[Senate Hearing 112-352]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-352
COUNTERING TERRORIST FINANCING: PROGRESS AND PRIORITIES
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME AND TERRORISM
of the
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 21, 2011
__________
Serial No. J-112-42
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin CHUCK GRASSLEY, Iowa
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
CHUCK SCHUMER, New York JON KYL, Arizona
DICK DURBIN, Illinois JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota JOHN CORNYN, Texas
AL FRANKEN, Minnesota MICHAEL S. LEE, Utah
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
Bruce A. Cohen, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Kolan Davis, Republican Chief Counsel and Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island, Chairman
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin JON KYL, Arizona
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
DICK DURBIN, Illinois JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
Stephen Lilley, Democratic Chief Counsel
Stephen Higgins, Republican Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Page
Kyl, Hon. Jon, a U.S. Senator from the State of Arizona.......... 2
prepared statement........................................... 60
Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont,
prepared statement and August 3, 2011, letter.................. 64
Whitehouse, Hon. Sheldon, a U.S. Senator from the State of Rhode
Island......................................................... 1
WITNESSES
Boelter, Ralph S., Acting Assistant Director, Counterterrorism
Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation...................... 6
Glaser, Daniel L., Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing,
U.S. Department of the Treasury................................ 8
Monaco, Lisa O., Assistant Attorney General, National Security
Division, U.S. Department of Justice........................... 4
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Responses of Ralph S. Boelter to questions submitted by Senators
Grassley and Kyl............................................... 21
Responses of Daniel L. Glaser to questions submitted by Senators
Grassley and Kyl............................................... 28
Responses of Lisa O. Monaco to questions submitted by Senator Kyl 39
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Boelter, Ralph S., Acting Assistant Director, Counterterrorism
Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, statement........... 44
Glaser, Daniel L., Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing,
U.S. Department of the Treasury, statement..................... 48
Monaco, Lisa O., Assistant Attorney General, National Security
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, statement................ 68
Weich, Ronald, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Washington, DC, August 12, 2011, letter........................ 73
COUNTERING TERRORIST FINANCING: PROGRESS AND PRIORITIES
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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:58 a.m., in
room SD-226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sheldon
Whitehouse, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Whitehouse, Klobuchar, Blumenthal, Kyl,
and Grassley.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
Chairman Whitehouse. The hearing will come to order.
Today's hearing considers a central element of the fight
against terrorism: the disruption and dismantling of terrorist
finance networks. I am very grateful that the Ranking Member,
Senator Kyl, is here. I know he has significant duties
elsewhere as one of a certain group of 12 who are getting
considerable attention in Washington these days, and I
appreciate that he has taken the trouble to be here for this
hearing. I will make a brief opening statement, yield to the
Ranking Member, and then if nobody else is here, we will
proceed to the witnesses.
It is obvious that terrorists need funds to maintain their
organizations, to recruit and train new members, and to conduct
operations. To meet this need, terrorists have sought funds
from various sources: states hostile to our country; wealthy
individuals who share their extreme ideology; charitable donors
who may not know that their donations will end up in the hands
of violent terrorists; corruption or even criminal activity
such as drug production, kidnapping, or other cooperation with
international organized crime groups.
Terrorists also have used various methods for moving their
money, including through use of the American financial system,
as well as through informal channels, such as hawalas and cash
smuggling. Terrorists may deliver it into the United States to
fund an attack against our homeland, launder it through our
financial institutions, or move it from so-called charities in
the United States to fund terrorist attacks abroad.
This diversity of sources of terrorist financing and means
and purposes for moving terrorist cash makes the vital
challenge of choking off terrorist funds highly complex. It
demands an integrated and well-coordinated response by the U.S.
Government.
To that end, the United States has brought a sharpened
focus to this fight in the decade since the 9/11 attacks. New
legal authorities provided by statute and by Executive order
have given the executive branch powerful tools to designate
terrorist organizations and stop their use of the American
financial system.
Reorganizations of departments and agencies have
prioritized the fight against terrorist financing to ensure
sustained effort in this crucial task. The Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Department of Justice have investigated
and successfully prosecuted cases of material support for
terrorist groups. The Treasury Department, State Department,
and other agencies have worked to identify terrorist groups and
freeze their assets in the United States and overseas.
Disrupting terrorist financing requires sophisticated
analysis of bank records, meticulous study of available
intelligence, careful assessment of foreign groups that may
support terrorist organizations, and international partnerships
that allow insight into the movement of terrorist finances
abroad.
As I saw in a recent visit, this international work has
reached as far as Afghanistan. Corruption, the diversion of
funds from military contracts, and the poppy trade provide
ready cash for terrorists in Afghanistan and the region. So I
was glad to meet in Kabul with representatives of the Afghan
Threat Finance Cell. The testimony provided today by the
Treasury Department describes the ATFC's efforts to improve the
targeting of insurgents' financial support and to disrupt other
illicit financial activities. Their work throws into stark
relief the tight relationship between terrorist finance and
terrorist violence.
This close connection with terrorist violence is the reason
we must sustain focus against terrorist finance. In that spirit
today's hearing will assess our past performance in the effort
to disrupt and interdict terrorist funds, and it will evaluate
our Nation's readiness for future challenges.
This is no partisan issue. Every member of this Committee
and of the Senate as a whole shares a commitment to disrupting
and dismantling terrorist financing networks, and Congressional
oversight, I believe, plays an important role in ensuring that
we are on the right track.
With that in mind, I am happy that we are joined today by
representatives of the Department of Justice, the FBI, and the
Department of the Treasury. The responsibilities and expertise
of the witnesses here today promise a full discussion of where
we stand in the fight against terrorist financing and how ready
we are to take on the challenges ahead.
I thank the witnesses in advance for their participation,
and I yield to the Ranking Member for any statement he might
like to make.
STATEMENT OF HON. JON KYL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
ARIZONA
Senator Kyl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and because of the
commitment the Chairman mentioned, I will have to depart after
this statement. But I want to make a point to the witnesses in
particular. I really appreciate your presence here and hope
that you will convey to your colleagues our appreciation for
the work that has been done by all three of the entities with
whom you work.
I share all of the views that the Chairman just conveyed
and would just comment on a couple of things, and I will put my
full statement in the record.
Chairman referred to the material support statutes. I am
delighted that they have been upheld in the Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project decision because they are a very
important work horse in our efforts against al Qaeda, Hamas,
and other terrorist organizations.
Since we make it a crime to knowingly provide material
assistance to these and other terrorist groups, these statutes
have helped starve those groups of resources, as the Chairman
noted, and it makes it more difficult for them to carry out
their attack plan and to do business with others. And they
critically recognize that money is fungible, an important
principle here, because it is impossible to give money to al
Qaeda or Hamas, for example, without furthering these
organizations' terrorist goals, regardless of how it is done.
Not only is any dollar given to Hamas' so-called charitable
wing a dollar that can be diverted to terrorism, but donations
to this and other groups also enhance their power and prestige,
which in turn makes it easier for them to recruit terrorists.
So the rigorous enforcement of the material support
statutes can make these groups radioactive, deterring others
from working with them, and ultimately cripple them entirely.
As the Chairman pointed out, finances are such a key part of
this that this is the way to go right to their bread basket, in
effect.
The second thing I want to mention is the Comprehensive
Iran Sanctions Accountability and Disinvestment Act, a long
name for the CISADA acronym. Here we have aimed particularly at
Iran, but there are others as well, but the Treasury Department
is required to prescribe regulations that require our banks
here in the United States to maintain--the banks that maintain
foreign correspondent relations to have an audit or a
certification requirement that neither they nor their
correspondents abroad are servicing designated Iranian banks.
Now, I really appreciate the effort that Treasury has made in
this regard, but it did take nearly a year to draft the rule,
and we still await the issuance of the final rule to implement
Section 104(e) of the Act to address the vexing problem of
foreign correspondents' accounts. And so I want to urge the
Office of Management and Budget to complete an expeditious
review of the final review and get this done so that we can
take advantage of the tools that we passed here in the Congress
and confront these illicit financing activities head-on.
In addition, we continue a bipartisan effort to strengthen
the economic and political tools available to the
administration to confront other illicit financial activities.
For example, Senators Menendez, Lieberman, and I introduced S.
1048, the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Sanctions Consolidation
Act of 2011, which would enhance existing measures, and it
targets the nexus of proliferation between States like Iran and
Syria and North Korea, and I would hope that my colleagues
would consider and potentially act on this legislation so that
we can continue to try to close all of the loopholes that we
have identified that enable illicit financial activities.
Again, I want to thank the Chairman for calling the
hearing, for getting a good group of witnesses here, for all of
those who are interested in the subject that are here. I will
have questions for the record, Mr. Chairman, but I am going to
have to depart in about 10 minutes.
Chairman Whitehouse. Understood and appreciated.
[The prepared statement of Senator Kyl appears as a
submission for the record.]
Chairman Whitehouse. If we are ready to go to the
witnesses, then I will first introduce Lisa Monaco, who is the
Assistant Attorney General for National Security. She
previously served as Principal Associate Deputy Attorney
General, and prior to joining the Deputy Attorney General's
office, she was chief of staff to FBI Director Bob Mueller. Ms.
Monaco has also served as special counsel to Director Mueller
and initially joined the FBI on detail from the U.S. Attorney's
Office for the District of Columbia. Ms. Monaco served with me
in the Department of Justice under Attorney General Janet Reno,
where she served as counsel to the Attorney General, providing
advice and guidance on national security, law enforcement,
budget, and oversight issues. We are delighted to have her here
today. You are invited to proceed.
STATEMENT OF LISA O. MONACO, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL,
NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Ms. Monaco. Thank you very much, Chairman Whitehouse,
Ranking Member Kyl, and Senator Grassley. I have a brief
opening statement, with your permission, and if I could ask for
my full statement to be entered into the record.
Chairman Whitehouse. Without objection, it will be.
Ms. Monaco. Thank you, Chairman Whitehouse and Ranking
Member Kyl, for holding this hearing and for inviting me to
testify today regarding the Department of Justice's role in
combating terrorist financing.
The Department's efforts to combat terrorist financing are
closely coordinated with those of our interagency partners,
including, of course, the gentlemen who are here with me today.
Our common objective is to deploy our counterterrorist
financing tools in a coordinated, integrated way to disrupt the
flow of funds and other material support to terrorist
organizations.
Our efforts in this regard fall into three general
categories: investigating and prosecuting terrorist financing
and material support to terrorism, as the Chairman mentioned;
foreign capacity building and technical assistance; and
defending the laws and regulations designed to disrupt and
punish terrorist financing. And I will just briefly mention
each of these.
Perhaps the Department's principal role in countering
terrorist financing is to work with the FBI and our other law
enforcement partners to investigate and prosecute the
individuals and networks who are engaged in it. Prosecution not
only disrupts terrorist financing networks; it often permits us
to gain valuable intelligence about terrorist networks.
My full statement for the record cites several cases in
which we have disrupted fundraising activity, and in some cases
those funds were actually earmarked to support specific violent
acts of terrorism like the attempted assassination of the Crown
Prince of Saudi Arabia.
Our ability to investigate and prosecute these cases relies
on working with the Congress to ensure that our investigative
authorities, our evidentiary rules, and the substantive
criminal provisions remain effective and up to date, and I want
to thank the members here today for your assistance, and I want
to thank Chairman Whitehouse for your leadership in holding
this hearing.
Although domestic prosecutions are important, the
Department also recognizes that because the networks that
finance and support terrorist organizations are international,
so must be our efforts. To disrupt terrorist financing networks
and bring their members to justice, we rely on cooperation with
capable foreign partners. Toward that end, the Department
currently has a network of 55 resident legal advisers in
countries around the world, and those who are stationed in
Bangladesh, Kenya, Turkey, and in the United Arab Emirates are
expressly focused on the problem of terrorist financing.
We also frequently provide technical assistance to foreign
countries who are drafting or amending their own terrorist
financing laws, and we support and participate in training
foreign governments and their investigative and prosecutorial
services so that they, too, can mount effective terrorist
financing cases.
Finally, the Department, as Ranking Member Kyl mentioned,
defends the laws and Executive orders used to disrupt terrorist
financing. You will hear from Assistant Secretary Glaser about
how the Department of the Treasury uses Executive Orders 12947
and 13224 to designate individuals and entities that support
terrorism and to freeze their assets.
In addition, under the provision of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, which was enacted by this body,
the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Departments of
Justice and Treasury, designates foreign terrorist
organizations, or FTOs. FTOs' assets are then frozen, and their
members and supporters are barred from admission to the United
States. And as the Committee well knows, it is also a Federal
crime under one of the material support statutes to provide
anything of value to an FTO, and the Department has
successfully defended these and other terrorist financing laws
and Executive orders against legal challenge.
As you will hear from my colleagues here today, our efforts
to counter terrorist financing have had some significant
success in the past decade, but we have work yet to do.
Terrorist organizations and their supporters continue to adapt
and evolve their operations, and in order to be effective, we
must work with the Congress to ensure that we maintain our
authorities and capabilities necessary to counter terrorist
financing.
Thank you very much, Chairman, and I welcome the
Committee's questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Monaco appears as a
submission for the record.]
Chairman Whitehouse. Thank you very much, Ms. Monaco. We
are delighted to have you here, and we will hold questions
until all the panel has had the chance to provide their
testimony.
Our next witness is Ralph Boelter, who currently serves as
Acting Assistant Director of the FBI's Counterterrorism
Division. Mr. Boelter began his career at the FBI up in New
England as a special agent in the Boston division,
investigating white-collar crime, violent crime, and criminal
enterprise matters. He has since served at FBI headquarters in
the Criminal Investigative Division, as supervisor of the Los
Angeles Division's Violent Crime and Criminal Enterprise Squad,
and as special agent in charge of the Minneapolis Division,
where he managed a number of high-profile investigations,
including significant corporate fraud and counterterrorism
matters. We are delighted he is here and ask for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF RALPH S. BOELTER, ACTING ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. Boelter. Thank you, Senator, Chairman. Good morning,
Chairman Whitehouse, Ranking Member Kyl, Senator Grassley. I
appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today
regarding the efforts of the FBI to combat terrorist financing.
As we commemorated recently the tenth anniversary of the
tragic events of September 11, 2001, we are reminded that the
FBI's No. 1 priority is the prevention of terrorist attacks
against the United States. The mission of the Terrorism
Financing Operations Section within the FBI--the TFOS, as we
call it--is to ensure that financial investigative efforts and
techniques are applied in all counterterrorism investigations
and to manage investigative efforts into individuals and
entities who provide funding to terrorists.
TFOS carries out this mission through the application of
financial investigative techniques and the exploitation of
financial intelligence. To improve its ability to detect and
disrupt those with the intent and capability to conduct attacks
against the United States, TFOS has undergone a significant
shift in the way it addresses the threat of terrorism
financing.
Rather than solely collecting evidence to solve a
particular case, this new approach prioritizes the collection
and utilization of intelligence to develop a comprehensive
threat picture, enabling strategic disruptions of terrorist
financing operations. Thus, TFOS exploitation of intelligence
not only seeks to identify the scope and breadth of terrorist
financing, but also it seeks to identify the members of the
terrorist network. This enables the FBI to enhance indicators
and tripwires and develop actionable intelligence to identify
and prevent terrorist attacks.
To more fully utilize the intelligence we receive from our
domestic intelligence and law enforcement partners, TFOS
recently added a Targeting Unit. The Targeting Unit works to
identify currently unknown fundraisers and their associates.
In addition, TFOS added a Strategic Intelligence Unit to
monitor threats, financial trends, and methodologies which are
key to identifying possible terrorist financing transactions at
their earliest point.
In May of this year, Hor and Amera Akl pled guilty to
conspiring to provide material support to Hizballah. The Akls
claimed to an FBI informant that they had moved money to
Lebanon and had high-ranking contacts with Hizballah. Amera Akl
told the informant that she ``dreamed of dressing like
Hizballah, carrying a gun, and dying as a martyr.''
Posing as an individual with access to investors, the FBI
informant delivered $200,000 to Hor and Amera for delivery to
Hizballah. Both were arrested after the two were observed
attempting to hide the money in a vehicle destined for shipment
overseas.
In addition, in the last year, the FBI conducted terrorist
financing investigations that led to the indictment of
individuals for providing funding to the Pakistani Taliban, al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and Al-Shabaab. These cases,
among many others, highlight the importance of applying
financial investigative techniques to counterterrorism
investigations.
Of course, we cannot accomplish this mission alone. Our
close partners in these efforts are members of the Treasury
Department, and in particular the Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network within that Department. Working closely with the
Treasury, the FBI conducts significant outreach to our
financial industry counterparts. Through these continuing
partnerships, the financial industry is better able to identify
and report trends or patterns of suspicious activity around the
country.
In addition, TFOS coordinates efforts with our foreign
intelligence and law enforcement partners around the world.
Through all the FBI's 62 legal attache offices, TFOS jointly
investigates terrorist financing matters with our foreign
counterparts. These relationships are key to the FBI's efforts
to stem the flow of financial support to terrorists and protect
the United States from terrorist attacks.
In conclusion, the efforts of TFOS, in close coordination
with our Federal, State, and local partners, the financial
industry, and our international partners, have established an
increasingly difficult environment within which terrorist
financiers can operate undetected. We believe these efforts
have reduced the funding available for terrorist operations and
have made the concealment and transfer of terrorism-related
funds more difficult.
As the terrorists adapt their methods to raise and transfer
funds, the FBI--and its partners--has also adapted its efforts
and its capacity to detect and disrupt these financial
networks. To identify new and emerging networks and currently
unknown subjects, TFOS systematically tracks and analyzes
intelligence to guide terrorist financing investigations.
TFOS's cooperative efforts with our Government and private
sector partners ensures an ongoing and coordinated approach to
terrorist financing to prevent future terrorist attacks against
the United States.
Chairman Whitehouse, Ranking Member Kyl, I appreciate the
opportunity to come before you today to share the work that the
FBI is engaged in to address terrorist financing and
counterterrorism in this country and around the globe, and I am
happy to answer any questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Boelter appears as a
submission for the record.]
Chairman Whitehouse. Thank you, Mr. Boelter. I appreciate
your testimony.
Our final witness on the panel is Daniel Glaser, who is the
Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing at the Department
of Treasury's Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence.
He has also served as Treasury's Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes. In addition to his
prior roles at the Treasury Department, he has served as an
attorney for the United States Secret Service and as the head
of the U.S. delegation to the Financial Action Task Force, an
intergovernmental agency charged with formulating policies to
combat international money laundering and terrorism financing.
Mr. Glaser, welcome.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL L. GLASER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
TERRORIST FINANCING, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Mr. Glaser. Thank you, Chairman Whitehouse, for the
opportunity to discuss our efforts to combat terrorist
financing.
In the decade since the tragic attacks of September 11th,
the U.S. Government has worked toward developing a
comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to combat terrorist
financing. Critical to this evolution has been the recognition
that the Treasury Department--and the financial tools it
wields--is central to our counterterrorism efforts and, indeed,
to our National security as a whole.
Money is vital to terrorist organizations. The monetary
cost of executing an individual attack may be low, but
terrorists require substantial sums to recruit, train, and
sustain operatives, procure weapons, compensate families of so-
called martyrs, and garner support from local populations. This
need to raise and move funds is a significant vulnerability
that can be exploited. The financial networks of terrorist
organizations are susceptible to identification and disruption.
It is our efforts to do just this that I would like to discuss
today.
Prior to 9/11, the U.S. national security community had yet
to grasp the full significance of the terrorist threat. Not
surprisingly, terrorist financing was not high on the national
security agenda, but that changed quickly 10 years ago. A
galvanized U.S. Government recognized the importance of
attacking terrorists' financial infrastructure as a critical
component of an effective counterterrorism strategy.
Treasury, armed with new authorities to freeze terrorists'
assets, played a significant role in this response. We
designated various terrorist-affiliated entities, crippling the
financial nodes of al Qaeda, Hamas, and other foreign terrorist
organizations. Today I can confidently say that the U.S. no
longer remains fertile ground for terrorist fundraising.
Despite our initial success, though, we recognized that
Treasury's full potential remained bridled without a more
comprehensive strategic approach and the institutional
framework to implement it. Accordingly, in 2004 the Treasury
Department, working with Congress, created the Office of
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, or TFI. The creation of
TFI, the first office of its kind in the world, was a
revolutionary development in the national security arena, and
in less than 8 years, TFI has had a dramatic impact on our
National security and become a fixture within our foreign
policy establishment. Our mission is clear: Marshal the
Treasury Department's policy, enforcement, regulatory, and
intelligence functions to sever the lines of financial support
to international terrorists, WMD proliferators, narcotics
traffickers, organized criminals, and other threats to our
National security.
We advance this goal in many ways. For example, we work
through multilateral bodies such as the Financial Action Task
Force to establish a global framework that promotes
transparency and which enables us to identify and address the
various forms of terrorist financing vulnerabilities and
threats.
We have also sought to mitigate the risks posed by hawalas,
charities, cash couriers, and new payment methods. And we have
systematically undermined terrorist financial networks by
imposing targeted financial measures.
We have coupled these instruments with sustained outreach
to the international and private sectors seeking to freeze
terrorist groups out of the international financial system. Of
course, in achieving these successes, cooperation from foreign
counterparts is essential. Our engagement with Saudi Arabia
exemplifies this approach. Though our partnership in combating
terrorist financing in earlier years with Saudi Arabia had not
always been good, sustained engagement over the years has
produced strong progress. Moving forward, we must continue to
build on this relationship and to encourage other regional
players, in particular Qatar and Kuwait, to follow Saudi
Arabia's lead in prioritizing the fight against terrorist
financing.
Of course, considerable challenges remain ahead. We are, as
Secretary of Defense Panetta has said, within reach of
defeating al Qaeda. Their financial situation is indeed dire,
and our goal is to make it worse.
But some pillars of financial and logistical support remain
intact. Even as we make progress against core al Qaeda, we are
finding that with the rise of al Qaeda affiliates, the
terrorist financing threat has changed and, in some ways,
become more intractable. Issues such as kidnapping for ransom
and other terrorist groups that rely on non-traditional sources
of funding, such as Al-Shabaab and Hamas, will require
innovative approaches. We must continue to work with our
interagency partners, the private sector, and our international
counterparts to advance our mission. With the comprehensive
strategic approach I have outlined here today, we will move
forward to meet these challenges.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to answering
any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Glaser appears as a
submission for the record.]
Chairman Whitehouse. Thank you very much, Mr. Glaser. Let
me turn right away to your observation that some pillars of
financial and logistical support for terrorist organizations
remain intact. What are those pillars? And in what way are they
resistant to our previous efforts? What do we need to do to
bring them down?
Mr. Glaser. Well, thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman.
I think we have made--we have to be vigilant across the board
on every way terrorists raise funds and move funds, and all the
ways that they have traditionally raised funds and all the ways
they have traditionally moved funds, all the ways they continue
to do so. But I think we have had a lot of success and made a
lot of progress on the more traditional ways of fundraising
through charities, moving funds through the formal financial
sector, we have made a lot of progress, and I think we really
have made it, as I like to say, costlier, riskier, less
efficient for terrorist organizations to move their funds--
raise funds and move their funds around the world.
One of the results of that success has been to transform
the problem, and one of the things we have seen, particularly,
as I said in my opening statement, with the reliance--with the
emergence of not just al Qaeda core but al Qaeda affiliates,
groups like al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula, Al-Shabaab, is an increased reliance on
localized criminal activities to support themselves--in
particular, with respect to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,
kidnapping for ransom from which they derive substantial sums,
so much so that it really-you know, they could survive on it.
So while we need to continue to sort of look at the deep-
pocket donors and look at the ways that money moves into those
regions, it is also important that we come up with new ways of
thinking about how a group like AQIM is raising their funds.
I think it is important that we engage with our partners in
Europe, for example, on the very substantial ransom sums that
are paid and come up with a common view and a common approach
on ransom sums that are paid. That would be something that I
think we need to focus on.
There are other ways these groups raise funds. You have
groups that are controlling territory, so you have Al-Shabaab,
not an al Qaeda group, but Hamas who could raise funds the way
the U.S. Government does through taxation. And, again, that
presents challenges, and how do we target those financial
systems? How do we find a way in to doing that? You know, these
are some of the challenges that we face.
Chairman Whitehouse. The more geographically local ones
provide new types of challenges.
Mr. Glaser. One of the successes has been, you know, you
smash the center, you make it harder for them to exert command
and control and deliver potentially devastating attacks. One of
the consequences of that that you have to face is a more
dispersed threat with its own sources of financing, which are
in some ways smaller--and that is a good thing--and harder to
sort of coordinate as an overall global strategy. That is a
good thing. And in a lot of ways poor, and that is a good
thing. But, you know, then you have your new challenges of
going after the localized ways that they raise funds.
Chairman Whitehouse. Ms. Monaco, tell me a little bit about
how we are doing against the hawala networks. These are
financing networks that have lasted for hundreds, perhaps even
thousands of years, supporting the trading communities in that
area of the world, and they have developed an informal means of
operating that does not require reporting and is hard to
penetrate. Given that, what are the techniques you find that we
are using that have generated some success, and can we be
optimistic about encouraging further success against them?
Ms. Monaco. Well, Chairman Whitehouse, I think we have had
some success, as you alluded to, and as Assistant Secretary
Glaser's testimony discusses, we have also made some headway in
ensuring that informal networks like hawalas are subject to
registration requirements and trying to build in some of the
same requirements that surround the formal system into the more
informal system. So I think that is a success and that is a
point of progress that we can recognize.
I think we have been successful in some cases, and some of
the statements submitted for the record recognize this as well.
I would point to the Younis case, an individual who pled guilty
just earlier this summer in New York. I think that is an
example of the great efforts of the FBI and the Assistant U.S.
Attorneys in New York in focusing on all aspects of a
particular threat and following each thread, including the
financial thread, and the defendant in that case pled guilty to
operating an unlicensed money-transmitting operation in which
eventually some of that money found its way to Faisal Shahzad,
the plotter of the attempted car bomb, of course, in Times
Square. So that is an instance where FBI investigators very
diligently followed every aspect of that operation, including
where the funding was coming from, and in that case identified
the use of the informal money-transmitting system and disrupted
that operation going on both here and in Pakistan.
So I think we have had some successes. I think the Treasury
Department's efforts to impose some of the requirements that
exist in the formal system onto the informal system I think is
a tremendous step in the right direction.
Chairman Whitehouse. Very good. Thank you.
Let me turn to Senator Grassley and then, in order of
arrival, Senator Blumenthal and Senator Klobuchar. Senator
Grassley.
Senator Grassley. I probably will not have an opportunity
to ask all of you questions because I can only stay for one
round, but I appreciate it and I will submit some questions for
answer in writing. I will start with Ms. Monaco.
I sent a letter to the Department of Justice requesting
information about the non-prosecution agreement entered into
with the Islamic Investment of the Gulf Limited. I think it was
an unusual move when the Department issued no press release
about this agreement. The agreement was the conclusion of an
investigation that moved around the Department from the
National Security Division to the Criminal Division's Terrorism
Financing Section to the Tax Division. As of today I have not
had a response to the letter because--well, you know, I just
kind of expect answers to my letters, but maybe it is a little
soon to get them, so I am going to ask you. But I hope that we
can get answers because I want to make sure that the Department
is not trying to hide something.
The silence on this issue of not issuing a press release I
think kind of runs afoul with the claim that this
administration is going to be very transparent.
So what role did the National Security Division play in
this investigation and in the non-prosecution agreement with
the Islamic Investment?
Ms. Monaco. Senator Grassley, I do understand that the
Department has received your letter, and I was informed about
that in preparation for this hearing, and I will certainly take
back the urgency with which the Senator has expressed a desire
to get a response to that and ensure that we get a prompt
response, that the Department gets a prompt response to you.
With respect to the National Security Division's
involvement, I am not aware of a particular involvement in that
matter, but, again, I am happy to go back and review that.
Senator Grassley. Then you cannot answer the question who
were the individuals at the Department that approved of the
non-prosecution agreement? Or that is probably separate so you
probably cannot answer that.
Ms. Monaco. I cannot, Senator.
Senator Grassley. You can answer this: At any time did you
offer an opinion on it?
Ms. Monaco. I did not, Senator, no.
Senator Grassley. OK. There are reported connections
between the Islamic Investment and known terrorist groups.
Surely the National Security Division would investigate those
connections, wouldn't they? I mean just as a matter of
procedure.
Ms. Monaco. Senator, I would not want to speculate in this
particular case. Again, I am not aware of what involvement, if
any, the Division had in that matter, but I would be happy to
go back and take a look at that, and we will ensure that we try
and get a response to your letter promptly.
Senator Grassley. Well, it would seem to me like they would
have something to do with it. You may not know specifically
what they had to do with it, but they surely had something to
do with it.
Ms. Monaco. Again, Senator, I am not aware, and I would not
want to speculate to the Committee.
Senator Grassley. You can answer this question: How much
money did the non-prosecution agreement involve?
Ms. Monaco. I do not know.
Senator Grassley. Well, can you tell us why they did not
publicize the agreement when they normally would?
Ms. Monaco. I am not aware of what the practice--if it
would be normal practice to disclose that information, Senator.
Senator Grassley. Well, would it be possibly because the
Department got a bad deal and they are trying to hide it?
Ms. Monaco. Again, Senator, I am not sure if it is, in
fact, normal practice to disclose the terms of any particular
settlement agreement in that regard.
Senator Grassley. In keeping with the spirit of openness
and transparency that the President and the Attorney General
promote, will you provide my office with a copy of the non-
prosecution agreement with the Islamic Investment as well as
answers to my questions contained in the letter of September
7th?
Ms. Monaco. Senator, I will absolutely go back and ensure
that we get a response to your letter and provide whatever
information is appropriate to provide to you and to the
Committee.
Senator Grassley. Could you tell me when I could expect an
answer to that letter?
Ms. Monaco. I would not want to overpromise, Senator, but,
again, I would certainly go back and make sure that we do get a
prompt response.
Senator Grassley. As far as you know, there would not be
any national security implications about releasing the
information I have asked for?
Ms. Monaco. I am not----
Senator Grassley. I mean, after all, it was a grand jury
situation that was investigated.
Ms. Monaco. I am not aware of what the national security
implications would be. It certainly would not be outside the
realm of possibility that there would be national security
implications in a grand jury investigation. But, again, I would
not want to speculate.
Senator Grassley. I had my staff ask the Justice Department
yesterday whether the matter involved national security and if
that was the reason for silence on the non-prosecution
agreement. The Office of Legislative Affairs did not answer my
staff's question despite notice that I would bring it up today.
We have the capacity to review classified information, and if
there is something about this that involves national security,
since I have the capacity for classified information, I would
urge you to use those channels to provide me with the
information.
Ms. Monaco. I understand, Senator.
Senator Grassley. OK. And then I will stop with this: On a
related matter, I understand that, despite the hiring freeze at
the Justice Department, more staff have been hired for the
National Security Division. How many people do you have in the
National Security Division Policy Office? How many were hired
since the hiring freeze? And who approved the hires?
Ms. Monaco. Senator, the Department is under a hiring
freeze, as you know, given the current budget situation. There
are, however, exemptions that have been granted based on--to
that hiring freeze where Department components can demonstrate
that they have the funding and the allowable positions that
have been provided by the Congress. I would have to double-
check on the precise number, but I would say in the
neighborhood of 30 individuals in the Law and Policy Office.
Senator Grassley. OK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Whitehouse. Thank you very much, Senator Grassley.
The next questioner will be Senator Blumenthal of
Connecticut, who has a distinguished career in law enforcement,
as you all well know.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Chairman Whitehouse, for your distinguished career in law
enforcement and for holding this hearing.
I think that we are all gratified by the progress that has
been made in this area, particularly in combating the financial
institutions' potential complicity in these transactions that
involve financing terrorism. And I recognize that progress has
been made in that area, and I want to thank each of you and the
people who work with you for your continuing work and your
accomplishments.
All three of you, I believe, have made reference to the
guilty plea by Mohammad Younis and the information that was
developed about the sources of funding for the Shahzad plot.
And apparently a major source was in Pakistan, possibly with
the complicity of the financial institutions there, possibly
with the knowledge of officials in Pakistan. I wonder if you
could comment on what information has been developed about the
Pakistanis' involvement in financing terrorist organizations
and what steps can be taken to combat it.
Ms. Monaco. I will just comment briefly on that, Senator
Blumenthal. First I want to make clear that in the Younis case
that individual was prosecuted and has pled guilty to operating
an unlicensed money-transmitting operation, which I mentioned
previously. He was not witting in the guilty plea--in that case
did not demonstrate that he was witting of the purpose of those
funds but, rather, the unlicensed transmission operation. So I
just wanted to make that clear for the record.
As to development of information with regard to the
Pakistani end of that operation, I do not have anything that I
would be able to offer to the Committee. I am not sure about my
FBI colleague.
Mr. Boelter. Yes, Senator, I would just say generally that
one of our great challenges is a lack of visibility in the
financial institutions and entities overseas. That is a
challenge, I would not limit that to Pakistan, but globally.
With respect to this case in particular, I think I would
defer to speak to that issue in a more----
Senator Blumenthal. In a different setting.
Mr. Boelter. Yes.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, I appreciate the reasons for your
preference, although your testimony does say, and I am quoting,
``Shahzad advised that the funding was arranged in Pakistan by
associates of the . . . (TTP).'' And I take it from that fairly
general statement that perhaps a follow-up in a different
setting would be worthwhile because I would be very interested
in this instance and others where Pakistan perhaps played a
part with degrees of knowledge and intention that may be open
to question about the terrorist financing.
And let me follow up with you in another related area. What
other countries would you say would bear scrutiny and perhaps
could cooperate more fully in making their systems more
transparent and, therefore, aid us in tracking down and
stopping this kind of financing?
Mr. Boelter. Well, Senator, I think I would defer to my
Treasury colleague to speak on that point, if I may, Senator.
Senator Blumenthal. Sure.
Mr. Glaser. Thank you, Senator. We spend a lot of time at
the Treasury Department on precisely this issue, trying to work
with other countries on what should be the international
standards for anti-money-laundering and counterterrorist
financing and then putting systems in place to ensure the
countries are actually taking steps to comply with those
standards. And we do that through an organization called the
Financial Action Task Force.
The Financial Action Task Force has what is called the FATF
40+9, which is the 40 recommendations on money laundering, 9
special recommendations on terrorist financing, and taken
together they represent a comprehensive framework for combating
money laundering and terrorist financing. It includes criminal
laws, regulatory laws, and international cooperation.
And then we have worked with the IMF and the World Bank and
FATF to make sure that every country or virtually every
country--North Korea, for example, has not been reviewed, but
virtually every country in the world is subject to a very
rigorous review process.
FATF has on its website identified the countries which in
particular have performed very poorly on those. Pakistan is one
of those countries that has been so identified by the FATF, and
there are about 25 countries. I could tell you a few. I cannot
rattle them all off, off the top of my head, but it is publicly
available on the FATF website which countries still have a lot
of work to do. I am just getting this basic structural
framework in place.
Senator Blumenthal. I know that that information is
available publicly, and just one last question because my time
is about to expire. Does that list coincide with the list of
countries that are actually responsible or without perhaps the
knowledge of the governments themselves, does that list of the
least transparent coincide with the list of countries that also
are the most complicit, perhaps unwittingly?
Mr. Glaser. Exactly, and that is----
Senator Blumenthal. I am not framing the question very
artfully, but you get the----
Mr. Glaser. I know exactly what you are asking. I was about
to make that distinction as well. That group of countries that
I was mentioning are countries that need work on their basic
framework, on their basic regulatory structure, their basic
legal structure, and a lot of them are working to put those in
place.
Then you get to the more difficult question of which
countries are actually implementing it, which countries are
actually doing what they need to do.
For example, Kuwait is a country that does not even have a
terrorist financing law, the only country in the gulf that does
not have a terrorist financing law. Kuwait is a country that
has some work to do.
Qatar is making progress, but Qatar has a lot of work to do
in implementing its terrorist financing laws, and I am going to
be visiting Qatar and Kuwait later this month or the beginning
of October--the end of September or beginning of October, to
talk to them about the steps that they still need to take in
order to make progress.
And then, of course, you have your state sponsors,
countries like Iran, which we have recently designated an al
Qaeda financial support network supported by Iran. Iran is the
chief donor to Hizballah, to Hamas. So, I mean, you know, once
you get to the state sponsorship arena, it is a whole different
level.
So as you point out, I would say there are sort of three
levels: the countries that still need work on a framework, the
countries that simply do not have the political will or need
more political will to implement, and then the countries that
are actually actively part of the problem.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Whitehouse. Senator Klobuchar.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much.
I first wanted to welcome the Assistant Director, Ralph
Boelter. He was a special agent in charge of the Minneapolis
office and did an amazing job with our FBI there, and we have a
very close law enforcement community in Minnesota. My favorite
story of that was the Secret Service once had a holiday party,
and I will never forget the invitation: ``You're invited to the
Secret Service Open House,'' which I thought was sort of funny.
And when we got there, they would not tell you how many agents
worked there because it was a secret. But I have really enjoyed
working with you, and I welcome you here today.
Mr. Boelter. Likewise, Senator. Thank you.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you.
I wanted to first start and follow up a little with you,
Assistant Secretary Glaser. You were talking with Senator
Blumenthal about some of the work that you are doing. I was
just curious, from sort of a bigger picture question, what are
the most common--like the two or three most common forms of
fundraising you are seeing to finance these terrorist entities?
And I know that in your testimony you talk about how it has
become more intractable, more difficult to find. So what are
you seeing now?
Mr. Glaser. Thank you for the question. As I said before,
all the methodologies that we have traditionally seen for
raising and moving terrorist funds we are still seeing. So
terrorist organizations continue to receive money from deep-
pocket donors in the gulf. They continue to receive money
through charities. They continue to move money through both the
informal and formal financial sectors. So all of that continues
to go on, even though we continue to make tremendous progress
in those areas. And I would just again point to Saudi Arabia as
a good example of that progress.
I have been at this for a long time, and several years ago
we were quite frustrated with what we thought was Saudi Arabia
not taking as much action as it should be taking. In recent
years we have seen Saudi Arabia have investigations, real law
enforcement investigations into terrorist financing and real
prosecutions in terrorist financing, and it put in place some
of the strictest laws in the world with respect to how it
regulates and oversees its charities with respect to their
international disbursements of funds. So that is progress, and
that is one of the ways that we have made it harder for
terrorist groups to access the international financial system.
As a result, we have seen the problem disperse and become
more localized, which has its advantages and disadvantages. One
of the disadvantages is some of the more traditional tools we
use in terms of sanctions, in terms of engaging with
governments, and in terms of confronting governments are less
effective, and we have to come up----
Senator Klobuchar. Because it is more dispersed and it is--
--
Mr. Glaser. Because it is more dispersed, it is more
localized, and it becomes almost a local law enforcement issue.
One of the things I pointed to is kidnapping for ransom. I know
I keep mentioning it like a broken record, kidnapping for
ransom, because it is really, really important and it is----
Senator Klobuchar. And so that money is going from these
looser groups into terrorism.
Mr. Glaser. Well, these looser groups are terrorist
organizations, and this is how they are funding themselves, but
oftentimes----
Senator Klobuchar. Right, so they just do it themselves.
They kidnap people, they use that money, and then they commit
acts of terrorism.
Mr. Glaser. These are terrorist organizations that raise--
yes, that in part, and to a large part, support themselves
through that criminal activity.
Senator Klobuchar. Right. Could I turn to Assistant
Director Boelter? Sort of combining your old job and your new
job, organized crime, what do you see as the relationship
between financing terrorism and organized crime?
Mr. Boelter. I do not see a strong connection there. I
think organized crime is not--it is not naturally paired with
terrorism because the objectives of organized crime are to make
money, frankly, and the objectives of terrorists are really to
inflict harm on this country and our interests, and other
countries as well. So I think there is not a natural
relationship between those two entities, and likewise, I am not
saying there is no connection, but I do not think it is a
significant connection.
Senator Klobuchar. And do you see some of the same things
that Mr. Glaser was talking about with the funding?
Mr. Boelter. In the different modes of raising----
Senator Klobuchar. Yes, that it is more dispersed with
individual terrorist groups funding themselves.
Mr. Boelter. Absolutely, and I think to some extent that we
have moved them in that direction over the last few years by
shutting down the formal financial network or access to it, to
them. So I think that is a product somewhat of what we have
done, but, yes, it is a changing landscape in terms of how they
raise money. I would not suggest that engaging in kidnappings
would be their first choice, but it is something that--because
that is a high-risk activity, but that is clearly overseas in
particular something that we are seeing.
Senator Klobuchar. Assistant Attorney General Monaco, you
talked about training and working with our partners
internationally. What response have you received? Have there
been changes over the last decade? Have you seen changes to the
foreign laws that make it easier for us to work with them?
Ms. Monaco. I think we have seen a growing level of
cooperation and particularly in those areas where we have
targeted our efforts. I mentioned Bangladesh, Kenya, and some
other areas where we really are focusing almost exclusively
with personnel in those areas on terrorist financing.
I think in areas like Indonesia there have been good
strides made, and I think while we are working in those
targeted areas to bring up the level specifically on terrorist
financing in the areas I mentioned, our resident legal attache
program across the world with the 55 folks I mentioned is
something we are trying to buildup our counterterrorism
cooperation generally, buildup the level of attention and
cooperation across the board.
Senator Klobuchar. You know, I spent the evening of
September 11th this year with the family of Tom Burnett, who
was one of the passengers on that flight and one of the four
guys that decided in that split second to wrestle the
terrorists in the plane and then landed in a field in
Pennsylvania instead of in one of our buildings here, which
could have killed thousands of people, and his parents actually
are--Mr. Chairman, I am glad you held this hearing. They are
very focused on this financing issue and trying to go after who
financed this terrorism act and working on it. So I just want
to thank you for your work on their behalf and everyone else in
this country. Thank you very much.
Ms. Monaco. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Whitehouse. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar.
I have a statement from Chairman Leahy on this hearing.
With unanimous consent, I will put the statement into the
record, and it has two letters attached, which I will also put
into the record.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Leahy appears as a
submission for the record.]
[The letters appear as a submission for the record.]
Chairman Whitehouse. Ms. Monaco, I will summarize its
conclusion, which is that the Attorney General should issue
prosecutorial guidelines that remove the uncertainty over the
scope of the material support law. I will hope very much that
the Department takes that advice to heart. We have just had a
vote in the last markup where the Department was invited to
issue prosecutorial guidelines and did not, and the result was
that a measure passed through the Judiciary Committee that the
Department disapproves of. When the Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee invites the Attorney General to issue prosecutorial
guidelines on a matter, I think that is something that the
Attorney General should attend to with considerable dispatch
and attention because it is a device that leaves the control
over this in the hands of the Department as to how to design
the very best response. If you fail at that, then you end up
with us. So please take that as a very positive step, and I
would urge the Attorney General to respond quickly and
affirmatively to the Chairman's request.
Back to the hawalas for 1 second. It strikes me from the
description of the areas in which we have had success that it
has been in this country where the operation of the hawala
violates in essence our banking laws--they are operating an
unauthorized financial facility. Once you get outside of that
geographic boundary and into the area, say, between Afghanistan
and Saudi Arabia, where funds are floating back and forth, or
other gulf states, have we had any success dealing with the
hawala system?
Ms. Monaco. I think that some of our efforts have been in
the intelligence-gathering vein and have allowed us some
insight--and I think my colleagues may have more to offer on
that--has allowed us some insight into those activities
overseas, but I do think it poses one of the challenges we face
in terms of the transparency, or lack thereof, of the operation
of formal and informal networks.
Chairman Whitehouse. Mr. Glaser, would that be one of your
pillars of financial and logistical support that remain
standing?
Mr. Glaser. Well, sure. As you noted, the reason hawala and
other forms of informal remittances and informal money services
exist is because there are large communities throughout the
world that do not have access to formal financial services or
affordable financial services. So the long-term ``solution'' to
hawala is a generational one, and it is about building an
international financial system that everybody around the world
has access to.
Now, since that is a long-term solution, we need shorter-
term--we need to address the problem in a shorter-term way as
well. As you point out, the first prong is having an
appropriate regulatory regime. I do think we have an
appropriate regulatory regime in the United States, and money
service businesses--and hawala would be a money service
business--are required to register; they are required to have
an anti-money-laundering program, and they are required to
report suspicious transactions.
There are international standards that I mentioned before
through the Financial Action Task Force that apply to all
countries to have similar sorts of systems, and we are working
with other countries to ensure that those around the world.
The next prong would be enforcement, and I think that we
have taken--you mentioned Afghanistan. We have tried to be very
aggressive with respect to international hawaladars that we
think are problematic. In February of this year, under the
Kingpin Act, under our kingpin sanctions, we designated the New
Ansari Network, which is a major hawala operation in
Afghanistan, which is moving billions of dollars in narcotics
proceeds into and out of Afghanistan. So there is a particular
hawala network that we went after, and we continue to follow up
on that.
You mentioned the ATFC, the Afghan Threat Finance Cell.
They have worked directly with special units of the Afghan
police to conduct raids on hawaladars within Afghanistan. So
there is an important--in addition to the regulatory component,
there is an important enforcement component.
The way we try to approach it beyond the sort of long-term
effort to make financial services available to everybody, you
know, is a regulatory prong, enforcement, international
standards, and general economic development. So that is at
least how we think about the issue, but I do not want to give
the impression that we have the issue cracked. It is there. It
is a tough issue, and it is a largely non-transparent system as
it exists today, and that is something that we focus on very
intently.
Chairman Whitehouse. Thank you.
A final question probably to Ms. Monaco. I believe that one
of the great attributes of American democracy in this wonderful
balanced system that has been handed down to us from the
Founding Fathers is the jury and the right that every American
has, when harmed, to go before a jury of their peers and plead
their case and stand equal before the law with whoever may have
harmed them. Americans have clearly been harmed by terrorist
organizations. They have been harmed in America by terrorist
organizations. And some have sought to vindicate their rights
by bringing private actions to establish the scope of those
terrorist organizations, to establish the scope of the networks
that support them, financially and otherwise, and to seek the
redress that is every American citizen's right.
Do you find that a helpful element of the various ways in
which--it is a nongovernmental element to a significant degree,
but is it a helpful element in trying to identify and bring to
justice people who are financing terrorist activities that harm
Americans here in our home country?
Ms. Monaco. If I understand the Chairman's question, the
right of individuals or organizations to challenge their
designation?
Chairman Whitehouse. The right of victims of terror to go
after those who finance the terrorist plotters who harmed them
and seek to bring them to justice in our civil courts.
Ms. Monaco. Certainly, Senator, there are a number of those
cases in which individuals have, as you say, sought redress in
the courts. I certainly agree with you as a lawyer and as a
former prosecutor about the jury system and its importance in
our system. And I think the ability of individuals to seek
redress in the courts is absolutely a founding element of our
democracy.
Chairman Whitehouse. And so the Department of Justice is
perfectly comfortable with the notion that people can proceed
in that way to vindicate their rights against those who have
harmed them in the American civil court system?
Ms. Monaco. Well, I think equally so the Department plays a
role in defending statutes, in defending--in acting in
litigation. Great career members of our Civil Division, as you
know as a former denizen of the Justice Department, tremendous
lawyers there who seek to uphold statutes passed by this body
and to vindicate the interests of the Government in the courts,
and I think they equally play an important role.
Chairman Whitehouse. Very good. I appreciate everybody's
testimony. I know that you have important responsibilities, and
for you to take the time to come up here and share with all of
us the work that you are doing and the concerns and challenges
that you face is very helpful to us as we try to provide you
the necessary material support to do the jobs that you have to
do to protect us. So let me close by thanking you for your
diligent service on behalf of our Nation, recognizing what
every member who has been here has noted, which is the vital
importance of the task that you have made it your purpose and
mission to accomplish and to wish you well as you go forward.
Please feel free to come to us with any specific requests you
have to strengthen the hand that you have against those who are
providing this kind of material support to the terrorist
networks that still are targeting our country and our people.
Thank you very much. The record of the hearing will remain
open for an additional week in the event that anybody wishes to
add anything, but subject to that, the hearing is now
adjourned.
Ms. Monaco. Thank you, Senator.
[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Questions and answers and submissions for the record
follow.]