[Senate Hearing 112-258]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-258
GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICER REQUIREMENTS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PERSONNEL
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 14, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
David M. Morriss, Minority Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Personnel
JIM WEBB, Virginia, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
General and Flag Officer Requirements
september 14, 2011
Page
Stanley, Hon. Clifford L., Under Secretary of Defense for
Personnel and Readiness........................................ 6
Gortney, VADM William E., USN, Director, Joint Staff............. 7
Freeman, Dr. Benjamin J., National Security Fellow, Project on
Government Oversight........................................... 13
Chiarelli, GEN Peter W., USA, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army..... 36
Ferguson, ADM Mark E., III, USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations,
U.S. Navy...................................................... 40
Dunford, Gen. Joseph F., Jr., USMC, Assistant Commandant, U.S.
Marine Corps................................................... 46
Breedlove, Gen. Philip M., USAF, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air
Force.......................................................... 49
(iii)
GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICER REQUIREMENTS
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Personnel,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:07 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jim Webb
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Webb, Ayotte, and
Graham.
Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel;
Gabriella E. Fahrer, counsel; and Peter K. Levine, general
counsel.
Minority staff member present: Richard F. Walsh, minority
counsel.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles and Kathleen
A. Kulenkampff.
Committee members' assistants present: Brad Bowman,
assistant to Senator Ayotte; and Sergio Sarkany, assistant to
Senator Graham.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JIM WEBB, CHAIRMAN
Senator Webb. The subcommittee will come to order.
The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on
general and flag officer (G/FO) requirements. We are holding
this oversight hearing to examine the growth over time of G/FOs
in the military. It has been 66 years since the end of World
War II, and there have been an estimated 10 studies and reviews
of general officer requirements during that period, but this is
the first hearing on this issue, I think, in recent memory.
This hearing will consist of two panels. On the first
panel, we have the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness, Dr. Clifford Stanley, and the Director of the Joint
Staff, Vice Admiral William Gortney, who served as co-chairs of
The General and Flag Officer Study Group established by the
Secretary of Defense in August 2010. This study group conducted
a baseline review of Active Duty G/FO positions as they existed
in fiscal year 2010.
Based on the results of this study group's work, the
Secretary of Defense in March 2011 approved changes to 140 G/FO
requirements, including the elimination of 102 G/FO positions,
and reduction to a lower grade of an additional 23 positions.
We are interested in the scope of the study group's efforts
and also learning if the Department of Defense (DOD) plans any
future reviews of G/FO positions.
Also on our first panel is Dr. Benjamin Freeman, a National
Security Fellow at the Project on Government Oversight (POGO).
Using data provided by DOD, Dr. Freeman is conducting a
comprehensive study of trends in the numbers of G/FOs on Active
Duty and the relationship of these numbers to the size of the
military. Dr. Freeman will provide us with historical data on
these changes and also will discuss the relationship of these
requirements to the size of the force.
The second panel will consist of the Vice Chiefs of Staff
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Assistant Commandant
of the Marine Corps. These witnesses will help us to understand
each Service's stated requirements for the numbers of G/FOs and
what drivers exist to explain the growth in the numbers over
time.
I would like to make an observation at this time. The last
hearing that we held here involved Judge Advocate General (JAG)
positions.
I welcome the ranking member, Senator Graham, and there is
nothing that I have said that you would have not heard before.
So you are coming in at the right time. Welcome.
I was just beginning to make a point. As a result of our
last hearing where we had extensive discussions on the issue of
JAGs in a room full of lawyers with the bench full of lawyers
and most of the people on the subcommittee are lawyers, our
conversations went on for a very long period of time. I am
conscious of the work of people here in the Senate and also
those of you who are helping in the defense of the country.
So I am going to ask, first of all, that all the witnesses
adhere to the traditional 5-minute rule in terms of summarizing
your testimony. Your full written testimony is a part of the
record. It has been examined thoroughly by staff and will be
available for follow-on. Also for those members of the
subcommittee to adhere to a 7-minute rule in terms of
questions. If people on the subcommittee have follow-on
questions, they will certainly be entertained.
I first raised this issue in this subcommittee in April
2010 when I asked DOD for information on the number of generals
and admirals in the military. This issue was addressed again in
this subcommittee's hearing 2 months ago when we discussed the
number of G/FOs serving in the JAG Corps in each branch of the
armed services. At that time, I noted the disparity among the
Services in the numbers of G/FOs.
In preparation for this hearing, we have collected the data
reflected on this chart that is now up on the screen. I am
going to just spend a minute or 2 talking on this. What we
asked DOD to provide us was a comparative timeline from fiscal
year 1986 and then 2001 and then today snapshots of the
authorized end strength of the different Services and the
number of G/FOs by Service and by rank.
You will notice on these charts, it is just going from 1986
to 2011, the Army's end strength having gone from 780,800 down
to 480,000 in 2001 but up to 569,000 today, their total number
of general officers having gone from 412 to 315 to a ratio of 1
general officer for every 1,800 soldiers on Active Duty,
although the numbers of three stars and four stars are fairly
constant. In fact, they are directly constant in terms of four
stars and just slightly down in terms of three stars.
The Navy having gone from 586,000 to 328,000 on Active
Duty, the total number of flags actually having gone up by one
during that period, a lot more in terms of the three-star ranks
and two more in terms of four-star and rather consistent at the
0-7 level.
The Marine Corps, 199,500 in fiscal year 1986 to 202,000 in
fiscal year 2011, the number of overall general officers from
65 to 86, fairly constant at 0-7, well, only one up in terms of
four stars but doubling in terms of three stars.
The Air Force having gone from 611,500 in 1986 to 332,000,
its total number of general officers having gone from 339 to
314, its number of four stars having gone from 12 to 13, three
stars to 43.
In comparing the overall numbers in 2011, we can see that
the ratio of the Air Force is about 1 general officer for every
1,000 airmen on Active Duty; the Marine Corps, 1 for every
2,350 marines; the Navy, 1 for every 1,279 sailors; and again,
the Army, 1 for every 1,808 soldiers.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Webb. We all know that when someone looks at the
rank on an Active Duty member's shoulders and sees the general
officer or an admiral, they pretty much tend to think--and I
hope rightly so--that there is equivalence in terms of what it
takes to become a flag officer or a general officer in terms of
history and also in terms of criteria. This is what we have
asked to examine in this hearing today.
This is not intended to be an adversarial hearing. More
than anything, it is an informational hearing. We would like to
hear from the people who conducted this study and also the Vice
Chiefs of the Services and the Assistant Commandant in terms of
how these ranks are agreed upon and what the requirements are
and how people feel about the growth that has occurred. We can
understand some of this growth explained by post-September 11
increases in joint requirements, and I look forward to hearing
from our witnesses what other reasons might be behind them.
The numbers provided this subcommittee indicate a
particular disparity in the distribution of four-star generals
and admirals. As shown in the next chart, data provided by the
Services reflects that as of October 1, 2011, the Army will
have 11 four-star generals: 5 in the institutional Army and 6
in joint and other competitive assignments. The Navy will also
have 10 four-star admirals: 6 in the institutional Navy; 4 in
joint assignments. The Marine Corps will have four four-stars:
two in the institutional force; two in other assignments. The
Air Force will have 13 four-stars: 9 in the institutional Air
Force and 4 in other assignments. The disparity in the number
of four-star positions in the institutional forces, I think,
warrants an examination. I am curious as to whether the
Efficiencies Study Group looked at this and other disparities
as part of their examination.
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Webb. At this point, I would like to invite Senator
Graham to make any opening statement that he would like.
Senator Graham. No, Mr. Chairman. I think this is good for
the committee to get the information and look at the issue. I
appreciate the effort to listen and learn.
Senator Webb. Thank you very much.
Secretary Stanley and Vice Admiral Gortney, welcome. There
was a joint written statement which we have examined, and each
of you, I understand, are prepared to give a short opening
statement. We will proceed from Secretary Stanley to Admiral
Gortney and after that, we will hear from Dr. Freeman. So,
Secretary Stanley, welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. CLIFFORD L. STANLEY, UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS
Dr. Stanley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Graham.
Thank you very much. Admiral Gortney and I have prepared one
joint statement, as you have just said, and we wanted to have
this particular statement here to just go over some comments
very briefly.
The General and Flag Officer Efficiencies Study Group, or
the Study Group as we referred to it, was directed by the
Secretary of Defense to take a critical look at the number and
grades of the Department's Active Duty G/FO positions with an
eye toward reducing where appropriate. The Secretary of Defense
specifically directed Admiral Gortney and I to conduct a
baseline review of all Active Duty G/FO positions, identify at
least 50 for elimination, and to make recommendations to
realign G/FO positions based on organizational missions. In
addition, the Secretary directed that we seek every opportunity
to eliminate bureaucracy, reduce overhead, and develop policies
to better manage future G/FO growth. While there is clearly
more work to be done with respect to the Reserve components, we
are here today to report on the results of last year's Active
component review.
Our review differed from earlier G/FO reviews--and this is
since World War II--in several distinct ways. The review was
conducted in the midst of a war. The amount of time allotted
was very compressed, and the objective was not to determine the
exact number of G/FOs required, but instead to identify
organizational efficiencies which would allow us to more
effectively align the G/FO force with the priority of missions.
The most significant difference may be that the Secretary
has approved a new governance structure that will maintain the
number of G/FOs below statutory ceilings and provide us needed
flexibility to rapidly adapt service force structures to meet
the emerging requirements. This is a significant change to the
way we will manage our G/FO forces in the future, and we
understand the value of this flexibility rests with an
understanding of our previous force management practices.
In the past, DOD always maintained the number of G/FOs as
close to statutory ceilings as possible. While this provided
sufficient numbers of G/FOs to meet the most pressing needs,
anytime a new requirement arose, delays ensued while an offset
was identified and then downgraded or eliminated.
Just as this committee gave flexibility to the joint
community through new legislation in 2009, the creation of the
joint pool, the Secretary of Defense has directed reductions
which, through self-imposed policies, will similarly allow the
military departments to operate below authorized ceilings and
gain that same flexibility. We refer to this as a ``Service
buffer or Services buffer.'' This buffer served as a shock
absorber against new requirements allowing an offset position
to be eliminated without negative impact on the mission or
personnel caused by ill-timed action.
Our review began with the identification of 952 authorized
and funded G/FO positions in the Active ranks: 294 joint and
658 Service positions. While the number of serving G/FOs and
the specific positions fluctuated slightly over time, 952 was
our fiscal year 2010 baseline starting point--this was the
basis from which we identified positions for elimination and
reduction.
After careful and thoughtful deliberation, including
extensive discussions with senior officials from the Military
Services, Vice Admiral Gortney and I recommended 110 positions
for elimination and the Secretary of Defense ultimately
approved the elimination of 103 G/FO positions.
Twenty-three additional positions were identified for
reduction to a lesser grade, and then finally, 10 positions
were restructured and reallocated in support of joint
organizations such as U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM).
As I previously stated, the Secretary chose to create
flexibility and enhance readiness across DOD by establishing a
policy framework rather than seek statutory changes. Operating
below authorized grade and strength ceilings gives DOD the
ability to rapidly change force structure. As I am sure you
fully appreciate, speed is critical in modern warfare.
Maintaining this buffer against future senior office
requirements ensures a rapidly adaptable force structure which
is essential to our military forces.
This concludes my verbal statement. My co-chair, Vice
Admiral Gortney, will cover the details regarding how we came
to these recommendations. Thank you, Senator Webb, Senator
Graham, and members of this subcommittee.
Senator Webb. Thank you very much, Secretary Stanley.
Admiral Gortney, welcome.
STATEMENT OF VADM WILLIAM E. GORTNEY, USN, DIRECTOR, JOINT
STAFF
Admiral Gortney. Thank you, Dr. Stanley.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Graham, members of this distinguished
subcommittee, thank you for allowing us to testify on this
important subject.
As Dr. Stanley stated, I will discuss the methodology used
to arrive at the recommendations we provided to the Secretary
of Defense for his ultimate decision.
The Study Group was comprised of members of the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and from each
of the Services' G/FO management offices.
Our goal from the very beginning was to develop a
disciplined, credible, defendable, and executable process that
would result in meeting the Secretary's intent while accounting
for the equities of the four Services and the joint commands
and staffs.
Four weeks before the Secretary directed the Efficiency
Study, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs directed me to begin
coordinating with the Services to review the G/FO positions.
Each Service evaluated their own G/FO positions and sorted them
into four tiers: ``must have,'' ``need to have,'' ``good to
have,'' and ``nice to have.'' They were directed to put 10
percent of their positions into the ``nice to have'' category.
Additionally, drawing upon the knowledge of previous G/FO
studies, we requested the Services consider various lines of
operation that we identified as operations, intelligence,
service support, information operations, cyber, headquarters,
and command and control and further break those into categories
identified as military operations, military support, military
presence, and military experience.
This information that gave us a head start provided by the
Services was absolutely essential in our ability to complete
the study in the allotted amount of time.
Armed with this information, the Study Group then created a
set of assumptions that were approved by the Secretary and also
established business rules to objectively sort the positions
both vertically within the Service hierarchy and then
horizontally across the Services. Meeting one of the
established criteria was not a trigger for position elimination
but rather a signal to the Study Group that a position required
further review and justification. This methodology allowed us
to view every position from multiple angles, and both our
assumptions and business rules have been submitted with our
executive summary.
After 6 weeks of meeting daily, the Study Group had
completed the vast majority of the work and had identified a
few areas that required more knowledge and more senior officers
to make better educated decisions. We then established a G/FO
Working Group comprised of members from the Joint Staff to take
a deeper look at those more challenging issues for resolution,
and these issues consisted of areas of training and education,
installation management, and accessions.
The Study Group went after growth, and the majority of the
growth was in overseas contingency operations (OCO). The
Secretary approved 103 positions for elimination, of which 47
are from OCOs; 12 were eliminated from the joint pool, 38 from
the Services to which the Services agreed, and 6 additional
positions where they did not agree.
The Services were full partners in this endeavor in order
to ensure transparency and elicit responses and discussion that
would aid us in creating the intended efficiencies. Every
member of the group had an equal vote at the table. The group
followed a preplanned agenda to permit the Services to come
prepared to each meeting to discuss specific positions and
organizations, and Dr. Stanley and I provided monthly updates
to the Chairman and the Service Chiefs.
Thank you for this opportunity to discuss this, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared joint statement of Dr. Stanley and Admiral
Gortney follows:]
Prepared Joint Statement by Hon. Clifford L. Stanley and VADM William
E. Gortney, USN
GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICER EFFICIENCY TASK FORCE CO CHAIRS--EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The General and Flag Officer (G/FO) Efficiencies Study Group was
directed by the Secretary of Defense to:
Conduct a fiscal year 2010-level baseline review of
all active G/FO positions and related overhead and
accoutrements.
Restructure to best align with mission,
responsibilities and relevant counterparts.
Eliminate at least 50 positions over the next 2 years.
Reallocate G/FO billets based on mission.
Redistribute ranks to reduce overhead and bureaucracy.
Develop policies and procedures to manage future G/FO
growth.
The Study Group's analysis looked at common positions that will
help restructure organizations based upon elimination, redistribution,
or a reduction in paygrade. The Study Group attempted to move away from
a pure vertical sorting and did a commonality of functions analysis
across Service and organizational lines. These commonalities were based
on like functions such as recruiting and accessions, education and
training, health care, legal, legislative affairs, installation
commands, service headquarters staff, and combatant commander
headquarters/component staffs. The Study Group was cognizant that a
strength of our military is the differences of our individual Services,
but looking across Services and comparing similar functions revealed
areas for possible efficiencies.
The Study Group recommended 103 positions for elimination (50 over
the next 2 years and the remainder based on conditions in overseas
contingency operations). The majority of these positions were directly
related to the Joint growth over the past 10 years and the reduction of
Service ``grade creep'' over the course of the protracted war effort.
Many U.S. service-based operations have moved forward to ensure
sustained combat operations and have left legacy command structures and
or redundant 24/7 operations capability. Many of the positions that are
encumbered by overseas operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were created
from Service/Joint billets in offset. By eliminating these positions,
we also reduce the Service strength by their fair share percentage in
the Joint Pool. The Study Group further recommended reallocating 10 G/
FO positions to increase the Joint Pool based on elimination savings
from other organizations. Twenty-three positions were reduced from a
higher to a lower grade of G/FO.
The most significant difference between this and previous studies
is that we did not ask for a ``percent bogey'' that just slices the
overall number equally amongst the Services that has usually resulted
in a change to legislation to maintain. Because of this difference, our
recommended policy provides a governance oversight framework for the
Secretary of Defense and the Military Departments to create a culture
of self discipline below authorized end strength. Two years ago, the
Joint Pool policy created the foundation for increased flexibility for
the Department in the management of positions; this policy will take
those governance procedures to the next step and create additional
buffer allocations. It will also create a similar Secretary of the
Service-controlled buffer.
______
Mr. Chairman, Senator Graham, and members of this distinguished
subcommittee, thank you for inviting us to testify before you.
The General and Flag Officer Efficiencies Study Group (Study Group)
was directed by the Secretary of Defense, and by follow-on guidance
from the Chair of the Efficiencies Task Force to:
Conduct a fiscal year 2010 level baseline review of
all active General and Flag Officer (G/FO) positions and
related overhead and accoutrements.
Restructure to best align with mission,
responsibilities, and relevant counterparts.
Eliminate at least 50 positions over the next 2 years.
Reallocate G/FO billets based on mission.
Redistribute ranks to reduce overhead and bureaucracy.
Develop policies and procedures to manage future G/FO
growth.
This review differed from the 10 earlier G/FO reviews conducted
since World War II in several distinct ways: the review was conducted
while armed conflict was ongoing, the amount of time allotted to
conduct the review was very compressed, and the objective was not to
determine how many G/FO were required, but instead to identify
organizational efficiencies that would allow the Department to more
effectively align the force with priority missions. The most
significant difference may be the fact that the Secretary has approved
a governance structure that will maintain discipline on the number of
requirements and provide for the first time in the history of the
Department the flexibility to rapidly adapt Service G/FO force
structure to emerging requirements.
METHODOLOGY
Based off authorizations proscribed in title 10 U.S.C.,
Sec. Sec. 525 and 526, the Study Group determined there are 952
authorized and funded G/FO positions in the active duty ranks. That
baseline number is divided into two sections: Joint authorizations of
294, and Service authorizations of 658. Conversely, we found that if we
purely counted the number of G/FO's vice the number of authorized
positions, the numbers constantly fluctuated due to the 60-day
transition time (when a G/FO departs a Joint position, that officer is
considered exempt from Service Statutory ceilings for 60 days), and
those positions affected by approved retirements or terminal leave. The
authorized and funded number of 952 defines the fiscal year 2010
baseline and is the basis for recommended reductions to meet the intent
of the Secretary of Defense's efficiency goal.
The preeminent charge for the Study Group was restructuring of the
Department's G/FO force to best align individual Service G/FO positions
by mission, responsibilities and its relevant counterparts. To
accomplish this task, we began by requesting each Military Service's
evaluation of their Service G/FO positions in the following manner.
Tier: (Prioritization from 1-4)
1. Must Have
2. Need to Have
3. Good to Have
4. Nice to Have--Services were required to designate at least 10
percent of their positions as Tier 4 to force discussion and create
organizational change
Line Of Operations:
Operations
Headquarters
Service Support
Categories
MO: Military Operations--direct action
MS: Military Support
MP: Military Presence--nature of job supports
public support and confidence
ME: Military Experience--nature of job
requires years of military experience
The Study Group, armed with this insight, looked longitudinally
across the Services at all functions and identified opportunities that
would not have been visible if the Group had only reviewed the
structure of a single Service. Study Group business rules were created
to take subjective data and turn it into an objective study. Meeting
the business rules was not a trigger for position elimination, but
rather a signal to the Group that a position required further study and
justification. This methodology allowed us to view every position from
many different angles. The business rules were:
The grade is dissimilar to a common position held by
another Service
The position resides in an academic setting
The position resides in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense or Department of Defense and is not listed as a
Director of an organization
The position was assigned as a Tier 4 (nice to have)
position
The position was historically filled by a lesser grade
or a member of the Senior Executive Service
The position was created as a direct result of an
Overseas Contingency Operation
The position can be best served by an SES who
possesses scientific/technical expertise
The positions tour length exceeds 4 years and could/
should be filled by a civilian
The position was created for a specific mission, which
has been completed
The position's roles and responsibilities are
duplicative with another position
The position had been historically filled with one
officer then split into two separate positions
The position is a Deputy or Vice Commander
The position's higher headquarters is realigned under
a new organization
The position is located on a Joint Base with multiple
GO/FOs that could have originated from a previous service base
Throughout the process we engaged Service stakeholders and ensured
transparency to elicit responses and discussion that would aid us in
creating the intended efficiencies. We conducted a range of meetings
and published co-chair memos to outline and request feedback through
each phase of our study. These efforts were coordinated with ongoing
assessments and parallel studies so that we could capitalize on
organizational, functional, and senior leadership efficiency
recommendations and provide a more comprehensive product.
While a role and mission assessment was not conducted in the
interest of time, the alignment of the G/FO positions against
operational and non-operational organizational structures was assessed,
albeit in a necessarily cursory manner. The results of this assessment
were included in our recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.
Identification of additional efficiencies in the future may be
possible, but we are confident that the proposed recommendations
capture the major efficiencies readily available in the existing
environment.
RESULTS
The Study Group recommended 110 positions and the Secretary of
Defense ultimately approved 103 G/FO positions for elimination. Twenty-
three additional positions were reduced from a higher to a lower grade
of G/FO, and 10 additional positions were restructured or reallocated
(i.e. to support establishment of the new Cyber Command). Instead of
recommending changes to statutory allowances as has been done in the
past, at this time the Secretary of Defense instead has chosen to allow
the Services to use these 103 efficiency positions to establish Service
buffers and we have developed a new framework for managing the G/FO
force below authorized end strengths.
JOINT POOL
Two years ago, creation of the Joint Pool policy built a foundation
for increased position management flexibility by providing the
Secretary of Defense with G/FO authorizations he could manage based on
operational needs. Our new recommended policy will take those Joint
Pool governance procedures to the next step by creating additional
buffer allocations, as well as, by creating similar Service Secretary-
controlled buffers. To facilitate reprioritization of Joint G/FO
positions and to set a policy of self governance based on the
efficiency recommendations, 86 of the 324 G/FO authorizations provided
for under title 10, U.S.C, section 526 will be held as a buffer by the
Secretary of Defense for future requirements and to facilitate
temporary requirements. Additionally, Service minimum required
contributions to the Joint Pool were lowered as follows:
U.S. Army--82 from 102
U.S. Navy--60 from 74
U.S. Air Force--75 from 92
U.S. Marine Corps--21 from 26
These 238 designated positions will be excluded from the Military
Service's G/FO grade and strength limitations specified in title 10,
U.S.C., Sec. Sec. 525 and 526 after required information, has been
provided to Congress and 12 months have elapsed, unless sooner
authorized by Congress. The allocations are predicated on the Military
Services maintaining their minimum number of Joint G/FO in Joint Pool
positions; should one Service fail to maintain its allocation, those
positions may be reallocated to another Service. To provide a stable
promotion planning platform, a 5 year rolling average of encumbered
Joint Pool positions will be used as the method for calculating future
allocations.
Offsets are required for each new Joint Pool position
unless the Secretary of Defense decides to increase the Joint
Pool beyond the 238 previously-distributed authorizations; such
an increase would result in the reallocation of the increase to
the Military Services.
Temporary allocation of additional G/FO authorizations
for new positions added to the Joint Pool are included in the
determination of a Military Service's average participation
rate in the Joint Pool.
Once the incumbent in the previously-designated
position departs, the Service filling the new Joint Pool
position will begin receiving credit for filling the position.
SERVICE POOL
Using the Joint Pool as a model for a policy vice legislative-
driven strength limiting mechanism; a Service Pool managed by the
Service Secretaries in the same manner the Joint Pool buffer is managed
by the Secretary of Defense will be created from the 44 remaining
positions (103 recommended eliminations minus the 59 which were
designated to the Joint Pool buffer). The Service Pools will be used as
a self governance tool to maintain the reductions realized by the
efficiency study. By no means is this intended to impact the Services'
ability or responsibility to man, train, and equip in accordance with
title 10, U.S.C. The current distribution of commissioned officers on
active duty in G/FO grades is legislated in title 10, U.S.C., Sec. 525,
(excluding Sec. 528) and has the following appointment limitations:
U.S. Army--total of 230
7 officers in the grade of general
45 officers in a grade above the grade of
major general
90 officers in the grade of major general
U.S. Air Force--total of 208
9 officers in the grade of general
43 officers in a grade above the grade of
major general
73 officers in the grade of major general
U.S. Navy--total of 160
6 officers in the grade of admiral
32 officers in a grade above the grade of rear
admiral
50 officers in the grade of rear admiral
U.S. Marine Corps--total of 60
2 officers in the grade of general
15 officers in a grade above the grade of
major general
22 officers in the grade of major general
Based on the Study Group's recommendation that appointment
limitations should not change in statute but should be limited by
policy, the new Department-limited distributions will be:
U.S. Army--total of 219
7 officers in the grade of general
45 officers in a grade above the grade of
major general
90 officers in the grade of major general
U.S. Air Force--total of 186
9 officers in the grade of general
43 officers in a grade above the grade of
major general
73 officers in the grade of major general
U.S. Navy--total of 149
6 officers in the grade of admiral
32 officers in a grade above the grade of rear
admiral
50 officers in the grade of rear admiral
U.S. Marine Corps--total of 60
2 officers in the grade of general
15 officers in a grade above the grade of
major general
22 officers in the grade of major general
To facilitate future and temporary requirements without the need
for statutory relief each time, the Military Departments will be
allowed to keep as a buffer efficiency positions identified by the
Study Group. Services buffers are as follow:
U.S. Army--11
U.S. Air Force--22
U.S. Navy--11
U.S. Marine Corps--0
Each Military Department Secretary is responsible for:
Establishing procedures for the temporary use of these
authorizations. Each authorization may only be used for an
encumbered position for a period not to exceed 2 years.
Ensuring the number of authorizations are not
exceeded.
Providing a report of all G/FO to the USD(P&R) through
the CJCS semi-annually.
Submitting requests for increases to the authorized
number of Military Service G/FO positions to the Secretary of
Defense through the CJCS and the USD(P&R).
The implementation of these changes requires careful monitoring by
all involved to avoid ill-effect to the development and maintenance of
an appropriately experienced G/FO force. Particular attention is
necessary in order to retain warfighting experience gained in Iraq and
Afghanistan. As a means of providing the necessary promotion stability
and for the maintenance of an effective bench of candidates, positions
identified for elimination will only be redesignated upon the departure
of the incumbent. This delay in elimination or redesignation will
mitigate the need for the use of extraordinary authorities to deal with
early retirements and unplanned departures from Joint positions.
Implementation began January 1, 2011. By December 30, 2013 we will have
eliminated 50 G/FO positions as directed by the Secretary at the outset
of our Study Group's work. Service quarterly updates to the Secretary
of Defense have maintained a positive control on the implementation and
execution of the efficiency reductions.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide you with an explanation of
our Study Group's analysis and recommendations combined with our plan
for implementation.
Senator Webb. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Dr. Freeman, welcome.
STATEMENT OF DR. BENJAMIN J. FREEMAN, NATIONAL SECURITY FELLOW,
PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT
Dr. Freeman. Thank you, Senator Webb, for having me. Also,
thank you, Ranking Member Graham and the members of the
subcommittee as well.
I am pleased to have the opportunity to present the POGO's
investigation of the increasing number of G/FOs in the U.S.
military. Founded in 1981, POGO is a nonpartisan, independent
watchdog that champions good government reforms. We have a long
history of examining the size of the military's officer ranks,
especially in relation to the number of enlisted personnel at
DOD.
Our interest in the number of officers in the U.S. military
was reignited in August 2010 when the Secretary of Defense
launched these DOD efficiencies initiatives. They limited the
increasing proportion of officers relative to enlisted
personnel, as well as the tendency for higher ranking officers
to do work that could reasonably be done by lower ranking
officers. This is known as ``brass creep'' or as ``officer or
rank inflation.''
The focus of my testimony here is the growing proportion of
G/FOs relative to the rest of the uniformed force, a subset of
brass creep that I refer to as ``star creep.'' While star creep
has occurred since at least the end of World War II, the pace
of star creep has accelerated in the 20 years since the Cold
War ended, culminating in today's unprecedented top-heavy force
structure. The average G/FO today has nearly 500 fewer
uniformed personnel under their command than they did in 1991,
and as of June 2011, the U.S. military had more three- and
four-star officers than at any point since the Cold War ended.
Whether DOD has expanded or contracted, star creep has
persisted. During the drawdown in the decade following the end
of the Cold War, lower ranks were cut much more than higher
ranks. In the decade since the war in Afghanistan began, higher
ranks grew at a much faster rate than lower ranks. The top
officer ranks, G/FOs, have grown faster than enlisted and lower
officer ranks, and the three- and four-star ranks have
increased faster than all other components of DOD's force
structure. Even with the onset of the war in Afghanistan, the
U.S. military continued to become more top heavy, which is
noteworthy because this is the first major U.S. conflict in
which the military has increased the G/FO ranks at a higher
rate than all other uniformed ranks.
Throughout the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
average number of uniformed personnel beneath each G/FO fell.
In fact, from 2001 to 2007, DOD added 28 G/FOs while cutting
more than 5,500 uniformed personnel from lower ranks. This
trend towards a more top-heavy military continued from 2007 to
the present, with the growth rate of the top brass nearly
doubling the growth rate of lower ranks.
Every branch of the military has increased its G/FO ranks,
especially the three- and four-star ranks since the tragic
events of September 11, 2001, but the disparities between the
branches are surprising, as Chairman Webb has already noted.
The Army and Marine Corps, which bear the greatest burden in
the war on terror, have added far fewer top brass than the Navy
and the Air Force. In fact, the Navy and the Air Force have
each added more top brass than the Army and Marine Corps
combined. The Navy and the Air Force added this top brass while
cutting more than 70,000 enlisted personnel and lower ranking
officers.
Furthermore, the Air Force has a historically low number of
planes per general, and the Navy is close to having more
admirals than ships for them to command.
This progression towards a more top-heavy force is not
without its consequences. It is a burden for both taxpayers and
military commanders. The cost of officers increases markedly
with their rank so taxpayers are overpaying whenever a G/FO is
in a position that could be filled by a lower ranking officer.
Additionally, military personnel experts know that
unnecessarily top-heavy organizations hinder military
effectiveness and they slow decision cycles. Former Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates said that in some cases the gap between
him and an action officer may be as high as 30 layers, and this
results in a ``bureaucracy which has the fine motor skills of a
dinosaur.''
The growth in DOD's top ranks documented in our
investigation will not be fully eliminated when military
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan end, nor will Secretary
Gates' commendable efficiencies initiatives fully reverse this
trend toward a more top-heavy military, unfortunately.
To further combat star creep and gain a better
understanding of its cost to taxpayers and impact on military
effectiveness, much more work is needed. We believe that the
Government Accountability Office, DOD's Director of Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation, and Secretary of Defense
Leon Panetta's office can contribute significantly to this
effort. We implore the subcommittee to utilize these invaluable
resources.
For our part, we at POGO will continue our work to better
understand this issue, and that is why we are grateful for this
hearing. We look forward to learning more from the other
panelists and the members of the subcommittee.
I look forward to answering any questions you may have, and
I thank you once again, Chairman Webb and Ranking Member
Graham, for holding this hearing.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Freeman follows:]
Prepared Statement by Benjamin Freeman, Ph.D.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The increasing proportion of officers relative to enlisted
personnel, as well as the tendency for higher ranking officers to do
work that could be done by lower ranking officers, is known as brass
creep or as officer or rank inflation. The pace of brass creep has
accelerated in the 20 years since the Cold War ended, culminating in
today's unprecedented top-heavy force structure.
Whether the Department of Defense (DOD) has expanded or contracted,
brass creep has persisted. During the drawdown in the decade following
the end of the Cold War, lower ranks were cut much more than higher
ranks. In the decade since the war in Afghanistan began, higher ranks
have grown at a much faster rate than lower ranks. This is as true
within the officer ranks as it is between the enlisted and officer
ranks. The top officer ranks, general and flag officers,\1\ have grown
faster than lower officer ranks, and three- and four-star positions
have increased faster than all other components of the DOD's force of
uniformed personnel--a phenomenon we call star creep.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ General and flag officers include all generals in the Air
Force, Army, and Marines and all admirals in the Navy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since the war in Afghanistan began, every branch of the military
has increased its general or flag officer ranks, especially their
three- and four-star ranks, but the disparities between the branches
are surprising. The Army and Marines, which bear the greatest burden in
the war on terror,\2\ have added far fewer top brass than the Navy and
Air Force. In fact, the Navy and Air Force have each added more top
brass than the Army and Marines combined, and the Navy and Air Force
added this top brass while cutting more than 70,000 enlisted personnel
and lower ranking officers. Furthermore, the Air Force has a
historically low number of planes per general and the Navy is close to
having more admirals than ships for them to command.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Defense Manpower Data Center, Data, Analysis and Programs
Division, Global War on Terrorism: Casualties by Military Service
Component--Active, Guard, and Reserve, October 7, 2001 through August
29, 2011. http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/gwot--
component.pdf (Downloaded September 8, 2011)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This progression towards a more top-heavy force is a burden for
taxpayers and military commanders. The cost of officers increases
markedly with their rank, so taxpayers are overpaying whenever a
general or flag officer is in a position that could be filled by a
lower ranking officer. Additionally, some military personnel experts
say unnecessarily top-heavy organizations hinder military effectiveness
as they slow decision cycles.\3\ Former Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates said that ``in some cases the gap between me and an action
officer may be as high as 30 layers,'' and this results in a
``bureaucracy which has the fine motor skills of a dinosaur.'' \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ PowerPoint presentation by Retired Army Major Donald E.
Vandergriff on Officer Manning: Armies of the past. http://
pogoarchives.org/m/ns/officers--briefing.ppt (hereinafter Officer
Manning: Armies of the past)
\4\ John Barry and Evan Thomas, ``A War Within: Robert Gates has
one last, crucial mission before he leaves office, and it's not in
Afghanistan or Iraq. It's in Washington--within the hallowed halls of
the Pentagon,'' September 12, 2010. http://www.thedailybeast.com/
newsweek/2010/09/12/what-gates-plans-to-do-before-he-leaves-office.html
(Downloaded September 8, 2011) (hereinafter ``A War Within'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To reverse this trend towards a more top-heavy force and gain a
better understanding of the causes and consequences of star creep we
recommend that Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta continue to implement
the general and flag officer efficiencies initiated under Secretary
Gates, and that he begin a new round of initiatives to further reduce
the general and flag officer ranks. To aid in this effort, the DOD's
Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation should be asked to
investigate the impact of star creep, and brass creep more broadly, on
DOD payroll expenditures and determine if it hinders military
effectiveness. The Government Accountability Office can also be tasked
with aiding this effort by investigating the root causes of star creep
and working to identify unnecessary general and flag officer positions.
______
Chairman Webb, Ranking Minority Member Graham, and the
distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to have the
opportunity to present the Project On Government Oversight's (POGO)
investigation of the increasing number of general and flag officers in
the U.S. military.
Founded in 1981, POGO is a nonpartisan independent watchdog that
champions good government reforms. POGO's investigations into
corruption, misconduct, and conflicts of interest achieve a more
effective, accountable, open, and ethical Federal Government. POGO has
a long history of examining the size of the military's officer ranks,
especially in relation to the number of enlisted personnel at DOD.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Project On Government Oversight, More Brass, More Bucks:
Officer Inflation in Today's Military, March 1, 1998. http://
pogoarchives.org/m/ns/officer-inflation-report-19980301.pdf and Project
on Military Procurement, Officer Inflation: Its Cost to the Taxpayer
and to Military Effectiveness, June 1982, revised October 1987. http://
pogoarchives.org/m/ns/officer-inflation-19871001.pdf (hereinafter
Officer Inflation: Its Cost to the Taxpayer and to Military
Effectiveness)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The increasing proportion of officers relative to enlisted
personnel, as well as the tendency for higher ranking officers to do
work that could be done by lower ranking officers, is known as brass
creep or as officer or rank inflation. I refer to the rising proportion
of general and flag officers relative to the rest of the uniformed
force (officers and enlisted) as star creep, which is a subset of brass
creep.
Before I go into more detail on star creep, I want to note that
this is only a partial and mostly descriptive account of the
composition of DOD personnel. For instance, the rise of joint commands
since enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in the 1980s \6\ is likely
a root cause of much of the star creep we have seen since the law's
passage, however, we at POGO have not fully evaluated this causal
relationship. Furthermore, a deeper examination of the military
Reserves and National Guard components, the DOD civilian workforce, and
DOD service contractor employee workforce is needed for a more holistic
understanding of the DOD's total force structure. Many experts have
told POGO that the Reserves, National Guard, and DOD civilian workforce
suffer from issues similar to those faced by the regular active duty
uniformed force, i.e. they are too top-heavy. We have not, as of yet,
examined this claim.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, U.S.C., title 10, subtitle A,
part I, chapter 5. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/title--
10.htm (Downloaded September 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, my testimony only touches on the financial costs of
star creep. Furthermore, analysis is required to determine the proper
balance of general and flag officers relative to other DOD personnel,
including DOD uniformed, civilian, and contractor personnel. The
recently released final report by the Commission on Wartime Contracting
has advanced understanding of the costs of the mixed uniformed,
civilian government employee, and contractor employee force in Iraq and
Afghanistan.\7\ However, the situation stateside appears to be quite
different, where the government pays billions more annually to hire
contractors than it would to hire Federal employees to perform
comparable services, as described in POGO's recently released report,
Bad Business: Billions of Taxpayer Dollars Wasted on Hiring
Contractors. But, cost is not the only factor that should be considered
when deciding on the right mix between uniformed, government civilian,
and contractor personnel--military effectiveness, whether work is
inherently governmental or closely associated with inherently
governmental functions, and whether frameworks exist for effective
accountability for the type of personnel in question are also factors
that should be weighed. Thus, POGO will be doing considerably more work
on these issues and we hope your hearing sheds light on how to achieve
the best force at the best cost.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan,
Final Report to Congress: Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling
costs, reducing risks, August 2011. http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/
docs/CWC--FinalReport-lowres.pdf (Downloaded September 8, 2011) The
report states that most local and third country national service
contractors used in long contingency operations are more cost-effective
than uniformed personnel and Federal civilian employees. The picture is
more mixed when examining high-skill jobs, according to the report:
dwell time costs make uniformed personnel more expensive, but
``contractor and Federal civilian costs are roughly comparable.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our interest in the number of officers in the U.S. military was
reignited in August 2010, when Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
released a ``Statement on Department Efficiency Initiatives'' that
lamented the increase in DOD senior personnel, noting that we have:
. . . seen an acceleration of what Senator John Glenn more
than 20 years ago called ``brass creep,'' a situation where
personnel of higher and higher rank are assigned to do things
that could reasonably be handled by personnel of lower rank. In
some cases, this creep is 1fueled by the desire to increase
bureaucratic clout or prestige of a particular service,
function or region, rather than reflecting the scope and duties
of the job itself. In a post-September 11 era, when more and
more responsibility, including decisions with strategic
consequences, is being exercised by more junior officers in
theater, the Defense Department continues to maintain a top-
heavy hierarchy that more reflects 20th century protocols than
21st century realities.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Department of Defense, ``DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates
from the Pentagon,'' August 9, 2010. http://www.defense.gov/
transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4669 (Downloaded September 8,
2011) (hereinafter ``DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates from the
Pentagon'')
While this ``brass creep'' Gates and Senator Glenn referred to has
occurred since the beginning of the 20th century, the pace of brass
creep has accelerated in the 20 years since the Cold War ended,
culminating in today's unprecedented top-heavy force structure. In
fact, whether the DOD has expanded or contracted, brass creep has
persisted. During the drawdown in the decade following the end of the
Cold War, lower ranks were cut much more than higher ranks. In the
decade since the war in Afghanistan began, higher ranks have grown at a
much faster rate than lower ranks. This is as true within the officer
ranks as it is between the enlisted and officer ranks. The top officer
ranks, general and flag officers,\9\ have grown faster than lower
officer ranks, and three- and four-star positions have increased faster
than all other components of the DOD's force structure--a phenomenon we
call star creep. I also want to note that, although my analysis is
focused on the period since the end of the Cold War through the
present, this is not meant to imply that I believe the ratio of general
and flag officers to the uniformed force at the end of the Cold War was
necessarily the ``correct'' ratio.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ General and Flag Officers include all Generals in the Air
Force, Army, and Marines and all Admirals in the Navy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since the war in Afghanistan began, every branch of the military
has increased its general or flag officer ranks, especially their
three- and four-stars, but the disparities between the branches are
surprising. The Army and Marines, which bear the greatest burden in the
war on terror,\10\ have added far fewer top brass than the Navy and Air
Force. In fact, the Navy and Air Force have each added more top brass
than the Army and Marines combined. Furthermore, the Air Force has a
historically low number of planes per general and the Navy is close to
having more admirals than ships for them to command.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Defense Manpower Data Center, Data, Analysis and Programs
Division, Global War on Terrorism: Casualties by Military Service
Component--Active, Guard, and Reserve, October 7, 2001 through August
29, 2011. http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/gwot--
component.pdf (Downloaded September 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This progression towards a more top-heavy force is a burden for
taxpayers and military commanders. The cost of officers increases
markedly with their rank, so taxpayers are overpaying whenever a
general or flag officer is in a position that could be filled by a
lower ranking officer. The costs involved are more than just
compensation for that officer; the subordinate personnel assigned to
and overhead associated with a general or flag officer, particularly
three- and four-star positions, are the greatest additional expense.
Additionally, some military personnel experts say unnecessarily top-
heavy organizations with excessive layers of ``middle management''
hinder military effectiveness as they slow decision cycles.\11\ Gates
claimed that ``in some cases the gap between me and an action officer
may be as high as 30 layers,'' and this results in a ``bureaucracy
which has the fine motor skills of a dinosaur.''\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ PowerPoint presentation by Retired Army Major Donald E.
Vandergriff on Officer Manning: Armies of the past. http://
pogoarchives.org/m/ns/officers--briefing.ppt (hereinafter Officer
Manning: Armies of the past)
\12\ John Barry and Evan Thomas, ``A War Within: Robert Gates has
one last, crucial mission before he leaves office, and it's not in
Afghanistan or Iraq. It's in Washington--within the hallowed halls of
the Pentagon,'' September 12, 2010. http://www.thedailybeast.com/
newsweek/2010/09/12/what-gates-plans-to-do-before-he-leaves-office.html
(Downloaded September 8, 2011) (hereinafter ``A War Within'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
there are fewer dod personnel for each general and flag officer
Since World War II ended, the number of general or flag officers
per uniformed personnel has been increasing \13\--reaching an all-time
high in 2010 of nearly 7 general and flag officers per every 10,000
uniformed personnel.\14\ This is an increase of more than half a
general or flag officer per 10,000 uniformed personnel than when the
war in Afghanistan began; one and a half more than when the Cold War
ended; and five more than when World War II ended, as Figure 1 shows.
There has been a fairly constant increase in the ratio of general and
flag officers compared to all other uniformed personnel since the end
of the Cold War, even though the military underwent a contraction
during the 1990s and an expansion following the onset of the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ All uniformed personnel data prior to 1989 taken from POGO's
prior officer inflation report (Table 1): Officer Inflation: Its Cost
to the Taxpayer and to Military Effectiveness. Data from 1989 to 2005
are from the Selected Manpower Statistics Table 2-15: Department of
Defense, Statistical Information Analysis Division,'' Workforce
Publications.'' http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/Pubs.htm
(Downloaded September 8, 2011) Uniformed personnel data from 2006 to
the present are as of the end of each fiscal year in tables found here:
Department of Defense, Statistical Information Analysis Division,
``Military Personnel Statistics.'' http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/
personnel/MILITARY/miltop.htm (Downloaded September 8, 2011)
(hereinafter ``Military Personnel Statistics'') All branch specific
personnel data taken from the DOD's ``Active Duty Military Personnel by
Service by Rank/Grade'' tables from September of the year in question,
except for 2011 data, which were taken from April (the most current
month available as of this writing): ``Military Personnel Statistics''
\14\ This is an all-time high for years in which reliable DOD
personnel data are available, which includes only the post-World War II
era. This constrained time period is the result of general/flag officer
data being publicly unavailable for most years prior to World War II.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As of April 2011, there were 964 general and flag officers. By
comparison, at the end of the Cold War the United States had 1,017
general and flag officers. Thus, there has only been a nominal decrease
in general and flag officers even though the number of active duty
uniformed personnel has decreased by roughly 28 percent, the Air Force
flies 35 percent fewer planes,\15\ and the Navy has 46 percent fewer
ships in its fleet.\16\ In sum, the number of general and flag officers
has barely fallen despite double-digit percentage drops in the size of
the forces they command.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Air Force Historical Studies Office, ``USAF Statistics: USAF
Statistical Digests and Summaries.'' http://www.afhso.af.mil/
usafstatistics/index.asp (Downloaded September 8, 2011)
\16\ Naval History & Heritage Command, ``U.S. Navy Active Ship
Force Levels, 1886-present.'' http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/
org9-4.htm (Downloaded September 8, 2011) (hereinafter ``U.S. Navy
Active Ship Force Levels, 1886-present'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This trend towards a top-heavy force structure continued during the
post-Cold War drawdown from 1991 to 2001. During this time period, the
DOD cut just over 600,000 uniformed personnel--a decline of
approximately 30 percent--but only 146 general and flag officer
positions were eliminated--a decline of less than 15 percent. Thus, the
remaining general and flag officers were responsible for commanding far
fewer personnel when the war in Afghanistan began, and this trend
towards commanding fewer personnel continued even after the conflicts
in Afghanistan and Iraq began, as can be seen in Figure 2.
There were 871 general and flag officers when the war in
Afghanistan began in 2001, and by April 2011, there were 964.\17\ Yet
the enlisted ranks have increased at a smaller rate during the
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan than the growth than general and flag
officers. This trend is the opposite of what has occurred in prior
major conflicts. This is the first major U.S. conflict in which the
military has increased the general and flag officer ranks at a higher
rate than all other ranks. From 2001 to April 2011, the DOD added 93
general and flag officers and 47,604 uniformed personnel (17,739
officers and 29,196 enlisted personnel) to its payroll, which amounts
to adding one general or flag officer for every 512 uniformed
personnel. To put this in perspective, in 2000, the average general or
flag officer commanded approximately 1,590 uniformed personnel. In
other words, throughout these conflicts the DOD has employed fewer
personnel per general or flag officer than it did in peacetime, which
is counterintuitive and historically unprecedented.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Unless otherwise noted, all data come from the last month
(September) of the fiscal year in question. Between September 2010 and
April 2011, which was the most recent data available as of this
writing, Gates began his efficiency initiatives that reduced the total
number of general and flag officers. Thus, the 2011 totals for general
and flag officers are lower than the 2010 totals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During peacetime, there are fewer personnel per general or flag
officer because a Reserve of lower ranks is not as essential as a
Reserve of top commanders. The latter take much longer to groom than
all other personnel, thus the military must have a stable of general
and flag officers ready in the event a conflict breaks out to train and
command forces in that conflict. This is the U.S. mobilization
doctrine, which argues that the numbers of officers should be kept top
heavy to provide a pool to lead new formations in time of
mobilization.\18\ During a conflict, conversely, the number of
enlisted, lower-level officers, and civilians should, in theory,
increase at a faster rate than the top brass.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Officer Manning: Armies of the past
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This pattern has not held during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
During the first several years of these conflicts, from 2001 to 2007,
the number of DOD uniformed personnel actually decreased by more than
5,500,\19\ while the number of general and flag officers increased by
28. From 2007 through April 2011, the U.S. military added over 13,000
officers and just over 39,000 enlisted personnel for a total increase
in uniformed personnel of 52,937, a 3.8 percent increase. During this
same period, the total number of general and flag officers increased by
65, a 7 percent increase. Thus, during the current conflicts the growth
of the top brass has outpaced the growth of the total uniformed force.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ As we document below, this aggregate figure masks the fact
that the Air Force and the Navy cut personnel, while the Army and
Marines added personnel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Growth in the Number of Three- and Four-Star General and Flag Officers
The increase in the very top brass--three- and four-star officers--
further illustrates star creep within the DOD. The number of three- and
four-star general and flag officers (lieutenant-generals, vice-
admirals, generals, and admirals) has increased since the Cold War
ended, as depicted in Figure 3. In 1991, there were 157 three- and
four-stars.\20\ By April 2011, they had swollen to 194--an increase of
24 percent. We have more three- and four-stars now that at any point
since the Cold War ended. Since 1991, no DOD personnel group has grown
at a faster rate. From 1991 through April 2011, officer ranks shrank by
more than 56,000 (19 percent) and enlisted personnel decreased by
nearly half a million (30 percent).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ From 1989 until the end of the Cold War the number of three-
and four-star billets remained constant at 157. In 1994, during the
post-Cold War drawdown, this number drops to just 140. Thus, using 1991
data provides a more conservative estimate of the rise in top billets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The increase in the very top brass has contributed to the top-heavy
nature of the DOD force structure. As depicted in Figure 4, the number
of three- and four-star general and flag officers per 10,000 DOD
uniformed personnel has increased markedly since 1991. The greatest
increase occurred during the 10 years following the end of the Cold
War, but even after the war in Afghanistan began the same upward trend
continued. As of April 2011, there were 1.37 three- and four-star
general and flag officers for every 10,000 uniformed DOD personnel--an
increase of nearly 20 percent since the war in Afghanistan began.
Currently, the average three- and four-star officer has approximately
7,300 uniformed personnel under their command, yet just 15 years ago
the average three- and four-star general or flag officer had more than
10,000 uniformed personnel under their command. Even if the 155,000
service contractors working in Iraq and Afghanistan \21\ are accounted
for, the average three- and four-star officer still has far fewer
personnel under their command than they did prior to these conflicts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ This total service contractor figure is as of March 2011,
according to a recent CRS report: Congressional Research Service,
Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background
and Analysis (R40764) , May 13, 2011. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
natsec/R40764.pdf (Downloaded September 8, 2011)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The rise of the top brass during the current conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan compared to other DOD personnel is noteworthy. From 2001 to
2011 the number of officers per three- and four-star general or flag
officers dropped by 172 and the number of enlisted personnel per three-
and four-star officer dropped by 1,253. Figure 5 compares the growth of
three- and four-star officers to other categories of military
personnel. The three- and four-star ranks have increased twice as fast
as one- and two-star general and flag officers, three times as fast as
the increase in all officers, and almost 10 times as fast as the
increase in enlisted personnel. If you imagine it visually, the shape
of U.S. military personnel has shifted from looking like a pyramid to
beginning to look more like a skyscraper (i.e. higher ranks having
fewer lower ranking personnel under them rather than more).
Star Creep Across the Services Since September 11
While star creep is the general trend across the military, there
have been considerable and counterintuitive variances across the
Services since September 2001. Figure 6 tracks the number of general
and flag officers per 10,000 uniformed personnel in each branch of the
military from September 2001 to April 2011.\22\ The Marines have the
fewest generals and are also the leanest force (but still top heavy
compared to historical Marine force compositions), averaging just over
four generals for every 10,000 uniformed personnel. At the other end of
the spectrum, the Air Force is the most top-heavy branch with almost 10
generals for every 10,000 airmen. In other words, the Air Force is two-
and-a-half times as top-heavy as the marines, and in absolute terms
they have more than three times as many generals as the Marines. With
312 general officers, the Air Force is tied with the Army for most
general and flag officers of any Service, even though the Air Force has
approximately 237,000 fewer uniformed personnel than the Army.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Source for all branch specific general/flag officer ratios:
``Military Personnel Statistics,'' (September of the year in question
for all years except 2011). April 2011 was the most recent data
available as of this writing. Additionally, the DOD does not break out
civilian personnel data for the Marines, thus all branch comparisons
are for total uniformed personnel and do not include civilians in each
branch.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The general pattern of the Army and Marines becoming leaner, as
illustrated in Figure 6, is logical given that the ground wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan have placed a much greater burden on the fighting
forces in the Marines and Army compared with the Navy and Air Force.
The growth in the number of generals or flag officers in each branch
during these wars, however, appears to be much less logical. Table 1
lists the total generals or flag officers in each branch as of April
2011, the number added since September 2001, and the number of those
additions that were three- and four-stars. The Air Force led the way,
adding 40 generals between September 2001 and April 2011, an increase
of 15 percent. But, the Navy actually increased its highest ranks at a
greater rate than any other branch, adding 36 flag officers (an
increase of 17 percent), including 15 three- and four-star admirals (an
increase of nearly 40 percent).\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Source for this and all in grade/rank calculations: ``Military
Personnel Statistics.'' The charts are under ``Active Duty Military
Personnel by Service by Rank/Grade'' and all comparisons are between
September 2001 and April 2011 (the most recent data available as of
this writing).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Every branch added top brass, but the branches engaged in the
majority of all combat operations since September 2001 (the Army and
Marines) have added far fewer than the other two branches. The Army and
Marines, combined, added far less than half the top brass of either the
Navy or Air Force. The Navy and Air Force, combined, also added more
three- and four-star ranks (20) than did the Army and Marines combined
(17). These differences between the services are laid out in Table 1.
On average, there are now approximately 185 fewer enlisted
personnel per general in the Air Force and 400 fewer enlisted per
admiral in the Navy than there were just 10 years ago.
Similarly, there are more than 40 fewer officers per general or
flag officer in both the Air Force and Navy today than there were in
2001.
But this only begins to scratch the surface of this irregularity.
During this same time period the Navy and Air Force cut both enlisted
personnel (65,205) and officers (5,369), while the Army and Marines
added both enlisted personnel (94,401) and officers (23,108). Thus, the
Navy and Air Force added more three- and four-stars even as they cut
their forces. Meanwhile, the Army and Marines who presided over a
growing force increased their three- and four-star billets at a much
slower rate.
There has also been a significant reduction in the number of
weapons systems utilized by both the Navy and the Air Force. The Navy
now has 32 fewer active ships and the Air Force operates 576 fewer
aircraft than they did in 2001.\24\ If the Navy continues to add
admirals as it has throughout the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and
reduce the total number of ships in its fleet it will, in the very near
future, have more admirals than ships for them to command, as shown in
Figure 7. By way of comparison, in 1986 during the Reagan Cold War
buildup, there were more than two ships per admiral; when the Vietnam
War ended in 1969 there were nearly three ships per admiral; and, when
World War II ended there were approximately 130 ships per admiral.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ All Navy ship figures are from U.S. Navy Active Ship Force
Levels tables: ``U.S. Navy Active Ship Force Levels, 1886-present.''
Air Force plane data for 2001 come from Table E-1 of Department of the
Air Force, U.S. Air Force Statistical Digest, fiscal year 2001, p. 91.
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/websites/dodandmilitaryejournals/
www.saffm.hq.af.mil/FMC/statdigest/2001/milonly/statdig01.pdf
(Downloaded September 8, 2011); 2011 figure is from Department of
Defense Appropriations Bill, Full Committee Report, pp. 8-10. http://
appropriations.house.gov/UploadedFiles/fiscal year--2012--DEFENSE--
FULL--COMMITTEE--REPORT.pdf (Downloaded September 8, 2011)
\25\ These statistics are based upon calculations contained in
POGO's 1982 report (as revised in 1987) on officer inflation: Officer
Inflation: Its Cost to the Taxpayer and to Military Effectiveness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although not on pace with the Air Force and Navy, star creep within
the Army and Marines is also apparent. The Army has decreased its
number of one-star generals, while increasing its higher ranking
generals. Specifically, the Army cut 13 brigadier generals between
September 2001 and April 2011, but added 11 major generals, 11
lieutenant generals, and 2 four-star generals. Thus, even within the
general and flag officer ranks, it is the higher ranks that are being
added while only brigadier generals are being cut. The Marines' story
is very similar: five brigadier generals were cut during this time
period, seven major generals were added, and four lieutenant generals
were added. Since September 2001, three- and four-star officers in the
Army and Marines have increased by 25 and 24 percent, respectively.
THE FINANCIAL COSTS OF STAR CREEP
For taxpayers concerned with an ever-expanding DOD budget, star
creep adds to DOD costs. This is due in large degree to the costs that
that surround general and flag officers, such as staff, contractors,
and travel, which tends to increase significantly with higher ranks.
Raymond Dubois, former DOD Director of Administration and Management
from 2002 to 2005, spoke with Air Force Times directly on this
point.\26\ ``A four-star has an airplane. A three-star often doesn't .
. . Can a three-star get an airplane when he needs it? Not always. Does
a four-star get an airplane when he needs it? Always. Many times he'll
already have a G5 sitting on the runway, gassed up. There are the kinds
of costs that are fairly significant when you add them all up,''
according to Dubois.\27\ At his August 2010 speech on DOD efficiency
initiatives, former Secretary of Defense Gates referred to these perks
as ``the overhead and accoutrements that go with'' senior positions, be
they military or civilian, within DOD.\28\ His thoughts on this were
elaborated upon in an interview with Newsweek:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Scott Fontaine, ``AF has military's highest GO-to-troops
ratio,'' May 9, 2011. http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/05/air-
force-general-officer-troop-ratio-050911w/ (Downloaded September 8,
2011) (hereinafter ``AF has military's highest GO-to-troops ratio'')
\27\ ``AF has military's highest GO-to-troops ratio''
\28\ ``DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates from the Pentagon''
Gates grumbles about perks and posh quarters--generally
defended by senior officers as a reward for decades of
stressful family moves every couple of years--but those are not
his real targets. The defense secretary's deeper complaint is
about what he calls ``brass creep.'' Roughly translated, it
means having generals do what colonels are perfectly capable of
doing. Generals require huge staffs and command structures:
three-star generals serving four-stars, two-stars serving
three, each tended by squadrons of colonels and majors. This
sort of elaborate hierarchy may have been called for in
Napoleon's day, but in an era of instant communication, Gates
thinks the military could benefit from a much flatter, leaner
management structure.
These entourages are symbolic of a military leadership that,
in the view of its civilian leader, is suffering from an
inflated sense of entitlement and a distorted sense of
priorities.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ ``A War Within''
The direct compensation cost of officers also increases with their
rank. In just basic pay, when a colonel (Navy captain) with over 20
years experience becomes a brigadier general (rear admiral--lower
half), their pay jumps from $110,674 to $138,488, an increase of more
than $27,000 per year.\30\ Costs increase further when other parts of
an officer's compensation package are included, such as allowances for
subsistence, housing, and tax benefits. A major general (rear admiral)
with 30 years of service and a family of four receives a compensation
package worth more than $206,000 annually, and if they are promoted to
a three-star lieutenant general (vice admiral) their compensation
package increases to over $225,000.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ This is just monetary compensation and does not include
housing, healthcare, or any other part of the compensation packages
enjoyed by officers. All uniformed personnel salary figures taken from
the DOD's Pay Tables: Department of Defense, Defense Finance and
Accounting Service, ``Military Members,'' Updated July 27, 2011. http:/
/www.dfas.mil/dfas/militarymembers.html (Downloaded September 8, 2011)
\31\ The ``Regular Military Compensation Calculator'' includes
basic pay, basic allowance for subsistence, and the basic allowance for
housing: Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary, ``Regular
Military Compensation Calculator.'' http://militarypay.defense.gov/
mpcalcs/Calculators/RMC.aspx (Downloaded September 8, 2011)
(hereinafter ``Regular Military Compensation Calculator'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMBATING STAR CREEP
It is clear that star creep is costly to taxpayers. To overcome
this problem, there are two basic options: elimination or replacement.
As Gates demonstrated in his ``Track Four Efficiency Initiatives
Decisions,'' \32\ issued in March 2011, unnecessary officer positions
can be eliminated, and many other tasks that cannot be eliminated can
be performed by lower-ranking officers or DOD civilians to reduce
costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Memorandum from Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, to
Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al., regarding Track Four
Efficiency Initiatives Decisions, March 14, 2011. http://
www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pdi/pc/docs/3-14-2011--Track--Four--Efficiency--
Initiatives--Decisions.pdf (Downloaded September 8, 2011) (hereinafter
Track Four Efficiency Initiatives Decisions)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Eliminating General and Flag Officer Positions
The most cost-effective, though not always viable, option for
reducing the cost burden of star creep is to completely eliminate
general or flag officer positions. This strategy was heavily
incorporated into Gates' efficiency initiatives, which eliminated 102
general and flag officers. Twenty-eight of the eliminations are from
war-related positions, such as leadership posts in Afghanistan and at
the Guantanamo Bay detention center. Unfortunately, the Gates memo does
not fully eliminate all of these general and flag officer positions; it
keeps them in a ``Service Buffer,'' which can be ``used for an
encumbered position for a period not to exceed 2 years,'' and allows
requests for even longer terms to be sent to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Track Four Efficiency Initiatives Decisions, p. 30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These cuts only take us a fraction of the way towards getting the
top brass back to pre-September 11 levels. As of March 2011, when Gates
issued the ``Efficiencies'' memo, the Pentagon had added five four-star
billets since 2001,\34\ but the memo will only eliminate four of
these.\35\ There were also 32 more three-stars in March 2011 than there
were in 2001, yet Gates' plan will eliminate just eight of these after
March.\36\ Overall, Gates' plan for efficiencies in 140 general and
flag officer positions targeted three- and four-star billets just 24
times, and only eliminated 21. Incidentally, this is only two more than
the three- and four-star positions added under Gates' tenure.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ 2001 data from Table 2-15: Department of Defense, Defense
Manpower Data Center, Statistical Information Analysis Division,
Selected Manpower Statistics, fiscal year 2005, Table 2-15. http://
siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/M01/fy05/m01fy05.pdf (Downloaded
September 8, 2011). March 2011 data from: Department of Defense,
``Active Duty Military Personnel by Rank/Grade,'' March 31, 2011.
http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/rg1103.pdf (Downloaded
September 8, 2011).
\35\ The memo eliminates a total of 5 billets, but one had already
been completed prior to issue of the memo and the personnel figures
referred to here.
\36\ The memo as a whole eliminated nearly twice this number of
three-star billets, however, many of these had already been completed,
and were thus already accounted for. Additionally, two three-star
billets were added by reducing four-star billets to three-star billets.
\37\ In January 2007, the first full month in which Gates was
Secretary of Defense, there were 175 three- and four-star billets, and
in April 2011, just prior to Gates' departure, there were 194. January,
2007 data available here: Department of Defense, ``Active Duty Military
Personnel by Rank/Grade,'' January 2007. http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/
personnel/MILITARY/rg0701.pdf (Downloaded September 8, 2011) April,
2011 data available here: Department of Defense, ``Active Duty Military
Personnel by Rank/Grade,'' April 30, 2011. http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/
personnel/MILITARY/rg1104.pdf (Downloaded September 8, 2011)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While Gates' initiatives to eliminate unnecessary top brass are a
first step in the battle to control star creep and keep personnel costs
down, they may not go far enough. They retain a number of general and
flag officer positions that might reasonably be eliminated or performed
by lower-ranking officers or civilian personnel.
Replacing General and Flag Officers with Lower Ranks
While some positions should be eliminated, elimination alone is not
a panacea for the problem of star creep. Many general and flag officers
perform essential tasks and thus someone needs to perform those tasks.
In many instances, however, the tasks can be completed just as well by
less expensive alternatives within the DOD force structure.
As previously mentioned, officer costs increase with officer rank,
so if the work of a higher-level officer can be done by personnel at a
lower level, there can be cost savings. This, too, was a key part of
Gates' memo from March 2011, where he identified dozens of general and
flag officer positions whose grade should be reduced.\38\ For example,
he proposed reducing three legal billets from brigadier general to
colonel.\39\ While no savings figure for these specific cuts is
provided, a rough estimate can be obtained using the Regular Military
Compensation Calculator.\40\ Assuming 20 years of service and a family
of four, the average annual compensation of a brigadier general is
approximately $183,000 and the average annual compensation of a colonel
is $153,000. Thus, decreasing just these three billets by a single rank
would save taxpayers nearly $100,000 annually. Moreover, these three
positions are just a fraction of the general and flag officers serving
in legal positions. In all, nearly 20 general and flag officers perform
legal tasks, typically as judge advocates.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Track Four Efficiency Initiatives Decisions
\39\ Page 29 of the ``Track Four Efficiency Initiatives Decisions''
lists three Air Force Judge Advocate positions that are to be
downgraded to the rank of Colonel, Additionally, it is noted that the
Air Force did not agree to these changes.
\40\ The ``Regular Military Compensation Calculator'' includes
basic pay, basic allowance for subsistence, and the basic allowance for
housing.
\41\ The Flag and General Officers' Network, ``Flag/General
Officers Public Directories/Selection/Promotion/Orders Lists.'' http://
www.flagandgeneralofficersnetwork.org/fgosp.html (Downloaded September
8, 2011) (hereinafter ``Flag/General Officers Public Directories/
Selection/Promotion/Orders Lists'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As an All-Volunteer Force, the military needs to maximize the
combat orientation of uniformed personnel. If a general or flag officer
is performing primarily bureaucratic functions, a close review of the
justification for the staffing of these functions is warranted, along
with a rigorous examination of other staffing alternatives.
A look down the official rosters of general and flag officers
reveals a large number of positions that are not combat commands.\42\
For many of these functions, the importance of the activity is clear.
What is not always clear is why the activities must be performed by a
general or flag officer. Many general and flag officers work as
lawyers, doctors, financial managers, comptrollers, legislative
assistants/liaisons, public affairs directors, corporate directors,
chiefs of staff, and as chaplains. Specifically, in the general or flag
officer ranks there are: 8 chaplains, 18 lawyers, 4 public/legislative
affairs personnel, and 46 medical personnel, including 2 dentists.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ All positions mentioned here are as of March 2011 (the same
month Gates' issued the efficiency initiatives memo): ``Flag/General
Officers Public Directories/Selection/Promotion/Orders Lists''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For some of these positions, a general or flag officer serving in
the role may be fully justifiable. Senior command leadership may be
necessary to perform the functions of a DOD doctor or JAG attorney. But
it is not clear that all these positions should be at the general or
flag officer level. It is also not clear why there are variances across
the service branches in these positions. For example, does the Navy
need as much top brass in medical positions as all of the other
Services combined? Does the Air Force need more chaplain generals than
any of the other branches?
INITIAL CONCLUSIONS
The U.S. military is more top-heavy than it has ever been. The
average general or flag officer is commanding fewer personnel than they
ever have and many are not commanding troops for battle--they are
commanding legislative aides, dentists, lawyers, and chaplains.
Moreover, the branches that bear the least burden in the War on
Terror--the Navy and the Air Force--have added more general and flag
officers than the Army and Marines, and they have done so while cutting
lower-ranking officers and enlisted personnel.
This star creep does not appear to be fully justified and it has
increased personnel costs at the DOD. Gates' efficiency initiatives are
a vital first step towards reducing top brass, but these cuts may not
go far enough. There continue to be a number of positions that may not
need to have general or flag officers filling them.
PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS
While POGO believes we do not need as many general and flag
officers as there are now, given the current size of our military, cuts
should not be made arbitrarily. Many of our recommendations request
further studies to determine what positions can be eliminated or
downgraded. More fundamentally, we seek to better understand the root
causes of brass creep, a desire we believe the subcommittee shares.
1. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta should address the issue of
star creep by first ensuring that Former Secretary Gates' efficiency
initiatives are fully implemented, and by exploring elimination of the
Service Buffer.
2. Panetta should begin another round of initiatives to identify
additional reductions in the general and flag officer ranks. As part of
this, Panetta should conduct a roles and missions review, which will
help to identify structural components that are driving the demand for
general and flag officers.
3. Congressional oversight into the process of joint duty general
and flag officer appointments should strive to restrain the unnecessary
growth of the number of general and flag officers.
4. The DOD's Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
should be asked to investigate the impact of star creep, and brass
creep more broadly, on DOD payroll expenditures and determine if it
hinders military effectiveness, as Secretary Gates claimed.
5. The Government Accountability Office should be asked to
investigate the root causes of brass creep overall and make further
recommendations to eliminate or replace excessive general and flag
officers.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Dr. Freeman.
Again, I would like to express my appreciation to all three
of you for your testimony and to note again that your full
written testimonies will be entered into the record, along with
your oral statements.
Let me begin by asking you, Dr. Stanley, I would assume
that Secretary Panetta also supports this process that
Secretary Gates put into play?
Dr. Stanley. That is definitely a valid assumption, Senator
Webb. We have embraced this. We have not talked about this
specifically, but he is on board and has accepted the policies
and the things put in place by his predecessor.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
Can you give us an overview--maybe, Admiral, you would also
like to participate in this--in terms of just how the statutory
ceilings work? You mentioned they were a key ingredient in your
study. Do they give you overall DOD numbers from which at the
OSD level you allocate, or do these numbers come up Service-by-
Service so that you are in an approval mode?
Dr. Stanley. Senator Webb, if I understand your question
correctly in terms of statutory ceilings, the number we were
dealing with was 952 that was given to us as a statutory
ceiling. We worked with that number and the Secretary told us
in our narrow scope to work with this particular study by doing
it within a very short period of time to reduce by 50 G/FOs.
That was our focus on this particular time. This was not a
study or anything to look at for--looking at long-term because
we do not know what the emerging requirements----
Senator Webb. I understand that. In fact, I am going to ask
you another question about that in a minute. But just in terms
of the process, Admiral, you may want to comment on this.
Admiral Gortney. Yes, sir. One of the key assumptions that
we made that we had the Secretary approve up front before we
went down the study was what was the base number that we would
work from, and that was the statutory limits that included the
joint pool numbers.
Then the second assumption was how did we want to
adjudicate it. Did we want to ask for legislative lowering of
the limits or would we want to manage it within the statutory
limits that we have right now? He chose to leave the limits
where it was and then use his authorities within the joint pool
to control the numbers. He felt it was his responsibility to
manage DOD with the authorities that he already had.
Senator Webb. So essentially in terms of how this process
works inside DOD, you have a statutory ceiling in terms of the
number of flags that can be allocated among the Services. Is
that correct?
So then how was it determined which Service has a certain
number of those flags, or you seem to have been doing it the
other way around, just sort of like trimming rather than----
Admiral Gortney. When it comes to the joint pool, each
Service has a fair share for their numbers assigned to them
within the joint pool, and we used that percentage through the
study. But the legislated numbers, or the maximum of four
stars/three stars for their Service positions, were the ones
that we used.
Senator Webb. Right. I understand, but you could have a
totally different allocation among the Services if the
Secretary of Defense, for instance, were to decide--is that a
correct assumption--from this statutory ceiling.
Admiral Gortney. It is my understanding that the Services
each have their own statutory numbers, but I could be wrong.
Senator Webb. We will get some follow-on input on that.
[The information referred to follows:]
Each Service has a statutory limit to the number of general/flag
officers within their respective Service. The statutory limitations are
determined in two parts, the actual overall number of general/flag
officers and a limit to the number of a specific grade each Service is
allowed to manage.
Senator Webb. You indicated in the study--I will start,
Secretary Stanley, with you again--that the objective in this
case was not to determine how many G/FOs were required. What
would have been your methodology if you actually were to
determine how many were required?
Dr. Stanley. Senator, I do not want to put a hypothetical
in here. We were definitely focused on what the Secretary asked
us to do. When we looked at the numbers required and where we
are, we looked for efficiencies within the G/FO ranks. The
conditions on the ground, not only the wars we are fighting,
but engaging where we are right there, looking across the
Services in DOD, actually got us to your question of what is
required because at the end of the day, that is where we ended
up in terms of our determination in getting to the actual
numbers of what is required. So even though the Secretary said
come up with 50, we identified more than that, actually 103,
which gave us the answer to what was actually, we thought,
required.
Senator Webb. Admiral?
Admiral Gortney. We were looking for the efficiencies, go
after the growth that was out there and any efficiencies that
we could eliminate or reduce or transfer to the Senior
Executive Service (SES). We did not go after--which from your
question, it would imply a roles and mission study.
I think if you wanted to look at what is the true
requirement, I think you would need to pick a point in time
out, say, 2020-2025, and what are the roles and missions of
each one of the Services and what are the roles and missions of
the joint commands and joint staffs that happened to be out
there. That might lead you to another set of numbers. We did
not have the time in order to do that. That was not our tasking
from the Secretary.
Senator Webb. So here is what I am trying to get at. Where
is it decided that each of these Services has the justification
or the requirement for the flags that we see here? Where is it
decided and how is it decided? We may get into this more in the
second panel. How is it decided that the Air Force--I am not
picking on the Air Force--with 332,000 people should have 151
brigadier generals when the Navy with 328,000 should have 129
and the Army with 569,000 people should have 144? Where is that
decided?
Admiral Gortney. A fair question, sir. I am not exactly
sure where the decision. We have the statutes that we live by.
The Services have mandated statutory limits. We have a joint
pool and we manage them within those numbers.
[The information referred to follows:]
The overall decision of what each Service maintains in way of grade
shape is formed based on statutory authority. Beyond that, the
individual Services, working with manpower models which are weighed
against mission requirements, have determined their independent grade
shape. This action is not done in a vacuum and is routinely reviewed by
the Service.
Senator Webb. So you get overall statutory authority from
Congress.
Admiral Gortney. I believe so. I believe that is the
answer.
Senator Webb. From there, who is deciding? How do you
compare a brigadier general in one Service to another? Who does
that?
Admiral Gortney. A fair question, sir.
Senator Webb. That is why we have this hearing.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. To build on Senator Webb, this is a good
hearing, and I was thinking, we will come in here--I have
learned a lot.
One, I think maybe we need to reconstitute this committee
to answer that basic question. Somebody has to say 334 versus
whatever number and have a reason for it.
But the study group's charter was to find 50 reductions.
Right? You came up with 103. But as I understand it from the
Vice Admiral, you really did not look at roles and missions. So
I am not so sure I agree with you, Secretary Stanley, that you
went to what the force needs are because if you do not look at
roles and missions 25 years down the road, I am not so sure
that is an accurate statement. But the fact of the matter that
you are looking at and we are trying to deal with star creep is
a very good thing.
I have a unique perspective here being a judge advocate.
What I want to try to inform the subcommittee of, and
particularly Senator Webb, is that this idea of having a top-
heavy force, too many general officers, is something we should
be concerned about. I totally agree with that.
But the SES is a designation. It is a high-paid civilian.
Right? Does the SES make about the same as a brigadier, or do
you know, Dr. Freeman?
Dr. Freeman. I am sorry. I do not have that answer.
Senator Graham. I think they do.
Now, here is what the Air Force does, and I do not mean to
be overly defensive here. But the Air Force has 10 SES legal
support people. They are civilians beyond GS-15 or whatever the
top grade is. The Army has 22, 100 percent more. The Navy has
16, about 40 percent more. The Air Force, the Navy, and the
Army can tell us why you have more high-paid civilians in one
Service than the other, and maybe they can tell us why you have
more generals versus less SES.
But the one thing I would say in my little area of the
world is that a two-star JAG position did not serve us well
during Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay discussions. There is a
real tension that this goes beyond party politics between the
Office of the General Counsel who serves the Secretary of
Defense and each Service Chief--they are civilians--and the
military uniformed lawyer loyalty-wise to the commander.
We had a very bad problem in the Bush administration that
the Obama administration, quite frankly, has corrected. The
civilian lawyers in the Bush administration in my view shut out
military legal advice and tried to make a power grab saying
that the JAG had to clear their legal advice to their
commanders through the civilian Office of General Counsel. That
to me was an exercise of control of legal independence. Our
commanders need their lawyer.
The Surgeon General was a three-star. The Corps of
Engineers professional was a three-star, and we learned during
the course of these hearings, Senator Webb, at the two-star
rank you got shut out of meetings. You were either sitting on
the wall or not in the meeting rather than at the table.
Congress decided to elevate the JAGs so they would be in the
room.
We, in this committee--and I am very proud of this--have
reinforced the idea that the military legal community owes
allegiance to their military commander. We all believe in
civilian control of the military, but what we do not want is
some political appointee being able to shape legal advice to
someone whose career is on the line. So that is a tension
between responsibilities, political accountability, and rank
does matter.
But I think what Senator Webb is trying to do here is very
helpful.
Now, on the Air Force side, we have four brigadier generals
that service the major commands. Like Air Combat Command, they
drop bombs. My belief is that having that brigadier general on
the Air Combat commander's staff is probably a very good thing
when it comes to rules of engagement interpretations in a
kinetic war.
But I am very open-minded about how we can deal with star
creep. The one thing I would just suggest to Senator Webb is
that we need to look at the SES utilization in terms of cost
and why one Service would go heavy on the generals side and
light on the civilian side and listen to their rationale. There
may be a good reason why you would have 10 Air Force SES
lawyers and 4 brigadier generals. The Army has 22 SES attorneys
and I think 3 brigadier generals. I would just like to hear
from their point of view why they make those decisions. Maybe
we could expand, if Senator Webb would entertain this, looking
at the SES levels, because that is, I would probably guess, at
least the equivalent of brigadier general in terms of
compensation, and see why each Service goes the way they do.
But yes, it is a good question. How could somebody have 334
in the Air Force? Who makes that decision? You apparently have
a statutory ceiling, and beyond that, you leave it to each
Service to make the decisions about how many general officers,
and I would like to know more about that.
So, thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
The total number of general officer positions within each military
Service is determined by law. The 2009 National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) authorized 208 general officer billets in the U.S. Air
Force. Of the 208 authorized general officers in Air Force service
positions, 6 are currently allocated to be Judge Advocate General (JAG)
billets.
The six JAG general officer positions are: the Air Force Judge
Advocate General (TJAG), the Deputy Judge Advocate General (DJAG), the
commander of the Air Force Legal Operations Agency (AFLOA), the Staff
Judge Advocate at Air Combat Command (ACC/SJA), the Staff Judge
Advocate at Air Mobility Command (AMC/SJA), and the Staff Judge
Advocate at Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC/SJA). There are also three
members of the Senior Executive Service (SES) serving in the Air Force
JAG Corps. Two of these SESs support the AFMC/SJA and the other serves
under the TJAG on the Air Staff.
The Air Force differs from the other Services in that it places O-7
SJAs in key positions at three Major Commands (MAJCOM). The reason
behind this is that the Air Force sees great value in having senior JAG
expertise in the field where it can better support the mission of the
warfighter.
Specifically, the Air Force has general officer JAGs at ACC, AMC,
and AFMC. The ACC/SJA advises the ACC Commander (the lead agent for the
combat air forces) and the supported combat commanders. The ACC/SJA
provides counsel on issues requiring general officer oversight of the
numerous legal matters including the employment of airpower against
time sensitive targets and issues with rules of engagement. At AFMC,
the SJA provides legal oversight to the MAJCOM responsible for one-
third of the Air Force's annual budget--a total obligation authority of
over $42 billion in the fiscal year 2012 budget. The AFMC enterprise
includes the Air Logistics Centers, Test Centers, Product Centers, and
the Air Force Research Laboratory--all of which have major impacts for
both the Air Force and Department of Defense at large. The AMC/SJA
provides legal advice that is critical to development of national
industrial mobilization base for airlift and aerial refueling. The
Commander of AMC maintains a fleet of 479 Active Duty tanker and
transport aircraft and manages 1,255 aircraft from the Air National
Guard and Air Force Reserve. In addition, the command plans,
coordinates, and manages the Civil Reserve Air Fleet with civilian
partners. The vast responsibilities and strategic importance of each of
these three MAJCOMs require that the commanders are supported by the
most experienced members of the JAG Corps.
Senator Graham. What I would like to do is actually get the
group to go back and look at roles and missions in terms of the
general officer force we would need and look at the SES and see
how that has been growing or not growing.
So that is it. Thank you.
Senator Webb. I thank Senator Graham for those comments.
Let me be clear about a couple of things. I totally agree
with you. I think that this is an area that we are just
beginning to get a look at, and there is a Guard and Reserve
component in here that has not been examined. Dr. Freeman
mentioned that in his testimony, and I am not one to be sitting
here saying that the Air Force is the Army or the Marine Corps.
Each Service has its own characteristics, and we are looking
forward to hearing----
Senator Graham. Being an Air Force officer, I think the Air
Force has some explaining to do.
Senator Webb. Senator Ayotte, welcome.
Senator Ayotte. I guess I better say I am married to a
Guard and Reserve lieutenant colonel.
I very much appreciate the study that you undertook,
Secretary Stanley, and just want to follow up on a couple of
things.
Number one, the fact that we did not look at roles and
missions. I think that is very important in terms of this
analysis so that we get this right because we need in my view
to look at our grand strategic environment when we make the
decision on what is appropriate in terms of flag grade officers
or, of course, everything that we do in the military in terms
of readiness.
If you look at where we are post-September 11, we have
stood up Strategic Command in October 2002; Africa Command,
2007; CYBERCOM, 2010. So I fully agree that we need to look at
this issue of star creep and grade inflation and unwanted
growth overall of the Pentagon bureaucracy, but I think also
with creating new needs in our strategic environment, if we do
not look at roles and missions, we could make some poor
decisions in terms of leadership.
So, as Tom Donnelly of the American Enterprise Institute
has said, given the threats we face and the wars we are in, it
is not surprising that the headquarters require experienced,
strategically savvy, and politically sensitive commanders. We
are fighting a very different conflict in terms of what we are
dealing with.
To what degree did the joint requirements and the creation
of the commands I just described and the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan--did we look at that in terms of the growth in the
number of flag officers since September 11?
Admiral Gortney. Absolutely, ma'am. As we plotted over time
from 2001 to today doing the study, it was clear that is where
the majority of the growth was, and we have identified those
positions to go away. We applied the conditions that those
positions will go away. So as long as we are in the fight, they
will remain. When they are done, they will fall off.
Additional billets were actually billets that we thought we
would identify for elimination, but we transferred them over to
CYBERCOM because we were standing up CYBERCOM and we needed to
take some of those positions. So we did identify positions for
elimination but took those positions and applied them over
there.
Senator Ayotte. Some of this reduction is going to occur
naturally based on end strength reductions that are coming as
well.
Admiral Gortney. That is the next step, is where are we
headed into the future, and then we have to continue to study
what needs to go down as the force reduces coming out of Iraq
and Afghanistan. Executability of the study was very important
to us. How are we going to implement it and the Services asked
for 5 years and that is what the Secretary approved, 5 years to
implement the changes. That allows them--because the Services
control the input and they control the output of their flag and
general officers. On an average, 11 or 12 percent can come in,
and on an average, 11 or 12 percent go out for the last 5
years. It is mandated by law, by age, or time in grade that
they must retire. It allows the Services over 5 years to
control that input so that it is less than the output.
Senator Ayotte. But if we have not looked at roles and
missions, how do we know we are going to get this right?
Admiral Gortney. Once again, our goal was to find the
efficiencies, go after the growth and find the efficiencies
that were out there for elimination, reduction, or transfer to
the SES. I think one of the reasons we were able to execute our
plan as quickly as we did was because we bounded it to that. It
is a fairly subjective argument. We were trying to apply
objective measures to it as best we could, frame the problem in
that regard, and that is why were able to come up with the
reductions that we did.
Senator Ayotte. What are the plans with regard to the SES?
What percentage growth have we seen in that service since
September 11? What type of analysis are we going to undergo
with regard to the SES in terms of making sure that this has
not occurred within DOD rather than just focusing on the flag
officers?
Dr. Stanley. The Secretary actually took that into
consideration, again not roles and missions. But what he did do
was as the G/FO group was meeting, we also had the SES
efficiency group meeting. Again, everything was actually
focused just on efficiencies, not roles and missions, and quite
frankly, they tiered it looking at the technical, looking at
the leadership, and looking at the SES, as well as highly
qualified experts, and looked at all of those and looked from
an efficiency standpoint what are they doing now, which ones
are the ``nice to have''--it was pretty subjective in that
part--and then identifying those, what they called the ``easy
takes.'' They literally identified over 176. We were asked to
come up with 150. He gave us a goal. We came up with 176 and
actually took a number of those. Some of those billets or those
positions had not been filled. Some we knew were going away.
Some, the mission had actually changed.
I happened to have sat on both of them as a co-chair in
both, as we were talking about the G/FO piece, I could see
where we were going with the SESs. But again, not roles and
missions. Very bounded in efficiencies. That was it, knowing
that we had other studies to do later on.
Senator Ayotte. So if you sat on both, can you help me?
What is the percentage growth among--if you look at the
percentage growth post-September 11 among flag officers versus
SES over that same period, can you give us some kind of sense
of how you compare the two?
Dr. Stanley. This particular study that we did, we were not
looking at the percentage growth in terms of where we were.
What we literally were just given here is a number. We know we
have grown, and we knew that going into it. We were looking at
some easy efficiencies where we were. The Secretary was
anticipating this year in terms of having too many people, a
lot of growth, how do we address this, how do you deal with the
OCO from the G/FO piece in terms of those who are actually
committed now, and letting the conditions on the ground drive
that, as well as SES. But it was a very, very quick look at
what we were doing in the same period of time. They both ended
up at the same time.
Senator Ayotte. I guess I am trying to understand are we
looking at that side of it too, and is it there is a greater
percentage of growth there versus what is happening on the----
Dr. Freeman. If I may, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. Yes.
Dr. Freeman. Since September 11, we have added over 100,000
DOD civilians total. I do not have the figures for the SES'ers,
but their growth rate does rival the growth rate of G/FOs
overall. Very comparable growth rates there.
Senator Ayotte. So in your view, we need to undertake a
similar stringent analysis on that end?
Dr. Freeman. That is absolutely correct. POGO personally--
that is where we are headed next and we certainly hope the
committee and the DOD looks at that issue as well.
Senator Ayotte. I appreciate that and particularly want to
make sure that we are not just--and I do not mean to use a term
the wrong way--picking on the military side and not doing a
similar stringent review on the civilian side.
Dr. Stanley. Could I just make one comment?
Senator Ayotte. Yes.
Dr. Stanley. What we do know is that from the intelligence
side, there was a significant increase, and even when we
started this part of our study, we did not touch all of those.
There were things that happened in the intelligence side that
we needed since September 11 and it was not just a matter of
percentages as much as we were not going to touch those.
Senator Ayotte. I am very glad to hear that, of course,
because I could appreciate why that would enhance.
May I ask one more brief question?
Senator Webb. I would remind the Senator we are on a 7-
minute rule, but go ahead.
Senator Ayotte. Just on the JAG officer issue, we have
heard a lot of testimony before this committee, particularly in
the Navy JAG program, with concerns about the program. I would
just, as a comment, echo on Senator Graham's comments to say
given the importance of the JAG program, I hope that that is
taken into account when you are looking at leadership and
making sure that we have the right type of leadership to stress
the importance of that program.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Senator.
Could staff put up slide 2?
[The information referred to follows:]
Senator Webb. Just as a clarification, to reemphasize where
we were at the beginning of this hearing, there was a
discussion on growth in the joint commands. One of the
questions that we have on this hearing is the number of G/FOs
inside what we call the institutional Services. One of the
things that was brought to the attention at the beginning of
the hearing is the number of Air Force four-star generals who
are in what is called the institutional Service and also Navy,
by the way, compared to their overall strength. We have nine
general officers in the Air Force in institutional positions,
meaning inside the Air Force, as compared to the numbers that
you see: two in the Marine Corps; five in the Army; and six in
the Navy.
Was this issue addressed during your study, Dr. Stanley?
Dr. Stanley. It was but in a very limited scope. What we
did, Senator, was actually--first of all, as we looked at the
different Services and where they were, we were more focused in
terms of not only what was happening within the headquarters
but combatant commands (COCOM) headquarters and what the----
Senator Webb. So this is something that you would be
continuing to examine as we put the--
Dr. Stanley. Absolutely.
Senator Webb. I would think because, quite frankly, I do
not think there is anybody in DOD who, if given a choice
between being a four-star and being an SES, would pick being an
SES.
Thank you very much for your testimony. We will now hear
from the second panel.
We now welcome the second panel: General Peter Chiarelli,
Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; Admiral Mark Ferguson III,
Vice Chief of Naval Operations; General Dunford, Assistant
Commandant of the Marine Corps; and General Breedlove, Vice
Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
I would like to proceed again reminding the witnesses if
you could summarize your testimony within 5 minutes. Your full
written statement is a part of the record. Then we will have a
7-minute round of questions afterwards.
General Chiarelli, welcome.
STATEMENT OF GEN PETER W. CHIARELLI, USA, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF,
U.S. ARMY
General Chiarelli. Chairman Webb, Ranking Member Graham,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the issue of
general officer requirements in the U.S. Army. On behalf of
Secretary McHugh, our new Chief, General Ray Odierno, and the
more than 1.1 million men and women serving on Active Duty and
in the U.S. Army Reserves and Army National Guard, Army
civilians and their families, I want to thank you for your
continued and strong support over the past decade. It is
largely through your efforts that we have had the resources and
manpower required to sustain us in the current fight while
simultaneously preparing and training soldiers for the next
fight.
We are all aware of the challenges posed by the current
fiscal crisis, and I can assure you your Army remains committed
to instilling a culture of cost savings and accountability.
This includes force structure and manpower authorization
specific to our general officer corps.
For 13 years, from 1995 to 2008, our authorized general
officer Active Duty end strength remained unchanged at 302.
Over the past 4 years, per directives issued by Congress and by
senior leaders of DOD, the Army incrementally increased our
general officer end strength to meet the requirements for
senior leadership in Iraq and Afghanistan and also to assure
our ability to meet internal Army and joint requirements. These
additional authorizations have proven absolutely critical to
ensuring our force is able and capable of meeting the demands
of the current environment both at home and in theater.
Looking ahead, as we draw down operations in Iraq and
eventually in Afghanistan, we recognize the Military Services
will be required to make reductions to end strength to include
within our flag and general officer ranks. I assure the members
of the subcommittee the Army's senior leaders are prepared to
do our part. By 2014, as a result of the Secretary of Defense's
efficiencies review and reductions in our joint pool minimum,
we will reduce our internal general officer authorizations by
11 and our joint contribution from 102 to a minimum of 82, for
a projected total general officer end strength of 301, one
below the end strength in place from 1995 to 2008. We believe
this projected end strength will be sufficient to meet our need
for senior leadership both internal to the Army and across DOD.
That said, any further reductions or acceleration of
planned reductions would jeopardize our ability to effectively
meet those requirements. Bottom line, as we look at making
reductions for force structure in coming days, we must ensure
we remain a flexible force with a general officer population
capable of leading institutional change while concurrently
providing needed skills to our combatant commanders.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I thank you
again for your continued and generous support and demonstrated
commitment on behalf of the outstanding men and women of the
United States Army and their families.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Chiarelli follows:]
Prepared Statement by GEN Peter W. Chiarelli, USA
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Webb, Ranking Member Graham, and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, on behalf of our Secretary, the Honorable John
McHugh; our Chief of Staff, General Raymond Odierno; and the over 1.1
million soldiers who serve in our Active component, Army National
Guard, and U.S. Army Reserves, as well as our Army civilians and family
members, I thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to
discuss the U.S. Army's general officer requirements.
First, I want to thank this subcommittee for its steadfast support
and demonstrated commitment to our men and women in uniform. I
appreciate the genuine concern the subcommittee and its members
demonstrate for our soldiers, Army civilians, family members, and the
overall personnel readiness of our force. It is largely through your
support that we have the resources and manpower required to sustain us
in the current fight, while simultaneously preparing and training
soldiers for the next fight. We are deeply grateful and appreciative of
your continued, strong support.
You called us here today to discuss the current flag and general
officer requirements of our respective Services in the context of
increasingly constrained budgets and changes to force structure. Let me
assure you upfront, your Army remains committed to instilling a culture
of savings and accountability; and this includes force structure and
manpower authorizations specific to our General Officer Corps. The Army
promotes officers to its authorized general officer end strength in
accordance with law and the Office of the Secretary of Defense policy.
We do this in a very deliberate manner. Each year, our Army's senior
leaders commit time to reviewing and validating each internal Army
general officer position. While our validated requirements exceed our
title 10 general officer authorizations, we are able to provide the
requisite leadership by assigning our colonels selected for brigadier
general and pending promotion to these positions.
For 13 years, from 1995 until 2008, the Active Army's authorized
general officer strength remained unchanged at 302. In 2008, Secretary
Geren appointed the ``Special Commission on Army Acquisition and
Program Management in Expeditionary Operations'' to review contracting
linked to the war effort. Dr. Jacques Gansler, former Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, headed the six-
member commission. As a result of the commission's findings, the Army's
general officer authorization increased by five in 2008 to ensure
needed senior leader expertise in contracting. In 2009, the advent of
the ``Joint Pool'' established a limit of 230 internal Army billets and
required the Army to fill a minimum of 85 billets, bringing the Army's
general officer end strength to 315. In 2010, the Army's fair share of
Joint requirements increased from 85 to 102 to provide the Services the
ability to support temporary general officer requirements associated
with or in support of Iraq and Afghanistan. Most recently, the
Secretary of Defense conducted a general and flag officer efficiencies
study group which, by policy, will require the Army to reduce its
internal general officer authorizations by 11 and its joint
contribution will change from a fair share of 102 to a minimum of 82,
by 2014.
Once all planned general officer reductions are implemented, we
believe we will have sufficient general officer authorizations to meet
our projected need for senior leadership both internal to the Army and
across the Department of Defense. At the same time, any further
reductions or acceleration of planned reductions would reduce the
Army's flexibility in meeting general officer requirements across the
Department of Defense.
As you well know, America's Army has been operating at a tremendous
pace for over 10 years. As a result of combat operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the Army's general officer authorizations increased to
provide the most capable and decisive land force in the world. With the
recent end of combat operations in Iraq, and as a result of the
Secretary of Defense's efficiency review, the Army will see a
noticeable reduction in the number of general officers between now and
2014.
PRIMARY CHALLENGES
As we look at making reductions to our force structure in coming
days, to include reductions in the number of general officer
authorizations, we must ensure that we remain a flexible force, with a
general officer population capable of leading institutional change
while concurrently providing needed skills to our combatant commands.
Our primary challenge is managing the elimination of eleven Army
general officer authorizations set forth in the Secretary of Defense
Efficiency review, bringing the Army's internal general officer
authorizations from 230 to 219. This is coupled with the concurrent
requirement to draw down the number of general officers currently
serving in Joint requirements, largely in temporary positions
supporting contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
For the past 4 years, the Army has incrementally increased the
General Officer Corps to meet the requirements for senior leadership in
Iraq and Afghanistan and assure our ability to meet internal Army and
joint requirements. Between now and fiscal year 2014 the Army will
incrementally decrease the general officer end strength. In an
environment where we must meet the directives established by the
Secretary of Defense's efficiencies study and simultaneously reduce the
number of general officers serving in Iraq, the Army will need to
increase the number of general officer retirements per year in order to
prevent delays in promoting officers on promotion lists. The increased
retirements must be managed in such a fashion so as to assure continued
development of a diverse and talented group of general officers to
serve in the most senior leadership positions across the Department of
Defense.
DOING OUR PART
In order to maintain the appropriate force structure, and achieve
our goal to provide a tailorable and scalable force capable of meeting
our national security requirements, the Army's senior Leaders recognize
we must do our part. To date, the Army has eliminated three internal
Army general officer requirements and has downgraded the Commanding
General, U.S. Army Europe from O-10 to O-9. The Army will eliminate
eight additional internal Army general officer requirements as directed
by the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the Army leadership continues
to identify cost saving measures and efficiencies throughout the force.
CLOSING
These continue to be challenging times for our Nation and for our
military. That said, I assure the members of this subcommittee--your
Army's senior leaders remain focused and committed to effectively
addressing current challenges, while also determining the needs of the
Force for the future.
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I thank you again for
your steadfast and generous support of the outstanding men and women of
the U.S. Army, Army civilians, and their families. I look forward to
your questions.
Senator Webb. Thank you very much, General Chiarelli.
Admiral Ferguson, welcome.
STATEMENT OF ADM MARK E. FERGUSON III, USN, VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Ferguson. Chairman Webb, Ranking Member Graham, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the Navy's flag officer end strength as
part of DOD's efficiencies study and efforts.
From September 11, 2001, until today, the additional
demands for flag officers have resulted in additional growth of
flag positions for the United States Navy. This growth has
occurred primarily in additional joint billets supporting
ongoing operations and meeting new mission areas in areas such
as cyber, explosive ordnance disposal, special operations, and
intelligence.
Contrasting what we have experienced in the joint arena,
Navy in-service flag numbers over the past decade have
essentially remained flat at approximately 160 officers. Our
in-service flags serve as both operational commanders of naval
forces dispersed around the globe and on their operating staffs
or are associated with the Title 10 responsibilities to man,
train, and equip the force.
Within our current authorized end strength, we believe we
have the flexibility both to seek greater efficiencies as well
as more effective staff alignments, as well as respond to
emerging operational demands.
This Navy flag end strength also supports the United States
Marine Corps in the form of senior health care executives and
flag officers, chaplain corps officers, JAG corps, and
acquisition professionals that provide support for the entire
Department of the Navy.
Our participation in the Secretary of Defense's flag
officer review resulted in changes to approximately 25
positions for the Navy. This review eliminated 11 Navy flag
officer positions resulting in a projected end strength of
approximately 149 flag officers assigned to the Service when
the efficiencies measures are completed. An additional 14 flags
were reduced as part of our joint contribution, leaving a total
of 60 in the referred to joint pool. In addition, we downgraded
50 officers. Flag positions were converted then to SES.
We fully support these reductions and believe that we are
appropriately sized for our current tasking. We have begun
planning for the reductions and execution and we use
adjustments in both promotion opportunity for flags, as well as
retirements, to meet these new end strength targets.
In the future, we remain absolutely committed to create a
more agile, flexible, and effective flag officer staff
structure for the Navy to deliver the finest naval forces that
we can to the Nation.
On behalf of the Secretary and the Chief of the Naval
Operations Center, thank you for the support of the committee,
and we look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Ferguson follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM Mark E. Ferguson III, USN
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In the decade since September 11, 2001, Navy has experienced growth
in flag officer positions, primarily due to an increased number of flag
officers provided to the joint force in the execution of ongoing combat
operations and in support of new mission areas. In 2001 the Navy has an
authorized level of 161 in service and 59 joint positions.
The Navy is unique in that it provides flag officer leaders in
support of the U.S. Marine Corps, such as Senior Health Care
Executives, Chaplain Corps officers, Judge Advocate General Corps
officers, and Acquisition Professionals.
The Department of Defense efficiency review recommended the
elimination of 11 in-service flag positions and 14 joint positions
allocated to Navy. Following the full implementation of these changes,
Navy will have an active duty billet structure of 149 in-service flag
positions, 60 joint positions, and 4 exempt flag positions as
authorized by law. The review also authorized a total of 48 Reserve
flag officers with 3 filling designated joint positions.
Navy supports these efficiency actions and anticipates additional
review to reduce or merge flag officer positions. Navy is taking a
phased approach to lowering flag inventory through the reduction of
promotion opportunities and retirements.
______
Chairman Webb, Ranking Member Graham, and distinguished members of
the committee, thank you the opportunity to testify regarding the
Navy's flag officer end strength as a part of the Department of
Defense's efficiency efforts.
Navy has been fully supportive of the effort to identify savings
that can be reallocated for investments in high priority warfighting
capabilities and programs to prepare and equip our sailors for current
and future challenges. While the budgetary savings from the review of
flag officer end strength is modest when compared to other implemented
changes, we believe the actions were necessary and set us on a path of
having a flatter and more agile staff structure.
BACKGROUND
Prior to September 11, 2001, the Navy had 220 flag officers--161
in-service and 59 joint positions--with an end strength of 377,810
sailors. This is a total ratio of 1 flag officer to every 1,717
sailors. If only flag officers assigned to in-service Navy billets
(non-joint flag) are compared against the Navy end strength, then the
ratio is 1 flag officer to every 2,347 sailors.
While we do not include USMC end strength in this calculation, Navy
continues to provide flag officer staff support for the U.S. Marine
Corps as Senior Health Care Executives, Chaplain Corps officers, Judge
Advocate General Corps officers, and Acquisition Professionals. This
provides a more efficient means to deliver support to both the Navy and
Marine Corps.
For example, the close coordination between our two services allows
the Department of the Navy (DoN), to operate a single Systems Command
for procurement of aircraft and support equipment. Led by a Navy flag
officer, the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) is the Aircraft
Controlling Custodian for all DoN test aircraft regardless of service.
Each of NAVAIR's five affiliated Program Executive Offices (PEOs) are
led by flag officers.
Similarly, Naval Sea Systems Command is responsible for not only
the procurement and in-service maintenance planning for all Navy ships,
but is also accountable for the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC)
Service Life Extension Program, the development and procurement of the
LCAC replacement and the Ship-to-Shore Connector.
Lastly, the PEOs for Enterprise Information Systems and PEO C\4\I
are both responsible for Navy and USMC systems that enable information
dominance and the command and control of maritime forces.
Since September 11, 2001 the Department of Defense has added two
new combatant commands and additional Joint Task Forces to meet
emerging operational missions. As required, Navy has provided flag
officers to fill these leadership positions for the Joint Force. In
addition to flag positions allocated to the service at U.S. Africa
Command and U.S. Northern Command, Navy flag officers have served in
Joint Task Forces to include: Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo;
Commander, Joint Task Force Horn of Africa; Chief, Office of Defense
Representative-Pakistan; Director, Communications and Strategic
Effects-Afghanistan; and Chief Medical Advisor, International Security
Assistance Force, Afghanistan.
During this time the Navy has also undergone additional mission
growth. The SEAL and Explosive Ordinance Disposal communities have
risen in importance, with an increase in those communities'
representation in joint assignments. Similarly, to keep pace with the
rapidly growing prominence of information (dominance), the Navy created
flag officer positions in the Intelligence, Information Warfare,
Information Professional community.
To reflect these changes in the joint force, the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 directed changes to
general and flag officer end strength. This legislation capped the Navy
at 160 flag officers, but increased our ``fair share'' contribution to
the ``Joint Pool'' from 60 in 2001 to 74 in 2010. At present, the Navy
is filling 78 joint billets. The changes specified in the 2010 NDAA
codified joint flag officer increases while keeping the Navy ``in-
service'' numbers flat at 160.
EXEMPTIONS
As authorized by law, Navy is permitted exemptions to flag officer
end strength that count neither against the 160 in-service nor the 74,
``Joint Pool'' billets. Currently, the Navy has 18 exemptions. Four are
filled by active duty officers and 14 by mobilized reservists. Of these
exempt positions, eight are in-service billets, seven are ``Joint
Pool'' and three billets are designated for the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs. The four active duty exemptions are the Superintendant of the
Naval Academy, the Director of the Nurse Corps, the Director of the
Medical Service Corps and the Attending Physician to Congress. Eleven
of these 18 exemptions were provided for by Congress in the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2010, Public Law 111-84, which amended sections 525 and 526
of U.S.C. Title 10.
EFFICIENCY REVIEW
In the summer of 2010, Navy participated in the Secretary of
Defense flag officer efficiency review. Navy entered the general and
flag officer manning efficiency review having experienced essentially
zero growth in the in-service flag end strength, with contributions to
joint billets as the principal driver of flag officer growth. Our
review resulted in the recommended elimination or reduction of 25 flag
officers. This action eliminated 11 in-service flag officer positions,
resulting in an effective end-strength of 149 in-service. An additional
14 flag officers were reduced from joint billets, reducing our future
contribution to a total of 60. This represents a reversal of the 2010
NDAA directed growth. Following the full implementation of the
recommended position eliminations, and using a targeted end strength of
approximately 328,000 sailors by 2017, Navy will have a total ratio of
1 flag officer to every 1,571 sailors and a non-joint, in-service ratio
of 1 flag officer to every 2,201 sailors.
IMPLEMENTATION
The Navy has begun implementing these changes in a phased approach.
In doing so, we have focused on two tasks; alignment of the billet
structure and the adjustment of flag officer inventory. Beginning in
fiscal year 2012, our billet structure will begin to reflect the
elimination or reduction of the paygrade required for identified
positions, for example: from O-8 to O-7 or from O-7 to SES or O-6. At
this point, we intend to make the position modifications as incumbents
are relieved, and should be complete by fiscal year 2013.
As this change will occur less than 2 years after the authorized
end strength increase, we are planning for a near equivalent reduction
through adjustments in promotions and retirements. Under current
policy, flag officers may serve for up to 5 years after initial
selection and promotion. To meet the required reduction goals, near-
term O-7 and O-8 selection opportunities will be reduced. We anticipate
that we will meet the required reductions within the 5 year period, and
believe a measured approach will minimize disruption and allow an
effective transition to lower manning levels.
NAVY RESERVE
Finally, U.S. Navy Reserve officers play an important role in our
overall flag manning. In 2001, Reserve flag officer end strength was 48
flag officers, with 4 filling designated Chairman's Reserve positions
and counted within the Active component. At that time, the Navy Reserve
held 87,913 sailors with a ratio of 1 flag officer to 1,690 sailors.
The Navy ``fair share'' allocation of joint duty positions,
authorized in the 2010 NDAA, also provided the authority for Reserve
Force components to participate in the Joint Pool assignment processes
to fill critical roles in excess of the Chairman's Reserve positions.
As seen with the Active component over this time period, the Reserve
component flag end-strength also experienced zero in-service growth.
Upon full implementation of the efficiencies initiatives in 2017, the
Navy Reserve will have 48 flag officers with 3 filling designated joint
or Chairman's Reserve positions. The planned end strength of 61,254
sailors will result in a ratio of 1 flag officer to every 1,201
sailors.
CONCLUSION
We remain committed to creating a more efficient and economical
staff structure. We anticipate we will continue to reduce or merge flag
officer positions. We look forward to working with Congress to create a
more efficient and agile force structure.
Senator Webb. Thank you very much, Admiral.
General Dunford, welcome.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, ASSISTANT
COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS
General Dunford. Chairman Webb, Ranking Member Graham,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the
opportunity to address the impact of the efficiencies
initiatives affecting general officer and SES authorizations
within the Marine Corps.
Currently the Marine Corps' authorized Active Duty end
strength is 202,100. Of those, 87 are general officers.
Title 10 limits the number of general officers on Active
Duty internal to the Marine Corps at 60. The Staff Judge
Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps is exempt from
internal Active Duty general officer limitations. Counting the
Staff Judge Advocate, there are 61 generals supporting internal
Marine Corps requirements. General officers currently comprise
.04 percent of the Active component of the Marine Corps. Our
internal ratio of Active Duty general officers is 1 for every
3,300 Active Duty marines.
General officers serving in joint assignments, as
authorized by the Secretary of Defense, are not counted against
the internal general officer numbers. Our current fair share to
the joint pool is 26, and that number is expected to be reduced
to 21 by 2015.
Our overall ratio of Active general officers is currently 1
for every 2,300 Active Duty marines when you count that joint
authorization. That ratio will change to 1 to 2,500 when our
joint requirement is reduced.
The current mix of Marine Corps general officers represents
the proper balance to support Marine Corps operating forces and
supporting element demands across the globe, and we are
satisfied with our joint representation.
Civilian senior executives perform an invaluable role to
the Marine Corps total force team. They provide crucial
leadership to ensure continuity in vision and policy in the
midst of Active Duty general officer rotations.
The Marine Corps currently has 22 SES billets and 2 Senior
Leader billets. The efficiencies review resulted in the
elimination of one Marine Corps SES position. The incumbent
vacated this position in August 2011 and the position was
eliminated. We also believe we have the right mix of senior
executives to support our requirements.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Dunford follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Webb, Senator Graham, and distinguished members of this
subcommittee, I am honored to appear here today. I want to thank you
for your continued support to our sailors, marines, their families, and
our civilian marines, and I appreciate the opportunity to address
General and Flag Officer (G/FO) and Senior Executive Service (SES)
authorizations.
On August 16, 2010, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates directed
a series of initiatives designed to reduce duplication, overhead, and
excess, and instill a culture of savings and cost accountability across
the Department. The Marine Corps supported the Secretary of Defense
mission to identify areas in which the Department could create
efficiencies.
In a memorandum dated March 14,2011, Secretary Gates directed
immediate implementation of certain identified efficiencies. Among the
efficiencies were the elimination, reallocation, reduction, or
legislative change to 140 G/FO positions. The efficiencies effectively
validated current Marine Corps general officer (GO) requirements by
recommending no change to Marine Corps GO levels.
In addition to the G/FO positions, Secretary Gates identified
efficiencies within the Civilian Senior Executive (CSE) roles,
eliminating 176 CSE positions and 33 highly qualified experts. The
review resulted in the elimination of one Marine Corps SES position,
the Business Enterprise Director, Installation and Logistics. The
incumbent vacated this position on August 7,2011, and the position was
then eliminated. The Marine Corps currently has 22 SES billets and 2
Senior Leader billets.
GENERAL OFFICERS
Title 10 limits the number of GOs on active duty internal to the
Marine Corps at 60. It also generally prescribes the following maximum
limits: 2 officers in the grade of general, 13 officers in the grade of
lieutenant general and 22 officers in the grade of major general. The
Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps is exempt
from internal active duty GO limitations. As well, GOs serving in joint
duty assignments as authorized by the Secretary of Defense are not
counted against the internal GO numbers.
Currently, the Marine Corps authorized active duty end strength is
202,100. Of those, 87 are GOs. The breakdown of the 87 GOs includes 61
assignments to internal Marine Corps billets (including the Staff Judge
Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps) and 26 joint billets.
General Officers presently comprise .04 percent of the Active component
of the Marine Corps--approximately 1 Active Duty general officer for
every 2,300 Active Duty marines.
Table 1 describes overall actual GO levels within the Active and
Reserve components within the Marine Corps.
Table 2 describes the Marine Corps' actual distribution of general
officers.
The current mix of Marine Corps GOs represents the proper balance
to support Marine Operating Forces and supporting element demands
across the globe. The Marine Corps has a history of frugality
throughout the Corps--GOs are no exception. The last increase in Marine
Corps GOs (from 80 to 81) was authorized by the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009. This coincided with the overall
end strength increase to 202,100. Similarly, as we begin to rebalance
the Marine Corps for the future, we ask for the committee's support in
retaining the proper number of GOs.
Our current fair share to the Joint Pool is 26; and that number is
expected to be reduced to 21 by 2015. The Marine Corps seeks to place
GOs into joint billets that leverage the individual officer's personal
experience or expertise, providing the greatest utility to the force
overall. This challenging task requires close management and
coordination within the headquarters, as our joint requirement is a
relatively high proportion of our total GO structure. As our fair share
comes down we expect this task to become less onerous.
SENIOR EXECUTIVES
CSE perform an invaluable role to the Marine Corps Total Force
team. They provide crucial leadership to ensure continuity in vision
and policy in the midst of Active Duty general officer rotations.
The Marine Corps currently has 22 SES billets and 2 Senior Leader
billets. The leadership roles filled by these positions include
Assistant Deputy Commandants (ADC) within Headquarters, Marine Corps,
subordinate senior leadership to the ADCs, and senior civilian
leadership at major commands such as Marine Corps Systems Command,
Marine Corps Logistics Command and Marine Forces Reserve.
When Secretary Gates identified efficiencies within the CSE roles--
totaling more than 200 positions across DOD--the review resulted in the
elimination of 1 Marine Corps SES position: the Business Enterprise
Director, Installation and Logistics. The incumbent vacated this
position on August 7, 2011, and the position was then eliminated.
POSTURING FOR THE FUTURE
In the fall of 2010, the Marine Corps conducted an overarching
organizational review to evaluate and refine the organization, posture
and capabilities required of America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness
in a post-Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan security environment.
We understood in conducting this review that the future is going to be
further challenged by fiscal constraints. Of necessity, our future
force structure represents many judiciously considered factors and
makes pragmatic tradeoffs in capabilities and capacities to achieve a
posture that creates opportunity and enables flexibility and rapid
response to crisis.
Our intent is to rebalance the Corps for the future by
reconstituting an active force of approximately 186,800 marines with
39,600 in the Selected Marine Corps Reserve. The ratio of GOs to other
marines will then increase from 1:2,300 to approximately 1:2,150. As we
prepare to restructure the force for the post-OEF security environment,
we expect the current GO balance to meet the needs of this future force
structure. We ask for the committee's support as we move forward with
these changes.
CONCLUSION
Based on our analysis through the Force Structure Review, the
Marine Corps has planned for a force with the right capabilities and
capacities to provide the Nation with the world's most capable
expeditionary force in readiness. With your continued support, the
Marine Corps will remain a force that is ready to respond to today's
crises with today's forces, today. Thank you for the opportunity to be
here today; I look forward to answering your questions.
Senator Webb. Thank you very much, General Dunford.
General Breedlove, welcome.
STATEMENT OF GEN. PHILIP M. BREEDLOVE, USAF, VICE CHIEF OF
STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE
General Breedlove. Chairman Webb, Ranking Member Graham,
Senator, thank you for this opportunity to speak to this
important subject today, and thank you for your continued
support.
The United States continues to need a strong and agile
military to confront a dynamic international security
environment composed of a diverse range of threats. With our
joint partners, the Air Force defends and advances the
interests of the United States by providing unique capabilities
across the full spectrum of conflict in order to succeed in
today's wars and in future conflicts. I thank you and this
committee for your strong and continued support of our Air
Force as it does this mission.
A key element of the Air Force's continued ability to
provide combat power to the joint team is the depth and breadth
of its senior leadership team. Our senior leadership consists
of two different but mutually supportive elements: Air Force
general officers and SES civilians. We rely on our general
officers for their years of command experience and military
judgment. Our SES civilians bring broad area expertise, as well
as stability and continuity not achievable under the current
military promotion system.
Due to their comparable level of job complexity, scope of
responsibility, span of control, inherent authority, and
influence on joint and national security matters, the Air Force
advocates a deliberate and balanced approach to flag-level
leadership as we believe that general officers and SESs should
be viewed as partners as we move forward.
According to the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act,
the Air Force is authorized 300 general officer billets with
208 of those being Service positions and 92 being in the joint
service. Of the total SES authorizations allocated to DOD, the
Air Force has been apportioned 197 SES billets.
In response to Secretary Gates' efficiencies study earlier
this year, the Air Force has targeted 39 general officer
positions and nine SES positions for elimination. When these
reductions are complete in 2014, the Air Force senior
leadership will consist of 261 general officers and 188 SESs, a
level lower than that of the Air Force senior leadership team
on September 11, 2001, and the lowest level of Air Force
general officers ever. When normalized to its end strength, the
Air Force senior leadership size is in line with the Service
requirement and those of our sister Services. Ultimately, we
believe that we have the correct mix of military officers and
civilian executives to provide the Air Force with the best
leadership team.
As America's source for air and space power, the Air Force
remains a reliable partner in the joint team. Along with our
sister Services, we have reevaluated our senior leadership team
and have taken targeted reductions in order to reduce overhead.
Our team of general officers and senior executive civilians
provides the Air Force with an extensive breadth and depth of
expertise to provide America global vigilance, reach, and
power.
I look forward to your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Breedlove follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Philip M. Breedlove, USAF
The United States continues to need a strong and agile military to
confront a dynamic international security environment composed of a
diverse range of threats. With our joint partners, the Air Force
defends and advances the interests of the United States by providing
unique capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict in order to
succeed in today's wars and prevent future conflicts. The Air Force
remains a mission-oriented and highly prepared force--not an easy task
after more than 20 years of constant combat operations.
A key element of the Air Force's continued ability to provide
combat power to the Joint team is the depth and breadth of its senior
leadership team. This team is responsible for not only organizing,
training, and equipping the current force, but must also envision and
develop a future Air Force that continues to provide air, space, and
cyber power for America. Our senior leadership consists of two
different, but mutually supportive, elements: Air Force general
officers (GO) and Senior Executive Service (SES) civilians. We rely on
our general officers for their years of command experience and military
judgment. Our SES civilians bring broad area expertise as well as a
stability and continuity not achievable under the current military
promotion system.
In order to develop a Total Force and achieve mission success, we
must ensure that there is a level of interchangeability between our
senior military and civilian leaders. Due to their comparable level of
job complexity, scope of responsibility, span of control, inherent
authority, and influence on joint and national security matters, the
Air Force advocates a deliberate and balanced approach to flag-level
leadership, and we believe that GOs and SESs should be viewed as equal
partners as we move forward in this process. Accordingly, Air Force
senior management structure merges these two groups into a unified
team; to consider them separately does not give an accurate picture of
our leadership corps.
The 2009 National Defense Authorization Act authorized 300 general
officer billets (208 Service, 92 Joint) for the Air Force. Of the total
SES authorizations allocated to the Department of Defense (DOD) by the
Office of Personnel Management, DOD has apportioned 197 SES \1\ (170
Service, 27 joint) authorizations to the Air Force. For a detailed
breakdown of Air Force senior leadership by rank, see Appendix 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This number includes SESs only and does not include Senior
Level (SL), Defense Intelligence Senior Level (DISL), or Scientific and
Professional (ST) positions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although current authorizations are slightly larger than they were
a decade ago, they are small historically. In 1955, the Air Force was
authorized 425 GOs, and by 1991, that number had shrunk to 326. Between
1991 and 2001, Air Force GO authorizations were reduced by an
additional 44. On September 11, 2001, the Air Force was authorized 282
GOs and 171 SESs. Since that date, the Air Force has taken on new and
expanded missions including the global war on terror; manning the newly
established U.S. Cyber Command and U.S. Africa Command; and building
partner capacity. As a result, the Air Force has slightly increased its
Service and Joint GO authorizations (4 percent increase in Air Force
billets, 12 percent increase in Joint billets). However, despite a
substantial increase in missions as well as an increased Joint billet
requirement, the Air Force has only added 18 new GO authorizations
since 2001 (6 percent increase in total GO billets).
Secretary Gates' efficiency study in March 2011 sought a review of
DOD for opportunities to reduce duplication, overhead, and excess. In
response, the three military Departments were tasked to identify 10
percent of their total general or flag officers for reductions and to
review the level of their SES workforce. As a result of this study, the
Air Force has targeted 39 GO positions (22 Service, 17 Joint) and 9 SES
positions for elimination. When these reductions are complete in 2014,
the Air Force senior leadership will consist of 261 GOs and 188 SESs--a
level lower than that of the Air 50 Force senior leadership team on
September 11, 2001, and the lowest level of Air Force general officers
ever. When normalized to its end strength, Air Force senior leadership
size is in line with the other Services both before and after the
efficiency study reductions. Ultimately, we believe that we have the
correct mix of military officers and civilian executives to provide the
Air Force with the best senior leadership team.
As America's source for air and space power, the Air Force remains
a reliable partner in the joint team. Along with our sister Services,
we have re-evaluated our senior leadership team and have taken targeted
reductions in order to reduce overhead. Our team of general officers
and senior executive service civilians provide the Air Force with a
breadth and depth of experience that is most effective when considered
in concert. While this mix of these two groups varies between the
Services, the ratio of Air Force senior leaders to airmen is broadly in
line with the other Services. Together, our leadership team remains
committed to the joint fight and remains ready to provide global
vigilance, reach, and power for America.
Appendix 1
This appendix includes the senior leadership levels of the Air
Force in 2001, 2011, and the projected levels in 2014 as directed by
the efficiency study. Over the past decade, the Joint GO positions
considered exempted billets (those posts which are not counted under a
Service's Title 10 GO end strength limit) have changed. In order to
make the most accurate comparison, these exempted positions are not
counted in the totals below. Finally, this data reflects total
authorized positions since the actual number of senior leaders
constantly fluctuates due to promotion, accession, and retirement.
2001 Senior Leadership
In the fall of 2001, the Air Force was authorized 282 GO billets,
of which 200 were Service GO billets and 82 were Joint GO billets. The
breakdown of authorized GOs was 10 Generals, 34 Lieutenant Generals, 97
Major Generals, and 141 Brigadier Generals. There were a total of 171
Air Force SES members in the fall of 2001, of which 162 were Service
SESs and 9 were Joint SESs. In sum, we were authorized 453 Air Force
senior leaders on September 11, 2001.
Senator Webb. Thank you very much, General Breedlove.
Again, I would like to thank all of you for your oral
statements and repeat that your full written statements will be
entered into the record along with your oral statements.
Let me begin by asking General Breedlove and Admiral
Ferguson both to discuss the number of four stars inside your
institutional Services which are both higher than the Army and
considerably higher than the Marine Corps. General Breedlove,
maybe you can begin by just explaining how this process was
examined and who makes the decisions.
General Breedlove. Senator, thanks for the opportunity.
Of course, in that 13-general-officer team, 1 is the Chief
of the National Guard Bureau which will rotate out of the Air
Force next summer and will rotate to a sister Service. We are
about one-quarter of the Guard force strength. So we can expect
that to rotate back to us in about four positions down the
line.
As far as the other nine general officers in our
institutional force, which rightly was your concern as you
began your discussion, our sister Services typically organize
themselves along regional or functional lines, and I will allow
them to talk to that.
In the Air Force, we have aligned along both because of the
responsiveness required to the combatant commanders and the
responsibilities of those functional commands.
Let me talk first to the regional commands, the Pacific Air
Forces and U.S. Air Force Europe (USAFE). The scope and breadth
of their requirements of the air forces that they deal with,
all being led by very senior officers, led the combatant
commander to advocate strongly that he needed a four-star
airman in order to carry on airmen's business in his area of
responsibility. Each of the major air forces in the Pacific
region are typically led by four stars and for an Air Force
airman to be at the table on behalf of the Commander of Pacific
Command (PACOM), he would have to be a four star, and so there
was strong advocacy.
In that theater, there are multiple three-star joint force
air component commanders who would lead the fight if we had one
for Korea, who would lead the fight if we had one in the South
China Sea, who would lead the fight, God forbid if we ever had
another one, in or around Japan. So in order to lead those
three-star joint force air component commanders that are part
of the COCOM's force structure, he asked for four-star airmen
to be there.
In USAFE, it is much the same. The USAFE Commander wears
four North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) hats, all of
them commanding NATO forces. As the Commander of Headquarters
Allied Joint Force Command, Brunssum, the Theater Missile and
Air Defense Commander, and also as you saw, responding in
Libya. In the near future, as we build the phase-adaptive
approach, which is the missile defense of Europe, you had heard
Admiral Stavridis advocate that the United States needs to lead
that effort because it will be primarily an Air Force force
defending in that missile defense piece. So as the other allied
nations in Europe are four stars, we are advocating for a four-
star U.S. commander to be able to do that.
Across the functional commands, we have four-stars leading
them.
Air Education and Training Command, by itself is the fourth
largest air force in the world.
Air Force Materiel Command, a huge portfolio, including all
of our depots, all of our nuclear business, all of our
acquisition business, all of that is in the Air Force. We have
sought a four-star to lead that business.
Air Mobility Command, which moves all of the air freight
all around the world, takes our soldiers to and from the
battle, and responds to every combatant commander in our
military, we have led with a four-star.
Then finally, Air Force Space Command, which takes care of
space for far more than just the U.S. Air Force, as you are
aware, for all the other users of space in the U.S. Government,
has been led by a four-star.
Sir, the bottom line, we have looked at both a functional
alignment and a regional alignment and the scope and breadth
and depth of the requirements of those, and over time, the
combatant commanders in each case have advocated through the
various NDAAs that four stars lead those Services.
Senator Webb. Where is it that the decision is made that
these are four-star billets? Is it the Secretary of the Air
Force, Secretary of Defense? I would assume the Secretary of
Defense.
General Breedlove. Sir, it is not the Secretary of the Air
Force. I cannot tell you that it is the Secretary of Defense. I
just do not know that answer. We need to get back to you on
that.
Senator Webb. All right. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
The total number of general officer positions within each military
Service is determined by law. The 2009 National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) authorized 208 general officer billets in the U.S. Air
Force. The 2009 NDAA also established limits for the number of officers
in the grades of O-10s. Specifically for the Air Force, the 2009 NDAA
authorized nine O-10s.
Of the nine O-10 positions in the U.S. Air Force, title 10 of the
U.S. Code specifies two: the positions of the Chief of Staff (CSAF) and
that of the Vice Chief of Staff (VCSAF). The remaining seven O-10
positions are allocated based on the discretion of the CSAF and the
Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF). The Air Force allocates these seven
O-10 general officer billets to be commanders of seven of the Air
Force's nine Major Commands (MAJCOMs). The allocation of O-10 billets
to these seven MAJCOM positions was done by assessing the span of
control, the scope of resources managed, the level of accountability
required, as well as the political-military interactions and the inter-
service coordination required for each of these senior leadership
billets.
The O-10 positions are subject to review and approval each time a
new officer is nominated to fill one of these key leadership billets.
The CSAF advises the SECAF as to which specific officer should fill a
given O-10 position in the Air Force. The SECAF recommends the officer
to the President of the United States (through the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense). The President then
nominates the officer to the Senate and requests confirmation to a
position of importance and responsibility authorized to carry the grade
of general under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. section 601. The
nomination is subject to review and scrutiny at each step in the
process.
Senator Webb. Admiral Ferguson?
Admiral Ferguson. Chairman Webb, for the Navy alignments,
obviously, two of the four stars are the Chief of Naval
Operations and the Vice Chief. When you look at our other four-
star positions, they evolve historically either by the nature
of our geographic dispersal in the fleets--so we have the
Atlantic fleet, which is Norfolk, Commander of Fleet Forces
Command, and then we have the Pacific fleet in Hawaii, which
evolved historically and being geographically dispersed and
working for the combatant commanders that direct operational
forces in their major theaters.
The other two four-stars, one was the Director of Naval
Reactors who was dual-hatted with the Department of Energy, was
created as a four-star by an act of Congress to oversee the
safe operation of all nuclear propulsion plants. That has been
a historical mission and specified term lengths and
responsibilities by Congress and is dual-hatted.
The other one is Commander of Naval Forces Europe who is
also dual-hatted as a NATO four-star commander for the Southern
Region. So that is an agreed upon flag specified by NATO and
authorized by Congress. He is also, for example, involved in
the Libya operations currently ongoing but commands NATO forces
in the south.
Senator Webb. Thank you.
General Chiarelli, let me ask you one question before I run
out of my time here. To what extent is the question that the
gentleman from POGO raised about growth of general officers in
the Guard and Reserve a portion of the Army situation here? In
other words, how much have they grown in the Army Guard and
Reserve and how does that interact with the numbers that you
have here on the Active Duty side?
General Chiarelli. I am going to have to get back to you on
that because we did a review of Guard and Reserve component
general officer positions last time and did not raise the
number. They were looking for a redistribution of numbers.
I can tell you right now we have on full-time support today
81, and 36 of those have a nexus to Operation Enduring Freedom
or Operation Iraqi Freedom. So they are on Active Duty today.
Because if you look at the numbers, my numbers really are not
569,000 if you take a look at how many folks we have mobilized
today. We are upwards of 700,000 soldiers that are currently on
Active Duty, and those numbers go up and down based on
mobilizations.
I might be able to help you on your answer at least from
the Army's standpoint. The Army recently reduced a four-star.
We went from six internal four stars. We are authorized seven.
We have been authorized seven by law for the longest period of
time. We only had six filled. We reduced our U.S. Army Europe
(USAREUR) Commander to a three-star position, Lieutenant
General Mark Hertling, who is currently in that position, and
in doing that, we coordinated with the Secretary of Defense who
gave us the authority to go ahead and reduce down to five of
our seven internal, taking the USAREUR position and making it a
three-star position.
Senator Webb. So it would be your view that the Secretary
of Defense has the authority under the legislative umbrella to
declare that to be a four star?
General Chiarelli. Not being a lawyer, I would not want to
say that definitively, but I was part of that particular
process and working it, and I know it was coordinated through
the Secretary of Defense.
Senator Webb. It is rather interesting that we do not
really have an answer to that question today.
To the other question, if I understand you right, you are
saying that the Guard and Reserve situation does not really
have an impact on your numbers of Active Duty general officers.
General Chiarelli. No. We use Guard and Reserve officers in
certain positions. We currently have a total of 81 that are on
full-time support today, but that is basically being caused by
deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Senator Webb. Yes, but you are saying that that number has
not really changed.
General Chiarelli. No. It goes up and down depending on the
number of Reserve component soldiers we have mobilized and the
requirements down range.
Senator Webb. But in terms of Guard and Reserve numbers
themselves?
General Chiarelli. No. I am going to have to go back and
check that, but I do not believe it has. They were looking for
a redistribution here not too long ago, and we did a very
extensive study of Guard and Reserve general officer positions.
[The information referred to follows:]
Current law, policy, and management practices do not result in
growing Army Reserve general officer end strength. Aside from temporary
growth authorized to meet current contingency operations, the Army
Reserve general officer force has neither grown nor increased the
Active Army general officer force. Current law, 10 U.S.C. section
12004, and policy restrict the Army to 207 Army Reserve component
general officers, of those officers the Army Reserve has been allocated
115 general officers and the Army National Guard 92 general officers.
The Army Reserve is also authorized one three-star as the Chief, Army
Reserve by 10 U.S.C. section 3038. To meet the demands of current
contingency operations, the Army Reserve experienced temporary growth
in the Army Reserve general officer population. This temporary growth
is authorized by 10 U.S.C. section 527 and rigorously controlled by the
Chief of Staff, Army using the General Officer Management Office.
The Army Reserve components have also experienced restricted,
temporary growth to fill requirements in the Joint Pool and the
Chairman's Reserve Program as authorized, and restricted, by 10 U.S.C.
section 526. The restrictions within section 526 combined with the
application of assignment tenures to one-star and two-star Reserve
generals using 10 U.S.C. section 14314 prevents the cumulative growth
to either the Army numbers in section 526 or the Army Reserve numbers
in section 12004. Under current law, the Army may exempt up to 20
percent of Reserve component general officer authorizations for those
serving in joint duty assignments. This means that the Army National
Guard can exempt up to 18 general officers and the Army Reserve can
exempt 23 general officers.
Upon the completion of Joint Pool or Chairman's Reserve Program
tenured assignment the Reserve general officers are typically
transferred to the Standby Reserve or to the Retired Reserve. If the
officer is subsequently assigned to a non-joint traditional Reserve
billet, the officer moves back to the rigorous management control
procedures maintained in the Army general officer management office to
comply with Reserve general officer end strengths as prescribed by
section 12004. In each case the officer ceases to remain on Active
Duty.
The Army Reserve currently has 125 general officers, 34 of whom are
performing Active Duty tours. The Army National Guard current has 117
general officers, 35 of whom are performing Active Duty tours. As
outlined previously, the general officers performing Active Duty tours
are programmed to self-terminate from Active Duty orders upon
completion of temporary tours authorized by section 526 and section
527. These officers will transfer to the Standby Reserve, the retired
Reserve or return to accounting within section 12004 as a Reserve
officer. This management practice does not result in permanently
growing Army general officer end strength.
Senator Webb. Thank you very much.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. This has been fascinating. I am trying to
figure out how you become a four-star general, not that that is
going to happen to me anytime soon. But the whole idea of how
you become a four-star general--I would assume the Secretary of
the particular Service has to nominate you, right? Is that
correct?
Admiral Ferguson. That is correct, Senator, but it is a
process where the Service Chief--the Service Secretary goes to
the Chairman to the Secretary of Defense and then to the Senate
for confirmation after the President endorses the nomination.
Senator Graham. Okay. So this process--the Secretary of
Defense has to sign off on it.
Admiral Ferguson. Yes, that is correct.
Senator Graham. Just like any other promotion from major to
lieutenant colonel.
General Chiarelli. Even in our internal positions, the
Secretary of Defense signs off on it. Sometimes the Service
will go ahead and nominate an individual to take even an
internal position----
Senator Webb. Let me add an observation as a former
Secretary of the Navy. The decision to move forward with a
nomination is the President's decision based on a Service
Secretary recommendation to the Secretary of Defense and then
to the White House. Really, the question I was trying to get at
is who decides that this position is four stars and who decides
that it is not?
Senator Graham. That is what I am trying to say. How do you
become a four-star general versus just a general officer. I
guess the Service Secretary will say, yes, I need a four-star
general at USAFE. I need a four-star admiral as Commander,
PACOM. Right?
General Chiarelli. By law, in the U.S. Army, the Vice and
the Chief of Staff of the Army are four-star generals. U.S.
Army Materiel Command (AMC) commander, U.S. Army Forces Command
commander----
Senator Graham. So you got statutory positions.
General Chiarelli. Two out of our five that we currently
have.
Senator Graham. Okay. How many in the Air Force?
General Breedlove. Two.
Senator Graham. So Congress has created two. All right.
So beyond those two, it seems to me that someone has to
decide this command or this function or this region deserves a
four-star commander. That comes from the Service Secretary to
the Secretary of Defense. Is that right? Because that is
Senator Webb's question. Do we know? If we do not know--the
answer is okay to say we do not know. His question is a good
question. How do you determine whether or not USAFE--you gave
an explanation that makes sense to me. I just want to know how
do you determine that is a four-star billet versus a three-star
billet. You told us in the Army, U.S. Army Europe--you have
gone from four to three. Somebody decided to do that. Who
decided to do that?
General Chiarelli. The Chief of Staff of the Army decided
to make that recommendation to the Secretary of Defense based
not only on ratios, because we think ratios lead you to some
false comparisons----
Senator Graham. Yes, and I am going to talk about that in a
minute.
So the point is if you give up a slot in that process, I
assume that is how you add a slot. So if you wanted to go from
a three- to a four-star in U.S. Army Europe, you would go
through the same process.
General Chiarelli. In the Army, we look at mission
analysis, resource analysis, the number of not only military
but civilians and Reserve component soldiers that are under
that command. All those things go into an analysis. But we have
three and we have had three forever other than the statutory
ones. That is U.S. Army Forces Command commander, U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command commander, and AMC commander.
Senator Graham. I got you. I think I understand better now.
Let us look at roles and missions for a lack of a better
term. When we leave Iraq, we will have, I hope, some force left
behind in 2012. I hope it is enough to do the job, but whether
it is 3,000 or 10,000 or 15,000, it is going to be a lot
smaller than 100,000. General, what kind of level of command
would you want to lead that force? What rank do you think would
be appropriate given that commander's job in Iraq and with the
Iraqi Government?
General Chiarelli. He will be supported by whoever the
chief of the OSC is, as I understand it, which I understand is
a three-star position.
Senator Graham. What is OSC?
General Chiarelli. Operation and Security Cooperation.
Senator Graham. So that would be a three-star billet?
General Chiarelli. That is my understanding.
Senator Graham. Now, normally we would not have a three-
star general commanding 3,000 people.
General Chiarelli. No, but there will be a commander for
those individuals.
Senator Graham. So I am saying that is a role or a mission
that we believe from a national security point of view you have
to have somebody with sufficient rank to deal with that
position. That would be a three-star billet. Right?
General Chiarelli. Which one is that, sir?
Senator Graham. The OSC.
General Chiarelli. Yes.
Senator Graham. Now, under him, you will have an actual
operational commander.
General Chiarelli. Yes, you will.
Senator Graham. What rank do you think that person will be?
General Chiarelli. It depends on the number of folks.
Senator Graham. Let us say it is 10,000.
General Chiarelli. If the decision is made to leave a
division headquarters there, they would leave a two-star
general. If all that is left is a brigade headquarters and that
is the decision of interaction with the Iraqis, it would be a
colonel, I would imagine, unless special provisions were made.
Senator Graham. Would that be a case where you would want
special provisions to have a general officer?
General Chiarelli. It would be one I would think that would
be looked at because of the interaction with the Iraqi army.
Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, one special situation. The
rule of law programs in Afghanistan were incredibly disjointed,
interagency, all kinds of cats and dogs agencies, every
alphabet soup agency spending on rule of law. The
administration decided to create an ambassador for the rule of
law, Ambassador Clem, and he has a one-star military deputy
because the civilian-military partnership is the future of all
conflicts. That is just a case where I think the general
officer made sense in terms of roles and missions. I bet you we
could find some situations where it is the other way too, that
the general officer billet just really does not make sense in
terms of what the mission is.
I appreciate the thoroughness. I think we need to ask more
questions. The Air Force has 10 SES billets for legal advisors.
Now, the continuity--you are right. An SES person is just going
to be there from administration to administration, from
retirement to new people coming in. It gives you continuity.
The brigadier general would have some operational experience
where the uniform brings different aspects to the job.
The Navy has 22. Do you know why the Navy has 22 SES
personnel in their legal department and the Air Force would
have 10? I do not mean to put you on the spot. I am just
curious.
Admiral Ferguson. Senator, I would have to defer to the
general counsel to answer that.
Senator Graham. Yes, but I think that the purpose of this
hearing is to find out why we have picked one and not the other
and why we are growing so fast. I just think some jobs require
rank. Some jobs may just have been created for general officers
just because that seems to be the trend.
I know the Air Force pretty well. I think I understand
their reasoning. The fact that they have 10 SES attorneys, the
lowest of the group, probably explains the 1 or 2 additional
brigadier generals. I do not know if that is the right model.
It is just something to consider.
From an Air Force point of view, how do you balance that?
What are you looking at?
General Breedlove. Senator, in preparing for this hearing,
I have learned an awful lot about lawyers in the Air Force. I
guess the thing that was most instructive to me----
Senator Webb. You should have been here 2 months ago.
General Breedlove. It might actually help my Navy
compatriot answer his question. What I learned was that the
three Services do law very, very differently. There are
basically eight major functions that either JAGs or General
Counsels (GC) do in all three of the Services. In one of the
Services, the JAG Corps does three of those and the GC does
five. In another Service, the JAG Corps does five of those and
the GC does three. In my Service, the JAG Corps does eight of
those and the GC does one. So that explains a little
difference, the number and difference of general officers and
SESs across the four Services because we do very different
things with our lawyers within our own Service construct.
Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, I am willing to relook at
that construct, if it makes sense.
Senator Webb. Thank you very much, Senator Graham.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the work that all of you do and thank you all
for your service and your leadership.
I wanted each of you to help me by telling me whether you
are confident that we will not be increasing the legal risk
that we are undertaking by cutting the JAG Corps field grade
officers. I am really concerned that we have strong JAG Corps.
So given this analysis and the efficiency initiatives that you
are undertaking, where is this going to leave our JAG Corps
overall in terms of leadership and importance?
General Chiarelli. I believe the JAG Corps will probably
assume a certain portion of the cuts as the Army gets smaller
down to 520,000, but no more than any other branch would given
a reduction in the number of forces we have and the size of its
officer corps.
Admiral Ferguson. Senator, I would say for the Navy and the
program that we are submitting, we will be growing the JAG
Corps in response to commissions that are taking place down at
Guantanamo----
Senator Ayotte. Glad to hear that.
Admiral Ferguson.--and in response to the recent commission
that we have. So you will see the number of officers grow over
our program in a phased approach. I do not believe we have any
leadership reductions planned at the senior levels presently.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
General Dunford. Senator, we did not grow the JAG Corps
when we grew the Marine Corps, and we do not have any intention
of reducing the JAG Corps as we draw down.
General Breedlove. Senator, I cannot answer the broader JAG
question. I can answer two things that we have been focusing
on.
First of all, we have come through a period in the Air
Force where we focused on acquisition excellence and
recapturing some integrity pieces in our acquisition business.
So we are focusing law into the acquisition business.
The other place we will not be shrinking is in what I would
call our rule of war law. We are continuing to focus on giving
not only our air commanders but our joint force commanders, who
typically the Air Force serves under in these COCOMs, the right
kind of advice as we apply lethal force.
Senator Ayotte. Since we have all of you before this
committee, this is not on the topic of this hearing but I
really want to hear from all of you on it, and that is, we had
the nominee for the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Ash Carter,
before the Armed Services Committee yesterday.
You represent the branches of our Armed Forces. You are
undertaking an analysis to cut between $400 billion and $450
billion over the next 10 years, and thereafter if, for some
reason, Congress fails to undertake its responsibility with the
Super Committee and further funds were sequestered as a result
of the failure of the Super Committee to act, what is the
impact on each of your forces?
General Breedlove. Senator, I will jump in here first.
As we look at what we now understand to be $450 billion or
more across 10 years, it is going to affect our Service. In
previous testimony, all four of us together have had the same
concerns, and that is, as we were beginning to look at this
process when the cut was in the range of $300 billion to $350
billion, we thought that we could constrict our force, our Air
Force, and continue to do all of the mission sets that we are
currently asked to do, in other words, to drawn down capacity,
but not change the complexion or character of the Air Force.
Then that drawdown in capacity would manifest itself in
increased risk in those missions that we are called to do,
especially if we had to swing to a high-end conflict from the
current counterinsurgency fight that we are focused on now.
In previous testimony, I also said if we go past $350
billion, that we would begin to have to look at not being able
to just constrict capacity, but we might have to look at the
character and what kind of missions we would provide America
through her Air Force. I believe that we are to the point now
where we are going to have to look at that. What are those
missions that we may not be able to do that we have formerly
provided? That will then bring risk again into the equation as
we look at how we service our joint force commanders around the
world. I think that we can meet the requirements, but the risk
will be very much increased.
General Dunford. Senator, Secretary Panetta has described
any cuts beyond $450 billion as catastrophic, and I do not know
what the specific impact would be on the Marine Corps. But the
only place that we could go to cut--General Breedlove alluded
to--in the Marine Corps' case is capacity. Seventy percent of
the money that we spend is on people. So if we were caused to
reduce the size of the force, it would be capacity. We would
see the impact of that capacity reduction would be in our
ability to meet the needs of the combatant commander on a day-
to-day basis, as well as crisis response and contingency
response. But it is hard to scope that without knowing the
exact cuts that would come the Marine Corps' way if the cuts
exceeded the $450 billion that you referred to.
Admiral Ferguson. Senator, I would echo what Secretary
Panetta and the other Vice Chiefs have said. It begins to
affect the ability of the Services to meet the national defense
strategy. It implies increased response time to crises,
conflicts, and disasters. It starts to affect the ability to be
forward deployed and engaged around the globe, and it starts to
introduce higher levels of risk in ongoing operations when you
go to those larger levels of cuts that are discussed. It starts
to affect the ability for force training and readiness and
force generation capacity, and a sequestration would affect
cuts in programs and start to affect the industrial base. That
is of concern to us for the generation of our future capacity.
So, our priority is to sustain the best Navy in the world
and deliver for the Nation on that, and so the specifics of it
we are still assessing based upon how events unfold.
General Chiarelli. $400 billion is challenging, but it is
workable, and that is what we are doing. I think I would only
echo what Secretary Panetta said, that if we were to go into
sequestration, it would hollow out the force, and that is our
big worry. Our big worry is that whatever ramp you put us on,
if it is down to 520,000, that it be a ramp that we can sustain
the force and ensure that it is not hollowed out. After the
Gulf War, we took 100,000 out in a year. What we ended up with
was a very, very hollow force because when you take those kinds
of numbers out so quickly, you basically take it out of whoever
you can get to leave rather than ensuring you have the right
numbers in the military occupational specialties to ensure that
you have a balanced force. So for us, that is absolutely
critical, given that we are a people-based organization.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
I firmly believe that we should not undermine our national
security from our failure to make the tough decisions here and
deal with the entire budget. So I appreciate your answering my
question.
Senator Webb. Thank you very much, Senator Ayotte.
I thank all of you for your testimony today. It has been, I
think, a very interesting hearing. As I have frequently said,
this has been valuable not only to people who are here but to a
number of staff people who will examine your testimony very
carefully. We will probably have a continuing conversation on a
number of these issues. Again, this has been very valuable to
our committee. Thank you.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Webb
CRITERIA FOR ESTABLISHING GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICER POSITIONS
1. Senator Webb. Secretary Stanley, section 525 of title 10,
U.S.C., establishes the maximum number of O-8s, O-9s, and O-10s each
Service may have in their institutional force. Section 526 of title 10
establishes the total maximum number of general and flag officers each
may have in its institutional force, as well as a total maximum of
general or flag officers available for the joint pool, which is then
allocated to the Services by the Secretary of Defense. While each
Service is required by law to have a Chief and Vice Chief of Staff (or
Commandant and Assistant Commandant in the case of the Marine Corps) at
the rank of O-10, other O-10 allocations are discretionary. How does
the Department of Defense (DOD) determine which Service positions
should be filled by O-10s?
Secretary Stanley. The criteria used for determining which Service
positions should be filled by O-10s are developed in the same manner as
for all general or flag officer positions. Based upon a review of any
statutory requirements, duties and responsibilities, and the mission of
each individual position, each of the military departments will make a
determination and recommendation to the Secretary of Defense that a
specific position warrants designation as a position of importance and
responsibility as an O-10 position.
2. Senator Webb. Secretary Stanley, what are the criteria or
standards used to make this determination, and what is the approval
process?
Secretary Stanley. The criteria used for determining which Service
positions should be filled by O-10s are developed in the same manner as
for all general or flag officer positions. Based upon a review of any
statutory requirements, duties and responsibilities, and the mission of
each individual position, each of the military departments will make a
determination that a specific position warrants designation as a
position of importance and responsibility as an O-10 position and will
make that recommendation to the Secretary of Defense through the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary for
Personnel and Readiness.
Although not all-encompassing, below are some of the criteria and
standards used when considering designation of any new general or flag
position:
Nature of the position:
Characteristics of function: type of command, scope,
and level of function
Grade and position of: superior, principal
subordinates, and lateral points of coordination; a
consideration of the military or governmental structure within
which the manpower requirement function is performed
Supervision over position: proximity of supervision
and the degree of independence of operation
Official relations with U.S. and foreign governmental
officials and with the public: nature, extent, and level
Reflection of national emphasis and determination:
relationship of position to national objectives and programs,
special conditions under which the position was first
established or other reasons why position reflects national
will
Special qualifications required by the position
Magnitude of responsibilities:
Missions of organization and special requirements of
the position
Number, type, and value of resources managed and
employed
Military forces
Personnel
Value of equipment and properties
Total obligational authority and foreign resources
Geographic area of responsibilities
Authority to make decisions and commit resources
Auxiliary authorities and responsibilities inherent in
the position
Development of policy
National commitment to international agreements
Significance of actions and decisions:
Impact on national security of other national
interests
Importance to present and future effectiveness and
efficiency of the national defense establishment
Effect on the prestige of the Nation or the Armed
Forces
3. Senator Webb. Secretary Stanley, please provide a comparison of
the criteria and standards of each of the Services for determining
which positions warrant a general or flag officer of a given rank and
describe DOD's oversight process to avoid grade creep.
Secretary Stanley. Each of the Services has different processes
through which they determine which positions warrant a general or flag
officer of a given rank, but each of the Services and the Department
generally use the same criteria for validation of a position. They
assess any statutory requirements; the nature of the position's duties
and magnitude of its responsibilities; the span of control and scope of
resources managed; and the significance of actions and decisions
required by the position along with the importance of the position's
mission accomplishment to national security and other national
interests. These categories are broad in nature to provide latitude to
the Service senior leadership when making these decisions. A
description of each individual Service criteria and validation process
is attached.
Title 10, section 525, delineates the total number of authorized
general and flag officer positions by both Service and individual
grades. While the Services are granted leeway to manage their general
and flag officer populations within legislative limits, the Department
does closely monitor to ensure a Service does not grow beyond its legal
limit.
Army:
When making a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense on which
positions should be filled by a general officer, the Army conducts a
holistic review of the position and considers the statutory
requirements (if they apply), the duties and responsibilities, and the
mission. For operating force units, the Army uses doctrine to determine
unit designs including the level of command. The allocation of
operating force units between the Active and Reserve components,
including general officer commands, is influenced by supported
commander requirements and resource availability as recommended by the
Total Army Analysis Process. The Army also conducts a manpower analysis
to determine the number of military, civilian, and/or contractor
personnel who fall under the position/command. As part of the process
in determining and/or validating the need for a general officer
position, the Army conducts an annual, internal-Army General Officer
Requirements Review. Requirements are sent to Army Commands, Direct
Reporting Units, Army Service Component Commands, and Army Staff
Principals for validation and prioritization. During the review,
commands/agencies may also make recommendations or requests to add,
delete, change the grade and/or civilianize general officer positions.
Commands/agencies may also make these recommendations/requests
throughout the year, as requirements emerge or change. For new general
officer positions, the command/agency must justify the position and
identify an offset/billpayer. For a deletion, the command/agency must
identify where/how the previously held responsibilities will be
transferred, to include how the position should be filled (military or
civilian) and at what level/rank. All general officer requirements are
adjudicated at the four-star level. In every case, general officer
requirements, and the fill of general officer positions, are predicated
upon best enabling the Army to complete its missions and to take care
of its soldiers, civilians, and their families.
Air Force:
Based on statutory authorizations, the Air Force allocates general
officer billets among the various leadership positions based on the
responsibilities at the Air Staff, the Major Commands (MAJCOMs) and
other functions. This allocation is done consistently by assessing the
span of control, the scope of resources managed, the level of
accountability, the political-military interactions, and the inter-
service coordination required for each of these senior leadership
billets.
The nine leadership positions in the U.S. Air Force filled by four-
star generals are: the Chief of Staff, the Vice Chief of Staff, the
Commander of Air Combat Command (ACC), the Commander of Air Education
and Training Command (AETC), the Commander of Air Force Materiel
Command (AFMC), the Commander of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), the
Commander of Air Mobility Command (AMC), the Commander of Pacific Air
Forces (PACAF), and the Commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE).
The Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff are commensurate with the
top two leadership positions in each of the other Services. The seven
other four-stars in the Air Force are MAJCOM commanders and they have
responsibilities, spans of control, and political-military interactions
that require the most senior grade of general officer.
There are typically 36 Air Force senior leadership positions filled
by three-star officers. One third of these positions are on the Air
Staff and these billets include the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, the
various Deputy Chiefs of Staff (Manpower, Intelligence, Operations,
Logistics, Information, Plans, and Programming), the Military Deputy
for Acquisition, the Inspector General, the Judge Advocate General, and
the Surgeon General. The other three-star positions are allocated to
major Numbered Air Force (NAF) commanders, the vice commanders of the
seven four-star MAJCOMs as well as the commanders of Air Force Special
Operations Command and Air Force Global Strike Command. The Commander
of Air University and the Superintendent of the U.S. Air Force Academy
are also three-star positions.
The two-star positions in the Air Force are typically used for the
MAJCOM-level staff directorates, the commanders of smaller NAFs, the
vice commanders for MAJCOMs commanded by 3-star officer, and combat
task force commanders. In addition, the Director of Legislative
Liaison, the Air Force Civil Engineer, and the deputies for key three-
star Deputy Chiefs of Staff on the Air Staff are two-star billets. The
senior contracting officer and the senior budget officer of the Air
Force are also general officers of two-star rank as are the Program
Executive Officers (PEOs) for major acquisition efforts. Unique
functions such as commanders for the Air Force Intelligence
Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency, the Air Force Operational Test
and Evaluation Center, the Air Force Flight Test Center, and the Air
Force Personnel Center are two-star billets as well.
The remaining general officer authorizations in the Air Force are
at the grade of one-star. Positions here include some wing command
positions, the head of Air Force Security Forces, the director of the
Air Force Office of Special Investigation, deputy directors on MAJCOM
staffs, acquisition PEOs, vice commanders of major NAFs, and both the
Commandant and Dean of Faculty (if a military officer) at U.S. Air
Force Academy. Inspector Generals, Judge Advocate Generals, and Surgeon
Generals at some MAJCOMs are one-star officers.
Navy:
For Navy one- and two-star positions, the Secretary of the Navy is
the approval authority for flag officer positions. These billets are
designated based on the following criteria:
International agreements on rank structure, such as
within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Nature of the Position. This includes characteristics
of billet function (e.g. command, general or coordinating
staff, et cetera), consideration of the military and
governmental structure within which the billet is assigned,
official relations with U.S. and foreign governmental
officials, and importance of the position to national security
objectives.
Scope of Responsibilities. This involves the missions
of the organization and any special requirements, the number,
type, and value of resources managed and employed, size of the
geographical area of responsibility, national commitment to
international agreements, and seniority of subordinate
commanders.
Importance of mission accomplishment to national
security and other national interests.
For Navy three- and four-star positions, the Secretary of the Navy
nominates flag officers to the President via the Secretary of Defense
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The positions have been
previously vetted using, but not limited to, the aforementioned
criteria. In addition, as provided for by title 10 U.S.C. section 601,
with the advice and consent of the Senate, the President designates all
three- and four-star billets as positions of importance and
responsibility authorized to carry the grade of admiral or vice
admiral.
The Navy does not make recommendations regarding flag officer
requirements to joint flag officer billets. It responds to requests for
nominations from the Joint Staff, General/Flag Officer Matters Office.
Marine Corps:
There are no defined, written, or objective criteria for making
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense regarding general officer
billets in the Marine Corps. Historical precedence and professional
judgment drive the selection of general officer billets. This task
falls upon the Commandant of the Marine Corps who approves every
general officer requirement for the Marine Corps. Precedence informs
professional judgment with regard to appropriate span of control and
authority, degree of independence and autonomy from other suitable
command authorities, roles and missions of the command, and the
operational/strategic impact of the billet. The Marine Corps does not
fill a position with a general officer solely on historical precedence,
however, we do consider that factor an important consideration. The
current mix of Marine Corps general officers represents the proper
balance of postings to Marine Corps operating forces, supporting
elements, and joint requirements.
4. Senator Webb. General Chiarelli, Admiral Ferguson, General
Dunford, and General Breedlove, what criteria do you use when making
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on which positions should
be filled by a general or flag officer?
General Chiarelli. When making a recommendation to the Secretary of
Defense on which positions should be filled by a general officer, the
Army conducts a holistic review of the position and considers the
statutory requirements (if they apply), the duties and
responsibilities, and the mission. For operating force units, the Army
uses doctrine to determine unit designs including the level of command.
The allocation of operating force units between the Active and Reserve
components, including general officer commands, is influenced by
supported commander requirements and resource availability as
recommended by the Total Army Analysis Process.
The Army also conducts a manpower analysis to determine the number
of military, civilian, and/or contractor personnel who fall under the
position and command. As part of the process in determining and
validating the need for a general officer position, the Army conducts
an annual, internal Army General Officer Requirements Review.
Requirements are sent to Army Commands, Direct Reporting Units, Army
Service Component Commands, and Army Staff Principals for validation
and prioritization. During the review, commands or agencies may also
make recommendations or requests to add, delete, change the grade, or
civilianize general officer positions. Commands or agencies may also
make recommendations throughout the year, as requirements emerge or
change. For new general officer positions, the command or agency must
justify the position and identify an offset. For a deletion, the
command or agency must identify how the previously held
responsibilities will be transferred, to include how the position
should be filled (military or civilian) and at what level or rank. All
general officer requirements are adjudicated at the four-star level. In
every case, general officer requirements, and the fill of general
officer positions, are predicated upon best enabling the Army to
complete its missions and to take care of its soldiers, civilians, and
their families.
Admiral Ferguson. For Navy one- and two-star positions, the
Secretary of the Navy is the approval authority for flag officer
positions. These billets are designated based on the following
criteria:
International agreements on rank structure, such as
within NATO.
Nature of the Position. This includes characteristics
of billet function (e.g. command, general or coordinating
staff, et cetera), consideration of the military and
governmental structure within which the billet is assigned,
official relations with U.S. and foreign governmental
officials, and importance of the position to national security
objectives.
Scope of Responsibilities. This involves the missions
of the organization and any special requirements, the number,
type, and value of resources managed and employed, size of the
geographical area of responsibility, national commitment to
international agreements, and seniority of subordinate
commanders.
Importance of mission accomplishment to national
security and other national interests.
For Navy three- and four-star positions, the Secretary of the Navy
nominates flag officers to the President via the Secretary of Defense
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The positions have been
previously vetted using, but not limited to, the aforementioned
criteria. In addition, as provided for by title 10 U.S.C. section 601,
with the advice and consent of the Senate, the President designates all
three- and four-star billets as positions of importance and
responsibility authorized to carry the grade of admiral or vice
admiral.
The Navy does not make recommendations regarding flag officer
requirements to joint flag officer billets. It responds to requests for
nominations from the Joint Staff, General/Flag Officer Matters Office.
General Dunford. There are no defined, written, or objective
criteria for making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense
regarding general officer billets in the Marine Corps. Historical
precedence and professional judgment drive the selection of general
officer billets. This task falls upon the Commandant of the Marine
Corps who approves every general officer requirement for the Marine
Corps. Precedence informs professional judgment with regard to
appropriate span of control and authority, degree of independence and
autonomy from other suitable command authorities, roles and missions of
the command, and the operational/strategic impact of the billet. The
Marine Corps does not fill a position with a general officer solely on
historical precedence, however, we do consider that factor an important
consideration. The current mix of Marine Corps general officers
represents the proper balance of postings to Marine Corps operating
forces, supporting elements, and joint requirements.
General Breedlove. When providing recommendations to the Secretary
of Defense as to which positions will be filled by general officers,
the U.S. Air Force carefully assesses the responsibilities of the
position being considered and then fills that billet with an officer
with the appropriate rank. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force
considers a number of factors when determining whether a position
warrants an O-10, an O-9, an O-8, or an O-7.
The primary factor when considering if a position merits a general
officer is the span of control required to execute the mission of the
unit or staff function in question. Some leadership positions demand a
far-ranging and complex span of control and the Air Force places more
experienced general officers (and thus higher ranking) into these
billets.
In addition, the Air Force considers the value of the managed
resources when making determinations for general officer positions.
Commands, programs, and staff functions responsible for large amounts
of service resources have increased accountability to not only the Air
Staff, but also to DOD, Congress, and the White House. Because of this
key factor, the Air Force will place general officers of higher rank
into positions that require a greater responsibility for Air Force
resources.
The Air Force also looks at the level of international interaction
required in each billet when making a determination as to which general
officer grade will fill that position. Political-military relationships
in the international arena are critical to the accomplishment of our
national security objectives. For the general officer positions that
deal with international relationships, the Air Force seeks to ensure
that the positions are at a rank commensurate with the counterparts.
This helps ensure success as we build and maintain our strategic
partnerships around the globe.
5. Senator Webb. General Chiarelli, Admiral Ferguson, General
Dunford, and General Breedlove, what criteria do you use when making
recommendations concerning positions that should be filled by O-10s?
General Chiarelli. The criteria used for making recommendations
concerning positions that should be filled by O-10s are developed in
the same manner described earlier for all Army general officer
positions. The duties and responsibilities of the position and the
mission of the unit must warrant leadership at the O-10 level.
Additionally, when recommending candidates for the Secretary of Defense
to forward to the President for nomination to the Senate, the Secretary
of the Army and Chief of Staff, Army, with input and recommendations
from the Army's four-stars, consider each candidate's background,
experience, and potential for service (or continued service) as an O-
10. Ultimately, whether for an internal-Army or joint O-10 position,
the imperative is ensuring the most capable senior leaders in uniform
are placed in positions of importance and responsibility so as to
ensure the Army and DOD carry out their responsibilities in the most
effective, efficient manner possible. Of note, the Army has not
requested a new, internal-Service O-10 position since the Continental
Army Command was inactivated and, on July 1, 1973, U.S. Army Forces
Command and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command were activated.
Admiral Ferguson. The Navy has six in-Service positions that are
filled by O-10 flag officers. Those positions are: (1) The Chief of
Naval Operations, (2) The Vice Chief of Naval Operations, (3) Director,
Naval Nuclear Propulsion, (4) Commander, Fleet Forces Command, (5)
Commander, Pacific Fleet, and (6) Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe/
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Africa/Commander, Allied Joint Force
Command Naples.
Chief of Naval Operations and Vice Chief of Naval Operations
The Chief of Naval Operations and the Vice Chief of Naval
Operations are provided for in title 10 U.S.C. sections 5033 and 5035.
For these positions, the law dictates that both officers while so
serving have the grade of admiral without vacating permanent grade.
Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program
In conjunction with title 42 U.S.C. section 7158, Executive Order
No. 12344 section 4 states that an officer of the U.S. Navy appointed
as Director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program shall be nominated
for the grade of admiral.
Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command and Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet
Subject to flag officer end strength limits established for the
Navy in title 10 U.S.C. section 525, the Chief of Naval Operations has
designated three Geographic Fleet Commanders positions be filled by O-
10 flag officers commensurate with the scope of command authority and
responsibility their organizations have over their subordinate
commands. Supporting the Chief of Naval Operation in his title 10
responsibilities, the U.S. Navy's CONUS-based forces are divided into
two geographic regions: U.S. Fleet Forces Command (formerly Atlantic
Fleet) and U.S. Pacific Fleet. Each command effectively comprises one
half of the entire U.S. Navy operating forces. The O-10 grade for both
positions is commensurate with the scope and span of their
responsibilities.
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe; Commander, U.S. Naval Forces,
Africa; Commander, Allied Joint Force Command, Naples
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe and Commander, U.S. Naval
Forces, Africa has additional and distinct responsibilities within the
NATO as the Commander, Allied Joint Force Command Naples (JFC-Naples).
JFC-Naples is one of NATO's three operational commands, the others
being Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum and Allied Joint Force
Command Lisbon. The billet is designated as a four-star billet by NATO.
Each of the three components under JFC-Naples: Allied Air Command
Izmir (AC Izmir), Allied Maritime Command Naples (MC Naples), and
Allied Force Command Madrid (AC Madrid) is led by a three-star flag or
general officer.
In addition to four-star level military responsibilities within
NATO, this billet has significant engagement responsibilities involving
interaction at the highest diplomatic and political levels with senior
governmental officials from the 28 NATO nations and 22 Partnership for
Peace nations. Additionally, the ongoing NATO Command Structure
revision will reduce the Joint Force Commands from three to two, of
which this billet will be one.
General Dunford. There are no defined, written, or objective
criteria for making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense
concerning positions filled with O-10 general officers in the Marine
Corps. The Marine Corps only has two O-10 billets which are the
Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Assistant Commandant of the
Marine Corps. Traditionally we have also provided two O-10 general
officers to joint commands. Historical precedence and the professional
judgment of the most senior Marine Corps leadership develop the
recommendation criteria for promotion selection to O-10.
General Breedlove. There are nine positions in the United States
Air Force filled by four-star generals. These are the Chief of Staff
(CSAF), the Vice Chief of Staff (VCSAF), the Commander of Air Combat
Command (ACC), the Commander of Air Education and Training Command
(AETC), the Commander of Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), the
Commander of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), the Commander of Air
Mobility Command (AMC), the Commander of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF),
and the Commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE). Title 10 of the
U.S.C. specifies the CSAF and VCSAF positions, and these positions are
commensurate with the top two leadership positions in each of the other
Services. The seven other four-stars in the U.S. Air Force are Major
Command (MAJCOM) commanders and they have responsibilities, spans of
control, and political-military interactions that require the most
senior grade of general officer. Because of the complex and broad
responsibilities for management, execution, and the commitment of
wartime and training resources, these seven MAJCOMs clearly warrant the
four-star grade of general. The effectiveness of daily operations in
each one of these seven MAJCOMs has critical and direct impacts to the
Nation's security. The Nation's capability to field a credible military
force in any arena of conflict, regardless of the scope of warfare
involved, is essential to our national security aims. Because of the
responsibilities vested in each of the MAJCOMs, the Air Force feels
strongly that the commanders of ACC, AETC, AFMC, AFSPC, AMC, PACAF, and
USAFE should remain as four-star generals.
NEED FOR ROLES/MISSIONS STUDY
6. Senator Webb. Secretary Stanley and Admiral Gortney, the General
and Flag Officer Efficiency Study Group that you co-chaired conducted a
fiscal year 2010 baseline review of all Active Duty general and flag
officer positions, but did not seek to determine how many general/flag
officers are required given our force today. Do you believe that a
roles and missions study is warranted that would look at the needs of
the Services and the joint community to determine actual requirements
for general and flag officers? If not, why not?
Secretary Stanley. Although the Efficiency Study Group was not
charged with determining how many general/flag officers are required
within the force, we did compare a number of like Service organizations
to determine how the Services were alike or dissimilar. DOD also had
recently conducted the 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions (QRM)
review. Within this review, DOD defined its core missions and linked
those missions areas with its capabilities development processes by
identifying nine core competencies: force application; command and
control; battle space awareness; net centric; building partnerships;
protection; logistics; force support; and corporate management and
support. The Services used those core competencies to inform the
categorization of their individual general and flag officer positions
which became the basis of the Efficiency Study Group's efforts.
While the QRM review laid a foundation for understanding DOD's
roles and responsibilities in today's complex security environment,
there is still much work to be done. We will keep roles and missions at
the forefront of our upcoming review of Reserve component general and
flag officer positions.
Admiral Gortney. Although the Efficiency Study Group did not
determine how many general/flag officers are required within the force,
we did compare a number of like Service organizations. These
similarities showed that there simply wasn't enough time to do the top-
down level of review that is required to truly determine the impact of
current general/flag officer strength. A roles and missions study,
although extraordinarily complex and time consuming, would provide much
needed clarity with regard to maintaining proper general/flag officer-
to-troop ratios. The financial expense requires a fair amount of
planning and will take a significant amount of time to engage. Should
we move in that direction, deliberate planning would have to begin
immediately.
7. Senator Webb. Secretary Stanley and Admiral Gortney, what is the
plan to review the general and flag officer requirements in the Reserve
components?
Secretary Stanley. We are planning to begin our review of Reserve
component position since the review of Active component general and
flag officer positions is complete. Currently, the Joint Staff is in
the process of validating all previously joint positions that lack
joint credit certification and incorporating them into the Joint Staff
manning document. After this is completed, the Reserve Chiefs and the
Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) will tier and categorize all
Reserve component positions, similar to the way we did the Active
component review, to ensure we have a good starting baseline from which
to evaluate the positions. Once we have that information, a determined
top-to-bottom review of Reserve/Guard general and flag officer billets
will be conducted, with overarching responsibility given to the Reserve
Chiefs and Chief, NGB General Officer Management Office.
Admiral Gortney. Our first step was to validate and establish
within joint personnel systems all previously joint positions that lack
joint credit certification. Over the last several months many joint
positions that are specifically Reserve/Guard in nature have been
incorporated into the Joint Staff manning document. Purposefully, we
next plan to request the Reserve and Guard tier/categorize all joint
positions to ensure whatever the specific requirement necessary to
develop our Reserve/Guard general officers is being met. It is true
that a formalized process helmed by an outside organization is not on
our scope. Rather, a determined top-to-bottom review of Reserve/Guard
general/flag officer billets, with overarching responsibility given to
the Reserve Chiefs and Director NGB General Officer Management Office.
8. Senator Webb. Secretary Stanley and Admiral Gortney, each
Service has a Chief and Vice Chief, but beyond that there appears to be
little consistency across the Services with respect to what military
department major subordinate commands or activities require a four-star
general or flag officer level of leadership or structure. For example,
each of the Services has a command that manages the readiness and
availability for deployment of its uncommitted forces: the Army has
Forces Command, the Navy has Fleet Forces Command, but the Air Force
has Air Combat Command, Air Mobility Command, and arguably Space
Command. Also, note that the Army's Training and Doctrine Command and
the Air Force's Education and Training Command have four-star generals,
but the Navy's Education and Training Command is led by a two-star rear
admiral and the Marine Corps Training and Education Command is
commanded by a major general. Does DOD have a plan to review the
current O-10 positions to determine whether these positions warrant
general and flag officers in that grade?
Secretary Stanley. As part of our recent Efficiency Study, we
reviewed each of the Services' structures and general/flag officer
positions and identified those whose structure appeared anomalous when
compared to the other Services. We, in fact, took a very determined
look at the Education and Training Commands across DOD. The military
departments were very detailed in their explanations of why organic
commands maintain grades that are divergent from the other Services.
It's also important to note that each Service varies in size, scope,
and mission. Although training and education for ground forces is
detailed and extraordinarily complex, it also differs greatly from what
the Air Force faces with regard to aircraft and weapons platforms.
Beyond this, there is not a plan to conduct another review of
current O-10 positions; however, any request for a new O-10 position
will be assessed on its merits when submitted.
Admiral Gortney. We presently have no plan to review current O-10
positions, however we have very recently taken a detailed review of
Service general/flag officer positions. During the Secretary of
Defense's mandated Efficiency Study, all grades and positions were put
on the table. We, in fact, took a very determined look at the Education
and Training Commands across all Services. The Services were very
detailed in their explanations of why organic commands maintain grades
that are divergent from the other Services. It's also important to note
that each Service varies in size, scope, and mission. Although training
and education for ground forces is detailed and extraordinarily
complex, it also differs greatly from what the Air Force faces with
regard to aircraft and weapons platforms.
9. Senator Webb. Admiral Ferguson and General Breedlove, the Army
has recently reduced the grade of the Commander of U.S. Army Europe to
a lieutenant general while the commanders of U.S. Naval Forces Europe
and U.S. Air Force Europe continue to be O-10 positions. Has your
Service reviewed your European Command position to determine whether it
should remain an O-10 position?
Admiral Ferguson. We have reviewed the position and determined
that, given the scope and significance of the duties assigned, it is
appropriate and necessary to retain the position in the grade of O-10.
The U.S. Naval Forces Europe billet is a four-star billet due to
designation by NATO, as the officer is also dual-designated as the
Commander, Allied Joint Forces Command Naples (JFC-Naples). JFC-Naples
is one of NATO's three operational four-star commands. The Commander of
U.S. Army Forces Europe does not have NATO-command responsibilities for
a region.
General Breedlove. Yes, the Air Force has reviewed the position of
Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe and has determined it should
remain an O-10 position for the near future.
10. Senator Webb. Admiral Ferguson and General Breedlove, how do
you justify retaining it as an O-10 position in light of the Army
decision that the Commander of U.S. Army Europe is a lieutenant
general?
Admiral Ferguson. Unlike Commander U.S. Army Europe, Commander U.S.
Naval Forces Europe also has responsibilities within NATO as the
Commander, Allied JFC-Naples under Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe. JFC-Naples is one of NATO's three operational commands, the
others being Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum and Allied Joint Force
Command Lisbon.
Each of the three components under JFC-Naples: Allied Air Command
Izmir (AC Izmir), Allied Maritime Command Naples (MC Naples) and Allied
Force Command Madrid (AC Madrid) is led by three-star flag or general
officers. The designation of JFC-Naples as a four-star billet was
approved by all NATO nations.
In addition to four-star level military responsibilities within
NATO, this billet has significant international and alliance engagement
responsibilities involving interaction at the highest diplomatic and
political levels with senior governmental officials from the 28 NATO
nations and 22 Partnership for Peace nations. Additionally, the NATO
Command Structure revision will reduce the Joint Force Commands from
three to two, of which this billet will be one.
General Breedlove. The Commander of U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE)
delivers full spectrum air power options to the combatant commanders of
both U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)--
AORs that comprise 51 and 54 nations respectively. USAFE leads and
supports joint, coalition, and NATO operations as well as promoting
regional stability in these two expansive and diverse continents. In
addition, the USAFE commander also serves in a NATO leadership role and
wears four different hats: within the NATO command structure, the USAFE
Commander serves as the Commander Headquarters Allied Air Command, the
Air Commander for the Joint Forces Command at Brunssum, the Air Defense
Commander, and the Regional Airspace Control Authority. As the
Commander of Allied Air Command, the USAFE commander is directly
responsible to the Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) for ensuring the
security, peace, stability, and territorial integrity of the NATO
alliance. Within the responsibilities as the Air Defense Commander and
the Regional Airspace Control Authority for NATO, the USAFE Commander
is directly responsible for the control and management of the Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) mission in Europe.
If the USAFE Commander position were to be downgraded, these
critical command positions in the NATO alliance would transition to a
four-star airman from another NATO nation. This would mean that that
BMD in Europe--a capability comprised largely of U.S. assets--would not
be commanded by a U.S. Air Force officer. This would also mean that the
overall leadership of allied airpower in the vast and dynamic EUCOM and
AFRICOM AORs would also transition away from the United States. The
U.S. Air Force feels strongly that these are not palatable options for
regional security and that we must continue to maintain the USAFE
Commander as an O-10 position.
COMBATANT COMMANDS AND SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDS
11. Senator Webb. Secretary Stanley and Admiral Gortney, DOD has
more than a dozen geographic and functional combatant commands. While
all of these combatant commands are commanded by a four-star general or
flag officer, the Service components of these commands are led by a mix
of one-, two-, three-, and four-star general or flag officers. There
appears to be little, if any, consistency in DOD's staffing of these
components and, in many cases, the grade of the officer leading these
entities seems to be driven more by history or tradition than the
responsibility of the position. The impact of three- or four-star
general or flag officers leading these various component commands may
further be leading to an inflation of the headquarters staff. In your
view, are the grades of those officers serving on combatant command and
Service component staffs inflated?
Secretary Stanley. No, I've seen no evidence to indicate that that
the grades of those officers serving on combatant command and Service
component staffs are inflated. The comprehensive review that VADM
Gortney and I conducted on behalf of Secretary Gates allowed us to
independently evaluate these positions. I would note that many of the
positions have multiple responsibilities, both Service and Joint. In
some cases, some officers have as many as five positions which they
hold simultaneously. Variances in duties and responsibilities
necessitate that the grade of the position be derived from the scope
and breadth of its responsibilities, which vary significantly. The
potential for grade creep may exist; however, our military systems have
mechanisms in place for validation and establishment of specific
grades.
Admiral Gortney. No, the grades of the officers serving in COCOMs
and Service component staffs are based on the scope of responsibilities
and were deemed appropriate by the Secretary and Chief at the time.
Discretion, sound judgment based on experience, and duty
responsibilities is incorporated in the determination of a position's
grade. The potential for grade creep may exist; however our military
systems have mechanisms in place for validation and establishment of
specific grades.
12. Senator Webb. Secretary Stanley and Admiral Gortney, does the
presence of a four-star commander unnecessarily lead to inflated grades
of the principal staff officers and is further study of this required?
Secretary Stanley. Generally speaking, four-star commands have more
responsibility than three-star commands and thus are more likely to
have principal staff officers of higher grades. But specifically no, a
four-star's presence is not directly proportional to principal staff
officer staff grade inflation. The grade structure of each individual
command is largely dictated by the scope of responsibility assigned to
the various positions and commands. Resource allocation is monitored
and managed by the Joint Staff and each Service. Appropriate resource-
controlled mechanisms are employed by each Service which mitigates
grade inflation.
Admiral Gortney. No. A four-star's presence is not directly
proportional to staff grade inflation. Resource allocation is monitored
and managed by the Joint Staff and each Service. Appropriate resource-
controlled mechanisms are employed by each Service which mitigates
grade inflation. Each Service has a table of organization that denotes
structure requirements.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
RESERVE READINESS
13. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Stanley, the next Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey, recently stated that the future
fiscal environment will present significant challenges in preserving
the readiness gains of the Reserve component. General Dempsey also
stated that the Reserve component of our Armed Forces has transformed
from an ``exclusively strategic Reserve to one that also provides
operational, full-spectrum capabilities to the Nation.'' Repeated
combat deployments, as well as peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and
Homeland defense missions, have produced a Reserve component far more
operationally capable and experienced than at any time in our Nation's
history. How have reductions to date in general and flag officers
impacted our critical Reserve component?
Secretary Stanley. Although National Guard and Reserve general and
flag officer authorizations were not evaluated in the Secretary's
efficiency review, they will be evaluated in the next DOD review, which
is anticipated to commence in the coming months. While all of the
efficiencies were Active component positions, lost authorizations will
provide fewer opportunities for Reserve component general and flag
officers to serve in extended Active Duty positions.
14. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Stanley, how will future reductions
in general and flag officer levels impact our critical Reserve
component?
Secretary Stanley. Any reductions beyond those already planned for
the Active Forces may affect training and development of future leaders
for Joint and Service staff positions.
15. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Stanley, what portion of flag officer
cuts or eliminations will come from the Reserve component?
Secretary Stanley. Until DOD completes its review of Reserve
component general and flag officer positions which are anticipated to
commence in the coming months, we do not have the applicable
information to determine the portion of flag officer cuts or
eliminations from the Reserve component.
SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE
16. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Stanley, what has been the percentage
growth in Senior Executive Service (SES) since September 11, 2001?
Please include specific numbers in your answers, including annual
numbers by Service and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).
Secretary Stanley. In September 2001, DOD held 1,342 SES
allocations. As far as percentage growth, that number has grown 6
percent to 1,423 SES allocations as of today. The table below details
the annual numbers for DOD, the Services, and OSD.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senior Executive Service 2000/2001 2002/2003 2004/2005 2006/2007 2008/2009 2010/2011
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army.................................... 289 289 286 288 291 296
Air Force............................... 170 170 161 161 165 170
Navy.................................... 333 333 324 324 324 329
4th Estate/OSD.......................... 550 550 580 585 588 584
Combatant Commands...................... N/A N/A 28 33 44 44
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Total OPM Authorization............... 1,342 1,342 1,379 1,391 1,412 1,423
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Stanley, how does this percentage
compare to the growth in flag grade officers over the same period?
Secretary Stanley. Active component general and flag officer
authorizations were reduced by 34 percent between 1970 and 2000 (from
1,339 to 879), and then increased by 8 percent (from 879 to 952) after
the general and flag officer Joint Pool legislation was enacted by the
2009 and 2010 NDAAs. Over the same period, SES allocations have grown
by 6 percent.
18. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Stanley, how will the efficiencies
initiatives decrease the number of the SES positions in DOD? Please
provide specific numbers.
Secretary Stanley. The goals of the efficiencies initiative
regarding SES positions were to identify and eliminate redundancies and
obsolete positions, and to identify and properly classify over-graded
positions, if any. Therefore, DOD conducted a bottom-up review and
identified 97 such SES positions that will be eliminated or downgraded.
In addition, during the review, newly identified or emerging needs were
evaluated to ascertain enduring needs. As a result of this evaluation,
DOD identified 70 previously unrecognized mission-critical or mission-
support positions. Accordingly, while the overall distribution of SES
positions across DOD has not dramatically decreased, the efficiencies
initiative has ensured the overall requirements identified across DOD
are more appropriately aligned, classified, and structured.
For fiscal years 2012 to 2013, DOD's SES positions are allocated as
follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senior Executive Service Fiscal Years 2012 to 2013
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army........................................ 302
Air Force................................... 165
Navy........................................ 317
4th Estate/OSD.............................. 591
Combatant Commands.......................... 48
---------------------------
Total DOD Authorization from OPM.......... 1,423
------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Stanley, to what degree does OSD
oversee the quantity and use of SES positions by the Services?
Secretary Stanley. OSD recognizes that the Services, fourth estate,
and the combatant commands are in the best position to know their
mission requirements. Therefore, they are responsible for identifying,
establishing, and classifying their SES position needs. However, their
on-board capacity is limited to the number SES allocations provided to
them by the USD(P&R).
After the Services, the combatant commands and the fourth estate
have identified their SES requirements needed to fulfill their
missions, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and
Readiness) is responsible for evaluating requests received from the
Services, fourth estate, and the combatant commands. USD(P&R) then
submits DOD requirements to the U.S. Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) for all SES allocations throughout DOD. It should be noted that
these requirements are considered on a biennial basis in response to
the request from OPM, which serves as the distributing authority for
all SES allocations government-wide. At the end of each biennial
allocation process, the USD(P&R) is responsible for distribution of
DOD's authorized SES allocations received from OPM across DOD. During
the biennial allocation process, the Services, the fourth estate, and
the combatant commands may request any allocation changes and may
submit an out-of-cycle request through the USD(P&R).
20. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Stanley, is there standard OSD
guidance as to when a position should be filled by a flag grade officer
as opposed to an SES?
Secretary Stanley. Each of the Services has different processes
through which they determine which positions warrant a general or flag
officer or a civilian senior executive, but each of the Services and
DOD generally use the same criteria for validation of a position:
nature of the position, magnitude of the responsibilities, and
significance of actions and decisions required by the position. These
categories are broad in nature to provide latitude to the Service
senior leadership when making these decisions. General and flag officer
positions are warfighter-oriented, whereas civilian senior executive
positions tend to be more business-oriented.
[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]