[Senate Hearing 112-346]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-346
SECURING OUR NATION'S TRANSPORTATION
SYSTEM: OVERSIGHT OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S
CURRENT EFFORTS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 9, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts Ranking
BARBARA BOXER, California OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROY BLUNT, Missouri
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
TOM UDALL, New Mexico PATRICK J. TOOMEY, Pennsylvania
MARK WARNER, Virginia MARCO RUBIO, Florida
MARK BEGICH, Alaska KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
DEAN HELLER, Nevada
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
Bruce H. Andrews, General Counsel
Todd Bertoson, Republican Staff Director
Jarrod Thompson, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Rebecca Seidel, Republican General Counsel and Chief Investigator
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on November 9, 2011................................. 1
Statement of Senator Rockefeller................................. 1
Prepared statement........................................... 1
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 2
Statement of Senator Isakson..................................... 3
Statement of Senator Boxer....................................... 4
Statement of Senator Blunt....................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 6
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Statement of Senator Ayotte...................................... 23
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 24
Statement of Senator Boozman..................................... 27
Statement of Senator McCaskill................................... 29
Statement of Senator Pryor....................................... 31
Statement of Senator Rubio....................................... 33
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 35
Witnesses
Hon. John S. Pistole, Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security........... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Appendix
Hon. Olympia J. Snowe, U.S. Senator from Maine, prepared
statement...................................................... 41
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. John S. Pistole
by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 42
Hon. Barbara Boxer........................................... 42
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 44
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 49
Hon. Tom Udall............................................... 50
Hon. Olympia J. Snowe........................................ 51
Hon. Johnny Isakson.......................................... 54
Hon. Roy Blunt............................................... 56
Hon. Kelly Ayotte............................................ 58
Letter dated November 8, 2011 to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV and
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison from Captain Lee Moak, President, Air
Line Pilots Associational International........................ 58
Article from the ALPA Issue Analysis entitled ``Aviation
Security: 10 Years after the 9/11 Attacks''.................... 60
SECURING OUR NATION'S
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM: OVERSIGHT
OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION'S CURRENT EFFORTS
----------
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:36 p.m. in room
SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John D.
Rockefeller IV., Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
[The prepared statement of the Chairman follows:]
Prepared Statement of John D. Rockefeller IV,
U.S. Senator from West Virginia
Ten years ago this month, the Senate Commerce Committee created the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA). I have seen firsthand how
extremely difficult it is to lead the agency. There is no margin for
error, and no shortage of criticism.
We are now approaching a decade without a successful attack against
the Nation's transportation network. I find that remarkable. I also
know it has not come without an incredible amount of hard work on the
part of the TSA.
Despite its achievements in keeping our country's transportation
networks secure, the TSA has always attracted a tremendous amount of
attention and generated its fair share of controversy. The volume of
traffic alone makes that so. But this does not make the job of TSA
Administrator any easier. Adding to the daily burden you face are
proposed budget cuts and conflicting messages from Congress on which
direction to take the agency. But, this is exactly why I believe you
have been the ideal person for this job from the start of your tenure.
Your deep background in law enforcement has given you valuable
perspective in considering new concepts and understanding the value of
your workforce. You have worked aggressively to strengthen
relationships with our foreign partners and to make certain
intelligence is used as effectively as possible. The ``risk-based''
approach to security you advocate is a realistic path forward in our
current environment. You have been uncompromising in promoting
activities that are necessary for the security of our transportation
system, but flexible when common sense dictates the need for reasonable
alternatives. Your steady leadership is vital, and Congress should do
everything to give you the support you deserve.
There is a lot of misinformation and differing viewpoints about the
adequacy of transportation security, its needs, and its direction. What
I really want is the unvarnished truth from you regarding the direction
of the agency, how it can be more effective, and any potential
stumbling blocks that jeopardize our transportation security regime. I
also want us to assist you in making sure you have the resources you
require. You have encouraged Congress to provide additional funding
through airline passenger security fees, and I support you in this
effort.
I strongly believe we must have certainty that any funds raised for
aviation security go directly to aviation security, because I believe
most U.S. travelers want to be safe and secure above all else. There
should be a reasonable way to move forward and make sure needed
security initiatives are properly funded throughout the system.
Thank you for being here today. We can handle the truth, so please
give us the clarity we need to keep you and the TSA successful in its
mission.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg [presiding]. Senator Rockefeller is on
the floor managing a bill there, and asked if I would take over
for a bit, and I, for the, more than, was really willing to do
that.
I thank everyone for being here today. This month marks the
10th Anniversary of the Transportation Security Administration.
It was established on November 19, 2001, just after 9/11.
From the beginning, TSA has been charged with protecting
our entire transportation system and despite this, TSA has
primarily focused on aviation security, and appropriately so.
But, in fact, 98 percent of the TSA budget is dedicated to
aviation security. And that leaves less than 2 percent for
trains and public transportation which terrorists have fixated
on for years, as the bombings in London, Mumbai and Madrid
demonstrate.
According to reports, when bin Laden was killed this
spring, documents recovered at his compound showed that he had
trains in his sight and in his mind that he wanted to attack in
our country. Our rail network is as vast as it is open and rail
offers easy access and a chance to strike high casualties.
Americans take 10 billion trips aboard trains, subways and
other forms of public transportation each year, compared to 700
million flights each year.
Make no mistake--the threat to Americans' rail network is
real, and we've got to do more than we have to keep it secure.
And it doesn't mean at all that we should overlook aviation
security. It only means that we've got to take a more balanced
approach to making transportation in our country safer.
Aviation security remains a serious concern, particularly
in my home state of New Jersey, where we have witnessed
security lapses at Newark Liberty Airport, one of the busiest
in the country. In one incident, a carry-on bag containing a
knife got past TSA agents at the airport. In another,
passengers were able to enter secure areas without being
screened. Incidents like these raise concerns about our ability
to protect the public as they move through our aviation system.
But I also remain concerned about the ability to scan the
baggage effectively as airline baggage fees cause passengers to
carry on more and more, bigger bags.
And the bottom line is this--that while we have serious
fiscal challenges in our country, we can't put a price on human
lives. And nothing is more important than keeping our
communities, families and the economy safe.
And I'm pleased that we have Administrator Pistole here for
his efforts. I've worked with him, and know that he's a capable
leader who works very hard at the job and does it very
effectively. So, I look forward to hearing from him on the
security of our entire transportation system.
And, not to be critical at all, but to say, look, we have
to be alert to all of the risks that our people take, and we
want to reduce them wherever possible. So, I thank you, Mr.
Pistole, for being here.
And I don't see Senator Hutchison here, but in terms of our
arrival, I'll call on Senator Isakson of Georgia. John?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Isakson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate it.
And I want to thank Administrator Pistole for being here
today and having this hearing.
It's very timely for me. I represent the State of Georgia,
in which Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport, the busiest
airport in the United States, which boards about 90 million
passengers a year and has the most takeoffs and landings of any
commercial airport in the United States. And so, airport
security is very important to me. And, like every other member
of the Senate Commerce Committee, I go through TSA security 100
or 120 times a year. So, TSA security is very important to me.
And I appreciate very much the hard work the Administrator
has done, and particularly, in recent weeks his timely response
to an incident that took place in Atlanta. And I want to thank
the Administrator for that.
What happened, Mr. Chairman, is a whistleblower went to
WSB-TV in Atlanta with undercover video of the loading of
carts, food carts, onto airplanes at Hartsfield-Jackson
International Airport, as well as the passage of alleged
employees through the turnstiles, using one badge when four
people would go through.
These raised serious questions as to whether or not TSA
rules were being circumvented or, in fact, may be that things
could be slipped on through the gourmet carts onto an airplane
that should not have been there.
The Administrator initiated an immediate investigation. I
received a letter today with a partial response in terms of
what they have cleared, but a commitment that they're going to
complete the investigation of the videos to make sure that
they, before they comment on whether or not there were actually
breaches. And, while I understand, because of the nature of
security, and because television is public in the United
States, we can't always talk about everything that we require,
for the bad guys might be watching. But, to the extent
possible, I hope the Administrator today will discuss some of
these issues and some of the redundancy of the agency's
requirements and the agency's inspection, to make sure that
these security items are being taken care of.
But, I want to end where I began by saying, I represent the
busiest airport in the world. Passengers from every state and
every country in the world go through Atlanta, Georgia's
Airport. And security is critically important.
I thank the TSA for what they're doing, and recognize it's
always a work in progress. And I hope the Administrator will
address some of those issues that were raised in WSB's report
today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks very much.
I'm pleased to call on the Chairman of the Environment and
Public Works Committee, Senator Boxer. She's very busy, as we
all are, but she's always there ready to go to work on the next
thing.
Senator Boxer.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Senator, thank you very much.
And, by the way, thank you for your support today on that
important bipartisan markup we had of the highway bill.
Mr. Chairman, this is a timely hearing.
I'm very happy to see you here, Mr. Pistole. I wanted to
point out that I have a hearing at exactly this time over in
Foreign Relations on the violence in Syria and, as Chairman of
the Subcommittee, I'm going to need to leave. But I wanted to
leave you with some very clear points, if I could.
In California, the travel and tourism industry employs more
than 800,000 Californians. A 2010 survey found that more than
60 percent of travelers would take two to three more trips a
year if the hassles in screening could be reduced without
compromising security. Of course, that's the goal that you've
been working on, sir.
At a time when our nation is suffering from 9 percent
unemployment, the potential to increase demand and increase
jobs in our travel industry cannot be ignored. And I wrote to
the Administrator last November in support of his efforts to
create a new Trusted Traveler Program. And I'm excited about an
announcement that I believe is expected shortly, of an
expansion.
A Trusted Traveler Program not only has the potential to
reduce the need for invasive screening of low risk travelers.
It could also help TSA better focus resources where they're
needed the most. And this program called TSA Pre3 started in
October. I'm not going to give away everything here, because I
want you to have the chance to do that. We're going to hear
about an expansion of this program to several other airports,
including one very busy on in my state. If that is right, and
I'm right on that, may I thank you publicly for that? Because
I've been calling for this for a long time.
And I want to reiterate--no one who supports this ever
wants to compromise security. I was honored to be able to write
the law that allows pilots to carry guns in the cockpit to
protect the aircraft. I also wrote the language that expanded
the Air Marshal Program to long haul flights. As we know, those
flights were all long haul that were hijacked that fateful day.
So, I am looking forward to hearing about this--reading
about your testimony in support of the Air Marshal Service. My
understanding is, we're robust, we're good, but I--and I know
some of it is classified, but to the extent that we could be
reassured on that.
And also, to make sure that our guns in the cockpit law is
working well, and that the training is going forward, and that
we're not impeding those trained pilots from protecting the
aircraft, because we all know, when worse comes to worst, the
instruction is, unfortunately, not a good one. We'll have the
military there shooting down an aircraft. I think the pilot
should have every right, assuming he or she is trained, to
protect that aircraft.
So, Mr. Chairman, I thank you so very much. I look forward
to reading the testimony.
And if I'm right on this news, then I thank you so much,
sir.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much.
Senator Blunt.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROY BLUNT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman. And I'll submit some
statements for the record.
Thank you for your important and good work, Mr. Pistole.
I want to talk a little bit when we get time for questions
about this issue of TSA at airports, and what I continue to
believe would be the importance of a private sector competitor,
if that's what the airport wants to do. I remember this debate
when TSA was created. And the theory was that TSA would benefit
if the airport and TSA and everybody else knew that there were
other options. If there are problems, whether they're problems
like the problems at Hartsfield-Jackson, at that airport; or
whether it's the airport in Springfield, Missouri, the
Springfield-Branson airport that would like to go to an outside
provider; or the Kansas City airport, which is about halfway in
size between Springfield-Branson and the huge airport in
Atlanta, who's had a private provider the whole time, and had
what I thought was some unfortunate experience just even trying
to extend that private contract. As it turned out, the courts
agreed whenever your agency was taken to the claims court to
talk about this. And I want to talk about that a little more.
But all of us understand the critical importance of your
work. I want to join Senator Boxer's comments on the importance
of foreign travel. We're looking at ways to make the visa
process work better, and make entry and exit from the country
work better. There are ways to meet the security needs of the
country and still encourage the friendship and economic impact
that foreign travelers make. They stay longer; they spend more;
and they invariably, in almost all cases, they like us better
when they left than they did when they came. So, there are all
kinds of positive repercussions here--unless the memory is how
terrible it was getting in and out of the country. And I know
your organization is more and more conscious of that all the
time.
But I, and this committee would be very interested in
working with you to provide the encouragement and tools, and
support you need to make that part of traveling to America work
in a way that ensures safety, but also encourages people to
want to come, and want to come back.
And, Chairman, I yield back my time.
[The prepared statement of Senator Blunt follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Hon. Roy Blunt, U.S. Senator from Missouri
Thank you Chairman Rockefeller and Ranking Member Hutchison for
holding this hearing today. Securing our nation's transportation system
is a constant challenge, and regular hearings on this subject are
important in order to ensure that TSA is strong and agile enough to
stay ahead of threats but not so intrusive as to burden the flow of
commerce.
Additionally, thank you Administrator Pistole for appearing before
us today. I appreciate your work as you have the difficult task of
being on the frontline of this nation's security.
Some people forget that TSA is responsible for more than just
securing our nation's airways. With the responsibility of securing most
of our transportation network including our Nation's highways, rail
system, ports and airports, TSA has its work cut out for them in this
security climate.
Administrator Pistole, you have the challenging task of finding and
maintaining the balance between keeping our nation secure and
continuing to ensure the free movement of people and commerce.
It is this balance that is integral to a secure nation and a
vibrant economy.
It is easy to forget that the public and industry share in the
goals of the TSA mission. Often times we see different sides disagree
about the proper way to achieve a common goal.
But it is the focus on this common goal that can be a key to
success for TSA. Stakeholders understand the importance of security and
can be essential in the proper implementation of security initiatives
or changes.
Such partnerships are at the very core of that delicate balance of
security and the free flow of commerce.
Simply put, more regulations do not improve security.
Overregulation forces industry to commit resources to regulatory
compliance rather than actually improved security.
Despite TSA's large scope of responsibility, TSA gets the most
recognition and scrutiny for their role at our nation's airports.
Our airports are our primary line of defense in securing our
airways. And it is at the airport where TSA works closely with both the
public and the airlines.
There are nearly 450 airports across the U.S. They range in size
and all provide unique services resulting in unique security
challenges.
However since the TSA was established, TSA has only continued to
grow into one of the largest and most expensive bureaucracies with over
62,000 employees.
In doing so, TSA is further removed from being the accountable,
flexible security administration that even TSA acknowledges they need
to be.
And early this year, TSA ended the expansion of their Screening
Partnership Program (SPP).
SPP airports have the flexibility to properly merge TSA protocol
with the unique characteristics and needs of a specific airport.
Preserving two security screening options promotes efficiency and
accountability in both SPP airports and airports that do not
participate.
Capping the program at 16 airports limits our airport security
options to a one-size-fits-all approach.
Our airports are our primary line of defense in securing our
airways. Why would we reduce the number of tools they need to do their
jobs?
The safety of our nation's skies will not improve as long as we
continue to limit our security options to an unaccountable, one-size-
fits-all federal bureaucracy.
Only in Washington, D.C. do we measure the importance of something
by how much we spend on it as opposed to the results we get.
Again, I thank the chair and the Administrator for their hard work.
I look forward to hearing your perspective and working together to find
the best way to balance our security needs with privacy and economic
needs.
Senator Lautenberg. Senator Cantwell.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Chairman Lautenberg. Thanks
for conducting this important meeting. And I look forward to
hearing from the TSA about the important security measures,
both on the cargo front and on the passenger side.
But before I turn to that, I did want to say,
congratulations, Mr. Chairman, to United Airlines and to Alaska
Airlines, because just on Monday United became the first U.S.-
based air carrier to fly a domestic flight using a mixture of
jet fuel and drop-in aviation biofuel. And beginning today,
Alaska Airlines will operate 75 flights over the next 11 days
with 20 percent aviation biofuel blends. So, both are pushing
forward on this important area of aviation transportation.
Mr. Pistole, I appreciate you being here. And in many ways
I think you have a difficult and thankless job. And our
nation's security and safeguarding it is such a critical and
important issue, with over 400 different commercial airports
and over 700 million air passengers each year. That is a huge
challenge.
And I know that there have been various implementations of
technology, both at our ports--and in Washington State, ports
are us. We move a lot of cargo container traffic. But we
certainly believe in an international standard that will help
us prevent dangerous cargo from ever reaching our shores. Once
it's into one of our ports, it's already too late. So, we
certainly want to hear what we're doing on a global basis to
make sure that those technology deployments are happening.
And, like my colleagues, I want to hear about, on the
aviation side, the passenger screening and profile issues, and
to make sure that we're meeting a variety of challenges that
come with those responsibilities. And so, like my previous
colleague mentioned, these security measures are important but
it's important that we keep commerce moving as well, because
it's critically essential, particularly at this hard-hit
economic time to make sure that we're doing all we can to
continue to move traffic.
So, I appreciate you holding this hearing and look forward
to asking Mr. Pistole some very specific questions about the
process, both with passengers and cargo. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Lautenberg. Senator----
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll wait to ask
questions.
I appreciate Mr. Pistole being here today, and for the
difficult and important work you do to keep our country safe.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you.
Senator Rubio. Let's just move to the questions. I'll waive
my time as well.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much.
The Ranking Member of the Committee, Senator Hutchison, is
here.
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you very much.
It's good to have you back since we had you for your
confirmation. We'll see how you've weathered the storms. And,
of course, there have been some.
I just want to say that I think there are still kinks that
need to be worked out for the privacy and comfort of passengers
who are going through these new machines where you have to put
your hands up and get photographed. And I hope that you are
continuing to work on those things, because I do hear a lot of
complaints about them. And having gone through them, I
understand those concerns.
Also I just hope that we will continue, as I think the
Senator from Missouri said, to try to make travel a pleasant
experience, particularly international travel where we have
guests coming into our country and we want them to have a good
experience and want them to come back.
You have had a terrifically difficult job, which we know.
And I would like to hear your statement about where you are
finding improvements, and what your future suggestions are
going to be.
And with that, I'll put the rest of my statement in the
record and listen to you, and be able to ask questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hutchison follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison, U.S. Senator from
Texas
Chairman Rockefeller, thank you for convening today's oversight
hearing on the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). This is a
timely hearing, given we are approaching the holiday travel season.
Today's hearing will set us on a course for initial work on TSA
authorization legislation. It has been several years since we last
authorized the agency and I believe it is important that we take a
comprehensive and deliberate approach given the importance of the
mission and policies to our national security.
I look forward to working with Chairman Rockefeller and the rest of
the Committee members along with you, Mr. Pistole, as your thoughts and
priorities will be weighed heavily during any authorization process.
Clearly, there are a litany of serious challenges and threats that need
addressing in order to maintain a safe and secure transportation
system.
We must balance a secure transportation network and the free
movement of commerce. There needs to be a check and balance in our
methods to make sure the economy can grow and prosper under what we all
hope can eventually be an ``unseen,'' yet highly secure and efficient,
transportation security network.
Given the sheer volume, complexity and international component of
our global transportation network, finding effective and practical
solutions is a notable challenge. We need to be focusing on bolstering
our intelligence gathering and analysis and effectively utilizing
proven methods such as canine teams. Across all modes, utilizing
fundamental resources will go a long way in creating a strong domestic
and international security network.
Administrator Pistole, I will have several questions regarding
aviation, but as I am sure you are aware, the issue we still hear about
most from our constituents is the airline passenger screening
experience. As far back as your nomination hearing, I have emphasized
there should be a goal of making the airport screening and travel
process more smooth and seamless for all travelers. That goal needs to
be done in a way that improves security, but also maintains passenger
privacy. Reports indicate that you are making changes to the airport
checkpoint; I will be interested to hear your strategy.
TSA is responsible for security in all modes of transportation.
However, TSA has historically only played a supporting role with
respect to transit and passenger rail security and other surface
security issues, coordinating activities with the Department of
Transportation and private stakeholders.
I continue to be concerned that too little effort is being
dedicated to secure our surface transportation system.
An attack on our rail infrastructure could be crippling. While we
have successfully avoided a domestic attack, many of our allies
overseas have not had the same success. We simply cannot let something
like the Madrid (2004) or India (2006) terrorism events happen
domestically, TSA must focus more of its energy securing our nation's
surface network.
Across all modes, after a decade in operation, it is still my
impression that TSA often finds itself playing catch-up, fighting the
last battle. I think we all appreciate the difficulties and daily
struggle of maintaining a secure system, since we all understand that
America still faces the grim reality of terrorist threats. However, we
also know that terrorists are going to continue to adapt their methods
to try to circumvent our multi-layered system, we need to be looking
ahead of those threats and have a long-term strategy that fully
utilizes all of the tools at our disposal.
Thank you, I look forward to the testimony.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much.
And now I call on Mr. Pistole. And I ask you now, Mr.
Pistole, to deliver your testimony.
Everyone knows, I believe, that John Pistole is the
Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration.
And Administrator Pistole will update us on TSA's efforts to
ensure the security of our transportation system.
And I want to thank you for coming, Mr. Pistole. And I
would now ask you to give your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE, ADMINISTRATOR,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Pistole. Well, good afternoon, and thank you, Chairman
Lautenberg and Ranking Member Hutchison, distinguished members
of the Committee. It's a privilege and honor to be here today
to testify. Thank you for that opportunity.
When I last appeared before the Committee, we were talking
about some risk-based security initiatives. And most of that
was still in the formulative stage.
Where we are now, I'm pleased to report that we have begun
implementing several key aspects of risk-based security, and
testing others at airports around the country, and all with a
singular goal. And that is to provide the most effective
security in the most efficient way.
As this initiative expands, we must ensure that each step
we take actually strengthens security as we continue monitoring
intelligence that indicates terrorists' continued attempts in
terms of conducting attacks here in the U.S. involving
transportation assets.
Anecdotally, last week I told Senators Lieberman and
Collins and their committee that our officers continue to find
four to five guns on average each day at the approximately 450
airports monitored by the TSA--people who have carry-on bags
that are trying to get on the plane. And in the last 7 days
since that hearing, we've prevented over 30 more guns from
being carried into the cabin of an airplane, including nine
just yesterday. Nine in one day.
Senator Hutchison. Mr. Pistole, can I interrupt you for a
minute and ask you----
Mr. Pistole. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Hutchinson.--do you consider most of those
inadvertent forgetfulness?
Mr. Pistole. Absolutely. Yes.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you.
Mr. Pistole. At least that's what they would say. So, yes.
So, because risk-based security is reducing the size of the
haystack in which a terrorist may be hiding, we are focusing
our resources on potentially higher-risk passengers, and the
results thus far are positive.
Our commitment to new and innovative technology is a key
component of risk-based security, and our success in
discovering other non-metallic items is greatly enhanced with
the use of advanced imaging technology, or AIT. These machines
give our officers the best opportunity to find both metallic
and non-metallic threats, and successfully detect items as
small as a coin or a wrapped piece of gum--in this case, a
Nicorette piece of gum.
Now, AIT is not perfect, and we continue working closely
with industry to improve its detection capabilities. But, it's
a combination of technology, policy, and methodology that
drives risk-based security.
Last month we began TSA Pre3, a voluntary passenger pre-
screen initiative that's being tested in four U.S. airports
today, placing more focus on pre-screening individuals who
volunteer information about themselves prior to flying. Because
we know more about them, TSA Pre3 travelers are able to divest
fewer items, which could include leaving on their shoes, a
belt, a light jacket, as they proceed through security
screening.
Of course, we will always incorporate random and
unpredictable measures throughout our security process, and at
no point is a traveler guaranteed expedited screening. We don't
want terrorists gaming the system. Initial feedback for TSA
Pre3 in the test airports has been favorable, with over 45,000
travelers having gone through the expedited screening process.
Today, I am pleased to announce the expansion of these
efforts to select checkpoints in three more airports, as
Senator Boxer alluded to. Las Vegas will be the first in
December. And then LAX, Los Angeles International, and
Minneapolis-St. Paul in early 2012. So, that will get us up to
seven airports.
Efforts to expand identity-based screening also include a
crew member screening system which helps positively identify
and verify the identity and employment status of airline
pilots. Under this program being tested at seven airports, tens
of thousands of airline pilots have processed through this
expedited screening, recognizing them as the most trusted
people on an aircraft.
We're also evaluating an expanded behavior detection
initiative that began this fall at Boston Logan Airport, and is
also being tested in Detroit. In this initiative, behavioral
analysis techniques are used by specially trained officers to
determine if a traveler should receive additional screening.
This innovation used by many security agencies worldwide
enables officers to better verify or dispel suspicious behavior
and anomalies. Preliminary analysis from Boston shows an
increase in detecting potentially higher-risk passengers. We
frankly need additional information, additional data, to
understand if this trend is statistically significant.
In August, we implemented new nationwide screening
procedures for children 12 and under, allowing them to leave
their shoes on and go through a less intrusive security
screening. And the results from this nationwide screening
enhancement show a sharp reduction--though not elimination--of
pat-downs for children, and families have responded very
favorably to these changes.
I'm also pleased to report the reinitiation of the Aviation
Security Advisory Committee, with 24 members having been named
by Secretary Napolitano. I look forward to meeting with them
and hearing their views and recommendations.
Let me close with these thoughts. Innovation, partnerships,
and a commitment to the pursuit of excellence--these are the
watchwords of TSA as we move into 2012.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pistole follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Pistole, Administrator, Transportation
Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Good morning Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, and
distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity
to testify today about the Transportation Security Administration's
(TSA) on-going efforts to develop and implement a more risk-based
approach to secure our Nation's transportation systems. When I last
appeared before this Committee this past June, our plans to implement
additional risk-based security (RBS) measures were still in their
formative stages. I am pleased to report that we have now begun
operational testing of several key aspects of risk-based security that
I will describe.
TSA employs risk-based, intelligence-driven operations to prevent
terrorist attacks and to reduce the vulnerability of the Nation's
transportation system to terrorism. Our goal at all times is to
maximize transportation security to stay ahead of evolving terrorist
threats while protecting privacy and facilitating the flow of
legitimate commerce. TSA's security measures create a multi-layered
system of transportation security that mitigates risk. We continue to
evolve our security approach by examining the procedures and
technologies we use, how specific security procedures are carried out,
and how screening is conducted.
Since I became TSA Administrator, I have listened to ideas from
people all over this country, including our key stakeholders and
security professionals, and I have heard from our dedicated workforce
and our counterparts abroad about how TSA can work better and smarter.
Based on this feedback, last fall, I directed the agency to begin
developing a strategy for enhanced risk-based security (RBS), which is
based on the simple premise of focusing our limited resources on the
passengers we know least about. I am pleased to report to the Committee
today that in the past few months we have taken concrete steps to
implement key components of the agency's intelligence-driven, risk-
based approach to security, advancing the agency toward the ultimate
goal of providing the most effective security in the most efficient way
possible.
TSA Pre3TM
This past October, TSA began testing a limited and voluntary
passenger pre-screening initiative with a small known traveler
population at four U.S. airports (Miami, Dallas-Ft. Worth, Detroit, and
Atlanta). This pilot program will help assess measures designed to
enhance security, by placing more focus on pre-screening individuals
who volunteer information about themselves prior to flying in order to
potentially expedite the travel experience. By learning more about
travelers through information they voluntarily provide, and combining
that information with our multi-layered system of aviation security, we
can better focus our limited resources on higher-risk and unknown
passengers. This new screening system holds great potential to
strengthen security while significantly enhancing the travel
experience, whenever possible, for passengers.
During this pilot, TSA is using pre-screening capabilities to make
intelligence-based risk assessments for passengers who voluntarily
participate in the TSA Pre3TM program and are flying
domestically from one of the four airport pilot sites. Eligible
participants include certain frequent flyers from American Airlines and
Delta Air Lines as well as existing members of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection's (CBP) Trusted Traveler programs including Global Entry,
SENTRI, and NEXUS who are U.S. citizens and are flying on participating
airlines. The data collected from these pilot sites will inform our
plans to expand the program to include additional airlines as well as
other airports that participate in CBP's Global Entry program, once
they are operationally ready.
TSA pre-screens TSA Pre3TM passengers each time they fly
through participating airports. If the indicator embedded in their
boarding pass reflects eligibility for expedited screening, the
passenger is able to use TSA's Pre3TM lane. Because we know
more about these passengers, TSA Pre3TM travelers are able
to divest fewer items, which may include leaving on their shoes,
jacket, and light outerwear, as well as other modifications to the
standard screening process. As always, TSA will continue to incorporate
random and unpredictable security measures throughout the security
process. At no point are TSA Pre3TM travelers guaranteed
expedited screening.
Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) in the four pilot airports
are receiving very positive feedback from TSA
Pre3TM travelers while the two partner airlines have
successfully demonstrated the technical capabilities required to
participate in the program, thus paving the way for other airlines to
follow. As we learn from these pilots, we are working closely with
other airlines and airports to determine when they may be operationally
ready to join. We are also working with CBP to ensure that individuals
who want to apply for Trusted Traveler Programs are able to do so in an
efficient manner.
Known Crewmember
We hold airline pilots responsible for the safety of the traveling
public every time they fly a plane. It makes sense to treat them as our
trusted partners. To build on our risk-based approach to security, we
are currently supporting efforts to test another identity-based system
to enable TSA security officers to positively verify the identity and
employment status of airplane pilots. The Known Crewmember program is
the result of a joint test between the airline industry (Air Transport
Association) and pilots (International Airline Pilots Association),
which allows uniformed pilots from 22 airlines to show two forms of
identification that are checked against a database called the ``Cockpit
Access Security System,'' which confirms identity. After more than two
months into the pilot program, and with deployments nearly complete at
the seven participating airports, over 59,000 uniformed pilots have
been cleared through the process with an average of nearly 1,900
approvals per day. Both Known Crewmember and TSA Pre3TM are
clear examples of TSA's commitment to focusing its attention and
resources on those who present the greatest risk, thereby improving
security and the travel experience for passengers across the country.
Expanded Behavior Detection
Beginning this fall, TSA took steps to expand its behavior
detection program that builds on existing Screening of Passengers by
Observation Techniques (SPOT), which has grown since 2003 to include
over 160 airports. Under the pilot program, TSOs employ specialized
behavioral analysis techniques to determine if a traveler should be
referred for additional screening at the checkpoint. The vast majority
of passengers at the pilot airport checkpoints experience a ``casual
greeting'' conversation with a Behavior Detection Officer (BDO) as they
pass through travel document verification. This additional interaction,
used by security agencies worldwide, enables officers to better verify
or dispel suspicious behavior and anomalies.
Preliminary analysis from Boston shows an increase in the rate of
detection of high-risk passengers. However, additional data is required
to understand if the trend seen in the Boston data is statistically
significant and replicable at other airports. TSA is currently
conducting analyses with the DHS Science and Technology Directorate to
estimate the number of cases required for validation. In the meantime,
we are expanding this pilot to Detroit in order to collect additional
data on incorporating enhanced real-time risk assessments into our
other layers of security.
Screening of Children 12 And Under
This past August, TSA modified its screening procedures to provide
more options to resolve alarms that may occur during the screening
process of passengers 12 and under. With nationwide rollout complete as
of late September, the data has demonstrated a reduction--though not
elimination--of the need for a physical pat-down for children that
would otherwise have been conducted to resolve alarms. We maintain our
standard procedure that when a pat-down is required of any minor, a
parent or guardian must be present and the screening may occur in
private. TSA has also implemented additional measures to expedite the
screening process where possible including allowing passengers 12 and
under to leave their shoes on.
By streamlining procedures for these lower risk passengers through
programs like these, TSA is better able to focus its finite resources
on those who pose higher risks to transportation. We are continuously
evaluating lessons learned from these modified procedures to determine
our next steps as we consider future procedures to strengthen and
streamline the security screening process for other low-risk
populations.
New Document Assessment Technology
In addition to testing new procedures for low-risk populations, TSA
is also employing technology to automatically verify passenger
identification documents and boarding passes, providing TSA with a
greater ability to identify altered or fraudulent documents. This
technology, known as Credential Authentication Technology--Boarding
Pass Scanning Systems (CAT-BPSS), will eventually replace the current
procedure used by security officers to detect fraudulent or altered
documents. CAT-BPSS enhances security and increases efficiency by
automatically and concurrently comparing a passenger's ID and boarding
pass to a set of security features to verify their authentication and
ensure that the information on both match. The system also verifies the
IDs of airline personnel and can screen a wide range of travel
documents. TSA began testing the technology in July 2011 and will
deploy and evaluate the technology at TSA Pre3TM airports in
the near future.
Conclusion
TSA will continue to enhance its layered security approach through
state-of-the-art technologies, expanded use of existing and proven
technology, better passenger identification techniques and other
developments that will continue to strengthen aviation security. I
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I look
forward to answering your questions about the evolution of TSA's risk-
based, intelligence-driven approach to security.
The Chairman [presiding]. Administrator Pistole, you seem
to be in some ways in a no-win situation of late. Of course,
that's, I guess, your usual condition, isn't it?
The TSA's been criticized for an over-reliance on physical
screening. For a period of time we went through the pat-down
and all that, and everybody got upset. And then, you've been
urging us to pursue a more risk-based method based on the
passengers.
Now TSA gets criticized by some of the various aspects of
this approach. Clearly, TSA needs to utilize a variety of
tactics to achieve best results.
I just want to ask you a question. You'll never satisfy the
American public while trying to keep them safe. Isn't that
basically true?
Mr. Pistole. The key, obviously, is to provide the best
security in the most professional way that respects privacy and
civil liberties, and that is our challenge every day. With
approximately 1.8 million encounters, passengers traveling
every day at the 450 airports it is, there is an opportunity
for somebody to not be 100 percent satisfied, as in any
business or any government activity. So, yes, it is a
challenge.
The Chairman. My traveling is not as international or
urbane as some members of this committee. But actually, urbane
for me gets to be when I get out to Jackson Hole, Wyoming. But
I have yet to see a TSA member--I don't want to seem like your
flack here--be rude. On a number of occasions, and sometimes
involving translational problems, you know, they do the best
they can. I've seen them go to the farthest point of politeness
extending themselves even though there's a long line waiting.
And on a number of occasions I've found that I've gotten their
names and said, who is your supervisor? I wanted to write them
and tell them what a good job you're doing. So, it's very
interesting.
People complain and then I, you know, travel. Granted not
as much as I used to before I messed up my knee. But, my
reaction is a very good one. Now, you change your
methodologies. You change different technologies. I can
remember, I think, 5 years ago going through Dulles Airport and
putting my finger on a pad, and I was told that that will be
operational in a period of time. And that was four or 5 years
ago. I have no idea whether they're using that out there or
not, or why. But, in other words, your people have to adjust.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
The Chairman. Your people have a certain degree of
turnover. Some of that is economic, although you've tried your
best on that. And the other is just that other opportunities
occur and they take them. Are your people keeping up with what
it is that you want them to do?
Mr. Pistole. Yes. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you for those
positive comments.
I know the men and women of TSA who work the checkpoints
every day appreciate that feedback any time it is positive,
because the negative ones are the ones that are heard in the
press.
Clearly it is a paradigm shift for TSA in our risk-based
security initiative to get away from the one size fits all that
looks at everybody as a possible terrorist. And so, the
approach that we are taking, which I have buy-in from around
the country from our workforce, is to exercise a little common
sense, frankly, to look at the person as much as the prohibited
item, with the key being, let's look for those items that could
cause catastrophic failure to an aircraft.
And so, really that's two components: some type of
electronic initiator, coupled with some type of mass that could
be an explosive--or it may be a liquid explosive. But it's
those two things.
So, the challenge is, how do we distinguish between those
that we assess, make a judgment about? Recognizing this is risk
mitigation. It's not risk elimination.
So as we try to mitigate or manage the risks, can we treat
those that we know more about because they voluntarily shared
information with us, such as through Customs and Border
Protection's Global Entry Program, or through the TSA Pre3
Program that we're doing now.
If we can do that on the front end, then we know more about
them, we can make better judgments at the checkpoint. So, that
expedited screening possibility that I mentioned over 45,000
people have already gone through, that allows us to focus our
limited resources on those that may pose a higher risk, such as
the ones that we know only what's in Secure Flight--name, date
of birth and gender--or that we know the most about because
they're on the terrorist watch lists.
So, here's how I start every day: Senior Leadership Team at
TSA headquarters, with an intelligence briefing from around the
world, from the CIA, NSA, FBI, all the security services around
the world, to say what are the terrorists thinking? What
technologies are they looking at? How are they trying to defeat
our defenses, our layered defenses? And so, how can we use that
in a smart, informed fashion? So, that's what the whole risk-
based security initiative's about.
The Chairman. Look, I thank you. Granted, that was somewhat
of a softball. I was trying to settle into my position. I'll
try to ask you a more interesting question in my next go
around.
Mr. Pistole. That was an excellent question, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Hutchison?
Senator Hutchison. Mr. Pistole, in February you changed the
longstanding determination of prohibiting transportation
security officers from collective bargaining. And while the
determination prohibits these screeners from striking or
engaging in slowdowns, it does allow for collective bargaining
on non-security employment issues.
Could you update us on the status of that, and what you
anticipate to be the issues that are involved in a collective
bargaining when striking and slowdowns are not possible, but
hours and the kind of work required are? I'd like to know if
that's going to hamper in any way the effectiveness of your
ability to say exactly what needs to be done for security
purposes.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator. And the short answer is,
no. It will not affect security in any way.
The determination that I announced on February 4 of this
year was to do two things: One, to recognize a FLRA decision
that required that we hold an election for the purposes of
exclusive representation, but without regard to collective
bargaining. That frankly didn't make a whole lot of sense to
me.
So, my determination was to allow the security officers to
vote on whether they wanted collective bargaining--because
there was already 12,000 or 13,000 paying union dues without
collective bargaining--and then, if they voted in favor of a
union, then to move forward with collective bargaining at the
national level.
So, that election was held. It was close between two
unions, AFGE and NTEU. There was a runoff election, and AFGE
won that. And so, since that time this summer, we've been
working through a hybrid labor management relationship that is
unique, both in the Federal Government and, I believe, in the
private sector, because of the authorities given to TSA under
the enabling legislation from November 19, 2001.
So, what that allows us to do is take off any issues
related to security, and focus on the issues that I was hearing
in town halls around the country that were important to the
security officers. Things like pay and other benefits were
important, but that's not something that I agreed to be subject
to collective bargaining, along with the right to strike or
things like that, which would affect security.
So, what we've been in discussions with the union on are
those things that are important to them, such as appeal of
disciplinary matters, of how should those be handled, things
such as bidding on shifts that they work, issues about uniforms
and things like that--all non-security issues. So, we are to
the point of having ground rules be finalized. And then we are
ready to move forward with them to address those issues that
are important to our security officers.
Senator Hutchison. So, your view, is that this is going to
be able to work out in a way that will not in any way endanger
the security part of their jobs?
Mr. Pistole. Absolutely. And again, I have to credit the
Congress for the insight and the prescience in terms of, the
enabling legislation that gave that broad discretion authority,
recognizing the inherent security issues that were unique to
TSA in the aftermath of 9/11. So, thank you for that.
Senator Hutchison. Let me ask you about the program for
known travelers to the three new airports. Is it your intention
to continue to add more airports as you see the results of what
you have now and how it's working? And are you, as you are
adding airports, putting new processes in place because you've
learned from something that worked or didn't? And if so, what?
Mr. Pistole. Yes. Thank you, Senator. Yes.
The goal is, after we expand to Las Vegas, LAX and
Minneapolis, to look at other airports with other carriers.
This is an ongoing process. For example, several major carriers
are going through mergers right now, whether it's United/
Continental, Southwest/AirTran. And so, their IT systems are
such that they're not quite ready to move forward. But they
will be in the first quarter of next year in some measure.
And so, I hope to be announcing additional airlines and
airports that would be able to accommodate those passengers,
both in those frequent flyer programs at elite levels, and then
also those CBP Global Entry people who sign up, pay a fee,
through that program.
So, yes. The goal is to expand it as broadly as possible
while maintaining the highest level of security; and, again,
all done on a voluntary basis.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Pistole.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hutchison.
And now we go to Johnny Isakson, the Senator from Georgia.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
In the investigative report that you have seen and I have
seen that was done by WSB in Atlanta, there were instances
under, an undercover camera caught instances of one employee
swiping their ID card and then holding a turnstile so three
other people could go through. As I understand it, that's a,
that's referred to as either escorting or piggybacking. Can you
explain what of that would be permissible, and what would not
be permissible?
Mr. Pistole. Well, as a general rule, neither would be
permissible.
The question which, I don't have the details on this
particular instance are, a situation where all four may be
authorized access, and it's simply one person holding the door
as a courtesy for the other three, as opposed to swiping. They
should each swipe their badge if that's their required access,
so there's a record of who is coming and going.
I don't have the details of that for this particular
matter, but that's part of what we're looking into.
Senator Isakson. Can you, do you know, or--and I don't
know, so, I'm asking. And you may not either. But, at
Hartsfield-Jackson, was that the first encounter they would
have with a security check? Or would there have been a previous
encounter with a security check before they got to that point?
Mr. Pistole. I don't know specifically. It is airport
specific, but at some airports they would go through an
exterior security checkpoint, either the vehicle or the
individuals. I simply don't know on this one.
Senator Isakson. Because I believe part of the reason for
swiping rather than having ID security is also so you know
who's at work and who isn't at work, and they get credit for
the hours worked or not worked.
So, on, in terms of Gate Gourmet and Gate Safe, who are the
two entities in terms of the food and service, do you normally,
once you--I guess you approve a contractor, and they go through
a certain process to be approved for security, I would guess
that's true?
Mr. Pistole. Well, so, generally what happens is, we
establish the security requirements for the catering company
that the airport enters into a contract with. So, we're not
necessarily involved in that. But we do establish a security
regimen, and then inspect to those standards to make sure they
are following those standards.
Senator Isakson. So, you have standards the airport has to
meet. The airport does the approval of the----
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Isakson.--the provider, whomever it is. Do you
randomly or periodically inspect those--TSA now----
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Senator Isakson.--the TSA randomly inspects those people to
make sure they're compliant?
Mr. Pistole. Yes. So, we do hundreds, if not thousands, of
inspections across the country involving all number of things,
but as it relates to catering companies, we do both random and
unpredictable inspections--surprise inspections, both with the
airport and the catering companies to assess whether they are
following those security regimens, those protocols that we
have.
Senator Isakson. When I ran my company for years we had a
little process called mystery shopping----
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Isakson.--where we would have mystery shoppers that
would test the performance of our employees in terms of service
and courtesy.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Isakson. Do you use that type of approach from time
to time?
Mr. Pistole. We do. And the Inspector General and the GAO
also use those in terms of covert testing looking at what is,
what we consider as part of the insider threat--people who have
access to secure areas of airports. Yes.
Senator Isakson. OK. With regard to the inspection
process--and I will say at Hartsfield-Jackson they have done a
great job of expediting the throughput. I travel every week,
sometimes twice a week, and it's been very good. But, I'm
wondering about the radiation. I think last week you in another
committee hearing said you were re-evaluating the effects of
radiation in terms of the new inspection. Can you talk about
that for a second?
Mr. Pistole. Yes. And since that time, Senator, of course
the testing had been done before we ever deployed the advanced
imaging technology, the backscatter technology, that, all the
independent scientific studies that we had demonstrated that
the minimal, the really minute amount of radiation that was
being emitted is well below anything that would ever reach even
the minimal standards of safety. And the equivalent was 3
minutes at altitude flying, the natural radiation that you
receive is the equivalent of going through one time.
That being said, I had a response to a question from
Senator Collins, who asked for a new independent study done by
DHS. And since that time, there has been a draft IG report that
I just received, but the IG has allowed me to speak about it
here today--which confirms our previous findings based on their
study and their analysis. And they made, I think, five or six
recommendations which we agree with. But none of those go to
the actual safety issues which have been called into question.
So, my strong belief is that those type of machines are
still completely safe; they always have been. So, I want to
reassure the traveling public on that. And if it determines, if
the determination is that this IG study is not sufficient, then
I will look at it still, yet another additional study.
Senator Isakson. My time is up. Thank you and thanks for
your prompt response to my request.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I tried a palace coup but the team didn't spring to----
[Laughter.]
Senator Lautenberg. I know where the power is, Mr.
Chairman.
[Laughter.]
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Pistole, one of the many benefits
of rail travel is the ability to easily and efficiently get on
the train, and get moving to your destination. What can we do
to improve security without sacrificing convenience to the
large number of passengers that use rail and public
transportation?
Mr. Pistole. I think, Senator, it really comes down to the
partnership that we have, for example, with the Amtrak police,
and their very effective deployment of both uniformed officers
and canines at certain points and certain stations as people
enter, some random bag searches. But then, also, their actual
presence on the trains, for example. So, I think that's
significant.
And it's also the visible intermodal protection response
efforts that we do, the VIPER Teams that--again, we know from
terrorist debriefings that they are dissuaded by three things:
closed circuit TV--if they're not a suicide bomber; uniformed
officers; and canines.
So, it's that combination of those three things that we try
to use in terms of the--whether it's Amtrak police or the Metro
Transit Authorities; whether New Jersey or New York--those that
have the front line responsibilities, we can augment their
resources, either through training or through personnel, or
through the hardening of targets that we've done--for example,
on the PATH tunnels between New Jersey and New York.
Senator Lautenberg. As I mentioned in my opening remarks,
we don't spend as much as one would think with the volume of
traffic that there is on rail, but----
Mr. Pistole. Senator, if I could just comment on that. So,
if we just look at our budget, that's true. But when we look at
the grant funding that we provide, which is not included in our
budget, then that ratio changes somewhat significantly, and
it's much more akin to what the actual risk scores that we
provided in a classified setting. Say, here's where we assess
the aviation risk; here's where we assess the surface risk. And
so, when you look at the total funding, frankly, the several
billion dollars that we provided in surface transportation
through grant funding since our creation, that ratio comes out
much more consistent with how we assess risk.
Senator Lautenberg. Last year, GAO found that TSA needed to
do a better job of providing transit security to the areas most
vulnerable to attack. What do we need to do to make adjustments
to that process, to ensure that funds truly are spent in the
highest risk areas?
Mr. Pistole. One of the things that we've done this year,
Senator, is to enter into a Memorandum of Agreement with FEMA,
who actually administers the grant funds. In the agreement,
they accept our risk assessment and then allocate funds based
on the risk assessment--and demonstrated need through the
grants application process. And so that, we found, worked much
better, this year than in previous years, because we are
putting the money where the highest risks are. So, obviously,
the New York metropolitan area, including parts of New Jersey,
received more money than, perhaps, other areas that were
assessed as being at lower risk.
Senator Lautenberg. Yes. Well, I hope that we're going to
be pretty observant about that as we come into this next fiscal
year, because we still have that vulnerability, most risky two-
mile stretch between the airport and the harbor. And, as is, as
we see the review of funding, we're looking at significant cuts
proposed in the areas of grant giving under the Homeland
Security budgets. And I would ask to hear from you as to what
you think these cuts are going to mean in terms of your ability
to take care of things.
Mr. Pistole. I think in a nutshell, Senator, it really
comes down to making sure that we are investing smartly in the
highest risk areas. We can't be all things to all people, all
places, at all times. We can't mitigate all risks. So, let's
make sure that--based on the intelligence, based on everything
we know--that we are putting our money, our U.S. taxpayer
money, toward those highest risks.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Chairman, may I have the courtesy
of another quick question?
During the first 3 months of this year, there were an
unusually high number of breaches at Newark Liberty. At a
meeting in April, you and the newly appointed Federal Security
Director at Newark Airport indicated TSA would provide a report
on specific actions taken at Newark to improve security and cut
breaches. Can you tell me when we can expect this report to be
available?
Mr. Pistole. It should be available in the next, let's say
30 days. I just saw the draft yesterday. I believe it's ready.
I spoke with Don Drummer, the Federal Security Director there
this morning about it, and he is ready to brief you as soon as
your schedule allows.
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks Mr. Chairman.
Thanks, Mr. Pistole.
The Chairman. Thank you Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Blunt?
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pistole, I want to talk almost exclusively about the
Screening Partnership Program.
And I may have some written questions that I'll want to
submit if we don't get through with this discussion today,
which we may not.
Senator Blunt. When that program was created, it was
created intentionally to see what would happen if there is a
private sector alternative out there. Now, who--does the
airport come to you if they want to try that, and they say,
we'd like you to bid this process for us with someone other
than the TSA that's running it now? Or, I guess they might also
say someone other than the private sector person that's running
it now. But, you bid that out, is that right?
Mr. Pistole. Yes. The airport would come in and say, we
would like to consider something, somebody other than TSA to
run our airport operations. In the past we have looked at
those--and, of course, we have the 16 that were, from early on,
that are continuing, and with San Francisco being the largest
of those; Kansas City, obviously, being the second largest.
Senator Blunt. Mm-hm.
Mr. Pistole. And then a number of smaller airports. So,
that is a process.
And if I could just give you a little bit of background on
my decision from January of this year: I am clearly interested
in any best practices, any efficiencies, anything from the
private sector that can help us do our job better.
You look--we've invested billions of dollars in the private
sector in terms of technology and ways of accomplishing our
mission, including H.R. issues, IT issues, in addition to what
you see at airports--the in-line cargo systems, the baggage
systems; we also check 100 percent of all bags for explosives.
So, we've invested taxpayers' billions of dollars in private
industry to do just that.
That being said, as far as the workforce, my approach is
that I believe that TSA should be a Federal counterterrorism
agency focused on preventing another 9/11 or something like
that from happening. I have greater flexibility with TSA
airports in terms of surge capacity in case there is a natural
disaster like Katrina, or something like that--but if I need to
move people, I can't move any of the airport personnel because
they are a private company and that, and there's, many of them
have their own rules and things, so I'm limited in that.
The other part is trying to push out classified
intelligence to as many people as we can, so I've expanded the
number of people within TSA who have access to classified
information to help them make better judgments and decisions.
So that being said, that's my general philosophical
approach. But I am open to new applications from airports.
We've approved, I believe, five renewals of those 16 this year,
so I want to keep those in place, assuming they're doing the
best possible job.
I would note, even those privatized airports, there's been
some arguments made that say, well, we could save lots and lots
of money if they were privatized. Obviously, taxpayers' money
is still being used to pay those private airports. It's just
not going to Federal employees. It's going to private
employees.
So that being said, in each of the 16 airports that we
have, each of those, save one very small airport--actually
costs the taxpayers more than if it was a TSA-run airport. That
is because we are paying basically the same wages, but then
there's the overhead from the private company that--obviously,
it's a for-profit business--and so, we have those
considerations.
Senator Blunt. Is the GAO totally in agreement with that
analysis? I think they say you don't consider everything you
should consider in that comparison.
Mr. Pistole. GAO and others look at four different aspects
of the costing, and so it depends on what, if you're comparing
apples to apples or one of the four different models, including
such items such as, are they counting retirement costs--you
know, pension funds and things like that?
Senator Blunt. Right. OK. So, you've capped this at 16, is
that right?
Mr. Pistole. Not capped it. That's what it is now. So we
actually have, I denied five back in January. Two of those five
have come in for reconsideration. What I'm looking for--is
there a clear and substantial advantage to the taxpayer and to
the traveling public, obviously, in terms of security and
efficiency? So those will be, those are being reviewed, and
we'll probably have a decision in the next 30 days on those
two----
Senator Blunt. And three of those five, the, three of the
Montana locations, I think actually, your predecessor asked
them to apply for the private program, is that?
Mr. Pistole. I'm not sure about that. I have to look into
that, Senator.
Senator Blunt. I think that's right, I think I can make the
comment that TSA went to three of these airports and said, why
don't you apply for the private program? And then in January of
last year you said, we're not going to let you go to the
private program.
Mr. Pistole. I'll have to look into that, Senator, I'm not
sure about that.
Senator Blunt. You know, I think the view that the private
competitor doesn't give you the flexibility as a government
employer is outside of the idea that actually the government
would do a better job if the airport and the government both
knew that the airport had another option. And I'd ask you to
consider that philosophy as part of looking forward.
We would all understand transferring people from place to
place and a little more government control. But you have a lot
of control and you're the one that issues that contract.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Blunt. And frankly, competition is a good thing in
almost all places. And I believe in the 16 airports that you've
got it's been a good thing. I don't know of any Kansas City or
San Francisco performance areas that are outside the norm of
TSA.
Mr. Pistole. No. And you're right, Senator. They, out of
the 16, some are higher in security testing; some are lower in
customer satisfaction. So, it's a range. So yes. It's accurate
to say that, I would say----
Senator Blunt. That they're normative.
Mr. Pistole.--better or worse. So, yes.
Senator Blunt. Right. I'm out of time. I'll submit some
more questions on this.
Mr. Pistole. Thanks, Senator.
Senator Blunt. And it's a topic that I'm very interested
in, and I know the philosophy of having that out there.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Blunt. And I'm glad to hear you say it's not
necessarily limited to 16, though I think the overall
philosophy that the government can do this better is not
necessarily the right philosophy.
Thank you for the extra time, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Blunt.
Senator Cantwell?
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pistole, there's a story in Washington State about a
gap in security related to railcars and sulphuric acid and
other powerful corrosives that can release toxic vapors. I
don't know if you've read or seen about this, but basically a
train was left idle but running for 6 hours, at least
physically unattended. So, that brings up a couple of
questions.
What can TSA do to work with the Federal Railroad
Administration to make sure that there aren't these kind of
gaps in security in the system?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator. Yes, I understand the FRA
has initiated an investigation based on that to see what safety
issues were addressed.
Obviously, our focus is on security from the standpoint of,
is what's on that train considered a toxic inhalation hazard?
Is it something that can be used by terrorists as a weapon, if
you will, against our people? And so, we've worked very closely
with the rail industry--and in fact, over the last 2 years,
they, with our strong support and encouragement, have reduced
the toxic inhalation hazard in urban areas, which is the
primary hazard, by over 90 percent by doing simple things, such
as securing the locomotive through various means; not parking
the trains overnight. For example, it used to be done just
within a half mile of here, of the Capital. So, not leaving
those railcars with toxic inhalation hazards in them close by
where they could be used as some type of weapon. So, that's
been a positive.
I know a little bit about the situation, basically what
I've read. So, we will work with FRA to make sure that those
type of situations do not repeat.
Senator Cantwell. So, you do think it's a problem?
Mr. Pistole. I think it's an issue that needs to be
addressed both from a safety and security perspective, yes.
Senator Cantwell. OK. And then, just that, you know, that
high threat urban area?
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Senator Cantwell. This is a picture of Puget Sound, and
what that definition looks like.
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Senator Cantwell. But in this particular case, this train
was left 30 miles from a city of nearly a half a million
people. And, I think, Tacoma, which is right here, would take
it kind of personally that they are left out of a high threat
urban area. So, it's a very populous area, so you had to draw
the line somewhere. But the notion that somebody could leave a
train with those kinds of chemicals unattended in Tacoma would
be shocking for people to find out. So, I think this, too,
needs to be addressed, this high threat area definition, and
the materials that, you know, need further regulation, both of
those. Would you agree?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, absolutely, Senator. I'll look into
those, and especially as it relates to Tacoma, if that is the
way that the rules are written, I'll review those with our
folks in FRA.
Senator Cantwell. And I think in this case, the train was
left outside of Spokane or not far from Spokane, so I mean, I
don't think Spokane qualifies for this either, and yet there's
a lot of rail traffic that goes through there. And I think a
lot of people in Spokane would say, wait a minute, we're not
part of this protection?
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Cantwell. So if you could get us answers, that
would be great.
Mr. Pistole. I will do that, Senator.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell.
Senator Ayotte.
STATEMENT OF HON. KELLY AYOTTE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to ask you, Mr. Pistole, to give us an update
on the report that was issued by the GAO addressing the
transportation worker identification card, and the fact that
TSA has failed to implement and evaluate the program to make
sure that only qualified individuals are having access to our
ports and NTSA-regulated facilities.
And one of the biggest concerns of the GAO report was that
you had not evaluated the effectiveness of the program. And
when you last came before our committee, I expressed concern
that we were giving people a perception of greater safety,
rather than the reality of greater safety, if we weren't
measuring the effectiveness of this program.
So, can you tell us where we are 6 months later with
respect to the GAO findings on the TWIC program?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, thank you, Senator. So, the good news
about the TWIC program is that we are doing vetting and
background checks for approximately 2 million workers--
particularly dock workers, port workers. So, we know who those
people are, and we're not allowing people who are on a
terrorist watch list or anything to get those cards. Some do
have criminal records, and there is a list of disqualifying
felonies that would keep somebody from getting a TWIC card.
The challenge has really been in the deployment of the card
readers, which makes it so it's not simply a flash pass, if you
will, so you can just show the card, because there's not a
viable card reader.
The U.S. Government had a number of challenges working with
both industry in terms of developing the card readers that
could withstand conditions across the U.S.--for example, in
Portsmouth or perhaps in New Orleans, or even Anchorage or
something. So, the, part are those challenges.
The others was collecting enough data from the dock workers
themselves to say, OK, is this going to work? Do you have to
actually enter the card? Do you have to, you know, do a key? Or
something like that.
So the GAO report you referenced, I think they had six
recommendations. We agreed with those recommendations. Our
challenge is to make sure we can get our process done so the
Coast Guard, which has responsibility for actually operating
the card readers once they are installed, along with the port
authorities and the companies, have a viable system that is not
simply a flash pass or something that appears to give better
security than it does.
So right now, you're absolutely right. It is not, the
intent of Congress has not been completed to provide the best
possible security at the ports and it is a continuing process.
Senator Ayotte. So you would agree me we still have a long
way to go?
Mr. Pistole. I would agree with that.
Senator Ayotte. And what about the issue of, we're in a
position where many of the people who have been enrolled are
actually going to be up for renewal in 2012, which I think you
and I talked about before, which, again, millions of workers
are going to be making trips, and sometimes it's difficult for
them. And how do, where do they go get this renewal? And
particularly, since we're asking them to do it in the context
of a program right now, where we haven't measured the
effectiveness; we don't have the card readers in place to know
that we're really even doing anything to protect port security.
So, can you help me with that piece of it, as well?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, and I agree, Senator. I mean, it's
frustrating to think that if you applied for, paid for, and
received a TWIC card 5 years ago, and you're up for renewal and
you haven't even been able to use it, that does not reflect
well on the United States Government. So, that is something
that is frankly disappointing, and I'm focused on trying to
make sure that we can at least get the cards online, such as
with card readers in certain ports. Some work well; some,
again, need some refinement.
The way forward is, as I mentioned, to get that done, get
all this done. And what I'm looking at is, do we need to make
some type of modification in terms of the renewals? If people
haven't been able to use them, do we extend the time period
until they can use them? Or some other options there.
Senator Ayotte. Well, I would certainly be interested in
your keeping the Committee updated going forward in terms of
the effectiveness of this program, and whether or not we have
to take a different approach if we aren't able to implement the
card reader system in an effective way, so that we're not
giving people the perception, again, of greater safety, but the
reality is very different.
So I appreciate your coming before the Committee today.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
The Chairman. Next will be Senator Klobuchar.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And it's good to see you, Administrator.
Mr. Pistole. Senator.
Senator Klobuchar. I was saying good things about you at
our Judiciary hearing. I don't know if you heard that.
Mr. Pistole. I did not hear that. Thank you very much.
Senator Klobuchar. OK, well, I'm glad I got to tell you
that.
Mr. Pistole. Noted, thank you.
Senator Klobuchar. It was just, we had a few grumpy
senators--not that we ever do--about the work of your
employees. And I just have found that there has been a huge
change in morale, and I think you're doing a good job. And I
also liked how you defended them when there were questions
raised. It's always legitimate to raise questions. But it's
been my impression, someone that works with them every day,
that they have incredibly hard work.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you.
Senator Klobuchar. They have incredibly hard jobs and do a
good job.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator. The men and women at TSA
appreciate that. Thank you.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you.
Now, I was also pleased to see that you have chosen the
Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport to be one of three airports where
you're rolling out the Pre3 program. I know you've done some
other ones, as well, to pre-screen certain known air travelers.
We have a hub, a successful airport that we love. And I
wondered if you could talk to us about how this will work.
What's the timeline for the rollout?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, thank you, Senator.
So, Minneapolis will be in January or February, so we're
working with the airport and the airline. Because one of the
things we want to make sure is that we can provide what I
believe are the services that will be attendant to this. So,
what's involved is, at certain checkpoints it will be a
dedicated lane for those people who are part of TSA Pre3, or
part of Global Entry.
And then they are allowed to go to that dedicated lane.
They would have their boarding pass in their hand, with the
barcode embedded with the information. And that's why the
airlines were critical partners in this, along with the
airport. So they would go to that checkpoint and have their
boarding pass scanned. And assuming they're part of this low
risk category, then they would be able to keep their jacket on,
belt on, shoes on, their 3-1-1 liquids in their bag, and the
laptop in their briefcase as possibilities.
There are no guarantees in this, because we will do random
and unpredictable searches. Even though nine times you've
traveled that way, on the tenth time you may be asked just to
go through regular screening. But that's the whole intent as we
separate those that we know more about, because they
voluntarily share information.
Senator Klobuchar. And then, what kind of information do
you have to provide ahead of time? Is it biometric data, or
what is it?
Mr. Pistole. If you go through CBP's Global Entry Program,
including Nexus or Sentri, which is on the Canadian and Mexican
borders, then yes. You do biometrics you submit to an
interview; criminal history check and some other issues; which
allows you to re-enter the country from a foreign travel on an
expedited basis also.
Senator Klobuchar. How many people are in it at the few
airports you've already started it in?
Mr. Pistole. Hundreds of thousands are eligible. Right now
it's just domestic-to-domestic. So if, for example, somebody's
flying from Minneapolis to Amsterdam, they would not qualify
for this. It's only, we're going to make sure we get it right
domestically first. There's a lot of interest from overseas,
particularly the EU, with all the flights back and forth. But I
want to make sure we get it right here, domestically, before we
afford that benefit to those who may be coming here from
overseas, and reciprocity there.
And so, but thus far we've had over 45,000 people go
through in the month since we started this in the four
airports--Detroit, Atlanta, Dallas-Fort Worth, and Miami.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Then also, you're rolling out this
stick image body scanner equipment, is that right?
Mr. Pistole. Well, it's not a stick image. We call it
generic outline of a person.
Senator Klobuchar. Oh, that sounds better. I just call it
what it looks like to me, but----
Mr. Pistole. Well, yes. For those who may have artificial
joints and things that, yes. It's a generic outline of a
person, addresses the privacy issues that have been raised in
the past.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. And so, this is software? I know
you're trying it out at the Rochester International Airport?
Mr. Pistole. Yes so, we call it Automatic Target
Recognition, ATR. So it's simply a software modification to the
existing equipment with the same detection capabilities. But as
you walk through, after you walk through, you know, the few
seconds you're there, then you step out, you can actually turn
and see the generic outline of a person, which is the same for
each of you. And if there's an anomaly, that simply shows up as
a small rectangle.
For example, if you left, you know, a phone on your belt or
something--not on a belt, but on some place; or, as I mentioned
in my opening, it actually picked up a piece of Nicorette gum
in a person's back pocket. So, it can detect small items like
that. And so, that's the whole process. Passengers can see that
there's no need for remote imaging vision, a room to see that
image. And if there is an anomaly, it's simply a pat-down of
that area. So, as opposed a full pat-down, it's simply, OK,
there's something there.
For example, I went through recently and they said, can we
check under your tie? I said, yes, sure, and so, there's
nothing there. And so, I went off.
Senator Klobuchar. And how is it going so far?
Mr. Pistole. Very positive feedback from travelers who
appreciate the privacy protections that are built into it. And
the security officers find, again, that the detection
capabilities are the same as, or better, as we continue pushing
industry to strengthen their detection standards.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. And I'm going to ask my remaining
questions just in writing. But I did want to let you know,
Senator Blunt and I head up the tourism work that's going on in
the subcommittee. And we've been working very well with the
State Department to try to move some of the visa wait times.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Klobuchar. And so, while I know that's under their
jurisdiction, obviously we're also focused on some of the work
with TSA in trying to speed things up and make them as friendly
as possible for our visiting travelers.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you.
Mr. Pistole. Appreciate it.
Senator Klobuchar. Very good.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar.
Senator Boozman?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BOOZMAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS
Senator Boozman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We appreciate you being here----
Mr. Pistole. Thanks, Senator.
Senator Boozman.--Mr. Pistole. And I know that you and your
guys are working really hard to do the best you can.
I'd like to take a minute, though, to share a story. I have
a dear friend. This individual is a medical doctor. He's 91.
He's got metastatic prostate cancer. He was actually the team
physician when I was in high school. And when I was 14 I had a
ruptured spleen and he's credited with saving my life. So I
know the family very, very well.
He was flying back to Arkansas. It's a two stop flight. And
because of that he had to pack an extra sterile catheter.
During the procedures, he was patted down five times by five
different individuals. He was threatened with opening his
sterile catheter, and also threatened in not getting onto the
airplane. Finally, the chief TSA agent came and did the final
pat down.
Again, this guy's a physician. And he was decorated in
World War II. He's seen and done about everything; doesn't
complain about anything. But this really did shake him and the
family that was accompanying him. They just didn't really feel
he was treated like he should be treated. We've heard--and I
think it actually did jeopardize him mentally and physically,
the whole bit.
Today, we've had testimony about the pre-flight programs
for frequent fliers. Is there a program, or can there be a
program, for individuals like this that don't fly very often,
that are in this kind of shape that basically I would say we
can use some common sense, and----
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Boozman.--do some things to prevent these kind of
things from happening.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator. And I'm sorry to hear
about his unpleasant experience. And if you'd like to get me
his name I'll be glad to reach out for him personally to talk
to him.
Yes, clearly the goal is to focus on the higher risk. And,
you know, the doctor, your friend that you described, common
sense says is not a higher risk.
We've actually look at age as a factor in terms of who's on
the terrorist watch list. And I can, not in this setting, but
in a classified setting I could tell you exactly the ages and
the ranges. I was frankly surprised that there are some, let's
just say, quite senior citizens who are on the watch list.
That being said, it is such a small number that in a risk
mitigation and risk-based security approach, we are looking at
ways that we could recognize those of a certain age--and again,
I won't say, because I don't want terrorists to game the
system--but of a certain age that would be given an expedited
screening, recognizing that we don't want somebody to be
unwittingly used by somebody carrying something on, as has
happened overseas in the past.
So that is underway. I do want to manage expectations,
because it is quite a challenge. How do we do that? And how do
we make sure it's done evenly and consistently? But again, we
are looking at that.
Senator Boozman. Can we, is there the ability to, in
training our screeners, that they recognize some of these
objects that they come across? You know, the catheters?
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Senator Boozman. You know, that are consistent with this
kind of condition. Again, looking at these people--and I'll
tell you to be honest with you, if an individual, you know, if
the TSA agent can't look and kind of put all this together, if
he can't do that with the sick and elderly, then he can't do it
with somebody that really is a terrorist, because so much of
this is having that ability to feel like something's right. And
in these kind of cases you ought to feel like something--or,
something's wrong, rather.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Boozman. And in this case, you ought to feel like
this checks out; I need to do something more important.
Mr. Pistole. It's a good point, Senator. And I would just
note that the checkpoint, obviously, is just one of the many
layers of security that we use. And hopefully, a putative
terrorist is going to be on somebody's radar before they ever
get to a U.S. airport or coming to the U.S. So, whether it's
CIA, NSA, FBI information about investigations, hopefully that
person will be identified. If that's not the case, and a
person--you can call them a clean skin--a domestic terrorist
who's not on anybody's radar, gets in the airport and tries to
do something--then it comes down to the men and women of TSA to
provide that security, or the Federal Air Marshals onboard.
But the whole goal is to provide more common sense and say,
OK, how can we differentiate those that we can make some
judgments--again, not risk elimination, but some informed
judgments, and say, the great likelihood is this person's not a
terrorist. And so what can we do to facilitate their travel
rather than hinder the travel?
Senator Boozman. Right. And perhaps we can use the lessons
that we've learned with the 12 and under, and say we've got a
problem here. And, again, use the same kind of reasoning with
somebody that's sick and elderly in their nineties, that
obviously, looking at the age, looking at the condition, the
things that they're carrying.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Boozman. And then again, like with a sterile
catheter that you need to exist, you know, not exist, but to
function, you know, on the rest of your trip, to put you in
grave distress----
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Boozman.--to have the common sense not to threaten.
So, thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pistole. Thanks, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Boozman.
Senator McCaskill?
STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE McCASKILL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Can you tell me, Mr. Pistole, what is the ratio of workers
to scanning machines in the airport? How many workers does it
take to run a machine?
Mr. Pistole. So, if you're talking about a walk-through
metal detector, there's----
Senator McCaskill. No, no. I mean the scanners.
Mr. Pistole. The advanced imaging technology. So, the
budget--I'd have to make sure I have this right, but I believe
it was five people that were budgeted for the advanced imaging
technology, with the belief that we would have the ATR
capability in Fiscal Year 2012. And so, that's what we're
building to. And that figure is based on--and I stand to be
corrected on that by staff if that's not right. I'm thinking 5,
5.5.
That is not just at one time and place, so that includes 7
days a week for however many hours a day that airport
checkpoint is open; includes leave; includes all those things.
But to adequately staff, to make sure that we don't have 2-hour
waits, then I believe that's what it is. Again, I stand to be
corrected by staff on that.
Senator McCaskill. Well, I've gotten different answers.
I've gotten, Secretary Napolitano said it would be six, more
than six screeners per machine. I think your staff has told my
staff 6.25.
Mr. Pistole. OK.
Senator McCaskill. In the budget for 2012, you have
requested a total of 275 AIT scanners and 510 positions, which
really concerns me.
And the reason is, is that, I am in commercial airports at
least twice a week, almost every week. And these days it feels
like I'm there three, four, sometimes--I took nine commercial
air flights in less than 3 days not too long ago.
And so I've become quite an expert on your checkpoints,
because I have an artificial joint.
Mr. Pistole. OK.
Senator McCaskill. And I will tell you that many, many,
many times they are not operable. Many, many times there is the
strap across them.
And I finally, not too long ago, I asked someone as I went
through, is it possible for me to wait until someone comes back
for the scanner? Because I try to avoid the pat-down at all
costs. I made a joke in this committee hearing about the love
pats I had to endure. I've got to tell you, they are, sometimes
they are just unbelievably invasive, and very painful for me to
endure.
And so I really don't want to have to do that. And so I,
the minute I hit a checkpoint, I start scanning to see if
there's a machine. In St. Louis, where I normally go through,
there's not one. And everybody's pretty good there, except one
woman. And if I see her coming, I just tense up because I know
it's going to be ugly in terms of the way she conducts her pat-
downs. And I just am confused as to why we are spending money
on this technology if we can't afford to operate it. And then,
second, my question is, if we're--I asked at one, is it
possible for me to wait? And they said, ``Well, do you have an
artificial joint?'' And I said, ``Well, as a matter of fact, I
do.'' And they said, ``Well, we'll open it for you.'' They
didn't know who I was. This wasn't because I was a senator or
anything. These people had no idea who I was. I wasn't in
Missouri. And they said, ``Well, sure, we'll open it for you if
you have a joint.''
And I'm thinking, well, do you have to know to ask? Because
there's no signage that says, ``If you have an artificial
joint, ask, and we'll open the scanner for you.'' So I need you
to address these things.
And why aren't we putting signs up and prioritizing those
people that are going to set the alarm off, no matter what,
that's going to cause extra personnel?
And then that brings me to my final point I'd like you to
address, and that is, why not more women? I have to wait a
long, long time because there are always more men available to
do the pat-downs than women. And even when I go through the
scanner, they always catch my watch. I actually had a man, as I
came out of the scanner that heard in his ear to check my
watch, and I had no sleeves on. So this was all that was on my
wrist. He said, ``I can't check it. I have to wait for a
woman.''
So I'm going, really? You can't look at my watch and see
that this is not anything to be concerned about--and he said,
``No, I have to wait for a woman.'' And so I had to stand there
to wait for a woman, which was a long time. So if you would try
to briefly address those issues.
Mr. Pistole. Yes, and thank you, Senator. And I'm sorry for
your unfortunate experiences.
The whole idea of advanced imaging technology is twofold.
One is to take the nonmetallic threats that we saw on Christmas
Day 2009 with Abdulmutallab, and frankly, to increase
throughput, because we are able to get more people through at
least that portion of it.
And we still have the checked bags--I'm sorry, the carry-on
bags--that we have to review. And that, frankly, takes longer
than it does the person. So, but we can get more people through
the advanced imaging technology than we can through the
walkthrough metal detector in general fashion.
It really comes down to each airport and the staffing at
each airport. So, if I could have staff follow up in terms of
where you've had those issues, and I'll find out----
Senator McCaskill. Almost everywhere there is a machine,
it, they may only have one going.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator McCaskill. That's the other thing. You've got to
figure out--OK, if I get in this line, will they let me walk
all the way over here? Almost always, with very few exceptions,
are all the machines working at once.
Mr. Pistole. OK. And then, I'll also follow up on the
signage issue, and the fact that if there is a machine that you
can simply say, may I go through that? And they say, yes, then,
yes, obviously the traveling public needs to know that--and
especially as we look at the holiday period coming up here.
I'll make sure that we are clearer on our signage, and more
readily available, on our website where we encourage everybody
to go look at--the website, to say, here--especially if you're
an infrequent traveler--here are the things you should be
prepared for, not only to help yourself but all your fellow
travelers who are behind you in line, who may be slowed down
because you're not.
Senator McCaskill. If you would look into those issues----
Mr. Pistole. I will do that, certainly.
Senator McCaskill.--and the hiring of women and the
disproportion of men and women.
And let me just say, I agree with Senator Klobuchar. The
TSA workers have a hard job, and they do a good job. But I'm
used to my privacy being invaded, because I chose a public
career; and I'm not usually one to complain about that.
But when you have the traveling public tell you that
sometimes these pat-downs are unacceptable, trust me, they are
not exaggerating. There are many times that women put hands on
me in a way that, if it was your daughter or your sister or
your wife, you would be upset. And just so you know that. Not
all of them, but some of them do. And the aggressive ones are
really unacceptable. And it's hard for me to get excited about
flying now because of that extra requirement I have most of the
time. Thank you.
Mr. Pistole. Duly noted, Senator. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Pryor?
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PRYOR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS
Senator Pryor. You want to get down to the bottom of your
list?
The Chairman. It's way down here, yes.
Senator Pryor. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Pistole, thank you for being here today. And I would
like to ask a few questions.
I saw you, what, a couple weeks ago in another committee,
so these a little bit of follow-up, and a few gaps that I think
we didn't cover last time.
But let me ask about the commercial aviation passenger fee,
you know, we know what it is. We know it's going up, et cetera.
But you guys, you know, do charge that to commercial air
passengers. But you also do rail and sea travel. Is there a
passenger fee for those things?
Mr. Pistole. Not that TSA charges. If it's a ferry, for
example, or something that would go internationally, there
would be a customs fee, perhaps, but I'd have to look into
that. Then, as far as a rail security fee, no, not that I'm
aware of.
Senator Pryor. You know, and I do the rail every now and
then from here in Union Station. Do you all check passengers
routinely on----
Mr. Pistole. We work particularly with Amtrak police on
that, through the VIPER teams, the Visible Intermodal
Protection Response, in terms of random and unpredictable
screening. And they would also work with Amtrak in terms of
training canines and funding on some issues. But, no, we don't
have primary responsibility, if that's what you're asking.
That's Amtrak police.
Senator Pryor. OK. That's good. I may follow up on that
with you on the side at some point.
You also in your testimony talked about some pilot
programs, like the voluntary passenger pre-screening
initiative, the known crew member program, and the expanded
behavior detection programs. We actually talked about these a
couple weeks ago.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Pryor. And, what are your timelines on these
programs? When will they be implemented? And how long is a
pilot, in your mind?
Mr. Pistole. Let me take them in order if I could, Senator.
So, the TSA Pre3, which is currently at four airports, and
we're expanding to the additional three--Las Vegas, LAX and
Minneapolis-St. Paul--in December, January and February, is
really a factor of how soon the airlines and the airports are
ready, both from a technology and a physical checkpoint
standpoint.
So my goal is to expand it as quickly and as efficiently,
with as much security as possible. It really does come down to
our partners that I mentioned, in terms of the airlines and the
airports, to do that.
As far as the known crew member, with the pilots in charge
of the aircraft, we are doing that at seven airports. We have a
90-day pilot, which goes into January, I believe, that,
assuming it continues to go as successfully as it has, then the
plan is to expand that nationwide as quickly as possible.
Again, there's some IT dependencies there that both the Pilots
Association and the Air Travel Association have done a great
job on, because one of the keys is that taxpayers shouldn't be
paying for that. And so, they have stepped up, those entities
have stepped up and done that on their own in partnership with
us.
When we do the honor flights, when World War II veterans
come into Washington to visit the World War II Memorial. So, if
you're on a charter flight, you go through identity-based
screening. That's from any airport in the U.S. that would come
here on a charter flight, recognizing them with the respect
that I believe we should, as World War II veterans.
The 12 and under is nationwide, all 450 airports. And I'm
missing one, I think, but, so the goal is to expand all the
risk-based security initiatives as broadly and as quickly as
possible with the best security.
Senator Pryor. OK. And then you have different evaluation
criteria for each one of those, to know how they're working and
how they can be improved.
Mr. Pistole. And thank you for that follow-up, because the
Assessor program is also part of that in Boston Logan and
Detroit Metropolitan airport. And I don't know whether we'll be
expanding that beyond those two, because I don't have enough
data yet to make an informed judgment as to the return on
investment for that.
Senator Pryor. All right. Let me switch gears if I can. And
that is, going back to 2003, the Congress directed the TSA to
issue new repair station security rules. And there's been a
long history--2003, 2004, 2007, 2008, now 2011--we still don't
have the finalized rules. My understanding is the FAA just sent
a proposed final rule for oversight of foreign aircraft repair
stations, but it's not shown up in the Federal Register yet. Do
you know anything about that, and could you update us on the
progress?
Mr. Pistole. Yes. I know that on the foreign repair
stations that we have, let's see, a total of 742 around the
world, 452 in Europe. And we have not, so we have done, we call
them ``visits'' of those 400 repair stations, thus far because
we don't have the authority to actually do inspections, waiting
on the approval of the final rule. So that has been, as you
noted, a very long process.
Senator Pryor. What's the process there? Why is it taking
so long? Because, I mean, I'm not just blaming you for this. It
goes back to 2003. So, I mean, this has been 8 years in the
making.
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Senator Pryor. It's going to be a great rule.
Mr. Pistole. Right. And it clearly goes to aviation
security and the interdependencies we have as part of the
global supply chain; and passengers obviously; the foreign
threats that we've seen have come from overseas thus far. I
think it's been a factor of the ability of industry to actually
put standards in place that were both practical and achievable,
as opposed to setting an unachievable standard, and then
working with FAA to say, ``OK, do you recognize their repair
station from a safety perspective?'' And then for us, from a
security perspective.
So we have those two standards which may or may not be
completely consistent, as I understand. But it has taken too
long. I mean, there's no excuse for that. And it is a critical
component of both Congressional intent and administration
intent for both administrations.
Senator Pryor. Do you know when the final rule will be
ready?
Mr. Pistole. I don't know, but I will check that and get
back to you.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Pryor.
Senator Rubio?
STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Good afternoon. I know you've had a long afternoon and have
answered a lot of questions. I'll be brief and to the point.
I would really like to focus on tourism a little bit.
Obviously, being from Florida we have millions of international
travelers. I was hoping you could briefly describe to me what
we do. Do we work with tourism, local tourism folks in
particular, in areas with a lot of international passengers to
train them for special procedures in the handling of
international passengers, how that might be different from
maybe some domestic travelers that are more familiar with our
procedures? I mean, do you find that to be a special challenge
in places that have a lot of international travel? And do we do
anything different with those agents?
Mr. Pistole. There's really two things that we've done,
Senator, as relates to Florida. One is our TSA Pre3 program
with Miami International, obviously with American Airlines. And
so expediting those that we know more about.
The other is, we've worked with a certain company that is
huge in Orlando that has huge entertainment facilities and
things like that--Disney obviously--to look at----
Senator Rubio. And Universal.
Mr. Pistole. Yes. We've, that's why I was not naming names.
Senator Rubio. To cover all our bases here, yes.
Mr. Pistole. That's right. In terms of customer service.
So, it's not just international travelers, but customer service
across the board. How do they do it? How do they also deal
with, for example, suspicious behavior of somebody who's in
queue, who's in line to enter a park or something?
So we've worked with them in a number of respects to say,
how do you do that? How do you provide the best possible
security, but in the most customer-friendly way, to make sure
that somebody doesn't come into a theme park with something bad
on them?
Senator Rubio. And then, just in terms of logistics, in
terms of how we lay out the security lines, you know, the
process for screening, et cetera. Here's what I found,
particularly in Orlando. I was in Orlando last week meeting
with their airport people. Maybe not last week, the week
before.
And one of the things about Orlando that's unique as
opposed to, say, Miami, Atlanta, Dallas, is there's not a lot
of connecting flights that connect through Orlando. Most of the
people are coming in and they're leaving from there.
Mr. Pistole. Their destination.
Senator Rubio. And so I think it adds a little bit more to
the traffic that you see through TSA, as opposed to airports
where people are connecting and some of the traffic's happening
behind the security lines.
What do we do for airports like that, that are so, such a
high percentage of arrivals and departures from that
destination, in terms of how we lay out the security lines and
the logistics of the process?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, and you've hit on a great point, Senator.
Because the physical configuration of a checkpoint is obviously
dependent upon the layout of the airport and what the airport
is willing to let us use in terms of space. It's not
government-owned space, and so we have to work with the airport
authorities and the airlines to say, how can we best fit our
security checkpoint in? And especially as we've expanded the
use of the advanced imaging technology, which require a larger
footprint than the walkthrough metal detectors? So it is a
partnership there. And it really comes down to the old adage,
``if you've seen one airport, you've seen one airport.''
Because each is unique. Each present their own challenges.
Senator Rubio. And finally, I know you've been asked a lot
about the TSA Pre3. One of the airports is Miami, which I
happen to travel out of a lot. Do you think I'd be a candidate
for that?
Mr. Pistole. I think you'd be an excellent candidate,
Senator.
[Laughter.]
Senator Rubio. All right. I'll fly in.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you.
Senator Rubio. Thank you for your time. I appreciate it.
The Chairman. Senator Thune?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And appreciate your
holding the hearing today on this always important subject.
The Chairman. We timed it in order for you to be here.
[Laughter.]
Senator Thune. And I appreciate that.
The Chairman. You're welcome.
Senator Thune. Thank you.
Let me, if I might--I know you've talked a lot about
probably most of these subjects already. But, in terms of the
Pre3 program, do you have any estimate of how much quicker you
could process passengers through with that? I mean, how much
are we talking about in terms of getting people through the
security process?
Mr. Pistole. Yes. Thank you, Senator. There are actually
two aspects. One, where there's a dedicated lane, which the
four airports that we are currently using Pre3 in, and three
that we're expanding to here in the next 3 months, all have a
dedicated lane. So that's one factor, that there's fewer
people, obviously, in that dedicated lane than in a normal
checkpoint queue. So that's one aspect. And that can be
anywhere from a few minutes to 20 minutes or whatever it may
be.
The other is the actual time going through security because
you're not, as we say, divesting as much. You're not taking a
light jacket off. You're not taking a belt and shoes off.
Somebody could go through literally in a matter of a few
seconds, assuming they don't alarm on the walkthrough metal
detector and there's nothing in their carry-on bag that would
alarm otherwise.
So if there are very few people in line, it could be the
most expedited, efficient process, again, allowing us to focus
on those that we assess as being higher risk.
Senator Thune. When do you see this thing expanding, and
how quickly will it move to other airports around the country?
Might we see, start seeing this as something that's utilized in
all the various----
Mr. Pistole. Clearly there's a greater application in the
largest, the category X, the Cat-X airports, those 28. And then
the next category, category one. The two, three and four are
the smaller airports--may not see as much, for example, in
2012, or even in 2013 because they don't have space for a
dedicated lane. They may just have a smaller checkpoint and
things.
But what we are looking at is, how can we do that in some
of the smaller airports that would make sense from a risk-based
approach? And there are some other options that we would rather
talk about in a classified setting in terms of some other
security screening options that would also facilitate this. But
again, I don't want to go into detail on that in an open
hearing.
Senator Thune. The assumption at some point is that the
people, I mean, in terms of getting to an airport before their
flight, this would reduce significantly the amount of time that
they would have to be there pre-flight to get cleared.
Mr. Pistole. That's true. Although, again, I'd try to
manage expectations.
Senator Thune. Right.
Mr. Pistole. There's no guarantee.
Senator Thune. Right.
Mr. Pistole. So I wouldn't want somebody to say, ``Well,
I'm part of Global Entry, and so I'm guaranteed that expedited
screening,'' because it's not a guarantee. It's a likelihood,
perhaps even a high likelihood. But again, it's, so I wouldn't
want somebody to cut it close and then go through regular
screening that time just on a random, unpredictable basis.
Senator Thune. OK. The Federal Flight Deck Officer program,
which will allow certain crew members that are authorized by
TSA to use firearms to defend against acts of criminal violence
in situations where you may have individuals that are
attempting to get control of an airport. I'm curious in knowing
the degree that this program has been successful. And it's been
appraised by several groups as having been highly successful,
and yet we've not seen any expansion of that program I think
since 2004. And so, could you kind of just comment on that
generally? And knowing that we have a limited number of air
marshals available, do you see that program as a cost-effective
alternative?
Mr. Pistole. I don't necessarily see it as an alternative,
but I am in strong support of a program in that it's another
layer of defense that is only partially taxpayer-funded in
terms of us, TSA does the training for the pilots, and the
retraining and re-certification of them.
So yes, obviously, in those flights that we don't have
Federal air marshals on, I think it is a good deterrent to a
possible terrorist to think, ``Well, even if there's not a
Federal air marshal, and I don't know that, but even if I can
get to the cockpit somehow, then there may be an armed pilot in
there who is going to not allow me to do what I want to do.''
So, I'm a strong proponent of it.
Part of it is budget-driven, so how much do we have to fund
the program in terms of training and resources? And then, how
many people cycle in and out of it so it's not a stagnant
group? But it is, I can say, thousands of pilots. And so, we
see that as a great force multiplier for us.
Senator Thune. OK. A final question with the Screening
Partnership Program. My airport in Sioux Falls, for example, is
using private security screeners. And I think you've probably
all responded to some questions about this, and whether it's
less expensive or more expensive.
I'm curious in knowing when you--we're in the transition
now between contractors. Does TSA have certain requirements or
standards that it sets with regard to these contractors as they
switch from one private security firm to another?
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Senator Thune. And in, with respect even to the employees
and the types of, you know, pay and benefits, those sorts of
things, who sets that? Does TSA set that?
Mr. Pistole. Yes. TSA sets the security standards first. So
obviously, any private contractor has to follow our standards,
all of our protocols, and all of that. They also have to pay a
similar wage to what a TSA worker would make. And what we have
found in the 16 airports--in all but, I believe, one airport--
that those contracts have been more expensive than they would
be for a TSA workforce, for several reasons. We've driven those
prices down over the years, and so it's closer. But it still
does cost taxpayers more to have the privatized workforce.
We've seen about the same results in terms of customer
satisfaction in the covert testing that is done at the SPP
airports as we have the other airports also. So, it's similar.
So, what I'm looking for is, is there basically clear and
compelling indicia or something to say, yes, there is a reason
to change from a TSA-run airport? In the colloquy we had
earlier, I described some of the philosophical aspects of that
also.
Senator Thune. OK. Thank you. I see my time's expired.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Pistole, just one more question from me.
The ticket fee amount is about 10 bucks round trip. That's
been true since 2001. I'm for increasing that.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. But that's not part of my question. You have
discussed a number of factors in the briefing of all of this.
There are a lot of things going on for you. There's a lot of
changes. The technology we've talked about here, you have that
large LASP thing, which is, has to do with general aviation and
many, many other costs. Could you answer two questions for me?
Number one, to what degree do you consider, as the
professional administrator of all of this, that you are
protected in the budget situation because of the nature of your
work financially? Not you personally, but your organization.
And second, if you are insufficiently protected and you
have a number of programs going forward which you might tell me
that you have the funds to continue to do for the moment, but
maybe that doesn't last very long and it takes a long time for
these things to shake down. What would be the cost to you
potentially if we did not raise that ticket fee?
Mr. Pistole. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your
support on that fee.
You know, Congressional intent, as I understand it, when
you created TSA 10 years ago was to have that fee pay for at
least some of the expenses, the cost of enhancing aviation
security across the country. And the fact that it hasn't been
raised since that time, you know, obviously the costs have gone
up. I am looking for every possible efficiency within TSA and
with our partners to say, are there things that we can do that
do not cause taxpayers to pay more and yet provide the same
requisite level of security?
That being said, I feel somewhat protected in the sense
that I believe everybody recognizes that what the men and women
of TSA do day in and day out is a critical security function
that needs to be done. Whether everybody agrees with how we go
about doing it is a different question. But the fact that
something needs to be done, and whether it's TSA or private
companies that do it, that is a cost of doing business in the
U.S. post-9/11. So, that's the simple fact.
Secretary Napolitano has been very strong in her support
for not adversely impacting any security operation. So, her
guidance and direction, and then working with OMB as to make
sure to say that we will look at any cost-cutting from issues
that, outside of the security arena. So, however we can do
that.
So, for example in the last 6 months I've been doing a TSA
headquarters efficiency review to find ways that we can work
more efficiently, and yet still provide the same high-level
security that the American traveling public expects. And that
includes things such as merging some IT functions, some
training functions, things that just are inherent within any
large organization.
So, I've been working on that, put a hiring freeze on
certain positions, capped other positions so people would not
be promoted until we can get through this budget issue. And so,
we're doing a number of things internally.
Now, that doesn't make a dent in the overall deficit
problem that the Super Committee is dealing with. But they are
things that I think get to the baseline goal that I have for
TSA--to provide the most effective security in the most
efficient way.
The Chairman. Well, I won't ask any more.
The last question goes to Senator Hutchison.
Senator Hutchison. Mr. Pistole, I just wanted to give you a
chance to talk about some of the privacy issues and what you're
doing about it. I think Senator Boozman and Senator McCaskill
certainly related personal experiences.
The general complaint that I hear is just about that
machine, the AIT machine. And if there's any way that it could
be shielded from other people watching while you're putting
your hands in the air and that sort of thing. So, I just would
like to----
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Senator Hutchinson.--follow up on that and see, what you
are doing to minimize that privacy invasion to the extent that
you can, while I know you're also addressing some of these
other issues that, you know, a lot of people feel.
I do want to say, having said all of that, that I have been
amazed at how wonderful the TSA agents with whom I have dealt
have been.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you.
Senator Hutchison. And I had a situation once where I did
have to have a pat-down. And you could tell they hated doing
it, but they were doing their job. Which we all understand. And
I just think they have been unfailingly polite in the instances
that I've been with them. So, I want to say that.
But also, the concerns that are raised in other areas. You
have the isolated incidents, and I just want to know what
you're doing to find out about things like Senator Boozman's
constituent.
Mr. Pistole. Well, thank you, Senator. And on behalf of the
over 6,500 TSA employees in Texas and their family members, I'm
sure they greatly appreciate your comments, and I will pass
those on.
Senator Hutchison. In National Airport.
Mr. Pistole. In National, too.
Senator Hutchison. In National Airport.
Mr. Pistole. Terrific.
Senator Hutchison. They've done a great job, you know, with
a lot of hardships from long lines and----
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Hutchison.--heavy traffic, and all of that.
Mr. Pistole. And thank you. I appreciate that.
So, I am a strong proponent of the privacy aspects of what
we do, and recognizing that we have the terrorist intent that
we saw on Christmas Day, and then what we see in terms of how
can we best go about doing that. So, we recently purchased 300
new advanced imaging technology machines. My specific direction
was that all new purchases such as that will have the privacy
filters built into them. We will not purchase any machines that
do not have that automatic target recognition.
So, the goal is to move as quickly and as efficiently away
from the old machines that do provide that grainy image of a
person, an individual, and give that generic outline of a
person. So, we have 245 or so that we're already equipped with,
the new 300 machines that we purchase will have that.
We are waiting on the manufacturer of the other type of
technology to finish their testing with us of their ATR
capabilities. They haven't demonstrated that quite yet. And so
as soon as that's done, all of those other about 240 machines
will be converted also.
So, the goal is to have every one of those AIT machines in
the country have that privacy filter.
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you.
I also have a constituent who is on apparently some list
because when she travels internationally--they go to Spain
every summer, and then when they come back, and back and forth,
this constituent is on some kind of watch list because she's
been detained for hours. She is 11 years old.
Now, there's got to be something that triggers when a child
is detained for, you know, some kind of similar name or
something.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Hutchinson. And I hope so much that you can assure
that something like that is not passing the common sense test.
Mr. Pistole. No. So, obviously there's some issue there.
And so, if we can get, follow up with that, and we can look
into that and try to get that addressed.
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you. Thank you----
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hutchinson.--very much for your time. You've been
very generous and stayed to the end.
Senator Boozman. Mr. Chairman, can I just say something?
The Chairman. Sure.
Senator Boozman. Again, I echo what, the comments that
Senator Hutchison said. My experience with the TSA has been
very, very positive. I think they work really hard. And, you
know, people don't realize--I mean, we go through the same
screenings as everybody else. They have no idea who we are or
whatever.
I do think that it's important that we help you and give
you the tools because, sadly, these episodes--like the 11-year-
old, the episode that I was talking about--these are the kind
of things that crop up, and then that becomes the public's
view.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Senator Boozman. And so, again, I guess my message is, is
that--I think all of ours on the Committee--is that we want to
help you any way we can to sort through these things and make
things as efficient as possible.
Mr. Pistole. I greatly appreciate it, Senator.
And thank you, Senator, also.
Look, the bottom line is, with 1.8 million people every
day, over 12.5 million people every week, 50 million every
month, over 625 to 630 million a year, we do have these, I'll
call them one-off situations. The vast, vast majority of people
go through effectively and efficiently. And so the goal is to
try to even reduce those one-offs so we can provide the most
effective security in the most efficient way.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. I thank you also, in closing this hearing.
And as I've told you privately and publicly, I think you're the
perfect person for this job. I just like the fact that you're
former FBI.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator, Chairman.
The Chairman. And I think that you're very serious about
it; you're very straight with us about it; you talk our
language; you don't obfuscate, and you don't make excuses. And
I think it's a real pleasure to work with you. It makes me feel
good about the future of TSA.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
support.
Senator Hutchison. And as well, I would say exactly ditto
to that.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator, much appreciated. I'll
pass it on to the hardworking men and women of the TSA. Thank
you.
The Chairman. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Hon. Olympia J. Snowe, U.S. Senator from Maine
Welcome back to the Committee Mr. Pistole, you're quickly becoming
one of this committee's ``frequent fliers''. As you know, the threats
against our transportation systems are varied, and not strictly
confined to passengers aboard aircraft. In recent months, threats
against rail and transit systems and our cargo shipping industries have
been discovered.
Indeed, I hope our conversation today will not be consumed just by
aviation security, because as you know, TSA is also the agency given
primary responsibility for surface and maritime security. In your
appearance before the committee in May of this year, you rated the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential, the ID document used
to secure our ports, as a 3 out of 10 in terms of its success. I'd like
to hear more about the work you have done to improve the program, and
what steps TSA plans to take in easing the stresses the upcoming TWIC
re-enrollment wave is sure to cause.
These other missions are a critical element of our overall security
picture, but TSA's primary focus remains the protection of our aviation
assets. The introduction of Advanced Imaging Technologies or AIT
machines was a critical misstep in the agency's public relations
mission, and many travelers still object to their use. More troubling
though, is the recent ProPublica report using data from the Army
Medical Command that indicates that while the radiation from
Backscatter AIT machines is low, it could still cause cancer. It is
critical that TSA regain the trust of the public by fully testing these
machines, and removing them from use until their safety can be verified
beyond doubt. TSA should immediately remove Backscatter Advanced
Imaging Devices from use, and rely on Millimeter Wave Detection devices
which we know do not increase radiation risks for travelers.
Mr. Pistole, TSA has stumbled too many times in recent years, and I
think you would agree that public faith in the agency has suffered as a
result. However, in the last few months, TSA has begun the
implementation of trusted traveler programs and a special crew
screening process. For these steps forward you should undoubtedly be
commended. I appreciate your leadership, and your candid assessments of
the Agency's successes and failures, but I would like to hear more
about your plans for communicating with the traveling public as well as
the industries that daily rely on your security credentials and
assessments to transact business.
As you know from your previous appearances before this committee,
aviation security is a sensitive subject for many Americans. Travelers
want assurances that they are safe, but privacy and convenience are
also top concerns. I applaud your efforts to address many of these
issues through the use of Automated Target Recognition (ATR), but
clearly, we have additional hurdles to overcome before we have achieved
a long-term security solution that effectively safeguards passengers
and cargo without unduly infringing on personal privacy and
convenience.
Three of the Millimeter Wave Detection machines will be installed
in Portland Jetport in January of next year, with another installed in
Bangor International Airport. At a cost of $144,000, these machines
come at a significant expense. As you've stated in recent hearings
before the Senate, TSA is still discovering between 5-6 weapons a day
in routine screenings. I'd like to hear more from you about whether the
AIT machines are the primary method of discovery of these weapons, or
if the baggage X-rays and traditional metal detectors are the primary
detection methods. I am also curious about the detection rates of newly
implemented ``chat downs'' occurring at Boston's Logan Airport. TSA is
tasked with screening more than 50 million passengers a month, and
resources must be allocated in a responsible and equitable fashion.
Thank you Mr. Chairman for holding this hearing which fulfills one
of our greatest responsibilities as a Committee, the careful oversight
of agencies that serve the public.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to
Hon. John S. Pistole
Question. As you know, requiring biometrics to identify travelers
have been called for in various legislation including the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004. The TSA has begun pilot programs that expedite
passengers (Pre3) and pilots (CrewPASS and Known Crewmember) through
security by having those individuals provide additional information to
the agency. I know that TSA is planning to expand these programs, but
will these expansions require biometric information to be submitted by
the users? If not, when will this occur?
Answer. There are currently no plans for the Transportation
Security Administration to incorporate biometrics into checkpoint
screening.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Hon. John S. Pistole
Question 1. I understand that the TSA Pre3 program will be expanded
to other airports in the coming years. Will all airports eventually be
eligible for the Pre Check program? What is the timeline for expansion
of the program?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
currently applying criteria, including checkpoint throughput capacity
and Global Entry participation, to identify other airports for the
pilot. TSA is also working with the airlines to increase known
travelers in order for them to participate in the pilot.
Question 2. As TSA expands the program, will TSA continue to enroll
new participants through airlines frequent flier programs? How will TSA
be determining what other potential passengers to include in the pre
check program?
Answer. Throughout Calendar Year 2012, TSA will continue to work
with additional airlines interested in participating in TSA
Pre3TM with their frequent flyer populations. TSA will
continue to consider various intelligence and risk assessment factors
when determining passengers eligible for the TSA
Pre3TM program.
Question 3. How will TSA leverage existing Federal resources, such
as resources that support screening programs operated by Customs and
Border Protection, to develop and expand TSA Pre3 in the most cost
effective, efficient and sustainable way possible?
Answer. As the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) expands
TSA Pre3TM to additional airports, one of the criteria for
site selection is whether or not the airport participates in the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Global Entry program in order to
promote the efficiency and effectiveness of the pilot. For individuals
who are interested in becoming eligible for TSA Pre3TM, TSA
encourages them to visit the CBP Global Entry application website.
Question 4. The Senate Homeland Security Appropriations bill
includes $10 million to help TSA develop a trusted traveler program.
How will this funding help expand the program?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration would use the
$10 million in the Fiscal Year 2012 Senate Bill to modify the existing
Secure Flight workflow to expand the TSA Pre3TM program
within Risk-Based Security (RBS). Implementation within Secure Flight
requires:
1. Making changes to the application workflow; and
2. Increasing capacity in the processing power (server cores),
development environments, and network bandwidth.
The change in application software includes the acquisition of
software for RBS rules creation and processing, the integration with
the existing core Secure Flight processes, the use of additional
population lists, and modification of the message response processing.
Secure Flight also requires additional hardware to expand core
processing and infrastructure to meet the performance needs.
Question 5. In the past, there have been difficulties communicating
to the public the latest TSA screening procedures and this has resulted
in anger and confusion at checkpoints. How will the TSA be informing
the public about the latest changes?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Office of
Strategic Communications and Public Affairs (OPA) engages in a year-
round effort to communicate to the traveling public about screening
procedures, policies, and technologies in place at airports nationwide.
During the busy holiday travel season, OPA accelerates those efforts
and hosts dozens of press events at airports nationwide to penetrate
local media markets and reach infrequent passengers who are traveling
recreationally around the winter holidays. This year, TSA has used this
opportunity to communicate with travelers about the TSA
Pre3TM program. OPA also incorporates information about the
latest screening procedures, including those being tested as part of
our Risk-Based Security initiative, to passengers as part of holiday
travel messaging.
Prior to the start of the TSA Pre3TM program, OPA issued
a national press release and posted web copy to its public website,
www.tsa.gov. Regional spokespeople from across the country held large
media events at each pilot location to communicate information about
the pilot to a wide array of travelers. TSA also leverages these
communication tools for other screening procedures, such as the
modified procedures for passengers ages 12 and under, the enhanced
behavior detection pilot program, and a known crewmember pilot program
to expedite screening for pilots.
Question 6. Concerns have been raised about the potential health
effects from the new whole body imaging scanners purchased by the TSA,
particularly the backscatter imaging machines. These concerns have led
to the European Commission recently adopting new rules, banning the
backscatter imagining machines at all airports in Europe. What progress
has TSA made in ensuring that these devices are safe, and have no long
term health effects? Passengers are concerned about new whole body
imaging technologies that they feel could violate their privacy. TSA
has developed Automated Target Recognition (ATR) software that can
increase the privacy of travelers that go through these machines, but
right now this software is not compatible with the older backscatter
machines. Will TSA develop ATR software that will be compatible with
the backscatter X-ray machines?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not
have concerns regarding the use of backscatter technology. Since the
original deployment of Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT), TSA has
utilized Inter-Agency Agreements with the National Institute of
Standard and Technology (NIST) and the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to further validate the third party radiation
studies that all vendors must submit prior to testing. The systems
emitting ionizing radiation, such as those using backscatter X-ray, are
tested at NIST and systems emitting non-ionizing radiation, such as
those using millimeter wave, are tested by the FDA. These additional
tests have been added to our testing process, which all systems must
pass in order to be placed on our Qualified Products List. The AIT
systems are tested by NIST or FDA for a minimum of 45 days before they
are taken to the airport for the initial operational test and again
before any major configuration changes are fielded.
In addition, the TSA Office of Occupational Safety, Health, and
Environment is working with Certified Health Physicists from the U.S.
Army Public Health Command to perform radiation safety surveys of the
deployed general-use backscatter X-ray AITs. The systems are checked
against administrative and radiation dose requirements of the American
National Standards Institute/Health Physics Society (ANSI/HPS) Standard
N43.17-2009, ``Radiation Safety for Personnel Security Screening
Systems Using X-ray or Gamma Radiation.'' All systems surveys to date
have been found to be well below the radiation dose limits of the ANSI/
HPS N43.17-2009 standard. In addition, the U.S. Army Health Physicists
performed a radiation dosimetry study to determine the effective dose
to individuals undergoing screening. The analysis of the data to date
shows that the effective dose per screening is well below the maximum
permitted for a general-use system under the ANSI/HPS standard (maximum
measured dose of 0.045 microsieverts (or 4.5 microrem) which is well
below the limit of 0.25 microsieverts (or 25 microrem)). Assuming a
person received the maximum dose measured; a person could receive over
5,000 screenings every year without exceeding the annual radiation dose
limit specified in ANSI/HPS N43.17-2009 (which is 25 mrem per year or
one-quarter of the recommended public dose limit of 100 mrem per year).
This would require an average of 15 screenings every day of the year.
Several groups of recognized experts have been assembled and have
analyzed the radiation safety issues associated with this technology.
These experts have published recommendations, commentaries, technical
reports, and an American national radiation safety standard as a result
of their analyses. This technology has been available for nearly two
decades, and we have based our evaluation on scientific evidence and on
the recommendations of recognized experts. Public meetings were held to
discuss these products with FDA's advisory panel (TEPRSSC), and the
American national radiation safety standard was available for public
comment both before its initial publication and before its recently
published revision. There are numerous publications regarding the
biological effects of radiation and the appropriate protection limits
for the general public that apply to these products. As a result of
these evidence-based, responsible actions, we are confident that full-
body X-ray security products and practices do not pose a significant
risk to the public health.
Strict privacy safeguards are built into the foundation of TSA's
use of advanced imaging technology to protect passenger privacy and
ensure anonymity, and TSA always looks for new technology that meets
our security standards while enhancing existing privacy protections.
TSA recently installed new software on all millimeter wave imaging
technology machines referred to as Automated Target Recognition (ATR)--
upgrades designed to enhance privacy by eliminating passenger-specific
images and instead auto-detecting potential threats and indicating
their location on a generic outline of a person. Areas identified as
containing potential threats will require additional screening. The
generic is identical for all passengers. If no potential threat items
are detected, an ``OK'' appears on the monitor and the passenger is
cleared.
By eliminating the image of an actual passenger and replacing it
with a generic outline of a person, passengers are able to view the
same outline that the TSA officer sees. Further, a separate TSA officer
is no longer required to view the image in a remotely located viewing
room. By removing this step of the process, screening is more efficient
and throughput capability of the technology is improved.
For units that do not yet have the new software, TSA has taken all
efforts to ensure passenger privacy. To that end, the officer who
assists the passenger never sees the image the technology produces and
the officer who views the image is remotely located in a secure
resolution room and never sees the passenger. The two officers
communicate via wireless headset. Advanced imaging technology cannot
store, print, transmit or save the image, and the image is
automatically deleted from the system after it is cleared by the
remotely located security officer. Officers evaluating images are not
permitted to take cameras, cell phones or photo-enabled devices into
the resolution room. To further protect passenger privacy, backscatter
technology has a privacy filters that blur images. Once Automated
Target Recognition (ATR) software has been tested and approved for
backscatter X-ray AITs, TSA will upgrade the currently deployed units
with ATR.
Question 7. The incident last month, where airport ramp crew at LAX
found a loaded handgun after it fell out of luggage is very concerning.
It is illegal to check baggage with a gun in it without following the
appropriate procedures. TSA staff has stated that the agency only
screens for explosives in baggage, and it does not screen for guns. Can
you explain how the law against improperly checking a gun is supposed
to be enforced without TSA screening for these weapons? If TSA does not
consider this to be an agency responsibility, who is responsible?
Answer. Passengers checking luggage that contains a firearm are
required to declare the firearm with the airline and must ensure that
the firearm is unloaded and properly packaged. In the course of
screening, if a Transportation Security Officer (TSO) has to open a bag
in order to resolve an alarm, he or she will seek to confirm that the
weapons have been declared and that they have been packed correctly. If
a TSO discovers that any of these requirements are not met, the TSO
will notify a law enforcement officer and an airline representative,
and the local TSA Transportation Security Inspector office will
initiate the appropriate civil enforcement action against the
passenger. TSA may assess civil penalties against passengers who fail
to declare, unload, or properly package firearms in checked baggage.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by the Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Hon. John S. Pistole
Question 1. How does the geographic coverage of the Seattle High
Threat Urban Area currently align with the significant population
centers within the Puget Sound region? How would its expansion to other
nearby urban areas, such as Tacoma, Washington, impact the safety and
security of freight rail and shipping operations?
Answer. In 2008, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
identified 46 High Threat Urban Areas (HTUA) with the publication of
rail security transportation regulations (49 C.F.R. Part 1580). The
geographic coverage of these HTUAs is generally defined as an area
encompassing the core city and a ten-mile radius from the city border.
This definition is consistent with the descriptions of eligible
metropolitan areas identified in the Fiscal Year 2006 Urban Area
Security Initiative (UASI) grant program. While the geographic coverage
of the metropolitan areas identified in the UASI program have since
expanded in scope, TSA has elected to maintain the boundaries as
defined in the rail security regulations. The expansion of the size of
the Seattle HTUA to encompass all or portions of the City of Tacoma
would not have a material impact on rail security. A review of the rail
security-sensitive material (RSSM) shipments subject to the provisions
of the transfer of custody requirement shows that only six shipments in
the last 12 months were delivered by rail in the Tacoma area and none
originated in this area. As TSA's rail security regulations are focused
on the security of RSSM shipments when transferred from the original
shipper to a railroad carrier, transferred from one railroad carrier to
another, and when delivered to a final destination within an HTUA, the
limited number of occurrences of these transfers in either the Tacoma
or Spokane areas does not warrant an expansion at this time of the
scope of the defined HTUAs.
Question 2. Despite a significant population and heavy freight rail
traffic, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not
consider Spokane, Washington, a High Threat Urban Area. What was TSA's
reasoning for excluding Spokane from this designation? How would a new
High Threat Urban Area in this region impact the safety and security of
freight rail and shipping operations?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has used
the list of areas eligible for the Urban Area Security Initiative
(UASI) as the basis for its list of freight rail High Threat Urban
Areas (HTUA). Seattle is the only city in the State of Washington that
has been consistently eligible under the UASI grant program.
A review of the rail security-sensitive shipments moving through
the Spokane metropolitan area showed that no such shipments were
delivered to, transferred within, or originated from Spokane within the
past 12 months. As TSA's rail security regulations focus on the
security of shipments when they are transferred from the original
shipper to a railroad carrier, transferred from one railroad carrier to
another, or delivered to their final destination, the limited number of
occurrences of these transfers in the Spokane area does not currently
appear to warrant an expansion of the scope of the defined HTUAs.
Question 3. The Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan annex
to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, released in 2011 by
your agency, states: ``Certain materials not currently classified as
RSSM [rail security-sensitive materials] may have the potential to be
used as weapons of mass consequence during transportation. A need
exists to specifically assess the potential for these materials to be
exploited in the physical state in which they are commonly
transported.'' To that end: Has such an assessment been performed for
sulfuric acid and liquid petroleum gas and, if not, are those materials
slated for consideration in the future? If so, what was the result of
TSA's assessment? In general, what are the costs and benefits of adding
new materials to the current list of Rail Security-Sensitive Materials
(RSSM) in terms of efficiency of freight movement and the safety and
security of freight rail and shipping operations?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
assessed the properties of sulfuric acid and Liquefied Petroleum Gas
(LPG) and the potential security risks they pose in bulk rail
transportation. A release of sulfuric acid is not considered to be a
significant security threat to widespread populations as airborne toxic
material. Sulfuric acid does not meet the criteria of a material that
is poisonous by inhalation as defined in the hazardous materials
regulations. Sulfuric acid, while it is a very corrosive material, has
a very low vapor pressure that does not present hazard to the general
population upon release; a release of a rail tank car quantity of
sulfuric acid would result in a pool that presents a local contact
hazard, due to the corrosive nature of liquid sulfuric acid with the
skin and eyes. While some aerosolization of sulfuric acid may occur
during its release, depending upon the method of rupture, it is
expected that the droplets would settle to the ground in a localized
area near the release site.
TSA has also assessed the properties of LPG and the potential
security risk it poses. While LPG is a flammable gas and does have the
potential to explosively combust in certain circumstances, the security
risk in rail transportation is relatively low when compared to
liquefied compressed gases that are toxic. Studies by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and other agencies revealed that it would be
difficult to weaponize containers of LPG due to the chemical and
physical characteristics of the material. Other factors also influence
the assessment of security sensitivity including the method of
transportation and the methods that could be employed to weaponize the
material.
Whereas highway shipments of LPG may be driven to close proximity
of the intended target, rail shipments of LPG are confined to a fixed
pathway. For this reason, TSA and the Department of Transportation have
identified LPG and other similar compressed flammable gases as
security-sensitive materials when they are transported in bulk by
highway, but not when shipped by rail.
TSA is cognizant of the costs associated with the special
provisions that rail shippers, carriers, and receivers must bear if
they ship, transport, or receive materials regulated as security-
sensitive. Before proposing adding any additional materials to this
list, TSA would need to conduct further analysis to develop estimates
of the security benefits.
Question 4. At the hearing, we discussed the investigative report
that included videotape of several trains carrying materials including
sulfuric acid and liquid petroleum gas at different locations across
Washington State that had their engines idling and were apparently left
unattended. Regardless that the specific materials do not fall under
TSA's jurisdiction, it does raise questions about lax security
protocols that can create opportunities for those who want to do harm
using materials that do fall under TSA's jurisdiction.
Mr. Pistole, how can TSA's surface transportation inspectors
provide better oversight to avoid these types of security lapses?
Answer. As noted, incidents such as the one in this scenario are
not specifically prohibited by Federal regulations. TSA does have
regulations (49 CFR 1580.107) in place that require railroads to have
an employee present when certain hazardous material shipments are first
offered for transportation, are interchanged with other railroads in
identified high threat urban areas, and are at the point of delivery in
identified high threat urban areas. In addition, there are Federal
safety regulations that require certain practices for idling
locomotives and trains with no crew onboard. Those safety regulations
are intended to ensure that a train will not unintentionally move. If
the required safety procedures are followed, a number of relatively
complicated steps would be required to put the train in motion. TSA has
examined the security risk associated with idling, unattended trains
and determined that such a scenario is relatively low risk from a
security perspective. TSA will continue to monitor and evaluate the
security risks to freight railroad operations, including the practice
of idling, unattended locomotives to determine any future actions that
may be necessary.
TSA works with the rail carriers to educate their employees and to
find ways to reduce the vulnerability of security sensitive material,
including identifying alternative processes or procedural changes that
can reduce vulnerabilities. TSA conducts rail corridor assessments in
urban areas to identify potentially vulnerable rail operations, such as
points where trains are temporarily left unattended while they await a
new train crew. In many cases, a minor change in the location or timing
of a crew change can greatly reduce the risk exposure of a train or
critical material. TSA will continue to work with the rail industry and
its government partners to identify and minimize the potential risks in
freight rail transportation.
Question 5. What steps will TSA take to ensure that these practices
are not widespread across the freight rail transportation system for
cargo that does fall under your jurisdiction?
Answer. While TSA has jurisdiction related to security for all
freight rail transportation, regardless of cargo, current regulations
focus on high risk concerns. For example, for Toxic Inhalation
Hazardous (TIH) and other rail security-sensitive materials, TSA has
promulgated regulations (49 C.F.R. Sec. 1580.107) that require the
secure transfer of custody and attendance of these shipments when they
are originally picked up by the railroad, when they are delivered to a
customer in a High Threat Urban Area (HTUA), when they are transferred
to another railroad in a HTUA, or when they are transferred to another
railroad outside an HTUA when it is known that the rail car will go
through a HTUA before reaching its final destination.
Question 6. There have been media reports that the TSA has not been
as careful as it needed to be in evaluating the health implications
associated with the use of Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) for
passenger screening at airports. Later this month ProPublica and PBS
are releasing the results of a joint investigation soon that suggests
significant risks were ignored. What steps did the TSA take to evaluate
the potential health risks associated with AIT machines before
deploying them? My understanding is that airport AIT machines are not
considered medical devices. As a result, they are not subject to the
regulations required for diagnostic medical imaging equipment. Did the
producers of AIT machines have to submit clinical data to the FDA
showing the device's safety? Was independent safety tests performed on
the AIT machines? Are you taking any other measures to ensure the
safety of the AIT machines once deployed in the field?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) properly
tested and evaluated Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) for detection,
operational, and safety suitability. Millimeter wave technology
screening is safe for all passengers, and the technology meets all
known national and international health and safety standards.
Furthermore, the energy emitted by millimeter wave technology is
thousands of times less than the limits in the Institute of Electrical
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) C95.1 IEEE Standard for Safety Levels
with Respect to Human Exposure to Radio Frequency Electromagnetic
Fields, 3 kHz to 300 GH and guidelines from the International
Commission on Non-ionizing Radiation Protection.
General-use backscatter technology was evaluated by the Food and
Drug Administration's Center for Devices and Radiological Health, the
National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the Johns Hopkins
University Applied Physics Laboratory. All results confirmed that the
radiation doses for the individuals being screened, operators, and
bystanders were well below the dose limits specified by the American
National Standards Institute/Health Physics Society.
TSA's current safety protocols require all equipment manufacturers
to comply with nationally-recognized safety standards to ensure the
safety of both passengers and operators. Each general-use backscatter
X-ray AIT unit undergoes a system inspection and radiation survey
before it leaves the manufacturing facility. The manufacturer must
perform a radiation survey on each unit once it is installed in the
airport. Additional radiation surveys are performed once every 12
months; whenever a unit is moved; after any maintenance action that
affects radiation shielding, shutter mechanism, or X-ray production
components; and after any incident that may have damaged the system.
TSA partnered with Certified Health Physicists at the U.S. Army
Public Health Command (Provisional) to conduct independent radiation
surveys and inspections to confirm the regular testing performed by the
equipment manufacturer.
Question 7. I understand you have been working with Secretary
Napolitano to improve security partnerships with foreign allies since
the Christmas Day and Yemeni based bomb plots. I have a strong
appreciation for these efforts--SeaTac Airport is a major international
gateway, and an incident there would have a chilling effect on commerce
in my state. Within the confines of this public forum, could you give
me a better idea of the efforts you are pursuing with foreign
governments and international organizations, such as the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), to strengthen international
aviation security? What are the major obstacles you are encountering
with foreign governments and international organizations? Has the TSA
given appropriate consideration to tightening the standards they use to
certify security at foreign airports or increasing its oversight of
security compliance at foreign airports?
Answer. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) works with the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and appropriate civil
aviation authorities of foreign governments to address aviation
security concerns on passenger and cargo flights. TSA supports ICAO's
Aviation Security Branch and the U.S. Ambassador to ICAO through
membership and leadership on working groups and ad hoc study groups on
aviation and supply chain security. TSA's Office of Global Strategies
leads the United States delegation on the ICAO Aviation Security Panel
of Experts, which is the body that advises the ICAO Council on
strengthening international aviation security standards and best
practices. TSA supports ICAO through capacity development efforts to
help ensure that states are trained to address security vulnerabilities
identified through ICAO's Universal Security Audit Program (USAP) and
sustain an acceptable baseline level of security. Through active
participation in the ICAO, bilateral engagement and with capacity
development, TSA supports ICAO and its Contracting States by helping
implement the objectives of ICAO's Aviation Security Declaration. TSA
also works bilaterally with individual states to improve compliance
with ICAO Annex 17-Security Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs)
which are the global baseline standards for aviation security.
TSA responds quickly to new and emerging threats by reviewing and
instituting new security measures and policies. There are some
challenges with ensuring that the international aviation security
environment keeps current with evolving security demands. TSA works
closely and diligently with the international community in order to
successfully address emerging threats through information sharing with
ICAO's Aviation Security Point of Contact Network, participation on
several key working groups, and in ICAO Regional Conferences. The ICAO
working groups include the Threat and Risk Working Group, the
Secretariat Study Group on Unruly Passengers, Working Group on Air
Cargo Security, and, working groups to update SARPs to address emerging
threats. These threats include cargo, supply chain security, mitigating
the insider threat (staff screening), updating international aviation
security training manuals, updating the Man-Portable Air Defense System
tool kit for use by States, updating ICAO's USAP, and furthering
capacity development amongst Member States.
In accordance with the requirements of 49 U.S.C. Sec. 44907, TSA
evaluates the implementation of civil aviation security Standards
Recommended Practices set forth in Annex 17 and Annex 14 to the
Convention on International Civil Aviation. ICAO Contracting States are
obligated to comply with these Standards. TSA is an active member of
the aviation security panel that develops and proposes revisions to
ICAO security SARPs. TSA also continuously reviews the specific
parameters of its airport assessment criteria to ensure that the areas
of focus, data collected, and analyses conducted accurately and
factually capture the security posture at each foreign airport with
direct flights to the United States. Moreover, TSA has developed a
robust risk-based scheduling methodology to ensure that those airports
that pose the highest risk to international civil aviation are visited
more frequently in order to verify that mitigation measures are being
effectively implemented and sustained.
Question 8. The first phase to get TWIC cards in the hands of all
those who need them to work at ports have been completed. The second
phase, the card reader to authenticate that the person holding the TWIC
card is who they say they are, is still a pilot project. I recognize
that you inherited the Transportation Worker Identification Credential
or TWIC program from your predecessors. What is the status of the TWIC
card reader pilots? What is the Department's back-up plan if the TWIC
card reader pilots are not successful?
Answer. The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)
Reader Pilot concluded on May 31, 2011. A draft of the TWIC Reader
Pilot final report is currently under review. Once the report is
approved, the Secretary will forward it to Congress as required in
section 104 of the Safety and Accountability For Every Port (SAFE Port)
Act. The TWIC Reader Pilot was designed to test the business processes,
technology, and operational impacts required to deploy transportation
security card readers at secure areas of the marine transportation
system. TSA's goals for the TWIC Reader Pilot included determining the
technical and operational impacts of implementing a transportation
security card reader system; determining any actions that may be
necessary to ensure that all vessels and facilities to which this
section applies are able to comply with such regulations; and
performing an analysis of the viability of equipment under the extreme
weather conditions of the marine environment. The Transportation
Security Administration determined that it had successfully met those
goals and concluded the TWIC Reader Pilot on May 31, 2011; therefore, a
back-up plan is not necessary. The results of the pilot program will
help inform the Coast Guard's reader rulemaking effort and comply with
the requirements of the SAFE Port Act.
Question 9. The ``Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007'' required that the TSA Administrator begin
implementation of a system to provide expedited access to sterile areas
for flight crews. Right now my understanding is that there are two
efforts underway to achieve this--the Known Crewmember and CrewPASS
programs. What is the status of these pile programs?
Answer. The Known Crewmember pilot program is a joint initiative
between the airline industry and the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA). This program allows uniformed pilots from 22
airlines to show two forms of identification that are checked against a
database called the ``Cockpit Access Security System,'' which confirms
that the pilot is recognized for access. As of early November 2011, 10
weeks into the pilot, more than 100,000 pilots have been cleared
through the process, with an average of over 2,500 approvals per day.
A similar system, the Crew Personnel Advanced Screening System, was
approved by TSA in 2009. It is currently in operation at airports in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Columbia, South Carolina; and Baltimore,
Maryland.
Question 10. My understanding is that the White House Office of
Management and Budget is reviewing TSA's proposed rules resulting from
its Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Large Aircraft
Security Program? Is this the case? If so, what is the timeline and
process from here? According to press accounts, Douglas Hofsass, one of
TSA's deputy assistant administrators said ``the new version will focus
on securing the aircraft, knowing who the passengers are, vetting the
pilots and allowing an appropriate weight that allows the operators the
flexibility to run their businesses and gives the TSA some security
assurances, particularly based on what weight of aircraft poses a
threat.'' Could you please elaborate on that statement for the
Committee?
Answer. The Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (SNPRM) is
currently under administrative review by the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). At
this time, TSA estimates the SNPRM to be released for public comment in
2012.
After considering comments on the Notice of Proposed Rule Making
(NPRM) issued in 2008 and meeting with stakeholders, TSA decided to
revise the proposals in the NPRM. TSA is considering alternatives to
several proposals based on its review of the comments received.
Question 11. The Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) has been
recognized as an extremely successful component of the layered aviation
security system in the U.S. While the program includes many thousands
of armed pilots, it is managed by a very small number of people and was
negatively impacted by insufficient budget in the past year. Do you
have a plan to make sure training is available to new applicants to the
FFDO program? What about recurrent training for existing FFDOs?
Answer. In Fiscal Year 2012, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) Office of Law Enforcement plans to offer training
to an estimated 250 new Federal Flight Deck Officers (FFDOs) as well as
provide recurrent training to thousands of pilots.
Question 12. Currently, commercial aviation passenger pay a $2.50
security fee per segment flown, limited to $5 per one-way flight. The
fee was established after the 9/11 terrorist attacks to help fund the
cost of increased aviation security. The President has proposed to
effectively double the fee now and triple it to $15 by 2017. What
percentage of aviation security costs are covered by the current fees?
Answer. In Fiscal Year 2011, approximately 25 percent of aviation
security costs were covered through collections from the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) September 11th Security Fee (9/11 Fee)
and another 5 percent of aviation security costs were covered through
collections from the TSA Aviation Security Infrastructure Fee (Air
Carrier Fee).
Question 13. What percentage of aviation security costs would be
covered under the President's plan?
Answer. Under the President's proposal to the Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction, the way in which the fee is collected
is changed, moving from a ``per enplanement'' to a ``per one-way trip''
structure. As such, passengers would only be charged once per one-way
trip, as opposed to the current structure in which passengers can be
charged up to twice per one-way trip. This results in a maximum fee of
$7.50 in 2017, a fee increase of $5.00 for those currently paying $2.50
for a non-stop flight, and an increase of $2.50 for those currently
paying $5.00 for multiple enplanements (i.e., connecting flights)
during a one-way trip. It has been estimated that TSA aviation security
fees would recover approximately 75 percent of aviation security costs
over ten years, some of which would be returned to the General Fund as
mandatory savings, and the rest of which would be applied as offsetting
collections to TSA's appropriations.
Airlines have raised concerns that they will not be able to pass
these fees through to consumers and will have to absorb the additional
cost. The result may be that they choose to further reduce capacity.
Question 14. What do you say to the airlines' concerns?
Answer. The President's proposal is to adjust the 9/11 Fee, which
is paid directly by consumers (passengers) at the time of ticket
purchase. The proposal would help to optimize a funding strategy that
balances the cost burden.
Question 15. Do you believe that since most airlines began charging
passengers for checking bags, more passengers are carrying their bags
on board, which in turn, is slowing down the work of the Transportation
Security Officers?
Answer. Passengers are seeking to avoid checked baggage fees by
carrying baggage through the checkpoint. This increase in the number of
carry-on items per passenger, the number of X-ray images processed, and
the complexity and density of the images have resulted in longer image
review times. The increase in passenger carry-on items has impacted
checkpoint throughput.
Question 16. Can you explain how the requirements set out by the
TSA's Small and Disadvantaged Business Office are realized through the
agency's various funding mechanisms, including procurement contracts,
grants, cooperative agreements, and other transaction authority? Do the
Small and Disadvantaged Business Office's goals and requirements apply
to grant funds and transactions that are entered into with airports
through TSA's ``Other Transaction Authority''?
Answer. The small business goals of the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) Small and Disadvantaged Business Office do not
apply to Other Transaction Authority (OTAs) because the agreements are
typically with governmental authorities as opposed to private companies
or universities. Nevertheless, TSA ensures that airport authorities
follow their local procurement rules regarding preferences for small
businesses in the subcontracts awarded under TSA's OTAs. TSA also
requires airport authorities to submit a semi-annual small business
utilization report on their OTA funding. The report includes contracts
awarded to small business, service disabled veteran, veteran, woman,
and HubZone businesses.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Hon. John S. Pistole
Question 1. Administrator, as you may know, I serve as Co-Chair of
the bipartisan Senate Tourism Caucus and also as Chair of the Commerce
Subcommittee on Innovation, Competitiveness and Export Promotion which
has jurisdiction over tourism. I am focused on making America more
competitive in the global travel market and recently introduced the
International Tourism Facilitation Act to address the problem of delays
in the processing of tourist visas. I've been working closely with the
State Department to find ways for them to expedite visa processing
while maintaining a priority on national security interests. I
understand the TSA is not involved with processing visas for
international visitors; however, the TSA plays an important role in
screening foreign travelers. Since maintaining security is a chief
priority of mine, do you have any recommendations or thoughts regarding
how best to ensure full security alongside expedited processing of
foreign tourists?
Answer. Foreign passengers traveling on domestic air carriers and
international air carriers, both inbound and outbound from the United
States, are vetted under the Transportation Security Administration's
(TSA) Secure Flight system. Responsibilities for processing visa
applications lie primarily with the Department of State (DOS);
therefore, TSA defers to DOS.
Question 2. Administrator, in the past I've heard concerns from
airline pilots over delays they face during passenger screening. I'm
glad to learn that TSA is working closely with the airline industry to
develop the ``Known Crewmember'' program to expedite security for
trusted pilots. Can you discuss the ``Known Crewmember'' program and
the success you've had in gaining participants over the past few
months?
Answer. The Known Crewmember pilot program is a joint initiative
between the airline industry and the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA). The current program allows uniformed pilots from
22 airlines to show two forms of identification that are checked
against a database called the ``Cockpit Access Security System,'' which
confirms the pilot's access. As of early November 2011, 10 weeks into
the pilot program, more than 100,000 pilots have been cleared through
the process, with an average of over 2,500 approvals per day.
Question 3. Is the program currently open only to pilots, and if
so, do you plan to expand the program to incorporate flight attendants
and other crewmembers?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
prioritized applying the Known Crewmember concept to pilots since they
are in control of an aircraft. The seven airports piloting Known
Crewmember will complete their activities in late January 2012. At that
time, TSA will have data to assess the effectiveness of the concept and
will determine whether it should be expanded to other crewmembers.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to
Hon. John S. Pistole
Question. The Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) program is
arguably the most efficient, cost effective layer of security in our
air transportation infrastructure, yet the budget has not increased
since the program's inception. FFDOs currently receive their initial
training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in
Artesia, NM. Due to budget restrictions, the TSA Office of Law
Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service (TSA OLE/FAMS) has proposed
pulling all FFDO training out of Artesia which could require building
more facilities and hiring new instructors in other locations. FLETC
Artesia has experienced instructors and outstanding facilities already
in place, which includes a static aircraft for critical scenario-based
training. Also, the room and board arrangements make it extremely cost
effective for FFDOs, who are required to pay for all of their travel
and meal expenses. With that in mind, please respond to the following
questions: In today's tight budgetary environment, why isn't more money
being directed to the FFDO program? The intent of Congress was to train
as many pilot volunteers as possible, yet the majority of the FFDO
budget now goes to keeping the FFDO force current and qualified. What
are your plans for increasing the size of the FFDO program? My office
has learned that the TSA Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal
Service has proposed moving the FFDO program out of Artesia, New
Mexico. FLETC Artesia is a world class facility that has dedicated,
experienced instructors using unique tools that include an actual
aircraft for training scenarios. These training tools and facilities
cannot be easily found or created. Given a limited budget, how can the
expense of moving facilities be justified? How would the loss of
facilities and instructor experience available in Artesia impact the
quality of the training FFDOs receive? Artesia offers a very economical
experience for our FFDOs who volunteer at their own expense to
participate in a program that is critical to our aviation security.
Rather than increase those expenses by moving facilities, has the TSA
considered giving FFDOs more options in traveling to Artesia, such as
re-opening the option to travel to and from El Paso, TX?
Answer. There are no plans to move initial training for new Federal
Flight Deck Officers (FFDOs) from FLETC Artesia, New Mexico to another
location. FFDO Recurrent Training will continue at the Atlantic City,
New Jersey and Dallas, Texas Training Facilities.
The President's Budget Request for Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 request
provided the resources necessary to sustain the FFDO Program at the
current services level.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Olympia J. Snowe to
Hon. John S. Pistole
Question 1. Mr. Pistole, I am very concerned by the recent
ProPublica report that indicates Backscatter Advanced Imaging
Technology (AIT) machines may increase the risk of cancer for some
travelers. While the data is not yet conclusive, it seems that a number
of scientists have pointed to the potential increase in cancer rates
because of this unnecessary radiation.
As you know, Millimeter Wave Detection machines, like those that
will soon be installed in Maine do not use radiation to detect foreign
objects. These devices can also be outfitted with Automated Target
Recognition software which masks images of passengers, and increases
privacy protections for travelers. It is my understanding that all new
devices purchased will use Millimeter Wave Detection technology. It is
clear that TSA has remaining concerns regarding the Backscatter
devices. With doubts about the health and safety of Backscatter
technology, why has TSA not removed all of these devices from service
until their safety can be proven beyond a doubt?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not
have concerns regarding the use of Backscatter technology. As a point
of comparison, one scan using backscatter technology produces the same
exposure as two minutes of flying on an airplane. General-use
backscatter technology was evaluated by the Food and Drug
Administration's (FDA) Center for Devices and Radiological Health
(CDRH), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and
the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. All results
confirmed that the radiation doses for the individuals being screened,
operators, and bystanders were well below the dose limits specified by
the American National Standards Institute/Health Physics Society. The
Center for Study of Responsive Law asked the FDA to comment on TSA's
statement that the general-use backscatter x-ray technology is safe for
all air travelers and on whether the FDA believes that a more prudent
approach for public health would be to convene an independent panel of
experts to study the potential health impacts posed by these X-ray
scanners. In their response, FDA states the following: ``Public health
is protected when general-use x-ray security systems that comply with
the applicable national radiation safety standard are used in
accordance with the requirements of use in that standard. Using a
general-use system as just described will result in effective doses to
individuals below the annual dose limits recommended by the National
Council of Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) for the general
public. In fact the dose limit per screening is far below the
negligible individual dose set by NCRP.'' The following is a link to
FDA's full response titled: ``CDRH response to Center for Study of
Responsive Law inquiry on people screening, November 5, 2010''--http://
www.fda.gov/Radiation-EmittingProducts/
RadiationEmittingProductsandProcedures/SecuritySystems/ucm
238024.htm.
Once Automated Target Recognition (ATR) software has been tested
and approved for backscatter AITs, TSA will upgrade the currently
deployed units with ATR.
Question 2. Were these AIT devices rushed into service at the
expense of the safety of the traveling public? It has already been
established that TSA's public relations campaign was a dismal failure.
Should the whole program have been held until proper scientific reviews
could evaluate the operation of these devices in real world conditions?
Answer. Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) was not rushed into
service. Prior to deployment, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) properly tested both types of AIT for detection,
safety, and operational suitability. Pilot testing of backscatter AIT
began in February 2007 and of millimeter wave AIT in October 2007. The
Department of Homeland Security and TSA selected both technologies to
drive innovation and competition. Millimeter wave technology screening
is safe for all passengers, and the technology meets all known national
and international health and safety standards. The energy emitted by
millimeter wave technology is thousands of times less than the limits
in the IEEE C95.1 IEEE Standard for Safety Levels with Respect to Human
Exposure to Radio Frequency Electromagnetic Fields, 3 kHz to 300 GH and
guidelines from the International Commission on Non-ionizing Radiation
Protection. General-use backscatter X-ray technology was evaluated by
the Food and Drug Administration's Center for Devices and Radiological
Health, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. All results
confirmed that the radiation doses for the individuals being screened,
operators, and bystanders were well below the dose limits specified by
the American National Standards Institute/Health Physics Society.
Question 3. What testing has been done on machines currently in
airports to determine the effects of long term use on the device's
complex machinery? Are machines regularly tested to ensure they do not
emit more radiation than is considered safe?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) current
safety protocols require all equipment manufacturers to comply with
nationally-recognized safety standards to ensure the safety of both
passengers and operators. Each general-use backscatter X-ray Advanced
Imaging Technology (AIT) unit undergoes a system inspection and
radiation survey before it leaves the manufacturing facility. The
manufacturer must perform an additional radiation survey on each AIT
once it is installed in the airport. Radiation surveys are then
performed once every six months; whenever a unit is moved; after any
maintenance action that affects radiation shielding, shutter mechanism,
or X-ray production components; and after any incident that may have
damaged the system. TSA partnered with Certified Health Physicists from
the U.S. Army Public Health Command to conduct independent radiation
surveys and inspections to confirm the regular testing performed by the
equipment manufacturer. The systems are checked against administrative
and radiation dose requirements of the American National Standards
Institute/Health Physics Society (ANSI/HPS) Standard N43.17-2009,
Radiation Safety for Personnel Security Screening Systems Using X-ray
or Gamma Radiation. All systems surveyed to date have been found to be
well below the radiation dose limits of the ANSI/HPS N43.17-2009
standard.
Question 4. Security changes following September 11 and many of the
subsequent attempts since have frustrated travelers who are forced to
remove their shoes and undergo significant scrutiny during the air
travel process. Limits on liquids, and new rules requiring removal of
shoes may have helped address immediate threats, but inconsistent
application of the new rules has frustrated passengers.
In October of this year TSA debuted the ``Trusted Traveler'' or
``Pre-Check'' program which allows frequent fliers to provide TSA with
personal information to create a more accurate risk assessment.
Travelers approved by the program can proceed though the checkpoint
with their shoes on, and their laptops still in a bag. Using better
intelligence allows security officials to more reasonably asses risk,
and provide passengers with a more user-friendly system. How can we
prevent the manipulation of ticket information to prevent misuse of the
trusted traveler program?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) currently
validates passenger identification using Travel Document Checker
procedures conducted by Transportation Security Officers. In July 2011,
TSA conducted lab testing of Credential Authentication Technology/
Boarding Pass Scanning System (CAT/BPSS) technology, which
automatically and concurrently verifies passenger boarding passes and
IDs that are presented during the passenger security checkpoint
screening process, as well as those IDs presented by airport and
airline personnel to access sterile areas. In September 2011, TSA
purchased a total of 30 CAT/BPSS systems from 3 vendors for testing at
a small number of airports throughout the country. The CAT/BPSS
technology will enhance security and increase efficiency by comparing a
passenger's ID and boarding pass to a set of security features.
Participants in pre-check still undergo physical screening,
additional random and unpredictable screening measures, and document
validation at the checkpoint. These safeguards combined with the other
layers of security, such as Secure Flight and Behavioral Detection
Officers, provide strong protections against manipulation of the
passenger screening process.
Question 5. Mr. Pistole, more than 8,000 Mainers have been issued
TWIC cards and will soon need to renew their credentials. These workers
who have already visited enrollment centers twice to obtain their
original documents will, under the current process, again be required
to take days off to travel to the centers in Bangor or Portland.
The cards issued to mariners between 2007 and 2009 will soon begin
to expire, and I can't help but wonder if we cannot improve upon the
issuance process for these credentials. While we will all agree on the
importance of securing our ports, I would like an explanation as to why
the TWIC card can only be picked up in person, while a U.S. Passport or
green card can be delivered via U.S. Postal Service? Will there be a
process that allows port workers who currently hold a valid TWIC to
renew their credential without revisiting an enrollment center? What
``lessons learned'' will you apply during the re-enrollment phase in
coming years?
Answer. TSA understands Congressional and stakeholder concerns with
requiring a second visit to the enrollment center to activate renewed
Transportation Workers Security Credential (TWIC). In coordination with
the U.S. Coast Guard which is TSA's partner in the TWIC program, I am
currently evaluating aspects of the TWIC program with a view towards
maintaining security of our ports and fairness to TWIC holders.
Because of differences in how they are used, the U.S. Passport does
not serve as a comparable document to the TWIC. When a traveler
presents a passport at a Port of Entry, a Customs and Border Protection
officer runs checks of the individual's data against government
databases to determine if any lookouts exist and compares the
photograph in the passport with the original source data from the
Department of State and the individual standing in front of them. While
a rule to require electronic TWIC readers is in development, currently
ports are not required to validate TWICs electronically. Due to these
differences, the issuance process--as it currently exists--for TWIC
necessarily differs than the process appropriate for issuance of U.S.
passports.
TWIC continually incorporates lessons learned to improve its
service and operations. For example, the TWIC program has been able to
eliminate duplicative security threat assessment (STA) checks and
reduces costs for many transportation workers through a determination
that STAs conducted for the Hazardous Materials Endorsement (HME), U.S.
Coast Guard Merchant Mariner License (MMD), and Customs and Border
Protection's Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program are comparable to the
STA required for the TWIC. As a result, these populations pay a reduced
fee when applying for a TWIC. Similarly, under its existing contracts,
TSA is in the process of implementing technical updates to the HME STA
systems to allow for TWIC holders to receive comparability when
applying for an HME. In addition, TSA has worked with its enrollment
providers to co-locate HME and TWIC enrollment services at
approximately20 locations across the country to enhance customer
service options.
TSA is also currently undergoing rulemaking that proposes to
consolidate and harmonize existing transportation worker vetting and
credentialing programs, to the extent possible under law, and include
new populations that must be vetted. This rulemaking effort is known as
the Standardized Vetting, Adjudication, and Redress Services Rulemaking
(SVAR, or alternately known as the Universal Rule). Through this
rulemaking, TSA intends to develop a framework that will establish
uniform standards, processes and fees related to threat assessment
services. The effort will also provide stakeholders, to the extent
possible, the ability to utilize threat assessment services that have
been previously acquired.
Question 6. Administrator Pistole, In your last appearance before
the full Committee in May, you gave the TWIC program a three on a scale
of one to 10, and you clearly noted a need for improvement in the
program's internal controls and enrollment process. During that
conversation, we discussed the redundancy of the TWIC with other
security credentials and screening programs, including Hazardous
Materials Endorsement, Merchant Mariner License, and FAST cards. Please
provide details regarding changes you plan to implement in the TWIC
program, or with these other credentials to reduce duplication of
screening and credentialing. In addition, how can we prevent the need
for workers to carry a whole deck of identification cards to do
business? Is the development of a credential much like the Federal
``Common Access Card'' in the works? How can we eliminate the
redundancy we find in many of these security credentials?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
undertaken several initiatives to identify and eliminate redundancies
related to security threat assessments (STAs) and credentialing.
TSA deemed that STAs conducted for the Hazardous Materials
Endorsement (HME), US Coast Guard Merchant Mariner License (MMD), and
Customs and Border Protection's Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program
are comparable to the STA required for the TWIC program. This
determination allows TSA to avoid duplicating existing STAs associated
with the individual and to reduce fees for transportation workers who
possess a valid HME, MMD, or FAST card. Also, individuals may satisfy
the requirement to undergo an STA to work at an Indirect Air Carrier or
Certified Screening Cargo Facility, by holding a valid TWIC, HME, or
FAST, or by completing the STA required to hold certain airport and
aircraft operator credentials. Under its existing contracts, TSA is
implementing technical updates to the HME STA systems to allow TWIC
holders to receive determinations of comparable STAs when applying for
an HME. Not only does comparability with these programs allow a reduced
fee to the worker, this option minimizes redundant STAs.
FAST Commercial Drivers must successfully complete a full
biographic and biometric background check plus a detailed face-to-face
interview with CBP officers at an enrollment center before being issued
a FAST card. In December 2008, FAST Driver data migrated from the FAST
Driver Registration System into the Global Enrollment System (GES).
FAST cards are Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative compliant
documents, and can be used in non-dedicated commuter lanes when
entering the United States. Each card consists of a Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) chip.
At the northern land border, CBP and CBSA through a joint bilateral
program conduct vetting to the drivers through law enforcement
databases prior to clearing applicants into the FAST program and
issuing FAST cards. By utilizing two databases, an addition level of
threat is reduced.
Additionally, TSA is currently undergoing rulemaking that proposes
to consolidate and harmonize existing transportation worker vetting and
credentialing programs, to the extent possible under law, and include
new populations that must be vetted. This rulemaking effort is known as
the Standardized Vetting, Adjudication, and Redress Services Rulemaking
(SVAR, or alternately known as the Universal Rule). Through this
rulemaking, TSA intends to develop a framework that will establish
uniform standards, processes and fees related to threat assessment
services. The effort will also provide stakeholders, to the extent
possible, the ability to utilize threat assessment services that have
been previously acquired.
In addition, TSA has worked with its enrollment providers to co-
locate HME and TWIC enrollment services at approximately 20 locations
across the country increasing efficiencies and providing more
convenient service options for transportation workers. TSA is in the
solicitation process for a new Universal Enrollment Services contract
to replace the current, expiring TWIC contract. The new Universal
Enrollment Services contract will:
Combine and consolidate enrollment centers to allow
individuals to apply for STAs for any TSA STA vetting programs;
Align with TSA's SVAR effort to allow reduced fees,
comparability and reduced burden of cost and travel related to
multiple enrollments for different programs; and
Provide more enrollment centers serving multiple populations
across a broader geographic range.
It is important to note that transportation operators and facility
owners make access decisions for their facilities and TSA cannot
control the number of credentials that they require.
TSA is currently evaluating aspects of the TWIC program with a view
towards maintaining security of our ports and fairness to TWIC holders.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Johnny Isakson to
Hon. John S. Pistole
Question 1. During our exchange at the November 9, 2011 hearing, I
asked about the use of so-called backscatter technology, which relies
on radiation to detect objects hidden under the clothes of passengers.
I referenced your statement at a prior Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee in which you said ``We will conduct an
independent study to address that.'' You had said during our exchange
that you were reviewing a draft report from the Inspector General (IG)
of the Department of Homeland Security that, at first glance, confirmed
the conclusion of previous independent studies that the scanners are
safe for all passengers. Will you please share with us your plans to
conduct an independent study in the wake of your review of the IG
report?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) currently
has a Rapiscan Secure 1000 Single Pose general-use backscatter x-ray
system undergoing a second laboratory evaluation by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to ensure compliance with
the American National Standards Institute/Health Physics Society (ANSI/
HPS) Radiation Safety for Personnel Security Screening Systems Using X-
ray or Gamma Radiation consensus standard. In addition, the U.S. Army
Public Health Command Certified Health Physicists performed a radiation
dosimetry study to determine the effective dose to individuals
undergoing screening. The analysis of the data to date shows that the
effective dose per screening is well below the maximum permitted for a
general-use system under the ANSI/HPS standard.
TSA is still reviewing the Inspector General report which has not
been finalized at this time.
Question 2. I recognize that security is a balancing act, and that
we must balance the free flow of commerce and freedom of movement with
security in the post 9/11 world. Historically, both DHS and TSA have
not done a good enough job of explaining its aviation security
regulations and policies to the traveling public, or to its field
representatives who are charged with enforcing them. For example, one
constituent relayed an experience in Savannah where he was told he was
now required to un-tuck his shirt when going through screening. He
asked when this new rule was implemented, and was told ``it has always
been this way.'' TSA, it seems, consistently fails to communicate these
changes, especially when doing so could probably speed up the screening
process and give travelers an idea of what to expect. If you travel
through 5 different airports, you will have 5 different TSA
experiences. As we go into the very busy holiday travel season, what
are you doing to ensure that TSA policies and regulations are properly
understood and consistently enforced by TSA field representatives?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration uses a multi-
faceted approach to ensure its policies and regulations are properly
understood and consistently enforced by TSA field personnel. Some of
those approaches are:
Recurrent training of Transportation Security Officers (TSO)
both in group settings and on an individual basis. This
training continuously exposes and updates employees to the
processes and procedures required to properly screen
passengers.
Daily shift briefings to ensure TSA field personnel are
focused and poised to accomplish the mission prior to starting
a shift. The daily shift brief updates TSA field personnel on
current security intelligence information, addresses pertinent
airport incidents, and includes information on changes that may
have occurred in standard operating procedures.
Frequent national teleconferences between TSA Headquarters
and TSA Federal Security Directors. This forum is used to
discuss critical issues, such as increased passenger loads,
standard operating procedure changes, and other challenges that
may result from a holiday travel season.
Continuous observation of TSO. Supervisory TSOs observe TSO
screening practices and procedures and correct any practices
that are not consistent with established protocol.
Distribution of information. TSA's operational network and
field leadership rapidly distribute information, best
practices, and new procedures along with its associated
training to TSA field personnel.
A National Standardization Guide for Improving Security
Effectiveness. This program evaluates and assesses performance
and subsequently develops individual and collective training to
meet TSA's standards and expectations for screening proficiency
at the individual level.
TSA will continue these approaches to ensure that TSA policies and
regulations are properly understood and consistently enforced by TSA
field personnel. As part of our continuing evolution of TSA as high
performing counterterrorism organization, I am consolidating training
and workforce engagement into one office that will strengthen our
efforts to address some of the concerns noted.
Question 3. What are you doing to ensure that they are properly
communicated to your customers, the traveling public?
Answer. TSA's Office of Strategic Communications and Public Affairs
(OPA) engages in a year-round effort to communicate screening
procedures, policies, and technologies in place at airports nationwide
to the traveling public. During the busy holiday travel season, OPA
accelerates those efforts and hosts dozens of press events at airports
nationwide to penetrate local media markets and reach infrequent
passengers who are traveling recreationally around the winter holidays.
This year, TSA issued a national press release, hosted a national
media availability with TSA Administrator Pistole, posted web copy to
www.tsa.gov, and leveraged social media tools like the TSA Blog and
Twitter to reach a broad audience.
To provide passengers with 24/7 access to the most commonly
requested TSA information on their mobile devices, TSA has developed
the My TSA mobile application. My TSA puts the most frequently
requested information about security procedures at airport checkpoints
right at their fingertips. The application has multiple functions,
including allowing travelers to find out if an item can be taken in
checked or carry-on bags, view delays at all U.S. airports via a feed
from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), get the most commonly
asked packing and traveling tips, and post and see other passengers'
checkpoint wait times at specific airports.
In addition, regional spokespeople from across the country worked
closely with reporters in wide-ranging media markets to reach travelers
in big cities and small towns, and will continue to carry out this
engagement throughout the year.
Question 4. Can you update the Committee on the changes made to how
TSA is treating its child customers?
Answer. As part of our risk-based approach to security, TSA has
modified prescreening procedures for children who appear 12 years of
age and younger. One of these modified procedures includes permitting
them to leave their footwear on through screening checkpoints. A
byproduct of these revised screening procedures is to reduce, though
not eliminate, pat-downs of children who appear 12 years of age and
younger. If a pat-down is necessary, the procedure is less invasive
than the procedure used to screen adults. As always, children and their
guardians will not be separated during screening.
Question 5. As you know as part of his deficit reduction plan, the
President is proposing tripling the passenger security fee per one-way
trip from $2.50 to $5.00 with additional 50-cent-per-year increases
over the next five years to a total of $7.50. In conjunction with a
$100 charge for every airplane departure in controlled airspace, the
President estimates that these new fees will result in an estimated
$8.8 billion in additional revenue over five years, and $24.9 billion
over 10 years. The President's proposal would direct $15 billion to be
deposited into the General Fund for deficit reduction, with any
additional revenues in excess of this amount being applied to the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) budget. While I support
ensuring we have the best security apparatus in place to protect
passengers, I believe that airline passengers are being unfairly
targeted to pay down the deficit. With regards to this plan, did TSA
approach the Administration to indicate that it needs these additional
funds?
Answer. With regards to only the portion of the plan that relates
to the Passenger Security Fee, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), in ongoing collaboration with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
engages Congress to attain annual operating budgets that provide the
resources necessary to ensure transportation security. TSA's annual
operating budget is satisfied through a combination of appropriated
resources and through resources generated from security fees imposed on
beneficiaries of certain security services. In working within these
constructs, TSA attempts to reach an optimal funding strategy that
balances the burden of aviation security. The portion of the deficit
reduction plan regarding the proposal for a $100 charge for airplane
departures in controlled airspace may be addressed by the Federal
Aviation Administration.
Question 6. How much additional funding do you anticipate TSA will
see each year as a result of this proposal?
Answer. The most immediate impact of the proposal would be a change
in the ratio of appropriated and fee funding received by TSA vice a
change in total funding. TSA estimates that if the passenger fee
proposal is adopted, the changed fee would generate $850 million, $900
million, and $950 million in fiscal years 2013, 2014 and 2015
respectively, in new discretionary security fee revenue that would
further offset the total TSA cost of aviation security. The enactment
of annual operating budgets would ultimately determine whether or not
overall TSA resource levels are changed.
Question 7. What plans does TSA have for using this additional
funding?
Answer. The increase in security fee revenue would allow a greater
portion of the overall cost of aviation security to be offset by
beneficiaries of aviation security services.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roy Blunt to
Hon. John S. Pistole
Question 1. Why has the TSA decided to ignore the Court's
injunctive relief in regards to the SPP contract at MCI (Kansas City
International Airport)?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is not
ignoring the Court of Federal Claims. In its decision regarding the
protest filed by FirstLine Transportation Security, Inc., the court
stated that TSA had two options if it desired to move forward with a
Screening Partnership Program (SPP) contract award at MCI, one of which
was a complete re-procurement of the solicitation requirements. As the
court expressly noted, ``What course of action TSA chooses to pursue
after contract award is cancelled in order to maintain security
services at MCI is not for this court to decide.'' Consistent with the
court's ruling, TSA has chosen to move forward with a complete re-
competition of this requirement to allow for full and open competition
of the revised, current scope of work and using evaluation criteria in
accord with the court's decision.
Question 2. However, with no Advanced Imaging Technologies (AIT)
full body scanners being added and little Risk-Based Security
initiatives changes in Kansas City, does this still remain your reason
for ignoring the court's injunctive relief?
Answer. As stated above, TSA is not ignoring the court's injunctive
relief. The court explicitly gave TSA the option of complete re-
procurement of the solicitation requirements, and TSA has chosen this
option to allow for full and open competition of the revised, current
scope of work.
Question 3. Were these factors in the contract reward in April? If
they were factors at that time then what specially changed in the
following six months?
Answer. No, Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) and Risk-Based
Screening (RBS) initiatives were not factors in the April 2011 contract
award.
Question 4. According to GAO, TSA has had a difficult time
assessing apples to apples cost analysis of SPP airports and
traditional TSA operated airports. Does TSA currently have better
analysis to make that comparison? Does that now include increased
screener efficiencies? Does it include an analysis of overtime charges
or costs due to injury?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has had a
constructive dialogue with the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
regarding the cost analysis of airports directly operated by TSA and
those airports operated within the Screening Partnership Program (SPP).
While there are difficulties with any cost analysis, TSA included
different assumptions to create a range and to cover all possibilities.
TSA cost comparisons encompassed all applicable costs, including
overtime and injury costs. In communications with TSA, GAO acknowledged
its satisfaction with TSA's cost analysis methodology.
Question 5. Administrator, in you announcement to cap the SPP to 16
airports, you said that you would not expand the program unless there
was a ``clear or substantial advantage'' to adding additional airports
to the SPP program despite the demand. However, you have not released
the metrics TSA uses to evaluate SPP applications. Will you release
those metrics?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not
use a standard set of metrics to evaluate Screening Partnership Program
(SPP) applications. Every airport is considered independently based on
the unique characteristics that define the security and operational
needs of that location as well as the impact on the total security
network. Unique airport characteristics that might be used to make an
SPP determination could be airports located in hard to hire areas such
as airports with a high tourist population or a high cost of living;
airports that experience increased traffic during a particular time of
the year such as greatly increased traffic during ski season; and
airports that are open only for part of the year such as operating only
during the summer.
Question 6. Does TSA have criteria in place to even be able to
determine what might be a clear or substantial advantage?
Answer. Every airport is considered independently based on the
unique characteristics that define the security and operational needs
of that location. Each airport's unique situation and associated cost
is considered, along with the effect of privatization at the specific
location on the total security network.
Question 7. Please include a copy of that data in your response,
Answer. See the response above.
Question 8. TSA encouraged three Montana airports to opt-in to the
SPP program but in January you denied their applications. What about
the Montana airports made TSA encourage their participation in the SPP
program?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not
encourage an airport to participate or not participate in the Screening
Partnership Program (SPP). Per the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act, an airport may submit an application ``. . . to have the screening
of passengers and property at the airport . . . to be carried out by
the screening personnel of a qualified private screening company . .
.'' TSA does not consider an airport's interest in SPP until the
airport submits an SPP application. The program remains open today, and
TSA is continuing to accept applications.
Question 9. What changed during that period of time?
Answer. See response above.
Question 10. Is there one airport in the country, large or small,
that you would encourage participating in the program now?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not
encourage an airport to participate or not participate in the Screening
Partnership Program (SPP).
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Kelly Ayotte to
Hon. John S. Pistole
Question. Unfortunately every Israeli citizen is used to living
his/her life in the shadow of terrorism starting from an early age. Not
only is understanding and living with terrorism a part of daily life in
Israel, but so too is an awareness that individuals are often the
primary target of terrorist attacks. At the same time, terrorists
haven't penetrated Tel Aviv's international airport's security in
almost 40 years. Israeli airport security, by contrast to TSA's
approach, separates travelers into two groups before they ever get to
an X-ray machine. All passengers waiting to check-in speak to a
security agent. The agents ask a series of questions, looking for
uneasiness or inconsistent statements. The vast majority of travelers
pass the question-and-answer session and have an easy time going
through security. Still, there are no full-body scans, for example, and
only between 2 percent and 5 percent of travelers get singled out for
additional screening. While the security situation is much different in
Israel than it is in the U.S., and I am sensitive to the security
threats that Israeli citizens endure daily, I still think there is an
opportunity to learn from the experience and practices of Israel. How
does the Israeli security model inform what security approaches TSA
should take?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
considered the Israeli model, as well as best practices from other
countries, and has worked to incorporate practices in a U.S. model that
is consistent with our constitutional liberties and laws and feasible
in an operational environment with much more locations and travelers
than in Israel. For example, as part of TSA's Risk Based Security
efforts, TSA is evaluating practices to include pre-screening and
behavior assessment to allow for a real time threat assessment of a
passenger prior to and during screening and boarding. Currently, the
Assessor proofs of concept have modified current screening procedures
by testing a new behavior detection technique. It includes interacting
with all passengers at the Travel Document Checker (TDC) station to
detect high-risk passengers. This pilot is currently underway in Boston
and Detroit, and TSA is reviewing additional sites for consideration.
______
President's Department
Air Line Pilots Association, International
Washington, DC, November 8, 2011
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV,
Chairman,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison,
Ranking Member,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Rockefeller and Senator Hutchison:
On behalf of more than 53,000 pilot members who fly for 37 airlines
in the U.S. and Canada, the Air Line Pilots Association, International
(ALPA) would like to provide you with a synopsis of a number of
aviation security concerns that ALPA believes should be brought to the
attention of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee
during its TSA oversight hearing with Administrator John Pistole on
November 9, 2011. Also attached for your review is an ALPA issue
analysis of aviation security 10 years after the 9/11 attacks.
Threat-Based Security
The attempted bombing of Northwest (NWA) flight #253 on Christmas
Day, 2009 served as a catalyst for ALPA to publish a white paper
entitled Meeting Today's Aviation Security Needs: A Call to Action for
a Trust-Based Security System, in January 2010. In that document, ALPA
articulated that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) needs
to change its post-9/11 philosophy of screening all people equally for
harmful objects to one that focuses on identifying individuals having
evil intent.
We are pleased to acknowledge the positive response from a number
of our industry partners, as well as from TSA leadership, expressing
agreement with our call for a philosophical change in underlying
aviation security philosophy. ALPA has been encouraged by TSA
Administrator John Pistole's advocacy for the implementation of more
threat-driven, risk-based security procedures, such as a known traveler
program, and expanded use of the Screening of Passengers by Observation
Techniques (SPOT) program. We are particularly pleased with his public
statements that a properly identified and thoroughly vetted pilot
flying an airliner should not be required to undergo the same screening
procedures as a passenger about whom very little is known. TSA's
support for the ALPA-conceived alternative screening program for
pilots, referred to as Known Crewmember (KCM), has been a welcome
change to previous ``one-size-fits-all'' screening requirements. ALPA
expresses its gratitude to the leadership of the Air Transport
Association (ATA) and its member airlines for facilitating the roll-out
of KCM.
We believe that significant steps have been taken by TSA to
implement more risk-based solutions to securing the aviation sector,
and we look forward to continued government and industry partnerships
in the expansion of KCM and other threat-based, risk-mitigation
programs.
Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) Program
The FFDO program, which uses federally-credentialed, volunteer,
armed pilots who are trained and managed by the Federal Air Marshal
Service (FAMS) to serve as the ``last line of defense'' of the flight
deck, has dramatically grown since its inception in 2003. The FFDO
program has been acknowledged by industry and government to be an
extremely successful and cost-effective layer of aviation security. In
this era of austerity, the FFDO program's annual budget has remained
stagnant since 2004. As a result, TSA/FAMS ceased accepting new
applications in 2011 and has announced its inability to accept
applications to the program during 2012 as well. Additionally, FAMS is
considering certain program cuts to counterbalance the stagnant
funding. We respectfully submit that the FFDO program is a cost-
effective layer of aviation security and Congress should consider
increasing the budget for the program.
Regarding the FFDO program's deployment outside of the U.S., ALPA
commends the TSA and the FAMS for their successes to date in this
regard, and encourages continued efforts to expand its international
capabilities.
Secondary Barriers
On September 28, 2011, design standards for reinforced flight deck
door secondary barriers were established by RTCA, a Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA)-chartered, standard setting organization. These
inexpensive, lightweight devices are intended to protect the flight
deck whenever the reinforced door must be opened in flight. When used
in conjunction with appropriate crew procedures, the secondary barrier
will assist in identifying and delaying an attacker's intent to do
harm. ALPA encourages the use in protecting the flight decks of our
Nation's airliners to enhance aviation security both domestically and
abroad.
Threatened Airspace Management
The failed attack against Northwest Airlines flight #253
demonstrated deficiencies in ground-to air communications during and
after a significant in-flight security event. Pilots in command of
other aircraft, either airborne or about to take-off, were not advised
in real time of the circumstances impacting NWA 253. This lack of
communication deprived these other aircraft commanders, in their role
as In-Flight Security Coordinators (ISCs), of critical information
which related to a potential security threat to their own flights, and
negatively impacted the ability of flight and cabin crewmembers to best
protect their passengers and aircraft.
On April 7, 2010, the FAA and TSA did a better job of communicating
information to other aircraft regarding an on-going security incident
involving a diplomat suspected to be assembling a bomb while in the
lavatory of an airliner traveling from Washington, DC to Denver, CO.
However, the flight decks of only selected airborne aircraft were
notified of the event. Since then, we have not witnessed the sharing of
security-related information with aircraft commanders that would be of
value to them in fulfilling their duties as pilots-in command.
As recently as June 19, 2011, a bomb threat was made against a
Washington, DC-bound airliner while it was in flight. The captain was
not notified of the potential danger until landing at Ronald Reagan
National Airport. The aircraft, with its 44 passengers and three
crewmembers still onboard, sat on the ground for 29 minutes before
emergency responders arrived at the plane and the passengers and crew
were allowed to deplane.
In addition to this communications deficiency, we have seen no
evidence of a clearly-defined, prioritized plan to control the national
air space (NAS) in the event of another 9/11-type attack. The U.S.
economy and the domestic aviation industry cannot sustain the negative
financial impact resulting from a repeat of a nationwide shutdown as
occurred at that time. ALPA urges Congress to ensure the development of
a prioritized plan for control of the NAS in such circumstances, with
the intent of preventing a total or substantial closure.
All-Cargo Airline Security
In November 2010, law enforcement and intelligence agencies
interdicted attempts to bomb two U.S. all-cargo aircraft destined from
international locations to the United States. Successful detonation of
the explosives, hidden in printer cartridges shipped from Yemen, could
have resulted in catastrophic loss of life and the aircraft involved.
These attacks confirmed that all-cargo carriers remain a focus of
terrorists. Notwithstanding government and industry awareness of a
variety of security vulnerabilities which still exist in the air cargo
domain, all-cargo operations remain exempt from a number of security
practices mandated for passenger air carriers. Examples include: no
hardened flight deck door requirement; no mandated All-Cargo Common
Strategy training for crewmembers; no requirement for fingerprint-based
criminal history record checks for persons with unescorted access
privileges to aircraft and cargo; and no uniform requirement for
Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) restrictions on all-cargo
air operations areas.
Although the Air Cargo Security Requirements; Final Rule, published
in May 2006, did much to improve the security of all-cargo aircraft and
operations, it fell short of the mark in several critical aspects. An
investigative report issued by the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) on June 20, 2011 provides evidence of a number of these remaining
vulnerabilities and bolsters ALPA's argument that much work remains to
be done in this regard. Based on the unwillingness of regulators,
government and industry to adequately address these deficiencies, we
believe that Congressional action is required to bring about needed
change.
Laser Illumination of Aircraft
On October 27, 2011 ALPA, in conjunction with the Air Transport
Association, sponsored a one day conference entitled: Laser
Illumination of Aircraft-A Growing Threat. The event highlighted the
very real dangers posed to flight safety by this illegitimate activity
which FAA statistics show to be increasing at an alarming rate, and was
intended to spur further action to mitigate the problem.
ALPA applauds the FAA's recent announcement of its increased civil
fining authority with respect to this activity, up to a maximum of
$11,000 per event. We are also pleased the Senate included an amendment
in the Federal Aviation Administration reauthorization bill sponsored
by Senator Sheldon Whitehouse to make knowingly shining a laser at an
aircraft cockpit a Federal crime. While we continue to advocate for a
multi-year, comprehensive FAA reauthorization bill, we acknowledge the
uncertainty of that legislation, and urge the Senate to swiftly pass a
stand-alone measure that would make the intentional laser illumination
of aircraft a specific Federal crime.
ALPA is grateful for the Committee's attention to these critical
transportation security matters. We look forward to working with you to
better protect the traveling public and the U.S. aviation industry.
Sincerely,
Captain Lee Moak,
President.
______
ALPA Issue Analysis--Air Line Pilots Association, International--
Washington, D.C.--www.alpa.org
Aviation Security: 10 Years after the 9/11 Attacks
The 9/11 terrorist attacks resulted in a sea change for aviation
security through the combined efforts of government, industry, and
labor. ALPA's view is that aviation security progressed significantly
because of these efforts, but ongoing improvements will always be
needed to stay ahead of the ever-changing threat.
To take aviation security to the next level, the government needs
to continue to transition to a proactive, human-centered, and threat-
driven security system that harnesses the expertise and experience of
all parties--regulators, airlines, airports, and labor. As part of this
endeavor, there must be a shift away from focusing solely on the
detection and interdiction of threat items and toward a determination
of the presence of hostile intent.
Trusted airline employees should be positively identified and used
as the ``eyes and ears'' of security. A new paradigm for cooperation,
coordination, and communication among all affected parties will enhance
our ability to detect and counter all terrorist threats. ALPA has a
long history of building strategic alliances among stakeholders to
achieve our common goals, and we are enthusiastically engaged in this
challenge.
ALPA represents more than 53,000 pilots who fly for 39 airlines in
the United States and Canada. The union's 80-year history as an
independent safety and security organization gives the Association an
unparalleled perspective in analyzing the current state of aviation
security and how it needs to change to keep airline passengers, crews,
and cargo secure in the future.
What follows is a description of the most important accomplishments
of the past 10 years, and the most needed additional improvements.
Most Significant Accomplishments Since 9/11
U.S. DOT Rapid Response Teams
A few days after 9/11, the U.S. Secretary of Transportation formed
two ``Rapid Response Teams'' to develop recommendations for improving
security. One team was tasked with examining security at U.S. airports
and focused on the screening of passengers and cargo. The other focused
on aircraft security, particularly in safeguarding the flight deck.
ALPA's president was asked to serve on this team. The two teams
developed a number of significant
recommendations, many of which were implemented within a year of 9/
11. In Canada, parallel activity involved ALPA representatives working
with the top levels of the Canadian government to ensure that new,
meaningful security measures were implemented.
Creation of New Federal Security Agencies
In November 2001, the President signed into law the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act, which created the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA). The responsibility for security policy, passenger
screening, and other related functions was transferred from the Federal
Aviation Administration to TSA at that time. One year later, the
Homeland Security Act created the Department of Homeland Security,
which combined TSA and 21 other Federal agencies and offices under a
single cabinet-level department devoted to national security.
The Canadian government created a new Crown corporation, the
Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA), which is responsible
for, among other things, screening passengers and their carry-on and
checked baggage.
Transport Canada developed a security consultative structure in
2004 composed of the Advisory Group on Aviation Security (AGAS), the
Security Regulatory Committee, and working groups. Since its inception,
AGAS has facilitated information exchange between government and
industry on current and emerging aviation security policy and
regulatory and program priorities and initiatives.
Beginning in 2008, ALPA worked with Transport Canada on the
Security Management System, a program similar to the Safety Management
System, that is intended to supplement performance-oriented security
regulations and security measures for all aspects of Canadian aviation.
Common Strategy--Passenger and All-Cargo Domains
ALPA played a significant role in the pre-9/11 development and
implementation of the Common Strategy, a standardized crisis response
plan used by the aviation industry and critical government agencies for
dealing with defined criminal and terrorist acts perpetrated onboard
aircraft. Because the events of 9/11 clearly demonstrated that the plan
needed to address the suicidal terrorist threat, ALPA urged the FAA to
address this need. As a result, the FAA administrator asked ALPA to
lead a coalition of industry stakeholders to develop a new Common
Strategy. This undertaking was completed in 2002, and in 2006 a new
All-Cargo Common Strategy was published, which marked the first time
that this standardized security plan had included crewmembers who fly
all-cargo aircraft.
In 2003 ALPA expressed concern to Transport Canada that a Canadian
version of the Common Strategy was not in place. As a result,
significant changes were made to the Canadian security training
guidelines for airline crewmembers, including establishing four levels
of response to threat events onboard aircraft.
Federal Air Marshal and In-Flight Security Officer Programs
Until September 11, 2001, U.S. passenger airliners were protected
by a small cadre of 33 Federal air marshals, who flew mostly
international routes. ALPA strongly supported an expansion of this
small program to provide greater deterrence and security onboard more
flights, both domestic and international.
Today, a significantly bolstered Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS)
is managed by the Transportation Security Administration and protects
U.S. carriers domestically and internationally. FAMS works closely with
other government agencies, ALPA, and additional critical industry
stakeholders to accomplish its mission. Some of the many
responsibilities it has undertaken include management of the Federal
Flight Deck Officer and Crewmember Self-Defense Training programs.
Canada had no aircraft protection program before 9/11, but
thereafter, ALPA convinced the Canadian government that it needed to
create an air marshal program. In 2002 the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police (RCMP) instituted the Canadian Air Carrier Protective Program
(CACPP), which puts armed RCMP members, designated as In-Flight
Security Officers (IFSOs), on Canadian-registered aircraft. These
officers operate under training regimes and rules of engagement very
similar to those of FAMs.
Federal Flight Deck Officer Program
ALPA was instrumental in calling and lobbying for the creation of
the Federal Flight Deck Officer program shortly after the 9/11 attacks.
In 2002, Congress enacted the Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act
(APATA) as part of the Homeland Security Act. In April 2003, the first
class of 44 pilots graduated from the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center and was deputized as Federal law enforcement officers, charged
with the responsibility of defending the flight decks of passenger
airliners. One year later, Federal legislation made pilots who fly all-
cargo aircraft eligible to participate in the program. Since then,
thousands of dedicated volunteer pilots have served as Federal Flight
Deck Officers, protecting the flight decks of both passenger and all-
cargo airliners and adding a key layer of additional security to air
transportation.
Reinforced Flight Deck Doors
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2002 included a
requirement to strengthen the flight deck doors on airliners. ALPA
played a critical role in assisting the Federal Aviation
Administration's and Transport Canada's efforts to develop design
criteria and standards for these barriers. Reinforced flight deck doors
are now installed on virtually all passenger airliners in the U.S. and
Canada and on many cargo aircraft. Additionally, enhanced flight deck
door security procedures for flight deck and cabin crewmembers were
developed and put in place to promote communication and ensure the most
effective response to a security threat aboard the aircraft.
Secondary Barriers
The value of a reinforced cockpit door can only be realized when
the door is securely closed.
During longer flights, the cockpit door may need to be opened for
many reasons, including flight and cabin crew coordination and to meet
the flight crew's physiological needs.
A secondary barrier--composed of netting, strands of wire, or other
lightweight materials--placed on the cabin side of the fortified flight
deck door is designed to add enhanced security during times of ``door
transition'' by impeding access to the cockpit door and providing
additional time for crewmembers to secure the door in the event of an
attempted breach. A secondary barrier also assists a flight and cabin
crew in determining whether an individual intends to breach the flight
deck door and poses a potential security threat.
ALPA successfully advocated to government and industry the creation
of a new RTCA Special Committee (SC) 221, which began in 2008 to
develop performance standards for secondary barriers. At least one
major airline has already installed these devices on many of its
aircraft in advance of standards finalization, and some aircraft
manufacturers now offer secondary barriers as an option on new
equipment.
Enhancing Jumpseat Security
Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, the access to the flight
deck jumpseat was eliminated. It was restored, however, fairly soon
thereafter for pilots who were employed by the company that operated
the aircraft. Access to that seat, which is essential for movement of
flight crews, was not authorized for ``off-line'' pilots (i.e., those
not employed by the company that operates the aircraft). Several
airlines, with ALPA's strong support, collaborated in 2003-04 on the
development of a new system, called the Cockpit Access Security System
(CASS), which verifies employment and validates identity using Internet
access to airline employee databases. The TSA tested the system in 2004
and approved its use by all airlines beginning in 2005. Because of
CASS, pilots other than those operating the aircraft are permitted to
travel in the cockpit and support the on-duty flight crew in the event
of a safety or security issue.
Canada approved the use of positive identity verification measures
to authorize the use of the flight deck jumpseat by non-operating, on-
line flight crews.
Implementing Threat-Based Security
ALPA has for years called for a philosophical shift in aviation
security from the current practice of screening all people equally for
harmful objects (i.e., one-size-fits-all security) to one that focuses
on identifying persons with the intent to do harm. Such a ``threat-
based'' approach to security screening would allow passengers with
known backgrounds to be promptly cleared through security, and would
free resources to place a greater focus on individuals whose background
is unknown or in doubt. ALPA advocates determining the risk posed by
each passenger through a combination of publicly available information,
human interaction, and behavior-pattern recognition.
In 2011, TSA announced that it would be starting a program later
this year at four airports to implement a ``known traveler'' type of
program that would begin to achieve ALPA's goal of threat-based
security.
Enhanced Pilot-Screening Programs
One component of threat-based security is recognizing the
trustworthiness of airline pilots, who are the most heavily scrutinized
employees in the aviation industry. Beginning in 2007, ALPA strongly
advocated for a system of better screening airline pilots, called the
Crew Personnel Advanced Screening System (CrewPASS). The ALPA-conceived
CrewPASS program was designed to provide enhanced security screening
for authorized flight crewmembers using airline employee databases to
verify an individual's identity and confirm his/her employment status.
CrewPASS was implemented at three East Coast airports in 2008 and
continues to operate today.
In 2011, the TSA approved testing of the next iteration of this
concept, called the Known Crewmember program. Known Crewmember, which
is jointly sponsored by ALPA and the Air Transport Association, uses
more advanced technology than CrewPASS. The first access points for the
Known Crewmember program began operating at Chicago O'Hare
International Airport on August 9 and at Miami International Airport on
August 23, 2011. The program will soon open additional test sites at
Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, Minneapolis-St. Paul
International Airport, Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport,
Washington Dulles International Airport, and Boston Logan International
Airport. The TSA is prepared to authorize nationwide implementation
pending successful testing.
In 2002, the Canadian transport minister introduced a new form of
airline employee identification--the Restricted Area Identity Card
(RAIC)--to provide for enhanced flight crew security screening. A
cutting-edge aviation security initiative, the RAIC program uses
biometric data and in-depth background vetting to more effectively and
securely identify airline pilots and other airline employees. In 2004,
CATSA introduced the RAIC iris-and-fingerprint program. Since then, the
initiative has been expanded to include approximately 100,000 employees
who work in restricted areas at Canada's 29 largest airports. The
Canadian RAIC program has become an international model for airline
employee screening programs.
Cargo Security
Enhancing cargo security presents a formidable task because of the
complexities of the air cargo supply chain, the demands associated with
the flow of commerce, and economic constraints. Responding to a Federal
mandate, the TSA took on this challenge in the mid-2000s by harnessing
the expertise of critical industry stakeholders, including ALPA. A new/
final rule on air cargo security published in 2006 brought sweeping
changes to security measures applied in passenger and all-cargo
domains.
ALPA worked diligently with Transport Canada to develop appropriate
air cargo security legislation. As a direct result of ALPA's advocacy
to the Canadian Air Cargo Security Working Group, Transport Canada
issued a rule in 2010 requiring 100 percent hold-baggage screening.
Safeguarding Aircraft from Laser Attacks
In January 2011, ALPA instituted an action plan to safeguard the
skies from deliberate laser illuminations of aircraft. In June 2011,
the Department of Transportation and the FAA announced a new legal tool
to help authorities impose civil fines of as much as $11,000 against
individuals who attack aircraft with lasers from the ground.
Most Needed Security Improvements
Implement Threat-Based Security
The current one-size-fits-all philosophy driving aviation security
is inadequate to meet today's security threats. Not all airline
passengers pose an equal threat, so the goal of security screening must
not be to only detect and interdict prohibited items, but also to
distinguish between the known individual, the unknown individual, and
those individuals who intend to do harm. A threat-based approach will
ultimately enhance passenger privacy, create a more efficient and
effective screening system, and make better use of limited screening
resources. While TSA has publicly committed to pursuing a threat-based
approach to aviation security and some steps have been taken, threat-
based security should be adopted across the board as a foundational
philosophy and as a plan of action to address today's threats.
In line with the development of threat-based security,
implementation of the Known Crewmember program across the U.S. should
be achieved in the near term. We recommend the inclusion of flight
attendants in this program.
Secure All-Cargo Flight Operations
After more than a decade of advocacy, ALPA believes that
congressional action is needed to compel regulators and industry to
close the gap in security requirements for all-cargo flight operations.
The association is particularly concerned about the need to improve
Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) requirements, background
vetting of individuals with unescorted access to cargo aircraft and
cargo, hardened flight deck door requirements, and training in the All-
Cargo Common Strategy for response to security threats. A June 2011
report from the Government Accountability Office gives clear evidence
that these vulnerabilities continue to exist and to jeopardize the
security of air transportation in this country.
ALPA recommends that all airports that serve regularly scheduled
all-cargo operations conducted by transport category airliners be
required to establish and maintain a designated SIDA for such
operations. SIDA requirements detail perimeter security protocols,
clearly define entry and exit procedures, dictate specific
identification display and ramp security procedures, and are predicated
on a mandatory 10-year fingerprint-based criminal history record check
for all employees who maintain unescorted access privileges within the
SIDA. ALPA also calls for installing hardened flight deck doors on all-
cargo airliners, mandated security training for all-cargo flight
crewmembers and staff, and establishing a threat-based approach to
cargo security.
Enhance the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program
The FFDO program to deputize and arm trained airline pilots to
defend the cockpit has proven extremely successful. Participation has
grown considerably since the program began in 2002. In spite of this
success, the TSA has not requested or received any significant increase
in funding for the FFDO program since 2004. Because the current funding
level is inadequate to support the existing FFDO corps, the program has
stopped accepting new applications through 2012. Both industry and
government have acknowledged that the FFDO program is a proven, cost-
effective layer of aviation security, and ALPA calls on Congress to
provide a significant increase in its funding.
Institute Threatened Airspace Management
ALPA calls for the development of a prioritized plan for control of
the national airspace system during a major security event. A
Threatened Airspace Management Plan must provide pilots-in-command of
airborne aircraft, or those about to take off, with real-time
notification of significant and ongoing security concerns. Improved
ground-to-air communications will better enable pilots to protect their
passengers, crew, cargo, and aircraft. Additionally, maintaining a
current prioritized plan for control of threatened airspace is
critical.
Install Secondary Barriers on All Airliners
A reinforced cockpit door is an asset only when the door is
securely closed. During longer flights, the cockpit door may need to be
opened for many reasons, including flight and cabin crew coordination,
meal service, and the flight crew's physiological requirements.
The RTCA, a group made up of government and industry
representatives that sets technical standards, will soon issue its
final report containing performance standards for permanently
installed, secondary flight deck barriers. ALPA urges government and
industry to carefully consider the security benefit provided by these
devices and recommends installing them on all airliners.
Protect Aircraft from Laser Attacks
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) statistics show an
exponential increase in reported laser attacks against aviation. The
threat to aviation safety is growing and real. ALPA calls for
additional progress on its 2011 regulatory, legislative, and public
awareness action plan to safeguard the skies from deliberate laser
attacks on aircraft. The actions required include:
prosecuting to the fullest extent of the law individuals who
intentionally shine a laser at an aircraft,
restricting the sale of portable lasers that are strong
enough to cause injury,
increasing the size of laser-free zones around airports,
developing new air traffic control and pilot operating
procedures to mitigate risk when laser illuminations are
reported, and
adding deliberate laser illuminations to the NTSB's list of
most wanted transportation safety improvements.
Recently, Canadian authorities have handed down stronger sentences
for individuals who have been convicted of deliberately shining a laser
at an aircraft. ALPA supports these efforts to prosecute to the fullest
extent of the law those who perpetrate laser attacks.
Fully Fund the Canadian Air Carrier Protective Program
In October 2010, budget cuts led to a 25 percent reduction in the
force of In-flight Security Officers (IFSOs) in the Canadian Air
Carrier Protective Program. In ALPA's view, the value of the CACPP and
the cooperation that exists between the program and airline pilots are
essential elements in aviation security and must be fully supported.
Enhance Government-Industry-Labor Collaboration
On the 10th anniversary of 9/11, ALPA commends those in government
and industry who have worked with the Association to achieve so many
significant enhancements to aviation security. We must continue to
improve on our collaborative efforts to develop and implement new and
better ways to address the constantly evolving threat against aviation.