[Senate Hearing 112-396]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-396
COMMERCIAL AIRLINE SAFETY OVERSIGHT
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 20, 2012
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts Ranking
BARBARA BOXER, California OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROY BLUNT, Missouri
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
TOM UDALL, New Mexico PATRICK J. TOOMEY, Pennsylvania
MARK WARNER, Virginia MARCO RUBIO, Florida
MARK BEGICH, Alaska KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
DEAN HELLER, Nevada
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
John Williams, General Counsel
Todd Bertoson, Republican Staff Director
Jarrod Thompson, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Rebecca Seidel, Republican Chief Counsel and Chief Investigator
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington, JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ranking
Chairman Member
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
BARBARA BOXER, California ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROY BLUNT, Missouri
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
TOM UDALL, New Mexico PATRICK J. TOOMEY, Pennsylvania
MARK WARNER, Virginia DEAN HELLER, Nevada
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on March 20, 2012................................... 1
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 30
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 32
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 35
Witnesses
Margaret Gilligan, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety,
Federal Aviation Administration................................ 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Hon. Calvin L. Scovel III, Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Transportation................................................. 7
Prepared statement........................................... 9
William R. Voss, President and CEO, Flight Safety Foundation..... 18
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Gregory Belenky, M.D., Research Professor and Director, Sleep and
Performance Research Center, Washington State University,
Spokane........................................................ 21
Prepared statement........................................... 23
Captain Carl Kuwitzky, President, Coalition of Airline Pilots
Associations (CAPA)............................................ 24
Prepared statement........................................... 25
Thomas L. Hendricks, Senior Vice President for Safety, Security
and Operations, Airlines for America (A4A)..................... 27
Prepared statement........................................... 28
Appendix
Hon. Charles E. Schumer, U.S. Senator from New York, prepared
statement...................................................... 39
Response to written questions submitted to Margaret ``Peggy''
Gilligan by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 40
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 40
Hon. Barbara Boxer........................................... 43
Hon. Tom Udall............................................... 44
Hon. Mark Begich............................................. 44
Hon. Roger F. Wicker......................................... 44
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Calvin L. Scovel
III by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 45
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 47
Response to written questions submitted to William Voss by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 48
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 48
Response to written question submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Gregory Belenky, M.D........................................... 49
Response to written questions submitted to Captain Carl Kuwitzky
by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 51
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 51
Hon. Tom Udall............................................... 53
Response to written questions submitted to Thomas L. Hendricks
by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 53
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 54
Hon. Mark Begich............................................. 55
Air Line Pilots Association, International, prepared statement... 56
Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., Director, Physical Infrastructure
Issues, GAO, prepared statement................................ 59
COMMERCIAL AIRLINE SAFETY OVERSIGHT
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 20, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and
Security,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 p.m. in room
SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Maria Cantwell,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Good afternoon. The Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Aviation Operations and
Safety Subcommittee will come to order. I thank the witnesses
for being here today for our hearing on ``Commercial Airline
Safety Oversight.'' And I thank the witnesses for their
testimony and my colleagues for attending this hearing.
I want to welcome my fellow members of the Committee, the
witnesses, and the families of the victims of Colgan Air Flight
3407. Your steadfast efforts in the face of tragedy have led to
safety improvements that would not have happened otherwise. And
thank you for your advocacy on behalf of all the flying public.
The Federal Aviation Administration's continued mission is
to provide the safest and most efficient air space system in
the world. And, by and large, our air transportation does
maintain a very high level of safety day in and day out.
The National Safety Transportation Board conducted an
examination of U.S. civil aviation accidents involving
commercial passenger and cargo carriers from 2000 through 2009,
and this study shows that there is a drop in the accident rate
when measured by the departures and numbers of flight hours.
That's the good news for the American traveling public. And
this is a credit to all the hard work put in by the FAA,
airlines, airline manufacturers, and other stakeholders.
Nevertheless, we cannot rest. We must maintain constant
vigilance and make sure that ongoing system improvements are
made, and we need to know all of the potential mishaps that
could happen.
Take the year 2009. The five fatal accidents involving
commercial aircraft included three nonscheduled international
cargo flights and one nonscheduled domestic business jet flight
and one scheduled domestic passenger flight, the Colgan Air
crash in Buffalo, New York, in which 50 lives were lost.
There has not been a domestic commercial airline crash
since. These results are a tribute to the incredibly hard work
of, as I said, the airline industry and FAA employees focusing
on safety. But that doesn't mean that things are working
perfectly. We need to continue our efforts.
First, we need to understand the root cause of the
accident. And getting to the root cause of the Colgan Air crash
is just what this committee did over the course of a dozen
hearings that this subcommittee held in the last Congress. And
I appreciate the steadfast work of my colleagues, Senator Chuck
Schumer and Senator Kirsten Gillibrand, in advocating for the
families of the Colgan Air tragedy.
Pilot experience and training proved to be a critical
issue, and pilot and crew fatigue was of equal concern. We
learned about unimaginable long pilot and crew commutes to
work. And the co-pilot of the Colgan Air Flight 3407 had a
commute of over 2,000 miles from Seattle to Newark. So
compensation levels for less experienced pilots and crew is not
the only reason for long commutes, but it is far too common a
reason.
There was also much discussion regarding the consistency of
safety practices between regional and large network airlines.
And at a fundamental level, the hearing made question of
whether regional carriers were effectively being used in their
efforts to make sure that the level of safety was being
provided. I find it very difficult to tell if one of the safety
levels is more important than a policy of making sure that the
airline giving the actual name to the regional carrier--whether
they were meeting the same standards as the large carrier.
Not surprisingly, company culture makes a huge difference
in how safety is approached. As with all the industries, there
is a range of approaches to safety standards from topnotch to
marginally compliant. And we took particular notice of regional
carriers, because over half of all domestic departures and
about one-quarter of all passengers in the U.S. were on these
regional carriers. And at this time, many passengers did not
know what airline they were flying when they actually booked
their ticket. They do now.
Given the current financial state of several regional
carriers that fly for network airlines, I think that the FAA
needs to keep a very close eye to make sure that the safety and
commitment remains on par. This committee, working with Senator
Schumer and the House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee, led the effort to pass the Airline Safety and
Federal Aviation Administration Act of 2010.
This legislation made a number of improvements to airline
safety and pilot training. Last December, the final rules were
issued for flight and duty times for pilots and crew and
proposed rules for pilot certification qualifications. There
are several other key rulemakings in various stages that are
still making their way through the agency.
The purpose of today's hearing is to examine commercial
aviation safety since the Colgan Air crash and the progress
that has been made by the FAA and the industry collectively and
to hear from the public about these issues. In short, the
hearing is to keep American travelers safe and to make sure
that we have the best practices in our air transportation
system.
The Committee is very interested in learning the impacts of
the 2010 law. And we also want to understand whether the
resulting rulemakings were implemented consistently with what
Congress intended. Additionally, we would like to know if there
are any issues that remain unaddressed either in the 2010 law
that requires the FAA rules or in recent enactment of the FAA
authorization bill.
So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. And I
think with the prerogative of the Chair here--because have such
a short hearing time before votes--I'm going to just go ahead
and forego any opening statements by members and go right to
our witnesses.
So we'll start with you, Ms. Gilligan. Thank you so much
for being here. If you could turn on your button and speak
right into the microphone, and if you could keep your
statements short and provide the full written testimony, we
would so appreciate it.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MARGARET GILLIGAN,
ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATION SAFETY,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Ms. Gilligan. Thank you, Senator Cantwell, and thank you,
members of the Subcommittee, for inviting me here today to
provide you with an update of FAA's progress in implementing
the initiatives in the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation
Administration Extension Act of 2010. Given that the third
anniversary of the tragic Colgan accident just passed last
month, this gathering is particularly timely.
The provisions of the Act presented a number of challenges
for the FAA. Despite these challenges, in the 20 months since
the passage of the Act, we have convened five aviation
rulemaking committees, issued three notices of proposed
rulemaking, one supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking, and
one final rule. We've conducted two studies and drafted seven
reports to Congress on our efforts to implement the initiatives
in the Act.
Although we have not met all the deadlines anticipated by
Congress, we've made significant progress in several areas.
This is due in large part to the dedication of over 70 safety
professionals who have been working tirelessly on these
initiatives, while at the same time allowing their counterparts
to continue to meet our daily safety oversight
responsibilities.
I'm happy to report, Senator, as you noted, that on
December 21, Secretary LaHood and Acting Administrator Huerta
announced the publication of the final rule for new pilot
flight duty and rest requirements for passenger airline pilots.
The new rule capitalizes on advances in fatigue science to
provide the necessary protections for pilots to be fully rested
and alert when reporting for duty.
Air carriers will now be required to consider the time of
day a pilot accepts an assignment, the number of flight
segments scheduled, and the number of time zones crossed to
determine how long a pilot can remain on duty without a rest
period. The final rule also recognizes that pilots have a
responsibility in their off-time to use rest periods for their
actual intent, to rest. We expect pilots to manage their off-
duty rest to report ready for work, and we require them to
certify they are fit before each flight. We expect air carriers
to support pilots who report if they are not fit and not assign
them duty.
We've also made progress on safety management systems. We
issued this proposed rule on October 29, 2010, and are working
to meet the August 2012 deadline set by Congress for the final
rule. We and the industry recognize that safety management
systems provide an approach to safety that allows for trend
spotting and early identification of possible safety problems,
and we are committed to completing that initiative.
On February 29, 2012, we published a proposal to raise the
qualification requirements for first officers. The proposal
would require first officers to hold an Airline Transport Pilot
certificate and require 1,500 hours of pilot flight time.
Consistent with congressional direction, the proposal also
considers allowing pilots with fewer than 1,500 hours of flight
time to apply for an Airline Transport Pilot certificate with
restricted privileges based on education or military flying
experience. The comment period closes on this proposal April
30, and we look forward to reviewing the comments and
completing the final rule.
To improve training requirements for pilots, just one month
before the Colgan accident, FAA had published a comprehensive
new proposal. We received over 3,000 pages of comments in
response to that proposal. Following the accident, the National
Transportation Safety Board issued several recommendations
related to training, and the 2010 Act mandated additional
training requirements that had not been addressed in our
original proposal.
To address the requirements in the Act, the NTSB
recommendations, and the comments we had received, we issued a
supplemental proposal in May 2011. The comment period closed in
September 2011, and we are reviewing the comments to develop a
final rule that addresses all of the training initiatives.
And, finally, in September 2010, we established an aviation
rulemaking committee to provide recommendations on leadership
training and professional development for pilots. We have
drafted a proposal which is in executive review while we work
to balance regulatory burdens and costs.
All of these rulemakings are very complex, and it is true
we did not meet some of the deadlines Congress anticipated. The
rulemaking process is by intention a deliberative one and by
definition can take quite a bit of time. Even in instances
where the FAA has been directed by Congress to issue a final
rule, we are still required to meet the other statutory
requirements, including the Administrative Procedures Act.
We are also required to ensure the benefits resulting from
the rule justify the costs, because as many in Congress have
acknowledged, we have to be aware that new rules may add new
costs. This has presented quite a challenge for many of the
rulemakings that I've outlined for you today.
Chairman Cantwell and members of the Subcommittee, this
concludes my prepared remarks, and I'll be happy to answer any
questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gilligan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Margaret Gilligan, Associate Administrator for
Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation Administration
Chairman Cantwell, Senator Thune, Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting me here today to update the Subcommittee on
the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA's) progress in implementing
the safety enhancement initiatives in the Airline Safety and Federal
Aviation Administration Act of 2010. Just last month, we remembered the
third anniversary of the tragic accident of Continental Flight 3407.
Over the past three years, the aviation industry, as with many other
industries, has faced some tough economic challenges. During this
period, we have remained vigilant in our oversight responsibilities to
ensure that we continue to have the safest aviation system in the
world, while also advancing aviation for the future. The provisions in
the 2010 Act helped facilitate several of these major advancements,
such as new flight, duty and rest requirements for pilots, and issuing
a proposal to require air carriers to implement safety management
systems. Although some of the provisions have taken longer than
Congress anticipated under the provisions of the Act, we have made
significant strides in accomplishing many of the objectives and I am
here today to outline this progress for you.
Pilot Flight, Duty, and Rest Requirements
In 2009, the Department of Transportation identified the issue of
pilot fatigue as a top priority in the Safety Call to Action following
the accident of Flight 3407. The FAA launched an aggressive effort to
create a new pilot flight, duty and rest proposal, which we issued in
September 2010. On December 21, 2011, Secretary LaHood and Acting
Administrator Huerta announced the completion of the final rule. This
new rule provides the necessary protections for passenger airline
pilots, allowing for responsible pilots to be fully rested and alert
when reporting for duty, which is what the traveling public expects
when they board an airplane. Using the latest fatigue science, the rule
addresses cumulative fatigue and how flight schedules affect the body's
24-hour clock in calculating appropriate duty periods for pilots,
providing pilots a greater opportunity for rest. Factors such as the
time of day a pilot takes his or her first flight, the number of
scheduled flight segments, and the number of time zones crossed, will
now all be considered when determining how long a pilot can remain on
duty without a rest period.
This rule also expands the definition of a flight duty period to
include more than just flying the airplane. Flight duty periods are now
more comprehensive, and include flight-related activities such as time
spent in training in an aircraft simulator, and standing by on-call for
flights at an airport. These duties are part of the workday, contribute
to fatigue, and must be counted as part of the core job of flying the
airplane. The rule also provides for a 10-hour minimum rest period
before a flight duty period, which is two hours more than required
under the old flight and duty time provisions. We have also addressed
cumulative fatigue by placing weekly and 28-day limits on a pilot's
schedule.
This rule provides the necessary flexibility to use fatigue science
as it progresses to combat fatigue. Air carriers will be allowed to
develop a fatigue risk management system, which provides an opportunity
to create an alternative model for combatting fatigue by incorporating
the latest innovations in mitigating fatigue.
This final rule also establishes new fitness for duty requirements
that serve as a reminder to both airlines and pilots of their
professional responsibilities to ensure that rest periods are used
appropriately and that pilots arrive at the start of an assignment
alert and ready for work. In establishing these requirements, we took
into account that off-duty activities do have an impact on fatigue for
pilots, regardless of the type of activity, such as playing golf or
commuting to work. We expect pilots to manage their off-duty rest to
ensure they report ready for work. We expect the air carriers to
support pilots who self-report fatigued and not assign them to duty.
Due to the complexity of the rule, completing this rulemaking
effort took longer than expected. As many in Congress have noted, new
rules may add new costs. As with discretionary rules, in instances
where the FAA has been directed by Congress to issue a final rule, we
are still required to do so in a manner in which the benefits resulting
from the rule justify the costs. In evaluating this rule under this
requirement, it became clear that applying this rule to cargo operators
was not clearly justified compared to the benefits generated for this
segment of the industry. The final rule does allow cargo operators to
voluntarily adopt provisions of the rule, and some of these operators
are already improving rest facilities for pilots. We have encouraged,
and continue to encourage cargo carriers to continue improving their
rest and fatigue related policies.
Safety Management Systems
The 2010 Act required the FAA to issue a proposal to require air
carriers to develop and implement a safety management system (SMS)
within 90 days of the Act's enactment. The FAA met this statutory
deadline and issued the proposal on October 29, 2010. It was published
in the Federal Register on November 5, 2010 and the comment period
closed March 7, 2011. As proposed, the SMS rule would give air carriers
a set of business processes and management tools to examine data from
everyday operations, isolate trends that may be precursors to incidents
or accidents, and develop and carry out appropriate risk mitigation
strategies. The FAA and industry recognize SMS as a holistic approach
to safety that allows for trend spotting to help identify possible
safety problems and correct them before they lead to accidents or
incidents. In the proposal, the FAA described what an acceptable SMS
might look like, not how the SMS requirements would be met. This allows
air carriers to develop and implement an SMS that best matches the size
and complexity of their own unique operating environments. SMS is not a
substitute, however, for FAA oversight, inspection, and audits of air
carriers to ensure compliance with existing regulations.
Pilot Qualification Standards
On February 29, 2012, we published a proposal that would
substantially raise the qualification requirements for first officers
(sometimes referred to as ``co-pilots'') who fly for U.S. passenger and
cargo airlines, consistent with the mandate in the 2010 Act. The
proposed rule would require first officers to hold an Airline Transport
Pilot (ATP) certificate, requiring 1,500 hours of pilot flight time.
Currently, these pilots are required to have a commercial pilot
certificate, which requires only 250 hours of flight time. Some other
highlights of the proposed rule include requiring pilots to have a
minimum of 1,000 flight hours as a pilot in air carrier operations that
require an ATP prior to serving as a captain for a U.S. airline;
enhanced training requirements for an ATP certificate, including 50
hours of multi-engine flight experience; and completion of a new FAA-
approved training program.
In the 2010 Act, Congress clearly acknowledged that the measurement
of experience in determining when an individual may be ready to serve
is not limited solely to the number of hours flown. Rather, education
and other commercial flying experience must also be considered.
Consistent with the requirements of the 2010 Act, this proposal also
allows pilots with fewer than 1,500 hours of flight time to apply for
an ATP certificate with restricted privileges. As proposed, this
certificate would only be issued to graduates of a four-year
baccalaureate aviation degree program with 1,000 hours of flight time,
provided they have obtained a commercial pilot certificate and
instrument rating from a pilot school affiliated with the university or
college. Former military pilots with 750 hours of flight time may also
qualify for this restricted ATP certificate. In both cases, pilots with
this restricted certificate would only be able to serve as first
officers for U.S. airlines. They could not use it to serve as a captain
in any commercial flying operation that requires an ATP, nor use it to
teach other pilots. Pilots seeking a restricted ATP would be tested to
the same standard required for full ATP certificates, and they would be
required to have the equivalent minimum instrument time and night time
flight hours as a full ATP certificate would require. The comment
period for this proposed rulemaking closes April 30, 2012, and we will
work diligently to develop a final rule that addresses the safety
initiatives required in the 2010 Act.
Crewmember Training Requirements
In January 2009, one month prior to the Continental Flight 3407
accident, the FAA published a proposal to enhance training programs by
requiring the use of simulation devices by pilots. The FAA received
over 3,000 pages of comments in response to this proposal. Following
the accident, the National Transportation Safety Board issued several
recommendations related to training requirements for air carrier
pilots. And the 2010 Act mandated some additional training requirements
as well. In order to fully consider the comments, address many of the
NTSB's recommendations resulting from the accident of Flight 3407, and
incorporate the mandates of the Act, the FAA issued a supplemental
proposal to permit interested parties to comment on the new
requirements. The supplemental proposal was issued on May 20, 2011 and
the comment period closed on September 19, 2011. The FAA is actively
reviewing the comments to develop a final rule that addresses these
training enhancements.
In addition to this rulemaking, in 2011, the FAA established the
Stick Pusher and Adverse Weather (SPAW) Aviation Rulemaking Committee
to examine upset prevention and recovery training and provide
recommendations to address stick pusher and adverse weather events.
Mentoring and Professionalism
The FAA recognizes the need to continuously improve professional
standards to improve flightdeck discipline. On September 15, 2010, the
FAA established an Aviation Rulemaking Committee to develop
recommendations on appropriate leadership training and professional
development requirements for pilots. That group of experts delivered
its recommendations in November 2010, and the FAA has considered them
in developing a rule to address the mentoring mandate in the 2010 Act.
We have not met the statutory deadline for this proposal because we are
evaluating how this effort aligns with existing rulemaking projects. We
aim to find a set of proposals that appropriately balances
effectiveness and resulting benefits, with regulatory burden and cost.
These rulemakings are very complicated, and in some cases, very
expensive. As these rules progress, we are constantly evaluating how
these provisions may best be leveraged to improve safety, while
ensuring that the aggregate costs to society are not greater than these
benefits as we are required to do.
We remain committed to aggressively addressing these safety
enhancements while continuing with our daily oversight obligations. In
the time since the passage of the 2010 Act, approximately 1.3 billion
passengers have travelled on U.S. commercial airlines without a single
fatality. At the same time, the FAA has overseen the safe management of
the merger of 8 airlines, resulting in 4 new entities -each larger and
more complex than ever before. While these mergers had a significant
impact on FAA resources, they were handled efficiently and in a manner
that ensures continued compliance with regulations and
safe operating practices. We have also approved and assisted in
implementing the use of new technologies to support NextGen--making
operations safer and more efficient. And every day our dedicated safety
workforce performed inspections, analyzed data, spotted areas for
improvement and worked with air carriers to enhance aviation safety.
Our success in advancing these safety enhancements, while
continuing to manage our daily safety oversight responsibilities and
plan for the future, is due in large part to the dedication of safety-
minded aviation professionals in all parts of our industry, including
the FAA's inspector workforce.
In conclusion, we believe that the collective efforts of FAA, the
airlines, labor unions and, of course, Congress, will continue to
result in ensuring the safety enhancements identified in the 2010 Act
are addressed. Safety is at the core of the FAA's mission, and we will
always strive to make a safe system safer.
Chairman Cantwell, Senator Thune, members of the Subcommittee, this
concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions
that you might have.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Ms. Gilligan.
We'll now hear from the Honorable Calvin Scovel, who is the
Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Transportation.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. CALVIN L. SCOVEL III, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Scovel. Madam Chairman, members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for inviting me to testify at this important hearing
on airline safety.
As you know, Congress and FAA took swift action following
the 2009 Colgan Air crash to improve pilot performance and
enhance air carrier safety programs. These actions culminated
with the passage of the Airline Safety and FAA Extension Act
which is proving to be an important catalyst for change.
Today, I will focus on FAA's progress in responding to the
Act and the challenges it faces in implementing certain
provisions. I will also discuss several concerns related to
achieving the full measure of safety enhancements intended by
the Act.
FAA has made noteworthy progress. Early this year, FAA
issued a final rule on crew rest requirements, a major
achievement given that the regulations had not been updated
since 1985. To its credit, FAA based the new regulations on
scientific factors, such as the number of flight segments flown
and the number of time zones crossed.
FAA has also devised a plan to help air carriers implement
voluntary safety programs. Our analysis shows a steady rise in
the use of these programs. Seventy percent of Part 121 air
carriers have at least one program, up from 59 percent 2 years
ago. FAA is also close to issuing a rule on safety management
systems which allow operators to examine day-to-day operations,
isolate trends in data that may indicate danger, and put in
place risk mitigation strategies.
Despite these advancements, FAA has been challenged to
implement key measures related to pilot proficiency and
professionalism and to a new centralized pilot records data
base. FAA's final rule on pilot training is almost 6 months
overdue. This is due in part to industry opposition, which
prompted FAA to issue a second proposed rule last May. The
proposed rule now requires more thorough training for pilots to
recognize and recover from stalls.
FAA is nearly 8 months overdue in issuing a proposed rule
for improving pilot performance, a longstanding safety concern.
Our audits have found that poor decisionmaking, inadequate
aircraft control, improper flying techniques, and a disregard
for operating procedures are high-ranking causal factors in
airline accidents, a finding consistent with NTSB's review of
the Colgan accident.
While FAA focused on advancing pilot mentoring as part of
its 2009 call to action, since then it has not released a
detailed plan for implementing these programs. Seven of nine
carriers we recently visited did not have formal mentoring
programs and none had professional development programs.
Industry officials have expressed concern that potential pilot
turnover could outweigh the benefits of establishing these
programs.
FAA does not expect to issue its final rule on enhanced
pilot qualifications until August 2013, a year after the
mandated deadline. The proposed rule issued in February calls
for a substantial increase in pilot flight hours. Air carrier
representatives are concerned that the new requirements for
first officers do not gauge the quality of flying experience
and that entry-level pilots will have difficulty meeting the
new requirements.
Beyond implementing the final rule, FAA will need to ensure
carriers are ready to transition to the new requirements. This
is important, because at the two carriers we recently visited,
75 percent of current first officers did not have the advanced
certificate.
FAA must overcome three primary challenges to develop a
robust and secure pilot record database that carriers can use
when hiring pilots. First, FAA must determine what level of
detail from pilot records the database should include.
Capturing and standardizing historical pilot training records
will also be difficult.
Second, FAA must determine how to transition from current
recordkeeping practices to the new database without disrupting
the flow of information. Third, FAA must address data
reliability concerns related to pilot information obtained from
the National Driver Register.
To fully implement the provisions of the Act, FAA will
ultimately need to work more effectively with its field offices
and the airline industry. Poor communication and outreach have
stalled FAA's efforts to implement some safety initiatives.
None of the nine FAA field offices we visited during our
ongoing review were informed of the agency's progress in
developing mentoring and leadership programs for pilots. Early
outreach to field offices on the status of selected rulemakings
and best practices would, we believe, better position carriers
to implement new programs when rules are finalized.
Helping small carriers establish voluntary safety programs
is also critical to ensure the Act's provisions are fully
implemented. However, FAA has yet to fully execute a plan to
provide small carriers with best practices and guidance for
these programs.
Finally, FAA must address issues related to pilot
commuting, a factor that may significantly contribute to
fatigue. NTSB's investigation into the Colgan crash revealed
that the two pilots had commuted hundreds of miles before that
flight and NTSB found that both pilots' performance was likely
impaired because of fatigue.
In its report, NTSB stated that operators have a
responsibility to identify commuting risks, implement
strategies to mitigate those risks, and ensure commuting pilots
are fit for duty. Although FAA considered mandating preflight
rest periods for commuting pilots, it concluded that such a
requirement would be difficult to enforce and would not
guarantee responsible commuting.
Last September, we recommended that FAA collect and analyze
commuting data for all Part 121 flight crews and determine if
additional actions are needed. FAA has committed to addressing
our recommendation by October of this year. Despite delays and
the many challenges FAA faces in responding to the Act, we are
encouraged by its progress and will continue to monitor its
efforts to meet remaining requirements.
That concludes my statement, Madam Chairman. I'd be happy
to answer any questions that you, or members of the
Subcommittee may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Scovel follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Calvin L. Scovel III, Inspector General,
U.S. Department of Transportation
Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting me here today to testify on the Federal
Aviation Administration's (FAA) progress in implementing advanced
standards for pilot training and new safety measures for air carriers.
As you know, following the 2009 Colgan Air crash, Congress and FAA took
swift action to implement measures for improving pilot training and
qualifications programs, reducing flight crew fatigue, and ensuring
operators meet safety standards. These efforts culminated with the
August 2010 passage of the Airline Safety and FAA Extension Act,\1\
which contains new requirements to enhance safety in these areas.
Effective implementation of these requirements should go a long way in
improving safety in commercial airline travel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-216, August 1, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prior to passing the Act, this Subcommittee, as well as the House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, requested that we
review FAA and industry efforts to enforce new Federal regulations for
flight crew rest requirements and address fatigue issues and airline
pilot training program weaknesses. Since we began our work in 2009, we
have issued three reports.\2\ Our testimony today is based on those
reports as well as our ongoing work regarding implementation of the
Act. Today, I will focus on: (1) FAA's progress in responding to
provisions of the Act, (2) the challenges FAA faces in implementing
certain provisions, and (3) concerns related to achieving the full
measure of safety enhancements intended by the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ OIG Correspondence Number CC-2009-074, ``Letter to Senators
Rockefeller, Hutchinson and DeMint Regarding Commercial Aviation
Accidents, Pilot Experience and Pilot Compensation,'' February 9, 2011.
OIG Report Number AV-2011-176, ``FAA and Industry Are Taking Action To
Address Pilot Fatigue, but More Information on Pilot Commuting Is
Needed,'' September 12, 2011. OIG Report Number AV-2012-027, ``New
Approaches Are Needed To Strengthen FAA Oversight of Air Carrier
Training Programs and Pilot Performance,'' December 20, 2011. OIG
reports are available on our website: www.oig.dot.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Summary
FAA has met or is on schedule to meet many of the Act's
requirements, such as improving pilot rest requirements and
establishing better processes for managing safety risks. However, FAA
has not met timelines for raising pilot training standards,
implementing mentoring programs, providing enhanced leadership skills
to captains, and increasing minimum pilot qualifications. FAA also
faces challenges in establishing a pilot records database--an important
component for enhancing the air carrier screening process for pilot
applicants. In addition to overcoming these challenges, FAA needs to
provide additional guidance and assistance to industry--especially
smaller carriers--in developing and managing new safety programs.
Background
The 2010 Act included 16 provisions to improve airline safety and
pilot training with milestones spread over a 3-year period. The Act
called for advanced standards for pilots, including required rulemaking
activities for training programs, crewmember screening and
qualifications, and new fatigue regulations to improve passenger
safety. These rulemaking activities are complex, and some have
encountered significant air carrier opposition. In addition to notice
and comment periods required by law, FAA must conduct detailed analyses
of each rule's likely effects and coordinate with stakeholders. The Act
also included several important initiatives that FAA did not complete
during its Call to Action on Airline Safety,\3\ such as developing
mentoring and professional programs for pilots and following up with
air carriers on efforts to adopt voluntary safety programs. In
addition, the Act requires FAA to establish a pilot records database
that air carriers must access to review qualifications and past
performance data before hiring pilots. (See exhibit for further detail
and current status of FAA's efforts in each section of the Act.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ FAA's Call to Action Plan, announced on June 24, 2009,
consisted of 10 short- and mid-term initiatives to enhance pilot
performance and training, increase air carrier participation in
voluntary safety programs, and expand pilot records review. FAA also
set goals to develop new safety oversight guidance to its inspectors,
issue rulemakings on pilot fatigue and training, conduct regional
safety forums to discuss industry best practices, and develop programs
addressing pilot professionalism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FAA Met Act Requirements to Address Pilot Fatigue and Advanced Some
Safety Initiatives at Air Carriers
FAA developed a concerted strategy to meet the Act's stringent
timelines and implement new safety programs, including issuing a final
rule on crew rest and fatigue, increasing air carrier use of voluntary
safety programs, and advancing Safety Management Systems (SMS).
FAA Overhauled Flight and Duty Time Regulations
In January 2012, FAA updated its flight and duty time regulations
for Part 121 \4\ air carrier pilots to better ensure pilots are rested
when they fly. This is a significant achievement for the Agency given
that these updates were the first modifications to the regulations
since 1985 and that the proposed rule received over 8,000 comments from
the aviation industry, mostly opposing the planned requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ 14 CFR Part 121, Operating Requirements: Domestic, Flag, and
Supplemental Operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unlike the old rules--which included different rest requirements
for domestic, international, and unscheduled flights--the new
regulations establish one set of rules that are based on scientific
factors, such as the time of day pilots begin their first flight, the
number of scheduled flight segments, and the number of time zones
crossed. Pilots are also now required to affirmatively state that they
are fit to fly and are prohibited from flying during a scheduled duty
period when they report fatigue. Other key changes in the new flight
and duty time regulations include a 10-hour minimum rest period prior
to duty, a 2-hour increase over the previous rule, and 30 consecutive
hours free from duty per week--an increase of 25 percent over the
previous regulation requirements.
FAA Promoted Air Carriers' Use of Voluntary Safety Programs
In March 2011, FAA completed a congressionally required review of
Part 121 air carriers' use of voluntary safety programs \5\ and later
devised a plan to help smaller air carriers implement these programs.
Data gathered through voluntary safety programs can be used to identify
the trends and patterns that represent risks. The Act targets air
carrier participation in three such programs that FAA oversees:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Voluntary Safety Programs, Response to P.L. 111-216, Sec. 213,
January 28, 2011.
Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), which encourages air
carrier and repair station employees to voluntarily report
safety information that may be critical to identifying
potential precursors to accidents without fear of enforcement
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
or disciplinary action.
Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA), which collects
and analyzes digital flight data generated during scheduled
flights to provide greater insight into performance and
operations.
Advanced Qualification Program (AQP), which provides a
voluntary alternative to traditional training standards by
incorporating data-driven quality control processes to refine
pilot training based on the individual's proficiency and
identified training needs.
The review found that, as of March 2011, 68 percent of Part 121 air
carriers participate in at least one voluntary safety program and just
under half of those carriers use more than one. Our ongoing analysis of
current FAA data as of January 2012 shows a continued rise in voluntary
safety program use--70 percent of Part 121 air carriers have at least
one program, up from 59 percent 2 years ago. Further, for the same time
period, 47 percent of Part 121 air carriers have multiple programs,
compared to 36 percent 2 years ago.
As shown in figure 1 below, the highest concentration of new growth
for these air carriers has been with ASAP and FOQA. We also determined
that the majority of carriers that transitioned to AQP training were
regional carriers. Air carriers that use AQP benefit from improved data
collection and analysis techniques and enhanced flight crew
coordination.
Figure 1. Increase in Voluntary Safety Program Participation
Source: OIG analysis of FAA-reported data
FAA Is Ahead of Schedule for Implementing SMS
Increasing use of voluntary safety programs is important for Part
121 air carriers of all sizes, as the data generated by these programs
is a large driver of SMS, a systemic and comprehensive process for
managing safety risks. Specifically, SMS provides operators with
business processes and management tools to examine data from everyday
operations, isolate trends that may be precursors to incidents and
accidents, and develop and carry out appropriate risk mitigation
strategies. FAA has nearly completed its efforts to issue a final rule
on SMS for air carriers. The Agency released a proposed rule in October
2010 and, according to the Act, has until August 2012 to issue a final
rule.
FAA has also taken steps to assist air carriers in developing SMS
before the completion of the final rule. FAA developed an SMS pilot
program in 2007 to develop implementation strategies and oversight
responsibilities. SMS pilot projects allow FAA and air carrier input in
developing guidance and provide carriers an opportunity to share best
practices and lessons learned. Currently, 83 percent of all Part 121
air carriers (73 of 88) are participating in the pilot program.
The new system, when fully implemented across all carriers, has the
potential to significantly advance safety. However, there is industry
concern that the SMS rule will not be scalable for air carriers of
varying size and operational complexity, posing a larger burden on
smaller air carriers for their implementation. Currently, 14 of the 15
carriers that are not yet participating in FAA's SMS pilot program are
smaller carriers (with less than 20 aircraft). Additionally, air
carriers are concerned about public disclosure of SMS-collected data.
Most of these concerns focus on whether the data can be used in legal
proceedings. The current proposed rule does not address these concerns.
FAA Faces Challenges In Meeting Act Provisions On Pilot Training And
Safety Issues
FAA efforts to issue Act-mandated rules to improve training
standards, establish mentoring and leadership programs, and enhance
screening and qualifications for pilots are delayed. While FAA is
responsible for raising pilot qualifications, the successful
implementation of such rules depends on FAA's ability to address air
carrier concerns and work through the regulatory process in a timely
manner, which has been a significant challenge for FAA. The Agency also
faces several challenges in establishing a new centralized electronic
pilot records database to provide air carriers with better background
information on pilots they intend to hire.
Industry Concerns Have Delayed FAA's Rulemaking Efforts To Enhance
Pilot
Training Standards
FAA is almost 6 months overdue on issuing a final rule revising
pilot training requirements--the delay is due in part to significant
industry opposition. This is an important safety initiative that will
require pilot training programs to incorporate flight simulators and
enhance pilots' ability to work together during emergencies. In January
2009, FAA issued the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). However, FAA
received extensive industry comments, primarily opposing that the rule
imposes overly prescriptive training hours rather than basing pilot
training on skills most needed to safely perform flight operations. As
a result, FAA issued a second proposed rule in May 2011. The revised
proposal requires more thorough ground and flight training for pilots
on how to recognize and recover from stalls, as well as remedial
training for pilots who perform poorly in training.
With advancements in pilot training on the horizon, it is important
that FAA enhance its oversight practices. For example, under the new
rule, carriers will be required to provide remedial training for pilots
with performance deficiencies. However, it will be difficult for FAA to
gauge the effectiveness of this training unless it corrects weaknesses
we identified in our December 2011 report on pilot training. We found
that FAA was not tracking poorly performing pilots due to inadequate
guidance for its inspectors on how to gather data on pilot performance.
Specifically, FAA guidance requires inspectors to compare pilot
proficiency checks that they have performed against those conducted by
the carriers' check airmen.\6\ However, we questioned the viability of
this requirement since nearly all pilot proficiency checks are
conducted by check airmen, not FAA inspectors. As a result, FAA
inspectors may not have sufficient data to make a meaningful
comparison.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Pilots employed by air carriers who evaluate a pilot's
proficiency during training and examinations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FAA's Rule To Require Pilot Mentoring, Leadership, and Professional
Development Committees at Air Carriers Is Overdue
FAA is also almost 8 months overdue in meeting a mandated timeline
to issue a proposed rule requiring that air carriers establish pilot
mentoring, leadership, and professional development committees to
improve pilot performance. This is due, in part, to a lengthy delay in
developing an appropriate balance between the costs and benefits of
these programs. FAA intends to issue a proposed rule that it believes
would generate benefits by reinforcing safe flying practices.
Pilot performance issues are longstanding safety concerns--pilot
performance was cited in 7 of the 10 major accidents that occurred over
the last decade, indicating that the quality of training,
professionalism, and mentoring is important to safety. In February
2011,\7\ we also reported that poor pilot performance--such as poor
decision-making, inadequate aircraft control, improper flying
techniques, and a disregard for operating procedures--is a high-ranking
causal factor in airline accidents,\8\ a finding consistent with the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) review of the Colgan
accident.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ OIG Controlled Correspondence CC-2009-074, ``Letter to Senators
Rockefeller, Hutchison, and DeMint Regarding Commercial Aviation
Accidents, Pilot Experience and Pilot Compensation,'' February 9, 2011.
\8\ We analyzed the experience (i.e., total flight time and total
make and model flight time in the accident aircraft) of pilots involved
in 322 scheduled Part 121 passenger accidents that occurred from
January 2000 through December 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After the Colgan accident, FAA focused on advancing pilot mentoring
as part of its 2009 Call to Action on Airline Safety and Pilot Training
but never released a detailed plan to implement programs at air
carriers. In December 2011, we reported that regional air carriers were
not pursuing mentoring opportunities for their pilots. Officials at
these carriers expressed concerns that a mentoring program would have
to be scaled to their business model and that pilot turnover at these
carriers could outweigh the benefits of establishing these often costly
programs. Seven of nine large and small carriers we recently visited as
part of our ongoing audit did not have formal mentoring programs, and
none had professional development programs to instill and reinforce
high performance standards for their pilots.
FAA Is Behind Schedule and Will Likely Miss the Deadline To Issue a
Rule
Increasing Minimum Qualifications for Commercial Airline Pilots
The Act requires FAA to issue a final rule to substantially raise
airline pilot qualifications by August 2012. However, FAA did not issue
the proposed rule until February 2012 and expects to issue the final
rule by August 2013--a year after the mandate. Given the significant
increase in pilot flight hours that the Act mandates for the final
rule, FAA has encountered industry opposition.
FAA's rule would require first officers to hold an Airline
Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate,\9\ requiring 1,500 hours of pilot
flight time--up from the current mark of 250 hours with a commercial
pilot's license. The proposed rule would also require first officers to
have an aircraft type rating, which involves additional training and
testing specific to the airplanes they fly. Air carrier representatives
are opposed to the increased flight hour requirement because they feel
a pilot's quality and type of flying experience should be weighted more
heavily than the number of flight hours. They state that the supply of
qualified and available pilots will decrease because it will be
difficult for entry-level pilots to attain this amount of hours before
being qualified to fly at a commercial air carrier.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) Certificate is the highest level
of pilot certification. Pilots certified as ATP are authorized to act
as pilot-in-command of an aircraft in commercial airline service.
Additional eligibility requirements are contained in 14 CFR 61.153.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, while FAA's pilot qualification proposal satisfies most of
the Act's requirements in this area, it may fall short in ensuring
sufficient pre-employment screening. For example, the Act states that
applicant pilot screening must include an assessment of skills,
aptitudes, airmanship, and suitability specific to each air carrier's
operations. However, it is unclear whether FAA intended for the
enhanced ATP requirements in the proposed rule to also satisfy the pre-
employment screening measures contained in the Act. If so, air carriers
may not make appropriate changes to their pre-employment screening
procedures specific to their operations.
Finally, FAA has not acted to ensure carriers are ready to
transition to these new pilot qualification requirements. For example,
at two regional air carriers we visited as part of our ongoing review,
more than 75 percent of current first officers did not have an ATP.
Yet, neither carrier had developed a plan to ensure these pilots would
be able to meet the enhanced requirements by the deadline, nor had the
local FAA inspectors followed up with these carriers to assess their
ability to comply with enhanced requirements. Additionally, FAA has not
taken steps to determine the potential impact the new ATP requirement
would have on current pilots, information that will be important for
safety oversight.
FAA Lacks a Clear Strategy for Transitioning to a New Centralized
Electronic Pilot Records Database
FAA met the Act's initial milestone in developing a centralized
electronic pilot records database that will include records previously
maintained by air carriers. The Act did not prescribe any additional
milestones for the database's implementation, but the Agency has
recognized that a rulemaking will be necessary to fully develop the
intricacies of this electronic system and is in the preliminary stages
of writing this proposal. However, to create a robust, complete, and
secure data repository that carriers can use when hiring pilots, FAA
must overcome three key challenges:
First, FAA must address what level of detail should be
captured from air carrier pilot training records, such as
whether recurrent flight training will be included. The Act
stipulates that comments and evaluations made by the pilot
examiner \10\ be included in the database; however, industry is
highly protective of these data and opposes including them in
the database. FAA must also address how to include historical
air carrier pilot training records into its new system.
Gathering the historical records while keeping them
standardized across sources will be difficult because
information in the records varies based on differences in air
carrier training programs and the record retention period
varies from 5 years to indefinitely, depending on the carrier.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ An FAA inspector or air carrier pilot who is qualified, and
permitted, to conduct flight checks or instruction in an airplane, in a
flight simulator, or in a flight training device for a particular type
airplane.
Second, FAA does not expect to issue a final rule and launch
the database for at least another 2 years, so FAA will have to
determine how to transition from current recordkeeping
practices mandated by the Pilot Records Improvement Act
(PRIA)\11\ to the new database without disrupting the flow of
information. Therefore, until air carrier records are fully
integrated into the new database, carriers may need to continue
requesting data from both FAA and previous employers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Pub. L. No. 104-264, Section 502 (codified at 49 U.S.C.
Sec. 44703(h)-(j)).
Finally, a pilot records advisory committee identified
multiple challenges for FAA in accessing records from the
National Driver Register (NDR)\12\ and incorporating them into
the database. For example, FAA must decide how to ensure data
reliability of pilot records and resolve conflicting data
retention policies for the database versus NDR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ NDR is a central information system that allows states to
electronically exchange information on licensed drivers through a
computerized network.
In addition to these challenges, we reported in December 2011 that
FAA lacks a centralized process to receive and respond to carriers'
requests for pilot records. This raises questions about whether air
carriers are getting all the relevant information FAA has on pilots
before they are hired. While this problem may be mitigated once the new
database is launched, it remains a concern in the interim, especially
since FAA's 2009 Call to Action on Airline Safety and Pilot Training
called on carriers to obtain more comprehensive records on pilots prior
to hiring. As a result, FAA experienced an influx of record requests
from carriers and an increased workload.
Sustained Commitment And Oversight Are Needed To Achieve The Full
Measure Of Safety Enhancements Intended By The Act
Sustained FAA management commitment and oversight are needed to
ensure that provisions of the Act are effectively implemented and have
the desired impact of improving safety. Specifically, FAA needs to: (1)
effectively communicate with local FAA offices and industry on the
status of new rules and guidance, (2) provide additional direction and
support for developing new safety programs at smaller air carriers, and
(3) address pilot commuting issues.
FAA Has Not Provided the Level of Education, Outreach, and Guidance
Needed for Industry To Implement New Safety Programs
A lack of key stakeholder involvement and poor communication
between FAA and industry is impeding progress on several Act
initiatives. FAA created six aviation rulemaking committees (ARC) to
develop recommendations on multiple initiatives, such as identifying
and promulgating best practices in pilot training and developing the
pilot record database. However, FAA did not inform its field offices or
airlines of many of the ARCs' results, such as status of rulemakings,
or engage in effective outreach efforts for new safety programs other
than SMS. For example, none of the nine field offices we visited during
our ongoing review had received information from FAA on the Agency's
progress in developing mentoring, professional development, and
leadership programs for air carrier pilots. If FAA had provided early
outreach to field offices on the status of rulemaking and best
practices, air carriers could be better positioned to implement new
pilot safety programs when the rules are finalized.
Further, FAA did not follow up to ensure proper implementation of
guidance it has issued to air carriers. For example, while FAA issued
guidance for retaining and submitting pilot training records for the
new electronic, centralized pilot records database, it did not follow
up to see that air carriers were following the new requirements. Four
of the six carriers we visited during our ongoing review had not
clarified their policies to reflect this change. As a result, important
details concerning pilot training and proficiency may be lost and not
available for air carriers to use in future hiring decisions.
Additionally, some air carriers that had moved forward with new
programs encountered obstacles in obtaining FAA approval. For example,
one regional air carrier attempted to proactively develop a program for
first officers to obtain advanced certification as prescribed by the
Act. While the local FAA office initially approved the program, FAA
rescinded the approval 1 day before it was set to launch because
national-level guidance had not been issued. Although most actions
taken by air carriers thus far are voluntary, a lack of clear and
timely communication by FAA provides little impetus for air carriers to
move forward with new initiatives.
FAA Does Not Have a Focused Plan To Help Smaller Air Carriers Establish
New Safety Programs
Despite overall gains, implementation of voluntary safety programs
has mostly occurred at larger air carriers. Yet, the Act instructed FAA
to develop a plan to help all Part 121 carriers establish such
programs, with particular emphasis on ASAP and FOQA. FAA devised an
implementation plan for ASAP and FOQA at smaller air carriers, but a
lack of funding has prevented FAA from enacting the FOQA plan. As a
result, smaller carriers have been unable to purchase and install the
equipment needed to run this program. With a focused plan and dedicated
funding, FAA can help smaller air carriers establish voluntary safety
programs and realize the benefits of increased safety reporting and
trend analyses.
As shown in table 1, while all large carriers with more than 50
aircraft in their fleet have an incident reporting system (ASAP), the
system has been adopted by only 41 percent of small carriers with 15 or
fewer aircraft. Similarly, just over 10 percent of these small
operators have FOQA, compared to more than 90 percent of large
operators.
Table 1. Air Carrier Voluntary Safety Program Participation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of Large Carriers Small Carriers
Program Carriers (more than 50 Medium Carriers (15 or fewer
Participating aircraft) (16-50 aircraft) aircraft)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aviation Safety Action 60 of 88 24 of 24 19 of 23 17 of 41
Program (68%) (100%) (83%) (41%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flight Operational 38 of 88 22 of 24 11 of 23 5 of 41
Quality Assurance (43%) (92%) (48%) (12%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Advanced Qualification 19 of 88 13 of 24 3 of 23 3 of 41
Program (22%) (54%) (13%) (7%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: OIG analysis of FAA-reported data as of January 2012.
Despite the disparities between the large and small air carriers,
FAA has not fully implemented its plan to assist smaller air carriers
with the resources needed--such as best practices and guidance--to
establish new safety programs. Smaller air carriers have fewer
resources than their mainline counterparts to handle the operation and
management of new safety programs. As a result, they will have to
prioritize development of these programs based on feasibility and
importance and will face difficulties in implementing new programs
simultaneously--especially without guidance or program assistance from
FAA.
FAA's Fatigue Rule Does Not Address Pilot Commuting
FAA's changes to the flight and duty time regulations represented a
significant safety achievement; however, the regulations do not require
air carriers to identify pilots who commute. These are significant
factors that may contribute to fatigue given that many pilots in the
industry reside hundreds or even thousands of miles from their duty
locations. While FAA considered mandating that pilots arrive in time to
receive a pre-flight rest period in the proposed rule, it stated that
the requirement would be difficult to enforce and would not guarantee
responsible commuting.
Pilot commuting and related issues were concerns that came to light
after the Colgan accident. The NTSB investigation into the crash
revealed that both pilots had commuted hundreds of miles before the
flight. NTSB also found that Colgan did not proactively address the
pilot fatigue hazards associated with basing its operations at an
airport where pilots typically have to commute long distances in order
to begin their work shifts. In its investigative report, the NTSB
stated that ``operators have a responsibility to identify risks
associated with commuting, implementing strategies to mitigate these
risks, and ensure that their commuting pilots are fit for duty.''
NTSB issued a recommendation to FAA to address fatigue risks
associated with commuting, including identifying pilots who commute.
The National Academy of Sciences similarly noted in a July 2011 report
that there are not enough data to determine the role commuting plays in
contributing to fatigue or whether it should be regulated.\13\ This
underscores how collecting and analyzing these data could help FAA make
well-informed decisions on commuting. In our September 2011 report on
pilot fatigue, we recommended that FAA collect and analyze data
regarding pilot commuting for all Part 121 flight crews and determine
if additional changes are needed or if airlines need to take further
mitigating actions in their fatigue management systems. In its
response, FAA stated that it will review available data on pilot
commuting and determine if additional data could offer added safety
benefits. FAA committed to completing these actions by October 1, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ The National Academy of Sciences, The Effects of Commuting on
Pilot Fatigue, ISBN 978-0-309-21696-8, July 6, 2011 (Response to P.L.
111-216, Sec. 212).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion
FAA plays an integral role in maintaining the excellent safety
record of the U.S. National Airspace System. FAA acted swiftly to
address safety concerns highlighted by the Colgan crash and has since
made commendable progress in meeting new Act requirements. FAA still
faces several challenges, however, in updating pilot training and
leadership programs, developing screening and qualifications standards,
and ensuring carriers have the data they need to make sound hiring
decisions. To effectively implement these initiatives in a timely
manner, FAA must balance industry concerns with a sustained commitment
to oversight. We are encouraged by FAA's progress to date and will
continue to monitor its efforts to meet remaining Act requirements.
This concludes my statement. I would be happy to address any
questions from the Chairman or Members of the Subcommittee at this
time.
Exhibit. Status of Key Airline Safety Act Requirements
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section Initiative Milestone Deadline Milestone Status
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
202 NTSB Recommendations Report Annual Met, On-Target
Report
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
203 FAA Pilot Records Database 10/30/2010 Met
Database Development
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Report 2/1/2012 Missed & Overdue
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
204 Air Carrier Safety & ARC Report 7/31/2011 Met
Pilot
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Training ARC ARC Report 7/31/2012 On-Target
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
205 FAA Inspector Start OIG Review 5/1/2011 Met
Staffing
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
206 Mentoring, NPRM 8/1/2011 Missed & Overdue
Development, and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Leadership Final Rule 8/1/2013 To Be Determined
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
207 Crew Pairing and CRM Study 8/1/2011 Completed Late--8/26/2011
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
208 NTSB Training ARC Formation 11/29/2010 Met
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendations NPRM 8/1/2011 Met
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ARC report 11/30/2011 Completed Late -3/7/2012
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final Rule 8/1/2013 To Be Determined
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
209 FAA Rulemaking on ARC Formation 9/30/2010 Completed Late--11/16/2010
Training
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ARC Report 8/1/2011 Completed Late--9/23/2011
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final Rule 10/1/2011 Missed & Overdue
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
210 Code Share Ticket Amend 49 U.S.C. N/A Met
Disclosure Sec. 41712
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
211 FAA Safety Perform one per Annual Met
Inspections year
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
212 Fatigue & Commuting NPRM 2/1/2011 Met
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final Rule 8/1/2011 Completed Late--1/4/2012
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Risk Management 11/1/2010 Met
Plans
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Start Study 9/30/2010 Met
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Preliminary 1/30/2011 Met
Findings
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Report 6/30/2011 Met
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
213 Voluntary Safety Report 1/28/2011 Completed Late--3/16/2011
Programs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
214 ASAP & FOQA Plans Issued 1/28/2011 Completed Late--4/14/2011
Implementation
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Plans Implemented 8/1/2011 FOQA Portion Overdue
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
215 Safety Management NPRM 11/1/2010 Met
Systems
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final Rule 8/1/2012 On-Target
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
216 Screening & NPRM 1/28/2011 Completed Late--2/29/2012
Qualifications
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Final Rule 8/1/2012 To Be Determined
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ATP 8/1/2013 To Be Determined
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
217 ATP Certification Final Rule 8/1/2013 On-Target
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: OIG analysis of FAA-reported data.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Scovel. You brought up
some very important points, and I do have questions for you but
I'm going to go to Mr. Voss next and hear from the rest of the
witnesses. Unfortunately, I have to go to the floor to speak on
an amendment that's being voted on shortly, and so I'm going to
turn to my colleague, Senator Lautenberg, to continue the
hearing in my absence.
And so thank you, Senator Lautenberg, for taking over.
But, Mr. Voss, why don't you go ahead--he's the CEO of
Flight Safety Foundation--and we look forward to your comments.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM R. VOSS, PRESIDENT AND CEO, FLIGHT SAFETY
FOUNDATION
Mr. Voss. Thank you, Madam Chairman and distinguished
members of the Subcommittee.
The Flight Safety Foundation is an independent nonprofit
organization focused solely on aviation safety. We have more
than 1,000 organizations and individuals as members across more
than 150 countries. I appreciate this opportunity to testify.
Let me first speak briefly to the fatigue rule. When the
FAA published the new fatigue rule, it brought to an end more
than 20 years of political gridlock and internal fighting. It
brought forward a set of rules that reflect a modern
understanding of the science of fatigue. The new rule gives
industry the flexibility to respond to new operational risks as
they emerge and to embrace new advances in science as they
occur. This is a great achievement, and the world has taken
notice.
As difficult as that was, the pilot certification and
qualification requirements are a far greater challenge. There's
still a great deal of work to be done to address these issues
in experience and training. The training standards for airline
operations over the last few decades have become dangerously
outdated, and we've seen some tragic consequences.
The problem is not unique to the United States. It's a
global problem that must be dealt with now, and the world will
be watching the FAA to see how they address it.
Since the initial proposal of the ATP and 1,500 hour rule
in H.R. 5900, we've expressed some reservations that too much
emphasis was being placed on mandatory flight hours. Our
position is that if a flight crew needs to have a specific
skill set in order to protect the lives of their passengers,
then positive steps should be taken to ensure that knowledge is
obtained. Assuming that vital knowledge will be obtained
through experience leaves too much to chance.
For that reason, the Foundation agrees very much with the
FAA's suggestion that a structured training program can allow
the 1,500 hour requirement to be reduced, because structured
training programs simply leave less to chance. Ultimately, the
Foundation believes the real effectiveness of the new rule will
be the result of focused training mandates, and we're
encouraged to see a number of these in the proposed rulemaking.
The requirements for an ATP certification training program
and the development of an ATP knowledge test are very positive.
Also, the advanced jet training course suggested by one of the
ARCs addresses many of the high-risk issues. In addition, the
NPRM contains two experience requirements that make a great
deal of sense. One is the 50-hour multi-engine requirement for
second in command. The other is for 1,000 hours of airline
operational experience before assuming the role of captain.
Most responsible airlines already do this, and we
institutionalize some of the best practices.
Looking forward, the progress made to date has been rather
impressive. However, I'd like to offer some suggestions and
cautions as we move forward with implementation.
First of all, while the external forces such as Congress
and the family groups have provided clearly an essential push,
it's important at this junction that the experts are allowed to
focus on the issues that pose the real risks rather than the
issues that only resonate politically. There are things that
capture the public's imagination, but they may not always be
the same things that need to be addressed to reduce risk.
Second, progress against the objectives of H.R. 5900 must
be made with a sense of urgency but without overreaching. The
myriad of working groups and deadlines spawned by 5900 had the
desired effect and unfroze the stagnant system. But the breadth
of activity clearly exceeded the resources and capability of
the FAA to manage. While a sense of urgency must be maintained,
we also have to recognize we're now in a part of the process
where the details really matter, and we must respect that.
Finally, it should be acknowledged that H.R. 5900 will have
significant international implications. The new ATP requirement
the FAA will generate will result in a rule that the rest of
the world will be unable to follow. The structure of the global
airline industry and the demand for aviation professionals
around the world will make it impossible for foreign regulators
to follow the FAA's lead. This is an unusual situation and
comes at a time when U.S. leadership in aviation is being
challenged in some parts of the world.
There will also be some challenges for foreign regulators
who inspect U.S. airlines operating abroad. The Flight Safety
Foundation strongly supports the FAA proposal to issue an ATP
certificate with restricted privileges and to issue this with
as few as 1,000 hours. But such a certificate falls outside the
framework of international standards. Therefore, foreign
inspectors will not be able to accept it unless special
provisions are made.
In summary, we are encouraged by the many advances we are
seeing in the implementation of H.R. 5900. We retain a healthy
respect for the detailed work of implementation which follows.
We'll be happy to answer any questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Voss follows:]
Prepared Statement of William R. Voss, President and CEO,
Flight Safety Foundation
Chairman Cantwell, Ranking Member Thune, and distinguished members
of the Subcommittee: My name is William Voss and I am the President and
Chief Executive Officer of the Flight Safety Foundation.
The Flight Safety Foundation is an independent, nonprofit,
international organization engaged in research, education, advocacy,
and publishing. Its mission is to be the leading voice of safety for
the global aerospace/aviation community. We have members all around the
world representing every facet of the aviation industry. On behalf of
the Foundation, I appreciate this opportunity to testify about the
implementation of H.R. 5900, the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation
Administration Extension Act of 2010.
The short answer is that the implementation of H.R. 5900 is
progressing well. The more complicated answer is that there is still
work to be done and parts of this law that ought to be reconsidered.
The Fatigue Rule
My background in aviation is diverse. I've been a pilot, an air
traffic controller, a certified aviation mechanic, and a regulator and
standard-setter, both at the FAA and the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO). I know firsthand how the issue of fatigue can
affect every aspect of this industry. We all know that fatigue affects
our performance, but normally our own drowsiness or lack of sleep does
not have the potential for catastrophic consequences, unlike the
airline pilot who is responsible for dozens or hundreds of lives. While
some may not be entirely satisfied with all aspects of the fatigue rule
mandated under H.R. 5900, I have to say that the overall result is
indeed historic. More than 20 years of political gridlock has been
broken. What we have today are a set of rules that reflect our modern
understanding of fatigue and target operational risks based on science
rather than just political horse-trading. The new rule gives the
industry the flexibility to respond to new operational risks as they
emerge and to embrace new advances in science as appropriate. The world
has taken note, and to a great extent is following this positive
example.
Pilot Certification and Qualification Requirements for Air Carrier
Operations
There is still a great deal of work to be done to address the
issues of experience and training requirements called for under H.R.
5900. Congress and family groups were right to call for action in this
area. The training standards for airline operations have been
relatively static for decades, while incremental implementation of new
technology and wholesale restructuring of the industry has caused those
training requirements to become dangerously outdated and we are seeing
some tragic consequences. This problem is not unique to the United
States. It is a world-wide problem that must be dealt with now and the
world will be watching to see how the FAA addresses it.
Since the initial proposal of the 1,500 hour rule, the Flight
Safety Foundation expressed reservations regarding the focus that H.R.
5900 places on mandatory flight hours. Our position has been that if a
flight crew needs to know, understand or have a specific skill set in
order to protect the lives of their passengers, then steps should be
taken to ensure the knowledge is obtained through training or previous
experience. Mandating an arbitrary number of hours experience required
to be in a cockpit makes the dangerous assumption that specific
knowledge will be obtained simply due to hours in the air. This leaves
too much to chance.
There are countless examples of pilots with many thousands of
hours, who lacked the critical knowledge to avert a tragedy. The Air
Florida pilots who crashed at Washington National more than 20 years
ago had 8,300 hours and 3,500 hours respectively, yet still lacked
critical knowledge of cold weather and de-icing operations. While the
final report has not been issued, it is clear that there were gaps in
the knowledge of the crew of Air France 447, which crashed in the
Atlantic Ocean several years ago, that lost control of the aircraft
following a brief failure of an airspeed sensor.
While the purpose of a 1,500 hour rule is understood, the Flight
Safety Foundation strongly supports the notion that a structured
training program can allow this requirement to be reduced, since that
training program would reduce risk by leaving less to chance. The
Foundation believes the real effectiveness of the new rule will be more
a result of mandating critical training that targets risk in the real
world, rather than simply increasing the number of hours.
The Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) calls for several changes
that are very important. The requirements for an Airline Transport
Pilot (ATP) Certification Training Program and the development of a
revised ATP Knowledge are positive. These changes will help ensure that
the basic knowledge of air carrier operations are provided and will
open the door to a modernization of the existing knowledge test.
The Flight Operations and Qualifications Aviation Rulemaking
Committee (ARC) also recommended a requirement for an Advanced Jet
Training Course. The Foundation supports this recommendation since it
would ensure specific practical training that addresses many of the
highest-risk areas, and would meeting many of the requirements spelled
out in Section 216 of H.R. 5900.
The NPRM also includes two new experience requirements that
institutionalize common practice and make a great deal of sense. One is
the requirement for 50 hours of multi-engine experience for a second in
command. This requirement is a de facto industry standard already. The
other requirement is for 1,000 hours of airline operational experience
before assuming the role of captain. This amounts to a requirement for
one to two years of line experience as a first officer before assuming
command. Most responsible airlines already have a similar requirement.
It is vitally important to ensure that Captains are promoted in a
thoughtful and deliberate manner. Captains become mentors and trainers
for first officers. They also set the limits of what is acceptable and
the types of risks that may or may not be taken. The professionalism
and maturity of the Captains drive the safety culture of an airline. I
hope to see additional work that focuses on the important area of
mentoring.
Looking Forward
The progress in the area of fatigue and pilot training is
impressive. However I would like to offer some suggestions and cautions
as we move forward with further implementation.
First of all I would like to suggest that while external forces
have provided an essential push, it is important at this junction that
the experts are allowed to focus on the issues that pose a risk rather
than just the issues that resonate politically. For example, H.R. 5900
Section 207 directs the FAA to, ``. . . conduct a study on aviation
industry best practices with regard to flight crewmember pairing, crew
resource management techniques, and pilot commuting.'' I have heard a
lot of controversy about pilot commuting but I have heard very little
about crew pairing. As a safety professional I will tell you crew
pairing techniques are a powerful tool to mitigate risk. We are at a
juncture where the things that capture the public's imagination may not
be the same things that need to be addressed to avert the next tragedy.
Secondly, progress against the objectives of H.R. 5900 must be made
with a sense of urgency, but without overreaching. The myriad of
working groups, studies and deadlines, specified by H.R. 5900 had the
desired effect. They created a flurry of activity that unfroze the
system that had and drove overdue action on key issues. However, this
flurry of activity generated as much heat as it did light. The breadth
of activity clearly exceeded the resources and capability of the FAA to
manage. From this point on, it would be best if the sense of urgency
could be maintained and a schedule agreed to that allows for the
thoughtful implementation of some difficult changes.
Finally, it should be acknowledged that H.R. 5900, and specifically
the requirement for an ATP for the second -in- command in an air
carrier, will have significant international implications. Since the
close of World War II, the United States has been a leader in the field
of aviation, and the FAA has served as a model for regulatory
authorities around the world. For the first time, the FAA will
promulgate a rule that the rest of the world will have to universally
dismiss. Given the structure of the global airline industry and the
demand for aviation professionals around the world, it will be
impossible for foreign regulators to follow the FAA's lead and
implement an ATP requirement for the second-in-command of an air
carrier.
In addition, there will be challenges for foreign regulators who
are confronted with an Airline Transport Pilot Certificate that was
issued with less than 1,500 hours. While the Flight Safety Foundation
strongly supports the FAA proposal to issue an ATP Certificate with
restricted privileges at 1,000 hours, such a proposal does fall outside
the framework of international standards and will require some
thoughtful adjustments to accommodate international operations.
These are not inconsequential concerns. Our actions reverberate
throughout the world and it is important that our lawmakers and
regulators at the FAA consider the impact new regulations have on
international operators flying into the U.S. as well as the impact some
of these regulations may have on the US's position as the standard-
bearer for aviation regulation. We are encouraged by many of the
advances we have seen during the implementation of H.R. 5900, but still
see some areas that need more work.
For the traveling public, the tragedy of an aviation accident is
magnified by the rarity. We've achieved levels of safety that are the
envy of other industries and can make all of us proud. But we must stay
vigilant and understand that safety is an ongoing effort. As we get
deeper into the implementation of H.R. 5900, it is our hope that the
FAA continues to increase its work with safety professionals and other
experts in order to make our safe skies even safer.
Thank you very much for this opportunity to testify this afternoon.
Senator Lautenberg [presiding]. Thank you very much.
Dr. Belenky, we'd like to hear from you now, please.
STATEMENT OF GREGORY BELENKY, M.D.,
RESEARCH PROFESSOR AND DIRECTOR,
SLEEP AND PERFORMANCE RESEARCH CENTER,
WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY, SPOKANE
Dr. Belenky. Chairman Cantwell, Senator Lautenberg, and
distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
invitation to comment on the new FAA rule, Flight Crew Duty and
Rest Requirements.
In the new rule, the FAA has combined science and
operational experience. The FAA introduces the concept of
maximum flight duty period as the basis for the prescriptive
rule and fatigue risk management systems as alternatives to the
prescriptive rule.
The maximum flight duty period takes into account the
effects of time on duty, circadian rhythm, and segments flown,
so workload. Thus, the maximum flight duty period captures and
mitigates the three major components of fatigue: sleep-wake
history, circadian rhythm, and workload. Again, fatigue risk
management systems offer a flexible, evidence-based alternative
to the prescriptive rule.
With respect to the maximum flight duty period and its
modulation by time on duty, the circadian rhythm, time of day,
and workload, the rule is clear and unambiguous. With respect
to fatigue risk management, while there are internationally
accepted standards from the International Civil Aviation
Association, ICAO, the FAA needs to define what is an
acceptable demonstration of an equivalent level of safety and
hence an alternative means of compliance for a fatigue risk
management system with respect to the prescriptive rule.
Presumably, this will be defined in the upcoming FAA
advisory circular on fatigue risk management. In this yet to be
released advisory circular, it seems reasonable to expect that
the FAA would consider the use of biomathematical models to
predict performance on the basis of sleep-wake history and
circadian phase.
As the first step in a process of demonstrating an
equivalent level of safety, a model could be used to make
relative comparisons between schedules generated by the
prescriptive rule and schedules generated by a proposed fatigue
risk management system. To make such comparisons, the model or
models must be shown to accurately predict human performance.
Thus, models must be verified as to their internal workings,
validated in terms of their predictions, and certified for use
in aviation in a manner similar to the mathematical models used
to predict mean time before failure of an aircraft component.
Further, modeling is not the only path to fatigue risk
management, as ICAO guidance makes clear. In the new rule, the
FAA introduces the concept of flight time limits, limits that
are well within the temporal boundaries of the maximum flight
duty period.
In support of this, the FAA cites studies suggesting,
quote, that ``after a person has worked for about eight or 9
hours, the risk of an accident increases exponentially for each
additional hour worked.'' This is a strong claim. Strong claims
require strong evidence. The scientific evidence supporting
this assertion is weak.
Accident risk is calculated by dividing the number of
accidents by the number of people exposed. In the study cited,
the number of people exposed had to be estimated from other
data bases as exposure data were not available in the accident
data bases themselves. As the authors of these papers
themselves acknowledge, this introduces a major uncertainty
into the calculation.
While there may be a rationale for flight time limits, the
studies cited do not provide it. In this instance, a major
policy decision was made, in my opinion, on the basis of
questionable evidence.
To conclude, the FAA has made important advances in the
evidence-based management of fatigue risk by integrating
scientific findings in sleep and performance into its new rule.
Uncertainty remains in the validation of biomathematical
performance prediction models for use in FRMS, fatigue risk
management systems, and in the rationale for flight time
limits.
Thank you, Chairman Cantwell, members of the Committee, for
the opportunity to testify. I would be happy to take any
questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Belenky follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gregory Belenky, M.D., Research Professor and
Director, Sleep and Performance Research Center, Washington State
University, Spokane
Chairman Cantwell, Ranking Member Thune, and distinguished members
of the Subcommittee: thank you for the invitation to comment on the FAA
rule on Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements. I am Gregory
Belenky, Research Professor and Director, Sleep and Performance
Research Center, Washington State University.
In the new rule, the FAA has effectively combined science and
operational experience. They introduce the maximum flight duty period
as the basis for the prescriptive rule, and, fatigue risk management
systems as an alternative to the prescriptive rule. The maximum flight
duty period takes into account the effects of time on duty, the
circadian rhythm, and segments flown. The maximum flight duty period
neatly captures and mitigates the three major components of fatigue--
time awake, circadian rhythm, and workload. Fatigue risk management
systems offer a flexible alternative to the prescriptive rule.
With respect to the maximum flight duty period and its modulation
by flight crew circadian rhythms and workload, the latter represented
by segments flown, the rule is clear and unambiguous. With respect to
fatigue risk management, what constitutes an acceptable demonstration
of an equivalent level of safety and hence an alternative means of
compliance awaits the issuance of the relevant FAA advisory circular.
In the yet to be released advisory circular, it seems reasonable
that the FAA would consider the use of biomathematical models to
predict performance on the basis of sleep wake history and circadian
rhythm phase. As the first step in a process of demonstrating an
equivalent level of safety, it could use a model to make relative
comparisons between schedules generated by the prescriptive rule and
schedules generated by a proposed fatigue risk management system. To
make such comparisons, the model must be known to accurately predict
human performance. Models must be verified as to their internal
workings, validated in terms of their predictions, and certified for
use in aviation in a manner similar to the mathematical models used to
predict mean time before failure of an aircraft component.
In the new rule, the FAA introduced flight time limits that are
well within the temporal boundaries of the maximum flight duty period.
In support of this, the FAA cites studies suggesting ``that after a
person has worked for about eight or nine hours, the risk of an
accident increases exponentially for each additional hour worked.'' The
scientific evidence supporting this assertion is weak. Risk is
calculated by dividing the number of accidents by the number of people
exposed to the accident risk. In the studies cited, the number of
persons exposed had to be estimated as exposure data were not available
in the accident databases. While there may be a rationale for flight
time limits, the studies cited do not provide it. In this instance, a
major policy decision was made on the basis of questionable evidence.
To conclude, the FAA has made important advances in integrating
scientific findings in sleep and performance into the new rule.
Uncertainty remains in biomathematical performance prediction model
validation and in the rationale for flight time limits.
Thank you, Chairman Cantwell for the opportunity to testify before
the Subcommittee. I would be happy to take any questions that you and
the members of the Committee may have.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you.
And now Captain Carl Kuwitzky.
Captain, please go ahead.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN CARL KUWITZKY, PRESIDENT, COALITION OF
AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATIONS (CAPA)
Mr. Kuwitzky. Good afternoon, Madam Chairperson Cantwell
and the distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Aviation
Operations, Safety, and Security.
My name is Captain Carl Kuwitzky. I'm a Boeing 737 line
pilot flying for Southwest Airlines. I've been with Southwest
since 1983, flying captain the last 25 years. I'm honored and
grateful for your invitation to appear before you today in my
capacity as President of the Coalition of Airline Pilots
Associations.
You have before you my prepared remarks. But rather than
read those remarks verbatim into the record, I would like to
shorten them up a bit and speak to you a little more from the
heart.
Today, this committee is taking a look back on the progress
of the sweeping legislation passed following the tragic Colgan
accident, and that accident was, indeed, tragic. But out of
that accident came long-needed change. Today, I want to touch
on three issues in my comments, two of them directly out of
that legislation.
The first is the flight and duty time rules. As you know,
they were released in December, and they were long overdue.
Pilots have been working on this issue for 20 years. Why, you
might ask? No one knows fatigue better than airline pilots. We
live with it every day. Fatigue is a huge issue in our
industry.
The FAA approached this issue appropriately using the best
available science, convened an aviation rulemaking committee,
and pored through thousands of public comments. CAPA applauds
the release of these new rules, but there's a critical flaw.
And that flaw is the exclusion or carve-out of all cargo
carriers from the new rule. Therefore, it misses the mark.
Cargo pilots and pilots flying on the backside of the clock
were the ones most in need of the new rules. Cargo pilots
suffer the same fatigue issues as passenger pilots, probably
even more so. Yet they were excluded.
We do not have one level of safety. We have two, one for
passenger pilots, one for cargo pilots. This must change. Cargo
pilots must be included under the new Part 117 rules. We should
all operate under one level of safety.
With respect to first officer qualification, the
legislation you're reviewing required an upgrade in the minimum
professional standards for first officers piloting commercial
aircraft. CAPA has long supported the current ATP certificate
with its requisite requirements as the minimum level to serve
as a first officer in Part 121 and 135 operations.
We appreciate the direction and we support the direction
the FAA is moving with the recently released NPRM in raising
the experience level to serve as a first officer in these
operations. What the NPRM proposes is certainly well above the
current level, a minimum standard of 250 hours, which is
completely unacceptable.
But we believe the current ATP and 1,500 hours should be
the benchmark. That certification level produces a mature,
experienced, professional aviator with sound judgment to
operate in today's complex environment.
The last issue I'd like to talk about is Federal Flight
Deck Officers. As you know, the FFDO program was enacted post-
9/11. It was designed to be the last line of defense from a
terrorist attack on our Nation's cockpits. Many of our Nation's
pilots volunteered to serve, and these pilots incurred
significant personal financial costs to participate in
attending initial training, maintaining proficiency, and
attending requalification training.
This is one of the most cost-effective programs in our
Federal Government--$15 for each flight for an FFDO versus
approximately $3,000 for a FAM to be on the same flight. And
the total cost of the FFDO program is but a tiny fraction of
the entire Federal Air Marshall Service budget.
Unfortunately, the FFDO budget was reduced by approximately
half in the President's recent budget release. The budget
amount, if approved, will not sustain the existing program,
much less replace pilots who have left the program and will
begin leaving in larger numbers later this year when age 65
mandatory retirement begins. There's a backlog of pilots
awaiting training, but they've not been allowed to go due to a
lack of funding.
Our ask is simple. Please reject the cut in the FFDO budget
and increase it to allow pilot volunteers to attend initial
training to maintain the existing layer of security in our
Nation's skies.
Thank you to the Committee for this opportunity to testify
before you today. CAPA looks forward to working constructively
with this subcommittee to address the issues I've raised in my
testimony. I look forward to your questions and comments.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kuwitzky follows:]
Prepared Statement of Captain Carl Kuwitzky, President,
Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations
Good afternoon, Madame Chairperson Cantwell, Senator Thune and the
distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Aviation Operations,
Safety and Security as well as Commerce Committee Chairman Rockefeller.
My name is Captain Carl Kuwitzky. I am a line pilot currently flying
for Southwest Airlines for 29 years. I am honored and grateful for your
invitation to appear before you today in my capacity as President of
the Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations (CAPA).
CAPA is a trade association focused exclusively on the safety of
the flying public and the enhancement of the piloting profession. We
represent over 31,000 commercial airline pilots of Southwest Airlines,
American Airlines, US Airways, UPS, Southern Air, ABX Air, Atlas Air
Cargo, Kalitta Air, Polar Air Cargo, Arrow Air, Horizon Air, Miami Air,
USA 3000, Omni Air, and Gulfstream Air. CAPA was proudly in the
forefront in the fight for the passage of the Airline Safety and
Federal FAA Extension Act of 2010.
We congratulate this Subcommittee and all of the Senate and the
House for enacting this important legislation vital to the safety of
America' flying public and to maintaining and improving the high stands
of our profession. Enactment of the Airline Safety Bill in 2010 was
indeed a watershed moment for the commercial aviation industry.
However, it was only the first step that needs to be taken for the
safety of our flying public. The rigorous implementation of that bill
by the Federal Aviation Administration is the next step that must be
taken to ensure commercial aviation safety. As you know, the FAA
recently released the new flight duty and rest regulations required by
the Airline Safety and FAA Extension Act of 2010.
These long awaited regulations were on the National Transportation
Safety Board's ``Most Wanted'' list and sought by professional
commercial airline pilots for over twenty years. The FAA correctly used
all available science, convened an Aviation Rulemaking Committee and
considered thousands of public comments to determine specific rules
governing flight time and duty time in our profession.
While CAPA applauds the promulgation of those rules, it is with
regret that we must suggest that the critical standard of ``One Level
of Safety'' for all commercial carriers was not met by the FAA. The
regulations unfortunately have a critical flaw, that is, the exclusion
of mandatory compliance by ``all-cargo'' operations. The safety of our
Nation's air space is only as strong as its weakest link, and that weak
link is fatigue in primarily all-night cargo operators who were
excluded from the rule.
Madame Chairperson, approximately 15 percent of all departures in
the United States are all-cargo flights. These aircraft fly in the same
airspace and routinely interact with passengers carriers throughout the
aviation system. Cargo and passenger aircraft interact during numerous
critical phases of flight which include Precision Radar Monitored (PRM)
approaches and Land and Hold Short Operations (LASHO). During PRM
approaches, aircraft fly with absolute minimum separation, relying on
each other to fly precise approaches. During LASHO operations, aircraft
are cleared to land and hold short of a crossing runway or taxiway
where other aircraft are operating.
Madame Chairperson, an exemption similar to this cargo ``carve-
out'' was attempted in the early 1990s when TCAS was mandated for
passenger carriers while cargo carriers were exempt due to the alleged
cost of the system. Following a fatal passenger/cargo midair accident
in 1996, a near miss in 1997 between a UPS Boeing 747 and Air Force
One, and two additional near misses in 1999, TCAS was finally mandated
for all cargo aircraft. We fervently hope that the current cargo carve-
out can be obviated by the FAA or by Congressional statute if necessary
before there is a terrible episode of a fatal accident. It is CAPA's
position that until the new flight and rest regulations are applied to
passenger carriers, all-cargo carriers and supplemental carriers, our
air space will not be governed under ``One Level of Safety'' and the
American public will not be assured of their right to a maximum level
of safety.
The Airline Safety and Federal FAA Extension Act of 2010 was also
enacted to upgrade the minimum professional stands for First Officers
piloting commercial aircraft. CAPA has always advocated the Airline
Transport Pilot (ATP) License as the minimum standard for employment as
a pilot with a Part 121 or Part 135 air carrier. The ATP provides the
minimum requisite academic coursework, flight training and experience
needed for the safe piloting of today's complex, high-speed aircraft
through a congested, multifaceted air traffic control network in
difficult weather and other situational environments. Mainline air
carriers require the ATP for employment and once again, ``One Level of
Safety'' dictates that all air carriers, regional or otherwise, should
require the ATP as well. The 1500 flight hours that the ATP requires
develops a mature, experienced and professional aviator who has the
foundation to exercise prudent judgment while responsible for the safe
transportation of scores of passengers.
We were gratified that the Airline Safety bill did suggest
directionally that all commercial airline pilots have an ATP. We were
concerned that the legislation did allow the FAA Administrator to make
exemptions from this standard. We were further concerned that the FAA
rules will, while upgrading the current minimum standard, not actually
require all commercial aviation pilots to have an ATP. We will continue
to press the FAA and the Congress to ultimately fix this deficiency in
the standard required in our profession.
Madame Chairperson, on another issue not part of the Airline Safety
Bill, I would like to raise the issue of the Federal Flight Deck
Officer program. The FFDO program is a highly cost effective one
designed to provide the last line of defense against possible terrorist
activity aboard commercial aircraft. The pilot participants in this
program bear significant costs out of their own pockets to train and
take part in the program. Other programs such as that of the Federal
Air Marshalls (FAMS) are hugely augmented, again in a highly cost
effective manner, by the FFDO pilots. The Federal expenditures
associated with the FFDO program are a tiny fraction of the cost of the
FAM program. As you know, the FFDO budget has been stagnate for a
number of years resulting in a significant backlog of pilots who have
applied to participate in the program and are awaiting training due to
the lack of Federal funds. In addition, unfortunately the budget the
President submitted recently to the Congress cuts very substantially
the Federal funds allocated to the FFDO program.
CAPA urges the Senate Commerce Committee and the Senate
Appropriations Committee to reject that cut in expenditure and indeed
increase FFDO funding so new applicants can be trained for the program.
Finally, CAPA congratulates this Subcommittee, the full Commerce
Committee and the entire Congress for finally enacting an FAA
Reauthorization bill. This bill will help to propel NextGen forward and
provide a sustainable, certain level of funding for the Nation's air
travel infrastructure. It is the first step the Congress has taken to
the development of a national air transportation policy for the 21st
century.
CAPA looks forward to working constructively with this Subcommittee
on all of the matters I have raised in my testimony. I look forward to
your questions and comments. Madame Chairperson, I would respectfully
request that my longer statement be included in the record of this
hearing.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you.
Mr. Hendricks, we'd like to hear from you now.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS L. HENDRICKS, SENIOR VICE
PRESIDENT OF SAFETY, SECURITY AND OPERATIONS,
AIRLINES FOR AMERICA (A4A)
Mr. Hendricks. Senator Lautenberg, members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before
the Committee today on this timely, important subject.
Safety underpins every aspect of airline operations. The
remarkable safety record of the airlines that are members of
A4A demonstrates their unflagging commitment to fulfilling that
responsibility. As a former airline captain, I have repeatedly
witnessed that commitment. The results are extraordinary. No
mainline U.S. airline has had a fatal passenger accident in
over a decade.
That achievement, however, does not mean that we're
satisfied. Airline employees and management teams continuously
work to improve safety. We very much appreciate the
Subcommittee's emphasis on safety, as well as the efforts of
the Federal Aviation Administration and the National
Transportation Safety Board.
The recently enacted FAA Modernization Reform Act includes
a wide range of initiatives that will further enhance aviation
safety, including the deployment of ASDE-X radar at major
airports, promoting the sharing of safety data by airlines and
airline employees with the FAA, and establishing a risk-based
inspection system for aircraft repair stations located
overseas. But the fact is that day in and day out, our members
and their work forces exceed what laws and regulations require.
Government's role in airline safety is crucial. But it is
also important to recognize that how we do safety has changed
dramatically over the years. The airline industry has reached
the point where many of the improvements in safety are
attributable to robust, data-driven analysis programs. They
often involve collaborative scrutiny of the FAA, employees and
management. And many of the most effective programs are the
result of voluntary employee reporting mechanisms.
These data-based programs enable us to identify emerging
patterns and promptly deploy focused resources to reduce risks
prior to crossing the threshold where safety can be
compromised. This approach--going where the data take us--has
greatly improved the quality of safety programs.
With respect to recent safety initiatives, including those
that Public Law 111-216 directed, we want to compliment the FAA
on its professionalism in conducting a number of demanding
rulemakings in a very short time. One of these proceedings is a
proposed pilot qualification rule.
In accordance with the legislation, the FAA issued a
proposal on February 29 that first officers hold an Airline
Transport Pilot certificate and a minimum of 1,500 hours flight
time. Existing FAA regulations do not require a first officer
flying for a Part 121 air carrier to hold an ATP certificate.
Only the pilot in command must meet this certificate
requirement. The proposed rule allows for lesser flight
experience thresholds for aviation college graduates and former
military pilots.
A4A is preparing comments for the rulemaking proceeding.
Although we have not completed them yet, we are concerned about
the issue of quantity versus quality. Hard hour minima are not
a substitute for the quality of a pilot's training and
experience. Moreover, we need to avoid the unintended
consequence of the rule becoming a significant barrier to
recruiting airline pilots.
Public Law 111-216 also contains training requirements that
we supported because they were targeted initiatives. In
response to that legislation, the FAA created several aviation
rulemaking committees. Last May, it issued a supplemental
notice of proposed rulemaking concerning Subparts N and O, the
FAA's training regulations. This is a very complex matter.
In simplest terms, we recommend that the FAA withdraw the
supplemental rule and convene an aviation rulemaking committee
to respond to specific concerns. We propose that they
reconsider its decision not to mandate the Advanced
Qualification Program as the single means of conducting air
carrier training. And, finally, we recommend that the FAA
require training for upset prevention and recovery in adverse
weather operations.
The FAA's flight time limitations and rest requirements
rulemaking proceeding was a complicated undertaking. Overall,
we believe the outcome was good. The FAA gave careful
consideration to the comments it received and the final rule
reflected that.
Our biggest disappointment was that the rule imposed a hard
flight time limit of eight or 9 hours, depending on the time of
day. No other nation imposes limits to flying time on
commercial aviation. Rather, they correctly provide limits on
total flight duty periods, which also encompasses nonflying
activities. Also, the current rule allows for that limit to be
extended for circumstances beyond a carrier's control. That
narrow allowance does not compromise safety and recognizes the
vagaries of airline operations.
As my remarks indicate this afternoon, the airline industry
is committed to data-driven evaluations of operational issues.
That kind of analysis produces the most responsive and
effective results, and it allows for the most efficient
deployment of finite resources in making necessary changes. As
my remarks also indicate, we believe that regulation should
also demonstrate that commitment.
We appreciate very much the Subcommittee's leadership in
aviation safety. We look forward to working with you to achieve
further improvements in safety. And I look forward to taking
any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hendricks follows:]
Prepeard Statement of Thomas L. Hendricks, Senior Vice President for
Safety, Security and Operations, Airlines for America (A4A)
Chairman Cantwell, Ranking Member Thune and members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for inviting us to appear at this timely and
important hearing.
Safety underpins every aspect of airline operations. The remarkable
safety record of the airlines that are members of A4A demonstrates
their unflagging commitment to fulfilling that responsibility. As a
former airline captain, I have repeatedly witnessed that commitment.
The results are extraordinary: no mainline U.S. airline has had a fatal
passenger accident in over a decade.
That achievement, however, does not mean that we are satisfied.
Airline employees and management teams continuously work to improve
safety. We very much appreciate the Subcommittee's emphasis on safety,
as well as the efforts of the Federal Aviation Administration and the
National Transportation Safety Board. The recently enacted FAA
Modernization and Reform Act includes a wide range of initiatives that
will further enhance aviation safety, including expediting the
deployment of ASDE-X radar at major airports, promoting the sharing of
safety data by airlines and airline employees with the FAA, and
establishing a risk-based inspection system for aircraft repair
stations located overseas. But the fact is that, day in and day out,
our members and their workforces exceed what laws and regulations
require.
Government's role in airline safety is crucial but it is also
important to recognize that how we ``do safety'' has changed
dramatically over the years. The airline industry has reached the point
where many of the improvements in safety are attributable to robust
data-driven analysis programs. They often involve the collaborative
scrutiny of the FAA, employees and management. And many of the most
effective programs are the result of voluntary employee reporting
mechanisms.
These data-based programs enable us to identify emerging patterns
and promptly deploy focused resources to reduce risks prior to crossing
the threshold where safety could be compromised. This approach--going
where the data take us--has greatly improved the quality of safety
programs.
With respect to recent safety initiatives, including those that
Public Law 111-216 directed, we want to compliment the FAA on its
professionalism in conducting a number of demanding rulemaking
proceedings in a very short time.
One of these proceedings is the proposed pilot qualification rule.
In accordance with Public 111-216, the FAA issued a proposal on
February 29 that first officers hold an Airline Transport Pilot
certificate and a minimum of 1500 hours flight time to obtain the
certificate. Existing FAA regulations do not require a first officer
flying for a Part 121 air carrier to hold an ATP certificate; only the
pilot in command must meet this certificate requirement. The proposed
rule allows for lesser flight-experience thresholds for aviation
college graduates and former military pilots.
A4A is preparing comments for the rulemaking proceeding. Although
we have not completed them yet, we are concerned about the issue of
quantity versus quality. Hard-hour minima are not a substitute for the
quality of a pilot's training and experience. Moreover, we need to
avoid the unintended consequence of this rule becoming a significant
barrier to recruiting airline pilots.
Public Law 111-216 also contained training requirements that we
supported because they were targeted initiatives. In response to that
legislation, the FAA created several Aviation Rulemaking Committees.
Last May, it issued a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking
concerning Subparts N and O, the FAA's training regulations.
This is a complex matter. In simplest terms, we recommend that the
FAA:
Withdraw the SNPRM and convene an Aviation Rulemaking
Committee to develop revisions to Subparts N and O that are
data-driven and respond to specific concerns. The SNPRM's
proposals, in contrast, would have a negligible effect on
airline safety but would impose significant costs on carriers
and would divert resources from some of the most sophisticated
training programs in the world. That outcome is not
justifiable.
Reconsider its decision not to mandate the Advanced
Qualification Program as the single means of conducting air
carrier training. AQP entails a systematic front-end analysis
of training requirements from which explicit proficiency
objectives for all facets of pilot training are developed.
That, we believe, is how all Part 121 carriers should conduct
their training.
Require training for upset prevention and recovery, and
adverse weather operations. This should be done by adopting the
recommendations of Public Law 111-216 and the Flight Crewmember
Training ARC.
The FAA's flight time limitations and rest requirements rulemaking
proceeding was a complicated undertaking. Overall, we believe the
outcome was good. The FAA gave careful consideration to the comments it
received and the final rule reflected that. Our biggest disappointment
was that the rule imposed a hard flight-time limit of eight or nine
hours, depending on the time of the day. It is important to note that
no other nation imposes limits to flying time on commercial aviation.
Rather, they correctly provide limits on total flight duty periods,
which also encompasses non-flying activities. Also, the current rule
allows for that limit to be extended for circumstances beyond the
carrier's control. That narrow allowance does not compromise safety and
recognizes the vagaries of airline operations.
As my remarks this afternoon indicate, the airline industry is
committed to data-driven evaluations of operational issues. That kind
of analysis produces the most responsive and effective results. And it
allows for the most efficient deployment of finite resources in making
necessary changes. As my remarks also indicate, we believe that
regulations should also demonstrate that commitment.
We appreciate very much the Subcommittee's leadership in aviation
safety. We look forward to working with you to achieve further
improvements in safety.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much.
We're looking at an industry that has made enormous
progress in safety over the years, over the decades. And,
obviously, we've got to pay as much attention to any factor
that interferes with safe movement in aviation as we can. And
in this instance, we're looking, particularly, at pilot
training and the number of hours that should be allowed to
work--conditions that obviously affected the terrible accident
that resulted from the Colgan crash up in Buffalo.
And for some years now, I've been very involved with
aviation safety. I had an active role in helping to find the
culprit who brought down Pan Am 103 many years ago. I went to
Scotland to try and understand what happened there. And one of
the things that we do notice, particularly, is that progress
made in aviation safety includes significant advancements in
technology--when you think about it, the GPS systems.
I used to ride along in a twin second seat and--I never
took any training, and a friend of mine once said to me, ``What
do you do if we're flying along and all of a sudden I go''--I
said, ``I go''--the same way. And so I admire so much what's
happened to the pilot population--with the pilot population,
the skill, the--I will say the easier operation of very
sophisticated aircraft.
So, Mr. Scovel, the investigation of the Colgan Air crash
revealed that prior to the crash both pilots commuted long
distances, which likely contributed to fatigue. The NTSB
recommended that the FAA implement strategies to reduce risks
from commuting.
What steps do you think the FAA ought to take to address
issues arising from having to travel that distance? Or should
that be a factor at all?
Mr. Scovel. Thank you, Senator. We think commuting has
potential to be a significant factor as it relates to fatigue.
And in the course of the NTSB investigation of the most
unfortunate Colgan Air crash in 2009, NTSB entered a finding
that the performance of both pilots was likely impaired due to
their fatigue.
The NTSB also noted that both pilots had commuted many,
many miles in order to get to their home base of Newark. The
co-pilot came from Washington state. The pilot came from
Florida. The NTSB report also detailed what efforts, if you
could call them that, both pilots had taken in order to acquire
some rest before they actually entered the aircraft on the
fatal flight.
It's been a problem, and the NTSB, in its report, has
identified--and I will quote nearly verbatim here as I did in
my opening statement--that operators have responsibility to
identify the risk, to take action to mitigate it, and to ensure
that commuting pilots are fit to fly. NTSB also stated in that
Colgan report that FAA should address fatigue risks associated
with commuting, including identifying pilots who commute. As
part of its investigation, NTSB also examined the Colgan
payroll out of its Newark base and determined that 49 of
Colgan's 136 Newark-based pilots--that's 36 percent--had
typical commutes of 400-plus miles from states like California,
Nevada, and Washington.
In executing its responsibility under the Airline Safety
Act, the National Academy of Sciences reported in July 2011
that it was unable to find enough data to determine a
relationship between commuting and fatigue or whether it should
be regulated. Based on that and based on the NTSB
recommendation that FAA should address commuting's relationship
with fatigue, we recommended in September 2011 that FAA collect
and analyze commuting data and determine what, if anything, is
needed.
We don't presume to prejudge the outcome. It may be, based
on the data and proper scientific analysis, that the current
situation is just fine. We would tend to suspect not, but
that'll be up to the experts to judge.
Senator Lautenberg. We can't discuss that in the abstract.
There are lots of jobs, lots of careers that are connected to
being on duty at the appropriate time. And the commutation that
exists in so many instances has been kind of an accepted part
of the job. So it takes a lot of thought before a rule change
to say, ``Well, you shouldn't do that.''
Mr. Scovel. We need the information, sir. We need the data,
and right now we don't have it. We're virtually whistling in
the dark in the absence of that information.
Senator Lautenberg. Are we getting--is that data being
developed at this point?
Mr. Scovel. In response to our recommendation, FAA has told
us that they will survey the existing data to determine if more
data may be needed. In fact, we already have the National
Academy of Sciences report that says they've looked for all the
data. They haven't been able to find it. We believe it's the
FAA's duty right now to go out and get that data.
Senator Lautenberg. Ms. Gilligan, last year, a large Air
France plane struck a much smaller Delta plane at JFK. Luckily,
nobody was injured. But this situation could have had tragic
consequences, and we've seen near misses on the ramp, on the
airfields themselves. And to help prevent incidents like this,
the GAO recommended that FAA increase oversight of ramp areas.
When can we expect FAA to take action on this
recommendation?
Ms. Gilligan. Well, Senator, we're working with the
industry as well. There are some events on the ramp that do
rise to the level of an incident or an accident and, if so,
those are reported and they are reviewed. But at this point, we
don't have a focused program for looking at ramp types of
incidents, because we believe that there are other areas of
risk that we can address more forcefully.
For example, on the flight duty and rest rule, while
commuting is a concern that's been raised, we believe we've
addressed it very aggressively in a couple of different ways.
First of all, the rule we put out does require that the pilot
report fit for duty and determine that, in fact, they are fit
and that they've used the rest period to make themselves fit
for duty. We require that they certify that they're fit. We
expanded the amount of rest time that the carriers provide to
the pilots, again, to give the pilot the opportunity to take
advantage of that rest opportunity.
And another element in last year's bill which we've not
commented on was a requirement you put in place for fatigue
risk management plans. Every airline that holds a U.S.
certificate has a fatigue risk management plan that's been
approved by the FAA which includes education on fatigue and
things that contribute to fatigue, which includes commuting and
other activities that pilots may be involved in.
I think to your point, pilots are like all the rest of us,
and they have lives that they lead beyond the jobs that they
do. But it's very important--as Captain Kuwitzky pointed out,
it's very important that pilots be educated to understand how
they can contribute to fatigue and, more importantly, how they
can manage their fatigue so that they do report to work fit for
duty. So I think we've taken very aggressive steps to address
not just commuting, but the pilot responsibility to spend their
time resting when that's appropriate.
Senator Lautenberg. Captain Kuwitzky, in the New York/New
Jersey region, air cargo is a large part of the aviation
system, and you say that in your comments. Roughly 15 percent
of departures nationwide are all cargo. But you say--and I
think it sounds right to me--that there ought to be one safety
standard for whether or not you're flying with passengers or
whether you're flying with cargo.
We don't want any accidents to take place. And something
like a cargo plane could very well be an important participant
in some tragic occurrence if the pilot isn't rested and
following the rules.
So what are the potential safety impacts of having weaker
standards for some types of pilots?
Mr. Kuwitzky. Thank you, Senator Lautenberg. The passenger
and cargo pilots share the same air space, same runways,
taxiways, the same environment every day. If a cargo pilot is
fatigued, he could be flying an ILS PRM approach just hundreds
of feet away in the clouds on an instrument approach. Land and
Hold Short operations are another area where fatigue could
impair judgment. We also operate in reduced vertical separation
now. So it wouldn't take much for an overshoot, and a tired
pilot could have catastrophic results.
So that's why we're so adamant about one level of safety.
We operate in the same air space. There shouldn't be separate
rules for separate operations.
Senator Lautenberg. Before I call on my colleague, there
are approximately 20 family members from the Colgan crash
victims in the audience, and we welcome their participation. We
are sorry for the problems that brought them here, but we thank
them for their active participation in finding safer ways for
aviation to operate, even as good as it is. And it's fantastic,
overall, when you think about it.
And I now call on Senator Klobuchar.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
also thank Senator Cantwell for holding this hearing. And I
want to thank all the witnesses and, of course, the families
out there who diligently come to so many of these hearings, and
I hope that you see that all has not been lost in terms of the
repercussions and the positive outcomes of your work and that
we've seen some changes to these rules and there's still a lot
more to be done. But I wanted to thank you for being constant
reminders of what can go wrong and how serious and tragic it
can be.
Minnesota is a hub for Delta, and we also are the home of
Sun Country Airlines. So we have a number of--we have a bigger
carrier, but we also have a number of smaller carriers that go
all over our state. We manufacture Cirrus aircraft up in
Duluth, and we also have a manufacturing facility that I
visited which has this incredible--makes parachutes for smaller
aircraft that have successfully saved hundreds of people where
the small plane actually starts to crash--I'm sure many of you
know about this--and the parachute comes up. And I got to visit
that about a year ago.
My focus in past hearings on this topic has been on the FAA
bill and then also on the pilot fatigue issue. So I guess I'd
start with you, Ms. Gilligan. You have a major bill now with
significant effort to implement the FAA on top of the
rulemakings that are required as part of the Airline Safety Act
of 2010.
How do you see getting this done, and what do you see as
the challenges in getting it done?
Ms. Gilligan. Well, I think you've characterized it
properly. It will be a challenge. In the recent reauthorization
bill, we've identified 12 additional rulemakings and as many as
eight to 10 other requirements in the bill that might well lead
to rulemaking. So it is a tremendous amount of work for the FAA
to take on.
Obviously, we're in the midst at this point of trying to do
all that planning. At the same time, there are a number of
requirements that have relatively short timeframes with reports
to Congress due within the next 90 days and 180 days. We've got
our teams working together now to try to meet those short-term
deadlines while we do the planning for some of the longer-term
requirements.
But I think, to your point, what's important for us right
now as well is to make sure we've completed the work we started
on the 2010 bill, at the same time trying to balance that with
the demands of the recent reauthorization. So it will be a
challenge with the resource limitations that we all know all of
the agencies are facing. But we understand what the
congressional intent is, and we will certainly work hard to
meet those expectations. If we run into problems, we'll
certainly share with staff where we're having problems and what
we plan to do to address them.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Thank you.
General Scovel, one of the facts that came out of the
crash, the Colgan crash, was the lack of sleep for the pilots,
which my colleagues have talked about. A report from your
office last year found that FAA needed to collect more data on
the issue of pilot commuting, including how many flight crew
members in the aviation industry commute and the distances they
commute.
Is any of that commuting data available or being reported
by the industry today? And has FAA taken steps to implement
your recommendation on commuting?
Mr. Scovel. Thank you, Senator. The Congress in the Airline
Safety Act levied a requirement on the National Academy of
Sciences to survey the field for available data regarding
commuting's impact on fatigue. The National Academy of Sciences
reported last July that there was an absolute dearth of such
data and recommended that it be collected, as did NTSB in its
Colgan report.
We have repeated that recommendation to FAA in our report
last fall that FAA collect the data and undertake a proper
analysis, again, to determine what impact commuting may have on
fatigue, whether the current system is fine, or whether other
regulatory steps too, needed from the agency or by industry are
to improve FAA's fatigue risk management systems.
The agency reported back to us that it would, again, survey
for available data and let us know by this October whether a
further data collection effort would be required. We think it's
up to FAA now in order to get that done.
Senator Klobuchar. So, Ms. Gilligan, could you talk about
why the FAA did not include the impact of commuting in the new
pilot fatigue rules? Did FAA examine commuting practices as
part of the development of the rules?
Ms. Gilligan. Senator, I'll be glad to comment on that.
First of all, as the report from the National Academies of
Sciences concludes, there are a number of things--any number of
activities that pilots may be involved in that can contribute
to their fatigue, and that the focus on commuting or any other
individual activity may not be sufficient to understand the
risk.
And that's why in our rule we took a different approach. We
took the approach of extending the opportunity for rest so that
pilots now have an opportunity to get the seven or 8 hours of
sleep that the science tells us people need, and we've placed--
so that's the role for the airline. The airlines have to give
more opportunity for rest, and they need to evaluate that, in
fact, the crew is coming to work fit to perform.
We also see responsibility, as the Academy's report
identified--responsibility on the part of the pilots to use
their rest periods to rest, to come to work prepared to perform
the functions that they're responsible to perform. And our
rules require that they certify, not just at the beginning of
the day, but before each flight that they believe they are fit
to perform that flight. And if they tell their employer they
are not fit, then we expect the airline to take them off that
rotation and not assign them to that duty period. So we believe
that we've struck the right balance within the rule.
In addition, because of the fatigue risk management plans,
we also see that the airlines are providing training to the
pilots on fatigue, what contributes to fatigue, how they can
better manage their fatigue, so that they, again, can meet
their responsibility to come to work prepared. And it's, again,
not just commuting. Spending the day playing golf----
Senator Klobuchar. No, I would agree. I just think it's
something unique, as someone who commuted for 5 hours today to
get here and got up at 4 in the morning--it just seems that
people who have these jobs tend to be differentiated because of
the fact that many of them have these long commutes, and that's
something they have in common that, obviously, can make them
tired. And that's why I'm more focused on--it certainly was at
play in the Colgan crash. So I hope you'll continue to look at
it.
Thank you.
Ms. Gilligan. We will.
Senator Lautenberg. Senator Thune.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our
witnesses for being here today as well and for their
willingness to testify.
Thankfully, the FAA does operate the safest and most
efficient aerospace system in the world, with over 30,000 safe
flights daily and nearly 800 million people transported per
year, all of the while this industry continues to grow with an
estimated 1 billion passengers estimated annually by the year
2021. Even though the national air space system has achieved
its safest period in history, we are reminded by the family
members of those here today that there is still a lot of room
for improvement.
For example, since November 2001, regional carriers have
been involved in the last six fatal accidents involving U.S.
air carriers which resulted in 136 fatalities. Of these, four
have been attributed to pilot error, including the most recent
one involving Colgan Air, Inc., in 2009, which we know resulted
in 50 fatalities in Buffalo, New York.
In response to this accident, Congress passed the Airline
Safety Extension Act in 2010, which directs the FAA to update
pilot flight and duty regulation, improve pilot training and
experience requirements, and require airlines to implement
safety management systems. While the FAA has made some
important safety improvements, they also have missed some key
deadlines.
For instance, they should be commended for promoting the
use of voluntary safety reporting systems, SMS implementation,
and updating pilot flight and duty regulations. However, the
FAA has not met key timelines for raising pilot training
standards, implementing crew member mentoring and leadership
programs, and increasing minimum pilot qualifications.
And so I appreciate having those of you who are here today
to share your insights with us. To ask a couple of questions
related to those subjects--one has to do with the FAA last
month proposing--or announcing proposed rules to raise the
qualifications for first officers from 250 hours to 1,500
hours. Included in these rules are two exceptions that provide
flight hour credit for military pilots and baccalaureate
aviation degrees.
And I would direct this to any of you on the panel. But can
any of you comment on the rule, in general, and these
exceptions, in particular?
Mr. Kuwitzky. I'll take a shot at it, Senator Thune. Our
position has always been that the ATP and 1,500 hours is the
minimum, because it produces within the criteria to get the ATP
a certain level of experience that's able to translate into the
cockpit. You can't get experience in a classroom or reading
about it. The only place you can get experience is in the
cockpit of an airplane, experiencing all that goes on.
Now, you can get 3,000, 4,000 hours of experience in a crop
duster that has no translation to our operation. But if you
have a minimum of 1,500 hours and you have exposure in the crew
system, in the airline style operation, you're going to be a
very good first officer. You're going to understand the system,
and you'll be able to serve very well.
Senator Thune. Anybody else?
Mr. Hendricks. Yes, Senator Thune. I'd like to offer my
views on this. I think we're trying to accomplish the same
thing, which is to have the most highly qualified and trained
pilots operating in the flight decks of our aircraft in the
Part 121 environment.
I would offer and like to echo the statement made by Mr.
Voss previously that it's about the quality of the training,
not necessarily about a hard number of hours. I'm a former
military pilot. At 300 hours, I was flying fighters off of
aircraft carriers. I felt very qualified. The training I had
gotten was world-class.
Many airlines in Europe have what are known as ab- initio
training programs. They're very successful. They take
relatively low-time pilots, expose them to very high- quality
training, and the record shows over the course of a couple of
decades they've produced quality pilots that perform well over
the long term.
So while I agree with my panel members that we want to make
sure we have the most highly qualified pilots flying in the
flight decks of our aircraft, we should look at the quality of
that training, the breadth of that training, rather than just a
random number of hours, if you will.
Senator Thune. Let me ask you as a follow-up, if this rule
becomes permanent, how much more difficult is it going to be
for carriers, especially regional carriers, to find first
officers that qualify?
Mr. Hendricks. We think the potential for the regional
industry--we think there's a potential it would be very
difficult. If you look at the requirement for the baccalaureate
degree that you referred to, some of those degrees in aviation
cost upwards of $200,000-plus. And then once those funds are
expended, a pilot is not qualified to operate in the
environment because he's got to go out and get another 750 or
800 hours of flight time. And what type of quality flying is he
going to achieve that's going to make him a better and more
qualified airline pilot?
So we have concerns, even with the exceptions that have
been made by the FAA for military pilots and those with
aviation degrees.
Senator Thune. Let me ask this, if I might, Ms. Gilligan.
On the issue of the FAA issuing the proposed rule for first
officer qualifications, they have not issued one for pilots.
What's causing the delay there?
Ms. Gilligan. Well, sir, that particular rule addresses the
particular requirement in the Act that we raise the
requirements for those who act as a first officer. Right now,
all pilots in command are required to hold an Airline Transport
Pilot certificate, and one of the requirements for that
certificate is 1,500 hours.
Now, there are other training enhancements that the Act
requires. Those we are covering in other rulemakings, one in a
rewrite of our training rules, generally, and that will affect
both first officers as well as pilots in command. So I think
you'll see that we will address all of the requirements in the
Safety Act, but they are in different rulemakings, depending on
what made the most sense.
Senator Thune. What's the estimated timeline for issuance
of--you talk about those proposed rules?
Ms. Gilligan. The first officer qualification rule, which--
the proposal just went out. The statute actually has a
requirement that the 1,500 hours would go into effect on a date
certain, which is August of 2013. So we are looking to finalize
our rule before that date so that the airlines can take
advantage of whatever we build into the rule.
The training rule doesn't have--the overall rewrite of our
training rule doesn't have a final schedule yet. It's quite a
complex rulemaking, and we got quite a number of comments.
We're looking at how we can better balance the requirements of
the rule and the costs that it will drive. And we expect that
we'll have a published schedule for that shortly, and that will
be available on the Department of Transportation website once
the schedule is published.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lautenberg. I have one question, Ms. Gilligan. The
FAA reauthorization signed into law earlier this year exempts
certain NextGen projects from environmental review. Exemption
has raised concerns in my state and my region that there'll be
potentially increased noise as a result of NextGen
implementation.
Now, how will the FAA provide communities with an
opportunity for public input during implementation? Will they?
Ms. Gilligan. Senator, that is an area that I'm not
personally involved in, although I can tell you that we are
reading the language very carefully, because we understand
that--while I think it was congressional intent that some of
the Next Generation air transportation system improvements move
forward as quickly as we can, we understand that it was not
meant to do it without any concern for environmental effects.
So I can assure you--I can promise that we will get back to
you directly and let you know how that's being interpreted to
help you respond to that question.
[The information referred to follows:]
The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 did not exempt any
projects from environmental review. The Act does provide two legislated
categorical exclusions for certain NextGen procedures. A categorical
exclusion is still subject to environmental review; however, since a
categorical exclusion is presumed to have no significant impact, the
review is less detailed and the review process is less extensive than
for projects with potential significant impacts. Since these
categorical exclusions have been enacted in legislation, their
implementation will not be postponed for further public process.
However, there will be an opportunity for public feedback at the time
both categorical exclusions are incorporated in a revision that is
currently being drafted to the FAA's guidance implementing the National
Environmental Policy Act. This guidance is subject to public review.
Senator Lautenberg. I will hope that they could listen to
the language that comes from the homeowners in the area.
Thank you all very much for your excellent testimony. The
record will be kept open, and you may get questions in writing,
and please respond as promptly as you can.
Thank you all very much.
[Whereupon, at 3:51 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Hon. Charles E. Schumer,
U.S. Senator from New York
I would like to thank Chairman Cantwell and Ranking Member Thune
for holding this important hearing on commercial airline safety
oversight. It is of great importance to me and the families of
Continental flight 3407 that the Senate Commerce Committee is
investigating the progress that has been made on implementing P.L. 111-
216--The Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension
Act of 2010--and the work that remains to be done.
I know you are aware of the reason why this issue is so personally
important to me. On February 12, 2009, the Nation was jolted awake to
the issue of aviation safety when Continental Flight 3407 crashed near
Buffalo, New York, claiming fifty-one lives. Since that tragic day, we
have learned a great deal about what led to the crash. Working in the
wake of the crash with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB),
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the heroic family
members who lost their loved ones on flight 3407, we were able to
successfully pass H.R. 5900 in order to prevent an accident like this
from ever happening again.
Since H.R. 5900 (P.L. 111-216) was signed into law on August 1,
2010, the FAA has made significant progress in implementing aspects of
the law, including publishing pilot fight and duty rules. However, much
work remains to be done to fully implement the law. Critical
rulemakings still need to be completed including publishing of final
rules on crewmember training and pilot certification and qualification
requirements. FAA must also complete work on a pilot records database.
If completed, each of these actions will improve the preparedness of
those we entrust to fly our planes. In addition, action must be taken
to address the problem of pilot commuting. FAA has studied the problem
of commuting and has committed to report on this issue by October 1,
2012. I look forward to FAA completing this review and urge them to
implement any additional changes that are needed to combat pilot
fatigue. Finally, the law requires completion of a rule on safety
management systems by August 1, 2012. It is my hope that FAA finalizes
a strong rule and works proactively with industry to make sure that all
carriers are reporting sufficient information.
As we move ahead with full implementation of P.L. 111-216, I look
forward to working with FAA, the NTSB and the Inspector General (IG) to
ensure that our aviation safety programs truly raise the bar for
aviation safety. It is not enough to simply write regulations. We must
continue to evaluate their performance and seek new opportunities to
enhance our safety systems. In addition, our safety regime is only as
good as its enforcement, which is why oversight hearings such as this
and reports by the NTSB and the IG are so critical.
In closing, I reiterate that much progress has been made since the
passage of P.L. 111-216, but work still needs to be done to realize its
full implementation and the fulfillment of our national promise to
provide the best in aviation safety. Three years have passed since the
last fatal commercial aviation accident--the crash of Continental
Flight 3407--but we cannot lower our guard or slow the pace when it
comes to aviation safety. It is imperative that we continue to push
ahead with strong regulations and I am confident that by continuing to
work together, we can ensure that the FAA will meet its obligations to
the Nation's airline passengers.
Thank you for holding this hearing to review the safety of our
Nation's airline industry. I look forward to continuing to work with
you to promote safety in our Nation's skies.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to
Margaret ``Peggy'' Gilligan
Question. What are the primary challenges for the FAA in
implementing a new centralized electronic pilot records database (PRD)?
Answer. The primary challenges involved in implementing a PRD
include:
Initiating several new rulemaking projects;
Meeting the cost/benefit analysis;
Developing a common data standard that will facilitate the
transfer of records from more than two thousand Part 121, 125,
and 135 operators;
Cost of entering a decade worth of FAA and air carrier data
in the PRD; and
Accommodating data from the National Driver Register (NDR).
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Margaret ``Peggy'' Gilligan
Flight Duty and Time
Question 1. Ms. Gilligan, does the FAA's vision of one level of
safety mean one level of safety across all Part 121 operators or does
it mean one level of safety between regional airlines and mainline
carriers?
Answer. The term ``one level of safety'' relates to scheduled
passenger-carrying operations conducted under Part 121, which covers
all scheduled operations conducted in aircraft with 10 or more seats.
All scheduled carriers referred to as regional airlines or mainline
airlines are covered by Part 121 and meet the same regulatory
requirements.
Question 2. The FAA takes pride in the fact that the flight and
duty time rules are science based. What is the scientific basis for
all-cargo operations not being included under the new rule?
Answer. The decision to not include all-cargo operations under Part
117 was driven by economics rather than science. Even if the FAA is
directed by Congress to issue a rule, we must still do so in a manner
in which the benefits resulting from the rule justify the costs.
In evaluating this rule under this requirement, it became clear
that applying this rule to cargo operators was not clearly justified
compared to the benefits generated in this segment of the industry.
However, these carriers have the ability to operate under the new rules
if they so choose.
Question 3. According to OMB's cost-benefit analysis of the flight
and duty time rules, the projected cost for including all-cargo
operations is $306 million and the projected benefit of avoiding one
fatal all-cargo accident ranges roughly between $20 million and $32
million depending on the number of crewmembers on board the aircraft.
Do you agree with scenarios and assumptions OMB used for its cost-
benefit analysis of the flight and duty time rules for all-cargo
airlines? If the economic benefits of the analysis are weighted heavily
towards preventing the loss of life, and all-cargo airlines only carry
a handful of crew, doesn't that a priori set the bar impossibly high
for any FAA safety rules for all-cargo airlines to clear OMB?
Answer. In developing a rule, we are required to do so in a manner
in which the benefits resulting from the rule justify the costs. It is
impossible to predict the outcome of any future cost-benefit analysis
without knowing the specific content of the proposed regulation and the
benefits associated with it.
In evaluating this rule under this requirement, it became clear
that applying this rule to cargo operators was not clearly justified
compared to the benefits generated for this segment of the industry. In
light of this, based on the requirements in the Act that all air
carriers, including cargo operators, must have an approved fatigue risk
management plan and provide fatigue education training, we determined
an appropriate alternative would be to allow cargo operators to
voluntarily adopt provisions of the rule.
Question 4. Secretary LaHood called for all-cargo airlines to meet
voluntarily the standards called out in the flight and duty time rule.
Do you believe this will be an effective approach? Which all-cargo
airlines have made such a commitment to date?
Answer. The Secretary has already engaged in several meetings with
all-cargo airlines to discuss these matters. Some cargo airlines
already have implemented improvements, such as providing improved rest
accommodations for pilots to use while cargo is loaded and unloaded
during night time operations.
In addition, in accordance with the Act, all-cargo carriers have an
approved FRMP, which is an air carrier's method for managing and
mitigating day-to-day flightcrew member fatigue throughout its
operation within the current regulatory structure for flight, duty, and
rest limitations. However, no air carriers have begun implementing the
new flighty, duty and rest rules.
Question 5. Many of our Nation's busiest airports for cargo are
also our busiest airports for passengers. For example, SeaTac is the
17th largest airport in terms of passenger enplanements. It is also the
18th largest for cargo. Nearby Boeing Field is the Nation's 25th
largest airport for cargo. It is a metroplex where both passenger and
cargo aircraft share the same airspace and are in close proximity on
the ground. Twenty two of the 30 busiest passenger airports are also in
the top 30 busiest airports for cargo. It is at these busiest of
airports where I have the greatest concern about the disparity in the
rules for all-cargo and passenger airlines. When it became clear that
the FAA's proposed rules on flight and duty times for all-cargo
airlines would not stand as a result of OMB's cost-benefit analysis,
did the agency consider requiring all-cargo airlines operating at these
most busiest airports to use the same flight and duty time rules as
passenger airlines do?
Answer. No. From a surveillance and oversight perspective this
would not be operationally and functionally feasible. In addition,
during any twenty-four hour period, most passenger and all-cargo
operations operate opposite of one another. Passenger operations
generally occur between the hours of 5:30 A.M. and 11:00 P.M. while
all-cargo operations generally occur between the hours of 9:30 P.M. and
8:30 A.M.
Pilot Commuting
Question 6. Ms. Gilligan, the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) in its analysis following the February 2009 crash of Colgan Air
Flight 3407 in Buffalo, NY, found that out of 136 Newark-based Colgan
pilots, 20 had commutes between 400 to 1,000 miles, and 29 had commutes
over 1,000 miles from their home to their domicile of Newark, New
Jersey. Why do some pilots commute long distances to their duty
stations--is it out of economic considerations, lifestyle
considerations, other reasons?
Answer. As stated in the National Academy of Science report,
quality of life and economic issues are the reasons pilots commute.
Pilots typically live in a particular geographic area to preserve the
quality of life for their families or they live in a location where
they were previously domiciled but have bid to be assigned to another
domicile within the carrier's system.
Question 7. Can airlines benefit if their flight crews commute to
their duty stations? How widespread are long distance work commutes for
the crews for mainline carriers and for the crews of regional carriers?
Answer. As stated in the NAS report, having pilots able to commute
longer distances to their domiciles rather than requiring them to live
nearby may allow the industry to change flight patterns more quickly to
respond to changing market demands. Since, for most airlines, pilots
are not required to live near their domiciles, the airlines typically
do not pay for pilot relocation or for cost-of-living adjustments when
pilots move from one domicile to another. The latest data suggests that
60 percent of the mainline and regional pilots commute to their
domicile.
Question 8. The 2010 law Congress passed required the National
Academy of Science to conduct a study on the effects of commuting on
pilot fatigue and air carriers commuting policies. The report had three
conclusions and made six recommendations. Do you agree with the
report's conclusions? Does the FAA intend to take action on any of the
recommendations?
Answer. The FAA included one of the NAS recommendations in draft AC
117-3, Fitness for Duty, in which NAS recommended, ``Pilots should
avoid planning commutes or other pre-duty activities that result in
being awake beyond approximately 16 hours before the scheduled end of
duty, endeavor to sleep at least 6 hours prior to reporting for duty,
and obtain more than 6 hours of sleep per day whenever possible to
prevent cumulative fatigue from chronic sleep restriction. Pilots
should also consider the amount of sleep and time awake in their
decision-making relative to when to inform their supervisors that they
should not fly due to fatigue.'' All other recommendations require
additional studies and we are currently evaluating how to address these
recommendations.
Question 9. In your written testimony you state: ``In establishing
these requirements, we took into account that off-duty activities do
have an impact on fatigue for pilots, regardless of the type of
activity, such as playing golf or commuting to work. We expect pilots
to manage their off-duty rest to ensure they report ready for work.''
Do you believe that pilot commuting should be incorporated into
airlines' Fatigue Risk Management System?
Answer. There are distinct differences between a Fatigue Risk
Management System (FRMS) and a Fatigue Risk Management Plan (FRMP). The
FRMS applies to operations outside the regulatory structure and a FRMP
operates within the regulatory structure. The FRMP is a statutory
requirement and requires all air carriers, including cargo carriers, to
develop a fatigue education and awareness training program. One of the
elements of this training program is the effect of fatigue as a result
of commuting.
Question 10. The USDOT Inspector General's September 2011 report
recommended that the FAA ensure the collection and analysis of data
regarding domicile and commuting lengths for all Part 121 flight crews
and determine if additional changes are needed or if the airlines need
to take further mitigating actions in their fatigue management systems.
Has the FAA agreed to act on these DOT IG recommendations? Do you
foresee any specific challenges in trying to identify the domicile of
flight crews?
Answer. The FAA concurred in part with the DOT IG recommendation to
collect additional data, by committing to a review of existing
literature and data on the subject to determine if additional data
collection would be warranted. The work by the National Academy of
Sciences (NAS) represents the most recent effort to determine whether
there is a linkage between commuting and safety. The NAS panel
identified neither a correlation between pilot commuting and safety nor
a unique risk to aviation safety.
Since commuting may still be the result of a change to an air
carrier's business model, such as closing a domicile or furloughing
pilots, or due to a crewmember's personal choice, any data collection
represents only a snap shot of the industry.
Collecting data on pilot domicile and commuting practices would be
a daunting task and any consideration of additional data gathering in
this regard must be based upon consideration of whatever data is
already available and the potential safety benefit of collecting
additional data.
Status of Pilot Training and Experience Rules
Question 11. Ms. Gilligan, some of the witnesses here today have
expressed concerns about the FAA's progress on requirements to update
pilot training and experience rules. Where are the proposed rules in
the process? What is the FAA doing to make sure these efforts are on
track?
Answer. The FAA has two rulemaking projects that currently address
pilot training and experience. The Qualification, Service, and Use of
Crewmembers and Aircraft Dispatchers Supplemental Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (SNPRM) is a comprehensive training rule that includes
revised airline pilot training requirements. The SNPRM public comment
period closed in September 2011 and the FAA is currently developing the
final rule. The Pilot Certification and Qualification Requirements for
Air Carrier Operations Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which provides
training requirements for achieving an airline transport pilot
certificate and includes the requirement that all airline pilots have
an airline transport pilot certificate, is currently open for public
comment. The comment period closes on April 30, 2012 and the FAA will
then work on developing the final rule. The FAA anticipates publishing
both final rules in 2013.
Centralized Database of Pilot Records
Question 12. Ms. Gilligan, the `Airline Safety and Federal Aviation
Administration Extension Act of 2010' required the FAA to develop a
centralized database of pilot records, which would include a pilot's
training and experience history, in order for airlines to better screen
applicants for pilot positions. What are the primary challenges for the
FAA in implementing a new centralized electronic pilot records
database? What is the current timeline for completing the database?
Answer. As previously mentioned, the primary challenges involved in
implementing a PRD include:
Several new rulemaking projects;
Meeting the cost/benefit analysis;
Developing a common data standard that will facilitate
the transfer of records from more than two thousand air
carriers and operators;
Cost of entering a decade worth of FAA and air carrier
data in the PRD; and
Accommodating data from the National Driver Register
(NDR).
We have several major milestones in place and anticipate the
Database Proof-of-Concept by 4th Quarter FY 12. The time period to
comply with historical data is set for November 2016.
Effectiveness of Call to Action on Safety
Question 13. Ms. Gilligan, former FAA Administration Babbit's Call
to Action on Safety shortly after his Senate confirmation was
universally well received. It included a number of FAA actions but also
included significant voluntary efforts by industry. Looking back, would
you say that there remains a high rate of industry participation in
these voluntary safety efforts by both mainline and regional airlines
or has interest and participation waned over time as the lessons
learned from the Colgan Air crash becomes more historical in nature?
Answer. Participation in FAA's voluntary reporting programs is at
an all time high. In January of 2011, 69 percent of part 121 operators
participated. Today, over 80 percent participate in at least one
voluntary program. If we break it down further into mainline and
regional carriers, virtually 100 percent participate in at least one
voluntary program and most participate in several voluntary programs.
Airline Transport Pilot Certification
Question 14. Ms. Gilligan, the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation
Administration Extension Act of 2010 allows the Administrator to credit
specific academic training courses beyond those required towards
meeting the flight hours requirements. The Administrator would have to
determine that allowing a pilot to take specific academic training
courses will enhance safety more than requiring the pilot to fully
comply with the flight hours requirement. Would the training courses
considered for credit towards flight hour requirements have to be taken
at FAA-approved schools exclusively or could the courses also be taken
at non-approved schools?
Answer. The FAA has not looked at any individual academic course to
allow credit towards meeting the 1,500 hours of pilot time; rather it
has proposed two alternative hour requirements for obtaining an ATP
certificate with restricted privileges based on overall academic course
work. The first alternative permits military pilots to apply for the
restricted ATP at 750 hours total time. The second alternative permits
pilots who graduated from a 4-year baccalaureate aviation degree
program who also obtained their commercial pilot license and multi-
engine and instrument ratings at an affiliated flight school to apply
for a restricted ATP at 1,000 hours total time.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Margaret ``Peggy'' Gilligan
Question 1. I understand that the FAA has been hard at work to
implement provisions of legislation that I was proud to champion with
Senator Snowe, the Ensuring One Level of Aviation Safety Act, which was
passed as part of the larger Airline Safety and Federal Aviation
Administration Extension Act of 2010. I appreciate the agency's effort
but remain concerned that the rule regarding crewmember training has
faced so many delays. The final rule was initially scheduled to be
completed on October 1, 2011. When does FAA expect to have this
rulemaking completed?
Answer. The FAA is currently in the process of addressing all the
comments to the Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that was
published on May 20, 2011 and is developing a Final Rule.
Question 2. The Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration
Extension Act of 2010 also called for the establishment of a Pilot
Record Database. Creating this database, as the Department of
Transportation Inspector General has observed, will require a number of
years of rulemaking and engagement with stakeholders to complete. What
milestones has FAA set for itself in the development of the Pilot
Records Database, and what is the time-frame for these goals?
Answer.
Major Milestones*:
Begin work on the Database August 2010
--Requirements Team
--Contract with LM
Convene PRD ARC January 2011
ARC Report July 2011
Evaluating recommendations On-Going
Study: Economic and hosting July 2012
alternatives
Database Proof-of-Concept (PoC) 4th Quarter FY 2012
This adjusted timeline reflects the addition of time for an
``economic and hosting alternatives study''. It is not the same
schedule that was provided in the PRD ``Statement to Congress'' in Feb
2012. Once the Proof-of-Concept is complete, we will evaluate the
feedback and determine a rulemaking timeline.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to
Margaret ``Peggy'' Gilligan
Question 1. I am concerned that the fatigue rule allows for
voluntary implementation by all-cargo carriers. As Capt. Kuwitzky
testified today, all-cargo carriers comprise 15 percent of departures.
Those flights interact with passenger flights on the ground and in the
sky. What steps is the FAA taking to ensure that all-cargo carriers
have adequate policies in place to ensure their pilots are not-fatigued
while flying?
Answer. The FAA developed requirements for an FRMP, which is an air
carrier's method for managing and mitigating day-to-day flightcrew
member fatigue throughout its operation within the current regulatory
structure for flight, duty, and rest limitations. All part 121 air
carriers, including all-cargo carriers, have an approved FRMP.
Question 2. In the testimony today we have heard different
suggestions for ensuring that crew members and first officers,
specifically, are adequately trained. Some groups are concerned that a
requirement for a minimum number of hours may not be sufficient to
ensure that pilots have the necessary skills. One suggestion is to
ensure that pilots also receive specific training in skills like upset
prevention and recovery prior to or in addition to receiving their
airline transport pilot (ATP) certificate. How does the FAA propose to
address the need for additional training, initial and periodic
updating, in upset prevention/loss of control recovery?
Answer. The FAA reconvened the Stick Pusher and Adverse Weather
(SPAW) ARC in January 2012. The FAA is tasking the ARC with specific
deliverables on upset prevention and recovery training in simulators.
The SPAW ARC will meet from March to August 2012. We will consider
the ARC's recommendations and develop the guidance material for the
delivery of upset prevention and recovery training in simulators for
air carriers and the simulator training proposed for pilots seeking an
ATP certificate.
The FAA will continue its collaborative efforts in stall and upset
prevention and recovery training with EASA, ICAO, and through prominent
work groups such as the Royal Aeronautical Society's International
Committee for Aviation Training in Extended Envelopes (ICATEE). These
harmonized efforts will ensure U.S. pilots will continue to receive the
highest quality and relevant training available.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to
Margaret ``Peggy'' Gilligan
Question 1. The FAA established an Aviation Rulemaking Committee in
2010 which made recommendations for the establishment of a mentoring
program to help more senior pilots work with less experienced
crewmembers. This group made recommendations to the FAA in November
2010, yet the FAA has missed the statutory deadline to address the
mentoring mandate contained in the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation
Administration Extension Act. Why has the FAA not met its statutory
deadline?
Answer. The rule has been out of the FAA in review in the Executive
Branch since March 2011.
Question 2. When does the FAA anticipate it will address issue a
final rule on mentoring?
Answer. Once the NPRM is published, the FAA is required by statute
to issue a final rule 16 months after the close of the comment period.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Roger F. Wicker to
Margaret ``Peggy'' Gilligan
Question. There are currently six Aviation Safety items on NTSB's
Most Wanted List, including Pilot and Air Traffic Controller
professionalism.
Recent accidents and incidents have highlighted the hazards to
aviation safety associated with departures by pilots and air traffic
controllers from standard operating procedures and established best
practices.
In fact, an air traffic controller at Gulfport-Biloxi airport who
nearly caused a mid-air collision last year recently repeated the same
error. Despite the near miss last year, the FAA, after a brief
suspension, declared this air traffic controller fit to resume his
duties.
While I applaud the thousands of air traffic controllers that
provide safe and professional service to our Nation on a daily basis, I
am concerned that the FAA saw fit to return an air traffic controller
to his duties after a history of multiple incidents that required past
disciplinary action by the FAA.
Can you clarify the standards and procedures that the FAA uses in
its internal review process in such incidents?
Answer. The FAA has internal policies and procedures for reviewing
air traffic incidents and determining the appropriate course of action
for a particular air traffic controller.
Specifically, the FAA closely monitors and evaluates risks and
hazards represented by incidents in the air traffic (ATC) system.
Incidents are required to be reported via various internal safety
management orders. These reporting programs allow for direct action to
be taken by management when it is deemed necessary to address the risks
or hazards in the National Airspace System (NAS). They also allow for
data to be collected to continue to analyze the system for risks which
helps monitor, assess, and identify systemic risks in the NAS.
FAA managers are guided by the Human Resources Policy Manual (HRPM)
PM-9.1, Performance Management System (PMS), FAA Table of Penalties,
FAA Order 3400.20, Individual Performance Management (IPM) for
Operational Personnel and specific articles in the NATCA CBA to manage
performance reviews and the conduct of all air traffic control
specialists. When the operational actions of a particular air traffic
controller are called into question, management will make a
determination as to whether the employee's actions are a performance
issue warranting additional or remedial training, whether it is a
conduct issue requiring discipline, or whether his/her actions are the
result of systemic issues in the NAS that need correcting, or some
combination thereof.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Hon. Calvin L. Scovel III
Flight and Duty Time
Question 1. What is your interpretation of the FAA's one level of
safety? Does it mean one level of safety across all Part 121 operators
or just regional and mainline carriers?
Answer. ``One level of safety'' is a term developed and used by
FAA. Generally speaking, FAA has indicated that this term refers to an
ongoing commitment of regulatory oversight, technical expertise, and
continued efforts from labor and management to share safety best
practices among all operators. However, FAA has not articulated exactly
what it means or how to implement it. For example, as part of its
commitment to safety, FAA proposed one set of regulatory requirements
for all Part 121 operators, but ultimately published new fatigue rules
that only apply to Part 121 passenger flights. Cargo carriers remain
exempt from the changes, and this raises questions about how far ``one
level of safety'' extends. FAA has also indicated that Part 135 air
carriers should expect a proposed rulemaking to address pilot fatigue
in their operations that will likely include provisions similar to the
Part 121 changes. In our opinion, FAA is making progress to address
pilot fatigue, but more work remains to define and achieve one level of
safety across the industry.
Question 2. Is there scientific basis for all-cargo operations to
be excluded from the new rules? Do you consider their exemption from
the new regulations as leading to an unacceptable level of risk?
Answer. FAA's decision to exclude cargo operations from the new
rules was based on cost. However, the Agency acknowledged that fatigue
factors are ``universal'' based on sleep science and initially proposed
to include cargo carriers under the new regulations. During rulemaking,
industry experts made conflicting arguments regarding whether the new
rules should apply to cargo carriers. For example, one carrier
representative noted that some all-cargo operators have invested
millions in high-quality rest facilities and stated that they typically
fly fewer total hours than passenger flights, thus mitigating potential
fatigue. Conversely, a number of labor groups supported the inclusion
of cargo carriers under the new rules, and NTSB stated that ``human
fatigue factors are the same across operations and science cannot
support the notion of allowing longer duty hours for certain
subgroups.'' We have not examined the level of risk associated with
FAA's decision but believe that safety--not cost--should be FAA's
overarching concern.
Pilot Commuting
Question 3. Do you agree with conclusions reached by National
Academy of Science in its report on the effect of commuting on pilot
fatigue? Do you consider their six recommendations useful?
Answer. The conclusions from the National Academy of Sciences study
on commuting and pilot fatigue are consistent with findings from our
report issued last year that examined similar issues. Our work in this
area was limited to six carrier visits, but none of them had commuting
policies. In addition, FAA's new flight crew regulations do not require
carriers to identify pilots who commute or have policies to address
issues that may impact commuting and fatigue. We believe the Academy's
recommendations for FAA to collect more information are useful and will
help FAA better understand pilots' commuting patterns, identify factors
or trends that may induce fatigue, and target areas that may need
specific attention or additional research. The Agency will be unable to
determine the potential impact commuting may have on fatigue until this
information is collected and assessed.
Question 4. FAA stated that it would review available data on pilot
commuting and determine by October 1, 2012 if additional data could
offer added safety benefits. Does the FAA's proposed action address the
intent of your recommendations?
Answer. In light of our work and the National Academy of Sciences'
conclusions that there is inadequate data on pilot commuting, FAA's
proposed actions to ``scan'' for available information on commuting
pilots does not directly address our recommendations. We believe that
FAA should collect and analyze this information so it can position
itself to make certain that commuting and fatigue do not have
detrimental consequences or impact safety. However, until FAA conducts
its review of available commuting data, it will be premature to presume
or prejudge the outcome of this work.
Pilot Training
Question 5. Mr. Scovel, one of the subheadings in your written
testimony is called ``Industry Concerns Have Delayed FAA's Rulemaking
Efforts To Enhance Pilot Training Standards''. You also mention that
with the upcoming advancements in pilot training, it is important for
the FAA to consider how to strengthen its oversight practices of
pilots. Will this require a rulemaking or can the FAA do this with its
existing authority? Will it require additional staff resources or can
it be done through the re-allocation of existing staff resources?
Answer. FAA can use its existing statutory authority to strengthen
its oversight of air carrier pilot training programs. In our December
2011 report on pilot training, we found that FAA was not well
positioned to assess these programs--in part because it has not
prepared inspectors to effectively oversee pilots who have performed
poorly or failed training.
We made recommendations to improve oversight of pilot performance
that could be accomplished by ensuring inspectors follow existing
guidance, and in other cases expanding on guidance to better target
surveillance to high-risk areas. For example, FAA guidance requires
inspectors to compare pilot proficiency checks that they have performed
against those conducted by the carriers' check airmen. However, we
questioned the viability of this requirement since nearly all pilot
proficiency checks are conducted by check airmen, not FAA inspectors.
As a result, FAA inspectors may not have sufficient data to make a
meaningful comparison.
We recognize that there are limitations in FAA's inspector
workforce and that the Agency cannot monitor every pilot. However, FAA
could obtain valuable data, analyze trends, and provide more effective
oversight by requiring inspectors to perform a representative sample of
pilot examinations. In response to our recommendation, FAA is currently
considering whether to establish a method of documenting comparison
reviews made between FAA inspectors and check airmen.
Electronic Pilot Records Database
Question 6. Mr. Scovel, what are the primary challenges for the FAA
in implementing a new centralized electronic pilot records database?
Answer. The primary challenges for FAA in implementing a new
centralized electronic pilot records database include defining the data
to be captured, developing a transition plan, and incorporating
National Driver Register (NDR) records.
First, FAA must determine the level of detail that should be
captured from current and historical air carrier pilot training
records. For example, the Act stipulates that comments and evaluations
made by a pilot's check airman be included in the database. However,
industry is highly protective of these data and opposes including them
in the database.
Second, the Agency will have to develop a strategy to transition to
the new database while also ensuring air carriers receive available
data in the interim. FAA projects the final rule and database
implementation will not take place until 2014 at the earliest.
Furthermore, the initial data available will be limited to FAA data
until air carriers are able to populate the database with their
records.
Finally, incorporating records from the NDR will be complicated due
to the design of the NDR system. When a request is processed through
the NDR, the system identifies possible matches and determines which
State retains the records. The requester must contact each State with a
possible match to obtain the records and then attempt to verify they
are for the pilot in question. This cumbersome process will impact how
FAA incorporates these records into the new database. In addition, FAA
has not yet determined the implications of including State records in a
national database without regard to each State's record retention
policy.
Effectiveness of Voluntary Industry Measures
Question 7. Mr. Scovel, former FAA Administrator Babbitt's Call to
Action on Safety shortly after his Senate confirmation was universally
well received. It included a number of FAA actions but also included a
lot of industry voluntary efforts. Looking back, would you say that
there remains a high rate of industry participation in these voluntary
safety efforts by both mainline and regional airlines, or has interest
and participation waned over time as the lessons learned from the
Colgan Air crash become more historical in nature? Overall, do you
believe that voluntary measures for aviation safety put in place since
the Colgan Air crash have generally been effective?
Answer. Thus far, FAA's efforts to facilitate air carrier's
adoption of voluntary safety programs have been effective in increasing
overall participation. After the Colgan Air accident, FAA focused on
advancing the use of voluntary safety programs as a part of its 2009
Call to Action on Airline Safety and Pilot Training. These efforts were
bolstered by provisions in the Airline Safety and FAA Extension Act of
2010 that focused on safety programs for reporting incidents, recording
flight data, advanced qualification training, and comprehensive risk
management. As a result, air carrier participation in these important
programs has increased since the time of the accident.
Our ongoing analysis of current FAA data (as of January 2012) shows
a continued rise in voluntary safety program use--70 percent of Part
121 air carriers have at least one program, up from 59 percent 2 years
ago. Further, 47 percent of Part 121 air carriers now have multiple
programs, compared to 36 percent 2 years ago. However, despite overall
gains, program implementation has mostly occurred at larger air
carriers, and work remains to ensure smaller carriers are provided the
assistance needed to implement new safety programs.
We have not examined the effectiveness of voluntary safety programs
since the Colgan accident; however, both FAA and the airline industry
have continued to emphasize their importance.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Hon. Calvin L. Scovel, III
Question. Inspector General Scovel, please expand on the discussion
related to FAA's ability to develop and implement enhanced pilot
screening and qualifications at Part 121 air carriers. Specifically, is
FAA on track to issue a final rule that would allow industry and other
aviation stakeholders sufficient time to meet the new requirements
before the statutory deadline of August 1, 2013? If not, what
challenges has the Agency encountered and what obstacles remain for
issuing the final rule?
Answer. FAA is behind schedule in issuing a final rule to enhance
pilot screening and qualifications by August 2012. As required by the
Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of
2010, FAA recently issued a proposed rule that would require first
officers to hold an Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate,
requiring 1,500 hours of pilot flight time. This rule would provide an
allowance for pilots with fewer than 1,500 hours of flight time, but
who have an aviation degree or military pilot experience, to obtain a
restricted ATP certificate. Finally, the proposal would require first
officers to have an aircraft type rating, which involves additional
training and testing specific to the aircraft they fly.
While issuing a proposed rule is a significant first step, air
carriers may have insufficient time to make necessary adjustments to
their training and qualification programs prior to the mandatory
deadline of August 2013. For example, at two regional air carriers we
visited as part of our ongoing review, more than 75 percent of current
first officers did not have an ATP. Further, neither of the carriers
had developed a plan to ensure these pilots would be able to meet the
enhanced requirements by the deadline, nor had FAA inspectors followed
up with these carriers to assess their ability to comply with enhanced
requirements.
FAA continues to encounter resistance from air carrier
representatives who oppose the Act's requirement to increase the
minimum hours. They argue that a pilot's quality and type of flying
experience should be weighted more heavily than the number of flight
hours. Nevertheless, it is important that FAA take steps to determine
the potential impact the new ATP requirement would have on current
pilots, and issue a rule with enough lead time for air carriers to
prepare first officers to meet the new qualifications.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to
William Voss
Question. The FAA is currently in the process of working with cargo
carriers to have them voluntarily meet the new flight and duty
regulations that are mandatory for the commercial carriers. Is it
realistic to expect that all cargo carriers will meet this goal?
Answer. I believe a large number of cargo carriers will voluntarily
adopt the most important safety features of the new rule. The most
important, and overlooked feature, of the new rule is the provision for
compliance through the use of a Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS).
Given the obvious challenges posed by the overnight schedules
associated with cargo operations, many cargo carriers have already
started implementing FRMS. These carriers will likely come up with
scheduling solutions that will vary somewhat from the proposed flight
and duty time limitations, but will be tailored to their unique
operations and will ensure a high level of safety.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
William Voss
Question 1. Mr. Voss, can you detail why you consider flight crew
member pairing a powerful tool to mitigate risk?
Answer. In many parts of the world, experienced crews have been in
very short supply for a very long time. Many airlines in these regions
have managed this risk by paying close attention to crew pairing. They
consider factors such as total experience, familiarity with the route,
experience in the type of aircraft, and experience in the weather
specific conditions and so on. The airlines examine each flight to
ensure that the combined experience of the crewmembers addresses the
risks that the specific flight is likely to encounter. This relatively
simple and common-sense approach greatly mitigates the risks that can
be created by junior crewmembers who must at some point acquire
operational experience. Crew pairing is done to a limited extent by
U.S. airlines but more could be gained by looking at this risk-
mitigation approach more closely.
Question 2. Mr. Voss, do you believe that exempting all-cargo
airlines from the flight and duty time rules represents an acceptable
level of risk? Do you believe significant numbers of all-cargo airlines
will voluntarily adopt the new flight and duty time requirements?
Answer. I believe a significant number of cargo airlines will
achieve the safety objectives of the new rule by implementing Fatigue
Risk Management Systems that allow them to monitor fatigue risk in
their operation, and tailor crew schedules to mitigate these specific
risks. The provision for FRMS is a key component of this new rule, and
makes a great deal of sense for night-time cargo operators. FRMS have
been implemented in many major airlines around the world, and have been
shown to assure a high level of safety while allowing significant
operational flexibilities.
Question 3. Mr. Voss, what are mainline and regional airlines doing
to improve pilot training for safely performing flight operations
independent of any new FAA rules?
Answer. Of course the FAA has a number of voluntary programs that
significantly improve operational safety. Following the Colgan accident
there was a significant increase in the number of Regional Airlines
conducting Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA). It has long been
a position of the Flight Safety Foundation that this program provides
essential predictive safety information about the operation of the
airlines. FOQA has been an international requirement for more than a
decade. The U.S. is one of the few nations that does not mandate this
program by regulation.
Another important voluntary program that is much more cutting-edge
is the Advanced Qualification Program. This program allows airlines to
analyze operation data to identify crew deficiencies and then develop
training programs that target the actual risk that face the airline
rather than simply comply with statutory requirements that were
published decades before.
This data-driven approach to training is a fundamental change.
Traditional regulatory approaches generate lists of training objectives
that rapidly become obsolete and burdensome. These ``laundry lists''
are inevitably a response to the last accident. The training driven by
the AQP system is always targeting the next accident.
Question 4. Mr. Voss, former FAA Administration Babbit's Call to
Action on Safety shortly after his Senate confirmation was universally
well received. It included a number of FAA actions but also included a
lot of industry voluntary efforts. Looking back, would you say that
there remains a high rate of industry participation in these voluntary
safety efforts by both mainline and regional airlines or has interest
and participation waned over time as the lessons learned from the
Colgan Air crash becomes more historical in nature?
Answer. The FAA has always had a large number of voluntary
programs. All of these programs are very good and make a significant
contribution to safety. Participation in these programs among Regional
airlines clearly increased in the aftermath of the Colgan accident. I
believe many of these airlines will continue to participate in these
voluntary programs, because once these programs are established they
prove their value by providing real operational benefit and insight to
the airline.
It is interesting to note that many of these voluntary programs are
mandatory nearly everywhere in the world except the U.S. In this
regard, the FAA is actually non-compliant with international standards.
There are several reasons for this. First of all, industry and labor
forces have much more influence over the regulatory process in the U.S.
compared to the rest of the world. Secondly, the FAA is constrained by
the administrative procedures act which requires them to cost-benefit
each regulation against a history of fatalities. The safety record in
the U.S. is so good, that it is not possible to cost-justify the
implementation of safety regulations that are considered essential in
the rest of the world.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Gregory Belenky, M.D.
Flight and Duty Time
Question 1. Dr. Belenky, what are the fundamental differences
between a prescriptive rule approach to fatigue mitigation and a
fatigue risk management one?
Answer. A prescriptive rule is a one size fits all approach to
fatigue mitigation usually taking the form of limits to permissible on-
duty hours/24 hours. In contrast, a fatigue risk management system does
not set prescriptive limits but rather uses data collection in actual
operations, often in judicious combination with sleep and performance
prediction modeling, to tailor fatigue risk management to the actual
operation in question to ensure adequate sleep for all operational
personnel. A fatigue risk management system ensures that there is
adequate timing and duration of sleep opportunity, monitors to ensure
that personnel make good use of this opportunity, follows up to ensure
that the combination of adequate opportunity and use made of the
opportunity is effectively sustaining performance, and investigates
errors, incidents, and accidents with an eye toward further improving
the system.
Question 2. Dr. Belenky, based on your research experience and the
literature is there any difference in the type of fatigue experienced
by pilots of passenger airlines and that experienced by all-cargo
airlines?
Answer. Fatigue is a result of time awake (sleep/wake history),
time of day (circadian rhythm), and workload (approximated by time on
task). There is no difference in the fatigue experienced by pilots
whether flying passengers or cargo, if time awake, time of day, and
workload are the same.
Question 3. Dr. Belenky, in your testimony you raise issues with
the studies the FAA cites that suggest ``that after a person has worked
for about eight or nine hours, the risk of an accident increase
exponentially for each additional hour worked''. Could you describe in
more depth the difficulties with the scientific papers claiming an
exponential increase in accident risk after 8-9 hours on duty?
Answer. The FAA relied on review papers in reaching this
conclusion. These review papers overstated the conclusions reached in
the primary sources they cited and did not discuss the limitations and
caveats that the authors of the primary sources included in their
discussion of their results. Specifically, none of the data sets used
in the analyses in the primary sources had exposure data from the same
population as they were taking their accident data. Accident risk is
calculated by dividing the absolute number of accidents by the number
of people exposed to the accident risk (exposure). So, in the above
example, to calculate accident risk in the 9th hour on duty one would
divide the number of accidents that occurred during the 9th hour on
duty (numerator) by the number of people on duty during the 9th hour
(denominator). As is obvious, this calculation is sensitive to the
accuracy of both the numerator and denominator. In the primary sources
cited by the review articles cited by the FAA in support of its
assertion of an exponential increase in accident risk, the researchers
had accurate accident data (numerator) in for example the 9th hour on
duty but did not have number of people on duty during the 9th hour from
the same data set. They were therefore forced to estimate this number
from other, unrelated data sets. For example, in one paper specific to
fatigue risk in aviation, accident data was data was derived from a
review of records over a 20 year period through 1998 and the exposure
data estimated from a single two month period in 1998 as self-reported
by a few airlines. Similar to the example just given, for all the
primary sources cited by the secondary sources cited by the FAA,
exposure data (the denominator; the number of people working extended
hours) was not available from the data set from which the number of
accidents was determined and had to be estimated from other unrelated
data sets. Thus, the evidence for the FAA assertion ``that after a
person has worked for about eight or nine hours, the risk of an
accident increase exponentially for each additional hour worked'' is at
best flimsy. Hence, a major policy decision--to impose flight time
limits within the temporal boundaries of the flight duty period--was
based on inadequate, highly questionable evidence.
Question 4. Dr. Belenky, in your testimony, you state that
operational fatigue is the result of integrating effects of sleep/wake
history (time awake, sleep loss), circadian rhythm (time of day), and
workload (time on task, task intensity, and task complexity). In
additional there appears to be trait-like individual difference in
response to all three factors. My understanding is that many of the
predictive models that have been developed use ad hoc data sets. How
can researchers validate mathematical models predicting human
performance from sleep/wake history and circadian rhythm phase? Is
there a need for a FAA approved standardized process for the
verification, validation, and certification of these models?
Answer. As you indicate, what validation has been done has been
done by the model developers themselves and using data sets available
to the particular modeler in question. What is needed is a process of
model verification, validation, and certification that is independent
of the model developer and uses the same standardized data sets in
validating any and all models. This process would most logically be
done by an independent agency or entity with guidance and oversight
from the FAA.
Question 5. Dr. Belenky, as long as a pilot has eight hours of
sleep within a 24 hour period, does it matter if the sleep is
consolidated or if it is split? Another name for the smaller segment of
split up sleep is a nap. Are you supportive of pilots taking naps while
on duty?
Answer. If total sleep time sums to 8 hours in every 24 hours, it
does not matter if the sleep is consolidated into a single sleep period
or split into two or three sleep periods (main sleep plus one or two
naps). Naps add to recuperative sleep time. Again, it is total sleep
time in 24 hours that is the primary determinant of recuperation.
However, splitting sleep into two or three periods is one thing,
fragmenting sleep with awakenings every two to three minutes is
another. If sleep is fragmented, i.e., interrupted by awakenings 3-4
times/hour, minute-by-minute recuperative value is reduced, and if
interrupted every 2-3 minutes recuperative value is abolished, even if
total sleep time sums to 8 hours.
Pilot Commuting
Question 6. Dr. Belenky, the National Research Council report ``The
Effects of Commuting on Pilot Fatigue'' included three conclusions and
six recommendations. The conclusions were along the lines of ``there is
insufficient evidence'', ``there is inadequate data'' and ``there are
no valid and reliable tools and techniques feasible to reach the goals
of detecting fatigues and fitness for duty in pilots in an operational
setting''. One recommendation was: ``Pilots should avoid planning
commutes or other pre-duty activities that result in being awake beyond
approximately 16 hours before the scheduled end of duty, endeavor to
sleep at least 6 hours prior to reporting for duty, and obtain more
than 6 hours sleep per day whenever possible to prevent cumulative
fatigue from chronic sleep restrictions. Pilots should also consider
the amount of sleep and time awake in their decision making relative to
when to inform their supervisors that they should not fly due to
fatigue.'' What do you think of that conclusion?
Answer. The NRC report on commuting is excellent and the specific
recommendation given above is sound.
Question 7. Dr. Belenky, based on your research do you believe a
pilot who commutes long distances can get quality sleep on the flight
to their domicile?
Answer. The recuperative value of in-flight sleep depends upon the
duration of the sleep opportunity, the timing of the sleep opportunity
relative to the circadian cycle, and the quality of the sleeping
environment. The quality of the sleeping environment is a function
primarily of how flat one can lie while sleeping (the flatter the
better) and secondarily of how quiet and isolated from noise and other
disturbance the sleeping environment is. If one can lie flat, be
insulated from sound, and the sleep opportunity is of adequate duration
and placed at a sleep conducive time with respect to the circadian
cycle, then sleep will be of good quality and therefore recuperative.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Captain Carl Kuwitzky
Question 1. CAPA opposes the carve-out from the flight and duty
regulations that the cargo industry received for a number of reasons,
including the predominance of nighttime flights in the industry. The
FAA is currently in the process of working with cargo carriers to have
them voluntarily meet this requirement. Can you give us an update on
how many carriers CAPA represents that have agreed to this?
Answer. As of this writing there have been no all-cargo carriers
voluntarily ``opt-in'' to the new Part 117 rules.
Question 2. Is it realistic to expect that all cargo carriers will
meet this goal?
Answer. Given the fact that the cargo industry lobbied extremely
hard to exclude themselves and their pilots from the rule, I think it
is highly unlikely that they would voluntarily ``opt-in'' under the
Part 117 rules.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Captain Carl Kuwitzky
Flight and Duty Time Rules
Question 1. Captain Kuwitzky, according to OMB's cost-benefit
analysis of the flight and duty time rules, the projected cost for all-
cargo operations is $306 million and the projected benefit of avoiding
one fatal all-cargo accident ranges roughly between $20 million and $32
million, depending on the number of crewmembers on board the aircraft.
Do you believe that the scenarios and assumptions OMB used to evaluate
the rule for all-cargo airline pilots were the proper ones?
Answer. No, I don't. The OMB considered the loss of a cargo
aircraft in isolation. By that I mean they did not consider the loss
including a passenger flight involved either inflight with a mid-air
collision, or on the ground with a cargo flight. Additionally, they did
not consider the financial cost should a cargo flight go down in a
congested metropolitan area.
Question 2. If the economic benefits of the analysis are weighted
heavily towards preventing the loss of life, and all-cargo airlines
only carry a handful of crew, doesn't that a priori set the bar
impossibly high for any FAA safety rules for all-cargo airlines to
clear OMB?
Answer. No, please see the previous answer. If a cargo flight is
involved in a mid air collision or loss of control in flight and
crashes in a congested metropolitan area, the costs involved could well
exceed the costs of a passenger carrier going down due to fatigue.
Question 3. In your testimony, you mentioned that several years
after TCAS was required for passenger jet, it was required for cargo
jets. In the final rule for requiring TCAS on all cargo aircraft, did
OMB perform a cost benefit analysis?
Answer. With respect to an OMB review, I do not know for certain. I
do know that the FAA conducted an ``Initial Regulatory Evaluation
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Determination, And Trade impact
Assessment'' for Collision Avoidance Systems for Cargo and All New
Manufactured Airplanes. This analysis was done by the Office of
Aviation Policy and Plans-Regulatory Analysis Division in September
2001. The docket number is as follows: FAA 2001 0910910.
Question 4. Secretary LaHood called for all-cargo airlines to meet
voluntarily the standards called out in the flight and duty time rule.
Why or why not do you believe this will be an effective approach?
Answer. This approach is to be applauded but it is extremely
problematic. Due to the OMB review, The Secretary of Transportation is
limited in what he can do. That is why we believe the proper action is
for Congress to address the deficiency in Part 117 and to compel DOT/
FAA to require cargo carriers to comply with Part 117.
Question 5. What is your interpretation of the FAA's ``one level of
safety''? Does it mean one level of safety across all Part 121
operators or does it mean one level of safety between regional airlines
and mainline carriers?
Answer. ``One Level of Safety'' is a broad term that we have long
viewed as applying to all commercial121 operations. The level of safety
should be constant regardless of whether there are 30 or 300 passengers
in the back of the aircraft. It should be no different if it is an all-
cargo operation as well.
Pilot Commuting
Question 6. Captain Kuwitzky, why do some pilots commute long
distances to their duty station--is it out of economic considerations,
lifestyle considerations, or for other reasons?
Answer. Pilots commute for a variety of reasons including lifestyle
and economic factors. Additionally, many pilots commute out of
necessity due to being on the bottom of their respective seniority
list. Company's often open and close bases as well as transfer flying
to other bases on a monthly basis forcing junior pilots to another
base. A pilot moving considering these numerous variables is both
problematic financially and personally for the pilot's family.
Question 7. Do you have a sense whether, in general, pilots of
regional carriers on average commute a greater distance to their
domicile that pilots of mainline carriers?
Answer. I do not have any hard data but would expect that commuting
distance would not vary much from regionals to mainline carriers. I
would say though that I would expect a higher percentage of regional
pilots commuting than mainline pilots.
Question 8. How do pilots that make these long commutes typically
address their fatigue?
Answer. Pilots with long commutes typically have fewer flight
options to get to their destination, which would normally give them
plenty of opportunity to get rest in hotels or apartments in advance of
their trip. The pilot members of CAPA have a positive record of showing
up for work rested and in compliance with FAA requirements.
Question 9. Do you believe pilots who commute long distances to
their duty stations represent a safety concern?
Answer. No. Pilots who commute know very well of their
responsibility to show up for work well rested. They plan to arrive in
time to get the necessary rest before their trip. However, among the
regional carriers, the low pay at some carriers may force pilots to
seek less than optimum rest facilities in advance of a trip.
Pilot Training
Question 10. Captain Kuwitzky, what are mainline and regional
airlines doing to improve pilot training for safely performing flight
operations independent of any new FAA rules?
Answer. I do not have access to the various carriers to speak to
this question.
Lithium Batteries
Question 11. Captain Kuwitzky, my understanding is that CAPA is
concerned about the language regarding the air transport of lithium
batteries in the enacted ``FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012''.
Can you explain your concerns?
Answer. CAPA is concerned in that the Act you referenced actually
lessens an already weak standard at place in our Air Transport System.
By allowing a standard in this country to now be set by an
international regulatory body (ICAO), we have further diluted our
ability to manage ``at home'' an area of Airline Safety that needs
immediate reform. Since 1997, UPS Airlines alone has lost two
airliners, one to spontaneous lithium battery fire and another
apparently so based on preliminary reports. There were also two pilot
fatalities in the recent UPS accident in Dubai. There have been
numerous other similar accidents both here and abroad with similar
results. In fact the FAA's own internal study released just last fall,
predicts that U.S. Air Carriers will lose at least five commercial
aircraft, their crews and cargo, to lithium based fires in the next 10
years. We have no idea to what level we may expect fatalities and
property damage on the ground at these aircraft crash sites, but past
history indicates there will be and to us that is clearly unacceptable
risk. CAPA has long requested the Senate mandate an industry stake
holder working group to look at and propose safe standards and
increased protections when transporting these hazardous I dangerous
materials. In addition, we believe the best standard of safety on this
and any rule regarding air transportation is one set and regulated here
at home.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to
Captain Carl Kuwitzky
Question. In your testimony you address the cost effectiveness of
the Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) program and ask this committee
and the Appropriations Committee to reject the Administration's
proposed cuts to the FFDO program in the FY13 budget. In the budget,
the Administration states that funding for the FFDO program should be
reduced because TSA is focusing its ``aviation security activities on
programs that mitigate the highest amount of risk at the lowest cost''
and that the FFDOs are less necessary because other security
improvements since 2001 ``have greatly lowered the chances of
unauthorized cockpit access and represent a comprehensive and redundant
risk-mitigation strategy that begins well before passengers board the
aircraft. How do you respond to the Administration's position on the
FFDO program and could you discuss in more detail why you believe the
budget cuts are ill advised?
Answer. While improvements have been made post-9/11 on our aircraft
including a hardened cockpit door, it must be noted that the cockpit
doors were not breached by force on 9/11. Every day our Nation's
cockpit doors are opened inflight due to physiological needs by the
pilots or to receive meal and/or beverage service and an opportunity is
introduced for terrorists to attempt to breach the cockpit. Data has
shown that it takes less than 3 seconds for a terrorist to breach the
cockpit when the door is opened. Additionally, the cockpit door is
designed to prevent penetration from ballistic intrusion. While that is
an improvement, the door can still be breached with sufficient force.
Having a cost effective solution in place with FFDO's armed in the
cockpit is and should be the last line of defense.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Thomas L. Hendricks
Question 1. In your testimony, you mention how useful databased
safety measures are to carriers and to the FAA. I applaud A4A's great
progress in implementing ASAP and FOQA at all of your member airlines
even before the FAA finalizes this requirement. Can you update me on
how many of your regional airline partners have yet to implement these
programs?
Answer. While A4A does not represent regional airlines, we have
attached slides from MITRE Corp. that shows which regional airlines
have ASAP and FOQA programs. Those regional carriers that do not have
an FAA-approved FOQA program are denoted in grey. 69 percent of
Regional Airline Association (RAA) carriers have established pilot ASAP
programs, and 55 percent have implemented FAA-approved FOQA programs.
Question 2. Beyond ASAP and FOQA, are there other safety programs
that the FAA has not required which could be useful?
Answer. Yes, and many are in place. Technically, the Internal
Evaluation Program (IEP) is not ``required'', but there is an Advisory
Circular that addresses it (AC-120-59A). DOD requires it in their
biennial Air Carrier Survey Program audits, and most Part 121 carriers
do it. These periodic internal compliance audits are a reasonable way
to stay ``up to date'' between biennial DOD and IATA Operational Safety
Audits (IOSAs) that most Part 121 carriers undergo to satisfy DOD
airlift, international codeshare and alliance requirements. In
addition, carriers must undergo continuous data reporting under FAA's
Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS) to satisfy their Certificate
Management Offices. This enables the transfer of data collected by
inspectors (with appreciable air carrier assistance) into the ATOS
database. Safety Attribute Inspection (SAI), Element Performance
Inspection (EPI), and Constructed Dynamic Observation Report (ConDOR),
random inspection, and Dynamic Observation Report (DOR) data are used
to assess air carrier system design and performance, and identify any
safety issues. When many of these programs are fused together with
ASAP, FOQA, and FAA's Continuous Analysis and Surveillance System
(CASS) under the umbrella of Safety Management Systems (SMS), the
resulting processes require air carriers to devote considerable funds,
personnel, time and attention to administration of safety programs
across the functional departments comprising operations.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Thomas L. Hendricks
Flight and Duty Time Rules
Question 1. Mr. Hendricks, to date have there been any operational
challenges reported by airlines in implementing the FAA's new flight
and duty time rules?
Answer. No, the implementation date is still more than a year away.
Pilot Commuting
Question 2. Mr. Hendricks, do you think there is any linkage
between pilot commuting and safety? In general, do airlines encourage,
discourage, or are silent on the issue of whether its flight crews
should commute long distances from their home to their domiciles? Page
24 of the National Academy of Sciences report ``The Effects of
Commuting on Pilot Fatigue'' cites the benefits to commuting for
airlines. These benefits include ``ability to adapt quickly to changes
in flight patterns because of changes in the market; no need to require
pilots to live near domicile; no need to pay relocation expenses for
pilots for domicile change made; and no need to pay cost-of-living
adjustments for domicile changes'' Do you agree with this statement?
Answer. Individual airlines all address the commuting issue, albeit
in different manners, through their safety and training programs, and
via contractual agreements with pilots. The issue is best addressed by
individual airlines. Suffice it to say, safety is the paramount
consideration in any and all agreements between airlines and their
pilots. With respect to the NAS report, the benefits to pilots and
their airlines vary by company, individual situations, and can be
somewhat subjective.
Question 3. Do you agree with the U.S. DOT's IG recommendations
that the FAA--(1) Ensure the collection and analysis of data regarding
domicile and commuting lengths for all Part 121 flight crews.
Specifically, information regarding the number of pilots and other
flight-crewmembers who commute, their methods of transportation, and
distances, and distances they commute, should be collected, and (2)
Review and analyze the Part 121 domicile and commuting data collected
to determine if further changes to flight duty and domicile regulations
are needed or if airlines need to take further mitigation actions in
their fatigue management systems?
Answer. We do not object to these recommendations.
Question 4. Should pilot commutes be incorporated in a given
airline's Fatigue Risk Management system?
Answer. Yes--we believe pilot commutes should be incorporated in a
given airline's Fatigue Risk Management system.
One Level of Safety
Question 5. Mr. Hendricks, does A4A interpret the FAA's vision of
one level of safety to mean one level of safety across all Part 121
operators or does it mean one level of safety between regional airlines
and mainline carriers?
Answer. I think the term ``one level of safety'' has become abused
and outmoded. As we move into the future, Safety Management Systems
(SMSs) will comprise an infinite level of safety. We will be looking
beyond compliance with existing regulations to an industry that
communicates safety effectively across all functional boundaries,
starting with shared safety policies, aggressive hazard precursor
identification and reporting, data-driven risk assessment, and layered
mitigations.
One of industry's prime tasks will be to continuously evaluate risk
mitigation effectiveness as conditions in the National Airspace System
change dynamically day-to-day and through constant evolution. The
regulator's task will also evolve--from constantly looking over the
operator's shoulder to spot non-compliance to observing performance
metrics at various nodes of multiple processes to validate that the
operator's SMS is functioning as it should.
Pilot Training
Question 6. Mr. Hendricks, what are mainline and regional airlines
doing to improve pilot training for safely performing flight operations
independent of any new FAA rules?
Answer. I can only speak for the mainline carriers. Our members
constantly collect data and feedback to adjust and improve their
programs as necessary. We are very proud of our training programs and
believe they are the best I the world.
Call to Action
Question 7. Mr. Hendricks, former FAA Administration Babbitt's Call
to Action on Safety shortly after his Senate confirmation was
universally well received. It included a number of FAA actions but also
included a lot of industry voluntary efforts. Looking back, would you
say that there remains a high rate of industry participation in these
voluntary safety efforts by both mainline and regional airlines or has
interest and participation waned over time as the lessons learned from
the Colgan Air crash becomes more historical in nature?
Answer. The commercial aviation industry is moving aggressively
toward adopting Safety Management Systems (SMS) to meet the design
goals of a rule that will likely go into effect in mid-August of this
year. SMS is revolutionizing the way we look at safety. All FAA Part
121 commercial airlines and FAA Part 139 airports will, as aviation
service providers, have a common safety strategy put forth by the
International Civil Aviation Organization. It will be scalable and
flexible, depending on the size and complexity of the organization, but
it will leverage existing required processes, those that air carriers
have adopted voluntarily as traditional ``best practices,'' and the
results of the Call to Action. I predict that SMS will further enhance
the industry's unprecedented level of safety.
Pilot Database
Question 8. Mr. Hendricks, the FAA is required to develop a
centralized database of pilot records, which would include a pilot's
training and experience history, in order for airlines to better screen
applicants for pilot positions. You heard Mr. Scovel discuss some of
the FAA's challenges in accomplishing this from the USDOT IG's
perspective. What are the challenges from A4A's perspective to the FAA
implementing a database and corresponding processes that will make it
useful for your member airlines?
Answer. Last year, A4A and several of our member carriers
participated on an Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to develop a
practical platform for the FAA's electronic Pilot Records Database
(PRD). While the ARC members made substantial progress on most issues,
IG Scovel's concerns about the feasibility of entering ``historical''
pilot records in a standardized format into the PRD are very well-
founded.
The ARC's investigation revealed that ``historical'' records, which
are estimated to exceed 7 million documents and date back to the 1970s,
are stored in a variety of incompatible mediums (e.g., paper--typed;
paper--handwritten; microfiche; digital, and scanned). Further, the
content of these records varies widely and can include irrelevant or
privacy protected information: e.g., medical and payroll information
might appear on the same sheet with the record of a training event.
Moreover, carriers cannot remove unrelated information as Federal
regulations prohibit carriers from ``altering'' or ``summarizing''
existing aviation records.
Accordingly, the ARC recommended a ``phase-in'' system for the PRD.
Under ARC's proposal, carriers hiring pilots would obtain ``current''
and ``future'' records from the PRD, while continuing to request
``historical'' records directly from the prior employers until the PRD
had at least five years of records stored.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to
Thomas L. Hendricks
Question 1. The DOT IG's report notes that implementation of
voluntary safety programs such as ASAP and FOQA has mostly occurred at
larger air carriers, while it hasn't been implemented at smaller and
regional carriers. What barriers are there to implementing these
voluntary safety programs?
Answer. There are no barriers. There are currently 244 pilot,
dispatcher, mechanic, flight attendant, and ground support programs.
Resource impacts are scalable. A small regional air carrier can operate
a pilot ASAP fairly economically. The biggest hurdle is training Event
Review Committee members to work effectively toward consensus.
Question 2. What can mainline carriers do to make sure these
programs exist for their smaller regional code sharing partners?
Answer. Mainline carriers have been doing this for the past two
years. Our mainline carriers with regional codeshare partners meet
frequently in person or by teleconference to look at trends, discuss
best practices, and encourage optimal safety performance. Two of our
mainline carriers, Delta Air Lines and U.S. Airways, have completed
Level IV of the FAA SMS Pilot Program, and share lessons learned with
their codeshare partners (Piedmont, Pinnacle, Colgan, PSA, ExpressJet,
Chautauqua, Comair, Compass, GoJet, Mesaba, Shuttle America, SkyWest).
______
Prepared Statement of Air Line Pilots Association, International
The following statement is submitted by the Air Line Pilots
Association, International (ALPA), representing more than 53,000
professional airline pilots flying for 37 airlines in the United States
and Canada. ALPA is the world's largest pilot union and the world's
largest non-governmental aviation safety organization. We are the legal
representative for the majority of professional airline pilots in the
United States and are the recognized voice of the airline piloting
profession in the country, with a history of safety advocacy that
extends for over 80 years. As the sole U.S. member of the International
Federation of Airline Pilots Associations (IFALPA), ALPA has the unique
ability to provide active airline pilot expertise to aviation safety
issues worldwide, and to incorporate an international dimension to
safety advocacy.
The ``Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension
Act of 2010'' stands as a major milestone in ensuring that airline
travel remains the safest form of transportation in human history. ALPA
applauds the Senate's diligence in monitoring progress toward
implementation of the safety improvements outlined in this legislation.
We have been pleased to represent the voice of airline pilots nation-
wide through our participation in all of the FAA Aviation Rulemaking
Committees formed as result of the Act. We have commented extensively
through that process and through the public comment process for FAA
Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) covering pilot fatigue and
mitigations for it, pilot training and standards, pilot qualification
requirements, and principles related to the initial and continuing
professional development of an airline pilot. Our formal comments go
into extensive detail on many of the topics under consideration by the
Subcommittee and we would be pleased to provide the Subcommittee with
copies of those comments. ALPA has long said, and continues to
maintain, that the single most effective safety feature of a modern
airline aircraft is a well-trained, well-motivated, well rested
professional pilot.
Pilot Fatigue
ALPA believes that in general, our industry is making good progress
in developing and implementing the safety enhancements set forth in the
legislation under discussion here today. There are, however, notable
areas where there remains critical work to be done.
Foremost among these is the gap left in the safety net by the
exclusion of pilots of all-cargo airlines from the provisions of the
newly promulgated flight and duty time regulations. We continue to find
it unconscionable that some airline pilots will not be afforded the
safety margins that the new law provides as relates to fatigue risks.
This inequity has been created despite the fact that airline pilots
operate the same aircraft at the same time in the same airspace and to
and from the same crowded airports, and that this discrepancy is based
solely on the nature of the payload.
Just this month, the National Sleep Foundation's report on its 2012
`Sleep in America' poll vividly illustrated the risk posed by fatigue
among transportation workers and the particular challenges that airline
pilots face in delivering on their commitment to achieving the highest
standards of safety. That poll is the latest evidence of the serious
risk. ALPA respectfully urges the Administration to acknowledge that
risk--and the compelling and conclusive science that preceded it--and
bring cargo pilots under the new pilot fatigue rules. To that end, we
ask this Committee to pursue an immediate legislative remedy to mandate
that the new flight and duty regulations (FAR Part 117) apply to all-
cargo operations.
In spite of that shortcoming, the new pilot fatigue rule marks
historic progress in what must be an unrelenting commitment to ensuring
the highest safety standards throughout the airline industry. For
decades, ALPA has fought for regulations that are based on modern
science; apply equally to all types of airline operations, including
domestic, international, and supplemental; and enable air carriers to
establish Fatigue Risk Management Systems. ALPA is proud to have led
the effort to move forward on these critical safety provisions in our
role as co-chair of the FAA's Aviation Rulemaking Committee, which made
recommendations regarding this important rule, with the determined goal
of advancing safety. While the new rule brings much-needed science-
based improvements in flight and duty regulations, ALPA will continue
to strongly advocate for One Level of Safety for all types of flight
operations and across the airline industry.
Pilot Training and Development
Another key element of the Act is the recognition that the
screening, selection, training, qualification and continued
professional development of a pilot in air carrier service is a
critical factor in maintaining the absolute highest levels of safety.
The Act directed a number of activities, including the formation of
several aviation rulemaking committees (ARCs). Those groups have done
extensive work to identify industry best training practices and to
develop recommendations for more rigorous selection and qualification
criteria, improved training standards and means to ensure continuing
professional development of airline pilots. ALPA's advocacy in these
efforts has been consistent and universal across the activities
specified in the Act. Almost all of the industry efforts directed by
the Act have been completed, and FAA is in the process of evaluating
the many recommendations made.
To date, we note the publication of the aforementioned long-awaited
improvements to flight time, duty time and fatigue regulations, and
rulemaking proposals for revisions of training standards and
requirements for new first officers in airline service and for
implementation of safety management systems at airlines.
The remaining efforts identified in the legislation are not yet
incorporated in proposed rulemaking. This means there remains a great
deal of work yet to be done, and we urge the Administration to dedicate
sufficient resources to ensure these vital efforts can continue without
delay.
In particular, we note the potential, embodied in the Act, for
significant improvements in the minimum qualifications necessary to
become a professional airline pilot and in the standards to which
pilots must be trained. As our industry has evolved, the complexity and
sophistication of the aircraft, the airspace, and the operations have
increased dramatically. Yet the pilot training and qualification
regulations have failed to keep pace. The FAA has recently issued a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that, when finalized, will represent a
quantum leap in recognizing what ALPA has said for some time--that
piloting an airline aircraft in revenue service is a demanding
profession that requires the highest levels of training and
certification that operating in today's airspace system demands. In
particular, those improvements include the following:
Increasing the minimum flight experience necessary in order
to be hired by a FAR 121 air carrier
Establishing a restricted ATP that recognizes that quality
of training is more important than total flight hours
accumulated and gives appropriate level of credit to military
trained pilots and graduates of aviation colleges and
universities that have intense structured professional pilot
training programs
Establishing ATP training programs tailored toward FAR 121
airline operations
Establishing a requirement for SIC pilot to be type rated in
the aircraft they operate to ensure that they demonstrate the
same knowledge requirements and flying skills as the PIC for
that aircraft.
Establishing minimum experience requirements for pilots
before they can move into the PIC position
Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Parts 61 and 121 have not kept
pace with the dynamic airline industry. Many pilot training
requirements currently in force were first published in an era in which
common business practices, driven not by regulation but by the supply
of pilots and equipment in use, dictated that low-time, commercial-
certificated pilots could only get airline jobs flying small, slow,
propeller-driven aircraft and as flight engineers on jet transports.
Pilots would traditionally fly several years and thousands of hours
before even being given an opportunity to upgrade to first officers on
high-performance jet transports.
Today, it is not uncommon for new-hire pilots to be employed as
first officers of high-altitude, high-performance aircraft carrying 50
or more passengers in highly complex Part 121 operations. This reality
demands that airlines hire pilots with more knowledge and greater
skills than the new-hire airline pilots of the past, but in fact, just
the opposite is happening at some airlines.
Due to economic pressures, some ``regional'' airlines actually seek
out and hire the least experienced pilots meeting FAA minimum
requirements because they are willing to accept the lowest compensation
in order to build flight time and use that experience to progress to
larger, more stable airlines. It must be noted that building this
experience is done in unrestricted revenue service.
It is also noteworthy that before code-sharing with regional
partners began, all flying was done by the pilots of an airline on a
single pilot-seniority list. This practice ensured that newly hired
airline pilots--even those with thousands of hours of military or
civilian flight time--had several years of airline operations
experience before assuming the command responsibilities of an airline
captain. However, as competitive cost concerns increased with the
advent of post-deregulated start-up carriers, the ``legacy'' airlines
began to outsource the flying to as many as a dozen new ``regional''
partners flying 30- to 50-seat propeller aircraft and 50- to 90-seat
jets. The ``legacy'' airlines then began the practice of having their
``partners'' bid against each other to maintain these ``fee for
departure'' outsourcing contracts. As the legacy airlines replaced more
and more mainline flying by this outsourcing scheme to regional
operators, they furloughed hundreds of highly experienced pilots,
effectively replacing them with lower-paid and lower-experienced
pilots.
The time has clearly come for these regulations to be updated to
ensure that a high standard of aptitude, knowledge and training are met
by anyone flying an aircraft in Part 121 operations. One critical gap
in this effort, however, needs to be addressed. New regulations
promulgated with the intent of ensuring relevant experience is obtained
before pilots begin airline service must not allow the unintended
consequence of rendering an active airline pilot suddenly ineligible to
continue his or her employment. Fairness and common sense dictate that
attempts to ensure relevant experience should not inadvertently result
in taking that experience out of the cockpit. New regulations must
include a clear path for currently employed airline pilots to follow to
continue to fly and be able to achieve full compliance with
requirements imposed after their employment began.
As a result of P.L. 111-216, we have seen broader recognition of
the value of professional development, command training and mentoring.
ALPA has long advocated these principles, and the ongoing industry
activity to develop these programs, initiated as a result of the Act
must be supported in order to continue. As we have noted, our industry
has changed dramatically since the era when many of today's training
regulations were developed. That change has affected the training
culture within airlines as well. The days of pilots being ``seasoned''
through years of experience under the tutelage of wise old Captains are
gone. However, the need for the piloting skills developed in that
manner remains, and the need for the pilot in command to in fact be in
command has become more acute. The solution is to replace the
mentoring, command training and professional development which once
were a guaranteed by-product of business models and industry practices
with formal mechanisms to address the means to develop these skills.
An airline captain must have skills far beyond simply being able to
operate the aircraft from the captain's seat. The captain must be able
to organize the efficient cooperative activity of all flight crew,
cabin crew, and ground crew to ensure the safe planning and conduct of
the flight from gate to gate. He or she must be able to maintain
control of situations under adverse conditions and in the face of
pressure to compromise standards in the interest of operational
expediency. The need to maintain command authority has arguably
increased due to the continuing decline in experience levels of other
crewmembers.
P.L. 111-216 accurately identified the need for airlines to provide
specific command training courses for new captains to instill in them
the skills to lead on the flight deck. In addition to basic skills such
as aeronautical decision making and crew resource management, new
captains should receive training to reinforce effective communication,
leadership, conflict resolution, and judgment necessary to properly
lead a crew, exercise command authority, and maintain the highest
levels of safety in the face of internal or external pressures.
The Act also points out the value of mentoring. Mentoring is a form
of instructing in which seasoned pilots share their experiences to help
newer pilots increase their proficiency. This activity does not take
the place of any proficiency training, but supplements it. In many
cases, this mentoring takes the form of captains mentoring first
officers, but could also be an experienced first officer providing
counsel to a new-hire on company policies, piloting technique, aircraft
systems, etc. Much of this mentoring can be informal if an airline
safety culture fosters the opportunity for pilots to interact away from
the actual flight, but can and should also be formalized in the
interest of transferring the maximum amount of knowledge across
experience levels. This training must go beyond just written statements
in the airline's manuals.
ALPA has long recognized the value of a formal Professional
Standards function within an airline's pilot group, and in fact
maintains such a formal organization at each ALPA-represented airline
and as part of ALPA's Air Safety Organization at the national level.
Such Professional Standards organizations, supported by both line
pilots and airline management, are identified in the legislation as a
critical component to enhancing safety.
The ARC that addressed mentoring, leadership and professional
development has made its recommendations to the FAA, and that activity
must not be allowed to stagnate. These are critical cultural changes
that will take time to fully implement and mature, so we must begin
sooner rather than later to implement these enhancements.
Safety Management Systems
A safety management system (SMS), such as referred to in P.L. 111-
216, has been described as a comprehensive, process-oriented approach
to managing safety throughout an organization. An SMS includes an
organization-wide safety policy; formal methods for identifying
hazards; controlling, and continually assessing risk; and promotion of
a safety culture.
SMS stresses not only compliance with technical standards but
increased emphasis on the overall safety performance of the
organization. ALPA has participated in numerous FAA activities related
to developing and promoting SMS, including the SMS Pilot Project and
the SMS Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC). We are encouraged that the
FAA appears to be on schedule to comply with P.L. 111-216 and publish a
final SMS rule this summer.
Use of SMS has been recognized by the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) as an effective means to implement a non-punitive
safety culture in an organization. SMS encourages all members of an
organization to identify hazards and for that identification to be made
without fear of retribution, even if the identified problem is that
individuals' own error. Thus, protection of safety data is an essential
and critical element of any safety program, and especially of an SMS.
Data must be gathered in sufficient depth and detail to support
analysis of risk and implementation of corrective procedures,
processes, etc.
Voluntary Safety Programs
We note that the Act recognizes the value of voluntary safety
programs that can exist independently or be part of an SMS, such as the
Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), Flight Operations Quality
Assurance (FOQA), Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) and Line
Oriented Safety Audits (LOSA). We must point out, however, that these
programs rely to varying degrees on data provided by individuals that
is provided voluntarily with an expectation that the reporter's
forthrightness will be respected as an attempt to enhance safety and
thus the need to protect those data from misuse is critical to the
survival of these safety programs. Processes in place to protect the
data gathered through various need to be strengthened and expanded to
provide proper protection for the data, both within and outside an
organization.
Information gathered through an anonymous, non-punitive employee
reporting program must be protected against disclosure to anyone who is
not authorized to view such safety reports. If sanctions are taken
against an employee as a result of a safety report, that reporting
program will lose participation. Much can be inferred about an
organization's safety culture through their support for employee
reporting programs. Failure to protect data in these programs will
hinder future data-gathering efforts. ALPA has spoken often at a number
of venues urging protection of this information to better assure data
privacy and legal protections. Use of this information for any other
than its intended purpose perverts an essential, much-needed safety
system.
In conclusion, ALPA is encouraged by the progress made to date in
pursuing safety enhancements outlined in P.L. 111-216, but we reiterate
that much remains to be done. ALPA stands ready to continue to assist
in that effort, and we appreciate the opportunity to offer our views to
the Subcommittee.
______
Prepared Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., Director,
Physical Infrastructure Issues, GAO
Aviation Safety: FAA Has an Opportunity to Enhance Safety and Improve
Oversight of Initial Pilot Training*
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\*\ The complete statement can be found at http://www.gao.gov/
products/GAO-12-537T.
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What GAO Found
FAA's pilot training requirements for certification of commercial
pilots are not aligned with airline operations or emphasize skills that
airlines consider important for greater aviation safety.
Requirements do not emphasize training in decision-making,
although this skill is essential to the airline pilot
profession. According to FAA and other stakeholders, the
regulations regarding ground school and flight training, as
well as the test standards for a commercial pilot certificate,
generally emphasize the development of motor skills to master
of maneuvers and individual tasks to determine competence, and
not decision making.
Requirements do not emphasize training in using modern
technologies, such as flight simulation training devices.
Modern aircraft used by regional airlines have evolved and the
operational demands have increased on pilots in high altitude
and complex airline operations. Pilots in today's newer
aircraft have to manage automation, advanced avionics and
systems, information displays, and other new technologies.
Requirements and testing do not emphasize situational
awareness or understanding risk assessment, or provide a
complete understanding of managing the automation of the
aircraft.
Many of the key industry stakeholders GAO interviewed said the
current training regulations for commercial pilots should be revised to
incorporate additional training requirements that would improve the
performance capabilities of the first officer applicants that seek
employment at airlines. Some of the recommended types of training are
provided to pilots when they are hired by airlines to ensure that the
newly hired commercial pilots are competent in a range of training
areas--some per FAA requirements. However, according to the Air Line
Pilots Association, the lack of specific training requirements to be a
commercial airline pilot results in a wide range of initial training
experiences, not all of which are well suited for the commercial
airline industry. To compensate, some regional airlines use various
flight training devices to screen pilots during the hiring process to
gauge their piloting skills. FAA has an opportunity to ensure that the
knowledge and skills it requires of commercial pilots is still
relevant.
FAA has an annual inspection program that includes the oversight of
pilot schools, pilot examiners, and flight instructors, i.e., the
gatekeepers for the initial pilot training process. However, GAO's
analysis of FAA inspection data found that the agency does not have a
comprehensive system in place to adequately measure its performance in
meeting annual inspection requirements for pilot schools and pilot
examiners, which could make it difficult to ensure regulatory
compliance and that safety standards are being met. GAO's report
included recommendations to improve FAA's oversight of pilot
certification by developing a comprehensive system that may include
modifying or improving existing data systems to: (1) measure its
performance in meeting the agency's annual inspection requirements for
pilot schools and pilot examiners and (2) better understand the scope
of discretionary inspections for flight instructors. FAA generally
agreed with the recommendations.
Why GAO Did This Study
Regional airlines have experienced the last six fatal commercial
airline accidents, and pilot performance has been cited as a potential
contributory factor in four of these accidents, including the most
recent in February 2009 which resulted in 50 fatalities. Public and
media concerns about aviation safety escalated as a result about the
level of safety across the entire airline industry, particularly about
pilot education and training before they can be hired by regional
airlines. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is responsible for
ensuring that pilots receive the necessary training and undergo the
proper certification testing. Once hired, all U.S. commercial airlines
are required to provide the advanced training for their pilots.
However, to become a certified commercial pilot, which is currently the
minimum requirement for being hired by an airline as a first officer;
individuals must undergo several steps of pilot training and
certification in accordance with FAA regulations.
This statement is based on GAO's November 2011 report on initial
pilot training and focuses on (1) the various types of U.S. pilot
training organizations, the regulatory training requirements for
commercial airline pilots, and how they compare in preparing pilots
candidates for commercial airlines, and (2) how and to what extent FAA
carries out its oversight role of pilot training and certification of
private and commercial pilots.
Chairwoman Cantwell, Ranking Member Thune, and members of the
Subcommittee:
I am pleased to submit this statement on GAO's work related to the
U.S. pilot training system. This study was undertaken at the request of
the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, its
Subcommittee on Aviation, and members of Congress. Although the U.S.
mainline airlines are experiencing an unprecedented level of safety,
there have been several accidents in recent years involving regional
airlines.\1\ Specifically, the last six fatal commercial airline
accidents involved regional airlines, which account for about 53
percent of the Nation's commercial flights. As a result, Congress and
the flying public have raised concerns about the extent that there is
``one level of safety'' \2\ across the entire airline industry. The
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) cited pilot performance as
a potential contributory factor in four of these accidents, including
the one on February 2009, in Buffalo, New York, involving Colgan Air.,
Inc. in which 50 lives were lost.\3\ The focus of our study was the
initial pilot education and training required before pilots can be
hired by airlines, at which time they receive advanced training.\4\ The
continued safety of the U.S. aviation system depends in part on the
roughly 3,400 U.S. pilot schools providing well-trained pilot
candidates for airlines. This is particularly relevant for regional
airlines, which are much more likely to hire and train pilots directly
from these schools, whereas large mainline airlines tend to hire and
train pilots who already have experience at regional airlines or in the
military.
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\1\ Mainline carriers operate aircraft seating 90 or more
passengers and regional air carriers are airlines that generally
operate aircraft seating fewer than 90 passengers.
\2\ Since 1995, FAA has imposed the ``one level of safety'' on the
entire airline industry in which all U.S. commercial airlines--mainline
and regional--are subject to the same standards and requirements, and
receive the same level of safety oversight.
\3\ NTSB Aircraft Accident Report, 2010, Loss of Control on
Approach, Colgan Air, Inc., Operating as Continental Connection Flight
3407, Bombardier DHC-8-400, N200WQ, Clarence Center, New York, February
12, 2009. NTSB/AAR-10/01. Washington, D.C.
\4\ Mainline and regional airlines provide their pilots with
1)advanced training as entry-level indoctrination training when they
are hired and 2)continual recurrent training while they are employed.
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This statement is based on our November 2011 report \5\ and focuses
on (1) the various types of U.S. pilot training organizations, the
regulatory training requirements for commercial airline pilots, and how
they compare in preparing pilots candidates for commercial airlines,
and (2) how and to what extent FAA carries out its oversight role of
pilot training and certification of private commercial pilots. To
address our objectives in the report, we reviewed and synthesized
published literature related to pilot certification and training issues
in the United States. We also reviewed Federal Aviation Regulations
related to training and certification for pilots, and legislative
provisions that addressed issues related to pilot training. We
interviewed officials at Department of Transportation (DOT), Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), and NTSB. We also conducted interviews
with representatives from a range of aviation stakeholder
organizations, including pilot unions, pilot school associations,
general aviation groups, commercial aviation industry associations,
international aviation associations, and regional airlines. For a more
detailed explanation of our scope and methodology, see appendix I of
our full report.
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\5\ GAO, Initial Pilot Training: Better Management Controls are
Needed to Improve FAA Oversight, GAO-12-117 (Washington, D.C.: November
2011).
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The performance audit on which this statement is based was
conducted from March 2010 through November 2011 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.