Ayotte, Graham, and
    Cornyn.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse,
    professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff
    member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Peter K.
    Levine, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; William
    G.P. Monahan, counsel; Robie I. Samanta Roy, professional staff
    member; Russell L. Shaffer, counsel; and William K. Sutey,
    professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority
    staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
    Pablo E. Carrillo, minority investigative counsel; Paul C.
    Hutton IV, professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner,
    professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional
    staff member; Michael J. Sistak, research assistant; and
    Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Kathleen A. Kulenkampff, Hannah
    I. Lloyd, and Bradley S. Watson.
        Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Griffin,
    assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to
    Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Ann
    Premer, assistant to Senator Nelson; Gordon Peterson, assistant
    to Senator Webb; Maria Mahler-Haug, assistant to Senator
    McCaskill; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay
    Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Brooke Jamison,
    assistant to Senator Gillibrand; Ethan Saxon, assistant to
    Senator Blumenthal; Anthony Lazarski, assistant to Senator
    Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Joseph
    Lai, assistant to Senator Wicker; Charles Prosch, assistant to
    Senator Brown; Brad Bowman, assistant to Senator Ayotte;
    Matthew Rimkunas and Sergio Sarkany, assistants to Senator
    Graham; and Joshua Hodges, assistant to Senator Vitter.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. This morning the committee meets to
    consider the nomination of Ashton Carter to be Deputy Secretary
    of Defense. We welcome the nominee and his family to today's
    hearing. We appreciate the long hours and other sacrifices that
    our nominees make to serve their country, and we know that
    these sacrifices would not be possible without the support of
    their families.
        Senator Lieberman, who is going to be introducing Dr.
    Carter this morning, needs to chair another committee meeting.
    I know that firsthand because I'm supposed to be there later
    myself. In any event, what we're going to do now is call upon
    Chairman Lieberman, Senator Lieberman, who's a member of this
    committee, as well, to introduce our nominee, and then we'll
    come back to the opening statements. I've consulted with
    Senator McCain and he's perfectly happy to do it that way.
        Senator Lieberman.

     STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
                          STATE OF CONNECTICUT

        Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much for your courtesy,
    Mr. Chairman, and for your skill at overcoming the obvious
    irascible reluctance of Senator McCain to allow me to speak
    first.
        Chairman Levin. He's a soft touch. [Laughter.]
        Senator Lieberman. I am really grateful for the opportunity
    to appear before you now, not from my customary seat, in order
    to introduce Dr. Ash Carter, the President's nominee to be our
    30th Deputy Secretary of Defense. Just slightly more than 2
    years ago, I had the privilege of introducing and supporting
    Ash's nomination as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics. After that hearing, this committee
    in its wisdom endorsed the nomination, approved it by voice
    vote, and then the Senate did the same. I think we have some
    momentum going here.
        If anything, over the last 2 years I think Ash Carter has
    strengthened his case, the case for him to assume at this
    particular time this extraordinary position. I've known Ash for
    years and we've become personal friends, both during his time
    serving in the Defense Department under Bill Perry during the
    Clinton administration and now.
        We've also had the opportunity to travel under the esteemed
    leadership of Senator McCain, with me in a supporting role, to
    the security conference in Munich every February, and it's been
    a great opportunity to get to know him both as a person and a
    public official.
        His resume is quite impressive. I'll just state some of the
    highlights for you. He has, unusually, a Ph.D. in theoretical
    physics, has been a professor of international relations,
    security, and science and, going back to the Clinton
    administration, served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    International Security Policy.
        Since then he's also served during the Bush administration
    on the Defense Science Board and the Defense Policy Board, and
    is widely recognized and respected, I think on a bipartisan
    basis, as one of our country's leading thinkers and leaders,
    actors, on defense and national security issues.
        For the last 2 years, as I've mentioned, Ash has served as
    Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
    Logistics. In this position he has overseen billion-dollar
    military programs and procurement of critical equipment for our
    men and women in the Armed Forces. In this job, as so many
    others, I believe he has truly distinguished himself.
        Of particular note, Ash has played a pivotal role in
    getting 6,500 mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) all-
    terrain vehicles to our troops in Afghanistan at really
    breakneck speed. Of course, we all know that these vehicles
    have saved countless lives. The success of the program I think
    speaks to Ash's fierce dedication to our men and women on the
    front lines, but also to the importance of the acquisition
    programs delivering equipment our troops need in a way that is
    not only timely, but cost effective.
        When and I hope, of course, if Ash is confirmed, he will
    assume his new responsibilities at a time when the Pentagon
    faces the prospect of what I would call extreme, draconian
    budget cuts, so severe that Secretary of Defense Panetta has
    warned that they could, ``hollow out the force and weaken our
    national defense.'' Of course, I totally agree and I know many
    members on both sides of the aisle on this committee agree.
        In the face of this danger, I think Ash's considerable
    talents, his experience, his skill as an advocate, will be more
    necessary than ever. I have great confidence that he will work
    ceaselessly, first to make sure that every dollar entrusted to
    our Department of Defense (DOD) is used as efficiently and
    effectively as possible, but also that he will be a determined
    advocate for the programs and the funding that are needed to
    ensure that our military stays what it is today, the best in
    the world, and that our Nation therefore, at a time when the
    world remains dangerous and unpredictable, remains as secure
    and free as we all want it to be.
        Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, I thank you again for your
    courtesy and I am proud to offer my wholehearted endorsement
    for this nomination and hope that my colleagues will give him
    the same unanimous support that he received the last time he
    appeared before the committee.
        Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman.
        We just heard from Senator Lieberman and his support for
    you, and much about your record, your career. I think most of
    us, perhaps all, are familiar with your distinguished record of
    public service culminated in your current position as Under
    Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
    Logistics. If you're confirmed as Deputy Secretary, you're
    going to be the number two official in DOD, and in that
    capacity you're going to play a key role in determining how our
    country addresses an extraordinarily complex set of challenges
    that face our Armed Forces.
        For example, how can we reduce the stress of repeated
    deployments on our men and women in uniform and their families
    after 10 years of non-stop military operations in Iraq and
    Afghanistan? How will we complete the drawdown of U.S. forces
    in Iraq, and what continuing role, if any, is the U.S. military
    willing to play after the December 31 withdrawal deadline if
    there is a request from Iraq? How can we most effectively
    contribute to the success of the mission in Afghanistan by
    keeping the focus on transitioning security responsibility to
    Afghan forces, including continuing the drawdown of U.S. forces
    in that country?
        How can we reduce our force posture around the world to
    bring down the huge costs we're facing, while at the same time
    maintaining a strong forward presence in key areas?
        At the same time all that's on your plate, the next Deputy
    Secretary is going to play a key role in implementing ongoing
    efficiencies initiatives and achieving the additional savings
    that are needed in the current fiscal climate. Last year then-
    Secretary Gates approved roughly $180 billion in cuts to
    defense programs over the Future Years Defense Program. The
    recent legislation on the debt ceiling calls for an additional
    $400 billion in reductions in security spending over a 10-year
    period, with the possibility of far deeper cuts if the joint
    committee is unable to reach agreement and a sequester is
    triggered.
        Now, just the reductions required so far, required by the
    legislation on the debt ceiling, just those reductions are
    going to require an extremely careful review of every program
    and expenditure in the defense budget and tough decisions to be
    made to balance the requirements of today's force and current
    military missions against investment in needed preparations for
    the threats of tomorrow.
        I know that Dr. Carter agrees that DOD budget reductions
    must contribute to overall deficit reduction, but must do so
    without compromising our current or our future security. Unless
    we impose much greater discipline on our acquisition process
    and unless we bring down the costs of our weapons programs, we
    are unlikely to achieve that objective.
        Finally, the Deputy Secretary has traditionally handled a
    wide array of management duties, a role that was enhanced by
    recent legislation formally designating the Deputy Secretary as
    Chief Management Officer of DOD. Virtually every area of DOD
    management is included in the annual list that we get of high
    risk areas prepared by the Government Accountability Office.
    Those high risk areas have not changed much over the years.
        Dr. Carter, as Deputy Secretary you're going to be
    responsible for addressing each of those high risk problem
    areas, including: DOD business transformation, DOD business
    systems modernization, DOD support infrastructure management,
    DOD financial management, DOD supply chain management, DOD
    weapons systems acquisition, DOD contract management,
    management of interagency contracting, strategic human capital
    management, and management of real property.
        Dr. Carter has demonstrated in his current position that he
    can be a strong manager and a decisive leader. We particularly
    appreciate the efforts that you have made to implement the
    Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA), the Better
    Buying Power Initiative, and to begin the process of bringing
    some of our largest acquisition programs under control.
        Now, I emphasize that you've helped to begin the process of
    bringing some of our largest acquisition programs under
    control, but we have a long way to go. Secretary Carter in his
    new capacity is going to need to speed up the process to help
    that speed-up effort, to speed up the process of controlling
    costs of acquisition.
        Senator McCain.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Dr. Carter, thank you for your service as Under Secretary
    of State for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and for
    your willingness to continue to serve as the Deputy Secretary
    of Defense. Your willingness and ability to bear the burden of
    senior leadership is both noteworthy and highly commendable.
        The position of Deputy Secretary of Defense is as
    challenging today as it's ever been. On the one hand, the
    Department is being confronted by daunting challenges to its
    ability to ensure the Nation's defense. On the other hand,
    there's the specter of dramatic cuts in defense spending.
    Against that backdrop, the Department must find ways to operate
    more efficiently and effectively than ever before. If confirmed
    as Deputy Secretary of Defense, you must be prepared to lead
    both these efforts and succeed in doing so.
        Providing for our national defense is the most important
    responsibility that our or any government has. It's our
    Nation's insurance policy. In a world that is more complex and
    threatening as I have ever seen, we cannot allow arbitrary
    budget arithmetic to drive our defense strategy and spending.
    Some of the defense cuts being discussed would do grave harm to
    our military and our Nation's security. Defense spending is not
    what is sinking this country into fiscal crisis and if Congress
    and the President act on that flawed assumption they will
    create a situation that is truly unaffordable, the decline of
    U.S. military power.
        Do not misunderstand me. Real defense cuts are coming and
    for that reason it's now more essential than ever for DOD to
    efficiently manage the taxpayers' money. But I will be blunt.
    This will require not just good leadership; it will require a
    change in culture at DOD. By that I mean an end to the
    Department's systemic tendency to spend the taxpayers' money in
    a manner that is far too often disconnected from what the
    warfighter actually needs and what is in the taxpayers' best
    interests.
        Particularly over the last 10 years, senior defense
    management has been inclined to lose sight of affordability as
    a goal and has just reached for more money as a solution to
    most problems. Today I see evidence of this cultural problem
    all too frequently and it must be changed.
        Every few weeks I get reports about huge cost overruns on
    the Pentagon's biggest weapons programs, like the recent
    projection of a $1.1 billion overrun in the cost of the first
    28 production-quality jets in the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
    program, a program that is now in its 10th year of development
    and the recipient of about $56 billion of taxpayer investment
    to date. Or, the estimated $560 million estimated cost
    overruns, or roughly 11 percent growth in cost, in the program
    to build the USS Gerald Ford.
        Then, there are the Defense Department's recent
    reprogramming requests. Four times over the last 2 months, the
    Department has asked this committee to let it shift a total of
    over $10 billion amongst its spending accounts. In doing so, it
    asks only the chairman and ranking members of the defense
    committees in the Senate and the House of Representatives to
    let it reallocate billions of dollars to, among other things,
    pay hundreds of millions of dollars for the cost overrun in the
    JSF program and provide authority to start dozens of new
    programs never before presented to Congress.
        Authorizing funding in this way, outside of regular order,
    subverts transparent congressional oversight, undermines
    accountability in how defense programs are managed, and
    actually encourages underperformance.
        Just a few days ago, the Bipartisan Commission on Wartime
    Contracting reported that at least $30 billion has been wasted
    on ill-conceived and poorly overseen contracts and grants in
    Iraq and Afghanistan. Earlier this year, a study of Army
    procurement showed that between $3.3 billion and $3.8 billion
    had been wasted by the Army every year since 2004 in developing
    new weapons programs that were cancelled without providing any
    new capability to the troops risking their lives fighting two
    wars.
        A culture that has allowed massive waste of taxpayers'
    dollars has become business as usual at DOD. Particularly in
    today's fiscal environment, this cannot be tolerated. If this
    is not corrected, the Department's ability to continue
    defending the Nation and to provide for its national security
    will be compromised. Taxpayers simply will not tolerate the
    continuing waste of their resources in light of the debt we
    face and our competing budgetary needs.
        I also want to know if you share my concern that solving
    this problem may be hindered by the revolving door of retired
    flag and general officers, top Pentagon civilian officials, and
    mid-level bureaucrats who had overseen weapons procurement
    programs before leaving government to join private sector
    defense industry. With the defense contracting pie expected to
    get smaller in the future, this problem may get worse than
    before. I hope you are as sensitive to this as I am.
        Notably, as the Deputy Secretary you would also serve as
    the Department's Chief Management Officer. You'd be responsible
    for ensuring, among other things, the Defense Department
    becomes fully auditable by 2017, as required under law. I
    strongly support the requirement for the Department to pass a
    clean audit so I'd like to hear from you on this issue.
        Finally, I've been told that the Defense Department's
    comprehensive strategic review of military roles, missions, and
    requirements that underpins how it intends to carry out the
    President's direction for a $400 billion reduction in defense
    spending over the next 12 years may not come out before next
    year. If true, this review would not be available to inform the
    deliberations of the Joint Select Committee on Deficit
    Reduction, or Congress generally, on how the currently proposed
    defense spending cuts will affect national security. This is
    unacceptable.
        The efforts of the Department or Congress cannot be
    conducted in a vacuum. Any major budget review, whether
    conducted by the administration or Congress, must be
    accompanied by an open, honest, and comprehensive review of
    requirements and set priorities based on sound strategy.
        Dr. Carter, I have come to know you as a hardworking,
    honest and committed public servant. But, if confirmed, you
    would face major challenges in confronting the cultural
    impediments to proper fiscal stewardship at the Defense
    Department, which I trust you have come to understand. This
    culture needs to change. The Defense Department needs to
    change. It must do so in order to be the best provider it can
    be of our Nation's most essential service, our national
    defense.
        On all these vital matters, failure truly is not an option,
    and as the Department's senior leadership applies itself to
    this urgent and critical task you should know that you will
    have the support of your friends in Congress. The challenge
    ahead is daunting, yes, but I have confidence in our men and
    women in uniform that, given the task ahead, they will rise to
    the challenges and indeed do more with less. Your leadership
    and that of Secretary Panetta will be more crucial than ever.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
        Now let me call on you, Dr. Carter. We know you're
    accompanied by your family here, so please feel free to
    introduce them.

    STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON CARTER, Ph.D., NOMINATED TO BE DEPUTY
                          SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

        Dr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to you, Ranking
    Member McCain. If I may, I'd like to make a brief statement,
    and then a number of questions have been raised already and
    I'll take them at whatever time it's convenient to you.
        Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, all the
    distinguished members of this committee, it's a privilege and a
    deep honor to appear before you as the President's nominee for
    Deputy Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I look forward to
    the opportunity to continue to serve President Obama and
    Secretary Panetta in a new role and to continue to work with
    the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with this
    committee to protect this great country, to serve the troops
    who serve us, and to leave a more secure world for our
    children.
        I'd like to thank my wife Stephanie, son Will, daughter Ava
    for being here today and for their support. I'd also like to
    thank Senator Lieberman for the kindness and honor of his
    introduction, for all he's done for this country, and for all
    he's taught me.
        If confirmed, I will step into large shoes and I would like
    to take this moment to express my admiration for the job Bill
    Lynn has done as Deputy. It has been a privilege to serve him.
        I have served, in one way or another, almost every
    Secretary of Defense since Caspar Weinberger, and I feel
    fortunate to have been a member of the Pentagon team led over
    these past years by Secretary Gates, Secretary Panetta, and
    Secretary Lynn.
        As Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
    and Logistics, I have had two overriding priorities. The first
    has been to wake up every morning and ask myself what my office
    can do to support our troops in Afghanistan, Iraq, or anywhere
    else in the world they are deployed, whether with better
    protection against improvised explosive devices (IED), better
    reconnaissance and surveillance, or better logistics, and on
    their timetable and not on the timetable of the Pentagon's
    frequently ponderous acquisition and budgeting process.
        My second priority has been to deliver better buying power
    to the taxpayers and the warfighters for their defense dollars,
    working closely with our acquisition professionals, our
    industry partners, and Congress. It's an effort, as has been
    noted, that this committee began in its 2009 Weapons Systems
    Acquisition Reform Act, and I began with Secretary Gates, all
    well before the current budget crunch.
        But the performance of the system is in my judgment still
    not acceptable. I think Senator McCain used the word
    ``intolerable'' and I would agree with that. I believe that
    there are some additional actions we're going to need to take
    to get better value for the defense dollar. This is something
    the American taxpayer should expect no matter what the defense
    budget is, but it becomes even more urgent in the serious
    budget predicament that faces us.
        Like Secretary Panetta, I do not believe we need to choose
    between strong fiscal discipline and strong national defense.
    If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of Defense, these two
    priorities will continue, but many others will be added.
    Secretary Panetta has made it clear to me that he expects his
    deputy to be prepared to act and speak in his stead at all
    times. He expects the deputy to shape an orderly deliberative
    process for him, so that he can make decisions and advise the
    President based on careful consideration of accurate management
    information and a full range of options. He expects his deputy
    to manage the budget down to a finite number of key issues that
    he needs to decide and to manage other Department-wide matters
    that require his attention only for final decisions of greatest
    consequence.
        Finally, Secretary Panetta expects all this to be done with
    the same heart, the same integrity, and the same dedication to
    our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that he brings to
    the job.
        In all these tasks, I pledge to Secretary Panetta and to
    this committee, if confirmed, my most earnest efforts. Thank
    you once again for the opportunity to appear before you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Carter follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by Hon. Ashton B. Carter
        Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and all the distinguished
    members of this committee, it is a privilege and a deep honor to appear
    before you as President Obama's nominee for Deputy Secretary of
    Defense. If confirmed, I look forward to the opportunity to continue to
    serve the President and Secretary Panetta in a new role, and to
    continue to work with the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
    with this committee, to protect this great country, to serve the troops
    who serve us, and to leave a more secure world for our children.
        I would like to thank my wife, Stephanie, and children, Will and
    Ava, for being here today and for their support. I would also like to
    thank Senator Lieberman for the kindness and honor of his introduction,
    for all he has done for this country, and for all he has taught me.
        If confirmed, I will step into large shoes, and I would like to
    take this moment to express my admiration for the job Bill Lynn has
    done as Deputy. It has been a privilege to serve him. I have served in
    one way or another almost every Secretary of Defense since Caspar
    Weinberger, and I feel fortunate to have been a member of the Pentagon
    team led over these past years by Secretary Gates, Secretary Panetta,
    and Secretary Lynn.
        As Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
    Logistics, I have had two overriding priorities. The first has been to
    wake up every morning and ask myself what my office can do to support
    our troops in Afghanistan, Iraq, or anywhere else in the world they are
    deployed--whether with better protection against improvised explosive
    devices, better reconnaissance and surveillance, or better logistics--
    on their timetable, and not on the timetable of the Pentagon's
    frequently ponderous acquisition and budgeting processes. My second
    priority has been to deliver better buying power to the taxpayers for
    their defense dollars, working closely with our acquisition
    professionals, our industry partners, and Congress. It is an effort
    this committee began in its 2009 Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform
    Act, and I began with Secretary Gates--all well before the current
    budget crunch. But the performance of the system is in my judgment
    still not acceptable, and I believe that there are some additional
    actions we are going to need to take to get better value for the
    defense dollar. This is something the American taxpayer should expect
    no matter what the defense budget is. But it becomes even more urgent
    in the serious budget predicament that faces us. Like Secretary
    Panetta, I do not believe that we need to choose between strong fiscal
    discipline and strong national defense.
        If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of Defense, these two priorities
    will continue. But many others will be added. Secretary Panetta has
    made it clear to me that he expects his Deputy to be prepared to act
    and speak in his stead at all times. He expects the Deputy to shape an
    orderly deliberative process for him, so that he can make decisions and
    advise the President based on careful consideration of accurate
    management information and a full range of options. He expects his
    Deputy to manage the budget process down to a finite number of key
    issues that he needs to decide, and to manage other Department-wide
    matters that require his attention only for final decisions of greatest
    consequence. Finally, Secretary Panetta expects all this to be done
    with the same heart, the same integrity, and the same dedication to our
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that he brings to the job.
        In all these tasks, I pledge to the Secretary of Defense and to
    this committee, if confirmed, my most earnest effort.
        Thank you once again for the opportunity to appear before you.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Dr. Carter.
        We start, as we always do with nominees, with the standard
    questions. You've answered them before, but we'll be asking you
    to answer them again.
        In order to exercise our legislative and our oversight
    responsibilities, we have to receive testimony, briefings, and
    other communications of information in a timely way.
        The first question is: Have you adhered to all of the
    applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of
    interest?
        Dr. Carter. Yes.
        Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
    any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
    confirmation process?
        Dr. Carter. No.
        Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
    deadlines established for requested communications, including
    questions for the record in hearings?
        Dr. Carter. I will.
        Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
    and briefers in response to congressional requests?
        Dr. Carter. Yes.
        Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
    reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
        Dr. Carter. Yes.
        Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
    testify upon request before this committee?
        Dr. Carter. I do.
        Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
    including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
    timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
    to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
    faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
        Dr. Carter. Yes.
        Chairman Levin. Let's try an 8-minute first round of
    questions.
        First on the budget. It is very clear that substantial cuts
    to the defense budget are on their way. We've already made cuts
    in our authorization bill. There's already cuts that we're
    working on for a possible modification of that bill so that the
    committee could consider a committee modernization before the
    bill comes to the floor.
        The recent legislation on the debt ceiling calls for $400
    billion of reductions in security spending. That's a slightly
    larger item than just defense spending, but it's mainly defense
    spending. It's $400 billion in reductions in security spending
    over 10 years, and if the joint committee which has been
    appointed cannot reach agreement and if a sequester is
    triggered, then there could be additional cuts approaching $600
    billion over 10 years.
        The joint committee has requested this committee and other
    standing committees for input. They need our input by mid-
    October, recommendations to them for reductions. It is a
    critically important review by them and by us. Now, we're going
    to need the Department to give us recommendations, data,
    detail, before we consider our input that we would recommend to
    that new committee.
        My first question is, will you, immediately upon
    confirmation, work to ensure that this committee gets the views
    of the Department on two things: one, steps that you recommend
    that we recommend to achieve reductions and to help avoid
    sequestration; and two, your views on the consequences of
    sequestration if it occurred?
        Dr. Carter. I do. Secretary Panetta's made it quite clear
    that this is a circumstance that's unprecedented and we can't
    get through it and do the right thing unless we are in close
    consultation with Congress, and that means that the way we
    would normally do budget business we're going to have to change
    this year. I certainly pledge to you, if confirmed, that close
    consultation. But the important thing is Secretary Panetta has
    made that quite clear.
        Chairman Levin. Consultation is important, but we also need
    recommendations. What we will need from you, I would say
    probably immediately upon confirmation, is a timetable for when
    you will be giving us the Department's recommendations for
    reductions to meet the legislation which has been adopted. Will
    you give us that timetable promptly upon confirmation?
        Dr. Carter. If confirmed, absolutely, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Now, do you believe that we also as part of
    that need to reexamine military personnel costs, including
    health care, compensation, retirement benefits, the things
    which we obviously are reluctant to impact, nonetheless we have
    to at least look at for possibilities? Do you agree with that?
        Dr. Carter. I do. Secretary Panetta has used the phrase
    ``everything on the table''. However, that is subject to one
    proviso and that is that, as he puts it, he doesn't want us to
    do anything that breaks faith with those who are serving or
    have served and therefore have an understanding about those
    matters that you just named. He doesn't want us to break faith
    with those understandings. But subject to that limitation,
    compensation, like acquisition, like operations and
    maintenance, like everything else, he says has to be on the
    table, given the magnitude of the task in front of us.
        Chairman Levin. That's a limitation which I think every
    member of this committee would share.
        Given the budget pressures under which the Department's
    going to be operating, one of the things that some of us
    believe we have to do is to take a look at the stationing and
    restationing of and the location of our military forces
    overseas, where we have a large number of bases, and to
    consider both relocation and the restationing possibly of some
    of those military forces from overseas back to the United
    States. Is that on the table?
        Dr. Carter. On the table.
        Chairman Levin. One of the areas where a number of us have
    focused, particularly Senator Webb, who along with Senator
    McCain and I have proposed changes to basing plans on Okinawa
    and Guam, and also urged a review of the plans that we have in
    Korea relative to stationing of forces and tour normalization.
    Is that all on the table?
        Dr. Carter. On the table.
        Chairman Levin. By the way, the Government Accountability
    Office reviewed that Okinawa-Guam issue and concluded that the
    total cost of the Okinawa-Guam realignment would be over $27
    billion and that the Guam buildup alone would cost more than
    $17 billion, with the U.S. share being $11 billion, which is
    much more than originally projected, and in our current fiscal
    environment I believe that we simply cannot continue with such
    massive restructuring and surely we can't do that until we have
    reliable cost and schedule data.
        We may not be able to get that data in time for this
    review, but we're going to have to do the best that we can, and
    I'm glad to know that you are going to be working with us.
        Now, that also would include, I hope, stationing forces in
    Europe and their location. Is that included?
        Dr. Carter. Yes, it is.
        Chairman Levin. Okay.
        On acquisition issues: We have these huge cost overruns
    and, while there's been some efforts, and we applaud the
    efforts which have been made, to try to bring them under
    control, and we have our Acquisition Reform Act now which is in
    place, which hopefully is going to avoid these kind of cost
    overruns in the future, nonetheless we must act. One of the
    things that we have to do is take a look at the JSF program.
    I'm wondering whether you believe that, for example, it is
    important that program look at the possibility of competing
    subsystems on the JSF or to compete logistics support to help
    reduce this year's estimate that the life cycle costs of the
    JSF are going to exceed $1 trillion. Are you willing to look at
    all that?
        Dr. Carter. I am, Mr. Chairman, absolutely.
        Chairman Levin. Please just expand on that.
        Dr. Carter. You mentioned the sustainment costs of the JSF.
    Senator McCain was referencing the production cost of the JSF.
    The JSF isn't alone among our programs and activities which
    have exhibited, as Senator McCain said, intolerable cost
    growth. We are working on both the production and the
    sustainment part of JSF and others.
        On the sustainment part in particular, Admiral Venlet and I
    are just beginning work on that this fall. That's a project
    that the program office hadn't really taken on before, managing
    that very large sustainment cost. I've seen the estimates for
    the costs of sustainment for JSF and they're unacceptably high.
    At the same time, we have not begun to manage them yet, and
    when we do so I'm expecting that they will come down.
        But in all of these matters, on all of our programs, we
    have a lot of work to do. WSARA was a fundamental foundation
    for us. We have tried to implement it in each and every one of
    our programs. But as I indicated to Senator McCain, we have
    more to do and there are some new chapters I think we need to
    open in our acquisition efforts to get even better.
        Chairman Levin. Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, if deficit reduction negotiations fail,
    triggering sequestration, Secretary Panetta has said that
    bigger defense cuts would have a ``devastating effect on the
    Nation's security''. Do you agree with Secretary Panetta?
        Dr. Carter. I absolutely do.
        Senator McCain. It would be devastating?
        Dr. Carter. Devastating, and I say ``devastating'' not
    lightly, but in light of two things. One is the scale. Chairman
    Levin already alluded to the scale, $600-ish billion on top of
    what we're facing already, which would take us to a total
    reduction over the next 10 years of in the neighborhood of $1
    trillion. Just the scale of it alone would lead us to have to
    consider truly draconian things--abandoning major weapons
    systems, furloughing civilian employees, and abruptly
    curtailing training because we couldn't pay for fuel, and so
    forth. That's the scale.
        The other thing about the sequester provision is that it's
    arbitrary. It's across the board, meaning it deprives us of the
    opportunity for choice, strategic choice. It puts a haircut
    across everything. You get yourself in a circumstance where,
    for example, you can't execute. You can't buy three-quarters of
    an aircraft carrier or three-quarters of a building.
        Both in the size and in the nature of the sequester, I
    think that word applies.
        Senator McCain. Thank you. I hope that all of our members
    and the American people pay attention to what you and Secretary
    Panetta are saying.
        I want to be a little more specific. In your answer to
    Chairman Levin's statement, you said, do I understand you
    correctly, you will be sending us recommendations as to what
    reductions need to be made to comply with the $20 billion
    reduction in authorization that is going to be appropriated? Is
    that correct, you will be sending us recommendations?
        Dr. Carter. That is. I think the shape they'll be in as
    they come across is not their final recommendations, but the
    options that we're considering. Decisions haven't been made.
    The comprehensive review is surfacing those options, so I would
    say even before decisions are being made----
        Senator McCain. Are you going to send us the
    recommendations?
        Dr. Carter. Absolutely.
        Senator McCain. Now, are you going to be sending us a
    comprehensive strategic review before we act, in other words
    before the end of this year?
        Dr. Carter. Yes, the comprehensive review will provide
    those recommendations before the end of the year.
        Senator McCain. Will we receive them before 2013?
        Dr. Carter. Yes.
        Senator McCain. Thank you.
        Do you agree there's a systemic cultural problem in how the
    Department does its acquisition business?
        Dr. Carter. I do.
        Senator McCain. What is your assessment of the enduring
    security needs of Iraq and of U.S. national security interests
    there?
        Dr. Carter. We have spent a lot of time, blood, and
    treasure in Iraq and have gotten ourselves to a point now where
    in my judgment we have created a future of stability for Iraq,
    and I think we all want to act at this juncture to make sure
    that's preserved. As we reach the end of the year and look
    forward to what happens after the end of the year, preserving
    those gains is the objective.
        Senator McCain. Have you formed your own opinion of the
    number of U.S. troops that would be needed and how to ensure
    their security?
        Dr. Carter. I have not. That is not one of my current
    responsibilities.
        Senator McCain. Do you know whether any military officer
    recommended to the President that troops be withdrawn from
    Afghanistan at the size and pace his plan dictates?
        Dr. Carter. I do not, no.
        Senator McCain. Your view of that decision you have not
    formed yet?
        Dr. Carter. No. If your reference is to the 3,000 number
    that's been in the press, that's not a number that I can
    validate at all. No decision has been made. No decision could
    have been made because, as I understand it, we're in
    discussions with the Iraqis about the mission and what goes
    forward.
        Senator McCain. This is probably not the subject of this
    hearing, but no one has denied that number, Dr. Carter. It's
    been published in the press and the media and no one in the
    Pentagon has said: No, that's not the number.
        Dr. Carter. I'm not familiar with the number.
        Senator McCain. On the JSF program, over the last year and
    a half you restructured the program twice by adding $7.4
    billion and 33 months to the development part of the program.
    If by the end of the year and under a fixed-price contract the
    program is not on track, what should we do?
        Dr. Carter. We have put in place a progressive step and
    we're going to continue to do that.
        Senator McCain. But let's assume that they do not reach the
    fixed-price contract and the program is not on track.
        Dr. Carter. The contract is very clear about the penalty
    paid. We do not bear the cost this time, unlike the cost
    overruns you referred to earlier. Because we have a fixed-price
    contract, the Government's liability is not open-ended, as it
    was in the past. If it overruns past the ceiling price on this
    fixed-price incentive firm (FPIF) contract, that's entirely on
    those performing the work and the taxpayer does not share in
    that liability.
        Senator McCain. I'd like to believe that, but that hasn't
    happened yet and the program has been in the making for, what,
    10 years now? How much has it cost, $56 billion? We have 18
    airplanes.
        Dr. Carter. I'm sorry, I thought you were referring to the
    low rate production contract--it's total value is about $56
    billion, yes.
        Senator McCain. Have you seen the report that says that
    ``The study paints a bleak picture of billions sunk into
    incomplete Army programs. Cancelled programs have eaten up
    between $3.3 billion and $3.8 billion since 2004. Numbers
    represent an average of 35 percent to 45 percent of the Army's
    annual budget for development, testing, and engineering.'' Are
    you familiar with that?
        Dr. Carter. I am, and it's unbelievable and as far as I can
    see, true. There were so many programs that were begun with
    optimistic assumptions or with an extravagant expectation. Then
    they get halfway built, it's like a bridge to nowhere, you
    can't complete them. This is something that you had in your
    WSARA. Now as we start new starts--and we do have some new
    starts even in this budget climate, for example the Ohio-class
    submarine--we're not going to let them start until and unless
    we see affordability and a target for affordability set early
    in the program, so that we don't have these bridges to nowhere.
        Senator McCain. Mr. Secretary, I hope that's the case. We
    continue to be reassured that things are changing and somehow
    they don't.
        Finally, are you confident that we can have DOD fully
    auditable by 2017? That's another moving target that we have
    been watching for many years.
        Dr. Carter. It's not moving any longer, as near as I can
    tell. Secretary Panetta made it clear that 2017, he means it.
    In fact, he said sooner if possible.
        Senator McCain. I thank you.
        I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First let me welcome Dr. Carter, who I've had the privilege
    of knowing and working with for many years. I can't think of
    anyone who is better prepared, not just intellectually and
    academically, but through the last several years of experience
    of dealing with these challenges we're talking about. I welcome
    your nomination and look forward to your confirmation.
        I also want to recognize your family and thank them for all
    they've done to allow you to serve the Nation.
        Let me say, I associate myself with the remarks of Senator
    McCain. I don't think I've heard it as insightfully or
    thoughtfully put in terms of the cultural challenges facing the
    Department, the issue specifically of the revolving door, of
    auditing issues, and the, frankly, poor performance over the
    last, not several years, but many years of acquisition and
    procurement programs.
        I think one of the issues is that, looking back now over 4
    decades or so of involvement with the military, sometimes it's
    a contractor-driven environment, no longer strategic, even
    budgetary, and certainly not sort of uniformed military advice,
    but a contractor-driven environment. That's something you're
    going to have to face.
        But let me focus on two issues. One was raised by Senator
    McCain. It's the auditing. In order to fully audit DOD, you
    need auditors. We've had this discussion before. One of the
    reasons that literally we have seen millions and millions of
    dollars disappear in places like Afghanistan and Iraq is that
    you have not been able to put on the ground adequate number of
    auditors; is that correct?
        Dr. Carter. That is correct.
        Senator Reed. What are we doing to fix that?
        Dr. Carter. Trying to put more on the ground, that's just
    one of the things we're trying to do. We are increasing the
    number of investigators so that the investigations and
    prosecution of transgressions is strengthened. General David
    Petraeus when he was commander over there established a number
    of task forces to do that, that have made a lot of progress and
    that we support.
        Of course, you don't want to get to the point where you're
    investigating and prosecuting. You want to prevent in the first
    place. That is, you don't want to have the conditions where
    it's even possible to defraud us on a contract. That means
    having contracting officers, contracting officer
    representatives, construction engineers, all the things
    associated with the programs that we're contracting for in
    Afghanistan and Iraq, in adequate numbers and with adequate
    skills.
        It means having commanders who are contractor-aware and
    proficient and know how to do this in their area of
    responsibility. In this and all of these areas, we have to
    improve our performance in contingency contracting. I fully
    recognize that.
        The Commission on Wartime Contracting has made a number of
    recommendations, the great bulk of which I agree with and we
    are actually implementing. But we have a ways to go.
        Senator Reed. In that context, I think this is one of those
    areas, too, which is the first to be thrown overboard when the
    budget gets done in terms of auditors, professional auditors,
    career personnel. I think we've learned to our disappointment
    that contracting out some of these procedures doesn't help,
    either. You are challenged to rebuild, essentially, a
    professional DOD auditor corps and Service-connected auditor
    corps. Is that going to be one of your commitments?
        Dr. Carter. It is, absolutely, and it actually began in
    this committee before I took office. It affects the acquisition
    workforce as a whole. We need to have within the Government the
    expertise and the controls. That is not something that we can
    outsource. That is something that we need to have within the
    walls of government, and that's why we've been working so hard
    to increase the strength of the overall acquisition workforce,
    which includes the auditing workforce.
        It's not just a numbers thing. It's skills, it's giving
    them opportunities for professional development, adequate
    training, and accreditation. All of that we are doing.
        Senator Reed. Let me also raise an issue that Senator
    McCain raised, which I concur in, and that is this revolving
    door phenomenon. We've had discussions about this also. My
    sense is that's obviously a challenge to you and Secretary
    Panetta, but I think it also has to begin or it has to be
    substantially embraced by the professional uniformed officers
    and noncommissioned officers in terms of their expectations of
    what they will do when they leave and the expectations of their
    relationship to the Department after they leave.
        I would urge you--I've done this privately to General
    Dempsey--to begin thinking very seriously about, is there, not
    a law, but a code or a reevaluation of the ethical dimensions
    of service after retirement in relation to DOD, because unless
    you have that you won't have the best guide or the buy-in by
    those people who are affected by this.
        Do you have any thoughts on that?
        Dr. Carter. Just that I share the thought. I think Senator
    McCain began it. I will say this. I travel all around the
    country to the places where the real work is done. These are
    our systems command, our logistics centers, and so forth, where
    the folks actually do the work of contracting and program
    management, this tremendous workforce, mixed military and
    civilian.
        They know what the right thing to do is. The overwhelming
    majority of them know what the right thing to do is. They hear
    what I'm saying and they know what the right thing to do is. It
    is a huge source of support to them in doing the right thing
    when they hear from you, from you here, that you are behind us
    and the leadership in the Pentagon in supporting them. They're
    supposed to be acting in the warfighters' and the taxpayers'
    interest and we just need to stand behind them, give them the
    tools to do the right thing and then support them.
        It's great for me. I go out all the time, I talk to them,
    and they say: I appreciate what you're saying because it sounds
    like if I make a hard decision and drive a hard bargain on
    behalf of the taxpayer and the warfighter you'll stand behind
    me. I will, but that's only half the action. It's important
    that they know that Congress stands behind them, too.
        I just wanted to say I appreciate the support. I understand
    the frustration that you feel over the performance of the
    acquisition system, but I don't mind the pressure because it's
    right and it sends the right signal to our people.
        Senator Reed. Let me just add a quick postscript. I can't
    think collectively of a more ethical group of people than
    professional military officers and noncommissioned officers who
    served the Nation and retired. But the context has changed over
    the last several decades, and I think you're right, we do have
    to send a message about obligations to the taxpayers, to the
    service men and women who continue to serve. Again, I think
    what we do and what you do is going to be critical. But without
    enlisting the senior retired and the currently senior members
    of the military in this thoughtful discussion, we won't be as
    successful as we must.
        My time has expired, but again, Dr. Carter, for your
    remarkable service to the Nation let me thank you and wish you
    well.
        Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Dr. Carter, for being responsive and coming by
    and talking to us, not just in preparation for this particular
    position, but in years in the past. I appreciate that very
    much.
        I have six things real quickly, two of which will be
    something for the record I'd like to get back from you, but
    they're more specific than some of the general things that were
    talked about by the other questioners on this panel. One would
    be--and I have to go back historically and look at this--one of
    the deficiencies that we have had for a long period of time has
    been in our Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) Cannon.
        I can remember back when I was in the House Armed Services
    Committee many years ago and we talked about that. Then along
    came the Crusader. We developed that over a period of time and
    it was--I hate to say this as a Republican about a Republican
    President, but it was President Bush in 2002 with just no
    warning at all, at least to me, terminated that program.
        General Shinseki came along and started working on a Future
    Combat System (FCS) that would go farther than just an NLOS
    Cannon. But nonetheless, we're still operating, it had been up
    until recently, where there are five countries, including South
    Africa, that have a better NLOS cannon than we do. This isn't
    what the American people expect.
        On this particular program, I disagreed with all those.
    However, the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) program now
    that you and I talked about, is now the Army's lead fire
    support modernization effort and I think it's moving along well
    now. But judging from the past when we had our programs, the
    Crusader, the FCS, all moving along fine, all of a sudden
    something happened.
        I'd just like to have you make any comments that you might
    have concerning this program, seeing it through, and its
    significance?
        Dr. Carter. It certainly is significant, Senator, and I'm
    personally involved in the acquisition strategy for Paladin,
    PIM. I'm very familiar with it. We're crafting that acquisition
    strategy now. The Army acquisition executive has that ball.
    She's doing a really good job of it and I think it's a well
    managed activity.
        Senator Inhofe. All right. Several of us up here have
    talked about the F-35. It's one that certainly is a great
    concern. The Pentagon recently sent a report to Congress on the
    Chinese military warning. I'm quoting now. It said: ``China's
    military has benefited from robust investment in modern
    hardware and technology. Many modern systems have reached
    maturity and others will become operational in the next few
    years.''
        One of those investments that they have been talking about
    is their new J-20 stealth fighter. You say the same thing about
    Russia with its fifth generation fighter, the T-50. The F-35
    being our only fifth generation fighter, I am more concerned
    now about it than I was before, back when the termination of
    the F-22 came along.
        But I understand the missions of both of them and what can
    be done with the F-35. When you stop and think about the need,
    as I recall when this program first came it was 2001, they were
    anticipating 2,852 copies. That's what they talked about at
    that time. Now, since that time reports such as the two that I
    just mentioned from Russia and China have--to me, if our
    amount, the number that we should have had was 2,800 back in
    2001, it would be actually more now.
        You are now looking at 2,443 of the F-35s that would be
    required by our Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. I've often
    wondered why it's fewer now, in the absence of the F-22 and
    with the developments that are taking place in Russia and
    China. Do you feel that number is adequate? I know that you're
    involved in that, but also I know that you might have a
    different opinion.
        Dr. Carter. No, that is the joint requirement right now,
    2,443 for the U.S. force, and then of course there are
    additional F-35s that are going to be built for the partner
    nations. I did do a Nunn-McCurdy certification this past
    summer, as required by law, of the F-35 program, and in the
    course of that our independent cost analysis and program
    evaluation shop did an assessment of the need for the JSF,
    because as part of certifying a program that is in Nunn-McCurdy
    breach, as JSF is, I have to ascertain whether there are
    alternatives that could replace it.
        We did not find alternatives to the JSF, no other
    alternative that met the joint requirement that exists,
    ``joint'' meaning there's an Air Force variant, a Navy variant,
    and a Marine Corps variant.
        Senator Inhofe. Why don't you give me some detail for the
    record, concentrating on the figure that was used in 2001, the
    developments in Russia and China, and then that reduced figure
    today, just for the record.
        Dr. Carter. Will do.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Based on the current and projected threats, I believe it is
    critical that we transition to a fifth generation capability across the
    U.S. Services while maintaining sufficient legacy inventory capacity to
    prevail in current and near-term conflicts. The Joint Strike Fighter's
    (JSF) unprecedented combination of stealth, sensing, and firepower will
    give our force the crucial edge it needs against advanced threats. The
    current U.S. joint Service requirement of 2,443 F-35s (plus F-35s for
    partner nations) remains in force based on the existing strategy, force
    structure, and available resources.
        In 2001, the planned JSF procurement strategy for the Department
    was 2,866 aircraft (1,763 U.S. Air Force and 1,089 Department of the
    Navy). In 2002, the Department of the Navy reduced their planned
    procurement to 680 JSF with the incorporation of the Tactical Aircraft
    Integration (TAI) Plan. TAI more fully integrates the Navy and Marine
    Corps forces by having Marine Corps TACAIR squadrons deploy with
    Carrier Air Wings and Navy squadrons deploy with Marine Aircraft Wings.
    TAI efficiencies allow the Department of the Navy to operate a smaller
    total of strike fighters and therefore will enable a reduced JSF
    procurement plan.

        Senator Inhofe. Now, you were in my office. You gave me
    this cute little thing here to carry around and I have looked
    at it. No one understands it. I don't understand it. I don't
    think you understand it. But it is very complicated.
        What I've done is blow this up for my colleagues up here.
    Let me tell them what we're talking about here. This is the
    ``Federal Acquisition Rule''. This is how we do business. I
    look at this and I feel a little bit like Kit Bond [former
    Senator Christopher Bond, R-MO], although he's not here in the
    Senate with us any more, but he used to carry these around.
        When you look at the complications that are there--and
    Senator McCain referred to this also--there are 1,680 policy
    documents and 91 laws affecting Federal Acquisition Regulations
    (FARs). Here they are right here. Now, we know it can be done
    faster. We've made exceptions. We have developed alternative
    procedures and working groups and organizations, such as the
    Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO),
    as I mentioned to you. That's the IED technology that's coming
    along. I'm very proud of Lieutenant General Mike Barbero, who
    brought his team in and looked at what we can do. I just sat
    there and I thought, this is something that's happening today;
    we're responding; we can come up with something and have it in
    the field almost in a week.
        If that's possible, I get the impression that, as
    complicated as this is, the FAR Council is made up of the
    Administrator of the Federal Procurement Policy Office,
    Secretary of Defense, Administrator of National Aeronautics and
    Space Administration, and Administrator of the General Services
    Administration. I think they're just too busy to get into this
    thing and get their hands dirty and fix it.
        Do you have any alternatives to overcome this process if
    we're not able to do it by getting those four entities in one
    room until it's done?
        Dr. Carter. First of all, for those who haven't had the joy
    of contemplating that chart, that shows the budgeting process,
    the acquisition process, and the requirements process in one
    big chart, and I was in an earlier conversation joking with a
    Senator that anybody who could master all of that probably
    would get pretty frustrated with how ponderous is.
        Mike Barbero, the really superb Director of JIEDDO, with
    whom I work every day, does things differently, and we can do
    things differently. I said in my opening statement that I have
    two priorities now. One is supporting the warfighter in the
    here and now and the other is managing all our programs and
    activities. When we do things like MRAP or JIEDDO, we can't
    follow that because the battlefield changes too quickly and we
    can't wait.
        Senator Inhofe. Exactly.
        Dr. Carter. Also, in response to Senator McCain, who was
    saying, can't we turn yet more pages and do things differently,
    one of the things I think we have ahead of us now is to try to
    take the experience of the wars and apply that to our usual
    FAR-driven acquisition system and see if we can't take some of
    the lessons of what I call the fast lane and apply them to the
    FAR and review the FAR.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay, that's good. It has worked, and I ask
    unanimous consent that this be made a part of the record at
    this point in the record.
        Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Senator Inhofe. I know my time has expired, and I was going
    to get into the Army Ground Vehicle. Almost everything that
    I've said about the NLOS Cannon would apply to that, too. In
    2009, General Thompson said the Army has to modernize those
    16,000 fighting vehicles for the future or we are going to put
    soldiers in harm's way. That was 2009.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Army has a comprehensive Combat Vehicle Modernization (CVM)
    strategy that addresses key capability shortfalls for the entire combat
    vehicle fleet (Abrams tank, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Stryker, and M113
    family). The strategy is based on three parallel and complementary
    efforts: transform, replace, and improve. The highest priority effort
    is transforming the capability of the Heavy Brigade Combat Team by
    acquiring the Ground Combat Vehicle Infantry Fighting Vehicle. The
    second priority is replacing the M113 Family of Vehicles with an
    Armored-Multi Purpose Vehicle (AMPV). Lastly, the Army will improve the
    Abrams tank, Bradley Cavalry, Fire Support, Engineer Vehicles, and the
    Stryker to increase protection, ensure required mobility, and allow
    integration of the emerging network. This strategy ensures the Army's
    entire fleet of combat vehicles will be able to operate side-by-side
    across formations with common situational awareness and required levels
    of protection, mobility, and lethality.
        The Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) is funded in the President's budget
    for fiscal year 2012 (PB12) and the funding extends throughout the
    Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). In addition to the GCV, the Army's
    CVM strategy has several other components, to include upgrading Abrams
    tanks and non-infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) Bradleys. Upon
    congressional approval of a new start, the Army intends to initiate the
    AMPV program. The AMPV will replace the M113 Family of Vehicles (FOV)
    with a platform that is more survivable, mobile, and can accomplish
    missions across the full spectrum of conflict.
        The Army's PB12 request includes RDT&E funding for all three CVM
    components. Procurement funding for the AMPV is planned to start in
    fiscal year 2014 with the first unit equipped planned for fiscal year
    2017.
        Abrams and non-IFV Bradley upgrades are also funded in PB12 and the
    funding extends throughout the FYDP.
        The Army believes that collectively, all components of the CVM
    Strategy are within the Army's projected funding resources.

        Senator Inhofe. For the record, I'd like to have you
    address that, as well as, in Afghanistan I know our Oklahoma
    45th, we've lost now 10 people already, and one I've been very,
    very close to is Specialist Chris Horton. I look at these
    results coming in and I look at the question of reducing our
    numbers and how we're going about it. I'd like for the record
    to have you evaluate that for both Iraq and Afghanistan.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The information referred to follows:]

    Iraq:
        We continue to abide by the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement,
    which requires pulling out all U.S. forces by the end of the year. This
    would fulfill the drawdown that the President began with his Iraq
    strategy announcement in February 2009, which included an end to the
    combat mission in August 2010, and a responsible drawdown of all U.S.
    forces by the end of this year. Since that announcement, more than
    100,000 U.S. forces have departed Iraq. The U.S. forces that remain
    have shifted into an advisory capacity, and Iraqis have fully taken the
    lead on security, and have been successful in keeping violence levels
    low. Over the next 2 months, the remainder of U.S. forces will depart
    Iraq unless the United States and Iraq negotiate a follow-on presence.
    Afghanistan:
        The International Security Assistance Force, U.S. Forces-
    Afghanistan, and U.S. Central Command are looking at ways to optimize
    our headquarters forces structure and thin the lines in areas that have
    transitioned to Afghan security forces lead, while ensuring that U.S.
    and coalition forces maintain the capabilities they need. The plans for
    the first phase of the drawdown will be briefed to the President in
    mid-October. The details of the U.S. surge recovery are classified, and
    will be presented in the October version of the congressional boots-on-
    the-ground report.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    Dr. Carter. Sorry that you're going to have to strain your neck
    looking over in this direction. I want to thank you for being
    here, your extraordinary service to our Nation over many years,
    your teaching at Harvard and other institutions, and helping to
    develop a new cadre of public servants. Thank you also to your
    family for their support over those many years.
        You and I talked briefly about the Joint Strike Fighter and
    about the two submarine-building programs, both very important
    to our national security, and I'm gratified that you will
    continue to support those two programs, as we discussed, and
    thank you for that support.
        We talked as well a little bit about the IED roadside bomb
    problem, which is so heinous and pernicious a cause of injury
    and death to our troops, in fact, I think it's responsible for
    more than 85 percent of all our casualties, deaths, and wounds
    to our warfighters abroad. I wonder if you could reaffirm for
    me your commitment, which you stated so eloquently in our
    meeting, to continuing and enhancing the effort to provide
    better body armor and better protection to our troops who are
    fighting right now.
        Dr. Carter. I absolutely do. It's what I wake up to every
    morning. Secretary Gates gave me the responsibility for the
    counter-IED fight 2\1/2\ years ago and then expanded that to
    all of our fast lane activities, and it's job one.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        I recently visited both Afghanistan and Pakistan in a trip
    led by Senator Casey, also joined by Senator Whitehouse and
    Senator Bennett. We spoke with a number of the leaders of
    Pakistan, the highest ranking leaders, including Army Chief of
    Staff Kayani, the Prime Minister, and the President. They have
    a plan. It still needs to be judged in whether in fact it's
    implemented, let alone implemented effectively.
        But if resources are necessary to help to stop and stem the
    flow of fertilizer and the substances used by terrorists to
    make those roadside bombs, would you consider using some of the
    $800 million now going to the task force for that purpose?
        Dr. Carter. I would. Just let me say that I appreciate that
    you have keyed in on this as an important part of the IED
    fight. The calcium ammonium nitrate that originates in Pakistan
    and then shows up as homemade explosives in Pakistan, other
    chemicals--potassium chlorate, which is a favorite of the enemy
    in the east, as the home-made explosive is a favorite of the
    enemy in the south--we have to attack this IED problem in every
    single possible way we can, and you can't just wait for it to
    come and get you. You have to go back into the supply chain.
        Part of that supply chain traces back into Pakistan. We
    need to get back and get at that. I know that we've been
    working with Pakistan to that effect, but really just in a
    preliminary way, and a lot more needs to be done.
        Senator Blumenthal. I would like to pledge to you--I know
    that many of my colleagues would join me in this commitment to
    persuading, cajoling, whatever we can do to put pressure, very
    simply, very bluntly, on the Pakistanis to face their
    responsibility, not only to their allies, but to their own
    people, who are often the victims of the devastating effects of
    these roadside bombs and suicide bombs made with those
    materials.
        I understand also that you are very much on top of the
    program to provide better body armor, and other protection to
    our warfighters from these roadside bombs, and that the growing
    protective armament, as well as the so-called biker shorts, are
    likely to be fully delivered by next month or within that time
    period; is that correct?
        Dr. Carter. That's correct. We are procuring large
    quantities of ballistic underwear, several different variants
    of it that offer differing levels of protection, both male and
    female. Obviously, this is a critically important effort, so
    we're sparing no effort in that regard. We have a number of
    suppliers to make sure that we're not dependent upon any single
    supplier who might have a production interruption or something
    like that and people wouldn't get to have the protection.
        We want to, within limits, provide folks with some choice,
    so we'd like to make several different variants, because it's
    obviously an issue of personal sensitivity. But, like all our
    armor issues, with vehicles, body armor, and so forth, there's
    nothing more important than this. We're all over it.
        Senator Blumenthal. I'm hopeful that we'll continue the
    effort--I know of your very distinguished scientific background
    in areas of physics and so forth, as well as in public policy--
    to develop even more effective protective devices for our
    troops there.
        Dr. Carter. We are, absolutely.
        Senator Blumenthal. One last area before my time expires.
    While many of these horrific wounds are visible in loss of limb
    and other kinds of very destructive internal wounds, some of
    them are invisible--the post-traumatic stress and chronic brain
    injury. I wonder what efforts you envision--I know there are a
    lot of ongoing efforts--to address these kinds of invisible
    wounds that are often undiagnosed and therefore completely
    untreated?
        Dr. Carter. We look back in history and one of the good
    things that will come out of what is otherwise not a good
    thing--that is, a decade of war--will be the progress we have
    made in recognizing the unseen injuries of war, and not only
    recognizing them, but treating them.
        I'll just make one comment. If you go up, as I'm sure many
    of you had, up to Bethesda to the Intrepid Center there, that
    particular Intrepid Center focuses on post-traumatic stress and
    traumatic brain injury in the same way that the one in San
    Antonio, for example, focuses on amputation and prosthesis.
    It's just amazing what is being done to bring together the--I
    probably won't use the right words here; I'm not a medical
    doctor--the psychological and social aspects of the treatment
    with the neurophysiological. That you can now see as people
    reexperience an injury, they can track the pathways, neuronal
    pathways. It's just truly remarkable.
        That's something we bring to our warfighters and that they
    deserve, certainly in my heart. But it's something that's going
    to be good for society as a whole going forward. As I said,
    it's one of the few good things you can say about what is
    otherwise a shame, to have been at war for a decade.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much for those responses
    to my questions, and I just want to say in closing that there
    are other areas that I would have explored if I had more time,
    such as cyber security. I know others on the panel may mention
    those areas, but I would like very much to follow up with you
    on the IED and roadside bomb issue, as well as cyber security,
    and say in closing that I agree very much with the comments
    made by Senators Reed and McCain and very much welcome your
    receptivity to those areas as well.
        Thank you very much. I don't want to give you bad luck by
    congratulating you in advance, but I look forward to working
    with you once you're confirmed. Thank you.
        Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Congratulations, Dr. Carter, on this important nomination.
    I've observed your work over the years. I think you are capable
    and would make a fine Deputy Secretary. Based on what I know
    today, I intend to support your nomination.
        You are taking the lead in a very important time. You've
    had questions about spending. As the ranking member of the
    Budget Committee, I know just how dangerous our debt situation
    is. We are going to be working with you.
        I'll ask you one thing: Will you speak up and point out
    dangers and risks that might be incurred by certain reductions
    in spending that may be proposed? In other words, we need the
    best advice we can get from the Defense Department, and some
    things may sound good to us in Congress, but in reality, as the
    professional, it could be dangerous.
        Are you willing to defend the legitimate programs and
    policies that are necessary for a healthy Defense Department?
        Dr. Carter. Absolutely, and I will, Senator, absolutely.
        Senator Sessions. I believe Senator Levin asked you about
    deployments in Europe. It's just a matter that's come up again
    recently. I am of the belief it's difficult to justify 40,000
    troops in Europe at this point in time. For our economy it's
    better for those troops to be in the United States spending
    their wealth and creating tax growth for the local communities
    and jobs.
        Will you examine our force levels in areas like Europe and
    maintain the levels we need, but not maintain them at higher
    amounts than necessary?
        Dr. Carter. Absolutely. Secretary Panetta says everything's
    on the table.
        Senator Sessions. That's important to me.
        As you go about looking to defend the reasonable defense
    budget, we ought to ask ourselves how much the base budget has
    been increased over the last several years. It's about 2
    percent, is that correct? Do you have the numbers offhand,
    about how much increase DOD has had over the last 2, 3, 4
    years?
        Dr. Carter. It's a few percent in real terms, yes, has been
    the pattern over the decade or so.
        Senator Sessions. That was proposed in the President's
    budget, I believe, a little less than around 2 percent over a
    decade for each year's growth.
        Dr. Carter. Correct.
        Senator Sessions. We need to ask ourselves a few things.
    All of us want to contain spending, but I would point out--and
    maybe you could use this when you defend DOD--the non-defense
    discretionary spending in the last 2 years has gone up 24
    percent, not 4 percent like the Defense Department.
        As we talk about the Defense Department, I'm talking about
    the base budget, not the overseas contingency operations, which
    is the war cost. That's projected to drop from $158 billion
    this fiscal year to $118 billion, I believe, next fiscal year;
    is that right?
        Dr. Carter. Correct.
        Senator Sessions. Then have another drop, perhaps even
    larger, the next year.
        Dr. Carter. Correct.
        Senator Sessions. But the base defense budget that we rely
    on to defend America has to be examined and not unnecessarily
    weakened, in my opinion.
        In fact, the stimulus package of a couple of years ago
    alone spent more money than the entire cost of the Iraq war,
    almost $850 billion. It's more than that. We look at the new
    proposal for a stimulus package, $450 billion; that would
    provide a nice increase for the Defense Department over the
    next number of years. It's a lot of money.
        I guess what I say is if we set priorities for America,
    don't you think we need to know that the war costs are coming
    down significantly, but we need to focus on how much you can
    bring down the base defense budget, and there is a difference
    between the two?
        Dr. Carter. That's true. To your larger point, Secretary
    Panetta has said that we can't deal with the deficit situation
    solely by looking at discretionary spending, period. Certainly
    as we look at things in the defense budget, as I noted earlier,
    for the Budget Control Act target that we're given we're facing
    and will share with you some very difficult choices, all these
    things that we've been saying that are now on the table that
    haven't been on the table for a decade. That's going to be hard
    enough. When you get to the levels of the sequester and the
    manner of the sequester, it's just devastating.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you for saying that. I believe it's
    the responsibility of Congress to reduce spending. We're going
    to have to do that. But we need not to see the Defense
    Department as an easy place to take our savings. We have to
    have it smartly done and throughout our Government.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions.
        Senator Begich.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Dr. Carter, thank you for coming to see me a few days ago.
    I appreciate the opportunity to have a conversation with you. I
    want to just make sure of a couple things. With all due respect
    to my colleague from Alabama, actually, the 40,000 troops in
    Europe, we are on the same page here. We want to see some
    reassessment, not only in Europe, but around the globe, of
    where we have our resources and so forth.
        I want to make sure we put all the numbers on the table.
    $800 billion or so in Iraq, $400 plus billion in Afghanistan,
    but the real cost comes later, not in your Department, but in
    the Veterans Affairs, which will be in the trillions. The
    numbers, what I hear is $3, $4, $5 trillion over time, money
    that we will have to pay for these brave soldiers who served
    our country and have now needs and services through the
    Veterans Administration.
        The real cost of the war is in the trillions, not in the
    billions, in the trillions. We're here in the Armed Services
    Committee, but when I walk down the hall going to another
    meeting, which will be the Veterans Affairs Committee, we'll
    have this discussion and then we will blame the Defense
    Department for $800 billion. I want to make sure as people
    watch this, it's the big number here.
        I agree with my colleague--there are no easy places in the
    Defense Department. There's no easy places in the overall
    budget. We sit on the Budget Committee together and we are
    struggling, I would say, on a lot of fronts of how to resolve
    this. We have some tough calls.
        I hope as we sit down and work on the defense budget--I
    think you're going to find, as we've talked on the Medium
    Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) issue, on this European
    issue, there's a lot of opportunity, I think, for us to have
    good conversation about how to manage the Defense Department
    budget. But we have to not keep it in isolation of the other
    pieces to the equation, because when we go to war there are
    multiple components, because once we leave at some point
    Afghanistan, whatever remains in Iraq, State Department's going
    to be spending who knows what, because in Afghanistan they
    can't support their military. They have no capacity monetarily.
    Is that a fair statement? They can't write a check and pay for
    the defense that we're trying to build for them; is that fair?
        Dr. Carter. That is correct. At the moment we are bearing
    the lion's share of the cost for the Afghan National Security
    Forces as they are built up.
        Senator Begich. You define the lion's share, probably--I
    don't know what the percentage is--80 percent?
        Dr. Carter. That's about right, because the other partners
    are paying a share of it as well.
        Senator Begich. They're light on their commitments, that's
    my view, and that's a personal view. I just think we spend a
    lot in helping all these countries and some of these others
    need to lean up a little bit more.
        But let me leave that off to the side. First a couple quick
    questions. Law of the Sea Convention. Do you support that we
    need to be a signatory to the Law of the Sea Convention in
    order to put our place on the map?
        Dr. Carter. I do.
        Senator Begich. We talked about the Ground-Based Midcourse
    Defense System (GMD) and the importance of it. If confirmed,
    will you support the 2010 ballistic missile defense review,
    which established the GMD as a priority and ensures the program
    is resourced appropriately?
        Dr. Carter. Yes.
        Senator Begich. I think it's important from the national
    and international perspective, but also I'm biased--it's
    located in Alaska and we need to make sure the resources are
    there to keep it moving forward.
        What is your understanding of the Failure Review Board's
    conclusions and recommendations on the GMD at this point? I
    know there's been some current reviews.
        Dr. Carter. The Failure Review Board did take up the
    matter, I think it has a pretty good idea of both what happened
    and what the path to rectification is for that flight test
    failure.
        Senator Begich. I know we're in the first stage of this.
    You're always going to have failures at a higher percentage in
    the first stages of testing on anything, because you're trying
    to test it to determine how it works and you're going to have
    some failure. As you move the testing forward, you get a higher
    level of accuracy and competency. Is that fair?
        Dr. Carter. It is. In missile defense, it's particularly
    important because of the nature of the mission. It's the
    defense of the country against long-range missiles. You want to
    make sure things work the way they're supposed to. I work very
    hard with General O'Reilly, who runs the Missile Defense Agency
    and works for me on missile defense, on the test program to
    make sure we have tests that are realistic, that they're
    numerous enough, by the way that they're affordable enough,
    because testing's very expensive also, so that when we say the
    system performs at a given level we have some basis for saying
    that.
        Senator Begich. Very good. It's fair to say that--and this
    is my simplistic way to look at it--when we did the first kind
    of testing, it was hitting the missiles on the side; now we're
    testing it straight on. The missiles on the side had low
    accuracy at the beginning, but now they're very accurate in the
    sense of their capacity.
        Dr. Carter. Right.
        Senator Begich. Through testing and development over time;
    is that fair?
        Dr. Carter. It is. We changed the kinematics and geometry
    of the end game to make that more and more stressing.
        Senator Begich. Now we're trying to shoot head-on and that
    takes a little more accuracy and more testing. As we move
    forward we'll improve on that. Is that fair?
        Dr. Carter. That's right.
        Senator Begich. On energy security--there's a good story--I
    can't remember which newscast had it yesterday--in regards to
    our dependency on foreign oil and where we're engaged,
    especially in the Middle East, in defense activity. My argument
    is the issue of a national energy plan is not--I know a lot of
    people want to argue and debate over clean energy issues, cap
    and trade and all that. My issue is national security and
    economic security.
        Do you see the issue of energy from the Defense
    Department's perspective as an important piece of the equation,
    trying to figure out how to become more energy efficient?
    Because I know I think defense runs about $2 billion over
    budget because the price of fuel has gone up. But also, a lot
    of our casualties and fatalities are about moving fuel to the
    front line and defending that. Is that a priority, or where
    would you rank that as a priority?
        Dr. Carter. It has to be a priority, for all the three
    reasons you described. It costs money. It costs lives in a war
    if you are, for example, trucking fuel around. You put lives at
    risk to do that. Of course, it's a national necessity to
    strengthen our energy security. For all those reasons, it's a
    big deal for DOD.
        I will say that we established a post--and this was an
    initiative that originated in Congress--a Director of
    Operational Energy at the Assistant Secretary of Defense level.
    She reports to me. She's superb. She has made a big difference
    just in the short time she's been in office. She's looking at
    operational energy, which is the fuel efficiency of vehicles,
    the insulation of buildings in the field, and things like that.
        We also are the largest real property owner in the world,
    as has been mentioned earlier, and therefore our installations
    and our buildings and their energy security are a big deal for
    us also. In all these ways it has to be a priority for the
    Department.
        Senator Begich. Great. I appreciate the new staffing that
    you have in this area, because I think you're right on, that
    DOD has a huge role here, not only during times of war, but
    also, as you said, you're a large consumer of energy and how
    you can tweak that can make a big deal on the consumption.
        We briefly talked in our meeting, and I know you're working
    on it, and that's an updated commentary regarding the report on
    rare earth minerals. We'll look forward to seeing that.
        Last, because my time is up, is at some point, and maybe it
    can be down the road--I know we'll have some more discussions
    in regards to this, and that's on Afghanistan and Pakistan and
    your assessment. I've heard some already, but I know we'll have
    some more discussion, so I'll just leave that and I may send
    you some additional questions on that. Is that okay?
        Dr. Carter. I look forward to answering them, sir.
        Senator Begich. Congratulations. Thank you very much for
    spending the time with me a few days ago.
        Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Begich.
        Senator Ayotte.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you very much, Dr. Carter, for your prior service.
    You're very well qualified to take over this position.
        On Sunday we all remembered September 11, the 10-year
    anniversary of a horrible day in our Nation's history. Do you
    believe it's an accident that we haven't had another major
    incident on our soil, and would you agree with what former
    Secretary Gates said, which is that the ultimate guarantee
    against the success of aggressors, dictators, and terrorists in
    the 21st century, as in the 20th, is hard power, the size,
    strength, and global reach of the U.S. military?
        Dr. Carter. It's no accident, and I absolutely agree with
    what Secretary Gates said.
        Senator Ayotte. To echo what some of my colleagues have
    already said to you, if we fail to have the political courage
    in Congress to make the difficult decisions and look at the
    entire breadth of Federal spending, including reforming our
    entitlement programs, allowing the Defense Department
    sequestration to occur, do you think this will make us less
    safe as we look forward?
        Dr. Carter. Absolutely. When we say disastrous, that's
    exactly the disaster we mean.
        Senator Ayotte. I appreciate that. I do not believe that we
    should subjugate our national security for our failure to have
    political courage here in Washington and to address the
    fundamental drivers of our spending.
        I wanted to ask you about what Senator McCain asked you
    about with respect to Iraq. Have you spoken to Secretary
    Panetta at all about troop levels in Iraq?
        Dr. Carter. I have not, I mean except casually, because in
    my current responsibilities that is not a subject that I have
    responsibility for. The piece of it that I work on is the
    implementation. When decisions are made about that, I will be
    involved in the implementation of it, the logistics associated
    with whatever is decided.
        Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, as I understand your position
    you will be Secretary Panetta's right-hand man; is that right?
        Dr. Carter. If confirmed as deputy, yes.
        Senator Ayotte. If confirmed. In that capacity, you will be
    making recommendations to him based on your best assessment of
    what should be done on all major areas in DOD?
        Dr. Carter. Yes, absolutely.
        Senator Ayotte. I would ask you, with respect to the troop
    levels in Iraq, to make a pledge to this committee that you
    will give very serious and due weight and consideration to what
    our commanders in the military are saying on troop levels that
    we need to make sure that our troops are protected, that we do
    not undermine the hard-fought security we've gotten through
    Iraq, with many who have sacrificed for that security, based on
    political considerations? Will you make that assurance to this
    committee?
        Dr. Carter. Absolutely.
        Senator Ayotte. Because I'm very deeply concerned with what
    I heard about the 3,000 level of troops, just for the security
    of those who will remain, for our assets, for securing our
    embassy in Baghdad, when you look at what happened the other
    day in Afghanistan to our embassy. These are all missions that
    these troops will be tasked with. I appreciate that, and I
    remain concerned from what we're hearing in the press and I
    hope that it's not true.
        I appreciate your spending time in my office to meet with
    me prior to this hearing. One of the issues that you and I
    talked about and also you've been asked about today is
    acquisition costs and how we go about acquisition in DOD. My
    view, which I think I shared with you in my office, but I'll
    share again, is that from the limited time that I've spent on
    the Armed Services Committee that I think a third year law
    student could negotiate better terms for the United States of
    America than we have been negotiating at the DOD on behalf of
    the taxpayers of this country.
        What can we do to make sure that we are negotiating better
    terms for our country, better results, particularly when we're
    going to be asking you to have to implement these cuts, which
    will be very difficult?
        Dr. Carter. I remember that conversation. I appreciate the
    opportunity to have met with you. I remember that phrase as
    well. There's so much we can do to do better. I think the place
    I'd start, Senator, is with the people--we were talking about
    this earlier--our acquisition workforce, uniformed and
    civilian, who does this kind of work. I really meant it when I
    said it earlier: When we back them and we say, we expect you to
    negotiate a better deal than a third year law student could
    negotiate, they want to hear that. They want to do the right
    thing. They want to be backed up by us, and they know that the
    power of the purse resides ultimately in Congress. When they
    hear you asking for the same thing, it helps us.
        I said there are some new pages I think we need to turn in
    the acquisition picture, and I'll just mention a few of them.
    One is to try to create on a lasting basis a fast lane, learn
    the lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq for acquisition.
        Another one is in acquisition of services. You and I talked
    about this. We spend a lot for services, not just planes,
    ships, and tanks, but services as well. We are looking at the
    requirements system, which is what do you ask for in the first
    place and is that reasonable, is there feedback between the
    acquisition system and the requirements system.
        In all of these ways, I think--and this is something that
    Senator McCain was asking about--we need to keep turning the
    page here. There's a lot more we can do.
        Senator Ayotte. How can we ensure that we only reserve
    cost-plus contracts for the limited situations where they're
    warranted?
        Dr. Carter. That's my direction to our contracting people
    and they have to have a reason for deviating from that
    expectation. There are reasonable reasons for deviating from
    that, but we have gotten into a habit of doing way too many
    things on a cost-plus basis that it wasn't necessary to do on
    that basis.
        Senator Ayotte. How do we end the end-of-the-year
    spendfest? Because we have all heard, end of the fiscal year,
    people buying things we don't need just because they want to
    make sure that they spend all the money we have. I'm interested
    in creating incentives, whether it's through legislation here,
    I'd like you to create incentives, to make sure that does not
    continue, because with limited dollars we just can't continue
    to buy things we don't need.
        Dr. Carter. I agree with you 100 percent, and it is really
    about incentives, creating the right incentives, so the
    incentive is not to spend it all by the end of September.
        Senator Ayotte. Do you have any ideas about what incentives
    you think would be effective?
        Dr. Carter. Yes, there are a number of things. First and
    foremost--and I had this discussion directly with our program
    managers and program executive officers, and I say: You will be
    judged by the value you deliver to the taxpayer, not by the
    size of the budget you're able to secure through the budget
    process. We will consider you a good program manager and not a
    failed program manager if you're returning budget to the
    Treasury at the end of the year.
        The other thing you have to do is say to the manager of a
    portfolio of programs, say a program executive officer: If you
    manage to be efficient in one area of your spending and you're
    having troubles in another, we'll give you a break where you're
    having trouble and you can reallocate some of that funding to
    where it would make another program more efficient, or if you
    save money in this way we'll help you buy more of something
    else, buy more capability.
        You have to make people understand that by saving money in
    one area they can serve their Service better, fix a broken
    program, and so in that sense they're sharing in the proceeds
    of good management.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Dr. Carter. I look forward to
    working with you on these issues and I know many others who
    serve on the committee as well, so we can improve this process.
        My time is up, but I also wanted to mention the Commission
    on Wartime Contracting: half of our money is going to
    insurgents. Senator Brown and I have a piece of legislation I
    hope you'll support, to cut off funding as soon as possible
    when our money goes into enemy hands.
        Thank you so much for testifying today and we very much
    appreciate your service.
        Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator McCaskill [presiding]. Dr. Carter, I'm sitting in
    briefly for the chairman while he's away, and I love it that
    Senator Ayotte ended with the Commission on Wartime
    Contracting. You are well aware from many conversations we've
    had over the last 4\1/2\ years how high up on the priority list
    this has been for my term on this committee.
        Have you had a chance to read the report from the
    Commission on Wartime Contracting yet?
        Dr. Carter. I have, and I've talked to the commissioners on
    a number of occasions about the report. My general impression
    is it's extremely well done. We've been working with them side
    by side. I think we were trying to work off the same list of
    recommendations that they have. It points to a problem that is
    a very serious one, and I thought it was a good piece of work,
    with great benefits to us, insights that we could use.
        Senator McCaskill. Is there anything in the report that you
    disagree with? Is there anything that you took issue with?
        Dr. Carter. There are a few of the recommendations--we
    haven't finished assessing this final report, which contains
    so-called strategic recommendations, which are more general. We
    haven't really had a chance to assess them. In fact, I
    testified before the commission with respect to their two
    interim reports.
        Senator McCaskill. Right.
        Dr. Carter. I forget what the numbers are, but they had in
    the neighborhood of 70 to 80 specific recommendations, and I
    think we adopted somewhere, I want to say, between 60--I'll get
    you the specific numbers and the details at any level you want.
    But almost all of their recommendations made a lot of sense and
    were things that we either were doing or should have been
    doing.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        This report included 15 strategic recommendations, of which 11 were
    Department of Defense (DOD)-specific recommendations and 4 were
    directed at Congress. As for the 11 DOD-specific recommendations, we
    embrace all of them in principle and are already in the process of
    implementing some of them.

        Senator McCaskill. I will look forward to any, particularly
    any issues that you don't completely agree with, because I
    think it's important that we figure out whether we all are on
    the same page going forward with the commission's work. This is
    going to be a subject of a hearing in the full Committee of
    Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs next week, and then
    the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee of this
    committee, we're going to do some work on it, too, and perhaps
    the Contracting Subcommittee of the Homeland Security and
    Governmental Affairs Committee also.
        There's going to be several follow-up opportunities to work
    on these recommendations over the coming weeks. I would really
    like to know if there's anything there that you are not
    completely comfortable with, because if there is I think we
    have to sort that out at the beginning, because my job now is
    to hold you accountable to make this work of this Contracting
    Commission be real to our military.
        I think that we have two problems on contracting. One is
    contracting within the big Pentagon picture and the other is
    contingency contracting. They have different sets of problems.
    Now, many of them are kissing cousins, but they are different
    sets of problems.
        The biggest problem with the contingency contracting is an
    overreliance on contractors in order to meet the mission and
    the supremacy of the mission in terms of shortcutting good
    contracting practices and a culture that is all about that. The
    view: I want what I want when I need it in theater; I don't
    want to listen to any acquisition personnel tell me I can't
    have it.
        It is anecdotal, but it is true that one of the major
    generals over contracting in Kuwait when I visited there--and a
    member of your staff was with us--actually said to me: I wanted
    three kinds of ice cream in the mess hall yesterday and I
    didn't care what it cost.
        Now, that is obviously problematic. We all want our
    soldiers in theater to get ice cream. We want them to get a
    variety of kinds of ice cream. But we have to care what it
    costs. It's that culture that I think your leadership at the
    very top is going to be absolutely essential on. I wanted to
    make sure we find out if there is any place that we disagree.
        The other big issue about contingency contracting is
    sustainability. I am very uncomfortable with the analysis
    that's going on in theater about sustainability of the money
    we're spending. I'm even more concerned that, for the first
    time, we have now morphed the Commander's Emergency Response
    Program (CERP). CERP began as something that was supposed to be
    for the on-the-ground commanders to be able to use to win
    hearts and minds in small projects. We now have an Afghanistan
    Infrastructure Fund in the DOD budget for the first time.
        We are actually going beyond what CERP was ever intended to
    be and we're building infrastructure in DOD. I'm not aware that
    we ever had a policy debate about whether that was a good idea
    or not. I would love to know why we think that's a good idea,
    and is this just going to be in contingencies or are we going
    to start taking this responsibility away from the State
    Department and U.S. Agency for International Development? I
    would love your follow-up thoughts on that.
        Also, Dr. Carter, about this Iraq Infrastructure Fund, it's
    $400 million. That's not a huge amount of money now, but
    neither was CERP when we started. Neither was CERP, and it
    obviously has grown significantly.
        Can you illuminate for me why they felt that they had a
    need to create an infrastructure fund in addition to the CERP
    funds that were being used for projects, road-building and
    community redevelopment?
        Dr. Carter. I would be pleased to, Senator. I'd like to get
    back to you on that particular issue in some detail because
    it's partly a policy issue as well.
        Senator McCaskill. Okay.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        As there is no Iraq Infrastructure Fund, the question appears to be
    focused on the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF). In fiscal year
    2011, Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton requested that $400 million
    be appropriated to the Department of Defense (DOD) for the AIF to
    execute critical infrastructure projects in support of the
    counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. The AIF is designed to
    bridge the resources and capabilities and serve the missions of both
    departments in supporting projects critical to counterinsurgency
    objectives and economic development such as electricity projects in
    Kandahar. The AIF projects are developed jointly with the Department of
    State.
        With regard to the question of an overlap with the Commander's
    Emergency Response Program (CERP) mission, the CERP is a DOD program to
    enable military commanders to respond to urgent, small scale,
    humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas
    of responsibility. The DOD reduced the fiscal year 2011 CERP request by
    $400 million to resource the AIF.

        Dr. Carter. If I could just comment on your general point,
    you're absolutely right, contingency contracting and all the
    rest of the contracting we've been talking about, JSF and so
    forth, present a different set of challenges. You have it in a
    nutshell that it's war, so people want to move quickly, and
    very understandably.
        What we need to do is not make it a choice between
    appropriate controls and contracting discipline and
    responsiveness to the warfighter. That's where I think the
    Commission on Wartime Contracting said we've fallen down over
    the last decade. We're getting better. We're trying to get
    better.
        With respect to the commission, I absolutely will get back
    to you on it on anything we disagree with. I know they have
    some numbers in there that we're trying to look at. I can't
    validate their numbers, but I can validate the overall accuracy
    of the report in the sense that any level of waste, fraud, and
    abuse is unacceptable, and all of the recommendations they've
    made, as I said, we're working off the same list.
        Senator McCaskill. We built a $300 million power plant in
    Kabul that is not fully operational and it's too expensive for
    them to use. If anybody tries to tell me there was a
    sustainability analysis done before we spent $300 million, I'd
    like to know who takes ownership of that, because I find it
    incredibly hard to believe that anybody looked at the long-term
    sustainability of a high tech, dual fuel power plant that's too
    expensive and, frankly, beyond the capability of the Afghan
    people to actually use it in a way that it was intended.
        That's a lot of money, and that's just one example, and
    unfortunately I could list too many. I would like you to
    address the sustainability analysis. I would like to see that
    in war colleges throughout the training of our amazing leaders
    in our military we begin to embrace contracting as part of that
    training, because we are never going to be able to get away
    from contingency contracting. The sooner these leaders know
    that's very important, the better.
        Let me very briefly, because I'm out of time. If you're
    going to contrast two acquisition programs, we have the poster
    child of bad with the JSF and the poster child of good with the
    Super Hornet. Now, factually that's great for me because I
    happen to care a lot about the Super Hornet in some of this,
    obviously. It would be obvious to point out that some of this
    is parochial.
        But there's no better example, we've never had a program
    more out of control, more over cost, than the JSF. Meanwhile,
    the Super Hornet has always delivered, on time, and now we're
    down to a cost of $52.7 million fly-away, and today's estimate
    on the JSF is $113 million, so half the cost.
        I just have one simple question: Given the Navy has
    publicly stated that the Super Hornet can undertake virtually
    any combat mission, is it your opinion that the Super Hornet
    remains a viable alternative based on the Navy's tactical
    needs?
        Dr. Carter. You're right that the performance of the Super
    Hornet program is commendable. Obviously, we're trying to
    manage in a direction so that JSF will one day replicate that
    kind of performance. I said in the Nunn-McCurdy certification
    this summer that no alternative meets the joint requirement as
    it is now spelled out for a fifth generation fighter but the
    JSF.
        Finally, we have in the last couple of years procured
    additional Super Hornets as we have been forced to delay the
    onset of production ramp-up for the JSF.
        Senator McCaskill. I have some more specific questions
    about the Super Hornet versus the JSF and I will get those for
    the record for you.
        Thank you very much, Dr. Carter. My time has expired.
        Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator
    McCaskill.
        Senator Graham.
        Senator Graham. I'd like to associate myself with Senator
    McCaskill's comments about the Super Hornet. I have some
    questions for you, too. I think it is a viable airplane at a
    good price and we ought to make sure we have an adequate
    inventory until we get the JSF in a better situation.
        Let's see if I can summarize your testimony when it comes
    to defense spending. Is your understanding and your belief and
    that of Secretary Panetta that if Congress were to follow
    through with the $400 billion cuts that are being asked by the
    administration, President Obama, to the defense budget and we
    took $600 billion more if the super committee fails to do their
    job, a trillion dollars, it would be devastating to the Defense
    Department? Is that correct?
        Dr. Carter. That's correct.
        Senator Graham. We would take the finest military in the
    history of mankind and gut it, is that right?
        Dr. Carter. Yes. The word Secretary Panetta uses is----
        Senator Graham. Do you have any idea why we would do that
    in Congress? What were we thinking? I don't know. I'm asking
    you because I can't think of a good reason to do that. Is the
    world that safe?
        Dr. Carter. The world's not that safe. We still are looking
    in our defense strategy to be ready for this very wide range of
    threats and contingencies that the world presents to us. We
    don't see that ending at any time in the future. We don't see
    anyone else in the world being able to assume the leadership
    role that the United States has. We never ever again want to
    have a hollow military.
        Senator Graham. We're on the path to do all those things if
    we follow through with this potential proposal?
        Dr. Carter. I think that's what Secretary Panetta means
    when he used the word ``disastrous''.
        Senator Graham. I think it's just completely brain-dead for
    us even to consider this, and we're not going to let it happen.
    You just tell the men and women in uniform we're going to wake
    up and get some good common sense here pretty soon.
        Iraq. Does it matter how it ends in Iraq in terms of our
    national security interest?
        Dr. Carter. Absolutely.
        Senator Graham. On a scale of 1 to 10, how important is it
    for Iraq to end well, become stable, and not be a satellite
    state of Iran?
        Dr. Carter. It's a 10, after all we've put into it.
        Senator Graham. If it's a 10--and I couldn't agree with you
    more--we ought to be looking at resourcing it as a 10. Do you
    agree with that?
        Dr. Carter. The decisions haven't been made about
    resourcing----
        Senator Graham. Do you agree with the concept that if it's
    a 10 we ought to resource it consistently?
        Dr. Carter. Absolutely.
        Senator Graham. Let's talk about Afghanistan. Does it
    matter how that ends?
        Dr. Carter. It does.
        Senator Graham. It does. It matters a lot, because that's
    the place where the attacks of September 11 were planned; is
    that correct?
        Dr. Carter. Absolutely.
        Senator Graham. What would happen after all of these years
    and all the blood and treasure and mistakes we made, if the
    Taliban were somehow able to come back? What would it mean to
    our national security interests down the road?
        Dr. Carter. It would be very serious.
        Senator Graham. Do you believe we can prevent that?
        Dr. Carter. I do.
        Senator Graham. I think we have a plan to prevent it. The
    only thing I worry about is that we're going to be penny wise
    and pound foolish.
        I know you very well, and I know that you and Secretary
    Panetta are going to give us the unvarnished truth. As we
    transition to Afghan control, please realize, to the committee
    and those who are listening, that how it ends does matter.
        The strategic partnership agreement that's being negotiated
    with the Afghan Government, are you familiar with the concept?
        Dr. Carter. I am.
        Senator Graham. Do you support the idea that post-2014 we
    would have an enduring relationship with the Afghan Government
    and people?
        Dr. Carter. Yes, I do.
        Senator Graham. It is in our national security interest to
    have a political relationship with the Afghan Government and
    people; do you agree with that?
        Dr. Carter. Sure.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree that it would be in our
    national security interest to have an economic relationship
    with the Afghan people?
        Dr. Carter. Yes.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree it's in our national security
    interest to have a military relationship with the Afghan
    Government, security forces, and people post-2014?
        Dr. Carter. I do.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that training of the
    Afghan army will be a need that goes past 2014?
        Dr. Carter. I will.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that General Caldwell
    is one of the unsung heroes of this war by creating a training
    regime that is more efficient and more productive?
        Dr. Carter. Double yes.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that the
    counterterrorism component that exists today will be needed
    past 2014 to make sure al Qaeda and Taliban do not regenerate?
        Dr. Carter. Yes.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that the Afghan
    Government has virtually no air force and they will need some
    air capability?
        Dr. Carter. Yes, and that's part of----
        Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that the intelligence-
    gathering capability of the United States is second to none?
        Dr. Carter. Yes.
        Senator Graham. That the Afghan Government and the Afghan
    security forces would benefit from that assistance?
        Dr. Carter. Yes.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that we need to embed
    some American soldiers in the future to make sure the Afghan
    army develops in a mature professional fashion?
        Dr. Carter. If Afghanistan agrees to that, of course.
        Senator Graham. All of this is contingent on them asking.
        Dr. Carter. You bet.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree with me it would be in our
    national security interest to leave behind a military footprint
    that would have American air power available to the Afghan
    security forces and counterterrorism units to suppress the
    Taliban as far as the eye could see?
        Dr. Carter. I think that's desirable, but of course we
    haven't begun to address the issue----
        Senator Graham. But if the Afghan people through their
    government would ask, it would be in our national security
    interest to say yes?
        Dr. Carter. It would.
        Senator Graham. Would you agree with me that if we had such
    an enduring relationship, it would be a signal to Iran that
    needs to be sent?
        Dr. Carter. Yes.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that the Iranians are
    trying to develop a nuclear program, not for peaceful purposes?
        Dr. Carter. That's my understanding, yes.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree with me that it would change
    the world as we know it if they were successful?
        Dr. Carter. It's very undesirable to let Iran go nuclear.
        Senator Graham. Do you believe that we're on a collision
    course with Pakistan?
        Dr. Carter. I can't say that. We work very closely with
    Pakistan in some areas. Obviously, there is great frustration
    in some other areas on both sides.
        Senator Graham. Would you agree that the relationship is in
    a new phase, very problematic?
        Dr. Carter. It is certainly problematic.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree that a lot of the IEDs coming
    into Afghanistan are made from products in Pakistan?
        Dr. Carter. They are.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree that it is now time for the
    Pakistani Government to step up and make a decision as to who
    they are and what they want to be?
        Dr. Carter. Certainly as regards terrorism and as regards
    weapons crossing the border from Pakistan to Afghanistan, we
    need their help. I mentioned that earlier with respect to
    ammonium nitrate, but it's across the board. They need to step
    up.
        Senator Graham. Would it be in our national security
    interest to open up transportation routes in the north to get
    supplies and equipment into Afghanistan without having to send
    everything through Pakistan?
        Dr. Carter. It is and we are.
        Senator Graham. The Uzbekistan Government, I met with them.
    They're willing to expand the relationship with the United
    States. Do you think that is in our national security interest
    to do so?
        Dr. Carter. It is. They have been part of that northern
    resupply system and----
        Senator Graham. It's my understanding that the
    administration is negotiating with the Uzbekistan Government to
    dramatically expand that supply capability and that we would
    need some waivers from this committee to support the Uzbekistan
    security forces. Secretary Panetta has written me a letter
    suggesting he supports that. Would you support that?
        Dr. Carter. Certainly if Secretary Panetta supports it, I
    would. I understand enough about the northern distribution
    network to understand its importance.
        Senator Graham. This is a critical area for us regarding
    Afghanistan. I want to let the committee know, Mr. Chairman,
    that we're on the verge of a major breakthrough in terms of
    northern supply and the committee will need to come up with a
    consensus about how we can help the Uzbekistan Government. Some
    waivers would be necessary to sell them equipment, monitoring
    their human rights problems in the past.
        I think you're an ideal candidate for this job. Most of the
    defense budget is personnel costs. When you want to reform
    retirement, count me in. I want to do it in a humane, generous
    way, but it needs to change. When you want to adjust TRICARE
    premiums for people like myself who is going to be a retired
    colonel one day, count me in, because even though you serve and
    you sacrifice you still have, I think, the ability to serve in
    retirement. We're not going to ask more of the retired force
    than they can give, but change has to come.
        I think you're an ideal choice to be Deputy Secretary of
    Defense and I look forward to supporting you.
        Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Cornyn. Mr. Chairman, may I make a brief UC
    request?
        Chairman Levin. You certainly can. Before you do that, I
    want to just say--this retirement announcement as a colonel,
    this precludes the possibility, which is there apparently, of
    you being promoted to a general.
        Senator Graham. We have enough challenges in the world.
    [Laughter.]
        Chairman Levin. Senator Cornyn.
        Senator Cornyn. I'm grateful, Mr. Chairman. I want to say
    to Dr. Carter how much I appreciated him visiting with me. I
    support his nomination.
        I'd like to make a unanimous consent request that two
    letters that I have written to him and two letters he's written
    back to me relating to the JSF be made part of the record.
        Chairman Levin. They will be made part of the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Senator Cornyn. I'm grateful to you. I have a conflicting
    appointment, so I won't be able to stay. But thank you for
    that.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
        Senator Hagan.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Dr. Carter, thanks for taking the time to come visit with
    me recently. I appreciated our discussion. In that discussion,
    as we discussed, you know that I am a strong supporter of the
    F-35B. It does provide the Marine Corps with the capability to
    launch from the large-deck amphibious ships, refuel in forward
    operating sites. As the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General
    Amos, has said, if we lose the F-35B there is no plan B for
    fixed wing aircraft on large-deck amphibious ships, and this
    would drastically cut our Nation's capability to project power
    in remote environments.
        Recently, when the F-15 airplane crashed in Benghazi,
    Libya, the AV-8B fighter jets conducted a tactical recovery of
    aircraft and personnel mission in Libya. The rescue forces took
    off from two amphibious assault ships in the Mediterranean.
    When the aircraft went down, there were no aircraft carriers in
    the area.
        I want to work with you to get the F-35B off probation and
    resolve the engineering issues inside the weight limits and
    financial boundaries. The term ``probation'' has a negative
    connotation. My question is, what kind of effect does the F-35B
    being on probation have on the Marine Corps's ability to
    transition to a fifth generation fighter? Does it affect the
    industrial base by putting suppliers on notice and increasing
    production costs?
        Dr. Carter. The F-35B is everything you said. Namely, there
    is a firm requirement for it; the attractiveness of the short
    takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) variant of the F-35 is the
    ability to take off from the smaller decked amphib ships; and
    General Amos has indicated that's a capability that he very
    much wants to have. That's why Secretary Gates, who originated
    the fact of and also the term ``probation'' for F-35, the
    instructions he gave us were to be success-oriented, and as the
    managers of the program we are. That is, we are trying to work
    through the engineering issues from which the concept of
    probation arose.
        Just to recap them briefly, it's a complicated variant
    because of its short takeoff and vertical landing nature, and
    therefore does present some engineering issues that the other
    variants don't. Those surfaced in flight tests and we know what
    they are and we're working through the engineering fixes to
    them. We can't rule out that additional ones will arise in
    flight tests. You can never say that. But we know what they are
    and we have a schedule for resolving them.
        What Secretary Gates said at the time was: Resolve those
    issues and then we'll look at the cost impact and the weight
    impact associated with those engineering fixes and decide where
    we go with STOVL from that point. My focus has been on
    resolving those issues. That's where Admiral Venlet's focus is.
    We are success-oriented. We will work through those engineering
    issues and get to that point.
        Senator Hagan. The F-35B I understand has performed very
    well in operational testing so far this year, and I think
    there's quite a few number of tests taking place next month. If
    the variant performs successfully during these sea trials next
    month, would you consider lifting the program from probation?
        Dr. Carter. General Amos and I talk about this all the
    time--probation is--I'll borrow a phrase from elsewhere--
    conditions-based. In other words, we told Secretary Gates that
    it would take us around 2 years to work through the engineering
    issues to which I referred, and we're on schedule to do that
    within those 2 years. If we resolve them within the 2 years,
    then we have done what he said probation was supposed to do.
        There's nothing magic about 2 years. There is something
    magic about resolving the issues.
        Senator Hagan. I agree with that. But if they get
    resolved--I think it's been a year now. If they get resolved, I
    think it would be important to the industrial base to be sure
    that probation would be removed as quickly as those issues are
    taken care of.
        I wanted to talk about the science and technical talent.
    DOD and the defense industry are facing challenges seeking new
    graduates with advanced degrees in scientific and technical
    fields to help develop complex military systems. Some of these
    challenges include Federal hiring and/or pay freezes, budgetary
    pressures leading to declining numbers of new defense programs,
    recruiting issues stemming from graduates being more interested
    in the commercial sectors related to information technology and
    energy versus the traditional defense industrial sector, such
    as aerospace or naval shipbuilding.
        What is the Department doing to ensure that it as well as
    the defense industrial base is able to have access to future
    scientific and technical talent, and what is the Department
    doing to recruit and retain the best and the brightest
    scientists and engineers, and how do you measure the
    effectiveness of these efforts? I just think it's critically
    important that we focus on this at DOD as well as, obviously,
    in our education system with science, technology, engineering,
    and math curriculum that is so critically important in our
    country today.
        Dr. Carter. It's critically important. Next to and after
    the superb nature of the men and women we have in uniform, the
    thing that makes our military the greatest in the world is the
    technology within it. There is a challenge associated with the
    globalization of the technology base for defense. It's no
    longer the case that all new technologies emerge in this
    country or in association with the defense technology base.
        We need to reach out and gather those ideas and those
    people who might otherwise end up not in defense and attract
    them into defense. We're doing a lot to strengthen the science
    and technology workforce.
        I think another point I'd make is that as we go into the
    budget situation that we're facing, we've talked about
    difficult choices; one of the difficult choices is between the
    present and the future, how much you invest in the present and
    how much you invest in the future. I think one of the things
    that we're going to need to do is make sure that we protect
    those investments in science and technology that will allow us
    10 years from now, 20 years from now, to have the skill base
    and the new ideas that will constitute the military of the
    future and make sure that we don't mortgage the future.
        That's the kind of balancing that we're trying to do in the
    comprehensive review, present versus future, even as we're
    trying to balance different kinds of threats. It's a very big
    effort within the acquisition, technology, and logistics
    department.
        Senator Hagan. You said that you're doing quite a bit in
    this area, especially from recruiting. Can you give me any
    concrete examples?
        Dr. Carter. Yes. Let's see. I'll take the Defense Advanced
    Research Projects Agency (DARPA) for example. We've made a lot
    of progress there in the last few years, and I credit the
    current director for doing that, in making it more attractive
    for people who are first-rate technical people to come in,
    spend some time in DARPA, make their contributions, get the
    feel of the excitement and the commitment of national defense
    as a place to apply their scientific talents. We've made a lot
    of progress there, but all of our technical managers are doing
    that.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you. I've worked quite closely with
    Dr. Duke and I think she is definitely doing a very good job at
    that example.
        Dr. Carter, thank you and thank you for your family, for
    your participation in I know what's going to be a nominee that
    will be confirmed very swiftly. Thank you for doing this.
        Dr. Carter. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
        Senator Brown.
        Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you also for taking time to come and visit with me. I
    appreciate it. I know we briefly talked about your thoughts
    about the Department's willingness to invest in the Reserve
    component, Guard and Reserve, to see how we can maximize those
    valuable dollars and maybe shift some of the responsibilities
    in training and resources to the Guard and Reserves. What's
    your position on that?
        Dr. Carter. The Guard and Reserves, we couldn't have done
    what we've done over the last 10 years without the contribution
    of the Guard and Reserves. I know that they've been asked to do
    things that were not foreseen at the time that many of them
    joined the Guard and Reserves. You can go, and I do, to theater
    and visit a unit and you can't tell whether that's an Active
    Duty unit or a Guard or Reserve unit. They're a critical part
    of the total force and their continuing vitality, like
    everything else that we're trying to protect, is an important
    part of this comprehensive review we're conducting.
        Senator Brown. I know you have some real economic and
    financial challenges, obviously, with the dollars that are so
    valuable. I'd like to just follow up with Senator McCain and
    Senator Levin's comments regarding the cost growth and delays
    on the JSF program, which are not limited to the airframe only.
    They also relate to the engine, which has increased from $385
    million to $2.3 billion. That's nearly a 500 percent increase.
        Yet DOD continues to say it's happy with the engine it has.
    I'm wondering, do you remain pleased with the cost,
    development, testing, and performance of the F-135 engine?
        Dr. Carter. I monitor the F-135 engine closely. No, I can't
    say I'm completely satisfied with that. I'm not completely
    satisfied with any part of the F-35 that's showing cost growth
    and the F-135 engine has. I will say that, like with everything
    else on the JSF, we are working very hard to manage to a better
    result, and those performing the work on the engine, like those
    performing the work on the airframe, are joining us in trying
    to restore affordability.
        Senator Brown. I noted in your testimony that you indicated
    that competing subsystems and support would be put on the
    table. Does that include the self-funding proposal being put
    forth on the engines?
        Dr. Carter. With regard to the self-funding proposal by
    General Electric (GE) and Rolls-Royce for the F-136 engine, I
    understand that a meeting was scheduled between GE and the
    Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary Lynn, and also
    the Air Force acquisition executive, to get more insight into
    that concept. Those meetings haven't occurred or haven't been
    scheduled.
        But if I'm confirmed as Deputy Secretary, I'd be happy to
    have those meetings and to learn more about the so-called
    ``self-funding'' proposal. I do have to say I have real
    concerns about that proposal on the basis of what I've heard so
    far. But again, if confirmed, if that meeting hasn't been held
    by the time that Secretary Lynn would leave, I'd be happy to
    have that meeting, because any time one of our industry
    partners has an idea on affordability I'm very open to ideas on
    affordability and would be willing to listen to that.
        Senator Brown. I noted in some of the letters I received
    from other Senators to you and in our conversation, you
    indicated that you would keep an open mind and you would meet
    with that leadership team to discuss all options. Is that still
    your position?
        Dr. Carter. It is. By the way, I have to meet with them on
    other things that they do for us also. GE does a lot for us--a
    number of different engine types, sustainment, research and
    development (R&D). We value their contribution to the military
    aircraft engine business.
        Senator Brown. If confirmed, will you have the authority to
    permit the self-funding to go forward, and obviously as a
    result will they be allowed to have access so they can in fact
    move forward with it?
        Dr. Carter. Until I know more about it, I don't know what
    authorities would be required and whether they would require
    additional legislative authority.
        Senator Brown. I had the honor of being able to go over to
    Afghanistan on duty and serve for a short time. The most
    talked-about issue was the proposed cut in military pensions
    among current servicemembers. Could you talk about that a
    little bit and say what your position is, not only for the
    people that are presently serving and have already done their
    20 years and are eligible, but as to how it affects Active,
    Guard, and reservists?
        Dr. Carter. I think two critical things on that that
    Secretary Panetta's made clear. One thing is that, like
    everything else, compensation and benefits has to be on the
    table, but--this is the only ``but'' he's made to that general
    guidance to us--don't break faith with the force. That would
    mean that significant, abrupt changes that would affect the
    understanding and the bond or deal made between service people
    and us when they entered service, that is not somewhere he
    wants to go. He has taken that off the table. He calls it
    ``breaking faith''.
        Senator Brown. It's interesting you say that, because
    before people knew I was a Senator, I was just there as a
    lieutenant colonel and we were just talking as soldiers, and
    without even blinking, sir, Mr. Chairman, that was the talk in
    every breakfast, lunch, and dinner that I sat down with the
    troops. Then when they found out I was a Senator, it was groups
    of people coming up and saying: What are you guys trying to do?
    I'm like, I'm not trying to do anything; I'll speak to the
    Secretary and, obviously, you, because I agree with you, there
    is a real dependency on them doing their job and them depending
    on getting their fair share once they've done their job and
    having that commitment honored. I appreciate that.
        One final question. I'm trying to figure out the numbers a
    little bit. On the MEADS program, the development of this
    program is governed by the international memorandum which
    everybody has been talking about for months and months. It
    specifies a maximum national commitment limit of $2.3 billion.
    Our appropriated funds from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year
    2011, however, total $2.98 billion, and that number exceeds the
    MEADS maximum national commitment limit of $2.3 billion.
        Can you help me understand the numbers, what the difference
    is?
        Dr. Carter. I will have to get back to you on those
    specific numbers.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Senator Brown. That's fine.
        Dr. Carter. Because I'm not familiar with those specific
    numbers. But I will say some that I am familiar with that may
    be helpful. The memorandum of understanding, which is the
    extant international agreement that you referred to, would
    under our proposal which is before you take about another $800
    million to complete the proof of concept part of that program.
        Senator Brown. Yes, to get out of the deal, basically, we
    have to pay $800 million.
        Dr. Carter. The alternative would be to terminate, which
    costs a comparable amount. Given those alternatives, we have
    asked for the funding to complete the proof of concept.
        Senator Brown. Maybe we can follow up, Mr. Chairman, with a
    question for the record which we'll submit to you, and just see
    where that discrepancy is. Maybe we don't have the right
    numbers. I just want to make sure I understand it.
        Thank you for your time and good luck.
        Dr. Carter. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Brown.
        Just a few additional quick questions from me. On cyber
    security, there was a commitment by General Alexander when he
    was confirmed to command the newly created Cyber Command that
    there would be a major effort to address a whole host of cyber
    security issues, and it was under way or to be completed by the
    end of calendar year 2010. The National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2011, already law, required a report from
    the Secretary by March of this year. We don't have the report
    that we're owed on cyber security issues. Are you aware of that
    and will you commit to get us that report promptly?
        Dr. Carter. Mr. Chairman, I'm not aware of the status of
    that report, but I certainly commit to you that, if confirmed,
    I'll make sure it's completed.
        Chairman Levin. Promptly?
        Dr. Carter. Promptly.
        Chairman Levin. Do you support the President's decision to
    withdraw 30,000 U.S. surge forces from Afghanistan by next
    summer?
        Dr. Carter. I do.
        Chairman Levin. How important is it to the success of the
    counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan that we maintain the
    process of transitioning responsibility to the Afghan Security
    Forces for their own security?
        Dr. Carter. Very important.
        Chairman Levin. Do you also agree it's essential for the
    Afghan Government to provide services for their people in order
    for the mission to prevent Taliban recontrol of Afghanistan to
    succeed?
        Dr. Carter. Yes.
        Chairman Levin. Do you agree that it's in the security
    interest of the Afghans that their government end corruption?
        Dr. Carter. Yes.
        Chairman Levin. Do you agree that the reconciliation or the
    reintegration of lower level Taliban be continued and that it
    is an important part of success of the mission?
        Dr. Carter. Yes.
        Chairman Levin. Now, relative to Pakistan, do you agree
    that it's important that Pakistan address the Haqqani Network's
    use of their soil as a safe haven to attack us?
        Dr. Carter. Yes.
        Chairman Levin. Relative to Iraq, General Odierno said
    yesterday or the day before that we must avoid the appearance
    of leaving a large occupation force in Iraq. Do you agree with
    General Odierno?
        Dr. Carter. I do.
        Chairman Levin. Secretary Carter, to you, your family, your
    wife, your two children who are here--I don't think they
    probably learned anything new because they know you very well.
    They know your competence, they know your steadiness, and we've
    learned that, too, over the years, all of us on this committee.
    We look forward to a prompt confirmation, and we will stand
    adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

        [Prepared questions submitted to Ashton B. Carter by
    Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
    follow:]
                            Questions and Responses

                                DEFENSE REFORMS

        Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
    Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
    strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
    enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
    of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
    commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
    to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
    to the combatant commanders.
        Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
    provisions?
        Answer. I do not see a need for modification of any Goldwater-
    Nichols Act provisions at this time. The Act has served the Department
    and our Nation well, fostering a spirit of jointness that has enhanced
    the Department's capabilities to respond when called, such as in
    Operation Enduring Freedom. If confirmed, I will continue to consider
    this issue and will make proposals for modifications if and when
    required.
        Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
    address in these modifications?
        Answer. N/A.

                                 RELATIONSHIPS

        Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
    the Deputy Secretary of Defense and each of the following?
        The Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. The Deputy Secretary performs duties as assigned by the
    Secretary and must be able to perform the Secretary's duties when the
    Secretary is absent. The Secretary and the Deputy work closely together
    to develop defense strategy and policy. The Deputy Secretary serves as
    the Department's Chief Operating Officer (COO) and focuses primarily on
    the daily activities of the Department, including financial management,
    acquisition, and personnel policy matters (both civilian and military)
    and on the implementation of policy and strategy decisions.
        Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
        Answer. The Deputy Secretary oversees and ensures the coordination
    of the activities of the Under Secretaries. The Deputy Secretary
    ensures that the Secretary's direction and guidance is implemented
    promptly and properly by the Under Secretaries. The Deputy Secretary
    elevates to the Secretary issues raised by the Under Secretaries that
    require the Secretary's personal attention.
        Question. The Deputy Chief Management Officer (CMO) of the
    Department of Defense (DOD).
        Answer. The DCMO reports directly to the Deputy Secretary, and
    there must be a close working relationship between the two. The DCMO
    monitors and reports on the progress of the Department toward achieving
    management goals, keeps the Deputy Secretary informed, and proposes
    solutions to significant issues to the Deputy Secretary.
        Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
        Answer. For Assistant Secretaries who report directly to the
    Secretary, the Deputy Secretary's relationship with them would be
    similar to the Deputy Secretary's relationship with the Under
    Secretaries. For Assistant Secretaries who report directly to Under
    Secretaries, the Deputy Secretary works with them through the
    appropriate Under Secretary.
        Question. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff.
        Answer. The Deputy Secretary works closely with the Chairman and
    Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Deputy Secretary has an
    especially close working relationship with the Vice Chairman on
    requirements, programming, budgeting, and departmental management
    matters.
        Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
        Answer. The Deputy Secretary works closely with the Secretaries of
    the Military Departments to ensure that the Secretary of Defense's
    policies are implemented fully and effectively in a timely manner.
        Question. The CMOs of the Military Departments.
        Answer. The Deputy Secretary works with the CMOs of the Military
    Departments in close coordination with the Deputy CMO. The CMOs of the
    Military Departments play an important role in ensuring that the
    Department carries out its strategic plan and attains its management
    goals.
        Question. The Service Acquisition Executives.
        Answer. The Deputy Secretary plays an important role in
    establishing acquisition policy for the Department, and interacts with
    the Service Acquisition Executives primarily through the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
        Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Military Services.
        Answer. The Deputy Secretary works closely with the Service Chiefs,
    as appropriate, in ensuring the Services have the resources they need
    to accomplish assigned missions and implement the Secretary's policy
    effectively and efficiently. The Deputy Secretary normally works with
    the Service Chiefs, in their role as Service Chiefs, through the
    Secretaries of the Military Departments. The Deputy Secretary normally
    works with the Service Chiefs, in their role as members of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff, through the Chairman and the Vice Chairman.
        Question. The Director of National Intelligence.
        Answer. The Deputy Secretary works closely with the Director of
    National Intelligence on matters of mutual interest to the Department
    and the Intelligence Community, for example, the relationship between
    the Military Intelligence Program and the National Intelligence
    Program.
        Question. The Inspector General of DOD.
        Answer. The Inspector General performs a vital function for DOD,
    and the Deputy Secretary receives advice from the Inspector General on
    significant issues. The Deputy Secretary ensures that the Inspector
    General is able to perform his functions in an independent manner.
        Question. The General Counsel of DOD.
        Answer. The Deputy Secretary relies on the General Counsel for
    legal advice on all issues that come before him. The Deputy Secretary
    must be able to rely on the candid advice of the General Counsel.
        Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
        Answer. The Deputy Secretary works with the Chief of the National
    Guard Bureau on matters related to the National Guard and in
    coordinating issues related to the National Guard with the States. The
    Deputy Secretary may receive advice from the Chief of the National
    Guard Bureau on any matter related to the National Guard.
        Question. The Judge Advocates General of the Services.
        Answer. The Judge Advocates General have important roles in their
    respective Military Departments, providing legal advice to the senior
    leaders of the Military Departments, overseeing the military justice
    system, and leading their respective teams of military and civilian
    lawyers. The Deputy Secretary works with the Judge Advocates General
    primarily through the General Counsel of DOD.

                   DUTIES OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

        Question. Section 132 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the duties
    of the Deputy Secretary of Defense are to be prescribed by the
    Secretary of Defense.
        Assuming that you are confirmed, what duties do you expect the
    Secretary to prescribe for you?
        Answer. The primary duty of the Deputy Secretary of Defense is to
    assist the Secretary as needed. If confirmed, my expectation is that
    the Secretary will ask me to serve as his alter ego when necessary; to
    assist him in organizing the decisionmaking process within the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense (OSD); to carry out the statutory duties of
    CMO of DOD; and to carry out other duties as assigned.
        Question. What background and expertise do you possess that you
    believe qualify you to perform these duties?
        Answer. My background includes service in a number of previous
    civilian positions in DOD, culminating in my current service as Under
    Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. During
    this service, I have had the opportunity to serve under four
    Secretaries of Defense, working most closely with William J. Perry and
    Robert M. Gates, and to work closely with four Deputy Secretaries of
    Defense: William J. Perry, John P. White, John J. Hamre, and William J.
    Lynn III. In addition to my service within DOD, I have served as a
    member of the Defense Science Board, the Defense Policy Board, and
    Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice's International Security Advisory
    Board. I have also served as chair of the International and Global
    Affairs faculty at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and Co-
    Director of the Preventive Defense Project, a research collaboration of
    Harvard and Stanford Universities. If confirmed, I would bring to this
    position substantial experience with the Department in each of the last
    3 decades; current detailed knowledge of the Department's operations;
    experience with managing major policy initiatives; experience with
    managing one of the Department's largest organizations and several
    large defense agencies; a solid understanding of many of the major
    technological issues confronting the Department; and experience
    tackling some of the Department's most persistent management problems.
        Question. Do you believe there are actions you need to take to
    enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Deputy Secretary of
    Defense?
        Answer. If confirmed, there would be many actions I would need to
    take to best perform the duties of Deputy Secretary. First and foremost
    among these would be to build a strong working relationship with
    Secretary Panetta as his Deputy. Likewise, I would need to build on my
    existing relationships with the Joint Staff, the combatant commanders,
    the Secretaries of the Military Departments and their military
    leadership, and the OSD staff to enlist their knowledge and assistance
    in helping me carry out the duties of Deputy Secretary. I would work
    closely with Deputy Secretary Lynn to ensure a smooth transition and
    seamless hand off of his major initiatives to ensure they are continued
    within the Department. Of critical importance initially would be to
    learn in greater detail the significant budget issues pending in the
    Department where my position as Under Secretary has not required deep
    involvement.
        Question. What changes to section 132, if any, would you recommend?
        Answer. At this time, I believe the statutory authorities for the
    position of Deputy Secretary of Defense are appropriate. If confirmed,
    I would be sure to inform Congress if I determined that any change in
    the statute were necessary to effectively perform the duties of this
    office.
        Question. Section 132 was amended by section 904 of the National
    Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008, to provide that
    the Deputy Secretary serves as the CMO of DOD. The Deputy Secretary is
    to be assisted in this capacity by a Deputy CMO.
        What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of
    the Deputy Secretary in his capacity as CMO of DOD?
        Answer. My understanding is that the primary duty of the CMO is to
    provide leadership and to ensure accountability for the business
    operations of DOD. These operations involve all of the Department's
    components and cut across the responsibilities of the Under Secretaries
    of Defense, so they require leadership and accountability at a high
    level. The CMO's role is to lead, oversee, and support, rather than
    supplant, the roles of the Secretaries of the Military Departments and
    agency heads in managing their business operations.
        The CMO also provides leadership to the CMOs of the Military
    Departments and is responsible for the development of the Strategic
    Management Plan for DOD. The Deputy Secretary chairs the Defense
    Business Systems Management Committee, a responsibility consistent with
    the CMO role.
        Question. What background and expertise do you possess that you
    believe qualify you to perform these duties and responsibilities?
        Answer. As Under Secretary, I have been deeply involved in the
    Department's operations over the last 2 years. As Defense Acquisition
    Executive and Defense Logistics Executive, I have fulfilled leadership
    roles similar in nature to the CMO role. This experience has provided
    me with the background and expertise to serve as CMO.
        Question. Do you believe that the CMO and DCMO have the resources
    and authority needed to carry out the business transformation of DOD?
        Answer. At this time, I believe that these positions have all of
    the authority needed to carry out business transformation. I am not
    currently in a position to determine if the CMO and DCMO have the
    appropriate resources to carry out these roles, although I have no
    reason to believe that they do not. If confirmed, I will examine the
    resources available to the CMO and DCMO to determine if they fully
    address the need.
        Question. What role do you believe the DCMO of DOD should play in
    the planning, development, and implementation of specific business
    systems by the Military Departments?
        Answer. As with the CMO, the role of the DCMO is to support and
    oversee rather than to supplant the responsibilities of the Secretaries
    of the Military Departments and other agency heads in acquiring
    specific business systems. The DCMO has specific responsibilities for
    many of our Major Automated Information System acquisitions as
    Milestone Decision Authority and broad responsibility for defense
    business systems as the Vice Chair of the Defense Business Systems
    Management Committee. The DCMO ensures that the acquisition of business
    systems is consistent with principles of sound business investment, has
    applied appropriate business process reengineering efforts, and is
    compliant with the Department's business enterprise architecture.
        Question. Do you believe that the DCMO should have clearly defined
    decisionmaking authorities, or should the DCMO serve exclusively as an
    advisor to the Deputy Secretary in his capacity as CMO?
        Answer. I believe that the DCMO should have duties as assigned by
    the CMO and the Secretary of Defense. These duties may include
    decisionmaking authority where the CMO or the Secretary determines
    appropriate.
        Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the
    statutory provisions establishing the positions of CMO and DCMO?
        Answer. At this time, I believe the statutory authorities for the
    positions of the CMO and the Deputy CMO are appropriate. If confirmed,
    I would be sure to inform Congress if I determined that any change in
    the statute were necessary to effectively perform the duties of this
    office.
                                MAJOR CHALLENGES

        Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
    the next Deputy Secretary of Defense?
        If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
    challenges?
        Answer. The main tasks of the Deputy Secretary of Defense are to be
    fully prepared to act and speak in the Secretary's stead at all times;
    to shape an orderly deliberative process for the Secretary, so that he
    can make decisions and advise the President based on careful
    consideration of accurate management information and a full range of
    options; and to manage the budget process and other Department-wide
    matters, reserving decisions of greatest consequence for the Secretary.
        I have had the opportunity to discuss these matters with Secretary
    Panetta, with other members of the Obama administration, with the
    Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the
    Service Secretaries and Chiefs, with combatant commanders, and with
    other leaders in OSD. I have also had the benefit of the advice of many
    Members of Congress, including members of this committee. Finally, it
    has been my privilege to know personally a number of former Deputy
    Secretaries of Defense throughout my career and I have worked, in one
    way or another, for almost every Secretary of Defense since Caspar
    Weinberger. Last, as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics, I have responsibility for a number of the
    matters that fall under the Deputy, and I look forward, if confirmed,
    to working with this committee to acquaint myself with the additional
    responsibilities that fall under the Deputy.

                                   PRIORITIES

        Question. What broad priorities would you establish, if confirmed,
    with respect to issues which must be addressed by DOD?
        Answer. The top priority of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, like
    that of the Secretary, is to ensure the security of the American
    people.
        Key challenges facing the Department at this time include:
    prevailing in the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and in the
    fight against al Qaeda; keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the
    hands of terrorists and rogue nations; preparing to counter future
    threats and military technologies; preserving the finest fighting force
    in the world and taking care of servicemembers and their families; and
    continuing the process of reform which will be crucial in this time of
    constrained budgets.

                      NATIONAL SECURITY BUDGET REDUCTIONS

        Question. The President has called for $400 billion in reductions
    to national security spending over a 10-year period starting in 2013,
    and has asked the Secretary of Defense to lead a review to provide
    recommendations on where to make those cuts.
        What is your understanding of the current status of that review?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the review is ongoing and will
    be completed as part of the fiscal year 2013-2017 program and budget
    review.
        Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in guiding
    the review and in determining what cuts should be made to the defense
    budget?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to play a significant role in
    the Department's program and budget review, including serving as
    chairman of the Deputy's Advisory Working Group which provides the
    Secretary informed views of major budget issues.
        Question. The recent agreement on the debt ceiling calls for
    reductions in defense spending that could range from $350 billion in
    the first phase, to as much as $900 billion, if the joint committee is
    unable to reach agreement and a sequester is required.
        Do you believe that a national security spending reduction of this
    magnitude can be accomplished without significant adverse impact on our
    national security?
        Answer. I believe the Department can build a balanced defense
    program that also achieves the national security reductions enacted as
    part of the Budget Control Act of 2011. These reductions are in line
    with what the Department was anticipating at a time of considerable
    fiscal challenge. However, making these reductions will require
    difficult choices by the Department and Congress. Any further
    reductions that may result from a failure of the joint committee to
    reach agreement will undermine our ability to meet our national
    security objectives. The risk of hollowing out the force and weakening
    our ability to respond to threats around the globe will go up
    significantly. It is imperative that the joint committee be successful.
        Question. If confirmed, how will you prioritize the objectives of:
    making needed investments in the future force, addressing pressing
    requirements for completing the mission in Iraq and Afghanistan,
    resetting of the force, meeting ongoing operational commitments across
    the globe, and achieving the level of savings proposed by the
    President?
        Answer. The art of budgeting is about setting priorities. Winning
    today's wars, investing in force modernization, resetting the force,
    and meeting our operational commitments are all priorities that must be
    addressed. In addition, Secretary Panetta has been clear that we must
    ensure that we are able to keep weapons of mass destruction out of the
    hands of terrorist and rogue nations and that we always support our
    servicemembers and their families. In addressing these priorities in
    the budget, it is important that we build a balanced defense program
    that meets the demands of today, but also prepares us to meet the
    inevitable challenges of tomorrow. That balance requires a careful
    assessment of the contribution each program makes toward those ends.
    Difficult choices will have to be made and, if confirmed, I look
    forward to contributing to that effort.

                            EFFICIENCIES INITIATIVE

        Question. Last year, then-Secretary Gates announced an efficiencies
    initiative designed to reform the business operations of the Pentagon
    and root out duplication, waste, and excess spending. The Secretary
    identified $78 billion of defense-wide cuts over the Future Years
    Defense Program; the Military Departments identified an additional $100
    billion of reductions, which they were permitted to reinvest in other
    areas.
        What is your view of the process by which DOD identified the $178
    billion in reductions called for in the efficiencies initiative?
        Answer. I believe that Secretary Gates acted with great foresight
    in establishing last year's efficiencies initiative. He clearly foresaw
    the fiscal and economic challenges our Nation is now confronting. As a
    result, the Department had a strong head start in identifying areas in
    its budget to target for efficiency. The process used by Secretary
    Gates, however, was designed to support his goal of largely
    redirecting, rather than reducing, defense spending. As a result, the
    processes that were used to identify the $178 billion in reductions may
    not be the best model for identifying the savings needed to meet the
    Department's current budget limitations. That said, the overall intent
    of Secretary Gates's initiative remains highly relevant, especially the
    Better Buying Power initiative, which we expect to continue to generate
    efficiencies in the Department's operations for years to come.
        Question. Do you believe that these reductions are achievable and
    have been appropriately distributed through the Department?
        Answer. I believe that the level of reductions projected by last
    year's efficiencies initiative are achievable and have been distributed
    appropriately throughout the Department. There will inevitably be a few
    efficiency items that produce lower savings than anticipated, thereby
    requiring the Services to make adjustments to meet their targets.
    However, it is my understanding that the Department, on the whole, is
    making good progress towards achieving the necessary reductions.
        Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in
    ensuring that the expected savings are achieved?
        Answer. If confirmed, I expect that I would oversee the
    Department's efforts to ensure that expected savings from the
    efficiencies initiative are realized.
        Question. What is your view of the decision to disestablish U.S.
    Joint Forces Command, the Business Transformation Agency, and the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information
    Integration?
        Answer. I believe the disestablishment of these organizations has
    been executed with minimal disruption to the Department's operations
    and with satisfactory distribution of their enduring functions.
        Question. Do you believe that the Department can achieve
    significant additional savings through the elimination of duplication,
    waste, and excess spending?
        Answer. Yes. Over the last 10 years, the Department has been
    engaged in two wars and a range of other contingencies and has
    experienced growth in its base budget at a rate faster than inflation.
    These circumstances fostered a tendency to defer some difficult
    decisions because management attention was consumed by the wars and
    funding was not so tight that these decisions were unavoidable. In the
    current fiscal environment, we can no longer afford to defer these
    difficult choices. I believe, however, that meeting the budget limits
    established in the recent Budget Control Act of 2011 will require us to
    cut significantly more than just duplication, waste, and excess
    spending.
        Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in
    identifying such potential savings?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to play a central leadership
    role in identifying potential savings in the Department's budget.

                               MANAGEMENT ISSUES

        Question. If confirmed, what key management performance goals would
    you want to accomplish, and what standards or metrics would you use to
    judge whether you have accomplished them?
        Answer. If confirmed, my key management goals will be those that
    have been identified in the fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013
    Strategic Management Plan. These seven key goals are:

             Strengthen and right-size the DOD Total Workforce mix
            (military, civilian, and contracted support) to accomplish the
            DOD mission and sustain superior performance in a time of
            constrained resources.
             Strengthen DOD Financial Management to respond to
            warfighter needs and sustain public confidence through
            auditable financial statements.
             Build agile and secure information technology
            capabilities to enhance combat power and decisionmaking while
            optimizing value.
             Increase the buying power of the DOD acquisition
            system and processes spanning requirements determination,
            development, procurement, and support to ensure that the force
            structure is modernized, recapitalized, and sustained within
            available resources.
             Increase operational and installation energy
            efficiency to lower risks to our warfighters, reduce costs, and
            improve energy security.
             Reengineer/use end-to-end business support processes
            to reduce transaction times, drive down costs, and improve
            service.
             Create agile business operations that plan for,
            support, and sustain contingency missions.

        These goals are aligned with and support the Department's
    overarching strategy as articulated in the Quadrennial Defense Review
    (QDR). Each goal is supported by sets of key initiatives and
    performance measures which serve as our management standards and
    metrics. The Department closely monitors these performance measures to
    assess whether we are achieving our goals.
        Question. GAO recently reported that ``the DOD systems environment
    that supports [its] business functions is overly complex and error
    prone, and is characterized by: (1) little standardization across the
    department, (2) multiple systems performing the same tasks, (3) the
    same data stored in multiple systems, and (4) the need for data to be
    entered manually into multiple systems. According to the department's
    systems inventory, this environment is composed of 2,258 business
    systems and includes 335 financial management, 709 human resource
    management, 645 logistics, 243 real property and installation, and 281
    weapon acquisition management systems.''
        Would you agree that the Department will not be able to put its
    financial house in order until it effectively addresses this problem?
        Answer. It is extremely important for the Department to rationalize
    its defense business system environment and ensure that its suite of
    systems is tightly integrated. However, while we must ensure that the
    Department's feeder systems, in all of its business areas, properly
    capture and report financial information, greater integration of our
    business systems environment alone will not correct the longstanding
    weaknesses in our business and financial operations. We must also
    continue to implement an integrated business strategy and pursue
    process improvement to enable interoperable business solutions and
    financial auditability.
        Question. Section 2222 of title 10, U.S.C., requires that the
    Secretary of Defense develop a comprehensive business enterprise
    architecture and transition plan to guide the development of its
    business systems and processes.
        Do you believe that a comprehensive, integrated, enterprise-wide
    architecture and transition plan is essential to the successful
    transformation of DOD's business systems?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
    DOD's enterprise architecture and transition plan meet the requirements
    of section 2222?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue the ongoing efforts to
    define, capture and enforce the business processes, data standards and
    business rules in the Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA) from an
    end-to-end perspective and hold the Under Secretaries of Defense and
    the Military Departments accountable for those functional portions of
    the BEA for which they are responsible.
        Question. What are your views on the importance and role of timely
    and accurate financial and business information in managing operations
    and holding managers accountable?
        Answer. Timely and accurate financial and business information (aka
    business intelligence) is the operational intelligence we use to inform
    the management of our business operations. It provides assurance that
    we are effectively and efficiently using our limited resources, while
    ensuring good stewardship of the taxpayers' money.
        Question. What role do you envision playing, if confirmed, in
    managing or providing oversight over the improvement of the financial
    and business information available to DOD managers?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would take my role as CMO/COO and chair of
    the Defense Business Systems Management Committee seriously. In these
    roles, I will hold those responsible for managing our business
    operations accountable for meeting the objectives identified in the
    Department's Strategic Management Plan that are directly linked to
    improving financial and business information.
        Question. The Department has chosen to implement the requirement
    for an enterprise architecture and transition plan through a
    ``federated'' approach in which the Business Transformation Agency has
    developed the top level architecture while leaving it to the Military
    Departments to fill in most of the detail. GAO recently reported that
    none of the three Military Departments has yet fully developed a well-
    defined business enterprise architecture and transition plan to guide
    and constrain business transformation initiatives.
        If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the
    Secretaries and CMOs of the business enterprise architecture and
    transition plans of the Military Departments meet the requirements of
    section 2222 and provide a sound roadmap for business transformation
    initiatives?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would intend to hold the Secretaries and
    CMOs accountable for delivering integrated business solutions defined
    in the federated business enterprise architecture and affiliated
    transition plans.
        Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed
    to ensure that business system investments are defined and implemented
    in accordance with the Department's business enterprise architecture?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would assess the investment review process
    currently in place to review and certify business system investments
    and implement improved policies and procedures as necessary. My focus
    would be to ensure that we review our investments from a holistic, end-
    to-end perspective.
        Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed
    to ensure that supporting architectures for component organizations are
    further developed and aligned with the corporate architecture to
    provide a truly federated business enterprise architecture?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the plans of the Service
    Secretaries and CMOs of the Military Departments for aligning their
    enterprise architectures with the Department's overall business
    enterprise architecture approach.

                                AUDIT READINESS

        Question. Secretary Panetta has stated: ``While we have reasonable
    controls over much of our budgetary information, it is unacceptable to
    me that DOD cannot produce a financial statement that passes all
    financial audit standards. That will change. I have directed that this
    requirement be put in place as soon as possible. America deserves
    nothing less.''
        What is your understanding of the efforts and progress that have
    been made in DOD since 1999 toward the goal of being able to produce a
    clean audit?
        Answer. While I am not familiar with the details or history of DOD
    accounting systems, I understand that DOD financial processes were
    established and ingrained in legacy systems long ago. These processes
    and systems were designed for budgetary accounting--not for the
    accounting standards called for in the Chief Financial Officers (CFO)
    Act. I also understand that there has been limited progress made
    towards auditability until recently. Our CFO has established a set of
    priorities and a roadmap for making progress. It focuses on the
    budgetary information that we use to manage the Department and ensures
    we can account for the material we need to support our mission.
        Question. Do you believe that these efforts will result in a clean
    audit opinion by the end of fiscal year 2017, as required by statute,
    or are additional steps needed?
        Answer. Yes. 2017 is an ambitious goal but, as Secretary Panetta
    has indicated, the Department is committed to it. In addition,
    Secretary Panetta has directed a review of audit efforts to ensure that
    our focus is on completing the project as soon as possible.
        Question. Do you believe that the Department can achieve a clean
    audit opinion through better accounting and auditing, or is the
    systematic improvement of the Department's business systems and
    processes a perquisite?
        Answer. From my discussions with Under Secretary of Defense
    (Comptroller)/CFO Hale, systematic improvement of the Department's
    business systems and processes is necessary to achieve a clean audit
    opinion.
        Question. When do you believe the Department can achieve a clean
    audit?
        Answer. The Department is working to have auditable financial
    statements by 2017. Secretary Panetta's review of audit efforts will
    inform that goal.
        Question. The Department's Financial Improvement and Audit
    Readiness (FIAR) plan is organized into five waves that focus on audit
    readiness of the Statement of Budgetary Resources (SBR) (waves 1 and
    2), the existence and completeness of assets (wave 3), and a full
    financial statement audit (waves 4 and 5).
        If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to ensure the
    development and implementation of specific detailed plans for achieving
    a full audit through waves 4 and 5?
        Answer. I understand that while the longer-term goal involves
    planning for and executing the final two ``waves'', the Department
    remains focused on near-term milestones. Senior leadership within the
    military components is committed to, and is accountable for,
    accomplishing these interim goals. As directed in the NDAA for Fiscal
    Year 2011, the Department has developed a strategy for producing fully
    auditable financial statements. If confirmed, I would work with our CFO
    to prepare implementation plans that will lay out exactly how we will
    do this.
        Question. What is your understanding of the roles and
    responsibilities of the military-department CMOs in implementing the
    FIAR plan through their individual financial improvement plans (FIPs)?
        Answer. The oversight role of the CMOs was established in the NDAA
    for Fiscal Year 2008. Since then, the Department has developed more
    detailed responsibilities for the CMOs regarding their financial
    improvement role and responsibilities. Specifically, the Military
    Department CMOs:

             Coordinate and marshal resources from across the
            Department in support of Under Secretary of Defense
            (Comptroller)/CFO financial improvement goals, objectives and
            priorities.
             Carry out budget, finance, accounting and human
            resource operations in a manner consistent with the
            comprehensive business transformation plan.
             Eliminate or reduce financial management systems that
            are inconsistent with the business systems architecture and
            transition plan.
             Ensure that the functional communities recognize their
            role in achieving audit readiness, since most financial
            transactions originate from business events in the functional
            community's business operations.
             Provide the unifying support needed to ensure that
            business system modernization efforts are fully linked with
            Component financial improvement activities.

        Question. What steps, if any, do you believe are needed to clarify
    those roles and responsibilities?
        Answer. I believe the currently defined roles are sufficiently
    clear, but, if confirmed, I would continue to monitor and make
    adjustments as needed.
        Question. Do you believe that performance measurement and
    monitoring mechanisms need to be improved?
        Answer. The Department has established a robust governance
    structure to oversee progress towards FIAR goals. If confirmed, I would
    plan to review our performance measures to see if any improvements are
    necessary to enable us to meet these goals.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to sustain the
    commitment of the Department's top leadership to the long-term goal of
    transforming the Department's financial management?
        Answer. Secretary Panetta has emphasized the importance of making
    the Department auditable. Our CFO has developed a plan for achieving
    audit readiness. If confirmed, I would intend to work closely with them
    and other leaders in the Department to transform the Department's
    financial management processes.
        Question. Do you think that having the Deputy Secretary of Defense
    ``dual-hatted'' as the CMO is consistent with the prioritization and
    sustained day-to-day focus needed for the success of the Department's
    financial improvement efforts?
        Answer. Yes. Overall accountability rests with the Deputy Secretary
    in his CMO role. However, day-to-day responsibility falls to the CFO,
    the Deputy CMO, and the CMOs of the Military Departments, as well as
    line management throughout the DOD business enterprise.

                            BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION

        Question. Since 2005, the General Accountability Office (GAO) has
    designated DOD's approach to business transformation as ``high risk''
    due to its vulnerability to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement.
    However, GAO has recently found that the Department's senior leadership
    has shown commitment to transforming business system operations and has
    made progress in establishing management oversight and developing a
    strategic plan to guide transformation efforts. Nonetheless, in GAO's
    view, the Department needs to take additional action to further define
    management roles and responsibilities and to strengthen strategic
    planning.
        Do you believe that the Department needs to more clearly define
    roles and responsibilities, as well as relationships among key
    positions and governance entities, for integrating the Secretary of
    Defense's efficiency initiative with ongoing reform efforts; overseeing
    its implementation and otherwise institutionalizing the effort in the
    long term?
        Answer. I do not believe additional steps are necessary at this
    time, but, if confirmed, I would continue to monitor the situation
    closely and take corrective action where necessary. The tools that
    Congress has provided the Department over the past 6 years, including
    the establishment of a clear business system investment review process
    in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005, the creation of the CMO construct in
    the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008, and specific strategic planning
    requirements in the Government Performance and Results (GPRA)
    Modernization Act of 2010, have created a strong framework for our
    business transformation efforts.
        Question. If so, what steps do you believe the Department should
    take to achieve this objective?
        Answer. I do not believe that additional steps are necessary at
    this time, but, if confirmed, I would continue to closely monitor the
    situation and take corrective action where necessary.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to
    further refine strategic goals, performance measures and other elements
    of the Department's strategic management plan?
        Answer. The Department's current strategic planning process is
    quite robust and has continued to improve with regard to planning for
    defense business operations since the introduction of the Strategic
    Management Plan (SMP) in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008. In my current
    role as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
    Logistics, I have been involved in the latest planning efforts for the
    fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013 SMP and believe that it
    faithfully aligns the Department's business goals with the Department's
    overall strategic goals. It also establishes a set of key initiatives
    and performance measures that will allow the Department's senior
    leaders the opportunity to track performance throughout the year and
    take corrective action where necessary. If confirmed, I would look to
    incorporate additional improvements and lessons learned from each
    iteration of this process.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to more
    clearly define the Department's strategic planning process, including
    mechanisms to guide and synchronize efforts to develop strategic plans;
    monitor the implementation of reform initiatives; and report progress,
    on a periodic basis, towards achieving established goals?
        Answer. The Department's current strategic planning process is
    effective. However, if confirmed, I would work to better align the
    timing of our business operations planning cycle with that of our
    overall strategic planning and budgeting activities. The Planning,
    Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process produces the
    following fiscal year's President's budget (PB) submission in February.
    The SMP articulates the Department's business priorities and is due in
    July. My goal would be to make the SMP timeline a more deliberate
    process aligning to the PPBE cycle.
        Question. Do you believe that the Deputy CMO should have control
    over funds for the components' business systems programs to ensure that
    the components follow guidance from OSD on the Department's business
    transformation efforts?
        Answer. I believe that it is important to allow the components to
    maintain control over their budgeting process, while simultaneously
    maintaining an enterprise perspective on our business system
    investments. The Department's current investment review process,
    established by Congress in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005, effectively
    allows OSD, including the Deputy CMO, in the role of vice chair of the
    Defense Business Systems Management Committee, to ensure that component
    investments are aligned with the enterprise strategy as laid out in the
    Business Enterprise Architecture.

                        ACQUISITION OF BUSINESS SYSTEMS

        Question. Most of the Department's business transformation programs
    are substantially over budget and behind schedule. Last year, at the
    request of the Armed Services Committee, GAO reviewed DOD's 9 largest
    Enterprise Resource Programs (ERPs), which are intended to replace more
    than 500 outdated business systems, and reported that 6 of the 9 had
    experienced schedule delays ranging from 2 to 12 years and incurred
    cost increases ranging from $530 million to $2.4 billion. GAO reported
    that DOD has failed to follow good management practices for developing
    schedules and cost estimates for many of these programs.
        If confirmed, how would you work with the Deputy CMO, the CMOs of
    the Military Departments, and the Under Secretaries of Defense to
    address these problems?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Department concurred with
    the recommendations in the GAO report and that the Services have taken
    steps to implement them. If confirmed, I would intend to continue to
    work directly with the Deputy CMO, the CMOs of the Military
    Departments, the Under Secretaries of Defense, and the DOD Chief
    Information Officer to implement better management practices and
    internal lessons learned. Each of these officials has an important role
    to play in addressing the planning, implementation, and change
    management challenges that historically have hamstrung the Department's
    ability to deliver programs such as ERPs in accordance with established
    cost and schedule baselines.
        Question. DOD must implement a full range of business systems
    modernization management controls to ensure that its business system
    investments are the right solutions for addressing its business needs;
    that these investments are being managed to produce expected
    capabilities efficiently and cost-effectively; and that, ultimately,
    its business stakeholders are satisfied.
        What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed to ensure
    that both the corporate and component investment management processes
    are appropriately defined and institutionalized?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would assess the investment review process
    the Department is using to review and certify business system
    investments and implement improved policies and procedures as
    necessary. The Department is currently implementing a Business
    Capability Lifecycle approach to acquiring business systems that
    emphasizes the use of well defined and relatively short increments of
    capability. Many of the Department's problems with business systems
    have stemmed from overly ambitious programs with severely
    underestimated budgets and schedules. The Business Capability Lifecycle
    approach is intended to constrain requirements and discipline programs
    to deliver testable and fieldable increments. I believe that adopting
    these practices will improve the results the Department achieves with
    its business systems investments.
        Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed
    to ensure that business system investments are managed with the kind of
    acquisition management rigor and discipline that is embodied in
    relevant guidance and best practices, so that each investment will
    deliver expected benefits and capabilities on time and within budget?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to implement the principles
    and initiatives outlined in the report to Congress, ``A New Approach
    for Delivering Information Technology Capabilities in DOD,'' which was
    signed by Deputy Secretary Lynn, and which provides an update on the
    Department's progress toward developing a new acquisition process for
    information capabilities. The Department has already begun this process
    through the implementation of the Business Capability Lifecycle, an
    alternative acquisition approach for defense business systems, pursuant
    to guidance I issued in my current role as Under Secretary on November
    15, 2010. If confirmed, I would ensure that this alternative
    acquisition approach is followed and that the Department does not
    revert to the old way of doing business out of habit or inertia.
        Question. Do you believe that unique challenges to acquiring
    services related to information technology (IT) systems may require an
    acquisition strategy or approach different from those used for
    acquiring property or services unrelated to IT systems?
        Answer. Yes, I believe that there are unique challenges to
    acquiring services related to IT systems and we must tailor our
    acquisition strategies to meet these unique circumstances. In fact, the
    Department has already begun to adapt to the unique challenges of IT
    acquisition through the implementation of the Business Capability
    Lifecycle, an alternative acquisition approach for defense business
    systems.
        Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed
    to ensure that requirements management, systems testing, and data
    quality are improved and to help resolve other problems that have
    continued to hinder the Department's efforts to implement its automated
    systems on schedule, within cost and with the intended capabilities?
        Answer. The issuance of the report to Congress, ``A New Approach
    for Delivering Information Technology Capabilities in the Department of
    Defense,'' and the November 15, 2010 directive requiring the use of the
    Business Capability Lifecycle are important initial steps, however,
    more work remains to be done. The Department is in the process of
    revising its acquisition process governing directives to incorporate
    this approach, but implementation has already begun on a case-by-case
    basis. If confirmed, I will actively pursue the implementation of these
    initiatives.

                           DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM

        Question. Two years ago, Congress enacted the Weapon Systems
    Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA), without a dissenting vote in
    either House. WSARA is designed to ensure that new defense acquisition
    programs start on a sound footing, to avoid the high cost of fixing
    problems late in the acquisition process.
        What are your views regarding WSARA and the need for improvements
    in the Defense acquisition process?
        Answer. When I initially took office as Under Secretary of Defense
    for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, I received a mandate from
    Secretary Gates to improve the defense acquisition system, including
    weapon systems acquisition, and particularly acquisition in response to
    urgent operational needs. Shortly thereafter, the administration
    supported, and Congress passed, the WSARA. I continue to support the
    improvements in the areas of defense acquisition organization and
    policy that are addressed in the WSARA. A number of the memos issued
    under the Department's Better Buying Power (BBP) initiative directly
    address WSARA mandates, ensuring that the act's requirements are
    reflected not only in acquisition policy, but also in our acquisition
    practice. This is particularly true in the case of the Department's
    mandate that affordability be treated as a requirement at major
    acquisition milestones, supporting the act's requirements that DOD
    examine trade-offs between cost, schedule, and performance, and in the
    Department's emphasis on promoting competition. If confirmed, I would
    continue the effort to improve the defense acquisition system
    consistent with the direction provided in WSARA. I would also continue
    to enforce the Better Buying Power guidance, based on WSARA, to target
    affordability and control cost growth, incentivize productivity and
    innovation in industry, promote real competition, improve tradecraft in
    services acquisition, and reduce non-productive processes and
    bureaucracy.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you improve all three aspects of
    the acquisition process--requirements, acquisition, and budgeting?
        Answer. My experience as Under Secretary has deepened my belief
    that the acquisition process must be closely coordinated with the
    requirements and budget processes in order for the defense acquisition
    system to function properly. I believe that in the last 2 years the
    Department has improved in this area, but it remains an ongoing
    challenge. The Department has made the most significant improvement in
    the area of rapid acquisition through the use of coordinating entities
    such as the Senior Integration Group (SIG), previously known as the
    Counter-Improvised Explosive Device SIG (C-SIG), which regularly brings
    together the leadership of the three processes with theater commanders
    to coordinate action on fulfilling urgent wartime needs. In July of
    this year, the Department broadened the responsibilities of the SIG to
    cover all urgent warfighter requirements.
        Prospectively, I believe it is necessary to create a closer
    alignment of the acquisition, requirements, and budget processes across
    the Department by expanding the type of cooperation and coordination we
    have instituted for urgent needs. If confirmed, I would make doing so a
    priority.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you improve acquisition
    accountability?
        Answer. The Goldwater-Nichols Act established a chain of authority
    for the acquisition process that provides for clear accountability in a
    chain beginning with the Defense Acquisition Executive and extending
    through the Component Acquisition Executives to the program Executive
    Officers and Program Managers. I emphasized this chain of
    responsibility as Under Secretary and, if confirmed, would continue to
    do so as Deputy Secretary. Additionally, the acquisition process must
    be operated in close coordination with the requirements process and the
    budget process, and this requires active participation by DOD's senior
    leadership to ensure all three processes are properly coordinated and
    held accountable. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring
    accountability in all aspects of acquisition during my tenure.
        As Under Secretary, I have also worked to reward productivity, and
    innovation in the defense industry by ensuring that the terms and
    conditions of our contracts fundamentally align contractors' incentives
    with the Department's interest so that our industry partners are
    accountable for performance not just to the Department but to their
    shareholders.
        Question. Do you believe that the current investment budget for
    major systems is affordable given increasing historic cost growth in
    major systems, costs of current operations, and asset recapitalization?
        Answer. Since becoming Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics, I have expressed my belief that the
    unacceptable cost growth in far too many individual programs, combined
    with a habit of mind born from an unrealistic belief that the defense
    budget would keep growing, had to be reversed in order to avoid an
    affordability crisis in defense acquisition. With the recent passage of
    the Budget Control Act of 2011, the Department will need to redouble
    its efforts to control cost growth in investment and reexamine all
    areas of the budget for affordability in the context of the caps put in
    place on discretionary spending. If confirmed, I would assist the
    Secretary in leading and managing the Department's review of all areas
    of the budget, including investment.
        Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue and
    guard against the potential impact of weapon systems cost growth?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to implement all aspects of
    WSARA and the Better Buying Power Initiative to reverse unacceptable
    cost growth in our programs and activities.
        Question. Do you believe that the Department has adequately
    addressed its shortfalls in systems engineering and developmental
    testing capabilities, or does more remain to be done in these areas?
        Answer. The Department has recognized and Congress has reinforced,
    with the WSARA, the need to reinvigorate and grow our capacity and
    capability in systems engineering and developmental testing and
    evaluation. I recognize the criticality of good systems engineering and
    strong developmental testing and evaluation to acquisition program
    success.
        The Department has appointed strong technical leaders as Deputy
    Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Systems Engineering (DASD(SE)) and
    Developmental Test & Evaluation (DASD(DT&E)), implemented new and
    updated Department acquisition policy and guidance, grown and educated
    its technical workforce, and increased program engagement with our
    Major Defense Acquisition Programs in supporting effective systems
    engineering and developmental test and evaluation activities.
        I believe that the resources and attention applied to these areas
    have been appropriate and I have supported the revitalization in these
    areas over the last 2 years, but I do not believe this work is done. If
    confirmed, I would work with the Secretary and Congress to ensure,
    within budget constraints, that we sustain the Department's commitment
    to grow a skilled acquisition workforce that provides the technical
    capabilities needed to deliver effective solutions to the warfighter on
    schedule and under budget.
        Question. Do you believe that additional steps are needed to ensure
    that WSARA principles are implemented on current major programs like
    the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program?
        Answer. WSARA principles have been widely implemented in the
    Department, but more can be done to implement them and extend them to
    non-Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). The WSARA directly led
    to refined Department guidance and complementary policy initiatives
    that are positively affecting the JSF program, as well as the other
    MDAPs. Subsequent to passage of WSARA, the JSF program was the subject
    of numerous reviews, culminating in a Nunn-McCurdy critical cost breach
    certification review that was guided by the acquisition reform
    principles outlined in WSARA. The review incorporated the inputs of the
    WSARA-formed Office of the Director, Cost Assessment and Program
    Evaluation (CAPE), and also included the participation and assessments
    of the Office of Performance Assessment and Root Cause Analysis
    (PARCA), and the Offices of the Director, Systems Engineering and
    Developmental Test and Evaluation. These organizational changes were
    instrumental in the completion of the thorough review and restructuring
    of the JSF program that resulted in the Nunn-McCurdy certification on
    June 2, 2010. The WSARA has also contributed to a renewed emphasis on
    sound systems engineering principles, realistic cost and schedule
    estimating, a re-energized focus on integrated test and evaluation, and
    implementation of tighter cost control measures across the MDAPs, to
    include JSF. Implementation of the Department's Better Buying Power
    guidance, reflecting WSARA principles, has also resulted in an
    increased emphasis on affordability and the incorporation of should-
    cost target goals for JSF and other MDAPs.

               ROLE OF SERVICE CHIEFS IN THE ACQUISITION PROCESS

        Question. Some have suggested that the Service Chiefs should be
    given a different or expanded role in the acquisition of major systems.
    Others have expressed concern that such a change would reverse efforts
    in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation to reduce the layers between the
    Under Secretary and the program managers, and ensure that there was a
    dynamic tension between those who defined requirements (Service Chiefs)
    and those who filled the requirements (Service Acquisition Executives).
        What do you believe is the appropriate role for Service Chiefs in
    the acquisition of major systems?
        Answer. Goldwater-Nichols establishes a clear chain of authority
    for the acquisition process and I believe this chain of authority--
    program manager, program executive officer, component acquisition
    executive, defense acquisition executive--is appropriate for
    acquisition decisions. The acquisition process does not exist in
    isolation, however, and Service Chiefs play a major role as a result of
    their deep involvement in the budget and requirements processes, and
    because they fund, manage, and train the acquisition workforce of their
    respective Services. The acquisition process functions properly only
    when the Service Chiefs, acting through their chain of command, are
    actively involved.

                            CONTRACTING FOR SERVICES

        Question. Over the last decade, DOD's spending on contract services
    has more than doubled. As a result, the Department now spends more for
    the purchase of services than it does for products (including major
    weapon systems). You testified last year that ``the low-hanging fruit
    really is [in contract services]. There's a lot of money. There has
    been a very, very high rate of growth over the last decade, in
    Services. They have grown faster than everything else. . . . So,
    there's a lot we can do. I think great savings can be had there, across
    the Services' spending. It's essential that we look there, because
    that's half the money.''
        Do you believe that the cuts made to contract services pursuant to
    the efficiencies initiative fully addressed the issues of waste and
    inefficiency in this area, or are further reductions possible?
        Answer. I believe the reductions the Department has made to date,
    primarily in the area of service support contracts performing staff
    augmentation functions, are a good start but are insufficient. Further
    reductions are possible. One of the major focus areas of the Better
    Buying Power Initiative the Department has instituted is to improve the
    Department's tradecraft in services acquisition.
        Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to
    control the Department's spending on contract services?
        Answer. Under the Better Buying Power initiative, the Department is
    working to have a cohesive and integrated strategy for services
    acquisition. The steps already taken include appointment of senior
    managers for acquisition of services in each Military Department,
    adoption of a standard taxonomy for services and identifying best
    practices, and revised contracting policies to increase the use of
    competition. Additional steps that can be taken include improved
    benchmarking against commercial experience and employment of stronger
    incentives for efficient performance. If confirmed, I would continue to
    ensure that the Department focuses on those areas where we know
    improvements can be made so that we are not spending too much on
    contracted services.

           CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE OF CRITICAL GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS

        Question. Over the last decade, the Department has become
    progressively more reliant upon contractors to perform functions that
    were once performed exclusively by government employees. As a result,
    contractors now play an integral role in areas as diverse as the
    management and oversight of weapons programs, the development of
    personnel policies, and the collection and analysis of intelligence. In
    many cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the
    same projects and task forces, and perform many of the same functions
    as DOD employees.
        In your view, is DOD still too reliant on contractors to support
    the basic functions of the Department?
        Answer. The appropriate balance between organic government
    performance and reliance on contractors is something that must be
    assessed function by function. Many functions are appropriate for
    contractor support; however, some functions, such as program
    management, are more appropriately performed by Government personnel.
    Some functions are inherently governmental and should not be performed
    by contractors.
        As Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
    Logistics, I worked to adjust this balance in the acquisition
    workforce, which had become overly reliant on contractors in a number
    of areas. As a result, and with the committee's assistance, the
    Department has significantly strengthened the civilian and military
    components of the acquisition workforce. At the same time, I
    communicated to our entire organization that contractors are an
    important component of the Department's Total Force. If confirmed, I
    would assess the issue of appropriate use of contractors across the
    Department to determine whether and where else DOD's reliance on
    contractors has become excessive.
        Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed
    to reduce the Department's reliance on contractors to perform critical
    functions?
        Answer. I understand there are functions that are so critical to
    the Department's activities that some portion of the function must be
    performed organically for the Department to have sufficient internal
    capability to continue to be able to perform and control its
    operations. Critical functions must be assessed on a case-by-case basis
    because the level of internal capability required is dependent on the
    function in question. In my role as Under Secretary, I have sought to
    ensure that the Department retains sufficient organic capability for
    critical acquisition and logistics functions. At this time I believe
    the Department has identified and eliminated most, if not all, over-
    reliance on contractors for critical functions. Over the next few
    years, however, I believe the Department needs to be watchful to ensure
    that this trend is not reversed. As budgets decline and as the organic
    workforce is reduced, there is a risk that reliance on contractors may
    increase, particularly in response to new contingencies. As the
    Department reduces its overseas deployments, it must identify and
    retain critical capabilities that have been built up over the past
    decade, at least at the level required to rapidly redeploy those
    capabilities in response to changing needs. Contingency contracting is
    an example of the type of expertise that must be institutionalized and
    retained. If confirmed, I would continue to work to address any
    shortfalls in the Department's ability to perform critical functions
    using organic resources.
        Question. Do you believe that the current extensive use of personal
    services contracts is in the best interest of DOD?
        Answer. I support the statutory framework that Congress has
    constructed governing the use of personal services contracts. I believe
    the Department should adhere to this framework. If confirmed, I would
    ensure that personal services contracts are not used inappropriately.
        Question. U.S. military operations in Iraq have relied on
    contractor support to a greater degree than any previous U.S. military
    operations. According to widely published reports, the number of U.S.
    contractor employees in Iraq and Afghanistan has roughly equaled the
    number of U.S. military deployed in those countries.
        Do you believe that DOD has become too dependent on contractor
    support for military operations?
        Answer. Contractors are a necessary part of the Total Force. They
    provide the Department with the ability to obtain a mix of unique skill
    sets and knowledge that may not be available in our organic force
    structure and permit us to concentrate our organic resources on those
    areas that are inherently governmental. Contractors provide a broad
    range of supplies, services, and critical logistics support in many
    capability areas, while reducing military footprint and increasing the
    availability and readiness of resources. Based on our experience in
    Iraq and Afghanistan, I believe we should continue to improve and
    evolve our strategy regarding the use and management of contractors. At
    this time, I do not believe the Department is too dependent on
    contractors for support of operations; however, this is an area that
    will require continuous scrutiny, particularly as budgets and organic
    capabilities are reduced. If confirmed, I would ensure that this
    scrutiny is provided.
        Question. What risks do you see in the Department's reliance on
    such contractor support? What steps do you believe the Department
    should take to mitigate such risk?
        Answer. Reliance on contractor support can lead to operational
    problems if contractors fail to perform. Experience has shown that a
    number of other problems can arise, including a potential for increased
    waste, fraud, and abuse; problems that arise from contractor
    interaction with local communities; and issues with the use of force.
        In my role as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics, I have worked to ensure that these risks are
    mitigated. The study conducted by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
    regarding reliance on contracted support in contingency operations and
    the assessments being conducted by the Military Departments and
    agencies are key components in this effort. It is also critical to
    ensure adequate and appropriate planning for contractor support. The
    Department is integrating contractor support estimates into existing
    planning systems, and also ensuring that Operational Contract Support
    requirements are considered in force planning scenario development and
    joint force assessments. If confirmed, I would continue to monitor
    these initiatives closely.
        Question. Do you believe the Department is appropriately organized
    and staffed to effectively manage contractors on the battlefield?
        Answer. Not yet, but there has been improvement and more is
    underway. At the start of our conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
    Department was not properly organized and staffed to manage contractors
    in the ongoing contingency operations effectively, but a number of
    corrective actions have been taken over the last several years. If
    confirmed, I would continue to oversee ongoing efforts to ensure DOD
    institutionalizes its contingency contracting capabilities and applies
    lessons learned from our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan to future
    conflicts.
        Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Department should
    take to improve its management of contractors on the battlefield?
        Answer. The Department needs to further ensure that training and
    contingency plans account realistically for the role of contractors on
    the modern battlefield; that adequate numbers of contracting officers,
    contracting officer representatives, and other skilled personnel are
    available to manage contractors; that there is transparency into
    contractor and subcontractor performance; that waste, fraud, and abuse,
    and corruption are prevented and vigorously punished; that DOD
    coordinates with civil agencies effectively; and that other measures
    identified by the Department are taken. Many of these actions are the
    same as those recommended by the Commission on Wartime Contracting.

                          PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS

        Question. Do you believe DOD and other Federal agencies should rely
    upon contractors to perform security functions that may reasonably be
    expected to require the use of deadly force in highly hazardous public
    areas in an area of combat operations?
        Answer. Without a substantial increase in the force structure
    committed to contingency operations, the use of contractors for some
    security functions in contingencies is a necessity. However, these
    security contractors must be properly regulated and supervised, and
    their roles must be carefully limited and defined. Contractors cannot
    engage in combat operations. Their use of force is limited to self-
    defense, the defense of others against violence, and the protection of
    critical property. Under these circumstances, I believe that the
    limited use of security contractors in contingency operations is
    acceptable. It would be inappropriate for me to comment on their use by
    other departments and agencies. If confirmed, I would ensure that the
    Department continues its efforts to implement and enforce appropriate
    limitations on private security contractors.
        Question. In your view, has the United States' reliance upon
    private security contractors to perform such functions risked
    undermining our defense and foreign policy objectives in Iraq and
    Afghanistan?
        Answer. The use of force by contractors or military personnel
    could, if misapplied, undermine our policy objectives. Private security
    providers are a necessity in Iraq and Afghanistan and will likely
    continue to be so in future contingency operations. DOD has established
    policies and procedures to manage contractors effectively to prevent
    unnecessary violence that would be detrimental to our policy objectives
    and to address incidents where violence may occur. As Under Secretary
    of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, I recently
    approved a revised instruction, DODI 3020.50, ``Private Security
    Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, Humanitarian or
    Peace Operations, or Other Military Operations or Exercises,'' which,
    as the title notes, expanded our oversight of such contractors from
    those operating in contingency areas to essentially all overseas
    operations. This is an area that requires constant attention.
        Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
    any private security contractors who may continue to operate in an area
    of combat operations act in a responsible manner, consistent with U.S.
    defense and foreign policy objectives?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to support the efforts
    already begun in this regard within the Office of the Under Secretary
    of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in the Military
    Services, and in the combatant commands. These efforts include
    development of Department-level policy, coordinating this policy with
    the Departments of State and Justice and other Government agencies, and
    engaging the international community to provide a common framework for
    the proper roles and oversight of private security contractors and the
    enforcement of those policies during overseas operations by the
    appropriate authorities. The administration recently published rules
    that will apply to private security contractors working for all Federal
    agencies operating in overseas operations, consistent with DODI
    3020.50.
        Additionally, I believe that work remains to be done to ensure that
    DOD instructions and combatant commander guidance and orders remain
    current, clear, and aligned with, with U.S. defense and foreign policy
    objectives. Collaboration among DOD, the Department of State, and other
    Governmental agencies must continue to ensure consistent policy is
    developed across the Federal Government and with potential coalition
    partners and host nations to promote a common interagency and
    international understanding of responsible use and oversight of private
    security services and binding enforceable standards for private
    security contractors operating in areas of combat operations.
        Question. Do you support the extension of the Military
    Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act to private security contractors of
    all Federal agencies?
        Answer. I support steps to ensure that there is accountability for
    the actions of all contractors performing work for the U.S. Government
    in an area of combat operations. If confirmed, I would consult with
    DOD's interagency partners concerning appropriate mechanisms to ensure
    such accountability.
        Question. What is your view of the appropriate application of the
    Uniform Code of Military Justice to employees of private security
    contractors operating in an area of combat operations?
        Answer. There must be an assurance of accountability for the
    actions of all contractors deployed to an area of combat operations. In
    most cases, the best option for handling cases involving contractors
    will be in the civil legal system. It is my understanding that in cases
    where there is no jurisdiction under an effective civil legal system
    justice is one tool to consider for ensuring accountability.
        Question. What is your view of the recently signed International
    Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers?
        Answer. I believe that the endorsement of the International Code of
    Conduct for Private Security Service providers was an important step
    for improving the performance of security functions by all private
    security contractors, not just those under contract to DOD or the U.S.
    Government. Codes of conduct, however, are aspirational and difficult
    to enforce. To make the Code effective, there needs to be auditable and
    measurable standards that exist separately from, and give teeth to, the
    principles of the Code: standards that are enforceable under contract
    law. Currently, the Department is sponsoring the development of
    business and operational standards for private security companies, and
    those which can be written into all Defense contracts for security
    functions. These standards are based on the principles described in the
    International Code of Conduct, along with the Montreux Document, and
    the regulations recently published in the Federal Register regarding
    private security functions.

                              IRAQ LESSONS LEARNED

        Question. What do you believe are the major lessons learned from
    the Iraq invasion, the effort to stabilize the country following that
    invasion, and the transition of security responsibility to the
    Government of Iraq?
        Answer. One of the most important lessons is that 21st century
    conflict will occur along the entire spectrum of conflict. DOD cannot
    be prepared only for combat, but also must be prepared to assist in
    addressing the social, political, and economic factors that can fuel a
    conflict. The U.S. military must plan and train with its civilian
    counterparts and be prepared to operate effectively in all phases of
    conflict. Indeed, the need for greater capabilities and capacity in
    civilian agencies has been a recurring lesson for the entire U.S.
    Government.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the
    Department's adaptations or changes in policy, programs, force
    structure, or operational concepts based upon these lessons learned?
        Answer. Lessons learned from Iraq have led to wide-ranging changes
    in all of the areas listed above. For example, U.S. counterinsurgency
    doctrine has been completely revised, culminating in the publication of
    Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24. Force structure changes include
    the development of Advise and Assist Brigades. DOD has demonstrated the
    ability to learn and adapt across Doctrine, Organization, Training,
    Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy.
        Question. If confirmed, what additional changes, if any, would you
    propose making to policy, programs, force structure, or operating
    concepts based on the lessons of combat and stability operations in
    Iraq?
        Answer. I understand that many of the lessons from Iraq are in the
    process of being integrated into DOD policy and doctrine, and are
    contributing to the progress being made in Afghanistan. If confirmed, I
    would ensure that the integration of lessons learned from Iraq into
    policy and doctrine are carried through to completion.

                         LEAD AGENCY TRANSITION IN IRAQ

        Question. Responsibility and authority for lead U.S. agency in Iraq
    is scheduled this year to transition from DOD to Department of State
    (DOS). By October 2011, the Department of State is supposed to achieve
    an initial operating capability as lead agency and achieve full
    operating capability by December.
        What is your understanding and assessment, if any, of the planning
    and progress on executing this transition from DOD to DOS? In your
    view, what are the sources of greatest risk, if any, to the current
    plan and successful implementation of this transition?
        Answer. DOD, DOS, and other agencies and departments have
    undertaken unprecedented levels of coordination and planning for the
    transition in Iraq. As USD(AT&L), my office has had some role in the
    logistics and contracting aspects of the transition plan, and my
    observation is that DOD has an excellent working relationship with DOS,
    and the two departments are working together at all levels to achieve a
    successful transition. As one would expect with a transition of this
    scope and complexity, challenges exist, and DOD is doing everything it
    can to help set up DOS for success. The greatest source of risk would
    be failure to provide the State Department with adequate funding in
    fiscal year 2012 in order to implement a successful transition of the
    U.S. mission from DOD to State.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you propose to
    the current plan or actions for implementation of the transition?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would carefully monitor the transition with
    other senior Defense leaders and make any necessary recommendations to
    the Secretary of Defense.

                        STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

        Question. The U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has
    underscored the importance of planning and training to prepare for the
    conduct and support of stability and support operations in post-
    conflict situations.
        In your view, what is the appropriate allocation of roles and
    responsibilities, if any, between DOD and other departments and
    agencies of the Federal Government in the planning and conduct of
    stability operations?
        Answer. Ideally, DOD would provide support to civilian agencies
    such as the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International
    Development, and the Department of Justice in the planning and conduct
    of stability operations. But, when directed, DOD has led stability
    operations activities to establish civil security and control and to
    restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure,
    deliver humanitarian assistance, and then has transitioned lead
    responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments'
    security forces, and international governmental organizations and
    nongovernmental organizations. If confirmed, I would ensure that DOD
    operates within U.S. Government and international structures for
    managing civil-military operations, and would seek to enable the
    deployment and use of civilian capabilities and resources, as directed
    and as appropriate.
        Question. In developing the capabilities necessary for stability
    operations, what adjustments, if any, should be made to prepare U.S.
    Armed Forces to conduct stability operations without detracting from
    its ability to perform combat missions?
        Answer. Stability operations are a core mission that DOD must be
    ready to carry out with proficiency equivalent to high-intensity combat
    operations. Although this represents a cultural shift for DOD, we
    understand that all of our Military Departments must adequately train,
    organize, and equip forces to conduct such missions. If confirmed, I
    would work with the Secretary, the Chairman, and leadership of the
    Military Departments to ensure that DOD is preparing U.S. forces for
    stability operations.
        Question. Do you believe that the U.S. Government needs to
    establish new procedures to manage stability operations? If so, why?
        Answer. I think we need to strengthen the U.S. Government's
    collective ability to plan together and be more collaborative in
    designing stabilization and reconstruction activities. The Department
    is working with interagency partners to identify areas where we can
    improve planning efforts.
                                drawdown in iraq
        Question. Do you support the current plan for the drawdown of U.S.
    forces from Iraq consistent with the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement of
    2008 signed by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki?
        Answer. As the President has stated, we intend to fulfill our
    obligations under the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, which requires
    all U.S. forces to withdraw by the end of the year. I would also note,
    however, that it is possible that the United States and Iraq could
    agree on follow-on arrangements that could include continued presence
    of U.S. forces in Iraq after 2011. I support this plan.
        Question. If the Government of Iraq were to ask for the continued
    presence in Iraq of U.S. forces beyond the end of 2011, would you
    support the deployment or retention of additional troops in Iraq beyond
    the current deadline for U.S. troop withdrawal?
        Answer. On August 2, Iraqi bloc leaders stated that they have
    agreed to mandate the Iraqi Government start talks with the United
    States. Talks are focused on training assistance under the Strategic
    Framework Agreement, given the Iraqi Security Forces' requirement for
    further development. I agree that we should talk to them about their
    request.

                        U.S.-IRAQ STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

        Question. In your view, what will be the nature of the U.S.-Iraq
    strategic relationship after December 31, 2011?
        Answer. The United States is committed to a long-term partnership
    with Iraq, as outlined in the November 2008 Strategic Framework
    Agreement, which describes a security relationship that addresses Iraqi
    needs and advances U.S. interests.
        Question. What do you see as the greatest challenges for that
    relationship over the coming years?
        Answer. Our greatest challenge is to ensure continued U.S.
    engagement and support for Iraq in an austere budget environment. The
    United States is at a critical point in its relationship with Iraq as
    U.S. forces draw down and the State Department becomes the lead U.S.
    Agency for the mission. Recent turmoil in the broader Middle East
    highlights the importance of active U.S. engagement and maintaining
    strategic partnerships with regional partners based on mutual interests
    and mutual respect.

                     AFGHANISTAN COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY

        Question. Do you support the counterinsurgency strategy for
    Afghanistan? In your view, is that the right strategy?
        Answer. Yes, I support the strategy that the President has set
    forth, and I believe it is the right strategy. A focused
    counterinsurgency campaign will allow us to help the Afghans build
    security forces and government capacity capable of providing the
    security and basic services necessary to achieve a peaceful, stable
    Afghanistan that does not again become a safe haven for terrorists.
        Question. If confirmed, are there changes you would recommend to
    the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan? For example, would you support an
    increase in counterterrorism action in Afghanistan?
        Answer. I believe the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is sound. The
    administration tracks metrics on progress toward its objectives in
    Afghanistan throughout the year, and the Department is constantly
    assessing and adjusting its implementation of the overall strategy.
    Counterterrorism is a significant part of the counterinsurgency
    strategy, and managing the balance of all aspects of the strategy is an
    ongoing process.
        Question. What is your assessment of the progress of the
    counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan?
        Answer. Important gains have been made over the past 24 months,
    establishing security and the authority of the Afghan Government in
    former Taliban strongholds, particularly in Helmand and Kandahar where
    we focused our surge forces, as well as building the capacity of the
    Afghan National Security Forces. The momentum has shifted to the Afghan
    Government supported by Coalition forces, and the transition process
    has begun with the Afghan Government assuming lead security
    responsibilities in several areas of the country this summer. This
    progress is, however, fragile and reversible.

      TRANSITION OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY IN AFGHANISTAN AND U.S. TROOP
                                   REDUCTIONS

        Question. On June 22, President Obama announced his decision to
    draw down 10,000 U.S. troops from Afghanistan by the end of the year
    and to withdraw the remaining 23,000 ``surge'' force by next summer,
    for a total drawdown of 33,000.
        Do you support the President's decision to begin reducing U.S.
    forces in July 2011? Why or why not?
        Answer. Yes. I support a responsible conditions-based drawdown as
    called for by the President. I believe we have made the progress
    necessary to allow us to begin to bring home U.S. surge forces. As
    USD(AT&L), I have worked through my co-chairmanship of the Senior
    Integration Group (SIG) to ensure that the forces in Afghanistan grow
    in overall capability even as the U.S. troop presence begins to
    decrease.
        Question. Do you support the President's decision regarding the
    size and pace of reductions in U.S. forces? Why or why not?
        Answer. Yes. I believe we have made the progress necessary to allow
    us to begin to bring home U.S. surge forces.
        Question. At the NATO Summit in Lisbon, the participants in the
    International Security Assistance Force endorsed President Karzai's
    goal of the Afghanistan National Security Forces having the primary
    responsibility for providing security throughout Afghanistan by 2014.
    Last month, transition of lead responsibility for security from ISAF
    forces to Afghan security forces began in seven areas around
    Afghanistan.
        Do you support the goal of transitioning security responsibility to
    the Afghan security forces by 2014?
        Answer. Yes. The transition of security-lead to the ANSF in the
    first tranche of provinces and municipalities has progressed smoothly
    and without any significant uptick in violence in those areas. Our
    transition strategy, as stated at the November 2010 NATO Lisbon
    Conference, is to complete security transition nation-wide by the end
    of 2014. Transition remains conditions-based. The ISAF Commander and
    NATO Senior Civilian Representative are working together to refine the
    transition process to take into account the gradual drawdown of
    Coalition forces, declining funding, and the need to focus enablers and
    resources in contested areas as we move forward with transition.
        Question. How important is it to the civil-military campaign in
    Afghanistan that the initial round of transitioning security
    responsibility to the Afghan security forces begins this summer and be
    completed by the end of the year?
        Answer. Successful transition depends upon sufficient development
    and capable governance to underpin security gains. The timetable is and
    should be conditions-based.

                      AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

        Question. What is your assessment of the progress in developing
    professional and effective Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)?
        Answer. In partnership with U.S. and NATO forces, the ANSF have
    made enormous progress in size and quality over the past 2 years and
    remain ahead of schedule for their growth targets this year. In
    addition, both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National
    Police (ANP) have made significant gains in effectiveness and
    professionalism. The establishment of the Afghan Local Police (ALP)
    program has also fostered greater local capability to resist
    insurgents. However, real challenges remain, for example, in stemming
    attrition rates.
        Question. Do you support the proposed increase in the size of the
    ANSF to the level of 352,000 personnel by 2012?
        Answer. Military commanders who are the closest to the issue have
    conducted detailed analyses of ANSF personnel and capabilities
    requirements and have concluded that right now, a level of 352,000
    personnel appears to be the right force size, although the balance of
    forces between the Army and Police may change over time. President
    Obama and NATO have endorsed that growth to 352,000 personnel, and I
    support those decisions.
        Question. What do you see as the main challenges to building the
    capacity of the ANSF and, if confirmed, what recommendations, if any,
    would you make for addressing those challenges?
        Answer. Some of the main challenges to building the capacity of the
    ANSF include poor literacy rates and low education levels in the Afghan
    population, which constrain the development of more advanced ANSF
    capabilities such as logistics, aviation, medical, and communications.
    These capabilities will be necessary for an increasingly self-
    sufficient ANSF to ensure Afghanistan does not again become a safe
    haven for terrorists. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan has put
    considerable attention on, and resources toward, the literacy problem.
    Another key challenge is the development of strong and capable leaders,
    which takes time and experience to cultivate. If confirmed, I would
    work with military and civilian leaders and international partners to
    explore ways to bolster ANSF capacity.
        Question. If confirmed, what recommendations, if any, would you
    have to address challenges relating to the sustainment of the ANSF over
    the long-term?
        Answer. We need to challenge our planning assumptions continually
    to ensure the Afghans are developing a security force that is
    sustainable, in terms of size, capabilities, and cost. We need to
    continue to resist providing certain advanced aviation and armor
    capabilities that do not appear to be necessary for Afghan security and
    are likely to be unsustainable over the long term. Currently, the
    United States provides the bulk of funding for the Afghan National
    Security Forces. We need to continue to urge other countries to
    increase the amounts they contribute. For example, former Secretary of
    Defense Gates challenged NATO Allies and partners to contribute a
    combined one billion euros annually to the NATO Afghan National Army
    Trust Fund.

                       AFGHAN GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

        Question. While improving security for the Afghan people is a key
    component of our counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, the success
    of that strategy also depends on improving the Government of
    Afghanistan's capacity to provide governance, better services and
    economic development. Significant concerns remain over the performance
    of the Government of Afghanistan in meeting the needs of the Afghan
    people and fighting corruption.
        What do you see as the role for DOD in building the capacity of the
    Government of Afghanistan to deliver services, provide better
    governance, improve economic development and fight corruption in
    Afghanistan?
        Answer. Improving governance and economic development is crucial to
    our strategy in Afghanistan. Although the Department of State (DOS) and
    the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are the lead
    agencies within the U.S. Government on governance and development
    initiatives in Afghanistan, DOD contributes to this effort and
    cooperates closely with DOS and USAID. Coordinating DOD stabilization
    projects with civilian reconstruction and development efforts ensures
    that the military and civilian activities work together to support
    longer-term development objectives, as well as near-term stabilization.

                   U.S. STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN

        Question. What in your view are the key U.S. strategic interests
    with regard to Pakistan?
        Answer. Our relationship with Pakistan is not always easy, but it
    is vital to our national security and to our regional interests. The
    core national security goal remains to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat
    al Qaeda and its affiliates to ensure that they do not have safe havens
    in Afghanistan and Pakistan and to eliminate their capacity to threaten
    the United States, our Allies, and interests abroad. Al Qaeda and other
    extremists continue to use safe havens in Pakistan to plot and prepare
    attacks against the United States and our allies and partners, and it
    is essential to continue working with Pakistan to eliminate these safe
    havens.
        The fact that Pakistan is a nuclear state that faces internal
    threats from extremist organizations adds to the urgency of these
    requirements. Furthermore, U.S. economic interests in South Asia
    require stability in the region. Preventing, if possible, a potential
    Pakistan-India conflict is another important strategic interest. For
    these reasons, it is in the United States' interest for Pakistan to
    have a strong, civilian-led government and an open society, to live in
    peace and security with its neighbors, and to ensure its nuclear assets
    remain secure, in accordance with international standards. If
    confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress as we pursue these
    strategic interests with Pakistan.
        Question. What in your view are the key lessons from the operation
    to kill Osama bin Laden for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship?
        Answer. The key lesson from the raid is that the U.S. must act when
    U.S. vital national interests are at stake, including unilaterally, if
    other options present too much risk to mission success. A second lesson
    is that the Pakistan sanctuary for al Qaeda, Afghan insurgents, and
    other terrorist groups remains a threat to U.S. vital national
    interests that must be eliminated. A third lesson is that the United
    States must remain engaged in Pakistan to secure its vital interests,
    and that Pakistan needs the United States as much as the United States
    needs Pakistan.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
    for U.S. relations with Pakistan, particularly in terms of military-to-
    military relations?
        Answer. Our military-to-military relationship with Pakistan, like
    our overall relationship, has experienced good and bad periods. If
    confirmed, I would continue to support DOD's efforts, in coordination
    with our interagency partners, to improve our counterterrorism
    cooperation and develop a constructive and mutually beneficial
    relationship with Pakistan, aimed at advancing shared national security
    objectives.

                          U.S. ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

        Question. Since 2001, the United States has provided significant
    military assistance to Pakistan, including foreign military financing
    and training and equipment through the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund
    to build the capacity of the Pakistan Army and Frontier Scouts to
    conduct counterinsurgency operations. In addition, the United States
    has provided significant funds to reimburse Pakistan for the costs
    associated with military operations conducted by Pakistan along the
    Afghanistan-Pakistan border and other support provided in connection
    with Operation Enduring Freedom.
        How effective, in your view, has this assistance been in improving
    Pakistan's efforts and commitment to counter terrorists in Pakistan?
        Answer. Security-related assistance, Coalition Support Fund
    reimbursements, and cross-border coordination with ISAF and Afghan
    forces have helped enable Pakistan's counterinsurgency campaign. Since
    2009, Pakistan has undertaken counterinsurgency operations against
    extremist organizations in its northwest areas, including in Swat,
    South Waziristan, Mohmand, and Bajaur, with varying levels of success.
    If confirmed, I would work with Congress to ensure that the support we
    provide is yielding the results we seek.
        Question. What conditions or factors should the Department take
    into consideration in determining whether additional U.S. military
    assistance should be provided to Pakistan in the future?
        Answer. The current ``train-advise-equip'' programs with the
    Pakistan military and paramilitary forces have been an important
    component in pursuing the near-term objective of eliminating terrorist
    sanctuaries and disrupting the al Qaeda network. It is vital, however,
    that Pakistan live up to its responsibilities, including to cooperate
    more fully in counterterrorism matters, to expand its counterinsurgency
    campaign, and to cease providing sanctuary to Afghan Taliban and other
    militant groups perceived to be beneficial to the Pakistani state.
    Future requests for security-related assistance will be informed by
    Pakistan's steps in these areas. Additionally, all U.S. security-
    related assistance will continue to be provided to Pakistan in
    accordance with the Leahy vetting requirements.

                          OSAMA BIN LADEN AND AL QAEDA

        Question. In your view, will the death of Osama bin Laden have a
    significant impact on the conflict against al Qaeda and if so, how?
        Answer. The death of Osama bin Laden is a significant blow to al
    Qaeda and brings us closer to that organization's strategic defeat.
    However, al Qaeda remains a potent, dangerous, and adaptable foe. Even
    as the core al Qaeda organization is weakened, decentralized affiliates
    and adherents pose a continuing threat to the United States.
        Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda
    affiliates to the U.S. Homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and western
    interests more broadly? Which affiliates are of most concern?
        Answer. Al Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents are diverse,
    dispersed, and decentralized. They are present in the Arabian
    Peninsula, North and East Africa, South Asia, and elsewhere around the
    globe, including within the United States. Their intent and ability to
    attack the United States varies by group, but striking the Homeland is
    a common theme in their propaganda and planning. Al Qaeda in the
    Arabian Peninsula has already demonstrated both the intent and the
    capability to conduct attacks against the United States. Also, despite
    the death of bin Laden, core al Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents
    in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region remain a persistent and serious
    threat.

                                    SOMALIA

       Question. Somalia is a collapsed state with a weak government
    unable to project either power or stability or to provide services to
    its people in the midst of a humanitarian crisis. Somalia is also a
    training and operations hub for: al Shabab and other violent
    extremists; pirates operating in the Indian Ocean and Arabian
    Peninsula; illicit traffickers of weapons, humans, and drugs; and
    remnants of the al Qaeda East Africa cell that was responsible for the
    destruction of our embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in August of
    1998.
        What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Shabab to the
    U.S. and Western interests in the Horn of Africa and to the U.S.
    Homeland?
        Answer. The threat from al Shabab to the U.S. and Western interests
    in the Horn of Africa and to the U.S. Homeland is significant. Al
    Shabab leaders, who have claimed affiliation with al Qaeda since 2007,
    are developing ties with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and are
    showing an increasing desire to stage international terrorist attacks
    in addition to their acts of violence inside Somalia. Al Shabab employs
    several hundred foreign fighters and regularly tries to recruit
    fighters from Somali diaspora communities in the United States and
    Europe. Al Shabab continues to repress the Somali people--it is not a
    coincidence that the areas in Somalia where the UN has declared famine
    conditions to exist are areas under al Shabab's control.
        Further, Somalia's lack of governance and sparse population could
    make it appealing as a safe haven for al Qaeda. As al Qaeda undergoes
    leadership changes and regroups from counterterrorism operations in
    Pakistan, we need to ensure that it does not relocate its center of
    operations to Somalia.
        Question. Given your knowledge of the role of the various U.S.
    Government departments and agencies in the Horn of Africa, what
    changes, if any, would you make to DOD's current role in the Horn of
    Africa?
        Answer. I understand DOD's primary mission in the Horn of Africa is
    to build partner-nation capacity in order to promote regional security
    and stability, prevent conflict, and protect U.S. interests. I believe
    this mission is appropriate. I am informed U.S. Africa Command is
    undertaking a review of East Africa to determine how our military
    efforts in the region work in concert with our interagency partners to
    achieve our collective regional goals and counter al Qaeda's linkages
    to elements of al Shabab. DOD's ultimate goal should be a fully
    integrated strategy under which security assistance, capacity building,
    operational collaboration with regional partners, and counter-terrorism
    actions are synchronized to provide the regional security and stability
    that is in the interest of both the United States and our regional
    partners.
        If confirmed, I would work to ensure our strategy is developed as
    part of a coordinated U.S. national security policy towards the Horn of
    Africa, and to determine how DOD can and should best support this
    policy.

                  YEMEN AND AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

        Question. A number of senior U.S. officials have indicated that the
    most significant threat to the U.S. Homeland currently emanates from
    Yemen.
        What is your assessment of the current U.S. strategy in Yemen?
        Answer. I understand the United States is disappointed by President
    Saleh's continued refusal to transfer power. U.S. leaders continue to
    urge him to do so immediately, and to ensure that the legitimate will
    of the Yemeni people is respected. The United States continues to work
    with European and Gulf Cooperation Council partners to facilitate a
    peaceful and orderly transition of power.
        The ongoing unrest has weakened an already fragile economy and
    allowed al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to expand its
    influence. Despite this, U.S. goals in Yemen remain the same: to help
    Yemen deny AQAP a safe haven and operational platform and to ensure
    Yemen is stable, unified, and economically viable.
        AQAP has attempted two dramatic attacks on the United States since
    December 2009, and has expressed intent to try again. AQAP attack
    planning demonstrates sophisticated and innovative techniques, such as
    concealed explosive devices and printer cartridge bombs. AQAP is also
    increasingly attempting to recruit and radicalize would-be terrorists
    in the West through its extensive media outreach, increasing the threat
    of lone-wolf terrorists inspired by AQAP.
        The administration has just released a comprehensive National
    Strategy for Counterterrorism that calls for a collaborative U.S.-
    Yemeni effort to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat AQAP. If confirmed, I
    would seek to ensure that DOD plays a constructive and appropriate role
    in carrying out this strategy.
        Question. Given the ongoing political upheaval and splintering of
    the military in Yemen, what are your views on the United States
    continuing to provide security assistance--most significantly DOD
    section 1206 funding--to Yemeni counterterrorism forces?
        Answer. As with every country, we are regularly evaluating U.S.
    assistance and counterterrorism cooperation to ensure that the
    assistance to be provided is appropriate and effective. The Republic of
    Yemen Government is a critical partner in the war against al Qaeda, and
    the Department must be particularly mindful of the continued and
    growing threat to the United States from AQAP. Given the challenges
    unfolding in Yemen, the United States will need to continually re-
    evaluate the partnership.

                                     CHINA

        Question. Much has been made about the economic and military growth
    in China and what that growth might mean in terms of regional and
    global security.
        From your perspective, what effect is China's expanding economy and
    growing military having on the region at-large and how is that growth
    influencing the U.S. security posture in Asia and the Pacific?
        Answer. In terms of regional security, China's economic growth has
    increased China's international profile and influence, and has enabled
    China's leaders to embark upon and sustain a comprehensive
    transformation of its military forces. The pace and scale of China's
    military modernization, coupled with the lack of transparency, raises
    many questions, both within the United States and the region as a
    whole, about China's future.
        From my perspective, DOD has a special responsibility to monitor
    China's military and to deter conflict. Through a robust forward
    presence, prudent capability developments, and sustained action to
    strengthen alliances and partnerships, DOD can support our national
    interest in promoting a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Asia-Pacific
    region.
        Question. What do you believe are the objectives of China's
    military modernization program?
        Answer. China appears to be building the capability to fight and
    win short duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery. Its
    near-term focus appears to be on preparing for potential contingencies
    involving Taiwan, including possible U.S. military intervention. Its
    modernization efforts emphasize anti-access and area denial
    capabilities. China is also devoting increasing attention and resources
    to conducting operations beyond Taiwan and China's immediate periphery.
    Beijing's growing focus on military missions other than war includes
    humanitarian assistance, non-combat evacuation operations, and counter-
    piracy support. Lastly, China is strengthening its nuclear deterrent
    and enhancing its strategic strike capabilities through modernization
    of its nuclear forces, and improving other strategic capabilities such
    as space and counter-space operations and computer network operations.
        Question. How do you believe the United States should respond to
    China's military modernization program?
        Answer. The United States has been and should remain the pivotal
    military power in the Asia-Pacific region. Our response to China's
    military modernization should be flexible and supported by the
    continued transformation of our force posture in the Asia-Pacific
    region, the maintenance of our global presence and access, the
    modernization of our own capabilities in such areas as anti-access and
    area denial, and the strengthening of our Alliances and partnerships.
        Question. U.S-China military-to-military dialogue has been strained
    over the past several years and efforts to establish and maintain
    mutually beneficial military relations has been hampered by China's
    propensity for postponing or canceling military engagements in an
    apparent effort to influence U.S. actions. Since the beginning of 2011,
    there have been a number of senior-level meetings between U.S. and
    Chinese military officials, including visits to China by Secretary
    Gates and Admiral Mullen, and a visit to United States by the People's
    Liberation Army Chief of Staff, General Chen. By most accounts, gains
    from these meetings have been modest at best, but they do represent an
    encouraging step towards perhaps a more mutually beneficial
    understanding between the militaries of our countries.
        What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China
    military-to-military relations and what would be your intention, if
    confirmed, regarding these relations?
        Answer. I have long supported a continuous dialogue between the
    armed forces of the United States and China to expand practical
    cooperation where our national interests converge and to discuss
    candidly those areas where we have disagreement. Such dialogue can be
    especially important during periods of friction and turbulence.
        I believe we should continue to use military engagement with China
    as one of several means to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security
    of the Asia-Pacific region, to encourage China to play a constructive
    role in the region, and to press China to partner with the United
    States and our Asian allies and partners in addressing common security
    challenges.
        Question. What is your view of the relative importance of sustained
    military-to-military relations with China?
        Answer. President Obama and President Hu have expressed that a
    healthy, stable, reliable, and continuous military-to-military
    relationship is an essential part of their shared vision for a
    positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship. I
    fully agree with that assertion.
        Question. Do you believe that we should make any changes in the
    quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what
    changes and why?
        Answer. I believe that military exchanges with China can be
    valuable, but can only truly work if China is willing to reciprocate
    with transparent and substantive discussions. If confirmed, I would
    look for ways to deepen and enhance our military-to-military
    relationship with China, and to encourage China to act responsibly both
    regionally and globally.

                                  NORTH KOREA

        Question. North Korea represents one of the greatest near-term
    threats to regional security and stability. This seriousness of the
    threat is seen by North Korea's continued pursuit of a nuclear
    capability and ballistic missile program, and particularly, over the
    past year, by North Korea's unprovoked and deadly attacks against South
    Korea--specifically the attack on the Republic of Korea navy ship
    Cheonan in March 2010 and the artillery attack on South Korea's
    Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010.
        What is your assessment of the current security situation on the
    Korean peninsula?
        Answer. North Korea's large conventional military, proliferation
    activities, and pursuit of asymmetric advantages through its ballistic
    missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, including
    uranium enrichment, present a serious threat to the United States, our
    allies in the region, and to the international community. The two North
    Korean attacks against South Korea last year provide a sober reminder
    that Pyongyang is willing to utilize its capabilities to undertake
    provocative actions. If confirmed, I would intend to monitor the
    security situation on the Korean Peninsula closely; work for the
    continued transformation of our alliances and partnerships in the
    region; and maintain the military capabilities necessary to protect our
    interests, defend our allies, and deter North Korea from acts of
    aggression and intimidation.
        Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United
    States and its allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD
    capabilities and the export of those capabilities?
        Answer. North Korea's missile and WMD programs pose a direct and
    serious threat to our regional allies and partners and have the
    potential to become a direct threat to U.S. territory. The United
    States must continue to monitor carefully North Korea's WMD and missile
    development programs and related proliferation activities. If
    confirmed, I would ensure that DOD continues to work closely with other
    parts of the U.S. Government to address these and other emerging
    threats, reduce our vulnerabilities and those of our allies and
    partners, and work cooperatively with our allies to ensure our
    contingency planning remains adaptive and responsive.
        Question. In your view are there additional steps that DOD could
    take to ensure that North Korea does not proliferate missile and
    weapons technology to Syria, Iran, and others?
        Answer. I understand that DOD, with its interagency partners, has
    taken several steps to prevent North Korea's proliferation of weapons-
    related technology, including working to advance international
    nonproliferation norms and cooperating with partner nations to inspect
    and interdict vessels and aircraft suspected of carrying illicit cargo.
    If confirmed, I would continue to work to strengthen international
    consensus against proliferation, invest in capacity-building programs
    with partner nations, and increase WMD-related information sharing with
    international partners.

                           LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION

        Question. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is
    pending consideration in the U.S. Senate.
        What is your view on whether or not the United States should join
    the Law of the Sea convention?
        Answer. I support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.
        Question. How would being a party to the Law of the Sea convention
    help or hinder the United States' security posture in the Asia-Pacific
    region?
        Answer. Being a party to the Law of the Sea Convention would not
    hinder the U.S. security posture in the Asia-Pacific region. In fact,
    it would enhance our leadership and ability to influence future
    developments in the law of the sea, strengthen our position in
    bilateral discussions with the People's Republic of China, and improve
    our position in a large number of Asia-focused multilateral venues. As
    former Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England testified before the
    Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 2007, ``The legal
    framework that the Convention establishes is essential to the mission
    of DOD, and the Department of Homeland Security concurs that it is also
    essential for their mission. For that reason, Secretary Gates, the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Department Secretaries, all of the
    combatant commanders, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard join me in
    asking the Senate to give its swift approval for U.S. Accession to the
    Law of the Sea Convention and ratification of the 1994 Agreement.''

                     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERNARCOTICS

        Question. On an annual basis, DOD's counternarcotics (CN) program
    expends approximately $1.5 billion to support the Department's CN
    operations, building the capacity of certain foreign governments around
    the globe, and analyzing intelligence on CN-related matters. In a
    recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, GAO found that
    DOD ``does not have an effective performance measurement system to
    track the progress of its counternarcotics activities.'' This is the
    second such finding relating to DOD CN in the last decade.
        What is your assessment of the DOD CN program?
        Answer. I understand that the Department's counternarcotics
    activities are intended to perform important roles, including detection
    and monitoring of drug trafficking bound for the United States,
    counternarcotics support to law enforcement agencies, drug demand
    reduction for the armed services, and critical support for combatant
    commanders' efforts to confront drug trafficking and other forms of
    transnational organized crime that support terrorists, insurgents, and
    other criminal groups. If confirmed, I would assess the Department's
    progress against these goals.
        Question. In your view, should DOD continue to play a role in
    attempting to stem the flow of illegal narcotics?
        Answer. Yes. In support of the National Drug Control Strategy, DOD
    plays an important, statutory role as the lead agency for the detection
    and monitoring of drug trafficking bound for the United States.
    Additionally, as outlined in the President's Strategy to Combat
    Transnational Organized Crime released in July 2011, drug trafficking
    and other forms of organized crime pose a national security threat to
    the United States. The enemies we face on the battlefield today are
    increasingly financed through non-traditional means, including through
    drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime. Just as the
    Department has long been focused on how traditional, state-funded
    adversaries are supported, we must use all of the tools at our disposal
    to attack the sources of revenue that support the asymmetrical threat
    we face today and are likely to face for the foreseeable future.
    Transnational organized crime contributes to global instability by
    undermining legitimate government institutions, fostering corruption,
    and distorting legitimate economic activity. The Department's efforts
    to build the counternarcotics capabilities of partner nation security
    forces serve to prevent and deter broader conflicts that could require
    a much more costly military intervention in the future.
        Question. In your view, should DOD continue to fund the National
    Guard Counterdrug Program for Youth Intervention and local law
    enforcement education programs that may be duplicative of the efforts
    of other agencies, using CN funds?
        Answer. I am aware of the purposes of this program, and, if
    confirmed, will assess its level of funding.

                               ENGAGEMENT POLICY

        Question. One of the central pillars of our recent national
    security strategy has been military engagement as a means of building
    relationships around the world. Military-to-military contacts, Joint
    Combined Exchange Training exercises, combatant commander (COCOM)
    exercises, humanitarian demining operations, and other engagement
    activities have been used to achieve this goal.
        Do you believe that these activities contribute positively to U.S.
    national security?
        Answer. Yes, DOD's engagement activities encourage and enable
    partner nations to provide political support, to give us access to
    territory and resources, to secure and govern their territory more
    effectively, and to contribute to regional and global security. Partner
    support reduces our risk around the world and enables U.S. deterrence
    and, when necessary, military actions. Further, enabling our foreign
    partners to provide for their own security and contribute to
    multilateral security efforts is an investment that pays immediate and
    long-term dividends by reducing the need for costlier U.S.
    interventions in response to turmoil in regions critical to U.S.
    interests. I believe that taken on the whole, these engagement
    activities are a cost-effective way to strengthen our national security
    posture by building lasting relationships and alliances with partner
    nations.
        Question. If confirmed, would you support continued engagement
    activities of the U.S. military?
        Answer. Yes, I believe that maintaining cooperative security
    relationships with foreign militaries will be imperative for DOD in the
    foreseeable future.
        Question. What improvements, if any, would you suggest to the COCOM
    or interagency process for undertaking these activities?
        Answer. As with stability operations and security sector
    assistance, DOD's investment in international engagement is most
    effective when coordinated with U.S. Government civilian counterparts
    with adequate capacity. If confirmed, I would ensure the Department
    works closely with other agencies to ensure that the U.S. military
    plans and trains with our interagency civilian counterparts, that we
    are jointly prepared to engage with partner nations to prevent
    conflicts and, if prevention fails, to respond effectively in all
    phases of conflict.

                           BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

        Question. In the past few years, Congress has provided DOD a number
    of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner
    nations, including the global train and equip authority (``Section
    1206'').
        In your view, what should be our strategic objectives in building
    the capacities of partner nations?
        Answer. Our primary objective in building the capacity of foreign
    partners should continue to be to help them develop effective and
    legitimate security institutions that can provide for their countries'
    internal security, and contribute to regional and multilateral
    responses to threats and instability. This, in turn, mitigates the
    burden on U.S. forces responding to security threats outside the United
    States and promotes interoperability between our forces.

                           SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

        Question. The previous two Quadrennial Defense Reviews have
    mandated significant growth in our Special Operations Forces and
    enablers that directly support their operations.
        Do you believe that we should further increase the number of
    special operations personnel? If so, why, and by how much?
        Answer. U.S. Special Operations Command's (SOCOM) current
    throughput is programmed to meet the growth mandated by the last two
    QDRs. This planned special operations personnel growth, at the rate of
    3 to 5 percent per year, includes Navy SEAL, Army Special Forces and
    Special Operations Aviation, and combat and combat support personnel.
    Until that programmed growth is complete, I do not believe it is
    prudent to consider additional growth to the Special Operations Forces
    (SOF) community.
        Question. In your view, how can the size of SOF be increased, while
    also maintaining the rigorous recruiting and training standards for
    special operators?
        Answer. SOF cannot be mass produced. As Admiral McRaven has pointed
    out, Special Operations growth should stay between 3 to 5 percent per
    year in order to ensure quality of the manpower being produced. This is
    the pace SOCOM has sustained over the past several years and is on
    track to sustain over the next several years. However, as the security
    landscape has changed, the demands for indirect kinds of missions have
    begun to exceed the ability of the Special Operations community alone
    to meet. As a partial remedy to this situation, the 2010 QDR
    recommended expanding general purpose forces' capacities and
    capabilities to execute some missions that used to fall exclusively to
    SOF. I support this recommendation.
        Question. In recent years, SOF have taken on an expanded role in a
    number of areas important to countering violent extremist
    organizations, including those related to information and military
    intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant changes to
    SOCOM title 10 missions to make them better reflect the activities
    Special Operations Forces are carrying out around the world.
        What current missions, if any, do you believe can and should be
    divested by SOCOM, and why?
        Answer. The Department uses a range of processes, such as the
    Unified Command Plan, to review the mission sets and responsibilities
    it assigns to SOCOM on an ongoing basis. Additionally, the language in
    section 167 of title 10, U.S.C., includes ``such other activities as
    may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense,'' which
    provides the President and the Secretary of Defense the flexibility
    needed to meet changing circumstances. At this time, I would not
    advocate significant changes to SOCOM's title 10 missions, though, if
    confirmed, I would review these responsibilities.
        Question. Are there any additional missions that you believe SOCOM
    should assume, and, if so, what are they and why do you advocate adding
    them?
        Answer. At this time, I would not advocate significant changes to
    SOCOM's title 10 missions.
        Question. What can be done to ensure that indirect special
    operations missions with medium- and long-term impact, such as
    unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, receive as much
    emphasis as direct action, and that they receive appropriate funding?
        Answer. The activities of Special Operations Forces are
    significantly varied, from strikes and counterterrorist raids to
    working by, with, and through local partners, whether that be in the
    form of training and advising foreign counterparts or providing support
    to civilian authorities abroad. I believe that each of these missions
    is an essential component of the Department's national security
    responsibilities and highly valued within the Special Operations
    community. If confirmed, I would seek to ensure that investments are
    made in an appropriately balanced way.

                                     RUSSIA

        Question. What are the areas of engagement with Russia that are
    most beneficial from a DOD perspective? How would you recommend
    carrying out such engagement?
        Answer. I understand that the Department has a robust engagement
    plan with the Russian Armed Forces through two working groups under the
    Bilateral Presidential Commission: (1) the Defense Relations Working
    Group (co-chaired by the Secretary of Defense and the Russian Minister
    of Defense) and (2) the Military Cooperation Working Group (co-chaired
    by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Russian Chief of
    the General Staff). The Defense Relations Working Group focuses on
    high-level policy issues, such as missile defense cooperation, defense
    technology cooperation, security issues, and defense reform. The
    Military Cooperation Working Group focuses on military-to-military
    cooperation, including counter-terrorism, Afghanistan-Pakistan, crisis
    response and counter-piracy. Services Chiefs and combatant commanders
    (particularly U.S. European, Pacific, and Northern Commands) also take
    part in military-to-military engagement activities contained in a
    mutually agreed upon annual work plan. Combined, these efforts strive
    to increase transparency and maintain direct and frank lines of
    communication, and I support their continuation and strengthening.
        Question. As Russia and the United States implement the New START
    treaty, do you believe that it will be possible to begin a discussion
    on tactical nuclear weapons, and are there any conditions that you
    believe should be precedent to such discussions?
        Answer. As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, the United States
    intends to pursue further reductions in strategic and nonstrategic
    nuclear weapons with Russia, including both deployed and non-deployed
    nuclear weapons. Because of the verification challenges associated with
    limiting non-strategic and non-deployed weapons, I believe that a
    discussion of potential cooperation measures would be useful as an
    early component of discussions on reductions and strengthened security
    measures.

                   DOD'S COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

        Question. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program was
    historically focused primarily on eliminating Cold War era weapons of
    mass destruction (WMD) in the states of the former Soviet Union. The
    emphasis of the program is beginning to shift away from Russia and to
    new threats, such as biological weapons surveillance mechanisms in
    Africa and elsewhere.
        In your view, what still needs to be done to reduce the
    proliferation threat from the residual Cold War stockpiles of WMD
    weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union?
        Answer. I have been involved in the Nunn-Lugar program from its
    inception and continue to participate in its management as USD(AT&L). I
    believe the countries of the former Soviet Union have made significant
    progress to reduce the threats associated with the extensive Soviet WMD
    programs, facilities, and stockpiles in their territories. In many
    cases this was accomplished with the support and assistance of DOD's
    Nunn-Lugar CTR program. The threat posed by WMD terrorism underscores
    the need for continued attention to residual Cold War stockpiles of WMD
    and materials. Where and when host governments are unable to mitigate
    this threat on their own, CTR and other U.S. programs should work with
    these nations to reduce these threats through the dismantlement of WMD
    and associated infrastructure and the consolidation and securing of WMD
    and related technology.
        Question. Are Russia and the former Soviet Union countries now
    making a significant contribution to efforts to reduce the
    proliferation threats they inherited?
        Answer. It is my understanding that, through direct national
    funding as well as collaboration with U.S. agencies and other
    international partners, Russia and other states of the former Soviet
    Union (FSU) are making significant contributions to reduce
    proliferation threats they inherited and to address new ones.
        The Nunn-Lugar CTR program continues to be DOD's principal vehicle
    to support these activities. FSU countries are partnering with CTR and
    other U.S. programs to reduce a variety of Soviet-era WMD threats
    within their borders and the region. As a specific example, we continue
    a strong partnership with the Government of Kazakhstan to destroy,
    secure, and consolidate dangerous pathogens and improve Central Asia's
    capacity to prevent and respond to a bioterrorism attack.
        Question. What do you see as the key remaining objectives of the
    CTR program in Russia?
        Answer. I view the key remaining objectives of CTR in Russia to be
    the prevention of proliferation and WMD terrorism through dismantlement
    of WMD and associated infrastructure; consolidation and security of WMD
    and related technology; transition of sustainment responsibilities for
    U.S.-provided security upgrades to the Russian Ministry of Defense;
    increased transparency; and support to bilateral defense and military
    cooperation, with the goal of reducing WMD threats.
        Question. Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among
    the U.S. Government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts,
    including DOD, the Department of Energy, and the State Department?
        Answer. From my current position, I appreciate that DOD's CTR
    mission is executed with strong White House leadership, essential
    support from the Department of State, and in close cooperation with the
    Department of Energy and other interagency partners. Robust
    collaboration across U.S. agencies and interagency coordination is a
    hallmark of the program and key to its effectiveness. If confirmed, I
    would continue efforts to maximize coordination and cooperation with
    our interagency and international partners.
        Question. As the CTR program expands to geographic regions beyond
    the states of the former Soviet Union, in your view what proliferation
    and threat reduction goals should DOD establish?
        Answer. In my current position with responsibility for the Defense
    Threat Reduction Agency, I have made it a priority to expand the
    geographic reach of the CTR program beyond the former Soviet Union. WMD
    threats are global, and DOD has substantial experience in building
    partner capacity to address WMD threats worldwide. The President has
    highlighted the threats posed by nuclear and biological terrorism as
    key proliferation concerns requiring international attention. In line
    with these priorities, DOD's goals for the program are: (1) reducing
    and eliminating nuclear weapons threats; (2) improving the security and
    accounting of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable fissile material; (3)
    detecting, eliminating, and preventing the proliferation of chemical
    weapons and biological materials; and (4) encouraging development of
    capabilities to reduce proliferation threats among key partners and
    regions.

                              PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE

        Question. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review concluded that the
    United States will continue to experiment with prompt global strike
    prototypes. There has been no decision to field a prompt global strike
    capability as the effort is early in the technology and testing phase.
    One test failed and the second test will occur in August.
        In your view, is there a role for a conventional prompt global
    strike capability in addressing the key threats to U.S. national
    security in the near future?
        Answer. The Department continues to investigate options for this
    unique capability. It is envisioned that a conventional prompt global
    strike (CPGS) capability could be useful in certain scenarios involving
    regional adversaries considering an attack using weapons of mass
    destruction or against high priority non-state adversaries. It may also
    serve a unique role in situations where a fleeting, serious threat was
    located in a region not readily accessible by other means.
        Question. What approach to implementation of this capability would
    you expect to pursue if confirmed?
        Answer. DOD is developing and testing technologies relevant to both
    land-based and sea-based CPGS concepts. It would be premature to make
    any decisions regarding a future acquisition strategy or development
    concept for this technology until this concept assessment has been
    completed.
        Question. In your view what, if any, improvements in intelligence
    capabilities would be needed to support a prompt global strike
    capability?
        Answer. As with other weapon systems, effective employment of CPGS
    weapons would depend on the availability of timely and accurate
    intelligence on the nature, location, and disposition of a potential
    target. Given the precision and promptness inherent in the CPGS
    concept, the intelligence requirements for this system would be
    especially demanding.

                   NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP

        Question. Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program
    with the aim of creating the computational capabilities and
    experimental tools needed to allow for the continued certification of
    the nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable without the
    need for nuclear weapons testing. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy
    are statutorily required to certify annually to Congress the continued
    safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
        As the stockpile continues to age, and as the Chairman of the
    Nuclear Weapons Council, what do you view as the greatest challenges
    with respect to assuring the safety, reliability, and security of the
    stockpile?
        Answer. The most recent certification of the stockpile, completed
    in April 2011, indicates the stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable.
    The greatest challenge, as reflected in the comments of the national
    security laboratory directors, concerns the long-term sustainment and
    viability of the stockpile and the supporting infrastructure. As the
    weapons complex and nuclear stockpile continue to age, efforts to
    sustain them are becoming more costly and technically difficult. Since
    the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, substantial financial and political
    commitments have been made to address age-related issues in the nuclear
    weapons complex. If confirmed, I will continue to work with Congress
    and the Department of Energy on this effort to maintain the skills,
    capabilities, and infrastructure needed to ensure the safety,
    reliability, and security of our nuclear stockpile in a constrained
    budget environment.
        Question. If the technical conclusions and data from the Stockpile
    Stewardship Program could no longer confidently support the annual
    certification of the stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable, would you
    recommend the resumption of underground nuclear testing?
        Answer. If the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security
    Administration (DOE/NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Program remains
    adequately funded to maintain critical technical and manufacturing
    capabilities, I believe it is likely to continue to be effective. My
    recommendation on what steps to take in the event that the stockpile
    could not be certified as safe, secure, and reliable would depend upon
    the causes of the problems in the stockpile, and what technical steps
    would be needed to address them.
        Question. As the current Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council,
    what are the most significant issues facing the Council?
        Answer. The continued safety, security, and reliability of our
    nuclear stockpile is the most significant challenge facing the Council,
    and it is important to meet this challenge in a cost-effective manner.
    It is essential that the United States continue to invest in critical
    technical and manufacturing capabilities and infrastructure. If
    confirmed, I will make this a priority and continue the strong
    partnership between the Departments of Defense and Energy that is
    essential to maintaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
        Question. Do you agree that the full funding of the President's
    plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to
    as the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to work to ensure a safe,
    secure, and effective nuclear deterrent and to advocate for the
    required funding. Maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear
    stockpile is a critical national security priority, and the section
    1251 report represents the administration's current best estimate of
    required funding. At the same time, like DOD delivery system
    sustainment and modernization efforts, NNSA nuclear weapons complex
    modernization must be undertaken in a cost-effective manner. DOD has
    already taken steps to reduce the estimated cost of the Ohio-class
    replacement ballistic missile submarine and new Long-Range Strike
    Family of Systems.
        Question. Can DOD afford the plan set out in the report?
        Answer. Given the potentially significant future budget reductions
    we are facing, DOD is examining all programs for affordability and
    national security requirements, including our plans for modernization
    of the nuclear enterprise. If confirmed, I will continue to work with
    Congress to ensure that our most critical national security
    investments, including those in the nuclear enterprise, are balanced
    with the realities of the current fiscal environment.
        Prior to completing this modernization effort, do you believe it
    would be prudent to consider reductions below New START treaty limits
    for the deployed stockpile of nuclear weapons?
        I support the Obama administration's agenda for reducing global
    nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear
    weapons, as outlined in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. I also support
    the NPR's conclusion: ``The United States will retain the smallest
    possible nuclear stockpile consistent with our need to deter
    adversaries, reassure our allies, and hedge against technical or
    geopolitical surprise.'' Reductions below the New START treaty limits
    must only be considered in the context of the geopolitical environment
    and the status of our nuclear stockpile and the enterprise
    modernization effort.

                           TACTICAL FIGHTER PROGRAMS

        Question. Perhaps the largest modernization effort that we will
    face over the next several years is the set of programs to modernize
    our tactical aviation forces with fifth generation tactical aircraft
    equipped with stealth technology, to include the JSF.
        Based on current and projected threats, what are your views on the
    requirements for and timing of these programs?
        Answer. Based on current and projected threats, I believe it is
    critical that we transition to a 5th generation capability across the
    Services while maintaining sufficient legacy inventory capacity to
    prevail in current and near-term conflicts. Over the next 10 years, the
    Department's 5th generation capability will grow from a relatively
    small percentage to approximately one third of the TACAIR force
    structure. In the 20 years that follow, JSF will become the mainstay of
    the force. We need JSF to deal with advanced fighters and surface-to-
    air missiles worldwide, especially in the stressing electronic warfare
    environments of the future. Additionally, the F-22A modernization
    program will provide improved capability to ensure the United States is
    unmatched in both fighter and ground attack capability as JSF begins
    operational employment. To ensure we have sufficient capacity of
    fighter attack aircraft during the transition period, the Department
    has continued the production of the F/A-18E/F, extended the service
    life of the Department of Navy's older F/A-18s, and invested in
    affordable F-15, F-16, and A-10 sustainment and modernization efforts.
        Question. What is your view on the affordability of these programs?
        Answer. I believe affordability is critical to these programs, as
    well as all of our acquisition programs and services. As Under
    Secretary, I have instituted a number of strategic initiatives designed
    to target affordability and control cost growth. Examples include
    establishing an affordability target at Milestone (MS) A for both
    production and sustainment costs and the requirement to report on
    systems engineering trades showing how key design features affect the
    target cost at MS B. Additionally, I believe the establishment of
    ``Should Cost'' targets will provide us with a continuous focus on
    reducing program cost during planning and execution, especially in
    preparation for contract negotiations. In looking at the affordability
    of the current TACAIR modernization programs, I believe we can do
    better at controlling costs, but I also believe that these programs are
    affordable if managed properly. The JSF program has a track record of
    cost growth that must be reversed. Last year I directed a bottom up
    technical review of the development and test program to provide us the
    best assessment of the time and costs required to complete the
    development phase. We are aggressively managing the early production
    contracts to ensure the Government achieves best value in procurement.
    Finally, the estimate for life-cycle program costs is very concerning
    to me and the Department is taking a very detailed look at all aspects
    of JSF operations, support, and sustainment to identify best value
    solutions to control the lifetime operating and support costs for the
    JSF fleet.
        Question. Even if all of the current aircraft modernization
    programs execute as planned, the average age of the tactical,
    strategic, and tanker fleet will increase. Aging aircraft require ever-
    increasing maintenance, but even with these increasing maintenance
    costs, readiness levels continue to decline.
        Can both the maintenance of the legacy force and the modernization
    efforts be affordable at anywhere near the expected budget levels?
        Answer. Based on expected budget levels, I believe there will have
    to be some tradeoffs. Balancing the costs of maintaining an aging
    aircraft fleet with recapitalizing and modernizing that fleet is one of
    the most difficult problems the Department will deal with over the next
    few years. The austere fiscal environment we currently face, and the
    projected future budget levels we anticipate, make the problem
    challenging. As part of addressing increasing maintenance costs and
    declining readiness levels, we must improve how we currently do
    business. I believe we can do that by working with our industry
    partners to achieve more efficient and cost-effective supply chain and
    logistics management. We are also taking Service best value processes
    and mandating establishment across DOD, such as the Navy's predecessor
    plan to the Department's Superior Supplier Incentive Program (SSIP) and
    the Air Force's initiatives to improve the management of services
    contracts. I believe that an affordable JSF is absolutely vital if the
    Department is going to be able to meet the capability and force
    structure requirements that the combatant commanders, Services, and
    warfighters need.
        Question. Some critics believe that there is still too much service
    parochial duplication in procuring new systems.
        Do you agree with these critics?
        Answer. In part, I do. I would offer that the Department is
    improving in this area but can certainly do better. Procuring systems
    that duplicate or overlap Service requirements is inefficient and does
    not provide the best value for defense spending.
        Question. What steps have you taken as Under Secretary to reduce
    such duplication?
        Answer. I have taken a number of steps to reduce duplication.
    Conducting comprehensive cross-Service warfighting portfolio reviews is
    part of the Better Buying Power initiative. Additionally, I meet
    regularly with the Service Acquisition Executives (SAE), both
    individually and collectively. These meetings help ensure that the SAEs
    are kept up to date on policy, guidance decisions, and direction, and
    they allow me to gain insight into service-specific acquisition issues
    and direction. Open and direct communication with the SAEs has helped
    in identifying common capability requirements prior to Materiel
    Development Decision milestones. As a participant in the Department's
    budget process, I have worked with the Deputy Secretary, the Services,
    and others to eliminate duplication.
        Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe the
    Department should take in the future?
        Answer. Last year, Secretary Gates directed the Department to
    pursue a wide-ranging efficiencies initiative. This effort extends well
    beyond removing inefficiencies associated with duplication. Working
    with the senior leadership across the Department's acquisition
    community, I drafted guidance focused on obtaining greater efficiency
    and productivity in defense spending. The guidance covered five focus
    areas: (1) Target affordability and control cost growth; (2)
    Incentivize productivity and innovation in industry; (3) Promote real
    competition; (4) Improve tradecraft in services acquisition; and (5)
    Reduce non-productive processes and bureaucracy. In November of last
    year, I issued direction designed to achieve specific action in those
    initiative areas. Since that time I have worked continuously to follow
    through on the implementation of these initiatives, to adjust them as
    necessary, and to identify other opportunities. I believe this is a
    start; however, there are many additional steps that the Department
    must take in the future to improve the way we do business and deliver
    better value to the taxpayer and warfighter. Improving how the
    Department does business is a continuous process. If confirmed, I would
    intend to focus on these areas and look for ways to expand sound
    business practices more broadly across the Department.

                                UNMANNED SYSTEMS

        Question. Congress has established a goal that by 2015, one-third
    of the aircraft in the operational deep strike force aircraft fleet and
    one-third of operational ground combat vehicles will be unmanned.
        Do you support this goal?
        Answer. I support the goal of fielding unmanned systems with
    greater capability; however, resources should be focused on warfighter
    capability needs and systems that are within technological reach. The
    Department's January 2001 congressional report stated that the 2015
    goal would be largely driven by the pace of the technology and that the
    timelines at the time did not fully support the goal. The Military
    Departments' acquisition strategies did, however, reflect an aggressive
    pace for the fielding of these systems, should the technologies prove
    viable.
        Today, unmanned systems are providing tactical and soldier focused
    capabilities critical to winning the current overseas contingency
    operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The capabilities needed for these
    conflicts (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; armed
    reconnaissance; Improvised Explosive Device (IED) detection/disposal),
    however, are not the same as the unmanned capabilities envisioned at
    the time the goal was established. The Department should continue to
    pursue the needed technology and consider unmanned systems on a case-
    by-case basis implementing them when it makes sense from a capability,
    technological, and affordability perspective.
        Question. What is your assessment of DOD's ability to achieve this
    goal?
        Answer. Because of technological challenges, an Unmanned Aircraft
    System (UAS) providing an ``operational deep strike'' capability will
    not be fielded by 2015. However, the Air Force and Army are both
    operating armed UASs (MQ-9 Reaper, MQ-1B Predator, and MQ-1C Gray
    Eagle) in current overseas contingency operations. These aircraft are
    providing critical intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and
    strike capabilities to combatant commanders. At this time, because of
    current operations, the Services are focused on higher priority
    missions than deep strike. The Navy has entered the materiel
    development phase of an unmanned carrier launched surveillance and
    strike capability, but with the goal of fielding a UAS with limited
    strike capability by 2018.
        For unmanned ground combat vehicles the Department is more than 4
    years away from a fielded capability that approaches the mobility,
    perception, and intelligence comparable to a trained squad of soldiers
    aboard a Stryker or Bradley combat vehicle or an Abrams tank crew. More
    limited capabilities are feasible, but may not be affordable within
    projected budgets. The Department is actively working on unmanned
    requirements to detect, mark, and report IEDs.
        Question. What steps do you believe the Department should take to
    achieve this goal?
        Answer. The Department should continue robust, focused research and
    development efforts related to UAS and ground robotics technology. This
    is vital to realizing increased unmanned capabilities that are properly
    aligned with evolving warfighter needs, at affordable cost.

                              SHIPBUILDING BUDGET

        Question. With about half of the Navy's construction and
    development dollars being needed to build nuclear submarines, the
    Navy's commitment to building new submarines could crowd out funding
    needed to modernize the surface fleet. With regard to the ballistic
    missile submarine replacement program--a 12 submarine $60 billion
    acquisition program--Admiral Roughead, has stated that, ``[SSBN-X] is a
    strategic national asset and should not necessarily be funded in the
    shipbuilding account.''
        In your view, will the level of funding in the shipbuilding budget
    and certain high-cost programs force the Department to make requirement
    decisions in a constrained budget environment that may not be in the
    best interest for our national security?
        What steps, if any, do you believe the Department should take to
    address this concern and ensure adequate funding for the ballistic
    missile submarine replacement program?
        Do you believe that certain high cost ``national assets'' should be
    funded outside the Services' budgets where they do not have to compete
    with other critical weapon systems modernization needs of the Services?
        Answer. DOD remains committed to sustaining the force structure
    required to maintain our Nation's security, and recapitalization of the
    Nation's sea-based strategic deterrent is critical to this mission.
    While the Ohio Replacement program presents certain resource challenges
    for the Department, we are aggressively acting now, during the design
    phase, to drive down costs while meeting the core military requirements
    for a survivable nuclear deterrent. These efforts, coupled with many
    other significant cost-saving initiatives throughout the Department,
    are critical to meeting our broad national security needs within the
    Department's budget. The Department considers all funding priorities
    together and must frequently make judgments that cross budget account
    lines.

                             INFORMATION ASSURANCE

        Question. Protection of military networks, information, and
    communications is critical to DOD operations. The Department has not
    yet provided Congress with a comprehensive legislative proposal that
    would enable the Department to implement the President's guidance on
    dealing with current and future cyber threats.
        What is your assessment of the cyber security posture of the
    Department's critical information systems?
        Answer. DOD is developing a solid foundation for securing critical
    information systems. Due to the advanced persistent threat, DOD's
    critical information systems, like other critical financial, energy,
    and transportation information systems, are at risk of having their
    vulnerabilities exploited by a sophisticated adversary. To address this
    threat and mitigate these vulnerabilities DOD has implemented and
    continues to improve a capability for protecting and defending its
    networks. Among other actions, the recent establishment of U.S. Cyber
    Command has brought increased operational focus to these tasks.
        Prospectively, an enormous amount of work will be required to keep
    pace with technology and capabilities, and to stay ahead of system
    vulnerabilities that put our information and communications technology
    systems at risk. If confirmed, I will continue the efforts to secure
    DOD's information and communications technology, address cyber
    challenges, and ensure DOD can defend against network adversaries.
        Question. What Department-wide policies or guidance do you believe
    are necessary to address information and cyber security challenges for
    current and future systems?
        Answer. The administration is currently working with Congress to
    develop new cyber legislation, and the Department is an active
    participant in these ongoing discussions. Additionally, the Department
    is currently developing policy and guidance in a number of cyber
    security areas. For example, the Department is developing policy for a
    strengthened insider threat program and is working with other Federal
    agencies on policy and practices that will strengthen the security of
    classified information sharing while still providing the information to
    those who need it when they need it. The Department has also recently
    published revised policy on the use of DOD Public Key Infrastructure
    for user authentication, digital signatures, and encryption, and is
    also currently developing cyber security policy in such areas as supply
    chain risk management, protection of DOD information held by the
    defense industrial base, and continuous monitoring of DOD information
    systems. The Department is also in the processs of consolidating its
    network infrastructure in order to better enable protection of those
    networks. If confirmed, I will assess this issue further, and if I
    determine that additional legislative changes are needed, I will work
    with the administration to provide those recommendations to Congress.

                                 CYBER SECURITY

        Question. Deputy Secretary Lynn has been heavily involved in
    developing the DOD cyber strategy.
        If confirmed will you also play a major role in DOD cyber issues?
        Answer. If confirmed as the Deputy Secretary of Defense, I would
    devote significant attention to cybersecurity and more broadly to
    continuing to strengthen the Department's ability to operate
    effectively in cyberspace. If confirmed, I would work closely with the
    Secretary of Defense and others in DOD to build on recent progress and
    continue to improve the Department's and the Nation's cyber security.

                           TEST AND EVALUATION (T&E)

        Question. What is your assessment of the appropriate balance
    between the desire to reduce acquisition cycle times and the need to
    perform adequate testing?
        Answer. I believe that cycle time is best reduced by ensuring
    reasonable requirements are set, by being willing to trade away
    requirements that prove to be excessive, and by controlling
    requirements creep so that development time can be constrained. I
    support rigorous developmental and independent operational test and
    evaluation to provide accurate and objective information on the
    capabilities and limitations of defense systems to both acquisition
    executives and warfighters and to ensure contractors deliver products
    that meet requirements. When systems are urgently needed in the field,
    the imperative for accurate and objective testing is still just as
    important but should be addressed through efforts to expedite the test
    and evaluation process, with some acceptance of risk. This has been
    accomplished successfully for such urgent efforts as the Mine Resistant
    Ambush Protected vehicle program. In those urgent cases some risk could
    be taken, but safety and basic performance had to be verified prior to
    fielding. Testing is needed to validate system performance and I
    believe it is a necessary part of the acquisition process. That said,
    there may be opportunities to achieve this goal through more efficient
    processes than those currently in practice.
        Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe we
    should procure weapon systems and equipment that has not been
    demonstrated through test and evaluation to be operationally effective,
    suitable, and survivable?
        Answer. Systems should demonstrate their effectiveness, suitability
    and survivability through operational testing prior to a full rate
    production decision. In specific cases, based on the nature and
    seriousness of the deficiencies found in testing, it may be acceptable
    to continue production while the deficiencies are corrected. In a
    limited number of urgent circumstances it might also be necessary to
    field a system prior to operational testing in order to address an
    urgent gap in a critical capability. But even in such cases,
    operational evaluation should still be conducted at the earliest
    opportunity to assess the system's capabilities and limitations and
    identify any deficiencies that might need to be corrected.
        Question. Congress established the position of Director of
    Operational Test and Evaluation to serve as an independent voice on
    matters relating to operational testing of weapons systems. As
    established, the Director has a unique and direct relationship with
    Congress which allows him to preserve his independence.
        Do you support the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation's
    ability to speak freely and independently with Congress?
        Answer. Yes.

                 FUNDING FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS

        Question. In the past, the Quadrennial Defense Review and the
    Department's leaders have endorsed the statutory goal of investing 3
    percent of the Department's budget into science and technology
    programs.
        Do you support that investment goal?
        Answer. As a scientist and in my current position, I fully
    recognize the critical importance of a robust science and technology
    (S&T) program that can develop and deliver near-term capabilities and
    maintain long term options for the Department. At this point in the
    consideration of the Department's future budget situation, however,
    every part of the budget must be considered ``on the table''.
        Question. How will you assess whether the science and technology
    investment portfolio is adequate to meet the current and future needs
    of the Department?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary, the Chairman
    of the Joint Chiefs, the Services and others to establish guidelines
    for investment priorities. Based on these priorities, I would work
    through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
    Logistics to assess the adequacy of the current program and recommend
    changes in the future program to address the Department's priorities.

                                     SPACE

        Question. In your current position you have been the milestone
    decision authority for major space acquisition programs.
        Do you believe that this authority should be retained by your
    successor? Why or why not?
        Answer. For the foreseeable future, I believe that the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
    (USD(AT&L)) should retain milestone decision authority (MDA) for major
    space acquisitions. Independent acquisition oversight is a statutory
    requirement for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and major
    space programs should be overseen by the USD(AT&L) in his capacity as
    the Defense Acquisition Executive, consistent with all other MDAPs in
    other domains, including air, sea, and ground. Most of our national
    security space programs, including those executed by the Air Force and
    Navy under title 10 authorities and those executed by the National
    Reconnaissance Office (NRO) under title 50 authorities, entail very
    substantial resource commitments and substantial development and
    acquisition risks. As a result of the hard work of the Service
    Acquisition Executives, the Director of the NRO, their staffs and the
    staffs of OSD and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, we
    are recovering from more than a decade of very serious space
    acquisition shortcomings. While that progress continues, we still
    confront serious challenges in space acquisition, which will become
    even greater in a constrained resource and budget environment.
    Therefore, I believe the USD(AT&L) should continue to be the MDA for
    major space acquisition programs, while working with the Service
    Acquisition Executives, the DNRO, and the ODNI to consider MDA
    delegation on a case-by-case basis at appropriate milestone decision
    points.

                           BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

        Question. In September 2009, President Obama announced that he had
    accepted the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff to pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to
    missile defense in Europe. This approach is intended to defend all of
    Europe against existing and emerging threats from Iranian missiles,
    starting this year and increasing in capability with each of its four
    phases. Phase 4 of the European PAA is intended to provide a capability
    to defend against long-range missiles that could reach the United
    States, thus augmenting the existing homeland missile defense
    capability.
        Do you support the Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense in
    Europe and, if confirmed, will you implement it?
        Answer. I support the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and,
    if confirmed, I would continue to advance the substantial U.S. efforts
    already underway to implement all four phases of the EPAA, as I have
    done as USD(AT&L) and as chair of the Missile Defense Executive Board.
        Question. In February 2010, the Defense Department issued its
    report on the first-ever comprehensive review of U.S. ballistic missile
    defense policy and strategy, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review
    (BMDR), as required by Congress. The BMDR established a number of
    policy priorities, including establishing defense against near-term
    regional missile threats as a top priority of missile defense plans,
    programs and capabilities. It also stated the policy of sustaining and
    enhancing the ability of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
    system to defend the Homeland against attack by a small number of long-
    range missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran, and of
    hedging against future uncertainties.
        Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities set forth
    in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review and, if confirmed, will you
    implement them?
        Answer. Yes, I support the conclusions of the 2010 BMDR and, if
    confirmed, would support continuing U.S. efforts already underway to
    implement the BMDR, as I have done as USD(AT&L).
        Question. Do you agree that our missile defense must be fiscally
    sustainable?
        Answer. Yes, I support the U.S. commitment, described in the 2010
    BMDR, to deploying capabilities that have been proven through extensive
    testing and assessment and that are affordable over the long term.
        Question. The two most recent flight tests of the GMD system failed
    to intercept their targets. The Director of the Missile Defense Agency
    (MDA) has formed a Failure Review Board to determine the root cause of
    the most recent failure and will devise a plan to correct it, including
    two flight tests to confirm the correction. Until the second flight
    test confirms the correction, probably sometime in late 2012, the
    Director of MDA has suspended production of the Exo-atmospheric Kill
    Vehicles (EKVs) of the type that failed last year's flight tests, in
    order to ensure that those EKVs do not contain a flaw that would need
    to be corrected later.
        Do you agree that it is prudent to verify that the flight test
    failure problem has been corrected before continuing production of the
    EKVs, and before building more Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) or
    deciding how many additional GBIs may be needed in the future?
        Answer. Verifying and correcting any problems with the EKVs prior
    to continuing production is prudent and supports the policy priority to
    ``fly before you buy'' in order to improve reliability, confidence, and
    cost control.
        Question. Do you believe that such verification should include a
    successful intercept flight test?
        Answer. A non-intercept test will provide a more rigorous
    evaluation of the kill vehicle flight envelope than could be achieved
    in an operational scenario flight test. A successful non-intercept
    flight test will sufficiently reduce risk to restart production of the
    EKV, in particular for long-lead items and items common to both EKV
    designs. Certification of the Capability Enhancement II (CE II) EKV
    will remain dependent on a successful intercept.
        Question. Do you support the continued modernization and
    sustainment of the GMD system?
        Answer. Yes. The United States is currently provided protection
    against the threat of ICBM attack from states like North Korea and
    Iran. It is important that we maintain this advantageous position by
    continuing to improve the GMD system.
        Question. The United States and NATO are seeking options to
    cooperate with Russia on missile defense. President Obama has announced
    that such cooperation would not limit U.S. or NATO missile defense
    capabilities.
        Do you agree that such cooperation could enhance the security of
    the United States, NATO, and Russia against common missile threats from
    nations such as Iran?
        Answer. Yes, cooperation with Russia could strengthen the
    effectiveness of U.S. and NATO missile defenses, as well as those of
    the Russian Federation. Effective ballistic missile defenses devalue
    Iran's ballistic missile arsenal by reducing its confidence that an
    attack would be successful.
        Question. Do you agree that, irrespective of Russian objections,
    the United States is committed to the continued development and
    deployment of U.S. missile defense systems, including qualitative and
    quantitative improvements to such systems?
        Answer. Yes.

                               READINESS FUNDING

        Question. After almost a decade of combat operations, each of the
    military services faces a rising bill for maintenance and repair. The
    Army has stated that reset funding will be needed for at least 2 to 3
    years beyond the end of overseas contingency operations. The Marine
    Corps leadership has acknowledged that a $10 billion bill awaits at the
    end of combat operations, but has requested only $250 million for reset
    this year. The Navy has identified a 1-year backlog of deferred ship
    and aircraft depot maintenance. The Air Force has requested funding for
    only 84 percent of needed aircraft repairs this year.
        What level of priority do you place on reset and reconstitution
    funding for the Military Services?
        Answer. I place a very high priority on reset and reconstitution
    funding for the Military Services. The current requests reflect the
    difficult challenge of balancing investments in deployed readiness,
    which is a top priority to support troops in the field, with
    investments in non-deployed readiness such as reset and reconstitution.
    It is imperative that Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding for
    reset and reconstitution continue to be enacted for 2 to 3 years after
    a drawdown of forces to fully reset the forces.
        Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address
    maintenance backlogs and ensure that the Military Departments request
    adequate funding for reset, reconstitution, and other maintenance
    requirements?
        Answer. I will work to ensure that the Department properly
    considers and balances maintenance and reset requirements with fiscal
    realities and future risk during Program and Budget development.

               PROTECTION OF U.S. FORCES AGAINST INTERNAL THREATS

        Question. On November 5, 2009, a gunman opened fire at the Soldier
    Readiness Center at Fort Hood, TX, killing 13 people and wounding or
    injuring 43 others. A DOD review of the attack released in January 2010
    concluded that the Department was poorly prepared to defend against
    internal threats, including radicalization among military personnel.
        What is your assessment of the lessons learned from the tragedy at
    Fort Hood?
        Answer. I understand that the Fort Hood review released by DOD in
    August 2010 included 79 recommendations on how to improve personnel
    policies, force protection, emergency response and mass casualty
    preparedness, and support to DOD healthcare providers. DOD has
    completed implementation of half of these recommendations.
        If confirmed, I would work to ensure that all the lessons learned
    and recommendations for improvement continue to be implemented and
    would work closely with Members of Congress to ensure that DOD is
    prepared to defend against internal threats, including radicalization
    among DOD's military and civilian personnel.
        Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to
    prevent and mitigate such threats in the future?
        Answer. The findings and recommendations of the Fort Hood Review
    are the foundation of the Department's current strategy. Leadership,
    clear guidance, and accountability are key. If confirmed, I would
    review this strategy and how it has been implemented, seek the advice
    of DOD's civilian and military leadership, and consult with Congress to
    ensure that the Department implements the most effective policies to
    prevent and mitigate such threats in the future.

                              RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

        Question. The Independent Review Related to the Tragedy at Fort
    Hood observed that ``DOD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks
    the clarity necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate
    religious practices from those that might indicate a potential for
    violence or self-radicalization.'' Recommendation 2.7 of the Final
    Recommendations urged the Department to update policy to clarify
    guidelines for religious accommodation and Recommendation 2.8 urged the
    Department to task the Defense Science Board to ``undertake a multi-
    disciplinary study to identify behavioral indicators of violence and
    self-radicalization . . . ''
        What is your view of these recommendations?
        Answer. The Fort Hood Follow-on Review prepared an implementation
    plan in response to both of these recommendations. If confirmed, I
    would review that report and the progress that has been made to ensure
    DOD policies, programs, and procedures appropriately accommodate the
    free exercise of religion.
        Question. Has DOD updated its policy to clarify guidelines for
    religious accommodation? If so, what is the revised policy?
        Answer. It is my understanding that DOD is updating its policy to
    clarify guidelines for religious accommodation. If confirmed, I would
    review the proposed update to ensure accommodation of servicemembers
    whenever possible without compromising accomplishment of mission, unit
    cohesion, and personnel safety.
        Question. What is your understanding of current policies and
    programs of DOD regarding religious practices in the military?
        Answer. The military places a high value on the rights of
    servicemembers to observe their respective religious faiths and this is
    reflected in our policies and programs.
        Question. In your view, do these policies appropriately accommodate
    the free exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on
    those who have different beliefs, including no religious belief?
        Answer. I understand each religious ministry professional has
    committed to functioning in a pluralistic environment and to
    supporting, both directly and indirectly, the free exercise of religion
    by all members of the Military Services, their family members, and
    other persons authorized to be served by the military chaplaincies. If
    confirmed, I will review the relevant policies, seek the advice of the
    military leadership, and consult with Congress to ensure that the
    Department appropriately accommodates the free exercise of religion.
        Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices
    regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of
    formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a
    chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious
    beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs,
    including no religious beliefs?
        Answer. Current policy appears to strike the proper balance by
    allowing chaplains to voluntarily participate, or not participate, in
    settings which conflict with their faith traditions, while also
    ensuring chaplains performing in an interfaith setting, such as an
    official dinner or interfaith memorial service, are mindful of the
    requirement for inclusiveness. If confirmed, I would monitor these
    policies and practices.
        Question. If confirmed, will you work to ensure that a scientific
    fact-based approach to understanding radicalization will drive the
    Department's relevant policies on this topic?
        Answer. DOD has commissioned a Defense Science Board study on
    violent radicalization and plans to commission two additional clinical
    studies to identify any potential indicators of violent behavior in
    military personnel. The results of these studies will inform DOD's
    policies and programs on radicalization. If confirmed, I intend to
    ensure that DOD continues to rely on a scientific, fact-based approach
    to countering radicalization and protecting our force.
        Question. Current policy in the Department gives discretion to
    military leaders to decide whether requests to waive uniform and
    appearance standards should be granted based on religious beliefs. The
    Department has submitted a legislative proposal that would clearly
    exempt the armed services from the requirements of the Religious
    Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).
        In your view, do DOD policies appropriately accommodate religious
    practices that require adherents to wear particular articles of faith?
        Answer. An important and delicate balance must be struck between
    accommodating religious practices that require adherents to wear
    particular articles of faith and maintaining the military's uniform
    grooming and appearance standards. If confirmed, I will work with the
    leaders of the Military Services to achieve an appropriate balance
    between granting religious accommodations and maintaining the
    military's uniform grooming and appearance standards.
        Question. Do you believe that the Armed Forces should be exempted
    from RFRA? If so, why?
        Answer. The Armed Forces have long relied on uniformity of dress
    and appearance to create a common identity, provide visual reminders of
    shared experiences, reinforce a sense of tradition, and foster pride.
    These factors are understood by the military, and historically by the
    courts, as critical to development of cohesion and esprit de corps, and
    thus to mission accomplishment. In section 774 of title 10 of the U.S.
    Code, Congress established a standard that balances religious
    imperatives with the military's dress and appearance requirements.
        I understand the RFRA establishes a ``very high'' standard for the
    executive branch, including the military, to use when denying any
    request for religious accommodation, which is why the Services have
    asked for an exemption.
        At this time, I do not have an informed view about the specific
    legislative proposal but if confirmed, I would consider this issue
    carefully.

                          MUSLIMS IN THE U.S. MILITARY

        Question. Are you concerned that the attack at Fort Hood could lead
    to harassment or even violence against Muslims in the military?
        Answer. The attack at Fort Hood was a tragedy for all involved. It
    is possible that the attack could spur retaliation in the form of
    harassment and violence; it is therefore important that military
    leaders and supervisors take precautions to prevent such occurrences
    and maintain good order and discipline in the force. No form of
    harassment can be tolerated.
        Question. If confirmed, what strategies would you advocate to
    address the potential for harassment or violence against Muslims in the
    U.S. military?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to advocate for open
    communications in the workplace, decisive action by our military
    leaders and supervisors, and command emphasis on the military standard
    for maintaining good order and discipline. If confirmed, I would also
    review the effectiveness of these feedback systems and take measures to
    improve them, as appropriate.

                     SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

        Question. The Department has in recent years developed
    comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and
    response to incidents of sexual assault, including providing
    appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault. However,
    incidents of sexual misconduct involving military personnel in combat
    areas of operation and at home stations are still being reported.
        Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures,
    particularly those on confidential or restricted reporting, to be
    effective?
        Answer. Sexual assault has no place in DOD. The Department's zero
    tolerance policy on sexual assault is the right policy. The Chairman of
    the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Secretaries, and the Service
    Chiefs, are continuously and directly engaged in emphasizing the
    importance of responding to sexual assault. It is my understanding that
    according to experts, sexual assaults in both civilian and military
    society are underreported--meaning that the number of sexual assaults
    estimated by anonymous surveys vastly outnumbers reports to police. In
    2005, the Department put in place new policies to prevent sexual
    assault and increase the number of reports received by DOD authorities.
    I understand these new policies have had positive results. However,
    there is still work to do to integrate and continue to improve our
    efforts across DOD and the Services. If confirmed, I will ensure that
    DOD continues to be committed to addressing sexual assault in this
    comprehensive manner.
        Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in
    which the restricted reporting procedure has been put into operation?
        Answer. I am not aware of any specific problems in the
    implementation of the restricted reporting option. It is my
    understanding that restricted reporting allows victims who wish to
    remain anonymous to come forward and obtain the support they need
    following an assault without being identified. I believe that the most
    important results of this reporting procedure should be that victims
    are coming forward so they can receive the care and support they need.
    I understand that the number of victims choosing a restricted report
    has increased by about 7 percent each year since 2007, and in fiscal
    year 2010, restricted reports accounted for about a quarter of all
    sexual assault reports made to the Department. Experts believe these
    are victims who would never have come forward had there not been a
    confidential reporting option. If confirmed, I would review DOD's
    program to gain a clear picture of progress and areas for future
    improvement in sexual assault reporting procedures.
        Question. What is your view of the steps the Services have taken to
    prevent and respond to sexual assaults in combat zones, including
    assaults against contractor personnel?
        Answer. Sexual assault against anyone is unacceptable in any
    location. I do not have enough information to make a comprehensive
    assessment at this time, but it is my understanding that if any of our
    deployed servicemembers, civilians, or contractors is assaulted, he or
    she will receive appropriate and responsive support and care.
        I understand DOD policy mandates a 24-7 response to sexual assault,
    regardless of location. In addition, I understand that DOD personnel
    travelling to combat zones receive pre-deployment training on
    prevention and response procedures in country. Furthermore, it is my
    understanding that the Department takes action against individuals who
    perpetrate sexual assault whenever it has the jurisdiction and
    sufficient evidence to do so. If confirmed, I would ensure that DOD
    continues to address sexual assault comprehensively across the Services
    in all locations. There must be no tolerance in DOD for sexual assault
    in any location, including any of our personnel or others who serve
    with our personnel while deployed in a combat zone.
        Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
    resources the Services have in place to investigate and respond to
    allegations of sexual assault?
        Answer. DOD is committed to addressing sexual assault in a
    comprehensive, integrated and uniform manner. As stated above, all of
    the Services have been directed to establish guidelines for a 24-hour,
    7 days-a-week sexual assault response capability for all locations,
    including deployed areas. I also understand that the Services recently
    invested $1.8 million to improve prosecutor training and resourcing,
    and that the three military criminal investigative organizations have
    committed to adding over 100 specially trained agents, dedicated to
    sexual assault investigations. While I cannot make a specific
    assessment at this time, if I am confirmed, I would make it a priority
    to evaluate the adequacy and efficacy of training and resources
    allocated to the Services for sexual assault investigation.
        Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of the
    Services to hold assailants accountable for their acts?
        Answer. DOD's policies emphasize the commander's role in effective
    response to sexual assault. DOD has taken action to provide training
    for commanders and to ensure adequate training and resources for
    prosecutors and investigators. I have been told that DOD policy
    requires commanders to forward all unrestricted reports to criminal
    investigators. I also understand that DOD's policies seek to build the
    victim's confidence, so that the victim feels able to come forward with
    an unrestricted report and to assist in the investigation, which is
    essential to achieving the goal of accountability. If confirmed, I will
    ensure that accountability, supported by a foundation of victim care,
    remains an important focus of DOD's sexual assault prevention and
    response efforts.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure senior
    level direction and oversight of efforts to prevent and respond to
    sexual assaults?
        Answer. I believe that sexual assault has no place in the Armed
    Forces. Recently, the Department has assigned a General Officer with
    operational experience as the Director of the Sexual Assault Prevention
    and Response Program office. If confirmed, I would ensure that sexual
    assault prevention and response continues to be a priority for the
    Department, and would work closely with the Secretaries of the Military
    Departments and the Chiefs of the Military Services to ensure that DOD
    maintains senior leadership focus on this issue.
         mobilization and demobilization of national guard and reserves
        Question. In support of the current ongoing conflicts, the National
    Guard and Reserves have experienced their largest and most sustained
    employment since World War II. Numerous problems have arisen over time
    in the planning and procedures for mobilization and demobilization,
    e.g., inadequate health screening and medical response to service-
    connected injuries or illnesses, antiquated pay systems, limited
    transition assistance programs upon demobilization, and inefficient
    policies regarding members of the Individual Ready Reserve. Reserve
    Force management policies and systems have been characterized in the
    past as ``inefficient and rigid'' and readiness levels have been
    adversely affected by equipment shortages, cross-leveling, and reset
    policies.
        What is your assessment of advances made in improving Reserve
    component mobilization and demobilization procedures, and in what areas
    do problems remain?
        Answer. I understand that many changes have been made to policies
    governing the utilization of the Reserve components, including: (1)
    providing for a minimum notification period of 180 days prior to
    mobilization; (2) establishing a dwell ratio goal of no more than 1
    year mobilized for every 5 years not mobilized; and (3) limiting the
    involuntary activation of Guard members and reservists to 1 year.
        These changes have improved effectiveness and morale by providing a
    predictable cycle of Active Duty and alert notification well in advance
    of activation, benefitting families, employers, servicemembers.
        A key problem is the lack of an integrated pay and personnel system
    to support Guard and Reserve personnel as they transition between
    various duty statuses. This is compounded by the fact that there
    remains over 30 different duty statuses for Guard and Reserve
    personnel. This diversity of duty statuses is cumbersome and results in
    mobilization and demobilization delays.
        Question. What do you consider to be the most significant enduring
    changes to the enabling of an operational Reserve aimed at ensuring
    Reserve component readiness for future mobilization requirements?
        Answer. I believe the most significant change to the Operational
    Reserve is its acceptance and inclusion as a full partner in the Total
    Force. The use of the Guard and Reserve over the past 10 years has
    proven their exceptional value to the Nation. Their equipping,
    modernization, and readiness are essentially managed in the same manner
    as the Active component. They are ready, capable, and expect to be used
    on a predictable and regular basis.
        Going forward, the Department must maintain Reserve component
    readiness, set expectations with members, families and employers, and
    seek ways to use the Guard and Reserve to the best advantage of the
    Nation. Budgeting for the Operational Reserve is critical. There must
    be a funding stream in the baseline budget that is carried through the
    future years to ensure the Reserve components remain trained, ready,
    and available to meet ongoing and emerging operational requirements. I
    believe the future environment will demand we use all components of the
    Total Force--Active, Guard, Reserve, DOD civilians, and contractors in
    the most efficient and effective manner possible.
        Question. Do you see a need to modify current statutory authorities
    for the mobilization of members of the National Guard and Reserves or
    to further enhance their ability to perform various national security
    missions?
        Answer. I believe the Department needs to be able to access the
    Reserve components on a predictable and regular basis. Current
    mobilization authorities have served us well but do not account for the
    continued use of the Guard and Reserve as full partners in the Total
    Force. I support current proposals before Congress to expand section
    12304 of title 10 to increase authorities to fully use the Reserve
    components as a rotational, operational force to augment the Active
    component forces. These proposals will enhance their ability to execute
    planned missions in support of the President's national security
    strategy.

                  MEDICAL AND DENTAL READINESS OF THE RESERVES

        Question. Medical and dental readiness of Reserve component
    personnel has been an issue of significant concern to the committee,
    and shortfalls that have been identified have indicated a need for
    improved policy oversight and accountability.
        If confirmed, how would you seek to clarify and coordinate
    reporting on the medical and dental readiness of the Reserves?
        Answer. In order to fully assess the capability of the Reserve
    components, it is critical to measure and report medical and dental
    readiness in a standardized manner. It is my understanding that over
    the past several years, small, but steady improvements have been made
    across the Services, but there is more work to do in confirming the
    medical and dental readiness of the entire Reserve Force.
        Medical and dental readiness is tracked through standardized
    calculations each quarter. Currently, the medical readiness achievement
    goal is 75 percent and DOD is at 63 percent. The dental readiness
    achievement goal is 85 percent, and DOD has met that goal.
        While some progress has been achieved, the medical and dental
    readiness of the Reserve components must remain a priority.
        Question. How would you improve upon the Department's ability to
    maintain a healthy and fit Reserve component?
        Answer. It is my understanding that DOD continues to pursue new and
    improved opportunities to provide flexible options for the Guard and
    Reserve to improve their overall readiness. Producing and maintaining a
    healthy and fit Reserve component requires more than access to health
    care--it also requires command emphasis and individual accountability.
        Recently, the Army Reserve approved and funded two medical/dental
    readiness days per soldier starting in fiscal year 2010.
        Resiliency is a key aspect of Yellow Ribbon Reintegration events.
    At pre-, during-, and post-deployment events, Guard and Reserve members
    and families are given tools to help build resiliency and coping
    skills. These tools encourage open dialogue with families and encourage
    members to maintain mental and physical fitness during deployment
    cycles.
        If confirmed, I would advance health and safety promotion and
    injury/illness prevention policy initiatives to address readiness
    requirements developed from evidence-based research.

                                   DWELL TIME

        Question. While dwell time is improving as our forces draw down in
    Iraq, many active duty military members are still not experiencing the
    dwell time goal of 2 years at home for every year deployed.
        In your view, when will the Active component dwell time goal be
    met?
        Answer. The Active component of the Navy, Air Force and Marine
    Corps, on average, are already meeting or exceeding the Department's
    dwell time goal of 1:2. I understand that the Army is now averaging
    better than a 1:1 dwell ratio, with some combat elements meeting the
    goal of 1:2. As we execute our drawdown plans for Afghanistan, these
    dwell times will continue to improve. Recently, the Army has shortened
    deployments for their Active component units to 9 months. These shorter
    deployments will reduce the stress on soldiers and their families. It
    is estimated that Army units will meet dwell time goals within the next
    2 years as the drawdown progress.
        Question. When will dwell time objectives be met for the Reserve
    components?
        Answer. The goal for the Guard and Reserve is 1 year of Active Duty
    for every 5 years at home (1:5). The goal for the Active Forces is 1:2.
    My understanding is that the Reserve components being mobilized are
    currently running closer to the active goal. Active and Reserve
    component dwell and current rotation models are linked and can only
    improve together.

                            ACTIVE-DUTY END STRENGTH

        Question. Secretary Gates announced this year that the Army would
    reduce its end strength by 22,000 through fiscal year 2013, including
    7,400 in fiscal year 2012. This end strength was part of the temporary
    increase authorized in 2009 and was intended to enable the Army to
    cease relying on ``stoploss'' and to make up for a growing population
    of non-deployable soldiers. Beginning in fiscal year 2015, depending on
    conditions on the ground, the Army and Marine Corps plan to reduce
    their permanent end strength and force structure by 27,000 soldiers and
    at least 15,000 marines, respectively.
        Do you agree with this Active Duty end strength reduction plan,
    especially given the fact that the population of non-deployables is
    growing?
        Answer. I am familiar with the Army's and Marine Corps' projected
    personnel reductions, and if confirmed, I would review their respective
    plans to make these reductions. Based on what we know today, and the
    assumptions that have been made, I believe that the troop reductions
    previously announced by Secretary Gates represent a prudent balance
    between meeting operational mission requirements and ensuring the funds
    are available for recapitalization. Both are critical to future
    readiness.
        Question. What is your view of how these planned end strength
    reductions will affect dwell time ratios?
        Answer. The Army and Marine Corps personnel strength reductions,
    starting in fiscal year 2012 for the Army, are based on the assumption
    of a future draw-down in Afghanistan. These are significant reductions,
    but if the Afghanistan force draw-down stays on track, the dwell ratio
    goal of 1:2 for Active personnel should be achieved.
        Question. What effect would inability to meet dwell time objectives
    have on your decision to implement the planned end strength reductions?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would take into consideration our ability
    to meet strategic mission objectives and dwell time objectives prior to
    implementing the planned Army and Marine Corps strength reductions.
        Question. In your view, can the Army accelerate to 2012 more of its
    planned reduction in its temporary over-strength without an adverse
    impact on national security?
        Answer. The Army is developing force reduction plans that consider
    ongoing and projected future operational requirements. Given our
    current commitments around the globe and dwell time ratios,
    accelerating reductions may not be prudent at this time. The Department
    is committed to working closely with the Army to ensure they achieve
    the appropriate personnel strength level and also retain the ability to
    meet national security objectives.
        Question. What would be the effect on dwell time of accelerating
    the Army's force reduction plan?
        Answer. The effect on dwell time would depend on the Army's
    deployment requirements coupled with the pace of its troop reductions.
    I would anticipate the Army might not be able to fully achieve the
    dwell ratio goal of 1:2 during the draw-down phase.
        Question. What are the assumptions regarding ``conditions on the
    ground'' that will allow for the planned reductions beginning in 2015
    to occur on time?
        Answer. We must balance our national security requirements and
    continue to have a ready, flexible, and capable force. The reductions
    in end strength for the Army and Marine Corps beginning in 2015 should
    be predicated on the assumption that we have a much smaller presence in
    Afghanistan at the end of 2014 than we do today. I also would consider
    our progress towards the established security objectives and I would
    solicit the advice of DOD's senior military and civilian leaders prior
    to making any recommendations to the Secretary.
        Question. The Services have requested congressional authorization
    of force management tools to avoid exceeding end strength limits and
    save money.
        In your view, what tools do the Department and Services need to get
    down to authorized strengths in the future, and which of these require
    congressional authorization?
        Answer. Several authorities used during previous force reductions
    have either expired or will be expiring soon, to include Enhanced
    Selective Early Retirement Boards, Reduction in Force, and Voluntary
    Separation Pay. The Department is seeking to renew or extend these
    authorities, and in some cases is requesting new legislation, in order
    to properly size and shape the force. The Department's policy is to
    make maximum use of voluntary authorities. Further, a balanced approach
    must be used to ensure to the greatest extent possible that those
    servicemembers who leave do not possess skills needed over the short
    term.

                              RECRUITING STANDARDS

        Question. Recruiting highly qualified individuals for military
    service during wartime in a cost-constrained environment presents
    unique challenges. The Army has been criticized in past years for
    relaxing enlistment standards in tough recruiting environments with
    respect to factors such as age, intelligence, weight and physical
    fitness standards, citizenship status, tattoos, and past criminal
    misconduct. On the other hand, as the Deputy Chief of Staff of the
    Army, G-1, recently testified, less than 25 percent of all 17-24 year
    olds are eligible to enlist, primarily due to physical and educational
    requirements.
        What is your assessment of the adequacy of current standards
    regarding qualifications for enlistment in the Armed Forces?
        Answer. The current enlistment qualification standards are well-
    defined and have stood the test of time. They are driven by the need to
    provide the Services with men and women who are prepared to adapt to
    the rigors of military life and meet performance requirements. To that
    end, the Services carefully screen applicants, who come from all walks
    of life. The Department has two key indicators of recruit quality: (1)
    traditional high school diploma graduates; and (2) above average scores
    on the enlistment aptitude screen (the Armed Services Vocational
    Aptitude Battery or ASVAB). The traditional high school diploma is the
    best single predictor of attrition, while the ASVAB is a robust
    predictor of training and job performance.
        Since it is more costly to recruit such ``high quality'' recruits,
    the Department has used a cost-performance tradeoff model, developed
    under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences, to set
    recruiting and enlistment goals. The recruit quality enlistment goals
    are 90 percent traditional high school diploma graduates and 60 percent
    scoring above average on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT),
    the math and verbal components of the ASVAB.
        When recruitment is not difficult, when the supply exceeds demand,
    as in the current environment, Services tend to recruit above the
    goals. When recruitment is more challenging, Services adjust and will
    recruit closer to the goals. During some particularly difficult
    periods, such as 2005, the Army developed special programs to reduce
    the attrition risk related to the enlistment of more individuals who
    did not possess traditional high school diplomas.
        Question. In your view, is there any way to increase the pool of
    eligible enlistees without sacrificing quality?
        Answer. Yes, I believe there are ways to increase the pool of
    eligible enlistees without sacrificing quality. The Services
    continually review medical standards, for example, to ensure they are
    relevant and in the best interest of the military, as well as the
    individual. For example, the Assessment of Recruit Motivation and
    Strength (ARMS) Study provided evidence that recruits who are over body
    fat standards but could pass certain tailored physical tests would have
    attrition rates similar to weight qualified recruits. Since
    implementation of the ARMS program, close to 12,000 soldiers have
    entered the Army with an ARMS waiver across the three components. The
    Services are also constantly exploring ways to improve other screening
    tools - especially with respect to our ability to predict attrition.
    Recent findings suggest the Services may be able to augment their
    screening procedures by incorporating other measures, such as
    personality, to identify applicants who are likely to adapt well to the
    military. If confirmed, I would work with the Services to continually
    find new and better ways to recruit and screen applicants.
        Question. In your view, are there any enlistment requirements or
    standards that are overly restrictive or which do not directly
    correlate to successful military service?
        Answer. I am not aware that the Department's military enlistment
    standards are overly restrictive. The Services employ fitness,
    adaptability, and aptitude standards that correlate to the physical,
    disciplined, regulated lifestyle and cognitive demands needed to
    succeed in the Armed Forces.
        Question. Do you believe that current policies defining three tiers
    of high school diploma credentials, aimed at minimizing attrition
    during the initial enlistment term, should be retained?
        Answer. My understanding is the Services track the attrition rates
    of military recruits by a variety of credential types, and traditional
    high school diploma graduates have lower rates of attrition than any
    other type of credential holder for the first term (3 years) of
    service. While the 36-month attrition rate for traditional high school
    diploma graduates is 28 percent, the attrition rates for other types of
    credential holders ranges from 38-45 percent. That is a meaningful
    difference, because it costs the Services approximately $45,000 to
    replace each individual who fails to successfully complete his/her term
    of service. Given the track record of the current policy, I believe it
    should be retained and augmented as needed to improve the accuracy of
    our ability to predict the attrition risk of individual recruits.

                             WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

        Question. The Navy has opened service on submarines to women, the
    Marine Corps recently expanded service opportunities for women in
    intelligence specialties, and the Army is reviewing its assignment
    policy for female soldiers. The issue of the appropriate role of women
    in the Armed Forces remains a matter of interest to Congress and the
    American public.
        Do you believe additional specialties should be opened up for
    service by women?
        Answer. As the nature of the combat environment has evolved, the
    roles of women in the military have expanded, and will continue to do
    so. It is my understanding that the Department believes it has
    sufficient flexibility under current law to make appropriate assignment
    policy for women. The Department will continue to monitor combat needs,
    and if the Services recommend expanding combat roles for women, the
    Department will notify Congress accordingly as required by statute (10
    U.S.C. Sec. 652 and/or Sec. 6035). Any decision regarding opening
    additional specialties for service by women should be based on our
    obligation to maintain a high state of mission readiness of our All-
    Volunteer Force.
        Question. Do you believe any changes are needed in the assignment
    policies regarding women in the Armed Forces?
        Answer. The USD(P&R) is conducting a Women in Services Restrictions
    review of the direct ground combat assignment policy in coordination
    with the Military Departments and the Joint Staff. This report on
    review findings will be provided to congressional defense committees by
    October 2011. If confirmed, I would examine proposed policy changes as
    a result of this review and work with Congress to implement them.

                          RISING COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE

        Question. In testimony presented to Congress in February 2009, the
    Assistant Director of the Congressional Budget Office asserted that
    ``medical funding accounts for more than one-third of the growth
    projected for operations and support funding between 2009 and 2026.''
    In April 2009, then-Secretary of Defense Gates told an audience at
    Maxwell Air Force Base that ``health care is eating the Department
    alive.'' The administration has proposed health care efficiencies to
    save nearly $8.0 billion through 2016.
        Do you agree with the proposed health care efficiencies?
        Answer. Yes, I believe the proposed efficiencies are modest,
    sensible efforts to control the Department's health care costs while
    ensuring superior levels of care are maintained.
        Question. What reforms in infrastructure, benefits, or benefit
    management, if any, do you think should be examined in order to control
    the costs of military health care?
        Answer. While the reform proposals included in the fiscal year 2012
    President's budget are a significant first step, I think it is
    important, especially in view of the fiscal challenges we face, that we
    continue to find additional opportunities to control the costs of
    health care. At the same time, we must preserve our ability to provide
    the best health care possible to our servicemembers and their families,
    and especially to our wounded warriors.
        Question. What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising
    medical costs on future DOD plans?
        Answer. I understand that even with the estimated savings from the
    health care efficiencies proposed in the fiscal year 2012 budget, the
    cost of the Military Health System continues to increase as a
    percentage of the DOD budget and will exceed 10 percent of the budget
    in just a few years. In this fiscal environment, we must make smart
    choices that permit us to maintain a balance between personnel benefits
    and funding for equipment and readiness. If confirmed, I would ensure
    that DOD provides quality care, and it does so in a way that provides
    the best value for our servicemembers and their families, as well as
    the American taxpayer.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you initiate or
    recommend to mitigate the effect of such costs on the DOD top-line?
        Answer. While I am not in a position to recommend actions at this
    time, if confirmed, I would work closely with the senior military and
    departmental leadership and the health care community to examine every
    opportunity to manage cost growth while ensuring that military
    beneficiaries are provided the highest quality care possible.

                        PERSONNEL AND ENTITLEMENT COSTS

        Question. In addition to health care costs, personnel and related
    entitlement spending continue to grow and comprise an ever increasing
    portion of the DOD budget. If personnel costs are not curtailed, the
    Nation may find itself with a military that is both too small and
    insufficiently equipped. Both former Secretary Gates and Secretary
    Panetta have called for a comprehensive review of military compensation
    and the retirement benefit.
        How might the retirement benefit, including the provision of health
    care to retirees, be modernized to reflect the needs of a new
    generation of recruits, ensure greater equity between those who serve a
    career and those who don't, while easing the long-term cost to the
    Government?
        Answer. We must maintain a strong, vibrant military force structure
    that will serve us well into the future while also looking at prudent
    ways to control personnel and entitlement spending. If confirmed, I
    would look forward to reviewing proposals that seek to balance these
    objectives.
        Question. What changes should be made to the military compensation
    system, including the one-size-fits-all approach to basic pay, separate
    allowances for housing and subsistence, and the tax treatment of
    various compensation components, to ensure that the compensation
    package is fair, economical, and sufficient to field a high quality
    All-Volunteer Force?
        Answer. I believe we need a military compensation system that
    continues to attract and support the highest quality personnel to
    sustain the All-Volunteer Force while also containing costs. I share
    Secretary Panetta's view that it is appropriate to conduct a
    comprehensive review of the military's pay and benefits structure to
    determine where costs can be contained, while ensuring that we are able
    to attract and support our men and women in uniform and their families
    in a wide variety of situations.

                 DEPENDENT CARE AND FLEXIBLE SPENDING ACCOUNTS

        Question. The 10th QRMC recommended providing dependent care and
    flexible spending benefits to active-duty servicemembers. Providing
    these benefits would seem consistent with the initiatives of First Lady
    Michelle Obama and Dr. Jill Biden on behalf of military families. It
    would appear that no new legislative authority is needed for the
    Department to provide these benefits to servicemembers and their
    families.
        If confirmed, would you extend these benefits to the Active Duty
    servicemembers and their families?
        Answer. I support the goals provided for in Dependent Care and
    Flexible Spending Accounts. I believe that we need to continue to
    provide a total compensation package to recruit and retain the military
    servicemembers the Department needs to achieve its worldwide missions
    while at the same time taking care of military families. If confirmed,
    I would review how Dependent Care and Flexible Spending Accounts could
    be integrated into the military's total compensation package while
    recognizing the difficulties of the current fiscal environment.

                    SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT FOR WOUNDED WARRIORS

        Question. Servicemembers who are wounded or injured performing
    duties in Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn
    deserve the highest priority from their Service for support services,
    healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to
    duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and
    continuing support beyond retirement or discharge. Yet, as the
    revelations at Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) in 2007
    illustrated, the Services were not prepared to meet the needs of
    significant numbers of returning wounded servicemembers. Despite the
    enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis, many challenges remain,
    including a growing population of soldiers awaiting disability
    evaluation.
        What is your assessment of the progress made to date by DOD and the
    Services to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously
    ill and injured servicemembers and their families?
        Answer. The Walter Reed revelations were a sobering moment for both
    Departments. The progress, focus, and improvements in this area have
    been substantial since 2007. In the 2\1/2\ years that I have been
    visiting wounded warriors and their families, I have seen advances in
    the knowledge and understanding of the prevention and treatment of
    wounds and their effects on individuals and families. But I believe
    there is more to learn, and more to be done. If confirmed, this would
    be a continuing priority of mine.
        Question. What are the strengths upon which continued progress
    should be based?
        Answer. The high priority the Department has placed on caring for
    our wounded warriors and their families is one such strength. The
    sustained focus and assessment of the needs of the wounded, ill, and
    injured servicemembers in areas such as traumatic brain injuries,
    stress, and amputation allows the Department to continue its progress
    in caring for these members.
        It is also important that the Department take a collaborative
    approach to caring for our wounded warriors with the Department of
    Veterans Affairs, the Department of Labor, the Office of Personnel
    Management, and other stakeholders to ensure that the needs of
    servicemembers and their families are met across the Federal
    Government.
        Question. What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?
        Answer. The Department should continue to identify opportunities
    for capturing best practices and implementing improvements by using a
    proactive assessment and evaluation process that corrects weaknesses in
    a cost-efficient and timely manner. Additionally, the Department needs
    to be proactive in identifying post-traumatic stress in our Reserve
    components who, following redeployment, return home and are removed
    from a military environment and chain-of-command.
        There are also opportunities to try new programs in the areas of
    employment, credentialing, licensing, and education and training for
    our wounded that can be explored.
        Lastly, a frequent complaint of our servicemembers is that services
    are simply not delivered in a timely manner. Our application of any
    program, whether aimed at transition services or care, needs to be
    timely in order to be effective.
        Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and
    resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded
    servicemembers and their families, and to monitor their progress in
    returning to duty or to civilian life?
        Answer. The Department needs to regularly evaluate and ensure that
    current programs and policies are current, helpful, and productive.
    Outcome assessments need to be conducted with adjustments made, as
    needed, to ensure necessary resources are in place to properly take
    care of our recovering wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers and
    their families.
        We must also continue to approach this from an interagency
    perspective. There are many agencies that want to contribute and help.
    The Department must ensure resources are fielded in a harmonious and
    productive manner.
        In addition, in August 2011, the President directed DOD and the
    Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to develop reforms to ensure that
    every servicemember receives the training, credentials, and education
    they need to transition to the civilian workforce or to pursue higher
    education.
        This DOD and VA-led task force will be an important part of our
    ongoing efforts to better assist our servicemembers as they return to
    civilian life.
        Question. Studies conducted as a result of the revelations at WRAMC
    pointed to the need to reform the disability evaluation system (DES). A
    DES pilot program and an Integrated DES program have been established
    to improve processing of servicemembers.
        What is your assessment of the need to further streamline and
    improve the Integrated DES?
        Answer. The revised and improved Integrated Disability Evaluation
    System (IDES) developed by DOD and VA is an improvement over the legacy
    system. It is fairer and faster than the system it replaced. It has
    also eliminated the gap in pay and benefits that always happened under
    the old system that was executed by the two Departments. The chief
    problem with the IDES is that it takes too long.
        Question. If confirmed, how will you address any need for change,
    particularly the Army's growing population of non-deployable soldiers
    and their need for expedited disability evaluation?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would assist the Secretary in executing the
    fielding of the IDES and in concurrently fielding enhancements to IDES.
    These enhancements would ensure that timeliness is improved and best
    practices shared. In any area where it is determined that legislative
    action could help improve this process, I would follow up with
    Congress.

                 SUICIDE PREVENTION AND MENTAL HEALTH RESOURCES

        Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the Services has
    increased in recent years. The Army released a report in June 2010 that
    analyzed the causes of its growing suicide rate and examined disturbing
    trends in drug use, disciplinary offenses, and high risk behaviors. In
    addition, studies conducted by the Army of soldiers and marines in
    theater are showing declines in individual morale and increases in
    mental health strain, especially among those who have experienced
    multiple deployments.
        In your view, what role should DOD play in shaping policies to help
    prevent suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase the
    resiliency of all servicemembers and their families, including members
    of the Reserve components?
        Answer. Every suicide among members of the Armed Forces is tragic
    and the Department has a responsibility to address the factors that
    contribute to suicidal behavior among our military men and women,
    whether they are deployed, at a military installation, or in their home
    communities. All of the Services have established robust suicide
    prevention programs, and senior leaders across the Department are
    engaged to address this very important issue. In addition to
    identifying and reducing risk factors primarily through prevention, we
    have undertaken multiple initiatives to increase protective factors.
    The Services have made significant efforts to build resilience among
    our servicemembers to enhance the key protective factors that enhance
    performance and increase the overall readiness of the force. I
    understand that the Final Report of the Department of Defense Task
    Force on the Prevention of Suicide by Members of the Armed Forces is
    being used as a vehicle to review all Departmental policies and
    procedures related to suicide prevention. The Department's
    Implementation Plan based on these recommendations is undergoing final
    review and will be delivered to Congress soon. If confirmed, I would
    ensure that the Department stays focused on this very important issue
    and continues to improve suicide prevention policies and processes.
        Question. What is your understanding of the action that OSD and the
    Army are taking in response to the June 2010 Army report, and the data
    in Chapter 3 (``The Lost Art of Leadership in Garrison'') in
    particular?
        Answer. I am fully aware that sustaining a force steadily engaged
    in combat for over a decade has unexpected challenges. Unfortunately,
    some of those challenges include a rise in ``high risk'' behaviors and
    suicides. The Army's Health Promotion and Risk Reduction Task Force was
    created to identify program and policy changes needed to respond to
    issues identified in this and other related reports. I understand that
    the Task Force is in the process of implementing 417 actionable tasks
    to rapidly improve Army health promotion, risk reduction and protection
    policies, programs and processes and is making significant progress. If
    confirmed, I would work to ensure that the Department brings these
    tasks to completion and that the Services share lessons learned to
    jointly address these risk factors.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that
    sufficient mental health resources are available to servicemembers in
    theater, and to the servicemembers and their families upon return to
    home station?
        Answer. Ensuring that our servicemembers and their families have
    sufficient access to the behavioral health resources that they need is
    critical to the wellness of our total force. The Department has been
    working to determine workforce requirements for behavioral health
    professionals, and how best to utilize all of the medical, educational,
    and counseling resources available. I understand that there has been
    significant progress in this area, but there is still room for
    improvement. If confirmed, I would monitor how well we are meeting
    these goals by assessing current utilization rates and further
    determining ways in which we can leverage more resources for our
    servicemembers and their families.

                            MILITARY QUALITY OF LIFE

        Question. In January 2009, the Department published its second
    Quadrennial Quality of Life Review, which focused on the importance of
    key quality of life factors for military families, such as family
    support, child care, education, health care, and morale, welfare, and
    recreation services.
        How do you perceive the relationship between military recruitment
    and retention and quality of life improvements and your own top
    priorities for the Armed Forces?
        Answer. I know that quality of life factors, such as the ones
    mentioned above, contribute significantly to recruiting and retention.
    Surveys and studies have shown that a servicemember's satisfaction with
    various aspects of military life, as well as the family's experience
    and support for staying in the military, have a strong influence on the
    member's decision to reenlist. One good example that influences
    retention is the Department's military child development program. This
    program provides quality, affordable child care for over 200,000
    children every day, permitting servicemembers and their working spouses
    to be more committed and successful in their respective careers. The
    degree of success in meeting those needs can have a strong influence on
    servicemembers' decisions to continue their military careers. If
    confirmed, I would monitor how effectively DOD programs, in conjunction
    with community efforts, not only meet the needs of servicemembers and
    their families but also contribute to the readiness of the Total Force.
    Taking care of servicemembers and their families is one of the
    Department's top priorities.
        Question. If confirmed, what further enhancements to military
    qualify of life would you consider a priority, and how do you envision
    working with the Services, combatant commanders, family advocacy
    groups, and Congress to achieve them?
        Answer. DOD is undertaking a number of initiatives to improve the
    well-being of the Total Force. These initiatives include expanding
    child care services, modernizing the DOD schools, improving the DOD
    Tuition Assistance program, new spouse education and career
    opportunities, and expanding counseling support for geographically-
    dispersed military members and their families. If confirmed, I would
    look forward to working with the DOD components, advocacy groups and
    Congress to close gaps and reduce overlaps in programs and ensure
    effective communications with families to ensure that they know how to
    access available support programs and services when they need it.

                                 FAMILY SUPPORT

        Question. Military members and their families in both the Active
    and Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous
    sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military
    leaders have warned of growing concerns among military families as a
    result of the stress of frequent deployments and the long separations
    that go with them.
        What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
    issues for servicemembers and their families?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure family readiness remains one
    of the Department's top priorities. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff and the Presidential Study Directive Nine identified access to
    health care (to include psychological health), military spouse career
    assistance, child care services, and servicemember and family education
    needs as the Department's highest priority family support initiatives.
    I concur and, if confirmed, will work diligently to ensure these areas
    remain at the forefront of the Department's efforts to support
    families.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that family readiness
    needs are addressed and adequately resourced?
        Answer. I believe that family readiness is correlated with family
    resilience. It is the Department's responsibility to ensure that
    families are well prepared to meet the challenges that come with
    deployment and service. Through focusing on the psychological, social,
    financial and educational well-being of military families, DOD can
    continue to build family resilience. A recent DOD survey of active duty
    spouses shows that families overall are coping well, but certain
    families are more vulnerable--especially our enlisted families and
    those who have recently deployed. Since 2006, active duty spouses have
    reported higher levels of stress in every DOD-wide survey. On the other
    hand, the number of spouses satisfied with military life has increased
    since 2006. I understand that programs like MilitaryOne Source and the
    Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program have made great strides in
    improving access to resources for families. However, the Department can
    do more, and if confirmed I will seek continued improvements in this
    critical area.
        Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
    light of global rebasing, BRAC, deployments, and future reductions in
    end strength?
        Answer. In order to appropriately address the needs of our families
    in today's dynamic environment, it is critical for DOD to build
    community partnerships with Federal agencies, State and local
    governments, businesses, and nonprofit organizations, all of which are
    key stakeholders in meeting the needs of our military families as they
    continue to serve or transition to civilian life.
        Global rebasing, BRAC, deployments, and changes to end strength all
    alter the context of a servicemember's family life and thus the needs
    of family readiness. The Department's efforts to ensure family
    readiness must constantly adapt to these changing conditions.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support to Reserve
    component families related to mobilization, deployment, and family
    readiness, as well as to Active Duty families who do not reside near a
    military installation?
        Answer. DOD has a duty to ensure that every family has access to
    quality resources, regardless of location. An appropriate network of
    support for our geographically dispersed families must be underwritten
    by a coordinated, community-based network of care, encompassing DOD,
    the Department of Veterans Affairs, State, local, non-profit and
    private providers. It is my understanding that DOD's Yellow Ribbon
    Program has been successful in establishing the required networks, and
    if confirmed, I would assess the program to ensure that it remains
    capable of addressing the support requirements of our Guard, and
    Reserve servicemembers and their families, wherever they serve. In
    addition, I understand that the Joint Family Support Assistance Program
    (JFSAP) has significantly expanded outreach services for military
    members and their families who are geographically isolated from
    installation services.
        Question. If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to
    enhance family support?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department continues
    to adapt and evolve our resources and programs to meet the needs of all
    servicemembers and their families. For example, we should appreciate
    the fact that we have a very young force, and the information, the
    resources, and the support we provide must be delivered in a manner
    they feel comfortable receiving; otherwise, the information may go
    unheeded and the resources and support may go unused. This means using
    technology, social media, and other innovative means. Additionally,
    there can be a wealth of helpful resources and support resident just
    outside our gates and residing in our communities. Partnerships with
    communities and community programs can therefore significantly enhance
    the Department's efforts to meet the needs of our families. Finally, we
    must continue to build on the great successes in family support that we
    have made since the start of combat operations nearly 10 years ago.
        Question. In your view, are the recent increases in military family
    support (which have risen to $8.3 billion in the fiscal year 2012
    President's budget) sustainable in future years?
        Answer. I believe family programs are sustainable in future years.
    Clearly it will be necessary to review family support programs with
    respect to efficiencies just as every other program in DOD will be
    reviewed, however, the focus should not merely be on improved
    efficiencies. We will need to provide the right programs--the ones that
    are targeted to the needs of our contemporary servicemembers and their
    families and that are shown to be effective in meeting those needs.
     department of defense and department of veterans affairs collaboration
        Question. Then-Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of Veterans
    Affairs Shinseki pledged to improve and increase collaboration between
    the respective departments to support military servicemembers as they
    transition to veteran status, in areas of health and mental health
    care, disability evaluation, and compensation.
        If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in ensuring that
    DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs achieve the administration's
    objectives in DOD and VA collaboration?
        Answer. I understand significant improvements have been made in
    DOD-VA collaboration in the last few years. Secretary Panetta has made
    it clear that he intends to continue the efforts of Secretary Gates and
    Shinseki and seek to accelerate current timelines. If confirmed, I will
    ensure that DOD continues to work closely with VA to support
    servicemembers and their families in all facets of making a seamless
    transition to veteran status.

                     GOLDWATER-NICHOLS FOR THE INTERAGENCY

        Question. The successful integration of joint capabilities within
    the Armed Forces under the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been held up as a
    potential model for integration of military and civilian agencies with
    related missions. A ``Goldwater Nichols Act for the Interagency'' is
    considered necessary by some to force changes in organization,
    training, policies, and procedures in order to achieve unity of effort
    and enhance cooperation between military and civilian departments.
    Presidential Executive Order (E.O) 13434 (National Security
    Professional Development) and DOD's Civilian National Security
    Professional Development Program reflect the intent to improve
    performance in this regard.
        What is your understanding of the concept of ``Goldwater Nichols
    for the Interagency''? What are your views on the merits of mandating a
    Goldwater Nichols Act for the Federal Government designed to achieve
    the goals set forth in E.O. 13434? How would you evaluate the progress
    of DOD and the interagency in achieving the goals of E.O. 13434?
        Answer. I understand that this concept originates from two facts.
    The first fact is that virtually every security problem in the modern
    world requires a joint mix of the skills and authorities that are
    resident in the military; the diplomatic corps; the development,
    intelligence, and law enforcement communities; and other Federal
    agencies. The second fact is that the Goldwater-Nichols Act enabled us
    to combine the efforts of the separate armed forces that constitute
    today's joint force. I believe this is a sound, indeed vitally
    important, concept. If confirmed, I would seek to move this concept
    forward, whether in law or by other mechanisms.
        If confirmed, I intend to reiterate the important role each
    interagency partner plays in supporting our Nation's security. We
    should also continue to adapt the education and training of our
    national security professionals to equip them to meet modern
    challenges. Developing future national security leaders who understand
    whole-of-government operations and thinking will remain an important
    priority.

                             HUMAN CAPITAL PLANNING

        Question. Section 115b of title 10, U.S.C., requires the Secretary
    of Defense to develop and annually update a strategic human capital
    plan that specifically identifies gaps in the Department's civilian
    workforce and strategies for addressing those gaps. DOD has not yet
    produced a strategic human capital plan that meets the requirements of
    these provisions.
        Would you agree that a strategic human capital plan that identifies
    gaps in the workforce and strategies for addressing those gaps is a key
    step toward ensuring that the Department has the skills and
    capabilities needed to meet future challenges?
        Answer. Yes. A strategic workforce plan is essential to ensure a
    capable and mission ready civilian workforce. I understand that the
    Department has committed to a revised plan which meets congressional
    direction, by the end of fiscal year 2015. Interim updates will be
    provided. The revised strategic human capital plan will clearly link
    the missions of the Department to the size, mix and skill sets of
    military, civilian and contractor employees. If confirmed, I will
    review this plan for adequacy before it is submitted.
        Question. Do you see the need for any changes in the requirements
    of section 115b regarding the requirement for a strategic human capital
    plan?
        Answer. Yes, it would be helpful to the Department to report
    biennially on the status of the DOD strategic workforce plan. A
    biennial report will allow time to mature the Department's strategic
    human capital processes, close identified workforce gaps, and implement
    strategies for recruitment and retention of the knowledge, skills, and
    abilities required to accomplish the mission.
        Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that DOD fully complies
    with these requirements?
        Answer. Yes.

                              ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

        Question. The All-Volunteer Force came into existence almost 40
    years ago and, since its inception, volunteer soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, and marines have helped to win the Cold War, defeat aggression
    during the Persian Gulf War, keep peace in the former Yugoslavia,
    combat terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan, and defend freedom around the
    world.
        Are you committed to the All-Volunteer Force?
        Answer. Yes, I am committed to preserving the All-Volunteer Force.
    The All-Volunteer Force has not only met, but surpassed, the visions
    and expectations of its founders, and provided this nation with the
    highest quality, most capable force in its history at a lower cost than
    a conscripted force. The All-Volunteer Force has proved its viability
    and resilience through over a decade of prolonged warfighting.
        Question. Under what conditions, if any, would you support
    reinitiation of the draft?
        Answer. I can think of no likely situation where I would support
    resumption of the draft. The All-Volunteer Force has surpassed all
    expectations of its founders. Today's force is unique because each
    person wearing the uniform today either entered or chose to remain in
    the military during this period of prolonged conflict. The All-
    Volunteer Force today is highly educated, of high aptitude,
    disciplined, physically fit, and representative of America. Today's
    recruits are the highest quality we have seen in the past 20 years.
        Question. What factors do you consider most significant to the
    success of the All-Volunteer Force?
        Answer. The success of the All-Volunteer Force is built upon three
    cornerstones: (1) recruiting a quality force; (2) appropriately
    compensating that force; and (3) providing force management policies
    that retain the right kinds of people in the right skills.
        Question. Do you share the concerns expressed by Admiral Mullen
    that there is a growing disconnect between the military and U.S.
    civilian society and, if so, how would you address this problem?
        Answer. Yes, because we want our military to be representative of
    the society which it defends. This is an inherent challenge when the
    Services only take in less than 1 percent of the youth population each
    year. The Department's civilian and military leadership, and the
    Nation's leadership as a whole, needs to work to prevent such a
    disconnect.

                           DETAINEE TREATMENT POLICY

        Question. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006,
    memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all
    relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
    procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
    Conventions?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
    specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
    22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
    Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies
    promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence
    interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply
    with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field
    Manual on Interrogations?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you share the view that standards for detainee
    treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that
    we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat
    our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S.
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be
    captured in future conflicts?
        Answer. Yes, I believe that DOD's leadership should always be
    mindful of multiple considerations when developing standards for
    detainee treatment, including that the manner in which we treat our own
    detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S.
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be
    captured in future conflicts.
        Question. Do you believe that DOD has the authorities it needs to
    detain and try individuals captured in the course of the current
    conflict, where it is appropriate to do so?
        Answer. It is my understanding DOD has the authorities it needs to
    capture, detain, and prosecute by military commission supporters and
    members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces.
        It is my understanding over the course of nearly a decade of policy
    development and litigation, the 2001 AUMF has provided the executive
    branch with the legal basis for using necessary and appropriate force,
    including detention, against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated
    forces. The United States has relentlessly and effectively pursued the
    enemy under this existing authority, and has successfully defended its
    authority to detain in the Federal courts. DOD is utilizing its
    existing authority under the Military Commissions Act of 2009 to
    prosecute certain of these detainees.

                            CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

        Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
    appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
    briefings, and other communications of information.
        Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
    this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
    committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
    information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
    with respect to your responsibilities as the Deputy Secretary of
    Defense?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
    other communications of information are provided to this committee and
    its staff and other appropriate committees?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
    such documents?
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

                            U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE

        1. Senator Akaka. Dr. Carter, in November 2007, Secretary of
    Defense Robert M. Gates delivered a speech at Kansas State University
    during which he expressed his thoughts that the Department of Defense
    (DOD) needed to enhance its ability to conduct soft power. He stated,
    ``In short, based on my experience serving seven Presidents, as former
    Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and now as Secretary of
    Defense, I am here to make the case for strengthening our capacity to
    use `soft' power and for better integrating it with `hard' power.''
        While I firmly believe that a strong and capable military must be
    available if the situation requires, I also feel that a responsive soft
    power capability is essential to our strategy. Do you agree with
    Secretary Gates' assessment and do you believe that organizations such
    as the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) can contribute?
        Dr. Carter. Yes, I agree that the United States must strengthen its
    capacity to use ``soft power'', and I believe that organizations like
    the USIP contribute significantly to our collective efforts to manage
    conflict worldwide, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan.
        In Afghanistan, the USIP is currently addressing the challenge of
    ensuring long-term peace and stability by contributing to the
    achievement of four interrelated goals: strengthening peaceful
    reconciliation and capacity to mitigate conflict; enhancing the rule of
    law; improving cooperation for peace, security, and economic
    development; and increasing understanding and effectiveness of
    operations in Afghanistan. Most notably, the USIP developed and
    continues to refine the curriculum for the Ministry of Defense Advisors
    program, which provides critical U.S. civilian expertise for U.S.
    efforts in Afghanistan.
        In Iraq, USIP synchronized the training of Iraqi facilitators,
    enhancing field coordination with military units and the Department of
    State (DOS)-led embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams. In the
    Mahmoudiya region of Iraq specifically, these contributions helped
    tribal and local government leaders forge an agreement that led to a
    substantial decrease in violence there. This agreement was viewed by
    local leaders and military officials as a ``turning point'' toward
    peace and stability in one of Iraq's most violent regions.
        Long-term success in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as overall U.S.
    efforts to prevent conflict and strengthen peace-building globally,
    depend in large part on a holistic approach to foreign engagement and
    assistance, with responsibilities shared across U.S. Government
    agencies and organizations. In order to fulfill these responsibilities,
    DOD's civilian counterparts throughout the government require robust
    capabilities and resources if we are to succeed against the wide range
    of threats facing the Nation.

                              FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

        2. Senator Akaka. Dr. Carter, the National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires DOD to provide auditable financial
    statements by 2017. In your responses to the committee's advance policy
    questions, you list as one of your management performance goals, ``To
    strengthen DOD Financial Management to respond to warfighter needs and
    sustain public confidence through auditable financial statements.''
    After many years of sustained efforts to make this a reality, what are
    the biggest challenges remaining and how are they being addressed?
        Dr. Carter. DOD's legacy financial processes and systems were
    established many years ago and designed to ensure budgetary
    accountability--not meet the proprietary or commercial accounting
    standards called for in the CFO Act, which are necessary to achieve
    auditability. To meet these standards, there is a substantial amount of
    work to be done. Some of the most significant impediments include:

             DOD business and financial management systems are not
            fully integrated and do not always collect data at the
            necessary transaction level.
             Reliable end-to-end processes and internal controls
            have not fully been defined to support financial reporting.
             DOD lacks sufficient operational and financial
            personnel experienced in financial audits.

        Meeting these challenges and improving our business processes have
    more attention in the Department than ever before. DOD is addressing
    them by changing the way it does business. To realize success, DOD is
    using a streamlined approach, implemented in August 2009, which focuses
    on improving and auditing budgetary and mission-critical asset
    information that informs key management decisions. Improving the
    quality of this information will enable commanders and other leaders to
    better meet mission needs with available resources. I believe this
    alignment of operational and financial objectives is the most effective
    incentive to improve financial management.

                    MILITARY LEADERSHIP DIVERSITY COMMISSION

        3. Senator Akaka. Dr. Carter, section 596 of the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, directed the creation of the
    Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC). The MLDC was given the
    task of evaluating policies to advance minority members of the Armed
    Forces. After 18 months of research, one of the primary findings
    reported by the Commission noted that the Armed Forces have not yet
    found a way to continuously develop senior leaders who are as diverse
    as the population of our country. What are your thoughts on diversity
    in the leadership ranks within the civilian and uniformed members of
    DOD?
        Dr. Carter. DOD looks at diversity as a strategic imperative that
    impacts readiness and mission accomplishment. As Secretary Panetta has
    said, ``If we all look the same, our mission will suffer. If we all
    think the same, failure is certain.'' The Department's leadership is
    committed to building a Total Force that attracts, recruits, develops,
    mentors and retains a diverse workforce now, and well into the 21st
    century. Further, we will communicate this priority clearly and hold
    leadership accountable for advancing minority members of the Armed
    Forces. Because changes in the composition of military leadership will
    be gradual, our commitment to this effort must be enduring.

        4. Senator Akaka. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, what steps would you
    recommend to develop senior leaders who are as diverse as our country?
        Dr. Carter. To develop a cadre of diverse senior leaders, the
    Department, in part, must take the following steps:

        (1)  Sustain engagement with affinity groups to attract talent.
        (2)  Mentor and provide access to key professional assignments to
    promising junior minority members of our Armed Forces so that they can
    attain the necessary skills and qualifications to ascend to senior
    leadership positions over time.
        (3)  Work closely with the Office of Personnel Management as it
    develops an overarching Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan for the
    Federal Government and incorporates the tenants of the President's
    Executive Order on Diversity in the diversity strategies DOD develops
    and employs.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Claire McCaskill

                              F/A-18 SUPER HORNET

        5. Senator McCaskill. Dr. Carter, some critics of the F/A-18 Super
    Hornet are incorrectly insisting that the Navy's most advanced high-
    performance strike fighter will not be capable of overcoming future
    threats. According to the experts, and that of our troops overseas,
    nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, the Navy has publicly
    stated that the Super Hornet can ``outperform any top-line fighter
    aircraft of today and tomorrow due to its balanced approach to aircraft
    survivability, blending low observable technology with state-of-the-art
    defensive electronic countermeasures, reduced areas of vulnerability,
    and high precision technology air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons.''
    The missions the Super Hornet can undertake are virtually any combat
    mission, including scenarios for first-day-of-the-war strike and every-
    day-of-the-war dominance. In Afghanistan, the Super Hornet is
    conducting a majority of the sorties that provide ground cover for our
    men and women in combat.
        The Super Hornet is also the Navy's model procurement program.
    Since 2007, all Super Hornets have been delivered on or ahead of
    schedule and below estimated program cost. The congressionally-approved
    third Multi-Year Procurement (MYP) contract for F/A-18E/F aircraft will
    save an estimated $818 million over single-year contracts, and the
    $52.7 million fly-away cost per aircraft and low sustainment costs make
    the Super Hornet the best value for money of any strike fighter in the
    U.S. inventory.
        Considering how well the F/A-18 program has delivered advanced
    capability and the potential of the Super Hornet, along with the high
    return the U.S. taxpayer has received for the funds invested in the F/
    A-18 program, do you think it's prudent to take funds away from the
    program to invest in other tenuous tactical aviation programs, as some
    of my colleagues have recently advocated?
        Dr. Carter. All Naval Aviation programs are feeling the impact of
    the current fiscal environment. Direction from Congress and the
    President indicates DOD's and Navy's Total Obligation Authority will
    decrease over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). The Navy's
    aviation investment provides the capability needed to meet current and
    projected national security objectives, while prudently balancing
    security risks against these fiscal realities. The Super Hornet program
    is not specifically being targeted to divert funds to another program;
    rather, the Department's goal is to allocate resources to meet the most
    pressing fleet requirements, balancing warfighting risks with available
    resources.
        The savings stated on the MYP III should be approximately $615
    million.

        6. Senator McCaskill. Dr. Carter, could DOD benefit from shifting
    some research and development (R&D) funds to further the development of
    the Super Hornet to increase its already impressive capabilities and
    make it an even more viable complement to other aircraft under
    development that are suffering from cost overruns and development
    delays?
        Dr. Carter. In keeping with the Department's desire to provide a
    flexible and balanced force, DOD's aviation investment plan provides
    the diverse mix of aircraft needed to carry out DOD missions. The F-35C
    is being procured as a complement to the F/A-18E/F, and as such has
    complementary rather than competing or redundant capabilities.
    Continued investment in both programs is required to meet warfighting
    needs. The Department continues to pursue a TACAIR investment strategy
    that provides an ideal balance of versatility, lethality,
    survivability, and capacity.

        7. Senator McCaskill. Dr. Carter, in your testimony before this
    committee in May, you were asked about the alternatives to the
    procurement of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. In your
    response, you stated that the tactical aviation requirements of
    individual Military Services differ from each other. Specifically, that
    the Navy has a current alternative to the F-35C variant in the F/A-18
    E/F Block II Super Hornet. Because this alternative exists, the
    Secretary of Defense budgeted for 41 additional Super Hornets as the F-
    35C has slipped in its delivery schedule to the Navy. Given that the
    Navy has publicly stated that the Super Hornet can undertake virtually
    any combat mission, is it your opinion that the Super Hornet remains a
    viable alternative based on the Navy's tactical aviation needs?
        Dr. Carter. F-35C and F/A-18E/F capabilities are complementary,
    with an ideal balance of versatility, lethality, survivability, and
    capacity that will pace the threat through 2025. A mix of the two
    aircraft in future carrier air wings represents an affordable, timely
    solution to the strike-fighter shortfall and provides conventional
    conflict analysis, validated combat capability, and capacity to support
    foreseen carrier strike group mission requirements. Continued
    investment in both programs is required to meet warfighting needs.

        8. Senator McCaskill. Dr. Carter, at the end of the acquisition run
    for the F/A-18, this country will have only one strike fighter aircraft
    manufacturer. From a competition standpoint, is this of concern to DOD?
        Dr. Carter. The combination of buying more F/A-18E/F, developing
    the F-35, and modernizing the F-22A provides strike fighter capability
    for the Departments of Navy and Air Force for the next 30-plus years.
    Additionally, some legacy strike fighter aircraft have service-life
    extensions that allow those aircraft to fly into the 2030s. By that
    time, the Department projects that it will begin recapitalizing the
    fifth generation force. Industry has already begun examining applicable
    materiel concepts and related technology for a sixth generation
    aircraft and the Department believes the military aircraft industrial
    base will be well positioned to provide competitive alternatives at
    that time.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Kay R. Hagan

                        SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL TALENT

        9. Senator Hagan. Dr. Carter, during your confirmation hearing, I
    asked you: ``What is DOD doing to recruit and retain the best and
    brightest scientists and engineers? How do you measure the
    effectiveness of these efforts?''
        In response to being asked to provide specific examples, you
    mentioned Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. What other
    examples can you provide? Also, how do you measure the effectiveness of
    these efforts?
        Dr. Carter. The scientists and engineers at DOD Laboratories serve
    as the foundation of the Department's technical base. DOD uses several
    approaches to recruit and retain the brightest scientists and
    engineers. One approach to maintain an effective cadre of talent is
    through application of the Science and Technology Reinvention
    Laboratory (STRL) program, also known as Demonstration or Demo
    Laboratories program. Directors at an STRL have considerable latitude
    within their existing demo project plans and current regulations in
    establishing personnel policies tailored to meet their specific needs
    for recruiting and retaining the necessary scientific and engineering
    talent to meet program requirements. Under STRL, Lab directors can use
    such approaches as pay for performance systems that reward the highest
    performers; education programs to train the workforce; and various
    hiring flexibilities with the most promising being a direct hire
    authority for candidates with advanced degrees. This direct hire
    authority allows laboratory leadership the ability to quickly hire
    promising new graduates and experienced scientists and engineers.
        Eight of the 15 STRL demo projects are in operation between 9 and
    14 years with the success of their demo interventions last evaluated
    through a pulse survey conducted in 2005. Under Secretary of Defense
    (Personnel and Readiness) staff members are working with demo
    laboratory representatives on an evaluation of current initiatives as
    well as the need for additional flexibilities that may arise. The data
    collected and the analysis will be used to refresh current initiatives
    and develop new ones as appropriate to further enhance the personnel
    demo projects' positive impact on assisting the STRLs to recruit and
    retain the talent needed to accomplish their missions.
        In addition to the STRL demo program, another key element of the
    Labs' ability to maintain a skilled workforce is section 219 of the
    Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.
    This section provides authority for a laboratory director to use up to
    3 percent of all available funds for establishment of high risk
    technology programs, education, and training of the workforce;
    transition of new technology to acquisition programs; and
    infrastructure improvements. One of the highlights of this program is
    found at the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL). The Director established
    the Karle Fellowships (named in honor of two of NRL's most prolific
    scientists) enabling the lab to recruit up to 50 exceptional university
    graduates per year and place them in technology development programs
    for 2 years at no cost to existing programs with minimal administrative
    burden. Upon transitioning to Navy programs, they are highly productive
    and well versed on Service technology needs.
        To measure effectiveness, DOD collects laboratory demographic data
    every 2 years, which allows it to analyze the skills, diversity, and
    experience levels of the technical workforce. Concurrent with
    collection of laboratory demographics, DOD maintains a high level of
    communication with the Military Departments and the labs on the
    technical viability of their workforce. As of the end of fiscal year
    2011, there were no significant gaps in the ability of the Military
    Departments to provide technical support for their programs or deployed
    forces.

               DEVELOPMENTAL AND OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION

        10. Senator Hagan. Dr. Carter, both the developmental and
    operational test and evaluation communities play a vital role in
    ensuring that weapons systems that are fielded ultimately deliver
    capabilities to the warfighters as promised.
        Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) discovers problems early
    on in the developmental phase when it is significantly cheaper to fix
    them than later on, and Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) confirms
    the operational effectiveness and suitability of the weapons systems in
    combat use. Unfortunately, the majority of problems that OT&E is
    discovering with weapons systems should have been detected and fixed
    during the DT&E phase.
        What will you do to ensure that such developmental problems are
    addressed earlier in the lifetime of a weapons program and hence,
    decrease costs and accelerate fielding?
        Dr. Carter. Section 102 of Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of
    2009 enacted 10 U.S.C. 139d (now 10 U.S.C. 139b) establishes the
    position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Developmental
    Test and Evaluation with well-defined responsibilities. This office is
    committed to early and continuous engagement with the major defense
    acquisition programs. This engagement includes providing guidance for
    test planning and resourcing, assessing progress-to-plan throughout the
    acquisition cycle, helping programs to adjust to inevitable problems
    during development, and informing decisionmakers about residual risk
    prior to OT&E (e.g., via Assessments of Operational Test Readiness).
    Measurable DT&E performance criteria that address a sound planning
    framework and objective measures of system maturity are developed to
    provide early indicators for decision makers. In addition, efforts are
    ongoing to strengthen the DT&E workforce through more robust education
    and certification requirements and assessment of workforce balance
    across the components. This will make best use of the available
    personnel resources to best influence effective DT&E programs, and
    minimize late and costly discovery of deficiencies.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich

                                  AFGHANISTAN

        11. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, I support eliminating the threat to
    U.S. national security in Afghanistan and Pakistan by defeating al
    Qaeda and preventing those countries from being safe havens again.
    However, like many of my colleagues, after a decade in the country I am
    concerned about an indefinite U.S. presence. At the end of the year,
    approximately 9,000 Alaska troops will be in the country. I believe we
    need a thorough threat assessment and to concisely define a realistic
    and achievable end-state. What is your assessment of our current
    strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan?
        Dr. Carter. We are seeing clear progress in our strategy,
    particularly in our core goal of disrupting, dismantling, and
    ultimately defeating al Qaeda. There has been steady progress in the
    development of the Afghan National Security Forces, and there was a
    clear decline in violence in 2011, compared to the previous year. I see
    the greatest risks to our goals and strategy stemming from safe havens
    in Pakistan, and from inadequate progress in developing more inclusive,
    capable, and legitimate Afghan governance.
        Successful U.S. operations in Afghanistan and our efforts in the
    larger region are making the United States safer. In Afghanistan, we
    are helping the Afghan people stand on their own so that Afghanistan
    can become a responsible, stable partner with others in the region,
    and, ultimately, a productive member of the international community.
    The Department is also cooperating closely with Pakistan to put
    unprecedented pressure on al Qaeda. As a result, the United States is
    moving toward achieving the core goal of ultimately defeating al Qaeda.
        As part of this greater effort, DOD is also engaging its partners
    in Central Asia to ensure uninterrupted support to our ongoing
    operations. We are helping to build regional, partner-nation security
    capacity to achieve greater stability in the region, which is vital to
    U.S. national security.

        12. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, what is your assessment of the
    threat to U.S. national security in the region?
        Dr. Carter. Security and stability in the region--and our success
    in this war--are vital to U.S. national security. Instability,
    extremism, and transnational terrorism in this region are among the
    many challenges that threaten our security, as well as the security of
    Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and other countries. The attacks of
    September 11, 2001, emanated from Afghanistan and point to the direct
    link between developments in this region and the security of the United
    States.

        13. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, how do you view the United States'
    long-term commitment--financially, reconstruction-wise, and security-
    wise?
        Dr. Carter. The United States and the international community have
    sacrificed an extraordinary amount--in lives and resources--to ensure
    Afghanistan never again provides a safe haven from which al Qaeda and
    its affiliates can attack us. Working with our coalition and Afghan
    partners, the Department remains committed to that goal. Ultimately,
    the Afghans must be responsible for taking the lead for security in
    their country, and the transition process through 2014 to achieve this
    objective is under way.
        To realize lasting security and stability, President Obama and
    President Karzai agreed that the United States and Afghanistan should
    have an enduring strategic partnership beyond 2014. Negotiations on
    that partnership framework are progressing. Likewise, NATO and the
    international community also made clear that their commitments to
    Afghanistan are enduring and will continue beyond the completion of the
    transition to Afghan security responsibility.
        Afghanistan will require international assistance for many years to
    come; this is the reality of more than 30 years of war that shattered
    many of the basic institutions of Afghan society. Our assistance,
    however, must be focused on helping the Afghans take full
    responsibility for their own future. We need to ensure that, as a
    nation, Afghanistan continues to develop the capacity and the resources
    it needs to reduce reliance on international aid.

        14. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, what is your assessment of
    President Karzai as a partner?
        Dr. Carter. U.S. policy toward Afghanistan is not contingent on a
    single leader. Rather, our commitment is to the people of Afghanistan,
    based on the core interests that we share. President Karzai is the
    democratically elected leader of Afghanistan, and the Department is
    committed to working with him to achieve our shared objectives.
        President Karzai faces a difficult situation in Afghanistan. He is
    fighting an insurgency with the assistance of more than 140,000 foreign
    forces. The burden of this war on the Afghan people is great, and they
    have been traumatized by some 30 years of war. Inevitably, there are
    times of tension or disagreement, and just as President Karzai needs to
    listen to our concerns, we also need to listen carefully to his.
    President Karzai has sometimes aired these concerns in ways we find
    unhelpful, but he ultimately appreciates what the United States is
    doing and the sacrifices made by our forces.

        15. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, what do you see as the role for DOD
    in building the capacity of the Government of Afghanistan to deliver
    services, provide better governance, improve economic development, and
    fight corruption in Afghanistan?
        Dr. Carter. DOD's primary role in Afghan Government capacity-
    building is to support the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of
    Interior, and their ability to provide security for the Afghan people.
    The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan made significant progress in
    growing the size and capabilities of the Afghan National Security
    Forces (ANSF). This progress is enabling the transition of lead
    security responsibility to the ANSF throughout Afghanistan by the end
    of 2014.
        The DOS and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have
    the lead for broader U.S. governance and development efforts in
    Afghanistan. That said, DOD stabilization activities also contribute to
    this effort in important ways. The Commander's Emergency Response
    Program (CERP) allows U.S. military commanders to carry out small-scale
    projects that meet urgent humanitarian relief or urgent reconstruction
    requirements within their areas of responsibility. Village stability
    operations led by our Special Operations Forces provide security and
    build linkages between villages and district and provincial authorities
    that help the Afghan Government deliver important services. The Task
    Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) develops near-term
    tactical and strategic programs that create economic opportunities in
    Afghanistan in support of U.S. military commanders' campaign
    objectives. TFBSO's national-level activities, such as its assistance
    to the Ministry of Mines, complement the governance and development
    efforts of U.S. civilian agencies by attracting U.S. and foreign
    investors and helping set the conditions for long-term economic
    development as security improves. Finally, the Afghan Infrastructure
    Fund, bridges the stabilization efforts of DOD with the development
    efforts of USAID by allowing coordinated planning and funding of
    programs that have both near-term stabilization benefits and meet
    longer-term economic development needs.
        To understand the corruption problem more fully and to address it,
    the Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan formed Task Force Shafafiyat
    (``Transparency''), which is coordinating the development of anti-
    corruption strategies and working to ensure that DOD contracts do not
    foster or enable corruption. These efforts improved the Department's
    ability to know both contractors and subcontractors, and to track money
    flows. They have also led to the adoption of new procedures that reduce
    the chances American resources would inadvertently strengthen criminal
    networks or insurgent groups.

        16. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, do you have concerns with the
    Afghan Government's ability to sustain our efforts--like funding their
    own security forces? What more can we be doing?
        Dr. Carter. The cost of sustaining the ANSFs will continue to
    outpace the Government of Afghanistan's near-term resourcing abilities.
    The ANSF will require continued international assistance until new
    Afghan national sources of revenue can be brought on-line.
        To that end, DOD is currently looking at how to reduce the
    remaining ANSF development and long-run sustainment costs. This effort
    includes looking into potential force structure changes in a post-
    counterinsurgency environment, as well as avoiding redundancies and the
    specific capability standards required for the Afghans. As the
    Department transitions areas to Afghan lead for security, DOD
    emphasized to its allies and partners the importance of maintaining
    their overall financial commitment to security in Afghanistan. In
    addition, DOD allies and partners continue to make contributions to
    ANSF sustainability through multi-donor trust funds, such as the Law
    and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan. DOD also implemented programs
    through its Task Force for Business Stability Operations to connect
    outside investors to potential Afghan producers, and to help
    Afghanistan build the capacity to develop its mineral and other natural
    resources in environmentally sound and sustainable ways.
        The Department also continues to participate in a concerted
    interagency effort to develop an overall economic strategy for
    improving Afghanistan's economic sustainability, economic development,
    revenue generation, and budget execution. Over time, such efforts will
    help enable the Afghans to take on increasing responsibility for their
    own security forces, with decreasing reliance on donor support.

        17. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, will you support the
    drawdown in July?
        Dr. Carter. I support President Obama's decision to begin the
    deliberate, responsible drawdown of 10,000 U.S. surge forces from
    Afghanistan over the course of this year, with a further drawdown of
    the remaining 23,000 surge forces by the end of summer 2012.
        At the end of summer 2012--when the U.S. surge forces have
    departed--there will actually be more Afghan and coalition forces in
    the fight than there are today because we will have added another
    55,400 members to the ANSF, not including the Afghan Local Police.
        Additionally, over the coming year, we will continue to develop
    more capable ANSF. A well-trained, operationally effective ANSF will
    allow the Afghans to assume more responsibility as we redeploy the U.S.
    surge forces. As a result, ISAF and the ANSF will be able to maintain a
    necessary level of combat operations against anti-coalition forces
    while completing the successful transition of lead security
    responsibility to the Afghans by the end of 2014.

        18. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, what is your assessment of the
    progress in developing a professional and effective ANSF?
        Dr. Carter. The Afghans, in partnership with the North Atlantic
    Treaty Organization (NATO) and the International Security Assistance
    Force (ISAF), made tremendous progress toward developing a professional
    ANSF that is both capable of sustaining a properly trained and equipped
    force over the long term and preventing the return of al Qaeda and its
    terrorist affiliates to Afghanistan.
        This progress is due, in large part, to the unifying efforts of
    NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). Since November 2009, NTM-A
    consolidated all training efforts under one command, and established
    iterative, professional, and standards-based training across the ANSF--
    none of which existed before.
        As the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior are consistently
    meeting their recruitment goals, NTM-A focused intensely on improving
    the quality of the force, especially in areas of literacy, leadership,
    and operational performance. In 2009, only 4,000 soldiers possessed
    some degree of literacy. Today, NTM-A estimates that the ANSF will
    achieve 50 percent overall literacy rates at the third-grade level in
    2012, with more than 70,000 police and 55,000 soldiers having received
    some level of literacy training. Only 14 percent of the Afghan
    recruiting age population (males aged 18-40 years old) and just 20
    percent of ANSF recruits are literate, so achieving a 50 percent
    literacy rate in the ANSF will not only increase the ANSF's operational
    effectiveness, but it will also contribute to Afghanistan's overall
    economic development in the longer-term.
        The Department is also focused on improving the quality and
    quantity of leaders in order to accelerate the ANSF's development.
    Although the ANSF is challenged by leadership shortfalls, as a result
    of a range of training and mentoring programs over the last 2 years,
    the ANSF noncommissioned officer and officer corps grew by more than
    20,000 leaders, significantly reducing the leadership shortfall.
    Through a strong partnership program with Coalition forces, the ANSF's
    operational performance in the field has also greatly accelerated. In
    January 2011, there were 124 Afghan battalions and headquarters
    elements rated as ``effective with coalition assistance'' or better. As
    of August, 147 units had achieved that standard (out of 184 units
    assessed).
        The result of these efforts--consolidated training and an intense
    focus on literacy, leadership, and operational performance--is that the
    ANSF made significant progress on the battlefield and began
    successfully taking the lead responsibility for security in areas of
    the country that entered transition. By the end of 2014, this
    increasingly capable ANSF will have the lead security responsibility
    throughout the country.

        19. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, will you make it a
    goal to transfer the security mission to the Afghans sooner than 2014?
        Dr. Carter. I think the current goal of completing transition by
    the end of 2014, as proposed by President Karzai and confirmed by our
    allies and partners at the November 2010 North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization (NATO) summit in Lisbon, remains a feasible and
    appropriate target. However, the Department will carefully monitor
    progress toward this goal, taking into consideration ``on-the-ground''
    conditions.

        20. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, what changes, if any,
    would you recommend for U.S. relations with Pakistan, particularly in
    terms of military-to-military relations?
        Dr. Carter. Our military-to-military relationship with Pakistan,
    like our overall relationship, experiences high and low points, and is
    challenged by a lack of trust on both sides. I will continue to support
    DOD's efforts, in coordination with our interagency partners, to
    improve our counterterrorism cooperation and develop a constructive and
    mutually beneficial relationship with Pakistan that is aimed at
    advancing shared national security objectives.

                            SPACE LAUNCH PROCUREMENT

        21. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, according to publicly disclosed
    reports, the U.S. Air Force Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)
    program costs are set to increase by nearly 50 percent over the next 5
    years. What are the reasons for these costs increases?
        Dr. Carter. The EELV program projects incurring a cost increase on
    EELV of approximately 40 percent over the next 5 years. There are
    multiple reasons why the EELV costs increased. These include
    unrealistically low 1998 competitive prices for the initial EELV orders
    due to the anticipated commercial launch market failing to materialize
    and the rising costs in launch vehicle production due to low order
    quantities causing suppliers to restart and recertify production lines.
    With the cancellation of the National Aeronautics and Space
    Administration (NASA) Shuttle and Constellation programs, overhead
    costs for EELV, especially on propulsion providers, have increased, and
    are being borne almost exclusively by DOD. The recently approved
    acquisition strategy is designed to target these causes and drive
    increased cost stability into the program.

        22. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, what insights does DOD have into
    its current vendor's cost and pricing structures?
        Dr. Carter. DOD certified cost and pricing data or acceptable
    equivalent data for our existing contracts. We intend to continue this
    practice on future contracts. In addition, we recently gained a great
    deal of cost insight into the EELV main and upper stage engines, which
    are two major cost drivers for the program. The Air Force Program
    Executive Officer for Space Launch (AFPEO/SL) commissioned two separate
    Independent Cost Estimates (ICE), the results of which have been
    provided to program stakeholders. In September 2011, the Air Force Cost
    Analysis Agency (AFCAA) completed an ICE for the RS-68 Delta main
    engine, which is manufactured by Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne (PWR). The
    ICE was a data driven estimate based on historical data from an earlier
    purchase, other PWR programs and recent subcontractor quotes. The study
    gathered data on labor, material, profit, overhead, and general and
    administrative costs. Also in September 2011, the National
    Reconnaissance Office's (NRO) Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG)
    completed an ICE for the RL10 upper stage engine, for both Delta and
    Atlas configurations, which is also manufactured by PWR. The study used
    historical data from fiscal year 2006-2010 for previous purchases of
    RL10 engines, as well as a bill of material from the PWR proposal. The
    data provided by AFCAA and the CAIG will be used in conjunction with
    existing certified cost and pricing data to assist in negotiations for
    the upcoming EELV procurements, including the fiscal year 2012 and
    fiscal year 2013-2017 buys.

        23. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, what actions has the Air Force or
    DOD taken to control costs?
        Dr. Carter. In June 2011, the EELV program signed an EELV Launch
    Capability (ELC) bridge contract, changing the contract type from an
    Award Fee type contract to an Incentive Fee construct incentivizing
    cost reductions while maintaining mission success. The recently
    approved EELV acquisition strategy supports a minimum production rate
    by implementing a more economical multi-core approach to procuring
    launch vehicles. The new acquisition is scheduled to be awarded by the
    fall 2012. Key elements of the strategy are a buy of sufficient size to
    ensure economic order quantity prices and a steady launch vehicle
    production rate. This strategy also includes a ``new entrant'' approach
    to allow for near-term on-ramp opportunities and future full and open
    competition with certified launch providers. The Air Force also
    recently completed a Should Cost Review of the EELV program. The Air
    Force incorporated the Should Cost Review recommendations in
    negotiations with the prime contractor on the ELC bridge contract,
    upcoming mission contracts and will use the Should Cost Review during
    negotiations for the fiscal year 2013-2017 acquisition. Additionally,
    the results of two recently completed Independent Costs Estimates (ICE)
    on the RS-68 main engine and RL-10 upper stage engine will be
    incorporated into negotiations for future contracts.

        24. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, the Government Accountability
    Office (GAO) has reported that ``the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense's (OSD) decision to advance the EELV program from the
    development and production phases, which began in 1998, to the
    sustainment phase will significantly reduce EELV's reporting
    requirements to OSD, such as program cost and status information,
    limiting its own ability to oversee the program.'' Given the lack of
    insight into the program, what specific actions has the Air Force or
    DOD taken to better understand EELV's costs?
        Dr. Carter. The Air Force took a number of steps to better
    understand the program costs. A Should Cost Review was completed in
    June 2010. In March 2011, a Blue Ribbon Panel was led by the SAF/AQ and
    the Program Executive Officer (PEO). In June 2011, the program changed
    the construct of the ELC contract to cost plus incentive fee and
    implemented activity based charging codes used by the prime contractor
    to gain better understanding of costs. The program continues to provide
    cost reporting at the prime and subcontractor level to the Defense Cost
    and Resource Center at OSD, as required by regulation. In addition to
    requiring ULA to submit certified cost and pricing data prior to
    negotiations, the Air Force program team will also conduct a complete
    evaluation of ULA costs and any supporting data for approximately $280
    million of inventory items purchased by Boeing for the initial EELV
    contract in 1998. The evaluation will look at incurred costs, quotes,
    purchase orders, invoices, and will compare prices to similar items
    manufactured on the open market. The Contracting Officer will use this
    data to determine whether the material costs submitted by ULA are
    supported and reasonable. The Defense Contract Management Agency
    approved ULA's purchasing system in September 2011, and the Defense
    Contract Audit Agency is finalizing its cost accounting system audit.
    If the auditors find deficiencies, AFPEO/SL will require the
    Contracting Officer to withhold a certain percentage of all progress
    payments in accordance with the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
    Supplement until the system achieves compliance. This should motivate
    ULA to make any other necessary changes to its business systems and
    accounting practices.

        25. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, as Deputy Secretary of Defense,
    would you require additional cost reporting, such as a reporting
    required in the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) as provided in title
    10 U.S.C. 2432, of which the EELV program is currently not subject?
        Dr. Carter. Section 838 of the Conference Agreement on the fiscal
    year 2012 Defense Authorization Bill, which originated as amendment
    1071 by Senator McCain, led the Department to further understand and
    appreciate the importance of providing EELV program cost, schedule and
    performance information to the congressional defense committees and OSD
    for oversight. OSD and the Air Force are working together to implement
    the right level of acquisition reporting. Of particular interest is a
    shared concern toward limiting the influence of factors outside the
    program's control that can drive unit cost such as satellite
    constellation sustainment, satellite production schedules, and launch
    range constraints.

        26. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, currently the EELV program is
    divided into two separate contracts: a cost-plus Launch Capability
    (ELC) contract that annually funds all fixed costs for United Launch
    Alliance (ULA); and a Launch Services (ELS) contract through which the
    Air Force purchases individual launches for its payloads. Combining
    costs associated for each contract, what is the average cost for a
    launch on an Atlas V?
        Dr. Carter. There is no average price for an Atlas V launch or
    launch vehicle. The cost-plus Launch Capability effort provides the
    minimum launch capability required to meet a launch rate of eight
    missions per year. There are 10 variants in the Atlas V launch vehicle
    family, and each one has a different cost. Additionally, every National
    Security Space mission is a different price, depending on the amount of
    mission-specific integration required, launch location, and number of
    the same/similar payloads previously flown.

        27. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, what is the average cost of a
    launch on a Delta V and a Delta V Heavy?
        Dr. Carter. There is no average price for a Delta IV launch or
    launch vehicle. There are five variants in the Delta IV launch vehicle
    family and each one has a different cost. Additionally, every National
    Security Space mission is a different price depending on mission
    integration costs, payload faring and launch location, and number of
    the same payloads previously flown.

        28. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, what are the total costs of a 40
    core block buy?
        Dr. Carter. The Air Force has not yet determined the actual size of
    the proposed lot buy of EELV booster cores. The recently approved
    acquisition strategy entails an examination of an economic order
    quantity of EELV booster cores using 40 cores (8 cores per year over 5
    years) as our budget baseline. However, as part of the acquisition
    strategy, the Air Force will request the current EELV provider, United
    Launch Alliance, propose firm-fixed prices against a range of 6-10
    booster cores per year over contract periods ranging from 3 to 5 years,
    thus allowing the program to balance the launch vehicle production rate
    and length of commitment decision among price, operational
    requirements, budget realities, and potential for new entrant
    competition.

        29. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, I understand the Air Force is
    moving forward with a planned acquisition to purchase 40 rocket booster
    cores from its current provider over the next 5 years (fiscal year 2013
    to fiscal year 2018), at a guaranteed annual rate of eight cores per
    year. What is the basis of this acquisition strategy?
        Dr. Carter. In late 2009, cost increases in the EELV program
    prompted the Commander of Air Force Space Command and the Director of
    the NRO to begin looking at alternative business models. The practice
    of ordering launch vehicles in small quantities was inefficient and did
    not provide a predictable production rhythm sufficient to control
    costs. They commissioned an external study, the Broad Area Review (BAR-
    X), conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses, and an internal
    Tiger Team study as well. The BAR-X looked at the entire spectrum of
    space launch to include infrastructure, while the Tiger Team focused on
    the EELV contracting approach. The BAR-X, Tiger Team, and Air Force
    Program Executive Officer for Space Launch (AFPEO/SL) all recommended
    an annual minimum production rate of launch vehicle cores plus
    associated upper stage engines, payload fairings, and solid rockets for
    multiple years as a baseline.
        The acquisition strategy allows the Air Force to make an informed
    decision on quantity and contract length based on the accumulation of
    sufficient pricing information and incorporates the findings of the
    studies as well as the GAO report. The request for proposal will
    require the contractor to provide prices for a range of quantities from
    6 to 10 cores over a contract period of 3 to 5 years. Specific
    decisions about unit quantities and contract duration will not be made
    until summer 2012, allowing the Air Force time to balance contractual
    commitments with operational requirements, budget, cost reductions and
    the potential for competition. To facilitate our assessment of
    potential new entrants, we are taking specific steps to enable
    competition, including the release--with our partners at NASA and the
    NRO--of the Joint Strategy for New Entrant Certification.

        30. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, when will the Air Force finalize
    the contract or issue the request for proposal (RFP) for this block
    buy?
        Dr. Carter. I anticipate a formal RFP release in the first quarter
    of 2012 with a decision about quantity and duration during the summer
    of 2012 and contract award by the fall of 2012.

        31. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, what, if any, are the estimated
    cost savings associated with a 40 core block buy? Has the Air Force or
    an independent examiner looked at the costs savings of a 40 core block
    buy versus a smaller block purchase, such as annual block buys of 8
    cores; a 2-year block buy of 16 cores, etc.?
        Dr. Carter. The Air Force will not know the total cost for the
    upcoming EELV lot buy until the new contract is negotiated. But as the
    question suggests, the Air Force is looking at a range of options for
    the size and length of a lot buy. The Air Force/NRO Tiger Team, Broad
    Area Review (BAR-X) and Air Force Program Executive Officer for Space
    Launch (AFPEO/SL) all recommended an annual minimum production rate of
    launch vehicle cores plus associated upper stage engines, payload
    fairings, and solid rockets for multiple years as a baseline. The
    implementation of this new strategy is intended to reduce costs for
    National Security Space (NSS) launches and stabilize the U.S. Launch
    industrial base. The Air Force will request that the prime contractor
    propose various rate-over-time combinations to inform the Air Force's
    final decision, and provide maximum flexibility to best meet NSS
    requirements and budgets. I am confident that a multi-core buy strategy
    will generate significant savings versus the current practice of buying
    individual missions. In addition to savings on the service portion of
    the contract, there are savings to be generated in the administrative
    area as well. The RFP will require ULA to submit one combined ELC and
    ELS proposal, with separate Contract Line Items (CLINs) for launch
    service and capability, which should significantly reduce the cost of
    proposal preparation and negotiations that were prevalent in past EELV
    acquisitions. This construct will also save both time and money by
    taking advantage of economic order quantity purchasing, as well as a
    single proposal preparation and negotiation. With this proposal, the
    Air Force will understand the specifics of different sizes of buys, and
    therefore, make a fully informed decision in the best interest of the
    taxpayer and DOD.

        32. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, what is the basis for the planned
    acquisition of 40 cores over 5 years, specifically?
        Dr. Carter. The Air Force did not decide on a firm quantity
    purchase of 40 cores over 5 years; the Air Force acquisition strategy
    allows the Air Force to make an informed decision on quantity and
    contract length based on the accumulation of sufficient pricing
    information, and incorporates the findings of the Broad Area Review
    (BAR-X) and Tiger Team studies as well as the GAO report. The request
    for proposal will require the contractor to provide prices for a range
    of quantities from 6 to 10 cores over a contract period of 3 to 5
    years. Specific decisions about unit quantities and contract duration
    will not be made until summer 2012, allowing the Air Force time to
    balance contractual commitments with operational requirements, budget,
    cost reductions and the potential for competition. To facilitate the
    assessment of potential new entrants, the Air Force is taking specific
    steps to enable competition, including the release--with partners at
    NASA and the NRO--of the Joint Strategy for New Entrant Certification.
        However, it is important to recognize the benefits of pursuing a
    multi-core buy, versus purchasing individual launch missions, as was
    done in the past. The Air Force/NRO Tiger Team, BAR-X and AFPEO/SL all
    recommended an annual minimum production rate of launch vehicle cores
    plus associated upper stage engines, payload fairings, and solid
    rockets for multiple years as a baseline. The implementation of this
    new strategy is intended to reduce costs for National Security Space
    launches and stabilize the U.S. Launch industrial base.
        In addition, the acquisition strategy was designed to support the
    planned launch manifest. For example, 46 launches (some use as many as
    3 cores per launch) are planned from fiscal year 2013-2017, with an
    additional 16 launches in fiscal years 2018-2019. Most of these
    launches will be reflights for programs that have already launched
    satellites to support their respective missions. Therefore, future
    satellites are using identical designs as their predecessors. This
    greatly reduces the chance of production delays and increases the
    likelihood these satellites will launch on schedule. Additionally, the
    Atlas ``white tail'' concept (a common booster core for Atlas rockets)
    and the Delta Fleet Standardization increase flexibility in booster
    assignment, which reduces launch delays.

        33. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, currently the Air Force has 41
    rocket booster cores purchased from its current vendor for 39 missions
    that have not yet launched. Ten of these cores were purchased in 1998
    under Buy 1. To a significant extent, this excess inventory is
    associated with launch schedule slippage associated with satellite
    manufacturing and integration delays. Should the Air Force and NRO
    launch schedules slip in the next 5 years in the context of a 40 core
    block buy from a single incumbent vendor, how will new entrants be able
    to compete for launches?
        Dr. Carter. The majority of satellite slips seen in the past 10
    years were in the development process. Based on recent experience, I
    anticipate a much more stable flow of satellite launches in this
    timeframe as these programs have transitioned to production. For
    example, fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 had seven and nine
    launches, respectively, with a 100 percent launch rate.
        In addition, there are more launch requirements during fiscal year
    2013-2017 than the up-to-40 cores budgeted in the buy (approximately
    55). These additional cores may be available for competition with new
    entrants to the program should any become a certified EELV provider.
    The Air Force is committed to competition on the EELV program and is
    taking steps to facilitate new entrant certification.
        The New Entrant Certification Strategy was signed by the Air Force,
    the NRO, and NASA, and was released in October 2011. The document
    defines the coordinated certification strategy for commercial new
    entrant launch vehicles. Also, the U.S. Air Force Launch Services New
    Entrant Certification Guide was signed and released in November 2011.
    The Guide provides a risk-based approach that the Air Force will use to
    certify the capability of potential New Entrant launch companies to
    provide launch services for EELV missions. The Guide lists a set of
    criteria that any New Entrant must meet in order to launch a high-value
    operational satellite. The Guide provides the standard or
    specifications the contractor must meet, the documents or data the
    contractor must provide and the evaluation process the Air Force will
    employ in assessing the criteria. These are important steps toward
    introducing competition into the EELV program. In addition, the Air
    Force will identify specific launch opportunities reserved for
    potential new entrants.

        34. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, the historical average launches
    under the EELV program is three flights per year over the last 9 years.
    Yet, the Air Force is expecting a launch demand of 13 to 14 launches in
    fiscal year 2013 alone. Has DOD assessed the cost impacts of a 40 core
    block buy in the context of well-documented and empirical schedule
    delays associated with payloads?
        Dr. Carter. The reason for the relatively low number of launches in
    the past is primarily due to slips within the satellite programs. The
    majority of satellite schedule slips seen in the past 10 years have
    been because they were still in the development process. However, as
    these satellites programs are transitioning into production, we expect
    a steadier, more dependable launch rate. For example, fiscal year 2010
    and fiscal year 2011 had seven and nine launches scheduled,
    respectively, with a 100 percent launch rate. We expect this more
    stable flow of satellites to continue.
        To that end, 46 launches are planned from fiscal year 2013-2017
    with an additional 16 launches in fiscal year 2018-2019. Most of these
    launches will be reflights for programs that have already launched
    satellites to support their respective missions. Therefore, future
    satellites are using identical designs as their predecessors. This
    greatly reduces the chance of production delays and increases the
    likelihood these satellites will launch on schedule. Additionally, the
    Atlas ``white tail'' concept (a common booster core for Atlas rockets)
    and the Delta Fleet Standardization increase flexibility in booster
    assignment, which reduces launch delays.
        In addition, based on the current manifest, there are more launch
    requirements in the timeframe of the first buy (fiscal year 2013-2017),
    with approximately 55 cores required in this timeframe. Therefore, I
    see little risk of oversupply on the 40 core buy, should the Air Force
    pursue this course of action.

        35. Senator Begich. Dr. Carter, I understand that DOD is currently
    finalizing its New Entrant certification requirements for the EELV
    program. What actions is DOD taking to ensure that New Entrant
    requirements will be equitable and reasonable to allow for full and
    open competition under the EELV program?
        Dr. Carter. The Air Force developed a strategy that maintains the
    current level of mission success while reducing costs; providing
    opportunities for potential new entrants is an important part of that
    strategy. To that end, the Air Force worked in close cooperation with
    NASA and NRO to finalize criteria by which potential new entrants can
    qualify for EELV-class National Security Space launches. These criteria
    are equitable and reflect our commitment to competition for qualified
    new entrants and our obligation to thoroughly examine the performance
    of competitors. The New Entrant Certification Strategy has been signed
    by the Air Force, the NRO and NASA, and was released in October 2011.
    The document defines the coordinated certification strategy for
    commercial new entrant launch vehicles. Also, the U.S. Air Force Launch
    Services New Entrant Certification Guide has been signed and was
    released in November 2011. The Guide provides a risk-based approach
    that the Air Force will use to certify the capability of potential New
    Entrant launch companies to provide launch services for EELV missions.
    The Guide lists a set of criteria that any New Entrant must meet in
    order to launch a high-value operational satellite. The Guide provides
    the standard or specifications the contractor must meet, the documents
    or data the contractor must provide and the evaluation process the Air
    Force will employ in assessing the criteria. These are important steps
    toward introducing competition into the EELV program. Additionally, SMC
    held an industry day on 1 December 2011, which provided the EELV
    criteria to interested potential space launch providers. The feedback
    was very positive. I believe this new process will provide a level
    playing field for any certified new/entrant to fairly compete for EELV
    missions. In addition, the Air Force will identify specific launch
    opportunities Reserved for potential new entrants.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen

                               ENERGY EFFICIENCY

        36. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Carter, there is no better opportunity for
    DOD to simultaneously satisfy the demands of the current economic
    climate and advance its strategic objectives than by improving energy
    efficiency in our military operations. I am pleased to see the advances
    each of the Services are making toward improving their respective
    efficiency standards. How will you evaluate if the Services are
    effectively sharing technologies and lessons learned to maximize
    investment?
        Dr. Carter. In the current fiscal and strategic environment, the
    Department is preparing to do more without more. Energy is a key part
    of this solution. By operating more efficiently and incorporating
    energy and sustainment considerations into our plans and operations, we
    expect to gain capability without increasing costs.
        The Honorable Sharon Burke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Operational Energy Plans and Programs (ASD/OEPP), leads the
    Department's efforts to ensure energy security for military operations
    by providing overall policy and guidance pursuant to the Operational
    Energy Strategy, released this June. In addition, the ASD/OEPP reviews
    the budgets of each of the Components to certify if the Department's
    budget is adequate to implement the Strategy. This certification
    process allows her to take a comprehensive look across all the
    Department's energy investments. The ASD/OEPP completed her first
    certification for fiscal year 2012 earlier this year and found the
    process very useful to coordinate technology choices and lessons
    learned across the Department.
        Both the Operational Energy Strategy and fiscal year 2012 Budget
    Certification are available online (http://energy.defense.gov).
        In addition, the Department is finalizing our Implementation Plan
    to support the Strategy, which will promote close coordination across
    the Department to identify and share best practices across the full
    range of activities that affect operational energy.

        37. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Carter, energy efficiency technologies
    often require significant upfront investment in order to achieve long-
    term savings. How will you make the case that these investments are
    needed given the difficult budget environment and long-term nature of
    efficiency savings?
        Dr. Carter. It is often difficult for planners and decision makers
    to make significant investments upfront to save money in the long term,
    but these sorts of decisions are becoming increasingly important in
    today's budgetary environment. As the Department considers how it
    responds to a more constrained budget environment we must take life-
    cycle cost savings into account, like those that result from
    improvements in energy efficiency. Investments in a more energy
    efficient force do more than save money in the long term; they make us
    a more capable and effective force. I would also note that there are
    opportunities for near-term energy efficiency improvements that will
    pay back within the Department's 5-year budget planning horizon.
        A more energy-efficient force will make it easier to sustain and
    operate at the forward edge of the battlefield or in remote regions and
    reduce the risks to our logistics train. Greater energy efficiency
    means fewer resupply convoys, greater tactical stealth, longer strike
    ranges for aircraft, longer time on station for sensors and platforms,
    and greater operational agility. The Department will push forward with
    energy efficiency improvements on this operational basis with the
    consequent financial benefits.
        The Department is also pursuing energy efficiency opportunities at
    our fixed installations, often by leveraging private sector
    partnerships and financing.

                          ACTIVE AND RESERVE READINESS

        38. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Carter, during past difficult fiscal
    environments, whenever a choice seemed necessary between maintaining
    Active or Reserve component capability, that choice invariably seemed
    to be weighted towards the Active component. Given the investment in
    and growing reliance on the National Guard and Reserves over the last
    10 years, do you agree that there is an inherent risk in potentially
    allowing our Reserve Forces to return to their pre-September 11
    readiness?
        Dr. Carter. Yes, I agree that there is an inherent risk in
    potentially allowing the Reserve component to return to pre-September
    11 readiness levels. The Department invested heavily in the Guard and
    Reserve over the past 10 years in order to prevail in today's wars--
    meeting the operational demands, while relieving stress on the active
    Component and bringing their unique skills and experience to the fight.
    Given this period of fiscal restraint, DOD must make tough decisions
    and determine acceptable levels of risks in all programs. I will strive
    to make the most efficient use of the Total Force. I appreciate the
    value provided by the Reserve components and believe continuing to
    support their readiness at an appropriate level is an important part in
    meeting that end.

        39. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Carter, what steps would you take to
    prevent this from happening?
        Dr. Carter. At this time, I do not have any specific
    recommendations, but I understand that the Department will continue to
    rely on periodic contributions of the Reserve components as an integral
    part of the Total Force to meet operational demands. This utilization
    of the Reserve components in operational missions helps to maintain
    their continued high readiness levels. Additionally, as Overseas
    Contingency Operations (OCO) funding levels wind down, I believe it is
    important for the Services to ensure the appropriate levels of
    readiness for their active and Reserve components are funded in base
    budgets. Given the fiscal constraints and uncertain security
    environment, I recognize the need for an efficient Total Force.
    Additionally, I understand the importance of maintaining appropriate
    readiness levels for the Reserve components in order to realize the
    value they provide in delivering capability and maintaining capacity.

                      RECRUITING SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS

        40. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Carter, DOD and the traditional defense
    industry are facing challenges seeking new graduates with advanced
    degrees in scientific and technical fields to help develop complex
    military systems. What is DOD doing to recruit and retain the best and
    brightest scientists and engineers?
        Dr. Carter. Each of the DOD Science and Technology Reinvention
    Laboratories (STRL) labs has the authority to directly hire scientists
    and engineers with advanced degrees outside of the established Office
    of Personnel Management (OPM) regulations. This allows Demonstration
    laboratory directors to quickly make tentative job offers to university
    graduates and experienced candidates and bring them on-board in only a
    fraction of the time required for conventional government employment
    hiring. This process makes DOD labs more competitive with industry and
    academia for the best and brightest talent. In addition, STRL labs all
    have pay banding systems that enable a director to offer higher
    starting salaries than non-STRL labs or other government organizations.
    While DOD labs may not offer starting salaries as high as many
    employers in the private sector, the type of work offered is often more
    attractive to graduates than the higher salaries in industry. Facile
    hiring procedures might be the deciding factor in a candidate's
    employment selection decision.
        Once on-board a Defense Lab, authorities such as those offered by
    STRL demonstration projects of Section 219 of the Duncan Hunter
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 allow a
    director to better reward high performers and provide training and
    education opportunities to the workforce. Laboratory demographic data
    reveal that the organic workforce is overall more highly educated than
    the general workforce of DOD and the Nation.

        41. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Carter, in your view, are those efforts
    effective?
        Dr. Carter. Yes, the efforts of the Department for recruiting
    scientists and engineers (S&E) are effective. We collect and analyze
    laboratory demographic data that shows our organic workforce to be
    overall more highly educated than the general workforce of DOD and the
    Nation. OSD works closely with the Military Departments to ensure the
    laboratory workforce has the necessary skills and talents to meet the
    needs of the Department and deployed forces. Authorities given to
    laboratory directors via the STRL (STRL, also known as Demonstration or
    Demo Lab) Program and section 219 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 provides them with flexibilities
    to recruit and rapidly hire promising university graduates, reward top
    performers, and provide them with exciting and meaningful work as well
    as training to maintain their skills. As of the end of fiscal year
    2011, there were no identified gaps in DOD's organic laboratory
    workforce. If any shortfalls are identified in the future, we are
    prepared to make the necessary investments in training and education
    programs to strengthen the technical workforce.

        42. Senator Shaheen. Dr. Carter, how do you measure the
    effectiveness of these efforts?
        Dr. Carter. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and
    Engineering (ASD(R&E)) Defense Laboratories Office collects and
    analyzes laboratory demographic data every 2 years. This information
    includes skills, diversity, education levels, years of experience and
    age distribution of scientists and engineers at all DOD in-house
    laboratories. ASD(R&E) provides this data to the Military Departments
    and maintains high levels of communication with them on their programs
    and the status of the laboratory workforce in meeting the technical
    demands of these programs. As of the end of fiscal year 2011, there
    were no reported gaps in the skills of the in-house workforce. If
    shortfalls are identified, ASD(R&E) is prepared to re-allocate Science,
    Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) program funds in
    education and training programs for DOD's current organic workforce.
        Implementation of available authorities such as section 219 of the
    Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009
    is closely monitored to ensure the Military Departments have the
    ability to execute training and education programs for their workforce.
    Currently, the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel
    and Readiness (OUSD(P&R)) is working with demo laboratory
    representatives on an evaluation of STRL (STRL, also known as
    Demonstration or Demo Laboratory) Program initiatives as well as the
    need for additional flexibilities that may have arisen since the
    conduct of the last DOD evaluation in 2005. The data collected and the
    analysis will be used to refresh current initiatives and develop new
    ones as appropriate to enhance further the personnel demo projects'
    positive impact on recruitment and retention of scientists and
    engineers. ASD(R&E) supports USD(P&R) and Deputy Assistant Secretary of
    Defense (Civilian Personnel Policy) in the review, refresh, development
    and implementation of STRL program authorities such as direct hire for
    candidates with advanced degrees and pay-for-performance systems that
    both maintain and strengthen the technical workforce of the labs.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

                               ACQUISITION REFORM

        43. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, in my view, one of the lessons of
    the JSF program and other problematic weapons systems procurement
    programs has been the following: DOD tends to start developing weapon
    systems even though its critical technologies are immature; it begins
    testing before the systems' designs are demonstrated as stable; and it
    then ramps up production before testing has shown that these designs
    meet requirements and are producible. This often leads to higher costs,
    lengthy development times, and late deliveries to the warfighter. In
    other words, there tends to be too much concurrency allowing
    development and procurement to go forward simultaneously. Do you agree
    with my appraisal that this is what happened in the JSF program?
        Dr. Carter. I agree that the Department must carefully monitor the
    level of concurrency on the JSF program and other programs. The
    decision to accept a level of concurrency on the JSF program was made
    consciously, based on lessons learned from past programs, and the
    requirement to modernize and recapitalize DOD strike fighter forces. In
    accepting a concurrent program, the Department planned to replace
    aging, less capable legacy fighters with a fifth generation strike
    fighter sooner than what was possible without concurrency. However,
    development of the three variants of the JSF has taken longer than
    originally planned, and the aircraft costs have risen and need to be
    addressed. The Department made procurement and programmatic decisions
    to mitigate the risks due to concurrency and will continue to review
    the program with this in mind.

        44. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, what, if anything, can be done to
    make sure that DOD doesn't start big weapons procurement programs with
    too much concurrency between development and production in the future?
        Dr. Carter. Starting programs with too much concurrency between
    development and production is counter to the spirit of the reforms that
    the Department has undertaken. Concurrency risks are evaluated on a
    case by case basis, and the Department does not plan to approve of
    concurrency in our acquisitions without well thought out strategies to
    balance risk appropriately. It is also important for us to reevaluate
    concurrency as programs progress to ensure that concurrency risk does
    not increase unacceptably when schedules are adjusted to reflect
    discovery in testing.

        45. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, in what other areas could, in your
    view, DOD improve how it buys major systems?
        Dr. Carter. The Better Buying Power Initiative includes several
    critical initiatives where the Department can improve the way we
    procure our major systems. The most important of these for buying major
    weapon systems is targeting affordability, controlling cost growth, and
    promoting real competition. Fully implementing these reforms for every
    program will lead to improvements now, and also to economies of scale
    as we successfully apply the same reforms to future programs.
        The Better Buying Power Initiative includes many important reforms,
    but it is inevitably not the Department's final word on acquisition
    improvement. I will continue to work with the acquisition community and
    Congress, as appropriate, to improve the way we buy our major systems.

        46. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, setting aside those areas squarely
    addressed under the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of
    2009, what remain the most significant impediments to the ability of
    DOD to effectively procure major systems?
        Dr. Carter. I don't believe the Department has significant
    impediments to effectively procure major systems that are not addressed
    in WSARA. I have found many examples of very effective use of existing
    techniques already present in DOD tool-kits. In the Better Buying Power
    (BBP) initiative, for example, there is nothing really new. BBP places
    an emphasis on thinking very carefully about what the Department is
    trying to achieve and more effectively employing existing practices to
    increase productivity, constantly manage costs, and incentivize
    efficiency.

        47. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, in your view, what is the next page
    of reforming how DOD procures goods and services generally? Please be
    as specific as possible.
        Dr. Carter. I would continue the effort to improve the defense
    acquisition system consistent with the direction provided in the WSARA
    of 2009. However, while WSARA principles have been widely implemented
    in the Department, more can be done to further them. Furthermore, the
    BBP initiative recognizes that the Department's practices for buying
    services are much less mature than our practices for buying weapons
    systems. The BBP initiative articulates several ways to improve
    tradecraft in services acquisition, which forms the next chapter for
    improving how the Department buys services. To assist with this, each
    of the Military Services has appointed a senior manager for the
    acquisition of services at the general officer/flag/senior executive
    service level. These service managers are responsible for governance in
    planning, execution, strategic sourcing, and management of service
    contracts.
        Another critical area for improvement is the requirements process.
    ADM Winnefeld is currently taking steps to reform the Joint
    Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process to
    ensure it actually makes tradeoffs between cost and performance. The
    Department is also working to implement a process for determining
    requirements for services. Lastly, I continue to focus on rapid
    acquisition, both in institutionalizing the processes developing for
    satisfying Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONS) and making the entire
    acquisition system more responsive to the Warfighter.

        48. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, what aspects of the JCIDS are most
    in need of reform?
        Dr. Carter. The JCIDS process most in need of reform is to produce
    clearly articulated Military needs in their operational context,
    informed by rigorous analysis of possible alternatives as to potential
    cost, schedule and performance. A clear understanding of total force
    capability needs and a proposed solution's fit and priority in its
    portfolio's architecture must be effectively communicated to the
    Acquisition Enterprise to enable transformation into design and
    manufacture of appropriately resourced systems and components. The
    JCIDS process formulates warfighter needs from a joint perspective, but
    key inputs lag acquisition activities. Specifically, JCIDS assessment
    must produce and then facilitate better synchronization of operational
    factors such as desired performance parameters developed through
    Materiel Solution Analysis (Analyses of Alternatives and others) in
    preparation for Technology Development--Milestone A, and refined Key
    Performance Parameters for Engineering and Manufacturing Development--
    Milestone B. It is also critical that the JCIDS process allow for
    realistic tradeoffs between cost and performance.

        49. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, will you vet the Vice
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's initiative to reform JCIDS that
    I understand will be issued late this year (or early next year)? If so,
    would you provide your professional views on its likely efficacy?
        Dr. Carter. AT&L has been actively engaged in the Joint Staff Joint
    Capabilities Development Process Review (JCD PR) since the summer of
    2010, and has assisted in formulation of revisions and refinements to
    the process that will be promulgated in November or December of this
    year.
        The JCD PR focused on adjusting Joint Requirements Oversight
    Council support structures and advisory processes to fulfill the
    Council's goal to shape the future Joint Force. These include early
    analysis of desired warfighter performance parameters in terms of
    affordability, risk calculation of tradespace, and prioritization
    across portfolios; and as Technology Development and Engineering and
    Manufacturing further refine those parameters, continuous monitoring of
    a program's achievement of quantified cost, schedule and performance.
    The concurrent, ongoing reforms of Defense Acquisition System processes
    to synchronize with JCIDS and incorporate rapid fielding of urgently
    required capabilities, and continuous coordination with Planning
    Programming Budgeting and Execution, will be necessary for all three
    processes to succeed as the Department evolves toward a new Joint Force
    in the current fiscal environment.

        50. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, what aspects of the resource
    allocation process, as it relates to DOD's procurement of goods and
    services, is most in need of reform?
        Dr. Carter. Over the last 2 years, the Department has greatly
    improved in the area of addressing urgent needs; however, I believe it
    is necessary to create a closer alignment of the acquisition,
    requirements, and budget processes across the Department to continue
    those improvements. In the same way that the Senior Integration Group
    broadened its purview to cover all urgent warfighter requirements,
    there are other means by which the Department can expand the type of
    cooperation and coordination we have instituted for urgent needs, and I
    plan to make that a priority.

        51. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, what aspects of how DOD contracts
    for services not addressed in your Better Buying Power Initiative
    remain in need of reform?
        Dr. Carter. One area that was not expressly addressed in my
    September 14, 2010, ``Better Buying Power'' memorandum last year, but
    remains ripe for reform in order to improve DOD's ability to acquire
    services effectively, is to enhance and develop the capability of the
    people who manage service contracts. With the Better Buying Power
    initiative, we have taken the key first step by putting in place senior
    managers at the general officer/senior executive service level in each
    of the DOD components as the responsible agents to oversee the full
    range of activity associated with the management of service contracts.
    In order to carry out their responsibilities, these senior managers
    will need people who have the training and experience necessary to
    execute the unique aspects of a given service acquisition. As noted by
    the Defense Science Board Task Force on Improvements in Services
    Contracting and documented in its report of March 2011, a significant
    number of functional personnel who are now managing service programs in
    the Department are not considered members of the acquisition workforce
    and as such have not received formal training as is mandated for DOD
    weapon system acquisition program managers under the Defense
    Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act. We can improve by extending our
    focus to that community of people. To that end, we have established a
    Functional Integrated Process Team for Services. The Director of
    Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy will work with the President
    of the Defense Acquisition University to develop training modules,
    tools, and other innovative solutions targeted to prepare this cadre of
    people who are generating requirements and managing a wide range of
    mission capabilities that are fulfilled through service contracts.

        52. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, are there any elements of your
    Better Buying Power Initiative that you believe could benefit from
    codification in law? If so, please explain.
        Dr. Carter. No, not at this time. The Better Buying Power
    initiative is aimed at improving our effectiveness of execution and
    improving our use of existing tools. Also, the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has sufficient
    authority as the Defense Acquisition Executive to enforce these
    changes.

                        DEFENSE FINANCIAL TRANSFORMATION

        53. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, for only the second time, the
    position of Deputy Secretary is dual-hatted with DOD's Chief Management
    Officer (CMO). As CMO, you would be responsible for DOD's financial
    management efforts, including getting it fully auditable by 2017, as
    required under law. Why do you think you are particularly well-suited
    and sufficiently qualified to making sure that DOD achieves this
    important objective?
        Dr. Carter. I have served in various positions with DOD, most
    recently as the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics,
    and Technology. I led the Department's efforts to accelerate the
    fulfillment of urgent operational needs; increase the Department's
    buying power; and strengthen the Nation's defenses against weapons of
    mass destruction and other emerging threats. I also led this Department
    in preparing for new strategic and fiscal realities, shaping key major
    acquisition decisions. I additionally worked to ensure DOD provides
    rapid and responsive support to the warfighter, and to transform the
    way this Department does business and acquires weapons systems.
    Finally, I worked to ensure that the weapons the U.S. military buys are
    more effective and more affordable. I intend to leverage this
    experience to oversee our audit readiness efforts, while relying on the
    Chief Financial Officer and Deputy CMO for day-to-day execution.
        I believe the current streamlined approach to achieving
    auditability, which focuses on improving and auditing the information
    most used to manage, is consistent with these efforts. Improving the
    information used to manage--budgetary and mission critical asset
    information--allows commanders and other leaders to better meet mission
    needs with the available resources. This alignment of operational and
    financial objectives is the most effective incentive to improve
    financial management. I look forward to working with Secretary Panetta
    in driving solutions to the strategic management challenges facing DOD.

        54. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, what, in your view, are the most
    significant impediments to DOD becoming auditable?
        Dr. Carter. DOD's legacy financial processes and systems were
    established many years ago and designed to ensure budgetary
    accountability--not meet the proprietary or commercial accounting
    standards called for in the CFO Act, which are necessary to achieve
    auditability. To meet these standards, there is a substantial amount of
    work to be done. Some of the most significant impediments include:

             DOD business and financial management systems are not
            fully integrated and do not always collect data at the
            necessary transaction level.
             Reliable end-to-end processes and internal controls
            have not fully been defined to support financial reporting.
             DOD lacks sufficient operational and financial
            personnel experienced in financial audits.

        55. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, if confirmed as DOD's CMO, how
    would you address these impediments?
        Dr. Carter. Meeting these challenges and improving our business
    processes have more attention in the Department than ever before. DOD
    will address them by changing the way it does business. To realize
    success, DOD is using a streamlined approach, implemented in August
    2009, which focuses on improving and auditing the information most used
    to manage. Improving the information used to manage--budgetary and
    mission critical asset information--allows commanders and other leaders
    to better meet mission needs with available resources. I believe this
    alignment of operational and financial objectives is the most effective
    incentive to improve financial management.
        The Department is committed to achieving auditability goals and has
    taken significant steps to ensure the goals are achieved by September
    30, 2017, as directed by Congress. There is still a great deal of work
    required to further improve our financial and business processes in
    order to meet this goal. I believe the Department can succeed because
    it has a well-defined plan with specific short-term and interim-term
    milestones, combined with a long-term roadmap. DOD also provided
    resources for the effort (approximately $300 million per year), and a
    clear governance process. Overall accountability rests with me as the
    Deputy Secretary of Defense and CMO. However, day-to-day responsibility
    falls to the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and DCMO and their staffs,
    as well as line management throughout the DOD business enterprise. To
    meet audit challenges, we have developed an effective partnership
    between the CFO and DCMO communities that will help with
    implementation. The DCMO and the Military Department CMOs play an
    integral role in the governance processes, including overseeing the
    implementation of new systems and the processes they enable. Senior
    leadership within the military components are committed to, and
    accountable for, accomplishing these interim goals.

        56. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, in connection with his confirmation
    hearing, Secretary Panetta said getting DOD auditable is a ``top
    priority'' and that he would see about accelerating the timetable to
    getting DOD auditable. Do you share Secretary Panetta's views?
        Dr. Carter. I share Secretary Panetta's desire to increase our
    efforts to implement the required changes and accelerate our progress
    in this area.

        57. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, how would you improve or accelerate
    DOD's plan to become auditable?
        Dr. Carter. The Department is dedicated to having fully auditable
    financial statements by 2017, the deadline established by Congress. On
    behalf of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense
    (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer (USD(C)/CFO) is reviewing DOD/
    Component Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness plans with
    appropriate DOD leaders to determine what improvements can be made to
    speed progress. Upon completion of this review, the Secretary will
    issue formal direction to the Service Secretaries and other leaders on
    additional actions they must take to ensure sufficient and qualified
    resources are devoted to achieving this priority in alignment with the
    Department's strategy and methodology.

        58. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, as CMO, you would also be
    responsible for ensuring that DOD fundamentally transforms how it does
    business--modernizes its business systems and restructures its
    processes. For years, GAO has identified these aspects of how DOD does
    business as exposing defense dollars to the risk of being waste,
    stolen, or otherwise abused. Why, based on your background and
    experience, do you think you are particularly well-suited and
    sufficiently qualified to address how DOD does business and how, if
    confirmed, would you address challenges in this area?
        Dr. Carter. As Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology,
    and Logistics), I was deeply involved in the Department's operations
    over the last 2 years. As Defense Acquisition Executive and Defense
    Logistics Executive, I have fulfilled leadership roles similar in
    nature to the CMO. This experience, and particularly my experience in
    establishing the Better Buying Power initiative across the acquisition
    activities of the Department, makes me well suited and qualified to
    address how DOD does business. I look forward to overseeing the
    Department's responses to both the broad and specific challenges that
    come with operating such a large, complex and vitally important
    resource for the Nation. I would address the challenges of
    modernization of our business systems and processes with the attention
    and thoroughness appropriate to such a costly and complex undertaking,
    ensuring that our senior leaders are all carrying out their roles in
    creating an integrated, effective, and agile business environment,
    while remaining good stewards of the taxpayers' dollars.

        59. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, do you think that there is merit to
    separating the CMO function from the position of Deputy Secretary of
    Defense? Please explain your answer.
        Dr. Carter. I believe the current joining of functions of the CMO
    and Deputy Secretary of Defense is appropriate. I would inform Congress
    if I determined that a separation of these duties was merited.

                ALTERNATIVE ENGINE FOR THE JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

        60. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, you have steadfastly supported a
    single-engine for the JSF, citing the significant upfront cost of a
    dual-source strategy and numerous analyses showing that, under the best
    of circumstances, there may never be a payback for carrying two engine
    suppliers. Given the enormity of possible spending cuts DOD is facing
    and the possibility that overall production numbers of the F-35 might
    be reduced, what is your assessment of the business case for two engine
    sources today?
        Dr. Carter. My position as well as the Department's position on the
    business case for the alternate engine remains unchanged: the costs to
    pursue a second engine are significant and immediate, while the
    benefits are speculative and would not be realized until many years
    later. As you allude to, the fiscal situation facing the Department
    amplified our concerns with the second engine program. The Department
    anticipates that many difficult situations will have to be made on
    major weapon systems, including the JSF program at large. DOD simply
    cannot afford to continue the second engine development activities with
    the many higher military priorities and the stringent budgets it faces.

        61. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, how does the offer from the
    industry team producing the engine to cover the remaining costs of
    development impact your opinion?
        Dr. Carter. The industry team has not made an offer to the
    Department to cover the remaining costs of the development program.
    There was discussion of a ``proposal'' from them to self-fund the
    second engine development activities for some limited period. The
    details of this ``proposal'' are sketchy at best. On April 25, 2011,
    the Department initiated the contract termination process and all
    qualification activities for the second engine ceased. DOD can
    reasonably project that any effort to continue the engine effort in
    isolation from the Government is likely to require extensive
    integration and validation efforts at a later time. These activities
    would require both time and resources which would ultimately be paid by
    the Government.

        62. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, based on what you currently know
    about it, why isn't this self-financing offer something we should
    embrace?
        Dr. Carter. The Department did not receive a proposal to self-
    finance the development of the alternative engine. In the absence of a
    proposal, it is difficult to determine whether such an idea would be in
    the best interests of the Department. The Department anticipates that
    the government would bear costs even under a self-funding proposal. For
    example, if the contractor self-financed the effort in isolation from
    the government, there would likely be a significant cost to the
    Government to re-integrate the second engine at a later time. The
    contractor may also require access to government test assets and
    facilities and this would also come at a cost to the Government. In
    addition, the contractor could pass the self-funding costs back to the
    Government via increased overhead rates and production prices. Careful
    scrutiny of a submitted detailed proposal would be required before DOD
    could objectively assess whether a self-financing ``offer'' would be
    something it should embrace.

        63. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, outgoing Deputy Secretary Lynn
    recently disagreed with the suggestion of a number of my colleagues
    that DOD should preserve all the equipment associated with development
    of the alternate engine so that the contractors could self-fund
    development. Do you share Secretary Lynn's position? Please explain.
        Dr. Carter. I do share Deputy Secretary Lynn's position that
    equipment purchased by DOD should be preserved as deemed necessary for
    use by DOD. A significant amount of the government equipment acquired
    under the F136 contract does, in fact, possess utility and value to the
    Department. For example, the F136 ground test engines have potential
    value to other DOD engine science and technology programs, such as the
    Adaptive Versatile Engine Technology program, and requests for F136
    hardware have already been received from DOD research labs.
    Additionally, common hardware procured under the F135 contract and
    provided to the F136 development program, is also useful to the F135
    program. Examples include the use of exhaust modules as development and
    flight test spares, and the use of the lift system controls hardware in
    software bench testing. The lift system common hardware (lift fan,
    driveshaft, exhaust module, and roll posts) can also be used by the
    F135 program. Preservation of any other equipment not found useful
    would come at additional expense to the Government, something the
    Department is not prepared to do.

                 U.S. FORCE REALIGNMENTS IN THE PACIFIC REGION

        64. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, we were recently briefed that the
    current cost estimate for the U.S. share of expenses of the planned
    relocation of 8,700 U.S. marines from Okinawa to Guam, is now over $17
    billion. That's $10 billion more than we estimated when we reaffirmed
    the agreement with the Government of Japan in 2009. I expect that the
    U.S. cost for construction of facilities will only rise as we include
    land acquisitions and improvements to the infrastructure of Guam. While
    I understand and support the need to maintain U.S. forces in the
    western Pacific, at what point does the movement of marines and their
    families to Guam become cost prohibitive?
        Dr. Carter. Our military forces in Japan are a central feature of
    our Asia-Pacific strategy, and the geostrategic location of Okinawa in
    East Asia is a critical component of this strategy. In order to ensure
    our continued use of facilities in Okinawa, we must not only address
    the impact of the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma on the
    surrounding communities, but we must also seek to reduce our overall
    footprint. The 2006 Realignment Roadmap attempts to accomplish these
    goals.
        In the context of reducing the U.S. presence on Okinawa, and
    consistent with our renewed emphasis on the global importance of the
    Asia-Pacific region, we seek a more geographically distributed,
    operationally resilient, and politically sustainable presence in the
    region. Guam must be part of that solution. As the westernmost reach of
    U.S. sovereign territory, Guam provides unconstrained access and
    operational flexibility for our forces. The Department is committed to
    establishing an operational U.S. Marine Corps presence on Guam.
        In response to numerous comments from Members of Congress, local
    political leaders, and citizens groups, the Department is carefully re-
    examining its options for Guam and is focused on developing an
    efficient, cost-effective laydown and master plan. I recognize the
    fiscal constraints we face in developing and implementing a force
    posture consistent with our strategy.

        65. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, in your opinion, given the
    direction to reduce defense spending, is DOD studying less costly
    alternatives that would achieve the same strategic benefits?
        Dr. Carter. In response to numerous comments from Members of
    Congress, local political leaders, and citizens groups, the Department
    is carefully reexamining our options for Guam and are focused on
    developing an efficient, cost-effective laydown and master plan. I
    recognize the fiscal constraints we face in developing and implementing
    a force posture consistent with our strategy for the region.

        66. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, what is you assessment of the
    status of the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to Camp
    Schwab on Okinawa, a Japanese funded initiative which is supposed to be
    contingent on the move of marines from Okinawa to Guam?
        Dr. Carter. The Department conveyed to the Government of Japan the
    urgency of taking the necessary steps to get construction on the
    airfield underway, starting with the approval of the landfill permit.
    In my judgment, the Japanese remain committed to the Realignment
    Roadmap.
        At the ``2+2'' meeting in June of this year, Secretary of Defense
    Gates and Secretary of State Clinton endorsed a plan for the
    configuration of the runway, while acknowledging that the FRF would not
    be completed by the Realignment Roadmap target date of 2014.
        Construction on the ground at Camp Schwab, which will enable the
    airfield construction to move forward more rapidly, has been underway
    for the past few years.

        67. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, when do you believe we will see
    tangible progress on the relocation of Futenma?
        Dr. Carter. ``Tangible progress'' on the Futenma Replacement
    Facility (FRF) should be understood within the context of the complete
    language in the Roadmap concerning the linkage between actions on
    Okinawa and Guam: ``the III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is
    dependent on: (1) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF and
    (2) Japan's financial contributions to fund development of required
    facilities and infrastructure on Guam.''
        In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on February
    15, 2011, Secretary of Defense Gates reiterated this formula, and
    further indicated his expectation that a decision on runway
    configuration would allow us to continue implementing the agreement. At
    the ``2+2'' meeting on June 21, 2011, Secretary of Defense Gates and
    Secretary of State Clinton endorsed a plan for the configuration of the
    runway, while acknowledging that the FRF would not be completed by the
    Realignment Roadmap target date of 2014.
        Tangible progress should not be thought of as single, specific
    event, but rather as a series of steps of roughly parallel Japanese and
    U.S. actions. Our understanding with the Government of Japan is that as
    progress on the FRF is achieved, the United States will take associated
    steps to move forward on Guam. I would see examples of noteworthy
    progress on the FRF being the decision on the runway configuration,
    approval of the environmental impact assessment, issuance of the
    landfill permit, construction of the seawall, and progress on the
    landfill itself.

        68. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, DOD recently awarded construction
    projects on Guam using funds provided by the Government of Japan,
    despite the lack of tangible progress on Futenma and despite concerns
    formally raised by this committee on the lack of a plan and cost
    estimate for the marines on Guam. Can you explain why the construction
    contract was awarded at this time in light of congressional concerns
    and unanswered questions?
        Dr. Carter. I appreciate the committee's concern regarding the Guam
    military realignment. In determining whether to award the Japanese-
    funded utilities and site improvements project, the Department
    seriously considered these concerns, as well as the interests of our
    partners in Japan and Guam, and the actions taken by the House. DOD
    deferred award of both the Apra Harbor Medical Clinic project and the
    option for utilities and site improvements at Finegayan. However, we
    elected to move forward with the utilities and site improvement work at
    Apra Harbor and Andersen Air Force Base (AFB), funded with Japanese
    fiscal year 2009 cash contributions, as these projects directly support
    previously awarded Military Construction (MILCON) projects and will be
    operationally beneficial. Congressional notification was completed in
    October 2010, and your staff was briefed at that time.
        The Government of Japan supported the decision to award the
    contract. With this first award of a Japanese-funded project, the
    United States is demonstrating its commitment to the Realignment
    Roadmap in accordance with the joint statement at the time of the June
    2011 ``2+2'' meeting.
        Tangible progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) should
    not be viewed as a single, specific event, but rather as a series of
    steps of roughly parallel Japanese and U.S. actions, as spelled out in
    our bilateral understandings on realignment. As the Government of Japan
    makes progress on the FRF, DOD will take associated steps to move
    forward on Guam.
        An essential point regarding the relationship between the Okinawa
    and Guam initiatives is that preparation on Guam will need to begin in
    advance of actual construction on the ground for the replacement
    facility at Camp Schwab. This will ensure that when Japan makes
    satisfactory progress on the FRF, suitable facilities will be available
    on Guam allowing the phased relocation of marines from Okinawa,
    sequenced in such a way as to maintain unit cohesion and operational
    readiness. The movement of marines to Guam, consistent with the
    agreement, depends on tangible progress towards the completion of the
    FRF at Camp Schwab.

        69. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, if you are confirmed as Deputy
    Secretary of Defense, how would you approach this issue?
        Dr. Carter. I will continue to consult closely with all relevant
    committees of Congress, allies, and partners in implementing the
    necessary force posture adjustments, consistent with the Department's
    regional strategy.

                              MILITARY PAY REFORM

        70. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, the Joint Select Committee on
    Deficit Reduction (JSCDR) has to make some decisions in the weeks ahead
    about future defense costs. The current 20-year military retirement
    system has come under scrutiny, particularly as the JSCDR begins its
    work and the requirement for deep cuts in defense costs looms. What is
    your sense of DOD's current position regarding retention of the current
    20-year retirement system?
        Dr. Carter. The 20-year retirement system has been a part of the
    military compensation and culture for decades; the entire force profile
    and promotion system is built around that structure. Revising or
    eliminating such a system must be approached deliberately and with a
    great amount of circumspection. The Department's leadership must be
    confident that any change in retirement will not have a significantly
    deleterious effect on the force or on individuals in the force, but
    will be supportive of recruitment and retention and will fairly
    compensate our servicemembers.

        71. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, do you see the need for change?
    Please explain.
        Dr. Carter. Overall, I see the need for a close review and analysis
    of the military retirement package. The review must consider the impact
    on recruiting and retention, the welfare of individual members, and
    judicious use of taxpayer dollars and the defense budget. Whether that
    review and analysis will support the case for change is undetermined at
    this point.

        72. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, what would DOD's response be to a
    call for a recommendation regarding maintaining the current system or
    relying on a new system?
        Dr. Carter. As far as recommendations, the Department already had
    several such calls, from various sources, for both preservation and
    reformation of the military retirement system. At this point, DOD's
    response is that the impact on military accessions and retention and
    other impacts on the force structure must be carefully assessed. While
    the military retirement system, as with all other compensation and
    benefits, is a fair subject of review for effectiveness and efficiency,
    no changes to the current retirement system have been recommended or
    approved by the Department, and no changes will be made precipitously
    or without careful consideration of potential consequences for both the
    current and future force.

        73. Senator McCain. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, what would be your
    answer to a question from a currently serving military member about the
    future of the 20-year retirement system?
        Dr. Carter. The Department's leadership is extremely sensitive to
    ensure we do not break faith with our currently serving members,
    especially those who demonstrated an inclination to a full military
    career by serving past their initial obligation period. Any proposed
    change or changes to the current system will be evaluated carefully and
    consideration of those obligations will be of the highest priority.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe

                             CIVILIAN HIRING FREEZE

        74. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, many small units in my State are
    being negatively affected by the civilian hiring freeze. They are not
    able to replace important positions in maintenance on our flight lines
    and depots, flight training, and other specialties. These cuts affect
    each unit's ability to accomplish their mission. In the last 5 years,
    blue collar and technical positions have flatlined. However, white
    collar professional and administrative positions have grown by 19
    percent. This statistic may be an indicator of an increasingly top-
    heavy corps of DOD civilians, but reflects that at the worker-level,
    our DOD professionals continue to do more with less. What is the way
    forward for the civilian hiring freeze?
        Dr. Carter. As part of the Department's efficiency initiative,
    Secretary Gates directed DOD organizations to hold to fiscal year 2010
    civilian funding levels, with some exceptions, for the next 3 years.
    This should not be perceived as a civilian hiring freeze but rather the
    Department's commitment to challenge workload requirements and more
    appropriately size its workforce to meet the most pressing and critical
    priorities. In particular, Secretary Gates' efforts focused on reducing
    administrative functions associated with headquarters staff while
    realigning resources to war-fighting capability, force structure
    recapitalization, and unit readiness. Secretary Panetta and I are
    committed to ensuring that the Department possesses everything it needs
    to protect national security at a time of considerable fiscal challenge
    in our country. To do so, spending choices must be based on sound
    strategy and policy. While some DOD organizations may be implementing
    short-term hiring freezes, sometimes referred to as strategic pauses,
    there is no Department-wide hiring freeze or constraint on any specific
    aspect of the workforce. These strategic pauses give Commanders and
    managers an opportunity to assess their organizational structure,
    identify their most pressing and critical areas, and minimize the
    potential adverse impact on our dedicated civil service workforce.
    Mission capability and unit readiness are a key element of these
    assessments.

        75. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, how will you ensure that DOD
    operations are not affected by the reductions in DOD civilians?
        Dr. Carter. Reductions in the Department's civilian workforce are
    being considered strategically and holistically (along with military
    end-strength, contracted services, and overall force structure). Any
    such reductions will be made in a manner that mitigates risk and
    minimizes impact on overall DOD operations, mission capability,
    operational readiness, and warfighter/family support. However, as
    Secretary Panetta and the Department's leadership have repeatedly
    stated, any further budget reductions beyond those in the current
    agreements, or constraints on hiring or retention of the Department's
    civilian workforce, would have an extremely adverse impact on our
    military's readiness and ability to execute the Nation's defense.

                  COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL ACQUISITION RULE REFORM

        76. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, despite well-founded attempts to
    improve our Federal Acquisition Rules (FARs) they remain complicated
    and outdated, leading to increased procurement times and costs. There
    are 1,680 policy documents and 91 laws affecting the FARs. There were
    30 new documents added in 2011 alone. DOD has developed alternative
    procedures, working groups, and organizations, such as Joint Improvised
    Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), that essentially bypass
    the current FARs, in order to rapidly field new weapons systems.
        The General Services Administration (GSA), NASA, DOD, and Office of
    Management and Budget (OMB) met in February to develop ``bold, new ways
    to improve the product quality and timeliness of the FAR process . . .
    [and call] for a tune-up of the FARs.'' FARs need more than a tune-up.
    The FAR Counsel, made up of the Administrator for Federal Procurement
    Policy, the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of National
    Aeronautics and Space, and the Administrator of General Services, are
    too busy to focus on rewriting and overhauling FARs. Do you believe the
    FARs have played a role in increasing the procurement costs and
    timelines of our weapon systems?
        Dr. Carter. On the whole, I do not believe that the Federal
    Acquisition Regulation (FAR) increases procurement costs and timelines
    of our weapon systems. I also note that we continuously update the FAR
    to reflect current statutes, executive orders, and acquisition
    policies. DOD supplements the FAR in the Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS)
    to reflect Department-unique laws and policies, and continuously
    updates the DFARS to ensure currency. The FAR and DFARS are codified in
    the Code of Federal Regulations, and revisions/updates to the FAR and
    DFARS are processed in accordance with the requirements of the Office
    of Federal Procurement Policy Act. These requirements include public
    comment periods that allow for all interested parties to provide
    comments and recommendations.
        As part of our Better Buying Power Initiative, we are looking very
    carefully at all processes and regulations that govern the operation of
    the acquisition system. My intent is to eliminate all that fail to add
    value and, consequently, to avoid the cost and unnecessary
    administrative burden they impose on our acquisitions.
        Separately, as a matter of clarification, the Joint Improvised
    Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) does not bypass the FAR.
    The JIEDDO leads, advocates, and coordinates all DOD actions in support
    of the combatant commanders' and their respective Joint Task Forces'
    efforts to defeat improvised explosive devices (IED) as weapons of
    strategic influence. It leverages the experience and expertise of
    warfighters across the Military Services, enhances network attack
    focus, increases procurement of device-defeat tools, and builds a
    robust set of IED-specific force training operations. However, it does
    not use procurement processes outside the FAR and DFARS.
        Finally, the Department established the Joint Rapid Acquisition
    Cell (JRAC) to facilitate an expeditious response to validated urgent
    Warfighter needs. The JRAC provides help in pushing urgent requirements
    through processes that are optimized for speed but compliant with the
    FAR and DFARS.

        77. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, what do you think of setting up a
    1-year commission to overhaul and rewrite FARs, a commission with
    members selected by Congress and organizations on the FAR Counsel
    responsible to reporting back to Congress their recommendations on
    streamlining and simplifying the FARs while ensuring proper oversight?
        Dr. Carter. I do not believe that we need such a commission. We
    continuously update the FAR and the DOD FAR Supplement (DFARS) to
    ensure implementation of current statutes, executive orders, and
    acquisition policies, as well as the deletion of obsolete text. As the
    Department takes these actions, one of the principles is to simplify
    and streamline the text to the maximum extent possible.
        The FAR does not increase the lead times or costs of procurements.
    The existing process ensures the currency of the FAR and DFARS, and a
    1-year commission to overhaul and rewrite the FAR is not necessary and
    not an effective use of resources.

                                    PALADIN

        78. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, I disagreed with the decision to
    terminate the Future Combat Systems (FCS) because our Army is in
    desperate need of modernization and our soldiers deserve better than
    50-year-old combat vehicles with 7 layers of new paint. The Paladin
    Integrated Management (PIM) is now the Army's lead fire support
    modernization effort in the wake of non-line-of-sight cannon (NLOS-C)
    cancellation. PIM will enhance the operational capability of the 46-
    year-old Paladin until we are able to acquire the next generation self-
    propelled howitzer. PIM is currently funded and I continue to work with
    the Army to accelerate fielding. Can you explain the significance of
    the PIM program and the importance of this program moving forward?
        Dr. Carter. The PIM program consists of a process that rebuilds
    vehicle platforms to original factory standards and applies
    modifications to deliver ``like new'' platforms, while incorporating
    improved subsystems and components to address obsolescence and
    supportability issues. The objectives are to ensure supportability/
    maintainability/interoperability by leveraging Heavy Brigade Combat
    Team (HBCT) fleet commonality for key components (engine, transmission,
    final drives, and suspension); replacing obsolete components; reducing
    logistics footprints; reducing operations and support costs;
    maintaining performance; leveraging Bradley common components;
    addressing crew survivability issues; and performing technology
    insertion.
        PIM will address increased force protection and survivability
    requirements. The PIM also fills existing capability gaps in the self-
    propelled artillery portfolio brought about by an aging fleet and the
    termination of prior modernization efforts. PIM provides growth
    potential in Space, Weight and Power (SWaP) and capacity for network
    expansion to accommodate future howitzer related needs, such as force
    protection packages. The Department is scheduled to award a
    Comprehensive Contract Modification by the end of 2011 and maintain
    Milestone C in June 2013.

                                      F-35

        79. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, DOD recently sent a report to
    Congress on the Chinese military, warning that: `` . . . China's
    military has benefited from robust investment in modern hardware and
    technology. Many modern systems have reached maturity and others will
    become operational in the next few years.'' One of those investments
    includes their new J-20 stealth fighter, which is actively undergoing
    testing. Russia is also unveiling its fifth generation fighter jet--the
    T-50--and is preparing to present it to the world market.
        What impact does the development and potential export of Chinese
    and Russian fifth generation fighters, proliferation the new surface-
    to-air missile systems, and improvements in missiles and sensor
    technology have on our legacy aircraft?
        Dr. Carter. Modern fighter aircraft, surface to air missiles, and
    sensors constitute a part of the growing threat posed to U.S. military
    forces by a wide array of systems. Our most capable adversaries are
    also deploying ballistic and cruise missiles, modern surface ships and
    submarines, mines, anti-satellite weapons, cyber threats, electronic
    warfare systems, and other weapons that enable anti-access and area
    denial (A2/AD) strategies.
        DOD is assessing these threats and instituted a number of
    initiatives to counter them. These run the gamut from developing new
    platforms (e.g., the F-35 and a new penetrating bomber), to fielding
    improved weapons and munitions (e.g., an extended range air-to surface
    standoff monition and a beyond-visual-range infrared air-to-air
    missile), to advanced electronic countermeasures, to new concepts for
    integrating and employing joint forces.
        In this dynamic threat environment, legacy aircraft operate at
    higher risk compared to fifth-generation aircraft but can conduct a
    range of necessary missions given adequate investments in upgraded
    avionics, sensors, and weapons. Within the context of these and other
    developments, U.S. forces will continue to operate a mixed fleet of
    mutually supporting fifth generation and legacy aircraft, investing in
    a more modern force over time.

        80. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, is 2,443 the validated number of F-
    35s required by our Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps? If so, is DOD
    committed to fielding the required fleet of 2,443 F-35s for all three
    Services and delivering the airplane to our international partners and
    allies as quickly and affordably as possible?
        Dr. Carter. The current program of record is 2,443 F-35s for the
    three U.S. Military Services. The Department is committed to fielding
    the F-35 as efficiently and affordably as possible to meet the Services
    and DOD requirements. Our international partners determine their own
    requirements, based on how many F-35 aircraft they need and when they
    need to purchase those aircraft. The partners negotiate directly with
    the contractor based on their requirements timeline.

                               TACTICAL DOMINANCE

        81. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, as a proportion of total combat
    deaths, infantry has increased from 71 percent in World War II to 81
    percent in wars fought since. Our acquisitions system is optimized for
    procuring large systems instead of extending our tactical dominance to
    the tactical edge. We need to meet the challenge, however, to make our
    small units tactically dominant. I echo General Dempsey's call to make
    the infantry squad more lethal. He said, ``We don't want to send a
    soldier into harm's way who doesn't overmatch his enemies.'' I am
    concerned that we may lose budget-share for our organizations that
    support the individual rifleman--a large portion of the program
    executive office (PEO) soldier budget comes from overseas contingency
    operations (OCO) which is dwindling even though we are still heavily
    engaged in Afghanistan. Is DOD looking at warfare from the ground up?
        Dr. Carter. Despite anticipated changes in overseas contingency
    operations and fiscal challenges, the Department is committed to
    providing small units with the equipment and training needed to
    maintain tactical dominance. Although our warfighters are better
    trained, led, and equipped, and more capable than ever, the Department
    must continuously evolve to maintain dominance over changing enemies
    and threats.

        82. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, what are some of the ways DOD is
    working to improve and lighten the load on our ground forces?
        Dr. Carter. The Department intends to continue pursuit of lighter
    body armor; lighter and more capable individual and crew-served
    weapons; and smaller, lighter, and more efficient batteries in order to
    reduce the burden on our ground forces.

        83. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, how will you ensure our acquisition
    system can better equip our soldiers and marines at the tactical edge?
        Dr. Carter. It is important for the Department to continue using
    all available acquisition means to lighten the rifleman's load and
    increase survivability and lethality. In addition to employing a
    deliberate acquisition approach to mature new technologies and
    integrate them into military equipment, the Department is responding to
    urgent warfighting needs by fielding mature capabilities as rapidly as
    possible, using all available rapid acquisition authorities, and
    working to better formalize and enhance the rapid acquisition process.

                           ARMY VEHICLE MODERNIZATION

        84. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, the Army procured its current fleet
    of combat vehicles 30 to 60 years ago and they are aging at an
    increasingly rapid rate. General Casey and General Chiarelli have
    stated they are burning up equipment as soon as they can procure it.
    Yet, Army procurement funding decreased $31 billion from fiscal year
    2008 to fiscal year 2010. In a June 16, 2009, Senate Armed Services
    Committee Airland Subcommittee hearing, LTG Thompson (Army Chief
    Acquisition Officer) said, ``The Army has tried 5 times in the past 20
    years to modernize its fighting vehicles . . . [I]t has kept its tanks
    and Bradleys operationally relevant [but] at some point in time the
    Army has to modernize those 16,000 fighting vehicles for the future or
    we are going to put soldiers in harm's way.'' The Army is moving
    forward with plans on the next combat ground vehicle but the only
    vehicle being discussed is the infantry vehicle. What is the overall
    plan for Army vehicle modernization?
        Dr. Carter. The Army has a comprehensive Combat Vehicle
    Modernization strategy that addresses key capability shortfalls for the
    entire combat vehicle fleet (Abrams tank, Bradley Fighting Vehicle,
    Stryker, and M113 family). The strategy is based on three parallel and
    complementary efforts: transform, replace, and improve. The highest
    priority effort is transforming the capability of the Heavy Brigade
    Combat Team by acquiring the Ground Combat Vehicle Infantry Fighting
    Vehicle. The second priority is replacing the M113 Family of Vehicles
    with an Armored-Multi Purpose Vehicle (AMPV). Lastly, the Army will
    improve the Abrams tank, Bradley Cavalry, Fire Support, and Engineer
    Vehicles, and the Stryker to increase protection, ensure required
    mobility, and allow integration of the emerging network. This strategy
    ensures the Army's entire fleet of combat vehicles will be able to
    operate side-by-side across formations with common situational
    awareness and required levels of protection, mobility, and lethality.

        85. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, what vehicles will be included as
    part of the Army's next combat ground vehicle?
        Dr. Carter. The Army is pursuing an incremental approach to
    procuring new Ground Combat Vehicle capabilities. The Army will first
    replace the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle with a new Ground Combat
    Vehicle (GCV). The GCV acquisition strategy implements innovative
    measures designed to keep the program on schedule and on budget, to
    include fixed-price incentive fee contracts in the 2-year Technology
    Development phase, an increased emphasis on mature technologies and
    reliance on competition throughout the program as an incentive. First,
    contractors will work collaboratively with the Army to develop
    competitive, best-value engineering designs to meet critical Army
    needs. Concurrently, the Army will initiate a dynamic update to its GCV
    Infantry Fighting Vehicle analysis of alternatives and conduct separate
    technical and operational assessments of existing non-developmental
    vehicles. Results from this assessment, along with contractors design
    efforts, will inform GCV requirements to support the next program
    milestone and facilitate a full and open competition for the next phase
    of the GCV program. Further increments of the vehicle are anticipated
    in the future, as additional capabilities are required.
        In terms of the overall combat vehicle portfolio, the Army is also
    examining potential solutions for the Armored Multi-Platform Vehicle to
    replace the M113. The Army will conduct analysis to determine whether
    modified platforms already in the inventory or non-developmental
    vehicles provide the best capability.

        86. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, will we be procuring one type of
    vehicle at time or multiple platforms?
        Dr. Carter. To ensure interoperability of the Army's mounted force,
    the Department will invest in multiple platforms simultaneously,
    through a combination of new procurement and vehicle upgrade programs.

        87. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, when do you expect increased
    budgets for procuring these vehicles?
        Dr. Carter. The Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) is funded in PB12 and
    the funding extends throughout the FYDP. In addition to the GCV, the
    Army's Combat Vehicle Modernization (CVM) strategy has several other
    components, to include upgrading Abrams tanks and non-IFV Bradleys.
    Upon congressional approval of a new start, the Army intends to
    initiate the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) program. The AMPV
    will replace the M113 Family of Vehicles (FOV) with a platform that is
    more survivable and mobile and can accomplish missions across the full
    spectrum of conflict.
        The Army's PB12 request includes RDT&E funding for all three CVM
    components. Procurement funding for the AMPV is planned to start in
    fiscal year 2014 with the first unit equipped planned for fiscal year
    2017. Abrams and non-IFV Bradley upgrades are also funded in PB12 and
    the funding extends throughout the FYDP.
        The Army believes that collectively, all components of the Combat
    Vehicle Modernization Strategy are within the Army's projected funding
    resources.

                                      IRAQ

        88. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, there are approximately 46,000 U.S.
    troops in Iraq. Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki and other Iraqi leaders
    have indicated they would like a U.S. presence beyond 2011 focused on
    training their forces, intelligence, and protecting their air space and
    borders. Massoud Barzani, President of Iraqi Kurdistan, said if
    American troops leave, the sectarian violence that plagued Iraq after
    U.S.-led operations began might erupt anew and called on the Iraqi
    Government to sign an agreement with the Americans to keep forces in
    the country.
        The Obama administration is finalizing several options that could
    leave as little as 3,000 to 4,000 U.S. forces in Iraq beyond that date,
    but no decision has been made by Iraq or the United States. This number
    is significantly lower than the 14,000 to 18,000 recently presented by
    General Lloyd Austin, Commanding General, U.S. Forces-Iraq. I believe
    leaving 3,000-4,000 U.S. forces in Iraq increases the risk to those
    forces and jeopardizes the successes achieved made by the Iraqi people
    and the coalition of nations who help liberate them. What is the U.S.
    Government's strategic plan in Iraq and how does a U.S. force presence
    contribute to that strategy?
        Dr. Carter. Strategically, a long-term partnership with the Iraqi
    Government and people is in the United States' interest, and a
    relationship with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) will be an important
    part of that partnership. The Department is currently in negotiations
    with the Iraqi Government about the nature of that relationship. The
    negotiations to date focused on possible mission sets to support the
    ISF in areas that Iraqi commanders have identified as shortfalls, such
    as: logistics, air and maritime security training, combined arms
    training for Iraq's external defense, and intelligence fusion for Iraqi
    counterterrorism operations.
        Iraq no longer needs large numbers of U.S. forces to maintain
    internal stability, and the commanders in the field assess that the ISF
    can handle counter-insurgency operations. The ISF has the lead for
    security, and levels of violence remain dramatically reduced from where
    they were in 2006 and 2007.
        At this point, no decisions have been made about any force levels
    in Iraq after 2011. The United States will continue to adhere to the
    2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement.

        89. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, how does a U.S. force presence in
    Iraq impact the security of the region?
        Dr. Carter. Given Iraq's importance and strategic location, it is
    profoundly in the U.S. national interest that Iraq emerge as a
    strategic partner to the United States; sovereign, stable and self-
    reliant; and a positive force for moderation and stability.
        We seek to achieve that end in part through the development of a
    continuing security partnership similar to those the United States has
    with other countries in the region. Such a partnership, which would
    center around a training mission, would be defined based on Iraqi
    desires, available U.S. and Iraqi resources, and competing global
    requirements. Training the Iraqi Security Forces would increase Iraq's
    capacity for both internal and external defense, and would build toward
    our shared objective of a strong strategic partnership that contributes
    to regional security.
        That said, no final decisions have been made--nor have we reached
    an agreement with the Government of Iraq--about a post-2011 U.S.
    presence in Iraq.

        90. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, what are the courses of action
    currently being looked at in Iraq, what are the risks associated with
    different courses with regard to troop levels, and what missions can be
    accomplished with those force levels?
        Dr. Carter. We are currently in negotiations with the Iraqi
    Government about the nature and scope of a potential future
    relationship. Any future security relationship would be fundamentally
    different from the one that we have had since 2003. The United States
    wants a normal, productive relationship with Iraq going forward--a
    partnership like we have with other countries in the region and around
    the world.
        For some time, the Department had had informal consultations with
    our Iraqi partners, including senior Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
    officials, regarding ISF gaps and areas in which the ISF might request
    training post-2011. These areas include combined arms training,
    necessary for Iraq's external defense; intelligence fusion (essential
    for a counterterrorism capability); air and maritime security training;
    and logistics.
        The negotiations to date have focused on the possible mission sets
    to support the ISF in these and other areas. Any post-2011 U.S. forces
    presence upon which the United States and Iraq might ultimately agree
    would flow from the requirements to support training and related
    mission sets.
        Again, we have made no final decisions--nor reached any agreement
    with the Iraqis--about a post-2011 U.S. forces presence in Iraq.

                                  AFGHANISTAN

        91. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, Afghanistan remains as one of the
    epicenters of violent extremism. Progress has been made but it is
    fragile and reversible. The deadlines of July 2011, summer of 2012, and
    December 2014 continue to have a devastating effect on operations and
    has sent the wrong message to our coalition partners, the people of
    Afghanistan, and the Taliban. Enemy activity in Afghanistan
    historically intensifies during the summer and this summer prove no
    different as evidenced by the bombing in Wardak Province on Sunday and
    the attacks in Kabul today. However, the Obama administration began
    drawing down U.S. forces beginning this July when almost 1,000 soldiers
    from the 45th Infantry Brigade Combat Team from Oklahoma were rerouted
    at the 11th hour to Kuwait. This strategy of not replacing units as
    they rotate out of Afghanistan is disruptive and increases risk.
        August was the deadliest month for U.S. forces since the war in
    Afghanistan began in 2001 with a total of 66 killed, 30 in a Chinook
    helicopter crash on August 6. Since July 29, 2011, Oklahoma soldiers
    have been killed in Afghanistan--they are doing a great job, are well-
    trained, but they are fighting it out every day executing the mission
    we have given them. President Obama has ordered the withdrawal of
    10,000 U.S. forces this year and another 23,000 by the summer of 2012,
    leaving about 68,000 forces on the ground. What rationale drove the
    drawdown at the height of the fighting season?
        Dr. Carter. The ``surge'' of forces ordered by President Obama in
    2009 was never intended to be open-ended, and has always been connected
    to the beginning of the transition process, which began in 2011.
    Campaign progress allowed the Department to begin recovering ``surge
    forces,'' marking an important milestone toward the completion of the
    transition of lead security responsibility to the ANSFs by the end of
    2014. Further, decisions over the pace and timing of the drawdown,
    within the designated milestones, were delegated to Commander, U.S.
    Forces Afghanistan/International Security Assistance Force (USFOR-A/
    ISAF). DOD is carefully monitoring campaign progress, and will ensure
    that decisions about force strength support the strategy.

        92. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, Ambassador Crocker said earlier
    this month that the United States must demonstrate strategic presence
    to win this long war in Afghanistan. Do you believe setting withdrawal
    dates of July 2012 and December 2014 demonstrates strategic patience
    and shows U.S. long-term commitment?
        Dr. Carter. The beginning of the recovery of the surge forces and
    the plan for completing transition of lead responsibility for security
    throughout the country to Afghan forces by the end of 2014, combined
    with the strategic partnership the United States is negotiating with
    the Afghan Government, show strategic patience and long-term
    commitment. These dates are achievable and consistent with the Afghans'
    own desire and efforts to increase their responsibility and leadership
    for the security of their country.

        93. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, do you believe that a stable
    Afghanistan will help prevent future attacks like that of September 11,
    2001, on this country?
        Dr. Carter. Yes. President Obama's strategy--as laid out in his
    West Point address on December 1, 2009--focuses on our core goal, which
    is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and to prevent its
    capacity to threaten the United States and our allies and partners in
    the future.
        To accomplish this, the Department is pursuing three objectives
    that will secure and stabilize the country: deny al Qaeda a safe haven,
    reverse the Taliban's momentum, and strengthen the capacity of
    Afghanistan's security forces and government so that they can take lead
    responsibility for Afghanistan's future.
        DOD made substantial progress on these objectives and have exceeded
    our expectations on the core goal of defeating al Qaeda, killing 20 of
    its top 30 leaders, including Osama bin Laden. The United States and
    its allies have broken the Taliban's momentum in their heartland in
    Kandahar and Helmand. We have also trained more than 100,000 new ANSF
    personnel, who are now in the lead for security responsibilities in
    seven areas of the country, with more to follow this fall.
        This undeniable progress is important to American security because
    it helps foster an Afghanistan that is stable and secure-a country in
    which extremists will not find a safe haven or a platform for launching
    attacks on the United States and our allies and partners.

                                WEAPONS BOYCOTTS

        94. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, European activists, including
    European parliamentarians, are pressuring European banks and funds to
    divest themselves of millions of dollars in investments in U.S.
    companies that produce landmines, cluster munitions, and nuclear
    weapons. Such actions harm the U.S. defense industrial base and also
    impede the military strategy of our Armed Forces and allies. The
    efforts of these groups are occurring outside the legitimate
    international dialogue about these important weapons systems, the
    United Nations' (UN) Convention on Cluster Weapons.
        In fact, efforts by international activists to disrupt U.S.
    munitions industries are misguided. Modern cluster munitions like the
    CBU-97 are more properly termed sensor fused weapons because they use
    sensors to increase their lethality against legitimate targets while
    protecting civilians against unexploded munitions and indiscriminate
    effects.
        Moreover, as DOS says, sensor-fused weapons, cluster munitions, and
    nuclear weapons are important tools in the U.S. national defense
    strategy that ensures our freedom and protects the lives of our
    soldiers. ``Their elimination from U.S. stockpiles would put the lives
    of its soldiers and those of its coalition partners at risk,'' DOS
    writes.
        There have been proposals to register and sanction foreign entities
    that seek to disrupt the U.S. defense industry. Such foreign entities,
    private and public, hold important defense suppliers at risk and
    endanger the U.S. defense industrial base, an important part of our
    Nation's military power. Do these foreign boycotts pose a material risk
    to our national defense?
        Dr. Carter. Given the interdependence of global commerce, I share
    the concern that national security and economic security face new
    risks. Foreign laws, policies, and international agreements, to which
    the United States is not a party, may impact our industrial base and
    thus affect our national defense.

        95. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, what actions is DOD taking to
    ensure that we are able to continue to be able to use these legitimate
    weapons systems?
        Dr. Carter. The Department established a policy in 2008 that
    restricts use of cluster munitions after 2018 to those that have a
    submunition failure rate of not more than 1 percent, thereby preserving
    the ability to employ an important military capability while addressing
    humanitarian concerns associated with cluster munition use. The
    Department continues to support negotiations within the United Nations
    Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons framework on a cluster
    munitions protocol that will protect U.S. national security interests.

        96. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, does DOD currently have the
    authorities necessary to protect our defense industrial base from
    weapons boycotts?
        Dr. Carter. The influence of activists and foreign governments on
    the U.S. defense industrial base is a complex dynamic. Protecting the
    U.S. defense industrial base and national security interests will
    require the Department to collaborate effectively with other executive
    branch agencies and Congress. We continue to work to understand and
    communicate the risks to the industrial base and work closely with
    other nations to preserve domestic industrial capabilities.

                             TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY

        97. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, traumatic brain injury (TBI)
    continues to be one of the most prevalent wounds from operations in
    Iraq and Afghanistan. The ability to diagnose and treat TBI continues
    to be problematic despite the priority Congress and the Army have given
    to it. I remain concerned that we are not adequately screening our
    soldiers when they return. Once diagnosed with TBI, we need to be able
    to treat our wounded warriors and ensure that treatment is continued as
    long as needed to include transition to the Department of Veterans
    Affairs (VA) care. Various alternative treatments for TBI may have
    promise and are used in the private sector but few of these treatments
    have been approved for use on Army soldiers. In a report by National
    Public Radio, General Chiarelli expressed frustration about the pace of
    the vetting of these treatments. What frictions are delaying the
    vetting of alternative treatments?
        Dr. Carter. DOD has enacted TBI screening programs by establishing
    policies that mandate a medical evaluation after a servicemember is
    exposed to a potentially concussive event and post-deployment health
    assessments. Alternative treatment studies must be developed in
    accordance with the highest standards of scientific research and
    analysis. Each discovery leads to new questions or problems to be
    solved such as co-occurrence with disorders such as post-traumatic
    stress disorder. Well-considered research designs paired with
    streamlined research policies allow military supported research to
    answer critical questions and make valuable contributions to the health
    and welfare of our servicemembers and to the country. DOD is looked to
    as the leader in neurotrauma research, and the DOD neurotrauma
    portfolio complements similar areas of research funded through the
    National Institutes of Health and Department of Veterans Affairs. As
    the many investments in TBI and psychological health research begin to
    come to fruition, the collective understanding of these health concerns
    will improve, leading to more effective screening techniques and
    treatment strategies.

        98. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, what can we do to speed up the
    process of the vetting better ways of diagnosing and treating TBI?
        Dr. Carter. To address this process of vetting better ways of
    diagnosis and treatment, we have put into place a method for a
    comprehensive review of a large portfolio of over 400 studies on TBI.
    DOD used a series of In Process Reviews (IPRs) to examine individual
    studies in specific subsections of the portfolio. In these IPRs,
    individual researchers are invited to present their ongoing work to
    panels of individuals from DOD, the Department of Veterans Affairs
    (VA), and the National Institutes of Health (NIH). This presents
    opportunities for the government to share information across agencies,
    to mitigate any potential redundancies, to leverage overlaps, and to
    remain informed of study progress and/or delays. As some of these
    individuals are clinicians, the IPRs help facilitate rapid translation
    of emerging research data into improved clinical care. The IPR process
    also presents investigators with opportunities to ask questions of the
    government, to share data or lessons-learned, and to identify
    collaborators. For example, just this year, DOD reviewed the current
    status on studies that address neuroimaging, non-invasive diagnostics
    in mild TBI, blast brain research and biomarker findings, cognitive
    rehabilitation and biomechanics after injury. This review process
    allows the Department to quickly assess what strategies work and just
    as important, what strategies do not work. The size of the entire DOD
    research portfolio on TBI cannot be overstated. The process for vetting
    research findings to identify and field safe and effective clinical
    care has proven to be the most efficient methodology to date.
        To further speed up the process of vetting better ways of
    diagnosing and treating TBI, researchers need access to emerging data
    from studies. To help facilitate direct comparison among studies, the
    U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command and NIH are developing
    a Federal Interagency Traumatic Brain Injury Research (FITBIR) database
    to store, integrate and share datasets from numerous small and large
    studies so that researchers can collaborate on future research. The
    FITBIR database will allow for comparison across research studies based
    on a common set of data elements, thereby advancing our understanding
    of research outcomes more quickly, and lead to more rapid validation
    and adoption of best practices, to include effective diagnostic
    modalities and treatment alternatives.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Thurmond, V. A., Hicks, R., Gleason, T., Miller, A. C.,
    Szuflita, N., Orman, J., et al. (2010). Advancing integrated research
    in psychological health and traumatic brain injury: common data
    elements. Arch Phys Med Rehabil, 91(11), 1633-1636.

        99. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, what types of equipment solutions
    are being developed, procured, and fielded to help prevent, measure,
    and identify TBI?
        Dr. Carter. DOD TBI research portfolio is comprised of more than
    400 studies investigating numerous questions across the full spectrum
    of TBI prevention, screening, diagnosis, treatment, and recovery. Some
    of these studies have led to the development or refinement of new blast
    wave sensors and accelerometers. Different versions of sensors are
    currently being fielded with deploying units as part of new helmet
    designs. Characterizing the effects of blast waves with different
    parameters on the human body is a very complicated endeavor, and is a
    high priority in many areas of the DOD research portfolio, not just in
    the TBI portion. A wide variety of approaches are being taken
    simultaneously to address these questions, including computational
    modeling, improved animal models, advanced physics, and even
    unprecedented integration of operational and field epidemiologic data.
        Other areas of major investment include of non-invasive, field
    deployable mild TBI (mTBI) diagnostics, and neuroimaging. Currently,
    mTBI, by definition, is not visible using conventional imaging
    technologies, but data from ongoing studies is beginning to reveal
    improved ways of identifying, measuring, and describing specific brain
    changes associated with TBI. Research which includes Diffusion Tensor
    Imaging (DTI), a neuroimaging modality, is starting to show promising--
    but still very early--results for detecting mTBI. In addition, other
    technological advancements are being fielded to include EYE-TRAC (Eye-
    Tracking Rapid Attention Computation) that may help to evaluate
    attention and concentration problems after mTBI. Quantitative EEG
    (Electroencephalography) is also being fielded as an objective
    diagnostic device that may help identify mild TBI on the battlefield.

                     SALE OF MI-17S TO IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

        100. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, DOD is spending billions to
    rebuild the helicopter fleets of Iraq and Afghanistan, by using Russian
    helicopters. The rationale is that Iraq and Afghan pilots, along with
    maintainers are used to operating Russian hardware. This ignores the
    fact that we are not equipping the same personnel that flew and
    maintained the old aircraft. We are training new pilots starting in
    small training aircraft. The program misses an opportunity to build
    ongoing relationships with these two countries. Iraq and Afghanistan
    will have to deal with Russia, not the United States, to supply and fix
    their aircraft for decades to come. We are also missing an opportunity
    to spend tax dollars at home. The money to buy the Russian helicopters
    is spent at the Russian defense export agency, and the money to
    refurbish and fix the Russian helicopters is paid to Russia-certified
    Russian airframe and propulsion mechanics. What is the rationale that
    DOD is using to justify buying Russian-made and maintained helicopters
    for our Iraq and Afghan allies?
        Dr. Carter. The United States provides assistance to our partner
    nations as a critical enabler in building an enduring capability for
    them to operate and maintain rotary wing fleets for both the ongoing
    war on terrorism and to enhance their internal security. To develop
    capabilities that they can sustain without continued U.S. assistance,
    some partners require low-cost, low-maintenance platforms.
        As stated in the question, the rationale to provide and support Mi-
    17s involve pilot and maintenance personnel familiarity, as well as
    complementing prior inventories of these aircraft models; cultural
    suitability; and the partner nation's preferences. Decisions were
    guided by the commanders on scene. Past procurements focused on the Mi-
    17 to leverage existing experience and because the aircraft provides
    critical capabilities not easily replaced by other platforms. The Mi-17
    is a multi-purpose aircraft that spans the medium- and heavy-lift
    categories, and can carry out attack and transport roles
    simultaneously. Simply stated, it is a low-tech platform that can lift
    a large payload.
        The Afghans have been using the Mi-17/Mi-8 series helicopters since
    the early 1980s due to its ability to operate at high-altitudes and in
    high temperatures with heavy loads. When the United States began
    rebuilding the Afghan Air Force (AAF), there were at least six Mi-17/
    Mi-8 aircraft being operated by the Afghans. The Commander of U.S.
    Central Command (CENTCOM) decided to continue to support the Mi-17 due
    to: its proven operational capabilities in the extreme environments of
    Afghanistan; its relatively low cost; and the fact that the maintenance
    system for the Mi-17 is easier for the AAF members to operate--an
    important factor due to the limitations of the education system in
    Afghanistan. The Afghans have since been introduced to western
    helicopters in the form of the MD-530 which is a very basic, light
    training helicopter that will be used for their initial entry rotary
    wing training.
        The initial Iraqi Air Force procurement of 18 Mi-17s, one of the
    first procurement decisions made by the fledgling Iraq Ministry of
    Defense (MoD), was undertaken without assistance from U.S. advisors and
    proved problematic. The decision to fill out the Iraqi fleet with 22
    additional Mi-17s was made by the Government of Iraq (GoI) and
    supported by the Multi-National Security Transition Command--Iraq
    (MNSTC-I) to meet Iraq's priorities. The latter MoD contract was
    processed through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program which is a
    more robust and transparent approach for building Iraq's security
    forces. Iraq has not indicated any intent to procure additional Mi-17s.
        As the Iraq security forces and their sustaining institutions have
    grown more comfortable with U.S. equipment and the FMS program, the GoI
    has expressed increasing interest in U.S. helicopters. The Iraqi MoD
    has already purchased 24 Bell helicopters, and has shown interest in
    purchasing additional U.S.-made helicopters when funding is available.
    Also, the Department recently notified Congress of our intent to sell
    six observation and 10-12 utility helicopters to the Iraqi police
    forces. We will continue to work with Iraq using the FMS system.

        101. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Carter, what opportunities were U.S.
    companies given to compete their helicopters for this purpose or to
    compete for the procurement and maintenance of the Russian helicopters?
        Dr. Carter. Russian helicopters, such as the Mi-17, have been
    procured four times; competitive details are summarized as follows:

              In December 2007, the Army Program Executive Office for
            Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation purchased 22 Mi-17
            aircraft for an Iraq FMS case. The contract was awarded sole
            source to ARINC, a U.S.-based firm, on the basis of unusual and
            compelling urgency. The Justification and Approval was approved
            by the Army Acquisition Executive.
              In 2008, the U.S. Navy Counter-Narcoterrorism Technology
            Program Office (CNTPO) purchased 10 Mi-17 aircraft, through the
            Strategic Missile Defense Command (SMDC), in support of an
            Afghan requirement. The competitively awarded, Indefinite
            Delivery/ Indefinite Quantity, Multiple Award Task Order
            Contract has five U.S. prime contractors: ARINC, Raytheon,
            Northrup Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and U.S. Training Center;
            ARINC was competitively selected for this order.
              In 2009, the Naval Air Systems Command awarded a competitive
            contract to a U.S. company, DTI, for four civilian Mi-17
            aircraft in support of an Afghan requirement.
              In May 2011, the Army Nonstandard Rotary Wing Program Office
            awarded a sole source contract, through the U.S. Army Aviation
            and Missile Command (AMCOM), for 21 Mi-17 aircraft in support
            of an Afghan requirement to Rosoboronexport (ROE), the Russian
            Federation's approved military export agency. The Secretary of
            the Army approved a Public Interest Determination and Findings
            that ROE is the only lawful source under Russian export control
            laws for the acquisition of military end-use Mi-17 aircraft.
            Diplomatic exchanges had previously confirmed the Russian
            assertions, first raised in November 2010, when the Russian
            Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the U.S.
            Ambassador to Russia that aircraft to be procured for the
            Afghanistan Ministry of Defense were considered Military End
            Use and, as such, Russian law required they be procured as
            military items through ROE. Prior to May 2010, DOS sanctions
            imposed on ROE precluded such a contract. Future procurement of
            Russian aircraft for military end-use purposes is expected to
            be subject to the same constraint.

        Sustainment and overhaul contracts should continue to provide
    competitive opportunities for U.S. companies in the future. Many of
    these aircraft, especially the civilian variants, are widely supported
    through both foreign and domestic commercial providers. At present, the
    U.S. Army, in its role as the designated, single Non-Standard Rotary
    Wing Program Office, is leveraging existing support contracts, which
    include the CNTPO SMDC IDIQ and an AMCOM Logistics Support Facility
    (LSF) contract. Both were competitively awarded contracts. As
    previously stated, the CNTPO SMDC IDIQ was awarded to five prime
    contractors (ARINC, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and
    USTC), all of which are U.S. based firms. The LSF prime contractor is
    Science and Engineering Services, Incorporated (SESI), also a U.S.
    based firm.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss

                                      F-35

        102. Senator Chambliss. Dr. Carter, I am concerned that DOD has
    redirected money originally planned for F-35 purchases to buy
    significantly less-capable fourth generation F-18s which are unable to
    operate in contested air space and each year can operate in fewer and
    fewer environments. This is especially the case given the accelerated
    Russian and Chinese J-20 and T-50 development, the alarming
    proliferation of the very latest sophisticated surface-to-air missiles
    (SAM), as well as rapid development of Chinese sensors and other
    advanced systems. Not only are we buying these aircraft but we're going
    to have to pay to operate and sustain them for well over a decade at
    further expense to taxpayers. If confirmed, will you commit to
    examining this expenditure of taxpayers' resources and report back to
    us regarding the extent to which you believe this is a wise way to
    spend DOD and taxpayers' dollars?
        Dr. Carter. In building the fiscal year 2013 President's budget,
    the Department is working hard to balance risk appropriately, avoiding
    over-expenditure in some areas so that we can attenuate key shortfalls
    elsewhere. For the fiscal year 2013-2017 timeframe, DOD must fund a
    tactical air forces portfolio that meets security needs in terms of
    both capability and capacity in the face of significant budget
    pressures. The Department is also assessing to what extent it should
    extend the service life of DOD's legacy fleet of F/A-18A-Ds and F-16s
    to maintain appropriate inventory levels. The Department remains fully
    committed to the F-35 program and is actively managing JSF costs and
    schedule.

        103. Senator Chambliss. Dr. Carter, DOD has reduced the number of
    F-35 aircraft in the near-term budget plan by 246 over the last 2
    years. There are rumors that DOD may reduce the planned numbers even
    further in next year's budget request. How can DOD continue to delay
    the procurement of fifth generation fighters while buying more fourth
    generation fighters when the threat is so clearly increasing and fourth
    generation F-18 fighters cannot survive when flying against the latest
    threat SAMs that are being fielded today?
        Dr. Carter. Based on the current and projected threats, I believe
    it is critical that the U.S. transitions to a fifth generation
    capability across the Services, while maintaining sufficient legacy
    inventory capacity to prevail in current and near-term conflicts. DOD
    needs JSF to deal with advanced fighters and surface-to-air missiles
    worldwide, especially in the stressing electronic warfare environments
    of the future. Additionally, the F-22A modernization program will
    provide improved fifth generation capability versus a high-end foe. To
    ensure the United States possesses sufficient capacity of fighter
    attack aircraft, the Department funded production of the F/A-18E/F
    through fiscal year 2014. While this aircraft is not stealthy like JSF
    and F-22, it has advanced sensing and is highly capable against many of
    the threats faced today and expected to face in the future.

        104. Senator Chambliss. Dr. Carter, last year you said you needed
    about $5 billion over 4 years to pay for more F-35 flight test and
    development costs and justified a cutback in F-35 production aircraft
    to pay for it. But DOD actually cut over $12 billion from the F-35
    production program by reducing procurement and spent much of the money
    on fourth generation F-18s. I don't believe that shows much
    appreciation for the strategic need to retain our air dominance and
    follow through on our own Government's strategy to keep us ahead of
    China and Russia. Can you assure me that you will not cut fifth
    generation airplanes in the future to buy additional obsolete fourth
    generation airplanes?
        Dr. Carter. The Department is carefully assessing the best approach
    in balancing tactical air forces' capability and capacity, while
    managing JSF concurrency. JSF brings an unprecedented combination of
    advanced sensing, stealth, and firepower; that said, the program is
    still under development and in the past two budget submissions resulted
    in slowed production in order to properly fund development and allow
    manufacturing processes to mature. Also, in the fiscal year 2013
    budget, as with the 2012 submission, the Department faces significant
    resourcing pressures. The decision to procure additional F/A-18E/F
    aircraft in the fiscal year 2012 budget was an acknowledgement of the
    need to maintain sufficient DON inventory; the FA-18E/F is not as
    advanced as the JSF, but it is fully mature and highly capable against
    many of the threats we faced today and expect to face in the future.

                           C-130 ADVANCED PROCUREMENT

        105. Senator Chambliss. Dr. Carter, DOD did not request advance
    procurement (AP) funding for C-130s in fiscal year 2012 as you have
    normally done. When I queried DOD on this back in the spring DOD
    indicated that the AP funding was unnecessary since AP funding had been
    obligated late over the last 2 years. I did some research into this and
    learned that the Air Force notified DOD during the fiscal year 2011
    budget build process that they intentionally withheld previous year's
    AP funding for ``negotiating leverage with the contractor'' and were
    able to save money on a future lot of C-130s. However, the Air Force
    also told DOD that not having AP funding in fiscal year 2012 would
    create greater costs over the FYDP and result in later delivery of
    aircraft. In response to a request from this committee during mark-up,
    you recently sent the committee a letter on this issue. In response to
    the question, ``would the addition of AP funding in fiscal year 2012
    save resources over the FYDP,'' you responded that: ``DOD now believes
    that the inclusion of AP in fiscal year 2012 may save $54 million over
    the FYDP.''
        I appreciate your response and would just like to ask you, do you
    agree that, in the case of major acquisition programs where long lead
    items are needed to ensure the most efficient production process, that
    advanced procurement funding makes sense, assuming that the funding can
    be obligated in a timely manner?
        Dr. Carter. In most cases involving aircraft production under major
    defense acquisition programs, the use of advanced procurement funding
    to purchase long lead items makes sense.

                    GUARD CHIEF IN THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

        106. Senator Chambliss. Dr. Carter, there is talk of making the
    Chief of the National Guard a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Do
    you think the Chief of the National Guard should be a permanent member
    of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
        Dr. Carter. No. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau is now a 4-
    star general, attends Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings, and provides
    invaluable advice. Members of the Guard are members of the uniformed
    Services and adding its Chief to the Joint Chiefs of Staff would
    introduce inconsistencies among its members, while at the same time
    creating the impression that the National Guard is a separate military
    Service.

                        RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FUNDING

        107. Senator Chambliss. Dr. Carter, continued investment in defense
    R&D is critical to ensuring our future technological superiority.
    Specifically, DOD's science and technology programs engage the Nation's
    universities and other research entities in basic and applied research
    on behalf of our national security. How do you plan to sustain support
    for these programs despite fiscal constraints?
        Dr. Carter. Secretary Panetta set the strategic direction for the
    Department in his October 13, 2011, testimony to the House Armed
    Services Committee when he said:

             ``Innovation is instrumental to the future of our joint force.
            We've expanded many of our--what we refer to in years past as
            low-density capabilities, and we've fielded many new
            technologies. We must continue to unleash innovation in the
            ranks and challenge ourselves to leverage these emergent
            capabilities in new and creative ways.''

        Following this guidance, it is clear that the Department needs to
    continue to invest in the engine of innovation--basic and applied
    research on behalf of our national security. This investment is guided
    by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, and
    I will look to the Assistant Secretary to advocate for, and shape the
    Department's investment, in these critical capabilities.

        108. Senator Chambliss. Dr. Carter, are you still planning for 2
    percent real growth for DOD basic research programs in the coming
    years?
        Dr. Carter. This level of investment in basic research remains a
    goal, however, with the current budgetary pressures facing DOD, we will
    have to carefully weigh this goal in the context of overall DOD
    priorities and needs. At the same time, I do affirm the role and
    importance of basic research in providing long term capabilities for
    the Department and Nation. I also can echo Secretary Panetta's comments
    at the October 13, 2011, hearing before the House Armed Services
    Committee, when he said:

             ``Innovation is instrumental to the future of our joint force.
            We've expanded many of our--what we refer to in years past as
            low-density capabilities, and we've fielded many new
            technologies. We must continue to unleash innovation in the
            ranks and challenge ourselves to leverage these emergent
            capabilities in new and creative ways.''

        The Department's basic research investment, of which roughly 60
    percent is accomplished through universities, is the bedrock of
    innovation for the Department. I believe it is important to maintain a
    healthy and vigorous investment in basic research and to maintain a
    clear link from the Department to the academic community. It is our
    investment in basic research that enables the connection.

        109. Senator Chambliss. Dr. Carter, fostering the next generation
    technical workforce for DOD and its industrial base is another key
    ingredient in our future security. Can you explain how DOD plans to
    enhance its science, technology, engineering, and mathematics programs
    in order to ensure that the Nation has a qualified national security
    workforce going forward?
        Dr. Carter. The Department conducts effective programs along the
    full Kindergarten-Workforce science, technology, engineering and
    mathematics (STEM) pathway to ensure that DOD and our Nation's
    industrial base are supplied with the technical workforce critical to
    preserving national security. Current and projected DOD budget
    limitations offer few opportunities to enhance the scope of these
    programs, but proactive management will continue to enhance the impact
    that these programs can achieve through innovative STEM activities. The
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering is
    delegated lead responsibility for DOD STEM efforts. Several specific
    examples of STEM efforts coordinated and supported by the ASD(R&E) are
    as follows:

        1.  DOD STEM Executive Board--Leadership for the Department's STEM
    efforts is provided by the DOD STEM Executive Board, chaired by
    ASD(R&E). The STEM Executive Board aims to maximize the effectiveness
    of DOD STEM investments within budgetary limits. Technological
    solutions to national security at all levels and the pace of
    technological change require an adept military and civilian workforce.
    The Executive Board is: developing a taxonomy to describe the military
    and civilian STEM workforces; articulating necessary skill sets for a
    technically competent workforce; and aligning DOD investments and
    policies across the DOD components. Further, the Executive Board
    synchronizes the DOD's future STEM workforce with the Department's S&T
    priorities.
        2.  National Academies Study--A joint National Academy of
    Engineering (NAE)-National Research Council (NRC) study funded by
    ASD(R&E) is assessing the science, technology, engineering, and
    mathematics (STEM) workforce demands for the Department and strategies
    for meeting these demands. The work scope includes: reviewing current
    and projected STEM workforce demands relevant to DOD and defense
    industrial base needs; identifying emerging science and technology
    fields that will likely have significant impact on DOD and national
    needs; and assessing current limitations and options for overcoming
    impediments to meeting these needs. The results of this study will
    enable the Department to enhance its STEM efforts by shaping
    investments more closely to expected future needs.
        3.  National Defense Education Program (NDEP)--Directly builds the
    Department's technical workforce and fosters STEM skill development:

          a.  The Science, Mathematics, And Research for Transformation
    (SMART) scholarship-for-service program selects highly-qualified
    undergraduate and graduate students pursing any of 19 STEM disciplines
    important to DOD. Students are provided a stipend for tuition, fees,
    books, health insurance, and housing to support them in their studies
    and perform internships in the Department's R&D facilities to develop
    key skill-sets for DOD employment. Students commit to a one-to-one
    service obligation and are eligible for up to 5 years of funding. Since
    2006, there have been over 1,100 SMART U.S. student participants who
    have studied at over 250 colleges and universities. Nearly 400 have
    graduated with bachelor's, master's, or doctoral degrees and joined the
    DOD workforce.
          b.  The National Security Science and Engineering Faculty
    Fellowship (NSSEFF) program makes grants to leading researchers to work
    on important research questions of great value to DOD. Since 2009, 29
    NSSEFF fellows at 20 research universities support more than 300
    graduate and undergraduate students and postdoctoral scholars and
    reported 125 interactions with DOD laboratories and Services.
          c.  Systems Engineering (SE) Capstone Program and Joint
    Cooperative Unmanned Systems Initiative (JCUSI)-Project-based learning
    exposes engineering students to systems engineering for DOD. These
    initiatives build institutional capacity for systems engineering for
    DOD and defense industrial base. Students are mentored by DOD personnel
    to solve actual DOD systems engineering problems. Over 300 students at
    14 universities and Service Academies completed SE Capstone projects in
    the 2010-2011 academic year. JCUSI exposes cadets and midshipmen to
    joint autonomous vehicle operating environments so they can be
    immediately productive in similar environments when deployed as
    officers after graduation. JCUSI involves 50 cadets and midshipmen from
    all three of the Service academies in a joint autonomous systems
    scenario integrating land, air, and surface sea autonomous vehicles.
          d.  K-12-DOD and its partners support and engage with elementary,
    middle school, and high school initiatives that inspire students to
    pursue STEM fields. National and local initiatives are designed to
    build STEM skills. Over 1,700 DOD scientists and engineers have engaged
    with more than 180,000 students and 8,000 teachers in 28 States. Since
    2009, the Department has developed ``Lab TV,'' a series of Web-based
    video programs of cutting-edge DOD laboratory research used by
    educators. The top 6 Lab TV programs have posted over 350,000 views,
    and several programs have ``gone viral'' on the YouTube Lab TV Channel.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker

                           FOOD SERVICE DISTRIBUTION

        110. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, the Continental U.S. Subsistence
    Prime Vendor Program was created to bring the efficiency of the
    domestic food service distribution industry to military food service.
    Through this program, distributors provide the military with the best
    products available in the marketplace at competitive prices in the most
    efficient manner possible.
        I am concerned the Defense Logistics Agency's (DLA) proposed non-
    commercial contracting model threatens the success of the Subsistence
    Prime Vendor Program. By proposing contract terms inconsistent with
    current industry practices, DLA may be limiting competition, which
    could result in increased food costs for taxpayers and lower service
    levels for our military.
        Can you provide a rationale for DLA's move toward a proposed non-
    commercial model?
        Dr. Carter. I can assure you the DLA is committed to using
    commercial terms and conditions to the most reasonable extent possible.
    Nonetheless, DLA was concerned that the Program, as structured, was
    vulnerable to price manipulation and fraud because of a lack of
    transparency. Over the past several years, DLA investigated options to
    address these vulnerabilities of the existing commercial model. DLA met
    with the foodservice industry, including the International Foodservice
    Distributors Association and individual companies, and, more recently,
    issued a request for information. Discussions focused on how to
    incorporate practices to increase transparency of the commercial
    business model, and DLA also sought input on a proposed pricing model.
        Recent Program changes are meant to reduce the risk of overcharges
    to the Government. The changes do not alter the fact that this is a
    commercial acquisition with specific provisions added only to the
    extent necessary to protect the Government. Among other things, the
    changes will ensure that all rebates and discounts that prime vendors
    receive from manufacturers, no matter how those rebates and discounts
    are described or designated by the vendors, are returned to the
    Government.
        The changes also afford the Government more oversight to prevent
    fraud by ensuring the Government has the right to review the original
    manufacturer's invoices to confirm the Government is charged the
    manufacturer's price. These changes are necessary to prevent the
    Government from paying more than is necessary for these products and to
    allow the Government to know for what it is paying.
        The contracts will remain fixed-price with economic price
    adjustment, but the pricing definitions have been clarified. These
    changes will allow insight into the management of the program that
    previously did not exist. DLA's changes have been challenged in bid
    protests filed at the Government Accountability Office, and more
    recently, the Court of Federal Claims. In a decision dated October 12,
    2011, the Court of Federal Claims determined that one provision DLA
    included in its CONUS subsistence prime vendor solicitations was not
    legally supportable, and DLA plans to remove that provision in
    accordance with the Court's finding.
        DLA will continue to work with the food distribution industry to
    craft a prime vendor model that maximizes competition and the use of
    commercial practices while protecting the Government and taxpayers from
    potential fraud and overcharges

        111. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, what additional oversight would
    such a model provide to ensure the prevention of waste, fraud, and
    abuse?
        Dr. Carter. The changes are necessary to prevent the Government
    from paying more than is necessary for these products and to allow the
    Government to know for what it is paying. The changes also afford the
    Government more oversight to prevent fraud by ensuring the Government
    has the right to review the original manufacturer's invoices to confirm
    the Government is charged the manufacturer's price.
        The contracts will remain fixed-price with economic price
    adjustment, but the pricing definitions have been clarified. These
    changes will allow insight into the management of the program that
    previously did not exist. DLA will continue to work with the food
    distribution industry to craft a prime vendor model that maximizes
    competition and the use of commercial practices while protecting the
    Government and taxpayers from potential fraud and overcharges

                    MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES

        112. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, we have spent over $30 billion on
    the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle fleet of vehicles.
    To what extent have we maximized the capability of this platform?
        Dr. Carter. Congress generously provided nearly $50 billion in
    support of protecting America's most precious resources: soldiers,
    airmen, sailors, marines, and special operators. Currently, more than
    27,000 MRAP vehicles maximized this capability in supporting unique
    Service missions and to an even greater extent to fighting unit
    requirements.
        There are dozens of MRAP variants with common exceptional
    protection capabilities, but also unique customizations in support of
    specific mission roles. This includes MRAP ambulances, wrecker and
    recovery vehicles, troop transport, route clearance, command and
    control platforms, and Special Forces variants, to name a few. There
    are significant commonality and systems design attributes, and
    concurrent additional capability adaptations are ongoing.
        Because of the significant payload capacity of many of the
    variants, commanders in theater have options, based on threat, to apply
    different armor protection kits. System engineers and industry design
    teams continue to develop solutions to keep the MRAP vehicle fleet the
    most protected in the entire theater. Also, in support of the off-road
    terrain throughout Afghanistan, independent suspensions have been
    integrated on virtually every vehicle in theater.

        113. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, have you considered integrating
    additional capability into this very survivable platform?
        Dr. Carter. Throughout the entire execution of the Joint Mine
    Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle program, the teams operated
    with a sense of urgency on mission capabilities for the MRAP fleet.
    With the help of our very capable industry partners, DOD integrated
    dozens of capabilities and literally hundreds of configurations in
    response of the Warfighters' demand signal.
        The most recent example is adding impressive under-body protection
    for the MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle (which is already highly survivable
    and effective off-road) with the Underbody Installation Kits (UIK).
    Because of the payload capacity of this configuration, the system
    engineers designed a significant upgrade that is being installed on the
    in-theater fleet rapidly.
        Numerous adaptations of the MRAP vehicle have occurred to adapt the
    more general purpose troop carrier designs to ambulances, wrecker and
    recovery vehicles, and command and control platforms. Additionally,
    numerous variations of light weapons were integrated onto the roofs.
        Finally, in addition to the all of the electronics and power
    integration for radio communications, counter-improvised explosive
    device capabilities (jammers), and displays, a significant portion of
    the fleet has evolved to have independent suspensions, creating a more
    capable, and more effective vehicle platform. The MRAP vehicles proved
    inherent capacity and versatility to integrate requirements; DOD will
    continue to exploit this capacity as the mission demands.

        114. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, we have equipped the Afghan
    National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) with a substantial
    number of vehicles. What steps are we taking to ensure the Afghans can
    sustain this fleet going forward?
        Dr. Carter. The long-term future plan is for the ANSF to have an
    organic maintenance and supply capability. There are many efforts
    underway on many levels by International Security Assistance Force
    (ISAF), International Joint Command (IJC), and NATO Training Mission-
    Afghanistan (NTM-A), in conjunction with Afghan senior leaders as part
    of the ISAF campaign plan.
        The reality in Afghanistan is that the logistics systems are very
    early in the process of being built. The ANA transitioned to organic
    maintenance at the organizational level in April 2011. Its equivalent
    of Direct Support-level maintenance is contracted by the Combined Joint
    Logistics Office (CJ4). Its General Support equivalent (at the national
    level in Kabul) has some organic capability, but not what can be called
    a robust industrial base.
        For the ANP, CJ4 contracted maintenance for weapons and vehicles.
    NTM-A is conducting ongoing analysis on how to create an enduring ANP
    maintenance system. The ANP is likely a couple years behind the ANA.
    The ANA Air Force has NTM-A/Combined Security Transition Command-
    Afghanistan-provided contract logistics support (CLS), and transition
    to organic logistics support is a long-term effort.
        The bottom line vision is to foster organic maintenance, however
    the reality today is that maintenance is largely CLS as DOD continues
    to develop ANSF logistics capacity.

                                    PAKISTAN

        115. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, recognizing that the Pakistan
    Counterinsurgency Capability Fund provides the Government of Pakistan
    with critical goods that are manufactured here in the United States,
    what is the status of DOD's certification of Pakistan's
    counterinsurgency efforts?
        Dr. Carter. The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) is
    instrumental in the training, advising, and equipping of the Pakistan
    military and paramilitary forces so that they can pursue the near-term
    objective of eliminating terrorist sanctuaries and disrupting the al
    Qaeda network. The Department apprises Congress regularly of our
    assessment of Pakistan's counterinsurgency efforts through two primary
    means. First, the biannual report to Congress, Progress Toward Security
    and Stability in Pakistan, provides our overall assessment of
    Pakistan's counterinsurgency efforts. The next edition of that report
    is due by the end of October. Additionally, DOD must notify Congress
    prior to its use of PCF funds, and this is achieved by submitting a
    spending plan to Congress, which details how the Department intends to
    spend the PCF funds. The delay in appropriations for fiscal year 2011
    for PCF--followed shortly thereafter by increased tensions in the
    relationship with Pakistan as a result of the raid that killed Osama
    bin Laden--have led to a delay in notification of the fiscal year 2011
    PCF spending plan.

                          JOINT LIGHT TACTICAL VEHICLE

        116. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, what is DOD's position regarding
    the Senate Appropriations Committee's termination of Joint Light
    Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)?
        Dr. Carter. The proposed termination will fail to resolve clearly
    identified capability gaps in U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps light
    tactical vehicle fleets. Those gaps cannot be cost effectively
    addressed by rebuilding the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
    (HMMWV) fleet and would result in the Services fielding a light vehicle
    that lacks protection for the crew and provides insufficient mobility,
    reduced fuel efficiency, decreased reliability, inadequate net-ready
    integrated C4I suite, and an inability to meet both current payload
    requirements and future combat loads. Following an extensive technology
    development phase, a comprehensive analysis of alternatives, and cost-
    informed trades throughout, the JLTV acquisition strategy planned is
    the most effective and affordable approach to deliver the required JLTV
    vehicle capability.
        The Army and Marine Corps completely revised the JLTV Acquisition
    Strategy, finalized the essential requirements, and made the necessary
    cost informed trades to achieve an affordable program. The Improvised
    Explosive Device-threat environment and fiscal environment have changed
    significantly since approval of the original JLTV acquisition strategy
    in 2007. The Army and the Marine Corps have made the proper adjustments
    in response to the changing threat, fiscal environment and
    congressional concerns. The Technology Development phase was executed
    on schedule and within budget, accomplishing its intent to identify the
    capabilities that are achievable and affordable to control cost growth.
    Senior leadership for the Army and Marine Corps agreed on requirements
    and reduced the Engineering, Manufacturing and Development (EMD) phase
    by 15 months, which will significantly reduce the overall expense of
    EMD.

                      F-16 SERVICE LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM

        117. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, the Air Force fiscal year 2012
    budget request contains money for an F-16 service life extension
    program (SLEP). Can you describe how SLEP money will be used between
    structural (e.g. full scale durability testing) and avionics
    modernization?
        Dr. Carter. The fiscal year 2012 President's Budget (PB) reflects
    the F-16 SLEP to include a structural program (Full-Scale Durability
    Test and Structures Engineering, Manufacturing and Development phase)
    as well as an avionics modernization effort that includes active
    electronically scanned array radar, center pedestal display, ALQ-213
    electronic warfare suites, and integrated broadcast service. Total
    funding as reflected in fiscal year 2012 PB is $24.767 million; $12
    million for avionics modernization and $12.767 million for structures.
    The $12 million associated with the F-16 SLEP avionics modernization
    program (now known as combat avionics programmed extension suite) will
    be committed to initial development and risk reduction efforts.

        118. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, is it premature to start the
    avionics acquisition activity prior to durability testing being
    completed and confirming viability of the F-16 fleet?
        Dr. Carter. The Department does not believe starting the avionics
    activity prior to completion of durability testing is premature. Based
    on studies by F-16 structural engineers and Lockheed Martin, I am
    confident that, with some modifications, the F-16 service life can be
    extended to at least 10,000 Equivalent Flight Hours (EFH) on the Block
    40/50 aircraft. The full-scale durability testing will validate that
    study and determine the extent of the modifications required to bring
    these aircraft to 10,000 EFH (the goal is 12,000 EFH). Additionally,
    the fleet viability board recently completed their study of the Block
    40/50 aircraft. This study concluded that although the weapon system
    cannot achieve 5th generation fighter capability, it is more affordable
    and can be made viable and relevant with respect to future force
    structure requirements. F-16 SLEP avionics modernization acquisition
    activity is programmed to start in fiscal year 2012 in order to meet
    the Air Combat Command's requirement for Initial Operational Capability
    (IOC) in fiscal year 2018.

                FOREIGN MILITARY SALES TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

        119. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, how does the U.S. Air Force intend
    to support a Korean-led competition and selection for both avionics and
    active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar for their KF-16
    fighter program?
        Dr. Carter. To date, the Department did not receive a Letter of
    Request (LOR) from the Government of Korea concerning their proposed F-
    16 avionics and AESA radar modernization program. Following receipt of
    an LOR, we will work with the Korean Government to formalize their
    requirements and provide a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) in
    accordance with the AESA acquisition radar strategy. Acquisition for
    FMS purchases is done in accordance with U.S. law and DOD regulations
    and procedures. The competitive procurement process is used to the
    maximum extent possible when procuring articles or services. Sole
    source procurement can be approved by the implementing DOD Service when
    the FMS purchaser requests it in writing and provides sufficient
    rationale. Due to the complex interaction between the aircraft avionics
    and the AESA radar, we anticipate that the procurement of the avionics
    will likely be combined with the AESA procurement.

        120. Senator Wicker. Dr. Carter, how does a potential Taiwan F-16
    Letter of Request for Letter of Acceptance affect U.S. Air Force plans?
        Dr. Carter. The Department received an updated Taiwan F-16 Letter
    of Request (LOR) for Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) in September
    2011 and subsequently provided congressional notification of intent to
    sell on 21 September 2011. The LOR does not include a request to sole
    source the active electronically-scanned array (AESA) radar. Therefore,
    the U.S. Air Force F-16 Program Executive Officer will select an
    acquisition strategy for Taiwan's F-16 modernization and potential U.S.
    Air Force modernization efforts that ensures full and open competition
    in accordance with U.S. law and regulations. U.S. Air Force
    modernization efforts are not hinged upon Taiwan's investments and are
    not necessarily affected by this sale.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Rob Portman

                F-136 FIGHTER ENGINE TEAM SELF-FUNDING PROPOSAL

        121. Senator Portman. Dr. Carter, what authorities prohibit DOD
    from permitting the continued use of limited government equipment
    deemed essential to the F-136 Fighter Engine Team (FET) self-funding
    proposal?
        Dr. Carter. There are no authorities that prohibit the Department
    from permitting use of Government equipment deemed essential to the
    F136 self funding proposal. However, if the Department determines that
    certain equipment is useful to another program, it will use that
    equipment in the most optimal and cost-effective manner. Additionally,
    if continued use of Government equipment following the termination of a
    contract would incur additional costs to the Government, the Department
    would oppose that use.

        122. Senator Portman. Dr. Carter, what steps have you taken to
    better understand this self-funding proposal and identify processes or
    procedures within DOD that would need to be altered to facilitate such
    a proposal?
        Dr. Carter. As I testified, I am willing to meet with General
    Electric and learn more about the self-funding proposal. General
    Electric is a valued partner on many DOD programs, including aircraft
    engines, and anytime an industry partner has new ideas on
    affordability, the Department is interested in learning about these
    ideas.

                      CORROSION PREVENTION AND MITIGATION

        123. Senator Portman. Dr. Carter, given that Congress has
    consistently added funding to strengthen the corrosion prevention and
    mitigation efforts of DOD, and GAO has consistently encouraged DOD to
    fully fund this successful cost reduction program, what are your plans
    for addressing this in the fiscal year 2013 budget request?
        Dr. Carter. The DOD corrosion prevention and mitigation program is
    successful and is important for the long-term viability of our
    equipment and infrastructure. The Government Accountability Office
    cited the program for achieving significant cost avoidance by reducing
    the incidence and effects of material degradation on DOD weapon systems
    and infrastructure.
        The Department is working diligently in preparing the fiscal year
    2013 budget request. There are many requirements competing for
    constrained funding. As a part of this process, the corrosion
    prevention and mitigation program budget is being considered, along
    with other important programs. The final funding level will be
    determined over the next several months.

        124. Senator Portman. Dr. Carter, in light of DOD's F-22/F-35
    corrosion evaluation, what steps are being taken with the KC-46A
    program to avoid repeating mistakes that result in significantly higher
    than expected long-term sustainment costs?
        Dr. Carter. The Department understands the critical importance of
    corrosion prevention and control (CPC) to maintain the airworthiness
    and control the long-term total ownership costs of the KC-46A. Specific
    steps the Department is taking in this regard include the following:

        1.  CPC is covered by our Weapon System Integrity Program (WSIP)
    approach. The WISP is composed of four distinct integrity programs that
    address corrosion across the entire aircraft system, including
    structures, mechanical equipment and subsystems, avionics, and
    propulsion systems.
        2.  As a commercial derivative system, the KC-46A leverages the
    corrosion control processes established for commercial aircraft. Boeing
    is on contract to provide a KC-46A CPC Plan, which will be reviewed and
    approved by the Government.
        3.  Given the environmental concerns regarding the chromated
    coating systems that traditionally are used for corrosion protection
    for military systems, the Air Force has convened a KC-46 Outer Mold
    Line Coating System Independent Review Team to review options and make
    recommendations for corrosion coatings. The team includes technical
    experts from industry, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Corrosion
    Prevention Office in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.
        4.  A Corrosion Prevention Advisory Board, comprised of
    representatives from engineering, manufacturing, quality assurance, and
    other areas involved in the design, engineering development, and
    production of the aircraft, provides ongoing oversight during the
    execution of the program.
        5.  The Department includes CPC in its ongoing oversight
    activities, including reviews by the Overarching Integrated Product
    Team.
        6.  The program office has ongoing dialogue with corrosion experts
    in the Navy's P-8 program office about a Boeing commercial derivative
    aircraft, which has a robust CPC program, given that aircraft's
    corrosive operating environment.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly A. Ayotte

                         REDUCTION IN DEFENSE SPENDING

        125. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, the President has called for $400
    billion in reductions to national security spending over a 10-year
    period starting in 2013. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and General
    Martin Dempsey acknowledge that a further reduction of defense spending
    would be detrimental to our national security. With your acquisitions
    background, what programs and capabilities must not be cut if the
    Federal Government is to fulfill its constitutional responsibility of
    securing the common defense?
        Dr. Carter. I agree that there is a point beyond which additional
    cuts place national security at risk. However, Secretary Panetta has
    clearly stated that everything must be ``on the table'' when
    considering these potential reductions. Given the potentially
    significant future budget reductions we are facing, DOD is examining
    all programs for affordability and national security requirements.

                         AUDIT OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        126. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, as you are aware, DOD is one of
    the few agencies in the entire Federal Government that cannot pass an
    independent audit of its finances. DOD's lack of audit readiness makes
    it difficult to implement efficiencies, achieve savings, and direct
    increasingly scarce defense dollars to higher priorities. In your
    response to the advance policy questions, you concede that, ``. . .
    there has been limited progress made towards auditability until
    recently.'' Why, in your view, is DOD not auditable today?
        Dr. Carter. DOD's massive size and complexity make it hard to
    achieve full auditability. DOD financial processes were established and
    ingrained in systems long ago. These processes and systems were
    designed for budgetary accounting--not proprietary or commercial
    accounting called for in the CFO Act.

        127. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, what are the most significant
    challenges to making DOD auditable by the 2017 statutory deadline?
        Dr. Carter. To meet standards in CFO Act, there is a substantial
    amount of work to be done. Some of the most significant impediments
    include:

             DOD has thousands of business and financial systems
            which support ongoing operations. The process of modifying
            these systems is complex, time consuming, and costly.
             DOD business and financial management systems are not
            fully integrated and do not always collect data at the
            necessary transaction level.
             Reliable end-to-end processes and internal controls
            have not fully been defined to support financial reporting.
             DOD lacks sufficient operational and financial
            personnel experienced in financial audits.

        128. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, what is your plan to overcome
    those obstacles?
        Dr. Carter. Meeting these challenges and improving our business
    processes have more attention in the Department than ever before. DOD
    will address them by changing the way it does business. To realize
    success, the Department is using a streamlined approach, implemented in
    August 2009, which focuses on improving and auditing the information
    used to manage the Department. Improving the information used to
    manage--budgetary and mission critical asset information--allows
    commanders and other leaders to better meet mission needs with their
    available resources. I believe this alignment of operational and
    financial objectives is the most effective incentive to improve
    financial management.
        The Department is committed to achieving auditability goals and has
    taken significant steps to ensure the goals are achieved by September
    30, 2017, as directed by Congress. There is still a great deal of work
    required to further improve financial and business processes in order
    to meet this goal. I believe DOD can succeed because it has a well
    defined plan with specific short-term and interim-term milestones and a
    long-term roadmap. The Department also provided resources for the
    effort (approximately $300 million per year), and a clear governance
    process. Overall accountability rests with the Deputy Secretary of
    Defense and CMO; however, day-to-day responsibility falls to the Chief
    Financial Officer (CFO) and DCMO and their staffs, as well as line
    management throughout the DOD business enterprise. To meet audit
    challenges, we have developed an effective partnership between the CFO
    and DCMO communities that will help with implementation. The DCMO and
    the Military Department CMOs play an integral role in the governance
    processes, including overseeing the implementation of new systems and
    the processes they enable. Senior leaderships within the Military
    Departments are committed to, and accountable for accomplishing these
    interim goals.

        129. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, what can Congress do to help?
        Dr. Carter. Continued attention and oversight from Congress
    encourages more attention and participation from the non-financial
    management community to sustain the current focus. Additionally,
    providing a timely appropriations bill without the use of multiple
    continuing resolutions will help leaders devote more time to audit
    readiness.

                              JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

        130. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, the F-35 JSF will form the
    backbone of U.S. air combat superiority for generations to come.
    However, in order to guarantee the continued success of this program,
    it is imperative that this effort be followed with solid analyses of
    the JSF life cycle costs so both DOD and Congress can make well-
    informed decisions about the program in the future. Can you provide an
    update on what investments or changes have been made in the development
    and design of the F-35 to reduce operations and support costs over the
    life of the program?
        Dr. Carter. The JSF has been designed to improve maintainability
    and overall supportability over legacy platforms. As the aircraft
    design matures, the program office is actively managing systems to
    ensure they meet or exceed their reliability design specification, and
    identify opportunities for Life Cycle Cost (LCC) reductions. In cases
    where systems fall short of meeting their goal, or where significant
    LCC reduction opportunities are identified, the JSF Program Office is
    making the appropriate programmatic and system/component modifications
    to increase reliability, while reducing LCC. In addition, we are
    initiating a targeted affordability program to identify technical and
    programmatic changes that will reduce the operating cost of the system,
    which will be tracked through our affordability management plan, the
    draft of which will be available early next year. The program is also
    conducting a business case analysis on the sustainment strategy to
    identify if changes to the sustainment baseline are required to achieve
    the best value solution.

        131. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, if the JSF program were canceled,
    what would be the operations and support costs for the legacy fleet
    that JSF is replacing? Please provide data that can be directly
    compared to the JSF. Please use the same time period for both.
        Dr. Carter. The JSF is scheduled to replace the AV-8B, F/A-18 A-D,
    and F-16 for the U.S. Military Services. A portion of the F/A-18A-D and
    F-16 fleet is already planned for service life extensions to meet force
    structure requirements. If the JSF were canceled, the Services would
    have to assess the possibility of even more aircraft having service
    life extended. For many of those aircraft with excessive flight hours,
    extending service life would not be an option, and they would have to
    be retired. It is possible that the development of other platforms
    would be required. The range of options that would need to be assessed
    in this unlikely scenario is unlimited and makes a direct comparison of
    data extremely difficult.

        132. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, will operations and support costs
    for the F-35 be the same, more than, or less than the legacy aircraft
    it will replace?
        Dr. Carter. DOD's analysis is that the costs per aircraft to
    operate and sustain the JSF are less than the F-22, about the same as
    the F-15C/D, and more than the F-16 and F-18. Given the significant
    increase in capability, it is not unreasonable that JSF costs more to
    operate and sustain than some legacy aircraft.

                               IRAQ TROOP LEVELS

        133. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, I am concerned about the December
    deadline in Iraq. Multiple senior military officials have expressed
    concerns regarding Iraq's ability to independently provide for their
    external defense and air sovereignty. Iraq will also require continued
    development in the areas of logistics, sustainment, intelligence, and
    training. It is important to bring our mission in Iraq to a successful
    conclusion. The Obama administration is considering keeping 3,000
    troops in Iraq beyond the December deadline in order to achieve this
    objective. What have our commanders on the ground requested for troop
    levels?
        Dr. Carter. In 2008, the United States concluded a Security
    Agreement with Iraq, which established conditions for the temporary
    presence of our forces in the country and for their withdrawal by the
    end of 2011. The United States complied with the terms of that
    agreement, and will comply with the requirement to withdraw our forces
    by the end of 2011.
        However, the Departments believe that an enduring security
    partnership with the Iraqi Government and people is in the best
    interest of the United States, and a continuing relationship with the
    Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) would be an important part of that
    partnership.
        The United States is currently in negotiations with the Iraqi
    Government about the nature of that relationship. America wants a
    normal, productive relationship with Iraq going forward--a partnership
    like we have with other nations around the world.
        Our negotiations with the Iraqis so far have focused on possible
    mission sets to support the ISF in areas where Iraq has identified
    shortfalls, such as logistics, air and maritime security training,
    combined arms training for Iraq's external defense, and intelligence
    fusion for Iraqi counterterrorism operations. Any post-2011 U.S. forces
    presence upon which the United States and Iraq might ultimately agree
    would flow from the requirements necessary to support training and
    related mission sets, including areas that the Iraqis identify as key
    to addressing their shortfalls.
        Again, there are no final decisions--nor reached any agreement with
    the Iraqis--about a post-2011 U.S. forces presence in Iraq.

        134. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, what have the Iraqis requested?
        Dr. Carter. On August 2, Iraqi President Talabani, upon the request
    of Prime Minister Maliki, held the third meeting of all major Iraqi
    political parties to discuss the nature and details of the U.S.-Iraq
    security partnership under the terms of the Strategic Framework
    Agreement, and how this would be affected by a potential U.S. presence
    in Iraq after December 31, 2011.
        At the conclusion of that meeting, the parties' leadership
    authorized Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Shaways to issue the following
    statement: ``Participants have agreed to mandate the Iraqi Government
    to start talks with the American side. Talks are limited to training
    issues under the Strategic Framework Agreement due to Iraq's need for
    training. A relationship must be designed in all aspects to support the
    full sovereignty of Iraq. The political leaders will monitor the talks
    to consider any final agreement with the American side. These talks
    must be conducted with a spirit of cooperation.''
        Consistent with this Iraqi position, the United States began
    negotiations with Iraq on the nature of this potential U.S.-Iraq
    security relationship post-2011, including training of Iraqi Security
    Forces (ISF) and related missions. For some time, we have had informal
    consultations with our Iraqi partners, including senior ISF officials,
    regarding remaining ISF gaps and areas in which Iraq might request
    training post-2011. These areas include combined arms training,
    intelligence fusion, air and maritime security training, and logistics.
    Our negotiations to date have focused on the possible mission sets to
    support the ISF in these and other areas.
        However, there are no final decisions, nor reached any agreement
    with the Iraqis, about a post-2011 U.S. forces presence in Iraq.

        135. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, what, in your view, is the correct
    troop level?
        Dr. Carter. The post-2011 U.S. force presence and mission set, if
    any, will be addressed through U.S. negotiations with Iraqi leaders.
    Because discussions are ongoing, no final agreement with Iraq has been
    reached, no final decisions have been made, and the current operative
    plan remains that the United States will remove all of its forces by
    the end of 2011. However, if the United States were to have a post-2011
    U.S force presence, it would be at a much lower level than the current
    level of U.S. forces in Iraq.
        Again, there are no final decisions, or any agreement reached with
    the Iraqis, about a post-2011 U.S. force presence in Iraq.

        136. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, what missions will the remaining
    troops perform?
        Dr. Carter. We are currently in negotiations with the Iraqi
    Government about the nature and scope of a potential future
    relationship. Our discussions with the Iraqis are focused on the types
    of training the United States may provide after December 31, 2011, and
    we have made no final decisions--nor reached any agreement with the
    Iraqis--about the nature of a U.S. presence in Iraq post-2011. We want
    a normal, productive relationship with Iraq going forward, like we have
    with other countries in the region and around the world.
        For some time, we have had informal consultations with our Iraqi
    partners, including senior Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) officials,
    regarding ISF gaps and areas in which the ISF might request training
    post-2011. These areas include combined arms, training necessary for
    Iraq's external defense; intelligence fusion to support
    counterterrorism efforts, air and maritime security training, and
    logistics.
        Our negotiations to date have focused on the possible mission sets
    to support the ISF in these and other areas. Any post-2011 U.S. forces
    presence upon which the United States and Iraq might ultimately agree
    would flow from the requirements necessary to support training and
    related mission sets.
        Again, there are no final decisions--nor reached any agreement with
    the Iraqis--about a post-2011 U.S. forces presence in Iraq.

                               RESERVE COMPONENT

        137. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, our Nation must reduce Federal
    spending, and defense has a role. However, in the coming months and
    years, we must avoid defense cuts that endanger our military readiness
    and shortchange the Guard and Reserve. General Dempsey, Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently stated that the future fiscal
    environment will present significant challenges in preserving the
    readiness gains of the Reserve component. General Dempsey also stated
    that, ``the Reserve component of our Armed Forces has transformed from
    an exclusively Strategic Reserve to one that also provides operational,
    full-spectrum capabilities to the Nation. Repeated combat deployments,
    as well as peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and Homeland defense
    missions, have produced a Reserve component far more operationally
    capable and experienced than any time in our Nation's history.'' Do you
    believe it would not be in the Nation's best interests to return the
    National Guard to strictly a Strategic Reserve?
        Dr. Carter. No, I do not believe that returning the National Guard
    to strictly a strategic Reserve is the correct solution or in the best
    interests of the Nation. I understand that the ``force mix'' of
    Strategic versus Operational Reserve component forces as well as the
    optimal AC/RC mix for certain capabilities are under review. I will
    ensure that the Department continues this vital work in order to ensure
    it can meet the demands of the National Military Strategy in a fiscally
    responsible manner.

        138. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, how do you recommend we maintain
    the readiness of the Reserve component in a period of fiscal restraint?
        Dr. Carter. While I do not have specific recommendations at this
    time, I recognize that the consistent operational experience the
    Reserve components have gained over the last decade has significantly
    increased their readiness and confirmed that they are an integral part
    of the Total Force. It is my opinion that in order to reduce stress on
    the overall force, maintain an All-Volunteer Force, and leverage the
    skills and experience resident in the Guard and Reserve, their
    continued contribution in the future will be critical. These
    contributions--planned, periodic utilization of the Reserve component
    in missions for which they are best suited--often have the added
    benefit of maintaining their readiness. Additionally, it will be my
    goal to make the most efficient use of the Total Force. The Reserve
    component is an experienced and well-trained element of that force,
    providing value in many mission areas by maintaining capability and
    capacity at lesser cost.

                           PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD

        139. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
    (PNSY) is an essential part of our Nation's naval readiness. PSNY
    conducts nuclear submarine maintenance on the Los Angeles-class and
    Virginia-class submarines. In fact, PNSY is currently conducting the
    first-in-the-Navy Virginia-class maintenance availability on the USS
    Virginia. A recent GAO study found that DOD has a backlog of over $3
    billion and at PNSY alone totaling over $500 million which impacts
    readiness, efficiency, and the health and safety of our sailors and
    workforce. If confirmed, do you commit to working to address this
    modernization backlog at this and other important shipyards?
        Dr. Carter. I am committed to investing in the Naval Shipyard
    infrastructure through Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization, and
    MILCON as part of a risk-balanced, fiscally constrained Navy
    infrastructure portfolio.
        Shipyard projects are evaluated and prioritized with all other Navy
    infrastructure projects to best enable warfighting and Joint
    capabilities, minimize the decline of mission-essential and quality of
    life infrastructure, and optimize warfare enterprise outputs and
    quality of service.
        Section 2476 of title 10, U.S. Code, requires that the Navy invest
    at least 6 percent of the average combined workload funded at all Navy
    depots for the preceding 5 years. The Navy spent 9.5 percent, 9.9
    percent, and 15.6 percent of these funds on shipyard recapitalization
    in fiscal year 2008-fiscal year 2010, respectively, and is in the
    process of investing 11.1 percent in fiscal year 2011.
        In fiscal year 2010, the Navy executed eight Operations and
    Maintenance (Sustainment and Restoration and Modernization) special
    projects at PNSY with a total value of $40.9 million. In fiscal year
    2011, the Navy planned additional special projects, valued at $17
    million, to repair and enable certification of Dry Dock #1. In fiscal
    year 2012, the Navy plans to invest $100.3 million in four energy
    special projects at PNSY.

                         PEASE AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE

        140. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, Pease Air National Guard Base in
    New Hampshire is a key base for Air Force refueling tankers. If DOD
    uses transparent and objective basing criteria for its KC-46A basing
    decisions, I am confident that Pease will continue to be a key
    strategic refueling base far into the future. Pease is the closest
    airbase to the operational and training refueling tracks, which will
    result in significant cost savings over the KC-46A's decades of
    service. The aerial refueling wing also has a unique Active Duty
    association that results in a very high aircraft utilization rate. The
    basing decision will be heavily scrutinized, so it is important that
    the process is objective and transparent. As Deputy Secretary of
    Defense, do you agree to work to ensure that the process for basing
    decisions for the KC-46A is objective and transparent?
        Dr. Carter. Yes. The Air Force is using its Strategic Basing
    Process to determine future locations for the KC-46A.

                              U.S. NAVAL SUPREMACY

        141. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, the U.S. Navy has the fewest
    number of ships since America's entrance into World War I. Yet the Navy
    is being tasked with arguably more responsibilities than ever before.
    Our fleet is undoubtedly the finest ever put to the seas, but it is
    said that quantity has a quality all of its own. Security in Asia and
    around the world would increasingly rely on the U.S. maintaining naval
    supremacy. Since shipbuilding is one of the largest DOD expenditures, I
    worry that DOD will be tempted to cut our Nation's shipbuilding
    program. As a member of the Seapower Subcommittee, I would like to
    know, how important it is in your mind that the United States maintains
    naval supremacy?
        Dr. Carter. There is no question that this country relies upon
    continued naval supremacy, and I am firmly committed to maintaining it.

        142. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, what ship-count is needed to
    accomplish naval supremacy?
        Dr. Carter. Ship count alone does not ultimately provide the proper
    mix of capabilities necessary to achieve naval supremacy across a wide
    range of possible contingencies. I believe procuring and maintaining
    the right mix of capabilities in our battle forces is what gives our
    Nation naval supremacy. The Department is committed to maintaining
    naval supremacy, but, as Secretary Panetta has stated, all areas of the
    budget are currently on the table in the budget review.

        143. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, the Navy has called the 313-ship
    requirement a floor. In terms of ships in the Navy, based on strategy,
    rather than budget exercises, is there a floor you would not go below?
    If so, what is it?
        Dr. Carter. The number of ships, while important, is less important
    than having in the fleet the proper mix of those critical capabilities
    necessary to defeat adversaries. I believe the Department needs to
    strategically prioritize its battle force mix consistent with ensuring
    it is a ready and agile battle force that is in balance with the other
    armed forces needed to maintain American national security.

                                  EFFICIENCIES

        144. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, after a series of hearings Senator
    McCaskill and I conducted earlier this year on efficiencies and
    financial management with DOD, it is not apparent that DOD is placing
    sufficient emphasis on eliminating non-essential spending. In an
    unprecedented time of budget deficits and skyrocketing debt, we have
    repeatedly called for DOD to rein in wasteful or unnecessary spending
    across the board. Yet, DOD continues to notify us of new programs and
    new projects to fund with savings they have accumulated as opposed to
    returning those savings to American taxpayers. As an example, a recent
    decision by the Air Force illustrates the conflict we see between
    statements by the Secretary of Defense and the actions of the Military
    Departments to continue to fund requirements that are not absolutely
    essential to their core missions and operations.
        In November 2010, we received a notification from the Air Force of
    their intent to transfer $28 million from operations and maintenance
    accounts in order to construct a student activities center at Fort Sam
    Houston, Texas, in support of a training mission consolidation directed
    by the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round. This facility is
    intended to support community and recreational activities, student
    processing, commander's calls, and graduation activities. After
    extensive meetings and a visit by our staffs to Fort Sam Houston, this
    committee concluded that the $589 million BRAC plan implemented by DOD
    for this decision was adequate, and that an additional construction
    project to build a student center funded through BRAC appropriations
    was not essential to the successful completion of the BRAC decision by
    September 15, 2011. In a letter to the Secretary of the Air Force dated
    April 15, 2011, we provided this position, which is consistent with our
    intent to take action when DOD spending may not be essential or
    efficient in these tough fiscal times.
        On June 1, 2011, we received a reply from the Air Force that
    indicated their intent to carry out the project, despite our
    objections. We immediately wrote the Secretary of Defense asking for
    his personal review of this decision to determine whether it is
    consistent with the current efforts of DOD. While we are still awaiting
    an answer, we were notified last week that the Air Force has awarded
    the contract to construct the student center. This disregard for the
    spending concerns of this committee is unacceptable. Do you condone the
    decision by the Air Force?
        Dr. Carter. At time of the hearing, the Department had not yet
    completed its response to Congress. On October 4, 2011, the Deputy
    Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment sent a
    letter to you and Senator McCaskill affirming the Air Force decision to
    build the student activity center. The Air Force's decision to spend
    $28 million from available resources within the BRAC account is
    necessary and therefore, appropriate, because it supports the
    significantly increased population of enlisted medical trainees at this
    location. For example, the student activity center will provide space
    for student processing (averaging 400 students weekly) and an academic
    support forum large enough for commander's calls and graduation
    activities. This project provides our front-line medics needed
    functionality overlooked in the initial planning for this BRAC
    recommendation. As such, the student activity center is an example of
    how we used the flexibility of the BRAC account to make appropriate
    adjustments as we approached the end of the BRAC implementation period.

        145. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, what would you do to
    ensure the members of congressional defense committees are adequately
    consulted about concerns formally raised to DOD before spending
    taxpayers' funds?
        Dr. Carter. I will make every effort to work with Congress to
    address your concerns.

        146. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, if confirmed, is a recreation
    center the type of priority you will continue to support as a critical
    new spending item?
        Dr. Carter. In light of the current funding climate, the Department
    must ensure that the highest priority needs are met. I will be diligent
    in finding and eliminating wasteful spending. It is also important that
    the United States continues to take care of the troops and their
    families in order to sustain our high quality All-Volunteer Force.

        147. Senator Ayotte. Dr. Carter, what is DOD doing exactly to rein
    in unnecessary spending as we approach the end of the fiscal year?
        Dr. Carter. All echelons of the enterprise must be alert to any
    unnecessary, wasteful spending. There is a legal limitation to spending
    more than 20 percent of an appropriation in the last 2 months of a
    fiscal year. It must be noted that in recent years the Department faced
    persistent continuing resolutions and late enactment of supplemental
    appropriations which have the effect of delaying contractual actions
    until late in a fiscal year.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham

                           AIR FORCE CENTRAL COMMAND

        148. Senator Graham. Dr. Carter, is the U.S. Air Force Central
    Command (AFCENT) creating accompanied tours in the CENTCOM Area of
    Responsibility (AOR)? If so, how many families does the Air Force plan
    to move from AFCENT to the CENTCOM AOR?
        Dr. Carter. DODI 1315.18, Procedures for Military Personnel
    Assignments, and the Joint Travel Regulation (JTR), established Qatar
    as a 24-month accompanied and 12-month unaccompanied tour. Four
    families are slated to move to Al Udeid, Qatar, in 2011 for a 24-month
    accompanied tour. The current plan is to increase the number of
    families by 12 per year for the next 5 years for a total of 60 families
    by the end of fiscal year 2015.

        149. Senator Graham. Dr. Carter, what is the timeframe for these
    moves?
        Dr. Carter. One family was in place July 2011, three more families
    will be in place fall 2011. The current plan is to increase the number
    of families by 12 per year for 5 years for a total of 60 families by
    the end of fiscal year 2015.

        150. Senator Graham. Dr. Carter, does AFCENT intend to eliminate or
    transfer any positions from Shaw AFB between now and October 2012? If
    so, what is the reasoning behind the elimination or transfer?
        Dr. Carter. To meet the OSD direction to target civilian manpower
    billets at fiscal year 2010 levels, the Air Force is conducting a
    comprehensive strategic review to increase efficiency, reduce overhead,
    and eliminate redundancy while preserving or growing in critical
    mission areas. As a result of this review, five AFCENT civilian billets
    will be eliminated at Shaw AFB. Reductions were due to efficiencies in
    reach-back support for Eskan Village (two billets) and reductions in
    staff support to AFCENT (three billets). The Air Force continues to
    develop enterprise-wide solutions to increase efficiency and remain
    within fiscal year 2012 civilian pay budget and therefore further
    reductions are possible. The Air Force will finish the review in mid-
    December and will notify Congress of the results in late January 2012.

        151. Senator Graham. Dr. Carter, are any such positions slated to
    be transferred to the CENTCOM AOR?
        Dr. Carter. There are currently no plans to transfer any positions
    affected by DOD's direction to limit each military Service's civilian
    end strength to levels in effect at the end of fiscal year 2010.

        152. Senator Graham. Dr. Carter, if the CENTCOM AOR is sufficiently
    stable to allow families to reside there does this signify that the
    AFCENT Commander's presence is no longer needed in the region? If so,
    do the Commander's ongoing obligations at Shaw AFB now require that he
    move back?
        Dr. Carter. The decision to initially move the Commander, U.S. Air
    Force Central (COMUSAFCENT) to reside in the CENTCOM AOR was made by
    the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) based on the U.S.'s vital
    national interests in the region and the desire to continue building
    robust partnerships in this key area of the world. The decision to keep
    COMUSAFCENT assigned within the AOR will be driven by the current
    operating environment and relationships within the AOR. At some point
    in the future DOD could envision the Deputy COMUSAFCENT being assigned
    in the AOR with his or her family while the Commander resides at Shaw
    AFB. Ultimately, however, the CSAF will look at all the key factors in
    making the decision if or when to return the Commander's position back
    to Shaw.

        153. Senator Graham. Dr. Carter, if the AFCENT Commander moves his
    family to the AOR, does this change the promise by the Air Force to
    return the AFCENT Commander to Shaw AFB once hostilities cease in the
    CENTCOM AOR?
        Dr. Carter. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force's decision to keep
    COMUSAFCENT assigned within the AOR will be driven by the current
    operating environment and relationships within the AOR. Whether the
    COMUSAFCENT moves his family to the AOR will not affect that decision.

        154. Senator Graham. Dr. Carter, with privatized housing now
    beginning at Shaw AFB, will new housing be built for the AFCENT
    Commander, as is being done for the AFCENT Commander?
        Dr. Carter. Yes. The project provides for a new home for both the
    AFCENT and the Army Central Command commanders. Five general officer
    homes will be constructed at Shaw AFB, SC, as part of housing
    privatization. The Southern Group Housing Privatization project which
    includes Shaw AFB, SC; Charleston AFB, SC; Arnold AFB, TN; and Keesler
    AFB, MS, was awarded to Forest City Southern Group, LLC on 30 September
    2011. The project owner started management operations the same day and
    has received authorization to commence construction from the Air Force.

        155. Senator Graham. Dr. Carter, unlike Naval Central Command
    (NAVCENT) Headquarters (HQ) the current AFCENT HQ location in the AOR
    is not controlled by the United States. Will the lack of U.S. control
    impact the security, support, or quality of life structure for family
    members who will be without access to a U.S. base?
        Dr. Carter. The safety of our Air Force members and their families
    is our number one priority. A prerequisite to Commander, CENTCOM,
    approval of the AFCENT plan was assurance that our families would be
    able to enjoy similar levels of safety and security afforded to ARCENT
    families by living in the same housing communities managed under DOS
    Housing Pool that satisfy CENTCOM force protection requirements.
    According to the DOS (http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis--pa--tw/cis/
    cis--1003.html#crime), violence in Qatar is ``rare'' and a ``large
    police presence is deployed throughout the country''. Reports of petty
    theft, credit card theft, and theft of unsecured items (e.g., cash,
    jewelry, electronics, etc.) in hotel rooms or other unattended public
    places are also noted, however, these crimes are not uncommon in the
    U.S. and awareness and vigilance are recommended.
        Owing to the availability, proximity, and quality of resources
    afforded to Air Force family members within the greater Doha region, we
    don't believe limited access or lack of robust, traditional family
    support resources at Al Udeid will degrade quality of life for
    servicemembers or their dependents while living in Doha, Qatar. The
    AFCENT command sponsorship program is an extension of a pre-existing
    ARCENT program, partnering with the U.S. Embassy, Qatar, and placing
    Air Force family members into secure, select, western-style DOS Housing
    Pool quarters. Neighborhoods are filled with ARCENT families, U.S.
    citizens, allies, and a wide variety of professionals serving in
    diverse capacities including academics, doctors, and corporate
    executives.
        Doha is a very modern Middle Eastern city with many western
    amenities including instantly-recognizable, western-style restaurants,
    retailers, and grocery stores that offer international cuisines. For
    families with K-12 children, there are several education options
    including enrollment in the American School of Doha, a world renowned,
    fully-accredited institution. Families with dependents in college can
    choose from branch campuses of internationally-recognized universities
    including Texas A&M, Carnegie Mellon, and Northwestern. Modern medical
    care is available and covered by TRICARE. Finally, the Qatari Ministry
    of Defense recently approved Air Force military family members access
    to Al Udeid Air Base, including access to limited morale, welfare, and
    recreation services, chaplain services, and fitness center resources.

        156. Senator Graham. Dr. Carter, what is cost-per-year required to
    support and protect families on accompanied tours to the CENTCOM AOR?
        Dr. Carter. Bringing up to 60 families to the CENTCOM AOR by fiscal
    year 2015 increases the support footprint. The Department estimates
    that the additional net cost to support and protect families in the
    CENTCOM AOR will be approximately $6 million per year. This cost
    includes personnel entitlement and related costs, schooling, housing,
    additional civilian positions to provide support to families, and
    associated force protection costs. This figure also takes into account
    partially offsetting expenses because families assigned to the CENTCOM
    AOR will no longer receive Basic Allowance for Housing or Family
    Separation Allowance.
        The report of the AFCENT ``Families At Al Udeid'' (F@AUAB) Working
    Group, which met at regular intervals from August 2010 through July
    2011, included the steps taken to assign the initial set of command-
    sponsored families in summer 2011. The report also identified the steps
    required in future years to achieve the COMUSAFCENT's intent to
    increase the number of command-sponsored families in Qatar by
    approximately 12 each year, to a total of about 60 families by 2015.

        157. Senator Graham. Dr. Carter, who initiated moving the families
    from Shaw AFB to the CENTCOM AOR (e.g., AFCENT, CENTCOM, Air Force, DOD
    and/or DOS)?
        Dr. Carter. The request to expand on the U.S. Army Central program
    was initiated by then-Lieutenant General Gilmary M. Hostage, former
    Commander, U.S. Air Forces Central, in coordination with, and approval
    from, General James N. Mattis, Commander, CENTCOM, and Dr. Clifford L.
    Stanley, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Resources).
        A small percentage of Air Force members are stationed,
    unaccompanied, at Al Udeid Air Base (AB), Qatar via permanent change of
    station orders for 1 year. Tour lengths will be extended to 2 years for
    a targeted group of individuals who choose to bring their families--
    there is no move of position authorizations from Shaw AFB to Al Udeid
    AB. The number of accompanied tours will increase and the number of
    unaccompanied decrease to maintain the same number of billets at Shaw
    AFB and Al Udeid AB.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn

                           F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

        158. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Carter, in your responses to advance
    policy questions, you made the following statements: ``Based on current
    and projected threats, I believe it is critical that we transition to a
    fifth generation capability across the Services while maintaining
    sufficient legacy inventory capacity to prevail in current and near-
    term conflicts'' and ``we need JSF to deal with advanced fighters and
    surface-to-air missiles worldwide, especially in the stressing
    electronic warfare environments of the future.'' Can you elaborate on
    these statements?
        Dr. Carter. I have not wavered in my firm belief that JSF is the
    centerpiece of the Department's tactical air forces. Its unprecedented
    combination of stealth, sensing, and firepower will give American
    forces a crucial edge against advanced threats. Thus, as a matter of
    utmost importance, DOD continued to actively manage the JSF program as
    it proceeds through development, balancing the capability benefits with
    the concurrency risks-within increasingly tight resourcing constraints.

        159. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Carter, some F-35 critics have called for
    our military's planned buy of F-35s to be downsized from the full 2,443
    requirement, resulting in a silver bullet fleet of far fewer F-35s,
    with the rest of the requirement to be filled by fourth generation
    aircraft. What concerns does this scenario raise for you?
        Dr. Carter. The Department is currently developing the fiscal year
    2013 budget and thus is still deliberating investment strategies with
    respect to specific programs. I understand that the Department must
    maintain a tactical air portfolio that meets the near and longer-term
    requirements of the warfighter within the bounds of affordability.
    JSF's impressive capabilities make it a key focus of our attention as
    the Department examines the appropriate size and mix of fourth
    generation and fifth generation fighter attack aircraft inventories
    based on strategic priorities, threat assessments, concepts of
    operations, and force structure requirements.

        160. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Carter, what would the effect on our
    warfighters be, especially in the face of a large-scale military
    conflict in which they were asked to operate for weeks or months on end
    in highly contested airspace?
        Dr. Carter. Sustained, large-scale combat operations are inherently
    stressful, but the key to lowering risk in any type of conflict is to
    modernize and support our forces with the right capabilities and
    adequate capacity. The Department is dedicated to that task in building
    the fiscal year 2013 President's budget.

        161. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Carter, DOD recently provided Congress
    with the annual report on Communist China's military modernization and
    expansion, in which it warned us that, `` . . . China's military has
    benefited from robust investment in modern hardware and technology.
    Many modern systems have reached maturity and others will become
    operational in the next few years.'' One of those investments includes
    China's new J-20 stealth fighter unveiled earlier this year. More
    recently, Russia unveiled its own stealth fighter called the T-50 at
    the Moscow Air Show in August. Speaking at the air show, the Russian
    Federation Air Force Commander in Chief said that series production of
    this fifth generation aircraft could begin as early as 2014.
    Additionally, the Chinese, North Koreans, and Iranians are fielding
    sophisticated SAMs that threaten our fleet of fourth generation
    aircraft. In your written testimony to this committee in May, you
    stated that ``the F-35 will form the backbone of U.S. air combat
    superiority for generations to come.'' Would you agree that in order to
    maintain air combat superiority for generations to come, the United
    States needs to successfully field a stealthy, multi-role fighter such
    as the F-35 in sufficient quantities?
        Dr. Carter. Tactical Air (TACAIR) modernization is a critical
    component in the Department's ability to meet our national security
    requirements. The Department's goal is to transition the TACAIR fleet
    to primarily a fifth generation force as efficiently as we can. On June
    1, 2010, I certified to Congress that the F-35 program is essential to
    national security. That certification, following a thorough Nunn-
    McCurdy review, highlighted the continued need for the F-35 program.
    However, the F-35 is still under development and the Department has a
    number of aging legacy aircraft, a portion of which may need replacing
    before the F-35 is ready for deployment. It is also vitally important
    that DOD maintains a TACAIR force structure that can fight the wars the
    U.S. military is currently involved in and the threats it may confront
    in the near future.

        162. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Carter, in your opinion, what does
    development by our potential adversaries of fifth generation fighters
    and sophisticated SAMs mean for the U.S. inventory of fourth generation
    aircraft?
        Dr. Carter. The Department is investing in F-35 and F-22 to address
    high end threats. While the high-end scenarios are stressing, the F-35
    brings an unprecedented combination of stealth, sensing, and firepower,
    complimented by the F-22's unmatched survivability and lethality in the
    air-to-air arena. However, pending full rate production of JSF, the
    Department must consider prudent investments to maintain our inventory
    capacity, which in the 2012 President's Budget involved expenditure in
    new FA-18E/Fs and legacy attack fighter aircraft modernization.

        163. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Carter, would you agree that these threats
    are reason to procure more fifth generation aircraft and phase out
    procurement of fourth generation aircraft?
        Dr. Carter. The Department needs the JSF to deal with advanced
    fighters and surface-to-air missiles world-wide, especially in the
    stressing electronic warfare environments of the future, and it is
    committed to making responsible investment decisions relative to the F-
    35 that accurately reflect the status of the program, the Services'
    requirements, and the larger Department priorities.

        164. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Carter, in your opinion, what is the
    survivability of a fourth generation fighter, such as the latest
    versions of the F/A-18, against a Russian T-50, Chinese J-20, and
    advanced SAMs?
        Dr. Carter. The F/A-18E/F is a highly capable aircraft designed to
    meet and defeat today's threats with growth potential for the future.
    It operates at higher risk in a war fight compared to the JSF but ably
    conducts the full range of strike fighter missions. F/A-18E/F will be a
    complementary platform on the Nation's carrier decks with the F-35C
    into the 2030s and will meet current and projected requirements, with
    planned investments in the fiscal years 2012-2016 FYDP and beyond.
    Investments in the F/A-18E/F include upgraded avionics, sensors, and
    weapons such as Infra-Red Search and Track, AIM-9X Block II, Integrated
    Defensive Electronic Countermeasures Block 2, and Active Electronically
    Scanned Array electronic protection upgrades, which will ensure
    relevancy against many emerging and future threats.

                    SHORT TAKEOFF VERTICAL LANDING AIRCRAFT

        165. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Carter, the Marine Corps has a validated
    and pressing need for a short takeoff, vertical landing (STOVL)
    aircraft to replace its famous AV-8B Harrier jump-jets. During the
    conflict in Libya, Marine Corps Harriers operated with great combat
    effectiveness from the USS Kearsarge, approximately 150 miles off the
    coast of Libya. Their flight time of 25 minutes from ship to target was
    just a fraction of the 440-mile, 75-minute transit that conventional
    U.S. tactical aircraft made from the nearest base in Italy.
    Additionally, due to the short transit time, Marine Corps combat
    aviators were able to return to the ship, load more weapons, and fly a
    second mission that same day. It seems pretty clear that the STOVL
    capability is a combat multiplier. Do you agree that this unique
    capability greatly increases the ability of our military units to
    execute their missions?
        Dr. Carter. STOVL fixed-wing aircraft, operating from forward
    deployed amphibious ships and expeditionary bases, provide important
    operational flexibility. With regards to the Libya operation, the
    presence of the USS Kearsarge and its air combat element allowed the
    United States to provide tactical aircraft capabilities from the sea
    without changing the disposition of aircraft carriers deployed
    elsewhere. While our NATO allies operated from bases 440 miles from
    Libya, most tactical U.S. strike aircraft operated from Aviano Airbase,
    1,045 miles from Benghazi. The AV-8B Harriers, however, were based as
    close as 120 miles from Benghazi, allowing them to operate without
    aerial refueling and generate multiple sorties per aircraft per day.
    This ability to operate from such close proximity to the Libyan coast
    made the Harrier highly effective in attacking fleeting targets of
    Qaddafi's highly mobile forces.

        166. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Carter, the Harrier, due to its STOVL
    capability, is the only U.S. tactical jet aircraft capable of operating
    from the Navy's fleet of amphibious assault ships, until the F-35B
    fleet comes online. It seems that, if the F-35B variant is not fielded
    in its intended numbers, the United States will have failed to leverage
    the enormous capability provided by amphibious assault ships and also
    the huge investment that U.S. taxpayers have made in these ships. Do
    you agree? How can we avoid such an undesirable outcome?
        Dr. Carter. The F-35B was designed to operate off our current
    Landing Helicopter Deck (LHD) class large deck amphibious assault
    ships, and is currently conducting sea trials aboard the USS Wasp LHD.
    The Department's future America Class Landing Helicopter Assault LHA(R)
    class vessels are specifically designed to operate F-35Bs, along with
    the full contingent of Marine Corps assault support rotorcraft. The
    integration of F-35B and F-35C aircraft into our strike groups will
    provide multi-role, fifth-generation capabilities across a range of
    combat operations to deter potential adversaries and enable future Navy
    and Marine Corps power projection. DOD remains strongly committed to
    both the F-35B and F-35C JSF.

                                F-35 CONCURRENCY

        167. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Carter, the JSF program was designed with
    a substantial amount of concurrency built in by DOD. My understanding
    is that concurrency is the deliberate overlap of the development/
    testing phase and the production phase of a program. By building in
    concurrency, DOD decided to start buying production models of the F-35
    before development and testing of the aircraft was completed. As I
    understand it, the goal of building in concurrency would be to get the
    F-35 to the warfighter faster, but at the risk of creating cost
    overruns during the early stages of production. Can you comment on why
    DOD built concurrency into the JSF program?
        Dr. Carter. The Department established a concurrent JSF program
    with the goal of providing the Department with incremental JSF
    capability in order to meet operational requirements and address strike
    fighter shortfall forecasts. Department leadership accepted a level of
    concurrency that it felt best balanced the risks of concurrent
    development and production against the need to meet the Services IOC
    requirements. In the time since this initial decision was made, program
    delays have substantially increased the level of concurrency and have
    made it necessary for the Services to delay their IOC dates and extend
    their legacy fleets. The Department will continue to review concurrency
    in the program to ensure that it is managed appropriately.

        168. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Carter, how has that affected the
    program's costs?
        Dr. Carter. Concurrency has increased procurement costs. Aircraft
    procured prior to the completion of the development and testing phase
    require modifications to incorporate changes discovered during testing
    and those costs are not insignificant. However, those increases have to
    be taken in the context that accepting concurrency costs allows for
    earlier delivery of the aircraft.

        169. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Carter, has concurrency led to a faster
    ramp-up to full-rate production?
        Dr. Carter. Yes. Because the program began Low-Rate Initial
    Production (LRIP) during development, full-rate production can be
    achieved sooner than if LRIP was delayed until the completion of the
    development and test phase.

        170. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Carter, my understanding is that the total
    cost overruns for LRIP Lots 1 through 3, which include both performance
    and concurrency overruns, was $1.054 billion, of which the Government's
    share was $771 million and industry's (both Lockheed Martin and United
    Technologies Corporation) was $283 million. DOD built concurrency into
    the JSF program. Would you agree that a significant portion of these
    cost overruns is a result of that concurrency?
        Dr. Carter. No. The cost overruns on the LRIP 1-3 contracts are not
    primarily a result of the concurrent aspects of the program. The good
    bulk of cost overruns are attributable to additional labor hours
    required for wing and mate assembly on the production line. It took the
    contractor longer to manufacture the early lots of aircraft than was
    predicted and negotiated for. Since these were Cost Plus Incentive Fee
    contracts, negotiated in 2007, 2008, and 2009, the Department was
    responsible for the cost increases. For this reason, in 2010 the
    Department transitioned to a Fixed-Price Incentive Firm contract for
    LRIP 4. In both the LRIP 4 contract and the LRIP 5 contract currently
    being negotiated, the Government will be protected against this type of
    open ended overrun. The costs due to concurrency can be predicted,
    based on the expected change to the design, and negotiated into these
    Fixed-Price type contracts. Additionally, an equitable sharing
    arrangement for overruns, or underruns, as well as a ceiling price is
    included in the costs to cap the Government's liability.

                              TAIWAN SELF DEFENSE

        171. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Carter, under the Taiwan Relations Act
    (TRA), the United States is statutorily obligated to make available to
    Taiwan such defense articles and defense services ``as may be necessary
    to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.''
    Yet DOD's 2011 report, Military and Security Developments Involving the
    People's Republic of China, concludes that the ``balance of cross-
    Strait military forces and capabilities continues to shift in the
    mainland's favor.'' Given this predictable shift in China's favor, do
    you assess that the United States has been upholding our obligations
    under the TRA?
        Dr. Carter. Yes. The balance of military forces and defense
    capabilities was expected to shift, and indeed it did. The Department
    is monitoring this shift very closely and discussed these changes and
    their effects with Taiwan. It is not possible for Taiwan to match
    China's military expansion, nor would it be desirable for Taiwan to try
    to do so. Instead, Taiwan must acquire and deploy advanced and
    asymmetric military capabilities to defend itself. To offset the shift
    in military balance we are working with Taiwan to help it develop these
    capabilities and the appropriate military force that will deter PRC
    aggression and, should deterrence fail, provide the Taiwan military the
    capability to defend the island for an extended time.

        172. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Carter, in your responses to advance
    policy questions, you stated that China's ``near-term focus appears to
    be on preparing for potential contingencies involving Taiwan, including
    possible U.S. military intervention.'' Since 2006, Taiwan has made
    repeated requests to purchase new F-16C/D multirole combat aircraft
    from the United States to augment their air force, which is becoming
    increasingly obsolete. In your opinion, does Taiwan need these 66 new
    F-16C/D fighters in order to maintain adequate self-defense
    capabilities?
        Dr. Carter. The Obama administration is firmly committed to the
    one-China policy, which is based on the three joint U.S.-China
    communiques and the TRA. This is a policy that endured across eight
    administrations, transcended political parties, and served as a central
    element of our approach to Asia for more than three decades. The
    administration's strong commitment to the TRA is evident in its
    actions, which include the September 21 notification to Congress of our
    intent to sell Taiwan $5.85 billion worth of new defense articles and
    services--including an upgrade package for Taiwan's 145 F-16 A/B
    fighters; spare parts for its F-16, F-5, and C-130 aircraft; and
    training for F-16 pilots at Luke AFB in Arizona.
        This decision follows the January 29, 2010 decision to sell Taiwan
    $6.4 billion in defensive arms, including 60 UH-60M Blackhawk
    helicopters, Patriot PAC-III firing units and missiles (three firing
    units, one training unit, and 114 missiles), Harpoon missiles, two
    Osprey-class mine hunters, and follow-on support for command and
    control systems. In addition, in August 2011, the Obama administration
    submitted a $310 million direct commercial sales notification to
    Congress for the approval of export licenses in support of radar
    equipment for Taiwan Indigenous Defense Fighters and Hughes air defense
    radars. These collective sales of more than $12.5 billion in arms to
    Taiwan are an important indication of our commitment to Taiwan's
    defense.
        The F-16 retrofit reflects a smart defense policy that provides
    real and immediate contributions to Taiwan's security. The retrofitted
    F-16 A/Bs will provide a more reliable, survivable, and capable
    aircraft--comparable to the F-16 C/D, but at a lower cost--and Taiwan
    will have 145 of them.

        173. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Carter, what risks would the United States
    face if Taiwan is unable to protect itself in the future?
        Dr. Carter. A Taiwan that is unable to protect itself could lead to
    instability in Northeast Asia. A weak Taiwan would be less likely to
    continue cross-strait engagement with China if it could not resist
    coercion. The lack of dialogue would potentially result in
    misunderstandings across the Strait and coud escalate to crisis due to
    miscalculations. Additionally, China may be more likely to resort to
    force against Taiwan if the island lacks the means to resist coercion
    and deter aggression.
        Taiwan is a visible and important indicator of U.S. commitment to
    Asia. A Taiwan that is unable to defend itself undermines U.S.
    interests, and the failure to provide for Taiwan's defense could cast
    doubt on U.S. commitments to other friends and allies in the region.
    Maintaining the current balance of power in the region and across the
    Taiwan Strait promotes stability and discourages regional arms races
    from materializing.

                          DOD CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER

        174. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Carter, section 904 of the National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 designates the Deputy
    Secretary of Defense as the CMO of DOD. In this capacity, the Deputy
    Secretary is responsible for overseeing the synchronization,
    integration, and coordination of DOD business operations, ensuring
    effectiveness and efficiency--including in DOD's financial management
    practices. Arguably, past deputy secretaries have not spent the
    necessary time on performing the critical job of CMO, which has fallen
    well short of Congress' intent for the CMO function. Do you agree that
    now, more than ever, there is a pressing need for DOD to improve its
    overall business practices and financial management systems in order to
    maximize each and every dollar and serve as better stewards of
    taxpayers' funding?
        Dr. Carter. I believe that, particularly in light of the current
    need to rein in spending, in order to acquire with wisdom and care and
    to make the most of each and every one of the taxpayers' dollars
    entrusted to the Department, the oversight of the Department's business
    operations and its financial management practices could not be of
    greater importance.

        175. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Carter, are you fully committed to
    carrying out the important function of DOD CMO on a daily basis?
        Dr. Carter. Yes, I am thoroughly committed to carrying out the
    function of DOD CMO on a daily basis.

        176. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Carter, how much time do you anticipate
    dedicating to your responsibilities as CMO?
        Dr. Carter. I anticipate dedicating a significant amount of my time
    to my responsibilities as DOD's CMO.

                            LOOMING DOD BUDGET CUTS

        177. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Carter, in a speech earlier this year,
    former Secretary Gates stated that ``we must reject the traditional
    approach of applying across-the-board cuts, the simplest and most
    politically expedient approach both inside this building and outside of
    it. . . . It results in a hollowing-out of the force from a lack of
    proper training, maintenance, and equipment. We've been there before,
    in the 1970s and in the 1990s.'' What assurances can you give that you
    will make every effort to avoid a ``hollowing-out of the force'', as
    described by Secretary Gates?
        Dr. Carter. The Secretary made maintaining an extremely agile,
    deployable force one of his major priorities. I will use my position to
    ensure that adequate resources are programmed and budgeted in the
    readiness accounts in order to meet this priority. We all understand
    that this force will likely be smaller but will ensure that it is
    trained to be ready and deployable when called upon to do so.

        178. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Carter, given our experience in recent
    years in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, can the United States afford
    to take another procurement holiday?
        Dr. Carter. Engaging in two simultaneous unconventional wars in
    Iraq and Afghanistan has demonstrated that our enemies do not look the
    same as they did in previous wars. This truth has changed the nature of
    our engagement and the nature of the systems required to properly equip
    our warfighters. Similarly, we cannot predict exactly what our enemies
    will look like in the future, and the defense acquisition system must
    be able to adapt. As we reduce budgets, we must take care to sustain
    the industrial base in ways that preserve the ability to equip our
    forces, as well as protect the future in ways that foster innovation,
    technical superiority, and essential intellectual capability.

        179. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Carter, what would doing so mean for our
    national security?
        Dr. Carter. A procurement ``holiday'' of sufficient magnitude could
    erode key sectors of the industrial base, which could in turn impair
    our ability to equip our warfighters adequately. It could also degrade
    key industrial capabilities necessary to sustain technical superiority.

                          DOD EFFICIENCIES INITIATIVES

        180. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Carter, it has been over a year since DOD
    launched its ambitious efficiencies initiative to spur savings. Can you
    provide specific examples where these initiatives had resulted in real
    dollar savings and efficiencies?
        Dr. Carter. Increasing competition is a main initiative to spur
    savings for the Department. Below is an example from each Military
    Department in which competition resulted in real dollar savings.
        In the Army, within the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)
    portfolio, the Multifunctional Distribution Information System-Low
    Volume Terminal (MIDS-LVT) radio program is an example of how
    competition has resulted in cost savings. During the production phase
    of the MIDS-LVT program, competition has resulted in approximately 60
    percent cost savings. The initial production cost of the radio was $435
    thousand per unit and, through ongoing competition between the two
    approved vendor production sources, the cost per unit has steadily
    decreased to $181 thousand per unit. With over 2,600 MIDS-LVT units
    purchased to date, the program has achieved hundreds of millions of
    dollars in procurement savings through the successful MIDS-LVT
    competitive acquisition strategy.
        For the Air Force, the MQ-1 Predator organizational-level
    maintenance contract is a good example of how competition produced
    acquisition cost savings. The initial contract, issued in March 2005,
    was a sole source award to the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM),
    General Atomics Aeronautical Systems. This decision not to compete the
    organization-level maintenance contract was primarily driven by the
    lack of published technical orders. When those technical orders became
    available, the contract was recompeted a year ahead of schedule and
    awarded to Battle Space Flight Services, resulting in a savings of $102
    million. Because of increased and accelerated wartime demand, the Air
    Force is anticipating additional savings over the life of the contract.
    The ability to compete the requirement in the future will continue to
    enable cost savings.
        For the Department of Navy (DON), the most visible example is the
    Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. After receiving proposals from
    Lockheed Martin and Austal USA in early 2010 that were deemed
    unaffordable, the DON changed its acquisition strategy to an all-or-
    nothing competitive contract award and encouraged the companies to
    establish leaner teaming arrangements. After proposals were submitted,
    the DON realized it could achieve competitive prices. In December 2010,
    Lockheed Martin and Austal USA were each awarded fixed-price incentive
    contracts for the design and construction of 10 ships from fiscal year
    2010 through fiscal year 2015. The benefits of competition, serial
    production, employment of mature technologies, design stability, fixed-
    price contracting, commonality, and economies of scale contributed to a
    highly affordable ship construction program. The approach, self-
    financed within the program budget by reinvesting a portion of the
    greater than $2 billion in total savings through the FYDP. The approach
    also enables the DON to efficiently produce the ships at an increased
    rate to meet operational requirements sooner.

        181. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Carter, recognizing that over 70 percent
    of weapons systems costs are borne in the sustainment vice the initial
    purchase, you have spurred the Services to focus their efforts at
    savings there. Can you provide specific examples where your efforts
    have brought increased competition and lower costs in the sustainment
    arena?
        Dr. Carter. Program Managers and Product Support Managers have been
    focused on sustainment solutions that affordably and effectively
    satisfy the Warfighter's requirements for the weapon system under their
    control. Part of the solution addressing the tenets reflected in the
    Better Buying Power initiative is performance-based, life-cycle product
    support (also known as Performance Based Logistics (PBL)).
        PBL strategies involve buying performance (as defined by the
    Military Services) rather than a traditional transactional support
    strategy. Inherent in PBL strategy are the overall reduction of
    financial and mission performance risk and the transfer of some of that
    risk from the Military Service to the PBL provider.
        Fixed-price, incentive-type contracts are central to effective PBL
    strategies with commercial activities. This approach is consistent with
    the ``Should Cost'' philosophy, which challenges programs to find
    specific ways to beat the existing cost projections reflected by the
    Independent Cost Estimate or program estimates. It specifically focuses
    on eliminating non-value added overhead and incentivizes the provider
    to improve their processes and product. It creates ``internal
    competition,'' as cost savings is in the organization's best interest,
    and it is also in the best interests of the warfighter and taxpayer.
        The Department instituted a PBL Awards program in 2005 to enhance
    PBL awareness and encourage PBL excellence. Three PBL award winners
    recognized this year by the Department for their success delivering
    sustainment in a more affordable and effective fashion are the Air
    Force Joint Stars (AF JSTAR), Apache Sensors, and Navy Tires program.
        The AF JSTAR program team delivered an average 96-percent mission-
    effectiveness rate and $47 million in savings since contract inception.
    Apache Sensor PBL improved mean time between failure by 100 percent
    between July 2010 and the present, and reduced sustainment costs by $7
    million over the same period. The Navy Tire program has resulted in $46
    million in savings across the life of the contract and the elimination
    of Navy wholesale tire inventory, which freed up 280,000 cubic feet of
    storage space in the DLA and allowed for the reassignment of personnel
    to other work. Most importantly, warfighter support has been superb
    with 100 percent of all orders filled without a backorder in delivering
    more 289,000 tires worldwide.

        182. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Carter, Air Force leadership (Major
    General Fedder at a National Defense Industrial Association breakfast
    on September 7, 2011) has recognized that in the Air Force garnering
    savings in sustainment must be lead by focusing on aircraft engines.
    Given that over 85 percent of Air Force engine sustainment work is
    sole-sourced, what is OSD doing to help the Air Force spur competition
    in sustainment?
        Dr. Carter. A key factor necessary for competition is licensing of
    the data rights to maintenance manuals for continued sustainment. The
    Department is addressing this issue as part of the Better Buying Power
    Initiative for promoting real competition. Proper consideration given
    to acquiring technical data and the appropriate accompanying licenses
    in both initial acquisition and in recompetition ensures the Department
    has repair capability available through organic field and depot
    maintenance, commercial sources of repair, or a combination of both,
    with the focus of optimizing competition to reduce cost and provide
    best value.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Hon. Ashton B. Carter
    follows:]
                        Nomination Reference and Report
                               As In Executive Session,
                                   Senate of the United States,
                                                        August 2, 2011.
        Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
    on Armed Services:
        Ashton B. Carter, of Massachusetts, to be Deputy Secretary of
    Defense, vice William J. Lynn III.
                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of Hon. Ashton B. Carter, which
    was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
    referred, follows:]
                                    ------

               Resume of Career Service of Hon. Ashton B. Carter
    Education:
             Oxford University

                     1976-1979
                     Ph.D., Theoretical Physics
                     Senior Scholar, St. John's College
                     Best Participant Prize, NATO Center for
                    Subnuclear Physics

             University of Edinburgh

                     Spring 1975, no degree

             Yale University

                     1972-1976
                     B.A., summa cum laude
                     Honors in Medieval History
                     Honors in Physics
                     Phi Beta Kappa
                     Andrew D. White Essay Prize in European
                    History
    Employment Record:
             U.S. Department of Defense

                     Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
                    Technology, and Logistics
                     2009-present

             Harvard University

                     Chair, International and Global Affairs
                    Faculty
                     John F. Kennedy School of Government
                     2006-2009 (leave of absence 2009-2011)

             Harvard University

                     Ford Foundation Professor of Science and
                    International Affairs
                     John F. Kennedy School of Government
                     1996-2009

             Preventive Defense Project, Harvard and Stanford
            Universities

                     Co-Director (with William J. Perry)
                     1997-2009

             U.S. Department of State

                     Senior Advisor to the North Korea Policy
                    Review
                     1998-2000

             U.S. Department of Defense

                     Assistant Secretary of Defense for
                    International Security Policy
                     1993-1996

             Harvard University

                     Director, Center for Science and International
                    Affairs
                     1990-1993

             Harvard University

                     Professor, and Associate Director, Center for
                    Science and International Affairs
                     1988-1990

             Harvard University

                     Associate Professor
                     1986-1990

             Harvard University

                     Assistant Professor
                     1984-1986

             Massachusetts Institute of Technology

                     Research Fellow, Center for International
                    Studies
                     1982-1984

             U.S. Department of Defense

                     Program Analysis and Evaluation
                     1981-1982

             Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress

                     International Security and Commerce Program
                     1980-1981

             Rockefeller University, New York

                     Research Associate
                     1979-1980

             Oxford University

                     Physics Instructor (``Tutor'' in the Oxford
                    system)
                     Quantum Mechanics and Relativity
                     1977-1979

             Brookhaven National Laboratory

                     Experimental Research Associate
                     1976

             Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory

                     Experimental Research Associate
                     1975
    Honors and Awards:
             Defense Intelligence Medal, from the Defense
            Intelligence Agency, April 1998.
             Distinguished Public Service Medal, Department of
            Defense (awarded three times) The highest award of the
            Department of Defense, ``for distinguished public service as
            Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology &
            Logistics'' from April 2009 to June 2011, and ``for
            exceptionally distinguished service to the Nation as Assistant
            Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy,'' July
            1994 and December 1995.
             Forum Award, American Physical Society, ``For his
            clear and lucid exposition of the physics issues in the nuclear
            arms race and his unique ability to combine his physics
            background and good judgment to clarify the technical
            parameters of these important public policy issues,'' 1988.
             Ten Outstanding Young Americans, United States
            Jaycees, 1987.
             Rhodes Scholar, 1976
             See above under ``Education.''

                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
    nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon. Ashton B.
    Carter, in connection with his nomination follows:]

                              UNITED STATES SENATE
                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                                  Room SR-228
                           Washington, DC 20510-6050
                                 (202) 224-3871
                        COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
          BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

        Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
    more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
    form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
    of your answer applies.
                        Part A--Biographical Information
        Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
    this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
    public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
    any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

        1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
        Ashton Baldwin Carter (Ash Carter).

        2. Position to which nominated:
        Deputy Secretary of Defense.

        3. Date of nomination:
        August 2, 2011.

        4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
        [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
    committee's executive files.]

        5. Date and place of birth:
        September 24, 1954; Philadelphia, PA.

        6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
        Married to Stephanie DeLeeuw Carter.

        7. Names and ages of children:
        William Ashton Carter, 22.
        Ava Clayton Carter, 19.

        8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
    dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
        Abington High School, Abington, PA, 1968-1972, High School Diploma
    1972
        Yale University, New Haven, CT, 1972-1976, B.A. 1976
        University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland, spring 1975, no
    degree
        Oxford University, Oxford, United Kingdom, 1976-1979, D. Phil.,
    1979

        9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
    last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
    job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
        Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
    Logistics, 2009-present; U.S. Department of Defense--Washington, DC
        Chair, International and Global Affairs faculty, 2006-2009 (on
    leave of absence 2009-2011); John F. Kennedy School of Government,
    Harvard University--Cambridge, MA
        Ford Foundation Professor of Science and International Affairs,
    1996-2009; John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University--
    Cambridge, MA
        Co-Director (with William J. Perry), Preventive Defense Project,
    1997-2009; Harvard and Stanford Universities--Cambridge, MA

        10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
    honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
    or local governments, other than those listed above.
        Member, White House Government Accountability and Transparency
    Board (2011-present)
        Chair, National Security Strategy and Policies Expert Working
    Group, Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United
    States, 2008-2009
        Co-Chair, Review Panel on Future Directions for DTRA (Defense
    Threat Reduction Agency) Missions and Capabilities To Combat Weapons of
    Mass Destruction, 2007-2008
        Member, International Security Advisory Board to the Secretary of
    State, 2006-2008
        Member National Academy of Sciences Committee on Science and
    Technology for Countering Terrorism, 2001-2003
        Member, National Missile Defense White Team, 1998-2009
        Member, Threat Reduction Advisory Committee, U.S. Department of
    Defense, 1998-2002
        Member, Defense Science Board, 1991-1993, 1997-2001
        Member, Defense Policy Board, 1997-2001
        Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy,
    U.S. Department of Defense, 1993-1996
        Member, National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International
    Security and Arms Control, 1990-1993
        Member, Sandia National Laboratory, President's Advisory Council,
    1992-1993
        Member, Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, Advisory
    Panel on START Verification Technologies, 1991-1992
        Member, National Academy of Sciences Panel on National Security
    Export Controls, 1990-1991
        Member, National Research Council Naval Studies Advisory Committee
    on the Future of the Aircraft Carrier, 1990-1991
        Member, White House, President's Council of Advisers on Science and
    Technology. Panel on National Security, 1990-1991
        Member, Defense Science Board Task Force on New Scenarios and
    Intelligence, 1990
        Member, Congressional Office of Technology Assessment Advisory
    Panel on START Verification Technologies, 1989-1990
        Member, Joint Chiefs of Staff Advisory Group on the Future of U.S.-
    Soviet Military Relations, 1988-1989
        Member. Commission on The Presidency and Science Advising, 1988
        Consultant, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of
    State, 1986-1988
        Member, Advisory Panel on Military Uses of Space, Office of
    Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, 1985-86
        Analyst, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary
    of Defense, Pentagon, 1981-1982
        Analyst, International Security and Commerce Program, Office of
    Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, 1980-1981
        Experimental Research Associate, Brookhaven National Laboratory,
    1976
        Experimental Research Associate, Fermi National Accelerator
    Laboratory, 1975

        11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
    officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
    or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
    business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
        None.

        12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
    professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
    other organizations.
        a. Aspen Strategy Group, 1997-2009 (now emeritus member)
        b. Council on Foreign Relations, 1989-present
        c. Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1989-present
        d. American Physical Society, 1976-present
        e. American Association of Rhodes Scholars, 1977-present

        13. Political affiliations and activities:
        (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
    any public office for which you have been a candidate.
        None.
        (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
    to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
    years.
        Member, Department of Defense Agency Review Team, Obama-Biden
    Transition, 2008-2009
        Member of National Security Advisory Group to Senator Tom Daschle,
    then Senator Harry Reid, chaired by William J. Perry, 2005-2008
        Co-Chair, with Ronald Lehman, of Policy Advisory Group to Senator
    Richard Lugar, 2005-2008
        (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
    organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
    entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.

      8/28/2008.....................  $2,300............  Friends of Hillary
      6/24/2008.....................  $4,600............  Obama for America
      9/15/2007.....................  $2,300............  Hillary Clinton
                                                           for President
      9/15/2007.....................  $2,300............  Hillary Clinton
                                                           for President
      6/29/2007.....................  $1,500............  Friends of Dick
                                                           Lugar, Inc.
      11/2/2006.....................  $1,500............  Friends of Dick
                                                           Lugar, Inc.

        14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
    society memberships, military medals, and any other special
    recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
        1. Defense Intelligence Medal, from the Defense Intelligence
    Agency, April 1998.
        2. Distinguished Public Service Medal, Department of Defense
    (awarded three times), The highest award of the Department of Defense,
    ``for exceptionally distinguished service to the Nation as Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy,'' July 1994 and
    December 1995, and ``for distinguished public service as Under
    Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics from
    April 2009 to June 2011.''
        3. Forum Award, American Physical Society. ``For his clear and
    lucid exposition of the physics issues in the nuclear arms race and his
    unique ability to combine his physics background and good judgment to
    clarify the technical parameters of these important public policy
    issues,'' 1988.
        4. Ten Outstanding Young Americans, U.S. Jaycees. 1987.
        5. Senior Scholar, St. John's College, 1978-1979
        6. Best Participant Prize, NATO Center for Subnuclear Physics,
    1978.
        7. Rhodes Scholar, 1976
        8. Summa cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa graduate, Yale University, with
    honors in medieval history and physics (B.A. 1976).
        9. Andrew D. White Essay Prize in European History, Yale
    University, 1976.

        15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
    books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
    written.
        Please see attached.
        [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
    committee's executive files.]

        16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
    speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have
    copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
    been nominated.
        I have delivered a large number of speeches in my capacity as Under
    Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and,
    previously, as Chair of the International and Global Affairs Faculty at
    Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. In a majority of cases, I have
    delivered these speeches using no notes, or using handwritten notes
    that have not been archived. Almost all of my speeches are derived
    from, or form the basis of, written publications or testimony, and
    their content can be found in my response to the previous question. As
    per the committee's request, I am providing two copies of each formal
    speech I have delivered (of which I have copies) on topics that are
    relevant to the position for which I have been nominated.
        1. ``Defense Budgets, American Power, and the National Security
    Industrial Base.'' Remarks at the Brookings Institution, 15 July 2011.
        2. Remarks at Heritage Foundation Conference, ``The Pentagon
    Efficiency Initiative: Enough to Stave Off More Defense Cuts?'' 20
    April 2011.
        3. ``Doing More Without More: Obtaining Efficiency and Productivity
    in Defense.'' Remarks at the Center for a New American Security. 22
    February 2011.
        4. Remarks at Aviation Week's R&D Technology and Requirements
    Conference. Washington, DC. 16 February 2011.
        5. ``The Defense Industry Enters a New Era.'' Remarks to Cowen
    Investment Conference, New York, NY. 9 February 2011.
        6. Remarks at Center for American Progress Conference, ``A $400
    Billion Opportunity: 10 Strategies to Cut the Fat out of Federal
    Procurement.'' 16 November 2010.
        7. ``Acquisition Process.'' Remarks before the Air Force
    Association Conference. 15 September 2010.
        8. Remarks at Navy League Sea-Air-Space Exposition, Gaylord
    Convention Center, Washington, DC. 4 May 2010.
        9. Remarks at Defense Logistics Modernization Conference. Center
    for Strategic and International Studies. 2 April 2010.
        10.Remarks at 38th IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security
    Strategy and Policy, ``Air, Space, and Cyberspace Power in the 21st
    Century.'' 20 January 2010.
        11. Remarks at PEO/SYSCOM Conference, Fort Belvoir, VA. 3 November
    2009.
        12. ``A Conversation with Ashton B. Carter.'' Council on Foreign
    Relations. 5 October 2009
        13. Remarks at Business Executives for National Security
    Conference, 13 May 2009.
        [Nominee provided copies and they are contained in the committee's
    executive files.]

        17. Commitment regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
        (a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
    conflicts of interest?
        Yes.
        (b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
    would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
        No.
        (c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
    deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
    for the record in hearings?
        Yes.
        (d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
    response to congressional requests?
        Yes.
        (e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
    testimony or briefings?
        Yes.
        (f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
    before this committee?
        Yes.
        (g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
    such documents?
        Yes.
                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
    committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
    forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
    Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                    ------

        (The committee may require that copies of your Federal
    income tax returns be provided to the committee. These
    documents will be made available only to Senators and the staff
    designated by the chairman. They will not be available for
    public inspection.)
                               Signature and Date
        I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
    on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
    provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
    and complete.
                                                      Ashton B. Carter.
        This 6th day of September, 2011.

        [The nomination of Hon. Ashton B. Carter was reported to
    the Senate by Chairman Levin on September 21, 2011, with the
    recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
    was confirmed by the Senate on September 23, 2011.]

    NOMINATIONS OF MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
     FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT; MARK W. LIPPERT TO
       BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY
    AFFAIRS; BRAD R. CARSON TO BE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
     ARMY; AND KEVIN A. OHLSON TO BE A JUDGE OF THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE ARMED FORCES

                                  ----------

                          THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2011

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Webb, McCain,
    Inhofe, Graham, and Cornyn.
        Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
    director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Michael J. Kuiken,
    professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K.
    Levine, general counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael
    J. Noblet, professional staff member; and Russell L. Shaffer,
    counsel.
        Minority staff members present: David M. Morriss, minority
    staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member;
    Michael J. Sistak, research assistant; and Richard F. Walsh,
    minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles and Kathleen
    A. Kulenkampff.
        Committee members' assistants present: Gordon Peterson,
    assistant to Senator Webb; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to
    Senator Shaheen; Anthony Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe;
    Sergio Sarkany, assistant to Senator Graham; and Dave Hanke,
    assistant to Senator Cornyn.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
        The committee meets today to consider the nominations of
    Mark Lippert to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and
    Pacific Security Affairs; Michael Sheehan to be Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
    Conflict (SOLIC); Brad Carson to be General Counsel of the
    Army; and Kevin Ohlson to be a judge of the U.S. Court of
    Appeals for the Armed Forces. We welcome our witnesses and our
    nominees and their families to today's hearing.
        The long hours and the other sacrifices that our nominees
    are willing to make to serve our country are appreciated by us,
    and as they know full well, they could not happen without the
    support of their families.
        Each of our nominees has a distinguished record of public
    service.
        Mr. Lippert worked in the Senate for the better part of 10
    years serving as an advisor to a number of Senators and as a
    professional staff member for the Senate Appropriations
    Committee before joining the National Security Council (NSC)
    staff in 2009. In the same period, he has somehow found time to
    serve two tours on Active Duty as a naval intelligence officer,
    earning a Bronze Star in Iraq in 2008.
        Mr. Sheehan is currently the president of Lexington
    Security Group. He previously served on the NSC staff under the
    first President Bush, under President Clinton as coordinator
    for counterterrorism in the State Department, as Assistant
    Secretary General of the United Nations (U.N.), and as a Deputy
    Commissioner of Counterterrorism for the New York City Police
    Department (NYPD). Mr. Sheehan is a West Point graduate with a
    distinguished 20-year career in the Army.
        Mr. Carson served as a Congressman from Oklahoma from 2001
    to 2005. In 2008 and 2009, Mr. Carson served on Active Duty
    with an explosive ordnance disposal battalion in Iraq where he
    was awarded the Bronze Star. Mr. Carson is currently the
    Director of the National Energy Policy Institute and an
    associate professor of law and business at the University of
    Tulsa.
        Mr. Ohlson served as the chief of staff to the Attorney
    General from 2009 to 2011 and chief of staff to the Deputy
    Attorney General from 1997 to 2001. Before that, he served as a
    judge advocate in the Army and was awarded a Bronze Star for
    his role in the first Gulf War. Mr. Ohlson is currently the
    Chief of the Professional Misconduct Review Unit at the
    Department of Justice.
        If confirmed, Mr. Sheehan and Mr. Lippert would play a key
    role in guiding Department of Defense (DOD) policy as the
    Department works to address continuing threats to our national
    security in an austere budget environment, while Mr. Carson and
    Mr. Ohlson would be among the most senior legal officials in
    DOD.
        We look forward to the testimony of our nominees and
    hopefully to their confirmation.
        Senator McCain.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in
    welcoming our nominees and their families today, and I
    congratulate them on their nominations.
        As you mentioned, Mr. Sheehan has been nominated to be the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for SOLIC. He has an extensive
    background in counterterrorism having served as a special
    forces officer in the Army and subsequently as coordinator for
    counterterrorism in the Department of State during the Clinton
    administration and as Assistant Secretary General at the United
    Nations in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations during the
    Bush administration.
        Mr. Sheehan, if confirmed, you will have a critical,
    important role given the importance of our Special Operations
    Forces counterterrorism efforts around the globe. Al Qaeda and
    associated organizations are becoming increasingly
    decentralized in nature and remain a serious threat. Prolonged
    instability in places like Yemen and Somalia continue to
    provide safe havens for these groups allowing them greater
    areas of operation to organize and plan attacks against
    America's allies, interests, and Homeland.
        Mr. Lippert has been nominated to be the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs.
    Since graduating college in 1997, he has gained national
    security policy experience on Capitol Hill, with the
    administration, and without question his service as an
    intelligence officer with the Navy Reserve has added to his
    understanding. The next few years are critical to this broader
    and strategic endeavor. Mr. Lippert appears to be qualified,
    and I praise his service in uniform.
        I have serious concerns regarding his nomination. In a
    meeting in my office, I asked Mr. Lippert his views on the
    success of the surge in Iraq, and I find his answers to be less
    than satisfactory. I would like to follow up on that matter
    this morning.
        Mr. Carson has been nominated to be the Army's General
    Counsel and is well qualified to be a key advisor to Secretary
    McHugh and General Odierno. He possesses extensive experience
    in the public and private sectors, including representing the
    Second District of Oklahoma in the House of Representatives in
    the 107th and 108th Congresses. Mr. Carson's military service
    as a mobilized Navy Reserve intelligence officer serving with
    the 84th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Battalion in Iraq in 2008
    and 2009 is particularly noteworthy.
        Finally, Mr. Ohlson has been nominated to be a judge on the
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, the civilian
    appellate court that oversees our military justice system. The
    court that you will serve on, if confirmed, is a key element in
    guaranteeing that the goals of the Uniform Code of Military
    Justice legislation enacted 60 years ago continue to be
    realized.
        Mr. Ohlson, your military service as a judge advocate in
    the Army and your years of service in the Department of Justice
    in a variety of capacities demonstrate your qualifications.
    However, your assignment from 2009 to 2011 as Attorney General
    Eric Holder's chief of staff and counselor during the period in
    which the Justice Department managed Operation Fast and Furious
    raised serious concerns. As a result, I am very troubled.
    Operation Fast and Furious, as we now know, resulted in over
    2,000 weapons walking into Mexico where they have been
    connected to the slaying of U.S. Border Patrol Agent Brian
    Terry and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Special
    Agent Jaime Zapata. On November 10, I submitted to you in
    writing a series of questions on this matter. I find your
    answers to be problematic.
        Without objection, I ask that my letter, Mr. Chairman, and
    Mr. Ohlson's response be made part of today's record. In other
    words, Mr. Ohlson's answer was he did not know a thing about
    it. I wonder why. I wonder why as chief of staff to Eric
    Holder, he does not know a thing about an operation of the
    scope and size resulting in the death of one of the citizens of
    my State, a killing with weapons that he did not know a thing
    about it.
        Chairman Levin. Those letters will be made part of the
    record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Senator McCain. I thank the Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Let me call on Senator Inhofe first, and
    then we are going to welcome Senator Leahy to our committee for
    their comments on two of these nominees. Senator Inhofe?

    STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
                              OF OKLAHOMA

        Senator Inhofe. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was going
    to introduce my friend, Brad Carson, and I have been crossing
    off the list things that have already been mentioned. Let me
    just say that he actually, Senator McCain, was born in Arizona
    in Winslow, and he had the good judgment to come to Oklahoma
    and spend up to this time there. He graduated from Jenks High
    School in Tulsa and attended Baylor and Trinity College and
    then ultimately the University of Oklahoma College of Law.
        He has been a friend of mine for a long period of time. We
    have disagreed on some of the political issues, but I can tell
    you right now, when he was first nominated and I discussed him
    with our mutual friend, Secretary McHugh, I went back and
    looked to refresh my memory and found that his voting record on
    our defense issues is right down the line where I think it
    should be for the position that he is nominated for. I am
    looking forward to supporting his nomination and serving with
    him.
        I want to say that, unfortunately, we have a 10 o'clock
    meeting in this building of the Environment and Public Works
    Committee where my attendance is mandatory since I am ranking
    member. So I have to leave a little bit early and I apologize
    for that, Mr. Carson.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Leahy, we are delighted to have you with us. You
    are the dear friend to all of the members of this committee,
    all the other Senators that serve with you, and your presence
    here will make an important statement on behalf of the nominee
    that you are here for. Senator Leahy?

    STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK LEAHY, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
                                VERMONT

        Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate being
    here. Earlier I wished Senator Inhofe a happy birthday and I
    will do it again publicly. It is good to be with you and
    Senator McCain and Senator Webb. Like Senator Inhofe, I have to
    leave for the Judiciary Committee right after this.
        But I really wanted to be here to introduce Mark Lippert.
    He is a personal friend but he is also a former member of my
    staff. The President has nominated him to be Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. I
    told the President I thought that was a great nomination. I
    have known him for years. I know what a lifelong public servant
    he is. He was raised in Ohio, went to Stanford University for
    his undergraduate degree, then a master's in international
    relations in 1997.
        When he joined my office 11 years ago in the year 2000, he
    quickly was promoted through the ranks. I promoted him to be a
    professional staff member for the Appropriations Subcommittee
    on State and Foreign Operations where all of the State
    Department appropriations and all of our international programs
    go. He assisted me with U.S. foreign policy and assistance
    programs with a focus on East Asia. He traveled there a number
    of times. He learned the history, the culture, the people. His
    advice was very valuable to both Democrats and Republicans on
    the subcommittee because we knew how professional it was and
    how non-political it was. He spoke with the highest integrity,
    but also with great analytical abilities and exceptional
    intellectual abilities. I hated to see him leave when he went
    to join then Senator Barack Obama as his chief foreign policy
    advisor, but then remained with the President as one of his top
    foreign policy experts, ultimately as the chief of staff for
    the NSC.
        But then he decided to leave the White House. He had joined
    the Navy while working in my office. He told me about his
    commission--I asked him why. He said it was a result of his
    lifelong dream to serve as a military officer. I remember how
    proud we all were to see him as a naval officer. He left the
    White House post. He did it to return to Active Duty in the
    Navy, including the posting, as you have already indicated, Mr.
    Chairman, in Afghanistan.
        Throughout all this, I have seen nothing but integrity,
    intelligence, and a willingness, perhaps a desire to serve the
    United States of America, and I think this is a great
    appointment.
        I should note that Mark's wife Robyn is here, as well as
    his parents. Robyn was a staff member in my office when she and
    Mark first met. So I take full credit for their successful
    marriage. She herself is somebody of great accomplishment.
        I will put my full statement in the record, but, Mr.
    Chairman, those of us who are either chairs or ranking members
    of various authorizing committees have a great responsibility,
    along with the other members, in passing on nominees. I can
    assure you this is one nominee that you can vote to confirm and
    you will not find a reason to second-guess your decision.
        I thank the chair and I thank the ranking member.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Leahy follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by Senator Patrick Leahy
        Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and members of the
    committee, it is my pleasure to introduce Mark Lippert, my friend and a
    former member of my staff, and President Obama's nominee to be his
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs.
        I have known Mark for many years and am proud of his
    accomplishments as a lifelong public servant. Mark has the character
    and the qualifications to make an outstanding defense senior leader,
    and I am proud to give him my highest endorsement.
        Mark was raised in Ohio and attended Stanford University where he
    received his undergraduate degree in Political Science in 1996 and a
    Masters in International Relations in 1997. In 2000, Mark joined my
    office as a research assistant and quickly stood out on account of the
    sharpness of his intellect which was matched only by his sense of
    humor.
        In 2001, I promoted him to be a professional staff member for the
    Appropriations Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations, where he
    assisted me with U.S. foreign policy and assistance programs with a
    focus on East Asia. In that capacity, he traveled to the region several
    times and developed a deep knowledge of the history, politics, and
    cultures of that critically important part of the world.
        Mark did an outstanding job for the subcommittee and was
    universally respected by his peers of both parties for being a person
    of the highest integrity with exceptional intellectual and analytical
    abilities.
        In 2005, I felt a mixture of pride and sadness when I bid Mark good
    luck as he joined the staff of then Senator Barack Obama as his chief
    foreign policy advisor. After President Obama's election in 2008, Mark
    remained one of the President's top foreign policy experts and
    ultimately the chief of staff of the National Security Council.
        Parallel to his civilian career, Mark has also had an exemplary
    military career as a Naval Reserve officer. In 2007, Mark paused his
    civilian life--which at that time meant taking the difficult step of
    leaving a political campaign during a key moment--and deployed to
    provide intelligence support to Navy SEAL operations in Iraq.
        When he decided to leave his White House post in 2009, Mark did so
    in order to return to Active Duty in the Navy. That tour included
    postings in Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa.
        Mark actually joined the Navy while working in my office, and he
    expressed to me that his commission was the result of his lifelong
    dream to serve as a military officer. In that light, I see this
    nomination, and today's hearing, as the predictable consequence of
    Mark's passion for service, his professional excellence, and his
    outstanding character and integrity.
        I would be remiss if I did not also introduce Mark's wife Robyn to
    the committee. Robyn was also a staff member in my office when she and
    Mark first met, so I take full credit for that. Robyn has had well-
    deserved success in her own career, and I know the committee joins me
    in thanking her for her support of Mark during his multiple
    mobilizations overseas.
        Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and members of this
    committee, I urge you to favorably report the nomination of Mark
    Lippert to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific
    Security Affairs. I know firsthand, as does the President, that Mark is
    well-qualified for the job.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Leahy, and we
    know that you, like Senator Inhofe, have to leave us and we
    totally understand.
        Senator Inhofe, apparently today is your birthday.
        Senator Inhofe. It is.
        Chairman Levin. The little birdie just said that, Senator
    Leahy. Happy Birthday Senator Inhofe.
        Thank you very much, Senator Leahy.
        We will now move to our nominees. The defense authorization
    bill is on the floor beginning at 11 o'clock, so we may have to
    do some scrambling if we are not done by then.
        Please introduce any family or any other people who are
    here with you; feel free to do that. We will start with Mr.
    Sheehan.

      STATEMENT OF MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN, NOMINATED TO BE ASSISTANT
     SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY
                                CONFLICT

        Mr. Sheehan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Levin,
    Ranking Member McCain, and members of the Senate Armed Services
    Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before your
    committee today. I am grateful of the confidence that President
    Obama has shown by nominating me to be Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for SOLIC. I also want to thank Secretary Panetta,
    Deputy Secretary Carter, and Under Secretary Flournoy for their
    support of my nomination. If confirmed, I will be deeply
    honored to serve.
        Given that SOLIC was created by Congress, there has always
    been a unique and valuable relationship between this committee
    and the office for which I have been nominated. Your support
    and that of the American people for our Special Operations
    Forces continues to be one of the key enablers of our success.
    Thank you for that.
        I also want to thank my family for my support. My wife Sita
    Vasan is with me this morning and my son Michael is right
    directly behind me. Thank you to them for their great support
    during my career and their being with me today.
        I believe that my policy background, as mentioned before,
    at the State Department, the U.N., and at the NYPD has well
    prepared me for this nomination, as well as my operational
    experience as an Active Duty Special Forces officer in both the
    counterterrorism unit as the assault team leader for our
    Special Forces A team in Panama and also as a counterinsurgency
    advisor in Central America for many years.
        If the Senate confirms me in this position, I will make
    every effort to live up to the confidence placed in me and the
    excellence demonstrated by our Special Operations Forces around
    the world every day.
        Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Sheehan.
        Now Mr. Lippert.

        STATEMENT OF MARK W. LIPPERT, NOMINATED TO BE ASSISTANT
      SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

        Mr. Lippert. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain,
    members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
    appear before you this morning.
        I have to admit that after working for 10 years on Capitol
    Hill as a staff member, it is much more intimidating to sit on
    this side of the dais.
        I would also like to thank my former boss, Senator Leahy,
    for his gracious introduction. From past experience, I know how
    busy he is every Thursday morning with his responsibilities as
    chairman of the Judiciary Committee, and I very much appreciate
    his time.
        I wish to thank President Obama, Secretary Panetta, and
    Under Secretary Flournoy for their support of my nomination.
        Please let me say a few words about my family. I would like
    to introduce my wife, Robyn Lippert, whom I met while working,
    as Senator Leahy mentioned, together on Capitol Hill. She has
    been the best partner that anyone could ask for and has
    patiently put up with military deployments to Iraq,
    Afghanistan, and elsewhere, long hours at the NSC, and the
    grind of the State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee.
        My mother and father, Susan and Jim Lippert, have made the
    trip from home, Cincinnati, OH, and I am deeply grateful for
    their lifetime of support.
        I would also be remiss if I did not introduce Captain John
    Burnham and Master Chief Bubba Dodson, two friends and mentors
    from my time on Active Duty at Naval Special Warfare
    Development Group.
        Members of the committee, from the fight to disrupt,
    dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, to
    maintaining and enhancing our force posture with treaty allies
    and partners in East and Southeast Asia, to engaging emerging
    powers such as India and China and preventing the proliferation
    of weapons of mass destruction, the challenges of this dynamic
    and important portfolio are self-evident. Accordingly, in the
    interest of time, I will simply say that these are among the
    greatest challenges that our Nation faces today and could face
    well into the future.
        If confirmed, I look forward to working with the committee
    and Congress as a whole to help address these challenges in an
    effective and bipartisan way to keep America safe, secure, and
    prosperous, ensuring it continues to be the greatest country on
    Earth.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
        Next we will call on Brad Carson. We welcome you
    particularly as a former colleague. Mr. Carson?

    STATEMENT OF BRAD R. CARSON, NOMINATED TO BE GENERAL COUNSEL OF
                       THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

        Mr. Carson. Thank you, Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, Senator
    McCain, Senator Webb, Senator Cornyn, other members of the
    committee, I do appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
    today. I would like to thank President Obama for nominating me
    to the position of General Counsel of the Army. I would also
    like to thank Secretary McHugh for his support of my
    nomination, and Senator Inhofe for his very kind words. If
    confirmed, I will be honored to serve as General Counsel of the
    Army.
        My wife Julie is here with me today. She has always been an
    unflinching supporter of mine. Also present is Karen Kuhlman
    who is a dear friend and the former legislative director of my
    office when I served in the U.S. House of Representatives.
        I believe that my background in law, education, business,
    and politics well prepare me to meet the extraordinary
    challenges facing the U.S. Army today. If the Senate confirms
    me to this position, I will make every effort to live up to the
    confidence placed in me. I am grateful for your consideration,
    and I look forward to your questions.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Carson.
        Mr. Ohlson?

     STATEMENT OF KEVIN A. OHLSON, NOMINATED TO BE A JUDGE OF THE
               U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES

        Mr. Ohlson. Thank you, Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, it is a
    great privilege to appear before this committee as the
    President's nominee to be a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals
    for the Armed Forces.
        I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of
    this committee for convening this hearing today and for
    considering me for this important post.
        I would also like to thank the President for his expression
    of confidence in me by nominating me for this position. If
    confirmed, I promise to do my level best to vindicate that
    trust.
        Of course, I would like to thank my wife Carolyn and our
    two children, Matthew and Katherine, who are in school today.
    It is clear to me that I would not be sitting here today if it
    were not for their enduring love and support.
        Mr. Chairman, during my entire professional career, I have
    experienced no greater honor than serving as an officer in the
    U.S. Army. I was privileged to serve in the Judge Advocate
    General's Corps and to prosecute a number of cases as a trial
    counsel, as well as to provide legal advice to commanders and
    their staff on a wide range of legal issues.
        But beyond that, during my time in the Army, I was
    privileged to become personally familiar with the men, women,
    mission, and ethos of the U.S. military and to see firsthand
    the exceptional quality of our Armed Forces. I will always
    treasure the opportunities I had to rappel out of helicopters
    at Air Assault School, to jump out of airplanes during my tour
    of duty at Fort Bragg, and to serve our Nation during Operation
    Desert Storm. If confirmed, I will bring to bear on my duties
    as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
    all of these experiences that I have had in the military.
        But in addition to this, if I am confirmed, I will also
    keep in mind my family's long tradition of serving as citizen
    soldiers at the hour of our Nation's greatest need. I have had
    relatives serve in virtually every armed conflict that our
    country has engaged in during the last century. As just a few
    examples, my grandfather, Leo Gauvreau, was an American
    doughboy who served in the trenches during World War I. My
    uncle, Leif Ohlson, made the ultimate sacrifice for our country
    on the battlefields of France on June 29, 1944, and today lies
    at rest at the cemetery at Normandy. Mr. Chairman, I am very
    proud to note that even as we sit here today, my nephew, Blake
    Perron, is in basic training at Fort Benning striving to become
    the very best infantryman he can be.
        So if I am confirmed, it is to these citizen soldiers and
    to all their comrades in arms to whom I will dedicate my
    service on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Ohlson.
        Let me now ask you a set of standard questions and you can
    answer together.
        Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
    governing conflicts of interest?
        Mr. Sheehan. Yes.
        Mr. Lippert. Yes.
        Mr. Carson. Yes.
        Mr. Ohlson. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
    any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
    confirmation process?
        Mr. Sheehan. No.
        Mr. Lippert. No.
        Mr. Carson. No.
        Mr. Ohlson. No.
        Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with
    deadlines established for requested communications, including
    questions for the record in hearings?
        Mr. Sheehan. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Lippert. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Carson. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Ohlson. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
    and briefers in response to congressional requests?
        Mr. Sheehan. Yes.
        Mr. Lippert. Yes.
        Mr. Carson. Yes.
        Mr. Ohlson. Yes.
        Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
    reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
        Mr. Sheehan. Yes.
        Mr. Lippert. Yes.
        Mr. Carson. Yes.
        Mr. Ohlson. Yes.
        Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
    testify upon request before this committee?
        Mr. Sheehan. Yes.
        Mr. Lippert. Yes.
        Mr. Carson. Yes.
        Mr. Ohlson. Yes.
        Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents,
    including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
    timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or
    to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good
    faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
        Mr. Sheehan. Yes.
        Mr. Lippert. Yes.
        Mr. Carson. Yes.
        Mr. Ohlson. Yes.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Let us have a first round of 7 minutes for questions, and
    there are only a few of us here at the moment. We can have a
    second round if appropriate or needed, a third round for that
    matter. We can have whatever number of rounds we need.
        Let me start with you, Mr. Sheehan. In your book titled
    ``Crush the Cell'', you say that by working closely with
    foreign units that we may be able to reduce human rights
    violations associated with those operations. But if you want to
    get things done, sometimes we must work in conjunction with
    tough organizations with spotty human rights records.
        Can you give us an idea as to how the benefits of working
    with partners be balanced with the necessity that they meet our
    human rights standards under the law?
        Mr. Sheehan. Yes, Mr. Chairman. When I was Ambassador-at-
    Large for Counterterrorism prior to September 11 and I was
    focusing on al Qaeda, I found that our Government had cut off
    relationships with some of the intelligence agencies for human
    rights violations and that I felt made our life a little bit
    more difficult. Moving forward, I find that often where al
    Qaeda resides, you are often working with countries that have
    less developed systems of governance and less developed
    judicial systems. So often you are dealing with organizations
    that do not maintain the same standards that we are accustomed
    to in the United States and in the West.
        I feel that working together with them, we can achieve both
    our intelligence collection objectives and work to
    professionalize those services as they work towards moving to
    the standards of professionalism in human rights that we expect
    of them. I think there has been great progress in that area,
    but as with most of these very developing and sometimes broken
    states, it requires a lot of patience and long work to achieve
    those objectives. But in the long run, I think both are equally
    important to achieving our security objectives in those broken
    and developing states.
        Chairman Levin. Let me ask you another question, Mr.
    Sheehan, relative to the Special Operations Forces night raids
    along with Afghan commandoes in Afghanistan. Frequently they
    have removed literally thousands of insurgents from the
    battlefield without any shots being fired, but nonetheless,
    night raids remain controversial in Afghanistan as we read
    again in this morning's paper when we see President Karzai
    indicating that the ending of those night raids is a condition
    of a long-term relationship with the United States. The Afghan
    Government and community leaders have repeatedly called for
    eliminating their use.
        Can you talk about those night raids? How important is the
    participation of Afghan commandoes in those operations? How do
    we address Afghan concerns about those night raids?
        Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Chairman, the ability to operate at night
    is one of the great advantages our Special Operations Forces
    have in every theater of operations, to include as we train our
    local counterparts and give them the technology and expertise
    to work at night, it also gives them a great advantage.
    Simultaneously we are aware of the cultural issues and other
    problems raised politically by the Afghan Government. We are
    trying to find the proper balance in that.
        But as you mentioned, the key here is transferring the lead
    of these night operations to the local Special Operations
    Forces as they develop their capacity in conjunction with ours.
    I think we are moving well in that direction. I think the
    commanders are very aware of the issue of the sensitivity of
    night raids and have taken that under consideration. I think
    there has been a reduction in the amount of civilian casualties
    from what I understand. I think we are moving on the right
    track in that very important area, but as you had mentioned,
    the key, as in all counter-insurgency operations, is shifting
    that primary burden to the local security forces that then can
    make that initial interaction in the villages in Afghanistan.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Mr. Lippert, there is a real issue that has been raised by
    Senator Webb, Senator McCain, and myself relative to the
    realignment issues on Okinawa and Guam. I have a lot of
    questions of you about that, but I see that Senator Webb is
    here, and in the hope that he may take on that subject, I will
    withhold at this time. However, if he either is unable to or
    has to leave--and I do not want to put this onus on him, but if
    he is unable to do it--I know what his thoughts are on this and
    I totally share them--I would then ask you questions for the
    record. I am just going to leave it at that at the moment
    because I think we have to change, the road we are on is not
    workable, and that is my view. I think Senator Webb would
    probably go into it in more detail, but I will press you on
    more detail again on the record if he is not able to get into
    that for whatever reason.
        Mr. Lippert, I will ask you, though, about the Haqqani
    Network. Would you agree that in order for relations between
    the United States and Pakistan to be normalized, that the
    Government of Pakistan has to go after safe havens in Pakistan
    for the extremists who are crossing the border and attacking
    U.S., Afghan, and coalition forces?
        Mr. Lippert. Yes, Senator.
        Chairman Levin. Mr. Carson, just one quick question for you
    and that has to do with the legal status of contractors on the
    battlefield. There is a very significant number of issues here
    about the legal status of contractors in the battlefield areas.
    Are you familiar with some of those issues? If so, would you
    agree that DOD needs to review the legal status of contractors
    on the battlefield to ensure that we are not subjecting
    contractor employees to legal jeopardy when they work to
    support our efforts in hostile areas like Iraq and Afghanistan?
        Mr. Carson. Senator, I believe that is, in fact, a very
    significant issue, and I know DOD is reviewing those issues
    even as we speak. If confirmed, I hope to get myself more
    expert in those issues and make it a top priority to resolve
    them.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Mr. Ohlson, criminal defendants in the Article III judicial
    system have an automatic right to appeal to Federal courts of
    appeal and then a right to at least petition the U.S. Supreme
    Court for final review of their criminal cases. In contrast,
    defendants in military courts martial may not appeal their
    cases to the U.S. Supreme Court unless the U.S. Court of
    Appeals for the Armed Forces has also granted discretionary
    review.
        Should defendants in the military justice system in your
    opinion in Article I courts have the same right as defendants
    in Article III courts to petition the Supreme Court for review
    of their case even if the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
    has denied their petition for review?
        Mr. Ohlson. Mr. Chairman, I do believe that individuals
    within the Article I court made up by the Court of Appeals for
    the Armed Forces should have the identical right as those
    defendants in the Article III courts and that the Supreme Court
    should have the ability to address those cases.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you all.
        Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Ohlson, in your response to my letter of November 10,
    you stated you had no knowledge of Operation Fast and Furious
    throughout your assignment as Attorney General Holder's chief
    of staff and counselor. Your letter, not surprisingly, seems to
    track closely with Attorney General Holder's assertions about a
    lack of knowledge of this disastrous operation.
        Was there ever a time in 2009 or 2010 you can remember
    reading about or discussing with Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
    and Firearms (ATF) officials Operation Gun Runner or Operation
    Fast and Furious?
        Mr. Ohlson. No, Senator. That never occurred.
        Senator McCain. Agent Brian Terry was murdered in Arizona
    in a firefight on December 14, 2010. Did you hear about his
    death at that time and the circumstances?
        Mr. Ohlson. I did, Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. When did you become aware then that two
    weapons that were found at the scene were linked to the gun-
    walking program known as Operation Fast and Furious?
        Mr. Ohlson. Senator, I found out about that through press
    accounts sometime after I left serving as chief of staff to the
    Attorney General.
        Senator McCain. So when this agent was murdered, it did not
    arouse your curiosity as to find out the details of his death?
        Mr. Ohlson. There was no indication at that time, sir, that
    there was any connection with Fast and Furious. I was not aware
    of Fast and Furious.
        Senator McCain. But when a Border Patrol agent is murdered,
    you did not say, hey, what is the story here? How did this
    happen?
        Mr. Ohlson. Yes, sir, and I remember the tragedy of----
        Senator McCain. Well, did you ask questions about it?
        Mr. Ohlson. No, sir. I was in a briefing of the Attorney
    General at that time and I learned of the death of Agent Terry.
        Senator McCain. When you learned about it, no matter what
    you were doing, it did not arouse your curiosity as to ask what
    the circumstances were?
        Mr. Ohlson. We were briefed on that, sir. It certainly
    aroused my sympathy for the family and I think it was----
        Senator McCain. But you did not ask enough to find out that
    this was part of Fast and Furious.
        Mr. Ohlson. Senator McCain, there was not a basis for me to
    ask that question at that time.
        Senator McCain. You would not ask how did the murderers get
    the weapons that they were using? That again did not arouse
    your curiosity?
        Mr. Ohlson. Sir, I did not ask that question.
        Senator McCain. You discussed in your letter routine
    courtesy copies of weekly reports that were sent to you. What
    information did those reports include about the gun-selling
    tactics of Operation Fast and Furious?
        Mr. Ohlson. Sir, as I understand it, those reports did not
    make any mention of gun-walking. They simply referred to the
    operation as Operation Fast and Furious.
        Senator McCain. So you get a memo and it says it is part of
    Operation Fast and Furious and you do not say, hey, what is
    Operation Fast and Furious?
        Mr. Ohlson. As it turned out, Senator, I did not read that
    weekly report.
        Senator McCain. So you are given weekly reports that you do
    not read?
        Mr. Ohlson. Sir, there were a number of courtesy copies
    that are sent around the Department, and you are correct. I did
    not read that report.
        Senator McCain. So we have reports that are required to be
    submitted to your department and they come to you, the chief of
    staff for the Attorney General of the United States, only as a
    courtesy.
        Mr. Ohlson. Yes, sir.
        Senator McCain. Did you or Mr. Holder ever receive
    information from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
    Explosives about its efforts to curtail firearms smuggling into
    Mexico?
        Mr. Ohlson. I was not privy to any such conversation, sir,
    no.
        Senator McCain. Again, you were not curious even though the
    issue of guns being smuggled into Mexico has been widely
    discussed, widely--a source of deep concern amongst many of us
    in public life. But it did not arouse your curiosity.
        Mr. Ohlson. I certainly take your point, Senator. As chief
    of staff, that was not within my area of purview, but in
    retrospect, I wish I had known more about that operation.
        Senator McCain. What actions did you take following news
    about Agent Terry's death?
        Mr. Ohlson. I did not take any actions in particular,
    Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Mr. Lippert, it has been widely reported
    that while serving in the White House, you and then-National
    Security Advisor General Jim Jones clashed significantly. It
    has also been widely reported that your departure from the
    White House to return to Active Duty in the Navy was an attempt
    to resolve this conflict. Would you please explain your
    interpretation of these events?
        Mr. Lippert. Senator, I have great respect for General
    Jones' lifetime of service from Vietnam veteran to Commandant
    of the Marine Corps to Supreme Allied Commander to his service
    in the White House, just the highest degree of respect for him
    and his service.
        In terms of the press accounts, I did not leak to the press
    about General Jones. My departure from the White House was
    voluntary. I actually turned down a promotion at the White
    House to return to Active Duty.
        Senator McCain. So there was no conflict between you and
    General Jones?
        Mr. Lippert. Senator, General Jones and I worked
    collaboratively on many issues, and I am proud of what we
    accomplished. But there were also times we disagreed. But I
    knew General Jones was the boss.
        Senator McCain. So your departure from the White House had
    no relation whatsoever to the problems with the relationship
    between you and General Jones?
        Mr. Lippert. Senator, as I mentioned, I was offered a
    promotion in the White House and then I turned down that
    promotion to return to Active Duty.
        Senator McCain. You are not answering the question.
        Mr. Lippert. Senator, the promotion was to the White House
    Military Affairs Office which would have been separate and
    apart from the NSC. At that point, I turned down that job and
    returned to----
        Senator McCain. I will ask the question one more time, Mr.
    Lippert, and I would like to have an answer. Did your departure
    from the White House have anything to do with the widely
    reported conflict that you had with General Jones?
        Mr. Lippert. Again, Senator, I would say it was due to the
    fact that I wanted to leave the NSC, went over to the White
    House Military Affairs Office, and turned down that promotion,
    sir.
        Senator McCain. If you do not choose to answer the
    question, that is fine.
        Ambassador Sheehan, very quickly do you believe that the
    Afghans are capable of carrying on night raids without U.S.
    military presence?
        Mr. Sheehan. Senator McCain, from my understanding, the
    Afghan Special Operations Forces that work in tandem with our
    Special Operations Forces have demonstrated a greatly increased
    capacity to operate on a wide range and some night operations.
    Right now at this point, I am not sure they are ready to really
    step up fully to the plate.
        Senator McCain. Do you know anybody that does?
        Mr. Sheehan. No, sir. I think most believe they still need
    some more work with our folks.
        Senator McCain. I thank you.
        I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
        Senator Webb.
        Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First, with respect to the chairman's question about the
    issue on Okinawa and Guam, I would suggest that we work up a
    joint written question for the record that could be answered in
    an accelerated fashion before the confirmation comes before the
    whole committee. I do not have enough time in 7 minutes to do
    the question justice, but it is a vital question in terms of
    what we are doing in that part of the world including, by the
    way, the announcement yesterday after a court ruling that the
    Navy says it is going to take more than 2 years for it to
    figure out an environmental impact report on the training
    ranges in Guam, which really I find kind of confusing at this
    point.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb, for that
    suggestion, and I just checked also with Senator McCain and we
    will ask our staffs, the three of us, to put together a joint
    question.
        Senator Webb. I appreciate that. It is very important for
    us to have a clear understanding of where Mr. Lippert and the
    Pentagon at large is going on that.
        First, I would like to congratulate all of the nominees and
    to thank them for having taken time in various ways to serve
    our country as they moved forward on those other careers and to
    welcome family and friends who are here today. I intend to
    support, without question, three of these nominations.
        Mr. Lippert, you and I need to have a longer meeting. These
    nominations, although they may have been in process for some
    time, were moved very quickly once they were announced. I have
    a number of concerns.
        First is this position that you are being nominated to is
    one of the three or four most vital assistant secretaryships
    right now in DOD given the transitions that we are looking at
    and the renewed emphasis which I have cared about for a very
    long time on our strategic presence in that part of the world.
    There have been questions about how this matches up with your
    professional skill set, however accomplished it is at this
    point. I would ask, first, if you would give us an explanation,
    first in terms of your view of the scope policy-wise and
    geographically of the position and how your experiences match
    up with that.
        Mr. Lippert. Senator, the answer to your first question on
    the scope of the position, it covers everything from the
    Western Pacific, U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility to
    South Asia, Armed Forces Pacific, up to Central Asia.
        In terms of my qualifications for the job, I bring a unique
    skill set of hands-on and policy experience to the position. In
    terms of hands-on, I was on the ground in Afghanistan. I have
    that experience. I studied Mandarin Chinese, lived in Beijing
    while I was a graduate student at Beijing University taking
    language courses.
        In terms of policy experience, I have 10 years of service
    on Capitol Hill working for Senator Daschle, the Democratic
    Policy Committee, working for Senator Leahy on the State and
    Foreign Operations Subcommittee, and then working for Senator
    Obama on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. All of that
    time gave me the skill set to tackle a lot of complex,
    difficult problems. It also had me engage in a range of these
    issues that we are still facing today. It allowed me to balance
    portfolios, juggle responsibilities, and deal with these
    substantive issues head on.
        Then finally my time with the NSC. During that time, I
    regularly engaged in these types of issues day-in, day-out, and
    at senior levels of the Government.
        I would just say in terms of my experience, I bring
    somewhat anecdotally to someone who sat in summits with the
    President and Asian leaders, someone who has been on the ground
    in Afghanistan, and someone who has a mastery of foreign
    assistance programs in Southeast Asia and the South Asia
    region.
        Senator Webb. I thank you for that. I look forward to
    spending some time with you when you can visit my office when
    we can discuss that connection further.
        I want to follow on to something that Senator McCain raised
    because it is a question that has been widely reported in the
    media and it affects not simply whether or not you and General
    Jones had some sort of a fallout but it is also a question of
    how someone works when they are on one of these high-level
    staffs.
        I, like most people on this committee, have a tremendous
    regard for General Jones. I have known him for many, many
    years. I believe he is one of the most knowing public servants
    that we have had, and I greatly admire his leadership style.
        The question that came up--and there have been a couple of
    reports on this. This is to give you an opportunity to clarify
    this. It said you were widely suspected of leaking salacious
    and damaging stories about General Jones. This was reported--I
    am reading from an article by Josh Rogin, but it was also
    reported by Bob Woodward in his book. There was a comment in
    there that at one point people seemed to agree this was rank
    insubordination. These are words that have been reported.
        Can you explain to us a little more what these reports were
    all about?
        Mr. Lippert. Senator, there were a number of reports
    derogatory towards General Jones that were coming out while I
    was chief of staff at the NSC. I, again as I said to Senator
    McCain, had nothing to do with those reports. I did not talk to
    the press about General Jones. Full stop there.
        On the other issue, in terms of rank insubordination, I
    knew General Jones was the boss. So on this issue, it is clear
    in my head. It is that I did not leak to the press and there
    was not insubordination.
        Senator Webb. So you can say categorically you were not the
    author of any of these personal leaks to the press directly or
    indirectly through a third party?
        Mr. Lippert. Yes.
        Senator Webb. Thank you. I will look forward to seeing you
    on a longer visit in my office.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.
        Senator Cornyn.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Ohlson, I wanted to just ask you some questions briefly
    following up on Senator McCain. What was the description of
    your duties as chief of staff for the Attorney General from
    January 2009 through January 2011?
        Mr. Ohlson. Senator Cornyn, there were a number of
    attorneys who worked within the Office of the Attorney General.
    I supervised them, and I also provided advice as a career
    member of the Department of Justice for 22 years. I am quite
    familiar with the Department and advised the Attorney General
    on issues related to it.
        Senator Cornyn. Let me ask specifically. In the Judiciary
    hearings of last week or so when we were asking the Attorney
    General some questions about memos that had been directed to
    him, there was one directed to him, an NDIC memo. Do you know
    what that stands for?
        Mr. Ohlson. National Drug Intelligence Center, sir.
        Senator Cornyn. That referred to Fast and Furious. It was
    dated July 5, 2010. There was a subsequent memo entitled
    ``Significant Recent Events Memo'' that was dated November 1,
    2010. Would you have been involved in either the preparation of
    or in the forwarding of those memos to the Attorney General for
    his attention?
        Mr. Ohlson. No, Senator Cornyn.
        Senator Cornyn. Who would be responsible to make sure that
    the Attorney General sees relevant memos from the Department of
    Justice that require his attention?
        Mr. Ohlson. We had within the Office of the Attorney
    General attorneys who were subject-matter experts with the
    various components, and if through reviewing material they
    determined that there was information that needed to be
    forwarded to the Attorney General, they would do so, sir.
        Senator Cornyn. But is there anybody who serves as, for
    lack of a better word, a traffic cop for the Attorney General
    to make sure that he sees the most important things that
    require his eyes-on attention?
        Mr. Ohlson. I would be the ultimate funnel point for that
    information, sir.
        Senator Cornyn. When did you first learn about the gun-
    walking associated with Fast and Furious?
        Mr. Ohlson. Through press accounts in approximately
    February of this year after I was no longer chief of staff,
    Senator Cornyn.
        Senator Cornyn. Was that about the time the Assistant
    Attorney General Weich delivered a letter to Senator Grassley
    denying that any gun-walking had occurred?
        Mr. Ohlson. Yes, sir, that would be the same time frame.
        Senator Cornyn. Were you involved in preparing or approving
    that letter?
        Mr. Ohlson. I was not, sir. I was no longer serving within
    main Justice at that time.
        Senator Cornyn. When did you first learn that that letter
    was false?
        Mr. Ohlson. Approximately 10 days ago.
        Senator Cornyn. Would that have been roughly the time Lanny
    Breuer was testifying before the Judiciary Committee?
        Mr. Ohlson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, let me ask you some questions
    about Taiwan. You have been nominated for a very important
    position in that very important part of the world. I have some
    charts here I would like to just show you. First, a chart that
    shows the official estimates by DOD. It shows the People's
    Republic of China with about 2,300 operational combat aircraft
    while the Government of Taiwan has only 490 operational combat
    aircraft.
        Let me show the second chart, please. The reason why that
    is very important is out of the 490 operational aircraft--as
    you can see, this chart from the Defense Intelligence Agency
    demonstrates that F-5 aircraft, as well as French Mirage
    aircraft, are old and becoming quickly obsolete, hard to
    repair, hard to get replacement parts for. You can see the huge
    cliff here dropping down in roughly 2020 in terms of the number
    of operational combat aircraft that Taiwan will have to deal
    with any Chinese aggression.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Senator Cornyn. If confirmed, what course of action do you
    plan to pursue to ensure that the U.S. Government keeps its
    commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to make sure they
    have the defensive weaponry necessary to defend that nation
    against aggression by communist China?
        Mr. Lippert. Senator, I strongly support a comprehensive,
    durable, and unofficial relationship with Taiwan, this vibrant
    democracy, and I am deeply concerned with the buildup that you
    referenced in your charts. My thinking will be guided by the
    ``one China policy'', the three communiques, the Taiwan
    Relations Act, and the six assurances. If confirmed, I can
    assure you that I am going to be an open-minded official that
    hears all sides of this debate, but I am not in the job yet, so
    I would not want to go further on that point.
        Senator Cornyn. Do you have an opinion as to how many
    viable combat aircraft Taiwan needs in order to defend itself
    against communist aggression?
        Mr. Lippert. I do not at this point in time, but if
    confirmed, I would dig into that question and work with your
    staff on that, sir.
        Senator Cornyn. In light of the imbalance that I have just
    shown you and the deterioration of Taiwan's air force, do you
    believe that the U.S. Government is fully upholding our legal
    responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act?
        Mr. Lippert. Senator, my sense is that the administration
    is upholding their responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations
    Act.
        Senator Cornyn. What is that based on?
        Mr. Lippert. That is based on the decision to upgrade the
    F-16 As and Bs. That is based on the $12 billion in sales over
    the last 2 years to Taiwan, and that is based on the close
    coordination and consultation with the Taiwan Government.
        Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, you know that upgrading the As
    and Bs does nothing to replace the obsolete F-5s and French
    Mirages. Do you think that sort of a dramatic decrease in the
    number of operating combat aircraft increases the risk for
    Taiwan, or do you think it is irrelevant?
        Mr. Lippert. My sense, Senator, is that reading the
    testimony of Assistant Secretary Campbell and Deputy Assistant
    Secretary Lavoy, that this decision was made on the As and Bs
    to get the most bang for the buck quickly, get the 160-plus
    aircrafts over to Taipei as soon as possible, and then go from
    there.
        Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, during the upgrades of the As
    and Bs, there will be a period of time where the As and Bs will
    actually be out of service. When though Taiwan has As and Bs
    aircraft, there will be--and it is reflected here in the
    circled area around 2020. It is going to take a long time, and
    there will actually be even a reduction beyond the retiring F-
    5s and French Mirages where the As and Bs will not be in
    service. Are you serious when you say you think that this
    provides Taiwan what they need in order to defend themselves?
        Mr. Lippert. Senator, what I am saying is that the
    administration, from what I have seen in testimony, felt that
    the best bang for the buck was to get the As and Bs over there
    as soon as possible.
        Senator Cornyn. You have no other views other than
    embracing the administration's position?
        Mr. Lippert. Senator, as I said in the first point, I would
    look forward to working with you and your office on this issue
    going forward.
        Senator Cornyn. Why are we trying to manage Taiwan's
    defense budget?
        Mr. Lippert. Could you clarify the question, Senator?
        Senator Cornyn. Yes. When Taiwan is ready to pay cash for
    American exported military aircraft, why would we deny them
    that ability? Is there any rationale you can see either from a
    commercial perspective or from a national security perspective
    why we would deny Taiwan those aircraft?
        Mr. Lippert. Again, Senator, all I can say is that the
    administration, from what I saw outside of the Government, made
    this decision consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act to try
    to get the best capability over there as soon as possible.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
        Senator Graham.
        Senator Graham. Very quickly. Let us follow up with that
    line of reasoning. Senator Cornyn is the expert on this. I will
    certainly defer to him and may get him involved in this
    question.
        But they are willing to buy new F-16s. Is that right?
        Senator Cornyn. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. Okay. Why would we not sell a good friend
    the F-16s?
        Mr. Lippert. Again, Senator, the decision----
        Senator Graham. Best bang for whose buck? Best bang for the
    buck. Whose buck?
        Mr. Lippert. The bottom line here, Senator, is that----
        Senator Graham. We are not letting the People's Republic of
    China manage our military sales to Taiwan, are we?
        Mr. Lippert. Absolutely not.
        Senator Graham. Okay. Well then, when you say ``bang for
    buck'', is it our buck or their buck that you are worried
    about?
        Mr. Lippert. Senator, again, it was a question of getting
    160-plus aircraft over with similar capabilities as soon as
    possible versus the newer airframes.
        Senator Graham. It takes longer to get the newer airframes
    over there?
        Mr. Lippert. Senator, that is my understanding, but again,
    I am happy to dig into this and work with your office on it.
        Senator Graham. Okay. We are selling new F-16s to Iraq. Is
    that right?
        Mr. Lippert. I will take your word for it on that, sir.
        Senator Graham. Well, I am very curious. I do not know why
    we would not be willing to sell them the plane they want and
    think they need the most, and I hope mainland China is not
    dictating what we are doing.
        Mr. Sheehan, are you familiar with the special operations
    missions in Afghanistan?
        Mr. Sheehan. Yes, Senator, I am somewhat although I am not
    in a post and I am a civilian right now.
        Senator Graham. I understand.
        Back to Senator McCain's question. There were some
    disturbing reports coming out of Afghanistan today from
    President Karzai, and I just want to be on the record that I am
    very supportive of an enduring relationship with Afghanistan. I
    think it is in our national security interest to have a
    political, economic, military relationship that extends to
    2014. I have been open about the idea of having bases, joint
    bases, post 2014 with American aircraft, Special Operations
    Forces units, to make sure that the Afghan security forces can
    always win any engagement with the Taliban. I think you could
    do that with a footprint around 20,000 or less. But between now
    and that time--do you feel the insurgency is still alive and
    well in Afghanistan?
        Mr. Sheehan. Absolutely, Senator Graham.
        Senator Graham. What percentage of detainees coming into
    American law of war detention at Bagram Air Base comes from
    night raids? Do you know?
        Mr. Sheehan. I do not know the answer.
        Senator Graham. It is 82 percent. To the members of the
    committee, the night raids, which are Afghan partnered--are you
    familiar with that?
        Mr. Sheehan. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Graham. Every night raid has Afghan partners. We
    try to make sure they are the first to go through the door. Are
    you familiar with the fact that most night raids end with
    captures without a shot being fired?
        Mr. Sheehan. I do, Senator, and I recognize how important
    night raids are for our forces.
        Senator Graham. As a matter of fact, it is important not
    only for the Afghan people to defeat the insurgency, but it is
    important to make sure that the leadership of the insurgency is
    kept off balance and cannot mount attacks against our forces.
    Is that correct?
        Mr. Sheehan. Absolutely correct, Senator.
        Senator Graham. So you are of the mind set representing the
    special operations community that we are not ready yet, nor are
    the Afghans ready yet to do this without American assistance?
        Mr. Sheehan. My understanding, Senator, is that the Special
    Operations Forces that we have been working with for many years
    over there have greatly enhanced their capability. I have
    talked to special operators that say they are pretty good, but
    they are not quite ready.
        Senator Graham. How many helicopters do they have?
        Mr. Sheehan. I do not know the exact answers.
        Senator Graham. I can tell you almost none that can do
    this. So when you look at the equipment and the technology and
    the expertise, I think we need to be joint special operation,
    Afghan-U.S. night raid capable for a while to come.
        I just want our Afghan friends to understand that they have
    a political concern. We want you to have sovereignty. On the
    detention front, nothing would please me more to transfer the
    2,800 prisoners we have in American law of war detention to
    Afghan control, but there is no legal system capable of
    receiving them yet. As long as you have American troops at the
    level we are anticipating, we have an obligation here to
    protect them.
        That is sort of my editorial comment about detention and
    night raids. We do respect Afghan sovereignty. We want to
    enhance it but we want to do it in a way to make sure we defeat
    the insurgency, protect the Afghan people, and protect American
    soldiers and those who are fighting on our behalf.
        Now, when it comes to special operations missions
    throughout the world, if we captured a high-level al Qaeda
    operative tomorrow, a special operator, what are they supposed
    to do with him in terms of detention?
        Mr. Sheehan. Senator, right now, my understanding is they
    go to Bagram Air Force Base.
        Senator Graham. I would correct that. If we caught someone
    in Yemen tomorrow, we are not taking them to Bagram.
        Mr. Sheehan. Caught them in Afghanistan.
        Senator Graham. Yes.
        In Afghanistan, we have available Afghanistan confinement
    facilities at least for a little while longer. Do you think
    that is a long-term detention facility for the U.S. war on
    terror? Do you think the Afghans are going to allow Afghan soil
    to be the U.S. prison in the war on terror?
        Mr. Sheehan. Probably not, Senator.
        Senator Graham. Now, let us say a capture was made in
    Yemen, special operations. Where would we put that person? What
    would we do with them?
        Mr. Sheehan. I am not sure of the exact answer to that,
    Senator, at this point.
        Senator Graham. Do you not think humane detention should be
    available to every member of the military, particularly special
    operators because that takes them out of the dilemma of having
    to kill or release, that we need a coherent detention strategy?
        Mr. Sheehan. Absolutely, Senator.
        Senator Graham. It is hard to interrogate a dead man, is it
    not?
        Mr. Sheehan. Absolutely.
        Senator Graham. I would just urge you on behalf of the
    special operations community to push the administration and
    Congress to take a burden off their backs. It is not fair to
    these men and women who are on the tip of the spear to have to
    capture people, let them go or kill them when this country's
    intelligence gathering needs are going to be left behind if you
    cannot capture, detain, and interrogate. We need an answer to
    that question, do you not agree?
        Mr. Sheehan. Yes, Senator, and if confirmed, I will work
    closely with you and this committee to get a better answer to
    that question.
        Senator Graham. Is your understanding that Congress
    basically has prohibited transfers into the United States of
    terror suspects? That is the law?
        Mr. Sheehan. I am aware of that, yes, Senator.
        Senator Graham. Please work on this with us because this is
    an unacceptable outcome for our military, for our Intelligence
    Community, and for our own safety. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Levin. Let me just quickly ask one question. I can
    just see if I can ask Senator Graham this question. My
    understanding is that the prohibition is that terror suspects
    cannot be brought here from Guantanamo. Is that correct?
        Senator Graham. Yes, sir. If you captured someone in Yemen
    tomorrow, the idea of bringing them into the United States for
    civilian prosecution seems to be the only lane available
    because we are not using military commissions. We are not using
    Guantanamo Bay as the detention facility. My concern, Mr.
    Chairman, is that that is criminalizing the war, that if you do
    not use Guantanamo Bay as a confinement facility to hold and
    interrogate, then there is no other jail available other than
    American civilian institutions.
        Chairman Levin. Or a military commission inside the United
    States?
        Senator Graham. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, I think that idea
    of, say, bringing someone captured in Yemen to Charleston Air
    Force Base for a military commission is not going to fly
    because most of us believe that Guantanamo Bay is a very
    appropriate place to do the trials, detention, and
    interrogation.
        Here is the main concern, Mr. Chairman. I am not so much
    worried about the prosecution as I am holding these people long
    enough to gather good intelligence. Being on a Navy ship is an
    ad hoc approach. You cannot keep someone on a ship very long.
    We have learned that long-term detention sometimes is the most
    appropriate way to gather intelligence that would be humane,
    but the only place I know that would allow us to do that is
    going to be Guantanamo Bay. If you bring them back to the
    United States, Mr. Chairman, for civilian prosecutions, I
    believe that is criminalizing the war. You lose intelligence
    gathering. I just do not think Congress is going to allow this
    administration or a Republican administration to jump over
    Guantanamo Bay. I may be wrong, but we are a Nation without a
    jail, and that is not good for us.
        Chairman Levin. I just want to clarify factually there is
    no prohibition on bringing folks other----
        Senator Graham. No. You are right.
        Chairman Levin. I just wanted to know.
        Senator Graham. You are right, Mr. Chairman, but the fact
    is we are not doing it. We do not have a confinement facility
    because of executive policy, but there is no bar of bringing
    someone back in the United States for civilian trial captured
    overseas or for confinement at a military base inside the
    United States. But we both know one would lead to
    criminalization of the war and the second is going to be
    rejected by Congress. The fact that we are not doing it shows
    that the policy is broken. We are not doing any of the above.
        Chairman Levin. I happen to agree with you. Our policy is
    broken for many reasons, probably for different reasons,
    however, but----
        Senator Graham. Yes, but we are where we are.
        Chairman Levin. However, I just want to clarify that
    factually--and this is for your benefit, Mr. Sheehan--at the
    moment at least, there is no prohibition on bringing in folks
    that are captured into the United States either for a civilian
    trial or for a military commission trial and to be kept at a
    proper prison or jail, more accurately, on a military base. I
    think that factually is correct.
        Senator Graham. That is factually correct and we are not
    using any of those facilities, but that is factually accurate.
        Chairman Levin. Just in terms of your response, Mr.
    Sheehan, I wanted to clarify that.
        One quick question and that has to do with--and this is the
    point also that Senator Graham was making accurately, I
    believe, with my total support, and that has to do with these
    night raids. I also made a comment about those night raids in
    addition to what Senator Graham said about the night raids and
    the importance of them and the care with which they are done
    and how few people have actually been killed, if any Afghans.
    We have captured a lot of insurgents and it is important for
    intelligence purposes. But in addition to everything which he
    mentioned, I believe that we also have female troops that go in
    with those teams on those night raids. We are being sensitive
    to Afghan culture in many, many ways. I just wanted to add that
    to what Senator Graham was saying.
        Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, you are dead right. We have
    learned night raids have been problematic for the Afghan
    people. Early on, we were doing them in probably less than an
    effective manner. We were creating more enemies than we were
    friends. But I would say that Admiral McCraven and the current
    task force commander, along with Generals Allen and Petraeus,
    have created a system, not only are we Afghan culturally
    sensitive, that when someone is called out, there is an Afghan
    partner doing the calling out. There are women associated with
    these raids to deal with the sensitivity of interrogating a
    woman. The amount of force being used now is just very small.
    They are very well coordinated with the Afghan legal system.
    Before we do a raid, we have a cell of Afghans who get to vote
    as to whether or not we go and take this target down. It is a
    very Afghan-centric system, but it cannot be done without
    American capability at this point.
        So when President Karzai says things like he said about 2
    hours ago or it was reported about 2 hours ago, it is not
    helpful. I think all of us--Senator Levin, McCain, and myself--
    have a goal of transitioning to Afghan control. We have 2,800
    law of order detainees at Parwan Prison, the old Bagram Air
    Base prison, the most modern prison I have seen anywhere in
    that part of the world, more modern than most in South
    Carolina. We want to shift those prisoners under the Afghan
    control.
        If you will just bear with me a second, this is important
    for the committee to understand. We have a court panel. We have
    three panels of Afghan judges at the air base doing trials with
    our prison population. They do about 50 a month, but we are
    capturing 150 a month. Outside their criminal system, there is
    no way to detain people under Afghan law. So we are trying to
    create a new way forward under Afghan law to hold people as a
    threat to the state with ample due process. We are not there
    yet.
        One final thought about the Afghan legal system. It is very
    immature, and it would be a national security mistake for us to
    dump 2,800 people that we have caught on the battlefield into
    the Afghan legal system. They do not have the capacity or
    capability, but we are getting there. President Karzai, we
    share your goal but we are just not there yet.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Graham.
        Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Mr. Chairman, I know we are short of time.
    We are due on the floor in just a few minutes, so I will try to
    be very brief.
        Mr. Carson, do you believe that water-boarding qualifies as
    torture in violation of the Geneva Conventions?
        Mr. Carson. These are complicated questions, but I do
    believe it does, Senator.
        Senator McCain. You really think that that is complicated?
        Mr. Carson. I think the definition of torture is a
    complicated question, but I do believe that water-boarding is a
    violation of the Geneva Conventions.
        Senator McCain. Mr. Ohlson?
        Mr. Ohlson. Yes, I do believe it is a violation of the
    Geneva Conventions.
        Senator McCain. Ambassador?
        Mr. Sheehan. Yes, sir.
        Senator McCain. On the issue of detention, we need a couple
    more answers from you, Ambassador Sheehan, on this whole issue
    of night raids and detention because we need to know your
    thoughts on it, and I hope you will get up to speed in response
    to some written questions that we will be submitting to you.
        Mr. Ohlson, I guess according to your testimony that
    despite all the information about the murder of Agent Brian
    Terry and the ATF significant involvement with Operation Fast
    and Furious, you knew nothing about it nor expressed any
    curiosity about it.
        Mr. Ohlson. I did not know about any connection to Fast and
    Furious. That is correct, Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. I guess we were shocked that gambling was
    going on in the establishment.
        Mr. Lippert, it has been documented in numerous books and
    other reports that there were significant, shall we say,
    disconnects and leaks to the media concerning General Jones
    that was harmful to his reputation during your tenure at the
    NSC, but your testimony is you had nothing to do with any of
    it.
        Mr. Lippert. That is correct.
        Senator McCain. Finally, I will ask you again, do you
    believe that we could have succeeded in Iraq without the surge?
        Mr. Lippert. Senator, the surge was vital in our success in
    Iraq, and I was in Anbar Province 2007-2008 to witness the
    surge break the back of the insurgency firsthand. I think we
    are where we are because of the surge.
        Senator McCain. We are out of time I am afraid, Mr.
    Chairman, and I thank the witnesses. Thank you.
        Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, could I just add one thing?
    You said that water-boarding violated the Geneva Convention.
    Would you agree that it violates the War Crimes Act and the
    Detainee Treatment Act that are now U.S. law? If you do not
    know the answer, go look at it, I mean, if you are unsure.
        Mr. Carson. I do not know the answer to those questions and
    do not know the specific provisions of the statutes. I believe
    it is bad policy in addition to a violation of the Geneva
    Convention. I would be happy to look at those laws as well to
    see----
        Senator Graham. The Detainee Treatment Act and the War
    Crimes Act. Okay? Is that the same with the rest of you?
        All of them nodded in the affirmative.
        Mr. Sheehan. Yes, Senator.
        Chairman Levin. Nodded in the affirmative that what?
        Senator Graham. That it does violate the War Crimes Act and
    it does violate the Detainee Treatment Act.
        Chairman Levin. I would hope they would nod in the
    affirmative, and Mr. Carson, I hope when you answer for the
    record--that you provide us an answer to the question for the
    record and you do that promptly.
        Mr. Carson. Certainly, Senator.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The use of waterboarding against a person in the custody or under
    the effective control of the Department of Defense (DOD) or under
    detention in a DOD facility would violate section 1402(a) of the
    Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (Public Law 109-163), which provides
    that ``No person in the custody or under the effective control of DOD
    or under detention in a DOD facility shall be subject to any treatment
    or technique of interrogation not authorized by and listed in the U.S.
    Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation.'' Waterboarding is not
    one of the interrogation techniques authorized by and listed in the
    Army Field Manual on intelligence interrogation (i.e., Army Field
    Manual 2-22.3, ``Human Intelligence Collector Operations,'' September
    2006). Furthermore, paragraph 5-75 of the Army Field Manual
    specifically prohibits waterboarding if used in conjunction with
    intelligence interrogations. This prohibition is reiterated in DOD
    Directive 3115.09, which establishes Department-wide policy for
    intelligence interrogations.
        DOD does not use waterboarding in conjunction with intelligence
    interrogations and, therefore, has not considered whether its use would
    violate the War Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. Sec. 2441). Waterboarding is
    prohibited by the Detainee Treatment Act, DOD policy, and the Army
    Field Manual.

        Chairman Levin. I want to thank my colleagues and thank you
    all for your presence, and I thank your families.
        We will stand adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 10:52 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

        [Prepared questions submitted to Michael A. Sheehan by
    Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
    follow:]

                            Questions and Responses

                                DEFENSE REFORMS

        Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
    Reorganization Act of 1986 and the special operations reforms have
    strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
    enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
    of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
    commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments
    to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
    to the combatant commanders.
        Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
    or special operations reform provisions? If so, what areas do you
    believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?
        Answer. No. The Act and current special operations authorities have
    served the Department and our Nation well and have enhanced the
    Department's capabilities to respond when called, such as in Operation
    Enduring Freedom. If confirmed, I will make proposals for modifications
    if and when required.

                                     DUTIES

        Question. Section 138(b)(4) of title 10, U.S.C., describes the
    duties and roles of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
    Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)).
        What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the
    ASD(SO/LIC)?
        Answer. The ASD(SO/LIC) is the principal civilian advisor to the
    Secretary of Defense on special operations and low-intensity conflict
    matters. After the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, the ASD(SO/LIC) is
    the principal special operations and low-intensity conflict official
    within the senior management of the Department of Defense (DOD). The
    ASD(SO/LIC) has as his principal duty overall supervision (to include
    oversight of policy and resources) of special operations and low-
    intensity conflict activities. In addition, the ASD(SO/LIC) oversees
    DOD's counternarcotics policies and resources, humanitarian assistance
    policies, strategies for building partner capacity, and stability
    operations policies in accordance with the Under Secretary of Defense
    for Policy's priorities and guidance.
        Question. What DOD activities are currently encompassed by the
    Department's definition of special operations and low-intensity
    conflict?
        Answer. Special operations and low intensity conflict activities,
    as defined in title 10 U.S.C. section 167, include direct action,
    strategic reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal
    defense, civil affairs, psychological operations, counterterrorism,
    humanitarian assistance, theater search and rescue, and such other
    activities as may be specified by the President or Secretary of
    Defense.
        Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, in the duties and
    functions of ASD(SO/LIC) do you expect that the Secretary of Defense
    would prescribe for you?
        Answer. I do not currently expect any changes to the duties and
    functions assigned.
        Question. In your view, are the duties set forth in section
    138(b)(4) of title 10, U.S.C., up to date, or should changes be
    considered?
        Answer. I do not believe any changes are needed at this time.
        Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
    enhance your ability to perform the duties of the ASD(SO/LIC)?
        Answer. No.

                                 QUALIFICATIONS

        Question. What background and experience do you have that you
    believe qualifies you for this position?
        Answer. I believe that my background in operational units, working
    counternarcotics strategy on the NSC staff, as Coordinator for
    Counterterrorism (Ambassador-at-Large), as Assistant Secretary General
    for the U.N.'s Department of Peacekeeping, as Deputy Commissioner of
    Counter Terrorism for the New York Police Department, and as an analyst
    of the best methods for combating terrorism at New York University
    (NYU) and West Point provide me with the necessary foundation for this
    position.
        In addition, I served as an Active Duty Army Special Forces officer
    in a counterterrorism unit (as a detachment commander of an assault
    team) and as a counterinsurgency advisor in El Salvador.

                                 RELATIONSHIPS

        Question. In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the
    following:
        The Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will perform my duties to provide overall
    supervision of special operations activities and advise to the
    Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
    regarding special operations activities and low-intensity conflict.
        Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will provide advice and support to the
    Deputy Secretary on special operations, stability operations,
    counternarcotics, and low-intensity conflict capabilities development
    and employment, among other matters.
        Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work very closely with the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Policy my advice on matters pertaining to
    special operations, stability operations, counternarcotics, and low-
    intensity conflict capabilities, among other matters.
        Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
        Answer. Special operations and intelligence are mutually
    supporting, so, if confirmed, I will work closely with the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
        Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
    Security Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and
    Pacific Security Affairs, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs.
        Answer. If confirmed, I expect to work closely with the regional
    Assistant Secretaries of Defense in the Office of the Under Secretary
    of Defense for Policy, providing advice regarding special operations
    and stability operations that are ongoing or in the planning stage. We
    would also work together on policies to build partner capacity,
    counternarcotics, and combat global threats. I would also anticipate
    working very closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global
    Security Affairs on our counterproliferation and cyber policy efforts.
        Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        Answer. Successful policy and resource oversight of special
    operations requires close coordination and collaboration with the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of Staff, and the
    Chairman's staff. If confirmed, I plan to maintain a close working
    relationship with the Chairman, the Chiefs, and the Chairman's staff.
        Question. The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Military Department
    Secretaries and Service Chiefs to ensure that the requirements to
    organize, train, and equip personnel and units that enable or feed
    Special Operations Forces are met and that maintaining the capability
    to perform stability operations is a priority. I would also work with
    them to ensure adequate resourcing of Service-common requirements and
    infrastructure for Special Operations Forces.
        Question. Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM).
        Answer. The Commander, SOCOM and the ASD(SO/LIC) must be partners
    in defining and meeting the needs of our Special Operations Forces. If
    confirmed, I am committed to maximizing that partnership and providing
    SOCOM with a senior civilian advisor in accordance with the ASD(SO/
    LIC)'s statutory requirement to oversee the policy and resources for
    special operations activities.
        Question. The commanders of the Service SOCOMs.
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Service special
    operations commands to ensure they have the policies and resources
    needed to develop and provide the capabilities needed by the Commander,
    SOCOM and the regional combatant commanders.
        Question. The regional combatant commanders.
        Answer. The regional combatant commands are at the forefront of the
    global fight against terrorists and violent extremists. They are
    responsible for maintaining a forward posture to deter and dissuade
    adversaries and assure and build the capabilities of our allies. If
    confirmed, I will work closely with the regional combatant commands in
    all of these areas.
        Question. The Director of National Intelligence.
        Answer. As mentioned above, special operations and intelligence are
    mutually supporting, so, if confirmed, I will work closely with the
    Director of National Intelligence and his subordinates.
        Question. The Director of Central Intelligence.
        Answer. Again, special operations and intelligence are mutually
    supporting, so, if confirmed, I will work closely with the Director of
    Central Intelligence and his subordinates.
        Question. The Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of
    State.
        Answer. The Department of State is a key partner in the fight
    against global terrorists and violent extremists. As the former
    Coordinator (Ambassador-at-Large) for Counterterrorism at the
    Department of State, I would hope to find opportunities to further
    integrate and coordinate our efforts with the Coordinator.
        Question. The National Security Council.
        Answer. All aspects of the ASD(SO/LIC)'s responsibilities require
    interagency engagement, coordination, and cooperation. The ASD(SO/LIC)
    represents DOD in the interagency on relevant matters including
    counterterrorism, counternarcotics, stability operations, partner
    capacity building, and other relevant SO/LIC issues.
        Question. The Director, National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).
        Answer. Special Operations Forces (SOF) activities are central to
    counterterrorism; the NCTC helps ensure coordination of all U.S.
    Government counterterrorism activities. If confirmed, I will maintain
    ASD SO/LIC's role as the primary Office of the Secretary of Defense's
    interface on SOF and counterterrorism (CT) matters.

                        MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

        Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
    the ASD(SO/LIC)?
        Answer. In addition to ensuring adequate resources to provide the
    special operations and stability operations capabilities needed by the
    Nation, the ASD(SO/LIC) must also provide policies and resources to
    keep the pressure on al Qaeda and its affiliates worldwide as we draw
    down force structure in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is vital that the U.S.
    Government remain focused on denying al Qaeda and its affiliates the
    ``sanctuary of impunity'' globally.
        Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
    addressing these challenges?
        Answer. As a veteran of the interagency process, if confirmed, I
    plan to keep the issue front and center--and to ensure that programs
    key to effective counterterrorism operations are properly supported--
    both politically and with resources.
        Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
    in terms of issues which must be addressed by the ASD(SO/LIC)?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to prioritize the defeat of
    al Qaeda and like-minded extremists, dismantling their ability to
    attack us at home or our interests abroad.
        I would also focus on sustaining the warfighting capability of SOF
    warriors. In the past 10 years, they have developed enormous capability
    both to fight terrorists and to build partner capacity which must be
    sustained for the long haul; terrorism will not go away any time soon
    and the need for effective allies and partners is critical to our
    national security.
        Question. Former ASD(SO/LIC) Michael Vickers was quoted as saying
    ``I spend about 95 percent of my time on operations'' leaving the rest
    of his time for ``Service Secretary-like'' activities including policy,
    personnel, organizational, and development and acquisition decisions
    impacting Special Operations Forces.
        Would you anticipate a similar division of time as ASD(SO/LIC)?
        Answer. Mike Vickers did a great job as the ASD(SO/LIC). If
    confirmed, I will certainly evaluate his approach as I take this job,
    but would expect to spend more time on Military Department Secretary-
    like activities as we face a period of declining DOD budgets.

           CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF THE U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

        Question. The legislation creating the SOCOM assigned extraordinary
    authority to the commander to conduct some of the functions of both a
    military service and a unified combatant command.
        Which civilian officials in the DOD exercise civilian oversight of
    the ``service-like'' authorities of the Commander, SOCOM?
        Answer. Per title 10 U.S.C. Sec. 138 and DOD Directive 5111.10 (in
    accordance with USD(P) priorities and guidance), the ASD(SO/LIC) is the
    principal civilian oversight for all special operations activities.
    Other DOD civilian officials also exercise oversight in some capacity:

             USD(I) coordinates on intelligence issues
             USD(AT&L) coordinates on acquisition issues
             USD(P&R) coordinates on personnel policies such as
            SOF-unique incentive packages
             USD(Comptroller) coordinates on SOF budget and year-
            of-execution program issues
             Military Department Secretaries coordinate on SOF
            manpower issues
             Director, CAPE, coordinates on SOF Program development
            and issues

        Question. In your view, what organizational relationship should
    exist between the ASD(SO/LIC) and the Commander, SOCOM?
        Answer. ASD(SO/LIC) provides civilian oversight of all special
    operations matters as required by title 10 U.S.C. Sec. 138. As such,
    the ASD(SO/LIC) provides oversight of special operations policy and
    resources matters and advice to implement Secretary of Defense and
    USD(P) priorities. The ASD(SO/LIC) is a voting member of SOCOM's Board
    of Directors for program guidance and decisions. The relationship with
    the Commander, SOCOM should be collaborative and cooperative to develop
    the best possible forces and employ them effectively.
        Question. What should be the role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in preparation
    and review of Major Force Program 11 and the SOCOM's Program Objective
    Memorandum?
        Answer. The ASD(SO/LIC) provides policy oversight for the
    preparation and justification of the SOCOM program and budget. The
    ASD(SO/LIC) co-chairs the SOCOM Board of Directors--the SOCOM resource
    decision forum. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Commander,
    SOCOM, to ensure that SOCOM funding sustains a ready, capable force,
    prepared to meet this new era's challenges.
        Question. What is the appropriate role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in the
    research and development and procurement functions of the SOCOM?
        Answer. The appropriate role of ASD(SO/LIC) is to provide policy
    oversight in resolving special operations acquisition issues. As the
    lead OSD official for SOF acquisition matters, the ASD(SO/LIC)
    represents SOF acquisition interests within DOD and before Congress.
    The responsibilities and relationships between the ASD(SO/LIC) and the
    Commander, SOCOM are defined and described in a Memorandum of Agreement
    between the ASD and Commander, SOCOM. The ASD directs and provides
    policy oversight to technology development programs that address
    priority mission areas to meet other Departmental, interagency, and
    international capability needs (e.g., the Combating Terrorism Technical
    Support Office).
        Question. What is the appropriate role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in the
    operational planning of missions that involve Special Operations
    Forces, whether the supported command is SOCOM, a Geographic Combatant
    Command, or another department or agency of the U.S. Government?
        Answer. The ASD(SO/LIC) serves as the principal advisor to the
    Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense for
    all aspects of employment, deployment, and oversight of special
    operations and counterterrorism capabilities. The ASD(SO/LIC) provides
    policy oversight of SOCOM's mission planning and Geographic Combatant
    Commanders' employment of SOF to ensure compliance with law and DOD
    priorities. The ASD(SO/LIC) coordinates deployment authorities and
    plans involving SOF within DOD and with interagency partners as
    required.

               SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND ACQUISITION AUTHORITIES

        Question. SOCOM is unique within DOD as the only unified command
    with acquisition authorities and funding. Further, the Commander of
    SOCOM is the only uniformed commander with a subordinate senior
    acquisition executive.
        If confirmed, how would you ensure SOCOM requirements are
    adequately vetted and balanced against available resources before
    moving forward with an acquisition program?
        Answer. The ASD(SO/LIC) is closely involved in all facets of the
    SOCOM Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution system, providing
    oversight of these matters. Additionally, through the annual program
    budget review process, the ASD(SO/LIC) is able to ensure that SOCOM's
    priorities and resource allocation are in alignment with the
    Department's strategic and policy imperatives.
        Question. What role can SOCOM's development and acquisition
    activities play in broader Service and DOD efforts?
        Answer. SOCOM can continue to serve as an incubator for developing
    new equipment and capabilities that initially are for special
    operations-specific needs but often transition to the rest of the
    Services. Some of the SOF technologies that have made their way to the
    Services include the MH-47 Chinook helicopter common avionics
    architecture system cockpit, an extended service life wing for the C-
    130, the MK48 lightweight machine gun, software-defined tactical
    radios, and an improved sniper sight. Particularly noteworthy is
    SOCOM's ability to conduct rapid evaluations of technology, systems,
    and concepts of operations, and the ability to integrate emerging off-
    the-shelf technologies.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that special
    operations capabilities and requirements are integrated into overall
    DOD research, development and acquisition programs?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to support SOCOM's important
    initiatives in this area, particularly the regularly-convened SOCOM-led
    ``Acquisition Summits'' with OSD, drawing together SOCOM, USD(AT&L),
    and the Service Acquisition Executives where all elements discuss
    acquisition issues of common interest. As SOCOM requirements are
    provided to the Joint Staff for inclusion in the Joint Requirements
    Knowledge Management System, I am comfortable that SOCOM's efforts are
    synchronized with the DOD process.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure sufficient resources
    are dedicated to the development of special operations-unique
    platforms, when required?
        Answer. As noted above, ASD(SO/LIC) is closely involved and
    integrated with SOCOM's planning, resourcing, and execution.
    Additionally, the ASD(SO/LIC) attends the SOCOM Board of Directors
    meetings, which allows him to ensure that he is aware of matters of
    concern and import to SOCOM and its subordinate commands. Naturally,
    advocating for steady and predictable resourcing of SOCOM is the
    principal means I would use, if confirmed, to oversee the investment
    strategy in these capabilities. If confirmed, I will also provide
    advice and support to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as she
    sits on critical resource decision-making bodies.
        Question. If confirmed, what metrics will you use to determine the
    effectiveness of SOCOM technology development investments and whether
    SOCOM is investing sufficient resources in these efforts?
        Answer. SOCOM has created a series of technology roadmaps that are
    effective in identifying promising solutions to meet requirements.
    These roadmaps have quantifiable metrics (e.g., cost, schedule,
    performance, and technology readiness) embedded in them and allow the
    ASD(SO/LIC) to monitor progress and identify obstacles that may require
    Department-level involvement.
        Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that SOCOM has an
    acquisition workforce with the skills, qualifications, and experience
    needed to develop and manage its acquisition and research and
    development programs?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would support Admiral McRaven's efforts to
    manage the SOF acquisition workforce, which is similar to the process
    used by the Service Acquisition Executives. SOCOM's acquisition
    workforce experts are professionally trained and certified, and have
    substantial experience in the SOF-unique processes needed to meet the
    equipping needs of SOF. I would also support SOCOM's efforts with
    USD(AT&L) to expand its organic acquisition workforce, as well as to
    create a unique identifier for SOF acquisition positions.

                    SPECIAL OPERATIONS PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

        Question. Some have argued that the Commander of SOCOM should have
    greater influence on special operations personnel management issues
    including assignment, promotion, compensation, and retention of Special
    Operations Forces. One proposal would modify section 167 of title 10,
    U.S.C., to change the role of the SOCOM Commander from ``monitoring''
    the readiness of special operations personnel to ``coordinating'' with
    the services on personnel and manpower management policies that
    directly affect Special Operations Forces.
        What is your view of this proposal?
        Answer. Changing section 167 of title 10, U.S.C., to reflect the
    word ``coordinating'' rather than ``monitoring'' would give SOCOM more
    influence over Service personnel policies that affect SOF retention.
    However, I believe that additional coordination and study should be
    done within the Department to fully understand the impact of this
    proposal.

                       SIZE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

        Question. The previous two Quadrennial Defense Reviews have
    mandated significant growth in our Special Operations Forces and
    enablers that directly support their operations.
        Do you believe that we should further increase the number of
    special operations personnel? If so, why, and by how much?
        Answer. I believe that completing the directed growth in SOF and
    Combat Support and Combat Service Support personnel directed in the
    2006 and 2010 QDRs would posture SOCOM to conduct the range of
    anticipated operations effectively to meet future requirements.
        Question. In your view, how can the size of Special Operations
    Forces be increased, while also maintaining the rigorous recruiting and
    training standards for special operators?
        Answer. Experience has shown that SOF manpower growth of 3 to 5
    percent annually can be sustained and will not dilute the force or
    outpace the required training and support structure. In my view, SOCOM
    has done a magnificent job of adjusting its processes to maintain the
    quality of SOF operators and support personnel during this current era
    of SOF growth.

                          SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS

        Question. In recent years, Special Operations Forces have taken on
    an expanded role in a number of areas important to countering violent
    extremist organizations, including those related to information and
    military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant
    changes to SOCOM's title 10 missions to make them better reflect the
    activities Special Operations Forces are carrying out around the world.
        What current missions, if any, do you believe can and should be
    divested by SOCOM, and why?
        Answer. As a result of the 2010 QDR, the Department is building the
    capacity and capabilities of the general-purpose forces (GPF) to
    conduct security force assistance to develop the capacity and
    capabilities of foreign security forces in permissive or semi-
    permissive environments. The GPF capability to train, equip and advise
    large numbers of foreign security forces could allow SOF to focus on
    more complex missions. However, I believe that SOF must maintain a very
    robust capability to train, equip, and advise foreign security forces
    as part of ensuring SOF capability to conduct operations in
    politically-sensitive environments, ensuring access for other SOF
    activities, and ensuring the ability to train, equip and advise either
    Special Operations Forces or irregular forces.
        Question. Are there any additional missions that you believe SOCOM
    should assume, and, if so, what are they and why do you advocate adding
    them?
        Answer. I do not currently foresee any additional missions that
    SOCOM should assume. I believe however, that SOF-led approaches to
    counterinsurgency are worth exploring. Counterinsurgency operations
    conducted by the United States will, more often than not, be conducted
    indirectly. SOF specializes in the indirect approach. I believe that
    employing unconventional warfare against non-state actors holds
    considerable promise as an expanded SOCOM mission area.

                  LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL AWARENESS CAPABILITIES

        Question. Deployed special operations personnel remain heavily
    concentrated in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) theater of
    operations, including many who have been deployed outside of their
    regional area of expertise.
        Are you concerned that the language and cultural skills among
    Special Operations Forces have been degraded because of repeated
    deployments outside their regional area of expertise?
        Answer. Rotational deployments of SOF units not regionally aligned
    to the CENTCOM area of responsibility have indeed taken a toll on the
    language, regional expertise, and culture capabilities of those units
    for their aligned regions. Current operations tempo limits the ability
    to train SOF for their primary areas of responsibility while still
    preparing for the next CENTCOM deployment. This is being addressed to a
    degree by SOCOM force structure growth and requires continued
    monitoring.
        Question. If so and if confirmed, what, if anything, would you do
    to ensure these unique skills are adequately maintained?
        Answer. I support recent SOCOM initiatives to implement higher
    requirements for language capability as well as to improve the training
    processes for its components. If confirmed, I would seek to continue to
    pursue several key policy issues in close coordination with SOCOM,
    including: native/heritage recruiting, valuing language and regional
    capabilities in selections and promotions, language testing and
    incentives, maintaining DOD-funded Defense Language Institute
    detachments at some of our components, adding SOF-specific school
    billets and funding from the Services for foreign education, and
    encouraging the Services to award Intermediate Level Education and
    Senior Level Education equivalency for Foreign Professional Military
    Education programs.

                 MARINE CORPS FORCES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

        Question. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command (MARSOC),
    is a subordinate component command to SOCOM established in 2005.
        What is your assessment of the progress made in standing up and
    growing MARSOC, and what do you consider to be the principal issues
    that need to be addressed to improve its operations?
        Answer. I believe that the establishment of MARSOC has been a
    resounding success, largely due to the commitment of the Marine Corps
    and Navy. My initial assessment is that the planned Combat Service and
    Combat Service Support growth must be fully implemented to support most
    effectively MARSOC's full spectrum of capabilities.
        Question. What unique attributes, if any, does MARSOC contribute to
    the capabilities of U.S. Special Operations Forces?
        Answer. Incorporating the wonderful heritage, spirit, expeditionary
    mindset, and ``can do'' attitude of the U.S. Marine Corps into SOCOM
    has been an extremely positive thing, in my view. MARSOC has led the
    effort to integrate intelligence and operations completely at the
    lowest possible level, and MARSOC's distinctive command and control
    procedures have created dynamism in the SOF community.
        Question. The Marine Corps have approved a primary military
    occupational specialty for enlisted marines trained as special
    operators allowing these personnel to remain in MARSOC for their
    professional careers.
        Do you believe officers should have a similar opportunity as
    enlisted marines to serve the duration of their military career in
    MARSOC rather than rotating through the command as they do currently?
        Answer. As a former Army Special Forces officer, I recall the
    process that the Army went through to establish Special Forces as a
    separate officer career field. One lesson from that experience was that
    such transitions occur during the maturation of an organization, and
    that it is probably too early to decide definitively how MARSOC-
    qualified officers should be managed long-term. I am confident that the
    Marine Corps will regularly review this topic and conduct the necessary
    study and analysis to determine if it is appropriate to make a change.

                    MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS

        Question. DOD recently announced that it was discontinuing use of
    the term ``Psychological Operations'' in favor of the term ``Military
    Information Support Operations (MISO).''
        Do you support this change? Why or why not?
        Answer. Yes. Today, for some, the terms ``Psychological
    Operations'' or ``PSYOP'' unfortunately conjure up images of
    propaganda, lies, or deception. These inaccurate perceptions limit the
    willingness to employ MISO personnel in some areas where they could be
    extremely effective.
        To date, there are some indications that the name change has
    allowed for some increases in acceptance, cooperation and coordination
    regarding MISO activities throughout the U.S. Government and with our
    partner nations.
        Question. What operational and doctrinal impacts do you believe
    such a change will have?
        Answer. Changing the term ``Psychological Operations'' to
    ``Military Information Support Operations'' throughout military
    doctrine, manuals, and other documents is one of semantics. There were
    no directed changes in doctrine or operational employment of the force.
        Question. Do you believe the Armed Forces have sufficient personnel
    and other assets to conduct the range of MISO being asked of them?
        Answer. MISO forces and assets, like the rest of the military, are
    stretched thin with the ongoing operational requirements to support
    deployed combat forces. MISO forces are low-density forces and are
    among the most deployed forces in the U.S. military. Under Admiral
    Olson, SOCOM conducted several reviews to address this issue. I know
    Admiral McRaven is committed to following through on this with the
    objective of enhancing DOD's MISO capabilities. One of the first
    efforts toward increasing the MISO capability is the reorganization of
    SOCOM MISO forces. This reorganization will reduce redundancy in
    commands and allow for the repurposing of numerous positions from staff
    to operational capability.
        Question. Al Qaeda and affiliated violent extremist groups work
    hard to appeal to both local and foreign populations. The composition
    and size of these groups in comparison to the U.S. Government permits
    them to make policy decisions quickly.
        Do you believe DOD is organized to respond quickly and effectively
    to the messaging and influence efforts of al Qaeda and other affiliated
    terrorist groups?
        Answer. DOD is well positioned and organized from the strategic
    level to the tactical level to respond quickly to al Qaeda and its
    affiliates when a quick response is required. But unlike kinetic
    warfare, effectiveness in the war of ideas does not necessarily lie in
    outpacing the tempo of our enemies. A steady drumbeat that clearly
    articulates U.S. policy over time, anchored in the bedrock truth, best
    serves our national interests. DOD takes its lead from the President,
    and relies heavily on the Department of State, in reenforcing the
    Nation's message. In doing so, DOD has been extremely effective in
    face-to-face encounters, through a broad array of engagements with our
    allied, partner, and host nations on a daily basis. As a representative
    example, DOD reinforces its engagements with printed products, such as
    Geographic Combatant Commands' Regional Magazines and the foreign
    engagement websites. These mediums provide DOD a broad range of
    options.
        In addressing al Qaeda, DOD seeks collectively to identify and
    exploit their miscues and errors, and force them into a reactive role.
    In that way, DOD determines the appropriate level of response and
    quickly coordinates that response with other agencies.
        Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role for Military
    Information Support Teams (MIST) in these activities?
        Answer. The MIST is the MISO equivalent of the Special Forces
    operational detachment. This is the element that executes MISO at the
    operational and tactical level. MISTs develop messages to counter
    hostile information and propaganda, in a manner that is culturally
    relevant and acceptable to the host national population. Such messaging
    is closely coordinated with the U.S. Embassy. MISTs also can maintain
    awareness of the information environment by identifying current trends
    in local and regional media reporting, detecting hostile messaging, and
    measuring local populace reaction.

                        MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

        Question. In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out
    by special operations personnel different from those carried out by
    others in the Intelligence Community?
        Answer. In my view, Special Operations Forces (SOF) intelligence
    operations are complementary and mutually supporting to those carried
    out by the Intelligence Community (IC). These operations comply with
    the policies and regulations guiding DOD and interagency activities.
    One key distinction between SOF intelligence operations and those
    conducted by the IC is the pace of these activities. SOF have refined
    the Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze (F3EA) intelligence cycle to
    support the rapid cycle rate of special operations activities. The F3EA
    process is now being migrated to conventional forces. SOF have also
    placed a premium on sensitive site exploitation and the collection and
    registration of biometrics data from the battlefield.
        SOCOM elements have also developed a series of joint interagency
    task force nodes, both in deployed areas and in the United States, that
    bring together expertise from all our interagency partners. SOF
    maximizes interagency contributions through reachback, de-confliction,
    and coordination of activities between agencies. This improves our
    forces' chances to get inside the enemy's decision cycle.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure intelligence
    activities carried out by Special Operations Forces are coordinated
    adequately with other activities carried out by those in the
    Intelligence Community?
        Answer. I believe that interagency collaboration is the most
    important contributing factor to many of SOF's achievements. As Admiral
    McRaven has stated, SOCOM will continue to follow all applicable
    Intelligence Community directives, report required sensitive activities
    to the USD(I), and maintain the robust intelligence oversight processes
    they have established with their Inspector General, Staff Judge
    Advocate, and the Command Oversight Review Board.
        If confirmed, I will oversee, maintain, and build upon the
    important relationships SOCOM--as a key member of DOD's Intelligence
    Community--has developed with the Federal intelligence and law
    enforcement agencies. Additionally, I am aware that SOCOM continues to
    employ SOF liaison officers, called Special Operations Support Team
    members, effectively to coordinate with agencies in the national
    capital region.

                            CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

        Question. Civil Affairs activities carried out by U.S. Special
    Operations Forces in partnership with host nation personnel play an
    important role in developing infrastructure, supporting good governance
    and civil societies, and providing humanitarian assistance, including
    medical and veterinary services to needy populations.
        In your view, does SOCOM have sufficient personnel and resources to
    conduct the range of Civil Affairs missions required for today's
    operations?
        Answer. I understand that SOCOM and the Army have determined that
    current and already programmed Civil Affairs (CA) force structure
    provides sufficient capacity within the CENTCOM AOR and other combatant
    command generated Theater Security Cooperation requirements. Any
    capability shortfalls within the CA force are being addressed in detail
    by the respective Military Departments and SOCOM, and solution sets are
    being provided through the CA Capabilities Based Assessment.
    Implementation of those solutions, by the Military Departments, will
    eliminate much of the existing capability gaps. Ensuring the Department
    has the correct force capacity to meet current requirements will be one
    of my priorities, and if confirmed, I would resist the temptation to
    create a new capability or increase capacity when it may suffice simply
    to enhance capabilities within current force structure, through
    additional, enhanced, or new training; structure and manning updates;
    and progressive equipping coupled with continued evolution of the
    roles, missions, and responsibilities of the current CA force.
        Question. Civil Affairs activities are most effective when
    coordinated with other U.S. Government efforts, most notably those
    carried out by U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
        If confirmed, how would you ensure Civil Affairs activities by
    special operations personnel are integrated into larger U.S. Government
    efforts?
        Answer. I understand that SOCOM employs two significant tools to
    ensure effective interagency coordination: the SOCOM Interagency Task
    Force (IATF), and an Interagency Partnership Program. The IATF
    identifies discrete problems and opportunities to foster interagency
    collaboration by leveraging unique interagency authorities, resources,
    and capabilities in support of the mission to expose, disrupt,
    dismantle, and defeat threats. This capability is available to the CA
    force as a reach-back mechanism for interagency coordination.
        The Interagency Partnership program established and maintains a
    network of SOCOM personnel in the national capital region to facilitate
    the synchronization of planning for global operations against terrorist
    networks and addressing other emerging national security concerns in
    coordination with appropriate U.S. Government agencies, the Joint
    Staff, OSD, combatant commands, combat support agencies, the military
    departments, and others. Two CA officers are currently in the USAID
    Military Affairs office. These mechanisms seek to ensure that SOF CA
    remains integrated into key U.S. Government efforts.
        Question. MISOs can have an amplifying effect on Civil Affairs
    activities by actively promoting the efforts of the U.S. military and
    host nation and by communicating truthful messages to counter the
    spread of violent extremist ideology among vulnerable populations.
        If confirmed, how would you ensure Civil Affairs and MISOs are
    adequately coordinated to achieve a maximum impact?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would support SOCOM in its role as joint
    proponent for both CA and MISO. This will enable unity of effort and
    the coordinated execution of CA and MISO. CA and MISO force
    representation at the operational and strategic levels will also remain
    critical in achieving a coordinated impact. At the tactical and
    operational levels, (e.g., country teams at the U.S. Embassies where CA
    and MISO are working), this is accomplished as a matter of course. CA
    and MISO personnel receive similar training and understand that their
    specialties are mutually supporting.

                    SPECIAL OPERATIONS ENABLING CAPABILITIES

        Question. The previous Commander of SOCOM described the ``non-
    availability'' of force enablers as SOCOM's ``most vexing issue in the
    operational environment.'' The 2010 QDR sought to balance previously
    mandated growth in Special Operations Forces with additional enabling
    capabilities.
        What do you believe are the greatest shortages in enabling
    capabilities facing Special Operations Forces?
        Answer. Shortages of enabling capabilities for SOF are often
    similar to the shortage of high-demand enablers that challenge the rest
    of the deployed forces (e.g., intelligence, explosive ordnance
    disposal, communications, medical, security).
        SOCOM's organic enabling capabilities are those that provide SOF
    the ability to self-sustain for short durations while maintaining the
    agility to deploy forces quickly in support of the combatant
    commanders. Longer-term support of Special Operations Forces, by
    doctrine, and except under special circumstances, becomes the
    responsibility of each Service's theater logistic command and control
    structure.
        Question. Do you believe additional enabling capabilities, beyond
    those mandated by the QDR, are required to support Special Operations
    Forces?
        Answer. The QDR mandated an increase in the number of organic
    combat and combat service support assets available to both the Army and
    Navy special operations units. These capabilities include logisticians,
    communications assets, forensic analysts, information support
    specialists, and intelligence experts. DOD is slowly realizing this
    programmed growth, and it will make a difference in how SOF units are
    supported. The QDR only addresses growth within SOCOM, however, SOCOM
    will always rely on the Services for some level of support as addressed
    in the previous question.
        Question. Do you believe additional enabling capabilities should be
    grown within SOCOM or provided in support of Special Operations Forces
    by the Services?
        Answer. I believe both should occur, but the preponderance of those
    support capabilities should remain in the conventional force and be
    provided to SOF through the habitual association of Service Combat
    Support and Combat Service Support capabilities with the SOF units they
    primarily support. Currently the responsibility of the conventional
    force to provide sustainment support to SOF is not clearly defined or
    specified. At times, this limits SOF's ability to sustain operations.
    SOCOM is currently working with its components, the Services, and the
    Joint Staff to develop the Special Operations Force Generation process
    to improve how it requests these critical capabilities. If confirmed, I
    will work with SOCOM to define enabler requirements more clearly, and
    to identify them farther in advance to allow the Services to plan for
    the employment of habitually associated units in support of SOF. A
    reduction of SOF emergent requests and an increase in habitually
    associated Service-provided capabilities will go a long way toward
    resolving this problem.

                            RENDER SAFE PROFICIENCY

        Question. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a
    growing and especially concerning threat to our Nation. Select special
    operations units are assigned the task of interdicting and rendering-
    safe weapons of mass destruction should they ever fall into the wrong
    hands.
        If confirmed, how would you ensure render-safe capabilities are
    adequately maintained by special operations units who may currently be
    heavily engaged in offensive kill/capture missions against high value
    targets in Afghanistan and elsewhere?
        Answer. The National Strategy for Counterterrorism highlights the
    danger of nuclear terrorism as being the single greatest threat to
    global security. I understand that, even amidst a sustained focus on
    offensive operations to capture/kill high-value targets in Afghanistan
    and elsewhere, the Department ensures that its render-safe capabilities
    are adequately maintained. If confirmed, I will work closely with SOCOM
    on this important issue. I will carefully monitor and assess the impact
    of our operational tempo on DOD's render-safe capabilities and ensure
    that these capabilities are maintained.
        Question. Do you believe additional render-safe capabilities are
    needed within SOCOM?
        Answer. Not at this time, though I have not yet had the opportunity
    to examine these capabilities in detail. I believe SOCOM has the
    capabilities now to accomplish its render-safe mission.
        As long as States continue to proliferate weapons of mass
    destruction, and both state and non-state actors continue their
    attempts to acquire these devices with the intent to target the United
    States and/or U.S. interests, we must remain vigilant and effective in
    our efforts. It is important to stay ahead of the threat, which
    requires expanded research and development efforts to ensure that our
    skilled operators are properly trained and equipped to defeat these
    threats.

                          SUPPORTED COMBATANT COMMAND

        Question. Under certain circumstances and subject to direction by
    the President or Secretary of Defense, SOCOM may operate as a supported
    combatant command.
        In your view, under what circumstances should SOCOM conduct
    operations as a supported combatant command?
        Answer. SOCOM should be, in accordance with the Unified Command
    Plan, the supported commander for planning and synchronizing planning
    for global operations against terrorist networks. Mission execution in
    most instances remains under the command of Geographic Combatant
    Commanders, or, more precisely, in accordance with title 10 U.S.C. 167
    unless otherwise directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, a
    special operations activity or mission shall be conducted under the
    command of the commander of the unified combatant command in whose
    geographic area the activity or mission is to be conducted.
        Only in rare instances, involving highly sensitive targets or
    significant political considerations, does Commander, SOCOM execute a
    mission.
        Question. In your view, what resource, organization, and force
    structure changes, if any, are required in order for SOCOM to more
    effectively conduct both supporting and supported combatant command
    responsibilities?
        Answer. It seems to me that, after 10 years of active combat, SOCOM
    is probably structured correctly to conduct both supporting and
    supported combatant command responsibilities. I understand SOCOM and
    the office of the ASD(SO/LIC) are currently studying the Theater
    Special Operations Commands to determine what changes, if any, should
    be considered in the future. I will look at this issue carefully if
    confirmed.

                              TRAINING CAPABILITY

        Question. What capabilities do you consider most important for
    effective training of special operations personnel?
        Answer. Special Operations Forces cannot be created rapidly since
    they require a high degree of training, experience, and job skill sets
    that are often unique. The human component of SOCOM is where its
    strength lies and to develop our special operations personnel we must
    be willing to invest the necessary time and resources in advanced,
    realistic training. We must be able to leverage real-world exercises
    like the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) programs to expose our
    SOF to real-world experiences. It is critical that they develop
    language and cultural skills that allow them to operate in diverse
    foreign environments where our national interests are greatest. Special
    operations personnel must develop a mastery of their skills. DOD/SOCOM
    must maintain or increase resources and time spent on training ranges
    and developing interoperability with the Services and our allies who
    serve as significant enabling components to SOF.
        Question. What improvements are necessary, in your view, to enhance
    training for special operations personnel?
        Answer. Professional military education remains an important part
    of developing the critical language and cultural skills required of SOF
    personnel. DOD must be willing to prioritize additional resources and
    incentives to encourage the development of language and cultural skills
    in our servicemembers and more importantly within our special
    operations personnel. DOD should take advantage of, and increase where
    possible, immersion training opportunities, exchanges, and advanced
    education opportunities. At the same time, DOD/SOCOM must not allow our
    SOF to lose their core combat capabilities; the balance between warrior
    and ambassador should be respected and SOCOM needs to prioritize the
    continued development of the core combat skills that make our SOF
    unique and experienced.
        Admiral McRaven has additionally highlighted that pre-mission and
    predeployment training with relevant Service-provided capabilities
    (e.g. mobility, fires, engineers, etc) is critical to ensure that joint
    SOF packages are effective.
        Question. What are the most significant challenges in achieving
    effective training of special operations personnel?
        Answer. SOCOM has highlighted that it needs to move from a
    primarily threat-focused approach to a population-focused approach.
    This means conducting indirect warfare and moving beyond core SOF
    skills. It already takes significant time to develop the basic skill
    sets for special operations personnel. Developing additional language,
    cultural, diplomatic, and other non-combat SOF skills will be a
    challenge. SOF are deployed at an extremely high rate leading an
    effective effort to combat terrorism throughout the world. Deploying
    persistently and for long durations results in great experiences for
    special operations personnel, but in many cases a focused mission may
    result in the atrophy of other skill sets. For example, aircrews may
    conduct repetitive air-land missions on a long deployment, but may not
    conduct a specific airdrop mission due to deployment constraints. SOCOM
    must ensure there is enough time to train in the deployment cycles to
    maintain proficiency in core SOF capabilities. Additionally, since most
    SOF missions require non-SOF support, time must be added to work
    closely with Service counterparts supporting SOF.
        Question. What, if any, training benefits accrue to U.S. Special
    Operations Forces from training foreign military personnel?
        Answer. Training foreign military personnel has a substantial
    benefit for SOF, especially when they are foreign military units tied
    directly to current and future operations. The training of these units
    can increase interoperability, and allow the foreign units to take a
    larger lead in their own defense operations while our special
    operations trainers maintain their instructor skills. The training of
    the foreign military personnel greatly benefits SOF as they gain an
    increased situational awareness of future operating environments and
    allies while honing language and cultural skill sets that are critical
    to successful operations. JCETs and other regionally synchronized
    training efforts help pave the way for critical counterterrorism
    operations or even humanitarian efforts or other SOF mission sets.
    These activities help expose SOF to new tactics, techniques, and
    procedures while also encouraging the development of communication and
    intelligence-sharing mechanisms that enable CT operations. Training
    foreign military units helps build trusting relationships and fosters
    familiarization that in return enables our SOF to work in foreign
    countries with greater success and confidence.
        Question. To what extent, in your view, is it appropriate for the
    U.S. to rely upon contractors for training foreign military personnel?
    What do you see as the primary risks and advantages in such contractor
    training?
        Answer. SOF cannot be replaced by contractors, but there may be
    times when utilizing contractors makes more sense and should be the
    course of action. In some situations, it may be prudent to contract out
    a specific mission because we may not possess that skill within our own
    SOF. For example, there may not be a SOF aviator trained on a certain
    aircraft, or there may not be a Green Beret with a specific language
    skill required for a training event. In these cases, a contract
    solution might be the best option to ensure an important mission is
    still conducted.
        Answer. On the other hand, there are risks of utilizing
    contractors. DOD is obligated to maintain strong oversight over
    contractors. Contractors are also not permitted to represent the U.S.
    Government. They are not a replacement for SOF and if not properly
    utilized may undermine efforts to train foreign units. Contractors can
    help provide augmented logistics, administrative support, and
    technical/computer expertise which in turn frees up special operations
    personnel for more SOF-unique training opportunities and operational
    missions.
        Question. On March 1, 2011, Admiral Eric Olson, the former
    Commander of SOCOM, provided written testimony to this committee that
    stated: ``The shortage of readily available, local ranges currently
    hampers Special Operations Forces' ability to meet deployment training
    timelines and causes our operators to `travel to train,' further
    increasing their already excessive time away from home.''
        What efforts do you plan to undertake in coordination with the
    military services to ensure that Special Operations Forces have timely,
    consistent and predictable access to training ranges and facilities?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would coordinate with SOCOM and take a
    closer look at how the GPF and SOF share training ranges and
    facilities. Where possible I would look to prioritize limited training
    resources for SOF training and those Service enablers supporting SOF.
    For example, if confirmed, I would prioritize future military
    construction efforts to expand training capabilities for SOF. I would
    also look to enter into additional memorandums of agreement for
    expanded GPF-SOF training opportunities on ranges and associated
    facilities to prepare our SOF for combat deployments.

         CAPABILITIES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

        Question. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) called for
    increased counterinsurgency (COIN), counterterrorism, and security
    force assistance capabilities within the general purpose forces.
        What is your assessment of the QDR with regard to the mix of
    responsibilities assigned to general purpose and Special Operations
    Forces, particularly with respect to security force assistance and
    building partner military capabilities?
        Do you believe that our general purpose forces need to become more
    like Special Operations Forces in mission areas that are critical to
    countering violent extremists?
        Are there certain mission areas that should be reserved for Special
    Operations Forces only?
        Answer. I fully support the strategy of building the defense
    capacity and capabilities of our partners as articulated in the 2010
    QDR. I believe that the mix of capabilities between general purpose and
    Special Operations Forces as called for in the QDR is correct. Each of
    the Services has gained valuable experience in this area over the past
    10 years, especially as a result of operations in both Iraq and
    Afghanistan. The Services are increasingly growing their organic
    capability and capacity to conduct security force assistance (SFA)
    operations in permissive and non-sensitive environments or where a
    large U.S. footprint is acceptable. Likewise, SOF have gained valuable
    experience in building the military capability and capacities of our
    partners not only in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also with our coalition
    partners as they prepare to deploy in support of both combat and
    stability operations. The Service SFA capability and capacity, however,
    should be for Service core competencies and not for missions best
    suited for SOF. SOF are still the force of choice for those security
    force assistance missions in non-permissive and politically sensitive
    areas and where the host nation demands a small footprint. In addition,
    SOF are the correct choice to train our partner nation SOF and improve
    their capabilities for counterterrorism operations.
        SOF have worked closely with the Service general purpose forces to
    prepare them to execute COIN and combating terrorism missions
    appropriate to their capabilities. The partnership between general
    purpose and Special Operations Forces is strong. The extensive combat
    employment of both forces in shared battle spaces has increased the
    need to coordinate our operations closely. This has resulted in a
    sharing of tactics, techniques, and procedures between SOF and general
    purpose forces that has helped to increase the Services' capabilities
    to execute COIN and combating terrorism operations. The Services can
    continue to complement SOF's capabilities by providing those combat
    enablers that are not organic to SOF units or that are not available in
    adequate quantities. These combat enablers, including intelligence and
    combat service support, are vital to the success of SOF, especially in
    today's complex operating environment.

                              COMBATTING TERRORISM

        Question. What is your understanding of the Department's strategy
    for combatting terrorism?
        Answer. The President's National Strategy for Counterterrorism
    maintains the focus on pressuring al Qaeda's core while emphasizing the
    need to build foreign partnerships and capacity and to strengthen our
    resilience. The United States is specifically at war with al Qaeda and
    associated forces, not the tactic of terrorism or the larger group of
    violent extremists in the world. Overarching goals are to protect the
    American people, Homeland, and interests; disrupt, degrade, dismantle,
    and defeat al Qaeda; prevent terrorists from acquiring or using weapons
    of mass destruction; eliminate safehavens; build enduring
    counterterrorism partnerships; degrade links between al Qaeda and its
    affiliates and adherents; counter al Qaeda's ideology; and deprive
    terrorists of their financial support and other enablers.
        The U.S. Government is engaged in a multi-departmental,
    multinational effort. Some of the activities that DOD directly
    undertakes to support this strategy include training, advising, and
    assisting partner security forces; supporting intelligence collection
    on al Qaeda; conducting information operations against al Qaeda; and,
    when appropriate, capturing or killing al Qaeda operatives. However, I
    understand DOD is also committed to enabling its intelligence and law
    enforcement partners, both in the United States and overseas, in their
    efforts to counter this threat.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you fulfill your responsibilities
    related to combatting terrorism?
        Answer. The ASD(SO/LIC) is the DOD lead for all special operations
    and low-intensity conflict matters. If confirmed, I would also advise
    the Secretary of Defense on sensitive counterterrorism and information
    operations; sections 1206, 1208, and related counterterrorism
    authorities; and the development of Special Operations Force
    capabilities necessary for countering the terrorist threat.
        Question. Are there steps the Department should take to better
    coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other Federal
    departments and agencies?
        Answer. In general, I think DOD is doing a good job of coordinating
    its counterterrorism efforts. At the operational level, the U.S.
    military, Intelligence Community, and law enforcement agencies
    regularly collaborate on operations. The various departments and
    agencies constantly share intelligence, with little of the
    ``stovepiping'' that we saw before September 11. At the strategic
    level, the multiple counterterrorism bodies chaired by the National
    Security Staff provide ample opportunity for senior leaders to discuss
    key terrorism issues. There will always be some natural bureaucratic
    tensions, but I think the U.S. Government is well postured for
    continued strong counterterrorism collaboration. I will look at this
    closely if confirmed.
        Question. As you look around the globe at this moment, what do you
    see to be the most significant counterterrorism threats to the United
    States, our allies, and partners?
        Answer. The most significant groups that threaten the United States
    and our allies are al Qaeda in Pakistan and al Qaeda in the Arabian
    Peninsula. However, a few key operatives operating from any of al
    Qaeda's affiliates, or even ``lone wolves'' inspired by al Qaeda, can
    wreak havoc anywhere in the world. I am very concerned with preventing
    terrorists from obtaining weapons of mass destruction or loose anti-
    aircraft weapons proliferating from unstable states. I understand that
    the U.S. Government is continually working to identify new terrorist
    methods of concealing improvised explosives.
        Question. On September 22, 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
    launched the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) with 30 founding
    members from around the world. The GCTF is a major initiative within
    the Obama administration's broader effort to build the international
    architecture for dealing with terrorism. The primary focus of the GCTF
    is capacity building in relevant areas and aims to increase the number
    of countries capable of dealing with the terrorist threats within their
    borders and regions.
        What is your understanding of this initiative?
        Answer. The GCTF is a multilateral platform that will provide a
    venue for countries to meet and identify counterterrorism needs, and
    mobilize the necessary expertise and resources to address such needs
    and enhance global cooperation. The GCTF is intended to complement
    ongoing efforts with the United Nations, as well as other regional and
    sub-regional bodies. I understand that the September launch of the GCTF
    was positively received by all of the countries involved.
        Question. Given the emphasis on building partner capacity, what is
    your understanding for the role of DOD--and in particular Special
    Operations Forces--in this initiative?
        Answer. The defeat of al Qaeda cannot be achieved without bringing
    together the expertise and resources of the entire U.S. Government--
    intelligence, law enforcement, military, and other instruments of
    national power--in a coordinated and synchronized manner. If confirmed,
    I would seek strong relationships with DOD's interagency partners, in
    particular, the National Counterterrorism Center, the State
    Department's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, and the
    Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, to maximize DOD's
    efforts to counter violent extremism. The GCTF, as a State Department-
    led effort, is one example where SOF's counterterrorism and security
    cooperation activities can support and inform interagency partners'
    efforts in counterterrorism.

                            SECTION 1208 OPERATIONS

        Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), as amended
    by subsequent legislation, authorizes the provision of support
    (including training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces,
    irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military
    operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.
        What is your assessment of this authority?
        Answer. I understand that section 1208 authority is a key tool that
    combatant commanders have repeatedly confirmed as essential to
    combating terrorism in their areas of responsibility. It enables the
    Special Operations Forces under their control to leverage willing
    partners who possess access to areas, people, and information that are
    denied to U.S. forces, but which are critical to our tactical and
    strategic success. The authority has allowed DOD to respond quickly to
    emergent global challenges. Use of section 1208 requires appropriate
    civilian oversight, including the Secretary of Defense's approval and
    congressional notification.

                                  AFGHANISTAN

        Question. What is your assessment of the current situation in
    Afghanistan? What are the weaknesses and shortcomings in the current
    effort to combat terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan?
        Answer. In my view, the International Security Assistance Force
    (ISAF) and its Afghan partners have made important security gains,
    reversing violence trends in much of the country, and beginning to
    transition Afghan security to lead in seven areas. Continued military
    pressure through partnered operations has allowed joint ISAF-Afghan
    forces to maintain and expand the security gains, especially in the
    former Taliban strongholds in Helmand and Kandahar. The Afghan National
    Security Forces (ANSF) have been integral to this success,
    demonstrating substantial growth in quantity, quality, and operational
    effectiveness.
        The United States is employing the right methodology, and security
    continues to improve. However, the insurgency's safe havens in Pakistan
    and the limited capacity of the Afghan Government remain the biggest
    threats to consolidating security gains to enable an enduring, stable
    Afghanistan. The insurgency remains resilient, benefiting from safe
    havens, with a notable operational capacity as reflected in isolated,
    high-profile attacks and elevated violence levels in eastern
    Afghanistan. Nevertheless, this partnered campaign has provided
    increased security and stability for the Afghan population, and the
    United States continues to build upon this success.
        Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role of Special
    Operations Forces in Afghanistan, and the proper relationship between
    counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations there?
        Answer. In my view, counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency
    (COIN) are inextricably linked in Afghanistan. There must be a balanced
    and measured approach to their application. CT efforts, including
    direct action, shape the environment and create conditions necessary
    for the causes of instability to be addressed. This enables the further
    capacity development of Afghan governance and Afghan security forces.
        Question. Night raids conducted by U.S Special Operations Forces
    and Afghan commandos have resulted in removing thousands of insurgents
    from the battlefield, often without any shots being fired. Nonetheless,
    night raids remain controversial in Afghanistan, and the Afghan
    Government and community leaders have repeatedly called for restricting
    or eliminating their use.
        In your view, what should be the role of night raids in our
    strategy in Afghanistan?
        Answer. In my view, night operations are an essential and highly
    effective element of a strategy against al Qaeda and the Afghan
    insurgency, and they should continue to play an important role in
    maintaining pressure on militant groups. Night operations allow the
    United States, with its Afghan and international partners, to fight the
    insurgency with precision and focus while minimizing risk to civilians.
        I understand that Afghanistan's highly trained Special Operations
    Forces are steadily growing, and that Afghans currently play a key role
    in coordinating and partnering in the vast majority of these
    operations. Of course, night operations must continue to be conducted
    with due respect for cultural sensitivities and great care for the
    prevention of civilian casualties. Ultimately, the goal must be to
    ensure that Afghan and international forces have the capabilities and
    authorities necessary to achieve the transition goals agreed at the
    Lisbon Summit last November, while also being mindful of the goal to
    increase Afghan ownership throughout the transition process.
        Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of night
    raids, particularly in removing from the battlefield mid- and senior-
    level insurgent commanders?
        Answer. The amount of pressure these operations have placed on the
    insurgency has been immense. Night operations have been particularly
    effective at using rapid exploitation of intelligence to target command
    and control structures, organizational capabilities, support networks,
    and infrastructure of insurgent and militant groups.
        I understand that the United States conducts the vast majority of
    night operations jointly with Afghan Security Forces, and we share a
    common goal--transition to Afghan security lead by 2014 and full
    transition as soon as the ANSF has the necessary capacity. Because of
    the high level of skill and professionalism of the joint U.S.-Afghan
    forces, no shots are fired during approximately 90 percent of night
    operations, and less than 1 percent of these operations result in
    civilian casualties.
        Question. What steps, if any, would you recommend to address Afghan
    concerns regarding the use of night raids?
        Answer. I understand that the United States has already taken
    numerous steps to minimize the potential for civilian casualties and
    give Afghan security forces leadership on night operations. All of our
    forces receive formal instruction in theater tactical directives
    pertaining to civilian casualties. Afghan Security Force leadership has
    been integrated into the planning, execution, and post-operation phases
    to ensure full transparency and enable its leadership to balance risk,
    cultural considerations, and operational requirements. Every U.S.
    operation is conducted with Afghan counterparts, and the Afghans are
    always in the lead during entry of compounds and call-outs. Measures
    for escalation of force are strictly followed. I understand that our
    Afghan partners, as well as U.S. commanders, strive to keep district
    and provincial political leadership informed of all operations.
        Question. Secretary Panetta and others have emphasized the
    importance of the Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police
    programs to the strategy in Afghanistan.
        What has been the effect of these programs on rural Afghan
    populations and what has been the response from the Taliban?
        Answer. Village Stability Operations (VSO) are a critical component
    of the COIN/CT balance in the ISAF campaign plan. VSO is a bottom-up
    approach linking governance to the village level. VSO uses Afghan and
    ISAF Special Operations Forces embedded in the community full-time to
    help improve security, governance, and development in more remote areas
    of Afghanistan where the ANSF and ISAF have a limited presence. I
    understand that, since its inception, VSO has expanded Afghan
    Government influence in key rural areas from 1,000 square kilometers to
    23,500 square kilometers today. VSO has also enabled a massive
    expansion in small-scale infrastructure development in these key rural
    areas. Across Afghanistan, increasing numbers of local communities are
    requesting to participate in this program.
        The Afghan Local Police (ALP), the armed local security program
    associated with VSO and established by President Karzai, has expanded
    to more than 8,000 members. Due to the increase in ALP effectiveness,
    the Afghan Ministry of the Interior has authorized an ALP end strength
    of 30,000. ALP are empowering local communities and have proven to be a
    significant threat to the Taliban, denying them safe-haven, and
    ultimately creating the conditions for long-term stability.
        As a result, the Taliban have mounted an aggressive intimidation,
    assassination, and disruption effort against Afghan Government
    officials, ALP members, and supportive populations. These attacks have
    largely failed to intimidate ALP forces and local communities, which
    continue to defend their villages effectively against insurgent
    attacks.
        Question. Do you believe the availability of U.S. Special
    Operations Forces is a limiting factor in expanding these programs to a
    point where they can have a strategic impact in Afghanistan?
        Answer. Yes, I believe that the expansion of this effort will need
    to rely on the application of theater Special Operations Forces and
    enablers. To assist in the responsible growth of these programs, ISAF
    has integrated specially trained conventional forces into the SOF-led
    VSO program, mainly to augment security requirements. These combined
    teams are producing strategic changes, and additional Special
    Operations Force structure will demonstrably expand this effect across
    the country. The approved expansion to 30,000 ALP patrolmen will likely
    strain the capacity of the coalition Special Operations Forces in
    Afghanistan and may require additional conventional forces to partner
    with SOF in order to support projected ALP growth adequately.
        Question. How do indirect approaches like the Village Stability
    Operations and Afghan Local Police Programs complement direct action
    counterterrorism missions within the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan?
        Answer. The U.S. National and Military strategies are based on
    direct and indirect approaches. Indirect SOF missions are part of what
    the Department now calls foundational activities. Village Stability
    Operations and the Afghan Local Police are part of that indirect
    approach and are critical to the success of General Allen's population-
    centric campaign strategy in key rural areas across Afghanistan.
    Counterterrorism efforts complement these rural efforts by shaping and
    managing the security environment where these indirect approaches are
    pursued. One is no less or more important than the other; they are
    distinct yet complementary efforts that work in tandem to achieve near-
    term and enduring stability.
        Question. On an annual basis, DOD spends approximately $500 million
    building the capacity of the Afghanistan Government to counter the
    illegal narcotics trade. Despite this sizeable annual investment,
    according to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC),
    Afghanistan remains the ``wellspring of the global opium trade,
    accounting for 93 percent of all opium poppy cultivation.'' UNODC has
    also found that about 80 percent of the drugs derived from Afghan opium
    poppies are smuggled out by transnational organized criminal groups
    through the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan; the rest flows
    through Central Asia.
        What is your assessment of DOD's counternarcotics program in
    Afghanistan?
        Answer. I understand that DOD supports counternarcotics efforts in
    Afghanistan by building Afghan capacity and working with U.S. law
    enforcement agencies such as DEA, CBP, FBI, and ICE to interdict
    narcotics trafficking. Although DOD supports Afghan eradication
    efforts, the Department of State has the lead for that effort. This
    year the interdiction of opiates and precursor chemicals in Afghanistan
    has increased. Afghan Counternarcotics Police vetted units, mentored by
    DEA, are now capable of conducting drug interdiction operations and
    have been actively involved in combined operations with DEA and
    military forces. DOD has also been building the capacity of the Afghan
    border management efforts to stop drugs from leaving Afghanistan and
    precursor chemicals from entering the country.
        Question. How would you improve DOD's counternarcotics efforts in
    Afghanistan?
        Answer. I believe that there have been considerable improvements
    this year in military and law enforcement coordination. Military
    commanders in Afghanistan are now requesting support from DEA and
    Afghanistan's Counternarcotics Police. Although there has been
    improvement there are probably other improvements that could be made;
    if confirmed, I will look into this.

                                    PAKISTAN

        Question. The relationship between the United States and Pakistan
    has often been described as tumultuous. Reports indicate Pakistan has
    expelled U.S. special operations personnel who were deployed there to
    train the Frontier Corps and other Pakistani security forces to fight
    al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other associated groups.
        How important in your assessment is the U.S.-Pakistan military-to-
    military relationship to the success of our overall counterterrorism
    strategy?
        Answer. The National Strategy for Counterterrorism is clear in
    stating that the United States will only achieve the strategic defeat
    of al Qaeda through a sustained partnership with Pakistan. In my view,
    the military-to-military relationship is an important part of this
    partnership as it facilitates the indirect approach of working through
    and with our Pakistan Military (PAKMIL) partners to achieve mutually
    beneficial counterterrorism goals. U.S. military assistance to Pakistan
    has helped the PAKMIL achieve success in its counterinsurgency efforts.
    Despite recent setbacks in this relationship, it is important that we
    continue to engage our PAKMIL counterparts to reestablish and rebuild
    the relationship and continue achieving these successes.
        Question. Do you believe the current difficulties, including the
    reductions in U.S. trainers, are temporary or lasting?
        Answer. The recent ouster of Special Operations Command (Forward)-
    Pakistan trainers was a significant setback in the overall military-to-
    military relationship in Pakistan. However, I do not believe that this
    event is indicative of the relationships that U.S. and Pakistan
    military leaders have established at the unit levels. I understand
    these relationships are strong, and I believe we should be making every
    attempt to ensure that our tactical and operational level leaders are
    able to maintain these ties however possible. In terms of disagreements
    at the more senior levels, I believe that these can be mended, but it
    will require persistent, patient engagement. It may require reducing
    expectations of the military-to-military relationship in the short
    term, but I do believe that over time the two countries can return to
    more robust levels of military cooperation.

                                      IRAQ

        Question. What are the main ``lessons learned'' from Operation
    Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn as they pertain to Special
    Operations Forces?
        Answer. I believe that the U.S. has learned many lessons through
    current operations. Some of these lessons include: the need to maximize
    combined operations with partner forces, the necessity of culturally
    attuned forces, the need for a unified U.S. Government approach, and
    the need for active and integrated interagency coordination.
        Question. What is your assessment of the security situation in
    Iraq?
        Answer. Although Iraq today is closer to being a stable and secure
    country, I remain mindful of the challenges. The Iraqis are taking
    critical steps to resolve ongoing political issues, but internal
    divisions remain. These issues must be addressed to avoid potential
    conflicts.
        The push for influence by Iran, and the activities of Iranian-
    backed militias that have attacked U.S. forces and the Iraqi people,
    are other issues that Iraq will still need to face. Unlike Iran, the
    United States is working to build a safer and stronger Iraq, and it is
    that shared interest that gives me confidence that the United States
    can build an enduring partnership with the Iraqi Government. I am also
    mindful of al Qaeda's role in Iraq.
        Regardless of DOD's post-2011 role, its civilian mission should be
    focused on helping Iraqis address their issues through a robust and
    representative Iraqi political process, which is the best safeguard
    against a return to violence.
        Question. What is your assessment of the capability of the Iraqi
    security forces? Do you assess that they are capable of conducting
    independent operations throughout the country?
        Answer. Iraq no longer needs large numbers of U.S. forces to
    maintain internal stability. U.S. commanders in the field believe that
    the Iraqi Security Forces are competent at conducting counter-
    insurgency operations, but that the Iraqis will have gaps in their
    ability to defend against external threats and in areas such as
    integrated air defense, intelligence sharing, and logistics.
        Question. Do you believe an enduring military-to-military
    relationship with Iraq is important to the long-term stability of Iraq?
        Answer. Yes. The United States wants a normal, productive
    relationship and close strategic partnership with a sovereign Iraqi
    Government going forward--similar to the partnerships we have with
    other countries in the region and around the world.
        Question. What do you believe to be the threat of al Qaeda to
    security and stability in Iraq?
        Answer. Iraq's security and political situation is improving after
    years of instability that enabled groups such as al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
    to spread chaos and sectarian conflict. AQI continues to be the main
    focus of counterterrorism efforts in Iraq, as it poses a threat not
    only to stability but to remaining U.S. military forces and civilians.
    Iraqi-led counterterrorism operations have dismantled AQI's previous
    senior leadership, but new AQI leaders have assumed control and the
    group continues to conduct high-profile attacks. DOD will continue to
    watch for AQI attempts to reinvigorate its efforts and draw on a still-
    significant network of associates that spans the region and includes
    associates in the United States.

                                     YEMEN

        Question. Prior to the current political crisis in Yemen, the U.S.
    Government had a robust security assistance program to help the Yemeni
    security forces take action against al Qaeda. Some observers, while
    supportive of U.S. security assistance to Yemen, have suggested that
    the problems being confronted by the Government of Yemen cannot simply
    be addressed with the provision of additional security assistance.
        What is your assessment of the security situation in Yemen?
        Answer. The security situation remains tense. Al Qaeda in the
    Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has taken advantage of the instability in
    Yemen, and operates with greater impunity in the most unstable areas
    while attempting to seize and control territory in the south.
        The Yemeni Government has recently made some gains against AQAP in
    the south, driving most of the group out of Zinjibar and removing
    several key leaders from the battlefield. However, the larger political
    instability in Yemen will not be resolved until President Saleh agrees
    to a political transition plan, which he has thus far been unwilling to
    do.
        Question. What criteria would you use in determining whether
    security assistance activities in Yemen should resume?
        Answer. I understand the United States is currently providing some
    modest, non-lethal assistance to Yemeni forces, but DOD is also
    assessing how the United States could resume more robust security
    assistance. This will require greater political stability, which will
    probably require President Saleh to leave power. The United States will
    also need to see an improved security situation that allows U.S.
    personnel to work safely with Yemeni forces. It will be important to
    ensure any partner units have not committed human rights abuses or been
    involved in suppressing the political opposition over these past
    months. Finally, it will be necessary to assess Yemeni willingness to
    employ partner units against AQAP and focus support on those units that
    are most receptive to U.S. assistance and most likely to be used
    against our common adversary.
        Question. Given the current limitations on lethal security
    assistance to the Yemeni counterterrorism forces, what is your
    assessment of the U.S. strategy to counter al Qaeda in the Arabian
    Peninsula?
        Answer. Although resuming capacity building is critical to long-
    term efforts against AQAP, the U.S. strategy goes beyond capacity
    building. I believe a number of important gains against AQAP have been
    made over the past year. DOD continues to collaborate extensively with
    Yemeni forces on operational matters. The United States is closely
    monitoring AQAP and regularly improving understanding of its external
    attack plots. Efforts to counter AQAP's narrative have also helped
    delegitimize the group and discourage its efforts to recruit new
    operatives. The U.S. Government's work on countering threat financing
    has made it more difficult for AQAP to receive funds and to support
    other parts of al Qaeda. Finally, the past year has seen several key
    leaders removed from the battlefield, including Anwar al-Aulaqi.

                                    SOMALIA

        Question. In your view, what should be the U.S. policy towards
    Somalia and what do you believe to be the appropriate role of the DOD
    in support of that policy?
        Answer. U.S. policies toward Somalia should support the Somali
    Transitional Federal Government's and the African Union Mission to
    Somalia's abilities to deliver security and basic services and lay the
    foundation for a stable, functioning government. That is what the
    United States wants to see for the people of Somalia.
        However, Somalia's decades-long lack of governance and sparse
    population make it appealing as a safe haven for al Qaeda. As al Qaeda
    undergoes leadership changes and responds to counterterrorism
    operations in Pakistan, the need to ensure that it does not relocate
    its center of operations to Somalia is critical.
        I understand that DOD's primary mission in the Horn of Africa is to
    build partner-nation capacity in order to promote regional security and
    stability, prevent conflict, and protect U.S. interests. I believe this
    mission is appropriate. I am informed that U.S. Africa Command is
    undertaking a review of East Africa to determine how military efforts
    in the region work in concert with DOD's interagency partners to
    achieve collective regional goals and counter al Qaeda's linkages to
    elements of al Shabaab. DOD's ultimate goal should be a fully
    integrated strategy under which security assistance, capacity building,
    operational collaboration with regional partners, and counterterrorism
    actions which are synchronized to provide the regional security and
    stability that are in the interest of both the United States and our
    regional partners.
        If confirmed, I would work to ensure our strategy is developed as
    part of a coordinated U.S. national security policy towards the Horn of
    Africa, and to determine how DOD can and should best support this
    policy.

                          TERRORISM THREATS IN AFRICA

        Question. Over the course of the last decade, al Qaeda-inspired and
    affiliated groups in Africa have gained strength, leading some to
    express concern about their intent and ability to strike the interests
    of the U.S. and partner nations.
        What is your understanding of U.S. policy with regard to countering
    the threats posed by these groups?
        Answer. In East Africa the U.S. strategy is focused on dismantling
    al Qaeda elements while building the capacity of countries and local
    administrations to serve as countervailing forces to the supporters of
    al Qaeda and the purveyors of instability that enable the transnational
    terrorist threat to persist.
        Al Qaeda elements in East Africa continue to be a primary focus of
    the United States in light of clear indications of their ongoing intent
    to conduct attacks against U.S. facilities and interests abroad. Al
    Qaeda's presence within al Shabaab is increasingly leading that group
    to pose a regional threat with growing trans-regional ties to other al
    Qaeda affiliates.
        U.S.' efforts against al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are
    closely integrated with the broader U.S. regional strategy, especially
    since the long-term eradication of AQIM will not be addressed by
    traditional counterterrorism tools alone. As appropriate, the United
    States will use its counterterrorism tools, weighing the costs and
    benefits of its approach in the context of regional dynamics and
    perceptions and the actions, will, and capabilities of its partners in
    the region--local governments and European allies. I understand that
    the United States will seek to bolster efforts for regional cooperation
    against AQIM, especially among Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger as
    an essential element of our strategy. The United States should also
    continue to work with our interagency and international partners on
    mitigating threats from emergent groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria.
        Question. Do you believe DOD's assets and other resources allocated
    to countering terrorist threats in Africa are adequate to understand
    and respond to the threats posed by these groups?
        Answer. A significant portion of the U.S. counterterrorism effort
    is focused on the Middle East and Afghanistan/Pakistan regions and
    CENTCOM has received the majority of DOD's operational and intelligence
    assets. To address terrorist threats in Africa, I understand we have
    executed an economy of effort. As our Nation's activities in the
    CENTCOM region change, additional assets may be available to address
    U.S. Africa Command's (AFRICOM) needs. Our Special Operations Forces
    will undoubtedly be an integral part of future engagements in Africa
    and will support partner nations in their response to terrorist
    networks working on the continent.

                                    COLOMBIA

        Question. For more than a decade, Colombian security forces have
    worked in partnership with U.S. Special Operations Forces to counter
    security threats. This partnership has helped to enable the Colombians
    to significantly degrade the terrorist organization known as the FARC.
        What do you believe are the primary lessons learned from U.S.
    Special Operations Forces training and advising activities in Colombia?
        Answer. In Colombia, the U.S. military learned the value of playing
    a supporting role, seeking to complement Colombian strategies, rather
    than develop competing ones. DOD's experience in Colombia also prepared
    us to adapt to the changing environment; to recognize and embrace
    opportunities when they presented themselves. DOD has learned that our
    partnerships must constantly evolve from the point where they start, to
    confront and counter threats that are also adapting and changing.
        Question. Are there lessons learned that may apply to U.S. support
    to Mexico and Central America in their efforts to counter the threats
    posed by transnational criminal organizations?
        Answer. Yes. Many of the U.S. Government's lessons learned from our
    experiences in Colombia are currently reflected in our efforts in
    Mexico. Transnational criminal activities, including narcotics
    trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, and arms smuggling, provide
    pathways and opportunities for criminal and terrorist organizations to
    move people and resources across the region. Moreover, effectively
    addressing these transnational criminal threats in Colombia and Mexico
    is critical to addressing security throughout the region, including in
    Central America and along our southwest border.

                          REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

        Question. What is your view of the effectiveness of U.S. assistance
    being provided through the Joint Special Operations Task Force-
    Philippines to the military of the Republic of the Philippines in its
    fight against terrorist groups?
        Answer. Though a great deal of our focus in the Philippines has
    been on countering terrorist groups, U.S. assistance to the Philippines
    has always been, and continues to be, a multi-faceted approach. The
    Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) engages each
    branch of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and Philippine
    National Police (PNP) using appropriate authorities to help build
    capacity and improve the image and professionalism of all elements of
    the AFP and PNP. Examples of successes range from the Department of
    State (DOS)-funded training to improve AFP aviation and maritime
    capabilities to DOD-funded procurement of precision munitions under
    section 1206. DOD has also conducted MISO activities and Civil Affairs
    projects, and has supported DOS-led diplomatic efforts. As a direct
    result of these combined efforts, the capability of the Philippine
    Security Forces has been vastly improved. The Philippine Government has
    become more effective in maintaining the pressure on the key terrorist
    groups.

                     STABILITY AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

        Question. The office of ASD(SO/LIC) is responsible for policy and
    activities concerning stability operations, such as peacekeeping and
    humanitarian assistance.
        If confirmed, what role would you play in the planning and conduct
    of ongoing and future stability operations? What are the major
    challenges in this area and how would you address them?
        Answer. Stability operations are a core mission that DOD must be
    ready to carry out with proficiency equivalent to high-intensity combat
    operations. Although this represents a cultural shift for DOD, they
    understand that all the Military Departments must adequately train,
    organize, and equip forces to conduct such missions. If confirmed, I
    would work with the Secretary, the Chairman, and leadership of the
    Military Departments to ensure that DOD is preparing U.S. forces for
    stability operations.
        Question. From 2000 to 2003, you served as the Assistant Secretary
    General (ASG) for Peacekeeping Operations at the United Nations (U.N.).
    What lessons did you learn from your experience at the U.N. that might
    apply to your work as the ASD(SO/LIC)?
        Answer. My time at the U.N. was invaluable. Much like assuming a
    leadership position at DOD, working as an ASG at the U.N. meant
    learning how to navigate an enormous organization with a culture and a
    bureaucracy all its own, the pressures of competing priorities and
    multiple stakeholders, and managing a large staff and complex
    operations with finite resources. It was a challenging experience, and,
    if confirmed, I look forward to applying it to my new post in SO/LIC.
        Question. Experience in Iraq has underscored the importance of
    planning and training to prepare for the conduct and support of
    stability operations in post-conflict situations.
        In your view, what is the appropriate relationship between DOD and
    other departments of government in the planning and conduct of
    stability and support operations in a post-conflict environment?
        Answer. Ideally, DOD would provide support to other departments and
    agencies such as the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International
    Development, and the Department of Justice in the planning and conduct
    of stability operations. But, when directed, DOD has led stability
    operations activities to establish civil security and control and to
    restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure,
    and deliver humanitarian assistance, and then has transitioned lead
    responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments'
    security forces, and international governmental organizations and non-
    governmental organizations. If confirmed, I would ensure that DOD
    operates within U.S. Government and international structures for
    managing civil-military operations, and would seek to enable the
    deployment and use of civilian capabilities and resources, as directed
    and as appropriate.
        Question. What lessons do you believe the Department has learned
    from the experience of planning and training for post-conflict
    operations in Iraq?
        Answer. I think we need to strengthen the U.S. Government's
    collective ability to plan and train together and be more collaborative
    in designing stabilization and reconstruction activities. I am aware
    that the Department is working with interagency partners to identify
    areas where they can improve planning efforts.
        Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign
    Affairs (July 29, 2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the
    U.N., stated that the United States ``is willing to consider directly
    contributing more military observers, military staff officers, civilian
    police, and other civilian personnel--including more women I should
    note--to U.N. peacekeeping operations.''
        What is your view on whether the United States should contribute
    additional military personnel to both staff positions and military
    observers in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?
        Answer. In general, I would support additional contributions of
    personnel to staff officer positions, provided that they are positions
    that would add significant value to the mission, and that the mission
    is a strategic priority for the United States.
        Question. What are the advantages and disadvantages of contributing
    additional military personnel to U.N. operations?
        Answer. There are several potential advantages to contributing
    additional military personnel to U.N. missions: the opportunity to
    shape these missions from the inside; professional development
    opportunities for servicemembers to serve in a joint, multi-lateral
    environment; and the benefit of receiving real-time information and
    insights on emerging threats and crises from places where there might
    not otherwise be a U.S. presence. It also enables an increased
    professional interaction by U.S. servicemembers with numerous partner
    nations' servicemembers, with whom we may not normally have the
    opportunity to serve.
        The potential disadvantage of providing additional military
    personnel is the additional demands these assignments would impose on a
    U.S. military force that has seen extensive deployments in recent years
    and is still heavily engaged in overseas operations. I do not believe
    the United States will be in a position to provide significant numbers
    of military personnel to peacekeeping missions anytime in the
    foreseeable future. However, I believe the selective placement of even
    modest numbers of U.S. military personnel in addition to the fewer than
    30 currently assigned to U.N. operations can have a significant,
    positive, impact on U.N. peacekeeping operations.
        Question. If confirmed, would you support identifying methods
    through which the DOD personnel system could be more responsive to
    requests for personnel support from multilateral institutions like the
    U.N.?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would support exploring ways that DOD could
    more quickly respond to requests for personnel support, bearing in mind
    applicable legal requirements and the current operational tempo of U.S.
    forces.
        Question. DOD has provided logistics, communications, and
    headquarters staff to a variety of United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping
    missions over the past decade.
        In your view, beyond providing key personnel and observers, what
    support, if any, should DOD provide to multilateral peacekeeping
    missions?
        Answer. The Department already provides support to multilateral
    peacekeeping missions beyond personnel and observers. For example, the
    combatant commands implement roughly half of all Global Peace
    Operations Initiative activities, and many troop contributor countries
    also benefit from inclusion in the regional Combatant Commands'
    regional peacekeeping exercises. The Army's Peacekeeping and Stability
    Operations Institute is involved in a number of efforts to improve
    international peacekeeping. Additional support might also be possible,
    but DOD will need to balance increase support for peacekeeping with
    other operational requirements.
        Question. In 2005, the United States along with our partners in the
    G-8 launched the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) to train
    peacekeepers. This program is run by the Department of State. DOD has
    provided varying degrees of support since the program's inception.
        What are your views on the GPOI program?
        Answer. I fully support the GPOI program. GPOI is not only a
    successful capacity-building program, but it is also a great example of
    a DOD-State Department partnership.
        GPOI's efforts are especially needed now as the demands on U.N.
    peacekeeping are great and missions continue to increase in scope and
    complexity.
        Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role of the DOD in
    this program and, more generally, in the training of peacekeepers?
        In general, peacekeeping training should be done by the military to
    the extent possible.
        As previously mentioned, the combatant commands already implement
    roughly half of all GPOI activities, and include peacekeeping
    contributor countries in their regional peacekeeping exercises.
        The State Partnership Program has also taken a role in peacekeeping
    training, partnering with contingents readying to deploy to U.N.
    peacekeeping missions.

                           INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION

        Question. The collaboration between U.S. Special Operations Forces,
    general purpose forces, and other U.S. Government departments and
    agencies has played a significant role in the success of
    counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in recent years.
    However, much of this collaboration has been ad hoc in nature.
        What do you believe are the most important lessons learned from the
    collaborative interagency efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere?
        Answer. Our Nation has learned many hard lessons about the
    importance of whole-of-government approaches in counterinsurgency and
    counterterrorism operations over the past several years. One of the
    most important lessons of our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq is
    that success in counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and post-conflict
    stability operations depends upon the integrated efforts of both
    civilian and military organizations in all phases of an operation, from
    planning through execution. Sustainable outcomes require civilian
    development and governance experts who can help build local civilian
    capacity. I understand that DOD supports the lead by other departments
    and agencies such as State, Justice, and USAID in areas such as
    fostering political reconciliation, building accountable institutions
    of government, restoring public infrastructure, and reviving economic
    activity, so that DOD can focus on providing a safe and secure
    environment and assist in building accountable armed forces. If
    confirmed, I will continue efforts to ensure that interagency
    collaboration is as robust and effective as possible.
        Question. How do you believe these efforts can be improved?
        Answer. I believe interagency collaboration can be improved by
    continuing to ensure that the U.S. military plans and trains with our
    civilian counterparts, and is prepared to operate effectively in all
    phases of conflict, including post-conflict reconstruction and
    stabilization. In addition, improving the interagency planning process
    would ensure that optimal use is made of all national instruments of
    statecraft, while also enhancing the ability to conduct comprehensive
    assessments, analyses, planning, and execution of whole-of-government
    operations. I understand a 3D (Development, Diplomacy, and Defense)
    planning group is underway as one method of reviewing and improving
    interagency planning and coordination efforts. Robust civilian
    capabilities are critical to realizing any improvements in interagency
    efforts and implementation of best practices for future operations.
        Question. Should these informal and ad hoc arrangements be made
    more formal (i.e. through legislation, DOD Directives or Instructions,
    etc . . . ) or is their ad hoc nature the reason for their success?
        Answer. I note that DOD policy states that ``integrated civilian
    and military efforts are essential to the conduct of stability
    operations.'' The same policy states that the Department shall support,
    collaborate with, and assist other U.S. Government departments and
    agencies to plan, prepare for, and conduct stability operations.
    Although I have not studied this issue in detail, I believe we should
    build on the working relationships developed as a result of experience
    in Afghanistan and Iraq in order to improve interagency cooperation,
    interoperability, and unity of effort. If confirmed, I will be open to
    the advice of others on this issue.

                             TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

        Question. Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act
    for Fiscal Year 2006 provides that no individual in the custody or
    under the physical control of the U.S. Government, regardless of
    nationality or physical location shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or
    degrading treatment or punishment.
        In your view, is the prohibition in the best interest of the United
    States? Why or why not?
        Answer. Yes, this prohibition helps to ensure that individuals in
    the custody of U.S. forces are treated humanely consistent with the
    applicable U.S. laws and the laws governing armed conflicts. To treat
    individuals in our custody otherwise could increase the chances that
    U.S. servicemembers will be treated inhumanely should they be captured
    by enemy forces.
        Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
    specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
    22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
    Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Section 2441 of title 18, U.S.C., as amended by the
    Military Commissions Act of 2006, defines grave breaches of common
    Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, including torture and cruel and
    inhuman treatment.
        Do you believe it is consistent with effective counterinsurgency
    operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of
    Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that our Special
    Operations Forces comply with the standards in the Army Field Manual,
    the DOD Directive, and applicable requirements of U.S. and
    international law regarding detention and interrogation operations?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that all U.S. Special
    Operations Forces continue to receive the necessary education and
    training in the standards established in the Army Field Manual,
    relevant DOD Directives, and other applicable requirements of U.S. and
    international law regarding detention and interrogation operations.
        Question. What steps, if any, would you take to ensure that those
    foreign forces trained by our Special Operations Forces understand the
    necessity of complying with the Geneva Conventions when detaining and
    interrogating individuals?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that our Special
    Operations Forces continue to stress in our training operations with
    foreign forces the importance of complying with the Geneva Conventions
    when detaining and interrogating individuals.

                   SPECIAL OPERATIONS PERSONNEL IN EMBASSIES

        Question. SOCOM deploys personnel to work with country teams in a
    number of priority countries where the United States is not engaged in
    direct action operations, but rather trying to counter the spread of
    violent extremism. Their mission is to support the priorities of the
    ambassador and the combatant commander's theater campaign plan against
    terrorist networks. At times, ambassadors have expressed concern that
    they have not been adequately informed of activities by Special
    Operations Forces in their country.
        Are you aware of these concerns?
        Answer. Yes. However, no significant concerns have been raised in
    recent years that I am aware of.
        Question. If confirmed, what do you intend to do to make sure the
    goals of special operations personnel deployed to these countries are
    aligned closely with those of the Ambassadors they are working with?
        Please describe the value of these special operations personnel to
    their respective Geographic Combatant Commands and the country teams
    they are supporting.
        Answer. The partnership among our geographic combatant commanders,
    ambassadors overseas, embassy country teams, and forward deployed
    Special Operations Forces has been strong throughout the past 10 years,
    even in view of the few isolated incidents where coordination could
    have been better. If confirmed, a priority of mine will be to continue
    working with Admiral McRaven, the Geographic Combatant Commanders, and
    State Department colleagues to strengthen these trusted partnerships
    further.

                        DOD COUNTERNARCOTICS ACTIVITIES

        Question. DOD serves as the single lead agency for the detection
    and monitoring of aerial and maritime foreign shipments of drugs
    flowing toward the United States. On an annual basis, DOD's
    counternarcotics (CN) program expends approximately $1.5 billion to
    support the Department's CN operations, including to build the capacity
    of Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies, and certain
    foreign governments, and provide intelligence support on CN-related
    matters and a variety of other unique enabling capabilities.
        In your view, what is the appropriate role of DOD in U.S.
    counterdrug efforts?
        Answer. In my view, DOD should continue to play an important role
    in U.S. counterdrug efforts in support of the National Security
    Strategy, the National Drug Control Strategy, and the Strategy to
    Combat Transnational Organized Crime. In addition to being the
    statutory lead agency for the detection and monitoring of drug
    trafficking bound for the United States, DOD provides critical
    counterdrug support to supporting State, local, Federal, and foreign
    law enforcement partners. The enemies America faces on the battlefield
    today are increasingly financed through non-traditional means,
    including through drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime.
    Just as DOD has long been focused on how traditional, State-funded
    adversaries are supported, the U.S. must use all of the tools at its
    disposal to attack the sources of revenue that support the asymmetrical
    threat the U.S. faces today and is likely to face for the foreseeable
    future. Transnational organized crime contributes to global instability
    by undermining legitimate government institutions, fostering
    corruption, and distorting legitimate economic activity. DOD's efforts
    to build the counternarcotics capacity of partner nation security
    forces serve to prevent and deter broader conflicts that could require
    a much more costly military intervention in the future.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD CN
    program?
        Answer. I have not yet had the opportunity to evaluate the
    effectiveness of the CN program. Based on my past experience, however,
    I fully recognize the importance of DOD counterdrug activities,
    including as the statutory lead agency for aerial and maritime
    detection and monitoring of drugs bound for the United States, DOD's
    activities in support of the warfighter in Afghanistan, and other areas
    of national security interest such as Mexico and Colombia. I also
    believe that DOD CN authorities are extremely useful tools that fit
    well into the current construct of the ASD for SO/LIC. If confirmed, I
    look forward to ensuring that these activities are given their
    appropriate level of attention and oversight, and to ensure that they
    are as cost-effective as possible.
        Question. What is your assessment of the ongoing efforts of the
    United States to reduce the amount of illegal narcotics entering into
    the United States?
        Answer. As outlined in the National Drug Control Strategy, the
    counterdrug efforts of the United States and partner nations have
    achieved major and sustained progress against cocaine use and
    distribution throughout the Western Hemisphere. These efforts have had
    an impact on both the demand and supply side of the cocaine threat as
    evidenced by declining border seizures, increased street price, falling
    cocaine retail purity, and sharply decreased domestic cocaine
    consumption. DOD support, such as the establishment of Joint
    Interagency Task Force-South and support to Plan Colombia, has played a
    critical role in this whole-of-government effort by bringing unique
    military capabilities and expertise to enhance the capability of our
    law enforcement partners.
        Question. In your view, what should be the role of the United
    States in countering the flow of narcotics to nations other than the
    United States?
        Answer. Confronting the threat of drugs bound for the United States
    should continue to be a high priority, but we cannot afford to turn a
    blind eye to drug trafficking that is not directly bound for the United
    States. Drug trafficking is by far the world's most lucrative illicit
    activity and therefore is used as a source of revenue by terrorists,
    insurgents, and other threats to national security. The vast illicit
    proceeds of drug trafficking can also contribute to instability in
    affected countries, particularly in smaller, more vulnerable countries
    along key transit routes as we are seeing today in Central America and
    West Africa. The national security implications of drug trafficking
    necessitate our close attention--even when the drugs are not bound
    directly for the United States.
        Question. Criminal networks are not only expanding their
    operations, but they are also diversifying their activities, resulting
    in a convergence of transnational threats that has evolved to become
    more complex, volatile, and destabilizing. In July 2011, the President
    released his Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime:
    Addressing Converging Threats to National Security. One of the priority
    action areas designating in the strategy is ``enhancing DOD support to
    U.S. law enforcement''.
        What is your understanding of the President's strategy to combat
    transnational criminal organizations?
        Answer. The President's strategy declares that transnational
    organized crime is a threat to national and international security. It
    calls on the U.S. Government to build, balance, and integrate the tools
    of national power to combat transnational organized crime and related
    threats to national security. The strategy calls for integrated, whole-
    of-government approaches to transnational organized crime. Importantly,
    the President's strategy addresses drug trafficking and transnational
    organized crime as increasingly intertwined threats. The fact that
    transnational organized crime poses a national security threat beyond
    that of illegal narcotics and requires integrated interagency responses
    means that DOD must ensure that it is organized, resourced, and
    appropriately authorized to provide vital support to law enforcement
    and foreign partners against transnational organized crime. DOD is not
    in the lead against transnational organized crime, but it provides
    unique and critically important support in efforts to combat the
    manifestations of transnational organized crime that threaten national
    security.
        Question. What kind of additional support, if any, would you
    envision DOD providing to U.S. law enforcement--either in the United
    States or in support of U.S. law enforcement operations abroad?
        Answer. It is important that DOD's unique supporting capabilities--
    from military intelligence support to counter-threat finance support--
    be available to support U.S. law enforcement at home and abroad. If
    confirmed, I will examine whether additional forms of such support are
    needed.
        Question. DOD and the Intelligence Community have determined that
    some terrorist organizations are beginning to rely more heavily on
    producing and trafficking narcotics to fund their operations.
        In your view, what role, if any, should DOD have in broader U.S.
    Government efforts to combat the nexus between narcotics and terrorism?
    Should DOD be the lead agency?
        Answer. DOD should continue to provide a range of support to law
    enforcement, the broader interagency, and foreign partner nations as
    part of integrated efforts to combat the narcotics-terrorism nexus.
    Support includes military intelligence support to law enforcement,
    counter threat finance support, military-to-military capability
    development, and operational activities against threats to the United
    States.
        DOD should not assume the role of lead agency in combating the
    drug-terror nexus. In some cases, DOD might be the operational lead in
    actions to degrade a specific threat related to the narcotics-terrorism
    nexus, but, in general, the Department should focus on remaining ready
    to deploy our unique capabilities as part of coordinated U.S.
    Government approaches against this nexus. It is also important to note
    that the nexus is broader than just drugs and terrorism--it often
    manifests as a crime-terror-insurgent nexus, in which a range of
    illicit activities undertaken by networks of criminals merge with, or
    are exploited by, violent, politically-motivated groups.

                             COUNTER THREAT FINANCE

        Question. A number of officials in DOD and the Intelligence
    Community have called for investing additional resources in identifying
    and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorist networks and
    illicit trafficking.
        What are your views on the role of DOD in counter threat finance
    activities?
        Answer. Terrorists, drug traffickers, and other adversaries rely
    heavily on legal and illegal funding sources to support their
    activities, which routinely work against U.S. interests. In my view, it
    is critical to engage all U.S. Government tools to track and halt the
    flow of money associated with these organizations. It is my
    understanding that DOD has a capability, working with its interagency
    counterparts in both Iraq and Afghanistan, to identify and disrupt our
    adversaries' finances. Although DOD is not the U.S. Government lead
    agency in counter-threat finance, it plays a supportive role by working
    with other departments and agencies, and with partner nations, to fight
    our adversaries' ability to use global financial networks.
        Question. What do you believe is the appropriate role, if any, of
    SOCOM in supporting counter threat finance activities?
        Answer. I believe SOCOM plays a critical role in the field of
    counter-threat finance, and should continue to pursue activities, as
    appropriate, with interagency partners in identifying and disrupting
    threat-finance networks. This involves synchronizing DOD counter-threat
    finance activities and integrating them into broader counter-network
    planning and operations.
        Question. In your view, should DOD seek to expand its support to
    other U.S. Government departments and agencies conducting counter
    threat finance activities (such as Department of Treasury, Drug
    Enforcement Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation)?
        Answer. I believe that DOD should increase its cooperation with
    U.S. law enforcement agencies, the Department of the Treasury, the
    intelligence community, and Department of State to target and degrade
    our adversaries' funding sources where necessary and possible. DOD
    Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Policy provides that DOD should work with
    other U.S. Government departments and agencies and with partner nations
    to deny and disrupt, or defeat and degrade, adversaries' ability to use
    global licit and illicit financial networks to affect U.S. interests
    negatively. Greater cooperation would yield an enhanced ability to
    target our adversaries' vulnerabilities using a whole-of-government
    approach, including interdiction, sanctions, and other law enforcement
    actions.

                          COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

        Question. Over the past few years, DOD has funded a growing number
    of MISOs and influence programs under the rubric of strategic
    communications programs. While the Department does not have any
    separate documentation outlining these activities, the Government
    Accountability Office reports that DOD ``spent hundreds of millions of
    dollars each year'' to support these operations, including initiatives
    funded by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization,
    the geographic combatant commands, and SOCOM.
        What are your views on DOD's strategic communications, MISOs and
    other influence programs, and their integration into overall U.S.
    foreign policy objectives?
        Answer. Operating in an information environment is a critical
    component of military operations. DOD's information and influence
    activities support military objectives established by Combatant
    Commanders, which in turn support the National Military Strategy. U.S.
    military objectives, by design, support U.S. foreign policy objectives.
    Recent changes to how DOD oversees, organizes, and employs Information
    Operations have resulted in significant improvements in the management
    and accountability of these activities. DOD recognizes the challenges
    of evaluating the effectiveness of these operations in the short-term
    and has placed an emphasis on better evaluating these activities.
        Question. In 2005, al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri declared that
    ``We are in a battle, and more than half of it is taking place in the
    battlefield of the media.'' Many observers have criticized the lack of
    a U.S. strategy to counter radical ideologies that foment violence.
        As ASD(SO/LIC), how would you seek to further DOD's strategic
    appreciation of the ideological basis of al Qaeda, its affiliates, and
    other non-state actors?
        Answer. DOD's global presence means our forces often come face-to-
    face with radical ideologies and the violence propagated by Islamist
    extremists. Therefore, DOD personnel are in an ideal position to
    contribute to U.S. Government efforts to counter the extremist
    messages. DOD seeks to reduce support for al Qaeda, its affiliates, and
    adherents by engaging foreign local populations, countering adversarial
    propaganda, and developing relationships with key leaders and credible
    local interlocutors across the globe.
        Question. In your view, how do we counter radical ideologies that
    foment violence?
        Answer. In my view, the efforts of the U.S. Government to counter
    radical ideologies that foment violence must be persistent and long-
    term, and should be developed in a way that will shape and support
    collaborative regional security initiatives. DOD participates in, and
    often provides support to, several interagency efforts to counter
    violent extremism. DOD works closely with State, the Central
    Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Counterterrorism Center, and
    others, to deconflict operations and realize efficiencies.

                           BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

        Question. In the past few years, Congress has provided DOD a number
    of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner
    nations.
        In your view, what are our strategic objectives in building the
    capacities of partner nations?
        Answer. DOD's primary objective in building the capacity of foreign
    partners should continue to be to help them develop effective and
    legitimate security institutions that can provide for their countries'
    internal security, and contribute to regional and multilateral
    responses to threats and instability. This, in turn, mitigates the
    burden on U.S. forces responding to security threats outside the United
    States and promotes interoperability between U.S. and partner forces.
        Question. In light of demands for defense budget cuts, how would
    you assess the trade-offs between providing funding for U.S. military
    forces and providing assistance to build the capacity of partner
    nations' security forces?
        Answer. The energy and resources devoted to building partner
    capacity contribute directly to country, regional, and global security
    and better enable our partners to provide for their own security needs.
    Even modest military and security capabilities may prevent or help
    manage conflict so that the United States and its allies and partners
    are not called to intervene in a much larger conflagration at great
    cost to the United States and U.S. forces. Cooperation through security
    capacity-building efforts ensures a relationship and interoperability
    with ready partners able to participate competently in coalition or
    collaborative operations. Building partner capacity in like-minded
    partners will mean less demand on U.S. forces to lead military
    operations, enabling the United States instead to work with and through
    our partners to meet common security challenges.
        Question. What is your understanding of the purpose of the section
    1206 train and equip authority? What is your assessment of the
    implementation of the global train and equip program?
        Answer. This authority has two discrete purposes outlined in law:
    to build a partner's national military or maritime security forces'
    capacity either to: (1) conduct counterterrorist operations, or (2)
    conduct or support stability operations where U.S. forces are
    participating.
        I have not been involved in the implementation of section 1206, but
    I understand the Department has begun an in-depth assessment of the
    effectiveness of section 1206 programs. If confirmed, I will ensure the
    authority is used in keeping with the intent of the authority and that
    it produces the intended security outcomes. I will also look forward to
    sharing the results of the ongoing assessment effort with Congress, and
    specifically this committee. As I understand it, section 1206 to date
    has enthusiastic support from embassies and combatant commanders, and
    reflects close collaboration between the Department of State and the
    Pentagon.
        Question. What is the relationship of the train and equip authority
    to other security assistance authorities, such as counternarcotics
    assistance, foreign military financing, and other title 22 authorities?
    What should be done to ensure that the global train and equip authority
    does not duplicate the efforts of these other assistance programs?
        Answer. It is critical that duplication of effort among these
    activities be avoided. If confirmed, I will do everything I can to
    deconflict among them.
        The Global Train and Equip (section 1206) authority fills two
    specific legal requirements: to build capacity for counterterrorism
    operations and stability operations where U.S. forces are a
    participant. Counternarcotics authorities are focused on providing DOD
    the ability to support U.S. or other government efforts to counter the
    flow of narcotics globally. If confirmed, both section 1206 and
    counternarcotics authorities will be under my purview, and I will
    monitor their implementation to ensure they continue to be used
    appropriately, and in keeping with their intent.
        Foreign Military Financing serves broad foreign policy objectives
    such as improving bilateral relations, encouraging behavior in the U.S.
    interest, increasing access and influence, and building capacity
    particularly where host-nation and U.S. interests align. As I
    understand it, the close collaboration between DOD and the State
    Department on the development, selection, and approval of section 1206
    program ensures we make the best use of available authorities.

                            COUNTERPIRACY OPERATIONS

        Question. Since January 2009, the U.S. Navy has been patrolling the
    waters of the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia as part of the
    international coalition engaged in counterpiracy operations. The Office
    of ASD(SO/LIC) leads the Department's policy and coordination efforts
    relating to counterpiracy operations.
        What is your understanding and assessment of the Department's
    ongoing counter piracy and counter piracy support operations?
        Answer. I understand that U.S. naval forces participate in Combined
    Task Force 151, a multinational counterpiracy task force established in
    January 2009, and in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO)
    Operation Ocean Shield. On average, there are three to four U.S. Navy
    ships supporting both of these task forces on a daily basis. Since
    2008, DOD has provided surface combatants (including helicopters and
    boarding teams), replenishment ships, P-3C maritime patrol and
    reconnaissance aircraft, communications support, and command staff in
    support of counterpiracy operations.
        Somali pirate operations have become more lucrative over the last 3
    years, demonstrating success as a business model. Despite the expansion
    of the piracy enterprise, there is still an overwhelming lack of
    judicial capacity in the region.
        The U.S. Government has focused on encouraging the use of Best
    Management Practices (BMPs) and Privately Contracted Armed Security
    Personnel (PCASP) in its outreach to industry, which DOD strongly
    supports. To date, ships that employ BMPs and armed security have a 100
    percent success rate in countering pirate attacks, strategically
    diminishing the pirates' success rate.
        Question. What do you believe to be the appropriate role of DOD in
    countering the threat posed by piracy?
        Answer. I believe that DOD should continue to support the National
    Security Council's ``Action Plan'' for countering piracy off the Horn
    of Africa by interrupting and terminating acts of piracy. Furthermore,
    DOD should continue to remain engaged with the international ``Contact
    Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia'' on numerous initiatives
    related to military operations, industry outreach, public diplomacy,
    legal issues, and supporting the Departments of State and Treasury in
    their efforts to make piracy less lucrative.
        Countering piracy in the region must be a shared responsibility
    with the maritime shipping industry--the first line of defense against
    pirates. The single most effective way to deter piracy is to ensure
    vessels follow BMPs and employ armed security personnel.
        The root causes of Somali piracy lie in the poverty and instability
    of Somalia. I believe that the solution to piracy does not lie in
    committing additional naval forces. Rather, addressing the problem
    depends on progress in restoring Somalia from a failed state to a
    functioning one.
        Question. Some have argued for kinetic operations against the
    network of pirates that operate in Somalia. Others argue that the
    threat of piracy is primarily a law enforcement issue and should be
    dealt with by civilian agencies.
        What is your assessment of these two views and what do you believe
    to be the most effective approach?
        Answer. I have also heard about both proposals. If confirmed, I
    look forward to learning more about these proposals, and would weigh
    the implications before deciding what I believe would be the most
    effective approach.

                                 CRUSH THE CELL

        Question. In 2008, you published a book called ``Crush the Cell:
    How to Defeat Terrorism without Terrorizing Ourselves.''
        In your book, you state that U.S. counterterror policy should focus
    on ``strategic terrorism'' which you define as ``the capability to
    sustain multiple conventional attacks over time, or develop and deploy
    a single catastrophic attack with a weapon of mass destruction.''
        In your view, what terrorist organizations are strategic
    terrorists?
        Answer. I would define al Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents as
    a strategic terrorist organization.
        Question. Do you believe the National Counterterrorism Strategy is
    appropriately focused on only those organizations that pose a
    ``strategic terrorist'' threat to the United States and our interests?
        Answer. I believe the National Strategy for Counterterrorism is
    appropriately focused on the preeminent security threat to the United
    States--namely al Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents. The Strategy
    also rightly ensures we remain committed to working vigorously and
    effectively to counter the efforts and activities of other foreign and
    domestic terrorists, even as we are careful to avoid conflating them
    with al Qaeda into a single enemy.
        Question. Your book is critical of Congress for creating the
    National Counterterrorism Center, Department of Homeland Security and
    the Office of the Director of National Intelligence following September
    11. You state, ``I'm convinced we could have fought this war with no
    budget increase, just a shifting of funds to counterterrorism and a new
    focus on the problem.''
        Do you still hold these views today? Why or why not?
        Answer. I was not in favor of creating new Federal bureaucracies
    after September 11. However, at this point, I would not reverse course.
        In terms of budget, I have long believed that the Federal
    Government should find off-sets for new, higher-priority missions
    whenever possible.
        Question. Your book includes a discussion of the effectiveness of
    U.S. military and intelligence personnel partnering with host nation
    personnel to conduct counterterrorism operations. You state, ``By
    working closely with foreign units, we may be able to reduce human
    rights violations associated with these operations. But if we want to
    get things done, sometimes we must work in conjunction with tough
    organizations with spotty human rights records.''
        Do you still hold these views today? Why or why not?
        Answer. When I was in the Federal Government, we were restricted
    from working with some key agencies in the Middle East and other parts
    of the world. I believe this was shortsighted, as working with them
    exposes them to operational tactics that are both more effective and
    based on protecting civilians. It is still true that many foreign
    police and intelligence agencies do not uphold the highest standards of
    human rights, but I believe we should engage both to improve their
    record and be effective in fighting terrorists--the two goals can and
    should be compatible. Of course, such engagement is currently
    restricted by law in many circumstances, and I would take care to
    oversee compliance with applicable law in contemplating any such
    engagement.
        Question. Your book expresses concern about the risk averse nature
    of senior commanders, bureaucratic decisionmaking, and separation of
    intelligence and operational functions as they relate to U.S.
    counterterrorism operations. To help solve these issues, you recommend
    that a single organization, either DOD or CIA, be assigned
    responsibility for ``special operations'' to combat terrorism. This
    recommendation echoes one made by the 9/11 Commission that lead
    responsibility for all clandestine and covert paramilitary operations
    be assigned to DOD.
        Do you still hold these views today? Why or why not?
        Answer. I wrote this 5 years ago, and much has changed. If
    confirmed, I will have the opportunity to evaluate our current
    decisionmaking process closely. I am open-minded and not sure I still
    hold those views.

                            CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

        Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
    appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
    briefings, and other communications of information.
        Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee and
    other appropriate committees of Congress?
        Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will appear before this committee and
    other appropriate committees of Congress when called upon to do so.
        Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
    committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
    information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
    with respect to your responsibilities as the ASD(SO/LIC)?
        Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will provide this committee or members
    of this committee accurate and appropriate information to the best of
    my ability when called upon to do so.
        Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
    other communications of information are provided to this committee and
    its staff and other appropriate committees?
        Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will provide the necessary information
    to this committee and other appropriate committees and their staff when
    asked to do so.
        Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
    such documents?
        Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will provide the committee the
    necessary documents when appropriate and will consult with the
    committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in
    providing documents.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Scott P. Brown

                            SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES

        1. Senator Brown. Ambassador Sheehan, last spring Admiral Olson
    testified that our Special Operations Forces (SOF) are ``fraying at the
    edges''. The current fight's high demand for SOF and its relatively
    small size has placed strain on our most elite fighting force. With the
    continuing budget cuts affecting all aspects of the military and with
    the military as a whole downsizing in troop end strength are you
    concerned about the future of our SOF?
        Mr. Sheehan. If confirmed as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Special Operations Forces and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)), I
    would place the highest priority on addressing the U.S. Special
    Operations Command (SOCOM) commander's concerns about the demand on the
    force. I would also staunchly advocate preserving programmed SOF growth
    to ensure SOCOM is sized to the current and future demand. This would
    include ensuring that SOF are resourced at a level that supports a
    sustainable rotation model that provides time in between deployments
    for reset, special skills training, professional development, and
    appropriate predeployment training.

        2. Senator Brown. Ambassador Sheehan, do you believe that our SOF
    will be able to grow at a rate of 3 to 5 percent per year that is
    currently projected?
        Mr. Sheehan. Although I have not seen the details of the current
    SOF growth plan, my general sense is that the Department has done an
    excellent job improving quality while also growing the force over the
    past 10 years. An average growth rate of 3 to 5 percent per year sounds
    reasonable to me, but I know from my own experience that this will vary
    across the force given varying complexity of skills and functions
    within the special operations community. Our core principle must be not
    to sacrifice quality for quantity as we grow and sustain SOF; and if
    confirmed as ASD(SO/LIC), I will work closely with the SOCOM commander
    to ensure our SOF accession programs are resourced and managed
    accordingly.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Michael A. Sheehan follows:]
                        Nomination Reference and Report
                               As In Executive Session,
                                   Senate of the United States,
                                                      November 1, 2011.
        Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
    on Armed Services:
        Michael A. Sheehan, of New Jersey, to be an Assistant Secretary of
    Defense, vice Michael G. Vickers.
                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of Michael A. Sheehan, which was
    transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
    referred, follows:]
                   Biographical Sketch of Michael A. Sheehan
    Education:
             U.S. Military Academy

                     1973-1977 (BS, 1977)

             Georgetown University School of Foreign Service

                     1986-1988 (MSFS, 1988)

             Army Command and General Staff College

                     (MA 1991-1992)
    Employment Record:
             Terrorism Analyst, NBC News

                     2006 to Current

             CEO and Partner, Lexington Security Group, LLC

                     2007 to 2011

             Partner, Torch Hill Equity Partners

                     2006 to Current
                     Private equity firm (I have been unpaid and
                    inactive in the past year)

             Fellow, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY

                     2006 to Current

             Fellow (for counterterrorism), NYU Center for Law and
            Security

                     2006 to Current

             Executive Director, Madison Policy Forum

                     2009 to Current

             Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism, NYPD

                     2003 to 2006

             Assistant Secretary General, U.N. Department of
            Peacekeeping Operations (In charge of logistics, budgets, and
            personnel for U.N. peacekeeping operations)

                     2001 to 2003
    Honors and Awards:
             Fellow: NYU Center for Law and Security (2006 to
            Current)
             Fellow: Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY
            (2006 to Current)
             U.S. Army Awards: Airborne (1975), Ranger (1978),
            Special Forces (1979), Combat Infantry Badge (for service in
            1985, 1986)
             Selected/Graduated from Colombian Special Forces
            School, Lancero (1980)
                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
    nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by Michael A.
    Sheehan in connection with his nomination follows:]

                              UNITED STATES SENATE
                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                                  Room SR-228
                           Washington, DC 20510-6050
                                 (202) 224-3871
                        COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
          BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

        Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
    more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
    form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
    of your answer applies.
                        Part A--Biographical Information
        Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
    this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
    public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
    any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

        1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
        Michael A. Sheehan.

        2. Position to which nominated:
        Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity
    Conflict (SO/LIC) and Interdependent Capabilities.

        3. Date of nomination:
        1 November 2011.

        4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
        [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
    committee's executive files.]

        5. Date and place of birth:
        10 February 1955; Red Bank, NJ.

        6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
        Married to Sita G. Vasan.

        7. Names and ages of children:
        Alexandra Eitel Sheehan, 20.
        Michael Vasan Sheehan, 8.

        8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
    dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
        Christian Brothers Academy High School (1972-1973).
        U.S. Military Academy, 1973-1977 (BS, 1977).
        Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, 1986-1988 (MSFS,
    1988).
        Army Command and General Staff College (MA 1991-1992).

        9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
    last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
    job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
        Terrorism Analyst, NBC News (2006 to Current), 30 Rockefeller
    Center, New York, NY.
        CEO and Partner, Lexington Security Group, LLC (2007-2011), 645
    Madison Ave., 16th Floor, New York, NY.
        Partner, Torch Hill Equity Partners (2006 to Current), Private
    equity firm (I have been unpaid and inactive in the past year), 2000
    Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 5100, Washington, DC.
        Fellow, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, (2006 to
    Current), U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY.
        Fellow (for counterterrorism), NYU Center for Law and Security
    (2006 to Current), 139 MacDougal Street, 4th Floor, New York, NY.
        Executive Director, Madison Policy Forum (2009 to current), 645
    Madison Ave., New York, NY.
        Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism, NYPD (2003 to 2006), New
    York City Police Department, One Police Plaza, New York, NY.
        Assistant Secretary General, U.N. Dept of Peacekeeping Operations
    (2001-2003), In charge of logistics, budgets, and personnel for U.N.
    peacekeeping operations, The United Nations, One U.N. Plaza, New York,
    NY.

        10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
    honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
    or local governments, other than those listed above.
        Member, Senior Advisory Group for the Director of National
    Intelligence (2008-2010).
        Coordinator for Counterterrorism. with the rank and status of
    Ambassador-at-Large. U.S. Department of State, 1998-2000, Acting 1998-
    1999. Confirmed 1999-2000.
        Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Organizations
    Affairs, Department of State (1997-1998).
        Director of Global Issues (peacekeeping, counternarcotics, low
    intensity conflict), National Security Council (1995-1997).
        Special Counselor to U.S. Permanent Representative. U.S. Mission to
    the United Nations (1993-1995).
        Director. International Programs and Intelligence Analyst. National
    Security Council (1989-1993).
        Lieutenant Colonel. U.S. Army Special Forces (1977-1997).

        11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
    officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
    or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
    business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
        Partner. Torch Hill Equity Partners (2006 to Current).
        Periodic consultancy on international police and counterterrorism
    issues with the following organizations (All inactive except as noted):

              Boeing
              Lockheed-PAE (Active-termination in progress) UAE, Ministry
            of Interior
              AAR Corporation
              Pacific Architect and Engineers
              CTC (Active-termination in progress)
              NBC (Active-termination in progress)

        12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
    professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
    other organizations.
        Special Forces Association (1980-present).
        International Association of Chiefs of Police (2004-present).
        Council of Foreign Relations (1997-present).
        Veterans of Foreign Wars (1999-present).

        13. Political affiliations and activities:
        (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
    any public office for which you have been a candidate.
        None.
        (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
    to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
    years.
        None.
        (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
    organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
    entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
        None.

        14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
    society memberships, military medals, and any other special
    recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
        Fellow: NYU Center for Law and Security (2006 to Current).
        Fellow: Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY (2006 to
    Current).
        U.S. Army Awards: Airborne (1975), Ranger (1978), Special Forces
    (1979),
        Combat Infantry Badge (for service in 1985, 1986).
        Selected/Graduated from Colombian Special Forces School, Lancero
    (1980).

        15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
    books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
    written.
        Crush the Cell: How to Defeat Terrorism Without Terrorizing
    Ourselves, Michael A. Sheehan; Random House, May 2008.
        Book Chapter: ``Diplomacy'' in Attacking Terrorism, Elements of a
    Grand Strategy, edited by Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes,
    Georgetown University Press, 2004.
        Conference Report: ``Partners in Peacekeeping: Logistics Support
    Issues of the United Nations and Troop Contributing Countries,'' United
    Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2003.
        Book Chapter: ``Careers in International Organizations'' in the
    book Careers in International Affairs, Seventh Edition, Georgetown
    University Press, 2003.
        Journal Article: ``International Terrorism: Trends and Responses,''
    DePaul Business Law Journal, Volume 12 Fall/Spring 1999/2000. Numbers 1
    & 2.
        Book Review: ``Blue Helmets: The Strategy of U.N. Military
    Operations, by John F. Hillen,'' Joint Force Quarterly, National
    Defense University, Spring Edition, 1998.
        Journal Article: ``Comparative Counterinsurgency Strategies:
    Guatemala and El Salvador,'' Conflict, Volume 9, November 1989.

        16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
    speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
    copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
    been nominated.
        I have given a variety of speeches, mainly in regards to my book;
    Crush the Cell: How to Defeat Terrorism Without Terrorizing Ourselves.
    For those speeches I have given, I primarily use note cards which I
    have not retained.

        17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
        (a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
    conflicts of interest?
        Yes, however the Department of Defense recently determined that my
    receipt of compensation from the United Arab Emirates, Ministry of
    Interior, as part of my consulting work through Lexington Security
    Group, LLC, violated the Emoluments Clause (U.S. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 9,
    cl. 8). This determination carries with it a monetary penalty that is
    deducted from my retirement pay. I am currently appealing the amount of
    the penalty.
        (b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
    would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
        No.
        (c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
    deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
    for the record in hearings?
        Yes.
        (d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
    response to Congressional requests?
        Yes.
        (e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
    testimony or briefings?
        Yes.
        (f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
    before this committee?
        Yes.
        (g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
    such documents?
        Yes.
                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
    committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
    forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
    Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                    ------

                               Signature and Date
        I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
    on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
    provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
    and complete.
                                                    Michael A. Sheehan.
        This 16th day of November, 2011.

        [The nomination of Michael A. Sheehan was reported to the
    Senate by Chairman Levin on December 15, 2011, with the
    recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
    was confirmed by the Senate on December 17, 2011.]
                                  ----------

        [Prepared questions submitted to Mark W. Lippert by
    Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
    follow:]
                            Questions and Responses

                                DEFENSE REFORMS

        Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
    Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
    strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
    enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
    of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
    commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments
    to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
    to the combatant commanders.
        Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
    provisions? If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
    address in these modifications?
        Answer. I do not see a need for modification of any Goldwater-
    Nichols Act provisions at this time. The Act has served the Department
    and our Nation well, fostering the spirit of a joint force that has
    enhanced the Department's capabilities to respond to critical security
    demands, such as in Operation Enduring Freedom. If confirmed, I will
    continue to consider this issue, and I will make proposals for
    modifications if, and when, required.

                                     DUTIES

        Question. Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5111.17 assigns the
    responsibilities, functions, relationships and authorities of the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs
    (ASD(APSA)). The directive establishes ASD(APSA) as the principal
    advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary
    of Defense on various matters relating to the Asian and Pacific
    regions, their governments, and defense establishments.
        What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the
    ASD(APSA)? Will they differ in any way from those described in DOD
    Directive 5111.17?
        Answer. The ASD(APSA) is the principal advisor to the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the Secretary of Defense
    on international security strategy and policy on issues of DOD interest
    that relate to the Nations and international organizations of the Asian
    and Pacific regions, their governments, and defense establishments and
    for oversight of security cooperation programs, including Foreign
    Military Sales, in these regions. The ASD(APSA) is also responsible for
    developing regional security and defense strategy and policy, as well
    as for overseeing the implementation and coordination with appropriate
    DOD officials of such policies and strategies.
        Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
    believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
        Answer. My experience on Capitol Hill, at the National Security
    Staff, and in the military have provided me with a unique skill set and
    the relationships that will allow me to be effective at managing a
    large issue portfolio and staff.
        As the Chief of Staff to the National Security Staff, my duties
    often required me to work at senior levels of the U.S. Government on a
    number of issues related to the East and South Asia region. In this
    capacity, I collaborated closely with key U.S. officials (such as NSS
    Senior Directors and officials of various agencies) on a range of
    policy matters, participated in bilateral and multilateral meetings,
    and coordinated foreign travel conducted by the President. I also
    performed similar functions with respect to the Obama-Biden Transition
    Project. During my tenure in these positions, I was responsible for
    helping to manage complex organizations with large numbers of employees
    and/or volunteers.
        As a staff member of the U.S. Senate, I held three different
    positions over the course of a decade, each of which required me to
    engage on East Asia and Pacific Rim issues. As foreign policy advisor
    to then-Senator Obama, I handled all of the Asia-related work for the
    Senator on the Foreign Relations Committee, including spearheading
    early efforts to combat avian flu in Asia. As a professional staff
    member on the State-Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the
    Appropriations Committee, I dealt frequently and extensively with East
    Asia-Pacific issues especially related to U.S. bilateral and
    multilateral assistance programs and associated legislation. As an aide
    to Senator Daschle (Democratic Policy Committee), I worked on issues
    such as the accession of China to the World Trade Organization.
        During my time in the military, I deployed in support of Joint Task
    Force operations in Afghanistan. I helped to manage a number of
    intelligence professionals spread out over a large forward deployed
    area, facilitating timely intelligence support for multiple direct
    action operations. I was selected to lead multiple, post-operation
    mitigation efforts with senior Afghans and coalition military and
    political leaders. As a reservist at the Office of Naval Intelligence,
    I was selected to work on highly-specialized projects concerning a key
    nation in East Asia.
        As for my education, I was awarded an M.A. in International Policy
    Studies from Stanford University. My coursework included a Stanford
    University-Beijing University study abroad program which focused on
    Mandarin language training (as well as continued Chinese language
    studies upon return to the United States).

                                 RELATIONSHIPS

        Question. If confirmed, what will be your relationship with:

              The Secretary of Defense
              The Deputy Secretary of Defense
              The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
              The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
              The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
              Commander, U.S. Pacific Command
              Commander, U.S. Central Command
              Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command
              Other Combatant Commanders
              The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs
              The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
            Affairs
              The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
            Americas' Security Affairs
              The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic
            Affairs
              The Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC
              Commander, U.S. Forces Korea

        Answer. If confirmed, I will report to the Secretary of Defense and
    Deputy Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Policy. I expect to develop and maintain a close working relationship
    with under secretaries and assistant secretaries across the Department,
    the General Counsel of DOD, the Secretaries of the Military
    Departments, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, the Combatant Commanders, and as appropriate, the Commander,
    U.S. Forces, Korea. If confirmed, I would also work closely with and
    coordinate with the other Assistant Secretaries of Defense within the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Policy. Examples of this
    coordination include working with the Assistant Secretary of Defense
    for International Security Affairs on the role of NATO in Afghanistan;
    the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low
    Intensity Conflict on counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and security
    assistance matters; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
    Defense and Americas' Security Affairs on humanitarian assistance and
    disaster relief efforts in Asia; and the Assistant Secretary of Defense
    for a Global Strategic Affairs to implement the Proliferation Security
    Initiative in the Asian and Pacific regions.

                           CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

        Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
    confront the next ASD(APSA)?
        Answer. I think the administration has rightly acknowledged that
    Asia is increasingly critical to U.S. prosperity and security
    interests. This is evident from the administration's steadfast
    commitment to defeating al Qaeda and countering violent extremism in
    South and Central Asia and efforts to enhance U.S. relationships across
    the Asia-Pacific region. At the broadest level, I believe the most
    significant challenge for the entire DOD is managing a changing global
    security environment in an era of budget austerity. As Secretary
    Panetta has noted, the Department faces hard, but manageable, choices
    in order to maintain a globally engaged force amidst domestic fiscal
    constraints.
        In Afghanistan, I note undeniable progress on the security front--
    particularly in the core goal of disrupting, dismantling, and
    ultimately defeating al Qaeda. U.S. forces along with Afghan and
    coalition partners are degrading the insurgency, building up the Afghan
    security forces, and continuing to transition key areas of the country
    to Afghan lead for security. Pakistan continues to remain a critical
    part of the fight against al Qaeda, and despite the many challenges in
    this relationship, I believe we need to continue to work closely with
    Pakistan to combat the extremists that threaten U.S. and regional
    security and stability.
        In the Asia-Pacific region, I think the administration has rightly
    focused on the need to support key norms and principles that benefit
    all nations. China's military buildup continues to pose anti-access/
    area-denial challenges and shift the cross-Strait balance in the
    mainland's favor. It remains important to encourage greater
    transparency from China about how it will use its growing capabilities.
        It is also vital to modernize and enhance U.S. regional security
    alliances, including efforts to enhance defense posture in the Asia-
    Pacific region. Finally, I think it will be essential to continue the
    administration's strong efforts to address the increase in non-
    traditional threats beyond violent extremism, such as the proliferation
    of nuclear and ballistic missile technologies, competition for scarce
    resources, and devastating natural disasters. If confirmed, I look
    forward to working with Congress to address these issues.
        Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
    addressing these challenges?
        Answer. I believe the administration has done a good job of putting
    in place the right strategies and plans to address the challenges
    facing the next ASD(APSA). These issues, and the plans associated with
    them, are always evolving. If confirmed, I would work closely with
    others in the Department, the interagency, Congress, and our
    international allies and partners to adapt and shape these strategies
    for the future. I would analyze current strategies, review the results
    of the recent strategy reviews, and participate in ongoing policy
    reviews as deemed necessary. If confirmed, I look forward to
    collaborating closely with the committee on the range of challenges and
    opportunities in the Asia-Pacific region.
        Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
    in terms of issues which must be addressed by the ASD(APSA)?
        Answer. Strategies for dealing with the set of challenges facing
    the ASD(APSA) are largely in place in DOD and in other departments and
    agencies within the U.S. Government, and are reflected in agreements
    with our allies and partners in the region. If confirmed, I see the
    challenge as principally one of careful, sustained execution of these
    strategies. However, if confirmed, I will be carefully evaluating
    current strategies to determine if a reordering of priorities,
    applicable to ASD(APSA), is in order. Overall, the key priorities are
    to continue to make progress against al Qaeda and its affiliates in
    Afghanistan and Pakistan; to broaden and deepen existing alliances,
    while developing our ties to new allies and partners; to work on a
    constructive relationship with China; to enhance the development of
    action-oriented regional organizations that can tackle shared
    challenges; and to ensure that the U.S. military is postured to protect
    and advance American interests in this critical region.
        In Afghanistan and Pakistan, the priority will remain to disrupt,
    dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and affiliates, and to
    prevent their return to either country, while increasing the capacity
    of the Afghan National Security Forces and the Afghan Government so
    they can assume the lead for Afghanistan's security by the end of 2014.
    If confirmed, I will work first and foremost to ensure the U.S.
    military stays on track and has the guidance and tools required to
    succeed in these missions.
        With regard to China, it is my understanding that DOD seeks a
    healthy, stable, reliable, and continuous military-to-military
    relationship with China's People's Liberation Army (PLA), in support of
    President Obama and the People's Republic of China (PRC) President Hu's
    vision for a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive bilateral
    relationship. Strengthening the military-to-military relationship
    serves a critical role in shaping China's choices, as does the
    continued adaptation of U.S. forces, posture, and operational concepts
    to ensure a stable and secure environment.
        U.S. regional security alliances remain vital, and central to the
    larger regional strategy. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to
    continue to broaden and deepen the U.S. defense and security agenda
    with allies and partners, expanding areas of cooperation even while
    reinforcing traditional missions of deterrence and reassurance.
    Finally, if confirmed, I will work to support the Department's effort
    to maintain and enhance defense posture and capabilities across the
    Asia-Pacific region.

                               ENGAGEMENT POLICY

        Question. One of the central pillars of our national security
    strategy has been military engagement as a means of building
    relationships around the world. Military-to-military contacts, joint
    combined exchange training exercises, combatant commander exercises,
    humanitarian assistance operations, and similar activities are used to
    achieve this goal.
        If confirmed, would you support continued engagement activities of
    the U.S. military? If yes, would you advocate for expanding U.S.
    military-to-military engagement? If not, why not?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will support continued U.S. military-to-
    military engagement with nations in Asia. I believe the current and
    emerging security environment will require robust engagement with the
    militaries of our allies and partners around the world, and building
    productive relationships with many States in which our past military-
    to-military engagements have been limited or absent entirely.
        Question. Do you believe that these activities contribute to U.S.
    national security?
        Answer. Yes.

                              STABILITY OPERATIONS

        Question. Experience in Iraq has underscored the importance of
    planning and training to prepare for the conduct and support of
    stability operations in post-conflict situations.
        In your view, what is the appropriate relationship between DOD and
    other departments of government in the planning and conduct of
    stability and support operations in a post-conflict environment?
        Answer. DOD has played and will continue to play an important role
    supporting other key U.S. departments and agencies in stability and
    support operations post-conflict.
        Question. What lessons do you believe the Department has learned
    from the experience of planning and training for post-conflict
    operations in Iraq?
        Answer. Operations in Iraq demonstrate that long-term success
    requires a robust capacity for integrated civil-military action and
    substantially more resources to support the expeditionary capacity of
    other key departments and agencies. Long-term success will also require
    close cooperation between DOD and other U.S. Government departments in
    planning, preparing for and conducting stability and support
    operations, both in terms of DOD participation in whole-of-government
    efforts and for interagency participation in the review of military
    campaign and contingency planning. The U.S. military must plan and
    train with civilian counterparts, be prepared to operate effectively in
    all phases of conflict, and develop better awareness of political,
    cultural, and economic factors to ensure that our actions will meet our
    objectives.

                           BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

        Question. In the past few years, Congress has provided DOD a number
    of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner
    nations, including the global train and equip authority (section 1206).
        In your view, what are our strategic objectives in building the
    capacities of partner nations in the Asia and Pacific region?
        Answer. The United States' primary objective in building the
    capacity of foreign partners should continue to be to help them develop
    effective and legitimate security institutions that can provide for
    their countries' internal security, and contribute to regional and
    multilateral responses to threats and instability. This, in turn,
    mitigates the burden on U.S. forces responding to security threats
    outside the United States and promotes interoperability between our
    forces.
        Question. What is your understanding of the purpose of the section
    1206 global train and equip authority?
        Answer. As I understand it, this authority has two discrete
    purposes outlined in law: to build a partner's national military or
    maritime security forces' capacity either to: (1) conduct
    counterterrorist operations; or (2) conduct or support stability
    operations where U.S. forces are participating.
        Question. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called for an
    expansion of the Government's resources devoted to instruments of non-
    military ``soft power''--civilian expertise in reconstruction,
    development, and governance.
        In your view, what should be the role of DOD, vis-a-vis other
    civilian departments and agencies of the Government, in the exercise of
    instruments of soft power?
        Answer. In my view, the Department's role should generally be to
    support, not lead, in the exercise of soft power.

                               AFGHANISTAN POLICY

        Question. Do you support the counterinsurgency strategy for
    Afghanistan? In your view, is that the right strategy?
        Answer. Yes, I support the strategy that the President has set
    forth, and I believe it is the right strategy. A focused
    counterinsurgency campaign will allow us to help the Afghans build
    security forces and government capacity capable of providing the
    security and basic services necessary to achieve a peaceful, stable
    Afghanistan that does not again become a safe haven for terrorists.
        Question. If confirmed, are there changes you would recommend to
    the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan? For example, would you support an
    increase in counterterrorism action in Afghanistan?
        Answer. I believe the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is sound. The
    administration tracks metrics on progress toward its objectives in
    Afghanistan throughout the year, and constantly assesses and adjusts
    its implementation of the overall strategy. Counterterrorism is a
    significant part of the counterinsurgency strategy, and managing the
    balance of all aspects of the strategy is an ongoing process.
        Question. Do you support the President's decision to withdraw the
    33,000 U.S. surge forces from Afghanistan, with 10,000 troops to be
    withdrawn by the end of this year and the remaining 23,000 troops to
    return by next summer?
        Answer. Yes. I support a responsible, conditions-based drawdown as
    called for by the President. I believe we have made the progress
    necessary to allow us to begin to bring home U.S. surge forces.

                             AFGHANISTAN TRANSITION

        Question. At the NATO Summit in Lisbon last November, the
    participants in the International Security Assistance Force endorsed
    President Karzai's goal of the Afghanistan National Security Forces
    (ANSF) having the primary responsibility for providing security
    throughout Afghanistan by 2014.
        Do you support the goal of transitioning responsibility for
    security throughout Afghanistan to the Afghan security forces by 2014?
        Answer. Yes. As I understand it, the transition to Afghan security
    lead in the first tranche of provinces and municipalities has
    progressed smoothly and without any significant increase of enemy-
    initiated attacks in those areas. The administration's transition
    strategy, as adopted at the November 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit, is to
    complete security transition nationwide by the end of 2014.
        Question. In your view, how important is it to the
    counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan that the transition of primary
    responsibility to the Afghan security forces for providing security
    throughout Afghanistan be completed by 2014?
        Answer. In my view, the current goal of completing transition by
    the end of 2014--as proposed by President Karzai and confirmed by our
    allies and partners at the November 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit--is
    important to our effort in Afghanistan. A key element of U.S. strategy
    is building an increasingly capable and professional Afghanistan
    National Security Force (ANSF) that can protect its citizens. To that
    end, my understanding is that the administration is focused on
    increasing the size, quality and performance of the ANSF to ensure the
    successful transition of security lead to Afghan control.
        With an increasingly capable ANSF, the Afghan Government has been
    able to begin the process of transitioning areas to Afghan security
    lead--a process that began in July 2011 and will continue through 2014.
    As a result, about 25 percent of the Afghan population now lives in
    areas where the ANSF have lead security responsibility. The Afghan
    Government will soon announce a second set of areas to begin the
    transition process, and will likely include locations where
    approximately 50 percent of Afghans live.
        Question. In your view, what are the main challenges to the success
    of the transition to an Afghan lead for security throughout the country
    by 2014?
        Answer. Safe havens for insurgents in Pakistan, and Afghan capacity
    in the governance and development areas, remain the most challenging
    aspects of transition. The limited capacity of the Afghan Government to
    manage development programs and fill government positions at the
    national and subnational levels hinders the ability to assume
    leadership on these lines of operation. Efforts in these areas must
    underpin the success of the security transition in order to achieve
    durable stability in Afghanistan.

                      AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

        Question. According to a recent DOD report, the NATO training
    mission has met its target end strength of 305,000 ANSF by October of
    this year. The Afghan Government has approved a new ANSF target end
    strength of 352,000 by 2012 comprised of 171,600 Afghan National Army
    (ANA) and 134,000 Afghan National Police (ANP).
        What is your assessment of the progress in developing a
    professional and effective Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)?
        Answer. My assessment is that the ANSF, in partnership with U.S.
    and NATO forces, have made enormous progress in size and quality over
    the past 2 years and remain ahead of schedule for their growth targets
    this year. In addition, both the ANA and ANP have made significant
    gains in effectiveness and professionalism. The establishment of the
    Afghan Local Police (ALP) program has also fostered greater local
    capability to resist insurgents. However, real challenges remain, such
    as stemming attrition rates.
        Question. What do you see as the main challenges to building the
    capacity of the ANSF and, if confirmed, what recommendations, if any,
    would you make for addressing those challenges?
        Answer. Some of the main challenges to building the capacity of the
    ANSF include poor literacy rates and low education levels in the Afghan
    population, which constrain the development of operational enablers,
    including logistics, aviation, medical, and communications
    capabilities. These capabilities will be necessary for an increasingly
    self-sufficient ANSF to ensure Afghanistan does not again become a safe
    haven for terrorists. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan has put
    considerable attention on, and resources toward, the literacy
    challenge. Another key challenge is the development of strong and
    capable leaders, which will take time and experience to cultivate. If
    confirmed, I would work with military and civilian leaders and
    international partners to explore ways to bolster ANSF capabilities.

                       AFGHAN GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

        Question. While improving security for the Afghan people is
    critical, the success of the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan
    also depends on improving the Government of Afghanistan's capacity to
    provide governance, better services, and economic development.
    Significant concerns remain over the performance of the Government of
    Afghanistan in meeting the needs of the Afghan people and fighting
    corruption.
        What do you see as the role for DOD in building the capacity of the
    Government of Afghanistan to deliver services, provide better
    governance, improve economic development, and fight corruption in
    Afghanistan?
        Answer. The role of DOD should be a supporting one. Improving
    governance and economic development is crucial to our strategy in
    Afghanistan. Although the Department of State (DOS) and the U.S. Agency
    for International Development (USAID) are the lead agencies within the
    U.S. Government on governance and development initiatives in
    Afghanistan, DOD contributes to this effort and cooperates closely with
    DOS and USAID. Coordinating DOD stabilization projects with civilian
    reconstruction and development efforts ensures that the military and
    civilian activities work together to support longer-term development
    objectives, as well as near-term stabilization. If confirmed, I would
    emphasize continued close coordination of these interconnected civilian
    and military efforts.

                        RECONCILIATION AND REINTEGRATION

        Question. Under what conditions, if any, should reconciliation
    talks with the Taliban leadership be pursued? In your view, should
    negotiations be pursued with the leadership of the Haqqani network? If
    so, under what conditions?
        Answer. The President has clearly outlined U.S. support for an
    Afghan-led process to pursue a political resolution to the conflict in
    Afghanistan. I support the Afghan Government's efforts to reconcile
    with groups who agree to cut ties with al Qaeda, cease violence, and
    accept the Afghan Constitution.
        I would defer to the Department of State for further discussion of
    reconciliation issues.
        Question. In your view, what role should Pakistan play in any
    reconciliation talks?
        Answer. I believe Pakistan should play a constructive role in the
    effort to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan.
        Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the current
    program for reintegrating insurgent fighters willing to lay down their
    arms? What additional steps, if any, should be taken to improve the
    reintegration program?
        Answer. I understand that, since the Afghan Government established
    the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program last summer, the
    Afghans--with international community support--have made steady
    progress in establishing the support structures to implement the
    program at the national and sub-national levels. The High Peace Council
    and working-level Joint Secretariat have conducted extensive outreach
    activities to spread awareness of this new program. There is a steady
    entry of reintegration candidates (now more than 2,700) into the
    program, and I believe the program has inspired informal reintegration
    as well. The international community should continue its support for
    program implementers and for the Afghan interagency cooperation
    necessary to reintegrate these former fighters in a timely way.

                   U.S. STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN

        Question. In September, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    Admiral Mike Mullen testified to the committee that he believed a
    ``flawed and difficult relationship [with Pakistan] is better than no
    relationship at all.''
        Do you agree with Admiral Mullen regarding maintaining a ``flawed''
    relationship with Pakistan? Why or why not?
        Answer. Our relationship with Pakistan is not always easy, but it
    is vital to our national security and to our regional interests. The
    core national security goal remains to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat
    al Qaeda and its affiliates to ensure that they do not have safe havens
    in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to eliminate their capacity to
    threaten the United States, our allies, and interests abroad. Over the
    past several years, the United States has made major progress in
    reducing al Qaeda's ability to conduct transnational attacks. As
    Secretary Panetta has said, ``the United States is within reach of
    strategically defeating al Qaeda''. At the same time, there are serious
    questions about Pakistan's ability to prevent its territory from being
    used as a safe haven by the Haqqani network and other militant
    extremists to attack coalition forces in Afghanistan. Therefore, I
    believe it is essential to continue working with Pakistan to eliminate
    these safe havens.
        The U.S. military-to-military relationship with Pakistan, like our
    overall relationship, has seen good and bad phases. Pakistan has
    suffered more than 11,000 military personnel killed or wounded and more
    than 30,000 civilian causalities in recent years from terrorist
    actions, most recently in the significant attacks following the Osama
    bin Laden operation. Therefore, the United States has a shared interest
    with Pakistan in preventing terrorism. As President Obama has said,
    ``We have killed more terrorists on Pakistani soil than anywhere else,
    and that could not have been done without their cooperation.''
        Question. What do you believe are the United States' key strategic
    interests with regard to Pakistan?
        Answer. I believe the United States' interests in the region and in
    Asia more broadly require a stable and constructive relationship with
    Pakistan. The fact that Pakistan is a nuclear state that faces internal
    threats from extremist organizations adds to the importance of a
    continued relationship with Pakistan. Preventing, if possible, a
    potential Pakistan-India conflict is another important strategic
    interest. It is in the United States' interest for Pakistan to have a
    strong, civilian-led government and an open society, to live in peace
    and security with its neighbors, and to ensure its nuclear assets
    remain secure, in accordance with international standards.
        If confirmed, I will continue to support DOD's efforts in
    coordination with our interagency partners for a constructive and
    mutually beneficial relationship with Pakistan, aimed at advancing
    shared national security objectives.

                              THE HAQQANI NETWORK

        Question. A number of recent deadly attacks on Afghan, U.S., and
    other coalition forces in Afghanistan have allegedly been linked to the
    Haqqani network operating from safe havens across Afghanistan's border
    with Pakistan. The Pakistan intelligence agency, the Inter-Services
    Intelligence (ISI), appears to provide support to the Haqqani network,
    which then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen
    has called a ``veritable arm'' of the Pakistani ISI.
        What is your understanding of the rules of engagement for U.S.
    troops in Afghanistan who are subjected to cross-border attacks from
    Haqqani or other insurgent forces on the Pakistan side of the
    Afghanistan-Pakistan border?
        Answer. My understanding is that U.S. forces in Afghanistan are
    authorized to act in self-defense when they are under attack. I
    understand that ISAF and CENTCOM are working with the Pakistanis to
    improve cross-border coordination.
        Question. Do you agree that it is essential, if U.S.-Pakistan
    relations are ever to be normalized, that Pakistan eliminate its
    support for the Haqqani network and denounce the cross-border attacks
    conducted by the Haqqanis and other insurgents against Afghan and
    coalition forces in Afghanistan? Why or why not?
        Answer. The ability of violent extremist groups to find support and
    safe haven in Pakistan poses a significant threat to U.S. forces, the
    NATO mission, and the long-term stability of Afghanistan. Attacks
    against U.S. and coalition personnel are unacceptable. It is Pakistan's
    responsibility to prevent attacks from its territory on others,
    including Afghanistan and our forces there. If Pakistan does not
    address these threats, the United States will have to consider a range
    of options, but it is best when we have Pakistan's cooperation.
    Pakistan has legitimate concerns that should be understood and
    addressed by the Afghan Government in any process to bring about a
    stable and durable political solution in Afghanistan. But Pakistan also
    has responsibilities of its own, including taking decisive steps to
    ensure that the Afghan Taliban and affiliated organizations cannot
    continue to conduct the insurgency from Pakistani territory. Increased
    action is particularly critical with groups such as the Haqqani
    network, who continue to maintain close ties to al Qaeda and other
    violent extremist organizations that pose real threats not only to the
    United States, but also to the people and Government of Pakistan.
        Pakistani military leaders cannot pick and choose among militant
    groups. However, Pakistan remains a critical country in the fight
    against terrorists. Therefore, I believe we should continue to work
    closely with Pakistan to act against the extremists that threaten U.S.
    and Pakistani security, and pursue a stable, peaceful, and prosperous
    region. As Secretary Clinton stated in her testimony to the House
    Foreign Affairs Committee on October 20, working with our Afghan and
    Pakistani partners is not always easy, but these relationships are
    advancing U.S. national security interests, and walking away from them
    would undermine those interests.
        Question. Would you support designating the Haqqani network as a
    Foreign Terrorist Organization in accordance with section 219 of the
    Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended? Why or why not?
        Answer. I would defer to the Secretary of State regarding
    designation of the Haqqani network as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
    It is in the interests of both Pakistan and the United States to
    eliminate terrorists and safe havens. As Secretary Clinton told the
    Pakistanis, ``There will be dire consequences for Pakistan as well as
    Afghanistan if this threat from the terrorist networks is not
    contained, at the very least, because there's no way that any
    government in Islamabad can control these groups.''

                          U.S. ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

        Question. The United States has provided significant military
    assistance to Pakistan, including foreign military financing and
    training and equipment through the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund
    (PCF) to build the capacity of the Pakistan Army and Frontier Scouts to
    conduct counterinsurgency operations. In addition, the United States
    has provided significant funds (``Coalition Support Funds'') to
    reimburse Pakistan for the costs associated with military operations
    conducted by Pakistan along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and other
    support provided in connection with Operation Enduring Freedom. More
    recently, the United States has suspended assistance to Pakistan under
    the PCF and Coalition Support Funds pending greater cooperation from
    Pakistan.
        In your view, under what conditions, if any, would it be in the
    U.S. strategic interest to resume the provision of PCF assistance and
    Coalition Support Fund reimbursements to Pakistan?
        Answer. In my view, the current ``train-advise-equip'' programs
    with the Pakistan military and paramilitary forces have been an
    important component in pursuing the objective of improving Pakistan's
    counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities and improving
    cross-border coordination. Going forward, it is vital that Pakistan
    live up to its responsibilities, including to cooperate fully in
    counterterrorism matters, to expand its counterinsurgency campaign
    against all extremists and militant groups that have found safe haven
    inside Pakistan. I understand that in the wake of the Osama bin Laden
    raid, the administration asked Pakistan to take a number of concrete
    steps to demonstrate its continued commitment to a cooperative and
    mutually beneficial relationship. Future provision of security-related
    assistance will be informed by Pakistan's response to these requests.
    If confirmed, I will work with Congress to ensure that the support the
    United States provides yields the results we seek.

                           DETAINEE TREATMENT POLICY

        Question. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006,
    memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all
    relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
    procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
    Conventions?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
    specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
    22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
    Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies
    promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence
    interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply
    with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field
    Manual on Interrogations?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you share the view that standards for detainee
    treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that
    we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat
    our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S.
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be
    captured in future conflicts?
        Answer. Yes, I believe that DOD should always maintain principled
    and legal standards for detainee treatment and comply fully with the
    law, keeping in mind that the manner in which we treat our own
    detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S.
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be
    captured in future conflicts.

                        FORCE POSTURE IN THE USPACOM AOR

        Question. In connection with his recent trip to the U.S. Pacific
    Command (PACOM) area of responsibility, Secretary Panetta stated that
    ``the United States remains committed to a robust forward presence in
    Asia.'' Significant changes to the U.S. force posture in the region are
    planned over the next several years, including movement of marines from
    Okinawa to Guam and the relocation of U.S. forces within South Korea.
    There are also discussions about increasing presence in southern parts
    of the Asia-Pacific, including countries like Australia and Singapore,
    and developing more comprehensive engagement strategies with a number
    of other countries in the region. These initiatives will likely compete
    with other global commitments for increasingly constrained funding.
        If confirmed, how would you propose to make the tradeoffs and tough
    choices necessary to manage risks that might result from a U.S.
    commitment to a ``robust'' forward presence in Asia in light of other
    global commitments and in the face of a shrinking DOD budget?
        Answer. In keeping with Secretary Panetta's recent statements I
    believe it is essential that the United States maintain an enduring
    military presence that provides a tangible reassurance that the United
    States is committed to Asia's security, economic development, and the
    prosperity essential to the region's success. It is also important to
    ensure that the Department maintains a fiscally responsible approach to
    a defense posture that maximizes U.S. resources. In many cases, it is
    most efficient to sustain our global posture by forward stationing a
    portion of our forces closer to where they will be used. Doing so
    maximizes the capability of our military, giving us ``more for less,''
    and potentially offsetting the impact of necessary force structure
    cuts.
        If confirmed, I would work with my counterparts across the
    Department and our Commanders in the field to assess the potential
    global tradeoffs, risks, and budgetary implications associated with any
    changes in U.S. forward presence in the Asia-Pacific.
        Question. In your opinion, what should be the United States'
    national security priorities in the Asia-Pacific?
        Answer. As outlined in the 2010 National Security Strategy, the
    United States must develop a positive security agenda for the region.
    DOD's priorities include protecting U.S. territory, citizens, and
    allies; deterring aggression and maintaining regional stability;
    maintaining free and open access to the maritime, air, and space
    domains; deterring and defeating violent extremism; and preventing the
    proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their associated
    materials.
        Question. In your view, what strategic criteria, if any, should
    guide the posture of U.S. military forces in that region to best
    address those priorities at acceptable risk?
        Answer. I agree with DOD's assessment that we should establish a
    more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and
    politically sustainable posture in the Asia-Pacific region.
        Question. What, in your view, does ``robust'' forward presence
    mean?
        Answer. In my view, a ``robust'' forward presence connotes a
    powerful, capable, military presence--one that is sufficient for a wide
    range of contingencies and activities across the range of military
    operations.
        I believe the Department must keep pace with changes in the Asia-
    Pacific security environment that pose profound challenges to
    international security, such as the rise of new powers, the growing
    influence of non-state actors, and the potential spread of weapons of
    mass destruction (WMD).
        As such, I believe the Department should maintain an enduring
    military presence in the Asia-Pacific region that provides a tangible
    reassurance that the United States is committed to Asia's security. To
    do so, as the Secretary has consistently said, will require that U.S.
    posture in the region be geographically distributed, operationally
    resilient, and, of course, politically sustainable.
        My understanding is that the Department is seeking to distribute
    U.S. forces geographically into Southeast Asia, Oceania, and the Indian
    Ocean region to address the significant security challenges we face
    across the entirety of the region. This will allow the United States to
    perform the types of missions our forces are more likely to face in the
    future--combating terrorism, responding to natural disasters, and
    strengthening regional stability. Consulting closely with U.S. allies
    and partners, and tailoring defense posture appropriately will allow
    the United States to respond more effectively to the wide range of
    challenges confronting the Asia-Pacific region in the 21st century.
        In East Asia, a robust presence is one that continues to support
    our long-time alliances while also ensuring our force remains
    operationally resilient in response to any future challenges. The
    United States must ensure that our regional allies and partners are
    confident in the continued strength of our deterrence against the full
    range of potential threats.
        Question. How, if at all, do the methods of forward basing,
    rotational forces, and agreements with allies for training and
    logistics activities throughout the region contribute to ``robust''
    forward presence?
        Answer. From my understanding, DOD views posture as a combination
    of three elements: forces, footprint, and agreements. Forces are U.S.
    military, capabilities, equipment, and units assigned and rotationally
    deployed overseas. Footprint is the term the Department uses to
    describe the overseas network of infrastructure, facilities, land, and
    propositioned equipment. Lastly, ``agreements'' are the series of
    treaties and access, transit, support, and status protection agreements
    and arrangements with allies and partners that set the terms of U.S.
    military presence within the territory of a host country, as agreed
    with the host government. In combination, these elements underwrite the
    Department's ability to develop a robust forward presence and project
    military power in support of our national interests.
        Some of these elements are more flexible than others, and this fact
    dictates the ways in which the Department can adapt its current posture
    to changes, including changes in the security environment, new
    diplomatic realities, or mounting budgetary pressure. For posture, I
    believe the whole is greater than the sum of its parts--not only is
    posture the fundamental enabler of U.S. defense activities overseas, it
    is also central to defining and communicating U.S. strategic interests
    to allies, partners, rivals, and adversaries.
        Question. In your view, is the right mix of these forward presence
    methods necessary to achieve an affordable theater posture at
    acceptable levels of risk? If so, how would you propose broadly
    assessing each method relative to its cost and benefit?
        Answer. Yes. Finding the right mix of forward stationed and
    rotational forces is one of the U.S.'s toughest challenges; requiring
    continuous review and assessment with respect to the evolving strategic
    environment, national interests, regional threats, opportunities, and
    our operational requirements to respond to crises. The right mix of
    presence provides the United States affordable regional posture at an
    acceptable level of military risk.
        I believe the Department must ensure defense posture reflects the
    unique regional and political security dynamics by harmonizing the
    right combination of relationships and agreements, forward-stationed
    forces, rotational presence, prepositioned equipment, and basing
    infrastructure to enable the Department to prevent and deter conflict,
    prepare to defeat adversaries, and succeed in a wide range of
    contingencies. This will naturally include the appropriate mix of
    assigned and rotationally allocated forces in theater in order to meet
    operational requirements in the most efficient manner.
        Question. How important is a forward basing strategy to the ability
    of PACOM to execute its day-to-day mission? Its operational contingency
    plans?
        Answer. I believe the United States' forward-basing strategy is
    critical to enable PACOM's execution of both its day-to-day operations
    as well as operational contingency plans. U.S. forward presence
    provides unique capabilities that can be flexibly deployed, employed,
    and sustained in a timely manner across a wide spectrum of operations
    and contingencies.
        Question. What do you see as the implications, if any, of the
    planned force posture changes in Korea, Japan, and Guam on the U.S.
    commitment to the Asia-Pacific region in general? How does the planned
    relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam improve U.S. security in
    the region? How does the planned relocation of U.S. forces on the
    Korean Peninsula improve security?
        Answer. As the administration considers posture changes in the
    Asia-Pacific region, my understanding is that we are seeking to build a
    presence that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient,
    and politically sustainable. As this effort evolves, I understand that
    our goal is to sustain the U.S. presence in Northeast Asia, while
    enhancing it in Southeast Asia. I believe that all of the initiatives
    underway support these broad objectives.
        Question. What is your understanding of the plans for the possible
    U.S. military presence in Australia and how, in your view, will such a
    presence advance U.S. security interests?
        Answer. It is my understanding that in November 2010, the
    Department established a working group with our Australian counterparts
    to develop options to align our respective force postures in ways that
    would benefit the national security of both countries. In September
    2011, at the Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN)
    meeting in San Francisco, Secretaries Clinton and Panetta discussed a
    number of options aimed at positioning the military forces of both
    nations to respond in a timely and effective way to contingencies,
    including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and to enhance
    their ability to train and exercise together and with regional
    partners. As I understand it, these options will demonstrate the
    strength of the U.S.-Australia alliance and the combined resolve to
    enhance regional stability and security.
        Question. In your view, are the levels of funding, manning and
    military-to-military engagement in the Asia-Pacific region appropriate
    to the management of current and future risk to U.S. strategic
    interests in the region? Do you foresee a requirement to increase or to
    decrease those funding levels in the coming years?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues in DOD and our
    military commanders to assess the appropriate levels of funding,
    personnel, and military-to-military engagement necessary to meet our
    strategic objectives in the Asia-Pacific region.

                                     CHINA

        Question. China is viewed by some in the United States as an
    emerging adversary that poses a potential threat to security in the
    region, and by others as a constructive international partner that
    should be welcomed and integrated into the international economic and
    political community. Others yet believe we are at a crossroads
    somewhere between those two scenarios.
        How would you characterize the current U.S. relationship with
    China?
        Answer. As President Obama stated in January 2011, the United
    States seeks a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship
    with China. I would describe the relationship as cooperative and
    competitive. The United States continues to pursue opportunities to
    engage where there is mutual benefit while discussing frankly areas
    where we may have differences.
        Question. To what extent do you believe the policies and actions of
    the United States and other major regional and international actors
    will affect the direction in which China develops?
        Answer. I believe that U.S. policies and actions can influence the
    direction of China's development. No country has done more to assist,
    facilitate, and encourage China's national development and integration
    into the international system than the United States. However, U.S.
    policy and actions, or the policies and actions of any country or group
    of countries for that matter, cannot alone determine China's future
    which, in many ways, will be based upon the choices that China's
    leaders make. More fundamentally, the United States can also help to
    shape the environment in which China makes its strategic choices, and
    in so doing, encourage China to ``do the right thing''.
        Question. What do you see as the impact of current global economic
    challenges on stability and security in China specifically, and in the
    Asia-Pacific region generally?
        Answer. The full impact of the global economic crisis upon China
    and stability in the Asia-Pacific region more broadly will continue to
    play out over time. But those who manage defense and security issues
    must be attentive to the connections between security and economic
    issues, and be prepared to work together with colleagues in economic
    and diplomatic fields, both to guard against negative outcomes and also
    to seek positive ways forward where they may exist.
        Question. China's defense spending has had double-digit increases
    annually for about the past 20 years. While a certain amount of
    military growth is to be expected for a country experiencing the kind
    of economic growth that China has had over about that same period, the
    types of platforms and capabilities China is developing have been
    interpreted by some as designed to project power, limit freedom of
    movement by potential adversaries, and conduct military operations at
    increasing distances. Such developments, coupled with strident rhetoric
    and a lack of transparency, stoke growing concerns about China's
    intentions in the region.
        What do you believe are the objectives of China's steady increase
    in defense spending and its overall military modernization program?
        Answer. China appears to be building the capability to fight and
    win short duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery. Its
    near-term focus appears to be on preparing for potential contingencies
    involving Taiwan, and to deter or deny effective intervention in a
    cross-strait conflict. Its modernization efforts emphasize anti-access
    and area denial capabilities. China is also devoting increasing
    attention and resources to conducting operations beyond Taiwan and
    China's immediate periphery. Beijing's growing focus on military
    missions other than war includes humanitarian assistance, non-combat
    evacuation operations, and counterpiracy support. Lastly, China is
    strengthening its nuclear deterrent and enhancing its strategic strike
    capabilities through the modernization of its nuclear forces, and is
    improving other strategic capabilities, such as in space and counter-
    space operations and in computer network operations.
        Question. How should the United States respond to this Chinese
    military growth and modernization?
        Answer. The United States has been and should remain the pivotal
    military power in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States' response
    to China's military modernization should be flexible and supported by
    the continued transformation of our force posture in the Asia-Pacific
    region, the maintenance of our global presence and access, the
    modernization of our own capabilities in such areas as countering anti-
    access and area denial, and the strengthening of our alliances and
    partnerships.
        Question. What do you believe are the Chinese political-military
    goals in the Asia-Pacific region? Globally?
        Answer. Broadly, the overriding objectives of China's leaders
    appear to be to ensure the continued rule of the Chinese Communist
    Party, continue China's economic development, maintain the country's
    domestic political stability, defend China's national sovereignty and
    territorial integrity, and secure China's status as a great power.
    Within this context, preventing any moves by Taipei toward de jure
    independence is a key part of Beijing's strategy. Within each dimension
    there lies a mix of important challenges and opportunities for the
    United States that will continue to deserve priority attention.
        Question. What effect is China's military growth having on other
    countries in the region?
        Answer. In terms of regional security, China's economic growth has
    increased China's international profile and influence, and has enabled
    China's leaders to embark upon and sustain a comprehensive
    transformation of its military forces. The pace and scale of China's
    military modernization, coupled with the lack of transparency, raise
    many questions, both within the United States and in the region as a
    whole, about China's future.
        Other countries in the region are closely watching the growth of
    China's military, and how its military acts. Although on the one hand
    China has recently deployed its first hospital ship, conducting good-
    will missions far from its shores, on the other hand, there have been
    worrisome incidents in disputed waters in China's neighboring seas that
    have caused concern in nations such as the Philippines and Vietnam.
    Security concerns regarding Chinese military intentions have
    contributed to a greater focus on regional forums, such as the
    Association of South Asian Nations (ASEAN), where issues may be
    addressed multilaterally; such security concerns have also led to
    stronger and more welcoming relations with the United States as a
    security partner of choice.
        Question. How do you assess the current cross-strait relationship
    between China and Taiwan, and how can we help prevent miscalculation on
    either side?
        Answer. Taiwan has made significant strides to reduce tensions in
    the Taiwan Strait. These initiatives should be encouraged. I believe
    the United States can help to prevent miscalculation on either side by
    continuing to abide by our longstanding policies, based on the three
    joint U.S.-China Communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act, including
    making available to Taiwan ``defense articles and services in such
    quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a
    sufficient self-defense capability.'' Such a continued commitment by
    the United States will allow Taiwan to continue its outreach to the PRC
    without fear of coercion.
        Question. How do China's efforts to establish a strategic presence
    in the Indian Ocean by securing and maintaining access to various
    seaports in South and Southeast Asian countries affect its political-
    military posture and influence in the region?
        Answer. China looks to South and Southeast Asia as an area of
    strategic importance, which includes political objectives, access to
    resources, trade, and investment. With regard to South and Southeast
    Asian sea-ports, the important question is how China intends to use its
    presence. The United States retains strong relationships in South and
    Southeast Asia and should continue to monitor China's growing presence
    in the region.
        Question. What are your views of China's deployment of warships to
    counter piracy in the western Indian Ocean and how does this deployment
    contribute to China's ability to project power?
        Answer. Generally speaking, I see China's participation in
    counterpiracy operations as a positive development that contributes to
    addressing a global security challenge and demonstrates China's ability
    to use its military in a positive, constructive, and responsible
    manner. It is more than likely that from this experience China could
    begin to develop capabilities that would enhance its ability to sustain
    a deployed force over an extended period of time.
        Question. What is the role of DOD in helping to ensure that China's
    nuclear power industry does not contribute to the proliferation of
    nuclear weapons in the region?
        Answer. The Obama administration has reiterated that preventing the
    proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems,
    along with related technologies and materials, is a key goal for the
    United States. I believe that DOD should work in the interagency
    process to ensure that any proliferation concerns relating to China,
    including its nuclear power industry, are expressed to the Chinese
    Government in appropriate forums, and should similarly support the
    development of appropriate interagency responses in the event that
    China takes steps that do contribute to nuclear proliferation.
        Question. Our military-to-military relations with the Chinese
    military can be characterized as modest at best and the Chinese
    approach to these relations can be accurately described as ``on again,
    off again''. Clearly, one thing that has hobbled U.S.-China military
    relations has been China's history of canceling or postponing military-
    to-military engagements in response to U.S. arm sales to Taiwan.
        What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China
    military-to-military relations?
        Answer. I have long supported a continuous dialogue between the
    armed forces of the United States and China to expand practical
    cooperation where our national interests converge and to discuss
    candidly those areas where we have disagreement. Such dialogue can be
    especially important during periods of friction and turbulence.
        I believe we should continue to use military engagement with China
    as one of several means to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security
    of the Asia-Pacific region, to encourage China to play a constructive
    role in the region, and to press China to partner with the United
    States and our Asian allies and partners in addressing common security
    challenges.
        Question. Do you believe that the United States should make any
    changes in the quality or quantity of our military relations with
    China? If so, what changes and why?
        Answer. I believe that military exchanges with China can be
    valuable, but can only truly work if China is willing to reciprocate
    with transparent and substantive discussions and engagements. If
    confirmed, I would look for ways to deepen and enhance our military-to-
    military relationship with China, and to encourage China to act
    responsibly both regionally and globally.
        Question. What is your view regarding the longstanding U.S. policy
    of selling defense articles and services to Taiwan despite objections
    and criticism from China?
        Answer. U.S. policy on arms sales to Taiwan is based on the 1979
    Taiwan Relations Act, which provides that the United States will make
    available to Taiwan defense articles and services in such quantities as
    may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense
    capability. The Act also states that the President and Congress shall
    determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services
    based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan. That policy
    has contributed to peace and stability in the region for more than 30
    years and is consistent with the longstanding U.S. calls for peaceful
    resolution of the Taiwan issue in a manner acceptable to the people on
    both sides of the Taiwan Strait. I believe our arms sales have been
    carried out in a responsible manner.
        Question. In your view, to what extent, if at all, should China's
    possible reaction to such sales be considered by the United States when
    making decisions about the provision of defense articles and services
    to Taiwan?
        Answer. None. The United States should not be held hostage to any
    potential reaction China may have in response to arms sales to Taiwan.
    The Taiwan Relations Act provided that the United States will make
    available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such
    quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient
    self-defense capability.
        Question. By most accounts, China has become more assertive in its
    claims of sovereignty in various domains, including maritime, air, and
    space. There are numerous examples of this assertiveness, but one in
    particular is China's increased aggressiveness in asserting its
    excessive maritime claims in the South China Sea. In one such incident,
    Chinese-flagged ships harassed the USNS Impeccable, a U.S. military
    ship conducting ocean surveillance in the international waters of the
    South China Sea. That incident underscored the nature of Chinese
    maritime claims and the Chinese sensitivity associated with U.S. Navy
    operations in these areas.
        What role should the United States play in the ongoing maritime
    dispute in the South China Sea?
        Answer. As Secretary Gates affirmed at the Shangri-La Dialogue in
    June of this year, and Secretary Clinton affirmed at the ASEAN Regional
    Forum meeting in July of this year, the United States is a Pacific
    nation that has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open
    access to Asia's maritime domain, the maintenance of peace and
    stability, free and open commerce, and respect for international law in
    the South China Sea.
        I agree with the assessments of the Departments of State and
    Defense that the United States should not take a position on the
    competing territorial claims over land features in the South China Sea,
    and I believe all parties should resolve their disputes through
    peaceful means and in accordance with customary international law,
    without resorting to the threat or use of force. The United States
    should sustain its presence in the South China Sea and uphold its
    commitments to its allies and partners in order to maintain peace and
    stability in the region.
        Question. How does the presence of the U.S. Navy in the South China
    Sea influence this maritime dispute and, in your view, would an
    increase in U.S. activity in that region serve to stabilize or
    destabilize the situation?
        Answer. The U.S. Navy is a key provider of the military presence
    that underlies peace and stability across the globe, including in the
    South China Sea. Although the United States does not take a position on
    the territorial and maritime disputes, I believe it is essential for
    the U.S. Navy to maintain its presence and assert its freedom of
    navigation and overflight rights in the South China Sea in accordance
    with customary international law.
        If confirmed, I will work with our military commanders to evaluate
    the appropriate level of naval activities in the South China Sea to
    maintain regional peace and stability as well as unimpeded access for
    lawful commerce and economic development.
        Question. What should the United States do to help prevent
    dangerous encounters in the South China Sea?
        Answer. To reduce the risk of conflict in the South China Sea, I
    believe the United States should use its position in several regional
    organizations, including the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional
    Forum, and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus, to facilitate
    initiatives and confidence-building measures that will help claimant
    states reach agreement on a binding Code of Conduct in the South China
    Sea. Additionally, the United States should encourage all claimants to
    abide by international ``rules of the road'', such as the International
    Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, to ensure greater
    operational safety and reduce the risk of dangerous incidents at sea.
        Question. Cyber space has become a critical realm for civilian and
    military applications and, as a result, it represents a potentially
    substantial vulnerability. There are reports that China is aggressively
    pursuing cyber warfare capabilities, and would likely seek to take
    advantage of U.S. dependence on cyber space in the event of a potential
    conflict situation.
        What is your understanding of China's efforts to develop and deploy
    cyber warfare capabilities?
        Answer. It is my understanding that in 2010, numerous computer
    systems around the world, including those owned by the U.S. Government,
    were the target of intrusions, some of which appear to have originated
    within the PRC. These intrusions were focused on exfiltrating
    information. Although this alone is a serious concern, the accesses and
    skills required for these intrusions are similar to those necessary to
    conduct computer network attacks. I also understand that developing
    capabilities for cyber warfare is consistent with authoritative
    People's Liberation Army military writings. Additionally, China's 2010
    Defense White Paper noted China's own concern over foreign cyber
    warfare efforts and highlighted the importance of cyber-security in
    China's national defense.
        Question. If confirmed, what would you do to help ensure our
    military is protected in cyber space and prepared to defend against a
    cyber attack?
        Answer. The United States, like many other nations, has been the
    target of innumerable malicious activities via cyber space from
    hackers, criminals, and unidentified entities, some of which may well
    be nation states. I understand that numerous steps have been taken to
    increase network defense and monitoring capabilities. This work
    continues actively today. DOD should continue to evaluate all global
    threats to its networks and work closely with other government
    agencies, industry, and the international community in order to meet
    those threats. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, the lead for cyber
    policy, on these efforts.
        Question. In January 2007, China used a ground-based missile to hit
    and destroy one of its weather satellites in an anti-satellite test
    creating considerable space debris and raising serious concerns in the
    international community. Since then, China has continued its active
    pursuit of missile and satellite technology.
        What is your view of China's purposes for its pursuit of these
    capabilities?
        Answer. In my view, this test was just one element of China's
    military modernization effort to develop and field disruptive military
    technologies, including those for anti-access/area-denial, as well as
    for nuclear, space, and cyber warfare. The United States' goal should
    be to promote the responsible use of space.
        Question. What do you see as the long-term implications of such
    developments for the U.S. military, for U.S. national security, and for
    U.S. interests in space?
        Answer. Space systems are vital to our national security and our
    economy. In this regard, the United States should seek ways to protect
    our interests in space. U.S. space policies and programs should be
    informed by China's space and counterspace capabilities, which have
    contributed to today's challenging space environment. I believe we need
    to enhance our deterrence and ability to operate in a degraded
    environment. At the same time, the United States should seek to engage
    China, a major space-faring nation, to promote the responsible use of
    space. However, our concern should not be focused on only one country,
    but on the range of actors that make space increasingly congested,
    contested, and competitive.
        Question. What are your views regarding the potential weaponization
    of space and the international agreements to prevent space
    weaponization?
        Answer. I support the principles outlined in the 2010 National
    Space Policy, including that all nations have a right to explore and
    use space for peaceful purposes, and that all nations should act
    responsibly in space to help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and
    mistrust.
        Space is vital to U.S. national security and that of our allies and
    partners. I support our longstanding national policies of affirming the
    right of all nations to use outerspace for peaceful purposes, the right
    of free passage through space, and the right to protect our forces and
    our Nation from those that would use space for hostile purposes.

                                     TAIWAN

        Question. Much of the recent discourse regarding Taiwan has
    involved the state of Taiwan's defensive military capabilities and the
    U.S. commitment to do what is ``necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain
    a sufficient self-defense capability'' as required by the Taiwan
    Relations Act (TRA). In particular, much of the debate about how best
    to enhance Taiwan's current defensive capabilities has revolved around
    fighter aircraft and what air defense capabilities are most prudent and
    appropriate under the circumstances.
        What is your view of the current state of U.S.-Taiwan security
    relations?
        Answer. In my view, U.S.-Taiwan security relations are excellent
    and have never been stronger. DOD engages Taiwan at every level to
    ensure that it maintains its ability to deter aggression from the
    China.
        Question. What do you believe should be the priorities for U.S.
    military assistance to Taiwan?
        Answer. I believe our priority should be to assist Taiwan in the
    implementation of an innovative defense strategy to deter aggression
    from China. Taiwan cannot compete militarily with China; it must
    develop a future defense force that is capable of limiting China's
    ability to coerce Taiwan.
        Question. What is your opinion of the TRA? Enacted 30 years ago
    this year, do you see any need to modify the TRA to reflect the current
    state of affairs in the region? If so, how?
        Answer. I believe DOD has a special responsibility to monitor
    China's military developments and to deter aggression and conflict. The
    TRA has served our country and the region well and has helped guarantee
    peace and stability in Northeast Asia for more than 30 years.
    Consistent with the TRA, DOD assists in maintaining the capacity of the
    United States to take appropriate actions, as determined by the
    President and Congress in accordance with U.S. constitutional
    processes, in response to threats to the security or the social or
    economic system of the people on Taiwan. DOD works closely with its
    interagency partners to make available to Taiwan defense articles and
    services in such quantities to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient
    self-defense capability. This is consistent with longstanding policy
    that has provided a basis for maintaining security and stability across
    the Taiwan Strait. I believe that the TRA is a good law that makes for
    good policy.
        Question. Given the increasing military imbalance across the Taiwan
    Strait, do you think Taiwan is making appropriate investments in its
    defensive capabilities? If not, what is the best way to encourage
    Taiwan to invest more in its military?
        Answer. My view is that Taiwan needs to increase its defense budget
    to 3 percent of its GDP. The under-resourcing of Taiwan's defense
    jeopardizes Taiwan's security and sends the wrong signal to Beijing.
        I believe that the best way to encourage Taiwan to invest more in
    its military is to send strong and consistent messages from both the
    executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Government to Taiwan.
        Question. What military capabilities do you believe would be most
    effective in improving Taiwan's self-defense capability over the next 5
    to 10 years?
        Answer. In my view, Taiwan needs to implement a defense strategy
    that includes asymmetric solutions that undermine the offensive
    capabilities of the PLA. This strategy requires systems that are
    survivable. Survivability is enhanced through the implementation and
    integration of measures that include mobility, redundancy, integration,
    camouflage, concealment, quantity, deception, decoys, hardening, and
    joint operations. This defense strategy would not replace traditional
    military approaches; however, it would ensure that in a crisis Taiwan's
    defenses would be more effective.
        Question. Do you think the United States should sell new F-16 C/D
    aircraft to Taiwan?
        Answer. Given the nature of the multi-dimensional threat that
    Taiwan faces and the need to prioritize and ensure that Taiwan has a
    full range of self-defense articles and services (as opposed to simply
    one platform), I believe that Taiwan needs multiple capabilities and
    methods that will provide Taiwan the means to defend itself. I believe
    that retrofitting Taiwan's F-16 A/B is a higher priority than
    assimilating new F-16 C/D airframes into Taiwan's air force. The F-16
    A/B retrofit would provide Taiwan with a robust aircraft that is nearly
    equivalent to the F-16 C/D in its capabilities. There are a number of
    other weapons systems that provide important capabilities at reasonable
    cost and should be a higher priority than Taiwan purchases of F-16 C/
    Ds.

                                  NORTH KOREA

        Question. North Korea still represents one of the greatest near-
    term challenges to security and stability in Asia and deterring
    conflict on the Korean peninsula remains a top U.S. priority.
        What is your assessment of the current security situation on the
    Korean peninsula and of the diplomatic efforts to date to persuade
    North Korea to comply with international mandates regarding its missile
    and nuclear programs?
        Answer. North Korea's provocative behavior, large conventional
    military, proliferation activities, and pursuit of asymmetric
    advantages through its ballistic missile and weapons of mass
    destruction (WMD) programs, including uranium enrichment, present a
    serious threat to the United States, our allies and partners in the
    region, and the international community. The opaque nature of the North
    Korean system, coupled with an uncertain political transition, add to
    our concerns. The two North Korean attacks against South Korea last
    year provide a sober reminder that Pyongyang is willing to utilize its
    capabilities to undertake provocative actions. I believe the United
    States must work with its allies and other key partners in the region
    and internationally on diplomatic solutions to the range of pressing
    concerns we face with North Korea. Under the appropriate conditions,
    diplomatic engagement with North Korea is important as well. The U.S.
    commitment to its allies has helped preserve deterrence against North
    Korea, but deterrence alone will not bring issues of North Korean
    compliance to a close. Diplomacy too is essential for a lasting
    resolution to the nuclear, missile, and proliferation threats we face.
        Question. What is your understanding of the threat posed to the
    United States and our allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD
    capabilities, and the export of those capabilities?
        Answer. North Korea's missile and WMD programs pose a direct and
    serious threat to our regional allies and partners and have the
    potential to become a direct threat to U.S. territory. The United
    States must continue to monitor carefully North Korea's WMD and missile
    development programs and related proliferation activities. If
    confirmed, I would ensure that DOD continues to work closely with other
    parts of the U.S. Government to address these and other emerging
    threats, reduce our vulnerabilities and those of our allies and
    partners, and work cooperatively with our allies to ensure our
    contingency planning remains adaptive and responsive.
        Question. What concerns you most about North Korea?
        Answer. North Korea maintains a large, offensively-postured
    conventional military; it continues to develop long-range ballistic
    missiles; it seeks to develop nuclear weapons; and it engages in
    proliferation of WMD in contravention of international norms and law.
    What concerns me most is that this range of threats comes from a single
    actor who stands on the outside of the international community.

                               REPUBLIC OF KOREA

        Question. The longstanding alliance between the United States and
    the Republic of Korea (ROK) has been a key pillar of security in the
    Asia-Pacific region. This relationship, while strong, is undergoing
    substantial changes in terms of command and control and force laydown
    over the next several years.
        What is your understanding of the current status of the U.S.
    security relationship with South Korea?
        Answer. In my view, the U.S.-ROK alliance remains one of the
    cornerstones of U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region and is as
    strong and viable today as it has ever been. This was most recently
    reaffirmed by the Secretary during his travel and participation in the
    Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul on October 28, 2011. Our
    security relationship is based on mutual commitment to common
    interests, shared values, continuous dialogue, and combined planning,
    ensuring a comprehensive strategic alliance.
        Question. If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to
    improve the U.S.-South Korean security relationship?
        Answer. As I understand it, DOD and the ROK continue to work
    closely to realign U.S. forces on the Peninsula and to prepare for the
    transition of wartime operational control to the ROK by December 2015.
    If confirmed, I would support this continued realignment and the return
    of facilities that our forces no longer require. The United States is
    also working toward developing new command and control relationships
    with Korea, which will ensure that contingency plans remain appropriate
    to changing circumstances. Additionally, I believe it is important to
    ensure the U.S. and Korean publics continue to understand the enduring
    mutual benefits derived from this alliance, and that the United States
    works effectively with the ROK as it plays an increasing role in
    regional and global security issues commensurate with the ROK's
    economic status and influence. If confirmed, I would work hard to
    maintain close contact with my ROK counterpart and to build upon the
    solid foundation developed to date to improve and transform this
    important security relationship.
        Question. What is your view regarding the timing of the transfer of
    wartime operational control from the United States to South Korea, now
    planned for December 2015, and what will you do to ensure this
    transition takes place by the end of 2015?
        Answer. I understand that the United States and the ROK have a
    comprehensive way forward to transition wartime operational control by
    December 2015. If confirmed, I will work with my ROK counterpart to
    complete this process under the Strategic Alliance 2015 framework,
    ensuring the transition is implemented methodically and validating that
    the combined defense posture remains strong and seamless.
        Question. How do we ensure that we continue to protect our vital
    regional interests, while continuing meaningful progress toward the
    transfer of command and control to the Republic of Korea and the
    relocation of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula?
        Answer. I believe regional interests are best protected through our
    presence in the region, strong alliances, and further developing
    mechanisms that enhance our abilities to engage in the region. A good
    example in Korea is the Secretary's effort to formalize the Korea-U.S.
    Integrated Defense Dialogue, a senior-level policy consultative
    channel, as an umbrella framework that encompasses various defense
    dialogue mechanisms between the ROK and the United States to ensure
    high-level political oversight and synchronization of alliance
    objectives.
        Question. Do you support expanding the number of U.S. personnel
    assigned to the Korean Peninsula for 2- or 3-year tours of duty and
    increasing the number of military and civilian personnel authorized to
    be accompanied by their dependents for these longer assignments?
        Answer. I understand tour normalization in Korea was designed to
    further our commitment to support our forward-stationed forces and
    family members. It was to be implemented on an ``as affordable'' basis
    and not according to any specific timeline. However, as Secretary
    Panetta has said, DOD is taking a hard look at everything that costs a
    lot of money, as this would. If confirmed, I will continue to assess
    thoroughly the cost of implementation and our proposed force posture to
    determine the best way forward.
        Question. Do you believe that the security relationship with South
    Korea should remain focused on defense of the Korean Peninsula, or
    should U.S. forces stationed in Korea be available for regional or
    global deployments?
        Answer. In accordance with the commitment to the Mutual Defense
    Treaty between the United States and the ROK, U.S. presence on the
    Korean Peninsula serves to deter potential aggressors from taking
    hostile actions that would threaten the peace and security of the
    Republic of Korea. In my view, this presence has both deterred further
    war on the Korean Peninsula and contributed to the stability of the
    Northeast Asia region. The U.S.-ROK alliance is transforming to ensure
    a capable and relevant forward presence for the future security
    environment. For U.S. forces in Korea, it is my understanding that the
    principles of force management decided at the 42nd Security
    Consultative Meeting in 2010 provide greater flexibility for regional
    and global deployments. As ROK military forces have served and will
    continue to serve with the U.S. military in places off the Peninsula
    (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, and in the Gulf of Aden), I believe the U.S.-
    ROK alliance will continue to serve an important role regionally and
    globally.
        Question. What is your assessment of the security benefits of the
    force repositioning agreed to under the Land Partnership Plan and the
    Yongsan Relocation Plan and how does repositioning U.S. forces change
    the way they will operate on the Korean Peninsula?
        Answer. The two plans work to consolidate and relocate U.S. forces
    from north of Seoul and from the Seoul metropolitan area to locations
    south of Seoul, primarily U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys and Daegu. The
    movement of units and facilities to areas south of the Han River
    improves force protection and survivability, placing the majority of
    personnel and equipment outside of the tactical effective range of
    North Korean artillery. In addition, the move to a central location
    outside of Seoul provides efficiencies, reduces costs, contributes to
    the political sustainability of our forward presence, and improves
    military readiness on the Korean Peninsula.
        Question. Since the North Korean attacks last year--the sinking of
    the South Korean navy ship Cheonan and the artillery attack on the
    South Korean island--South Korea has been adamant that it will respond
    ``firmly'' to the next such provocation. A main topic during recent
    U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meetings was reportedly the Joint
    Operational Plan for responding to future North Korean provocations.
        What is your understanding of the U.S. obligations in the event of
    an attack on South Korea by North Korea, and under what circumstances
    do you believe the U.S. Armed Forces should be committed to engage
    North Korean forces in response to an attack on South Korea?
        Answer. My understanding is that, under the Mutual Defense Treaty,
    when the political independence or security of South Korea or the
    United States are threatened by external armed attack, the United
    States and South Korea will consult together and develop appropriate
    means to deter the attack. Given the pattern and future likelihood of
    North Korean provocations, the two sides should continue to consult
    closely so that responses are effective.
        Question. The February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report
    established a policy and program priority for defending against near-
    term regional ballistic missile threats, and elaborated on the Phased
    Adaptive Approach (PAA) to regional missile defense, including to
    defend against North Korean ballistic missile threats.
        Do you support the missile defense policies and priorities
    established in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, including the PAA
    to missile defense in the Asia-Pacific region to defend against North
    Korean regional ballistic missile threats?
        Answer. Yes, I support the missile defense policy priorities
    established in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, including the
    implementation of PAA to regional missile defense that are tailored to
    the threats in each region and capabilities best suited for deployment.
    It is my understanding that the administration is currently developing
    a PAA to missile defense for the Asia-Pacific region that builds on our
    current missile defense efforts in the region.
        Question. There has been some speculation, mainly in the South
    Korean press, that recent incidents in South Korea, such as allegations
    of assault by U.S. soldiers on Korean civilians and environmental
    issues associated with U.S. bases, may cause the ROK to seek to
    renegotiate some of the terms of the current Status of Forces Agreement
    (SOFA) between the United States and the Republic of Korea.
        What is your opinion regarding whether or not the United States
    should reopen the SOFA to renegotiate any of the terms?
        Answer. I believe the SOFA has served the alliance well since its
    inception in 1967. The U.S.-ROK SOFA is a living document that is
    constantly reviewed and kept current and fresh through the work of the
    Joint Committee, the Special Joint Committee, and some 20 subject
    matter subcommittees that consult frequently with their counterparts
    across the ROK Government. Although the SOFA has been updated twice
    through long, difficult negotiations in 1991 and 2001, the Joint
    Committee process has approved thousands of implementing arrangements
    that effectively address the way in which the SOFA is implemented. This
    process has served both countries well over the years and continues to
    be the best path to address SOFA-related issues.

                                     JAPAN

        Question. How would you characterize the U.S.-Japan security
    relationship?
        Answer. The U.S.-Japan relationship is the cornerstone of security
    in East Asia. Japan is a valued ally and anchor of democracy and
    prosperity in the region. Our alliance has held fast through the
    turbulence of the post-Cold War, political turnover in Japan, and some
    contentious trade disputes, and now stands poised to become a truly
    global alliance. The United States and Japan are in the middle of a
    complicated realignment process that is part of a larger alliance
    transformation agenda that also includes a review of roles, missions,
    and capabilities to strengthen and ensure the relevance, capability,
    and cohesiveness of the alliance for the next several decades. The
    updated Common Strategic Objectives announced at the Security
    Consultative Committee in June 2011 highlight the alliance's ambitious
    agenda, which I fully support.
        Question. How does Japan's relationship with its regional
    neighbors, mainly China, North Korea, and South Korea, influence the
    U.S.-Japan relationship?
        Answer. I believe it is important for Japan to continue to
    cultivate constructive relations with all of its neighbors. By moving
    forward, Japan and other East Asian nations can increase their security
    cooperation. Working with other U.S. allies and partners in the region,
    Japan can increase its contribution to peace, security, and prosperity
    throughout Asia and globally. Japan is a valued and essential partner
    in the Six-Party Talks process and in other important regional security
    architectures.
        Question. What steps, if any, do you believe Japan ought to take to
    become a more active partner in security activities with the United
    States and in the international security arena?
        Answer. The security environment in Asia is changing and the United
    States needs a more capable alliance with Japan to deal with those
    challenges, including greater interoperability between our Armed Forces
    at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. If confirmed, I
    would work to encourage Japan's increasing contributions to the
    alliance, both regionally and globally. I would also encourage
    trilateral security cooperation with the Republic of Korea and with
    Australia, as these kinds of activities effectively strengthen the
    functional capacity of the emerging regional security architecture.
    Cooperation and the development of complementary and mutually
    reinforcing capabilities should range from missile defense to increased
    bilateral training opportunities--in Guam, for example.
        Question. What is your view of the U.S.-Japanese joint development
    of the Standard Missile-3, Block IIA missile defense interceptor, and
    of the overall program of cooperation between the United States and
    Japan on ballistic missile defense?
        Answer. Ballistic missile defense cooperation with Japan is a
    success story for the alliance and has resulted in Japan's fielding of
    both sea- and land-based missile defense systems. Japan is one of our
    most important ballistic missile defense partners, and U.S.-Japan
    bilateral cooperation on ballistic missile defense plays an important
    role in supporting our common strategic objectives on defense. The SM-3
    Block IIA is an important cooperative program that will result in a
    significant increase in ballistic missile defense capability.
        Question. Currently, the 2006 Roadmap Agreement between the United
    States and Japan links the closure of the Futenma Marine Corps Air
    Station on Okinawa and the movement of U.S. marines from Okinawa to
    Guam to the plan to build a Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp
    Schwab on Okinawa. The plan to build the FRF has run into difficulty
    and, as a result, the closure of Futenma and the movement of marines
    remain uncertain.
        What is your opinion of the prospects for the successful
    construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab on
    Okinawa?
        Answer. I believe that the Government of Japan (GOJ), like the U.S.
    Government, remains committed to the 2006 Realignment Roadmap, and
    although both governments have acknowledged that the Futenma
    Replacement Facility will not be constructed by 2014, as originally
    planned, there appears to be positive movement on the construction of a
    replacement facility at Camp Schwab.
        Question. Is the cost-sharing arrangement between the United States
    and Japan to pay for the relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam
    and the costs associated with the continued presence of U.S. forces in
    Japan equitable and appropriate? Why or why not?
        Answer. I believe the cost-arrangement between the United States
    and Japan as outlined in the May 2006 Security Consultative Committee
    (SCC) document known as the Realignment Roadmap is equitable and
    appropriate. For relocations within Japan, the GOJ is paying the lion's
    share of the costs to develop new facilities. The GOJ also understood
    the strong desire of Okinawa residents for the relocation of Marine
    Corps forces from Japan to Guam to occur rapidly and recognized that
    this move--which it explicitly sought--would not happen without
    substantial investment on its part. Spending less than 1 percent of its
    gross domestic product on its national defense, yet desiring the
    continued presence of U.S. forces in close proximity, Japan could also
    clearly justify financial support for U.S. military construction within
    a U.S. territory on the grounds that it is making a direct contribution
    to Japanese security and to overall alliance burdensharing. This
    decision was not without controversy in Japan, as it is highly
    unusual--perhaps even unprecedented--for a host country to pay for U.S.
    forces to relocate out of that country. It will be important for DOD to
    work closely with the GOJ on the project scope, management, and other
    factors to minimize risks to the efforts.
        Question. How, in your view, does building an unpopular new
    airfield on Okinawa, one that could take 7 to 10 years to finish at a
    cost of at least $3.6 billion, serve to improve the U.S.-Japan
    relations in general and the U.S. military-Okinawa relations in
    particular?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the relocation to the Futenma
    Replacement Facility will enable the closing of Marine Corps Air
    Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma), which is located in a very densely
    populated portion of Okinawa. I believe both the U.S. and Japanese
    Governments recognize that retaining the Marine Corps air assets on
    Okinawa, while moving them to a relatively isolated part of the island,
    is essential to the operational readiness of the Marine Corps ground
    units stationed there. Successive Japanese and U.S. Government
    officials have examined this problem, and have concluded that the
    vicinity of Henoko and Camp Schwab is the best place for this
    capability.
        Question. What do you see as the implications, if any, of the
    planned force posture changes in Korea, Japan, and Guam on the U.S.
    commitment to the Asia-Pacific region in general? How does the planned
    relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam improve U.S. security in
    the region? How does the planned relocation of U.S. forces on the
    Korean Peninsula improve security?
        Answer. As this administration considers posture changes in the
    Asia-Pacific region, my understanding is that we are seeking to build a
    presence that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient,
    and politically sustainable. I understand that our goal is to sustain
    the U.S. presence in Northeast Asia, while enhancing it in Southeast
    Asia. I believe that all of the initiatives underway, including changes
    on the Korean Peninsula as well as Okinawa and Guam, support these
    broad objectives.

                                     INDIA

        Question. What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-India
    security relations?
        Answer. In my view, a close and continuing security relationship
    with India will be important for security in Asia and for effectively
    managing Indian Ocean security in the 21st century. The United States
    and India have a range of common security interests that include
    maritime security, counterterrorism, and humanitarian assistance and
    disaster relief. Over the past decade, there has been a rapid
    transformation in the U.S.-India defense relationship. What was once a
    nascent relationship between unfamiliar nations has now evolved into a
    strategic partnership between two of the preeminent security powers in
    Asia. Today, U.S.-India defense ties are strong and growing. Our
    defense relationship involves a robust slate of dialogues, military
    exercises, defense trade, personnel exchanges, and armaments
    cooperation. Efforts over the past 10 years have focused on
    relationship-building and establishing the foundation for a long-term
    partnership. The strong ties between our two militaries reflect this.
    It is also my understanding that the United States remains committed to
    a broad defense trade relationship that enables transfers of some of
    our most advanced technologies.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific priorities would you
    establish for this relationship?
        Answer. If confirmed, I believe our priorities for this
    relationship should be focused on increasing maritime security
    cooperation, expanding the military-to-military relationship, and
    deepening cooperation on defense trade and production. Additionally, I
    believe there is potential for cooperating on counterproliferation,
    collaborating on humanitarian assistance and disaster response, dealing
    with piracy, cooperating on counterterrorism, greater intelligence
    sharing on common threats, and working towards stability in Afghanistan
    and the broader Indian Ocean region.
        Question. What, in your view, is the effect on DOD interests, if
    any, of the civil-nuclear cooperation agreement with India?
        Answer. The civil-nuclear cooperation agreement was a landmark
    agreement that significantly transformed the U.S.-India bilateral
    relationship. The agreement has also deepened the level of trust
    between the United States and India that will have positive effects on
    DOD interests and will hopefully lead to greater military-to-military
    cooperation and increased defense trade.
        Question. What is your assessment of the relationship between India
    and China and how does that relationship impact the security and
    stability of the region?
        Answer. As Asia's two largest powers, India and China collectively
    will have a significant impact on Asia's future security landscape.
    Both countries are in the process of building their respective military
    capabilities. It is important to engage actively with both of these
    Asian powers to ensure they both contribute in a positive way towards
    Asian stability and security. Both countries should adhere to
    international norms and standards in their resolution of outstanding
    issues.
        Question. What do you believe the United States should do to assist
    the Indian Government in the prevention of and response to terrorist
    events in India?
        Answer. As the world's largest democracy, I believe that India is a
    critical strategic partner of the United States. Both India and the
    United States share an interest in preventing terrorism.
    Counterterrorism cooperation with India is led by the Departments of
    State and Homeland Security, with support from DOD. If confirmed, I
    will work with both Departments to consider carefully all requests for
    counterterrorism assistance from India.
        Question. What is your assessment of the current relationship
    between India and Pakistan?
        Answer. In announcing the return to talks in early February, India
    and Pakistan's foreign secretaries agreed that a number of outstanding
    issues were on the table, including Kashmir, counterterrorism,
    humanitarian issues, and trade. It is good to see both nations make
    progress on these fronts. In early November, Pakistan's cabinet
    approved extending Most Favored Nation trade status to India.
    Subsequently, India and Pakistan's Prime Ministers met on the sidelines
    of the recent South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
    summit in the Maldives, where they heralded a new chapter in their
    relationship. I understand there will be talks soon on nuclear and
    conventional confidence-building measures, which will be critically
    important. I am pleased that both nations continue to engage with each
    other, and I am hopeful that confidence-building measures are able to
    take root to promote a greater level of trust between the two
    countries.
        Question. In your view, what impact has the ongoing tension between
    Pakistan and India had on the stability of Central and South Asia
    generally, and on the prospects for lasting security in Afghanistan?
        Answer. India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan are linked by history,
    culture, language, and trade, and regional stability cannot be achieved
    without the cooperation of all three countries. It is critically
    important that Afghanistan work to build positive relationships with
    all of its neighbors. In my view, the strategic partnership between
    India and Afghanistan is a bilateral matter between these two
    countries. It is my understanding that both countries have made clear
    that their partnership is not directed at any other countries. This
    should not be seen as a threat to Pakistan, nor a statement that
    Pakistan is no longer part of the solution. I believe it is the
    administration's view that India and Afghanistan should be transparent
    with their neighbors, including Pakistan, on the content of their
    partnership and the activities they carry out under it. I support this
    position because it has the best chances for stability of Central and
    South Asia.

                          REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

        Question. What is your view of the current state of U.S.-
    Philippines military-to-military relations?
        Answer. The Philippines is one of five treaty allies of the United
    States and is a committed bilateral and regional partner, especially in
    combating terrorism. The alliance with the Philippines remains strong,
    and the Philippines remains important to the United States and to
    regional stability in general.
        Question. What do you believe the U.S. goals should be in the
    Republic of the Philippines and how best can we achieve those goals?
        Answer. I believe U.S. defense goals should be to deny safe haven,
    sanctuary, and training areas for terrorist groups; and to partner in
    cooperative regional maritime security programs. These goals are best
    achieved through U.S. Government security assistance and security
    cooperation programs.
        Question. What is your assessment of recent U.S. military efforts
    in the Philippines and the effectiveness of the U.S. assistance being
    provided to the Philippines military in its fight against insurgent
    groups?
        Answer. In my view, the U.S. military is working effectively with
    the armed forces of the Philippines to provide assistance that is
    consistent with Philippines constitutional restrictions on foreign
    forces. The Philippines armed forces continue to professionalize and
    reform in a manner consistent with U.S. and Philippine defense goals
    and objectives. They benefit from various security assistance programs,
    exercises, and engagement opportunities that develop capacity and
    capability with their military. These efforts have resulted in
    successful counterterrorism operations against the Abu Sayaf Group and
    Jemah Ismaliya in the Southern Philippines. Lastly, it is my
    understanding that our security engagement programs have also resulted
    in better regional maritime security cooperation.
        Question. Do you anticipate a reduced U.S. military footprint or
    change in mission for U.S. military forces in the Philippines in the
    near- to mid-term?
        Answer. In my view, it is important to support the Philippines
    military in its operations in the south. It is my understanding that
    DOD is monitoring progress and plans to assess whether there needs to
    be an adjustment in the overall mission. If confirmed, I will work to
    coordinate these efforts with other departments and agencies with an
    eye towards a whole-of-government approach.
        Question. What policy guidelines, if any, would you establish, if
    confirmed, to ensure that U.S. personnel do not become involved in
    combat or law enforcement in the Republic of the Philippines?
        Answer. In my view, the established current policy guidelines are
    clear: the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement
    guide bilateral policy with the Republic of the Philippines. The
    Philippines constitution prevents foreign forces from conducting combat
    operations in the Philippines. Deployed U.S. forces will continue to
    comply with these limitations set by the Philippines Government.

                                   INDONESIA

        Question. Indonesia is a key Asian power and is the largest Muslim
    country in the world. Consequently, it is important to build on
    opportunities to improve and expand U.S. relations with Indonesia where
    possible. Last summer, Secretary Gates announced that DOD intended to
    resume working with elements of the Indonesian Special Forces, known as
    Kopassus. DOD engagement with Kopassus had been suspended for more than
    a decade because of past human rights violations by some of its
    members.
        What is your view of the current state of military-to-military
    relations with Indonesia and, specifically, Kopassus?
        Answer. The U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military relationship
    continues to improve after the end of years of restrictions. I believe
    the 2005 decision to waive congressional restrictions on bilateral
    military cooperation and the July 2010 decision by Secretary Gates to
    begin limited engagement with Kopassus have enhanced our ability to
    support Indonesia's efforts to consolidate its democratic
    transformation and to support its efforts to reform and professionalize
    the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI).
        Question. What is your understanding of the extent to which the
    Indonesian Government is cooperating with the United States in the war
    on terrorism?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would consult with the Assistant Secretary
    of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict on this
    question. Based on my current understanding, I believe that the
    Government of Indonesia has cooperated closely and effectively with the
    United States and our allies in combating global terrorist networks in
    the region, particularly against Jema'a Islamiya.
        Question. Do you favor increased U.S.-Indonesian military-to-
    military contacts? If so, under what conditions? Why?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would support increased military-to-
    military contacts. I believe we want Indonesia and the TNI to consider
    the United States as a strong and credible partner, particularly where
    our values and interests coincide in the critical areas of
    democratization and reform, bilateral and regional security
    cooperation, and counterterrorism. Our measured and gradual program of
    security activities with Koppasus will continue to take into account
    the implementation of reforms within the TNI. All activities will be in
    accordance with U.S. law, which, of course, requires individual and
    unit human rights vetting as a prelude to receiving U.S. military
    training or assistance.
        Question. What is your understanding of the factors that informed
    the decision to re-engage with Kopassus members?
        Answer. My understanding is that the significant reforms across the
    TNI and the Indonesian defense ministers' commitment to protect human
    rights and advance accountability contributed to Secretary Gates'
    decision for DOD to begin a measured and gradual program of security
    cooperation activities with Kopassus.
        Question. What is your view of the commitment of the Indonesian
    military leadership to professionalization of its armed forces,
    adhering to human rights standards, improving military justice, and
    cooperating with law enforcement efforts to investigate and prosecute
    those military personnel accused of human rights abuses?
        Answer. The Government of Indonesia continues to make progress in
    military reform. Early progress toward defense reform--separation of
    the police from the military, eliminating formal political roles for
    the TNI, increasing accountability, and human rights training--has been
    sustained. Continued progress on the divestiture of TNI businesses
    would be an unmistakable indication of Indonesia's commitment to
    reform. The 2002 Defense Law and the 2004 TNI Law codified the roles
    and responsibilities of the TNI as a mechanism to support, not replace,
    civilian government. Continued ``hard'' reforms that the United States
    should continue to support include full accountability for past human
    rights abuses, strengthening civilian control, putting the TNI fully
    ``on budget,'' and continued professionalization of the TNI officer
    corps.
        Question. If confirmed, what would you do to encourage respect for
    human rights and accountability in the Indonesian military?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would sustain efforts to encourage
    professionalism within the military in terms of both respect for human
    rights and accountability, through bilateral security discussions,
    joint training, military assistance, and military training programs.
    U.S. security assistance and security cooperation programs are the most
    effective channels to encourage professionalism in the Indonesian
    military.

                         HIGH ALTITUDE TRANSITION PLAN

        Question. DOD, under the High Altitude Transition (HAT) Plan,
    intends to retire the U-2 intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance (ISR) fleet in the middle of this decade and replace
    these aircraft with the Global Hawk RQ-4. Under the HAT Plan, the RQ-4s
    will apparently be a PACOM-wide asset, flying missions throughout the
    region, whereas the U-2s have been dedicated to supporting U.S. and
    Korean forces on the Korean peninsula. The United States and the ROK
    have been considering a ROK purchase of the Global Hawk aircraft
    through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process. If this FMS case were
    to proceed, much but not all of the impact of U-2 retirement would be
    mitigated, but either way the level of airborne ISR available on a day-
    to-day basis in Korea may well be diminished.
        In your assessment, is the possibility that the level of airborne
    ISR available on a day-to-day basis will be diminished a concern, or
    are there other means to compensate for the retirement of the U-2?
        Answer. Allied ISR capabilities on the Korean Peninsula and in the
    region contribute significantly to our ability to defend the United
    States and our allies and partners, promote regional stability, and
    protect our collective interests. I have not had a chance to review the
    U-2 retirement issue in detail, but if confirmed, I will be an advocate
    for a strong and well-equipped U.S. forward presence on the Korean
    peninsula.
        Question. If the sale does not go through, how would you propose
    that the United States sustain required levels of airborne ISR support
    on the Korean peninsula?
        Answer. I have not had an opportunity to examine this issue in
    detail. If confirmed, I will research this issue and work closely with
    my colleagues in DOD and other relevant departments and agencies to
    ensure that we do not experience a reduction in ISR capabilities that
    would diminish our ability to execute our required missions.

                            COUNTERPIRACY OPERATIONS

        Question. Since January 2009, the U.S. Navy has been patrolling the
    waters of the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia as part of the
    international coalition engaged in counterpiracy operations. Prior to
    the engagement off the coast of Somalia, DOD worked with many of our
    Asian partners to address the threat of piracy in Southeast Asia, such
    as in the Strait of Malacca.
        What is your understanding of the current threat of piracy in the
    Asia-Pacific region?
        Answer. Piracy in the Asia-Pacific region has declined in recent
    years, largely due to committed efforts of regional littoral states.
    Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia, for example, took the initiative--
    with U.S. support to provide increased security to key sea lines, in
    particular, the Strait of Malacca. Although piracy has declined in the
    Strait of Malacca, there are instances of piracy in the southern parts
    of the South China Sea, and we should be mindful that, as long as
    piracy remains a lucrative business model, it will be attractive not
    only in the Asia-Pacific region, but around the world.
        Question. What role, if any, should DOD play in countering any
    piracy threat in the Asia-Pacific region?
        Answer. The situation off the coast of Somalia and in the western
    Indian Ocean demonstrates that the military cannot solve the overall
    problem of piracy. Military force addresses the symptoms, not the
    causes, of piracy. In the Asia-Pacific region, DOD should provide
    capacity building and training support to enhance the ability of
    regional states to counter piracy when such support aligns with broader
    U.S. objectives and interests in the region and complements the
    political commitment of regional countries, as was the case with
    Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia regarding piracy in the Strait of
    Malacca.

                    INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING CONTRIBUTIONS

        Question. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign
    Affairs (July 29, 2009), Ambassador Susan Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the
    United Nations, stated that the United States ``is willing to consider
    directly contributing more military observers, military staff officers,
    civilian police, and other civilian personnel--including more women I
    should note--to U.N. peacekeeping operations.''
        What is your view on whether the United States should contribute
    more military personnel as both staff officers and military observers
    in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations?
        What are the advantages and disadvantages of contributing
    additional military personnel to U.N. operations?
        If confirmed, would you support identifying methods through which
    the DOD personnel system could be more responsive to requests for
    personnel support from multilateral institutions like the United
    Nations?
        Answer. The United States has a stake in the success of U.N.
    peacekeeping operations. I believe that, where practicable, the United
    States should continue to provide military personnel for U.N.
    peacekeeping operations, especially for key staff positions that can
    help shape the direction and success of the mission. However, as with
    any investment, there are associated costs.
        If confirmed, I will work to ensure that DOD evaluates requests for
    personnel support from multilateral institutions, weighing the
    potential positive impact of U.S. participation in the mission against
    other military commitments and the proposed cost of U.S. involvement.

                              COMBATTING TERRORISM

        Question. The administration recently released its National
    Strategy for Counterterrorism. This strategy highlights the need to
    maintain pressure on al Qaeda's core while building the capacity of
    partners to confront mutual threats. The strategy also underscores the
    need to augment efforts to counter threats from al Qaeda-linked groups
    ``that continue to emerge from beyond its core safe haven in South
    Asia.''
        If confirmed, what would be your role within DOD with respect to
    counterterrorism?
        Answer. The National Strategy for Counterterrorism maintains focus
    on pressuring al Qaeda's core while emphasizing the need to build
    foreign partnerships and capacity and to strengthen our resilience. If
    confirmed, I understand that my role in this effort will be to work
    closely with the nations in this strategically important region to
    build enduring partnerships and capabilities, degrade the links between
    al Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents, and eliminate terrorist safe
    havens. At the same time, I would work closely with colleagues in the
    U.S. interagency, as well as with our allies and partners, in order to
    support the counterterrorism strategy's objective of applying a whole-
    of-government approach to defeating al Qaeda.
        Question. What do you believe is the terrorism threat from al Qaeda
    and affiliated groups in the Asia-Pacific region?
        Answer. There have been important recent successes in the fight
    against al Qaeda, most notably the successful operation against Osama
    bin Laden. Despite these important successes, from its base of
    operations in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, al Qaeda
    continues to pose a persistent and evolving threat to the United
    States. Despite significant losses to its command structure, al Qaeda
    is adapting, and uses its safe haven to continue attack-planning as
    well as produce propaganda, communicate guidance to affiliates and
    operational cells in the region and abroad, solicit logistical and
    financial support, and provide training and indoctrination to new
    operatives.
        Question. Is there a nexus between terrorist groups and criminal
    networks in the Asia-Pacific region?
        Answer. Transnational criminal activity, including narcotics
    trafficking and arms smuggling, provides pathways and opportunities for
    terrorist organizations to move people and resources across the region.
    Kidnapping for ransom and piracy have the potential to generate
    millions of dollars, some of which may end up in the hands of
    terrorists to fund operations, training, and recruitment.
        Question. In Southeast Asia, most notably in the Philippines and
    Indonesia, U.S. engagement with partner nations has helped combat
    violent extremist ideology and activities. The integration of
    operations by host nation security forces with U.S. capacity building,
    development, and information support operations has dramatically
    reduced the ability of violent extremist organizations to operate.
        What more can the United States do in Southeast Asia to help combat
    the threat of terrorism perpetrated by violent extremists?
        Answer. The new National Strategy for Counterterrorism recognizes
    the success our partners have had in maintaining pressure on the
    region's most lethal terrorist organizations, while noting that the
    region remains potentially fertile ground for local terrorists who
    share al Qaeda's ideology and motivations. Going forward, the United
    States should continue to assist in building the security capacity of
    governments in the region that consistently demonstrate their
    commitment against al Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents.
        Question. Which Southeast Asian countries are most important in the
    fight against terrorism in that region and what should the United
    States do to enhance relations with those countries?
        Answer. Because of the prominent interagency aspects of building
    partner-nation counterterrorism capacity, especially on the law
    enforcement side, DOD will often serve in a supporting role. As
    reflected in the National Strategy for Counterterrorism, the United
    States has developed a robust network of bilateral counterterrorism
    relationships with key countries in Southeast Asia, including
    Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Australia. For
    DOD, Indonesia and the Philippines should be the top priorities for
    counterterrorism capacity-building assistance in Southeast Asia,
    notably through section 1206 programs. Section 1206 (of the National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, as amended) remains one
    of DOD's most effective authorities for building partner capacity to
    combat terrorism. DOD enjoys good relations with Indonesia and the
    Philippines and, in close consultation with Congress and the Department
    of State, should sustain and enhance these relationships through
    continued policy dialogues, security cooperation, and security
    assistance programs.

                            SECTION 1208 OPERATIONS

        Question. Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), as amended
    by subsequent legislation, authorizes the provision of support
    (including training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces,
    irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military
    operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.
        What is your assessment of the overall effectiveness of this
    authority?
        Answer. I understand that section 1208 authority is a key tool that
    combatant commanders have repeatedly confirmed as essential to
    combating terrorism in their areas of responsibility. It enables the
    special operations forces under their control to leverage willing
    partners that possess access to areas, people, and information that are
    denied to our forces, but critical to tactical and strategic success.
    The authority has allowed DOD to respond quickly to emergent global
    challenges. Section 1208 requires appropriate civilian oversight,
    including Secretary of Defense approval and congressional notification.

               DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERNARCOTICS ACTIVITIES

        Question. On an annual basis, DOD's counternarcotics (CN) program
    expends approximately $1.5 billion to support CN operations, build the
    capacity of certain foreign governments in Asia and around the globe,
    and analyze intelligence on CN-related matters.
        What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD CN program?
        Answer. Drug trafficking and associated organized crime are
    multidimensional threats to the United States. In addition to the
    impact on our Nation's public health and economy, drug trafficking and
    other forms of transnational organized crime provide a funding source
    for terrorists and insurgents, undermine legitimate government
    institutions, and contribute to international instability.
        I have not had an opportunity to assess the DOD CN program. If
    confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress, and counterparts at
    DOD, the Department of State, and the National Security Staff to ensure
    that these programs achieve measureable results in the Asia-Pacific
    region and that those results are clearly aligned with the goals of the
    National Security Strategy and the National Drug Control Strategy.
        Question. What is your understanding of the illegal narcotics
    industry in Asia?
        Answer. South and Southeast Asia have become increasingly more
    attractive as bases for drug trafficking organizations' production and
    smuggling operations. Several Asian and Pacific nations have
    experienced a significant increase in the production, transshipment,
    trafficking, and consumption of narcotics in recent years.
    Methamphetamine produced using diverted precursor chemicals, heroin
    transshipment through Asia, poppy cultivation, and potential narco-
    terrorist funding remain the primary drug threats to the United States
    from the Asia-Pacific region.
        Question. What role, if any, should DOD play in countering--either
    directly or by, through, and with our Asian partners--the illegal
    narcotics industry in Asia?
        Answer. I believe that the current DOD role is appropriate. DOD
    serves as the single lead agency for the detection and monitoring of
    aerial and maritime trafficking of illicit drugs flowing toward the
    United States. In addition, DOD plays a critical role in supporting
    U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies responsible for counterdrug
    and drug-related activities, primarily through information-sharing and
    building partner-nation security capacity. In cooperation with U.S.
    interagency and foreign partners, DOD conducts activities to detect,
    disrupt, and dismantle drug-related transnational threats in Asia and
    the Pacific.
        Question. On an annual basis, DOD spends approximately $500 million
    building the capacity of the Afghanistan Government to counter the
    illegal narcotics trade. Despite this sizable annual investment,
    Afghanistan remains the ``wellspring of the global opium trade,
    accounting for 93 percent of all opium poppy cultivation,'' according
    to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC). UNODC has also
    found that about 80 percent of the drugs derived from Afghan opium
    poppies are smuggled out by transnational organized criminal groups
    through the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan; the rest flow
    through Central Asia.
        What is your assessment of DOD's CN program in Afghanistan?
        Answer. I understand that DOD supports CN efforts in Afghanistan by
    building Afghan capacity and working with U.S. law enforcement agencies
    such as DEA, CBP, FBI, and ICE to interdict narcotics trafficking.
    Although DOD supports Afghan eradication efforts, the Department of
    State has the lead for that effort. This year the interdiction of
    opiates and precursor chemicals in Afghanistan has increased. Afghan CN
    police-vetted units, mentored by DEA, are now capable of conducting
    drug interdiction operations and have been actively involved in
    combined operations with DEA and military forces. DOD has also been
    building the capacity of the Afghan border management efforts to stop
    drugs from leaving Afghanistan and precursor chemicals from entering
    the country.
        Question. Do you think the DOD CN program in Afghanistan has been
    successful to date?
        Answer. Yes. I believe that considerable improvements have been
    made this year with military and law enforcement coordination.

                UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

        Question. Do you support U.S. accession to the United Nations
    Convention on the Law of the Sea? If so, why?
        Answer. I support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.
    It is in the enduring interests of the United States to be at the
    forefront of promoting the rule of law, including in the world's
    oceans. U.S. accession to the Convention would send an additional,
    clear signal to the world that we remain committed to advancing the
    rule of law at sea. Additionally, under the Convention, the United
    States would have the firmest possible legal foundation for the
    navigational rights and freedoms needed to project power, reassure
    allies and partners, deter adversaries, respond to crises, sustain
    deployed combat forces, and secure sea and air lines of communication
    that underpin international trade and our own economic prosperity.
        Question. Would U.S. accession to the United Nations Law of the Sea
    Convention benefit the U.S. military's mission in the Asia-Pacific
    region? If so, how?
        Answer. U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention would
    benefit the U.S. military's mission in the Asia-Pacific region by
    enabling the United States to reinforce and assert the Convention's
    freedom of navigation and overflight rights, including transit passage
    in strategic straits. In addition, becoming a party to the Convention
    would support combined operations with regional partners and support
    the Proliferation Security Initiative; establish undisputed title to
    our extended continental shelf areas; strengthen our position in
    bilateral discussions with the People's Republic of China; and bolster
    our leadership in future developments in the law of the sea. Accession
    would also improve the United States' position and add to our
    credibility in a large number of Asia-focused multilateral venues where
    Law of the Sea matters are discussed.

                           POW/MIA ACCOUNTING EFFORTS

        Question. The Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command is critical to the
    recovery and identification of remains of missing military members.
    Recovery of remains of U.S. servicemembers from World War II, the
    Korean War, and the Vietnam war continues to be a high priority. On
    October 20, 2011, DOD announced an agreement with North Korea that will
    allow U.S. personnel to return to North Korea to resume recovery of
    remains of U.S. servicemembers missing from the Korean War. Recovery
    operations in North Korea were suspended in 2005.
        What is your understanding of this recent agreement to resume
    recovery operations in North Korea?
        Answer. It is my understanding that Deputy Assistant Secretary of
    Defense Robert Newberry, Director of the POW/Missing Personnel Office
    (DPMO), led an interagency team to conduct negotiations with the North
    Korean military last month, which reached a successful arrangement to
    resume recovery operations. The operations in North Korea are expected
    to begin next year and will mark the first operations since 2005 when
    the United States halted missions because of increased tensions on the
    Korean Peninsula. Prior to that time, U.S. specialists from the Joint
    POW/MIA Accounting Command conducted recovery operations in that
    country for 10 years, recovering remains believed to be more than 225
    servicemen since 1996.
        It is my understanding that the arrangement calls for U.S. teams to
    work in two areas in North Korea--Unsan County, about 60 miles north of
    Pyongyang, and near the Chosin/Jangjin Reservoir--where more than 2,000
    soldiers and marines are believed to be missing.
        Question. How might the resumption of recovery efforts in North
    Korea impact the future of the Six-Party Talks or the stability on the
    Korean Peninsula?
        Answer. Remains recovery operations are a humanitarian issue
    between the United States and North Korea and are divorced from other
    political issues. I would have to defer to the Department of State for
    remarks on the future of the Six-Party Talks. The ROK-U.S. alliance and
    the U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea remains a cornerstone
    not only of stability on the Korean Peninsula, but throughout Northeast
    Asia more broadly.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to
    enhance POW/MIA recovery efforts in the U.S. Pacific Command area of
    responsibility?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy Assistant
    Secretary for DPMO, Pacific Command, the State Department, and all
    other organizations involved to provide advice and support whenever
    necessary.

                            FOREIGN LANGUAGE POLICY

        Question. In 2005, DOD approved the Defense Language Transformation
    Roadmap to improve the Department's foreign language capability and
    regional area expertise. Since then, the Department has been working
    toward implementing that roadmap.
        How many Mandarin and/or Cantonese speakers does DOD have in
    intelligence analyst positions?
        Is this number sufficient to ensure good intelligence assessments
    for use by the Office of Asian and Pacific Security Affairs?
        In your view, how should the United States expand the foreign
    language skills of civilian and military personnel in order to improve
    the quality of intelligence input to, and policy output by, the Office
    of Asian and Pacific Security Affairs?
        Answer. I have not had an opportunity to examine this issue in
    detail. If confirmed, I will research this issue and will look forward
    to working with Congress to ensure DOD builds sufficient foreign
    language capability and regional area expertise.

                             COUNTER-THREAT FINANCE

        Question. A number of officials in DOD and the Intelligence
    Community have called for investing significantly more resources in
    identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorist
    networks and illicit trafficking.
        What are your views on the role of DOD in counter-threat finance
    activities?
        Answer. Terrorists, drug traffickers, and other adversaries rely
    heavily on legal and illegal funding sources to support their
    activities, which routinely work against U.S. interests. It is critical
    to engage all U.S. Government tools to track and halt the flow of money
    associated with these organizations. It is my understanding that DOD
    has capability to identify and disrupt our adversaries' finances while
    working with its interagency counterparts in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
    DOD is not the U.S. Government lead agency in counter-threat finance,
    but I believe it plays a supportive role by working with other
    departments and agencies, and with partner nations, to fight our
    adversaries' abilities to use global financial networks.
        Question. In your view, should DOD seek to expand its support to
    other U.S. Government departments and agencies conducting counter-
    threat finance activities?
        Answer. DOD should increase its cooperation with U.S. law
    enforcement agencies, the Treasury Department, the Intelligence
    Community, and the Department of State to target and degrade
    adversaries' funding sources where possible. DOD counter-threat finance
    policy provides that DOD should work with other U.S. Government
    departments and agencies and with partner nations to deny or disrupt,
    or defeat and degrade adversaries' abilities to use global licit and
    illicit financial networks to affect U.S. interests negatively. Greater
    cooperation will yield greater ability to target adversaries'
    vulnerabilities using a whole-of-government approach including
    interdiction, sanctions, and other law enforcement actions.
        Question. Transnational criminal organizations are having a
    debilitating impact on the ability of our foreign partners to govern
    their nations and provide opportunities for their people.
        Do you think expanding counter-threat finance activities in the
    Asia-Pacific region would be beneficial? If so, what role--if any--
    should DOD play in those activities?
        Answer. Several dangerous terrorist organizations operate in the
    Asia-Pacific region. Not only do they seek to target the United States,
    but they work to destabilize the region. Expanding counter-threat
    finance activities in this part of the world would be a powerful way to
    target the finances of these organizations, hindering their ability to
    purchase weapons, pay salaries, and conduct attacks. Conducting
    counter-threat finance activities is most successful through a whole-
    of-government approach. I understand that PACOM and JIATF-West have
    already undertaken counter-threat finance efforts. If confirmed, I
    would advocate that DOD continue to work in collaboration with
    interagency partners and provide analytical capabilities, technology,
    strategic and operations planning, and personnel to attack the revenue
    used by these terrorist organizations.

                            CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

        Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
    appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
    briefings, and other communications of information.
        Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
    this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
    committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
    information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
    with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs?
        Answer. Yes.
        Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other
    communications of information are provided to this committee and its
    staff and other appropriate committees?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such
    documents?
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Webb

                            U.S. BASES IN EAST ASIA

        1. Senator Webb. Mr. Lippert, please describe the leadership
    approach you would take, if confirmed, to resolve the present
    challenges regarding the realignment of U.S. bases in East Asia,
    including Korea, Japan, and Guam. This should include which offices and
    leaders you believe should be consulted, both in the United States and
    abroad.
        Mr. Lippert. If confirmed, I will take an active, intense, and
    inclusive leadership approach to resolving ongoing realignment
    initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region, ensuring that the United States
    remains a Pacific power with a sustainable forward military presence in
    the region.
        I will be sure to give priority to these issues commensurate with
    the importance that our allies place upon them. For example, basing
    issues in Japan are among the most important bilateral issues for this
    key treaty ally, and I believe they should be treated as such. If
    confirmed, I would request to make my first overseas trip centered
    around this set of issues.
        If confirmed, I will be sure to keep an open mind and consult
    thoroughly with key stakeholders on these issues. It is critical to
    hear the views of U.S. Military Services, relevant components of DOD
    and the rest of the interagency, concerned congressional offices with
    long track records on this issue, and the elected leadership in Guam.
    As mentioned above, it is also important to gather the views of foreign
    leadership--which includes the national-level (to include
    parliamentarians) and local-level officials in these countries. The
    views of groups outside the government such as NGOs and think-tanks
    should also be taken into consideration.
        I recognize the limits of the position of Assistant Secretary of
    Defense on this issue, but I believe that, if confirmed, my background
    in the executive branch and on Capitol Hill makes me well-positioned to
    play an important role as a conduit between different elements of the
    U.S. Government and foreign governments on this complex and critical
    set of issues.

        2. Senator Webb. Mr. Lippert, please provide your views on the
    observations contained on these realignment matters contained in the
    May 6, 2011, letter from Chairman Levin and Senator Webb to then
    Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Mr. Lippert. It is my belief that this is a thoughtful and an
    insightful letter written by Members of the Senate with decades of
    defense and Asian policy experience. After reading the letter, talking
    with you personally, and consulting with others, I have a clear
    understanding that there are concerns regarding the feasibility of
    certain planned realignments and the complexities surrounding these
    issues--especially cost and political issues. I share your stated goal
    of a ``continuous and vigorous U.S. presence in the region'' and the
    importance you place upon the relationship with our allies in the
    region.
        I understand that senior Department of Defense (DOD) officials have
    been in contact with you to follow-up on this and other letters that
    you have written on the subject. If confirmed, I will endeavor to get
    up-to-speed on the latest developments, conduct a rigorous round of
    consultations, and engage with you further on these issues.
        Like you, I am committed to working with the interagency, Congress,
    our allies, and other stakeholders to effectively address operational,
    political, and fiscal realities while enhancing our strategic interests
    in East Asia.

        3. Senator Webb. Mr. Lippert, please provide your views on the
    questions raised in the October 21, 2011, letter from Chairman Levin
    and Senator McCain to Secretary Panetta, and the October 19, 2011,
    letter from Senator Webb to Secretary Panetta.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Mr. Lippert. My answer to this question does not vary significantly
    from question #2, as I believe the October 21 and October 19 letters
    can and should be read as specific proposals that stem from the well-
    articulated views in the May 6 letter.
        I certainly agree with your comments concerning the importance of
    the security alliance with Japan and the need to resolve the basing
    issues in that country. Again, after reviewing this correspondence,
    speaking with you personally, and consulting with others, I have a
    clear understanding that there are concerns regarding the feasibility
    of certain planned realignments and the complexities surrounding these
    issues--especially cost and political issues.
        As outlined in question #2, if confirmed, I look forward to
    engaging with you as a key partner in working to try to resolve these
    difficult, complex--yet critical--issues.

        4. Senator Webb. Mr. Lippert, please provide your views on the
    recent statement in the court papers filed by the Department of
    Justice, as reported in the press, that it will take the Navy at least
    2 more years to complete a supplemental environmental study of certain
    training requirements associated with the military buildup on Guam.
        Mr. Lippert. I am aware that the Navy is currently responding to
    this lawsuit, but do not know the specific details at this time. If
    confirmed, I will be sure to work closely with my counterparts to
    resolve this issue in an expeditious manner.

        5. Senator Webb. Mr. Lippert, please provide your views on
    alternate scenarios related to the relocation of Marine Corps Air
    Station Futenma including the possibility of joint-use runways in Naha,
    Okinawa.
        Mr. Lippert. I understand that there are proposals outside of the
    administration to examine the feasibility of moving Marine Corps assets
    at Futenma to Kadena Air Force Base, while dispersing a percentage of
    Air Force assets now at Kadena into other areas of the Pacific. This
    would be part of a broader plan that would revise the current Marine
    Corps implementation plan for Guam.
        I have heard only the broad contours of proposals, also coming from
    outside the administration, concerning development of the international
    airport at Naha as a joint-use facility that could be utilized by U.S.
    forces in contingency situations. My understanding is that Naha has a
    single runway, currently shared with the Japan Air Self Defense Force.
        If confirmed, I would need to consult thoroughly with key
    stakeholders and experts on these issues before commenting further.

        6. Senator Webb. Mr. Lippert, please provide your views on the
    impact on these East Asia realignments, if any, of the recent decision
    to utilize certain military facilities in Darwin, Australia, for U.S.
    Marine Corps training and other activities.
        Mr. Lippert. It is my understanding that the recent announcement
    regarding enhanced Marine Corps rotational training in Australia is not
    linked to our realignment agreement with Japan. The U.S. marines
    deployed to Darwin will be globally sourced.
                                     ______

                  Question Submitted by Senator Scott P. Brown

                                 CHINESE THREAT

        7. Senator Brown. Mr. Lippert, last year China asserted itself as
    the second largest economy in world. Along with its growing industrial
    prowess, China continues to grow and modernize its military. It has
    both increased its conventional forces, with programs like the J-20 5th
    generation fighter, and its diplomatic and humanitarian efforts to
    increase its access to raw materials and overseas markets. Furthermore,
    China has conducted pervasive collection efforts on the United States
    including private sector, dual-use, and military industries and
    technologies. The growth of China's military and its cyber capabilities
    are of great concern to me. How do you perceive China's threat to the
    United States and its allies and how is the threat being mitigated?
        Mr. Lippert. I have a clear-eyed view concerning the U.S.
    relationship with China. In some aspects it is cooperative; in others
    aspects it is competitive. As President Obama has stated, ``the [U.S.-
    China] relationship has not been without disagreement and difficulty.
    But the notion that we must be adversaries is not predestined.'' China
    is rapidly modernizing its military in the information age. With a
    focused set of missions and ready access to advanced technology in the
    global marketplace, China is accelerating the pace of its military
    modernization. If unanswered by an effective strategy, this could lead
    to a gradual erosion of our relative advantage and influence. I believe
    in a strategy that engages China; helps integrate China into
    international institutions; and balances China with our capabilities,
    alliances, and partnerships. Given the uncertainty around the evolution
    of China, I believe it is vital that we maintain a strong and effective
    force posture in the region that is geographically distributed,
    operationally resilient, and politically sustainable.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn

                 CHINA AND TAIWAN CROSS-STRAIT SECURITY BALANCE

        8. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, in your answers to the advance
    policy questions, you stated that ``China's military buildup continues
    to pose anti-access/area-denial challenges and shift the cross-strait
    balance'' (between China and Taiwan) in China's favor. You also
    acknowledged that China's ``near-term focus appears to be on preparing
    for potential contingencies involving Taiwan, and to deter or deny
    effective intervention in a cross-strait conflict.'' Many of us
    remember the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996, when China tried to
    intimidate Taiwan on the eve of its first free presidential elections
    by conducting a series of military exercises that included the firing
    of missiles just a few miles north of Taiwan. President Clinton
    responded by ordering the largest U.S. military force since the Vietnam
    War to deploy to the region, including two carrier battle groups. Such
    a scenario may repeat itself, though this time with a much more capable
    and willful Chinese military. Would you agree that, were China to
    launch some type of military offensive against Taiwan, such a scenario
    would have the potential to draw the United States into a dangerous
    large-scale conflict in the region?
        Mr. Lippert. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) states: ``It is the
    policy of the United States to maintain the capacity of the United
    States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that
    would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system of the
    people on Taiwan.'' In such a scenario, the President would determine
    the appropriate response; however, this question highlights the
    importance of the U.S. relationship with Taiwan. The Obama
    administration's strong commitment to the TRA is evident in its
    actions, which include the September 21 notification to Congress of its
    intent to sell Taiwan $5.85 billion worth of new defense articles and
    services--including an upgrade package for Taiwan's 145 F-16 A/B
    fighters; spare parts for its F-16, F-5, and C-130 aircraft; and
    training for F-16 pilots at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona. This
    decision follows the January 29, 2010, decision to sell Taiwan $6.4
    billion in defensive arms, including 60 UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters,
    Patriot PAC-III firing units and missiles (3 firing units, 1 training
    unit, and 114 missiles), Harpoon missiles, 2 Osprey-class mine hunters,
    and follow-on support for command and control systems. In addition, in
    August 2011, the Obama administration submitted a $310 million direct
    commercial sales notification to Congress for the approval of export
    licenses in support of radar equipment for Taiwan Indigenous Defense
    Fighters and Hughes Air Defense Radars. These collective sales of more
    than $12.5 billion in arms to Taiwan are an important indication of
    DOD's commitment to its obligations of the TRA and to Taiwan's defense.

        9. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, do you agree that helping deter any
    cross-strait military conflict is in both our own security interests
    and the Asia/Pacific region's security interests?
        Mr. Lippert. Absolutely.

        10. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, would you also agree that the
    likelihood of Chinese aggression against Taiwan becomes more likely as
    Taiwan's ability to defend itself deteriorates further?
        Mr. Lippert. I would agree that Chinese aggression could be
    perceived, by the leadership in China, as an option in a crisis if
    Taiwan is weak, and the U.S. commitment to Taiwan waivers. This is
    precisely why I believe the administration was right to pursue
    collective sales of over $12.5 billion in arms to Taiwan, continue
    robust engagement with Taipei, and, more broadly, make a point of
    emphasis on strong and enduring U.S. presence in the Western Pacific.

                        TAIWAN'S DETERIORATING AIR FORCE

        11. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, in official estimates provided by
    DOD, they show that the People's Republic of China has 2,300
    operational combat aircraft, while the Government of Taiwan has only
    490 operational combat aircraft. In my opinion, there now exists a
    serious airpower imbalance between China and Taiwan. Do you disagree?
        Mr. Lippert. The 2009 Annual Report to Congress on Military Power
    of the People's Republic of China reported: ``In the 2002 report, DOD
    assessed that Taiwan `has enjoyed dominance of the airspace over the
    Taiwan Strait for many years. This conclusion no longer holds true.' ''
    China's military has improved across the board, and the threat from
    combat aircraft is just one of many threats to Taiwan and regional
    stability. Taiwan will never be able to go toe-to-toe with the PRC;
    there is no silver bullet to solve this growing problem. Taiwan must
    properly fund its military and prioritize a defense transformation that
    incorporates an asymmetric strategy that both deters PRC aggression
    and, should deterrence fail, allow Taiwan to defend the island.

        12. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, what is your assessment of the
    risk to both Taiwanese and U.S. interests as a result of this cross-
    strait imbalance in air power?
        Mr. Lippert. The defense of Taiwan cannot be viewed through the
    narrow prism of airpower alone. A more holistic approach that considers
    all aspects of a joint defense of the island is vital.

        13. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, for years, DOD has documented a
    steady increase in advanced Chinese weaponry and aircraft positioned
    opposite Taiwan. It is a consensus belief among security and military
    experts that Taiwan has lost its technological edge in defense
    weaponry. What is the tipping point, in terms of Chinese force buildup,
    that would necessitate the sale of additional U.S. fighter aircraft to
    Taiwan?
        Mr. Lippert. The conference report accompanying the National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (House Rep. 111-288)
    requested the Secretary of Defense to provide a report on Taiwan's Air
    Defense Force. It is my understanding that a detailed classified report
    addressing these concerns was delivered to Congress in September 2011.

        14. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, do you honestly believe that the
    current Taiwan forces can successfully repel China's increasingly
    capable fighter aircraft?
        Mr. Lippert. The Annual Report to Congress on Military Power of the
    People's Republic of China 2009 reported: ``In the 2002 report, DOD
    assessed that Taiwan `has enjoyed dominance of the airspace over the
    Taiwan Strait for many years. This conclusion no longer holds true.' ''
    From what I am able to discern, China's military has improved across
    the board; the threat from combat aircraft is just one of many threats
    to Taiwan and regional stability. My general view is that Taiwan will
    have severe difficulty in matching the PRC capability for capability,
    and that there is no silver bullet for this growing problem. I am
    informed that the DOD Report to Congress on Taiwan's Air Defense Force
    may contain useful recommendations for the defense of Taiwan.
        In my view, the United States must continue its strong commitment
    to the TRA and that Taiwan must properly fund their military and
    prioritize a defense transformation that incorporates an asymmetric
    strategy that both deters PRC aggression, and should deterrence fail,
    allow Taiwan to defend the island.

        15. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, it is my understanding that DOD
    conducted its own assessments of Taiwan's defense needs from 1997
    through early 2004, producing over a dozen studies. Since that time,
    DOD has only produced the one 2010 study on Taiwan's air defense forces
    that was mandated by Congress, although reports indicate it also began
    a study on Taiwan's joint defense transformation in 2010. Do you
    believe reports, such as those produced between 1997 and 2004, are
    essential in understanding the threat posed by shifting China-Taiwan
    relations?
        Mr. Lippert. It is my understanding that the conclusions stated in
    the reports from 1997 to 2004 are no longer valid; these assessments
    could not have envisioned the rapid growth of PRC capabilities, nor
    Taiwan's failure to fund its defense adequately. However, the services
    DOD provides to Taiwan to improve its defensive capabilities have never
    been more robust. DOD has conducted numerous assessments with Taiwan,
    and is in year 4 of a 7-year assessment to assist Taiwan in developing
    an asymmetric strategy that reduces the threat from the PRC. This is
    just one of many assessments that have been conducted since 2004 to
    improve Taiwan's defense capabilities.

        16. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, if confirmed, how do you intend to
    ensure that the executive and legislative branches possess the
    necessary information to accurately evaluate Taiwan's defense needs?
        Mr. Lippert. If confirmed, I believe that frequent dialogue would
    ensure both the executive and legislative branches understand how to
    improve Taiwan's defense capabilities.

                            SALE OF F-16S TO TAIWAN

        17. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, what is your position on the
    proposed sale of 66 new F-16s C/Ds to Taiwan?
        Mr. Lippert. I believe the congressional notification of the F-16
    retrofit reflects a smart defense policy that provides real and
    immediate contributions to Taiwan's security. The retrofitted F-16 A/B
    aircraft will provide a more reliable, survivable, and capable
    aircraft--comparable to the F-16 C/D, but at a lower cost--and Taiwan
    will have a total of 145 of them.

        18. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, the F-16 production line may shut
    down before the administration authorizes additional F-16 sales to
    Taiwan. If that is allowed to happen, would you be in favor of selling
    Taiwan F-35 Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) to ensure that Taiwan can deter
    threats from China?
        Mr. Lippert. I believe we should provide Taiwan real defensive
    capabilities that will allow Taiwan's military to execute its defense
    missions effectively today and well into the future. Without the
    benefit of being in the position, I am limited on the insights I can
    provide on specific capabilities that would match the administration's
    strategic intent, though I recognize that is an evolving conversation.

        19. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, in terms of economic benefits, the
    F-16 C/D sales to Taiwan would mean at least $8 billion to a critical
    portion of our industrial base that is about to get hammered by defense
    cuts. Taiwan clearly needs these aircraft, and the United States
    clearly needs the thousands of jobs that are supported by the F-16
    production line. Do you agree that American jobs, overall economic
    impact, and the future of the defense industrial base are important
    considerations in determining whether to sell new F-16s to Taiwan?
        Mr. Lippert. I believe DOD's first priority is to ensure Taiwan
    acquires and maintains the necessary defensive equipment to deter
    aggression from the PRC.

               IMPACT OF TAIWAN POLICY ON RELATIONS IN EAST ASIA

        20. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, what message do you think the
    administration's de facto denial of Taiwan's request for new F-16 C/Ds
    has sent to other U.S. allies, both in the region and around the world?
        Mr. Lippert. The Obama administration's strong commitment to the
    TRA is evident in its actions, which include the September 21, 2011,
    notification to Congress of the intent to sell Taiwan $5.85 billion
    worth of new defense articles and services--including an upgrade
    package for Taiwan's 145 F-16 A/B fighters; spare parts for its F-16,
    F-5, and C-130 aircraft; and training for F-16 pilots at Luke Air Force
    Base in Arizona. This decision follows the January 29, 2010, decision
    to sell Taiwan $6.4 billion in defensive arms, including 60 UH-60M
    Blackhawk helicopters, Patriot PAC-III firing units and missiles (three
    firing units, one training unit, and 114 missiles), Harpoon missiles,
    two Osprey-class mine hunters, and follow-on support for command and
    control systems. In addition, in August 2011, the Obama administration
    submitted a $310 million direct commercial sales notification to
    Congress for the approval of export licenses in support of radar
    equipment for Taiwan Indigenous Defense Fighters and Hughes air defense
    radars. These collective sales of more than $12.5 billion in arms to
    Taiwan are an important indication of DOD's commitment to the
    obligations of the TRA and to Taiwan's defense. These sales are a very
    clear demonstration of U.S. commitment to Taiwan and to maintaining
    peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

        21. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, recently, the United States has
    engaged in military capacity building for Japan and Korea, which are
    also threatened by China's second artillery missile threat. The
    administration also recently announced the planned transfer and upgrade
    of 24 excess defense article F-16s to Indonesia, which sits on South
    China Sea. However, this same threat has been halfheartedly addressed
    by the administration, when it comes to selling Taiwan the F-16s they
    have requested. Can you explain this policy inconsistency and, if
    confirmed, will you work to rectify it?
        Mr. Lippert. In my view, the Obama administration is correct in
    pursuing collective sales of over $12.5 billion in arms to Taiwan,
    continuing robust engagement with Taipei, strongly supporting the TRA,
    and, more broadly, making a point of emphasis on a strong and enduring
    U.S. presence in the Western Pacific. If confirmed, I will look for
    ways to advance both U.S. and Taiwanese interests and mitigate risk in
    the region. My belief is that the defense of Taiwan should be a multi-
    faceted approach that considers all aspects of a joint defense of the
    island versus one that relies solely on air power. It is through this
    general approach that, if confirmed, I will review intelligence
    assessments, DOD studies, and other information--in order to form
    opinions on the state of U.S. and Taiwanese interests. My understanding
    is that a useful starting point could be the classified report
    delivered to Congress in September 2011 on Taiwan's Air Defense Force,
    pursuant to the conference report accompanying the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (House Rep. 111-288).

                             AIR-SEA BATTLE CONCEPT

        22. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, the Air-Sea Battle Concept has
    been described by some as a new way for the Navy and Air Force to work
    together to fight future wars against major powers. As I understand it,
    the Air-Sea Battle Concept is aimed at maintaining U.S. dominance of
    the air and sea domains and overpowering any nation-state that might
    try to defeat our military forces through the use of advanced missiles,
    stealth aircraft, and/or a blue-water naval fleet of its own. China is
    currently pursuing advanced missiles, stealth aircraft and a blue-water
    naval fleet. Does the implementation of the Air-Sea Battle Concept
    represent the U.S. policy response to a rising military threat from
    China?
        Mr. Lippert. It is my understanding that the Air-Sea Battle Concept
    is not designed with a specific country in mind. Instead, it is a much
    broader operational concept aimed at countering proliferating
    capabilities that present significant anti-access/areal denial (A2/AD)
    challenges. I believe Air-Sea Battle Concept will ultimately be about
    staying ahead of evolutionary changes in warfare that challenge U.S.
    power projection.

        23. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, why is it important that the U.S.
    military have a strategy to deal with China?
        Mr. Lippert. The U.S.-China relationship has assumed an enduring
    and global dimension and has become progressively more multi-faceted
    and complex. Moreover, given the uncertainty around the evolution of
    China, I believe it is vital that we maintain a strong and effective
    force posture in the region that is geographically distributed,
    operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. The U.S. military
    must support coordinated and deliberate whole-of-government strategic
    efforts in all regions of the world, and the necessity of doing so with
    respect to China is no different. DOD contributes to U.S. efforts to
    promote U.S. interests most effectively, identify shared interests and
    opportunities for cooperation, and address the most difficult areas of
    the U.S.-China relationship.

        24. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, in your opinion, does China pose a
    threat to the United States?
        Mr. Lippert. I have a clear-eyed view concerning the U.S.
    relationship with China. In some aspects it is cooperative; in other
    aspects it is competitive. I agree with President Obama's statement
    that, ``the [U.S.-China] relationship has not been without disagreement
    and difficulty. But the notion that we must be adversaries is not
    predestined.'' I believe in a strategy that engages China; helps
    integrate China into international institutions; and balances China
    with our capabilities, alliances, and partnerships. Given the
    uncertainty around the evolution of China, I believe it is vital that
    we maintain a strong and effective force posture in the region that is
    geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically
    sustainable.

                        UNITED STATES AS A PACIFIC POWER

        25. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, Secretary Panetta said during his
    recent trip to Asia that the purpose of his visit was ``to make very
    clear to this region and to our allies in the Pacific that . . . the
    Pacific will remain a key priority for the United States, that we will
    maintain our force projection in this area, that we will maintain a
    presence in this area, that we will remain a Pacific power.'' In light
    of China's aggressive military buildup, how do you believe the United
    States can best project itself as a Pacific power in the coming years?
        Mr. Lippert. As an Asia-Pacific power, I believe the United States
    must field a military presence in the Asia-Pacific region that is
    sufficient for a wide range of contingencies and activities, and that
    keeps pace with changes in the Asia-Pacific security environment, such
    as the rise of new powers, the growing influence of non-state actors,
    and the potential spread of weapons of mass destruction.
        I believe the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region
    should provide reassurance that the United States is committed to
    Asia's security. To do so, as Secretary Panetta has consistently said,
    will require that U.S. posture in the region be geographically
    distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable.
        My understanding is that DOD is seeking a more enhanced U.S. force
    presence in the Southeast Asia, Oceania, and the Indian Ocean regions,
    enabled by a more geographically distributed network of access
    relationships and capabilities. This will allow the United States to
    perform a range of future missions--combating terrorism, responding to
    natural disasters, and strengthening regional stability. I believe
    consulting closely with U.S. allies and partners, and with Congress, on
    defense posture will allow the United States to respond effectively to
    the challenges confronting the Asia-Pacific region in the 21st century.

        26. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, if confirmed, how do you intend to
    support and promote this strategic objective?
        Mr. Lippert. If confirmed, I will work closely with other
    components of DOD, the rest of the U.S. Government, and Congress to
    develop and implement policies that bolster U.S. capabilities and
    presence in the Asia-Pacific region.

                            CHINA AND CYBER-WARFARE

        27. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, according to the 2011 DOD report,
    ``Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of
    China,'' China maintains aggressive efforts directed toward illegally
    obtaining sensitive U.S. technologies. The 2009 version of this report
    cited the conclusion of the Intelligence Community that China is the
    most aggressive of foreign intelligence organizations in attempts to
    penetrate U.S. agencies. Additionally, this year's report notes that,
    of the numerous cyber intrusions directed against the United States,
    some appear to have originated from within China. According to the
    Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, in April 2009; ``a
    large number of routing paths to various Internet Protocol addresses
    were redirected through networks in China for 17 minutes . . . This
    diversion of data would have given the operators of the servers on
    those networks the ability to read, delete, or edit e-mail or other
    information sent along those paths. This incident affected traffic to
    and from U.S. Government and military sites, including sites for the
    Senate, the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Air Force, and the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense . . . '' In your opinion, is China
    engaging in state-sponsored cyber-attacks and cyber-theft against the
    United States?
        Mr. Lippert. It is my understanding that attribution of cyber
    intrusions is extremely difficult. According to DOD's 2011 Report to
    Congress on ``Military and Security Developments in China'',
    ``developing capabilities for cyber warfare is consistent with
    authoritative People's Liberation Army (PLA) military writings.
    Although [the writings do not identify] the specific criteria for
    employing computer network attack against an adversary, [they do]
    advocate developing capabilities to compete in this medium.''
        As described in the unclassified DOD Strategy for Operating in
    Cyberspace, the theft of intellectual property may be the most
    pervasive cyber threat today. The ability to innovate and build
    intellectual capital is the foundation upon which U.S. military and
    economic strength rests. Beyond addressing the theft of intellectual
    property, I understand that DOD is working actively to defend and deter
    potential cyber attacks and to encourage responsible state behavior in
    cyberspace.

        28. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, what is your assessment of the
    threat of cyber-attacks that originate in China?
        Mr. Lippert. I believe the use of sophisticated and powerful cyber
    capabilities could be crippling, regardless of where it originates. The
    unclassified International Strategy for Cyberspace provides a clear
    statement that the United States reserves the right to use all
    necessary means--diplomatic, informational, military, and economic--to
    defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our interests in
    cyberspace.
        As stated in the 2011 Report to Congress on ``Military and Security
    Developments in China'', ``developing capabilities for cyber warfare is
    consistent with authoritative PLA military writings. Although [the
    writings do not identify] the specific criteria for employing computer
    network attack against an adversary, [they do] advocate developing
    capabilities to compete in this medium.''

        29. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, the 2011 DOD report also stated
    that China continues to leverage ``state-sponsored industrial/technical
    espionage to increase the levels of technologies and expertise
    available to support military research, development, and acquisition.''
    In April 2009, computer spies successfully hacked into the JSF program
    and copied large quantities of data related to the design and
    electronics systems of the aircraft. Former U.S. officials said the
    attack appears to have originated in China. I view this as a serious
    risk to our long-term national security. Are you concerned about this?
        Mr. Lippert. Yes, I am very concerned about this issue. The loss of
    intellectual property from U.S. public and private sector networks has
    a corrosive effect on our military strength and the economic
    competitiveness upon which it depends. More immediately, the loss of
    sensitive government information poses great risks to our
    servicemembers and to DOD operations around the globe.

        30. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, do you think more needs to be done
    in this area?
        Mr. Lippert. I absolutely agree that DOD should expand and
    strengthen its efforts to protect sensitive government information from
    theft through cyber means.

        31. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, if confirmed for this position,
    how do you intend to address this problem?
        Mr. Lippert. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with
    the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, the
    Military Departments, the combatant commands, and interagency and
    international partners to undertake the sustained and integrated effort
    that these challenges require. This includes continuing to improve upon
    DOD's cyberspace capabilities and training, deepening efforts with the
    U.S. public and private sector, and working closely with allies and
    international partners, and strengthen military partnerships to sustain
    a secure, open, and interoperable cyberspace.

        32. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Lippert, given DOD's report indicating that
    China continues to leverage state-sponsored industrial/technical
    espionage, and the fact that China is a suspect virtually any time a
    major cyber-attack against U.S. defense networks occurs, how should the
    United States respond to the growing threat of Chinese cyber-warfare?
        Mr. Lippert. I support the President's International Strategy for
    Cyberspace, which advocates a whole-of-government approach to ensure
    the risks associated with attacking or exploiting U.S. networks vastly
    outweigh the potential benefits. I understand that DOD works to ensure
    that the U.S. military continues to have all necessary capabilities in
    cyberspace to defend the United States and its interests, as it does in
    all domains. If confirmed, I will assist in the Department's efforts to
    improve its cyber capabilities and training, work more closely with the
    interagency and private sector to expand capacity and cooperation, and
    strengthen military partnerships to deter and dissuade malicious
    activity in cyberspace.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Mark W. Lippert follows:]
                        Nomination Reference and Report
                               As In Executive Session,
                                   Senate of the United States,
                                                      October 20, 2011.
        Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
    on Armed Services:
        Mark William Lippert, of Ohio, to be an Assistant Secretary of
    Defense, vice Wallace C. Gregson, resigned.
                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of Mark W. Lippert, which was
    transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
    referred, follows:]
                     Biographical Sketch of Mark W. Lippert
    Education:
             Stanford University

                     September 1993-June 1997
                     Bachelor of Arts Degree awarded June 1997

             Stanford University

                     September 1996-January 1998
                     Master of Arts Degree awarded January 1998
    Employment Record:
             Naval Special Warfare Development Group

                     Intelligence Officer
                     October 2009-present (on terminal leave)

             National Security Council

                     Deputy National Security Adviser/Chief of
                    Staff
                     January 2009-October 2009 (on military leave)

             Obama-Biden Transition Project

                     Deputy Director for Foreign Policy
                     November 2008-January 2009

             Obama For America

                     Senior Foreign Policy Adviser
                     August 2008-November 2008

             SEAL Team One, Task Unit Al Asad

                     Intelligence Officer
                     June 2007-May 2008

             Office of Senator Barack Obama

                     Foreign Policy Adviser
                     Personal Representative of the Member to the
                    Foreign Relations Committee
                     May 2005-August 2008 (on military leave June
                    2007-May 2008)

             Office of Naval Intelligence, Reserve Unit 0499

                     Intelligence Officer
                     January 2005-present

             Senate Committee on Appropriations, State-Foreign
            Operations Subcommittee

                     Professional Staff Member
                     August 2000-May 2005

             Office of Senator Tom Daschle, Democratic Policy
            Committee

                     Policy Adviser
                     Policy Analyst
                     January 1999-August 2000

             Office of Senator Dianne Feinstein

                     Legislative Correspondent
                     July 1998-January 1999

             Legal Aid of Cincinnati

                     Research Assistant
                     September 1992-July 1993
    Honors and Awards:
             Presidential Unit Citation (2011)
             Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal (2011)
             Joint Service Commendation Medal (2010)
             Afghanistan Campaign Medal (2010)
             Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal (2010)
             Basic Parachutist Badge (2010)
             Information Dominance Warfare Qualification (2010)
             Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal (2009)
             Expert Rifleman Medal (2009)
             Expert Pistol Shot Medal (2009)
             Sea Service Deployment Ribbon x3 (2009-2011)
             Bronze Star Medal (2008)
             Iraq Campaign Medal (2008)
             Global War on Terrorism Medal (2008)
             Navy and Marine Corps Overseas Service Ribbon (2008)
             Armed Forces Reserve Medal (2008)
             National Defense Medal (2005)
             Term Member, Council on Foreign Relations (2004-2009)
             Certificate of Completion, Intensive Mandarin Chinese
            Language Studies Course, Beijing University-Stanford University
            (1997)
             Graduated With Distinction, Stanford University (1997)
             Teaching Assistant (partial tuition payment), Stanford
            University (1996)
             Phi Beta Kappa, Stanford University (1996)
             Selected to Intern, U.S. Department of State, Policy
            Planning Staff (1995)
             Letter of Commendation, Office of U.S. Attorney,
            Southern District of Ohio (1993)
             Dean's List, University of Chicago (1991-1992)
             Varsity Baseball, University of Chicago (1991-1992)
                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
    nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by Mark W.
    Lippert in connection with his nomination follows:]

                              UNITED STATES SENATE
                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                                  Room SR-228
                           Washington, DC 20510-6050
                                 (202) 224-3871
                        COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
          BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

        Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
    more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
    form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
    of your answer applies.
                        Part A--Biographical Information
        Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
    this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
    public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
    any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

        1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
        Mark William Lippert.

        2. Position to which nominated:
        Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security
    Affairs.

        3. Date of nomination:
        20 October 2011.

        4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
        [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
    committee's executive files.]

        5. Date and place of birth:
        28 February 1973; Cincinnati, OH.

        6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
        Married to Robin Elizabeth (Schmidek) Lippert.

        7. Names and ages of children:
        N/A.

        8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
    dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
        Stanford University, Sept. 1993-June 1997
        B.A., Political Science, June 1997
        Stanford University, Sept. 1996-Jan. 1998
        M.A., International Policy Studies, January 1998
        Beijing University, Exchange Program with Stanford, Summer 1997
        Additional Coursework from higher education institutions that was
    transferred to Stanford University: University of Chicago (9/91-6/92),
    University of Cincinnati (7/95-8/95), Xavier University (7/95-8/95),
    San Francisco State University (6/96-8/96)
        Mariemont High School, Mariemont, OH, June 1991

        9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
    last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
    job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
        Naval Special Warfare Development Group, Virginia Beach, VA,
    October 2009-Present (on terminal leave until end of year),
    Intelligence Officer
        National Security Council, Washington, DC, January 2009-October
    2009, Chief of Staff (currently on military leave)
        Obama-Biden Transition Project, Chicago, IL/Washington, DC,
    November 2008-January 2009, Deputy Director for Foreign Policy
        Obama for America, Chicago, IL, Senior Foreign Policy Advisor,
    August 2008-November 2008
        SEAL Team One, Coronado, CA, Intelligence Officer, June 2007-May
    2008
        Office of Senator Barack Obama, Washington, DC, U.S. Senate,
    Foreign Policy Advisor, Personal Representative of the Member to the
    Foreign Relations Committee, May 2005-August 2008 (On military leave
    from June 2007-May 2008)
        Office of Naval Intelligence, Suitland, MD, Intelligence Officer
    (Reserve Component), January 2005-Present
        Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on State-Foreign
    Operations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC, Professional Staff Member,
    August 2000-May 2005

        10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
    honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
    or local governments, other than those listed above.
        Office of Senator Tom Daschle, Democratic Policy Committee,
    Washington, DC, Policy Advisor, Policy Analyst, January 1999-August
    2000, (Internship: January 1998-June 1998)
        Office of Senator Dianne Feinstein, Washington, DC, Legislative
    Correspondent, July 1998-January 1999
        Department of State, Office of Policy Planning, Washington, DC,
    Intern (during graduate school) September 1996-December 1996
        Office of the Mayor, City of San Jose, San Jose, CA, Intern
    (Stanford University in Government Program), June 1994-August 1994
        Commander's Advisory Group, Naval Special Warfare Development
    Group, U.S. Navy Dam Neck, VA (Note: Have been invited by the
    Commanding Officer, group has not yet been established)

        11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
    officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
    or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
    business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
        None.

        12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
    professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
    other organizations.
        Stanford Alumni Association
        Capitol Hill, Navy ``Wardroom''

        13. Political affiliations and activities:
        (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
    any public office for which you have been a candidate.
        None.
        (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
    to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
    years.
        Obama for America, Chicago, IL, Senior Foreign Policy Advisor,
    August 2008-November 2008
        (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
    organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
    entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
        Wayne Lippert for Cincinnati City Council, $1,100, 9/29/11

        14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
    society memberships, military medals, and any other special
    recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
             Presidential Unit Citation (2011)
             Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal (2011)
             Joint Service Commendation Medal (2010)
             Afghanistan Campaign Medal (2010)
             Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal (2010)
             Basic Parachutist Badge (2010)
             Information Dominance Warfare Qualification (2010)
             Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal (2009)
             Expert Rifleman Medal (2009)
             Expert Pistol Shot Medal (2009)
             Sea Service Deployment Ribbon x3 (2009-2011)
             Bronze Star Medal (2008)
             Iraq Campaign Medal (2008)
             Global War on Terrorism Medal (2008)
             Navy and Marine Corps Overseas Service Ribbon (2008)
             Armed Forces Reserve Medal (2008)
             National Defense Medal (2005)
             Term Member, Council on Foreign Relations (2004-2009)
             Certificate of Completion, Intensive Mandarin Chinese
            Language Studies Course, Beijing University-Stanford University
            (1997)
             Graduated With Distinction, Stanford University (1997)
             Teaching Assistant (partial tuition payment), Stanford
            University (1996)
             Phi Beta Kappa, Stanford University (1996)
             Selected to Intern, U.S. Department of State, Policy
            Planning Staff (1995)
             Letter of Commendation, Office of U.S. Attorney,
            Southern District of Ohio (1993)
             Dean's List, University of Chicago (1991-1992)
             Varsity Baseball, University of Chicago (1991-1992)

        15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
    books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
    written.
        None.

        16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
    speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
    copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
    been nominated.
        None.

        17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
        (a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
    conflicts of interest?
        Yes.
        (b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
    would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
        No.
        (c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
    deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
    for the record in hearings?
        Yes.
        (d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
    response to congressional requests?
        Yes.
        (e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
    testimony or briefings?
        Yes.
        (f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
    before this committee?
        Yes.
        (g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
    such documents?
        Yes.
                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
    committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
    forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
    Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                    ------

                               Signature and Date
        I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
    on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
    provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
    and complete.
                                                       Mark W. Lippert.
        This 16th day of November, 2011.

        [The nomination of Mark W. Lippert was reported to the
    Senate by Chairman Levin on February 17, 2012, with the
    recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
    was confirmed by the Senate on April 26, 2012.]
                                  ----------

        [Prepared questions submitted to Brad R. Carson by Chairman
    Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

                            Questions and Responses

                                DEFENSE REFORMS

        Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
    Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
    strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
    enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
    of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
    commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments
    to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
    to the combatant commanders.
        Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
    provisions?
        Answer. This milestone legislation is now more than 25-years-old
    and has served our Nation well. Although I believe that the framework
    established by Goldwater-Nichols has significantly improved inter-
    Service and joint relationships and promoted the effective execution of
    responsibilities, the Department, working with Congress, should
    continually assess the law in light of improving capabilities, evolving
    threats, and changing organizational dynamics. Although I am currently
    unaware of any reason to amend Goldwater-Nichols, if confirmed, I hope
    to have an opportunity to assess whether the challenges posed by
    today's security environment require amendments to the legislation.
        Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
    address in these modifications?
        Answer. As noted above, I have no specific proposals to modify
    Goldwater-Nichols. As with any legislation of this magnitude, however,
    I believe it may be appropriate to review past experience with the
    legislation with a view to identifying any areas in which it can be
    improved upon, and then to consider with Congress whether the act
    should be revised.

                                     DUTIES

        Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
    the General Counsel of the Department of the Army?
        Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., section 3019, provides that the General
    Counsel of the Army shall perform such functions as the Secretary of
    the Army may prescribe. The Secretary has prescribed the General
    Counsel's duties through general orders, regulations, and memoranda.
    The General Counsel provides legal advice to the Secretary of the Army,
    the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries, and other offices
    within the Army Secretariat. As the chief legal officer of the
    Department of the Army, the General Counsel determines the controlling
    legal positions of the Department of the Army. The General Counsel's
    responsibilities extend to any matter of law and to other matters as
    directed by the Secretary. I understand that examples of specific
    responsibilities currently assigned to the General Counsel include
    providing professional guidance to the Army's legal community,
    overseeing matters in which the Army is involved in litigation, serving
    as the Designated Agency Ethics Official, exercising the Secretary's
    oversight of intelligence and other sensitive activities and
    investigations, providing legal advice to the Army Acquisition
    Executive, and taking final action on certain claims filed against the
    Army.
        Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
    believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
        Answer. The duties and responsibilities of the General Counsel of
    the Department of the Army are broad and far-reaching. Consequently,
    the General Counsel must possess sound legal and analytical skills,
    together with absolute integrity and mature judgment. As the diversity
    and complexity of the legal and policy issues confronting the Army are
    such that no one lawyer can have in-depth experience in all of them,
    the General Counsel must have strong interpersonal and leadership
    abilities and a willingness to work collaboratively with experts in
    numerous areas. I believe that, if confirmed, my background and diverse
    legal and executive experiences have well prepared me to execute the
    duties of the General Counsel of the Department of the Army. A summary
    of my experience follows:
        Currently, I am a professor in the College of Business and College
    of Law at the University of Tulsa. I attended Baylor University, where
    I graduated with highest honors, was inducted into Phi Beta Kappa, and
    selected as a Rhodes Scholar. Studying at Trinity College, Oxford, I
    earned a B.A./M.A. in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. I graduated
    from the University of Oklahoma College of Law, where I served on the
    law review, received the award for Outstanding Note in the Oklahoma Law
    Review, and was recognized as the Outstanding Graduate. In 1994, I
    entered the practice of law at Crowe & Dunlevy, the largest firm in the
    State of Oklahoma. During my early years of legal work, I focused on
    commercial litigation, with a particular emphasis on antitrust law.
    From 1997 through 1998, I was a White House Fellow, serving in the
    Department of Defense (DOD). After completing the White House
    Fellowship, I returned to practicing commercial litigation at Crowe &
    Dunlevy. In 2000, I was elected to represent the 2nd District of
    Oklahoma in the U.S. House of Representatives. In 2005, after leaving
    politics, I was a fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
    University. From 2005 to 2008, I was a director and then Chief
    Executive Officer of CNB, LLC, where I oversaw all legal matters and a
    large team of in-house lawyers. From 2009 to 2010, as an officer in the
    U.S. Navy, I served in Iraq on active military duty with the 84th
    Explosive Ordnance Battalion of the U.S. Army, where I was officer-in-
    charge of Weapons Intelligence Teams in Multi-National Division-South.
    I was awarded the Bronze Star and Army Achievement Medal.
        I believe that my extensive experience in law, business, education,
    politics, and the military have all helped prepare me for the
    extraordinary challenge of serving as General Counsel of the Department
    of the Army. I recognize the legal and policy issues facing the
    Department of the Army in this time of war and transformation. I have
    extensive experience in compliance, human resources management,
    corporate governance and strategy, and understanding legal and
    enterprise risk. If confirmed, I commit to using my skills and
    experience to diligently and effectively perform the duties of General
    Counsel.
        Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
    enhance your ability to perform the duties of the General Counsel of
    the Department of the Army?
        Answer. I am confident that I have the requisite legal experience,
    analytic abilities, and leadership skills to serve as the General
    Counsel of the Department of the Army. If confirmed, I will work to
    broaden my expertise and further my understanding and knowledge of the
    major legal challenges facing the Army, including its personnel and its
    component organizations. Additionally, if confirmed, I will undertake
    to establish and maintain collaborative and productive professional
    working relationships with the career civil servants in the Office of
    the General Counsel as well as with The Judge Advocate General of the
    Army and with other offices dealing with matters of mutual interest. If
    confirmed, I would expect to benefit from their knowledge as we work
    collaboratively to provide the best possible legal services to all
    members of the Department of the Army.
        Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do
    you expect that the Secretary of the Army would prescribe for you?
        Answer. Although the Secretary of the Army has not discussed with
    me the duties and functions he will expect of me, I anticipate that he
    will rely on me to provide accurate and timely legal advice to help
    ensure that the Army complies with both the letter and spirit of the
    law. I would expect the current enumeration of General Counsel
    responsibilities set forth in the General Order prescribing the duties
    of each principal official of Headquarters, Department of the Army,
    generally to remain in effect. Apart from such formally prescribed
    duties, I believe the Secretary of the Army would expect me to continue
    a collegial and professional relationship with the General Counsels of
    DOD, the other Military Departments, and the defense agencies and the
    legal staffs of other Federal agencies. I anticipate that the Secretary
    of the Army will expect me to continue the extraordinarily effective
    and professional working relationship that exists between the Office of
    the General Counsel and The Judge Advocate General and his staff.
    Finally, I anticipate that the Secretary of the Army will expect me to
    manage the General Counsel's office efficiently and effectively, and to
    ensure that the Army legal community is adequately resourced to perform
    its important mission.
        Question. In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the
    General Counsel of DOD?
        Answer. The General Counsel of DOD is the chief legal officer and
    final legal authority for DOD. As I understand it, the General Counsel
    of DOD, Mr. Jeh Johnson, has made clear in his testimony before this
    committee and in his actions in the Department that he intends to work
    closely with the Service General Counsels. If confirmed, I anticipate
    having a close and professional relationship with Mr. Johnson,
    characterized by continuing consultation, communication, and
    cooperation on matters of mutual interest, in furtherance of the best
    interests of DOD.

                                MAJOR CHALLENGES

        Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
    confront the General Counsel of the Department of the Army?
        Answer. In my opinion, a major challenge will be consistently to
    provide responsive, accurate legal advice on the broad array of complex
    issues that will arise in conjunction with the Army's execution of its
    mission to provide trained and ready forces to combatant commanders
    while shaping its structure and operations in an environment of
    declining resources. Although it is difficult to anticipate specific
    legal questions, I expect to confront issues relating to operational
    matters, acquisition reform, privatization initiatives, military and
    civilian personnel policies, and compliance with environmental laws. I
    am not aware of any problems in the current delivery of legal services.
    However, if confirmed, I will work hard to ensure that the Army legal
    community is adequately staffed and resourced to provide the
    responsive, accurate, and timely legal advice necessary to ensure
    success in all of the Army's endeavors.
        Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
    addressing these challenges?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize legal issues in the manner
    that best serves the Department of the Army. I will also ensure that
    the talented and dedicated lawyers comprising the Army legal community
    continue to provide timely, value-added legal and policy advice of the
    highest quality, executing the Department's recurring legal
    responsibilities and anticipating and responding to the numerous issues
    that the Army confronts every day. I will endeavor to keep Army lawyers
    involved at all stages of the decisionmaking process, because I believe
    that preventive law, practiced early in the formulation of departmental
    policies, will undoubtedly facilitate the Department's adaptation to
    the changing operational environment. Additionally, if confirmed, I
    will work diligently to resource adequately and staff expertly the Army
    legal community, in order to guarantee decisionmakers at all levels
    access to the best possible legal advice.
        Question. What broad priorities will you establish in terms of
    issues which must be addressed by the Office of the General Counsel of
    the Department of the Army?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will focus foremost on the issues that
    directly impact soldiers, their families, readiness, and the support of
    military operations. I anticipate that the other legal issues of
    highest priority will arise from the Army's execution of its mission to
    provide trained and ready forces to combatant commanders while shaping
    its structure and operations in an environment of declining resources.
    I will ensure that expert advice is provided to those engaged in the
    Army's efforts to improve the acquisition process and to eliminate
    fraud, waste, and abuse. I will also ensure that the Army legal
    community continues to provide timely legal advice of the highest
    quality, executing the Department's recurring legal responsibilities
    and anticipating and responding to the numerous issues the Army
    confronts every day.

                                 RELATIONSHIPS

        Question. What is your understanding of the formal and informal
    relationship between the General Counsel of the Army and the following
    offices?
        The General Counsel of the Department of Defense.
        Answer. As noted above, I am advised that the General Counsel of
    DOD, Mr. Jeh Johnson, has made clear his intent to work closely with
    the General Counsels of the Military Departments. If confirmed, I
    anticipate developing a close and professional relationship with Mr.
    Johnson, characterized by continuing consultation, communication, and
    cooperation on matters of mutual interest, in furtherance of the best
    interests of the Department of the Army and DOD.
        Question. The Secretary of the Army.
        Answer. The Secretary of the Army is the head of the Department of
    the Army and is responsible for, and has the authority to conduct, all
    affairs of the Department. If confirmed, my primary responsibility will
    be to provide the Secretary with competent legal advice and counsel and
    to perform the duties and functions he prescribes for me. My goal will
    be to execute these responsibilities by establishing a close and
    professional relationship with the Secretary of the Army that will
    ensure my ability to communicate with him directly and candidly on
    matters of significance to the Army.
        Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army.
        Answer. The Chief of Staff, Army, is the senior military officer of
    the Department of the Army and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    The Chief of Staff is directly responsible to the Secretary of the
    Army. If confirmed, I will endeavor to continue what I understand to be
    an excellent relationship between the Army General Counsel and the
    Chief of Staff and the Army Staff and will work closely with The Judge
    Advocate General to provide the Chief of Staff with appropriate legal
    advice and support in the performance of his assigned duties and
    responsibilities.
        Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Army.
        Answer. The five Assistant Secretaries of the Army perform such
    duties and exercise such authorities as are provided by statute or
    prescribed by the Secretary. Generally, the Assistant Secretaries are
    charged to formulate and oversee policies and programs within their
    functional areas of responsibility. As the chief legal officer of the
    Department of the Army, the General Counsel provides legal advice,
    counsel, and guidance to the Assistant Secretaries and their staffs. If
    confirmed, I will establish a close and professional relationship with
    the Assistant Secretaries and provide candid and objective advice
    regarding the matters entrusted to them.
        Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Army.
        Answer. The Judge Advocate General is the legal adviser to the
    Chief of Staff of the Army, members of the Army Staff, and members of
    the Army generally. In coordination with the Army General Counsel, The
    Judge Advocate General serves as military legal adviser to the
    Secretary of the Army. By law, The Judge Advocate General is primarily
    responsible for providing legal advice and services regarding the
    Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the administration of
    military discipline. I believe that close, professional cooperation
    between the civilian and uniformed members of the Army's legal
    community is absolutely essential to the effective delivery of legal
    services to the Department. If confirmed, I will work closely and
    collaboratively with The Judge Advocate General to ensure that the
    legal services and legal advice provided to the Army are of the highest
    possible quality.
        Question. The Inspector General of the Department of Defense.
        Answer. The Inspector General of DOD is the principal adviser to
    the Secretary of Defense on all audit and criminal investigative
    matters and for matters relating to the prevention and detection of
    fraud, waste, and abuse in the programs and operations of DOD. The
    Office of the Inspector General is an independent and objective
    organization within DOD. If confirmed, I will work with the Inspector
    General of DOD on matters related to the Department of the Army, to
    ensure that Army interests are fully and fairly represented and that
    Army actions taken as a result of DOD Inspector General recommendations
    are executed in compliance with applicable law, directives, and
    regulations.
        Question. The Inspector General of the Army.
        Answer. I understand that the The Inspector General of the Army
    reports directly to the Secretary of the Army regarding the discipline,
    efficiency, and economy of the Army, and on other matters as required.
    If confirmed, I anticipate maintaining a close and professional
    relationship with The Inspector General to ensure he has the legal
    advice and support required to accomplish his assigned duties and
    responsibilities.
        Question. The General Counsels of the other Military Departments.
        Answer. The General Counsels of the other Military Departments
    serve and act under the authority, direction, and control of the
    Secretaries of their respective Departments. If confirmed, I would
    expect to consult closely and collegially with them on matters of
    mutual interest or concern. I understand that the General Counsel of
    DOD acts to foster coordination of effort among all of the General
    Counsels so that DOD, as a whole, can make the best use of the legal
    services at its disposal. I look forward to participating in that
    effort, if I am confirmed.
        Question. The Attorney General and the Department of Justice.
        Answer. I am aware that the Attorney General and the Department of
    Justice represent the Department of the Army in civil litigation.
    Further, I have been advised that DOD and the Department of Justice
    have signed a Memorandum of Understanding delineating the areas of
    responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of offenses over
    which the two departments have concurrent jurisdiction. In view of the
    importance of the Army's relationship with the Attorney General and the
    Department of Justice, our communications must be clear, consistent,
    and timely on every level. If confirmed, I will work in conjunction
    with The Judge Advocate General and the General Counsel of DOD to
    ensure the continuation of a collaborative relationship with the
    Attorney General and the Department of Justice.

                  RELATIONSHIP WITH THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

        Question. In carrying out your duties, if you are confirmed, how
    will you work with the Judge Advocate General of the Army?
        Answer. I believe that close, professional cooperation between the
    civilian and uniformed members of the Army's legal community is
    absolutely essential to the effective delivery of legal services to the
    Department. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure that the Offices of the
    General Counsel and The Judge Advocate General, as well as The Judge
    Advocate General and I, work closely together to deliver the best
    possible legal services to the Department of the Army.
        Question. How are the legal responsibilities of the Department of
    the Army allocated between the General Counsel and the Judge Advocate
    General?
        Answer. The Army General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the
    Department of the Army. The Office of the Army General Counsel is a
    component of the Army Secretariat, and provides advice to the Secretary
    of the Army and other Secretariat officials on any subject of law and
    on other matters, as directed by the Secretary of the Army. The Judge
    Advocate General is the legal adviser to the Chief of Staff of the
    Army, members of the Army Staff, and members of the Army generally. In
    coordination with the Army General Counsel, The Judge Advocate General
    serves as military legal adviser to the Secretary of the Army. The law
    expressly prohibits interference with the ability of The Judge Advocate
    General to give independent legal advice to the Secretary of the Army.
    Even in the absence of that statutory requirement, I would always
    welcome the expression of independent views about any legal matter
    under consideration. The Judge Advocate General also directs the
    members of The Judge Advocate General's Corps in the performance of
    their duties. By law, The Judge Advocate General is primarily
    responsible for providing legal advice and services regarding the UCMJ
    and the administration of military discipline. The Offices of the Army
    General Counsel and The Judge Advocate General have developed and
    maintain a close and effective working relationship in performing their
    respective responsibilities. If confirmed, I will work to continue this
    synergistic partnership.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that legal opinions of
    your office will be available to Army attorneys, including judge
    advocates?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the majority of legal opinions
    provided to Army attorneys and Judge Advocates are issued by the Office
    of The Judge Advocate General, and that many of these opinions are
    coordinated with the Office of the Army General Counsel. The close,
    professional cooperation between the civilian and uniformed members of
    the Army's legal community is absolutely essential to ensure that legal
    opinions issued by the Office of the Army General Counsel will be
    available to all Army attorneys and Judge Advocates and vice versa. If
    confirmed, I will seek to ensure that the Office of the Army General
    Counsel appropriately makes available any legal opinions that it
    issues.
        Question. In response to attempts within DOD to subordinate legal
    functions and authorities of the Judge Advocates General to the General
    Counsels of DOD and the Military Services, Congress enacted legislation
    prohibiting any officer or employee of DOD from interfering with the
    ability of the Judge Advocates General of the military services and the
    legal adviser to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide
    independent legal advice to the Chairman, service secretaries, and
    service chiefs.
        What is your view of the need for the Judge Advocate General of the
    Army to have the authority to provide independent legal advice to the
    Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army?
        Answer. The Judge Advocate General's statutory responsibility and
    authority to provide independent legal advice, set forth in title 10,
    U.S.C., section 3037, have repeatedly been recognized as essential to
    the effective delivery of legal services. Uniformed attorneys bring
    another perspective to the practice of law, providing insight and
    advice shaped by years of service across the Army. In today's
    environment, our senior leaders both demand and deserve independent
    advice from their counsel.
        Question. What is your view of the responsibility of Army judge
    advocates to provide independent legal advice to military commanders?
        Answer. I believe that Army Judge Advocates in the field are vested
    with a critical responsibility: to provide quality, candid, legal
    advice to military commanders. Army commanders need and deserve the
    best legal advice and judgment available--that is, in part, made
    possible when Judge Advocates are empowered to provide commanders with
    independent legal advice, with appropriate guidance from supervising
    attorneys in their technical chain.
        Question. If confirmed, would you propose any changes to the
    current relationships between the Judge Advocate General of the Army
    and the Army General Counsel?
        Answer. Based upon my knowledge and understanding to date, I
    believe that The Judge Advocate General and the Army General Counsel
    have an excellent working relationship. If confirmed, I will continue
    to foster this professional and collaborative relationship with The
    Judge Advocate General and his staff to ensure the effective delivery
    of legal services to the Department of the Army.
        Question. Article 6 of the UCMJ gives primary jurisdiction over
    military justice to the Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, and
    Air Force.
        How do you view the responsibilities of the Army General Counsel in
    the performance of military justice matters with regard to the Judge
    Advocate General of the Army?
        Answer. The Judge Advocate General's responsibilities to ensure the
    proper administration of the military justice system require his direct
    and independent advice to the Secretary of the Army on military justice
    matters. I look forward to providing The Judge Advocate General with
    whatever support and coordination I can in this respect. I will, if
    confirmed, consult with The Judge Advocate General on matters of mutual
    interest or concern relating to military justice, recognizing his
    statutory duties and special expertise in this area. I will also work
    with The Judge Advocate General in safeguarding the integrity of the
    military justice system.

                    ATTORNEY RECRUITING AND RETENTION ISSUES

        Question. If confirmed, how do you assess your ability to hire and
    retain top quality attorneys and provide sufficient opportunity for
    advancement?
        Answer. I understand that the Army continues to recruit and retain
    top quality military and civilian attorneys and provide them
    opportunities for advancement. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor
    and assess recruitment, retention, and advancement programs for our
    military and civilian attorneys.
        Question. In your view, does the Department of the Army have a
    sufficient number of civilian and military attorneys to perform its
    missions?
        Answer. I understand that the Army's enhanced mission requirements
    in recent years have fueled appropriate growth in the Army's legal
    community. If confirmed, I will evaluate whether the number of
    attorneys in the Department of the Army is sufficient to support the
    successful accomplishment of all the Army's assigned missions.
        Question. In your view, what incentives to successful recruiting
    and retention of attorneys, if any, need to be implemented or
    established?
        Answer. In my view, retention of top notch military and civilian
    attorneys is essential to the current and future success of Army legal
    services. Although I am unfamiliar with the full scope of attorney
    retention programs available in the Army, if confirmed, I intend to
    review these programs carefully and support those incentives and
    initiatives that affect the retention of the best attorneys to support
    the Army mission.

                                DETAINEE ISSUES

        Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in
    addressing legal issues regarding detainees?
        Answer. Properly addressing legal and policy issues associated with
    detainees and detention operations is of vital importance to DOD and
    the Nation as a whole. I understand that the Office of the Army General
    Counsel and the Office of The Judge Advocate General support the DOD
    General Counsel in executing elements of the President's Executive
    Orders related to detainee operations. Additionally, if confirmed, and
    in coordination with The Judge Advocate General, I will provide advice
    to the Secretary of the Army in his role as the DOD Executive Agent for
    the administration of detainee operations policy, with particular focus
    on our obligation to treat all detainees humanely.
        Question. Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act
    (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 provides that no individual in the custody
    or under the physical control of the U.S. Government, regardless of
    nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman,
    or degrading treatment or punishment.
        In your view, is the foregoing prohibition in the best interest of
    the United States? Why or why not?
        Answer. Yes, I firmly believe that this prohibition is in the best
    interest of the United States. This prohibition is consistent with the
    long-standing military tradition of applying the humanitarian
    provisions of the Law of War to those individuals who, for whatever
    reason, are no longer actively participating in hostilities and find
    themselves in custody. Moreover, this prohibition is consistent with
    international standards to which the United States is a party.
    Prohibiting the cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment
    of individuals in our custody or under our physical control upholds our
    ideals and reinforces our moral authority around the world.
        Question. Do you believe that the phrase ``cruel, inhuman, or
    degrading treatment or punishment'' has been adequately and
    appropriately defined for the purpose of this provision?
        Answer. Although the phrase ``cruel, inhuman, or degrading
    treatment'' is, on its face, susceptible to broad interpretation, the
    proscriptions on such conduct contained in the Department's
    implementing directives, as well as the provisions of the Geneva
    Conventions that are embodied in those directives, make it clear to
    soldiers what conduct is prohibited. If confirmed, I will ensure the
    Army's implementation of this policy in doctrine, to include training
    manuals, is clearly understood.
        Question. What role do you believe the General Counsel of the Army
    should play in the interpretation of this standard?
        Answer. The appropriate role of the General Counsel is to provide
    advice to the Secretary of the Army and his staff on detention and
    interrogation policies that implement this standard. If confirmed, I
    will ensure Army implementation is consistent with the law, the intent
    of the administration, and the guidance issued by the Secretary of
    Defense.
        Question. What role do you believe the Judge Advocate General of
    the Army should play in the interpretation of this standard?
        Answer. The appropriate role of The Judge Advocate General is to
    provide advice to the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Army staff on
    detention and interrogation policies that implement this standard. I
    believe that The Judge Advocate General should continue the training
    programs that have been developed for Judge Advocates in the field. I
    understand that these programs have proven to be instrumental in
    attaining and maintaining adherence to this standard.
        Question. If confirmed, will you take steps to ensure that all
    relevant Army directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
    procedures fully comply with the requirements of section 1403 and with
    Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
        Answer. I will. I believe the requirements of section 1403 and
    Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions are essential to maintaining
    a disciplined Army, whose actions are grounded in the rule of law.
        Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
    specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
    22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
    Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
        Answer. I do. These standards have been instrumental in promoting
    the confidence of the American people in the Army and have been and
    will continue to be important in guiding our soldiers' actions in
    contingency operations.
        Question. Section 2441 of title 18, U.S.C., as amended by the
    Military Commissions Act of 2006, defines grave breaches of Common
    Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, including torture and cruel and
    inhuman treatment.
        In your view, does section 2441 define these terms in a manner that
    provides appropriate protection from abusive treatment to U.S.
    detainees in foreign custody and to foreign detainees in U.S. custody?
        Answer. These sections of the War Crimes Act were necessary to
    define the ``serious crimes'' or ``grave breaches'' of Common Article 3
    to the Geneva Conventions. Identifying these felony-level offenses in
    our domestic law implemented our international law obligations to
    define, with specificity, the grave breaches that must be prosecuted
    under the Law of War. In addition, I believe that we must continue to
    enforce these standards through the promulgation of doctrine, training,
    and oversight, and that we must hold soldiers accountable for
    violations of these standards.

                         CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD

        Question. U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have
    relied on contractor support to a greater degree than any previous U.S.
    military operations. The extensive involvement of contractor employees
    in a broad array of activities--including security functions--has
    raised questions about the legal accountability of contractor employees
    for their actions.
        Do you believe that current DOD and Department of the Army
    regulations appropriately define and limit the scope of security
    functions that may be performed by contractors in an area of combat
    operations?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the DOD regulation concerning
    workforce mix was updated in 2010 to better define and limit the scope
    of security functions that may be performed by contractors in an area
    of combat operations. It is also my understanding that the DOD
    regulation on contractor personnel authorized to accompany the U.S.
    Armed Forces is presently under review. If confirmed, I will support
    this review, as appropriate. Additionally, the Office of Federal
    Procurement Policy (OFPP) recently redefined the term ``inherently
    governmental'' in OFPP Policy 11-01, effective on October 12, 2011.
    This new policy added to the list of inherently governmental functions:
    (i) security functions performed in combat; and (ii) security
    operations in certain situations connected with combat or potential
    combat. I am advised that this means that each and every one of these
    situations should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine
    which security functions and activities are inherently governmental and
    which can be performed by contractors with appropriate management and
    oversight. If confirmed, I will support this process.
        Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to such
    regulations?
        Answer. It would be premature for me to recommend any changes to
    DOD or Department of the Army regulations. If confirmed, I will
    carefully consider the current departmental regulations and the results
    of ongoing reviews and make appropriate recommendations to the
    Secretary of the Army.
        Question. Do you believe that current DOD and Department of the
    Army regulations appropriately define and limit the scope of contractor
    participation in the interrogation of detainees?
        Answer. I understand that the current DOD and Department of the
    Army regulations define and, as properly implemented, limit the scope
    of contractor participation in the interrogation of detainees. However,
    the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 significantly limits departmental
    authority to use contractors in an interrogation role. It is my
    understanding that DODD 3115.09, DOD Intelligence Interrogations,
    Detainee Briefings, and Tactical Questioning, is under revision, and
    that the draft addresses the limitations on contract interrogators
    prescribed in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010.
        Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to such
    regulations?
        Answer. Although I have no basis of knowledge on which to propose
    changes at this time, I will, if confirmed, review applicable DOD and
    Department of the Army regulations to determine what, if any, changes
    may be necessary and appropriate.
        Question. OMB Circular A-76 defines ``inherently governmental
    functions'' to include ``discretionary functions'' that could
    ``significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of private
    persons.'' OMB recently issued guidance clarifying the applicability of
    these terms to the performance of security functions.
        In your view, is the performance of security functions that may
    reasonably be expected to require the use of deadly force in highly
    hazardous public areas in an area of combat operations an inherently
    governmental function?
        Answer. In the recently revised Office of Federal Procurement
    Policy (OFPP) policy addressing inherently governmental functions,
    security operations are listed as inherently governmental when they are
    performed in actual combat situations. For situations where security
    will be performed in any hostile situation other than actual combat,
    the circumstances should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to
    determine which security functions and activities are inherently
    governmental and which can be performed by contractors with appropriate
    management and oversight. If I am confirmed, I intend to examine this
    issue in greater depth.
        Question. In your view, is the interrogation of enemy prisoners of
    war and other detainees during and in the aftermath of hostilities an
    inherently governmental function?
        Answer. Currently, DOD policy allows properly trained and cleared
    contractors to conduct government-approved interrogations, provided
    they are supervised and closely monitored throughout the process by
    properly trained DOD military or civilian personnel. However, the NDAA
    for Fiscal Year 2010 significantly limits departmental authority to use
    contractors in an interrogation role. It is my understanding that DODD
    3115.09, DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Briefings, and
    Tactical Questioning, is under revision, and that the draft addresses
    the limitations on contract interrogators prescribed in the NDAA for
    Fiscal Year 2010.
        Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in
    addressing the issue of what functions may appropriately be performed
    by contractors on the battlefield?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will provide advice to the Secretary of the
    Army and other senior departmental officials regarding the functions
    that contractors may legally perform on the battlefield. I will assist
    them in implementing policies regarding the use of contractors that are
    consistent with applicable statutory and regulatory constraints.
        Question. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) was
    enacted in 2000 to extend the criminal jurisdiction of the U.S. courts
    to persons employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the
    United States.
        In your view, does MEJA provide appropriate jurisdiction for
    alleged criminal actions of contractor employees in Iraq, Afghanistan,
    and other areas of combat operations?
        Answer. Under the MEJA, Federal jurisdiction covers felony offenses
    committed overseas by members of the Armed Forces who leave military
    service prior to prosecution or who conspire with non-servicemembers
    covered by MEJA; civilian employees of DOD; contractors (including
    subcontractors at any tier) of DOD; dependents of the above; and
    civilian employees and contractors (including subcontractors at any
    tier) of any other Federal agency, but only to the extent their
    ``employment relates to supporting the mission of DOD.'' I understand
    that the goal of MEJA is to ensure that U.S. Federal employees and
    contractors supporting DOD missions overseas, who commit serious
    crimes, are not be able to escape Federal prosecution for serious
    offenses such as murder and rape simply because of a potential
    jurisdictional gap in the law. There is no analogue to MEJA for felony
    offenses committed by non-defense personnel overseas who are not
    supporting the mission of DOD. Rather, civilian employees and
    contractors who cannot be shown to be supporting the mission of DOD may
    be prosecuted only under certain specific statutes of extraterritorial
    scope. I understand, however, that this gap would be addressed by the
    enactment of the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (CEJA) of
    2011, currently pending before the Senate.
        Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to MEJA?
        Answer. In my opinion, CEJA would provide an effective means for
    the United States to exercise extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction
    over non-DOD Federal employees and contractors in Iraq, Afghanistan,
    and other areas of operation, who engage in conduct that would
    constitute a felony-level Federal crime in the United States. If
    confirmed, I will assess whether any change or supplement to MEJA may
    be appropriate.
        Question. What role would you expect to play, if confirmed, in
    developing administration recommendations for changes to MEJA?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would seek to offer my views and assist in
    developing proposals to change or supplement MEJA. I would also
    coordinate closely with The Judge Advocate General and the DOD Office
    of General Counsel in the development of any such proposals, given the
    complementary and sometimes competing availability of criminal
    jurisdiction under the UCMJ.
        Question. Section 552 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007 extended
    criminal jurisdiction of military courts-martial under the UCMJ to
    persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field during
    time of declared war or a contingency operation, such as our current
    operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
        In your view, does the UCMJ provide appropriate jurisdiction over
    alleged criminal actions of contractor employees in Iraq, Afghanistan,
    and other areas of combat operations?
        Answer. I am aware that Article 2 of the UCMJ was amended in 2006
    to extend UCMJ jurisdiction over persons serving with or accompanying
    U.S. Armed Forces in the field in times of declared war or in a
    contingency operation. This amendment authorized a commander's exercise
    of UCMJ disciplinary authority over certain civilians--for example, a
    contractor employee whose criminal conduct jeopardized good order and
    discipline or discredited the Armed Forces and thereby had a potential
    adverse effect on military operation. The Secretary of Defense, in
    turn, published guidance on the prudent exercise of this unique
    authority. I understand that this guidance enumerated the command and
    law enforcement authorities available when a crime is committed within
    a commander's geographic area of responsibility outside the United
    States. This guidance further ensures that the Department of Justice
    and DOD each play an appropriate role in resolving whether jurisdiction
    over the civilian is most appropriately exercised in a military court
    under Article 2 of the UCMJ, or in a Federal District Court under MEJA
    or other Federal laws.
        Question. What is your view of the procedures agreed upon by DOD
    and the Department of Justice to reconcile jurisdictional
    responsibilities under MEJA and the UCMJ?
        Answer. I understand that current policy requires DOD to notify the
    Department of Justice when offenses alleged to have been committed by
    civilians violate U.S. Federal criminal laws and to afford the
    Department of Justice the opportunity to pursue prosecution of the case
    in Federal Court. As stated above, such notification provides DOD and
    the Department of Justice the opportunity to determine whether
    jurisdiction is more appropriately exercised under the UCMJ or pursuant
    to MEJA or other Federal laws. If confirmed, in coordination with The
    Judge Advocate General and subject to consultation with the General
    Counsel of DOD, I will monitor cases in which the UCMJ or MEJA are
    employed to assess the effectiveness of the current procedures and
    evaluate whether further refinements of these procedures may be
    necessary.
        Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the UCMJ to
    ensure appropriate jurisdiction for alleged criminal actions of
    contractor employees?
        Answer. At this time, I am not aware of any specific provisions in
    the UCMJ that need change in this area.

                              ATTACKS AT FORT HOOD

        Question. In your view, do current Army policies limit the ability
    to include information in official records that may assist in the
    identification of potential threats?
        Answer. At this time, I am not sufficiently familiar with current
    Army policies regarding the filing of information in official records
    to permit me to express an opinion on this important question. I am
    informed, however, that the Army has made progress in addressing the
    issues associated with the identification of potential threats. If
    confirmed, I will look closely at this issue, in coordination with the
    Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs); the
    Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1; and the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2.
        Question. Do current Army procedures hinder the ability to share
    this type of information with other official agencies charged with
    identifying and monitoring potential extremist or terrorist activities?
        Answer. I am not aware of any specific procedures that hinder the
    ability to share information between agencies. However, if confirmed, I
    will review this matter to ensure that the Army's procedures for
    sharing potential threat and other force protection-related information
    both internally (e.g., with the Army Criminal Investigation Command),
    and with other DOD or Federal law enforcement or intelligence agencies
    are effective and in compliance with all applicable laws, directives,
    and regulations, as appropriate.
        Question. What is your understanding of how the Army balances the
    need to identify and respond to potentially harmful extremist views
    held by soldiers against individual privacy and respect for the right
    of soldiers to hold and express personal beliefs?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Army currently has a robust
    policy that proscribes participation in extremist organizations and
    activities. Commanders have been empowered to maintain good order and
    discipline in their units, and enforcement of this policy is a function
    of command. I further understand that the Army mandates reporting of
    suspected or possible international or domestic terrorist activity,
    espionage, compromises of security or classified information, and
    similar activities. It is my understanding that the Army regulation
    addressing counterintelligence and other threat awareness and reporting
    was updated in November 2010. If confirmed, I will work closely with
    the proponents of force protection policies to ensure that Army
    programs addressing potential threats maintain the proper balance
    between the need for commanders to maintain good order and discipline
    and protect the force, and soldiers' rights to privacy and to hold and
    express personal beliefs.
        Question. Do you see a need for a change in this balance?
        Answer. At this time, I have no basis of knowledge on which to
    formulate an opinion on this important issue. I do, however, recognize
    that this is a Department-wide issue that extends beyond the Army. If
    confirmed, I would support any and all DOD initiatives in this area.

                              RELIGIOUS GUIDELINES

        Question. What is your understanding of current policies and
    programs of DOD and the Department of the Army regarding religious
    practices in the military?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Army's policies support
    religious tolerance and mutual respect. If confirmed, I would continue
    the Army's firm commitment to upholding the Constitutional tenets of
    the ``free exercise'' and ``establishment'' clauses and review policies
    as necessary to assure continued compliance with the First Amendment.
        Question. In your view, do these policies accommodate the free
    exercise of religion and other beliefs without impinging on those who
    have different beliefs, including no religious belief?
        Answer. I have been informed that current Army policies require
    chaplains to support all unit personnel, regardless of their beliefs.
    It is my view that these Army policies do accommodate free exercise of
    religion. If confirmed, I am willing to study this issue further to
    determine if changes in policy are necessary and appropriate.
        Question. In your opinion, do existing policies and practices
    regarding public prayers offered by military chaplains in a variety of
    formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a
    chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious
    beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs,
    including no religious belief?
        Answer. I understand that during mandatory official functions,
    chaplains are not compelled to offer prayers that are inconsistent with
    their faith, but are expected to remain sensitive to the pluralistic
    Army and society they serve. In my opinion, these policies strike an
    appropriate balance, given the diversity of religious views in the
    Army. If confirmed, I would be willing to study this issue further to
    determine if changes in policy are necessary and appropriate.

             ROLE IN THE OFFICER PROMOTION AND CONFIRMATION PROCESS

        Question. What is your understanding of the role of the General
    Counsel of the Department of the Army in ensuring the integrity and
    proper functioning of the officer promotion process?
        Answer. I have been informed that under title 10, U.S.C., chapter
    36, the Secretary of the Army is responsible for the proper functioning
    of the Department of the Army's promotion selection process. In
    addition to the legal review of Memoranda of Instruction and selection
    board reports to ensure they comport with statutory standards, the Army
    General Counsel must also ensure the conduct of the board process
    conforms to all legal requirements. The diligent execution of this
    function requires advising the Secretary of the Army of any case in
    which a selection board report or selection board process fails to
    adhere to the statutory standards, either generally or with regard to a
    particular officer being considered for promotion. In advising the
    Secretary of the Army and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the
    Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), the General Counsel helps to
    ensure that Army promotion policies properly implement applicable laws
    and regulations and are fairly applied. In these matters, the Office of
    the Army General Counsel coordinates closely with The Office of the
    Judge Advocate General.
        Question. Do you see a need for change in this role?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the current process is working
    well; however, if I am confirmed and determine that a change is
    necessary, I would work closely with the Assistant Secretary of the
    Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), The Judge Advocate General, and
    the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, to effect such change, while
    maintaining both the integrity of the Army's promotion process and the
    trust of the Army Officer Corps, Congress, and the American people.

                      GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICER NOMINATIONS

        Question. Under DOD Instruction 1320.4, adverse and alleged adverse
    information pertaining to general and flag officers must be evaluated
    by senior leaders in the Services and in the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense prior to nomination for promotion and certain assignments.
        If confirmed, what role, if any, would you play in the officer
    promotion system, particularly in reviewing general officer
    nominations?
        Answer.
             I have been informed that for all officer promotions,
            including general officer promotions, the Office of the Army
            General Counsel, in coordination with the Office of The Judge
            Advocate General, plays an active role in the officer promotion
            system, to include: Reviewing Memoranda of Instruction that
            govern the conduct of promotion selection boards and subsequent
            promotion selection board reports.
             As to officers being considered for promotion to a
            grade below general officer, I have been advised that adverse
            information that is not in an officer's official military
            personnel file that may be presented to the promotion selection
            board is reviewed to ensure it is accurate and comports with
            the requirements of title 10 (i.e., that it is ``substantiated,
            relevant information that could reasonably affect the
            deliberations of the selection board'').
             In general officer cases, the standard for adverse
            information that must be presented to a promotion selection
            board is ``any credible information of an adverse nature.'' I
            have been advised that the Office of the Army General Counsel
            participates in a robust screening process designed to ensure
            that all adverse information is properly identified for
            presentation to the promotion selection board.
             I have been advised that when adverse information
            about an officer becomes available after a promotion selection
            board makes its recommendations, the Office of the Army General
            Counsel and the Office of The Judge Advocate General coordinate
            in providing legal advice to the Secretary of the Army. This
            advice enables the Secretary's determination as to whether a
            promotion review board should be convened to consider whether
            to continue to support the promotion of the considered officer
            or take steps to remove the officer from the promotion list.

        Question. What is your understanding of the role of the General
    Counsel of the Department of the Army in ensuring the legal sufficiency
    of statutory selection board processes?
        Answer. I understand that under title 10, the Secretary of the Army
    is responsible for the proper functioning of the Department of the
    Army's promotion selection process. Prior to approval by the Secretary
    of the Army, all Memoranda of Instruction for officer promotion
    selection boards are reviewed by the Office of the Army General
    Counsel, in coordination with the Office of The Judge Advocate General,
    to ensure the Secretary's instructions conform to statutes and
    accurately reflect his guidance regarding attributes necessary for
    service in the next grade. All reports of promotion selection boards
    are processed through the Office of the Army General Counsel prior to
    final action on the report by the Secretary. The Army General Counsel
    must be satisfied that the Army has met applicable statutory standards
    and that individual selection board reports conform to the law. The
    Army General Counsel must advise the Secretary of the Army of any case
    in which a selection board report fails to adhere to the statutory
    standards, either generally or with regard to a particular officer
    being considered for promotion. In advising the Secretary of the Army
    and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and
    Reserve Affairs), the Army General Counsel helps to ensure that Army
    promotion policies properly implement applicable laws and regulations
    and are fairly applied.
        Question. What is the role, if any, of the General Counsel of the
    Department of the Army in reviewing and providing potentially adverse
    information pertaining to a nomination to the Senate Armed Services
    Committee?
        Answer. It is my understanding that under current Department of the
    Army practice, the Office of the Army General Counsel reviews each
    selection board report, as well as departmental communications to the
    Committee, the President, and the Secretary of Defense, to ensure that
    the reports and communications comply in form and substance with law
    and applicable directives and regulation. The Office of the Army
    General Counsel gives special attention to cases of nominees with
    substantiated or potentially adverse information and cases with
    reportable information in order to ensure that such information is
    reported to the Senate Armed Services Committee in a timely, accurate,
    and comprehensible manner.

                      MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY AND CASES

        Question. In your view, what role, if any, should the General
    Counsel and civilian attorneys assigned to the Office of General
    Counsel play in military personnel policy and individual cases,
    including cases before the Board for Correction of Military Records?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army,
    the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), and
    other senior leaders, to ensure that the Army properly develops and
    fairly applies military personnel policies. Were I to become aware that
    the Department did not fairly and lawfully apply military personnel
    policies, I would take appropriate action to ensure that the Army
    properly resolves the issue. In addition, I am aware of and fully
    respect the independent role that the Army Board for the Correction of
    Military Records (ABCMR) plays in the correction of military records,
    and if confirmed, I would coordinate with the Assistant Secretary of
    the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), who exercises overall
    responsibility for the Army Review Boards Agency, regarding the legal
    sufficiency of ABCMR recommendations to the Secretary of the Army.

                 SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE POLICY

        Question. Numerous cases of sexual misconduct involving soldiers
    have been reported from Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan over the last
    several years. Many victims and their advocates contend that they were
    victimized twice: first by attackers in their own ranks and then by
    unresponsive or inadequate military treatment. They asserted that the
    military failed to respond appropriately by providing basic services,
    including medical attention and criminal investigations of their
    charges.
        What is your understanding of the resources and programs the Army
    has in place in deployed locations to offer victims of serious sexual
    assaults the medical, psychological, and legal help they need?
        Answer. This is an extremely important issue for the Army and, if
    confirmed, I will focus significant attention on it. Although I am not
    fully aware of all Army initiatives or resources to help sexual assault
    victims, I understand that the Army has taken significant steps to
    improve the assistance to all victims of sexual assaults, with specific
    attention to victims in a deployed environment. If confirmed, I will
    study this matter in greater depth with a view to ensuring the Army
    continues to take appropriate steps to provide medical, psychological,
    and legal help to soldiers who are victims of sexual assault, both in
    garrison and in deployed locations.
        Question. What is your view of the steps the Army has taken to
    prevent sexual assaults on female soldiers at their home stations and
    when they are deployed?
        Answer. It is my view that the Army has taken several extremely
    important steps in its campaign to prevent sexual assaults on female
    soldiers at their home stations and when deployed. I am aware that in
    2008, the Army launched a comprehensive new sexual assault prevention
    and response campaign that has continued to grow through the present
    day. If confirmed, I will ensure that the legal community fully
    supports this initiative.
        Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
    resources the Army has in place to investigate and respond to
    allegations of sexual assault?
        Answer. At this time I am not familiar with all of the Army's
    training and resources to investigate and respond to allegations of
    sexual assault. If confirmed, I will assess whether additional steps
    should be taken to support victims and hold offenders accountable.
        Question. Do you consider the Army's current sexual assault
    policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting,
    to be effective?
        Answer. I have been advised that the Army has focused both on
    eliminating sexual assault from its ranks and on increasing victim
    support--both key elements of an effective program to address sexual
    assault. I have been advised that part of the focus on victim support
    involves an option for confidential reporting (also called
    ``restricted'' reporting), which I understand allows sexual assault
    victims to disclose, confidentially, the details of their assault to
    specified individuals and to receive medical treatment and counseling
    without triggering the official investigative process. If confirmed, I
    will work with knowledgeable professionals to assess and ensure the
    continuation of effective Army programs in this regard.
        Question. Specifically, do you think that Sexual Assault Response
    Coordinators should be attended a confidentiality privilege in order to
    help them perform their duties more effectively?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work with knowledgeable professionals
    to determine whether extending a confidentiality privilege to Sexual
    Assault Response Coordinators would allow them to perform their duties
    more effectively.

                            WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION

        Question. Section 1034 of title 10, U.S.C., prohibits taking
    retaliatory personnel action against a member of the Armed Forces as
    reprisal for making a protected communication. By definition, protected
    communications include communications to certain individuals and
    organizations outside of the chain of command.
        If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure that senior
    military leaders understand the need to protect servicemembers who
    report misconduct to appropriate authorities within or outside the
    chain of command?
        Answer. Whistleblower protections for military personnel affirm
    that members of the Armed Forces must be free from reprisal for making
    or preparing a protected communication to a Member of Congress; an
    Inspector General; a member of a DOD audit, inspection, investigation,
    or law enforcement organization; or any other person or organization
    (within or outside the chain of command) designated under regulations
    or established procedures to receive such communications. I believe
    that these protections are essential. If confirmed, I will work with
    The Judge Advocate General to ensure that senior military leaders are
    fully and accurately advised of the whistleblower protections accorded
    by law and regulation to all soldiers, and that they understand their
    legal responsibilities in this important area. In addition, I will
    ensure that any individual cases involving allegations of reprisal that
    may come to my attention are fully addressed in accordance with the
    law.

                       SUPPORT TO ARMY INSPECTOR GENERAL

        Question. What role, if any, do you think the General Counsel of
    the Army should have in reviewing the investigations and
    recommendations of the Army Inspector General?
        Answer. If confirmed as the chief legal officer of the Department
    of the Army and counsel to the Secretary of the Army and other
    Secretariat officials, I will establish and maintain a close,
    professional relationship with The Inspector General, and will
    communicate with him directly and candidly. I will provide independent
    and objective legal advice to The Inspector General and the Secretary
    with regard to all matters that relate to Inspector General programs,
    duties, functions, and responsibilities. In coordination with The Judge
    Advocate General, I will oversee the provision of effective legal
    guidance to the Office of The Inspector General in conducting
    investigations and making recommendations. Further, as part of my
    responsibility to review legal and policy issues arising from the
    Army's intelligence and counterintelligence activities, I will advise
    The Inspector General concerning proper reporting of the Army's
    intelligence oversight activities.

                                WOMEN IN COMBAT

        Question. Current DOD policies regarding the combat role of women
    in uniform have been in effect since 1994.
        What is your understanding of the conclusions and lessons that have
    been learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan about the
    feasibility of current policies regarding the assignment of women?
        Answer. At this time, I do not have enough information to make an
    informed assessment of the conclusions and lessons learned from
    operations in Iraq or Afghanistan in regard to women in combat. It is
    my understanding that the Army is in compliance with DOD policy
    relating to the assignment of women.
        Question. What is your assessment of the Army's compliance with the
    requirements of law relating to the assignment of women?
        Answer. It is my understanding that the Army is in compliance with
    the requirements of the DOD policy relating to women in combat. Women
    have and will continue to be an integral part of the Army team,
    performing exceptionally well in all specialties and positions open to
    them.

                               CIVILIAN ATTORNEYS

        Question. Judge advocates in the Armed Forces benefit from an
    established career progression, substantial mentoring and training
    opportunities, and exposure to a broad spectrum of legal areas and
    leadership responsibilities. By contrast, civilian attorneys in the
    Military Departments normally do not have established career programs
    and may do the same work for many years, with promotion based solely
    upon longevity and vacancies.
        What is your understanding of the personnel management and career
    development system for civilian attorneys?
        Answer. It is my view that robust attorney career development
    programs result in excellence in client service, the recruitment and
    retention of high-performing professionals, and building the bench for
    the future. If confirmed, I will be in a position to examine this issue
    closely to ensure comprehensive and effective personnel management and
    career development programs for civilian attorneys.
        Question. In your view does that system need revision? If so, what
    do you see as the major problems and what changes would you suggest?
        Answer. As discussed above, robust attorney career development
    programs result in excellence in client service, the recruitment and
    retention of high-performing professionals, and build the bench for the
    future. However, it may be appropriate to review past experience with a
    view toward identifying any areas that can be approved. If confirmed, I
    will be in a position to examine this issue closely to ensure
    comprehensive and effective personnel management and career development
    programs for civilian attorneys.

                                     CLIENT

        Question. In your opinion, who is the client of the General Counsel
    of the Department of the Army?
        Answer. The client of the General Counsel of the Department of the
    Army is the Department of the Army, acting through its authorized
    officials.

                               ACQUISITION ISSUES

        Question. What role should the General Counsel play in ensuring
    that Army procurement programs are executed in accordance with the law
    and DOD acquisition policy?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the
    Army, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and
    Technology), and other senior Department of the Army leaders to ensure
    that the Department of the Army's acquisition and procurement programs
    are executed in accordance with applicable provisions of the U.S. Code,
    as well as controlling regulations and policies. Today's acquisition
    professionals face the challenge of managing their programs' cost,
    schedule, and performance while remaining in compliance with a myriad
    of legal and policy requirements. I believe it is the responsibility of
    Army lawyers to proactively assist their acquisition clients in meeting
    that challenge. From the earliest stages of program development,
    counsel should be involved in identifying potential issues and, where
    appropriate, legally-compliant alternative courses of action. In those
    rare situations where an issue cannot be satisfactorily resolved, it is
    incumbent on counsel to elevate their concerns promptly in order to
    protect the Department's overarching interests.
        Question. What role should the General Counsel play in ensuring
    that Army acquisition officials understand flexibilities provided by
    Congress in the acquisition and financial statutes and can take
    advantage of those flexibilities to act in the best interests of the
    Army?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Assistant
    Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) and the
    Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)
    to ensure that the Army's acquisition programs and financial operations
    are executed in a manner that is consistent with their governing legal
    framework and to challenge program strategies that may be premised on
    an unduly restrictive interpretation of the applicable authorities.
        Question. What role should the General Counsel play in ensuring
    that ethics provisions on conflict of interest are followed both by
    Army personnel and by Army contractors?
        Answer. Structuring departmental business practices to avoid both
    personal and organizational conflicts of interest should be one of the
    Army's highest priorities. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
    Secretary of the Army, the Assistant Secretary (Acquisition, Logistics,
    and Technology) and other senior departmental officials to promote an
    organizational climate that is sensitive to the need to avoid conflicts
    of interest and that reacts appropriately when specific issues arise. I
    believe that Army lawyers can make a significant contribution to this
    endeavor through the provision of acquisition ethics training and
    through early and sustained involvement in the Department's acquisition
    programs and procurement activities.
        Question. Allegations of fraud and abuse during contingency
    contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan have been wide-spread.
        What role should the General Counsel play in ensuring that Army
    personnel are properly trained in contingency contracting and are
    supervised in the performance of their duties?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the
    Army, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and
    Technology), and other senior Department of the Army personnel to
    ensure that the legal community continues to support fully the
    initiatives currently being implemented to improve contingency
    contracting and to enhance the contracting workforce overall. I would
    also work closely with The Judge Advocate General of the Army and the
    other legal offices to ensure that adequate legal resources are
    available to support the contingency contracting mission.

                        DETECTING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

        Question. Personal and organizational conflicts of interest have
    become a major concern. DOD's expanded use of private contractors being
    tasked to perform key functions that the Services had formerly
    performed in-house and the new requirement to fill thousands of DOD
    civilian positions with experienced, qualified individuals present
    challenges in preventing conflicts of interest and the appearance of
    conflicts of interest.
        What do you think the Army should do, and what should the General
    Counsel's role be, in ensuring that the Army identifies personal and
    organizational conflicts of interests and takes the appropriate steps
    to avoid or mitigate them?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would closely examine the Army's process
    for reviewing and preventing both personal and organizational conflicts
    of interest. I believe that ethics awareness and instruction for all
    personnel is vitally important, and I would ensure that ethics training
    is a priority at all echelons. Bringing functions back ``in-house''
    must be closely monitored with respect to former contractor employees
    and their relationships to their former employers. If confirmed, I
    would work closely with senior Army officials to foster a high level of
    organizational sensitivity to these concerns and to assist in the
    appropriate resolution of individual situations that may arise.
        Question. What is your understanding of the steps the Army takes to
    identify and address potential conflicts of interest during the hiring
    process?
        Answer. I understand that financial disclosure reporting is a
    primary source of information to identify and prevent conflicts of
    interest. If confirmed, I would emphasize the importance of properly
    identifying positions requiring financial disclosure reporting and
    ensure that rigorous and timely review of the reports is accomplished
    by both ethics counselors and supervisors. If confirmed, I will
    emphasize education in conflicts of interest in the Army's ethics
    training program.
        Question. Recent reports have raised concerns about potential
    personal conflicts of interest by contractor employees, including
    retired general and flag officers (``senior mentors'') who advise
    senior government officials.
        What is your understanding of existing statutes and regulations
    pertaining to personal conflicts of interest by contractor employees
    who advise senior government officials?
        Answer. I understand that concerns have been raised in media
    reports about the Military Services' senior mentor programs. In the
    past, the Army's senior mentors often were contractor employees, but I
    understand the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Army have
    issued policies that mandate employment of senior mentors as Highly-
    Qualified Experts (HQEs). This means they are Federal Government
    employees and not contractor employees. Further, I understand that in
    this capacity, senior mentors file public financial disclosure reports,
    which are reviewed by their supervisors and Army ethics counselors for
    financial conflicts of interest. Thus, all the normal statutes and
    regulations pertaining to employee conflicts of interest now apply to
    senior mentors. With respect to other contractor employees who might
    advise senior government officials, if confirmed, I would emphasize the
    importance of finding acceptable employment or contract arrangements
    that would minimize conflicts of interest, or any appearance thereof,
    that could undermine the public's confidence in the integrity of this
    program.
        Question. Do you see any need for changes to these statutes and
    regulations?
        Answer. At the present time, with the Secretary of Defense and
    Secretary of the Army policies pertaining to senior mentors in place, I
    believe that the statutes and regulations on personal conflicts of
    interest adequately protect the public interest. If confirmed, I would
    monitor this issue and, if I concluded that any changes were warranted,
    I would proceed through the Department's procedures for proposing
    legislative and regulatory changes.
        Question. What role do you see for the General Counsel in
    identifying and addressing potential conflicts of interest by employees
    of Army contractors?
        Answer. In my opinion, the Army General Counsel should work closely
    with the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and
    Technology) to ensure compliance with restrictions imposed by the
    Federal Acquisition Regulation pertaining to organizational conflicts
    of interest. I also would ensure that Army lawyers emphasize this area
    as part of the Department of the Army's program for annual ethics
    training.

                                  LEGAL ETHICS

        Question. What is your understanding of the action a Department of
    the Army attorney or an Army judge advocate should take if the attorney
    becomes aware of improper activities by a Department of the Army
    official who has sought the attorney's legal advice and the official is
    unwilling to follow the attorney's advice?
        Answer. Army attorneys generally provide legal advice to Army
    officials in their capacity as representatives of the Department of the
    Army. The Department of the Army is the attorney's client, and no
    attorney-client privilege is established between the attorney and the
    Army official. When an Army attorney advises an Army official, the
    official may use that advice to exercise official functions and duties.
    If an Army attorney suspects that the individual Army official, either
    in exercising such functions or in failing to do so, violates a law or
    standard of conduct, I believe the attorney has an obligation to report
    the potential violation to the appropriate higher authority.
        Question. Do you believe that the present limits on pro bono
    activities of government attorneys are generally correct as a matter of
    policy or does the policy need to be reviewed and revised?
        Answer. I understand that government attorneys may participate in
    pro bono activities so long as the representation is consistent with
    general governmental ethical rules and with the rules of professional
    responsibility applicable to attorneys. I understand that Army civilian
    attorneys may, for instance, perform pro bono work with supervisory
    approval so long as the representation does not occur on government
    time or at its expense, does not interfere with official duties, and
    does not create a conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict
    of interest. I understand the Army also operates a legal assistance
    program for soldiers and their families, providing free services in
    areas such as family law, wills and estate planning, tax law, landlord/
    tenant matters, contract disputes, consumer law, and assistance during
    the disability evaluation system. If confirmed, I would review the
    current policies in coordination with The Judge Advocate General and
    recommend revisions, if appropriate.
        Question. In your view, do the laws, regulations, and guidelines
    that establish the rules of professional responsibility for attorneys
    in the Department of the Army provide adequate guidance?
        Answer. The Army has comprehensive regulations, based upon the
    American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, that
    govern the ethical conduct of Army lawyers, both military and civilian.
    All Army attorneys must, at all times, be in good standing with the
    licensing authority of at least one State, territory of the United
    States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
    This regulatory system would appear to provide adequate guidance;
    however, if confirmed, I would review the current policy, in
    coordination with The Judge Advocate General and, as appropriate,
    recommend revisions.

                LITIGATION INVOLVING THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

        Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
    the Department of the Army and the Department of Justice with respect
    to litigation involving DOD?
        Answer. The Department of Justice represents the Department of the
    Army in civil litigation. In general, it is my understanding that
    coordination between the Department of Justice and the Department of
    the Army is timely and consistent on every level. If confirmed, I will
    work with The Judge Advocate General and the General Counsel of DOD to
    ensure the continuation of a collaborative relationship with the
    Department of Justice with respect to litigation involving the
    Department of the Army.
        Question. In your view, does the Department need more independence
    and resources to conduct its own litigation or to improve upon its
    current supporting role?
        Answer. The Department of the Army's interests in civil litigation
    are effectively protected and defended by the Department of Justice. If
    confirmed, I will work with The Judge Advocate General to ensure that
    adequate resources are available to ensure that the Army is able to
    provide the appropriate level of support to the Department of Justice
    and to protect the Army's interests and equities in civil litigation in
    which it is involved.

                            CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

        Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
    appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
    briefings, and other communications of information.
        Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
    this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
    committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
    information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
    with respect to your responsibilities as the General Counsel of the
    Department of the Army?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and
    other communications of information are provided to this committee and
    its staff and other appropriate committees?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
    such documents?
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Brad R. Carson follows:]
                        Nomination Reference and Report
                               As In Executive Session,
                                   Senate of the United States,
                                                    September 15, 2011.
        Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
    on Armed Services:
        Brad Carson, of Oklahoma, to be General Counsel of the Department
    of the Army, vice Benedict S. Cohen, resigned.
                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of Brad R. Carson, which was
    transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
    referred, follows:]
                   Biographical Sketch of Brad Rogers Carson
    Degrees Completed
             University of Oklahoma College of Law, Norman, OK.
            Juris Doctorate with Highest Honors. Attended 1991-1994.
             Trinity College, Oxford University, Oxford, United
            Kingdom. M.A. Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. Attended
            1989-1991. (Attended as Rhodes Scholar).
             Baylor University. Waco, TX. B.A. magna aim laude with
            highest honors. Attended 1985-1989.
    Professional Experience
             Associate Professor of Law and Business, University of
            Tulsa, January 2010-present. Joint appointment in University of
            Tulsa College of Law and the Collins College of Business at the
            University of Tulsa. Classes taught include: Property, Energy
            Policy, Negotiations and Game Theory, and Seminar on
            Globalization.
             Director, National Energy Policy Institute, Tulsa, OK,
            January 2010-present. Directs research institute devoted to
            better understanding American energy policy options. Completed
            multi-million dollar study, buttressed by more than 20
            technical papers, entitled ``Toward a New National Energy
            Policy: Assessing the Options.'' Organizing semiannual
            conferences and numerous symposia on energy issues. Spring 2011
            Conference entitled ``OPEC at 50: Its Past, Present, and Future
            in a Carbon-Constrained World.''
             Officer-In-Charge, Weapons Intelligence Teams, 84th
            Explosive Ordnance Disposal Battalion, Multi-National Division
            South, Iraq, December 2008-December 2009. Awarded Bronze Star,
            Army Achievement Medal.
             President and Chief Executive Officer, Director,
            Cherokee Nation Businesses, L.L.C., Catoosa, OK, April 2005-
            December 2008.
             Fellow, Institute of Politics, Harvard University,
            Cambridge, MA, 2005, Led seminar at Harvard University on
            contemporary American politics.
             U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC, Member
            of Congress, 2nd District of Oklahoma, 2001-2005, 107th and
            108th Congresses.
             Department of Defense, Pentagon, Arlington, VA,
            Special assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special
            Projects and White House Fellow, 1997-1998.
             Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C., Tulsa, OK, Antitrust Attorney,
            1994-1997, 1999.
    Memberships
             U.S. Association for Energy Economics, council member,
            2010-present.
             Oklahoma Bar Association, Member, 1994-present.
             Society of Petroleum Engineers, Member, 2011.
             American Association for the Advancement of Science,
            2010-present.
    Selected Activities and Honors
             Bronze Star. 2010.
             Army Achievement Medal. 2010.
             Board of Directors, National Job Corps Association,
            2005-2008.
             U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce Ten Outstanding Young
            Americans, Awarded 2002.
             Rhodes Scholar, 1989-1991.
             While House Fellow, 1997-1998.
             Exceptional Contribution to Legal Services of Eastern
            Oklahoma, Awarded 1996.
             Bledsoe Award for Outstanding Law School Graduate from
            the University of Oklahoma, 1994.
             Adjunct Professor of Law (Law and Literature),
            University of Tulsa College of Law, 1997.
             Legal Services of Eastern Oklahoma Board of Directors,
            1997.
                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
    nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by Brad R. Carson
    in connection with his nomination follows:]

                              UNITED STATES SENATE
                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                                  Room SR-228
                           Washington, DC 20510-6050
                                 (202) 224-3871
                        COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
          BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

        Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
    more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
    form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
    of your answer applies.
                        Part A--Biographical Information
        Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
    this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
    public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
    any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

        1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
        Brad Rogers Carson.

        2. Position to which nominated:
        General Counsel, U.S. Army.

        3. Date of nomination:
        September 15, 2011.

        4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
        [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
    committee's executive files.]

        5. Date and place of birth:
        March 11, 1967; Winslow, AZ.

        6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
        Married to Julie Kruse Carson.

        7. Names and ages of children:
        Jack David Carson, age 5.

        8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
    dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
        Baylor University, B.A. 1989 (1985-1989)
        Oxford University, B.A./M.A. 1991 (1989-1991)
        University of Oklahoma, J.D. 1994 (1991-1994)

        9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
    last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
    job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
        U.S. Congressman, 2nd District of Oklahoma, 2001-2005, Washington,
    DC.
        Fellow, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2005,
    Cambridge, MA.
        CEO & President/Director, Cherokee Nation Businesses, LLC, 2005-
    2008, Catoosa, OK.
        Officer-In-Charge, Weapons Intelligence Teams, MND-S, 2008-2009,
    Iraq.
        Associate Professor of Business, Associate Professor of Law,
    University of Tulsa, 2009-present, Tulsa, OK.
        Director, National Energy Policy Institute, University of Tulsa,
    2009-present, Tulsa, OK.

        10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
    honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
    or local governments, other than those listed above.
        White House Fellow, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense,
    1996-1997.

        11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
    officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
    or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
    business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
        Director, Cherokee Nation Businesses, LLC, 2009-present.

        12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
    professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
    other organizations.
        Oklahoma Bar Association, Member, 1994-present.
        U.S. Association for Energy Economics, Council Member, 2010-
    present.
        Society of Petroleum Engineers, Member, 2011.
        American Association for the Advancement of Science, Member, 2010-
    present.

        13. Political affiliations and activities:
        (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
    any public office for which you have been a candidate.
        U.S. Congress, 2nd District of Oklahoma.
        (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
    to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
    years.
        Obama for America National Finance Committee.
        (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
    organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
    entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
        Williams for City Council, 2011, $500
        Smith-Soap for Chief, 2011, $5,000
        Obama for America, 2011, $1,000
        Reid for Senate, 2010, $1,000
        Edmondson for Governor, 2010, $4,000
        Gumm for Senate, 2010, $1,000
        Williams for House, 2010, $500
        Burrage for Senate, 2010, $2,000
        Boren for Congress, 2010, $2,000
        Paddock for State Superintendent, 2010, $750
        Adelson for Mayor, 2009, $3,000
        AmeriPac, 2008, $2,500
        Adelson for Senate, 2008, $2,000
        Hoskin for House, 2008, $250
        Boren for Congress, 2007, $1,000
        Jim Himes for Congress, 2007, $1,000
        Rice for Senate, 2007, $500
        Rice for Senate, 2008, $250
        Snyder for House, 2007, $250
        Obama for America, 2007, $4,600
        Sparks for Senate, 2006, $250
        Burrage for Senate, 2006, $1,000
        Regan for Lt Gov, 2006, $500

        14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
    society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
    for outstanding service or achievements.
        Bronze Star, 2009.
        Army Achievement Medal, 2009.
        Board of Directors, National Job Corps Association, 2005-2008.
        U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce Ten Outstanding Young Americans,
    2002.
        Rhodes Scholar, 1989-1991.
        White House Fellow, 1997-1998.
        Exceptional Contribution To Legal Services Of Eastern Oklahoma,
    1996.
        Bledsoe Award For Outstanding Law School Graduate From The
    University Of Oklahoma, 1994.
        Adjunct Professor of Law (Law and Literature). University of Tulsa
    College of Law, 1997.
        Legal Services of Eastern Oklahoma Board of Directors, 1997.

        15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
    books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
    written.
        ``The Liberal Moment: What Happened?'' in Symposium Issue of
    Democrary: A Journal of Ideas (along with Michael Sandel, Michael
    Walzer, Danielle Allen, William Galston, Martha Nussbaum, Robert Reich,
    Katha Pollit, and Joe Klein) (Spring 2010).
        ``The Claremore Diarist'' in The New Republic (November 22, 2004).
        ``Does the Democratic Party Have a Future?'' in The Weekly Standard
    (September 16, 2002) (review of The Emerging Democratic Majority by
    Judis and Texeira).
        ``Pay to Play,'' in Blueprint Magazine (May 31, 2005).
        ``The Fall of the House of Representatives'' in Democracy: A
    Journal of Ideas (September 2006) (review of The House: A History of
    the House of Representatives by Remini).
        ``Smart Development Subsidies'' in Democracy: A Journal of Ideas
    ((Part of ``20 Ideas for the Next President'') (Spring 2008)).
        Tate v. Browning-Ferris Industries: Oklahoma Adopts a Common Law
    Action for Employment Discrimination.'' 46 OKLA. L. REV. 557 (1993).
        Legal Issues Facing Small Businesses and Their Owners (with Michael
    Troilo) in Human Resource Management in Small Business (New Horizons in
    Management) (eds. Cooper and Burke).
        Federal Appellate Practice (with Robert E. Bacharach) in Appellate
    Manual for Oklahoma Lawyers (eds. Muchmore & Ellis) (3 vols.) (1997).

        16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
    speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
    copies and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
    been nominated.
        N/A.

        17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
        (a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
    conflicts of interest?
        Yes.
        (b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
    would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
        No.
        (c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
    deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
    for the record in hearings?
        Yes.
        (d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
    response to congressional requests?
        Yes.
        (e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
    testimony or briefings?
        Yes.
        (f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
    before this committee?
        Yes.
        (g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
    such documents?
        Yes.
                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
    committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
    forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
    Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                    ------

                               Signature and Date
        I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
    on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
    provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
    and complete.
                                                        Brad R. Carson.
        This 3rd day of November, 2011.

        [The nomination of Brad R. Carson was reported to the
    Senate by Chairman Levin on December 15, 2011, with the
    recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
    was confirmed by the Senate on December 17, 2011.]
                                  ----------

        [Prepared questions submitted to Kevin A. Ohlson by
    Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
    follow:]
                            Questions and Responses

                                     DUTIES

        Question. Subchapter XII of Chapter 47 of title 10, U.S.C.,
    establishes the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (USCAAF) and
    provides for its organization and administrative procedures.
        What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the
    USCAAF and its judges?
        Answer. The duty of the judges on the USCAAF is to ensure
    independent civilian oversight of the military courts. This
    responsibility is accomplished through appellate review of the
    decisions of the military courts of criminal appeals. The judges also
    have the duty of serving on the Code Committee which meets annually for
    the purpose of making an annual survey of the operations of the Uniform
    Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). This committee also is responsible for
    preparing an annual report that, among other things, provides
    information about the number and status of pending cases in the
    military court system.
        The function of the USCAAF is to provide independent civilian
    oversight of the military justice system through appellate review of
    the decisions of the military courts of criminal appeals. In exercising
    this responsibility, the USCAAF is responsible for reviewing those
    cases where a military court of criminal appeals has affirmed a death
    sentence, where a Service Judge Advocate General orders a case to be
    sent to the USCAAF after it has been reviewed by a military court of
    criminal appeals, and where, upon petition of the accused and for good
    cause shown, the USCAAF has granted review of a decision rendered by a
    military court of criminal appeals.
        Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
    believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
        Answer. First, I served as a judge advocate officer in the U.S.
    Army for 4 years. During that time I not only became familiar with the
    military justice system by serving as a trial counsel and prosecuting a
    number of criminal cases, I also became familiar with the men, women,
    mission, and ethos of the U.S. Armed Forces. I achieved the latter by
    attending Air Assault school, attending Airborne school, being on
    ``jump status'' as a parachutist at Fort Bragg for 4 years, deploying
    to four foreign countries, and serving in Saudi Arabia (with two very
    brief forays into Iraq) during the Persian Gulf War and being awarded
    the Bronze Star.
        Second, I served as a Federal prosecutor in the U.S. Attorney's
    Office for the District of Columbia. In that capacity I indicted and
    prosecuted a wide variety of cases in a fast-paced, high-volume office,
    and I became very familiar with the criminal justice system and the
    duties and responsibilities of prosecutors.
        Third, I was appointed as a member of the Board of Immigration
    Appeals. In that position, I served in a judicial capacity deciding
    appeals in immigration cases. This professional opportunity enabled me
    to gain an understanding and appreciation of the role and function of
    adjudicators at the appellate level.
        Fourth, I served as a senior manager within the Department of
    Justice, and the experiences I had in those positions would help me to
    run an efficient and productive chambers if I were to have the honor of
    being confirmed by the Senate.
        Fifth, I served for 2 years as the Chief of Staff and Counselor to
    the Attorney General, which provided me with a broad appreciation of
    the policy issues that confront any criminal justice system.
        Sixth, I currently serve as the Chief of the Department of
    Justice's Professional Misconduct Review Unit. In collaboration with
    the attorneys who work for me, I review instances where Federal
    prosecutors have been accused of misconduct, I determine whether
    misconduct actually occurred, I write detailed memoranda explaining my
    reasoning, and then I impose discipline, if appropriate. Serving in
    this position has reinforced for me the vital importance of performing
    one's duties consistent with the highest standards of honor,
    excellence, integrity, and fairness.
        Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
    enhance your ability to perform the duties of a judge on the USCAAF?
        Answer. Being considered for a position that is as important, as
    challenging, and as consequential as serving as a judge on the USCAAF
    is a tremendous honor, and I would very willingly take any steps that
    may be helpful in enhancing my ability to perform those duties.
    Accordingly, if I have the privilege of being confirmed by the Senate,
    and even during the confirmation process, I will endeavor to obtain a
    more in-depth knowledge of the legal issues facing the USCAAF by
    reviewing and refreshing my memory of the UCMJ, the Rules for Courts-
    Martial, and the Military Rules of Evidence, and by reading key
    decisions of the USCAAF and scholarly articles about the military
    justice system.

                                 RELATIONSHIPS

        Question. What are the respective roles of each of the following
    with respect to the military justice system, and if confirmed, what
    would your relationship be with:
        The Secretary of Defense.
        Answer. The Secretary of Defense is authorized to be a convening
    authority for general or special courts-martial, and may promulgate
    orders and regulations that are actionable under the UCMJ. Further,
    because the Secretary is responsible for the formulation of policy
    related to matters directly affecting the Department of Defense (DOD),
    working through the Joint Services Committee the Secretary may propose
    legislative or other changes to the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) and
    the UCMJ.
        However, Article 141 of the UCMJ clearly states that the USCAAF is
    located in DOD ``for administrative purposes only''. Therefore,
    although it is unlikely that I would have any interaction with the
    Secretary of Defense even if I were confirmed, if I did so I would
    treat him or her with the greatest respect and courtesy, but I would
    always be mindful of the fact that, when it comes to my professional
    duties and responsibilities, USCAAF judges are wholly independent of
    the Secretary of Defense.
        Question. The Chief Judge of the USCAAF.
        Answer. The Chief Judge of the USCAAF is selected based on
    seniority of commission among those judges on the court who have not
    previously served in that position. The term of service is 5 years. The
    Chief Judge presides at court sessions, and oversees the administrative
    functions of the court. If confirmed, my relationship with the Chief
    Judge would be both collegial and respectful, but when it comes to
    decision-making in cases, I would fully exercise my independent
    judgment.
        Question. Judges of the USCAAF.
        Answer. If confirmed, I would expect my relationship with the other
    judges on the court to be very collegial, and I would closely listen to
    and consider their points-of-view on all issues that come before the
    court. However, when it comes to a vote on a petition, a writ, or a
    case, if confirmed, I would exercise my independent judgment in each
    and every matter.
        Question. The military courts of criminal appeals.
        The USCAAF reviews all cases where a military court of criminal
    appeals has affirmed a death sentence, where a Service Judge Advocate
    General orders the case to be sent to the USCAAF after it has been
    reviewed by a military court of criminal appeals, and where, upon
    petition of the accused and for good cause shown, the USCAAF has
    granted review of a decision rendered by a military court of criminal
    appeals. If confirmed, I would give full and due consideration to the
    analysis and reasoning of members of the military courts of criminal
    appeals in each and every case that comes before me. However, I
    ultimately would exercise my independent judgment in deciding each
    case.
        Question. The General Counsel of the Department of Defense.
        Answer. Although the General Counsel is the chief legal officer of
    DOD, Article 141 of the UCMJ states that the USCAAF falls under the
    Department for administrative purposes only. Thus, the court does not
    fall under the purview, management, or supervision of the General
    Counsel. However, the General Counsel does have the authority to
    exercise those delegated duties as the Secretary may prescribe, and
    thus coordinates any proposed legislative changes to the UCMJ that the
    Joint Services Committee may recommend. If confirmed, my relationship
    with the General Counsel would be respectful and cordial, but I would
    act independently in my role as a judge.
        Question. The Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, and Air
    Force, and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine
    Corps.
        Answer. The Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, and Air
    Force, and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine
    Corps, provide advice on military justice matters to the Service Chiefs
    and to the Commandant, respectively. They are responsible for such
    actions as supervising the administration of military justice,
    overseeing the judge advocates and military judges within their
    Service, and reviewing and taking action on certain records of trial.
    Additionally, a Judge Advocate General may certify questions to the
    USCAAF, and serves as a member of both the Joint Services Committee and
    the Code Committee. If confirmed, my relationship with these senior
    officers would be collegial and respectful, but I would always maintain
    my judicial independence and neutrality.

                                  LEGAL ISSUES

        Question. What do you anticipate would be the most significant
    legal issues you will be called upon to address if confirmed as a judge
    of the USCAAF?
        Answer. If confirmed, undoubtedly one of the most significant legal
    issues I would be called upon to address would be the changes to
    Article 120 of the UCMJ regarding the offense of rape. I also firmly
    believe that when deciding cases, the judges on the USCAAF must
    continue to be vigilant about protecting the integrity of the military
    justice system from the corrosive effects of command influence and
    ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally, I believe the court will be
    confronted with issues arising from the use of emerging technology as
    it pertains to such issues as possession of child pornography and the
    right of privacy.

                           JURISDICTION OF THE USCAAF

        Question. In your view, has the USCAAF fulfilled the expectations
    of Congress when the court was established in 1951?
        Answer. Yes, very much so. Not only has the court provided the
    necessary civilian oversight of the military justice system, it also
    has provided independent judicial review in military justice cases and
    has served as a bulwark against unlawful command influence.
        Question. In your view, are there any legislative changes needed
    regarding the role and responsibilities or the jurisdiction of the
    USCAAF?
        Answer. I am not aware of the need for any changes at this time.

                        UCMJ JURISDICTION OVER CIVILIANS

        Question. Section 552 of the John Warner National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 amended the UCMJ to clarify that
    persons serving with or accompanying an Armed Force in the field are
    subject to the UCMJ during a contingency operation as well as in a time
    of declared war.
        What challenges, if any, do you anticipate that the armed services
    and the USCAAF will encounter in implementing the UCMJ with regard to
    persons serving with or accompanying an Armed Force in the field?
        Answer. As with any new law that has not been thoroughly reviewed
    by the courts, there likely will be a number of challenges to this
    piece of legislation when and if it is invoked in any additional cases
    in the future. First and foremost, if it is a U.S. citizen who is
    prosecuted pursuant to this provision of the UCMJ, the issue will
    undoubtedly arise whether its application to a civilian violates a
    defendant's constitutional guarantees, such as the right to a trial by
    a jury of one's peers. Second, the USCAAF will have to wrestle with
    determining the scope of the law. For example, issues that may arise in
    any specific case will likely include determining the definition of
    such phrases as ``serving with or accompanying an Armed Force,'' ``in
    the field,'' and ``contingency operation.'' Third, there will be issues
    about whether the appropriate person within the military command
    structure exercised jurisdiction in any particular case.
        The armed services also will likely encounter challenges when
    implementing this UCMJ provision. I anticipate that when confronted
    with a case where this UCMJ provision is potentially applicable, the
    armed services may become concerned about the need to delay taking
    action until the Department of Justice (DOJ) has reviewed the case to
    determine whether DOJ will exercise jurisdiction. Further, when a
    particular case arises, depending upon the circumstances of the alleged
    offense, the American public may express concerns about the invocation
    of this provision of the UCMJ and the resulting prosecution of a
    civilian who is a U.S. citizen in the military justice system.

                            DECISIONS OF THE USCAAF

        Question. Please describe the three decisions of the USCAAF since
    2005 which you believe to have been the most significant.
        Answer. United States v. Lewis, 63 M.J. 405 (C.A.A.F. 2006). This
    case reiterates the fact that unlawful command influence is the mortal
    enemy of military justice and that, where it is found to exist,
    judicial authorities must take those steps necessary to preserve both
    the actual fairness, and the apparent fairness, of criminal
    proceedings.
        United States v. Prather, 69 M.J. 338 (2010). In this case the
    accused was charged with aggravated sexual assault for engaging in
    sexual intercourse with a person who was substantially incapacitated.
    The court held that an accused's burden to prove the affirmative
    defense of consent by a preponderance of the evidence
    unconstitutionally shifted the burden onto the defense to disprove an
    element of the offense.
        United States v. Lee, 66 M.J. 387 (2008). After conviction at
    court-martial, the accused alleged that his detailed defense counsel
    failed to adequately disclose a conflict of interest. The USCAAF held
    that counsel provided to or retained by the accused must provide
    reasonably effective assistance, and that where a constitutional right
    to counsel exists, there is a correlative right to representation that
    is free from conflicts of interest.
        Question. What is your view of the role of stare decisis in terms
    of prior decisions of the USCAAF?
        Answer. The doctrine of stare decisis is an essential guiding
    principle for any appellate court. In the military justice system this
    doctrine is especially important because it provides both commanders
    and servicemembers with needed stability, consistency, and
    predictability regarding the handling of criminal offenses. However,
    there may be rare instances where applicable precedent should be
    overturned. This step should only be taken after long and careful
    consideration, and in those instances when it does occur, I believe the
    judges of the USCAAF are obligated to explain their rationale for doing
    so clearly, fully, and persuasively.
        Question. In view of Article 36 of the UCMJ, what is your view as
    to the hierarchy of sources of law that must be applied by the USCAAF
    in determining appropriate rules of evidence and procedure in courts-
    martial?
        Answer. First and foremost, the USCAAF must ensure that its
    decisions are consistent with the Constitution. The USCAAF is also
    bound by the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Next, the court
    should look to the provisions of the UCMJ, other applicable Federal
    statutes, and its own precedents. Then the court should apply the rules
    and procedures set forth in the MCM. Finally, the court should look to
    DOD and Service regulations.
        Question. In your view, what is the appropriate standard for
    determining when the USCAAF should apply a rule that is different from
    the rule generally applied in the trial of criminal cases in the
    Federal district courts?
        Answer. When the MCM and the Military Rules of Evidence provide
    guidance in a particular matter, and when that guidance is not contrary
    to or inconsistent with the Constitution, binding Supreme Court
    precedent, or the UCMJ, then those rules are applicable. It is only
    when the MCM or the Military Rules of Evidence are silent on an issue
    that the court should look to analogous rules applicable in the Federal
    civilian courts.

                            MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM

        Question. In your view, what are the major strengths and weaknesses
    of the military justice system?
        Answer. In my view, the following are the major strengths of the
    military justice system. First, every accused in the military is
    entitled to a free, qualified defense counsel at every step of the
    judicial process. Second, there are sufficient resources devoted to
    criminal cases in the military so that every case receives the
    necessary and proper amount of attention. Third, in the military
    justice system there is no undue pressure for either the government or
    the defendant to plea bargain a case. Fourth, the accused's right to be
    present at, and to participate in, the Article 32 proceeding far
    exceeds any rights that a similarly-situated defendant would have in
    the civilian justice system. Fifth, the jurors in the military are
    uniformly educated, informed, and engaged.
        In my view, the two greatest weaknesses of the military system are
    the potential for command influence to play a role in the ultimate
    outcome of a criminal case, and the flawed perception among some that
    the military system doles out ``drumhead justice'' because of their
    mistaken belief that the rights of the accused are not adequately
    protected.
        Question. What is your view of the relationship between the rights
    of Service personnel and the disciplinary role of commanders?
        Answer. At the core of the UCMJ is the delicate balance that exists
    between the rights of servicemembers on the one hand and the need for
    commanders to maintain good order and discipline on the other hand. In
    the military justice context, an effective military force is grounded
    both on the high morale that is sustained by the knowledge and belief
    of the average servicemember that he or she will be treated fairly and
    that his or her rights will be protected, and on the ability of
    commanders to enforce high standards of behavior in a wide variety of
    situations, some of which are not analogous to those found in civilian
    society. In striking this balance, the UCMJ empowers a commander to
    take such steps as serving as the convening authority and selecting
    court members, while at the same time providing servicemembers with a
    variety of rights and with strong protections against command
    influence. The fact that fundamental changes to the military justice
    system have been relatively rare over the last 6 decades serves as a
    testament to the fact that the UCMJ has struck this balance correctly.
        Question. Do you think that changes to the military justice system
    are called for in light of the experiences of the armed services in
    Iraq and Afghanistan?
        Answer. I believe the military justice system has proven itself to
    be remarkably adept at adjusting to the varied situations arising out
    of the many operations, missions, and deployments of our Armed Forces
    during the last decade. Accordingly, I am not currently aware of any
    changes that are needed in light of the experiences of the armed
    services in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, if confirmed, I would always
    be keenly interested in any recommendations that may be generated by
    the Joint Services Committee or the Code Committee, as well as any
    legislative proposals that may be made by, or to, Congress, including
    the Senate Armed Services Committee.

                       CAPITAL CASES IN THE ARMED FORCES

        Question. The ability of the military justice system to provide
    qualified personnel and resources necessary to capably defend and
    prosecute death penalty cases and respond to the constitutional
    requirements associated with such cases has come under scrutiny.
        What is your understanding of the requirements under constitutional
    precedent for the defense of a capital case?
        Answer. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the
    Supreme Court established a framework for determining whether the
    performance of a defense counsel in a capital case was constitutionally
    adequate. Specifically, Strickland requires the defendant to prove both
    that the counsel's representation was deficient, and that there is a
    reasonable probability that, but for the counsel's deficiency, the
    outcome of the trial would have been different. In later cases the
    Supreme Court held that failure to conduct a thorough investigation of
    potential mitigating factors may constitute ineffective assistance of
    counsel. (See Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003); Porter v.
    McCollum, 130 S. Ct 447 (2009).)
        Question. Based on your review of military jurisprudence regarding
    death penalty cases since the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Furman v.
    Georgia, what are the issues or errors that have most frequently
    resulted in overturning of death sentences on appeal?
        Answer. In the vast majority of death penalty cases in the military
    that have been overturned on appeal, the reason for the reversal has
    been due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
        Question. What do you consider to be the essential elements in
    preparing court-martial practitioners for the prosecution and defense
    in capital cases?
        Answer. In capital cases it is critically important for both the
    trial counsel and the defense counsel to be top-notch lawyers of the
    highest caliber. Next, these lawyers must receive the necessary
    training in order to ensure that they are fully aware of all the facets
    of handling a capital case so that they will be informed and effective
    advocates at each stage of the proceedings. Further, these lawyers must
    have significant experience litigating cases; training is vitally
    important, but there is no substitute for hands-on litigation
    experience in the courtroom when handling a capital case. Next, the
    lawyers must have ready access to assistance and support in handling
    certain legal aspects of issues that are unique to capital cases.
    Lastly, the lawyers on both sides must have adequate time to prepare
    their cases. Even great lawyers with great training, great experience,
    and great access to resources cannot perform at a level commensurate
    with what we must demand in all capital cases unless they have adequate
    time to analyze and prepare the case.

                               COMMAND INFLUENCE

        Question. The problem of command influence, including instances
    involving judge advocates as well as commanders, is a constant threat
    to the military justice system.
        What is your view as to the role of the USCAAF in addressing this
    problem?
        Answer. As the USCAAF reiterated in United States v. Lewis,
    unlawful command influence is the mortal enemy of military justice, and
    where it is found to exist, judicial authorities must take those steps
    necessary to preserve both the actual and apparent fairness of criminal
    proceedings. Accordingly, the USCAAF has been, and must continue to be,
    vigilant against the corrosive effects of unlawful command influence at
    every stage of legal proceedings. Further, the court must ensure that
    all allegations of unlawful command influence are fully litigated at
    trial and on appeal. Finally, in those cases where unlawful command
    influence has occurred, the court must take strong, appropriate action
    to remedy the problem.

                    PRECEDENT UNDER MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT

        Question. The Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA) provides that
    the judicial construction and application of the UCMJ, while
    instructive, is ``not of its own force binding on military commissions
    established under this chapter.'' In addition, the MCA amended Article
    39 of the UCMJ to provide that the findings, holdings, interpretations,
    and other precedents of military commissions ``may not form the basis
    of any holding, decision, or other determination of a court-martial.''
        What is your understanding of the relationship between the judicial
    construction of the UCMJ and the judicial construction of the MCA?
        Answer. The rules of evidence and procedure in the Manual for
    Military Commissions (MMC) differ in several important respects from
    those in the MCM. For example, the MMC allows for admission of certain
    hearsay evidence ``not otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence
    applicable in trial by general courts-martial.'' The Manual notes that
    these differences ``reflect the [Secretary of Defense's] determinations
    that departures are required by the unique circumstances'' arising out
    of the conduct of certain military and intelligence operations.
    However, despite these differences, the procedures for military
    commissions are generally based on the procedures for trial by general
    courts-martial under the UCMJ. Nonetheless, as noted above, while the
    judicial construction and application of the UCMJ are to be considered
    instructive, they ``are not of their own force binding on military
    commissions.'' Therefore, the judges within the military commission
    system are authorized to interpret the MMC provisions that are the same
    or similar to provisions in the UCMJ in a different manner than they
    otherwise would be required to interpret them if USCAAF precedential
    decisions were binding upon them.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn

                           OPERATION FAST AND FURIOUS

        1. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Ohlson, Assistant Attorney General Lanny
    Breuer has testified to the Senate Judiciary Committee that he learned
    about the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' (ATF)
    use of gun-walking tactics in April 2010. Attorney General Eric Holder
    has been unclear about the exact date on which he learned about
    Operation Fast and Furious, but we know that it was no later than
    January 30, 2011--when Senator Grassley personally handed him two
    letters discussing that program and requesting documentation relating
    to it. On November 14, you sent a letter to Senator McCain stating that
    you ``took no actions in regard to, had no knowledge of, provided no
    advice about, and had no involvement in Operation Fast and Furious.''
    While you were the Chief of Staff to Attorney General Holder, did you
    ever have knowledge that the ATF may have been using gun-walking
    tactics, whether or not you had specific knowledge about Operation Fast
    and Furious?
        Mr. Ohlson. No. While I was Chief of Staff I never had any
    knowledge that ATF may have been using gun-walking tactics in any case
    or operation, past or present.

        2. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Ohlson, while you were the Chief of Staff to
    Attorney General Holder, were you ever present at a briefing or meeting
    where ATF gun-walking tactics or Operation Fast and Furious were
    discussed?
        Mr. Ohlson. No. While I was Chief of Staff to Attorney General
    Holder, I was not present at any briefing or meeting where ATF gun-
    walking tactics or Operation Fast and Furious were discussed.

        3. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Ohlson, did you attend a briefing on March
    12, 2010, with Acting Deputy Attorney General Gary Grindler where paper
    copies of an Operation Fast and Furious PowerPoint presentation were
    distributed?
        Mr. Ohlson. No. I did not attend that meeting.

        4. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Ohlson, while you were the Chief of Staff to
    Attorney General Holder, did you ever have any conversations with
    Acting Deputy Attorney General Gary Grindler where either weapons
    trafficking investigations or gun-walking tactics were discussed?
        Mr. Ohlson. While I was the Chief of Staff to Attorney General
    Holder, I did not have any conversations with Acting Deputy Attorney
    General Gary Grindler about gun-walking tactics. In regard to the more
    general topic of weapons trafficking investigations, I do not recall
    ever having a conversation with Mr. Grindler about that issue, but I
    may have been present when Mr. Grindler discussed that topic with
    others. If so, I do not recall such a discussion.

        5. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Ohlson, while you were the Chief of Staff to
    Attorney General Holder, did you ever have any conversations with
    Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer where either weapons
    trafficking investigations or gun-walking tactics were discussed?
        Mr. Ohlson. While I was the Chief of Staff to Attorney General
    Holder, I did not have any conversations with Assistant Attorney
    General Lanny Breuer about gun-walking tactics. In regard to the more
    general topic of weapons trafficking investigations, I do not recall
    ever having a conversation with Mr. Breuer about that issue, but I may
    have been present when Mr. Breuer discussed that topic with others. If
    so, I do not recall such a discussion.

        6. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Ohlson, while you were the Chief of Staff to
    Attorney General Holder, did you ever hear of a large firearms case
    being operated by the Phoenix Field Division of the ATF?
        Mr. Ohlson. I do not recall ever hearing of a large firearms case
    being operated by the Phoenix Field Division of the ATF while I was
    Chief of Staff to Attorney General Holder.

        7. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Ohlson, do you believe that Assistant
    Attorney General Lanny Breuer should have immediately disclosed his
    knowledge of ATF gun-walking tactics to yourself and the Attorney
    General in April 2010?
        Mr. Ohlson. I have no personal knowledge of what Assistant Attorney
    General Breuer knew or did not know about ATF gun-walking tactics in
    April 2010. However, if Assistant Attorney General Breuer had known
    about ongoing gun-walking tactics at that time, I believe that he
    should have, and I expect that he would have, immediately disclosed
    that information to the Deputy Attorney General and the Attorney
    General so that those tactics could be halted immediately.

        8. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Ohlson, do you have any knowledge of whether
    gun-walking tactics were used in the State of Texas during your tenure
    as chief of staff to Attorney General Holder?
        Mr. Ohlson. I have seen media reports speculating that these
    tactics may have been used in Texas, but I have no knowledge to support
    the contention that it actually occurred.

        9. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Ohlson, in the summer of 2010, the Attorney
    General's office--in which you served as the Chief of Staff--received a
    series of at least five memos from National Drug Intelligence Center
    Director Michael Walther that discussed Operation Fast and Furious.
    These memos were personally addressed to Attorney General Holder, even
    though he now claims that he never received or reviewed any of these
    memos.
        The documents expressly discuss Operation Fast and Furious as an
    ATF investigation of a ``firearms trafficking ring headed by Manuel
    Celis-Acosta. Celis-Acosta and straw purchasers are responsible for the
    purchase of 1,500 firearms that were then supplied to Mexican drug
    trafficking cartels.'' Obviously, this language should have triggered
    some investigation by the Office of the Attorney General.
        Additionally, on November 1, 2010, your office received a memo
    addressed to the Attorney General from Assistant Attorney General Lanny
    Breuer that discussed Operation Fast and Furious under the heading of
    ``Significant Recent Events''. On November 14, you sent a letter to
    Senator McCain stating that ``copies of weekly reports were forwarded
    to me that referred to the operation [Fast and Furious] by name.''
    Additionally, at your nomination hearing, you told Senator McCain that
    ``I did not read that weekly report.'' At that same hearing, however,
    you also told me that ``I would be the ultimate funnel point for that
    information.''
        As the ``ultimate funnel point'' for the information contained in
    these reports, as well as an actual recipient of that information,
    shouldn't you have taken the time to read these memos?
        Mr. Ohlson. When I was Chief of Staff, there were a number of
    attorneys within the Attorney General's office who reported to me. Each
    of these attorneys was responsible for providing oversight of specific
    components within the Department of Justice. As part of their duties,
    these attorneys read the weekly reports prepared by their respective
    components and informed me of any sensitive or important matters in
    each week's submission that required my attention. I took this approach
    because there are many different components within the Department of
    Justice handling exceedingly complex issues (e.g., Antitrust, Tax,
    Environment and Natural Resources, the Criminal Division, the Solicitor
    General's Office, et cetera) and the attorneys in my office were the
    subject matter experts in regard to their components and possessed the
    necessary background and knowledge to place any information contained
    in the weekly reports into proper context. It was through this process
    that I determined which of the exceedingly large number of
    informational documents that the Office of the Attorney General
    typically received each day needed to be provided to (i.e., ``funneled
    to'') the Attorney General.
        None of the entries in any weekly reports circulated to the
    Leadership Offices contained any reference to ``gun-walking'' or other
    similar tactics that violated Department policies. Therefore, no
    ``alarm bells'' went off in anyone's mind who reviewed these documents
    and they were not flagged for my attention.

        10. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Ohlson, shouldn't the American people
    expect that the Attorney General or the Chief Deputy within his office
    will be familiar with the operational details of an operation that
    involved the straw purchase of 1,500 firearms in the United States that
    were then supplied to Mexican drug trafficking cartels?
        Mr. Ohlson. Based on what I have learned from public testimony and
    media reports during the past 10 months, it is now clear to me that
    Operation Fast and Furious was a fundamentally-flawed operation and was
    not handled in a manner consistent with what the American people have a
    right to expect. First and foremost, gun-walking never should have been
    allowed to occur at any time or in any place. It was a grievous
    mistake. Further, the former Acting Director of ATF and the former U.S.
    Attorney for Arizona should have been knowledgeable about this case, so
    that they could have exercised proper operational oversight. Next,
    information about an operation of this importance and magnitude should
    have been conveyed to the leadership offices of the Department in a
    fuller, more effective, and more timely manner. Finally, as for my
    part, I sincerely regret that I was not knowledgeable about this matter
    and therefore was unable to take steps to inform the Attorney General.
    I have every confidence that if either the Acting Deputy Attorney
    General or the Attorney General had been made aware of the
    inappropriate tactics being employed in this operation, they would have
    put a stop to them immediately.

        11. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Ohlson, shouldn't you have familiarized
    yourself with the details of the weapons trafficking operation
    described above, especially where that operation was discussed by the
    Assistant Attorney General and put to the Attorney General's attention
    in a memo under the heading of ``Significant Recent Events''?
        Mr. Ohlson. Within the Office of the Attorney General there were a
    number of attorneys who reported to me. These attorneys were
    responsible for providing oversight of certain components within the
    Department of Justice, and they were the subject matter experts in
    regard to these components. Further, these attorneys attended the
    meetings that the Attorney General convened with the heads of each of
    these components, and they were in constant contact with senior staff
    within the components to ensure a free flow of information. It is my
    understanding that at no time was the issue of gun-walking ever raised
    with any of these attorneys, and there was no basis for these attorneys
    to raise a red flag with me in my capacity as Chief of Staff. In fact,
    I understand that the former Acting Director of ATF and the former U.S.
    Attorney for Arizona have both indicated that even they did not know of
    these inappropriate tactics while they were being used. In retrospect,
    I sincerely wish that everyone within the chain-of-command at the
    Department of Justice, including myself, had been appropriately
    informed of the misguided and inappropriate tactics employed in
    Operation Fast and Furious.

        12. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Ohlson, are you aware of any individual who
    has been held accountable for this breakdown in the informational chain
    under your watch?
        Mr. Ohlson. Based on the Attorney General's public testimony and
    media reports, it is my understanding that there have been some
    personnel changes in the offices that had supervisory responsibility
    over Operation Fast and Furious, and that additional actions to hold
    individuals accountable will likely follow the issuance of the Acting
    Inspector General's investigation into this matter.

        13. Senator Cornyn. Mr. Ohlson, do you believe that anyone should
    be held accountable for this episode?
        Mr. Ohlson. Yes, I do. Based on what I now know about Operation
    Fast and Furious, it was a fundamentally-flawed operation. These
    inappropriate tactics never should have occurred under any
    circumstances. Therefore, I do believe that whoever was responsible for
    approving and implementing these tactics should be held accountable.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of Kevin A. Ohlson follows:]
                        Nomination Reference and Report
                               As In Executive Session,
                                   Senate of the United States,
                                                    September 15, 2011.
        Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
    on Armed Services:
        Kevin A. Ohlson, of Virginia, to be a Judge of the U.S. Court of
    Appeals for the Armed Forces for the term of 15 years to expire on the
    date prescribed by law, vice Andrew S. Effron, term expiring.
                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of Kevin A. Ohlson, which was
    transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
    referred, follows:]
                     Biographical Sketch of Kevin A. Ohlson
    Education:
             Washington and Jefferson College

                     September 1978-May 1982
                     Bachelor of Arts Degree awarded May 1982

             University of Virginia School of Law

                     August 1982-May 1985
                     Juris Doctorate Degree awarded May 1985
    Employment Record:
             U.S. Department of Justice Professional Misconduct
            Review Unit

                     Chief
                     January 2011-present

             Office of the Attorney General

                     Chief of Staff and Counselor to the Attorney
                    General
                     January 2009-January 2011

             Executive Office for Immigration Review

                     Director
                     Deputy Director
                     Member of the Board of Immigration Appeals
                     March 2001-January 2009

             Office of the Deputy Attorney General

                     Chief of Staff to the Deputy Attorney General
                     June 1997-March 2001

             Office of the U.S. Attorney for the District of
            Columbia

                     Special Counsel to the U.S. Attorney
                     Assistant U.S. Attorney
                     December 1989-June 1997

             Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps, Saudi Arabia

                     Judge Advocate Officer
                     October 1990-April 1991

             Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Fort Bragg

                     Judge Advocate Officer
                     January 1986-December 1989
    Honors and Awards:
             Department of Justice Edmund J. Randolph Award (2011)
             Department of Justice Distinguished Service Award
            (2010)
             Department of Justice Edmund J. Randolph Award (2001)
             Bronze Star (1991)
             Kuwait Liberation Medal (1991)
             Southwest Asia Service Medal (1991)
             National Defense Service Medal (1991)
             Army Achievement Medal (1989)
             Honduran Parachutist Badge (1988)
             Army Parachutist Badge (1986)
             Phi Beta Kappa (1982)
             James G. Blaine Political Science Prize, Washington
            and Jefferson College (1982)
             George C. Marshall Award (1981)
             Army Air Assault Badge (1980)
             Four-year Army R.O.T.C. College Scholarship (1978)
                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
    nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by Kevin A.
    Ohlson in connection with his nomination follows:]

                              UNITED STATES SENATE
                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                                  Room SR-228
                           Washington, DC 20510-6050
                                 (202) 224-3871
                        COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
          BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

        Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
    more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
    form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
    of your answer applies.
                        Part A--Biographical Information
        Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
    this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
    public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
    any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

        1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
        Kevin Alan Ohlson.

        2. Position to which nominated:
        Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.

        3. Date of nomination:
        September 15, 2011.

        4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
        [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
    committee's executive files.]

        5. Date and place of birth:
        March 29, 1960; Town of Holden, Worcester County, MA.

        6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
        Married to Carolyn Florence Davis.

        7. Names and ages of children:
        Matthew Edward Ohlson, 14.
        Katherine Elizabeth Ohlson, 12.

        8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
    dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
        Wachusett Regional High School; attended 1974 to 1978; high school
    diploma received in June 1978
        Washington and Jefferson College; attended 1978 to 1982; Bachelor
    of Arts degree received in May 1982
        University of Virginia School of Law; attended 1982 to 1985; Juris
    Doctorate degree received in May 1985

        9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
    last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
    job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.

        a.  Board Member, Board of Immigration Appeals. I served in a
    judicial capacity deciding appeals in immigration cases; my employer
    was the U.S. Department of Justice; my office was located at 5107
    Leesburg Pike, Falls Church, VA; I served in this position from March
    2001 to November 2002.
        b.  Deputy Director, Executive Office for Immigration Review. I
    supervised the Board of Immigration Appeals and the Office of the Chief
    Immigration Judge; my employer was the U.S. Department of Justice; my
    office was located at 5107 Leesburg Pike, Falls Church, VA; I served in
    this position from December 2002 to March 2007.
        c.  Director, Executive Office for Immigration Review. I served as
    the head of the agency which is responsible for adjudicating all
    immigration cases nationwide; my employer was the U.S. Department of
    Justice; my office was located at 5107 Leesburg Pike, Falls Church, VA;
    I served in this position from March 2007 to January 2009.
        d.  Chief of Staff and Counselor to the Attorney General. I advised
    the Attorney General on legal and policy issues, and I managed the
    attorneys and staff who worked within the Office of the Attorney
    General; my employer was the U.S. Department of Justice; my office was
    located at 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC; I served in
    this position from January 2009 to January 2011.
        e.  Chief, Professional Misconduct Review Unit. This newly-created
    office is responsible for handling disciplinary actions and State bar
    referrals in all instances where the Office of Professional
    Responsibility has made preliminary findings that a Federal prosecutor
    has engaged in professional misconduct; my employer is the U.S.
    Department of Justice; my office is located at 1577 Spring Hill Road,
    Vienna, VA; I have served in this position from January 2011 to the
    present.

        10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
    honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
    or local governments, other than those listed above.

        a.  I served on Active Duty as an officer in the U.S. Army from
    January 1986 to December 1989. I then was recalled to Active Duty from
    October 1990 to April 1991 and served overseas during the Persian Gulf
    War. I also served on Inactive Reserve Duty from January 1990 to
    September 1990, and from June 1991 to October 1995.
        b.  I served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the District of
    Columbia from December 1989 until June 1997 (with a break in service
    during the time I was recalled to Active Duty, as mentioned above).
        c.  I served as Chief of Staff to the Deputy Attorney General at
    the Department of Justice from June 1997 to March 2001.

        11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
    officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
    or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
    business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
        Not applicable.

        12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
    professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
    other organizations.
        Member, American Legion (1992 to present)
        Member, Veterans of Foreign Wars (1992 to present)
        Member, Virginia State Bar (1985 to present; on inactive status
    since 1995)
        Member, Bar of the District of Columbia (1992 to present)

        13. Political affiliations and activities:
        (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
    any public office for which you have been a candidate.
        Not applicable.
        (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
    to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
    years.
        Not applicable.
        (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
    organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
    entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
        06/27/2008, $1,000 contribution to Obama for America
        07/01/2008, $200 contribution to ActBlue

        14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
    society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
    for outstanding service or achievements.
        Four-year Army R.O.T.C. college scholarship (1978)
        Phi Beta Kappa (1982)
        James G. Blaine Political Science Prize, Washington and Jefferson
    College (1982)
        George C. Marshall Award (1981)
        Bronze Star Medal (1991)
        Southwest Asia Service Medal with Two Bronze Service Stars (1991)
        Kuwait Liberation Medal (1991)
        National Defense Service Medal (1991)
        Army Achievement Medal (1989)
        Army Air Assault Badge (1980)
        Army Parachutist Badge (1986)
        Honduran Parachutist Badge (1988)
        Department of Justice Edmund J. Randolph Award (2001)
        Department of Justice Distinguished Service Award (2010)
        Department of Justice Edmund J. Randolph Award (2011)

        15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
    books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
    written.
        Co-author (with Eric H. Holder, Jr.) of ``Dealing with the Media in
    High Profile White Collar Crime Cases: The Prosecutor's Dilemma,'' in
    the 1995 edition of the American Bar Association's publication, White
    Collar Crime.

        16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
    speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
    copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
    been nominated.
        Not applicable.

        17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
        (a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
    conflicts of interest?
        Yes.
        (b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
    would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
        No.
        (c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
    deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
    for the record in hearings?
        Yes.
        (d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
    response to congressional requests?
        Yes.
        (e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
    testimony or briefings?
        Yes.
        (f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
    before this committee?
        Yes.
        (g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
    electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
    a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
    such documents?
        Yes.
                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
    committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
    forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
    Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
                                    ------

                               Signature and Date
        I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
    on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
    provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
    and complete.
                                                       Kevin A. Ohlson.
        This 24th day of October, 2011.

        [At the time of printing, neither the committee nor the
    Senate had taken further action on the nomination of Kevin A.
    Ohlson.]
                                    APPENDIX

    Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire on Biographical and Financial
                   Information Requested of Civilian Nominees

                                    ------

                              UNITED STATES SENATE
                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                                  Room SR-228
                           Washington, DC 20510-6050
                                 (202) 224-3871
                        COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
          BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

        Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
    more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
    form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
    of your answer applies.

                        Part A--Biographical Information

        Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
    this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
    public inspection prior to the hearing and will also be published in
    any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

        1. Name: (Include any former names used.)

        2. Position to which nominated:

        3. Date of nomination:

        4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)

        5. Date and place of birth:

        6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)

        7. Names and ages of children:

        8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
    dates attended, degree received and date degree granted.

        9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
    last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
    job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.

        10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
    honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
    or local governments, other than those listed above.

        11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
    officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
    or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
    business enterprise, educational or other institution.

        12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
    professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and
    other organizations.

        13. Political affiliations and activities:
        (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
    any public office for which you have been a candidate.

        (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
    to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
    years.

        (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
    organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
    entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.

        14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
    society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
    for outstanding service or achievements.

        15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
    books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
    written.

        16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
    speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
    copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
    been nominated.

        17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
    if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
    constituted committee of the Senate?

                        COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
             FINANCIAL AND OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
        Instructions to the Nominee: Information furnished in Parts B
    through F will be retained in the committee's executive files and will
    not be made available to the public unless specifically directed by the
    committee.

        Name:

                    Part B--Future Employment Relationships
        1. Will you sever all business connections with your present
    employers, business firms, business associations or business
    organizations if you are confirmed by the Senate?

        2. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue
    outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service
    with the government? If so, explain.

        3. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements after
    completing government service to resume employment, affiliation or
    practice with your previous employer, business firm, association or
    organization?

        4. Has anybody made a commitment to employ your services in any
    capacity after you leave government service?

        5. Is your spouse employed and, if so, where?

        6. If confirmed, do you expect to serve out your full term or until
    the next Presidential election, whichever is applicable?

                    Part C--Potential Conflicts of Interest
        1. Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation
    agreements, and other continuing dealings with business associates,
    clients or customers.

        2. Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other
    relationships which could involve potential conflicts of interest in
    the position to which you have been nominated.

        3. Describe any business relationship, dealing or financial
    transaction which you have had during the last 10 years, whether for
    yourself, on behalf of a client, or acting as an agent, that could in
    any way constitute or result in a possible conflict of interest in the
    position to which you have been nominated.

        4. Describe any activity during the past 10 years in which you have
    engaged for the purpose of directly or indirectly influencing the
    passage, defeat or modification of any legislation or affecting the
    administration and execution of law or public policy.

        5. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest,
    including any that may be disclosed by your responses to the above
    items. (Please provide a copy of any trust or other agreements.)

        6. Do you agree to provide to the committee any written opinions
    provided by the General Counsel of the agency to which you are
    nominated and by the Attorney General's office concerning potential
    conflicts of interest or any legal impediments to your serving in this
    position?

                             Part D--Legal Matters
        1. Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics
    for unprofessional conduct by, or been the subject of a complaint to
    any court, administrative agency, professional association,
    disciplinary committee, or other professional group? If so, provide
    details.

        2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged or held by
    any Federal, State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of
    any Federal, State, county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance,
    other than a minor traffic offense? If so, provide details.

        3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer
    ever been involved as a party in interest in any administrative agency
    proceeding or civil litigation? If so, provide details.

        4. Have you ever been convicted (including a plea of guilty or nolo
    contendere) of any criminal violation other than a minor traffic
    offense?

        5. Please advise the committee of any additional information,
    favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in
    connection with your nomination.

                          Part E--Foreign Affiliations
        1. Have you or your spouse ever represented in any capacity (e.g.,
    employee, attorney, business, or political adviser or consultant), with
    or without compensation, a foreign government or an entity controlled
    by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe such
    relationship.

        2. If you or your spouse has ever been formally associated with a
    law, accounting, public relations firm or other service organization,
    have any of your or your spouse's associates represented, in any
    capacity, with or without compensation, a foreign government or an
    entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe
    such relationship.

        3. During the past 10 years have you or your spouse received any
    compensation from, or been involved in any financial or business
    transactions with, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a
    foreign government? If so, please furnish details.

        4. Have you or your spouse ever registered under the Foreign Agents
    Registration Act? If so, please furnish details.

                             Part F--Financial Data
        All information requested under this heading must be provided for
    yourself, your spouse, and your dependents.

        1. Describe the terms of any beneficial trust or blind trust of
    which you, your spouse, or your dependents may be a beneficiary. In the
    case of a blind trust, provide the name of the trustee(s) and a copy of
    the trust agreement.

        2. Provide a description of any fiduciary responsibility or power
    of attorney which you hold for or on behalf of any other person.

        3. List sources, amounts and dates of all anticipated receipts from
    deferred income arrangements, stock options, executory contracts and
    other future benefits which you expect to derive from current or
    previous business relationships, professional services and firm
    memberships, employers, clients and customers.

        4. Have you filed a Federal income tax return for each of the past
    10 years? If not, please explain.

        5. Have your taxes always been paid on time?

        6. Were all your taxes, Federal, State, and local, current (filed
    and paid) as of the date of your nomination?

        7. Has the Internal Revenue Service ever audited your Federal tax
    return? If so, what resulted from the audit?

        8. Have any tax liens, either Federal, State, or local, been filed
    against you or against any real property or personal property which you
    own either individually, jointly, or in partnership?

        (The committee may require that copies of your Federal income tax
    returns be provided to the committee. These documents will be made
    available only to Senators and the staff designated by the Chairman.
    They will not be available for public inspection.)

                               Signature and Date
        I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
    on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
    provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
    and complete.

                                    ----------------------------------.

        This ---------- day of --------------------------, 20------.
                                     ______

    Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire on Biographical and Financial
           Information Requested of Certain Senior Military Nominees

                                    ------

                              UNITED STATES SENATE
                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                                  Room SR-228
                           Washington, DC 20510-6050
                        COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
       BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES FOR
                       CERTAIN SENIOR MILITARY POSITIONS

                          Instructions to the Nominee:
        Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an
    additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number
    (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.
        If you have completed this form in connection with a prior military
    nomination, you may use the following procedure in lieu of submitting a
    new form. In your letter to the Chairman, add the following paragraph
    to the end:

        ``I hereby incorporate by reference the information and commitments
            contained in the Senate Armed Services Committee form
            `Biographical and Financial Information Requested of Nominees
            for Certain Senior Military Positions,' submitted to the
            Committee on [insert date or your prior form]. I agree that all
            such commitments apply to the position to which I have been
            nominated and that all such information is current except as
            follows: . . . .'' [If any information on your prior form needs
            to be updated, please cite the part of the form and the
            question number and set forth the updated information in your
            letter to the Chairman.]

                        Part A--Biographical Information

        Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
    this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
    public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
    any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

        1. Name: (Include any former names used.)

        2. Position to which nominated:

        3. Date of nomination:

        4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.
    Also include your office telephone number.)

        5. Date and place of birth:

        6. Marital Status: (Include name of husband or wife, including
    wife's maiden name.)

        7. Names and ages of children:

        8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary
    or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local
    governments, other than those listed in the service record extract
    provided to the committee by the executive branch.

        9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
    officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
    or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business
    enterprise, educational or other institution.

        10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in
    professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and
    other organizations.

        11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
    society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding
    service or achievements other than those listed on the service record
    extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.

        12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree,
    if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly
    constituted committee of the Senate?

        13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly
    constituted committee of the Congress, to give your personal views,
    even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

                        COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
             FINANCIAL AND OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

        Instructions to the Nominee: Information furnished in Parts B
    through E will be retained in the committee's executive files and will
    not be made available to the public unless specifically directed by the
    committee.

        Name:

                    Part B--Future Employment Relationships
        1. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue
    outside employment, with or without compensation, during your military
    service. If so, explain.

        2. Has anybody made a commitment to employ your services in any
    capacity after you leave military service?

                    Part C--Potential Conflicts of Interest
        1. Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation
    agreements, and other continuing dealings with business associates,
    clients or customers.

        2. Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other
    relationships which could involve potential conflicts of interest in
    the position to which you have been nominated.

        3. Describe any business relationship, dealing or financial
    transaction which you have had during the last 10 years, whether for
    yourself, on behalf of a client, or acting as an agent, that could in
    any way constitute or result in a possible conflict of interest in the
    position to which you have been nominated.

        4. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest,
    including any that may be disclosed by your responses to the above
    items. (Please provide a copy of any trust or other agreements.)

        5. Do you agree to provide to the committee any written opinions
    provided by the General Counsel of the agency to which you are
    nominated and by the Office of Government Ethics concerning potential
    conflicts of interest or any legal impediments to your serving in this
    position?

        6. Is your spouse employed and, if so, where?

                             Part D--Legal Matters
        1. Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics
    for unprofessional conduct by, or been the subject of a complaint to
    any court, administrative agency, professional association,
    disciplinary committee, or other professional group? If so, provide
    details.

        2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged or held by
    any Federal, State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of
    Federal, State, county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance, other
    than a minor traffic offense? If so, provide details.

        3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer
    ever been involved as a party in interest in any administrative agency
    proceeding or litigation? If so, provide details.

        4. Have you ever been convicted (including a plea of guilty or nolo
    contendere) of any criminal violation other than a minor traffic
    offense?

        5. Please advise the committee of any additional information,
    favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in
    connection with your nomination.

                          Part E--Foreign Affiliations
        1. Have you or your spouse ever represented in any capacity (e.g.,
    employee, attorney, business, or political adviser or consultant), with
    or without compensation, a foreign government or an entity controlled
    by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe such
    relationship.

        2. If you or your spouse has ever been formally associated with a
    law, accounting, public relations firm or other service organization,
    have any of your or your spouse's associates represented, in any
    capacity, with or without compensation, a foreign government or an
    entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe
    such relationship.

        3. During the past 10 years have you or your spouse received any
    compensation from, or been involved in any financial or business
    transactions with, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a
    foreign government? If so, please furnish details.

        4. Have you or your spouse ever registered under the Foreign Agents
    Registration Act? If so, please furnish details.

                               Signature and Date
        I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
    on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
    provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
    and complete.

                                    ----------------------------------.

        This ---------- day of --------------------------, 20------.