    [Senate Hearing 112-249]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 112-249

                             LOOKING TO THE FUTURE:
                        LESSONS IN PREVENTION, RESPONSE,
                    AND RESTORATION FROM THE GULF OIL SPILL

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

         SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANS, ATMOSPHERE, FISHERIES, AND COAST GUARD

                                     of the

                             COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                          SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 JULY 20, 2011

                                   __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
                                 Transportation

                                    _____

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           SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                          ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
    DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii             KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
    JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts             Ranking
    BARBARA BOXER, California            OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
    MARIA CANTWELL, Washington           JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
    FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey      ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas              JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           ROY BLUNT, Missouri
    AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota             JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
    TOM UDALL, New Mexico                PATRICK J. TOOMEY, Pennsylvania
    MARK WARNER, Virginia                MARCO RUBIO, Florida
    MARK BEGICH, Alaska                  KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
                                         DEAN HELLER, Nevada
                        Ellen L. Doneski, Chief of Staff
                       James Reid, Deputy Chief of Staff
                       Bruce H. Andrews, General Counsel
                    Todd Bertoson, Republican Staff Director
               Jarrod Thompson, Republican Deputy Staff Director
       Rebecca Seidel, Republican General Counsel and Chief Investigator
                                     ------

         SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANS, ATMOSPHERE, FISHERIES, AND COAST GUARD

                         MARK BEGICH, Alaska, Chairman
    DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii             OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine, Ranking
    JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts         ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
    MARIA CANTWELL, Washington           JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
    FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey      MARCO RUBIO, Florida
    AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota             KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
    MARK WARNER, Virginia                DEAN HELLER, Nevada

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on July 20, 2011....................................     1
    Statement of Senator Begich......................................     1
    Statement of Senator Wicker......................................     2
    Statement of Senator Nelson......................................     4
    Statement of Senator Lautenberg..................................     5
    Statement of Senator Cantwell....................................     5
    Statement of Senator Rubio.......................................    65

                                   Witnesses

    Rear Admiral Paul F. Zukunft, Assistant Commandant for Marine
      Safety, Security, And Stewardship, United States Coast Guard...     7
        Prepared statement...........................................     8
    David M. Kennedy, Assistant Administrator, National Ocean
      Service, National Oceanic And Atmospheric Administration,
      Department of Commerce.........................................    12
        Prepared statement...........................................    14
    Hon. Grover C. Robinson, Commissioner, Escambia County, Florida..    33
        Prepared statement...........................................    35
    Dr. R. Eugene Turner, Chaired Professor, Distinguished Research
      Master, Louisiana State University.............................    37
        Prepared statement...........................................    39
    Erik Milito, Group Director, Upstream and Industry Operations,
      American Petroleum Institute...................................    47
        Prepared statement...........................................    49
        Letter dated August 3, 2011 to Hon. Mark Begich from Erik
          Milito.....................................................    72
    Jim Ayers, Senior Advisor and Consultant, Ocean Conservancy......    50
        Prepared statement...........................................    52

                                    Appendix

    Response to written question submitted to David M. Kennedy by:
        Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV..................................    75
        Hon. Mark Begich.............................................    75
    Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John D.
      Rockefeller IV to Erik Milito..................................    76
    Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to:
        Rear Admiral Paul F. Zukunft.................................    78
        Hon. Grover C. Robinson......................................    85
        Dr. R. Eugene Turner.........................................    85
    Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Olympia J. Snowe
      to:
        Rear Admiral Paul F. Zukunft.................................    88
        David M. Kennedy.............................................    89
        Hon. Grover C. Robinson......................................    90

                         LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: LESSONS
                          IN PREVENTION, RESPONSE, AND
                      RESTORATION FROM THE GULF OIL SPILL

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, JULY 20, 2011

                                   U.S. Senate,
    Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and
                                           Coast Guard,
            Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m. in
    room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Mark Begich,
    Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK BEGICH,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

        Senator Begich. I'm just reviewing--my family is in Alaska
    right now fishing, and my brother-in-law just caught a 40-pound
    king salmon. The uniqueness of technology is he could send me
    that photo right now and say, ``I'm sorry you're in Washington,
    but, oh, by the way, please look at this king salmon I just
    caught.''
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Begich. So, thank you all very much. Give me one
    second here.
        I'd like to welcome the witnesses and thank them for taking
    the time to testify before the Committee today.
        On July 15, 2010, just over a year ago, BP finally
    succeeded in stemming the seemingly never-ending flow of oil of
    the Deepwater Horizon spill. When the well was capped, the
    people of the Gulf Coast and people across the country, who
    were mesmerized by the video of the subsea gusher; we were
    finally able to breathe a collective sigh of relief.
        Yet, capping the Macondo well was not the end of this
    tragedy. We're still understanding and accounting for its
    costs--the cost to the environment, the cost to the individual
    people in the Gulf communities, and the cost to their
    economies.
        Over 200 million gallons of oil spewed out into the Gulf
    for nearly 3 months, becoming the largest accidental marine oil
    spill in history. The long term impacts to the wildlife and
    ecosystems of the Gulf, while still ill-defined, are sure to be
    long-lasting.
        Eleven men lost their lives in the explosion that preceded
    the blowout. Many other lives and livelihoods were, and
    continue to be, upended by the spill.
        Alaskans sympathize with the Gulf and its plight. We've
    lived through this before. In 1989, Alaska suffered the Exxon
    Valdez disaster, then the largest marine oil spill this country
    had faced. More than 20 years later, Alaskans are still dealing
    with the aftermath. The environmental impacts are still being
    monitored and assessed in the waters of the Prince William
    Sound. Affected Alaskans, many who waited decades before seeing
    justice in the courts, still feel the impacts of the trauma
    which the spill caused within their communities.
        While the effects of both spills are tragic, the greatest
    tragedy of both could and should have been avoided. In each
    case the responsible parties cut corners and took unnecessary
    risks for the promise of greater profits.
        While the risk-taking and mistakes made leading up to the
    Deepwater Horizon disaster were reckless and flagrant, our
    response to it must be thoughtful and measured. The United
    States needs to put itself firmly on the path to energy
    security, and we cannot do that without increasing our domestic
    supply of oil. Oil production must be an integral part of any
    balanced energy plan, including development of the OCS, whether
    in the Gulf or the Arctic waters of my state. We need to
    rededicate ourselves to taking the prudent steps to ensure that
    these kinds of spills never happen again.
        Industry needs to rigorously develop and implement better
    standards and best practices, and regulators must keep them
    accountable. While they may trust, they must also verify.
        In the event of a future spill, industry needs to have the
    capabilities to act swiftly and decisively. We must also make
    sure our front line responders, like the Coast Guard and NOAA,
    have the resources and flexibility and expertise they need to
    mitigate impacts and get the job done.
        We must provide local and State stakeholders and responders
    a strong voice in the process. It's their way of life and
    prosperity on the line. And we must make sure we have the best
    science available to guide the response efforts, to understand
    the impacts, and to restore the damage that was wrought by a
    spill.
        These are the reasons we're here today. I'm looking forward
    to hearing from our witnesses. They come from varied
    perspectives. And I hope that collectively their insight can
    put us on the path toward improved spill prevention, response
    and restoration.
        We'll have two panels. Before I introduce the first panel,
    let me ask Senator Wicker, here representing the Ranking
    Member, to make his opening.

                  STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER F. WICKER,
                     U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI

        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Chairman Begich.
        I'm standing in for Ranking Member Snowe at the moment. She
    will possibly join us for a few moments, but will not be able
    to be here for the entirety of the hearing because of
    scheduling conflicts.
        I appreciate you holding this hearing to investigate
    lessons learned from the Gulf oil spill--the tragic explosion
    of the Deepwater Horizon claiming the lives of four
    Mississippians and seven others.
        It took 87 days to contain the flow of oil, and even longer
    to seal the blown-out well permanently. This caused extensive
    damage to the Gulf ecosystem, and significant harm to the Gulf
    Coast economy, which has still not fully recovered.
        I hope to hear from the witnesses on both panels today--how
    we can prevent spills of this magnitude in the future in a
    responsible and sensible manner. Just as importantly, I would
    like to hear how we can mitigate the economic damages that
    resulted from the Deepwater Horizon spill.
        The administration's moratorium on offshore drilling added
    significantly to the spill's negative economic effects. Thirty-
    three deepwater rigs were forced to suspend operations in the
    Gulf, impacting thousands of American jobs. At least eight of
    these rigs have left, or plan to leave the Gulf in order to
    pursue operations elsewhere. It is highly unlikely they will
    ever return.
        At a time of record unemployment and soaring debt we should
    be implementing policies that increase American jobs and
    income, instead of ones that restrict them.
        It was clear at the onset that the administration and BP
    were not prepared to handle a spill of this magnitude. Although
    I praise the efforts of the Coast Guard and NOAA, the initial
    shortcomings and response efforts in coordination were
    disheartening. BP showed it lacked the proper planning and
    response capabilities for such an event.
        I'm pleased that the oil and gas industry have since
    responded by establishing the Marine Well Containment Company,
    a not-for-profit organization that can provide containment
    response should another significant blowout occur in the Gulf.
        As the coast continues to recover, it is my hope that
    responsible parties will work with State and Federal officials
    to restore the ecosystem and economy.
        For Mississippi, the long-term environmental impacts are
    not yet fully known, but it is clear the immediate economic
    damages have been significant. Many regular visitors to our
    beaches and coastal towns have stopped coming, and our fishing
    industry--steeped in tradition and a way of life on the Coast--
    has not recovered from the misperception that Gulf seafood is
    tainted with oil. The truth is, Gulf seafood is safe to eat,
    and it continues to be tested for oil and other toxins more
    than any other seafood in the world.
        A significant piece of the recovery will be directing fines
    collected under the Clean Water Act to impacted states. I have
    supported this effort from the beginning, and I would like to
    thank my colleagues from other Gulf states for their hard work.
    I'm confident we will soon have a proposal supported by every
    Gulf delegation to dedicate Clean Water Act fines to the
    environmental and economic recovery of the Gulf Coast.
        Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman. And I look forward hearing
    from our distinguished witnesses.
        Senator Begich. Thank you, Senator. Thank you, Senator
    Wicker.
        Senator Nelson?

                    STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA

        Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, when you see oil floating on
    the surface, and you see it approaching a pass like Pensacola
    Pass; and then, because of the on-rushing tide, you see that
    oil come on in to Pensacola Bay, or whatever bay, Perdido Bay--
    some of it, we wanted to keep it out of Choctawhatchee Bay--I
    can't tell you what an awful sight it is. Like some of the
    sights that you don't like to look at. That's what it looks
    like. And then, once it reaches a destination, either on ocean
    floor or on the beach, or all gathered up around the marsh
    grasses, then it just makes it even look all the worse. And it
    wreaks havoc. It wreaks havoc on the environment and on the
    economy.
        I'll never forget, with all the problem we've had in the
    Gulf Claims Facility, of getting them to try to help out
    people--what about the little lady that had the advertising
    business in Destin? Now, her business was a little
    advertisement, single owner, small business. But, she was
    advertising to go to this restaurant, that restaurant, this
    tourist destination. Well, when the tourists stopped coming,
    she didn't have any business. And so she had no income. And so
    she couldn't pay her mortgage. And it went on and on and on.
    And sometimes the banks cooperated, and sometimes the banks
    didn't cooperate.
        I looked at local government, and they're doing everything
    they can. It's like being the little boy sticking his finger in
    the dike, and it, the water breaks out over here, and they
    stick their finger there, and so it happens over and over.
        Now, I don't want this to happen again. And there are lot
    of lessons learned--that we learned from your state--that we
    didn't pay any attention, and it happened again. And if we
    don't pay attention to the lessons learned from the Gulf oil
    spill, it's going to happen again. And when it does, let me
    just give you a little preview.
        Repsol--the big Spanish drilling company that drills in the
    Gulf of Mexico and drills according to U.S. standards--they're
    getting ready to drill 40 miles off the North Coast of Cuba in
    over 5,000 feet of water. If there's a spill there, do you know
    what runs right by there? It's the Gulf Stream. And where does
    the Gulf Stream go? It parallels the delicate environmentally
    highly sensitive Florida Keys and all those coral reefs. And
    then the Gulf Stream comes to within one mile of the beaches of
    Miami Beach, all the way up to Palm Beach. And that is a part
    of the state that has an extraordinary amount of tourism.
        A lot of our Florida beaches oil did not get to. But the
    scare of oil there, when they saw the pictures of the oil on
    Pensacola Beach--and do you remember that newspaper photograph
    that had the entire beach? That white sugary sand beach was
    covered in black oil. And the tourists stop coming. And they
    stopped coming to the entire Gulf Coast of Florida. So, this is
    what we are facing.
        I am pleased, at my request, and, you and the Ranking
    Member were kind enough to invite the chairman of our county
    commission from Pensacola, Escambia County, who was at the
    front line of this. They were having to do a lot of it
    themselves, making it up as they went, because in many cases
    the U.S. Government did not have its act together.
        I'll just close with this. Mr. Chairman, I'll never
    forget--when I went to one of the centers, the command centers,
    and it was explained to me that the Coast Guard was in control
    51 percent, and BP was in control 49 percent. Well, that
    doesn't work. And we saw that didn't work. You've got to have a
    military chain of command. And who is at the top of that chain
    has got to have their orders carried out. So that's one of the
    significant lessons that we learned from this spill.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Begich. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Lautenberg, do you have any quick openings?

                STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

        Senator Lautenberg. Well, if I could trade it for an
    earlier position in the questioning, I'd like to do that. But
    just to say----
        Senator Begich. The negotiations.
        Senator Lautenberg.--Mr. Chairman, thanks very much. We
    were not--we know how expedient you'd like to try to make the
    hearing. It's too important to just bypass it. But I will
    relinquish my present position here, and plead for mercy on
    the, in the questioning. And with that, I surrender the chair.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Begich. Thank you.
        Senator Cantwell?

                   STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON

        Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I commend
    you for holding this important hearing today, and I thank the
    witnesses for being here.
        Oil spill prevention and response capability was a major
    focus of mine when I was the chair of this subcommittee, and so
    I'm pleased that you're continuing to focus on such a vital
    issue.
        We did manage to significantly strengthen our Nation's oil
    spill safety net in last year's Coast Guard bill--the biggest
    improvements since OPA 1990. But there is much more to be
    done--particularly in light of what we have learned from the
    devastating Deepwater Horizon spill.
        So, I have many questions for the witnesses today, on
    issues like steering restoration funds, to the Gulf cleanup--
    which I support--and possibly earmarking offshore drilling
    revenues to states for coastal restoration. But, I'm going to
    submit those for the record.
        Today I was hoping to get some answers from our hearing
    today, Mr. Chairman, from the administration witnesses on the
    emerging threat in the Northwestern United States.
        As many of my colleagues probably know, Canada planned to
    double production for the Alberta massive tar sand fields over
    the next decade, and much of that oil will come to the U.S. But
    some would also likely go to places like China.
        The nexus with this hearing is that much of that oil would
    be shipped by supertankers from Vancouver through the fragile
    waters of the San Juan Islands and the Strait of Juan de Fuca.
    This is a major threat to our region, and we have already
    accommodated oil tankers and barges carrying 15 billion gallons
    of oil--much coming from Alaska to Washington State's five
    refineries. In fact, we refine twice as much gasoline as we
    need in our state for consumption. So, there is always a risk
    there. But, we have tried to do our utmost to minimize that.
        The tankers traversing Puget Sound need tug escorts,
    steered--pilots, and people that know our waters. Just like
    what happened with Prince William Sound, we need to have people
    on the ground who knows what's happening. So, we have a very
    robust oil spill response network in place, including vessel
    traffic control systems.
        Unfortunately, these systems seem to have led to a free
    ride for Canada. It seems that the Canadian oil spill response
    plan in the Pacific Northwest is, ``call the Americans.''
        An internal audit last year revealed that, ``the Canadian
    guard--Coast Guard lacks the training, equipment, and
    management systems to fulfill its duties and response to the
    offshore pollution incident, such as an oil spill.''
        That is a scary situation for us in Washington State,
    particularly when plans by one oil company alone would increase
    oil tanker traffic by 45 percent. And, these super tankers we
    are talking about can hold up to a million barrels of oil.
    That's about four times what was spilled in the Exxon Valdez,
    and covered 1,300 miles of very pristine coastline. Obviously,
    such a spill in the narrow and heavily polluted waters of the
    Strait of Juan de Fuca would cause tens of billions of dollars
    in damage and have a significant impact.
        So, with that I will, Mr. Chairman, if I could, just show a
    chart for, that shows you where this vessel traffic goes. And,
    while it can go along the coast of Vancouver Island and out the
    Strait of Juan de Fuca, we're talking about a very busy traffic
    area, very pristine parts of both Canada and the United States.
    And I think it deserves a very robust oil spill response plan.
        So, thank you for allowing me to make this opening
    statement. I'll look forward having a chance to, asking of our
    panels today questions.
        Thank you.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
        And, again, thank you to our two witnesses.
        The first witness on our panel is Rear Admiral Zukunft.
        And, honestly, I'm very impressed with your Federal onsite
    coordination you did on Deepwater Horizon. A lot of kudos to
    the work you did there.
        We also have Mr. Kennedy, David Kennedy, Assistant
    Administrator for NOAA's National Ocean Service. And thank you,
    again, for NOAA, doing what you do--not only in the Gulf, but
    around the country in the sense of protecting our natural
    resources and beauty.
        So let me first open--Admiral, if you'd like to make your
    opening statement, and Mr. Kennedy. And then we'll open for
    questions.
        Does it work? OK.

               STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL PAUL F. ZUKUNFT,

         ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR MARINE SAFETY, SECURITY, AND
                 STEWARDSHIP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

        Admiral Zukunft. Good afternoon, Chairman Begich and
    Ranking Member Wicker, and distinguished members of the
    Subcommittee.
        I'm honored to appear before you today to speak about the
    status of lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon response
    and efforts the Coast Guard is undertaking.
        As you know, on April 20, 2010, an explosion aboard the
    Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit or MODU, Deepwater Horizon
    resulted in the sinking of this MODU and the tragic loss of 11
    lives, and the worst spill in U.S. history.
        The spill was designated as the first ever Spill of
    National Significance, and the first time we have designated a
    national incident commander. Under the framework of the Oil
    Pollution Act of 1990 and the National Contingency Plan, a
    monumental response was undertaken through the unified efforts
    of over 47,000 Federal, State, and local responders, including
    7,000 active and reserve Coast Guard members.
        I served as the Federal on-scene coordinator for over 6
    months. Today, 15 months later after the explosion occurred, we
    continue our response efforts, while concurrently--yet distinct
    from the response--the natural response damage assessment is
    occurring as well.
        Following the Deepwater Horizon incident, there had been
    numerous reports generated and investigations conducted, not
    only to determine the causes of the casualty, but also to
    evaluate the effectiveness of the spill response. These reports
    include the President's national commission on the BP Deepwater
    Horizon oil spill and offshore drilling, the National Incident
    Commander's Report, and the incident specific preparedness
    review. The Coast Guard has reviewed these reports, in addition
    to conducting our own internal review to determine areas where
    the Coast Guard needs to take corrective action.
        Two more reports are forthcoming--the Coast Guard, in B-O-
    E-M-R-E et. seq., or BOEMREs Joint Investigation Report, into
    the cause of the casualty, and the Federal On-Scene
    Coordinators Report, that will contain observations and
    perspectives of the Federal on-scene coordinator regarding the
    response effort. Both reports are concurrently undergoing final
    agency review and should be released within the next month.
        As we continue to inventory and analyze the lessons from
    these reports in our own inner, internal review, I'd like to
    highlight several actions we've already taken to address areas
    where response planning and preparedness should be improved,
    including directing Captains of the Port to review oil spill
    response plans for offshore facilities--and this is already an
    ongoing effort; requiring area committees to include worst case
    discharge scenarios for offshore facilities in their respective
    area contingency plans; developing subsea dispersant
    application guidelines; increasing state and local outreach,
    and participating in area committee meetings and activities;
    and participating in a Coast Guard Federal Emergency Management
    Agency and Environmental Protection Agency workgroup to develop
    recommendations to harmonize the National Contingency Plan and
    National Response Framework governance constructs.
        While there are several areas for improvement that we are
    pursuing overall, we have concluded that the framework provided
    for OPA 1990 in the national contingency plan for oil spill
    response served us extremely well, and that the National
    Contingency Plan provided the necessary discretion and freedom
    of action to address the very unique circumstances of the
    Deepwater Horizon response. The Coast Guard is also committed
    to ensuring the safety of activities on the outer continental
    shelf.
        The Coast Guard is primarily responsible for vessel safety,
    and BOEMRE is responsible for drilling systems and wealth
    safety. This division of responsibilities is captured in a
    Memorandum of Understanding between our two agencies. The Coast
    Guard and BOEMRE are working together to ensure there are no
    safety seams whatsoever in our oversight responsibility in the
    offshore drilling domain. To that end, we've established a
    Coast Guard/BOEMRE prevention workgroup, chartered to improve
    coordination and communication between the two agencies.
        In light of the Deepwater Horizon incident, we give renewed
    focus to the expansion of natural resource exploration in the
    Arctic. The remote and harsh environment presents unique
    prevention and response challenges for the industries operating
    in the region and the government agencies providing oversight
    of the increasing activities in the Arctic domain. We ask for
    Congress' continued support as we work to address the unique
    challenges posed by the Arctic region.
        In a similar vein, as Cuba prepares to begin offshore oil
    exploration, we have been updating our contingency plans, and
    engaging Federal, State and private entities including, Repsol,
    to ensure we are ready to address a potential discharge
    impacting U.S. waters.
        Finally, I want to thank Congress for their timely action
    in passing Public Law 111-191, which allowed significant
    advancements from the principal fund within the Oil Spill
    Liability Trust Fund in the midst of this unprecedented
    response. This was critical to me, to ensure that sufficient
    funds were available to support this Federal response.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I am
    pleased to take any questions that you may have. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Zukunft follows:]

         Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral Paul F. Zukunft, Assistant
    Commandant for Marine Safety, Security, and Stewardship, United States
                                  Coast Guard
        Good Afternoon, Chairman Begich, Ranking Member Snowe, and
    distinguished members of the Subcommittee. I am honored to appear
    before you today to discuss the lessons learned from the BP Deepwater
    Horizon oil spill.
    Comprehensive Overview of Coast Guard Lessons Learned Review and
            Implementation Strategy For the BP Deepwater Horizon Incident
    Background
        On the evening of April 20, 2010, an explosion aboard the Mobile
    Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) Deepwater Horizon led to the sinking of
    the MODU, the tragic loss of 11 lives, and the worst oil spill in U.S.
    history. Given the size and scope of the spill, Secretary Napolitano
    designated the incident a Spill of National Significance (SONS) and
    designated then-Commandant of the Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen as the
    National Incident Commander (NIC). Due to the severity of the spill,
    the complexity of the response effort, and the large-scale potential
    for adverse impacts on the environment and public health, this response
    required extraordinary coordination of Federal, state, local, tribal
    and commercial resources to contain and mitigate the effects of the
    spill. Using the framework provided for in the National Contingency
    Plan (NCP), a monumental response was undertaken through the unified
    efforts of more than 47,000 Federal, state, and local responders,
    including more than 7,000 active and reserve Coast Guard members. We
    established five Incident Command Posts (ICPs) across the Gulf Coast
    states and 15 staging areas to help flow critical resources to impacted
    locations. I served as the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) for more
    than 6 months during the response and recovery period.
        The size and scope of this incident required significant
    coordination of public and private resources at both the strategic and
    operational level. The command and control structure facilitated the
    NIC and FOSC's ability to direct and coordinate with other Federal,
    state and local stakeholders to address the most critical needs. The
    FOSC worked with other parties to address operational resource requests
    and state-by-state concerns throughout the operation. The NIC provided
    national-level support to the operational response--from resources to
    policy decisions--to secure the source and mitigate the impact of the
    spill. The NIC and the FOSC met regularly with key stakeholders,
    including the Governors of each state on the Gulf Coast and established
    a critical line of communication to resolve conflicts. At the
    operational level, a Unified Area Command was established to oversee
    operational activities across the entire Gulf Region. The FOSC served
    as the Unified Area Commander in accordance with established incident
    command doctrine, and under the Unified Area Command (UAC) there were
    the five ICPs: Houston, TX; Galveston, TX; Houma, LA; Mobile, AL; and
    Miami, FL.
        Although the role and functions of the NIC evolved considerably
    during the response, the NIC concept proved to be an extremely
    effective command organization that promoted unity of effort across all
    levels of government, ensured that timely information was provided to
    the public and first responders, and efficiently marshaled the
    resources of the Federal Government, private sector, and international
    sources to combat this unprecedented oil spill. As the first SONS and
    NIC designation in U.S. history, the BP Deepwater Horizon (DWH) oil
    spill response enabled us to learn a great deal about NIC roles and
    responsibilities. Going forward, the Coast Guard will work with our
    interagency partners to memorialize in doctrine and policy the
    responsibilities that accrued to the NIC during this response.
        The effort to contain and secure the well and the resulting spill
    response effort became extraordinarily large and complex. This effort
    required two drilling ships, numerous oil containment vessels used to
    control the source, and the highly coordinated use of mechanical
    recovery, surface burning, and dispersant applications. The weather
    significantly impacted our ability to carry out skimming and surface
    burn operations. Despite these constraints, we employed more than 835
    oil skimmers, more than 6,100 response boats and 3,190 vessels of
    opportunity, and over 120 aircraft. More than 34.7 million gallons of
    oil-water mix were recovered through skimming, 411 controlled in-situ
    burns removing over 11 million gallons of oil from the open water, and
    the dispersion of oil both at the surface and at the wellhead.
        Response operations took place in four zones: at the source of the
    spill, off-shore, near-shore, and in-shore. At the source, the drilling
    rigs and remotely operated vehicles necessary for deep water drilling
    were the only means of accessing the well at a depth of 5,000 feet.
    Off-shore, as close to the source as possible, the response focused on
    removal of the oil. Key to these operations were large skimmers and in
    situ burn task forces. Near-shore operations focused on skimming and
    the use of booms to protect sensitive areas and as much of the
    shoreline as possible. In Barataria Bay, for example, shoreline
    operations involved extensive assessment, environmental protection, and
    treatment strategies. After the well was capped, shoreline cleanup
    became the focus of continued response operations.
        Health and Safety was a primary strategic goal throughout this
    response, as reflected by our efforts to address the potential public
    health impacts of the spill and the remarkably low injury rate for
    responders across the operation. At its peak, there were 47,000 people
    working on the response, ranging from those drilling relief wells on
    ships fifty miles off-shore to those working on skimming and booming
    vessels and the work crews cleaning the shoreline. Thousands of
    personnel worked to decontaminate oiled booms, vessels and equipment. A
    significant safety organization was staffed by numerous Federal and
    state agencies and private safety experts who oversaw and examined
    broad aspects of worker safety.
        Overall, Section 311 of the Clean Water Act, as amended by the Oil
    Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA '90), as well as the NCP and the supporting
    National Incident Management System (NIMS), proved effective during the
    DWH oil spill response. The NCP provided a sound framework that allowed
    for the needed discretion and freedom of action to address
    contingencies that arose.
    Major Report Summaries
        As with any incident, there are ongoing assessments and reviews to
    gain a better understanding of lessons learned from the response to
    inform equipment standards, technology, and preparedness to respond in
    the future. These assessments come from both Coast Guard and third
    party reviews.
        The National Incident Commander's Report, released on October 1,
    2010, discussed the effectiveness of the NCP as the United States'
    blueprint for responding to both oil spills and hazardous substance
    releases. The report reviewed the roles and responsibilities of the NIC
    and examined whether existing legal authorities and doctrine were
    adequate. Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen provided his observations and
    recommendations regarding the authorities, doctrine, and policy that
    collectively provide the governance constructs used for oil spill
    response. Admiral Allen offered key recommendations to improve our
    collective ability to respond to the next major oil or hazardous
    substance release. These key recommendations include:

       Incentivizing the private sector to develop 21st century oil
            spill response capabilities to keep pace with advancing
            technologies in oil exploration, deepwater offshore drilling,
            oil production, and maritime transportation;

       Ensuring that all appropriate Federal, state, local, and
            tribal government authorities and response structures are
            included in response plans and their elected or appointed
            officials are invited to participate in oil spill response
            exercises; and

       Ensuring a NIC has appropriate authorities necessary for the
            execution of the position.

        The National Commission on the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
    Offshore Drilling was created by Executive Order 13543 on May 21, 2010
    as an independent, nonpartisan entity directed to provide a thorough
    analysis and impartial judgment of the DHW oil spill. The Commission
    was charged with examining the facts and circumstances concerning the
    root causes of the DWH explosion, improving the country's ability to
    respond to oil spills associated with offshore drilling, and
    recommending reforms to make offshore energy production safer. The
    report develops options to overhaul the U.S. approach to drilling
    safety and greatly reduce the chances of a similar, large scale
    disaster in the future.
        The Coast Guard's Marine Safety Manual prescribes a process to
    conduct a comprehensive review to capture lessons learned from a major
    spill response. The Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR) is the
    process by which the Coast Guard examines the implementation and
    effectiveness of the preparedness for and response to a major response,
    as it relates to the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
    Contingency Plan, Area Contingency Plans and other oil spill response
    plans. On June 14, 2010, the Commandant of Coast Guard Admiral Robert
    Papp, Jr., chartered an ISPR team to conduct an independent, third-
    party review of the Deepwater Horizon response. The ISPR team was
    comprised of Federal and state government representatives along with
    representatives from the oil exploration and production industry, non-
    governmental organizations, community groups and the professional oil
    spill response industry who served as technical advisors. The report
    represents the views of the ISPR team and provides an assessment of the
    Coast Guard's preparedness process as well as recommended corrective
    actions.
        On April 27, 2010, the Department of Homeland Security and
    Department of Interior jointly convened an investigation into the
    marine casualty, explosion, fire, pollution, and sinking of the DWH.
    Volume I of the report of this joint investigation concerns matters
    under the jurisdiction of the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard members of
    the joint investigation released Volume I on April 22, 2011. Volume II
    of the report will address matters under the jurisdiction of the Bureau
    of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE).
        Lastly, the FOSC report is under development. The FOSC report will
    contain observations and perspectives of the FOSC regarding the oil
    removal operation and actions taken. As required by 33 C.F.R.
    300.165, the report will document the situation as it developed, the
    actions taken, the resources committed, and challenges.
    Coast Guard Initiatives Resulting From Deepwater Horizon Lessons
            Learned
        The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill and other incidents have
    prompted the Coast Guard to review all operations and systems under its
    responsibility for potential improvements to both regulations and the
    inspection regime for foreign-flagged MODUs on the U.S. Outer
    Continental Shelf (OCS). Prior to the incident, we were already
    pursuing improvements to our offshore inspection capability through our
    marine safety improvement program. We recently increased our inspection
    resources and established an Offshore National Center of Expertise that
    greatly enhances inspector competency.
        All MODUs operating in the United States are subject to annual
    examinations to verify compliance with area laws and international
    conventions. If that exam finds ``questionable equipment, systems, or
    crew competency issues'' the Coast Guard can expand its investigation
    to determine whether a deficiency exists, and may require additional
    tests, inspections, or crew drills. On July 7, 2011 we announced in the
    Federal Register a risk-based oversight program for MODUs that will
    result in more frequent examinations of the highest risk MODUs based on
    accident history, past discrepancies, flag state performance, and
    classification society performance. Marine inspectors will focus on
    critical areas representing the greatest risks, such as dynamic
    positioning systems and operator competency. The President's Fiscal
    Year (FY) 2012 budget request seeks additional Marine Safety personnel,
    including Inspectors and Investigators, to staff vessel inspections and
    post-incident investigations.
        Additionally, we are actively engaged in oversight of rapidly
    developing well spill containment capabilities (Marine Well Containment
    System and Helix Well Control Group) to promote rigorous testing to
    ensure these response vessels are capable of responding to a deepwater
    well spill and meet applicable safety and environmental requirements.
    We recently established an OCS Activities Matrix Team to leverage
    expertise throughout the Coast Guard including various headquarters
    offices, the Marine Safety Center, the Eighth Coast Guard District in
    New Orleans, LA, and the OCS Center of Expertise. This team will focus
    on emerging OCS issues and enhance the Coast Guard's ability to address
    them, increase our plan review and inspection oversight, support
    investigations and casualty analysis, and provide a holistic approach
    to management of OCS safety programs.
        The Coast Guard shares MODU regulatory responsibilities with the
    BOEMRE and each agency's areas of responsibility are delineated in
    regulations as well as in Memorandums of Understanding. In general, the
    Coast Guard's primary responsibilities are related to vessel operations
    and safety systems including firefighting, lifesaving, electrical
    systems, and hull structures on the MODU and BOEMRE's primary
    responsibility is subsea operations and drilling systems. The Coast
    Guard does not oversee drilling systems, but the interface between
    subsurface and surface operations warrants close coordination and
    collaboration between both agencies. We continue to engage and improve
    coordination with BOEMRE through a Prevention Working Group that
    focuses on enhancing alignment and consistency between the two agencies
    on how inspections are conducted. The team will coordinate closely with
    Coast Guard-sponsored OCS stakeholder organizations such as the
    National Offshore Safety Advisory Committee (NOSAC) and other BOEMRE-
    Coast Guard meetings and Working Groups as vehicles for improving OCS
    safety.
        The lessons learned from the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill
    emphasize the importance of updated and comprehensive Regional and Area
    Contingency Plans around the Nation. The Coast Guard, as the FOSC for
    oil spills in the coastal zone, is ensuring the Worst Case Discharge
    (WCD) planning scenarios are accurate and reflect all potential sources
    for oil spills, including offshore facilities.
        The Coast Guard and BOEMRE have formed a joint Response Workgroup
    to improve interagency partnerships and collaboratively work on
    improving preparedness efforts in several areas post-Deepwater Horizon.
    Significant Workgroup initiatives include joint Oil Spill Response Plan
    (OSRP) Review, Regional Contingency Plan and Area Contingency Plan WCD
    Gap Analysis, joint BOEMRE/Coast Guard pollution equipment compliance
    inspections, and a review of the effective daily recovery capacity
    standard for mechanical recovery equipment. The Coast Guard and BOEMRE
    have conducted a joint review of OSRP in BOEMRE's OCS Gulf of Mexico,
    Pacific, and Alaska Regions. This review, which included Coast Guard
    participants from each region, identified the most accurate, up-to-date
    WCD information for offshore facilities. In addition to the OSRP
    review, a comprehensive analysis of Regional Contingency Plans (RCP)
    and Area Contingency Plans (ACP) was conducted to identify significant
    WCD preparedness gaps.
        The Coast Guard directed Area Committees to address these gaps and
    ensure WCD planning scenarios in all oil spill contingency plans
    reflect WCD information identified during the joint OSRP review. As
    mentioned in several key Deepwater Horizon lessons learned reports, the
    Coast Guard identified the need for Area Committees to encourage more
    participation from state, local and tribal officials in oil spill
    planning and preparedness efforts. The Coast Guard also re-emphasized
    existing guidance for District and Sector Commanders to develop
    aggressive outreach programs with state, parish, county, and other
    local officials.
        The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Environmental
    Protection Agency (EPA), and Coast Guard, via the chairs of the
    National Response Team (NRT) and the Emergency Support Function
    Leadership Group (ESFLG), have formed a working group to develop
    recommendations that support improvements for responses involving the
    whole of government under both the National Response Framework (NRF)
    and the NCP. This working group is conducting a comprehensive review of
    the similarities, differences and synergies between the NRF and the
    NCP.
        The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill response also highlighted the
    need for Oil Spill Research and Development. The FY 2011 appropriations
    included $4 million for research, development, test, and evaluation of
    technologies to prevent and respond to oil and hazardous substance
    spills. In addition, the President's FY 2012 budget request includes a
    full-time position for the Interagency Coordination Committee on Oil
    Pollution Research (ICCOPR) and Research Development Test & Evaluation
    funding for Oil Spill Detection/Response.
        The DWH response highlighted the need for highly qualified surge
    personnel in the event of pollution incidents. Swift identification of
    trained and experienced personnel is critical in supporting FOSCs as
    they carry out their statutory responsibilities. To improve personnel
    competency in areas that support the Coast Guard FOSCs, we are
    strengthening our Marine Environmental Response training program for
    all responders. The President's FY 2012 budget request seeks 87 new
    environmental response personnel.
        We are also developing a FOSC Representative course that will
    provide greater competency among junior officers and enlisted personnel
    who may be called upon to provide command and control functions during
    a range of oil spill and hazardous material incidents. The President's
    FY 2012 budget request also includes funding to establish a Coast Guard
    National Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT) to an immediate,
    highly proficient, and deployable surge capacity to Coast Guard
    Incident Commanders nationwide to responds to threats and other
    disasters.
        We continue to provide leadership and direction toward the
    establishment of a permanent civilian Regional Response Team (RRT) Co-
    Chair position at each Coast Guard District. These permanent Co-Chairs
    will provide leadership, continuity and subject matter expertise to
    regional elements of the National Response Systems and NRF.
        Finally, we are considering personnel enhancements in the pollution
    response field that will allow our high-performing Marine Science
    Technician enlisted members to advance into greater leadership roles.
    Once in place, these experts will be able to lead the Coast Guard
    through future pollution incidents.
    Conclusion
        The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill response required the
    collaborative and sustained response of more than 1,000 organizations
    and the lessons learned will help inform future Coast Guard operations.
    The OPA '90 as well as the NCP were used effectively, and the Incident
    Command System's scalable organizational structure proved effective in
    bringing together Federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector
    entities. The division of responsibilities between the NIC and staff
    working at the National level, and the FOSC serving as Unified Area
    Commander at the regional level, was effective in managing national,
    regional and local demands of this first ``Spill of National
    Significance.''
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today and I
    will be pleased to answer your questions.

        Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Admiral.
        Mr. Kennedy?

                     STATEMENT OF DAVID M. KENNEDY,

            ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL OCEAN SERVICE,

    NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF
                                COMMERCE

        Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Chairman Begich, members of the
    Committee, for the opportunity to testify on the ongoing
    response to, and lessons learned from, the Deepwater Horizon
    oil spill.
        I appreciate the opportunity to discuss NOAA's response to,
    and lessons learned from, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. NOAA
    has been working tirelessly from the first day of the BP
    Deepwater Horizon spill, and we will continue in our efforts
    until cleanup of residual oil, assessment of the spill's
    ecological and human use impacts, and restoration of the
    injuries, are complete.
        My testimony today will discuss the continuing challenges
    NOAA faces in the wake of the spill, the progress of ongoing
    and long-term removal and restoration activities, and the
    emerging needs for improved oil spill prevention response and
    restoration.
        The Deepwater Horizon oil spill was a grave reminder that
    Spills of National Significance can occur despite the many
    safeguards and improvements in place since the passage of the
    Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Although our best option is still to
    prevent spills from, to, from occurring, the risk of spills
    remains a concern, given the limitation and age of offshore and
    onshore oil infrastructure, and frequency and volume of oil
    transported through our waterways.
        If a spill does occur, responders must be equipped with the
    appropriate tools and information. An effective response based
    on solid science and smart decisionmaking does not just produce
    cleanup costs--it ultimately decreases environmental and
    socioeconomic impacts which can be more costly in the long
    term.
        To ensure that appropriate tools and information are
    available to responders and decisionmakers facing the next
    Spill of National Significance, the public and private sectors
    must continue to invest time and resources in spill-response
    research and development in the aftermath of this disaster.
    While existing research has resulted in advancement of some
    response technologies, more must be done to strengthen our
    Nation's response and restoration capabilities.
        Critical needs for further research and development are
    amplified when we examine challenges realized during Deepwater
    Horizon spill, and when we consider the emerging prospects of
    expanded offshore exploration and production in remote and
    ecologically sensitive areas. Examples of these well-documented
    needs include better understanding of the oil fate and behavior
    from deepwater releases; technological innovation for oil
    detection and modeling at the surface and in deep water;
    increased information on the long-term effects to injured
    species and habitats; and greater perspective, in particular,
    on social dimensions of spills, including community effects,
    risk communication methods--I think, very important, and
    valuation of natural resources.
        In addition, many of today's standard approaches to oil
    spill response, cleanup, and restoration have not been
    extensively evaluated in remote areas like the Arctic, and
    their utility in such environments is known to be significantly
    less effective. For example, the need to better understand oil
    in ice, weathering and transport, effectiveness of
    countermeasures in Arctic conditions and ecosystem impacts to
    that unique area in order to make responsible decisions.
        This issue also exemplifies the need for focused peer
    review research on oil spill response technologies, and
    development of new strategies and recommendations for key
    decisionmakers in the event of emergency.
        NOAA, along with our co-trustees, is also charged with
    assessing and restoring natural resources injured by an oil
    spill. The goal of the assessment process is to determine the
    type and amount of restoration needed to compensate the public
    for injury to said resources. Trustees also assess the public's
    lost was of the resource, which includes losses in recreational
    fishing, boating, hunting and swimming. The ultimate goal of
    NRDA is to implement a package of restoration projects that
    compensate the public for all ecological injuries and human
    recreational loss use combined.
        Concurrent with the Deepwater Horizon injury assessment,
    NOAA and the co-trustees are planning for and beginning to
    implement restoration. To date, the Trustees and BP had agreed
    to implement several emergency restoration projects designed to
    curtail further injury to resources. In particular, the
    trustees will implement a project to mend scars created in sea
    grass beds caused by response equipment--mainly boat propellers
    in Florida. Designated areas in Mississippi wildlife management
    areas that have also been flooded to attract migratory birds
    that otherwise might gather in oil-impacted area, areas.
        The Trustees are also preparing an environmental impact
    statement, which will identify a range of restoration
    alternatives that Trustees will consider to compensate the
    public for lost natural resources and services in the future.
    On April 21 of this year the Trustees announced an agreement
    under which BP committed to make $1 billion available to fund
    appropriate early restoration projects. Public input on early
    restoration projects has already begun, and will continue
    through the summer.
        The Deepwater Horizon oil spill presented a unique
    challenge to NOAA and all who have worked, and are still
    working, to address its impacts. NOAA has the underlying
    capacity and expertise to coordinate and deliver essential
    science-based services under oil and--during oil and hazardous
    material spills efficiently and effectively. As a result of
    Deepwater Horizon, NOAA examined and critically evaluated our
    capacity and ability to respond to such large scale events.
        For NOAA to continue to be the scientific leader for
    response to coastal marine spill, as well as other coastal
    hazards, it is critical to have adequate capacity and necessary
    resources to conduct, lead, and coordinate scientific research,
    and develop decision-support tools for informed and effective
    response and damage assessment.
        Thank you for allowing me to provide the update on the
    Deepwater Horizon oil spill. I'd like to close today by
    assuring you that we will not relent in our efforts to protect
    the livelihoods of Gulf Coast residents, and mitigate the
    environmental impacts of the spill.
        I'm happy, of course, to answer any questions you might
    have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Kennedy follows:]

       Prepared Statement of David M. Kennedy, Assistant Administrator,
           National Ocean Service, National Oceanic And Atmospheric
                     Administration, Department of Commerce
        Thank you, Chairman Begich and members of the Subcommittee, for the
    opportunity to testify on the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic
    and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) ongoing involvement in the
    Deepwater Horizon BP oil spill response effort.
        My name is David Kennedy, I am the Assistant Administrator for
    NOAA's National Ocean Service, and I am honored to be here to discuss
    the critical role NOAA serves in the Natural Resource Damage Assessment
    (NRDA) process following oil spills and the importance of our
    contributions to protect and restore the natural resources affected by
    this tragic event.
        NOAA's mission is to understand and predict changes in the Earth's
    environment and conserve and manage coastal and marine resources to
    meet our Nation's economic, social, and environmental needs. NOAA,
    acting on behalf of the Secretary of Commerce, is also a natural
    resource trustee and is one of the Federal agencies responsible for
    protecting, assessing, and restoring the public's coastal and marine
    natural resources when they are impacted by oil spills, hazardous
    substance releases, and, in some cases impacts from vessel groundings
    on corals and in seagrass beds. For over 20 years, NOAA has assessed
    and restored coastal, marine, and riverine habitats impacted by oil
    spills. During this period, NOAA was instrumental in evolving the field
    of restoration ecology and is one of the Nation's leaders in
    environmental restoration following an oil spill.
        The Deepwater Horizon BP oil spill, the largest accidental oil
    spill in history, is only the most recent example of the environmental
    and socioeconomic damage caused by oil spills, and underscores the
    importance of and the linkage between healthy environments and our
    socioeconomic wellbeing. As such, the entire Department of Commerce is
    deeply concerned about the immediate and long-term environmental,
    economic, and social impacts to the Gulf Coast and the Nation as a
    whole from the BP oil spill. NOAA and our co-trustees have been working
    tirelessly to assess the ecological impacts and identify restoration
    opportunities along the coastal and offshore areas of the Gulf of
    Mexico, and will continue to do so until restoration from those impacts
    is complete.
        My testimony today will discuss NOAA's involvement in the NRDA
    process, the status of the NRDA for the Deepwater Horizon BP oil spill,
    successes and challenges of the Deepwater Horizon NRDA, and the current
    status of restoration efforts.
    NOAA's Natural Resource Damage Assessment Role
        NOAA has several critical roles mandated by the Oil Pollution Act
    (OPA) of 1990 (33 U.S.C. 2701 et seq.), one of which is as a natural
    resource trustee. As a trustee, NOAA, along with our co-trustees, is
    charged with conducting a NRDA to assess and restore natural resources
    injured by an oil spill. The NRDA process is a legal process that is
    resolved through a claim for restoration submitted to the courts. The
    essence of the process is to determine the type and amount of
    restoration needed to compensate the public for harm or injury to our
    collective natural resources that occur as a result of an oil spill.
    Inherent in this process is the need to assess the injuries to natural
    resources that are caused by the oil spill itself, as well as those
    caused by actions carried out as part of the oil spill response.
    According to NOAA's regulations implementing the OPA, injury is
    determined relative to baseline, which is ``the condition of the
    natural resources and services that would have existed had the incident
    not occurred'' (15 C.F.R.  990.30). For restoration, OPA requires the
    trustees to restore, rehabilitate, replace, or acquire the equivalent
    of the injured natural resources and services (33 U.S.C. 2705, see also
    15 C.F.R.  990.30) and in doing so seeks a nexus between the types and
    magnitude of the injury and the restoration.
        In assessing the injuries to the suite of ecological services
    provided by the natural resources, NRDA also assesses the public's lost
    uses of those resources, such as recreational fishing, recreational
    boating, hunting, and swimming. The goal is to implement a
    comprehensive package of restoration projects that compensate the
    public for all of the ecological and human use loss injuries.
        Stewardship of the Nation's natural resources is shared among
    several Federal agencies, states, and tribal trustees that conduct
    NRDAs. NOAA, acting on behalf of the Secretary of Commerce, is the lead
    Federal trustee for many of the Nation's coastal and marine resources.
    NDRA regulations explicitly seek participation by both responsible
    parties and government (15 C.F.R.  990.14(c)(1)) to facilitate the
    restoration of natural resources and their services injured or lost by
    hazardous substance releases and oil spills. OPA also encourages
    compensation of injured natural resources in the form of restoration,
    with public involvement in determining the types and magnitudes of the
    restoration (33 U.S.C. 2706(c)(5)). NOAA and our fellow trustees
    conduct a NRDA in three main phases:

       Preassessment--The trustees evaluate injury and determine
            whether they have jurisdiction to pursue restoration and if it
            is appropriate to do so.

       Restoration planning--The trustees evaluate and quantify
            potential injuries and use that information to determine the
            appropriate type and scale of restoration actions.

       Restoration implementation--The trustees and/or the
            responsible parties implement restoration and monitoring. This
            may include corrective actions if necessary.

        Within NOAA, the Damage Assessment, Remediation, and Restoration
    Program (DARRP) conducts NRDA. Established in 1990 after the Exxon
    Valdez oil spill, DARRP is composed of a team of scientists,
    economists, restoration experts, and attorneys to assess and restore
    injured resources. Since 1990, NOAA, together with other Federal,
    state, and tribal co-trustees recovered over $800 million for
    restoration of natural resources injured by oil, hazardous substances,
    and vessel groundings, including the recent early restoration agreement
    with BP. NOAA works cooperatively with co-trustee agencies and (in the
    case of a cooperative assessment of injuries) the responsible party (or
    parties) to share data and information collected during the spill and
    during the injury assessment. Working cooperatively with the
    responsible party and co-trustees can save time and money and can
    result in restoration being implemented faster and more efficiently.
        Although the concept of assessing injuries may sound relatively
    straightforward, understanding complex ecosystems, the services these
    ecosystems provide, and the injuries caused by oil and hazardous
    substances takes time--often years. The time of year the resource was
    injured, the type of oil or hazardous substance, the amount and
    duration of the release, and the nature and extent of clean-up are
    among the many diverse factors that affect how quickly resources are
    assessed and restoration and recovery occurs. OPA requires that the
    trustees be able to demonstrate connections between the release of the
    oil, the pathways the oil moves along from the release point to the
    resources, exposure of the resources to the oil, and finally a causal
    connection between exposure and resource injury. The litigation context
    in which NRDA is conducted requires an elevated level of scientific
    rigor for the studies that are required to demonstrate these
    connections in order to ensure that our studies are accepted into court
    as evidence in the case. This level of scientific rigor coupled with
    the complexity of the ecosystems that are impacted by the spill means
    that the studies necessary to prove injury to resources and services
    may also take years to implement and complete. The NRDA process seeks
    to ensure an objective, scientifically rigorous, and cost-effective
    assessment of injuries--and that harm to the public's resources is
    fully addressed.
    Current Status of NOAA's Natural Resource Damage Assessment Efforts
        At the outset of the Deepwater Horizon BP oil spill, NOAA quickly
    mobilized staff from DARRP to begin coordinating with Federal and state
    co-trustees and the responsible parties to collect a variety of
    ephemeral data that are critical to help inform the NRDA. The trustees
    are currently assessing the injuries to the Gulf of Mexico and
    soliciting public involvement in various restoration initiatives. On
    September 29, 2010, the trustees sent BP a Notice of Intent to Conduct
    Restoration Planning. This indicates that the trustees determined they
    have the jurisdiction to pursue restoration under OPA and moves the
    case from Pre-assessment Phase into the Restoration Planning Phase. In
    this phase, the trustees formally identify and document impacts to the
    Gulf's natural resources, and the public's loss of use and enjoyment of
    these resources in order to determine the appropriate restoration
    projects to compensate for those losses.
        The Deepwater Horizon NRDA focuses on assessing the injuries to all
    ecosystem resources from the deep ocean to the coastlines of the Gulf
    of Mexico. Information continues to be collected to assess potential
    impacts to fish, shellfish, terrestrial and marine mammals, turtles,
    birds, and other sensitive resources, as well as their habitats,
    including wetlands, beaches, mudflats, bottom sediments, corals, and
    the water column. Lost human uses of these resources, such as
    recreational fishing, hunting, and beach use, are also being assessed.
    Technical teams consisting of scientists from state and Federal
    agencies, from academic institutions, and from BP have been in the
    field conducting daily surveys and collecting samples for multiple
    resources, habitats, and services. To date, several hundred scientists,
    economists, and restoration specialists have been and continue to be
    involved in our NRDA activities.
        These assessment teams, called technical working groups (TWG) have
    been established to determine the oil spill's impact on multiple trust
    resources. The TWGs are responsible for identifying endpoints and
    developing procedures and methods to measure potential injury to their
    respective resources in study plans. Currently, there are thirteen TWGs
    divided into the 1following categories: water column and sediments,
    turtles and marine mammals, shorelines, terrestrial species, human use,
    shallow water corals, oysters, birds, submerged aquatic vegetation, and
    deep sea benthos. Several support TWGs have also been established to
    help ensure TWGs have the resources and data that they need. The study
    plans are selected and designed based upon our experiences from past
    oil spills and sound science with the main purpose of documenting and
    quantifying injury to a particular trust resource or service.
        There are several steps in the development of a NRDA study plan.
    First, the TWG members identify an injury assessment approach or
    methodology for a particular resource. They then design and draft the
    study plan to address one or more questions related to the release,
    pathway, exposure, and injury resulting from the release of oil. The
    study plan is reviewed within the TWG, for scientific and statistical
    rigor, before the plan is reviewed by Deepwater Horizon case managers.
    As prescribed under the Oil Pollution Act NRDA regulations, the
    trustees afford BP the opportunity to review and provide input to the
    trustees in the development of study plans and many of the plans have
    been agreed to by representatives of the trustees and BP. Cooperation
    facilitates the cost effective collection and sharing of data, while
    allowing all parties to conduct their own analysis and interpretation
    of that data. It is important to note that at any time the trustees
    have the authority to withdraw from any cooperative assessment. Current
    study plans are focused on the causal connections between documented
    exposure to oil and injury to resources and services.
        Once BP or their contractor weigh in, the trustees then decide
    which, if any, of BP's comments to accept. The plans are then submitted
    to BP, as one of the responsible parties, to either approve and fund or
    decide not to fund. When trustees cannot reach agreement with BP, or BP
    decides not to fund the study, the trustees use their own funding
    sources (e.g., from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund) to conduct the
    study. Once the source of funds has been identified, the study plan is
    sent to contracting for processing if necessary. Studies have been
    developed over the course of days to weeks, and have not been delayed
    by the source of funds. It should be noted that even if the agencies
    fund the study, they still expect to recover those costs as
    ``reasonable costs'' of the assessment (33 U.S.C. 2702(b)(2)(A)).
        Due to the size of the Deepwater Horizon release and the large
    potential for injury, NRDA field efforts have far surpassed any other
    for a single oil release. As of June 9, 2011, the trustees had approved
    over 115 study plans and collected more than 36,000 water, tissue,
    sediment, soil, tarball, and oil samples. More than 90 oceanic cruises
    have been conducted since early May 2010 and many more are scheduled
    for the summer and fall of 2011. From these sample collection efforts,
    more than 21,300 laboratory analyses have been completed. Of those,
    more than 20,400 have been validated through a rigorous quality
    assurance process. Once these data clear the validation process, they
    are then made publicly available; a new milestone in NRDA public
    transparency.
    Current Status of Restoration Efforts
        The NRDA regulations define three types of restoration: emergency
    (15 C.F.R.  990.26), primary (15 C.F.R.  990.30), and compensatory
    (15 C.F.R.  990.30). Emergency restoration is undertaken during the
    response phase to minimize or prevent (further) injury to natural
    resources. Primary restoration is any action, including natural
    recovery that returns injured natural resources and services to
    baseline. Compensatory restoration is any action taken to compensate
    for interim losses of natural resources and services that occur from
    the date of the incident until recovery.
        To date, the trustees and BP have agreed to implement several
    emergency restoration projects designed to curtail further injury to
    different resources. In particular, the trustees will implement a
    project to mend scars created in submerged aquatic vegetation
    (seagrass) beds caused by response equipment, namely boat props, in
    Florida. Designated areas in Mississippi Wildlife Management Areas have
    been flooded to attract migratory birds that otherwise may gather in
    oil impacted areas. One initiative will collect, store, and propagate
    plants, and replant damaged shorelines along the Gulf Coast to prevent
    further injury and erosion. Another project will improve the nesting
    and rearing success of endangered sea turtles on the Padre Island
    National Seashore.
        Early restoration is the implementation of projects prior to the
    final quantification of injury. It is an emerging tool in NRDA that is
    not defined in the regulations and thus requires a great deal of
    discussion and agreement on how it will be implemented. It can fall
    under the purview of either primary or compensatory restoration.
        On April 21, 2011, the trustees announced an agreement, called the
    Framework Agreement, whereby BP agreed to fund $1 billion in early
    restoration projects. Under a separate allocation agreement the
    Department of the Interior (DOI), NOAA, and each of the five Gulf
    States (Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas) will
    receive $100 million to implement projects. The remaining $300 million
    will be used for projects selected by NOAA and DOI in coordination with
    the State trustees. All projects must meet the other requirements of
    the Framework Agreement, which insure a consistency with OPA, and be
    approved by the Trustee Council (comprised of all the natural resource
    co-trustees) and BP. Public input on proposed early restoration
    projects has already begun and will continue through this summer, and
    will culminate in a formal opportunity for comment once Phase 1 of the
    Draft Early Restoration Plan has been completed (some time in the
    fall).
        The benefits provided by these early restoration projects will
    eventually offset a portion of the Responsible Parties' total
    liability. Under the Framework Agreement, BP and the trustees must
    agree to the ``offsets'' that each project will generate. Each project
    will have its own stipulation, which will be filed with the court
    hearing the multi-district litigation on the accident. BP, all
    trustees, and the Department of Justice will sign each stipulation.
    This restoration should not compromise or negatively impact the NRDA
    process. Rather, it provides a rare opportunity for active restoration
    to begin prior to the full quantification of injury, a process that can
    often take years.
    Next Steps
        The immediate next steps for the Deepwater Horizon NRDA are to: (1)
    continue with the injury assessment; (2) implement early restoration
    with public input; and (3) continue broader restoration planning also
    with public input.
        The trustees have assessment activities planned throughout 2011 and
    into 2012. These activities will continue to assess impacts to habitats
    and resources as warranted. This year of field activity is crucial for
    discerning sub-lethal and temporal changes in populations or habitats;
    a key component to any damage assessment.
        A draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement will be
    available for public review and comment in early 2012. This document
    will identify the range of restoration alternatives that the trustees
    will consider to compensate the public for lost natural resources and
    services and lost human use. Concurrently, the trustees are focused on
    engaging the public to identify early restoration projects and begin
    the implementation process.
    Highlights of Success in the NRDA
        To meet the requests from academia, non-governmental organizations,
    and the general public regarding data and ongoing NRDA actions, NOAA
    and co-trustees have developed data sharing and other outreach
    practices that have resulted in one of the most transparent damage
    assessments in history. As noted previously, NRDA is a legal process,
    designed to resolve liability through restoration for the American
    public. The legal nature of damage assessment requires a degree of
    confidentiality to preserve the government's ability to make the
    strongest damage claim possible on behalf of the public in settlement
    negotiations and litigation. Nonetheless, the trustees have developed
    new public information sharing protocols to address the American
    public's unprecedented request for NRDA information, while at the same
    time, preserving the trustees' responsibility to ensure a strong legal
    case. The Administrative Record can be found online at http://
    www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/adminrecord/index.cfm.
        One of the key actions the trustees have taken to ensure enhanced
    transparency is the public distribution of cooperative assessment work
    plans and data during the NRDA process. Early in the Deepwater Horizon
    NRDA process, NOAA developed a NRDA Deepwater Horizon website (http://
    www.gulfspillrestoration.noaa.gov) which has become an effective tool
    in providing the public with important information. This website
    currently provides access to over 80 pre-assessment work plans and
    resulting validated data that are normally kept internal to the
    trustees until the NRDA has reached a legal settlement. These efforts
    to make data publicly accessible as soon as possible while ensuring
    that rigorous scientific protocols are upheld has required substantial
    coordination efforts.
        In addition, NOAA has continued to update its publicly accessible
    Gulf Environmental Response Management Application (ERMA) website
    (http://www.geoplat
    form.gov/gulfresponse), a NOAA tool that served critical operational
    and situational awareness roles during the response and will continue
    to be a vital tool during the assessment and restoration planning
    phases of the NRDA. The team that developed and evolved ERMA was
    recently named a finalist for the Homeland Security Medal for helping
    crisis managers respond to the Gulf oil spill by providing critical
    information on the flow of oil, weather conditions, location of
    response vessels, and the impact on fisheries and wildlife.
        Along with providing an unprecedented amount of data during the
    NRDA, NOAA and the other trustee agencies have sustained efforts to
    educate and communicate with the public. Since the beginning of the
    spill, NOAA has conducted numerous roundtable discussions with
    stakeholder groups and has facilitated stakeholder field trips where
    NRDA actions were observed and discussed. NOAA has also used multiple
    social media tools and videos to help disseminate information regarding
    the NRDA's status and the opportunities for public involvement. As part
    of the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement process to solicit
    restoration project ideas, eleven public meetings were held across the
    Gulf States and in Washington, D.C. More than 500 citizens attended
    these meetings. The trustees received several hundred comments on
    restoration alternatives at the meetings, through a website, and via
    mail. Throughout the rest of the NRDA process, NOAA and our co-trustees
    envision holding public meetings where input will be formally sought on
    the damage assessment and restoration planning process.
    Conclusion
        The task of quantifying the environmental damage from this spill is
    no small feat. NOAA knows that our efforts are just one of the many
    pieces required to restore the larger ecosystem within the Gulf. I
    would like to assure you that we will not relent in our efforts to
    protect the livelihoods of Gulf Coast residents and mitigate the
    environmental impacts of this spill. In the wake of such an event, we
    are reminded of the fragility of our coastal ecosystems and the
    dependence of coastal economies on the health and prosperity of our
    seas. Thank you for allowing me to testify on NOAA's damage assessment
    efforts. I am happy to answer any questions you may have.

        Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mr. Kennedy.
        I will ask Senator Wicker to go first, and then I will hold
    to the end. That will give Mr. Lautenberg, Senator Lautenberg 5
    minutes. We'll move quicker to you. So, boom, boom. So, Senator
    Wicker first, and then I'll jump to you.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's kind of you
    to do that.
        First of all, Admiral and Mr. Kennedy, thank you for your
    service, and thank you for your testimony.
        Let me ask you first Admiral, during the height of the oil
    spill there was a lot of discussion about how international
    assistance might have been hampered by the Jones Act. Tell us
    what your investigation has found. Did, in fact, the Jones Act
    impacts skimmer and other response equipment availability
    during a spill?
        Admiral Zukunft. Yes, Senator, I'd be pleased to answer
    that.
        As the Federal On-Scene Coordinator, I approved every
    pollution response funding authorization thousands of these
    authorizations. This is everything from domestic to
    international. And when I approve those, I hand them to BP and
    then BP writes the check. The responsible party pays. And
    that's where, when we talk about the division of labor, it is
    driven from the Federal down in holding the responsible party
    accountable. And if the responsible party fails to fund that,
    then we would fund that out of the Oil Spill Liability Trust
    Fund. So, that was the mechanism in process--in place.
        And so, when I looked at what my most critical gaps were.
    It was offshore skimming capability. And so, we reached out to
    Norway and their skimming systems that they use in the North
    Sea to get that skimming equipment to the Gulf Coast, but not
    to transit by vessel, but to get it on a heavy lift, and get it
    onto an OSV and to the Gulf of Mexico. But, we invoked over 60
    foreign offers of assistance where there are critical gaps that
    need to be closed.
        There is a waiver procedure under the Jones Act, and at no
    time did the Jones Act impede the resourcing that we needed to
    respond to this unprecedented spill.
        Senator Wicker. So it's your testimony the Jones Act was
    not a problem in getting international skimmers in?
        Admiral Zukunft. That is exactly correct. That it was in no
    way an impediment.
        Senator Wicker. OK. Now, let me ask you, then, about
    whether or not, in testing for cleanups we need to try
    technologies right there in the marine environment. Do Federal
    regulations restrict the Coast Guard's ability to test cleanup
    technologies and conduct response drills on controlled oil
    spills?
        For example, are there Environmental Protection Agency
    rules that prohibit you or others from testing the
    effectiveness of new technologies in answering this type of a
    spill?
        Admiral Zukunft. We work very closely with our National
    Response Team that is co-chaired, and with the Environmental
    Protection Agency, to consider controlled spilled in the
    environment. What we, and as a rule, we do not. And it's
    primarily due to environmental concerns.
        However, we do use a facility in New Jersey called OHMSETT
    where we do, on a daily basis--I was just there 6 weeks ago.
    It's a very large area. We can introduce ice into that as well
    and----
        Senator Wicker. And so, you spill the oil in New Jersey,
    and that's just fine with me.
        Admiral Zukunft. This is a----
        [Laughter.]
        Admiral Zukunft. Yes. This is a closed facility. But, a
    very, very large body of water, and none of that does get into
    the environment.
        Senator Wicker. OK. Thank you very much for that.
        I have to ask you, Mr. Kennedy, recently there has been a
    high number of sea turtle deaths in the Gulf of Mexico . Some
    people are blaming the shrimpers. I don't know what the
    shrimpers have done differently this year than they had done in
    previous years. Have you ruled out scientifically the oil spill
    as a cause of the sea turtle deaths?
        Mr. Kennedy. No, we have not. We, though, are looking very,
    very carefully at the mortalities, try and collect as many of
    those turtles as we can, conduct necropsies, and look very
    carefully at what we think the cause of death might be. The
    studies are ongoing. And----
        Senator Wicker. What do your initial findings show?
        Mr. Kennedy.--the initial findings are that the majority of
    the necropsies that we have conducted, and these are on the
    near shore--shallow areas where the turtles have been found--
    that the turtles are quite healthy, that they're feeding
    normally, and that their mortality is acute. All of those
    things are not normally associated with some sort of exposure
    and longer term mortality.
        So, what we're finding, at least in a number of the
    necropsies, is that this appears to be somehow associated with
    bycatch.
        Senator Wicker. I see. With some sort of trauma.
        Mr. Kennedy. Yes.
        Senator Wicker. And not toxicity----
        Mr. Kennedy. Yes.
        Senator Wicker.--in the water.
        Mr. Kennedy. Having said that, we absolutely have not ruled
    out--and continue to investigate what is going on there. And
    there are some examples that do not fit into that category I
    just described. So, I think the answer to your question is, we
    have not ruled that out, and we're aggressively continuing to
    look.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you both.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
        Senator Nelson?
        Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your public service.
        We had a failed decision-making apparatus. The Unified
    Command, to begin with, did not react as hard as people were
    working, and as individually as they were just giving it their
    all. The decision-making apparatus was not quick enough, and
    there was too much leeway for BP.
        I don't want to take the time, but I may as well, just to
    remind everybody that it started out, oh, it was only going to
    be 1,000 barrels a day, and then that was revised upwards, and
    it was revised upwards and upwards, and it ended up being
    something in excess of 26,000 barrels a day.
        What would you two recommend as an improved decision-making
    apparatus in a command structure that, the next oil spill, that
    we have in place?
        Why don't I ask the civilian first?
        And then to you, Admiral.
        Admiral Zukunft. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Kennedy. I will just start, I think, by saying that
    I've been doing oil spill response, one kind or another, for 25
    years. I know I look like I'm 35, but I'm actually a little
    older. And I have never--and I was involved in the Exxon Valdez
    spill deeply, as well. I've never seen anything that even
    approached the complexity of the issues that we had to deal
    with. And I think it's not, I think you have to start there. I
    think you have to start with the fact that none of us could
    have anticipated, even with a Spill of National Significance,
    how complex the issues were, and how they continued to kind of
    expand in their complexity, and all of this under a very, very
    strong, strong public spotlight and scrutiny.
        Having said that, I think there are a number of things that
    we potentially could do better. But, to stand up an
    organization of this magnitude, where you had, from every
    agency, parts of it brought in that had never been in a
    response mode before, you probably would start with more
    training for more of the entities within--just speaking for
    NOAA--for more of the entities within your organization, to get
    them better equipped, to know what to do on a response.
    Response mode is kind of a special mode, and it takes a lot of
    training and kind of a mindset.
        As we brought more and more and more of NOAA, for instance,
    all of our ships which, you know, are not normally involved in
    oil spills, the satellites, the aircraft, and all of our
    experts from every discipline, into this event, it took a
    little time to spin them up. And I think, so communication,
    training, and I----
        Senator Nelson. All right. Let me just stipulate----
        Mr. Kennedy. Yes.
        Senator Nelson.--with you there that it was complex, and it
    was extraordinary. But, you all let BP, basically, direct a lot
    of the response. It wasn't until some of us up here, including
    Senator Boxer, forced the availability of that live streaming
    video, that scientists could then see how much oil was coming
    out 5,000 feet below the surface, and do their calculations.
    This wasn't anywhere close to 1,000 barrels.
        So, what would you do in the command structure so that BP
    is not running the show?
        And I take nothing away from all the people that gave their
    heart and soul in doing this. What we're trying to do here is
    lessons learned, so that we don't repeat the mistakes of the
    past.
        Mr. Kennedy. Oil Pollution Act and National Contingency
    Plan, as the Admiral mentioned, I think, do lay out what we're
    supposed to do. I think when you have something this complex,
    you maybe have some learning curves on how that structure
    works. But there is a very specific structure in place. And I'm
    going to turn to the Admiral and let him handle this. This is
    his business.
        Senator Nelson. OK, so, what you're saying is, a specific
    structure in place. So----
        Mr. Kennedy. Yes.
        Senator Nelson.--does that mean we need to amend the law so
    that we don't fall back? Because if you're saying the statute
    required the way it was operated in the past, then that's one
    of the lessons learned.
        Mr. Kennedy. I think we're all saying that we should look
    at the Oil Pollution Act and see if there are amendments that
    are needed. But I think a better understanding across the board
    of what the current act is and how it is executed would help us
    as well.
        Admiral Zukunft. OK.
        Leading up to this, you know, we have a very mature area
    contingency plan process, where we work with all the
    stakeholders, we work with the Regional Response Teams,
    identify environmentally sensitive areas. And that's leading up
    to--and we exercise this in our Spills of National
    Significance.
        Those Spills of National Significance exercises do not get
    fully exercised at the local level. We're working in the Gulf
    of Mexico. For example, the state of Louisiana had five ongoing
    federally declared disasters under the Stafford Act. And this
    was the first time that the SONS--the NIC construct--under the
    Oil Pollution Act had seen the light of day since Exxon Valdez.
        Working communities that were very used to State-driven
    Stafford Act responses, which is a co-shared expense process
    to, now under National Contingency Plan, which is federally
    driven, where the Federal Government holds the responsible
    party accountable for paying every bill associated with that
    response and taking every measure necessary.
        The challenge we had was in critical resources. Because of
    the challenges with the planning process, and full ownership,
    from local up to State, when that first drop of oil came
    ashore, it may not have been on an environmentally sensitive
    area, but there was a mandate to boom the entire Gulf of
    Mexico, to the point where we had nearly 4 million feet of hard
    boom, another 10 million feet of sorbent boom, strung across
    the Gulf of Mexico. That boom did not exist in our Nation's
    inventory.
        Senator Nelson. Yes, But boom doesn't work off of a beach.
    So right there you have to adjust.
        Admiral Zukunft. Yes, sir.
        Senator Nelson. Well. I don't want to take any more time. I
    want others to have a chance.
        But, in all of this conversation I've been seeking a
    recommendation from you all on how we can make that command
    structure better. And I have not heard a recommendation. So, my
    recommendation, Mr. Chairman, would be, if they would like to
    respond in writing with a specific recommendation. If we need
    to change the statute, then that's what we're here for.
        But the next time around we sure want a crisp, chain of
    command. The order is given, and you don't have somebody trying
    to bungle it up, regardless of how complicated it is.
        Senator Begich. Let me----
        Admiral Zukunft. Thank you.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
        And I'd make that as a formal request of the Committee,
    that you could respond to that. Actually, that was one of my
    questions for both of you also, to, if you could give
    recommendations that you might think in the law could be
    changed in order to make it--and I'll use the words of Senator
    Nelson--a more crisp and efficient response. We'll make that as
    one of the questions for the record from the Committee in
    total.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        NOAA recommendations on (1) how to improve the Unified Command
    structure and on (2) what changes are necessary in the Oil Pollution
    Act to improve it.

            1. Under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
            Contingency Plan, the U.S. Coast Guard acts as the Federal On-
            Scene Command for oil spills in U.S. navigable waters. NOAA
            provides scientific support to the Coast Guard for such spills
            and may also assist EPA and state authorities if requested.
            NOAA is also a member of the National Response Team and
            Regional Response Teams. Through training, exercises, and
            workshops, we work with Federal, state and local agencies and
            coastal communities to improve preparedness for oil spill
            response.

            Given the unfortunate scale, complexity, and unprecedented
            nature of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, some aspects of the
            Unified Command Structure may not have been executed by design;
            however, this was mainly a result of the tremendous challenge
            presented by the equivalent of a new major spill every day for
            more than 3 months. From NOAA's perspective, greater and more
            consistent support for oil spill research and development as
            well as more emphasis on planning activities, training,
            exercises, and workshops are needed for Federal, state, and
            local agencies and coastal communities to improve preparedness
            for coastal environmental disasters.

            Furthermore, while needed improvements based on lessons from
            Deepwater Horizon have been well documented and will need to be
            addressed, the Unified Command I Incident Command System, as
            designed, is an effective and efficient structure for managing
            oil spill response.

            2. NOAA supports recommendations of the National Commission on
            the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill that call for mandatory funding
            for oil spill response research and development (R&D) and
            provide incentives for private-sector research and development.

            One recommendation of the Commission is to ensure R&D funding
            is not subject to the annual appropriations process and is
            provided at a level equal to or greater than the amount
            authorized by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. These funds should
            be focused on increasing sustainable Federal funding for oil
            spill response research by agencies such as NOAA.

            By removing oil spill research and development funding from the
            ordinary appropriations process, Congress can avoid the
            experience that followed the Exxon Valdez spill, when support
            for response research and development decreased over time.

        Senator Begich. Senator Lautenberg?
        Senator Lautenberg. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        We are at this hearing to learn what to do as a result of
    the several serious oil spills in the past, and most recently
    in the Gulf of Mexico.
        Chemical dispersants to break down large amounts of surface
    and subsurface oil were used. And despite concerns about
    dispersant safety, that actually predates the Exxon Valdez oil
    spill, we're still not sure about what the effects are for the
    concentrations of these dispersants. They were never made
    available to the public.
        Now, when we look and see that we are still reeling from
    the oil spills that took place years ago like Exxon Valdez,
    we're still, have many species that haven't yet returned to
    their quantity, or their, the quality of their existence.
        Now, I have introduced legislation that required testing of
    dispersants, including their long-term effects, before they're
    used, and the required disclosure of the ingredients in these
    dispersants.
        Now, would more information about dispersants, do you
    think, affect your oil spill response efforts? Might there be
    an influence there? Admiral?
        Admiral Zukunft. Thank you, Senator.
        When we use, made the decision to use Corexit 9500, we
    worked off an EPA-approved product list. The Regional Response
    Team had preapproval to apply dispersants. Obviously, we were
    in uncharted territory when we reached a magnitude of 1.8
    million gallons of dispersants applied both on the surface and
    subsurface.
        I will say, as the Federal On-Scene Coordinator, there were
    periods of up to 16 consecutive days where, because of the wind
    state, the sea states, we had to draw down the response on two
    occasions because of potential approaching hurricanes, and
    we're streaming live video of oil spilling. And then watching
    that oil come in to Barataria Bay and to Perdido Pass, and
    other locations, where we're trying to knock this down as far
    offshore as possible. And so you really, at that time, it would
    be great to have that information, you know, at my disposal,
    rather than waiting 3 months for a study. But I have to make a
    decision within 24 hours. After the 24-hour window expires,
    that dispersant is no longer effective.
        So, those are the tradeoff decisions I had to make--you
    know, how do I mitigate the effect of the spill, apply
    dispersants as far offshore as possible? And then, after the
    well was permanently plugged and abandoned, we did, working
    with NOAA, undertook the most aggressive undersea monitoring
    effort ever conducted in the Gulf of Mexico, looking for oxygen
    depletion, concentrations of oil and oil debris on the sea
    floor in depths of 5,000 feet.
        In the preliminary findings--and this was to determine if
    any further response, oil removal, was necessary--and as a
    result of that study, no further findings were necessary. That
    report was made public in the late December time-frame.
        Senator Lautenberg. So, do you think we've appropriately,
    now, analyzed the material that's in the dispersants and the
    dangers that it, they could represent? Are you satisfied that
    because you didn't find further damage at that time, that we
    are fully familiar with what the dispersants might bring, and,
    to the continuing following up of the accidents?
        Admiral Zukunft. I'm not, because we don't have a whole of
    science peer review. And so, the challenge I would deal with on
    a daily basis is, getting whole of science concurrence, and so,
    that's a challenge as well. So, it really needs to be fully
    peer reviewed and concurred with. So, further work is needed.
        Senator Lautenberg. And let it not be thought for a moment
    that we didn't appreciate the work and the bravery of the Coast
    Guard, their people. There was no task that was asked, that
    they didn't fulfill, and we're very proud of----
        Admiral Zukunft. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Lautenberg.--you and your people, and I want you to
    keep up the courage and the response that you give to things in
    your bailiwick.
        Now, the Coast Guard and NOAA play leading roles in
    responding to oil spills. But even in the best of times these
    agencies are called on to do more with less.
        Now, if the budgets for NOAA and Coast Guard are cut even
    further, as some are proposing, would your agency be able to
    help--both agencies--to respond to two major spills at the same
    time?
        Admiral Zukunft. First of all we're very thankful for the
    proposed budget in Fiscal Year 2012. That does address some of
    our resource shortcomings for incident management response.
        But, in reflecting on the Deepwater Horizon, this was 87
    major spills. And I say that because we had one day we
    recovered 30,000 barrels of oil, most of this well offshore.
    And this is not oily water, this is oil, it's in situation
    burning oil recovery, 1.2 million gallons, about 20 percent of
    Exxon Valdez. The next day we had the same amount of oil, and
    the next day we had the same amount of oil. So, every day the
    spill duplicated itself, and it almost became exponential.
        So, the fact that we are able to respond to 87 spills, with
    the augmentation of personnel that is in the 2012 budget, with
    the cooperation of inter-agencies, this was a tremendous
    learning experience at the local, Federal, tribal,
    international level. And shame on us if we don't take these
    lessons and apply those to future challenges, especially in the
    Arctic, in the Northwest, and to Cuba as well.
        Senator Lautenberg. Admiral, are you saying--and I'll be,
    this will be it--that you, 87 spills, and your response
    suggests that, maybe you could be doing with less funding in
    response to my question?
        Admiral Zukunft. We were sorely stressed in,--this was a
    campaign. We had exhausted our reserve call-up capability, and
    so we were thankful that this well was capped when it was. If
    we were still responding today--again, this was, most spills
    are an instantaneous release like Exxon Valdez. But, when you
    have a spill in deepwater dealing with hydrates, the
    complexities, great depths, and access, that is a, you know,
    that is the new frontier we're living in. And where is that
    exploitable oil and gas? You know, it's in that new frontier.
    It's either in deep water, or maybe in the Arctic, or it may be
    in a country where we don't have diplomatic relations.
        Senator Lautenberg. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
        We, I have other questions which I'll submit for the
    record.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Senator Lautenberg.
        Senator Cantwell.
        Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, again,
    thank you for this hearing.
        Obviously, looking to the future, lessons in prevention,
    response and restoration are very important issues. As I
    outlined in my opening statement, I'm very concerned about the
    future as it relates to the Pacific Northwest. And so, Rear
    Admiral, I appreciate your testimony today, and wanted to ask
    you--we put into the Coast Guard reauthorization bill language
    pushing Coast Guard to do analysis of the U.S.-Canadian oil
    response agreements.
        Can you tell me whether some analysis has been done, and
    what you think the agreements are in oil response between the
    United States and Canada?
        Admiral Zukunft. I can't on the record produce that. But,
    certainly, I'd be pleased to do so. I will say that we have
    regular, at least on a quarterly basis, interactions with our
    Canadian partners on everything from oil spill to, you know, to
    security among our common border. But, I would be glad to
    provide you an update.
        Senator Cantwell. Thank you. So, you will give me an
    analysis of those, what you think the existing agreements are,
    and how they work and----
        Admiral Zukunft. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
        Do you think--I mean, God forbid that such oil spill would
    happen in Canadian waters. Do you think, according to this,
    whatever it is, verbal agreements, or things that you have now,
    do you think the United States can enter those waters without
    the oil spill entering the United States?
        Admiral Zukunft. We have shiprider agreements where we do
    law enforcement in Canadian waters, just as we invite RCMP
    officers on our vessels, so we eliminate that seam between the
    United States and Canada. And I'm quite satisfied that we can
    do that in a, in an environmental capacity.
        And I'll just follow it with--I'm also, as part of our
    Arctic Council for search and rescue--and the next part of that
    is looking at carbon emissions in maritime environment in the
    Arctic domain. Canada is signatory to that, and they are very
    committed to living up to that commitment as well.
        Senator Cantwell. Well, so you think the answer is, yes,
    you can respond to an oil spill in Canadian waters?
        Admiral Zukunft. I am confident that we will be able to do
    so.
        Senator Cantwell. OK. And do you think that you can require
    supertankers to have a tug escort when they are a few miles
    within American waters?
        Admiral Zukunft. We traditionally will work with the
    International Maritime Organization to ensure that, you know,
    these are global, oftentimes global issues that may affect the
    ship routing, that could have unintended consequences. So, so
    we look for those best practices. They certainly exist. When I
    was the Commander of the Eleventh District in California, where
    we had the Exxon--I mean the CoscoBusan, there are areas for
    tankers as they come in to Richmond, where we do require tug
    escorts. So, certainly, that governance structure is in place
    in select ports based on the given risk.
        Senator Cantwell. Do you think that we should look at that
    policy as it relates to this increase in traffic, given the
    fragile nature of, you know, Puget Sound? I mean, the, it's a
    tricky waterway as our--I think our chart's still here--shows
    and designates, and some very pristine area in the country. So,
    do you think we should be reviewing this increase in tanker
    traffic? I mean, it's almost a 45 percent increase.
        Admiral Zukunft. With any of these decisions, we do an
    extensive amount of outreach, whether it's with advisory
    committees, with the pilot associations, you know, with our
    port authorities, because there are, you know, if there's a
    rulemaking, you know, it does have cost implications as well.
    But, certainly, if those risk factors are made known to us, you
    know, it would be the impetus for a rulemaking to advance that.
    This would create challenges since it would apply, you know, in
    an, in Canadian waters where this, this traffic originates,
    that would be a challenge for us.
        Senator Cantwell. What is your assessment of the Canadians'
    ability to respond to a major oil spill in this area?
        Admiral Zukunft. I'll just go back to the Spill of National
    Significance exercise that we conducted last year. And it was a
    scenario where--it was up in New England, and that oil would
    have then impacted Canadian waters as well. We invited Canada
    to participate, and they participated at the executive level,
    not in an observer status. But certainly, recognize that we
    cannot allow seams to exist, because oil is agnostic to
    borders, and that we need to be able to bridge that gap with
    appropriate response measures on both sides of that border.
        Senator Cantwell. I feel you're being very diplomatic, and
    so if I asked you to grade them you would probably hesitate.
    But, my point is, do you think they have the same preparedness
    that we do in responding to oil spills in the Northwest?
        Admiral Zukunft. You know, any comment I would make,
    Senator, would be speculative. But, certainly their earnestness
    in being a partner with the U.S. Coast Guard, and with our
    Regional Response Team process for, under National Contingency
    Plan, I see them as committed partners.
        Senator Cantwell. Do you think they have the same capacity
    that we do?
        Admiral Zukunft. I could not answer that question.
        Senator Cantwell. OK. Well, will you in your analysis of
    the U.S. agreements give us a sense of what you think their
    capacity is?
        This is a very big issue. The amount of traffic increase
    going through this very delicate waterway's tricky systems,
    where, again, most of the traffic we're talking about from
    Puget Sound does require local pilots and a variety things--
    these are very important issues. So we'll look to get your
    views on the record on that.
        Admiral Zukunft. I will be pleased to provide that. Thank
    you.
        Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Senator Cantwell.
        Let me also emphasize that last point, obviously, with
    Alaska on the border along with Washington, to Canada. I think
    it is--if there are issues that you identify that may be gaps,
    or you're unaware, because the information isn't there--I think
    we need to know that because of the work. I know my state
    does--I know your state does with Canada on regular basis. They
    visit our offices fairly regular because of issues of trade and
    fish, and many other things--that, I think it would be very
    important for us to know.
        And I think a part of our role should be to assist to make
    sure their standards equal--obviously we'd love them to
    exceed--but, at least, equal what we are requiring at this
    point.
        So, as you do that analysis, can you step to that next
    level and say, ``Here are some areas that we were unable to
    analyze. But it's clear we need some current review of?''
    Because we're, I think that's what Senator Cantwell was trying
    to get to, is that we want to help make sure Canada, if--we
    need to know. You should be able to sit in a room like this and
    say, ``They are--'' fill in the blank. Because that's the kind
    of relationship we need to have with their oil spill capacity.
        I think that's what you were going. Is that----
        Senator Cantwell. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Begich. Very good.
        Senator Cantwell. Absolutely.
        Admiral Zukunft. Mr. Chairman----
        Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
        Admiral Zukunft.--I look forward to providing that
    information.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Coast Guard is actively working to update the comparability
    analysis related to the Cooperative Vessel Traffic Service agreement
    between the United States and Canada for the management of maritime
    traffic in Puget Sound, the Strait of Georgia, Haro Strait, Rosario
    Strait, and the Strait of Juan de Fuca.
        The United States Coast Guard and the Canadian Coast Guard have a
    long history of cooperation in executing our responsibilities to
    prepare for and respond to oil and hazardous substance events under the
    auspices of the Canada-United States Joint Marine Pollution Contingency
    Plan (JCP).
        The Coast Guard is in the process of updating both the JCP and the
    suite of geographical annexes under the JCP in regards to oil spill
    response. In February 2011, at the Canadian Coast Guard-United States
    Coast Guard Summit, the leaders of both organizations agreed and
    committed to revise and update the JCP with a focus on improving the
    ability of both nations to support regional planning and response.
    Specifically, the updates aim to create broader agreements under the
    JCP for managing mutual aid between the nations for incidents which are
    not trans-boundary, such as Deepwater Horizon and also encouraging
    coordination of exercises and training among the regions which hold
    geographic annexes to the JCP.
        The JCP Annual Meeting will be held in Halifax, Nova Scotia, on
    August 30-31, 2011. This meeting will be attended by both national and
    regional representatives of both nations, including: RDML Cari Thomas,
    U.S. Coast Guard Director of Response Policy; and Jacqueline Gonclaves,
    Canadian Coast Guard Director General, Maritime Services. The objective
    of the meeting is to conduct a strategic review of the JCP in regards
    to cooperation for oil spill preparedness and response as informed by
    lessons learned from Deepwater Horizon. Specifically, the meeting
    attendees will examine the JCP and its regional annexes in terms of the
    strength of communications, incident management coordination, worst
    case discharge threats and assumptions, strategic priorities for
    response and recovery, equipment lists, and equipment sharing. The
    revised JCP is expected to be ready for final review by the end of
    2011.

        Senator Begich. OK.
        Admiral, I have a couple of questions for you. But, let me
    hold for a second.
        Mr. Kennedy, I want to ask, I know there's the
    Environmental Response Management Application, which is a tool
    that was used quite a bit in the Gulf. I know there's one in
    the Arctic being developed.
        Mr. Kennedy. Yes.
        Senator Begich. Can you give me, kind of, what's happening
    with that at this point, and, kind of, the status of that
    development?
        Mr. Kennedy. So, this is a product that we have developed
    just as a tool to help with data management of spill response.
    It more or less had been launched in the months prior to
    Deepwater Horizon, and turned out to be an extremely accessible
    tool. Basically, a product with data layers, and the ability to
    process and receive data in the event of a spill, so that you
    have kind of a central location where all of the information
    that's required by all the responders is available, and in a
    variety of different forms.
        And so, we have started that process. It's somewhat
    geography specific, and so you need to have it set up so that
    it can specifically respond to the uniqueness of the region
    that you're trying to develop it for. So, we have begun the
    Arctic. I'm, I will have to get back to you to give you a
    specific date. But, it's underway, and we expect to have a
    product, I think, by the end of the year. But, let me get back
    to you----
        Senator Begich. Can you provide that?
        Mr. Kennedy.--for specifics on that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

    Update on the status of the development of the Arctic ERMA
        Development of NOAA's Arctic Environmental Response Management
    Application (ERMA) is ongoing with plans to finish in Spring 2012,
    pending additional funding to support final stages of tool development,
    stakeholder meetings to refine functionality, and additional
    infrastructure to support a public facing website similar to
    Geoplatform.gov, which was deployed during the Deepwater Horizon oil
    spill last summer.
        Currently, NOAA has a working demo product (i.e., development site)
    for Arctic ERMA and we continue to add data and information applicable
    to planning for and responding to oil spills in the arctic. NOAA also
    continues to work with Alaska native communities to better access local
    traditional knowledge; however, a lack of resources is currently
    limiting our ability to fully engage these communities in a productive
    way.
        NOAA's goals for Arctic ERMA in 2012 include the following
    attributes: a platform that easily crosses boundaries; improves data
    sharing and communication; is easy to use even for non-GIS savvy users;
    conveys real-time data sets overlaid with baseline ecological and
    operational data; is accessible from anywhere as both a planning and
    preparedness tool, and serves as a common operating picture for an
    actual response.

        Senator Begich. You bet. Thank you.
        Another question--I know you have developed an MOU,
    memorandum of understanding between yourself and BOEMRE. Can
    you tell me--and it's related to information that's provided
    on, that you would provide in their process. Can you tell me
    how that coordination is going? This is in regards to offshore
    energy decisionmaking. And can you just give me a sense--I will
    tell you from, industry folks are all nervous about what that
    means in time, if it'll create delay. So I want to get a sense
    from you on that.
        And then, do you have the resources and expertise to really
    do that work?
        Mr. Kennedy. Sir, yes, we do have an MOU. We work with the
    old BOEMRE. MMS over the years had a partnership with them. We
    always felt like there was more that we could do to partner.
    So, this MOU, I, we think is the next best good step to have us
    at the table.
        As we have these kinds of discussions, I think it will do
    two things. I think it will bring a level of expertise and, I'm
    hoping, efficiency to the process that we haven't had, because
    we haven't been at the table as appropriately as we'd like to
    have been.
        So, to date, I think that relationship is blossoming, and
    that we are now engaging much more quickly and often with them
    as we discuss leasing and drilling issues. And we look
    forward--I think it's a new enough relationship, and a new
    enough organization, that we want to watch and see how it goes.
    But, we look forward to having the ability, and we think it
    will prove to be more efficient and effective.
        Senator Begich. And do you have the resources to do that
    expertise?
        Mr. Kennedy. I was hoping I would have the opportunity to
    answer Senator Lautenberg's question as well, because I thought
    it was a very good question for us. And, we for a long time
    have tried to look at our ability to respond to two spills.
    It's kind of the basis for, are we at a point where we think
    that nationally we can do our job? And the answer for NOAA is,
    no. We don't have the resources to respond to two spills. And
    over the last several years, the resources for the specific
    group that does most of our core response has had to be right-
    sized because of a lack of resources. And during the course of
    this event, everybody that still wasn't in a walker that had
    retired and was still somewhere around, we brought back to try
    and just have enough resources to respond to this one spill.
        So, given the budgets that we're looking at, we're very
    concerned about our ability to continue.
        Senator Begich. Can you for the record do two responses on
    that? One is on the decision-making process, which is the new
    MOU that you have with BOEMRE----
        Mr. Kennedy. Mm-hm.
        Senator Begich.--what kind of resources you think you need
    in order to accomplish that. And then, the second part is more
    global, which is on the oil spill capacity itself, what you
    think the response or resources need is for that. Can you do
    that, if possible, for the record?
        Mr. Kennedy. For, yes.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        What resources does NOAA need to implement the new relationship
    between NOAA and BOEMRE and what resources does NOAA need to be able to
    respond to two spills at the same time?

        (1) The following list of activities would enhance NOAA's ability
    to meet the terms of the new Memorandum of Agreement with the Bureau of
    Ocean Energy Management and Enforcement.

       Improve NOAA capacity to review the adequacy of oil spill
            and hazardous material response plans associated with oil and
            gas development in 26 lease areas on the outer continental
            shelf.

       Develop new I enhance existing oil spill response and damage
            assessment tools.

         New and enhanced scientific tools (e.g., ERMA) and
                protocols are needed to increase the effectiveness of oil
                spill response and improve efficiency and effectiveness of
                natural resource damage assessment in coastal and offshore
                areas identified for oil/gas exploration and production
                throughout the Nation.

         Addressing the backlog of outdated Environmental
                Sensitivity Index (ESI) maps and developing new maps for
                offshore oil and gas lease areas. Accurate, up-to-date ESI
                maps are essential to development of spill response plans
                as they identify and catalog resources at risk and also
                guide critical response decisions during an event.
                Currently, over 60 percent of NOAA Office of Response and
                Restoration's ESI maps are out of date (i.e., greater than
                7 years old) and do not provide the most recent information
                on shoreline characteristics, endangered species, nursery
                areas for commercially valuable fisheries, and other types
                of critical response data.

        (2) The following list of activities will enhance response and
    restoration capacity to ensure that NOAA can effectively respond to of
    two simultaneous spills of national significance.

       Rebuild the Office of Response and Restoration's (OR&R)
            response and damage assessment capacity.

         Ensure NOAA has the capacity to effectively respond to two
                simultaneous major spill events. The Deepwater Horizon
                spill underscored a large capacity gap for both oil spill
                response and natural resource damage assessment (NRDA). For
                example, the majority of OR&R's natural resource damage
                assessment staff were reassigned to the Gulf of Mexico
                region in order to meet the immediate needs of the spill,
                severely restricting OR&R's ability to conduct 140 other
                ongoing damage assessments from previous events across the
                Nation.

         Support additional trained response staff and augment
                external contract support, including enhancing expertise in
                analytical chemistry, environmental chemistry, biology,
                oceanography, NRDA, GIS and data management, logistics, and
                required NRDA financial/cost documentation functions. These
                funds will allow NOAA to conduct the necessary training and
                preparedness activities between incidents.

        Senator Begich. So, then there are some real numbers and
    expertise--
        Mr. Kennedy. Mm-hm. We'd be happy to do that.
        Senator Begich. Great.
        Let me ask the Admiral just a couple of quick questions,
    and then I'll have a series of questions for both of you that
    I'll submit for the record, for more detail.
        I know the Oil Spill Commission recommended that the Coast
    Guard work, and you mentioned it, too, they work more with
    State and local entities. And, in Alaska we have successful
    Regional Citizen Advisory Councils. One in Prince William
    Sound, and one in Cook Inlet. We're advocating one for the
    Arctic also.
        Can you tell me, is that the kind of increased local
    participation that makes sense for the Coast Guard, those kind
    of regional advisory councils to help do your work better, and
    also respond to the commission's recommendation?
        Admiral Zukunft. Certainly, Chairman. And, we have a lead
    role in that process as well.
        And that was, one of the key lessons learned is that, at
    the local level, that there was not full awareness of the oil
    spill contingency plans, the environmentally sensitive areas,
    and just the governance structure that's in place. And
    certainly, that's going to be especially critical as we look at
    the Arctic. And it's understanding the culture of the Arctic,
    and the tribal entities that reside there, as well.
        And so we've been doing a lot of outreach, you know, in
    those communities as we look at increased human activity, and
    then the impact of that activity in that precious environment.
        Senator Begich. And if I can just emphasize a point earlier
    that, again, regarding OPA 1990 and other processes that we
    have put into place over the years--your recommendations and
    thoughts on that will be critical. I know we mentioned that
    earlier. And, again, to follow up to Senator Nelson's comment,
    please do what you can there.
        And then the last question for both of you, because I
    cannot remember if you, either one of your agencies are doing
    this, or who is doing it. But, I don't know why I have this in
    my mind. But, is there a competition right now for oil spill
    technology that's undergoing literally as we speak? Because, I
    think there's an Alaskan company involved. But, there's, like
    10 companies. I don't know if it's NOAA, or it's Coast Guard,
    or someone else. Does this ring a bell to either one of you?
        OK. Mr. Kennedy, you shook your head yes, so you're the
    target here. Can you----
        Mr. Kennedy. Well----
        Senator Begich.--tell me, this is--am I right on this?
    There are 10 companies kind of competing for the best oil spill
    skimming technology?
        Mr. Kennedy. I can only highlight the issue because I
    haven't been in, directly involved. I have one of, an
    individual that works for me, who is more specifically
    involved. But, in the course of this event and the idea of what
    else should we, could we be thinking about that might be the
    silver bullet or help somehow, there was an idea hatched to
    come up with a prize and a, through a competition. There was a
    team put together.
        And Admiral Z, I don't know whether you recall the
    specifics of it.
        But, yes, there is an effort under-way, there was a call
    for proposals. There are some finalists, and there is a
    competition that's being--I don't know that it's been
    completely evaluated yet. But, it's in the process of being
    evaluated, with a winner, or winners, that would be awarded
    some funds to move forward.
        Senator Begich. Yes. I would be very interested, and I'm
    sure the Committee, too. I know there is an Alaskan company--
    that's why it's just kind of in my mind. And I think they're
    starting this month. But, I would be very interested to see
    what that is, because that's a great--I have to commend you.
    It's a great idea to challenge the private sector for
    innovation around this, because the spill technology or spill
    cleanup has not changed much in the last 20 plus years. And so,
    challenging the industry, I think, is a great--and also,
    innovating. So, I think it would be very interesting as you
    develop the response to that, or how it comes about, if you
    could share that with the Committee, that'd be great.
        Mr. Kennedy. OK.
        Senator Begich. Let me end there, and say thank you, both,
    for being our first panel. And, again, thank you for being here
    to help us understand what more we can do, and have a future
    sense for oil spill technology.
        Again, I'll present some additional questions to you for
    the record, and we thank you both for being here.
        Admiral Zukunft. Thank you.
        Mr. Kennedy. Thank you.
        Senator Begich. The next panel, if they can get, we'll give
    a couple seconds here to get some adjustment.
        As the next panel gets situated, we thank you.
        To the second panel, we appreciate you being here.
        Again, we have four additional witnesses. And, again, some
    members here have already submitted questions for you for the
    record that you'll see soon after this meeting. So, be prepared
    for that. Several have already indicated that.
        Let me introduce the next panel.
        It's--the first one will be the honorable Grover Robinson,
    Commissioner of Escambia County in Florida; Dr. Eugene Turner,
    Chaired Professor, Distinguished Research Master, and
    Distinguished Faculty at Louisiana State University, Baton
    Rouge; Erik Milito, Group Director for Upstream Operation for
    American Petroleum Institute; and Jim Ayers, Senior Adviser,
    Ocean Conservancy.
        Thank you all very much for being here today. What I'd like
    to do is, I'm just going to go right down the row here. If you
    can keep your comments to 5 minutes, I'll have some questions
    afterwards. Again, same thing--I'll have some for the record
    that I will not be able to get to, based on our time.
        So, let me start with Mr. Robinson.

     STATEMENT OF HON. GROVER C. ROBINSON, COMMISSIONER, ESCAMBIA
                            COUNTY, FLORIDA

        Mr. Robinson. On behalf of Florida's 67 counties and, more
    specifically, the eight Gulf Coast counties in northwest
    Florida, I would like to thank Chairman Begich and the
    Committee members for the opportunity to address the Senate's
    Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard Subcommittee
    this afternoon.
        I stand before you today as a seventh generation Floridian
    and Escambia County resident. Over 200 years, my family has
    survived and thrived in Escambia County through a civil war,
    countless hurricanes, and various cycles of economic booms and
    deep recessions. However, the Deepwater Horizon spill of 2010
    has rocked our community like no other event.
        As Chairman of the Escambia County Commission, I found
    myself at the epicenter of Florida's oil spill response for the
    last 14 months. It is my experiences during that time that I
    would wish to share with your committee today for suggestions
    related to OPA reform, as well as suggestions for monies for
    Clean Water Act penalties.
        In April 2010, the United States and the Gulf Coast faced a
    crisis unlike anything we have ever seen. The tragedy that
    struck that day took 11 lives, countless jobs, and caused
    extensive damage to our coastal resources.
        Florida is experienced with disasters, and Escambia County
    is no exception. Each year we prepare and respond to hurricanes
    that threaten our homes and beaches. Florida's emergency
    response teams are the best in the country and, arguably, the
    world. City, county and State first responders practice and
    prepare year round to respond and recover from potential
    disasters.
        Shortly after the oil spill, Escambia County was given 48
    hours to prepare for oil on our beaches. Our county did what we
    were trained to do--we declared a state of emergency which
    predated the State of Florida and prepared a plan to block oil
    from entering our more fragile inland water estuaries. Within
    24 hours of Escambia County declaring our state of emergency,
    the State of Florida declared a state of emergency, and we were
    introduced to the Unified Command Structure.
        With the threat of oil imminent and a plan in place, we
    were ready to do what was needed to protect our environment
    and, ultimately, our economy. Yet, we were stopped instead, and
    told that we must accept the protection plans of experts that
    had never stepped foot in Escambia County and knew nothing
    about the tidal flows and intricacies of our bays. Now, instead
    of putting up boom and protecting Pensacola Bay and the Perdido
    Bay Passes, we were arguing with strangers about what was best
    for the local waterways.
        This system of a Federal-down approach, set up through the
    Oil Pollution Act of 1990, OPA, simply did not work in disaster
    situation. While there are many aspects of OPA that are
    effective, such as Command Structure for Federal Waters, and
    the National Resource Damage Assessment, otherwise known as
    NRDA, process, the response process in local jurisdictions must
    be changed.
        While I recognize the Stafford Act, which is implemented
    during natural disasters, could not be applied uniformly to a
    man-made disaster, there is a fundamental element that should
    be applied regardless, of the cause. It is that local experts
    need to be included in determining the response and recovery
    plans for local jurisdictions. The very people that have lived
    and made their livelihoods in their community are best suited
    to know where priorities must be placed, and what is needed to
    provide adequate protection to the environmental resources of
    that community.
        I would no more pretend to know how to adequately respond
    to an oil spill in the Gulf of Alaska, or even how to defend
    Cape San Blas in Gulf County Florida, than an outsider would
    know how to protect the gulf shores and estuaries in Escambia
    County.
        Ultimately, the oil that was 48 hours off shore actually
    ended up taking 30 days to make it to our beaches. This should
    have allowed us ample time to implement plans to protect our
    passes and waterways. Unfortunately, OPA prevented us from
    effectively implementing our plans until July, by which time
    the well was already capped. We spent the first 75 days using
    inadequate plans provided to us by Unified Command that were
    not effective and wasted money.
        My essential point today is, local government provided
    better protection to the estuaries of Perdido and Pensacola
    Bays and the citizens of Escambia County, as well as provided
    cost savings to Unified Command and even British Petroleum. The
    only thing that prevented us from this protection was OPA.
        I've said many times, including to Admiral Landry, that it
    is my belief that the Coast Guard and other Federal agencies
    were staffed with good people who wanted to do the right things
    for our community and nation. However, they were prevented by
    the rules presented in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.
    Therefore, OPA reform must be enacted to allow for more
    effective and coordinated defense of our environmental assets
    by local, State and Federal jurisdictions working together.
    Local government has a place in the planning, coordination,
    communication, and implementation of disaster strategies and
    decisions, and its omission will lead to failure, as seen in
    May and June of 2010.
        I would like to close by saying that there's still time to
    make some of this right through the NRDA process and the Clean
    Water Act.
        Through the NRDA process, NOAA, DOI, and other State
    trustees are conducting studies to identify the extent of
    resource injuries, the best methods for restoring those
    resources, and the type and amount of restoration required.
    This process so far has been inclusive and collaborative, and
    for that we are grateful.
        I'm also pleased to say that Escambia County is recovering
    and our beaches are as beautiful as they ever were. But, as
    with most tragedies, while we may recover on the outside, the
    scars never leave us.
        Prior to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, I operated a
    successful real estate business started by my late father in
    1977. Like so many other businesses, I filed and received a
    claim due to the oil spill. Yet, my business has not fully
    recovered--so much so that, ultimately, my wife and I had to
    make the hard decision to merge our, merge with another firm
    after 34 years of existence.
        I am not alone. There are countless small businesses there
    that have suffered a similar fate. Any funds received due to
    fines from the Clean Water Act should be directed to the
    coastal counties that were impacted from the spill so that
    investments can be made for the long-term recovery of this
    region and our communities, both environmentally and
    economically.
        We must take, we must now turn this disaster around and
    seize the opportunities before us. We must take the opportunity
    to learn from our mistakes and reform OPA. We must take the
    opportunity through the NRDA process to help our environment
    fully recover from the tar on our white sand. And we must take
    the opportunity to use the Clean Water Act fines to invest in
    the Gulf Coast and our economies--not just to survive this
    disaster, but to thrive in spite of it.
        Thank you for the work that each of you do for our country
    and its citizens, and thank you for the time today to hear my
    testimony.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Robinson follows:]

         Prepared Statement of Hon. Grover C. Robinson, Commissioner,
                            Escambia County, Florida
        On behalf of Florida's 67 counties, and more specifically the 8
    Gulf Coast counties in Northwest Florida, I would like to thank
    Chairman Begich and the Committee members for the opportunity to
    address the Senate Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries and Coast Guard
    Subcommittee this afternoon.
        I stand before you today as a seventh generation Floridian and
    Escambia County resident. Over nearly 200 years, my family has survived
    and thrived in Escambia County through a civil war, countless
    hurricanes, and several cycles of economic booms and deep recessions.
    However, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill of 2010 has rocked our
    community like no other event.
        As Chairman of the Escambia County Commission I found myself at the
    epicenter of Florida's oil spill response for the last 14 months. It is
    my experiences during that time that I would like to share with your
    committee today suggestions related to OPA reform, as well as
    suggestions for monies from Clean Water Act penalties.
        In April 2010, the United States and her Gulf Coast faced a crisis
    unlike anything we have ever seen. The tragedy that struck that day
    took 11 lives, cost countless jobs and caused extensive damage to our
    coastal resources.
        Florida is experienced with disasters and Escambia County is no
    exception. Each year we prepare and respond to hurricanes that threaten
    our homes and beaches. Florida's emergency response teams are the best
    in the country and arguably the world. City, county and state first
    responders practice and prepare year round to respond and recover from
    potential disasters.
        Shortly after the spill, Escambia County was given 48 hours to
    prepare for oil on our beaches. Our county then did what we were
    trained to do--we declared a state of emergency which predated the
    State of Florida and prepared a plan to block oil from entering our
    more fragile inland water estuaries. Within 24 hours of declaring our
    state of emergency, the State of Florida declared a state of emergency
    and we were introduced to the Unified Command Structure.
        With the threat of oil imminent and a plan in place we were ready
    to do what was needed to protect our environment and ultimately our
    economy. Yet, we were stopped and instead told that we must accept the
    protection plans of experts that had never even stepped foot in
    Escambia County and knew nothing about the tidal plans and intricacies
    of our bays.
        Now instead of putting up boom and protecting Pensacola Bay and the
    Perdido Bay Passes, we were arguing with strangers about what was best
    for local waterways.
        This system of a Federal-down approach set up through the Oil
    Pollution Act (OPA) simply does not work in a disaster situation. While
    there are many aspects of OPA that are effective such as Command
    Structure for Federal Waters and the National Resource Damage
    Assessment (NRDA) process, the response process for local jurisdictions
    must be changed.
        While I recognize that the Stafford Act, which is implemented
    during natural disasters, could not be applied uniformly to a man-made
    disaster, there is a fundamental element that should be applied
    regardless of the cause.
        It is that local experts that should determine the response and
    recovery plans for local jurisdictions. The very people that have lived
    and made their livelihoods in their community are best suited to know
    where the priorities must be placed and what is needed to provide
    adequate protection to the environmental resources of that community. I
    would no more pretend to know how to adequately respond to a spill in
    the Gulf of Alaska or even how to defend Cape San Blas in Gulf County
    Florida than an outsider could know how to protect the gulf shores and
    estuaries in Escambia County.
        Ultimately the oil that was 48 hours off shore actually ended up
    taking 30 days to make it to our beaches. This should have allowed us
    ample time to implement our plans to protect our passes and waterways.
    Unfortunately, OPA prevented us from effectively implementing our plans
    until July by which time the well was nearly capped. We spent the first
    75 days using inadequate plans provided to us by Unified Command that
    were not effective and wasted money.
        My essential point today is local government provided better
    protection to the estuaries of Pensacola and Perdido Bays and the
    citizens of Escambia County, as well as provided cost savings to
    Unified Command and even British Petroleum. The only thing that
    prevented us from this protection and cost savings was OPA. I have said
    many times, including to Admiral Landry, it is my belief that the Coast
    Guard and the other Federal agencies were staffed with good people who
    wanted to do the right things for our community and the nation;
    however, they were prevented by the rules presented in the Oil
    Pollution Act of 1990.
        Therefore, OPA reform must be enacted to allow a more effective and
    coordinated defense of our environmental assets by local, state and
    Federal jurisdictions working together. Local government has a place in
    the planning, coordination, communication, and implementation of
    disaster strategies and decisions and its omission will lead to failure
    as seen in May and June of 2010.
        I would like to close by saying that there is still time to make
    some of this right through the NRDA process and the Clean Water Act.
        Through the NRDA process, NOAA, DOI and other State trustees are
    conducting studies to identify the extent of resource injuries, the
    best methods for restoring those resources, and the type and amount of
    restoration required. This process so far has been inclusive and
    collaborative and for that we are grateful.
        I am also pleased to say that Escambia County is recovering and our
    beaches are as beautiful as they ever were. But as with most tragedies,
    while we may recover on the outside, the scars never leave us.
        Prior to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, I operated a successful
    real estate business started by my late father in 1977. Like so many
    other businesses I filed and received a claim due to the oil spill, yet
    my business has never recovered. So much so that ultimately, my wife
    and I made the hard decision to merge with another firm after 34 years
    of existence.
        I am not alone. There are countless small businesses out there that
    have suffered a similar fate. Any funds received due to fines from the
    Clean Water Act, should be directed to the coastal counties that were
    impacted from the spill so that investments can be made for the long
    term recovery of this region and our communities, both environmentally
    and economically.
        We must now turn this disaster around and seize the opportunities
    before us. We must take the opportunity to learn from our mistakes and
    reform OPA. We must take the opportunity through the NRDA process to
    help our environment fully recover from the tar on our white sand. And
    we must take the opportunity to use the Clean Water Act fines to invest
    in the Gulf Coast and help our economies not just survive this disaster
    but thrive in spite of it.
        Thank you for all the work you do for our country and its citizens
    and thank you for taking the time today to hear my testimony.

        Senator Begich. Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
        Mr. Turner?

                   STATEMENT OF DR. R. EUGENE TURNER,

           CHAIRED PROFESSOR, DISTINGUISHED RESEARCH MASTER,

                       LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY

        Dr. Turner. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for holding
    these hearing.
        I'm a, I do field work. I've been working this 35 years. I
    was in the marshes last week. I'll be offshore for 2 weeks as
    of Sunday. And I'm going to speak to you about what some of the
    things are in the field, as asked.
        The oil has not gone away. It's still there. You can walk
    in the marsh, and you can smell it. And the crust on the marsh
    is still there, and you can probe the marsh and come up with
    fresh oil on the end of whatever you're probing.
        It hasn't gone away. It's had its impacts in the marsh and
    offshore. We have the, kind of, the Grand Canyon, Grand Tetons
    offshore that we do not see, very few people see. But, we know
    that's been impacted, and we know there's oil on there. We know
    things have been killed. And a disproportional amount of the
    oil that went onshore was in the Central Gulf from Mexico.
    Sixty percent of the oiled shoreline is in Louisiana. I think
    70 percent of the birds that were oiled and 40 percent of the
    turtles that were oiled came off of Louisiana, so it was in the
    Central Gulf that it had these impacts. I'll come back to make
    some recommendations about what might be done the next. But,
    I'd make some comments about the context of what's happening.
        We can't say that we know very much right now because the,
    we're trying it figure out. For example, is the shoreline
    eroded more because of the oil, or just as, just a little bit
    more? Is it synergistically larger? Erosion to an area that
    already has a huge, it's already lost 22 percent of the wet
    lands? So, this is going to make it a lot larger? Or, in fact,
    maybe, it strengthened the shorelines in some cases.
        But, if you figure out that the context, you know, I am
    talking about, that a certain amount of the oil went into the
    marsh and how much is lost, and how much of the area was,
    shoreline was, it might be in the order of a few square miles a
    year that could be lost if everything went the worst possible
    way. And we're losing that much every year already--and
    primarily through the permitting programs. So, we have a very
    dramatic loss that might happen, and we have this chronic
    background loss. And I think if the restoration is taken in the
    context of what's going on as a whole, restoration could be
    done as a whole, with this background factors in mind.
        The human dimension that's going on for restoration, as we
    have understandable desires to protect the shoreline from
    hurricanes and flood protection, and that's, going, may
    require, or, being asked to require for levees, but those very
    levees will destroy some wetlands behind them. So, we're trying
    to restore wetlands, and yet we're losing wetlands in these
    conflicting desires. And I think the agreements we reach about
    that have, to have more people at the table, not fewer, and
    that includes the national agencies, the local, as the whole
    suite of things that were involved in the oil spill, of course.
    And the oil spill funds are being asked to carry some of this.
    And I guess it'd be fairly complex. And that doesn't mean we
    have to be timid about engaging in these.
        As an example of the complexity, a Pew panel who works out,
    that's making recommendations on what to do with the oil spill
    money. It'll be out in a few weeks probably. But, one of the
    things that's in there is going to be to address this issue of
    hypoxia offshore, which is a dead zone the size of
    Massachusetts and is driven mainly by eutrophication nutrient
    release from the Midwest.
        The same nutrients are driving wetland loss in Louisiana
    through the restoration technique of diverting river water into
    them, which is actually because of the--more detail than you
    want to probably hear right now--but it's causing wetland loss
    because of the nutrients in the rivers going into these
    wetlands.
        The win-win solution is for, restoring the water probably
    offshore, and for the wetland restoration technique to be used
    in a productive way, is to reduce nutrients in the river. And
    the way to use the oil spill money in that is perhaps to have a
    watershed, demonstration watersheds on the scale of the TVA
    projects. So, it could facilitate a more effective use of the
    farm bill funds, whatever allowed, and have the communities be
    allowed to use them, so the farmers actually--according to all
    the models we've done and all the work in the communities, they
    actually use fewer subsidies, have greater profits, and better
    water quality, and all the rest. And, it's totally a win-win
    solution, including local governance, and it'll be outlined in
    the Pew workshop.
        In terms of some quick observations about what's went
    wrong, or what might go better next time, one of the salient
    issues is that we have to have greater involvement, and it
    would help to have greater local involvement, understanding,
    and participation, expertise available. And there are several
    Federal programs that are underutilized in the Gulf--the
    National Estuarine Program, the National Estuarine Reserves--
    there's a series in the table in my comments. They ought to be
    used better. And, Florida and Texas have made use of these, but
    the middle three states have not, including--I think, Louisiana
    is the only state that doesn't have a National Estuarine
    Reserve Program. They probably by proportion ought to have four
    or five, and that's, if anything could be done, to help that.
    It would build local support, participation, shared governance,
    greater monitoring.
        And that's one thing that's missing out of this. We didn't
    have a good baseline monitoring going on, long-term monitoring.
    We didn't have funding when the oil spill happened. We had, we,
    it was, you can't measure impacts if you don't have pre-impact
    data. And we could not get that. The only agency that helped us
    in that is the National Science Foundation. It was unusual, but
    they did come through with some.
        And the last little detail on this is that most of the
    assessments for damages for toxicity and things like that are
    based on individual species, and they're not based on the
    interactions they all have. It may be good for the lawyers, but
    it's not--because it's very precise. You can defend the, what
    the results are. But, they don't represent reality out in the
    field. They need to have a greater sense of, a more holistic
    view of damages when they do these assessments.
        And I'm out of time, so I'll stop.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Turner follows:]

        Prepared Statement of Dr. R. Eugene Turner, Chaired Professor,
           Distinguished Research Master, Louisiana State University
        Good afternoon, Presiding Senator Begich, Chairman Rockefeller,
    Committee Ranking Member Senator Snowe, and members of the
    Subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to participate in this
    timely hearing concerning the lessons from the Gulf Oil Spill and how
    we might do things better. I will briefly address the following topics
    and remain for any questions/comments you might have time for.

       The current understanding of the short-term environmental
            effects from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill,

       The long-term degradation of the Gulf of Mexico,

       The appropriate restoration activities that should be
            undertaken, particularly by the National Oceanic and
            Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), but other entities as well,
            including in the watershed

       What is needed to improve oil spill response and restoration
            in the future.
    Background
        Oil sheens and the smell of volatile organics remain in coastal
    Louisiana 15 months after the 20 April, 2010 BP Macondo (aka, DWH;
    Deepwater Horizon) oil spill disaster began at Mississippi Canyon Block
    252, located about 66 km offshore of the Mississippi River delta. This
    disaster resulted in 13 deaths and 17 people injured, and released an
    estimated 4.4 x 106 barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico
    (804,877 barrels were also collected at the seafloor (Crone and Tolstoy
    2010). It was the largest spill event in U.S. history, equal to 7 times
    the size of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and was the fifth largest in
    the world.
        Oil from this industrial accident was first found on the Louisiana
    beaches on 11 May; fresh sightings of the oily mousse and tar balls in
    the estuaries continued after the leak was stopped using relief wells
    on 15 July and officially declared closed on 19 September 2010.
        The Louisiana coastal ecosystems were disproportionately exposed to
    the released oil (Table 1). It had the highest percentage of its
    lengthy shoreline oiled (45 percent) resulting in 60 percent of the
    oiled shoreline in the GOM. The majority of the recovered oiled birds,
    turtles and mammals were in the three central states, and 70 percent of
    the recovered oiled birds were from Louisiana.
        Table 1. Indicators of oil spill exposure and impact in the GOM
    States. These metrics indicate that Louisiana had the greatest onshore
    exposure and impact by oil.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                             West Coast
          Indicators       --------------    AL       MS       LA       TX
                                 FL
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Percent of the GOM              30%       4%       2%      45%      20%
     Tidal shoreline in
     State
    Oiled Shoreline of               3%      15%      44%       8%       0%
     State shoreline
    Turtles oiled (live             16%      40%       4%      40%       0%
     and dead)
    Mammals oiled (live             17%       0%      67%      17%       0%
     and dead)
    Birds oiled (live and           11%       8%      11%      70%       0%
     dead)
    Percent of the oiled            16%       9%      15%      60%       0%
     GOM shoreline found
     in this State
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Sources: http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/oilspill/turtle_data.pdf;
      http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/oilspill/cetacean _data.pdf;http://
      www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/
      Consolidated%20 Wildlife%20Table%20110210.pdf.

    Current Understanding
    Natural Systems
        The ongoing research results that I am aware of document damages to
    fish, birds, marsh, coral, and bottom-dwelling organisms, and changes
    in food webs. Oil on the sea surface injured or killed seabirds, sea
    turtles and dolphins, put at risk many commercially valuable marine
    organisms, such as blue-fin tuna, blue crabs, penaeid shrimps, and many
    fish. Shorebirds, tourists, and fisher(wo)men were harmed. Seafood was
    contaminated, and oyster reefs destroyed. Deep-sea organisms on hard-
    and soft-sediment habitats died from apparent oil deposition within
    some as yet undetermined distance from the wellhead.

        The results from studies examining other oil spills suggests that
    the oil making its way into coastal ecosystems will persist for decades
    (Reddy et al., 2002). Its ecological effects may be immediately toxic
    to a variety of organisms, and the long-term effects last several
    decades (Teal et al., 1992; Culbertson et al., 2007a, b). Any damage
    incurred is expected to be dependent on exposure length and frequency.
    Recovery is possible, but not guaranteed. This is because, in part, oil
    quality changes with temperature, volatilization, and decomposition,
    and moved between ocean, estuary and marsh as droplets, tar balls, a
    brownish mouse with colorful descriptive names, or ``mousse''. This oil
    might coat the emergent wetland plants up to the high water mark or
    weigh them down as far as 10 m into the marsh. Its effects might
    combine with other influences to have a synergistic and maladaptive
    outcome. A series of cascading effects on the plant-dependent food web
    are expected to follow from these impacts.
        The ecosystem consequences of exposures to and incorporation of
    toxicants at the base of the pelagic food chains and the massive
    organic carbon subsidy to the shallow and deep ocean remain uncertain,
    requiring new advances in oil spill oceanography to assess. The
    illumination of the indirect impacts and the dismissal of many presumed
    impacts will play out for decades in the scientific literature, in
    government reports, and in the courts.
        A major coastal problem in Louisiana is to reduce wetland loss
    rates and to restore wetlands. Twenty-two percent of the wetlands
    existing in 1930 are now open water. These losses are primarily a
    consequence of dredge and fill operations, which were permitted by
    State and Federal agencies. It took 8,000 years to build these marshes,
    and so 22 percent of the wetland represents 1720 years of net land
    building. It is hard to see how to restore these wetlands faster than
    the natural system builds them, and so preventing more losses is
    extremely cost-effective. It is reasonable to ask if this oil spill
    accelerated these losses. I estimated how much this might be based on
    the penetration of oil into the oiled shoreline to address this
    question and estimate that there will be far more wetland loss (direct
    and indirect) from the annual dredge and fill permitting every year
    than from this one oil spill over the next 10 years. The chronic demise
    of the marsh may be more significant than the losses due to a one-time
    dramatic oil spill.
    The Human Dimensions
        These impacts took place in an ecosystem and socio-political system
    that already had many significant ``stressors,'' including: (1) intense
    hurricanes arising from global climate change exposes the Gulf coast to
    greater risks of catastrophic flooding, shoreline erosion, sea-level
    rise, (2) marsh channelization from petroleum-industry activities, (3)
    excessive nutrient (largely N) loading from agriculture and other
    anthropogenic sources extending into the Mississippi River watershed,
    (4) the exploitation of apex predators like sharks and blue-fin tuna,
    (5) bottom trawling and dredging, (6) industrial development, including
    petroleum production and refining, (7) failure to treat and control
    storm water and atmospheric emissions that have led to the introduction
    of mercury and other heavy metals and organic pollutants like dioxin,
    DDT, and PCBs into the Gulf. In addition, development of low-lying
    lands and coastal barriers has degraded and destroyed shoreline
    habitats and led to engineering of structural responses and dredge-and-
    fill projects to protect housing and infrastructure at risk, but such
    responses interfere with natural roll-over and transgression of barrier
    islands and resilience of natural shoreline habitats.
        This set of conditions poses extreme socio-economic challenges: how
    can resilience of human communities, culture, and ecosystems be
    sustained or created when maintaining coastal residency increasingly
    risks property and life, yet retreating inland by entire communities
    challenges the fabric and glue of social cohesion and place-based
    history?
    Synergisms
        There were synergisms between the existing stressors and the oil
    spill. The State, for example, opened river diversions and this killed
    oyster beds; businesses closed that had been around for 100 years. It
    was the cumulative effect of the ill-informed State government, the
    threat of oil impacts, that finally forced them out of business for the
    first time in 100 years. The diversion volume would not have been as
    high and for the length of time, in my opinion, if the oil spill was
    not occurring. The State neglected the oyster fishermen, ignored
    scientists, and over-reacted because of some perceived need to open the
    diversions as much as possible.
        There was (is) shoreline erosion before the oil spill, but I don't
    know that the combination of shoreline erosion and overzealous oil
    clean up caused more wetland loss than each operating separately. I
    suspect that is the case, but don't know it to be true. They would not
    have done some of the inappropriate things they did if it were not an
    oil spill.
    Restoration in Context
    Principles
        Addressing the impacts of the DWH oil spill should be integrated
    into a holistic understanding of how all stressors may potentially
    combine to destabilize the ecosystem by passing through a critical
    threshold and into an undesirable state of the system. Restoration
    should be holistic, not piecemeal, and should be durable and
    sustainable under the conditions of dynamic change expected in the Gulf
    for over a century and longer. Traditional tests of restoration
    appropriateness of ``in-place'' and ``in-kind'' are likely to fail the
    criteria for sustainability under a changing climate, rising sea level,
    and more intensely stormy regime.
        Below are a few simple operating principles that may help avoid
    potentially fatal flaws of logic, administration lapses, and financial
    waste (adapted from Turner 2009).

            (1) Assume that key pieces of information are missing and may
            not be revealed (ever);

            (2) Because of the collective and respected ignorance, be
            flexible in how to develop, evaluate and apply new information
            and perspectives; learn how to create the context for that new
            situation;

            (3) Include many small steps that are addressed in multiple
            ways;

            (4) Let data trump concepts, not the reverse. If ``the bigger,
            the better'' is the operating model, then the model is likely
            to be superficially abstract (this is not to dispute the need
            for hierarchy or a division of labor);

            (5) Assume that surprises will occur;

            (6) Develop exit strategies, including how to reverse
            interventions;

            (7) Do no harm; do not implement plans that will be
            irreversible if they go awry; If irreversible outcomes are
            anticipated, then start with the smallest plans, not the
            largest ones.
    Pew Panel Recommendations
        A workshop panel was recently completed under sponsorship of the
    Pew Foundation to make recommendations about the long-term
    sustainability of the Gulf of Mexico within the context of the DWH oil
    spill. I am one of 15 authors of this report. The report (Peterson et
    al., 2011) offers guidance on how funds from the Deepwater Horizon
    Blowout might be used for restoration. This report is due to be
    completed within 2 months and contains the following relevant
    recommendations about priority areas for restoration of the Gulf of
    Mexico following the DWH oil spill.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Restore water quality and damaged habitats
    Restore habitats directly and indirectly damaged by the oil release;
    Demonstrate transformative farming in Mississippi Basin to reduce
     nutrient loading;
    Remove marine, estuarine, and riverine debris and inhibit future
     discards;
    Restore water flows, water quality, riparian habitats, and ecosystem
     services of smaller rivers.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Rebuild fish stocks and wildlife populations by protecting habitat
     functions
    Purchase and preserve functionally valuable habitat for fish and
     wildlife sanctuaries;
    Protect habitat and implement recovery plan actions for injured species;
    Sustain and enforce existing Federal legislative habitat, fish, and
     wildlife protections;
    Create networks of protected habitats to enhance fish stocks and
     valuable species;
    Manage Gulf fisheries sustainably by recognizing ecosystem processes.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Make the Gulf coast resilient--A single integrated human and natural
     system
    Investigate deep-sea oil fate and injury to allow restoration of
     ecosystem services;
    Determine full impact of oil on, and restore, Sargassum and associated
     fish and wildlife;
    Engage Gulf communities to adapt to increasing coastal inundation--while
     sustaining fish and wildlife;
    Assess with rigor the potential fishery benefits of trawling protections
     of shelf bottom;
    Endow capacity building of GoM in social-environmental monitoring and
     problem solving;
    Communicate within communities to inspire informed environmental
     decisions.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Example--Hypoxia (aka ``Dead Zone'')
        Hypoxia (dissolved oxygen < 2 mg l-1) is a symptom of
    too many nutrients in the water. Hypoxia is a growing problem worldwide
    (Rabalais et al., 2010), and the extent and persistence of hypoxia on
    the continental shelf of the northern Gulf of Mexico makes the Gulf of
    Mexico `Dead Zone' one of the most extensive manifestations of
    anthropogenic coastal nutrient over-enrichment (Figure 1). Systematic
    mapping and monitoring of the area of hypoxia in bottom waters began in
    1985 (Rabalais 2002. An Integrated Assessment (CENR 2000) of the
    causes, consequences and actions needed to reduce hypoxia was completed
    and a 2008 Action Plan for Reducing, Mitigating, and Controlling
    Hypoxia in the Northern Gulf of Mexico (Mississippi River/Gulf of
    Mexico Watershed Nutrient Task Force 2001) was endorsed by Federal
    agencies, states and tribal governments.

        Several models have summarized various relationships between the
    river loading of nitrogen and the severity of the hypoxic zone
    (Rabalais et al., 2007). These models link the area of hypoxia and
    nutrient loading, and support the key component of the management
    action, which is to reduce nutrient loading to the Gulf of Mexico so
    that the average hypoxic area in summer is 5,000 km2 or less by 2015.
        Reducing nutrient loading to the GOM can happen with `win-win'
    outcomes if the agricultural communities are constructively involved in
    more flexible ways than presently allowed. We propose the creation of a
    network of research and demonstration projects that will establish and
    evaluate new bio-economic enterprises based on multi-functional
    production systems. This program will help develop and refine Federal
    farm-bill policy by using existing subsidies, but applied in regional-
    specific ways. The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Restoration funds would
    be the catalyst for this change.
        Administrative bodies that integrate across political, economic,
    and social boundaries (Roux et al., 2008) will be required to
    successfully apply management practices in ecological units stretching
    from small upland watersheds to coastal waters. To address problems of
    this magnitude requires working in watersheds at sufficiently large
    temporal and spatial scales to match the needs of the farming
    communities. These ``demonstration'' watersheds would be used to
    improve outcomes arising from the relationships between farm policies,
    on-the-ground outcomes, and environmental benefits or consequences that
    are suggested as benefits by others (e.g., Jordan et al., 2007; Batie,
    2009). In particular, the Farm Bill should provide the agricultural R&D
    infrastructure with incentives to evaluate multi-functional production
    as a basis for a sustainable agricultural bio-economy. We judge that
    this can be done with very modest public investments (ca. $10 million
    annually x 5 sites x 25 years). A variety of strong political
    constituencies now expects a very different set of outputs from
    agriculture, and the U.S. farm landscapes. The cooperation of NOAA,
    EPA, USDA and others is important for this to succeed in the existing
    mosaic of balkanized jurisdictional mandates.
        A key positive outcome of this proposed effort involves how river
    diversions are used to restore Louisiana's wetlands. The diversions are
    causing more wetland loss, not less (Kearney et al., 2011) in the
    organic soils lining the flanks of the lower Mississippi River. We
    suggest that their vulnerability to storms reflects the introduction of
    nutrients in the diversions (that add insignificant amounts of
    additional sediments), which promotes poor rhizome and root growth in
    marshes and oxidizes the existing soils. Improving water quality
    through implementation of sustainable farming practices will keep
    working farms working (and with better profits), decrease the size of
    the Dead Zone, and improve prospects for wetland restoration.
    Example--Conflicting Agendas
        A number of daunting restoration issues existed even before the BP
    oil disaster. Louisiana's legal integration of coastal restoration and
    hurricane protection in 2005 still left the issue of how to prioritize
    between these two necessities unresolved. The Comprehensive Master Plan
    for a Sustainable Coast (2007) is primarily a summary of major options
    and alternatives for restoration and protection.\1\ Neither the Master
    Plan nor the LaCPR Report (2010) provides the final decisions on which
    specific alternatives to choose.\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Integrated Ecosystem Restoration and Hurricane Protection:
    Louisiana's Comprehensive Master Plan for a Sustainable Coast, 2007;
    http://www.lacpra.org/.
        \2\ LaCPR Final Technical Report, 2009, U.S. Army Corps of
    Engineers, http://lacpr.usace
    .army.mil/default.aspx?p=LACPR_Final_Technical_Report. The National
    Research Council Review Team noted that the LaCPR Report ``produced no
    actionable project recommendations.'' Final Report from the NRC
    Committee on the Review of the Louisiana Coastal Protection and
    Restoration (LACPR) Program, 2009; p. 11; http://www.nap.edu/
    openbook.php?record_id
    =12708&page=11.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        One problematic decision involves the large new levee systems being
    planned for the Louisiana coast. These systems would consist of
    continuous levees, with a number of hydraulic gates to allow or block
    tidal flow, which would be closed to keep out storm surge. The
    construction of these levees would, essentially, wall off the coast,
    and cause more wetland loss. People are being polite about it, but make
    no mistake, wetland restoration will be compromised if these levees are
    built. These are not abstract issues, because some coastal parishes,
    with state approval and funding, have constructed sections of the
    Morganza to the Gulf levee system.\3\ Louisiana cannot afford to
    complete the entire project itself, it is expected that state and local
    officials plan to ask the Federal Government to perform this function
    at some point in the future.\4\ Fungible BP oil spill funds could well
    be sought to pay for these projects.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ N. Buskey, ``2010 will see unprecedented levee spending,''
    Houma Courier, December 26, 2009, http://www.houmatoday.com/article/
    20091227/ARTICLES/912269966.
        \4\ M. Brossette, ``Morganza's J-2 work to begin soon,'' Tri-Parish
    Times, September 16, 2009; http://www.tri-parishtimes.com/articles/
    2009/09/16/news/106_51_morganzapg1.eml.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In addition, both the existing sea-level rise and the acceleration
    of sea level rise from climate change puts major Gulf cities like New
    Orleans and Houston at risk of flooding. When hurricanes are added to
    this mix, then the long-term human occupation of the Mississippi delta
    and coastal shorelines of all Gulf states becomes problematic. There
    have also been attempts to decouple the climate and coastal issues that
    should not escape national scrutiny. While Louisiana is not the only
    state to oppose the EPA's Endangerment Finding of greenhouse gases, it
    is the only one asking for an estimated $60-$100 billion in Federal
    funds to restore and protect its coast.
        Resolution of these issues is critically important to create
    sustainable systems. Federal resources, leadership and participation
    are (still) essential to optimizing fruitful outcomes.
    Improving Future Oil Spill Response and Restoration
        The status quo is not enough, and never will be in a changing
    world. The existing resources for adaptation might be supplemented by
    the fines and legal settlement from this spill, that are projected to
    be as large as $20 billion, which is equivalent to $320 per capita for
    the GOM states. These are significant funds that can be spent to
    prevent or reduce the unknown consequences of past, present and future
    actions. They can be invested in the natural system capital supporting
    sustainable systems, or used inefficiently as fungible funds spent for
    projects with short-term goals in mind. They can be used to create the
    knowledge and experience to deal effectively with the unknown. Here are
    three areas that need attention to improve the status quo.
        (1) Increase rapid funding: There was an undeniable lack of quick-
    response funding to determine baseline conditions before the oil spread
    out from the wellhead, and just after it polluted an area. The National
    Science Foundation is the only agency that spent quick-reaction funds
    in a merit- reviewed way to figure out what was happening. It was a
    hectic process and could have been faster if funded adequately, but
    these NSF funds allowed people with expertise, local knowledge, and
    limited appearances of conflicted interests to get into the field
    quickly. We were left to our own devices to get around the
    administrative obstacles offered by State and Federal agencies, and
    from the industry consultants seemingly in charge for too long. But we
    could not have been nimble without these quick-reaction funds. These
    options need to be encouraged for the next spill, the next unexpected
    set of circumstances, and the next unexpected event.
        (2) Expand the long-term observations of natural systems: Measuring
    impacts and creating a baseline against which to measure restoration
    requires long-term measurements, and not just in one location, but
    many. These science-based observations need to be encouraged through
    funding and accomplished by independent scientists that can append
    additional inquiries onto them. I recommend that any funds from the
    polluting party that funds science studies by academics, are not to be
    used by academics (or non-profits) if they are involved in the NRDA or
    BP assessments. The USGS has this policy and it is a good one that
    maintains a high standard viz a viz the appearance of conflicting
    allegiances.
        (3) Improve the NRDA capabilities for field-based assessments: For
    the most part, the current NRDA process does not have the necessary
    tools and experience to evaluate ocean ecosystem impacts and lacks the
    capacity for rigorous testing of dispersant effectiveness or toxicity
    in natural systems. The clumsy laboratory tests used in this process
    may meet the needs of the legal system, but they are fairly useless in
    telling about the in situ impacts. An NRC panel assessment is
    recommended.
        (4) Expand infrastructure support: Several Federal programs,
    including NOAA programs, support infrastructure for education, policy
    development, public support and research in coastal affairs. Some of
    these are listed in Table 2. Some states have taken advantage of these
    program, while others have not. They are usually incredibly inexpensive
    programs and demonstrably effective, like pre-emptive educational
    initiatives almost always are. Most of these offer shared governance
    with the local, regional and State governing bodies. All have been
    operational for > 20 years. Expansion of these programs will enhance
    the quality and quantity of the response to the next oil spill, the
    sustainability of coastal systems, and raise the quality of life and
    livelihood of coastal residents.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify and for your time.
                                   Attachment
        Table 2. Indices of educational and research coastal infrastructure
    in the GOM: marine laboratories, coastal reserves, conservation zones,
    and State/Federal partnerships. Data are normalized per shoreline
    length to facilitate comparisons. SAML is the professional organization
    of non-Federal marine laboratories. The others (NEP, NERR, NPS, NMS)
    are federally-supported programs, some of which are co-managed with
    State entities. These metrics indicate that the strongest
    infrastructure is in Texas and Florida, and the weakest in Louisiana.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                         West
         Program     ------------     AL         MS         LA         TX
                       coast FL
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1. Southern
     Association of
     Marine
     Laboratories
     (SAML)
      (a) # Members          20          1          2          1         11
      (b) Km                410        977        289     12,431        492
       shoreline per
       member410
    2. National
     Estuarine
     Program (EPA/
     State)
      (a) #                   3          1          0          2          5
       Estuaries
      (b) Km2 Area       19,969    115,467          0     15,769    129,293
      (c) Km2 per Km        2.4        118        0.0        1.3         24
       shoreline
    3. National
     Estuarine
     Research
     Reserves (NOAA)
      (a) # Reserves          2          1          1          0          1
      (b)Km5/8 area       1,158         19         75          0        752
      (c) Km2 per           141         20        129          0        139
       1000 Km
       shoreline
    4. National               5          1          1          1          0
     Parks on
     coastline
     (interior)
    5. National               1          0          0          0          1
     Marine
     Sanctuaries
     (NOAA)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Notes: 1. http://www.naml.org;
    2. http://www.epa.gov/owow_keep/estuaries/programs/gom.html;
    3. http://www.nerrs.noaa.gov/;
    4. Park Boundaries overlap the State boundaries;
    5. http://sanctuaries.noaa.gov.

    References
        Batie, S.S. 2009. Green payments and the U.S. Farm Bill:
    Information and policy challenges. Front. Ecol. Environ. 7: 380-388.
        Boody, G., B. Vondracek, D.A. Andow, M. Krinke, J. Westra, J.
    Zimmermann, and P. Welle 2005. Multifunctional agriculture in the
    United States. BioScience 55: 27-38.
        CENR (Committee on Environment and Natural Resources) 2000.
    Integrated assessment of hypoxia in the northern Gulf of Mexico.
    National Science and Technology Council, Washington, D.C.
        Crone, T.J. and M. Tolstoy 2010. Magnitude of the 2010 Gulf of
    Mexico oil leak. Science 330: 634-635.
        Culbertson, J.B., I. Valiela, Y.S. Olsen, and C.M. Reddy 2007a.
    Effect of field exposure to 38-year-old residual petroleum hydrocarbons
    on growth, condition index, and filtration rate of the ribbed mussel,
    Geukensia demissa. Environmental Pollution 154: 312-319.
        Culbertson, J.B., I. Valiela, E.E. Peacock, C.M. Reddy, A. Carter,
    and R. VanderKruik 2007b. Long-term biological effects of petroleum
    residues on fiddler crabs in salt marshes. Marine Pollution Bulletin
    54: 955-962.
        Jordan, N., G. Boody, W. Broussard, J.D. Glover, D. Keeney, B.H.
    McCowan, G. McIsaac, M. Muller, H. Murray, J. Neal, C. Pansing, R.E.
    Turner, K.D. Warner, and D.L. Wyse 2007. Sustainable development of the
    agricultural bio-economy. Science 316: 1570-1571.
        Kearney, M.S., A. Riter, and R.E. Turner 2011. Freshwater
    diversions in marsh restoration in Louisiana: Twenty-six years of
    change in vegetation coverage and marsh area in three diversions.
    Geophysical Research Letters in revision.
        Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico Watershed Nutrient Task Force
    2001. Action plan for reducing, mitigating, and controlling hypoxia in
    the northern Gulf of Mexico. 36 pages. U.S. Environmental Protection
    Agency, Office of Wetlands, Oceans and Watersheds, Washington, D.C.
        Nassauer, J., M.V. Santelmann, and D. Scavia (Eds.) 2007. From the
    corn belt to the gulf: societal and environmental implications of
    alternative agricultural futures; Johns Hopkins University Press/
    Resources for the Future: Baltimore, MD.
        NOAA 1991. Coastal wetlands of the United States: an accounting of
    a national resource base. National Oceanic and Atmospheric
    Administration Rep. 91-3. 59 pp.
        Peterson, C.H., F.C. Coleman, J.B.C. Jackson, R.E. Turner, G.T.
    Rowe, R.T. Barber, K.A. Bjorndal, R.S. Carney, R.K. Cowen, J.M.
    Hoekstra, J.T. Hollibaugh, S.B. Laska, R.A. Luettich, Jr., C.W.
    Osenberg, S.E. Roady, S. Senner, J.M. Teal, and P. Wang 2011. A Once
    and Future Gulf of Mexico Ecosystem. Report from a Pew Commission Panel
    on the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. In press.
        Rabalais, N.N., R.E. Turner, B.K. Sen Gupta, D.F. Boesch, P.
    Chapman, and M.C. Murrell 2007. Hypoxia in the northern Gulf of Mexico:
    Does the science support the plan to reduce, mitigate, and control
    hypoxia? Estuaries and Coasts 30:753-772.
        Rabalais, N.N., R.J. D!az, L.A. Levin, R.E. Turner, D. Gilbert, and
    J. Zhang 2010. Dynamics and distribution of natural and human-caused
    hypoxia. Biogeosciences 7: 585-619.
        Roux, D. J., P. J. Ashton, J. L. Nel, and H. M. MacKay. 2008.
    Improving cross-sector policy integration and cooperation in support of
    freshwater conservation. Conservation Biology 22: 1382-1387.
        SAB (Science Advisory Board) 2007. Hypoxia in the northern Gulf of
    Mexico, An Update. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Science
    Advisory Board (SAB) Hypoxia Panel Advisory, Report EPA-SAB-08-003,
    Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C.,
        Teal, J.M., J.W. Farrington, K.A. Burns, J.J. Stegeman, B.W. Tripp,
    B. Woodin, and C. Phinney 1992. The West Falmouth oil spill after 20
    years: Fate of fuel oil compounds and effects on animals. Marine
    Pollution Bulletin 24: 607-614.
        Turner, R.E. 2009. Doubt and the values of an ignorance-based world
    view for wetland restoration: Coastal Louisiana. Estuaries and Coasts
    32: 1054-1068.

        Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Dr. Turner.
        Mr. Milito?

               STATEMENT OF ERIK MILITO, GROUP DIRECTOR,

                   UPSTREAM AND INDUSTRY OPERATIONS,

                      AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE

        Mr. Milito. Good afternoon, Chairman Begich, and Senator
    Rubio.
        I'm Erik Milito, Upstream Director at the American
    Petroleum Institute.
        API has more than 470 member companies which represent all
    sectors of America's oil and natural gas industry. Our industry
    supports 9.2 million American jobs, including 170,000 in the
    Gulf of Mexico related to the offshore development business. It
    also provides most of the energy we need to power our economy
    and way of life, and delivers more than $86 million a day in
    revenue to the Federal Government.
        It's now been more than a year since the tragic Macondo
    well accident. We cannot forget that the industry and the
    Nation lost 11 workers that day, and our thoughts and prayers
    continue to go out to the families of those workers. To be
    certain, the incident has provided us with a sobering reminder:
    We must maintain a laser focus on safety as a priority in
    operations.
        Immediately after the accident, the industry formed task
    forces to examine every aspect of offshore safety systems,
    including equipment, operating practices, subsea well control,
    and spill response. Due to the leadership and work of the
    industry, we now have enhanced capabilities in each of the key
    areas--prevention, capping and containment, and spill response.
        As an industry, we recognize that the most effective oil
    spill response is to prevent it from ever happening in the
    first place. Therefore, a great deal of attention has always
    been placed on prevention. The recommendations developed by the
    industry task forces form the basis of some of the regulations
    we have now on prevention. These include requirements for
    maintaining multiple barriers during well construction,
    implementation of various new testing requirements during
    drilling operations, and adoption of API Recommended Practice
    65, Part 2, on so many.
        In addition, the industry is currently developing API
    Recommended Practice 96, which will help improve deepwater well
    design and installation practices, as well as Bulletin 97,
    which is a joint effort between API and the International
    Association of Drilling Contractors, intended to help link--
    improve the link between the safety system of the drilling
    contractor with the safety system of the lease operator.
        Representatives of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management,
    Regulation and Enforcement participate in the standard setting
    activities, and about 100 of the API documents are referenced
    in the BOEMRE regulations.
        Also, the industry is putting the final pieces in place for
    its new Center for Offshore Safety, which we will have up and
    running later this year. The Center will focus on the
    development and implementations of safety and environmental
    management systems in deepwater operations, drawing on the
    collective knowledge and experience of the industry, and
    promoting use of the best safety practices.
        However, should an incident occur, preparedness becomes a
    key factor in determining the effectiveness of a response. In
    the post-Macondo world, the industry has invested significant
    resources in the development of a capping and containment
    solution to stop the blowout at its source. These efforts,
    which include the Marine Well Containment Company and the Helix
    Well Containment Group, will ensure the industry can quickly
    cap and contain a leaking well.
        In terms of spill response, the actions taken following the
    Macondo incident effectively minimized the impact to the
    environment and ecosystem. The spill itself was unprecedented.
    But, with close to 50,000 people, 9,700 vessels, 13.5 million
    feet of boom, 125 planes, and several rigs, so was the
    response. A substantial contingent continues to be on scene to
    remediate any potential affected areas.
        While preliminary reports have shown that the impacts to
    the shoreline, seafood, and vitality of the area are
    significantly less than what was anticipated, the long-term
    impacts will continue to be monitored and studied. Moving
    forward, industry is committed to review the entire spill
    response system, identify any potential gaps, and address where
    necessary. We've initiated this review on issues such as
    dispersants, in-situ burning, and mechanical recovery. This
    review effort involves both U.S. and international
    stakeholders. It is open to the entire industry, covers both
    Gulf and Alaska activities, and it seeks government input into
    the program.
        Great strides have been made to enhance the industry's
    capability to prevent an incident from happening, to cap and
    contain a leaking well, and to respond to a spill, and we're
    committed to building on this progress. But, we are also
    prepared to safely and fully resume operations in the Gulf,
    Alaska, and other areas. If permitting moves forward at a
    reasonable pace for projects in the Gulf alone, then we can put
    190,000 more people to work, safely bring more of the Gulf's
    vitally needed energy to America's consumers, and deliver many
    billions of dollars in additional revenue to our Federal
    treasury.
        Thank you. This concludes my statements. I'll be happy to
    take any questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Milito follows:]

        Prepared Statement of Erik Milito, Group Director, Upstream and
               Industry Operations, American Petroleum Institute
        Good afternoon Chairman Begich, Ranking Member Snowe, and members
    of the Subcommittee.
        I am Erik Milito, Upstream Director at the American Petroleum
    Institute. API has more than 470 member companies, which represent all
    sectors of America's oil and natural gas industry. Our industry
    supports 9.2 million American jobs, including 170,000 in the Gulf of
    Mexico related to the offshore development business. It also provides
    most of the energy we need to power our economy and way of life, and
    delivers more than $86 million a day in revenue to the Federal
    Government.
        It's now been more than a year since the tragic Macondo well
    accident. We cannot forget that the industry and the Nation lost 11
    workers that day, and our thoughts and prayers continue to go out to
    the families of those workers. To be certain, the incident has provided
    us with a sobering reminder that we must maintain a laser focus on
    safety as the priority in operations.
        Immediately after the accident, the industry formed task forces to
    examine every aspect of offshore safety systems, including equipment,
    operating practices, sub-seal well control, and spill response. Due to
    the leadership and work of the industry, we now have enhanced
    capabilities in each of the key areas: prevention, capping and
    containment, and spill response.
        As an industry, we recognize that the most effective oil spill
    response is to prevent it from ever happening in the first place.
    Therefore, a great deal of attention has always been placed on
    prevention. The recommendations developed by the industry task forces
    formed the basis of some of the regulations on prevention that we now
    see. These include requirements for maintaining multiple barriers
    during well construction, implementation of various new testing
    requirements during drilling operations, and adoption of API
    Recommended Practice 65 Part 2, which focuses on zone isolation in
    wells and preventing and controlling flows in cementing operations. In
    addition, the industry is currently developing API Recommended Practice
    96, which will help improve deepwater well design and installation
    practices, and Bulletin 97, a joint effort of API and the International
    Association of Drilling Contractors, intended to help link the safety
    system of the drilling contractor with the safety system of the lease
    operator.
        Representatives of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management,
    Regulations and Enforcement participate in the development of our
    standards, and about 100 are referenced in the BOEMRE regulations.
        Also, the industry is putting the final pieces in place on its new
    Center for Offshore Safety, which we will have up and running later in
    the year. The center will focus on the development and implementation
    of safety and environmental management systems in deepwater operations,
    drawing on the collective knowledge and experience of the industry and
    promoting use of the best safety practices.
        Should an incident occur, preparedness becomes a key factor in
    determining the effectiveness of a response. In the post-Macondo world,
    the industry has invested significant resources in the development of a
    capping and containment solution to stop the blowout at its source.
    These efforts, which include the Marine Well Containment Company and
    the Helix Well Containment Group, will ensure the industry can quickly
    cap and contain a leaking well.
        In terms of spill response, the actions taken following the Macondo
    incident effectively minimized the impact to the environment and
    ecosystem. The spill itself was unprecedented, but with close to 50,000
    people, about 9,700 vessels, 13.5 million feet of boom, 125 planes, and
    several rigs so was the response. A substantial contingent continues to
    be on scene to remediate any potential affected areas. While
    preliminary reports have shown that the impacts to the shoreline,
    seafood and vitality of the area are significantly less than what was
    anticipated, the long-term impacts will continue to be monitored and
    studied.
        Moving forward, industry has committed to review the entire spill
    response system, identify any potential gaps and address where
    necessary. We have initiated this review on issues such as dispersants,
    in-situ burning, and mechanical recovery. This review effort involves
    both U.S. and international stakeholders; it is open to the entire
    industry; it covers both Gulf and Alaska activities, and it seeks
    government input in the program.
        Great strides have been made to enhance the industry's capability
    to prevent an incident from happening, to cap and contain a leaking
    well, and to respond to a spill, and we're committed to building on
    this progress. But we are also prepared to safely and fully resume
    operations in the Gulf, Alaska and other areas. The government needs to
    issue leases, and approve and permit projects, without unreasonable
    delay. If permitting moves forward at a reasonable pace for projects in
    the Gulf, then we can put 190,000 more people to work, safely bring
    more of the Gulf's vitally needed energy to America's consumers, and
    deliver many billions of dollars in additional revenue to our Federal
    treasury.
        Thank you. That concludes my statement.

        Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mr. Milito.
        Let me move to Mr. Ayers, and then we'll go into questions.

     STATEMENT OF JIM AYERS, SENIOR ADVISOR AND CONSULTANT, OCEAN
                              CONSERVANCY

        Mr. Ayers. Chairman Begich. Senator Rubio, thank you for
    the invitation to be here today.
        I'm testifying today in my capacity as a Senior Advisor and
    Consultant to the Ocean Conservancy, although I have other
    conservation clients as well.
        The Ocean Conservancy is a national marine conservation
    organization of scientists and citizens and volunteers that
    promote a healthy ocean, and have done so for over 40 years,
    and headquartered here in D.C.
        My testimony will address three things: First, prevention
    preparedness and response, and recommendations with regard to
    my experience in Deepwater Horizon and Exxon Valdez; second,
    restoration; and third, a brief sentence in reference to the
    Arctic, and what I believe is an imperative approach.
        Among many other things, I served as the Executive Director
    of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, and led the
    effort to develop and implement a comprehensive restoration
    plan. I later became Chief of Staff, where I supported that
    plan and moved forward with preparedness, including issues that
    were mentioned earlier by Senator Cantwell, like shipping, and
    continued preparedness and prevention.
        In short, we are not prepared. We are not yet committed to
    prevention. And the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, though it is
    done a lot of good, has significant holes and, in particular,
    with regard to response.
        Here are my recommendations of how to fix the problem.
    First, we must integrate spill prevention and preparedness into
    the oil and gas decision-making process. Congress should
    mandate the baseline science and an understanding of the marine
    ecosystem in which we intend to drill is fully understood. That
    informed decisions about if we should drill, when, where and
    how, are based on science.
        It also means giving a stronger role to the expert agencies
    like NOAA and the Coast Guard. And, as was aforementioned,
    they're insufficiently not funded and not given the authority
    to incorporate true worst case scenarios into the planning
    process.
        We must require the best available technology in
    engineering to be brought forward into the process. That is
    currently not a mandate under OPA 1990, and I participated in
    that and find myself guilty. It is our responsibility to bring
    the best and brightest of America to bear on this project and
    on this issue of offshore drilling, and we have not done so.
        Second, we need to step up our game with respect to spill
    response. Government regulators and industry operators must
    ensure and demonstrate that they have trained personnel and
    equipment sufficient to contain, control, and clean up a worst
    case discharge. As you heard earlier, the cascading approach of
    bring supplies, equipment and personnel from other states and
    other nations is insufficient in protecting our Nation's ocean
    resources.
        The Coast Guard must be authorized and funded to ensure
    that responsible parties' oil spill response plans and area
    contingency plans are, in fact, in place and comply with the
    National Contingency Plan. Based on your question earlier,
    although it's suggested in the National Contingency Plan of how
    it should operate, it is not mandated, nor is it in place
    today.
        Third, Congress must commit the financial resources
    necessary to ensure that agencies like the Coast Guard and NOAA
    can do their job. I humbly suggest that a small increase in the
    per barrel tax that funds the Oil Spill Liability and Trust
    Fund would provide the funding necessary to ensure that
    responsibilities are met and, in fact, would be a certain
    provision that would allow and ensure that America can comply
    with the requirements of preparedness, prevention, and
    response.
        It's America's oil, America's oceans. Oil companies sell
    oil. It's the Government's responsibility to ensure that the
    public trust is protected.
        Let's move quickly to restoration. Restoration is becoming
    a part of our culture and our economy from the tundra to the
    Gulf and from Yellowstone to Chesapeake, this country is
    engaged in restoration, and will be for the rest of this
    generation.
        I'm pleased the restoration planning is moving forward in
    the Gulf, with the Gulf ecosystem task force that was created
    by the President, and that the Natural Resources Trustees under
    OPA 1990 are moving forward with the restoration plan. But, I
    have several critical elements to suggest.
        Based on my experience with the Exxon Valdez oil spill, we
    must have a common vision for a healthy biodiverse, productive
    Gulf, and we must have clear measurable objectives and rigorous
    criteria for moving forward with projects.
        To make this happen, Congress should demonstrate that
    America will not sacrifice the long-term health in fisheries
    and biodiversity of the Gulf of Mexico, or any other large
    marine ecosystems in this country, for short-term industrial
    production of any kind. That must begin with dedicating a
    significant portion of the Clean Water Act penalties, as has
    been done by Senator Rockefeller in Senate Bill 1140. Some
    piece of those penalties should be directed in a separate
    account within the Unites States Treasury, with the earnings of
    that accounts supporting a long-term Gulf ecosystem monitoring
    observation research program.
        And with that said, Mr. Chairman, let me say that the
    science-based approach that I'm suggesting would work in the
    Arctic as well. And, as you can see, it's science that's
    missing in both applications--both in the preparedness and
    response, and also in the restoration. Congress should act now
    to establish a long-term scientific monitoring observation
    research program, and ensure response capabilities are in
    place, before offshore environment is exposed to widespread
    industrial activity in the Arctic and the attendant risks
    therein.
        Finally, at broader level, Mr. Chairman, although Senator
    Snowe is not here, let me mention it--Congress should ensure
    that the United States has the financial resources necessary to
    be an effective steward of its oceans and coastal ecosystems.
    The National Endowment for Ocean's Act, co-sponsored by Ranking
    Member Snowe and other members of this committee, would do just
    that.
        The Ocean Conservancy recognizes the United States must
    continue to develop energy. It's an imperative. But, we must do
    so the right way, and we can do it right.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Rubio.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Ayers follows:]

        Prepared Statement of Jim Ayers, Senior Advisor and Consultant,
                               Ocean Conservancy
        Chairman Begich, Ranking Member Snowe, and members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to participate in today's
    hearing. My name is Jim Ayers, and I am the founder and President of
    Alaska Strategies, a conservation consulting firm. I am testifying
    today in my capacity as a senior advisor and consultant for Ocean
    Conservancy, a national marine conservation organization that has
    promoted healthy and diverse ocean ecosystems since its founding in
    1972. Ocean Conservancy is supported by more than 500,000 members and
    volunteers, with its headquarters in Washington, D.C.
        You have invited me here today to discuss two broad topics: first,
    the efficacy of the laws, regulations, and policies that relate to oil
    spills and spill response and prevention on the Outer Continental Shelf
    (OCS); and second, the progress and viability of long-term restoration
    in the Gulf of Mexico in the wake of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil
    disaster.
        My perspective on these topics is informed by substantial
    experience dealing with offshore oil spills and restoration efforts.
    Most recently, I was a representative on the U.S. Coast Guard's
    Incident Specific Preparedness Review for the response to the BP
    Deepwater Horizon oil spill--a review designed ``to examine the
    implementation and effectiveness of the preparedness and response to
    the BP Deepwater Horizon incident.'' \1\ Earlier in my career, I was
    the first executive director of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee
    Council, where I led the effort to develop and implement a
    comprehensive restoration plan for the region affected by the Exxon
    Valdez spill, and helped establish a long-term research and monitoring
    fund designed to enhance recovery and restoration.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ U.S. Coast Guard, Final Report: Incident Specific Preparedness
    Review for the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (Jan. 2011), at 1.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Before proceeding any further with my testimony, I would like to
    acknowledge that the BP Deepwater Horizon oil disaster was a human and
    environmental tragedy. It killed 11 men, seriously injured 16 others,
    and discharged roughly 205 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of
    Mexico. The disaster impacted lives, livelihoods, and the rich and
    diverse Gulf of Mexico ecosystem that is a national treasure and
    cornerstone of the regional economy.
        Now, more than a year after the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster, the
    United States stands at yet another major crossroads, and we must
    decide which way we want to go. On one hand, we can turn a blind eye to
    the shortcomings of the statutes that govern offshore oil and gas
    operations and spill response, maintaining the status quo and hoping
    for the best. On the other hand, we can acknowledge the gaps and flaws
    in the existing system and enact reforms designed to prevent future
    offshore oil disasters and promote preparedness, safety, and protection
    of ecosystem services vital to our Nation. I believe it is imperative
    that we choose the latter. In our pursuit of energy, we must minimize
    risks to the natural environment to ensure diverse, healthy ecosystems
    capable of supporting the economy and human health--for this generation
    and the next. But to do so, Congress must take meaningful action now.
        In Part I below, I address the existing framework that governs
    spill prevention and response, and recommend a series of reforms to the
    OCS oil and gas process. In general, these reforms strive to integrate
    spill prevention and response into OCS policies and decision-making
    processes. Then, in Part II, I discuss restoration efforts in the wake
    of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and recommend actions that will
    bolster effective long-term restoration in the Gulf of Mexico and
    better preparedness in frontier regions which may soon experience
    increasing levels of oil and gas activity.
    I. Oil Spill Prevention And Response Must Be Integrated Into The OCS
            Oil and Gas Process
        The Oil Pollution Act of 1990--enacted in the wake of the Exxon
    Valdez oil spill--is the primary statute governing issues of planning,
    prevention, response, and liability for oil spills in marine waters.\2\
    OPA 90 introduced several critical reforms, including technical
    standards, improved response planning, funding for research and
    development, and liability and compensation requirements. Under OPA
    90's amendments to the Clean Water Act, the Federal Government may
    respond to a spill event by ``federalizing'' the spill and engaging
    directly in the cleanup, monitoring the responsible party's cleanup
    efforts, or directing the responsible party in implementation of the
    response.\3\ These changes have made it more likely that the relevant
    contingency plans would be properly carried out during a major spill.
    OPA 90 also expanded the role and breadth of the National Contingency
    Plan (NCP) and linked the NCP to area response plans, regional response
    plans, and facility-level response plans--a multi-layered planning and
    response system intended to improve spill preparedness and response
    effectiveness.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ See, e.g., Nat'l Comm'n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
    and Offshore Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future
    of Offshore Drilling (2011) at 83 [hereinafter National Commission].
        \3\ 33 U.S.C.  1321(c)(1)(B).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Despite the benefits of the spill prevention and response framework
    established by OPA 90, the present system suffers from a significant
    flaw: for the most part, the OPA 90 framework exists separate and apart
    from the rest of the OCS oil and gas development process. As a result,
    preparedness regarding spill prevention and response is not integrated
    adequately into OCS policy, and does not play a significant role in
    many OCS decision-making processes. The following sections include
    recommendations to address this problem.
    A. Prevention of oil spills should start with ensuring that energy
            development takes place only in appropriate locations, where it
            can be undertaken without undue risk to environmental, human,
            and economic health.
        A little over a year ago, President Obama issued an Executive Order
    establishing a National Ocean Policy. That policy includes a set of
    overarching guiding principles for management decisions and actions
    toward achieving the vision of ``an America whose stewardship ensures
    that the ocean, our coasts, and the Great Lakes are healthy and
    resilient, safe and productive, and understood and treasured so as to
    promote the well-being, prosperity, and security of present and future
    generations.'' \4\ Prevention of oil spills should begin at the highest
    level, by ensuring that our National Energy Policy and our National
    Ocean Policy are aligned. As we pursue currently available energy
    resources, we must do so in a way that is safe for energy workers and
    allows us to maintain a healthy environment for this and future
    generations. Safe and responsible development of current energy
    sources, combined with sensible conservation measures and investments
    and a commitment to developing more sustainable energy options going
    forward, will help ensure that there are economic opportunities,
    healthy and diverse ecosystems, and a clean and safe environment in the
    future.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Exec. Order No. 13547, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,023, 43,023 (July 22,
    2010).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        More specifically, we must ensure that energy development occurs
    only in safe and appropriate locations. Oil and gas lease sales,
    exploratory drilling, and development and production on the OCS are
    appropriate only when there is sufficient science to support informed
    decisions that such actions can proceed with minimal risk to the health
    of ocean and coastal ecosystems. To help ensure that economic sectors
    other than oil and gas development are given adequate consideration,
    Congress should support the implementation of a more comprehensive
    system of regional planning for the conservation and management of
    marine resources. In addition, Congress should amend the nation's
    existing OCS policy statement to make protection, maintenance, and
    restoration of coastal and ocean ecosystems a primary policy objective.
        To help ensure that energy development occurs safely and only in
    appropriate locations, expert agencies in addition to the Bureau of
    Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) should
    play a greater role in decisions about, and preparation of
    environmental analyses for, oil and gas operations.\5\ These agencies
    should include the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
    (NOAA), the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), the U.S. Coast
    Guard, and others. For example, Congress should change Section 18 of
    the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to give the Secretary of Commerce
    a greater role in the initial decisions about if, when, where, and how
    to allow oil and gas leasing, exploration, and development on the OCS.
    Congress could amend Section 18 so that the Secretaries of Commerce and
    of the Interior have joint and equal responsibility for preparing five-
    year oil and gas leasing programs. Alternatively, Congress could amend
    Section 18 to require the concurrence of the Secretary of Commerce
    before any five-year leasing program is finalized and implemented.
    Similarly, the U.S. Coast Guard should play a role in identifying how
    oil and gas activities on the OCS proceed.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ See, e.g., National Commission at 264 (recommending that
    Congress amend the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ``to provide NOAA
    with a formal consultative role during the development of the five-year
    lease plan and lease sale stages.'').
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        To facilitate more meaningful environmental analysis before
    exploration and drilling activities proceed, OCS planning areas--at
    least in frontier areas--should be smaller and focused more precisely
    on specific lease tracts.\6\ Congress, for example, could amend section
    18 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to specify an upper limit
    on the percentage of a frontier planning area that may be included in
    any one five-year oil and gas leasing program. Alternatively, Congress
    could require DOI to use tract-style leasing in frontier areas, rather
    than offering enormous portions of planning areas.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ Cf. id. at 262 (recommending reducing the size of lease sales
    ``in less well explored areas,'' so that the ``geographic scope [of the
    lease sale] allows for a meaningful analysis of potential environmental
    impacts and identification of areas of ecological significance'').
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Finally, areas of the marine environment that are particularly
    significant--such as essential fish habitats, areas of high
    productivity, or areas supporting important concentrations of wildlife,
    migratory pathways, and subsistence use--should be protected from the
    impacts of OCS oil and gas activities. Regulators should preserve the
    resilience of marine ecosystems by placing important ecological areas
    off-limits to drilling and ensure that such areas are well buffered
    from oil and gas activities elsewhere in the region. Congress should
    amend the law to require regulatory agencies, during their planning
    processes, to identify any important ecological areas and explain the
    protection measures necessary to preserve the integrity and function of
    those areas.
    B. Making informed decisions about oil spill prevention and response
            requires adequate baseline scientific information.
        To understand fully the potential impacts on the local ecosystem
    from a large-scale spill--and to determine how best to respond to a
    spill--decisionmakers require adequate baseline science. Scientific
    baseline data and risk analyses should inform decisions about whether,
    when, and where to allow OCS oil and gas activities. As a result,
    before permitting OCS activities to proceed, Congress should require
    the availability of specific types and quantities of baseline
    scientific information gathered over time at scales appropriate to the
    decisions that must be made. This information might include physical
    characteristics--such as data on the sea floor, ocean currents, wind
    and weather patterns, and water temperature and salinity--as well as
    information about the ecosystem, such as the presence, distribution,
    and abundance of species and the relationships among those species.
    Collection of baseline science should include and incorporate local and
    traditional knowledge from affected communities. This approach would
    ensure that expert concerns are heard from the outset, and would help
    avoid later complications. ``Doing it right'' is an expression that
    many of us use with reference to oil and gas activity, and doing it
    right means taking the time and spending the money to gather the
    necessary science to support smart decisions.
        Certain types of scientific information, such as identifying
    sensitive areas and locations of critical ecological processes, are
    necessary to help plan for and implement oil spill response operations.
    In addition, baseline science is necessary in carrying out a natural
    resource damage assessment following an oil spill, because the impacts
    from the spill must be measured against the environmental baseline that
    existed prior to the spill.\7\ This is not possible without a robust
    time series of baseline data gathered over an appropriate geographic
    area. During my time with the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council,
    not a day went by when we did not rue the lack of baseline data
    gathered prior to that disastrous event. Baseline data are particularly
    lacking in frontier areas such as the Arctic.\8\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ See, e.g., 15 C.F.R.  990.52 (noting that natural resource
    trustees ``must quantify the degree, and spatial and temporal extent of
    such injuries relative to baseline.''); see also id.  990.30 (defining
    ``baseline'' as ``the condition of the natural resources and services
    that would have existed had the [oil spill] incident not occurred.'').
        \8\ See generally Holland-Bartels, Leslie, and Brenda Pierce, eds.,
    An evaluation of the science needs to inform decisions on Outer
    Continental Shelf energy development in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas,
    Alaska: U.S. Geological Survey Circular 1370 (2011); Coastal Response
    Research Center, Natural Resources Damage Assessment (NRDA) in Arctic
    Waters: The Dialogue Begins, Univ. of New Hampshire (2010). See also
    National Commission at 303 (recognizing that ``scientific research on
    the ecosystems of the Arctic is difficult and expensive. Good
    information exists for only a few species, and even for those, just for
    certain times of the year or in certain areas.'').
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Congress should require the collection of specific types of
    baseline science information before areas can be considered for oil and
    gas leasing. For example, before an area is considered for leasing in a
    five-year program, Congress should require at least 3 years of baseline
    weather, water, wind, ocean chemistry, and other environmental data. It
    should also require similar baseline studies for wildlife--including
    fish, birds, invertebrates, and marine mammals--and of the sea floor
    environment. Unless and until such data are compiled for a given area
    of the OCS, that area should not be eligible for leasing. In addition,
    Congress should enact requirements designed to ensure a more rigorous
    and meaningful evaluation of environmental sensitivity and marine
    productivity. This requirement should be integrated and coordinated
    with baseline science information.
        Congress should support collection of baseline scientific data
    through integrated programs that undertake research, monitoring,
    documentation of local and traditional knowledge, and synthesis. Such
    work would, for example, assess and monitor populations of principal
    species in the ecosystem and the biological and physical factors that
    affect their abundance and distribution; construct and maintain an
    updated quantitative food web model; identify sensitive species and
    important ecological areas; and enhance understanding of temporal and
    spatial variability within ecosystems. These programs would require
    secure and stable sources of funding.
    C. Rigorous risk assessment is critical to preventing oil spills and
            ensuring preparedness.
        As development planning and activities are considered, regulators
    must undertake a rigorous analysis of potential impacts and risks. As
    noted above, Federal agencies in addition to BOEMRE should have a
    greater role in planning for and conducting environmental analyses of
    OCS oil and gas activities. Risk analysis should be science-based, and
    subject to external, expert peer review. Analysis pursuant to the
    National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) should be substantive--not
    mere window dressing--and OCS drilling operations should not be
    categorically excluded from environmental review. All OCS drilling
    activities should be subject to site-specific NEPA analysis, either an
    Environmental Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement.
        The BP Deepwater Horizon disaster highlighted the risk of failing
    to engage in worst-case oil spill planning. When making decisions that
    involve the potential for catastrophic results--such as major oil
    spills--environmental analyses must take seriously the potential for
    disaster. This is true even if the probability of an individual
    occurrence is low, because the harm from such an event may be very
    great.\9\ Federal regulators must analyze low-probability, high-risk
    events to ensure that they are prepared for a worst-case. In light of
    the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster, the Council on Environmental Quality
    concluded that Federal regulators must ``take steps to incorporate
    catastrophic risk analysis.'' \10\ The National Commission on the BP
    Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (National Commission)
    recommended that regulators ``incorporate the `worst-case scenario'
    calculations from industry oil spill response plans into NEPA documents
    and other environmental analyses or reviews'' to inform the agency's
    ``estimates for potential oil spill situations in its environmental
    analyses.'' \11\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ See, e.g., 40 C.F.R.  1502.22(b)(4) (noting that in a NEPA
    analysis when information is missing or unavailable, ``reasonably
    foreseeable'' impacts include ``impacts which have catastrophic
    consequences, even if their probability of occurrence is low, provided
    that the analysis of the impacts is supported by credible scientific
    evidence, is not based on pure conjecture, and is within the rule of
    reason'').
        \10\ Council on Envtl. Quality, Report Regarding the Minerals
    Management Service's National Environmental Policy Act Policies,
    Practices, and Procedures as They Relate to Outer Continental Shelf Oil
    and Gas Exploration and Development (Aug. 16, 2010) at 27.
        \11\ National Commission at 267.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    D. Government regulators and industry operators must ensure that they
            have trained personnel and equipment sufficient to contain,
            control, and clean up a worst case discharge.
        To protect healthy, diverse ocean ecosystems for future
    generations, regulators and the oil and gas industry must ensure that
    facility-specific oil spill response plans provide for the immediate
    availability of equipment and trained personnel sufficient to contain,
    control, and clean-up a worst-case discharge. Equipment must be based
    reasonably close to potential accident sites, and trained teams of
    responders must be available in-region to operate the equipment in
    accordance with the pre-approved plan.
        Worst-case scenario planning will help Federal regulators and OCS
    operators anticipate their needs in the event of a major oil spill or
    other emergency event. The BP Deepwater Horizon disaster showed that
    the existing planning standard--responding to a worst-case scenario
    spill in 30 days--is unrealistic for an offshore well blowout. The law
    should be changed to require operators to meet a performance standard
    based on a true worst-case scenario oil spill. For an exploration well
    the worst case oil spill scenario time frame should be increased to at
    least 90 days (the time it takes to drill a relief well). The worst-
    case oil spill volume should be based on that 90-day period multiplied
    by a maximum flow rate of 60,000 barrels of oil per day, unless the
    operator can provide reservoir and engineering data to prove that the
    flow rate will be less.
        To be effective in an emergency, response capability must be
    mobilized immediately. For that to happen, equipment and personnel must
    be either pre-positioned near potential spill sites or quickly
    mobilized from nearby locations that actually have those resources
    onsite. Spill response plans often rely upon contracts with spill
    response companies or regional consortia, and delays in mobilization of
    an effective spill response may result from the lack of actual capacity
    in the area of the spill. If a response plan calls for contractors to
    provide equipment and trained personnel for the response, actual
    capacity must be demonstrated ahead of time.
        In addition to implementing more stringent planning and response
    standards, assessment of industry oil spill response plans must be more
    rigorous. For example, in the Arctic, BOEMRE approved an oil spill
    response plan in which Shell Offshore, Inc. claimed that it would
    recover 90 percent of the oil spilled during a worst case discharge
    from its proposed facility in the Beaufort Sea \12\--even though a 90
    percent recovery rate is, without question, wholly unrealistic. The
    agency approved Shell's plan despite the fact that in earlier planning
    documents, the agency had acknowledged that ``[o]n average, spill-
    response efforts result in recovery of approximately 10-20 percent of
    the oil released to the ocean environment.'' \13\ This lax oversight
    led DOI's Office of Inspector General to conclude that review of oil
    spill response plans ``does not ensure that critical data are
    correct.'' \14\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ See Shell Offshore Inc., Beaufort Sea Regional Exploration Oil
    Discharge Prevention and Contingency Plan (Jan. 2010) at unnumbered
    page following I-12 (containing BOEMRE approval letter); id. at 1-29
    (assuming that only 10 percent of the discharge from a hypothetical
    blowout will ``escape [ ] primary offshore recovery efforts'').
        \13\ Minerals Management Service, Final Environmental Impact
    Statement: Beaufort Sea Planning Area Oil and Gas Lease Sales 186, 195,
    and 202 p. IV-17 (Feb. 2003).
        \14\ Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of the Interior,
    A New Horizon: Looking to the Future of the Bureau of Ocean Energy
    Management, Regulation and Enforcement (Dec. 2010), at 44.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Finally, to facilitate more serious review of oil spill response
    plans for offshore facilities, broaden the scope of review, and promote
    better information-sharing, multiple Federal agencies should--in a
    coordinated and timely fashion--review and approve these plans. In
    addition to interagency review of oil spill response plans for OCS
    facilities, there should be public comment on such plans.\15\ The
    National Commission endorsed the idea of interagency spill plan review:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ See id. (``Plans should also be made available for a public
    comment period prior to final approval and response plans should be
    made available to the public following their approval.'')

            In addition to the Department of the Interior, other agencies
            with relevant scientific and operational expertise should play
            a role in evaluating spill response plans to verify that
            operators can conduct the response and containment operations
            detailed in their plans. Specifically, oil spill response
            plans, including source-control measures, should be subject to
            interagency review and approval by the Coast Guard, EPA, and
            NOAA. Other parts of the Federal Government, such as Department
            of Energy national laboratories that possess relevant
            scientific expertise, could be consulted.\16\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ National Commission at 266-67.

        The National Commission also noted that interagency review of oil
    spill response plans for OCS facilities would facilitate greater
    integration of those plans with broader-level area contingency plans
    and regional contingency plans because it would ``involve[e] the
    agencies with primary responsibility for government spill response
    planning in oversight of industry planning.'' \17\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\ Id. at 267.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In particular, the Coast Guard should have a formal role in the
    review of facility oil spill response plans. As it stands now, DOI has
    the primary responsibility to review facility response plans, even
    though the Coast Guard is ultimately responsible for response efforts
    on the water. As a result, the Coast Guard--the on-scene coordinator
    and lead agency for response to offshore spills--has not taken an
    active role in reviewing facility response plans. If it did, the Coast
    Guard might be able to suggest improvements or refinements that could
    make facility response plans more effective. Congress should ensure
    that the Coast Guard participates formally in spill prevention and
    response planning for OCS oil and gas facilities.
    E. OCS oil and gas operations must use the best available engineering
            and technology in their prevention and response toolkits.
        A recent DOI Inspector General Report concluded that the ``process
    for developing or updating standards and regulations has not kept pace
    with new and emerging offshore technologies.'' \18\ Going forward, we
    must ensure that OCS facilities use the best available engineering,
    technology, and safety procedures to maximize the protection of
    workers, ocean and coastal ecosystems, and the coastal businesses and
    economies that rely on those ecosystems.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \18\ Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of the Interior,
    A New Horizon: Looking to the Future of the Bureau of Ocean Energy
    Management, Regulation and Enforcement (Dec. 2010), at 44.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Operators of all new offshore leases should be required to
    demonstrate that they are using the most effective safety technology
    for exploration or development activity as a precondition to
    drilling.\19\ Standards regarding spill prevention technologies should
    be implemented, as well. These might require redundant engineering
    controls, such as multiple or improved blowout prevention systems, on-
    site blowout containment structures, and double-walled pipes or tanks.
    All OCS leases should be required to incorporate the most
    environmentally protective timing and location stipulations and terms
    to reduce the potential for environmental damage.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \19\ At present, OCSLA provides for ``the use of the best available
    and safest technologies . . . on all new drilling and production
    operations and, wherever practicable, on existing operations.'' 43
    U.S.C.  1347(b). However, this requirement is weakened significantly
    by other provisions: it applies only to certain types of equipment, and
    the Secretary of the Interior may waive the requirement if he
    determines that the additional cost of using the ``best'' or ``safest''
    technology outweighs the additional benefits of using the technology.
    Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Spill response technologies also must be improved. Estimates
    following the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster reveal that despite the
    massive effort that BP activated to clean up the oil,\20\ response
    efforts were able to remove or chemically disperse--without removal of
    the dispersed oil--only about one-third of the oil that was discharged
    from the Macondo well.\21\ The National Commission determined that
    ``[t]he technology available for cleaning up oil spills has improved
    only incrementally since 1990.'' \22\ The Commission further observed
    that ``[f]ederal research and development programs in this area are
    underfunded,'' and the major oil companies have committed minimal
    resources to in-house research and development related to spill
    response technology.'' \23\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \20\ At its peak, more than 45,000 people were involved in the
    response effort. National Commission Report at 133.
        \21\ See Jane Lubchenco et al., BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Budget:
    What Happened to the Oil? (Aug. 4, 2010) available at http://
    www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/imported_pdfs/posted/2931/
    Oil_Budget_description_8_3_FINAL.844091.pdf (estimating that of the 4.9
    million barrels of oil that was discharged, responders recovered 17
    percent directly from the wellhead, skimmed 3 percent, burned 5
    percent, and chemically dispersed 8 percent, for a total of 33
    percent).
        \22\ National Commission at 269.
        \23\ Id. at 270.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        To spur better on-water cleanup results and more investment in
    research and development for response technologies, regulators should
    require operators to demonstrate the ability to meet specific
    performance standards in real-world conditions in the lease area before
    allowing operators to conduct drilling operations. The performance
    standards should require operators to demonstrate in simulated field
    trials that they have in place adequate equipment, personnel, and
    resources to respond effectively in the event of a catastrophic spill.
    Operators should show that they can deploy their resources in real-
    world conditions and that the chosen equipment is effective in meeting
    an established oil removal performance target. These spill response
    standards should be enforced through independent third-party review of
    facility response plans and regular audits during the period of
    exploration and production.
    F. Congress must provide the funding necessary to ensure adequate
            preparedness.
        It will not be enough to require adequate oil spill preparedness in
    legislation or agency regulations. Congress also must commit the
    necessary financial resources to enable relevant Federal agencies, such
    as the Coast Guard, NOAA, DOI, and others, to do their jobs. Absent
    stable and adequate funding for oil spill preparedness, Federal
    agencies may not be able to carry out their responsibilities to plan,
    prepare, and respond to incidents, and to contain, control, and clean-
    up a major oil spill. Ensuring adequate preparedness is simply one of
    the costs of doing business. A small increase in the per-barrel tax
    that funds the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund could provide funding for
    Federal agencies to better meet their responsibilities to prepare and
    respond to oil spills.
        Taking a broader perspective, Congress should also ensure that the
    United States has the financial resources necessary to be an effective
    steward of its ocean and coastal ecosystems. Despite the importance of
    these ecosystems and the risks posed by oil and gas and other
    activities, there is no dedicated source of funding to support
    conservation and management activities. Congress should invest revenues
    derived from offshore development in a fund dedicated to ocean and
    coastal restoration and conservation. Given the economic and ecological
    importance of our ocean and coasts, we should invest more in
    monitoring, researching, protecting, and restoring the health of these
    systems and promoting their resilience so that they can better recover
    when disasters happen, whether man-made or natural.
        In May, Ranking Member Snowe and Senator Whitehouse, along with
    Chairman Rockefeller and Senators Inouye, Nelson, Stabenow, and
    Landrieu, introduced legislation to make crucial investments in cleaner
    and healthier oceans across the country. The National Endowment for the
    Oceans Act takes the common-sense step of using money the government
    already gets from economic activities on our oceans, and directs a
    portion of those funds toward keeping our oceans clean and healthy.
    Money from the endowment could then be distributed as grants to states
    and tribes for bottom-up, on-the-ground conservation and research to
    protect our oceans. Reinvesting a portion of revenue made from ocean
    resources is a fair and reasonable way to fund the work to protect
    ocean health, and ultimately economic health. We commend the bill's
    sponsors for their leadership on this issue and urge the Committee to
    move the National Endowment for the Oceans Act forward.
    II. Congress Must Commit to Long-Term Restoration in the Gulf of Mexico
        The Gulf of Mexico region and ecosystem are vital to the United
    States in many respects, including oil and gas resources, seafood
    production, shipping, and recreation, to name only a few. While the
    Gulf of Mexico region has benefited from and is heavily dependent on
    oil and gas production, it has also paid a high environmental price for
    it. Going forward, a sound energy development policy must include a
    commitment to restore the Gulf of Mexico ecosystem and communities
    following last summer's BP Deepwater Horizon disaster and decades of
    degradation. Congress must do its part to ensure that the people and
    environment in the Gulf region are made whole following that disaster,
    and the decades of environmental degradation that preceded it, by
    dedicating a major portion of Clean Water Act penalties to recovery and
    restoration in the Gulf.
    A. Restoration efforts in the Gulf of Mexico require dedicated,
            predictable funding.
        Dedicated, predictable funding will be critical to successful
    restoration. Congress should dedicate Clean Water Act penalties
    associated with the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster to fund restoration
    in the Gulf of Mexico. The National Commission recommended that 80
    percent of such penalties be dedicated to that purpose. Several bills
    have been introduced in the Senate that would accomplish that
    purpose.\24\ For example, Chairman Rockefeller introduced S. 1140, the
    ``Gulf Coast Restoration Act,'' which calls for 80 percent of Clean
    Water Act penalties to be deposited into a ``Gulf Coast Ecosystem
    Restoration Fund.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \24\ National Commission at 280.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Restoration funding should be structured in a way that results in
    dedicated, predictable funding streams. For example, an endowment
    should be established to support long-term research and monitoring
    needed to assess the health of the Gulf, evaluate the efficacy of
    restoration measures, and facilitate adaptive management. I will expand
    on this idea in Subsection D, below. The revenue stream from the
    endowment could also provide valuable support for the work of Gulf
    Coast research institutions, which are in a good position to make
    lasting contributions to the overall recovery of the Gulf ecosystem and
    economy.
    B. Gulf restoration efforts must address a variety of issues.
        Successful restoration of the Gulf ecosystem--including preserving
    the region's unique culture and traditions and promoting its economic
    restoration--will require sound management, stable and coordinated
    funding, prudent project selection, stewardship of the full ecosystem,
    and monitoring and adaptive management over the long-term. Restoration
    should focus on five key strategies:

            1. Protecting, restoring, and enhancing the coast and wetlands:
            Restore resilience to coastal areas and nourish wetlands
            through major projects in the Mississippi River delta and
            elsewhere in the five-state region.

            2. Maintaining healthy, sustainable fisheries: Restore and
            sustain Gulf of Mexico fisheries through investments in
            science, technology, fishing fleet performance, and strategies
            to restore depleted fish populations and support sustainable
            long-term management.

            3. Restoring and protecting coastal and marine habitats:
            Enhance key coastal and marine habitats like oyster reefs,
            seagrass beds, corals, and nesting sites for birds and turtles
            to strengthen and restore critical ecosystem services, such as
            shoreline protection, tourism, and fishing.

            4. Shrinking the dead zone in the northern Gulf of Mexico:
            Implement nutrient reduction strategies in the Mississippi
            River watershed to reduce the size and duration of the hypoxia
            zone to improve marine health and increase fisheries
            productivity in the Gulf of Mexico.

            5. Taking the pulse of the Gulf ecosystem: Create a
            permanently-funded, long-term Gulf of Mexico ecosystem
            monitoring and research program to provide the basis for
            adaptive management of coastal and marine natural resources.
    C. Restoration efforts are underway in the Gulf, but success will
            require a common goal, a comprehensive restoration program,
            public involvement, incorporation of science, and clear,
            measurable objectives.
        Federal and state restoration planning activities in the Gulf of
    Mexico are currently underway through the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
    Trustee Council, which implements the natural resources damage
    assessment (NRDA) and restoration program under OPA 90, and the Gulf
    Coast Ecosystem Restoration Task Force (Task Force), which was
    established by Executive Order.\25\ The Executive Order instructs the
    Task Force to prepare a Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Strategy by
    October 2011; \26\ this document is intended to guide development of a
    broader ecosystem restoration effort in the event that Congress
    allocates Clean Water Act fines for that purpose. The Trustee Council
    is preparing a programmatic environmental impact statement on a NRDA-
    based Gulf restoration program, and we anticipate release of the draft
    late this year or early next. In the meantime, BP has provided one
    billion dollars in early restoration funds and there is a flurry of
    activity as state and Federal agencies, as well as many stakeholders,
    consider how those funds can best be allocated.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \25\ Executive Order 13554 of October 5, 2010: Establishing the
    Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Task Force, 75 Fed. Reg. 62,313,
    62,313-17 (Oct. 8, 2010).
        \26\ Id. at 62,315.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We are pleased that the Task Force and Trustee Council are
    developing and evaluating restoration strategies and that a down
    payment of one billion dollars is now available to jump-start
    restoration efforts on the ground and in the water. However, based on
    my experience with the Exxon Valdez program, I want to share some
    perspective and offer several suggestions to help ensure that the
    restoration program in the Gulf is designed to achieve maximum long-
    term benefit to the ecosystem and communities in the region.
    (1) Restoration of the Gulf ecosystem will require a common vision and
            a comprehensive program to guide restoration efforts.
        Restoration in the Gulf of Mexico must start with an understanding
    of how the ecosystem works and a shared vision of what comprises a
    restored and sustained Gulf ecosystem. To achieve that vision requires
    development and implementation of an integrated, strategic program to
    guide and coordinate restoration efforts. In the Gulf, that program
    must address not only injuries caused by the BP Deepwater Horizon oil
    disaster, but also the systemic, decades-long degradation of the Gulf
    ecosystem. The restoration program must embrace the whole Gulf
    ecosystem, from coasts and marshes under state jurisdictions to blue-
    water environments managed by the Federal Government.
        To make the most of limited resources, all restoration projects in
    the Gulf--including those funded with early restoration money--must be
    part of the overarching restoration program. This will demand
    discipline. When funding is limited and money is on the table, there is
    a real temptation to use those funds for support of projects that have
    been languishing on the shelf, waiting for the availability of money.
    While I have no doubt that many of those projects are meritorious, if
    they are not part of an integrated, strategic suite of projects, they
    will not be effective tools in the pursuit of Gulf restoration. A
    haphazard assortment of unrelated efforts--however well intentioned--
    will not yield success. Setting aside differences and focusing on the
    disciplined implementation of an integrated restoration program will
    greatly enhance chances for success.
    (2) Transparency and public involvement are critical to successful
            restoration.
        Having served in government in many capacities and for many years,
    I know there is a tendency to think that we--as professional public
    servants--know best how to get the job done. It is critical, however,
    that restoration in the Gulf engage the public through a formal and
    recognized process that includes broad representation from communities
    and stakeholders in the region. No major decisions should be made--
    including allocation of funds for early restoration--without full
    engagement of the public in a process that is open, transparent, and
    consistent across the Gulf region. In the Exxon Valdez program we bent
    over backward to engage the public. At times it was difficult and even
    tedious, but in the end, it resulted in a better program, one in which
    the public was invested. Public engagement is critical to long-term
    success.
        Part of public participation is sharing information with the public
    about what is being studied and learned in the course of the damage
    assessment. We learned the hard way in the Exxon Valdez program that
    not disclosing information about the harm caused by spilled oil fed the
    public's worst fears and left a legacy of bitterness about government
    secrecy.
        Given the potential for NRDA-related litigation, we acknowledge the
    need for caution in what information is disclosed to the public, but
    Federal and state governments should do more to provide information in
    a way that is useful to and understandable by the public. We truly
    appreciate that the trustees are posting individual study designs
    approved by the governments and BP on the Internet, but what is lacking
    is a description of how these pieces fit together in an overall damage
    assessment plan and a summary-level glimpse of what is being learned.
    The former is essential if the public is to evaluate whether the right
    scientific work is underway. The latter is essential if we are to
    engage intelligently in restoration planning, including offering
    informed opinions about allocation of early restoration funds.
        Following the Exxon Valdez, Exxon and the governments had an
    adversarial relationship. Notwithstanding this fact, within 5 months of
    the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Federal and state trustees released a
    damage assessment plan with project descriptions and costs and invited
    public comment on their efforts.\27\ A similar document was released
    annually until a settlement was achieved. This level of information
    sharing would seem appropriate following the BP Deepwater Horizon
    event, especially given that the relationship between the responsible
    party and the governments is far more cooperative.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \27\ Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, State/Federal Natural
    Resource Damage Assessment Plan for the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Juneau,
    Alaska (Aug. 1989).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (3) External, independent scientific peer review is vital.
        Along with public participation, there is critical need to
    incorporate external, independent scientific peer review into the
    program from the very outset. We acknowledge and appreciate that the
    damage assessment involves consultation with and review by outside
    experts, but we urge the trustees to extend that approach to every
    aspect of the restoration program. The restoration program as a whole,
    and every restoration project--including those funded through early
    restoration--should be subjected to external review.
        In the Exxon Valdez program, we contracted with a chief scientist
    who did not work for any government agency and was not associated with
    any requests for restoration funds. His job was to manage a peer review
    panel and provide independent advice to the Trustee Council's executive
    director and to the Trustee Council itself. The chief scientist and
    peer review panel examined every project funded by the Trustee Council,
    as well as the overall restoration plan itself. I am very proud of this
    effort and believe it vastly improved the quality of the work and the
    effectiveness of our restoration program.
    (4) The restoration program and restoration projects must be guided by
            objective criteria and clear, measurable goals.
        Finally, it is critical that both the restoration program as a
    whole and every project have clear, measureable goals. A series of
    objective criteria should be used to make decisions about funding. For
    NRDA-based restoration, these criteria should be the same across the
    Gulf region and be consistently applied, including early restoration
    projects. Having an appropriate set of criteria and measurable goals
    will not only improve decisions about which projects go forward, it
    will facilitate monitoring and evaluation during and after
    implementation. The sums of money potentially available for restoration
    are too large to have anything but the most rigorous approach to
    decisionmaking in order to enhance accountability and public trust. As
    a model, I have attached a set of guiding principles and criteria
    developed by Ocean Conservancy; these are based in part on policies
    adopted and implemented by the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council.
        In short, successful restoration of the Gulf ecosystem will require
    a common vision of restoration, one that embraces the entire ecosystem,
    from coasts and marshes to the open water environments that stretch out
    beyond the shoreline. It will also demand the development and
    implementation of a comprehensive, integrated, Gulf-wide, science-based
    strategy and program. This program must be built on strong public
    participation and must incorporate external scientific peer review at
    every level. Finally, all restoration projects should have clear,
    measurable goals and be rigorously screened using objective criteria.
    Ten and twenty years down the road, when Congress asks the Government
    Accountability Office or the National Research Council to review the
    Gulf restoration program, we all hope they will conclude that these
    efforts resulted in tangible, lasting benefit for the Gulf ecosystem
    and hence its communities and economy.
    D. Congress should support a long-term scientific research and
            monitoring program in the Gulf of Mexico, and should consider
            exporting the model to frontier areas such as the Arctic.
        While I suspect that most people will agree that planning and
    design of restoration projects should be science-based, it is just as
    important that science is used to monitor and evaluate the results. To
    that end, we urge Congress to support the creation of a long-term
    scientific research and monitoring program to support restoration of
    and resource management in the Gulf of Mexico. In addition, we urge
    Congress to support a scientific research and monitoring program for
    the Arctic, so that we can make informed management decisions and avoid
    the type of degradation that has plagued the Gulf of Mexico.
    (1) Congress should establish a long-term, permanently funded
            scientific research and monitoring program for the Gulf of
            Mexico.
        Even in the absence of events like the BP oil disaster, the Gulf of
    Mexico ecosystem is in perpetual flux. Natural changes in oceanographic
    conditions, combined with chronic impacts from past and present human
    activities on land or at sea, affect habitat quantity and quality, as
    well as the abundance and distribution of marine life. Understanding
    change in the Gulf ecosystem--whether from natural or anthropogenic
    causes--requires long-term science and is essential to restoration,
    management, and conservation over the long term.
        As discussed above, restoration of the Gulf ecosystem must be
    informed, supported, and evaluated by science. A robust, long-term
    science program must be in place from the outset. Such a program should
    take advantage of the work on BP oil-related impacts being carried out
    in the NRDA and by independent researchers, and should be designed to
    detect lingering or sublethal injuries that extend over many years.
    More broadly, a restoration science program should provide information
    to support the design and selection of ecosystem restoration projects,
    evaluate the effectiveness of those projects and the overall program,
    and facilitate adaptive management going forward.
        The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council made an early decision
    to make a major investment of restoration funds in science, both to
    facilitate restoration of oil-spill injuries and to guide management
    and conservation efforts in the future. That investment in science
    continues more than 20 years after the oil spill. In addition, Congress
    established and endowed the North Pacific Research Board in Alaska as a
    source of competitive grants to support applied research that
    contributed to management and conservation of marine resources.\28\
    Research funded by the North Pacific Research Board has improved
    scientists' ability to forecast ecosystem changes, answered important
    questions about fish-habitat relationships, and led to more informed
    resource management decisions.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \28\ P.L. 105-83,  401(e), 111 Stat. 66-67 (Nov. 14, 1997);
    codified at 43 U.S.C. 1474d(e).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Drawing in part on the Alaska experience, members of the scientific
    and conservation communities have proposed versions of a permanent,
    endowed Gulf of Mexico Ecosystem Monitoring (GEM) program to supplement
    and extend beyond the restoration science carried out in connection
    with NRDA and Restoration Task Force programs in the Gulf. The GEM
    program should include and support an expanded, ongoing Ocean Observing
    System in the Gulf of Mexico so that ocean scientists can detect
    changes in the marine ecosystem and forecast the impacts of those
    changes on ecosystem productivity and fishery resources. We strongly
    recommend that Congress create a permanently-funded GEM program.
        To fund a GEM program, Congress should segregate a portion of the
    Clean Water Act penalties associated with the BP Deepwater Horizon
    disaster into a separate account within the U.S. Treasury. It should
    dedicate the revenue stream from the earnings of that account, after
    adjusting for inflation, to the support of the GEM program and its
    ecosystem monitoring and research projects. Grants should be awarded on
    a competitive basis to academic institutions, marine research
    consortia, government agencies, and other appropriate entities with an
    emphasis on developing an integrated series of scientific research and
    monitoring projects over a long time horizon. To ensure an adequate
    level of continuing support, Congress should designate on the order of
    $1 billion of the Clean Water Act penalties for the separate GEM
    account. GEM grants should be administered by a decision-making board
    established and operated by a regional entity, such as the Gulf of
    Mexico Alliance, under the fiscal and administrative authority of the
    U.S. Department of Commerce. Members of the board should include
    stakeholders from the Gulf region, as well as representatives of key
    Federal and state agencies and academic institutions.
    (2) Congress should act now to establish a long-term scientific
            research and monitoring program in the Arctic.
        Establishing a long-term scientific research and monitoring program
    will support restoration efforts in the Gulf of Mexico in the wake of
    the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster and decades of systemic degradation.
    But there is no reason that development and implementation of a science
    plan should come about only after a region has been degraded or
    affected by a catastrophe. On the contrary, the best time to conduct
    scientific research and monitoring comes before an area is exposed to
    widespread industrial activity and its attendant risks. This allows
    scientists to establish an accurate baseline that can help guide
    management decisions, including decisions about whether, when, where,
    and how to pursue oil and gas operations.
        With warming temperatures, decreasing seasonal ice, and advancing
    technology, the Arctic is becoming more accessible to commercial and
    industrial users. Ship traffic is already on the rise, and the oil and
    gas industry is anxious to explore the region. But the Arctic is a
    challenging area in which to operate, and its environment is
    particularly fragile. Moreover, the Arctic is not well understood, and
    there are significant gaps in our knowledge of this rapidly changing
    ecosystem.\29\ In short, we need to act now to ensure that we have the
    baseline scientific data that will allow us to make informed management
    decisions and no-regrets choices about industrial activities in the
    region. To that end, we urge Congress to support the immediate
    development and implementation of a long-term, comprehensive,
    integrated science program for the Arctic.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \29\ See generally Holland-Bartels, Leslie, and Brenda Pierce,
    eds., An evaluation of the science needs to inform decisions on Outer
    Continental Shelf energy development in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas,
    Alaska: U.S. Geological Survey Circular 1370 (2011); Coastal Response
    Research Center, Natural Resources Damage Assessment (NRDA) in Arctic
    Waters: The Dialogue Begins, Univ. of New Hampshire (2010). See also
    National Commission at 303 (recognizing that ``scientific research on
    the ecosystems of the Arctic is difficult and expensive. Good
    information exists for only a few species, and even for those, just for
    certain times of the year or in certain areas.'').
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    IV. Conclusion
        Ocean Conservancy recognizes that the United States must continue
    to develop energy sources needed to sustain and promote economic growth
    and support our social needs. But the catastrophe in the Gulf of Mexico
    shows that we must learn to do so in ways that are safe for energy
    workers and that allow us to maintain a healthy environment for this
    and future generations.
                                   Attachment
                               Ocean Conservancy

      Principles for Effective Restoration and Criteria for Selecting and
                          Funding Restoration Projects

    Principles for Effective Restoration
        The principles below are intended to guide development of
    restoration decision-making structures, processes, and plans, to
    measure their sufficiency, and to enhance their accountability:
    Sound Management

       Efficient, transparent, responsive, and accountable to the
            public;

       Active, full participation by relevant Federal entities and
            all Gulf states, individually and collectively, over time;

       A formal and recognized process that engages the public,
            including broad representation from regional communities and
            stakeholders;

       Commitment by Federal and state partners to incorporate
            local and traditional knowledge in management decisions;

       Coordination between the Natural Resources Damage Assessment
            and Restoration process (NRDA) conducted in response to the BP
            oil disaster and the broader restoration planning functions of
            Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Task Force; and

       A comprehensive science-based ecosystem restoration
            strategy--resting on a clear vision for a healthy Gulf
            ecosystem--and supplemented by annual work plans, progress
            reports, and periodic requests for project proposals.
    Stable and Coordinated Funding

       Coordination of projects from funds allocated from various
            revenue sources (to ensure that projects are consistent,
            complementary and not duplicative);

       Predictable funding streams, consistent from year to year,
            and sustained over the long-term;

       Funding levels commensurate with the magnitude of the
            restoration goals; and

       Endowment established to permanently support the research
            and monitoring needed to assess the health of the Gulf,
            evaluate the efficacy of restoration measures, and facilitate
            adaptive management.

       Funds provided by the parties responsible for the oil
            disaster under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Clean Water Act,
            and other sources, such as the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and
            Endangered Species Act; and

       Additional funds contributed by the private sector for
            matching or leveraging restoration funds provided by state and
            federal governments.
    Prudent Project Selection

       Established criteria clearly link projects to specific,
            measurable, feasible objectives;

       Projects subject to independent scientific peer review in
            selection and evaluation processes; and

       Projects coordinated and integrated projects within the
            framework of a comprehensive ecosystem restoration strategy.
    Stewardship

       Restoration and enhancement of the Gulf of Mexico ecosystem
            from coastal to open blue-water environments;

       Habitat protection and enhancement that provide long-term
            resiliency and sustainability for coastal communities;

       Rehabilitation of degraded natural resources and ecosystem
            services that provide sustainable economic opportunity and
            human uses.
    Sentinel System for the Future

       Monitoring and management systems in place to identify and
            address lingering injury from BP oil and evaluate effectiveness
            of restoration projects and make necessary adjustments based on
            performance in achieving goals; and

       Permanent ``take the pulse of the Gulf'' science program to
            track ecosystem health, identify emerging problems, and
            facilitate solutions.
    Criteria for Selecting and Funding Restoration Projects
        As restoration moves from planning to implementation, there will be
    a myriad of proposals for projects on which to spend restoration funds.
    The ultimate success of these projects--which must be measured by the
    health and resilience of the ecosystem--rests on selection,
    implementation, and evaluation of a series of integrated projects,
    consistent with a Gulf-wide plan, and rigorous application of criteria
    to ensure that only the best and most appropriate projects are funded.
    The restoration program that emerges should take a comprehensive,
    integrated ecosystem approach and should strive for restoration that is
    greater than the sum of individual projects. This is no easy task, and
    criteria can be structured to emphasize different goals and values. The
    criteria described below can be applied at the strategic level, as well
    as at the level of individual projects.
        The following criteria, based in part on those developed and tested
    by the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, are recommended for
    guiding project selection for Gulf restoration related to injuries or
    losses caused by the BP disaster or long-term environmental
    degradation:

       Restoration will contribute to a healthy, productive and
            biologically diverse coastal and marine ecosystem that supports
            the services necessary for the people who live or work in the
            area.

       Restoration uses an ecosystem approach based on an
            understanding of factors that control the populations of
            species or condition of habitats found in coastal and marine
            areas.

       Priority will be given to restoration projects that
            facilitate recovery of injured natural resources and lost
            services by addressing systemic problems facing the ecosystem,
            including historical degradation.

       Priority will be given to restoration of natural resources
            and ecosystem services that have economic, cultural and
            subsistence value to people living or working along the Gulf
            coast and that bring long-term benefit to multiple species.

       Possible unintended negative effects on non-target resources
            and services must be assessed in considering restoration
            projects.

       Competitive, innovative and cost-effective proposals for
            restoration projects will be encouraged.

       Restoration priorities and activities will be re-evaluated
            as information on the extent and significance of injury to
            natural resources is obtained from the Natural Resource Damage
            Assessment and from other scientific sources.

       Restoration activities should state a clear, measurable and
            achievable endpoint.

       Priority will be given to activities that involve multi-
            disciplinary, interagency or collaborative partnerships.

       Restoration activities will be subject to independent
            scientific review before approval.

       Restoration must include meaningful public participation at
            all levels--planning, project design, implementation and
            review.

       Restoration must reflect public ownership of the process by
            timely release and reasonable access to information and data.

       Long-term monitoring programs and decision support tools
            shall be established to assess performance of restoration
            activities, allow for adaptive management and measure the
            health of the Gulf ecosystem.

        Senator Begich. Thank you, Mr. Ayers.
        What I'll do--Senator Rubio, I'm going to do 7 minutes on,
    because we're the only two here, so I'll allow you up at 7
    minutes. I'll let you go first, and then I'll finish up.

                    STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA

        Senator Rubio. Thank you. And I'm not sure I'll need the
    full 7 minutes.
        Senator Begich. OK.
        Senator Rubio. But I appreciate that. Thank you for having
    the hearing.
        And, thank you all for being a part of it.
        Commissioner Robinson, it's great to see you. I was in
    northwest Florida last week, and the Small Business Committee
    allowed us to do a field hearing on the spill.
        I have a couple, three separate questions, and I think they
    can all be promptly answered. The first is one the concerns I
    kept hearing, which I guess I had heard before, but was really
    articulated to me in way that maybe I hadn't thought about as
    deeply before, is, there's this real concern in the Gulf region
    that, the spill happened, but that the full impact of it may
    not be known for years, in essence. That people get there, they
    look around, they,--it's good news, you know. There's no oil on
    the sand, and so forth. But, in fact, there's a bunch of oil
    still unaccounted for. It's out there somewhere, and its impact
    may be delayed. And I heard a lot of concern from folks about
    that.
        In particular, their concern was that we were going to set
    up a response process, be it, you know, through the Clean Water
    Act, the fines, that a few years from now, if there is some
    delayed impact, there won't be any funds or mechanism in place
    for that. In essence, there'll be a gap between the response
    this year and the impact that may be felt years down the road.
        I don't know if there's any thoughts on that you will share
    with us. But, it's certainty something that, a line that I'm
    going to be pursuing up here as we move forward on that
    process.
        Senator Begich. Who would like to respond to that?
        Mr. Milito. Absolutely. You can have a chronic undermining
    of the strength of an ecosystem, and then have a dramatic event
    like a hurricane that will reveal it. But, the hurricane only
    comes every 15 years in that area.
        So, absolutely, there can be delayed responses, and they're
    just not obvious to the eye because they're happening--for
    example, on the marsh they're happening below ground, which you
    don't look at.
        Mr. Ayers. I think there's two separate issues that we
    really ought to address, that we learned from the Exxon Valdez.
    And let me say, we were 18 months into it before I realized the
    situation along with our science advisors.
        The first is that it's imperative that as soon as possible
    there is a monitoring observation and research program that's
    established. We did that, but only 18 months after we began the
    program. But, that research monitoring program is still in
    operation in Alaska today, and it's a separate account like the
    one I suggested be set up, which is a full monitoring
    observation research program.
        The second is the issue that you're referring to, Senator,
    and that is, in Alaska there are still places in Prince William
    Sound, in the community around Cordova and Valdez and Chenega,
    and other places where oil is still found. There are still
    storms that churn up those hydrocarbons. And I think that will
    continue to be the case in the Gulf of Mexico for many years to
    come.
        Senator Rubio. My second observation is kind of a new
    issue, and I don't know what perception you'll have about it.
    It's really related specifically, again, to the Gulf. It's,
    Cuba has recently announced that it is going to begin to
    explore off its coast. And from the science that I have been
    shown, a spill in one of those sites would be even more
    catastrophic than what happened, based on the currents and the
    way it would take it. I think they'd only be, like, 40 miles or
    50 miles away from the Florida Keys--so, much closer than even
    what happened with the recent oil spill.
        Are there any recommendations you have about how to deal
    with a foreign drilling operation like that, in terms of what
    we can do? Because ultimately, if there is a spill, say, in a
    Cuban operation, its impact would be fully felt by the entire
    Gulf region--actually, the entire Eastern Seaboard potentially.
    But, there is not a lot we can do about it. It's their
    territorial waters.
        Has any work ever been done on that? Is there a, good
    examples of transnational cooperation? And I'll leave that one
    out there.
        Real quickly, I just want to reaffirm what the commissioner
    said about the Florida based response. We're very proud of our
    emergency response operations in the state. And I hope, moving
    forward, that we have response mechanisms, not just for oil
    spills, but, in general, that recognize that the people on the
    ground who deal on a daily basis with the geography and
    topography of a certain area know a lot better than some--with
    all due respect--you know, well-intentioned scientists far away
    who think they have a better idea. I just wanted to echo that,
    because those were very strong comments, and----
        Mr. Robinson. Senator Rubio, if I could, I would--and thank
    you. And I apologize that we missed you. We wanted to come
    testify but we were doing redistricting, so you know how long
    sometimes that takes.
        But, I think it is important, just what you said. And the
    fact that we need to be at the table, Florida and its
    individual counties need to be at the table if something
    happens regarding response. Clearly, we were 110 miles away in
    Escambia County from the Deepwater Horizon well and it did not
    prevent us from having impacts.
        So, clearly, when it comes to response, I think there is
    something in here that. I've had, I was just in Portland with
    other counties, and there's a lot of comments that, again, in
    some places it worked well, and that is when they engaged the
    locals.
        By the comments we heard from some of Senator Begich's
    constituents in Alaska, there were people from Montana with the
    Yellowstone, there are other places on the Gulf that did not
    have that same experience. If we go ahead and say now that you
    have to include those local governmental authorities so that
    they can engage the process and begin response immediately, I
    think that is going to be important to continuing to help at
    least coordinate that response. Because we are all very
    concerned about what happens if we don't have a responsible
    party.
        Senator Rubio. And as far as the other countries, like, the
    particular issue of Cuba is very concerning. I think Repsol's
    one of the companies. There are some other companies we don't
    know a lot about that are talking about being a part of it. We
    don't know what safety standards they would have.
        My point being, a spill there would have just as disastrous
    an impact, as disastrous, if not more, as the one that already
    occurred, but our ability to influence it is a lot less. Is
    there any thought, is there any model we would follow, is there
    any precedent----
        Mr. Ayers. Mr. Chairman, Senator Rubio, this committee has
    led the way with regard to fisheries and taking major
    standards, or, important standards of this country into the
    international arena, both in terms of action policy, and even
    legislation, and a recent senate joint resolution. And
    certainly, it's my view that that ultimately is what's going to
    have to happen, including with Senator Cantwell's concern over
    shipping, although it is governed by the IMO, the International
    Maritime Organization.
        But, it, the standards for off-shore drilling, it's first
    matter of this country, and I won't repeat my suggestions, but
    those standards are really the beginning of a discussion that
    ought to go into the international arena, and we have done that
    with Fisheries in many ways, from drift nets to bottom
    trawling. And certainly, the State Department and NOAA and the
    Coast Guard have been very involved, and I have worked with
    them.
        Senator Rubio. And I have exhausted my time.
        My only point I would like to raise for further discussion
    at some point--I don't think we have the time to do it today,
    and quite frankly, it wasn't the sole focus of this hearing.
    But, at some point, especially if it's companies that are doing
    business here, in this country, and you are dealing with
    nations that perhaps aren't following the same safety
    standards, I'd like to figure out a way where we can create
    some leverage there, because a spill in one of these places
    would be deeply disastrous as much as anywhere else. And so, I
    hope we'll be able to have those conversations in the future.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Senator Rubio.
        And actually, that is a really good point. As you were
    talking, I was just thinking that many of those same companies
    do business in Federal waters and State waters and Federal
    lands, and you never know if, maybe there's opportunity through
    our lease agreements that we have, what opportunity we have.
    So, it's a good question.
        And Mr. Ayers brought up a good point on fisheries--
    especially out of this committee, they have done international
    activities that have created international standards. So, it's
    a good question, it's a good point for later down the road,
    too. Thank you.
        Let me, Mr. Robinson, if I could follow up. Because I think
    your response to Senator Rubio intrigued me because some of the
    work we are doing in Alaska, and let me just ask you--last year
    we had a piece of legislation called the Shore Act that we were
    moving through. It created a Gulf Citizen's Advisory Council
    similar to what we would have, what we have in Prince William
    Sound, what we have in Cooks Inlet, where citizens are engaged.
    They're not regulatory, but they are advisory in early stages
    of prevention and other things, as well as monitoring a lot of
    activities.
        Is that an avenue or something that would be a positive
    step? I know in the legislation we had last year, we had that
    in there, and it seemed like you know, it's always, we do these
    after spills, that is the problem. You know, we always, that is
    why we are advocating one for the Arctic before we develop the
    Arctic----
        Mr. Robinson. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I think it is--I think the National Association of
    Counties, we took a strong advocacy asking all of you and
    Congress to look at, including local governments, and it was,
    while several of us around the Gulf back here were in
    Washington in March, and it was actually a commissioner from
    Alaska who stepped up and said, ``Everything you said was our
    exact experience.'' And clearly, we didn't learn how to engage
    the locals there. So, I think the more you can do that, the
    better.
        I think it's--certainly that is a starting point, but I
    think when the response actually happens, when the problem
    occurs, at some point or another, the local government has to
    be brought in in a better way than we were, just sitting on the
    sidelines. And that was a very difficult process for us to go
    through, seeing things that we knew and we tried to advocate.
    And there are certainly things as I said, I wouldn't know where
    to begin and either the Pacific or the Arctic in Alaska. But,
    surely, I know there are people who are your constituents that
    do know how to do that.
        And I think somewhere or another they need to be engaged in
    the process, certainly, as I said, in planning, as well as
    coordination, communication and implementation.
        Senator Begich. Very good. Thank you.
        Jim, let me ask you a question or two in regards to Clean
    Water penalties and how to utilize them. I know that is going
    to be one of the big issues that we deal with, how do we put
    that money into work?
        I think you heard Senator Rubio talk a little bit about how
    to monitor, and you have indicated and others have indicated
    that. Can you talk, just give me your thoughts? I know the
    legislation, you know, one of the thoughts is try to do an 80-
    20 split, 80 percent for the Gulf and some of the things they
    need, and then 20 percent set aside for other activities which
    could include Arctic scientific work and others. But, how would
    you see if there was an 80-20 split, where that 20 percent
    could end up in regards to the rest of the oceans or waterways
    within the United States?
        Mr. Ayers. Certainly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        As we all know, any time we are discussing the distribution
    of funds these days, it's fraught with peril.
        Senator Begich. That is why I'm giving you the question.
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Ayers. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
    appreciate it.
        Senator Begich. I'm here to help.
        Mr. Ayers. As am I. Senator, it's certainly my view that--
    and the Ocean Conservancy strongly supports Senator
    Rockefeller's bill and the use of the Clean Water Act penalties
    toward the 80 percent dedicated toward the Gulf, and certainly
    the idea of having a portion of that be used for the long-term
    monitoring and observation and research is in my mind a
    tremendous step forward with regard to a true commitment to
    ensuring the Gulf of Mexico.
        With regard to the balance of funds, I certainly wouldn't
    speak for, or haven't in a long time, except with regard to
    escort tugs, speak for the oil industry. We see eye to eye, I
    think, on escort tug issues in Alaska.
        But, with regard to the use of other funds that are going
    into the Oil Spill Liability and Trust Fund, those funds are,
    originate as a fee, or a tax if you will. Originally, each
    barrel of oil is taxed, and that discussion came up in OPA
    1990, and actually, the State of Alaska has a per barrel fee.
    Those are public resources and they are owned by the public.
    And that discussion went on 20-something years ago. And those
    funds, that fee per barrel, is there for oil spill, various
    liabilities, and is to be used as investments to deal with oil
    spill issues.
        Clean Water Act penalties are, of course a penalty, unlike,
    in my view, the oil spill per barrel tax, which I suggested an
    increase on earlier, to be clear. But, those dollars, in my
    view, ought to, not to go into the Oil Spill and Liability
    Trust Fund, but be used, in fact, for those areas in large
    marine ecosystems where the industry intends to go conduct
    offshore business.
        So, with regard to your question, specifically, my view is
    that 20 percent ought to be used in those areas where the
    industry is excited and proposing to do offshore business, and
    that money ought to be used to, in fact, put in place the kind
    of infrastructures of monitoring and observation and research
    that I'm talking about. And if they are headed to the arctic,
    my view is, some funds, it makes no sense to me at all to
    relieve the Oil Spill Liability and Trust Fund tax because you
    are paying a penalty. And remember, there is a cap on the Oil
    Spill and Liability Trust Fund, so if you put them in there,
    the caps raise, so you actually are giving some money back, so
    you ought to just write the oil companies a check.
        So, my view is you ought to invest those funds, sir, not,
    and deposit in the oil spill trust--and if they are headed to
    the Arctic, we all know that we have a tremendous gap in
    monitoring observation and research, and a tremendous gap in
    response, according to NOAA, and the Coast Guard, who was just
    here.
        Senator Begich. Very good, let me----
        Mr. Ayers. Thanks. Sorry to eat up your----
        Senator Begich. Not a problem.
        Let me ask another quick question, and then Mr. Milito, I
    will have two quick questions for you.
        But, Jim, last question--Citizen's Advisory Council for
    Arctic. Your, has your organization taken a position on that?
        Mr. Ayers. Citizen's Advisory Council for the Arctic, in my
    view--and I'm sure, and my work with the Ocean Conservancy,
    Center and other people that have worked with the Citizen's
    Advisory Committee have found them very helpful.
        They are awkward. It's not easy to involve the public. It's
    not easy to be transparent. But certainly, we support a
    Citizen's Advisory Committee, we think it's very important,
    certainly, we have worked very closely with the North Slope
    Borough, and tribes, and they ought to be at the table in the
    discussion of what is happening in that ecosystem.
        Senator Begich. Very good.
        Mr. Milito, you heard me ask a question earlier to NOAA in
    regards to this kind of new or enhanced relationship between
    NOAA and BOEMRE in regards to decisions or that, you know, the
    process that will go forward in regards to oil and gas leasing,
    and OCS.
        Can you give me, from the industry standpoint, even though
    it's in a new process, how has that been working? Or is it too
    new? What's your thoughts?
        Mr. Milito. I think at this point, it's too new to form an
    opinion on it. I will say that under the Outer Continental
    Shelf Lands Act, there have been opportunities, and it is an
    option for all Federal agencies to be engaged in the process,
    whether it's the 5-year leasing plan, the actual lease, or the
    permitting process. So, this formalizes it to some degree, and
    I think it actually lays out the steps in which NOAA will be
    able to insert itself. But, in talking to the BOEMRE staff,
    even they believe it's too early to comment and provide an
    opinion on that.
        Senator Begich. OK. Can you tell me, you know--and I will
    be very Alaska-centric here for a second in regards to the
    Arctic and the Arctic development--can you give me, from the
    industry standpoint, how, you have heard a lot of the issues
    that are out there, both from industry, or, from independent
    individuals, as well as organizations and senators, of the
    concern they have is we move forward and what kind of
    development may occur there.
        Give me your two bits on, kind of, how you see the industry
    respond to that, which is different than, in a lot of ways, the
    Gulf. They are different environments, different depths,
    different pressure, a variety of other differences, let alone
    the climate. Can you give me some thoughts on that?
        Mr. Milito. Well, we are obviously seeing a very tailored
    planning process for activities in the Arctic. At this point,
    we are really just looking at the Shell model, and Shell is
    going out of its way to not only meet the regulations, but to
    go beyond the regulations in terms of having the vessels and
    the personnel onsite in the event that there would be any type
    of blowout-type incident, and, as well as having the actual
    prevention measures in place for that Arctic environment. So,
    the exploration plan and the permits associated with it, the
    spill response plans, are very tailored and very robust for
    those purposes.
        I think you know, we have seen a lot of hold ups in the
    process, whether it's through the permitting at the BOEMRE
    level or through the EPA, but it looks like we are getting past
    all that and all those questions are being resolved. So, it's
    going to be a matter of looking forward to very select drilling
    that will occur--and we are not talking about punching holes,
    multiple holes in that Arctic environment. We are talking about
    a very isolated number of wells that are being planned, and
    being allowed to move those forward to just explore to see what
    is there. So, you know, we are hopeful that this is going to
    move forward given the tremendous investment that that brings,
    and also the opportunity to maybe help shore up TAPS as an
    ongoing resource for the country and for Alaska.
        So, there's tremendous benefit to it, and we think that we
    have a strong system in place based upon the tailored way that
    this activity is being addressed.
        Senator Begich. And just for those that are listening, TAPS
    is the Trans-Alaska Pipeline----
        Mr. Milito. I apologize.
        Senator Begich.--which, the volume is decreasing rapidly
    every day.
        Last question for the panel, and again, Mr. Milito, if I
    can ask you to follow up on Senator Rubio's concern, and I
    think Senator Nelson's concern, about Cuba, how, the proximity,
    the lack of jurisdiction we have, and more than likely, the
    inability for us to have a government relationship with Cuba
    for many reasons. We are still in for 40 plus years. But, put
    that aside.
        Do you think industry folks, recognizing that as an issue
    and, you know, I don't know the details of it as much as the
    senators from Florida. But recognizing--and let's assume for a
    moment, for this discussion, it is a significant issue of
    concern if there is a spill there. Do you think the industry
    would be proactive in trying to figure out what kind of
    relationship, for example, I'll just use one example that's
    just kind of going through my mind that, for example, if there
    is a company doing offshore development in Cuba, that they
    would allow U.S. inspectors to review those platforms and
    facilities for standards? I'm throwing that out. I'm not asking
    you for a definitive answer. But, to be proactive, rather than
    waiting for something to happen, that, to be very frank with
    you, from someone from an oil and gas state, if something goes
    wrong in Cuba and it comes to Florida, it's going to have a
    ripple effect to the industry throughout the country, in a
    negative way.
        So, do you think there's a proactive opportunity here,
    rather than waiting for something that could happen in the
    wrong direction?
        Mr. Milito. You know, the industry looks at its operations
    internationally, and we've seen all the standards that are
    being, created here, being shared with those in Europe and
    around the world, and vice versa. And even through the
    Department of Interior, we've seen ministerial forms put
    together. We've brought industry folks to participate in those
    4-hour--all the regulators from around the world get together
    to discuss this. And the problem is, you know, very obviously,
    that Cuba's not at the table. We've seen Interior reach out to
    Mexico and have a dialogue with them.
        And the industry fully supports trying to create
    consistency, because it doesn't make sense to go from one
    region to another and operate, not to have different standards
    in place.
        So, I think there could be an opportunity there. I can't
    give you a definitive answer, but it would make sense, given
    that, those companies operating in Cuba, many of which are
    operating in the Gulf of Mexico. So, that might be a good
    opportunity to try to make sure we have consistency, and
    perhaps, ways to make sure that the capabilities that the U.S.
    has in the Gulf can be deployed to assist in those types of
    responses.
        Senator Begich. Would you mind discussing with your
    association maybe a formal response to that question? You can
    address it to the Committee, and we'll all share it with the
    Senators from Florida. But, I, the thought would be, what is
    the proactive role here that we should be taking from our end,
    but also from, then, the industry's end prior to those kind of
    developments occurring, that we will--You know, Cuba will not
    come to the table. That's a----
        Mr. Milito. Right.
        Senator Begich.--guarantee at this point. And so, what do
    we do to ensure that we have the best standards, even though
    maybe Cuba doesn't have those standards. But, how do we ensure
    the companies that do business there have the best standards,
    so if there's an impact it's, you know, we're prepared for it.
    Would that be acceptable to you, to ask your association for
    kind of a formal response to that?
        Mr. Milito. Yes, we'll go back and run that through.
        [The information referred to follows:]

                                                         August 3, 2011
    Hon. Mark Begich, Chairman,
    U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
    Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard,
    Washington, DC.

    Honorable Chairman Begich,

        On July 20, 2011, I had the privilege of testifying before the
    Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard during
    the hearing entitled, ``Looking to the Future: Lessons in Prevention,
    Response and Restoration from the Gulf Oil Spill.'' During the hearing,
    you requested that API provide a response to the following question:

       Please provide a response to the Committee on the ability of
            the U.S. oil and gas industry to assist companies operating in
            Cuban waters in the prevention of, or response to, a potential
            oil spill from offshore drilling operations.

        We respectfully provide the following response to the Subcommittee:
        Unfortunately, due to the laws in place related to U.S. entities
    doing business with Cuba, the U.S. oil and gas industry is restricted
    in its ability to assist Cuban operators in prevention and response
    activities. Effective spill prevention and management requires: (1)
    prevention by incorporating industry best safety practices and
    proactive planning, (2) immediate response plans for capping and
    containment, including purchasing and setting aside any equipment which
    could be necessary and making plans for emergency delivery, and (3)
    long-term response plans for oil cleanup. Current U.S. sanctions
    prohibit U.S. firms from entering into agreements with contractors
    operating in Cuban waters for safety assistance on drilling projects.
        Additionally, capping and containment requires manufacturing and
    setting aside equipment sufficient for an immediate emergency response
    to a particular offshore project. U.S. firms would not be permitted to
    do this at this time. Finally, in the event of a spill, U.S. firms
    would not likely be able to engage in spill cleanup in Cuban waters,
    since such activity would require cooperation with the drilling
    contractor operating in Cuban waters, as well as individual Cubans.
    Current sanctions law does include an exception under which the U.S.
    Department of the Treasury is permitted to issue a specific license to
    firms requesting to do business with Cuban entities. However, this
    exception is rarely utilized and there are significant contractual and
    liability issues associated with seeking a license to engage in
    contracts with Cuban offshore operators.
        Despite the restrictions in place under U.S. sanctions law, the
    U.S. oil and gas industry works constantly and diligently to create and
    maintain standardization of operations on a global basis. Offshore
    operators, drilling contractors, and service/supply companies are
    active internationally, and both safety and business concerns continue
    to drive the industry to achieve consistency throughout the world. API,
    the International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC), the
    International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International
    Oil and Gas Producers Association (OGP), and the International
    Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA) all
    work individually and in coordination with each other and other groups
    to create global consistency in oil and gas operations.
        Beginning with its first standard in 1924, API now maintains over
    600 standards covering all segments of the oil and natural gas
    industry. API produces standards, recommended practices,
    specifications, codes and technical publications that cover all parts
    of the industry and its standards program is accredited by the American
    National Standards Institute. To provide just a few examples, for
    offshore exploration and production, API publications cover offshore
    structures and floating production systems, tubular goods (i.e.,
    casing, drill pipe), cementing practices, subsurface safety valves and
    wellhead equipment, and blowout preventers. Many API standards are
    being used by ISO as the basis for international standards. API is
    directly responsible for the administration of three major ISO
    subcommittees responsible for developing ISO oil and gas standards. Due
    to API's involvement in these committees, approximately 70 percent of
    all ISO exploration and production standards are based on API
    standards.
        Currently, API is developing Recommended Practice 96, which will
    help improve deepwater well design and installation practices, and
    Bulletin 97, a joint effort with IADC, intended to help link the safety
    system of the drilling contractor with the safety system of the lease
    operator. API is also updating its standard 53 on blowout preventers.
    API staff and members of the standards committees coordinate these
    efforts with OGP so that we are integrating efforts on an international
    basis. Furthermore, in addition to some 100 API standards incorporated
    in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, API standards are the most
    widely cited standards by international regulators. A recent study by
    OGP on the use of standards by international regulators found, through
    14 oil producing regions, that ``API standards are dominating, with 225
    references.''
        In addition to international standardization, the industry has a
    strong global program in place to ensure quality in the design and
    manufacture of industry equipment and materials. API publishes dozens
    of specifications that standardize the requirements for the design and
    manufacture of equipment, and API's Monogram Program provides a system
    for the manufacturers of this equipment to obtain a certification, or
    ``monogram,'' of quality assurance. In order to receive the monogram, a
    manufacturer must have an approved quality management system in place
    and must demonstrate the continued ability to meet the technical
    requirements identified in the applicable API product specification(s).
    API's Monogram Program is worldwide, with nearly 4000 certified
    manufacturers in 76 countries. Eighty percent of the monograms are
    issued outside of the U.S. Purchasers of industry equipment around the
    globe rely upon the program in the purchase of high-quality, reliable
    equipment.
        With regard to spill response, the U.S. oil and gas industry relies
    upon the utilization of the resources and capabilities of Oil Spill
    Response Organizations, or OSROs, in order to effectively respond to an
    offshore spill. OSROs are active around the world, including in the
    Latin American region. In addition, oil spill response research is
    coordinated closely through the various organizations identified above,
    so that the underlying data and the associate capabilities to respond
    are understood and developed with consistency around the world. For
    example, API has initiated a review of such issues such as dispersant
    use, in-situ burning, and mechanical recovery. This review effort
    involves both U.S. and international stakeholders, and we are
    coordinating closely with the international oil and gas organizations.
    Furthermore, both OGP and IPIECA are very active in addressing issues
    related to spill response at the international level.
        In conclusion, while the U.S. oil and gas industry remains limited
    in its ability to assist companies operating in Cuban waters due to
    current sanctions laws, the industry has been committed to enhancing
    operations around the world through international standardization,
    research, coordination, and information sharing.
        Please feel free to contact API should you have any further
    questions. We greatly appreciated the opportunity to appear before you
    and the subcommittee on this critical topic, and the industry remains
    steadfast in its commitment to operate safely and in an environmentally
    responsible manner.
                Sincerely,
                                                    Erik Milito

        Senator Begich. Great. Thank you very much.
        Let me thank the panel in total. Again, thank you very
    much. And, again, there are some additional questions that
    members have already submitted that you'll see, and I hope you
    can respond to those.
        Let me just check with staff and make sure I have to do
    anything official here. The record will be kept open for the
    next 2 weeks for additional questions that will be submitted,
    and then responded to.
        Again, thank you all for participating.
        At this time the hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:33 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.]
                                A P P E N D I X

     Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
                                      to
                                David M. Kennedy
        Question. The Department of Justice, working with NRDA Trustees,
    secured an agreement from BP to provide the early release of $1 billion
    in funding toward restoration projects in the Gulf of Mexico. While
    that initial step was commendable, most experts agree that restoration
    from the spill will take many years, and that there is a need for long-
    term monitoring and assessment. Questions remain about how best to
    establish the needed sideboards that will guide the restoration effort
    in the years to come. Mr. Kennedy, as you're aware, this Committee has
    sought to advance the SHORE Act, legislation that would provide
    agencies, coastal states, and stakeholders with the resources needed to
    better prevent spills in the future, and to ensure the long-term
    restoration of the Gulf. We are currently working to update that
    legislation. What advice do you have for the Committee as we seek to
    update the legislation to help guide the long-term Gulf restoration
    effort?
        Answer. While we support many of the provisions in subtitle A, the
    Administration requires greater flexibility in supporting new programs
    and additional activities in light of its fiscal constraints. In
    addition, some of the provisions appear to create inconsistencies in
    the treatment of agencies under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and
    others could hamper efficient and effective implementation of the law.
        In October 2011, the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Task Force,
    established by Presidential Executive Order 13554 on October 5, 2010,
    is to release a Preliminary Gulf of Mexico Regional Ecosystem
    Restoration Strategy (Preliminary Strategy). This Preliminary Strategy
    will outline Gulf Coast ecosystem restoration agenda, including goals
    for ecosystem restoration. The Preliminary Strategy is to identify
    monitoring, research, and scientific assessments needed to support
    decisionmaking for ecosystem restoration efforts and evaluate existing
    monitoring programs and gaps in current data collection. Given the
    focus of the Task Force, the Preliminary Strategy may include
    recommendations that the Senate Commerce Committee may wish to include
    in a revamped SHORE Act.
        In addition, as the Committee updates the legislation, NOAA
    suggests visiting the recommendations from the President's National
    Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling
    report and recommendations released January 11, 2011 (http://
    www.oilspillcommission.gov/final-report). Many of the recommendations
    relevant to NOAA were included in the SHORE Act. The Commission was
    charged with determining the causes of the disaster, and providing
    recommendations to improve the country's ability to respond to spills,
    and reforms to make offshore energy production safer.
        NOAA appreciates the opportunity to work with Congress on the
    legislation as it moves forward in the 112th Congress.
                                     ______

         Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to
                                David M. Kennedy
        Question. The Outer Continental Shelf lands Act (OCSLA) has a
    provision directing the Department of Interior to utilize NOAA science
    to support decisionmaking and even authorizes NOAA to bill them. Since
    Deepwater Horizon, NOAA and BOEMRE have established a Memorandum of
    Understanding (MOU) to better facilitate coordination and collaboration
    between the agencies to ensure that decisionmaking relating to outer
    continental shelf energy resources is based on updated science and the
    expertise of both agencies. NOAA has in the past cited capacity
    limitations as a primary impediment to the ability to provide relevant
    scientific input to the Department of Interior. Since the MOU was
    established, has the Department of Interior utilized its existing
    authority under OCSLA to fund any of NOAA's scientific efforts in
    support of improving offshore energy decisionmaking?
        Answer. Since the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, on
    May 19, 2011, NOAA has not entered into any new financial agreements
    with BOEMRE for its implementation. However, NOAA and BOEMRE have
    collaborated on the scientific review of multiple BOEMRE documents
    since May, including National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documents
    and an analysis of the potential impacts of a very large oil spill in
    the Arctic.
        NOAA has historically received funding for specific research
    projects, many of which are ongoing, relevant to offshore oil and gas
    activities through the BOEMRE Environmental Studies Program. For
    example, NMFS has been working productively with BOEMRE/MMS in the
    Alaska region on science relevant to living marine resources, including
    several successful scientific projects addressing high priority
    research topics. A large portion of the research supported by BOEMRE in
    recent years in Alaska has been focused on research topics of highest
    priority to BOEMRE, including improved information on marine mammal
    distribution and movements in lease sale areas. In addition to ongoing
    studies, NMFS has identified numerous data gaps that are critical to
    NMFS managers that would complement and strengthen the information
    produced by current and past environmental studies.
        NOAA looks forward to continuing to work with BOEMRE under the MOU
    to ensure that high priority needs of mutual concern to both agencies
    will be addressed.
                                     ______

    Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
                                 to Erik Milito
        Question 1. Going forward, do you think we need greater
    consultation and coordination between agencies like BOEMRE and NOAA on
    OCS decision-making, particularly as it relates to identifying areas
    that should be excluded from lease sales due to their high ecological
    importance and sensitivity?
        Answer. NOAA, the Coast Guard and other agencies have been very
    active in the planning and leasing processes for offshore oil and gas
    development and have played a significant role in this process. In
    fact, BOEMRE relies largely upon data produced and provided by NOAA in
    completing its analysis of the environmental sensitivities of the
    various planning areas, which is a statutory requirement in the
    planning process.
        The interagency consultation and coordination that exists between
    Federal agencies is a result of the existing regulatory framework
    implemented pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).
    The OCSLA provides multiple opportunities for engagement among BOEMRE,
    other Federal agencies, and state/local governments so that
    environmental, ecological and socioeconomic issues are effectively
    considered and addressed.
        With regard to the development of a proposed leasing program (Five-
    Year Program), Section 18 of the OCSLA states ``the Secretary shall
    invite and consider suggestions for such program from any interested
    Federal agency, including the Attorney General, in consultation with
    the Federal Trade Commission, and from the Governor of any State which
    may become an affected State under such proposed program.'' Section 18
    further states, ``The heads of all Federal departments and agencies
    shall provide the Secretary [of the Department of the Interior] with
    any nonprivileged or nonproprietary information he requests to assist
    him in preparing the leasing program and may provide the Secretary with
    any privileged or proprietary information he requests to assist him in
    preparing the leasing program. . . . In addition, the Secretary shall
    utilize the existing capabilities and resources of such Federal
    departments and agencies by appropriate agreement.'' (emphasis added)
        But the requirement to consult and coordinate with other agencies
    is much broader than the Five-Year Program. Section 5 of the OCSLA
    quite simply states, ``[i]n the enforcement of safety, environmental,
    and conservation laws and regulations, the Secretary shall cooperate
    with the relevant departments and agencies of the Federal Government
    and of the affected States.'' (emphasis added)
        Thus, based upon the plain language of the OCSLA, the existing
    framework provides for, and in many cases mandates, opportunities for
    interagency engagement. To that end, NOAA and other agencies have
    consistently participated in the process, by providing important
    information for consideration, by providing comments to BOEMRE and by
    coordinating key decisions with BOEMRE. A review of the 2007-2012
    Proposed Final OCS Leasing Program, the Revised 2007-2012 Final OCS
    Leasing Program, the 2007-2012 Multi-Sale Gulf of Mexico Final
    Environmental Impact Statement, Final Environmental Impact Statement
    for Chukchi Lease Sale 193, and the recently completed Final
    Environmental Impact Statement for Gulf of Mexico Lease Sale 218 in the
    Western Planning Area demonstrate that NOAA and other Federal agencies
    are very involved in the consultation and coordination with BOEMRE on
    OCS decisionmaking.
        In conclusion, the existing framework provides many levels for
    decisionmaking and for environmental analysis and consideration,
    including the development of the Five Year Program, the lease sale
    process, exploration plan approval, and permit approval. There are 27
    statutory authorities that apply to OCS oil and gas operations and 88
    Code of Federal Regulations parts implementing these statutory
    authorities, and there are 24 significant approvals and permits
    applicable to OCS oil and gas operations. This system provides an
    effective means of balancing the expeditious and orderly development of
    the OCS with environmental protection and national security.

        Question 2. How does industry think we can best balance encouraging
    offshore development while at the same time taking potential
    environmental impacts into account?
        Answer. As discussed in the response to question (1) above, there
    is a robust, multi-phase approach in place that allows the government
    to effectively encourage offshore development while taking potential
    environmental impacts into account. Environmental review occurs during
    the development of the Five-Year Program, during the completion of
    multi-sale environmental impact statements, during the completion of
    NEPA documentation for individual lease sales, and during the
    completion of NEPA documentation for exploration and development and
    production plans.
        As mentioned above, the OCSLA provides a comprehensive system for
    planning for and conducting oil and natural gas development on the
    Outer Continental Shelf. Pursuant to Section 18 of the OCSLA, the OCS
    oil and gas leasing program is developed in several stages, with
    requirements for collaboration, consultation, and coordination with
    Federal, state and local governments. In addition, the various stages
    provide significant opportunities for public comment so that the
    viewpoints of all stakeholders can be adequately considered.
        Furthermore, the requirements for preparing an oil and gas leasing
    program under the OCSLA ensure that consideration is given to ecosystem
    management. Section 18 of the OCSLA requires that the program be
    prepared consistent with the following:

            (1) Management of the outer Continental Shelf shall be
            conducted in a manner which considers economic, social, and
            environmental values of the renewable and nonrenewable
            resources contained in the outer Continental Shelf, and the
            potential impact of oil and gas exploration on other resource
            values of the outer Continental Shelf and the marine, coastal,
            and human environments.

            (2) Timing and location of exploration, development and
            production of oil and gas among the oil- and gas-bearing
            physiographic regions of the outer Continental Shelf shall be
            based on a consideration of----

                    (A) existing information concerning the geographical,
                    geological, and ecological characteristics of such
                    regions;

                    (B) an equitable sharing of developmental benefits and
                    environmental risks among the various regions;

                    (C) the location of such regions with respect to, and
                    the relative needs of, regional and national energy
                    markets;

                    (D) the location of such regions with respect to other
                    uses of the sea and seabed, including fisheries,
                    navigation, existing or proposed sealanes, potential
                    sites of deepwater ports, and other anticipated uses of
                    the resources and space of the outer Continental Shelf;

                    (E) the interest of potential oil and gas producers in
                    the development of oil and gas resources as indicated
                    by exploration or nomination;

                    (F) laws, goals, and policies of affected States which
                    have been specifically identified by the Governors of
                    such States as relevant matters for the Secretary's
                    consideration;

                    (G) the relative environmental sensitivity and marine
                    productivity of different areas of the outer
                    Continental Shelf; and

                    (H) relevant environmental and predictive information
                    for different areas of the outer Continental Shelf.

            (3) The Secretary shall select the timing and location of
            leasing, to the maximum extent practicable, so as to obtain a
            proper balance between the potential for environmental damage,
            the potential for the discovery of oil and gas, and the
            potential for adverse impact on the coastal zone.

        Furthermore, various other statutes and regulations apply to
    offshore activities, including, among others, the Coastal Zone
    Management Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the Endangered
    Species Act, the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, the Marine
    Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, the Comprehensive
    Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, the Resource
    Conservation and Recovery Act, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. We
    therefore believe that we currently have an effective statutory
    framework in place to effectively encourage offshore development while
    at the same time taking potential environmental impacts into account.
    However, we do remain concerned that decisions that have been made
    during the regulatory process could have the impact of discouraging
    domestic offshore development and thus dampen prospects for domestic
    job creation and government revenues in the billions of dollars.
    Enclosed are two studies that demonstrate the impacts of slow
    government permitting in offshore oil and gas projects. Also attached
    is a study that demonstrates that more than 500,000 jobs and $190
    billion in Federal revenues could be created if the government allowed
    access to additional Federal lands that have been kept off-limits to
    development, including offshore lands.
        [To view ``Restarting ``the Engine''--Securing American Jobs,
    Investment, and Energy Security'' go to: http://
    www.gulfeconomicsurvival.org/phx-content/assets/files/
    IHS_Report_Restarting_the_Engine_21July11_FINAL.pdf].
        [To view ``United States Gulf of Mexico Oil and Natural Gas
    Industry Economic Impact Analysis'' go to: http://www.noia.org/website/
    staticdownload.asp?id=457
    98].
        [To view ``Energy Policy at a Crossroads: An Assessment of the
    Impacts of Increased Access versus Higher Taxes on U.S. Oil and Natural
    Gas Production, Government Revenue, and Employment'' go to: http://
    www.api.org/Newsrooom/upload/SOAE_Wood_Mackenzie_Access_vs_Taxes.pdf].
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to
                          Rear Admiral Paul F. Zukunft
        Question 1. If a Deepwater Horizon-like explosion and subsequent
    spill happened tomorrow, what if anything would the Coast Guard do
    differently?
        Answer. The Deepwater Horizon oil spill was the first event in U.S.
    history to be declared a Spill of National Significance (SONS) and the
    first in which a National Incident Commander (NIC) was designated.
    Despite the unprecedented scope of the disaster, many aspects of the
    response worked very well.
        The National Contingency Plan (NCP) served the Nation well and
    proved effective during the Deepwater Horizon response. The NCP
    provided a sound framework that facilitated the discretion and freedom
    of action required to address contingencies that arose during the
    response.
        Although the NIC's role and function evolved through the course of
    the response, the NIC proved to be an effective command organization
    that served its intended purpose to promote unity of effort across the
    whole-of-government.
        After several near mishaps in the airspace above the oil spill
    response, the NIC, in coordination with U.S. Northern Command and the
    U.S. Air Force, established the Aviation Coordination Center (ACC) at
    Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida to establish command and control over
    the airspace. The ACC helped prevent midair collisions, improved
    situational awareness, validated oil trajectory monitoring, tracked
    skimmers and vessels of opportunity, and directed boom deployment to
    where it was most needed.
        As discussed below, the Coast guard has reviewed and analyzed the
    various Deepwater Horizon reports to identify lessons for preparedness
    improvements and develop national implementation strategies. The Coast
    guard has also implemented numerous initiatives on the lessons learned.

        Question 2. As we approach the one-year anniversary of the capping
    of the Deepwater Horizon well, what are some of the biggest lessons the
    Coast Guard has learned from that historic response?
        Answer. The Coast Guard has gathered a large body of observations,
    perspectives, and opinions regarding the response to the Deepwater
    Horizon oil spill from its internal work to identify strategic lessons
    impacting contingency preparedness, as well as from various other
    Deepwater Horizon reports, such as the President's National Commission
    on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling's findings,
    the National Incident Commander's (NIC) Report, the Joint Investigation
    Team (JIT) report, and the Incident Specific Performance Review. The
    Coast Guard has reviewed and analyzed this body of work to identify
    lessons for preparedness improvement and to develop appropriate
    national implementation strategies. We are also working with other U.S.
    Government agencies to share lessons learned from Deepwater Horizon
    with our international partners through appropriate bodies such as the
    International Maritime Organization, Arctic Council and others. These
    lessons are currently under review by the Coast Guard for
    prioritization and initiation of the recommended corrective actions.
        The lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill emphasized
    the importance of updated and comprehensive Regional Contingency Plans
    (RCPs) and Area Contingency Plans (ACPs) around the Nation. The Coast
    Guard, as the Federal On-Scene Coordinator for oil spills in the
    coastal zone, is ensuring the Worst Case Discharge (WCD) planning
    scenarios are accurate and reflect all potential sources for oil
    spills, including offshore facilities. The Coast Guard and the Bureau
    of Ocean Energy Management and Regulatory Enforcement (BOEMRE) have
    formed a joint Response Work Group to improve interagency partnerships
    and collaboratively work on improving preparedness efforts in several
    areas post-Deepwater Horizon. Significant work group initiatives
    include joint Oil Spill Response Plan (OSRP) Review, RCP and ACP WCD
    Gap Analysis, and joint BOEMRE/Coast Guard pollution equipment
    compliance inspections. The Coast Guard and BOEMRE have conducted a
    joint review of OSRPs in BOEMRE's U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)
    Gulf of Mexico, Pacific, and Alaska regions. This review, which
    included Coast Guard participants from each region, identified the most
    accurate and up-to-date WCD information for offshore facilities. In
    addition to the OSRP review, a comprehensive analysis of RCPs and ACPs
    was conducted to identify significant WCD preparedness gaps. The Coast
    Guard directed Area Committees to address these gaps and ensure WCD
    planning scenarios in all oil spill contingency plans reflect WCD
    information identified during the joint OSRP review. As mentioned in
    several key Deepwater Horizon lessons learned reports, the Coast Guard
    identified the need for Area Committees to encourage more participation
    from state and local officials in oil spill planning and preparedness
    efforts. The Coast Guard also re-emphasized existing guidance for
    District and Sector Commanders to develop aggressive outreach programs
    with state, parish, county, and other local officials.
        Additionally, the Deepwater Horizon incident and others have
    prompted the Coast Guard to review all operations and systems under its
    responsibility for potential improvements to both regulations and the
    inspection regime of foreign-flagged Mobile Offshore Drilling Units
    (MODU) on the U.S. OCS. Prior to the casualty, we were already pursuing
    improvements to our offshore inspection capability through our marine
    safety improvement program. We recently increased our inspection
    efforts and established an Offshore National Center of Expertise that
    greatly enhances inspector competency. Following the casualty we
    implemented further improvements and are pursuing more. All MODUs
    operating in the United States are subject to annual examinations to
    verify compliance with area laws and international conventions. If that
    exam finds ``questionable equipment, systems, or crew competency
    issues'' the Coast Guard can expand its investigation to determine
    whether a deficiency exists and may require additional tests,
    inspections, or crew drills in MODUs which will result in more frequent
    examinations of the highest risk MODUs based on accident history, past
    discrepancies, flag state performance, and classification society
    performance.
        Marine inspectors will focus on critical systems representing the
    most risk, such as dynamic positioning systems and operator competency.
    Additionally, we are actively engaged in oversight of the rapidly
    developing well spill containment capability (Marine Well Containment
    System and Helix Well Control Group) to promote rigorous testing to
    ensure these response vessels are capable of responding to a deepwater
    well spill and meet applicable safety and environmental requirements.
    We recently established an OCS Activities Matrix Team to leverage
    expertise throughout the Coast Guard including various headquarters
    offices, the Marine Safety Center, the Eighth Coast Guard District in
    New Orleans, LA, and the OCS Center of Expertise. This team will
    maintain attention on emerging OCS issues and enhance the Coast Guard's
    ability to address them, increase our plan review and inspection
    oversight, support investigations and casualty analysis, and provide a
    holistic approach to management of OCS safety programs.

        Question 3. What did we get right and what could we have done
    better?
        Answer. The Deepwater Horizon oil spill was the first event in U.S.
    history to be declared a Spill of National Significance (SONS) and the
    first to designate a National Incident Commander (NIC). Despite the
    unprecedented scope of the disaster, many aspects of the response
    worked very well.
        The National Contingency Plan (NCP) served the Nation well and
    proved effective during the Deepwater Horizon response. The NCP
    provided a sound framework that allowed for the needed discretion and
    freedom of action to address contingencies that arose during the
    response.
        Although the NIC's role and function evolved through the course of
    the response, the NIC proved to be an effective command organization
    that served its intended purpose to promote unity of effort across the
    whole-of-government. This whole-of-government approach was highlighted
    when we also created a supporting plan with the Federal Emergency
    Management Agency's (FEMA) Deepwater Integrated Services Team (DIST),
    comprised of officials from different offices within Department of
    Homeland Security, Department of Health and Human Services, the
    Department of Labor, and the Department of Justice. This supporting
    plan provided a coordinated strategy to fill identified gaps in
    providing affected individual and small businesses benefits and
    assistance. In short, we attempted to meet the human needs of the oil
    spill through several strategies, one of which included a plan to
    ensure equal access to public information through language assistance
    for limited English proficient populations, and documents in alternate
    formats for those with disabilities or functional needs.
        After several near mishaps in the airspace above the oil spill
    response, the NIC, in coordination with U.S. Northern Command and the
    U.S. Air Force, established the Aviation Coordination Center (ACC) at
    Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida to establish command and control over
    the airspace. The ACC helped prevent midair collisions, improved
    situational awareness, validated oil trajectory monitoring, tracked
    skimmers and vessels of opportunity, and directed boom deployment to
    where it was most needed.
        The Coast Guard is also conducting a review of the President's
    National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore
    Drilling's findings, the NIC's Report, Incident Specific Preparedness
    Review along with the other Deepwater Horizon reports that provide a
    body of observations, perspectives, and opinions. The Coast Guard is
    carefully reviewing these reports to identify areas of positive and
    effective preparedness improvements to develop effective and
    appropriate national implementation strategies. The Coast Guard has
    already taken several actions to address areas where planning and
    preparedness will be improved, including: directing Captains of the
    Port to review Oil Spill Response Plans for offshore facilities;
    requiring Area Committees to include Worst Case Discharge scenarios for
    offshore facilities in their respective Area Contingency Plans;
    increasing State and local outreach and participation in Area Committee
    meetings and activities; participating in a Coast Guard, Federal
    Emergency Management Agency, and Environmental Protection Agency
    workgroup to develop recommendations to harmonize the National
    Contingency Plan and National Response Framework governance constructs.
    Additionally on July 7, 2011, the Coast Guard issued a Federal Register
    Notice announcing an updated policy employing risk based targeting to
    prioritize inspections of foreign-flagged Mobile Offshore Drilling
    Units operating on the Outer Continental Shelf.

        Question 4. The Coast Guard's Incident Specific Preparedness Review
    (ISPR) acknowledged there was confusion among the state and local
    emergency managers between the National Contingency Plan (NCP) top-down
    construct set forth in OPA-90, and the National Response Framework
    (NRF) bottom-up construct used for Stafford Act responses such as
    hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes. Many local government officials
    suggest OPA-90 failed to provide an adequate response to the oil spill.
    Many local officials believe that this response should have been a
    Stafford Act response and that OPA-90 and the NCP hindered the local
    response effort. I understand that the Coast Guard developed policy in
    2009 addressing the connectivity of the NCP and the NRF, yet there is
    little to show that it was effective. Can you describe the Coast
    Guard's efforts in connecting the NCP with the NRF?
        Answer. The policy, Commandant Instruction 16000.22--Coast Guard
    Connectivity to the National Response Framework (NRF), dated November
    09, 2009, describes Coast Guard support and coordination with Federal
    Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the States during a Stafford Act
    funded event under the NRF. This policy is not an instruction on the
    alignment between the NRF and the National Contingency Plan (NCP).
        The Coast Guard is actively engaged with FEMA, Environmental
    Protection Agency (EPA), and other interagency partners including
    State, local, and private sector experts to better align the NCP and
    NRF based on statutory requirements, Homeland Security Presidential
    Directive--5, and Presidential Policy Directive--8 (PPD-8). The Coast
    Guard accompanied with other workgroup partners is developing change
    recommendations to better align the NCP and NRF as part of the revision
    to the NRF required by PPD-8.

        Question 5. How should the Coast Guard improve local involvement in
    preparedness activities and familiarity of oil spill response
    processes?
        Answer. As the designated Federal On-Scene Coordinator under the
    National Oil and Hazardous Substance Contingency Plan (NCP) in the
    coastal zone, the local Coast Guard Captain of the Port (COTP) is
    responsible for coordinating local preparedness and response activities
    for their respective coastal zone. These responsibilities include
    overseeing the development of the Area Contingency Plan and organizing
    the Area Committee whose membership is comprised of stakeholders from
    other Federal agencies as well as state, local, tribal and industry
    representatives.
        As mentioned in several key Deepwater Horizon lessons learned
    reports, the Coast Guard has identified the need for Area Committees to
    encourage more participation from state & local officials in oil spill
    planning and preparedness efforts. The Coast Guard has placed a
    reemphasis on its past guidance for District and Sector Commanders to
    develop aggressive outreach programs with States, Parishes, and County
    officials. The Coast Guard's 2011 Strategic Planning Direction directs
    Coast Guard COTPs to conduct outreach on the NCP with a focus on
    engaging both environmental and emergency departments at the state and
    local level. The Coast Guard will continue to encourage more
    participation from state & local officials in oil spill planning and
    preparedness efforts in the form of participation in industry and
    government led drills and exercises as well as Area Committee sponsored
    training and workshops in oil spill preparedness and response.
        The Coast Guard is also updating its national policy guidance to
    address major contingency plan gaps identified in Deepwater Horizon
    lessons learned reports for the identification and protection of
    environmentally sensitive areas, development of oil spill protection
    strategies, Area Committee outreach and coordination, and many other
    areas of improvement.
        Additionally, the Coast Guard co-leads an NCP/National Response
    Framework Alignment Work Group that focuses on ensuring NCP alignment
    language as provided in the Presidential Policy Directive -8 driven
    rewrite of the National Response Framework. This will include having
    both state environmental and emergency management contributors.

        Question 6. Reports suggest the Area Contingency Plans in the Gulf
    of Mexico were inadequate for an incident of this magnitude. The oil
    response plans were not linked to the local Area Contingency Plans and
    a worst case discharge scenario was not contemplated. Local officials
    did not participate in the Area Contingency Plan development. There was
    also a consistent lack of identifying and prioritizing environmentally
    sensitive areas, economically important areas, and the development of
    protective strategies for these areas. Can you describe some of the
    changes the Coast Guard is making to Area Contingency Plans as a result
    of the spill?
        Answer. The Coast Guard and Bureau of Ocean Energy Management,
    Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE) conducted a comprehensive joint
    analysis of Regional Contingency Plans and Area Contingency Plans (ACP)
    to identify significant worst case discharge (WCD) preparedness gaps.
    Some of the critical Worst Case Discharge (WCD) gaps include: Missing
    or incomplete planning assumptions and scenarios, adequacy of WCD oil
    spill response resources, adequacy of WCD protection & recovery
    strategies, and adequacy of WCD dispersant use, in-situ burning, and
    subsea containment strategies.
        As a result of this joint analysis, the Coast Guard is preparing
    detailed WCD process guidance on how to immediately address these gaps
    in Area Contingency Plans. As part of the Coast Guard's FY 2012
    Strategic Planning Direction (SPD), the Coast Guard has directed its
    field commanders to ensure WCD planning scenarios in all oil spill
    contingency plans reflect WCD planning information identified during
    the joint Oil Spill Response Plan review. This SPD also directs Coast
    Guard field units to conduct outreach on the NCP with a focus on
    engaging both environmental and emergency departments at the state
    level. The Coast Guard will continue to encourage its field commanders
    to ensure more participation from state & local officials in oil spill
    planning and preparedness efforts.
        The Coast Guard is also updating its national ACP policy guidance
    to address major contingency plan gaps identified in joint analysis as
    well as several Deepwater Horizon lessons learned reports. Priorities
    for improvements in Coast Guard ACP guidance include: Area Committee
    outreach and coordination, identification and prioritization of
    environmentally and economically significant areas, and development of
    protection strategies.

        Question 7. What kind of guidance should the Coast Guard provide to
    ensure that critical components of the Area Contingency Plan are
    incorporated nationwide? Is this already taking place?
        Answer. The Coast Guard publishes internal policy guidance on
    development and implementation of Area Contingency Plans. The Coast
    Guard is updating its national policy guidance to address contingency
    plan gaps identified in Deepwater Horizon lessons learned reports,
    including: identification and protection of environmentally and
    economically significant areas, development of oil spill protection
    strategies, improving state and local participation in oil spill
    planning efforts, and many other areas of improvement. This guidance
    will also stress the importance of Environmentally Sensitive Index
    (ESI) maps, which are produced by National Oceanic and Atmospheric
    Administration, during oil spill planning and response in making
    informed operational decisions to protect sensitive shoreline and
    habitat.
        To date, the Coast Guard and Bureau of Ocean Energy Management,
    Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE) conducted a comprehensive analysis
    of Regional Contingency Plans (RCP) & Area Contingency Plans (ACP) was
    conducted to identify significant worst case discharge (WCD)
    preparedness gaps. The Coast Guard has directed Area Committees to
    address these gaps ensure WCD planning scenarios in all oil spill
    contingency plans reflect WCD information identified during the joint
    Oil Spill Response Plan review.
        The Coast Guard's 2011 Strategic Planning Direction directs Coast
    Guard field units to conduct outreach on the National Oil and Hazardous
    Substances Pollution Contingency Plan with a focus on engaging both
    environmental and emergency departments at the state level. The Coast
    Guard will continue to encourage its field commanders to ensure more
    participation from state & local officials in oil spill planning and
    preparedness efforts.

        Question 8. OPA-90 requires that Area Contingency Plans identify
    sensitive environmental areas with general protection strategies. But
    there is no nationally recognized, standardized process or the
    identification and prioritization of these environmentally sensitive
    areas. What kind of oversight should the Coast Guard provide to ensure
    adequate local stakeholder participation and identification,
    prioritization, and protection strategies for environmentally sensitive
    areas?
        Answer. As mentioned in several key Deepwater Horizon lessons
    learned reports, the Coast Guard has identified the need for Area
    Committees to encourage more participation from state and local
    officials in oil spill planning and preparedness efforts. The Coast
    Guard has placed a reemphasis on its past guidance for District and
    Sector Commanders to develop aggressive outreach programs with State,
    Parish, and County officials. The Coast Guard's 2011 Strategic Planning
    Direction directs Coast Guard field units to conduct outreach on the
    National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan with a
    focus on engaging both environmental and emergency departments at the
    state level. The Coast Guard will continue to encourage its field
    commanders to ensure more participation from state & local officials in
    oil spill planning and preparedness efforts.
        The Coast Guard is updating its national policy guidance to address
    major contingency plan gaps identified in Deepwater Horizon lessons
    learned reports for the identification and protection of
    environmentally sensitive areas, development of oil spill protection
    strategies, Area Committee outreach and coordination, and many other
    areas of improvement.

        Question 9. How big of a burden would this be on the Coast Guard?
    Is this something that the Coast Guard could easily do?
        Answer. The identification and prioritization of environmentally
    sensitive areas and development of protection strategies are tasks that
    require significant funding, resources, and long-term commitment from
    key Area Committee members. Those activities can be very burdensome on
    many Area Committees, especially those without state-sponsored oil
    spill programs, to carry out these important preparedness activities.
        Significant participation and input from key Area Committee
    stakeholders, especially natural resource trustees and land managers
    that have local knowledge of critical habitat, endangered or protected
    species, or sensitive shorelines, is critical to the successful
    accomplishment of these tasks. As described in the National Contingency
    Plan, the Coast Guard leverages the expertise from lead Federal natural
    resource trustees, specifically National Oceanic and Atmospheric
    Administration (NOAA) and Department of the Interior, to engage Area
    Committees in these important discussions. Ecological Risk Assessments
    (ERA) are valuable science-based tools which assist Area Committees and
    Coast Guard Federal On-Scene Coordinator in making well-informed,
    scientific-based decisions on best response strategies to minimize
    impacts to environmentally sensitive areas. In addition, the Coast
    Guard regularly uses Environmental Sensitive Index maps, which are
    produced by NOAA, during oil spill responses in making informed
    operational decisions.

        Question 10. The Coast Guard expertise in marine safety has waned
    over the last decade due to several factors. The Service has been
    tasked by Congress to focus on homeland security centric missions. The
    successes of OPA-90 and spill prevention programs have also resulted in
    fewer offshore spills and less frequency in large spill events,
    creating the perception that fewer resources are adequate to accomplish
    spill prevention and response objectives.
        The Coast Guard's ``Incident Specific Preparedness Reviews'' also
    that the reorganization to `sectors' merged the services marine safety
    and response with law enforcement and search and rescue, resulting in
    people with little oil spill response training sometimes overseeing
    initial response activities. How can the Coast Guard make ``sector''
    organization work for all of its missions, including oil spill
    response?
        Answer. The Coast Guard plans on executing the following
    initiatives to enhance oil spill response capability at Sectors:

       Institute a Coast Guard Federal On-Scene Commander's
            Representative (FOSCR) course: Develop a FOSCR course as
            recommended by the FOSCR Front End Analysis to improve marine
            environmental response competency among junior officers and
            enlisted personnel at Sectors who may be called upon to provide
            command and control functions during a range of oil spill and
            hazardous material incidents. The first class was held in
            September 2011.

       Establish Permanent Regional Response Team (RRT) Co-Chairs
            at Districts: Establish civilian, permanent RRT Co-Chairs at
            each District as provided in the FY 2011 budget process.
            Permanent Co-Chairs will provide leadership, continuity, and
            subject matter expertise to the Coast Guard's regional elements
            of the National Response System (NRS) and National Response
            Framework (NRF), directly supporting operations carried out at
            Sectors by Federal On-Scene Commanders (FOSCs).

       Establish CG National Incident Management Assist Team
            (IMAT): Establish a full time CG National IMAT as provided in
            the President's FY 2012 budget request. A Coast Guard National
            IMAT will provide immediate deployable incident management
            surge capacity to Coast Guard Incident Commanders nationwide.

       Enhance Crisis Communications and Incident Management
            Training: Establish position-specific and career-path based ICS
            competency requirements for key personnel throughout the Coast
            Guard, and ensure integration into existing guidance for both
            enlisted and officer career paths. Expand the existing crisis
            communications training, as well as incident management
            training available for FOSCs to address all hazards contingency
            responses expected under the NRF.

        Question 11. As a result of the Deepwater Horizon explosion and
    spill, the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the Coast Guard
    and BOEMRE is being currently revised. It has been reported that
    officials from both agencies are meeting periodically to discuss
    findings and lessons learned from the joint investigation report. As it
    stands right now, the Coast Guard generally has regulatory
    responsibility for systems on MODUs and other offshore structures that
    are above the waterline; BOEMRE is responsible for systems below the
    waterline. It's my understanding the Coast Guard and BOEMRE either are,
    or soon will be, revising the MOU dealing with MODUs and other offshore
    structures.
        Given the broad array of demands we as a nation place on the Coast
    Guard, I'm concerned at the end of that process the Coast Guard may end
    up doing less (and BOEMRE more) when it comes to inspecting offshore
    oil platforms. How do you expect the new division of responsibilities
    to shake out?
        Answer. The Coast Guard and Bureau of Ocean Energy Management and
    Regulatory Enforcement have agreed to review the Memorandums of
    Agreement and make changes and/or improvements as necessary. The Coast
    Guard will increase focus on inspecting offshore platforms. The Coast
    Guard's Outer Continental Shelf Activities Matrix Team has already
    identified several areas to increase the Coast Guard's plan review and
    inspection oversight efforts, such as: gas detection systems; emergency
    disconnect and shutdown systems; dynamic positioning; and blow out
    preventers. Finally, the Coast Guard is reviewing offshore manning and
    training policies in order to ensure they meet current needs.

        Question 12. Can you assure us that the Coast Guard's
    responsibilities in inspecting offshore installations will not
    decrease?
        Answer. The Coast Guard has no intention of decreasing activities
    that might lessen the safety and security on offshore installations.

        Question 13. As a result of the Deepwater Horizon explosion and
    spill, the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the Coast Guard
    and BOEMRE is being currently revised. It has been reported that
    officials from both agencies are meeting periodically to discuss
    findings and lessons learned from the joint investigation report. As it
    stands right now, the Coast Guard generally has regulatory responsible
    for systems on MODUs and other offshore structures that are above the
    waterline; BOEMRE is responsible for systems below the waterline.
        The MOU between the Coast Guard and BOEMRE is designed to promote
    interagency consistency in the regulation of Outer Continental Shelf,
    minimize duplication of effort, and aid the agencies in the successful
    completion of their assigned missions. It seems, however, a duplication
    of effort can be a good thing when it comes to the inspection of safety
    systems. I wonder if there needs to be a holistic approach to
    inspecting the offshore drilling platforms. The software that controls
    all of the computerized systems on these high tech rigs is often
    overlooked, but it has clear implications for the safety of life and
    property at sea. Who do you think should inspect the software that
    controls all of the computerized systems of the drilling rigs?
        Answer. Mobile offshore drilling units (MODU) and floating
    facilities typically automate systems on board, such as dynamic
    positioning and ballast control systems. The Coast Guard does not
    directly inspect the ``software'' and ``lines of computer code''
    associated with these systems. However, during the course of a MODU
    inspection, the Coast Guard will verify that automated critical safety
    systems and associated software, such as dynamic positioning systems
    and ballast control systems, undergo extensive testing to confirm the
    robustness and reliability of that particular system.

        Question 14. Do you think there needs to be some duplication of
    effort-some intentional redundancies--when it comes to inspecting
    safety systems?
        Answer. Yes, some redundancy with respect to inspection of critical
    safety items closely integrated and interdependent with one another,
    such as the gas detection system, emergency disconnect and shutdown
    systems, and blow out preventer is appropriate, given the potential
    impacts should a failure occur.

        Question 15. How do you find the right balance between redundancy
    and efficiency in terms of inspecting offshore platforms?
        Answer. The Coast Guard will seek to achieve the best balance
    between redundancy and efficiency through coordination with primary
    stakeholders operating on the outer continental shelf (OCS). The Coast
    Guard (subject to the availability of funding) will continue to engage
    safety advisory committees, such as National Offshore Safety Advisory
    Committee and Offshore Marine Service Association and participate in
    major industry gatherings such as the Offshore Technology, Floating
    Production, Storage and Offloading Vessel and Dynamic Positioning
    conferences and Deepwater Symposium. Finally, the Coast Guard will
    engage standards development organizations, such as the American
    Petroleum Institute and International Standards Organization, to
    participate in the development of industry consensus standards and the
    Coast Guard will host regional inspectors meetings and invite OCS
    industry participation.

        Question 16. It is evident that the Vessels of Opportunity program
    played a huge role in the response effort. Prior to the oil spill there
    was no VOO program in the area. It was modeled after similar programs
    in other States, most notably Alaska. Yet in the early stages of the
    response there was widespread frustration by for-hire captains because
    there was a big difference between the number requested and the number
    actually needed. Is the Coast Guard developing a national policy for
    incorporating VOO into Area Contingency Plans?
        Answer. The Coast Guard is reviewing the lessons learned and
    recommendations from several Deepwater Horizon lessons learned reports,
    including those related to Vessels of Opportunity (VOO). Although many
    reports indicate the VOO program during Deepwater Horizon was
    successful, there are many issues associated with establishing a
    national VOO program, including funding, maintaining trained VOO
    operators, administration, oversight, selection criteria, and many
    others.
        The VOO program in Alaska is funded and administered by the oil
    industry, with some oversight from the Coast Guard. There are many
    reasons why this program was started in Alaska, most notably the
    remoteness of many of the port areas which greatly increases response
    times of Oil Spill Response Organization (OSRO) and the lack of
    availability of OSRO resources. Establishing VOO programs similar to
    the one in Alaska is not practical for most areas around the country.
    VOO programs have not been established in other areas because there are
    enough OSRO resources available. In addition, the development and
    management of a national VOO program requires a tremendous amount of
    funding and resources as well as training, which is not practical to
    sustain in geographic locations where OSRO resources are available.

        Question 17. What are your thoughts on the VOO program and what
    were the greatest lessons learned?
        Answer. Over 9,000 Vessels of Opportunity (VOOs) were contracted to
    assist with the spill response to perform duties such as placing boom,
    skimming oil, and on-water transportation and support services.
        In response to these challenges, the Federal On-Scene Coordinator
    and the Responsible Party (RP) signed a Deepwater Horizon VOO policy
    letter outlining the strategy for standardized VOO usage,
    organizational structure, required training and safety measures, and
    contractual and logistical requirements of the Deepwater Horizon VOO
    program.
        This program was funded and managed by the RP with considerable
    oversight by the Federal On-Scene Coordinator. The large and variable
    number of VOOs under contract on a daily basis and the unprecedented
    breadth and scope of the VOO program also presented logistical
    challenges to track and outfit VOOs, arrange waste disposal, and ensure
    integration of the VOO fleet into the common operating picture.
        The Deepwater Horizon response VOO program matured significantly
    during the course of the Deepwater Horizon response. VOO's performed
    oil recovery operations, transported shoreline cleanup workers, placed
    and tended boom, and provided general response support to keep
    operations moving. Because of the unprecedented size and scope of this
    spill, VOO's were used effectively to complement and supplement Oil
    Spill Removal Organization capabilities.
                                     ______

         Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to
                            Hon. Grover C. Robinson
        Question. You stated that the National Contingency plan-top down
    approach- outlined in OPA-90 ``simply does not work in a disaster
    situation.'' Yet expert reports highlight that the OPA-90 structure is
    sound and appropriate for a spill of national significance, although
    the connectivity of the NCP and National Response Framework (NRF) needs
    fixing. Do you think that an expansive outreach program to familiarize
    you and other State and local emergency managers with the NCP will help
    ensure the NCP remains a viable plan for catastrophic oil spill
    response? If so, what ideas do you have?
        Answer. After further research of OPA-90 and the NCP, I feel that
    the training of policies should include all levels of governments which
    will help in defining roles and responsibilities should future events
    occur. It needs to be reinforced that all levels of government having
    jurisdictional responsibilities. Command and Control is key in any
    event regardless of the size of the incident. All parties need to have
    a seat at the table to appropriately address all issues.
        The National Response Framework Flow Chart defines that the On
    Scene Commander determines the status of the response by state and
    local government responders and the company responsible for the release
    or spill (called the potentially responsible party (PRP)). The OSC also
    monitors the situation to determine whether, or how much, Federal
    involvement is necessary.
        The National Contingency Plan  300.115 describes the establishment
    of Regional Response Teams and their roles and responsibilities in the
    National Response System, including, coordinating preparedness,
    planning, and response at the regional level. The RRT consists of a
    standing team made up of representatives of each Federal agency that is
    a member of the NRT, as well as state and local government
    representatives, and also an incident-specific team made up of members
    of the standing team that is activated for a response. The RRT also
    provides oversight and consistency review for area plans within a given
    region. I am not aware of this existing in our region or anywhere else
    in the State of Florida and the lack of the team may have contributed
    to some of the DWH issues that we experienced.
        Sorry for being long winded. A short answer to your question is,
    training is always a plus for future responses.
        My suggestion in accomplish this goal would be to establish a
    Regional Response Team and train together as defined in the NCP.
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to
                              Dr. R. Eugene Turner
        Question 1. You stated that the state of knowledge about coastal
    ecosystem restoration has not kept up with the pace of development of
    restoration projects. Have you seen any instances where restoration
    efforts have been undertaken with too little scientific input and have
    done more harm than good?
        Answer. We all make mistakes by omission and without harmful
    intentions. Which is why we have reviews, oversight, and regulations.
    But some are noteworthy because of the frequency of occurrence or scale
    of the consequences. Repetitive errors of large scale are especially
    noteworthy.
        A notable combining both is described by Kearney et al., (2011).
    They describe the failure of three river diversions in coastal
    Louisiana. River diversions are a major part of the restoration policy,
    and the State is asking for funds from the Macondo oil spill fines to
    pay for more. These authors analyzed patterns in land loss in the flow
    path of the Caernarvon river diversion, and for two other river
    diversions. It examined whether they do what they are supposed to do.
    The supplemental materials has a video recording a flyover across the
    northern part of the diversion flow path in spring. There is lots of
    open water where there once was land. Google Earth has similar
    comparisons to make if you use the pull-down timeline function.
        They used two different methods to calculate land and lots of
    imagery. It is a credentialed analysis, it is published in an excellent
    journal (by the American Geophysical Union), and the first author
    invented the methodology and used it in Chesapeake Bay.
        Some key points.
        There were no net gains from the diversions at any of the three
    diversions before the hurricanes (1992 to 2005). This means that the
    diversions were not successful in creating land or restoring land. (A
    related analysis demonstrated that the losses before the diversion
    opened were directly related to dredging, which had dropped off to
    practically zero by the time these diversions began operation. Losses
    then were around 0.8 percent annually).
        There were huge losses in the diversion flow path wetlands after
    Katrina/Rita, but not in the reference sites. These losses were about
    142 km2 (55 mi2), or 33 percent of the area of
    land in the 1930s.
        These losses are many times more than the projected benefits (about
    one third are area created) of 21 sq mi from ALL the projects in the
    2007 GAO report. By comparison, Washington, D.C. is 68 sq mi. About 2/
    3rd of the projects funded (identified in the GAO report) were related
    to a redistribution of freshwater. Diversions are, therefore, the
    central planning element of restoration--and they don't work. They also
    cost a lot--the proposed Myrtle Grove diversion, for example, is a few
    hundred millions to build.
        The losses, in fact, are many times larger than the total combined
    area that might be gained from all other projects (projects not
    involving freshwater diversions) identified in the 2007 GAO report. If
    these other projects work, and at the projected cost, then it would
    take 2 billion to restored the lost land in the Caernarvon flow path.
    This is, in other words, an estimate of the cost of misplaced, unused,
    or neglected science infrastructure. That could have been noticed at
    any time in the last 26 years; but it wasn't because, I think, many
    thought this river diversions could not fail, that they were
    ``natural,'' or that it was better than doing nothing. They did fail
    because, we think, the river is now full of nutrients that were not
    there when the river formed the marshes 1000s of years ago, and because
    there is a mis-placed emphasis on sediments. This mis-placed emphasis
    resulted in overemphasizing the role of sediments, neglecting
    alternative hypotheses, and assuming that flooding the marshes during
    the river diversion was an insignificant stressor. As a result,
    rigorous monitoring of land gain/loss was not done.
        Monitoring of land gain and loss would be the essential monitoring
    data for coastal restoration. There are no data on land change for
    these projects. Not measuring gains and loss is a fatal flaw when doing
    `adaptive management' or assigning success.
        The reason we pose why these diversions are not helpful is that
    there are nutrients in the river that cause organic soils to decompose
    faster, and to decrease the biomass of live roots. Roots add to soil
    growth and hold it in place during hurricanes. Mineral soils like those
    at the tip of the river or in the Atchafalaya will behave differently
    from the organic soils where most of the diversions are in place or
    planned. People usually ignore this distinction.
        The ``cost'' of the missing science can be estimated by estimating
    how much it would cost to restore the lost 55 sq miles using the
    present restoration costs (note: this restoration may not be any more
    successful than the diversions). That cost runs in the billions of
    dollars.

        Question 2. Which scientific information gaps need to be filled to
    go about restoration in a smarter and more effective way?
        Answer. Improve the infrastructure and the necessary information
    will be developed.
        The science infrastructure needs to be improved in at least three
    ways: (1) Modeling is a potentially helpful component of restoration,
    but is not a substitute for data. (2) information about the ecological
    systems needs to be constantly monitored and upgraded. (3) we need to
    have some humility about what we do not know, and to temper the sense
    that ``controlling nature'' is possible, or even desirable.
    (1) Ecosystem Models
        Models are a potentially useful means to overcome some of the
    problems managing both complicated and complex systems. But modeling
    can be conducted and received within very different levels of certainty
    and acceptance. If the model is assumed to faithfully predict the
    future, then there may be little interest in defining the bounds of
    expectation. Even if these bounds of expectation are identified, the
    prediction may be useless in the long term. If the ecosystem model of
    an undisturbed estuary, for example, is based on the average
    conditions, perhaps because of limited field data or foregoing data
    incorporation, then model predictions may give comforting, but
    erroneous, results when novel conditions arise and interact with other
    factors. For example, a 20-year record of monthly precipitation may be
    useful to predict estuarine salinity--until there is a hurricane. In
    this case, the prediction of estuarine salinity may be accurate 99
    percent of the time, but not accumulate during the 1 percent of the
    time during which a surge of saltwater is trapped behind a flood
    protection levee, causing plant death. But, if the model is assumed to
    have significant unknowns, then it will have wide bounds of
    expectation, perhaps demonstrating the model's heuristic value, but
    undermining confidence applying it for management purposes.
        Some models are, unfortunately, sometimes mis-used to stifle
    discussion of alternative discussion by creating the aura of a mis-
    placed level of certainty to create a political advantage that
    suppresses debate, especially if the model is opaque. This is not to
    say that models are inherently unconstructive--they aren't. The climate
    change models, for example, are well-ventilated by an inclusive
    participant list, alternative views are sought, and there is an
    abundance of data to test the models. It is the context in which the
    models are developed and discussed that makes the global climate change
    models useful, rather than a hindrance. And that context is a key--to
    create an accepted and useful network of communication and information
    exchange that illuminates the areas of risks inherent in accepting
    different levels of certainty represented in models, how to adapt to
    new information, and to accurately identify complex system behaviors.
    (2) Adaptive management and monitoring (AMM)
        There is an undeniable and striking absence of effective monitoring
    and adaptive management in restoration. This situation reveals a
    resistance to: (1) effective monitoring of project design, (2)
    implementation and assessment of post-construction developments in
    meaningful ways, (3) consideration of alternative outcomes in the
    beginning, including project failure, (4) intellectual audits, and, (5)
    introduction of new information. Ralph and Poole (2003) said
    ``Contemporary approaches to adaptive management preclude iterative,
    self-correcting management approaches by promising, but failing to
    implement, adequate and integrated monitoring programs.'' (p. 244). If
    restoration efforts actively embraced the AMM, then monitoring is
    independent to better close the feedback loop, questions arising are
    used to direct the restoration, a strong experimental framework is
    included, the design phase is well-ventilated, and the capabilities to
    monitor would drive the definition of goals--not the other way around.
    If goals are not monitored, then how else is ``success'' quantified and
    compared to some metric of success? If the AMM is adopted in fact, then
    monitoring program goals and metrics are developed before determining
    what management might be appropriate, before agreeing on management,
    and, before specific management actions are started. In this way
    management can optimize results and reduce the opportunities to do
    irrevocable harm when something unexpected happens--and unexpected
    things will happen in complex systems.
    (3) Humility
        The absence of humility jeopardizes opportunities to reduce
    financial waste, raise confidence in agency competency, and it may
    result in more damage.
        Below are a few simple goals that that may help avoid potentially
    fatal flaws of logic, administration lapses, and financial waste.

      (1) Assume that key pieces of information are missing and may not be
        revealed (ever);

      (2) Because of the collective and respected ignorance, be flexible in
        how to develop, evaluate and apply new information and
        perspectives; learn how to create the context for that situation;

      (3) Include many small steps that are addressed in multiple ways;

      (4) Let data trump concepts, not the reverse. If ``the bigger, the
        better'' is the operating model, then the model is likely to be
        superficially abstract (this is not to dispute the need for
        hierarchy or a division of labor);

      (5) Assume that surprises will occur;

      (6) Develop exit strategies, including how to reverse interventions;

      (7) Most important of all: Do no harm; do not implement plans that
        may be irreversible if they go awry; assume that they will go awry.
        Never assume that they will work exactly as planned. If
        irreversible outcomes are anticipated, then start with the smallest
        plans, not the largest ones. Do not assume absolute knowledge.
                                     ______

      Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Olympia J. Snowe to
                          Rear Admiral Paul F. Zukunft
        Question 1. What changes are the Coast Guard implementing, or do we
    need to make legislatively, to make sure that the rigs still operating
    on the Outer Continental Shelf have a response plan in place that is
    actually capable of doing what it says it will in the event of an
    explosion or spill?
        Answer. A joint Response Workgroup (the Workgroup) between the
    Coast Guard and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and
    Enforcement (BOEMRE) was chartered to address lessons learned from the
    Deepwater Horizon oil spill and relevant recommendations of the Outer
    Continental Shelf Safety Oversight Board. The ultimate goal of the
    Workgroup is to improve national oil discharge planning, preparedness,
    and response for facilities located seaward of the coastline through
    improved alignment of BOEMRE and Coast Guard regulatory authorities and
    preparedness oversight activities.
        As part of this workgroup, the Coast Guard & BOEMRE conducted a
    comprehensive joint analysis of Regional Contingency Plans (RCP) & Area
    Contingency Plans (ACP) to identify significant worst case discharge
    (WCD) preparedness gaps. Some of the critical WCD gaps include: Missing
    or incomplete planning assumptions and scenarios, adequacy of WCD oil
    spill response resources, adequacy of WCD protection & recovery
    strategies, and adequacy of WCD dispersant use, in-situ burning, and
    subsea containment strategies.
        As a result of this joint analysis, the Coast Guard is preparing
    detailed WCD process guidance on how to immediately address these gaps
    in Area Contingency Plans. As part of the Coast Guard's FY 2012
    Strategic Planning Direction (SPD), the Coast Guard has directed its
    field commanders to ensure WCD planning scenarios in all oil spill
    contingency plans reflect WCD planning information identified during
    the joint Oil Spill Response Plan (OSRP) review. The Coast Guard will
    continue to encourage its field commanders to ensure more participation
    from state & local officials in oil spill planning and preparedness
    efforts.
        The Coast Guard is also updating its national ACP policy guidance
    to address major contingency plan gaps identified in joint analysis as
    well as several Deepwater Horizon lessons learned reports. Priorities
    for improvements in Coast Guard ACP guidance include: Area Committee
    outreach and coordination, identification and prioritization of
    environmentally and economically significant areas, and development of
    protection strategies.

        Question 2. The Coast Guard's Incident Specific. Preparedness
    Review found that in fact, the recruitment of these vessels and the
    management of their operations suffered from several challenges. The
    extensive on-the-water experience of the fishing industry was not
    utilized to its fullest extent, and the large number of vessels lacked
    efficient activation, coordination and clear communications with the
    Incident Command Posts and local authorities.
        Is USCG evaluating this program in a formal manner, or soliciting
    feedback from the vessels of opportunity on how this program might have
    been more effective? How can we better utilize the expertise and
    important local knowledge offered by the fishing and marine communities
    should the need arise in the future?
        Answer. The Coast Guard is reviewing the lessons learned and
    recommendations from several Deepwater Horizon lessons learned reports,
    including those related to Vessels of Opportunity (VOO). As mentioned
    in the Incident Specific Preparedness Review, the unprecedented breadth
    and scope of the VOO program presented logistical challenges to track
    and outfit VOOs, arrange waste disposal, and ensure integration of the
    VOO fleet into the common operating picture.
        There are many issues associated with addressing these challenges;
    including funding for exercises and training, oversight, and
    administration of VOO programs, whether implemented at the local,
    regional, or national level. There is also a question of determination
    of need for and value of VOO programs around the country. Early
    assessment indicates that during a major spill event, the best use of
    fisherman and marine community resources may be to focus their efforts
    toward transport of personnel and equipment between bases and active
    response operations platforms to support vessel traffic management in
    the vicinity of impacted areas, and as subject matter experts in local
    geography and hydrography.
        The Coast Guard has been and will continue to work at the Area
    Committee, regional, and national levels to ensure better employment of
    these important local resources in future spill events.

        Question 3. Faced with an emergency, the government had to make
    decisions about high-volume and subsea dispersant use within time
    frames that denied officials the opportunity to gather necessary
    information. Has the Coast Guard made any changes in their response
    plans as a result of the controversy surrounding use of dispersants?
        Answer. Except when human life is immediately and imminently
    threatened, the decision whether to authorize the use of dispersants
    requires the advice and consent of the Environmental Protection Agency
    (EPA), and, as appropriate, the affected state representative to the
    Regional Response Team (RRT), and consultation with the Department of
    Commerce (DOC), the Department of the Interior (DOI), when practicable.
        Prior to Deepwater Horizon (DWH), this decision-making process was
    routinely executed at the RRT level for incidents involving an
    instantaneous discharge at or near the surface of the water.
        Post DWH, the Coast Guard is coordinating with RRTs and Area
    Committees (who oversee Area Contingency Plans) to review existing pre-
    authorization agreements regarding dispersant application. The Coast
    Guard is working with National Response Team representatives from the
    EPA, DOC, and the DOI to develop a framework for RRTs to make sound
    decisions regarding subsea dispersant use. The EPA is revising the
    regulations governing the criteria for listing dispersants on the
    Product Schedule in Subpart J of the National Oil and Hazardous
    Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) and the Coast Guard will
    work with the EPA in that process. The Coast Guard is also
    participating in a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration led
    effort to conduct critical research projects on surface and subsurface
    dispersant use that will more fully inform future dispersant
    application decision-making processes.
                                     ______

      Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Olympia J. Snowe to
                                David M. Kennedy
        Question 1. Faced with an emergency, the government had to make
    decisions about high-volume and subsea dispersant use within time
    frames that denied officials the opportunity to gather necessary
    information. Has NOAA conducted any research on the impact of this
    dispersant use in the past year, and if so, what has been learned?
        Answer. NOAA is conducting work on dispersants since the Deepwater
    Horizon oil spill in two main areas. First, NOAA is conducting a
    project focused on compiling and analyzing operational response data
    from the spill to improve our understanding of, among other things, the
    efficacy and trade-offs of dispersant use. This is being conducted with
    $1 million from NOAA's FY 2010 supplemental appropriations funding
    through an existing partnership with the University of New Hampshire's
    Coastal Response Research Center. The NOAA project involves a broad
    synthesis of oil spill response data, with the goal of determining
    whether existing (pre-Deepwater Horizon spill) research and development
    (R&D) priorities are still appropriate, and which new areas of R&D are
    needed. The project is broadly examining R&D needs including fate,
    transport, effectiveness, toxicity, and human dimensions. The lessons
    learned will be shared at the appropriate stages within the Deepwater
    Horizon Natural Resources Damage Assessment process. Approximately 50
    percent of the funding authorized for this project has been set aside
    for R&D grants to address these gaps.
        Second, NOAA continues to conduct R&D on dispersants and seafood
    safety. NOAA has studied the uptake and persistence of dispersant
    constituents in edible fish and shellfish tissues and found that it is
    low and not a significant concern for seafood safety. There are
    numerous dispersant formulations available or in development for
    mitigation of oil spills under different physical conditions of the
    marine environment.
        A systematic assessment of less known dispersant constituents and
    their fate in aquatic species is warranted.
        To avoid duplications of effort, NOAA's work is being coordinated
    with the thirteen-member Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil
    Pollution Research (ICCOPR), which includes USCG, DOI and EPA. All of
    these agencies have participated as part of steering committee for the
    NOAA project and took part in a recent dispersant workshop at the NOAA
    Disaster Response Center in Mobile, AL. NOAA is also coordinating with
    EPA on dispersant information that would be relative to spills in
    foreign waters that could impact the U.S. (i.e., Bahamas and Cuba).
        Independent of the Natural Resource Damage Assessment activities,
    the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) has developed and published methods
    for the chemical analysis of water samples containing dispersant
    allowing for improved detection limits. Currently, USGS scientists are
    applying these methods to water samples collected from nearshore and
    offshore sites in the northern Gulf of Mexico. NOAA will work with the
    USGS and DOI Trustees to integrate their results into planning
    activities for future scientific investigations on dispersants with a
    focus on how the dispersant concentrations relate to short- and long-
    term biological responses.
                                     ______

      Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Olympia J. Snowe to
                            Hon. Grover C. Robinson
        Question. What recommendations would you make to ensure that
    Federal agencies coordinating a major response effort like the
    Deepwater Horizon are utilizing the knowledge and experience that local
    officials and community members bring to the table?
        Answer. The best way to engage local officials is by reforming the
    Oil Pollution Act of 1990 to include them as part of the team.
    Currently it is my understanding the law requires coordination between
    the responsible party, Federal agencies and state agencies. Since the
    Deepwater Horizon spill has been contained, local governments have been
    advocating for inclusion in the event this occurs again. The only way
    that I see that we will definitively be included is by language in the
    law. Otherwise, it is too easy for the responsible party or Federal
    agencies to dismiss us by them saying they are simply following the
    law.
        I would like to be clear that I do not believe anyone in the
    Federal agencies have an intent to exclude local governments. It is
    simply in the heat of the moment in trying to coordinate their own
    Federal response they overlook what local governments can provide.
        The reason this occurs is first there is a national and Federal
    response that needs to be taken in Federal/international waters. Only
    the Federal Government and the responsible party have the tools and the
    expertise to administer and handle that response. However, once that
    oil spill moves from international Federal waters into state and local
    waters, including inland estuaries, it should be the response to engage
    local governments at that time both in the planning, implementation,
    and oversight role.
        Please understand that if local governments are not engaged in all
    three roles the response would be less than effective. Additionally, if
    local governments are provided jurisdictional direction and oversight
    of their own local areas, that will also free up Federal resources to
    continue to fight any spill in the Federal/international waters. If any
    local jurisdiction is not capable of supplying the needed finances and
    manpower resources to handle these commitments, they can partner with
    state and even Federal agencies to assist. However, those local
    jurisdictions that do have proper funding and manpower should be able
    to hold some authority and decisionmaking within their jurisdiction.
        All of this comes with the assumption that the total overall
    coordination will be through the Federal agencies, and local agencies
    will have to be in constant communication and provide information to
    the unified command for overall direction of the entire Federal
    response. While the total response will be made from Unified Command
    location, there should be decentralized decisionmaking for local
    theatres provided to the local governments within their own
    jurisdictions.
        Please note that all of this can happen and would be the best
    alternative to provide complete and adequate protection for our mutual
    constituencies. The only obstacle prohibiting this approach currently
    is the Federal law which simply needs to be amended to again allow
    local governments to be involved in the planning, implementation and
    oversight of any response and recovery within their jurisdiction.
        Clearly locals will still be under the authority of both the state
    and Federal Governments; however, they should .have the ability to make
    some determination within the new framework provided for autonomous
    decisions and oversight.
        If you have any further questions or comments, please feel free to
    contact me. Thank you again for all the work you have been doing to
    evaluate this problem. We in local government greatly appreciate the
    opportunity to be involved and be a part of the team. Thank you again
    for making the difference.