[Senate Hearing 112-240]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-240
ENSURING THE SAFETY OF OUR NATION'S MOTORCOACH PASSENGERS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
AND MERCHANT MARINE INFRASTRUCTURE,
SAFETY, AND SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 30, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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72-670 WASHINGTON : 2012
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0SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts Ranking
BARBARA BOXER, California OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota ROY BLUNT, Missouri
TOM UDALL, New Mexico PATRICK J. TOOMEY, Pennsylvania
MARK WARNER, Virginia MARCO RUBIO, Florida
MARK BEGICH, Alaska KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
Bruce H. Andrews, General Counsel
Ann Begeman, Republican Staff Director
Brian M. Hendricks, Republican General Counsel
Rebecca Seidel, Republican Chief Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND MERCHANT MARINE
INFRASTRUCTURE, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey, JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ranking
Chairman Member
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
BARBARA BOXER, California ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas ROY BLUNT, Missouri
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota PATRICK J. TOOMEY, Pennsylvania
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MARCO RUBIO, Florida
MARK WARNER, Virginia KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on March 30, 2011................................... 1
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 1
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 2
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 3
Statement of Senator Ayotte...................................... 5
Statement of Senator Blunt....................................... 5
Statement of Senator Udall....................................... 77
Statement of Senator Pryor....................................... 78
Witnesses
Statement of Hon. Sherrod Brown, U.S. Senator from Ohio.......... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Hon. Anne S. Ferro, Administrator, Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration................................................. 10
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Ronald Medford, Deputy Administrator, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration.......................................... 18
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman, Chairman, National Transportation
Safety Board................................................... 21
Prepared statement........................................... 23
Peter J. Pantuso, President and CEO, American Bus Association.... 32
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Joan Claybrook, President Emeritus, Public Citizen and Co-Chair,
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates).............. 39
Letter dated 3/28/2011 to Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg and Hon.
John Thune from Edward Garrod--Beaumont, Texas............. 40
Letter dated March 25, 2011 to Hon. Frank Lautenberg and Hon.
John Thune from Julie M. Harmon--Lima, Ohio................ 41
Letter dated March 29, 2011 to Hon. Frank Lautenberg and Hon.
John Thune from Elise M. Huch, West Brook Bus Crash
Families................................................... 42
Letter dated March 29, 2011 to Hon. Frank Lautenberg and Hon.
John Thune from Martha Huch, West Brook Bush Crash Families 42
Letter dated March 28, 2011 to Hon. Frank Lautenberg and Hon.
John Thune from Yen-Chi Le, Ph.D., Houston Texas, Daughter
of Sherman Bush Crash Victim, Catherine Tuong So Lam....... 43
Letter dated March 29, 2011 to Hon. Frank Lautenberg and Hon.
John Thune from Melanie Brown Psencik...................... 44
Prepared statement........................................... 46
Supplemental statement....................................... 70
Appendix
Letter dated April 13, 2011 to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV and
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg from Hon. Charles E. Schumer.......... 83
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Anne S. Ferro by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 84
Hon. Claire McCaskill........................................ 85
Hon. Tom Udall............................................... 86
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison.................................... 88
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 92
Response to written questions submitted to Ronald Medford by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 92
Hon. Tom Udall............................................... 108
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison.................................... 108
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 110
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Deborah A.P.
Hersman by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison........................... 110
Response to written questions submitted to Peter J. Pantuso by:
Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison.................................... 111
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 113
Response to written questions submitted to Joan Claybrook by Hon.
Kay Bailey Hutchison........................................... 114
Letter from Peter J. Pantuso, President and CEO, American Bus
Association to Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg........................ 115
Letter ``Clarification Regarding Seat Belt Use Rates on
Motorcoaches'' from Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety
(Advocates).................................................... 116
ENSURING THE SAFETY OF OUR NATION'S MOTORCOACH PASSENGERS
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and
Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:36 p.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank R.
Lautenberg, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. The Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science and Transportation and our Subcommittee on Surface
Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety and
Security will come to order.
The discussion about ensuring the safety of our nation's
motorcoach passengers.
So I welcome everyone here.
We have serious concerns about the safety of our nation's
buses, and the bus passengers are demanding of us that we need
safer travel.
During the past 3 weeks, separate tour bus crashes in New
Jersey and New York and New Hampshire killed 17 people and
injured dozens more. Now, our hearts go out to the families of
those who died so tragically and we wish a speedy recovery to
all who were injured. And also, our heartfelt wishes go out to
all of the families and the friends of the bus accident
victims.
Now, many of these family members have gone to become
powerful advocates for stronger bus safety measures. Several
are here today, including John and Joy Betts and Yen-Chi Le,
and we are pleased that they are here. We are saddened by your
loss, as I say, but we are inspired by your motivation to
action and by your tireless work on important issues.
We owe it all to the victims of bus accidents and their
families to get to the bottom of what caused these crashes and
to do everything in our power to prevent things like this from
happening in the future. The deadliest of the recent bus
crashes occurred on March 12 in the Bronx in New York. A tour
bus flipped on its side, slid into a signpost, and sheered off
most of its roof. And the photograph shows the tragic
consequences, the damage here that was done on that day, and it
was a gruesome. It took 15 lives. It is not easy to look at
this picture without feeling very upset by what happened and it
quickly pushes us to think about what we can do to prevent it
from happening again, but we need to understand the severity of
the problem if we are going to be successful in solving it.
In this crash, the driver had a history of driving without
a license and had used an alias to get a new license. The bus
company had also been cited for previous safety violations.
Two days later, another tour bus lost control, struck a
bridge on the New York Turnpike and then slammed into an
embankment killing 2 people and injuring 40. The company that
operated this line had a safety record worse than 99 percent of
operators in the country. Imagine. We need to understand why
these dangerous drivers and bus companies were not taken off
the road before these disasters took place.
There is no doubt that buses play a critical role in our
nation's transportation network. Each year 750 million
passengers travel aboard 35,000 motorcoaches. These vehicles
often connect cities and communities that lack access to trains
or commercial airlines, but they are one of the most affordable
modes of transportation. Many Americans rely on buses to reach
destinations, vacation, visit family, and take sightseeing
excursions across our country.
Buses have also been used to evacuate companies during
emergencies, communities during emergencies including
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Although buses are generally safe,
more than 7,000 people are injured in bus crashes each year and
on average, 16 perish. That number may not sound big when you
look at the total number, but each one is a human being, a
child or a parent, and one life lost is too many, especially
when there are steps that we can take to prevent these types of
tragedies.
Now, I am concerned that the Department of Transportation
is not moving quickly enough to implement its 2009 plan to make
motorcoaches safer. Even though DOT has met some of the
deadlines included in the plan, it has not finished writing the
rules needed to make the buses safer.
It is also unacceptable that bus companies continue to put
unsafe drivers and buses on the road. And just because bus
companies can discount prices does not mean that they can
discount safety. If drivers are not fully trained, qualified,
and alert, they should not be trusted with the lives of dozens
of passengers. Now, we owe it to the public to make sure only
the safest companies are allowed to operate motorcoaches and
that only the safest drivers are behind the wheel.
So I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses about
what we must do to make sure all travelers reach their
destination safely.
And I will turn to our Ranking Member, Mr. Thune, to make
his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today's
hearing. This is our subcommittee's first hearing of the year
and I am pleased that we are able to kick off our agenda with
such an important topic. Bus safety is a very timely issue as
we have experienced three high-profile and tragic bus crashes
just this month.
Bus safety improvements have been delayed for too long, but
I am encouraged that we can move forward to reduce preventable
crashes and to protect passengers when accidents do occur.
I would like to thank Senator Hutchison for her
determination to improve bus safety. She and Senator Brown have
been committed to advancing bus safety legislation since 2007.
I am confident that we will finally pass a bill this year
thanks to her leadership and that of the Subcommittee and full
Committee chairmen and others.
Bus travel is an increasingly popular choice in areas like
the Northeast, but it has long been a necessity for rural
America. Millions of rural Americans, including many in South
Dakota, rely on buses as their sole means of intercity
transportation, and they expect and deserve bus safety
protections when they board a bus.
Over 2,000 communities nationwide are served by buses,
which is roughly eight times the number of places served by the
airlines. The annual bus passenger count is approaching that of
the airlines at 723 million trips in 2009 versus about 800
million for the airlines, and these travelers deserve the same
attention to safety that we give to passengers on the nation's
commercial aviation fleet.
Fortunately, bus accidents remain rare events, and
statistically speaking, motorcoaches are one of the safest
forms of transportation. About 19 people a year are killed on
buses as opposed to about 100 in aviation. However, many of
these bus deaths could be prevented by making basic safety
improvements like adding seat belts that have been standard on
airplanes for decades.
As some in this room know all too well, a single bus crash
can devastate a family and an entire community. That is why we
have a responsibility as policymakers to ensure that we are
doing all that we can to protect the traveling public and to
make sure that we prevent as many needless deaths and injuries
as possible.
I am encouraged that DOT has made some progress on the
Motorcoach Safety Action Plan it announced in 2009. I
understand that DOT has fallen behind in several areas, and I
look forward to hearing about their plans to keep the program
on track.
Likewise, the National Transportation Safety Board has
devoted considerable resources to bus safety efforts. They were
on the scene at the devastating accident in New York a few
weeks ago that killed 15 passengers, and I know we will learn
important lessons from the NTSB to prevent similar accidents.
Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing and
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today.
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks very much.
Now Senator Hutchison. I am sorry I might have gone out of
order.
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. No. Actually I asked Senator Thune to
take his place as the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee
because he is, and I am pleased that he is.
I am glad that we are having this hearing, and I want to
thank my cosponsor, Senator Brown, for being here to testify.
He has been a sponsor of this bill and a fighter for it for two
years now. And we are going to pass it this year because I
think everyone in this room and hopefully Congress understands
the importance of doing something to prevent these tragedies.
It is incomprehensible that it has taken so long.
I want to say that in addition to what we have seen just
recently with these tragic accidents, my state has seen major
accidents. Between 2005 and 2008, we had three terrible bus
crashes that killed 41 passengers. One of those was the mother
of Dr. Yen-Chi Le. I would like for you to stand and thank you
for being here and for your efforts throughout this time since
your mother was in that accident. You are trying to help others
not have to go through what you have. Thank you very much.
We have, as you said, Senator Lautenberg, 750 million
people travel by bus every year, and if we had the kind of
safety record on airplanes or railroads that we are seeing in
the charter bus industry especially, people would be outraged,
and we would be taking action. And that is exactly what Senator
Brown and I want to do is take action.
For example, more than half of all motorcoach fatalities
over the past 10 years have occurred as a result of rollovers,
and what we are asking for in our bill is stronger roofs and
stronger windows. 70 percent of the individuals killed in these
accidents over the last 10 years have been ejected from the
bus. They have gone through the windows or through the roofs.
They have not had seat belts, and that has resulted in critical
injuries and death.
Another issue that directly affects bus safety is the
reincarnated carriers where a bus company is taken out of
service because it has a bad safety record or we cannot find a
safety record, and then it is quickly operating under a new
name and it is now a new bus company with no record of its
terrible safety record or accident record and we have the same
situation happening.
Senator Brown and I began working on intercity bus safety
legislation in 2007, and we have now reintroduced the bill
hoping that we will be able to pass it, and it is on the first
markup of this committee. And I am very pleased about that.
Bus travel outpaces both air and rail transportation as the
fastest growing mode of intercity transportation. Despite the
announcement of a new Motorcoach Safety Action Plan, the
Department of Transportation has not yet acted on many basic
passenger safety protections that have been recommended for
years by the National Transportation Safety Board, and I am
pleased that we will hear from both DOT and the NTSB today.
I want to say that Greyhound Bus has, on its own,
voluntarily agreed to put seat belts in its new buses. I think
that is a major step forward. I would hope other bus companies
would follow, but frankly the ones that have the worst safety
record and where these accidents mostly happen are not the
scheduled bus carriers but the ones that are charters. It is
the school groups that charter a bus or sports teams that
charter a bus or recreational groups or senior citizens that
charter buses that are most at risk. I applaud Greyhound and I
do hope that the efforts that we are making today will
encourage others to voluntarily move faster than the bill will
even be able to go, but so far, we have not seen much effort to
do that.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to working with
you to get our bill on this markup and listening to others'
concerns, come out with a fair and reasonable plan that we can
pass this Congress. Thank you.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much, Senator Hutchison.
Senator Ayotte from New Hampshire, new here as well, and we
welcome you. Obviously, within a 5-minute period if you would
make your opening statement please.
STATEMENT OF HON. KELLY AYOTTE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Ayotte. I appreciate the opportunity to be here
today. I think this is a very important issue.
We also in New Hampshire in March had a bus accident in
Littleton. We are still waiting to hear the investigation
results of that accident. But I think we all appreciate that it
is important that we have safety measures to prevent these
accidents.
And I look forward to hearing the testimony of the
witnesses today and I appreciate the opportunity to be here.
Thank you.
Senator Lautenberg. Senator Blunt?
STATEMENT OF HON. ROY BLUNT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman. I am glad to be here. I
am going to have to go to another meeting before the hearing is
over, and it is not because of my lack of interest in this
topic.
For some time, I lived in Branson, Missouri and represented
it in the House for a long time and now in the Senate. At one
time, it was the number one motorcoach destination in the
country and may very well still be. But clearly, this is an
important part of our economy in many ways. It is sort of an
unappreciated part of our tourism and travel economy. It is a
critically important part of our transit economy.
And I applaud, Chairman, your efforts and those of the
Ranking Member and Senator Brown and Senator Hutchison to try
to do the things that need to be done to ensure that this
continues to be a mode of transportation that people have
increasing reason to feel good about and increasing reason to
use.
I am glad to be serving with you on this subcommittee.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you for being here with us.
Before we hear from today's witnesses, I want to welcome
our colleague, Senator Sherrod Brown. Senator Brown has been a
strong advocate for bus safety in the wake of a 2007 bus crash
that killed five baseball players from Bluffton University in
Ohio, and together with our full Committee Ranking Member,
Senator Hutchison, Senator Brown has introduced a bill on bus
safety. And I am pleased to be a cosponsor of that legislation.
Senator Brown, we invite you to give your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. SHERROD BROWN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
interest in this and for calling this hearing. Ranking Member
Thune, Senator Hutchison, thank you, and Senator Blunt and
Senator Ayotte. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today.
Special thanks to Senator Hutchison who has done yeoman's
work on this issue. We have had lots of meetings on the floor,
off the floor with colleagues on this, and as she said, this is
the year this is going to happen.
Motorcoach accident fatalities in both our states, in Texas
and Ohio, in 2007 and since have highlighted the need for
common sense safety measures that protect passengers and
motorists.
These tragic, yet seemingly preventable fatalities have
devastated families and communities, turning parents and
friends into advocates and activists for safer vehicles and
safer roads. Two Ohioans are here today who can identify with
the pain of losing a child in a motorcoach accident, turning
their grief into action. I would like to thank John and Joy
Betts who are here from Bryan, Ohio, northwest Ohio. If they
would stand up for a moment. Thanks.
John testified to this committee last year. I am so
appreciative of his attendance today and her attendance today.
They had a 9-hour drive from Bryan, Ohio to get here.
John and Joy and Yen-Chi Le, who were introduced by Senator
Hutchison, did what courageous people do. They lost loved ones
and turned that grief into action to honor their son or in Ms.
Lee's case, her mother, so that other families did not have to
go through this, and for that, they deserve a lot of credit and
honor.
The Betts lost their son, David, a member of the Bluffton
University baseball team, almost exactly 4 years ago this
month. Bluffton is a small college in Bluffton, Ohio near I-75
in Allen and Hancock Counties in the northwestern part of the
state.
David's baseball team--David, who had just been named the
starting second baseman--was on its way to Florida for spring
training when their bus lost control on a poorly marked exit
ramp outside Atlanta. The bus toppled from the overpass. Like
the majority of fatal motorcoach accidents, when the bus rolled
over, the passengers were ejected from their seats and thrown
through the bus windows. Along with David, six others were
killed. Many more were injured.
The tragedy, as these do, rocked a small town, but it
brought national attention to the need for long overdue safety
improvements to America's motorcoaches.
Since that day 4 years ago, Bluffton families have been
courageous and vocal advocates, led by Joy and John, and other
families have done the same in raising awareness of motorcoach
safety and demanding of Senator Hutchison and me and our
colleagues action.
The National Transportation Safety Board's final report
from the Bluffton accident released 3 years ago echoed
recommendations the NTSB has been urging for years. In the
110th, the 111th, and now the 112th Congress, Senator Hutchison
and I introduced the Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act which
includes many of the NTSB's ``most wanted'' safety
improvements.
Specifically, the Act would address many of the major
shortfalls from the Bluffton accident such as better protection
systems for occupants, including seat belts, stronger windows,
and an improved roof crush standard; updated requirements for
motorcoach drivers and motor carriers; and the need for on-
board recorders with the capability to collect crash data.
Many of these recommendations, including seat belts and
better motor carrier oversight and increased fire safety, have
languished in legislative uncertainty for decades. These
measures are not exotic. They are not complicated. They are not
new. We know how to do them. They are common sense safety
features that have been and are widely used across Europe and
Australia. But since they are not required by law, they have
not been installed in most American motorcoaches. So the public
safety remains at risk.
As a father, it is disturbing to know that students are
still traveling in motorcoaches without even the option, in
most cases, of buckling up.
As a Senator, it is unacceptable that our laws or lack of
them have made our vehicles and our roads less safe for
students and families and anyone whether they are traveling to
Branson, Missouri for music or whether they are traveling to a
sports event or a church event, as Senator Hutchison pointed
out.
This month has seen yet another rash, as the Chairman said,
of fatal motorcoach accidents, as heartbroken families and
communities in New York and New Jersey know all too well,
including the accident that Senator Ayotte mentioned in her
home state.
Opponents of stricter motorcoach safety standards will tell
you this is not a motorcoach problem. They would tell you that
we have a problem with rogue bus companies and bad drivers.
Certainly we must ensure drivers, as the Chairman suggested,
are fit to be behind the wheel and that bus carriers are
playing by the rules, which our bill addresses. But we simply
cannot look the other way and reject the idea that improving
the safety of the motorcoach vehicles themselves is
unnecessary.
John Betts from Bryan, Ohio has said, ``It is necessary
through our current regulations to get bad operators off the
road. However, it is not sufficient as it does nothing to
ensure safety once the crash has occurred.''
I could not agree more. We can get bad operators off the
road, but it is not enough to ensure passenger safety in the
tragic event of an accident.
In the last three Congresses, Senator Hutchison and I, as I
said, have introduced this legislation. We do it because it is
the right thing to do, and we do it because people like the
Betts have made it the easy thing to do. Out of their grief,
they have asked their government to step in and protect
American families so other families do not go through the
incredible, unspeakable pain that they did and that the
Bluffton community experienced. They have asked their
government to pass a law at relatively very little cost to the
manufacturers, as Joan Claybrook will testify, not much more
than a nickel per ticket through the life of the bus, maybe
even less. They have asked their Government to pass a law that
can save lives and keep our roads much more secure.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you especially to
Senator Hutchison.
[The prepared statement of Senator Brown follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Sherrod Brown, U.S. Senator from Ohio
Thank you, Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Thune, and members
of the Committee. I applaud you for holding this hearing on motorcoach
safety today.
Thank you also to Senator Hutchison--for nearly 4 years we have
worked together to pass our Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act into law to
make motorcoaches safer for the millions of passengers who ride them
every day.
Motorcoach accident fatalities in both our states highlighted the
need for common-sense safety measures that protect both passengers and
motorists.
These tragic, yet seemingly preventable fatalities have devastated
families and communities, turning parents and friends into advocates
and activists for safer vehicles and safer roads.
Two Ohioans are here today who can identify with the pain of losing
a child in a motorcoach accident--and turning their grief into action.
I would like to thank and recognize John and Joy Betts from Bryan,
Ohio who are in attendance today.
The Betts' lost their son David, a member of the Bluffton
University baseball team, on March 2, 2007.
Bluffton University is a small college in Bluffton, Ohio, near 1-75
in Allen and Hancock counties in the Northwest part of the state.
David's baseball team was on its way to Florida for spring training
when their bus lost control on a poorly marked exit ramp outside
Atlanta.
The bus toppled from an overpass.
Like the majority of fatal motorcoach accidents, when the bus
rolled over, the passengers were ejected from their seats and thrown
through the bus windows.
Along with David, six others were killed and dozens were injured.
The tragedy rocked a small town but also brought national attention
to the need for long, overdue safety improvements to America's
motorcoaches.
Since that day four years ago, the Bluffton families have been
courageous and vocal advocates in raising awareness of motorcoach
safety and demanding Congressional action.
The National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) final report from
the Bluffton motorcoach accident--released almost 3 years ago--echoed
recommendations the NTSB has been urging for years.
In the 110th, 111th, and now the 112th Congress, Senator Hutchison
and I have introduced the Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act, which
includes many of the NTSB's ``Most Wanted'' safety improvements.
Specifically, the Act would address many of the major safety
shortfalls from the Bluffton accident, such as:
Better protection systems for occupants including seatbelts,
stronger windows, and an improved roof crush standard;
Updated requirements for motorcoach drivers and motor
carriers; and
The need for on-board recorders with the capability to
collect crash data.
Incredibly, many of these recommendations--including seatbelts,
better motor-carrier oversight, and increased fire safety--have
languished in legislative uncertainty for decades.
These safety measures are neither exotic nor complicated. They are
not new, either. They are common-sense safety features that have been--
and are--widely used across Europe and Australia.
But since they are not required by law, they have not been
installed in most American motorcoaches.
Instead of saving lives, the public safety remains at risk.
As a father, it is disturbing to know that students are still
traveling in motorcoaches without even the option of buckling up.
As a Senator, it is unacceptable that our laws--or lack of them--
have made our vehicles and roads less safe for students, families, and
anyone traveling our Nation's roads.
This month has seen yet another rash of fatal motorcoach
accidents--as heartbroken families and communities in New Jersey and
New York know all too well.
Opponents of stricter motorcoach safety standards will tell you
that this isn't a motorcoach problem; they would tell you that we have
a problem with rogue bus companies and bad drivers.
Certainly, we must ensure drivers are fit to be behind the wheel
and that bus carriers are playing by the rules which our bill
addresses.
But we simply cannot look the other way and reject the idea that
improving the safety of our motorcoaches is unnecessary--or fiscally
imprudent.
John Betts has said, ``It is necessary through our current
regulations to get bad operators off the road. However it is not
sufficient as it does nothing to ensure safety once the crash has
occurred.''
I couldn't agree more. We can get bad operators off the road. But
it's not enough to ensure passenger safety in the tragic event of an
accident.
If the technology to save lives and reduce injury in motorcoach
accidents exists, we must put that technology to use.
As motorcoach travel increases--and it has as gas prices have risen
and airline travel has become more expensive--we need these new safety
standards to ensure the safety of every rider and driver on the road.
The number of serious accidents and tragic deaths will, sadly, only
increase if we do not take action.
In the last three Congress's, Senator Hutchison and I have
introduced the Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act.
We do so because it's the right thing to do. And we do so because
people like the Betts' have made it the easy thing to do.
Out of their grief, they have asked their government to step in and
protect Americans families from the heartbreak they and the Bluffton
community experienced.
They have asked their government to pass a law that can save lives
and keep our roads more secure.
I look forward to future collaboration with the Committee and our
colleagues in the Senate to pass this bill into law and to finally
improve motorcoach safety in our Nation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks very much, Senator Brown. We
thank you for your testimony.
Senator Brown. Thank you very much.
Senator Lautenberg. And now I would call the next panel to
the desk, which includes the Honorable Deborah Hersman,
Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board; the
Honorable Anne Ferro, who is Administrator of the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration from the U.S. Department of
Transportation; Mr. Ron Medford, Deputy Administrator of the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; Mr. Peter
Pantuso, who is President and CEO of the American Bus
Association; and the Honorable Joan Claybrook, Consumer Co-
Chair of Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety. She is the
former NHTSA Administrator.
As our witnesses make themselves comfortable, I am handed
an announcement that this afternoon the U.S. Department of
Transportation will announce that they are placing a company
called Super Luxury Tours out of service and they are
suspending their operating authority. This is the company that
was involved in the New Jersey accident. And I am pleased to
see the DOT taking such a rapid response to a terrible
situation.
Now I will ask Ms. Ferro--she is the Administrator, as I
mentioned, of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration.
She is going to provide us with an overview of the current laws
and safety practices that govern motorcoaches. We ask you to
take 5 minutes and give us your testimony, please. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. ANNE S. FERRO, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL MOTOR
CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
Ms. Ferro. Thank you, Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member
Thune, members of the Subcommittee. I greatly appreciate this
opportunity to discuss the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration's work to advance motorcoach safety.
First, I do want to join others in this room in expressing
my deepest sympathies to the families that have been impacted
by the tragedies of this month but also those past tragedies
and terrible motorcoach crashes.
The employees of FMCSA and our state law enforcement
partners across the country are committed to preventing the
kind of tragedies that we saw this past month.
Two years ago, Transportation Secretary LaHood ordered a
full departmental review of motorcoach safety. That work
resulted in the DOT's Motorcoach Safety Action Plan, Mr.
Chairman, which you mentioned. The plan incorporates
recommendations from NTSB, from the Motorcoach Safety
Enhancement Act that this committee has done tremendous work
on, that Senator Brown and Senator Hutchison both spoke of, and
it sets forth actions to address the root causes of motorcoach
crashes.
For FMCSA, these actions mean stronger oversight of driver,
vehicle, and company performance. We need to do this through
strict enforcement of current rules, introduction of new rules
and programs that close loopholes, and vigorous scrutiny
through roadside enforcement and through our onsite inspection
programs.
In the area of rules, I do want to say FMCSA has been very
busy in the past 12 months. Among the 17 rules we have issued,
I want to speak to four in particular.
We issued a proposed rule to apply and require electronic
on-board recorders on nearly all commercial vehicles, including
motorcoaches. This is in addition to the remedial rule that is
in place today.
We issued a proposed rule to prohibit commercial motor
vehicle operators from using hand-held cell phones and their
employers from requiring them to do it and administering
penalties accordingly.
We issued a final rule to ban texting in commercial vehicle
operations.
And just this week I signed a final rule to improve the
uniformity in commercial driver's license testing that will
also minimize the risk of fraud and require a commercial
learner's permit for anyone before becoming fully licensed.
In addition to the rulemakings, we have very strong
programs that we have introduced and implemented over the past
year and a half, two in particular.
The vetting program. This is a program that has been spoken
to in the Motorcoach Safety Action Plan, NTSB, and this
committee that requires any company applying for passenger
carrier to go through close scrutiny by FMCSA to detect those
companies that are trying to evade safety violations, out-of-
service actions, and penalties that we have taken. In 2 years
of vetting work, we have rejected 24 percent of the applicants.
Last December, in a separate program, to talk about really
our centerpiece safety enforcement program, we issued and
implemented the first of three components of this program, that
program being CSA, Compliance, Safety, Accountability. The
component I am speaking of is known as the ``Safety Measurement
System.'' It replaces SafeStat, the tool we used to prioritize
who we look at as high risk and who our roadside enforcement
officers select for inspection at the roadside. CSA gives our
own agents, our law enforcement partners, our safety advocates,
industry, and the public a sharper focus on high-risk companies
and where to apply the appropriate safety interventions or
removal actions.
Most importantly, I think for today is how is the agency
putting these programs to work and these initiatives. We are
doing it through strong and strict enforcement.
First, every state's commercial vehicle safety plan must
include a Motorcoach Safety Action Plan driven by the
performance measures in that state. We prioritize compliance
reviews for motorcoach operators now based on our SMS data, and
we implement strategically and energetically motorcoach safety
strike forces across the country and throughout the year. Just
in the past 2 weeks, 13 states have staged strike forces to
weed out unsafe motorcoach operators, 17 are planning strike
forces in the coming weeks, and more than 3,500 surprise bus
inspections were conducted, again complementing some of what
you saw in New York do.
And I do want to mention every high priority motorcoach
operator identified under CSA is either undergoing today a
compliance review or has already had one since we rolled out
the SMS numbers.
FMCSA's drive to improve commercial vehicle operations is
only accomplished through our collaboration with our federal
partners, our state partners, safety advocates, industry, and
labor.
And Mr. Chairman, I pledge my full cooperation in working
with you, with this committee to advance the goals that you are
discussing today and will be happy to answer any questions you
may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ferro follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Anne S. Ferro, Administrator,
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Thune, and members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify today regarding the
very serious issue of motorcoach safety.
As we know all too well, March has been the worst month in recent
years for motorcoach safety, with two horrific crashes within a three-
day period causing 17 fatalities and numerous injuries. The first crash
occurred in New York on March 12 with 15 fatalities, and the second
occurred in New Jersey on March 14 with 2 fatalities.
Please allow me to begin my testimony by extending my deepest
sympathy to the families who lost loved ones in these crashes and to
assure them that we at the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA) are committed to doing everything we can to prevent tragedies
like this from happening again. We have significantly increased our
regulatory and enforcement actions over the past several years to
improve passenger safety. However, the tragic events this month
indicate that we have more to do at the Federal level, and in working
with our State and local enforcement partners.
Motorcoach Safety Action Plan (The Plan)
Safety is the U.S. Department of Transportation's number one
priority across all modes of transportation. In 2009, Secretary LaHood
sought to make significant improvements to motorcoach safety by tasking
all of the appropriate DOT agencies to work together to establish a
unified Motorcoach Safety Action Plan (Plan). The Department released
the Plan in November 2009. It lays out concrete steps for addressing
the driver-related cause of crashes, fatalities, and injuries and
enhancing motorcoach: driver performance; vehicle safety and
maintenance; operator safety oversight; crash avoidance; and occupant
protection. The Plan also focuses on the Department's strategy for
improving data collection and analysis for motorcoach operations.
Based upon our review of motorcoach crash data we determined that
driver fatigue, driver behavior, vehicle rollover, occupant ejection,
and operator maintenance issues contribute to the majority of
motorcoach crashes, fatalities, and injuries. As a result, FMCSA had
responsibility for four priority safety-related action items in the
Plan. FMCSA's priority action items are:
1. Initiate rulemaking to require electronic on-board recording
devices on all motorcoaches to better monitor drivers' duty
hours and manage fatigue.
2. Initiate rulemaking to propose prohibiting texting and
limiting the use of cellular telephones and other devices by
motorcoach drivers.
3. Enhance oversight of carriers attempting to evade sanctions.
4. Establish minimum knowledge requirements for applicants
seeking FMCSA authority to transport passengers.
We made substantial progress in each of these areas and I would
like to take a few minutes to provide you with an update.
Electronic On-Board Recorders
On April 5, 2010, the Agency took a significant step toward
reducing the number of fatigue related crashes by publishing a final
rule mandating the use of electronic onboard recorders (EOBRs) by motor
carriers that transport passengers or property and that demonstrate
serious non-compliance with the hours of service (HOS) rules. This
action will reduce the likelihood of falsified or incomplete records of
duty status. The final rule establishes: (1) new performance-oriented
standards for EOBR technology; (2) a mandate for certain motor carriers
to use EOBRs to remediate regulatory noncompliance (a remedial
directive); and (3) incentives to promote voluntary EOBR use by all
carriers. It is expected that approximately 5,700 motor carriers each
year will be required to use EOBRs.
On February 1, 2011, the Agency published a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) to expand the requirement for motor carriers to use
EOBRs and to require nearly all motor carriers to systematically
monitor their drivers' compliance with HOS requirements. Specifically,
FMCSA proposed mandatory installation and use of EOBRs in interstate
commercial motor vehicles currently required to complete records of
duty status, including passenger carrier operations. Additionally, the
preamble to the rulemaking requests data and information about the
safety of short-haul passenger carriers that currently are not required
to maintain records of duty status.
The proposed rule would also establish specific requirements for
supporting documents that motor carriers are required to obtain and
keep, as required by section 113(a) of the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Authorization Act (HMTAA). Comments on the NPRM are due
May 23, 2011.
Distracted Driving
Driver distraction is a serious safety problem that must be
addressed to continue improving commercial motor vehicle (CMV) safety.
FMCSA developed an approach that involves Federal rulemaking, outreach,
and enforcement.
On September 27, 2010, FMCSA published a Final Rule prohibiting
texting by all CMV drivers while operating in interstate commerce and
imposing civil penalties on drivers and motor carriers that violate the
prohibition. The final rule also provides for commercial driver's
license (CDL) holders' disqualification when they have multiple
convictions for violating a State or local law or ordinance on motor
vehicle traffic control that prohibits texting. We are working closely
with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and with our
State and local safety partners in developing enforcement strategies
for those who violate this rule.
On December 21, 2010, FMCSA published an NPRM that would restrict
the use of hand-held mobile telephones. The Agency proposed new driver
disqualification sanctions for interstate drivers of CMVs who fail to
comply with this Federal restriction and for CDL holders who have
multiple convictions for violating a State or local law or ordinance on
motor vehicle traffic control that restricts the use of hand-held
mobile telephones. The comment period for the NPRM recently closed, and
the Agency plans to issue a final rule later this year.
Enhanced Oversight Of Motorcoach Operations
FMCSA launched several initiatives to enhance its oversight of
motorcoach companies, the drivers they employ and the vehicles they
operate. These efforts include strict enforcement of the current safety
regulations, more rigorous scrutiny of all passenger carrier
applications for operating authority, implementation of the Safety
Measurement System (SMS) to identify at-risk carriers for targeted
enforcement as part of our new Compliance, Safety and Accountability
program, or ``CSA,'' and improved oversight of the medical
certification process for drivers.
FMCSA Motorcoach Strike Forces and Oversight
FMCSA routinely conducts strike force activities at national,
regional and local levels to enhance our overall motorcoach enforcement
program.
For instance, in October 2010 we conducted a two-day strike force
at the Bands of America/Super Regional Championship at the Alamodome in
San Antonio, Texas. We inspected motorcoaches from 12 different
companies. The inspectors found 45 violations and placed 4 vehicles
out-of-service. Although this is a small event, we conducted the strike
force because more than 50 high school bands from across Texas use
motorcoaches to attend the competition. We want to be sure these types
of trips end safely.
Also last year FMCSA conducted the national passenger carrier
strike force from August 23 to September 3. During that time period
FMCSA, along with our State and local safety partners, conducted 5,679
passenger vehicle inspections, 324 compliance reviews, 31 new entrant
safety audits, and 35 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) reviews. We
discovered over 900 driver violations that required over 200 drivers to
be placed out-of-service and more than 350 drivers were cited for hours
of service violations. We also discovered over 5,600 vehicle violations
and placed over 900 vehicles out-of-service. As a result of these
compliance reviews, 9 percent of the passenger carriers received safety
ratings of ``Conditional'' and 2 percent received proposed
``Unsatisfactory'' safety rating.
In 2009 FMCSA conducted our national passenger carrier strike force
for 2 weeks in May. Again, FMCSA worked in conjunction with our State
and local safety partners to conduct 8,699 passenger vehicle
inspections, 548 compliance reviews, and 53 new entrant safety audits.
We discovered over 1,700 driver violations that required over 275
drivers to be placed out-of-service and more than 500 drivers were
cited for hours of service violations. We also discovered over 7,000
vehicle violations and placed over 900 vehicles out-of-service. As a
result of these compliance reviews, 9 percent of the passenger carriers
received ``Conditional'' safety ratings, and 3 percent received a
proposed ``Unsatisfactory'' safety rating.
In 2009, we also conducted multiple strike force events in many
National Parks including Yellowstone, Glacier, Mount Rushmore, Mesa
Verde, Yosemite, and Grand Teton to name a few. During these events
FMCSA and our safety partners inspected 146 motorcoaches, and placed 4
drivers and 8 vehicles out-of-service. We are planning similar events
this summer.
FMCSA has robustly expanded our enforcement activities focused on
motorcoach companies by holding company officials and consultants
accountable. One example occurred in July 2010 when the FMCSA issued a
Notice of Claim to Ernesto Segura Silva for a civil penalty of $78,170.
The Notice of Claim charged Mr. Segura, and the two motor carrier
company names he had used, with 36 violations of 6 separate motor
carrier safety requirements. A separate Notice of Claim for $55,270 was
issued to Mario A. Garcia, a consultant, for his actions in aiding and
abetting Mr. Segura and his unfit motor carrier operation to evade
Federal regulations, and continue transportation of passengers after a
final unsatisfactory safety rating, without operating authority and in
violation of FMCSA Orders to Cease.
The Notice of Claim issued to Mr. Garcia charged him with 34
violations of Federal requirements, including making false statements
and providing false or misleading information in the new entrant
registration process. This was the first time FMCSA had charged a
safety consultant for the consultant's actions in aiding a carrier in
violating Federal regulations and in assisting the carrier to
reincarnate and apply for new authority to evade Federal regulations
and avoid its safety, performance and compliance history and continue
operating after being declared unfit and ordered to cease. FMCSA
entered into a Settlement Agreement with Mr. Garcia which requires him
to, among other things, cease aiding and abetting motor carriers
evading regulation, provide FMCSA with a current list of his consulting
clients on a regular basis, and obtain training on the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Regulations.
FMCSA also sought an injunction in Federal District Court against
Garcia and a passenger motor carrier operation he started by using
Segura's motorcoach and driver after rejecting his application for
operating authority. On November 30, 2010 the Court entered an order
approving a Consent Decree permanently enjoining Garcia and this
passenger carrier from operating any commercial motor vehicle in
interstate or foreign commerce and Garcia is enjoined from aiding any
motor carrier in evading FMCSA regulations, operating without authority
or operating in violation of an FMCSA order.
FMCSA obtained another Federal District Court order last month
[Feb. 16] entering a Consent Decree against RLT Tours, an passenger
carrier transporting daily commuters between Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania
and New York City without necessary operating authority. Following a
compliance review, FMCSA had issued RLT Tours an unsatisfactory safety
rating, revoked its operating authority and ordered it to cease
operations effective November 5, 2010. Yet RLT continued to operate.
Under last month's favorable court order, RLT Tours and a related
company were dissolved and prohibited from operating in interstate
commerce. The Court similarly barred the individual owners from
operating in interstate commerce without proper operating authority,
and it expressly enjoined them--and any persons with whom they were
acting in concert--from applying for FMCSA operating authority without
accurately disclosing their relationship to RLT Tours.
One of the hurdles to effective passenger carrier oversight is the
informality with which motor coaches are leased from company to company
and the difficulty of determining in some situations which company is
responsible for safety of the vehicle and its operation. Unlike
property carriers, under current regulations passenger carriers are not
required to execute written leases specifying the party responsible for
safety. FMCSA is committed to initiating a rulemaking on this issue.
To combat the recent rash of crashes among motorcoaches in the New
York and New Jersey areas, FMCSA also joined with State and local CMV
enforcement officials to conduct strike forces designed to identify and
remove unsafe drivers and vehicles from service. These efforts were
very effective and I would like to share with the Committee some of the
results.
On March 17, FMCSA began an enforcement strategy with the New York
State Department of Transportation (NYSDOT), the New York State Police,
and the New York City Police Department (NYPD) to conduct a motorcoach
strike force. This combined effort resulted in approximately 87
inspections. The strike force deployed at multiple locations across the
state. Locations ranged from Buffalo bridge crossings with Canada to
popular motor coach destinations including Turning Stone Casino in
Verona near Syracuse, the southern tier of the NY State Thruway, and
New York City's Chinatown. NYSDOT will continue its statewide effort
over the next week with a heavy focus in New York City.
Governor Cuomo's office has asked the New York State Department of
Motor Vehicles to conduct an audit of all motorcoach operators to
determine if drivers are properly licensed and qualified to drive.
FMCSA is supporting this effort by sharing information from our Motor
Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS) data. There are more than
2,000 passenger carriers in NY State. The audits will focus upon
approximately 304 passenger carriers that operate at least one bus with
seating for more than 40 passengers.
These strike forces are tools that we have at our disposal to
quickly assess the state of safety on our roads. We thank our State and
local law enforcement officials, as well as our safety stakeholders,
for their efforts to support these projects to improve safety
nationwide.
I call upon all States to follow in the footsteps of Governor
Cuomo. If State licensing agencies perform a top to bottom review of
the CDL holders with a passenger endorsement that are based in their
State, together we will begin to root out individuals that received a
CDL under false pretenses or through fraudulent practices. Only by
working together can we solve this important safety issue.
In addition we must not be complacent in the enforcement of safety
regulations on motorcoach companies or other CMVs. FMCSA, the states
and local agencies must sustain an aggressive approach to increase the
number of inspections and reviews. The risk is too great not to take
action.
FMCSA has 3,681 motorcoach carriers registered with active
operating authority. We as an Agency increased the compliance reviews
conducted on motorcoaches by 128 percent, from 457 in 2005 to 1,042 in
2010. Inspections of motorcoaches increased 98 percent during the same
period, from 12,991 in 2005 to 25,703 in 2010. Motorcoach related
fatalities have decreased from 57 in 2004 to 46 in 2009; a reduction of
19 percent. Passenger carrier enforcement cases rose from 36 in 2008 to
44 in 2010, a 22 percent increase. Between Fiscal Years 2007-2010,
FMCSA placed 75 passenger carriers out-ofservice for being unfit to
operate, after receiving an unsatisfactory rating.
As previously stated, there are 3,681 FMCSA-registered motorcoach
companies. On average we conduct an on-site compliance review on a
motorcoach company every 34 years. This 3-4 year average reflects a
more than 100 percent increase over where we were in 2005, when the
average was more than 8 years between compliance reviews.
Operating Authority Vetting Program
In August 2008, FMCSA implemented a more robust investigation of
applications for passenger carrier operating authority. This was a
necessary step toward preventing the reincarnation of unsafe passenger
carriers that choose to evade FMCSA sanctions rather than operate in
compliance with the regulations.
Through the vetting program, FMCSA conducts an investigation of the
application information to determine whether the applicant is fit,
willing, and able to comply with the safety and other applicable
regulations, or if the applicant is attempting to evade enforcement
actions for violations committed under another business name.
We believe the program is effective, and I assure you that we will
maintain a high level of effort in this area. Since FMCSA started the
program in 2008, the Agency has applied the vetting process to 2,666
applications for passenger carrier operating authority. We granted
operating authority to 1,995 applicants, 669 carriers failed to
successfully complete the application and either withdrew their
applications or simply failed to respond to inquiries from the Agency,
and 2 were rejected because the Agency determined the applicant was a
reincarnation of another unsafe motor carrier. To date, 24 percent of
applicants have had their applications for operating authority
rejected.
The Vetting Program is one of our early success stories in raising
the safety bar to enter the passenger carrier industry.
New Entrant Safety Audit Program
One of the concerns that came to light during the development of
the Motorcoach Safety Action Plan was the perception that new
motorcoach operators did not have the knowledge or ability to properly
maintain their vehicles. To aid in determining the validity of this
perception, FMCSA modified the new entrant safety audit to ascertain
the maintenance capabilities of new motorcoach companies. Questions
were added asking if the motorcoach company owns or leases a facility
for the inspection, repair, and maintenance of its vehicles or if the
company has an arrangement or contract for the systematic inspection,
repair, and maintenance of its vehicles.
We also modified the new entrant safety audit to include a
component on compliance with the ADA regulations for over-the-road bus
(OTRB) companies. We ask if the carrier has the means to provide
accessible service on a 48-hour advance notice basis by its owned or
leased OTRBs. If the carrier does not have the means, then does the
carrier have an arrangement with another carrier that operates
accessible OTRBs to provide the service for the first carrier?
FMCSA established an internal goal to complete the new entrant
safety audits for passenger carriers within 9 months, rather than the
18 months required by statute. In FY 2010, FMCSA completed 77 percent
of the passenger carrier safety audits within 9 months and 90 percent
in 18 months. For FY 2011, to date, the percentages are 77 percent and
94 percent, respectively. On average, a safety audit is conducted on a
new motorcoach company in less than 6 months.
Compliance, Safety, and Accountability (CSA)
For the passenger carriers that are currently conducting operations
in interstate commerce, FMCSA's CSA program enables the Agency to
ensure that these companies have effective safety management controls
in place in order to continue operating.
CSA is a major FMCSA initiative for the comprehensive review,
analysis, and restructuring of the Agency's current safety monitoring
system, as well as our compliance and enforcement programs. CSA will
provide a more effective operational model so that the Agency can have
a greater impact on large truck and bus safety while optimizing the
resources of FMCSA and its State partners.
To this end, the Agency developed a new operational model, and
implementation of that model is in process. Full deployment is to be
completed by the end of 2011. The model includes four major elements:
(1) measurement; (2) intervention; (3) safety fitness determination;
and (4) information technology. The new measurement system pinpoints
the specific safety problems involved, while the broader array of CSA
interventions, including warning letters sent at the first indication
of safety performance problems and various types of investigations for
carriers with more severe safety performance problems, enables FMCSA to
match the most appropriate intervention to seriousness of the carrier's
specific safety problems.
In December 2010, FMCSA released to the public the new CSA Safety
Measurement System SMS and began using the system for prioritizing
carriers for enforcement interventions. Earlier this month, the Agency
began sending warning letters to motor carriers nationwide. The warning
letters are used to formally notify company executives about safety
problems observed in our inspection and crash database so that
appropriate corrective actions can be taken. FMCSA will closely monitor
the safety records of these carriers for the next 12 months to assure
that corrective action has indeed occurred. Failure of the carrier to
address the safety performance problems may result in tougher
enforcement actions, including a Federal notice of violation, a notice
of claim through which the Agency assesses civil penalties, or an off-
site or on-site investigation. The investigations may also result in
civil penalties for discovered violations.
FMCSA has implemented components to its CSA program which monitor
the compliance and safety of motorcoach companies separately from
trucking companies. For example, unauthorized for-hire motorcoach
companies that have operational activity are made a top priority for an
on-site investigation. In addition, motorcoach companies with below
industry median performance in a safety evaluation area, operating more
than 2 years without an on-site investigation, or operating more than 5
years since the previous on-site investigation are a priority.
Later this year, FMCSA plans on issuing an NPRM that will propose
changes to our current Safety Fitness Rating Methodology for commercial
bus and truck companies. Through this rulemaking proposal, FMCSA would
determine a carrier's safety fitness based on CSA data consisting of
crashes, road inspection results and violation history rather than
exclusively data from the standard compliance review. This proposal
would enable FMCSA to assess the safety performance of a greater
segment of the commercial motor carrier industry with the goal of
further reducing large truck and bus crashes and fatalities.
Enhanced Oversight of the Medical Certification Process
A critical part of ensuring the safe operation of all CMVs is
medical certification of drivers. Currently, FMCSA and its State
partners check regularly during compliance reviews, new entrant safety
audits, and roadside inspections to ensure that drivers have a valid
medical card. When it is discovered that a driver does not have a
medical card or a company is employing drivers without valid medical
cards, the driver and carrier are subject to enforcement action,
generally in the form of civil penalties. In addition, if during an
inspection a driver is found to be operating a passenger carrying
vehicle without possessing a valid medical card, the driver is placed
out-of-service.
On December 1, 2008, FMCSA published a final rule merging the
medical certification and CDL issuance and renewal processes. The rule
improves the Agency's and the States' ability to monitor the medical
certification status of interstate CDL holders. The final rule requires
CDL holders to provide a copy of their medical certificate to the State
driver licensing agency in order to be granted a CDL or to maintain
their existing interstate driving privileges. If a driver fails to
renew the medical certificate, or if the driver fails the physical
examination, the CDL will be downgraded automatically to prohibit the
operation of CMVs in interstate commerce.
The final rule became effective on January 30, 2009. States must
implement the information technology system changes necessary to comply
with the rule by January 30, 2012. All CDL holders must comply with the
requirements to submit the medical certification information to the
States by January 30, 2014.
The final rule required States to make the CDL driver's medical
certification status available electronically to motor carrier safety
enforcement personnel. FMCSA and State enforcement personnel would then
be able to determine during a roadside inspection whether a driver is
medically qualified by reviewing the electronic record maintained by
the State licensing agency. Federal, State, and local government
enforcement officials would query the Commercial Driver's License
Information System (CDLIS) or the National Law Enforcement
Telecommunication System to determine whether the driver had the
required medical certification--something they cannot now accomplish.
In addition to the medical certification rule, FMCSA is developing
a National Registry of Certified Medical Examiners. Later this year,
FMCSA plans to issue a final rule requiring that all healthcare
professionals who issue medical certificates for interstate truck and
bus drivers complete training on the Federal physical qualifications
regulations and pass a test to verify they understand the requirements.
Once this program is implemented, only medical certificates issued by
examiners listed on the National Registry will be accepted. Medical
examiners will be required to submit to FMCSA reports providing the
name and a unique numerical identifier for each person who applies for
a medical certificate. Certain other information will also be submitted
to enable the Agency to monitor medical examiners' performance and to
identify potential instances of ``doctor shopping''--medically
unqualified drivers making multiple attempts to obtain a medical
certificate.
Knowledge Requirements For New Carriers
The FMCSA acknowledges that many of the new motorcoach operators
that enter the industry each year do not have the knowledge needed to
put into place effective safety management controls for their company.
The Agency initiated a rulemaking to address this issue.
On August 29, 2010, FMCSA published an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking requesting public comment on the methods the Agency should
consider implementing to provide further assurance that a new applicant
carrier is knowledgeable about the applicable safety regulations before
being granted new entrant authority. The Agency announced that it was
considering whether to implement a proficiency examination as part of
our revised New Entrant Safety Assurance Process and sought information
concerning issues that should be considered in the development and use
of such an examination.
In addition, the Agency requested comments on other alternatives to
a proficiency examination to complement the processes already in place
to demonstrate that new entrant carriers are knowledgeable about
applicable safety requirements.
The FMCSA also tasked its Motor Carrier Safety Advisory Committee
(MCSAC) to provide suggestions or recommendations on approaches that
could be implemented to improve the existing new entrant safety
assurance processes, procedures, and requirements for ensuring that new
entrant motor carriers are knowledgeable about Federal motor carrier
safety mandates prior to beginning operations in interstate commerce.
The MCSAC provided its letter report in September 2010, which included
recommendations for mandatory testing of certain company officials
responsible for ensuring compliance with the safety regulations and
putting into place safeguards for ensuring that the individual taking
the test would actually be responsible for implementing or maintaining
the carrier's safety management controls.
In addition to the rulemaking, FMCSA is conducting a study to
evaluate the effectiveness of some of the recommendations. The phased
research is progressing on analysis of safety performance cost
effectiveness for fostering a safety culture in new entrants via
training and testing their knowledgeability. The initial report is a
detailed analysis of changes in safety performance that resulted from a
predecessor simplistic new entrant training effort. Preliminary results
of that simplistic training effort are encouraging in regard to the
effectiveness.
The Agency is currently reviewing the comments to the ANPRM and the
MCSAC report in preparation for developing an NPRM to request public
comment on a regulatory approach for ensuring new entrant carriers have
the knowledge needed to comply with the Federal safety regulations.
Conclusion
FMCSA's efforts to improve motorcoach safety could not be
accomplished without the assistance of our State and local safety
partners. We are working closely with the International Association of
Chiefs of Police, the Governors Highway Safety Association, the
Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance, and others enlisting their support
for promotion of sustained traffic enforcement against those CDL
operators who drive unsafely. In addition, we also rely on our
partnerships with safety advocacy groups and the many safety-conscious
professionals in the industry to make our highways safer. With almost
4,000 active interstate motorcoach operations, the industry has
demonstrated that we can achieve much higher levels of safety
performance than we witnessed earlier this month. This month's crashes
are tragic reminders that we have much more to do.
To that end, I want to assure you that everyone at FMCSA is
committed to three core principles: First is to raise the safety bar to
enter the motor carrier industry; second, is to maintain high safety
standards to remain in the industry. And our third core principle is to
remove high risk drivers and carriers from operating. Everything we do
is linked to one or more of these principles.
Mr. Chairman, we at FMCSA applaud you and your colleagues on the
Committee and in the Congress for your leadership in the area of motor
carrier safety. During these investigations into the recent motorcoach
accidents, we have been in constant communication with many of you and
your staff. We appreciate your support and your holding us to that high
standard that we know must be achieved to avoid future crashes. As we
go forward with efforts to reauthorize our highway safety program, we
look forward to working with you to develop a plan that will help
achieve great strides in the coming years.
I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much, Ms. Ferro.
Mr. Medford is the Deputy Administrator of the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and we are pleased to
hear from you. Please tell us how the agency sets standards for
the safety of buses and other motor vehicles.
STATEMENT OF RONALD MEDFORD,
DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Medford. Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Thune, and
members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
update you on the activities of the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration on the issue of motorcoach safety.
I want to also offer my sincere and deepest sympathy to
those who lost loved ones in the recent horrific crashes that
occurred in New Jersey and New York. They have our commitment
that we will continue to work as hard as we can to improve
motorcoach safety.
NHTSA is responsible for conducting research on vehicle
safety and developing and enforcing standards for all newly
manufactured vehicles that use our roadways. In addition, we
are responsible for ensuring that vehicles and vehicle
equipment that have a safety defect are identified and
recalled.
The motorcoach safety work is a priority effort that
Secretary LaHood and Administrator David Strickland have been
driving at the Department. Under the leadership of the
Secretary and the Administrator, we have been working
aggressively to improve motorcoach safety. In 2009, at the
direction of Secretary LaHood, NHTSA worked with the other
modal administrations in the Department of Transportation to
develop a comprehensive, systems-oriented safety strategy for
enhancing motorcoach safety.
The crash data indicated that the highest risk of
fatalities resulted from vehicle rollover often resulting in
occupant ejection. Seventy-five percent of all motorcoach
fatalities from 1998 to 2008 were a result of rollover and
ejections. NHTSA used this data to establish its highest
priorities.
The three high-priority actions identified in the plan are
seat belts, electronic stability control, and roof strength. We
have initiated a rulemaking to require seat belts in all
seating positions on new motorcoaches and have completed
research on rollover structural integrity and electronic
stability control systems and plan to propose safety standards
for these issues this year.
NHTSA has also made significant progress in several other
important areas related to motorcoach safety. We have also
issued a proposal to upgrade the safety standard for commercial
tires, including those used on motorcoaches. Research on
motorcoach emergency exits, lighting and signage and egress
rates is complete, and we are evaluating the results in order
to make a decision on whether to initiate rulemaking on this
issue later this year. Other safety areas covered by our
research and rulemaking efforts include improving fire safety
and enhancing data collection and analysis through the use of
event data recorders.
Mr. Chairman, NHTSA shares your desire to complete the
actions that are identified in the DOT motorcoach plan. We are
devoting a significant portion of the agency's research and
rulemaking resources to this important safety issue. You have
Secretary LaHood's and Administrator Strickland's commitment to
completing the work on various motorcoach safety programs as
quickly but as prudently as possible by ensuring that our work
is grounded in sound engineering and science.
The recent tragedies in New York and New Jersey that
resulted in a large number of deaths and serious injuries
highlight why we must act quickly on motorcoach safety. We
recognize that these vehicles carry so many of our nation's
citizens that have the potential in one single crash to injure
and kill a large number of people. That is why we have placed
such a high priority on improving the safety of these vehicles.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your consideration and the
Subcommittee's ongoing efforts to improve highway safety. I
would be glad to answer any questions that you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Medford follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ronald Medford, Deputy Administrator,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Thune, and members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to update you on the
activities of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) on the issue of motorcoach safety.
I will outline the breadth of our ongoing work for you, and this
will illustrate a significant body of research and regulatory activity
that addresses the highest risks associated with motorcoach travel and
how we have made significant progress toward mitigating these risks. We
believe our work in these critical safety areas complement
recommendations issued by the National Transportation Safety Board and
draft legislation currently being considered by the Congress to improve
motorcoach safety.
NHTSA's vehicle safety program includes conducting research on and
developing standards for a very wide range of vehicle safety issues,
enforcing those standards, and conducting defect investigations. The
motorcoach safety work is one of the important elements of the agency's
extensive research and rulemaking agenda. Motorcoach safety is a
priority for NHTSA, and we have been working very aggressively in this
area. We know that although motorcoach crashes may be relatively rare,
when they do happen, they can cause a significant number of fatalities
and serious injuries in a single event. In 10 years, from 2000 to 2009,
there were 338 motorcoaches involved in fatal crashes. In 48 of the 338
motorcoaches involved in a fatal crash there was a fatality to one or
more occupants (driver and/or passengers) of the motorcoach. The
remaining fatalities were to occupants of other vehicles or
nonmotorists involved in a crash with a motorcoach. The average for
this period was 16 motorcoach occupant fatalities per year, but in
2004, 2005, and 2008 a few events each resulted in a large number of
fatalities. In 2011, the number of fatalities has already exceeded the
annual average.
DOT Motorcoach Plan
In 2009, NHTSA worked with other modal administrations in the
Department of Transportation (DOT) to develop a comprehensive systems-
oriented safety strategy for enhancing motorcoach safety. The DOT
Motorcoach Safety Action Plan is based on a two-pronged approach:
First, it addresses possible driver related causes of motorcoach
crashes, which are: driver fatigue, inattention, medical conditions,
and the oversight of unsafe carriers. Second, it addresses the
motorcoach related causes of fatalities and injuries, which are:
vehicle rollover, occupant ejection, structural integrity, and fires.
Based on this approach 3 high priority action items related to new
vehicle designs were identified and have now been completed. They were:
Initiate rulemaking to require seat belts;
Evaluate and consider roof crush performance requirements;
and
Assess the benefits of electronic stability control systems;
Other priority strategies included in the plan were:
Improving tire performance;
Improving evacuation and emergency egress;
Improving fire safety (fire detection, fire hardening
systems); and
Data collection and analysis through the use of event data
recorders.
In these areas as well, NHTSA has made significant progress and I
will briefly touch on all of the items related to new motorcoaches.
Electronic Stability Control
Directional loss of control and rollover are causal factors in
heavy vehicle crashes, including motorcoaches. By selectively applying
the brakes on a vehicle, electronic stability control is a technology
designed to reduce these types of crashes. NHTSA has been aggressively
testing these systems and is currently working on a rulemaking
proposal, which we expect to issue later this year.
Improving Tire Performance
Tire performance plays a critical role in ensuring the safety of
occupants in every kind of vehicle--and motorcoaches are no exception.
We issued a proposal to improve tire performance on September 29,
2010.\1\ That proposal included new tests aimed at improving the
performance of new tires even when they are underinflated. We are now
working to finalize the rule.
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\1\ 75 FR60036, Docket # NHTSA-2010-0132.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seat Belts
Between 1999 and 2008, there were 24 fatal motorcoach rollover
events that resulted in 97 deaths. Seventy-six of those 97 were ejected
from the motorcoach. We initiated a proposal to require seat belts in
all seating positions in motorcoaches on August 18, 2010.\2\ This rule
is intended to prevent ejections and keep passengers in their seats,
thereby mitigating fatalities and injuries in crash and rollover
events. The proposed rule provides a definition of a motorcoach and
explores the issue of retrofitting seat belts on existing motorcoaches.
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\2\ 75 FR50958, Docket # NHTSA-2010-0112.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some manufacturers and operators have already started to equip
their motorcoaches with seat belts. For example, Greyhound (First
Group) is currently installing belts on new buses.
Improving Fire Safety
There are more than 2,200 bus fires annually, which add up to a
$24.2 million annual cost in direct property damage. NHTSA collaborated
with the National Institute of Standards and Technology to conduct
research on motorcoach flammability. This research program looked at
developing more stringent flammability and fire detection requirements.
The program also reviewed existing flammability standards and
procedures, as well as various test procedures to assess the
flammability of materials used in both the interior and the exterior of
motorcoaches.
We conducted wheel-well mockup studies to examine how fires
propagate into motorcoach occupant compartments, countermeasures for
fires such as fire hardening, fire detection, and fire suppression
systems, and the tenability of the occupant compartment during a wheel-
well fire. In December 2010, we published a report on the results of
the first year of this research.\3\ The final report on this research
will be published this summer. We will assess the results of the
research and make a decision whether to initiate rulemaking next year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Docket # NHTSA-2007-28793.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Improving Rollover Structural Integrity
By improving the structural integrity of the vehicle, we can
improve the chances of adequate survival space for occupants in the
event of a rollover, and we can strengthen the bus structure
surrounding the windows to improve their effectiveness in preventing
ejections.
NHTSA completed research on roof-crush test procedures and the
agency is currently developing a rulemaking proposal, which we expect
to issue late this year. This NPRM will consider NTSB's recommendation
for performance standards for motorcoach roof strength, which is on its
Most Wanted List.
In addition to studying whether we can strengthen the bus structure
surrounding the windows to improve their effectiveness in preventing
ejections, we are looking into window glazing and window retention.
Initial research and testing has been completed and we will make a
decision whether to initiate rulemaking by the end of the year.
Improving Evacuation and Emergency Egress
In the area of improved emergency evacuation, NHTSA and FMCSA
completed research in 2010 \4\ at the Volpe research center on
motorcoach emergency egress requirements and the need for enhancements
to effectively facilitate passenger evacuation. We will make a decision
whether to initiate rulemaking this summer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Docket # NHTSA-2007-28793-0024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agency's work on improving evacuation and emergency egress
considers NTSB's Most Wanted List recommendation to revise the standard
to require floor level exits that can easily open and remain open
during emergency egress.\5\ It also considers recommendations to revise
standards to require emergency lighting and/or retroreflective material
to identify exits, as well as a recommendation to conduct simulations
to evaluate current emergency egress designs.\6\
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\5\ NTSB Recommendation H-99-09.
\6\ NTSB Recommendations H-00-01, H-00-02, and H-07-08.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Data Collection and Analysis
Finally, in the area of data collection and analysis and the use of
Event Data Recorders (EDRs), NHTSA has monitored the Society of
Automotive Engineers (SAE) Truck and Bus Event Data Recorder
Subcommittee in the development of SAE Recommended Practice J2728,
``Heavy Vehicle Event Data Recorders.'' These were developed to define
specifications and requirements for heavy vehicle EDRs for the reliable
and accurate recording of the crash parameters relevant to heavy
vehicles. We will make a decision whether to initiate rulemaking on
this issue this year.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, NHTSA shares your desire to complete the actions that
are identified in the DOT motorcoach plan. NHTSA is devoting a
significant amount of its research and rulemaking resources toward
improving the safety of motorcoaches and the recent crashes in New York
and New Jersey highlight why we must continue to do so. We recognize
that these vehicles carrying so many of our Nation's citizens have the
potential in a single crash to injure and kill a large number of
people. That is why we have placed such a high priority on improving
the safety of these public transportation vehicles.
Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Thune, and members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for your consideration and thank you for your
ongoing efforts to improve highway and motorcoach safety. I would be
pleased to answer any questions.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you, Mr. Medford.
Ms. Hersman, Chairman of the National Transportation Safety
Board, is going to update us on the agency's review of the
recent bus accident in New York, as well as those in New Jersey
and New Hampshire. We welcome you, Ms. Hersman, and invite you
to give your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. DEBORAH A.P. HERSMAN, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Ms. Hersman. Thank you very much, Chairman Lautenberg,
Ranking Member Thune, Senator Udall, and members of the
Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to address the
important issue of motorcoach safety which has been placed in
the spotlight recently because of tragic accidents in New York,
New Jersey, and New Hampshire.
We do have a presentation on the screen to my left.
We immediately launched an investigation into the March 12
fatal accident on I-95 in the Bronx, and while it is too soon
to determine the cause of this accident, which killed 15 people
and injured 18 more, here is what I can tell you.
Around 5:30 a.m., a motorcoach was returning to New York
from a Connecticut casino, traveling at up to 78 miles per
hour, when it departed the travel lanes to the right, crossed
over a paved shoulder, and struck a roadside barrier. The bus
then traveled nearly 500 feet while rolling over and then
collided with a 9-inch diameter highway signpost. The impact
drove the post through the bus' windshield, severing the roof
panel of the bus for nearly the length of the bus.
We interviewed the bus driver who said that there were no
mechanical difficulties identified but there was a truck
involved. We also interviewed a truck driver who voluntarily
turned himself in, and he said he witnessed the bus crash in
front of him. An NTSB engineer examined the truck and found no
evidence to indicate that it had come into contact with the
bus.
We also found a video camera mounted to the front of the
bus, but it did not record the accident.
With our limited resources in our Highway Office, we are
very selective about which accidents we can launch a full team
to in order to maximize our effectiveness. While we did launch
a full investigation into the accident in the Bronx, for the
New Jersey and New Hampshire accidents we are conducting
focused investigations into the two companies' operations and
safety performance.
The New Jersey crash occurred on March 14 when a motorcoach
on a scheduled run from New York City to Philadelphia departed
the roadway and struck a concrete headwall of the New Jersey
Turnpike. The bus re-entered, crossed the median, and came to
rest after striking an embankment. The driver and one passenger
were killed and 44 people were injured.
On March 22 in Littleton, New Hampshire, the driver of a
motorcoach traveling on I-93 from Quebec to Boston reportedly
lost control and departed the roadway to the left. The bus went
down an embankment and rolled onto its left side. All 25
occupants were injured.
The NTSB currently has about 100 open recommendations
addressing motorcoach safety based on our accident
investigations, and three of those issues are on our ``most
wanted'' list of transportation improvements.
First, stronger occupant protection, including: stronger
roofs, window emergency exit redesign, and standards for
passengers seating compartments.
Second, better government oversight of operators to ensure
that both the operational status of the vehicle is up to date
and the drivers are safe.
And finally, implementation of advanced vehicle
technologies to prevent accidents from occurring in the first
place, including lane departure warning systems, electronic
stability control, and advanced collision warning systems.
The DOT currently has rulemakings underway, and the
proposed actions in those rulemakings, when completed, will
improve safety. But after 10 years of recommending action on
these issues and time on our ``most wanted'' list, these
actions are still not final and many are not moving forward. We
have seen no sense of urgency on many of our recommendations,
and as the Betts family and Yen-Chi Le can tell you, the names
and the locations of the accidents that we investigate may
change, but the solutions that we identify are the same.
We share your concern about the safety of motorcoaches and
heavy vehicles operating on our nation's highways. That is why
the NTSB will be conducting a forum on truck and bus safety on
May 10 and 11.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my statement, and I am ready
to answer questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Hersman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman, Chairman,
National Transportation Safety Board
Good morning, Chairman Lautenberg and members of the Subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) regarding oversight of
motorcoach safety. The NTSB is charged with investigating major
transportation accidents, including highway accidents, determining
their probable cause, and making recommendations to prevent similar
accidents from happening again. Every day, there are thousands of
accidents on our Nation's highways, resulting in tens of thousands of
fatalities each year. Unfortunately, three very recent highway
accidents have drawn our attention once again to the safety of
motorcoaches.
Recent Accidents
At about 5:37 a.m. on March 12, a motorcoach operated by World Wide
Travel of Greater New York LTD was traveling south on 1-95 toward New
York City from the Mohegan Sun Casinos in Uncasville, CT. There were 33
passengers on board. The 40-year-old driver on that trip was one of the
company's 40 full-time drivers, and he regularly drives this route. The
company provides 14 daily roundtrips between the casino and New York.
The driver failed to maintain his lane, drifted to the right and
impacted the highway guardrail. The motorcoach then slid along the
guardrail close to 500 feet before coming to rest. During the collision
sequence, the motorcoach rolled clockwise along its longitudinal axis
about 90 degrees on its right side before it impacted the support pole
for an overhead sign located about six feet from the edge of the
pavement. The pole penetrated the bus through its windshield and
continued almost the entire length of the bus, killing 15 passengers.
Then on March 14, at about 9 p.m., a motorcoach carrying 45
passengers was traveling southbound on the New Jersey Turnpike near
East Brunswick, NJ when it departed the left edge of the roadway and
struck a concrete headwall of an exit ramp. After striking the
headwall, the bus re-entered and crossed the roadway, and came to final
rest upright after striking an embankment. The driver was reportedly
ejected and killed in the accident sequence. One passenger was killed,
and almost all the other passengers received injuries ranging from
minor to serious. The bus was on a scheduled run from New York City to
Philadelphia, operated by Super Luxury Tours, Inc., which has about 16
motorcoaches and 16 drivers. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA) is currently conducting a post-crash compliance
review of this company.
Finally, on March 21, at about 8:15 p.m., on southbound Interstate
93 near Littleton, NH, a motorcoach departed the roadway, traveled down
an embankment, and rolled onto its left side before coming to rest.
This motorcoach was transporting approximately 25 Korean nationals from
Quebec to Boston, MA. Weather reports included snow and intermittent
fog in the area. There were no fatalities in the accident, but most of
the occupants were injured to varying degrees.
The NTSB launched a team of investigators to conduct a full
investigation of the accident in New York to eventually make findings
and determine probable cause. We are investigating the New Jersey and
New Hampshire accidents in a limited capacity, looking for information
from those accidents that may shed additional light on the bus
companies' safety performance. All three investigations are in the
early stages, and many details have not yet been determined. In the
coming months, the NTSB will analyze the information from all three
accidents to possibly issue recommendations aimed at improving
motorcoach safety and preventing additional tragic accidents like
these.
Safety Oversight
Motorcoach operations transport 750 million passengers per year--
almost as many as the 800 million passengers in commercial aviation.
They are one of the safest modes of transportation, averaging less than
20 fatalities per year (vs. about 100 in aviation) or 0.006 percent of
the total 34,000 annual fatalities on our Nation's highways.
Unlike when travelers get in their own automobiles, passengers
boarding a motorcoach place their lives in the hands of the motorcoach
operator and its driver. They expect, and they deserve, the highest
reasonable level of safety. For that reason, NTSB investigations focus
on identifying the underlying causes of accidents and the safety
improvements necessary to prevent their reoccurrence. Although the NTSB
can investigate only a fraction of highway accidents, we have
investigated a number of motorcoach accidents over the years and have
made recommendations to improve the safety of motorcoach
transportation. We currently have a total of 166 open safety
recommendations issued to the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT),
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), FMCSA, Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA), and Pipeline and Hazardous Material
Safety Administration (PHMSA) combined, 100 of which relate to
motorcoach safety.
The two most important factors related to safe motorcoach
operations are the condition of the vehicles and the performance of the
drivers. The NTSB believes that the FMCSA should emphasize both of
these critical elements in its compliance reviews, and that an
unsatisfactory rating in either vehicle or driver areas should
disqualify the operator. Currently, operators must be found to be
unsatisfactory in at least two of the six rating factors to be
disqualified. In other words, they can be unsatisfactory in either the
vehicle or driver areas and still be allowed to operate.
The NTSB's original recommendation regarding this issue was made in
1999 in response to a motorcoach rollover accident in Indianapolis, IN
that killed two passengers and injured 13. The accident motorcoach had
only 50-percent braking efficiency, and a postaccident compliance
review of the operator by the FMCSA resulted in 10 out of 10 of the
carrier's vehicles being placed out of service. The company had been
inspected nine times between 1987 and 1995, so it should have been
obvious that it had issues with its vehicle maintenance prior to the
accident. In 1994, even though 63 percent of the vehicles met the out-
of-service criteria, the operator received a ``conditional'' rating for
the vehicle factors and, because all the other factors were rated
``satisfactory,'' it was given an overall rating of ``satisfactory.''
Thus, the operator was able to continue to operate with unsafe
vehicles.
The NTSB recommended that the FMCSA change the safety fitness
rating methodology so that an adverse rating on either the vehicle or
the driver alone would be sufficient to result in an overall
``unsatisfactory'' rating for a carrier.\1\ Because of inaction on the
part of the FMCSA, the NTSB added this recommendation to our Most
Wanted List in 2000. We later investigated additional motorcoach
accidents that involved this same issue, including a five-fatal
motorcoach accident in Victor, NY in 2002; a 23-fatal motorcoach fire
near Wilmer, TX in 2005; a 17-fatal motorcoach accident in Atlanta, GA
in 2007; and a motorcoach rollover accident in Victoria, TX in 2008. To
date, the FMCSA has not acted on this recommendation.
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\1\ H-99-6 To FMCSA: ``Change the safety fitness rating methodology
so that adverse vehicle or driver performance-based data alone are
sufficient to result in an overall unsatisfactory rating for a
carrier.''
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The NTSB has also taken issue with the FMCSA's oversight of vehicle
inspections, including inspections of commercial motorcoaches.
Following the eight-fatal Tallulah, LA \2\ motorcoach accident and the
17-fatal Sherman, TX \3\ motorcoach accident, we made recommendations
that the FMCSA provide adequate oversight of private inspection
garages.
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\2\ H-05-04 To FMCSA: Conduct a study on the safety effectiveness
of the self- inspection and certification process used by motor
carriers to comply with annual vehicle inspection requirements and take
corrective action, as necessary.
\3\ H-09-20 To FMCSA: Require those states that allow private
garages to conduct Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
inspections of commercial motor vehicles, to have a quality assurance
and oversight program that evaluates the effectiveness and thoroughness
of those inspections.
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In accidents involving a school bus in Moutainburg, AR and a dump
truck in Glen Rock, PA, the NTSB found that the FMCSA lacked adequate
oversight of pre-trip brake inspections, the qualifications of brake
inspectors, training in brake maintenance, and training of drivers
about the dangers of adjusting automatic slack adjusters. The same
safety oversight issues that we have found in motor carrier and truck
accidents also apply to motorcoaches.
The NTSB has also found problems with commercial vehicle tires. For
example, some tires have a speed restriction because they are not meant
for highway speeds. If a speed-restricted tire is used in service at
speeds above 55 mph for extended periods, a catastrophic failure can
result. Although it did not cause the motorcoach accident in Tallulah,
LA, the inspection process never identified the speed-restricted tires
on this vehicle, even though it was being operated on major highways.
The NTSB made recommendations to correct this deficiency.\4\
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\4\ H-05-03 To FMCSA: Revise the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations Appendix G to Subchapter B, Minimum Periodic Inspection
Standards, Part 10: Tires, Sections A(5) and B(7), to include
inspection criteria and specific language to address a tire's speed
rating to ensure that it is appropriate for a vehicles intended use.
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The science of passenger vehicle dynamics has evolved to where we
now recognize that the better tires should go on the rear axle where
they provide better stability if the vehicle loses traction with the
roadway. However, for motorcoaches, current regulations call for deeper
tread depths on the front axle tires than on the rear. Therefore, in
2005, following a five-fatal accident in Hewitt, TX where the
motorcoach lost control on a rain-soaked highway, the NTSB asked NHTSA
to study this issue and the FMCSA to implement the results.\5\ These
recommendations have not been implemented by either agency.
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\5\ H-05-18 To NHTSA: Conduct testing on the effects of differing
tread depths for the steer and drive axle tires.
H-05-17 To FMCSA: Once the testing in Safety Recommendation H-05-17
is complete, modify the tread depth requirements for each axle to
reflect the results of the research.
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Following the motorcoach accident in Sherman, TX that was caused by
low air pressure on one of the front tires, the NTSB found that even
small reductions in air pressure can cause commercial tires to be
overloaded, overheat, and fail. This potential overloading problem is
especially true for the front tires of motorcoaches where, even with
proper air pressure, the tires are close to their maximum load rating.
Therefore, the NTSB made recommendations to NHTSA and the FMCSA to
require tire pressure monitoring systems \6\ and to require commercial
drivers to check their tire pressure with a gauge.\7\
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\6\ H-09-22 To NHTSA: Require all new motor vehicles weighing over
10,000 pounds to be equipped with direct tire pressure monitoring
systems to inform drivers of the actual tire pressures on their
vehicles.
\7\ H-09-19 To FMCSA: Require that tire pressure be checked with a
tire pressure gauge during pretrip inspections, vehicle inspections,
and roadside inspections of motor vehicles.
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Finally, the NTSB discovered another oversight issue as a result of
the motorcoach accident in Victoria, TX. This motorcoach was imported
from Mexico and repeatedly crossed the border into Texas, although it
should never have been allowed in the United States. It was not built
to meet NHTSA's Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) that are
required of all vehicles. Therefore, the NTSB made several
recommendations to the FMCSA and NHTSA to develop a database of FMVSS-
compliant buses \8\ and verify that operators are using FMVSScompliant
vehicles \9\. The NTSB also recommended that the FMCSA train law
enforcement to detect non-FMVSS-compliant vehicles \10\, and to obtain
the authority to put operators out of service if they use such illegal
vehicles.\11\
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\8\ H-09-37 & H-09-30 To FMCSA and NHTSA: Assist the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration in developing a Web-based
database of FMVSS-compliant passenger-carrying commercial motor
vehicles that can be utilized by Federal, state, and local enforcement
inspection personnel to identify non-FMVSScompliant passenger-carrying
commercial motor vehicles so that these vehicles (other than exempted
vehicles) are placed out of service and cease operating in the United
States. Implement a process to periodically update this database.
H-09-38 To FMCSA: Require that federal and state inspectors utilize
the database requested in Safety Recommendation H-09-37 during both
roadside and compliance review inspections of passenger-carrying
commercial motor vehicles to identify and place out of service non-
FMVSS-compliant vehicles.
H-09-31 To NHTSA: When the database requested in Safety
Recommendation H-09-30 is completed, make the database known and
accessible to state vehicle registration agencies and to Federal,
state, and local enforcement inspection personnel for their use during
roadside inspections and compliance reviews to identify non-FMVSS-
compliant passenger-carrying commercial motor vehicles. (H-09-31)
\9\ H-09-40 To FMCSA: Require that passenger motor carriers certify
on their OP-1(P) forms--(Application for Motor Passenger Carrier
Authority) and initial MCS-150 form (Motor Carrier Identification
Report [Application for USDOT Number]) and subsequent required biennial
submissions that all vehicles operated, owned, or leased per trip or
per term met the FMVSSs in effect at the time of manufacture.
\10\ H-09-039 To FMCSA: Institute a requirement for Federal and
state enforcement officials to obtain training on a procedure to
physically inspect passenger-carrying commercial motor vehicles for an
FMVSS compliance label, and work with the Commercial Vehicle Safety
Alliance to develop and provide this training.
\11\ H-09-41 To FMCSA: Seek statutory authority to suspend, revoke,
or withdraw a motor carrier's operating authority upon discovering the
carrier is operating any non-FMVSS-compliant-passenger-carrying
commercial motor vehicles, a violation of the FMVSS-compliant
certification requested in Safety Recommendation H-09-40.
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The NTSB has made recommendations to improve the FMCSA' s new
entrant program to prevent reincarnated motor carrier motorcoach
operators from entering the industry. In 2002, the NTSB investigated an
accident involving a tractor-semitrailer collision with a Greyhound bus
in Loraine, TX which resulted in three deaths. At the time, the FMCSA
had essentially no review or follow-up of new entrant motor carriers.
To become a motor carrier, the owner of a truck or bus company merely
had to fill out an online form and pay a small fee to receive operating
authority from the FMCSA. In this case, our investigation revealed that
when the trucking company owner submitted his application, he lied
about his knowledge of the regulations, about having systems in place
to comply with the regulations, and about a drug conviction for
possession of large amounts of marijuana the year prior to his
application. He also failed to maintain any records on his drivers or
vehicles, he did not have a drug and alcohol program, and he did not
conduct background checks of his drivers. Further, he knowingly
dispatched the accident driver, who did not have a commercial driver's
license or medical certificate.
As a result, the NTSB recommended that the FMCSA require new motor
carriers to demonstrate their safety fitness prior to obtaining new
entrant operating authority.\12\ In response to this recommendation,
the FMCSA developed the New Applicant Screening Program under which a
new motor carrier operating in interstate commerce is subject to an 18-
month safety monitoring period and receives a safety audit sometime
after its first 3 months of operation but before it completes 18 months
of operation.
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\12\ H-03-2 To FMCSA: Require all new motor carriers seeking
operating authority to demonstrate their safety fitness prior to
obtaining new entrant operating authority by, at a minimum: (1) passing
an examination demonstrating their knowledge of the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Regulations; (2) submitting a comprehensive plan
documenting that the motor carrier has management systems in place to
ensure compliance with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations;
and (3) passing a Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration safety
audit, including vehicle inspections.
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In 2008, the FMCSA began its New Entrant Safety Assurance Program,
under which the agency identified 16 regulations that are essential
elements of basic safety management controls necessary to operate in
interstate commerce and made a carrier's failure to comply with any of
the 16 regulations an automatic failure of the safety audit.
Additionally, if certain violations are discovered during a roadside
inspection, the new entrant is subject to expedited actions to correct
these deficiencies.
Unfortunately, unscrupulous motor carriers still use the new
entrant program to evade an enforcement action or an out-of-service
order by going out of business and then reincarnating themselves, as if
they are a brand new motor carrier. The NTSB found that this had
occurred with the motorcoach operator involved in the Sherman, TX
accident. After losing its authority to operate because of an
unsatisfactory compliance review rating, the operator successfully
applied for operating authority under a new name as a new entrant. The
NTSB concluded that the FMCSA processes were inadequate to identify the
operator as a company that was simply evading enforcement action. The
NTSB issued a recommendation to the FMCSA to evaluate the effectiveness
of its New Applicant Screening Program.\13\
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\13\ H-09-21 To FMCSA: To Develop an evaluation component to
determine the effectiveness of its New Applicant Screening Program.
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The NTSB found additional deficiencies with the FMCSA's new entrant
program during its investigation of a 2008 accident in which the driver
fell asleep and the motorcoach overturned in Victoria, Texas, killing
one person. The FMCSA failed to notice that the operator reincarnated
into a new operator shortly after the accident. As a result, the NTSB
issued recommendations to the FMCSA that ask the agency to develop
methods to identify reincarnated carriers and seek authority to deny or
revoke their operating authority.\14\ In September, 2009, the FMCSA's
Motor Carrier Safety Advisory Committee echoed the NTSB's position that
new entrants should be evaluated before being allowed to operate.
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\14\ H-09-34 To FMCSA: Seek statutory authority to deny or revoke
operating authority for commercial interstate motor carriers found to
have applications for operating authority in which the applicant failed
to disclose any prior operating relationship with another motor
carrier, operating as another motor carrier, or being previously
assigned a U.S. Department of Transportation number.
H-09-35 To FMCSA: Apply the evasion detection algorithm process
against all interstate passenger carriers that obtained Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration operating authority, after the New
Entrant Safety Assurance Program began in 2003 but before the program
began vetting those carriers, to verify that those new entrant carriers
do not have a concealed history of poor safety management controls
because they were able to reenter interstate commerce undetected as
reincarnated carriers.
H-09-36 To FMCSA: Establish a requirement to review all passenger
carrier lease agreements during new entrant safety audits and
compliance reviews to identify and take action against carriers that
have lease agreements that result in a loss of operational control by
the certificate holder.
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Motorcoach Passenger Protection
In the 12 years since the NTSB issued the recommendations
addressing occupant protection for motorcoach passengers, we have
investigated more than 30 motorcoach accidents that have caused 140
fatalities, 1,070 injuries, and 259 ejections. The structural integrity
of a motorcoach is critical to maintaining a survivable occupant space
for passengers, because intrusion into the occupant area and inadequate
window glazing can have dire consequences. Following our 1999 study of
motorcoach passenger protection, we issued recommendations to NHTSA
regarding roof strength and window glazing standards.\15\ \16\ We
reiterated these recommendations following the investigation of the
motorcoach accident in New Orleans, LA, and after the nine-fatal 2008
motorcoach accident in Mexican Hat, UT. In the 2010 Dolan Springs, AZ
mid-size bus rollover accident, the NTSB expanded its recommendations
about roof crush, occupant protection, and window glazing to apply to
all buses greater than 10,000 pounds.\17\ We also made a recommendation
to NHTSA to ensure that overhead luggage racks on all buses remain
anchored during an accident sequence.\18\
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\15\ H-99-50 To NHTSA: Develop performance standards for motorcoach
roof strength that provide maximum survival space for all seating
positions and that take into account current typical motorcoach window
dimensions.
H-99-51 To NHTSA: Once performance standards have been developed
for motorcoach roof strength, require newly manufactured motorcoaches
to meet those standards.
\16\ H-99-49 To NHTSA: Expand your research on current advanced
glazing to include its applicability to motorcoach occupant ejection
prevention, and revise window glazing requirements for newly
manufactured motorcoaches based on the results of this research.
\17\ H-10-3 To NHTSA: In your rulemaking to improve motorcoach roof
strength, occupant protection, and window glazing standards, include
all buses with a gross vehicle weight rating above 10,000 pounds, other
than school buses.
\18\ H-10-4 To NHTSA: Develop performance standards for all newly
manufactured buses with a gross vehicle weight rating above 10,000
pounds to require that overhead luggage racks are constructed and
installed to prevent head and neck injuries and remain anchored during
an accident sequence.
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Since 1999, the NTSB also has made recommendations to improve
passenger egress in the event of a crash or other emergency. One
recommendation asks NHTSA to require that window exits and other
emergency exits be designed so that they are easy to open and stay open
during an emergency evacuation, whether the motorcoach is upright or at
an unusual attitude.\19\ We also asked NHTSA to require that
motorcoaches be equipped with an independent power source for emergency
lighting, as well as interior luminescent or exterior retroreflective
material or both to mark all emergency exits.\20\ Finally, we asked
NHTSA to require motorcoach operators to provide passengers with pre-
trip safety information.\21\ The FMCSA has developed safety materials
for the motorcoach operators to use, but is allowing each motorcoach
company to develop an appropriate passenger safety awareness program
for their own operations, rather than developing a Federal requirement.
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\19\H-99-9 To NHTSA: Require that other than floor-level emergency
exits (i.e., windows) can be easily opened and remain open during an
emergency evacuation when a motorcoach is upright or at unusual
attitudes.
\20\ H-00-01 To NHTSA: revise the Federal motor vehicle safety
standards to require that all motorcoaches be equipped with emergency
lighting fixtures that are outfitted with a self-contained independent
power source.
\21\ H-99-8 To U.S. DOT: require motorcoach operators to provide
passengers with pre-trip safety information.
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Following the 2005 motorcoach fire near Wilmer, TX, the NTSB asked
NHTSA to evaluate current emergency evacuation designs of motorcoaches
and buses,\22\ to develop early warning detection systems to monitor
the temperature of wheel well compartments in motorcoaches and
buses,\23\ and to evaluate the need for a Federal vehicle standard to
require fire detection and suppression systems on motorcoaches.\24\
NHTSA has been conducting research and testing to address these issues,
but no formal rulemaking has yet been published.
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\22\ H-07-8 To NHTSA: Evaluate current emergency evacuation designs
of motorcoaches and buses by conducting simulation studies and
evacuation drills that take into account, at a minimum, acceptable
egress times for various postaccident environments, including fire and
smoke; unavailable exit situations; and the current above-ground height
and design of window exits to be used in emergencies by all potential
vehicle occupants.
\23\ H-07-6 To NHTSA: Develop detection systems to monitor the
temperature of wheel well compartments in motorcoaches and buses to
provide early warning of malfunctions that could lead to fires.
\24\ H-07-07 To NHTSA: Evaluate the need for a Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard that would require installation of fire
detection and suppression systems on motorcoaches.
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On April 30, 2009, following the NTSB board meeting on the Mexican
Hat, UT motorcoach rollover accident, Secretary LaHood ordered a full
departmental review of motorcoach safety by NHTSA, the FMCSA, the FHWA,
and PHMSA. The review's findings and consideration of outstanding NTSB
recommendations to the DOT agencies became the basis for the DOT
Motorcoach Safety Action Plan, publicly released on November 16, 2009.
The action plan outlines the additional steps needed to improve
motorcoach safety for the millions of Americans who rely on these
vehicles for safe transportation. The plan provides timelines for
rulemaking activities addressing the installation of seat belts on
motorcoaches and enhanced emergency egress requirements focused on
children, aging persons, and people with disabilities. NHTSA had
planned to make a decision on regulatory action regarding roof strength
requirements late in 2009, however, no updates have yet been released.
In 2010, NHTSA issued an NPRM proposing that lap/shoulder belts be
required for each passenger seating position in new motorcoaches, which
would partially meet the NTSB's recommendations on occupant protection.
Unfortunately, this proposed rule would not apply to smaller or medium-
size specialty buses such as the 29-passenger vehicle involved in the
accident at Dolan Springs, AZ, or the 32-passenger vehicle involved in
the accident in Lake Placid, FL. The proposed rule would not apply to
either of these vehicles because they are below the 26,000-pound
definition upon which this NPRM is focused. However, the rule would
apply to the very similar 29-passenger medium-size bus involved in the
Bethesda, MD accident last September because it meets the 26,000-pound
definition. It is not reasonable to expect that the average motorcoach
passenger understands the difference between a 29-passenger bus that
weighs 26,000 pounds and a 29-passenger bus that is lighter. The
average passenger expects the same level of safety no matter the size
or the weight of the bus. That is why we have urged NHTSA to expand the
rule to all buses and thereby lead to meaningful improvements in the
safety of all motorcoach passengers.
Crash Avoidance Technologies
Since 1995, the NTSB has advocated collision warning systems and
adaptive cruise control to prevent bus and truck accidents. In 2001, as
part of a study on Technology for the Prevention of Rear-End
Collisions, the NTSB investigated nine commercial vehicle rear-end
collisions in which 20 people died and 181 were injured. Common to all
nine accidents was the degraded perception of traffic conditions ahead
by the driver. The NTSB recommended that NHTSA issue performance
standards for adaptive cruise control and collision warning systems for
new commercial vehicles.\25\
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\25\ H-01-6 To DOT: Complete rulemaking on adaptive cruise control
and collision warning system performance standards for new commercial
vehicles. at a minimum, these standards should address obstacle
detection distance, timing of alerts, and human factors guidelines,
such as the mode and type of warning.
H-01-7 To DOT: After promulgating performance standards for
collision warning systems for commercial vehicles, require that all new
commercial vehicles be equipped with a collision warning system.
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In 2003, the NTSB investigated a multivehicle accident near
Hampshire, IL, in which a tractor-trailer failed to slow for the
stopped or slow-moving traffic on the approach to the Interstate 90
toll plaza. The tractor-trailer driver failed to detect the slowing
traffic ahead of his vehicle and the tractor-trailer struck the rear of
a specialty bus, killing eight passengers and injuring 12. As a result,
the NTSB reiterated the above recommendations. In 2007, these important
safety recommendations were added to our Most Wanted List. They were
reiterated in 2008, in the NTSB's report on a five-fatality motorcoach
and tractor-trailer accident in Osseo, WI, and a 15-fatality motorcoach
rollover accident in Turrell, AR. We also reiterated these
recommendations following the 10-fatality Miami, OK accident where a
tractor-trailer ran into the rear of six passenger vehicles that were
slowing or stopped on the highway. All of these accidents demonstrate
how crash avoidance technologies such as collision warning systems and
adaptive cruise control can help prevent rear end collisions.
Finally, electronic stability control is standard equipment on many
automobiles today and lane departure warning systems are becoming
increasingly common. Both systems help drivers, who may be distracted
or encounter challenging driving conditions, to maintain control of
their vehicles and remain on the roadway. Therefore, in 2008, as a
result of the Osseo, WI accident investigation, the NTSB recommended
that NHTSA determine whether equipping commercial vehicles with
electronic stability control systems would reduce commercial vehicle
accidents, and if so, require their use on commercial vehicles.\26\
Just last year, following our investigation into the Dolan Springs, AZ
bus rollover accident, the NTSB issued two new recommendations for
stability control systems on all newly manufactured buses greater than
10,000 pounds.\27\ This report also included a recommendation for lane
departure warning systems on new commercial vehicles greater than
10,000 pounds.\28\ These technologies help counteract basic human
frailties of inattention and distraction that are major undocumented
causes of highway accidents.
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\26\ H-08-15 To NHTSA: Determine whether equipping commercial
vehicles with collision warning systems with active braking and
electronic stability control systems will reduce commercial vehicle
accidents. If these technologies are determined to be effective in
reducing accidents, require their use on commercial vehicles.
\27\ H-10-5 To NHTSA: Develop stability control system performance
standards applicable to newly manufactured buses with a gross vehicle
weight rating above 10,000 pounds.
H-10-6 To NHTSA: Once the performance standards from Safety
Recommendation H-10-5 have been developed, require the installation of
stability control systems in all newly manufactured buses in which this
technology could have a safety benefit.
\28\ H-10-1 To NHTSA: Require new commercial motor vehicles with a
gross vehicle weight rating above 10,000 pounds to be equipped with
lane departure warning systems.
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Other Safety Issues
Fatigue
In the 1990s, the NTSB conducted two safety studies of commercial
accidents \29\ and found that fatigue was the most frequently cited
probable cause or factor in the fatal-to-the-driver crashes that were
investigated. Based on these studies, the NTSB recommended that the
FMCSA use science-based principles to revise the hours-of-service
regulations for commercial drivers, ensure that the rule would enable
drivers to obtain at least 8 hours of continuous sleep, and eliminate
sleeper berth provisions that allow for the splitting of sleep periods.
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\29\ (a) Fatigue, Alcohol, Drugs, and Medical Factors in Fatal-to-
the-Driver Heavy Truck Crashes, Safety Study NTSB/SS-90101 (Washington,
D.C.: NTSB, 1990); (b) Factors that Affect Fatigue in Heavy Truck
Accidents, Safety Study NTSB/SS-95-01 (Washington, D.C.: NTSB, 1995).
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In December, 2010, the FMCSA issued an NPRM proposing to change the
hours-ofservice rule. The NTSB supports those provisions that are
scientifically based and would reduce continuous duty or driving time,
encourage break-taking, promote nighttime sleep, and foster scheduling
patterns that are predictable and consistent with the normal human
diurnal circadian rhythm. However, we strongly oppose providing
exemptions for buses and motorcoaches, and other groups because of the
potential increased risk to the passengers and the driving public.
Of course, no hours-of-service rule is adequate unless it is
enforceable. Since 1977, the NTSB has advocated the use of tamperproof
electronic on-board recorders (EOBRs) to allow better monitoring of
hours of service and driver fatigue. The NTSB believed that the FMCSA's
April 2010 final rule on EOBRs did not adequately address this safety
issue, so we are encouraged that the FMCSA's new NPRM issued in January
2011 corrects many of the inadequacies and expands the scope of the new
rule to cover most carriers, as originally recommended by the NTSB.
Hours-of-service regulations are important, and EOBRs will help
enforce those rules, but fatigue management is the third leg of this
critical safety stool. In 2008, following three fatigue-related bus
accidents that occurred in Osseo, WI, Lake Butler, FL, and Turrell, AR,
the NTSB asked the FMCSA to develop a plan to deploy technologies in
commercial vehicles to reduce fatigue-related accidents,\30\ and to
develop a methodology to assess the effectiveness of the fatigue
management plans implemented by operators. Then last year, a 10-fatal
accident in Miami, OK involving a fatigued truck driver prompted the
NTSB to reiterate these recommendations and make an additional
recommendation to require all motor carriers, including motorcoach
operators, to adopt a fatigue management program.\31\
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\30\ H-08-13 To FMCSA: to develop and implement a plan to deploy
technologies in commercial vehicles to reduce the occurrence of
fatigue-related accidents.
\31\ H-10-9 To FMCSA: Require all motor carriers to adopt a fatigue
management program based on the North American Fatigue Management
Program guidelines for the management of fatigue in a motor carrier
operating environment.
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Citing many of the accidents the NTSB has investigated on the
highway and in other modes of transportation, in which drivers,
mariners, and train engineers had undiagnosed obstructive sleep apnea,
the NTSB issued recommendations to the FMCSA in October 2009 addressing
this safety problem. In particular, the NTSB recommended that the
FMCSA: (1) require drivers with a high risk for obstructive sleep apnea
to obtain medical certification that they have been appropriately
evaluated and, if necessary, effectively treated for that disorder,\32\
and (2) provide guidance for commercial drivers, employers, and
physicians about identifying and treating individuals at high risk of
obstructive sleep apnea.\33\
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\32\ H-09-15 To FMCSA: Implement a program to identify commercial
drivers at high risk for obstructive sleep apnea and require that those
drivers provide evidence through the medical certification process of
having been appropriately evaluated and, if treatment is needed,
effectively treated for that disorder before being granted unrestricted
medical certification
\33\ H-09-16 To FMCSA: Develop and disseminate guidance for
commercial drivers, employers, and physicians regarding the
identification and treatment of individuals at high risk of obstructive
sleep apnea (OSA), emphasizing that drivers who have OSA that is
effectively treated are routinely approved for continued medical
certification.
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Medically Unqualified Commercial Drivers
The NTSB has investigated many accidents involving commercial
drivers with serious preexisting medical conditions that had not been
detected or adequately evaluated. The most tragic example of this issue
was the 1999 Mother's Day motorcoach accident in New Orleans, LA, in
which a motorcoach driver lost consciousness while driving on an
interstate highway and crashed into an embankment, killing 22
passengers and injuring 21. The driver had multiple previously known
serious medical conditions, including kidney failure and congestive
heart failure, and was receiving intravenous therapy for three to 4
hours a day, 6 days a week. The issue of medically unqualified
commercial drivers has been on the NTSB's Most Wanted List since 2003.
Although the FMCSA continues to work to address medical issues, the
actions are piecemeal, including a final rule on merging the commercial
driver's license with the medical certificate and an NPRM on a national
registry of certified medical examiners. Yet, much remains to be done.
For example, the FMCSA needs to ensure that medical certification
regulations are updated periodically \34\ and that examiners are
qualified and know what to look for.\35\ In addition, the national
registry of certified medical examiners should include a tracking
mechanism for driver medical examinations.\36\ This step would reduce
the current practice of drivers ``doctor shopping'' to find one who
will sign their medical forms. Likewise, a second level of review is
necessary to identify and correct the inappropriate issuance of medical
certification.\37\ The FMCSA should establish a system for reporting
medical conditions that develop between examinations.\38\ Finally, the
FMCSA needs to develop a system that records all positive drug and
alcohol test results and refusal determinations, and require
prospective employers and certifying authorities to query the system
before making hiring decisions.\39\
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\34\ H-01-19 To FMCSA: Ensure that medical certification
regulations are updated periodically to permit trained examiners to
clearly determine whether drivers with common medical conditions should
be issued a medical certificate.
\35\ H-01-17 To FMCSA: Ensure that individuals performing medical
examinations for drivers are qualified to do so and are educated about
occupational issues for drivers.
H-01-20 To FMCSA: Ensure that individuals performing examinations
have specific guidance and a readily identifiable source of information
for questions on such examinations.
\36\ H-01-18 To FMCSA: Develop a tracking mechanism be established
that ensures that every prior application by an individual for medical
certification is recorded and reviewed.
\37\ H-01-21 To FMCSA: Develop a review process prevents, or
identifies and corrects, the inappropriate issuance of medical
certification.
\38\ H-01-24 To FMCSA: Develop mechanisms for reporting medical
conditions to the medical certification and reviewing authority and for
evaluating these conditions between medical certification exams;
individuals, health care providers, and employers are aware of these
mechanisms.
\39\ H-01-26 To FMCSA: Develop a system that records all positive
drug and alcohol test results and refusal determinations that are
conducted under the U.S. Department of Transportation testing
requirements, require prospective employers to query the system before
making a hiring decision, and require certifying authorities to query
the system before making a certification decision.
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Cell Phone Use
Driver distraction is a much-discussed issue these days, but the
NTSB issued its first recommendation about cell phones in 2004
following an accident in Alexandria, Virginia, in which an experienced
motorcoach driver, who was having a heated conversation on his hands-
free cell phone, failed to move to the center lane and struck the
underside of an arched stone bridge on the George Washington Parkway.
Our investigation found that the driver had numerous cues to change
lanes at the appropriate time to have enough clearance for the height
of the bus. In fact, not only was the driver familiar with the road, he
also was following another bus that had appropriately moved to the
center lane. Yet, this driver did not notice the well-marked signage or
any of the other cues as he approached the arched stone bridge. The
accident was clearly caused by this driver's cognitive distraction, due
to the conversation on his hands-free cell phone. The NTSB recommended
that the FMCSA \40\ and the 50 states \41\ enact laws to prohibit cell
phone use by commercial drivers while driving passenger-carrying
commercial vehicles or school buses. We also recommended that
motorcoach associations, school bus organizations, and unions develop
formal policies to prohibit cell phone use by commercial drivers,
except in emergencies.\42\ A current FMCSA NPRM, issued in December
2010, proposes to limit cell phone restrictions to just hand-held
devices, but the NTSB recommendation also includes hands-free devices.
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\40\ H-06-27 To FMCSA: Publish regulations prohibiting cellular
telephone use by commercial driver's license holders with a passenger-
carrying or school bus endorsement, while driving under the authority
of that endorsement, except in emergencies.
\41\ H-06-28 The National Transportation Safety Board makes the
following recommendation to the 50 States and the District of Columbia:
Enact legislation to prohibit cellular telephone use by commercial
driver's license holders with a passenger-carrying or school bus
endorsement, while driving under the authority of that endorsement,
except in emergencies.
\42\ H-06-29. The National Transportation Safety Board makes the
following recommendation to motorcoach industry, public bus, and school
bus associations and unions: Develop formal policies prohibiting
cellular telephone use by commercial driver's license holders with a
passenger-carrying or school bus endorsement, while driving under the
authority of that endorsement, except in emergencies.
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Event Data Recorders
Event data recorders are a proven technology that the NTSB has
recommended since 1999.\43\ We reiterated these recommendations in
2008, following the motorcoach accident involving Bluffton University
students in Atlanta, Georgia and reiterated them again in our Pedal
Misapplication Special Investigation Report in 2009.\44\ In 2009,
following the Dolan Springs, AZ investigation, we closed these
recommendations ``Unacceptable'' and replaced them with a similar
recommendation that applied to all buses above 10,000 pounds.\45\
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\43\ Safety Recommendations H-99-53 and -54 to NHTSA Closed
Unacceptable Action.
\44\ http://www3.ntsb.gov/publictn/2009/SIR0902.pdf.
\45\ H-10-07 To NHTSA: Require that all buses above 10,000 pounds
gross vehicle weight rating be equipped with on-board recording systems
that: (1) record vehicle parameters, including, at minimum, lateral
acceleration, longitudinal acceleration, vertical acceleration,
heading, vehicle speed, engine speed, driver's seat belt status,
braking input, steering input, gear selection, turn signal status
(left/right), brake light status (on/off), head/tail light status (on/
off), passenger door status (open/closed), emergency door status (open/
closed), hazard light status (on/off), brake system status (normal/
warning), and flashing red light status (on/off; school buses only);
(2) record status of additional seat belts, airbag deployment criteria,
airbag deployment time, and airbag deployment energy; (3) record data
at a sampling rate sufficient to define vehicle dynamics and be capable
of preserving data in the event of a vehicle crash or an electrical
power loss; and (4) are mounted to the bus body, not the chassis, to
ensure recording of the necessary data to define bus body motion. (H-
10-07) (This recommendation supersedes Safety Recommendation.)
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Closing
Many of the issues discussed today have been known for a number of
years, yet they continue to cause or contribute to accidents involving
motorcoaches, The NTSB remains hopeful that these issues will be
addressed to bring about the necessary changes that will keep
motorcoach operations one of the safest modes of transportation for the
American people.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my statement, and I will be happy to
respond to any questions you may have.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you, Ms. Hersman.
I want all of you to know that your full statement, though
consolidated for presentation here, will be included in the
record as it is written.
Mr. Pantuso, President and CEO of the American Bus
Association. It is my understanding you are going to share the
industry's plans for improving our federal motorcoach safety
programs, and we look forward to hearing from you, please.
STATEMENT OF PETER J. PANTUSO, PRESIDENT AND CEO, AMERICAN BUS
ASSOCIATION
Mr. Pantuso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
ABA is the trade association for the private, over-the-road
bus industry and for the tour and travel industry, all of whom
have a deep concern about safety. Our motorcoach members
operate nearly 60 percent of all coaches on the road and
provide a variety of services to more than 760 million
passengers annually.
ABA shares this committee's concerns and frustrations over
unsafe motorcoach operators and drivers. Recent accidents in
New York and in New Jersey are unacceptable and we believe they
could have been prevented with better information and clearer
information for operators, for the public, and certainly
stronger enforcement.
Making bus travel safer has always been at the top of our
agenda, and we have testified on this before Congress many
times. The bus industry continues to be one of the safest modes
of transportation, but we know that even one fatality is too
many. We have numerous suggestions to enhance safety, but given
the limited time, let me summarize just a few of those.
Our proposals for increased bus safety are longstanding,
and again, we ask for more effective safety regulations and
enforcement as we did in 2006 when I testified at a House
hearing and detailed deficiencies of certain bus operations.
ABA was an early and enthusiastic supporter of Secretary
LaHood's Motorcoach Safety Action Plan, and we believe in
strengthening state bus inspection programs, enforcing the
medical qualifications for drivers, and using technology to
enhance safety whenever possible.
The lack of federal and state funding leads to inconsistent
enforcement, making it too easy for carriers that have been
closed to reopen, too easy for financially marginal companies
to obtain operating authority, and still too easy for
individuals to obtain a commercial driver's license. The lack
of consistent and adequate enforcement of current regulations
must be addressed.
When Secretary LaHood issued the action plan, he declared
that a robust compliance and enforcement program was absolutely
critical to operate safely. We do applaud FMCSA for its
enforcement actions and its review of new motorcoach entrants.
We welcome the NYPD's recent efforts to inspect, ticket, and
tow buses in the wake of accidents, but federal, state, local
one-time actions are too rare. They are much too spotty.
Consistent, effective enforcement is the most vital factor in
motorcoach safety.
A review of the data shows that 54 percent of all
fatalities that have taken place from 1999 to 2009 were on
unsafe or illegal carriers. FMCSA needs additional staffing and
funding to inspect bus companies, and funding for the CMV
inspections is largely via the Federal Government's MCSAP
program where monies are then distributed to the States. We
believe that a certain percentage of those monies should be
dedicated specifically for bus inspections.
In lieu of additional staffing, we recommend that FMCSA
hire third party inspectors, as does the Department of Defense
for their rigorous bus inspection program. And in addition, we
feel strongly that if specific states are unwilling or
incapable of managing a bus inspection program, then those
funds should be withheld and used for third party inspectors.
As it stands now, perhaps eight states have effective bus
inspection programs, and this inequity must end. The programs
must be uniform from state to state so as not to create a safe
haven for illegal operators.
We need to raise the safety bar for passenger carriers to
obtain operating authority, and while FMCSA has made gains in
visiting new carriers sooner, we would like to see an inquiry
into the fitness of an operator before the first passenger ever
boards the bus.
The ABA believes that Congress should require a background
check for drivers before they can be granted a CDL, especially
with a passenger endorsement. This background check would
verify the applicant's identity, any drug and alcohol
violations, work permit, driving history, suspensions or
disqualifying conditions. When FMCSA has determined that a
carrier presents an imminent safety hazard and issues an out-
of-service order, the current process of sending letters,
seizing plates, impounding vehicles can take months and months,
and that is just too long. FMCSA needs Congressional authority
to close those operations immediately.
ABA recommends that FMCSA undertake a consumer awareness
campaign with easy-to-understand information for the consumers.
And finally, regarding seat belts in motorcoaches, ABA and
its members do not oppose seat belts. We do support seat belts
in new buses, and following the type of testing that was done
to determine what type of belt, seat design, and anchorage
would be required to save lives.
Regarding other enhancements, they must be viewed as a
system and engineered to the bus when it is being manufactured.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you and members of the Committee for
giving us the opportunity, and we will look forward to working
with you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pantuso follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter J. Pantuso, President and CEO,
American Bus Association
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, my name is Peter J.
Pantuso and I am the President and CEO of the American Bus Association.
The ABA is the trade association for the private motorcoach industry.
The ABA is home to over 800 bus operating companies, and 60 percent of
all private motorcoaches on the road, who provide all manner of
transportation services to the public. In addition to scheduled service
operations provided by companies such as: Greyhound Lines, Peter Pan
Bus Lines headquartered in Massachusetts, Bolt Bus, Megabus, Academy
Bus Lines in New Jersey and Jefferson Lines in Minnesota, ABA members
such as Capitol Bus Lines in Columbia, South Carolina; Abbot Trailways
in Roanoke, Virginia and Cav's Coach Company in Charleston, West
Virginia provide charter and tour services, airport shuttle services
and commuter services throughout the United States and Canada. In total
the private bus industry has provided 760 million passenger trips in
2008. In addition, ABA members also include an additional 3,000 member
companies which provide motorcoach passengers with services. These
members include tour operators, tourist attractions, destinations,
hotels, restaurants, bus manufacturers and those companies that serve
bus manufacturers and bus companies.
On behalf of the ABA's membership I would like to thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for having this hearing. The fight to make bus travel safer
is one that the ABA has been in the forefront of for many years. Over
the last 6 years I and other ABA staff have testified several times
before Congress on this issue and what is required to make bus travel
safer. Early in 2006 ABA staff toured lower Manhattan with the New York
City Police Department for a first-hand look at intercity bus service
to and from the City.
I have to note that the bus industry is one of the safest modes of
transportation. The National Safety Council in its report ``Injury
Facts 2011'' notes that the intercity bus transportation accident death
rates for the years 2006-2008 (the latest year statistics were
available) was 0.03 per 100 million passenger miles, which is twenty
times safer than travel by passenger car. Of course, as you rightly
point out, even one fatality is too many and we all must do everything
we can to improve bus travel. ABA is ever mindful that it is not only
our customers who ride our buses, but our neighbors, family, employees
and friends.
Mr. Chairman, as indicated above, ABA's proposals for increased bus
safety are long standing. Almost exactly 6 years ago in a published
letter to the Editor of the newspaper ``Roll Call'' (April 4, 2005) I
noted that ``not all bus companies are alike'' and that customers had
to beware of ``. . . unsafe operators . . . who do not follow Federal
and state requirements, have improper registration, insurance and
shoddy maintenance and do not provide (lawfully mandated) service to
disabled passengers . . .''. (A copy of my letter is appended to this
testimony). Of course barely a month later, a Washington Post columnist
extolled the virtues of what was obviously an unsafe operator whose
driver cheerfully broke several Federal and state laws while
transporting the columnist to New York City. I mention this to ensure
the Committee that the Committee's frustration on the issue of unsafe
passenger carriers mirrors ABA's frustration.
ABA continued, and continues today, to beat the drum for more, and
more effective bus safety regulation and particularly enforcement. In
the spring of 2006 I testified at a House Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee hearing on bus safety and ADA regulatory
compliance. At that hearing I detailed the deficiencies of certain bus
operators in addition to failure to abide by the ADA. Among the issues
raised at that time were the lack of a procedure to test the validity
of drivers' commercial driver's licenses (CDL); the lack of some
drivers' ability to understand or speak English and even understand the
traffic laws.
In addition, ABA was an early and enthusiastic supporter of the
September 2009 United States Department of Transportation's Motorcoach
Safety Action Plan. ABA believes in strengthening State bus inspection
programs, enforcing the medical qualifications of drivers as well as
contributing to their well-being. ABA agrees with the necessity of
continuing research in fatigue issues relating to motorcoach drivers
and in using technology to enhance motorcoach safety whenever possible.
Since 2005, I and ABA staff have testified on bus safety before the
House of Representatives, this Committee (September 18, 2008) as well
as other state and local political authorities, including the New York
City City Council (October 12, 2006) on bus safety. In all our
testimony our conclusions have been consistent. There is an unfortunate
lack of money and other resources, as well as inconsistent enforcement
of the existing safety regulations. It has been, in the pass, too easy
for carriers that have been closed down for safety violations to reopen
down the street with a new name but with the same management and same
lax safety attitude, although, the current FMCSA Administration has
worked diligently to close this loophole. Many of the issues ABA raised
in 2005 have recently begun to be addressed but overall it is still too
easy for financially marginal individuals to obtain authority to
operate; and it is too easy for individuals to obtain and keep a
commercial driver's license. Since 2005 the ABA has advanced specific
proposals that if implemented will lead to a safer industry.
First, the lack of consistent and adequate enforcement of current
federal regulations concerning bus operators must be addressed. We
agree with Secretary LaHood and the Motorcoach Safety Action Plan when
it declares that: ``A robust compliance and enforcement program is
critical to ensuring the motorcoach carriers operate safely.'' (U.S.
DOT Motorcoach Action Plan, pg. 26). ABA does applaud the FMCSA for
some of its enforcement actions, for example a 2005 ``sweep'' of 400
bus companies by a combined federal, state and local task force here in
Washington, D.C. led to the agency placing 56 buses and 13 drivers out
of service. ABA also welcomed the New York City Police Department's
effort to inspect, ticket and, if need be tow buses away, in the wake
of the recent tragic accident in the Bronx and in New Jersey. But such
enforcement actions while appropriate are too rare. Enforcement is the
most vital factor because a review of the data shows that 54 percent of
all motorcoach fatalities in the last decade (1999-2009) were accidents
of either unsafe or illegal carriers. In other words, over half of
fatalities in the last 10 years have been the result of bus operators
that should have never been allowed to operate under current Federal
regulations or bus drivers who never should have been allowed to
operate a vehicle. These fatalities could have been avoided through
stronger enforcement.
In light of this, FMCSA needs additional staffing and money to
inspect bus operators, and in some instances the money for commercial
motor vehicle (CMV) inspections should be reallocated. Funding for CMV
inspections are largely funded via the Federal Government's Motor
Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP). This program was established
by section 210 of the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 (49 U.S.C.
31142) to provide funds for States to inspect commercial motor vehicles
(CMVs). While the program prescribes Federal standards for annual
inspections of CMVs the States are largely required to complete the
inspection or use a State inspection program that is comparable to, or
as effective as, the Federal inspection requirements. However, most
states use the bulk of MCSAP funds to inspect trucks. Indeed, an ABA
analysis of CMV inspections demonstrates that between FY 2005 and FY
2009 there have been fewer than 200,000 combined bus vehicle and driver
inspections for out-of-service violations annually, compared with over
five million combined truck vehicle and driver inspections each year.
That is that one out of every twenty-four inspections involved a
motorcoach. Last year ABA submitted a proposal to Congress that a
certain percentage of MCSAP funds be specifically allocated for bus
inspections and that States certify this use to the U.S. Department of
Transportation. We renew that recommendation here (a copy of that ABA
recommendation and our analysis of the FMCSA/MSCAP inspection data is
appended to my testimony).
In lieu of additional staffing for more bus inspections ABA
recommends FMCSA hire third party inspectors for the task. ABA has also
long recommended this step. The Department of Defense (DOD) has a
rigorous bus inspection program which is accomplished by third party
inspectors. The DOD program is considered by the motorcoach industry to
be the most comprehensive. In addition, FMCSA should adopt the results
of a DOD inspection as satisfying the FMCSA inspection regime. As it is
many ABA members are inspected by, and approved by, both agencies. It
appears to ABA that one clearance should be satisfactory, thus freeing
resources for other inspections. We have requested this for over a
decade as a way to reduce the burden on FMCSA's current resources.
Second, and related to the first recommendation, ABA recommends
that a portion of MCSAP funds be withheld from states if those states
are unable or unwilling to implement a bus inspection program that
meets Federal program standards. As it stands now, perhaps eight states
have active and, in ABA's view, effective bus inspection programs and
less than half of the states have any bus inspection program at all.
This inequity must end. If you agree that inspection is a key component
to enforcement then you have to agree that more inspections are
warranted here. And bus inspection programs must be uniform. We have to
ensure that unscrupulous bus operators cannot move from a ``high''
enforcement state to a state with a less effective bus inspection
program for the purpose of defying safety.
Third, we must raise the safety bar on who can become a passenger
carrier operator. As it stands now all one needs to get passenger
carrier operating authority is an application fee of $300.00, proof
that you have an agent for service of process, proof that you are
willing and able to comply with applicable ADA requirements and
evidence that your company has the requisite minimum five million
dollar liability insurance policy. The applicant submits this
information to the FMCSA and the agency issues your operating
authority. Thereafter, the agency (within 18 months) will visit your
facility and determine your fitness to continue operations. Here the
agency has made gains by reducing the time for a bus safety audit to 4
months. But here again ABA believes more can be done. Our members would
like to see some kind of inquiry into the fitness of an operator before
that individual is granted authority to operate. We fully support the
application of a written test and interview of perspective new entrants
into the bus industry. ABA has also called for a safety audit to begin
within 45 days of authority being granted so that once equipment is
purchased and drivers are hired Federal inspectors can review
operations before they have begun in earnest.
Fourth, with respect to the CDL process for passenger carrying
drivers, ABA believes that the Congress should explore requiring an
applicant background check before a state can grant a CDL.
Specifically, this background check would verify the information
required under the ``Background and Character'' section of 49 CFR Part
391.21. That section requires verification of the applicant's identity
and any drug and alcohol violations, verification of the applicant's
work permit (if any) and history and a review of the applicant's
driving history for suspensions or disqualifying conditions.
Fifth, after the Secretary has issued an out-of-service order
against a motor carrier of passengers and has determined that the
carrier presents an imminent safety hazard, the Secretary will notify
the state MCSAP lead agency of the out-of-service order. After which
the MCSAP lead agency will ensure that the carrier has ceased
operations and if the agency finds a violation of that out-of-service
order the lead agency will seize the license plates of the vehicle.
Alternatively, FMCSA should have the authority to shut a company down,
pull the plates off of and impound the vehicles.
Finally, ABA recommends that FMCSA undertake with ABA the
development of a brochure that will explain the bus industry to
consumers and lay out how to contract for motorcoach service. Part of
our safety problem is the lack of information available to explain what
a consumer should look for in a motorcoach company.
I would like to address Senator Hutchison's point about the
necessity for seat belts in motorcoaches. ABA and its members do not
oppose seat belts on new buses just as we do not oppose standards for
advanced window glazing, roof strength standards, requiring electronic
on board recorders (EOBRs) or deciding whether additional emergency
egress options are necessary. ABA believes in testing and through
appropriate engineering integrating implementation. Our comments
submitted to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
on the proposed seatbelt regulation could not be any clearer on the
point that we support seat belts in new buses. However, crash testing
was first needed to determine what kind of belt, seat design and
anchorage was required to actually save lives. Testing that we
requested NHTSA undertake over a decade ago. A loaded 45 foot coach
weighing almost 52,000 pounds creates a far different crash environment
than that of an automobile. On integration of other vehicle
enhancements like roof strength and window glazing, our industry
engineers believe that the motorcoach must be viewed as a system in
which one enhancement does not interfere or degrade the effectiveness
of another. Testing and engineering and safety analyses must be
completed on all structural changes to the vehicle to ensure that we do
not cause greater problems in different accident scenarios by the
changes we make to one part of the vehicle. NHTSA's discretion to adopt
new standards should not be compromised in our view.
Last Congress, ABA, the Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU), Greyhound
Lines and other industry groups and companies, supported a bill (H.R.
1135) that would have required NHTSA to research safety issues
concerning roof strength, emergency egress, fire prevention and
suppression, window glazing and seat belts and if required issue
regulations concerning those safety items. This Committee reported out
a similar bill, S. 544.
I must say that S. 544 differed from the ABA supported bill largely
in the time given the agency to promulgate the needed regulations and
the number of issues NHTSA would have been required to complete in an
accelerated timeframe. I will only say that safety, in the form of seat
belts or new windows or adding an exit to a bus cannot just be
``added'' to any vehicle. As it did with seat belts NHTSA must have the
time to research the problem before advancing solutions to it. What is
crucial is that any new systems or mandates be engineered into the bus
as it is being manufactured for proper use and effectiveness. That said
ABA hopes to work with Senator Hutchison and the other members of the
Committee to ensure that safe buses are the end product.
Thank you Mr. Chairman, I will answer any questions you or any of
the members of the Subcommittee may have for me.
______
Roll Call--Monday, April 4, 2005
Bus Companies Are Not All Alike
Thank you for highlighting the benefits of bus travel in your March
28 Travel & Adventure article ``Competition Gives Travelers Lots of
Options.'' You're right, motorcoaches are an economical way to travel.
In face, the motorcoach industry is the Nation's most economical and,
more importantly, safest form of commercial public transportation. And,
while policymakers continue to debate the merits (and expense) of
supporting a national rail passenger system at a time when the Federal
Government coffers are dwindling, the workhorse of public
transportation, the motorcoach industry, moves more than 774 million
passengers annually with little or no government subsidy.
But not all bus companies are alike. When some companies offer
rates that are too good to be true, often they are.
Consumers who choose bargain-basement operators may be
inadvertently tipping the scales toward unsafe operators that could
undercut safety and quality of service as well as giving our industry a
black eye. If the consumer knew that there are some operators who do
not follow Federal and state requirements, have improper registration,
insurance, and shoddy maintenance, and do not provide (lawfully
mandated) service to disabled passengers, they might think twice about
riding their buses.
Travelers can and should find safe, quality operators in their area
to make sure they are getting the best value--which, in our view, means
safety, comfort and affordability. If they don't know who those
operators are, they can visit www.buses.org for listings and consumer
safety tips. The site, operated by the American Bus Association, keeps
a list of members who operated under our Code of Ethics. Or they can
log onto www.safersys.org, a website maintained by the Federal Motor
Carrier Administration.
Finally, I want to acknowledge your point about the distance
between Washington, D.C.'s main bus terminal and Union Station--the
city's public transportation hub built with bus parking, loading and
unloading in mind. We understand the frustration and inconvenience for
travelers nationwide and in our Nation's capital when they choose
public transportation yet can't connect conveniently with other modes.
We have asked Congress to authorize funds for intermodal facilities, so
travelers can have seamless transitions in our Nation's transportation
network. That would make a big difference in your ride.
Thank you for your time.
Peter J. Pantuso,
President & CEO,
American Bus Association.
______
Funds for Bus Inspections Urgently Needed
In the last several years there has been an increase in the number
of accidents involving illegal or unsafe motorcoaches operating in
interstate commerce. According to an analysis by the American Bus
Association, the trade association for the private over- the-road bus
industry, illegal and unsafe passenger motorcarrier operators flaunt
the law by operating without authority to do so, using equipment that
may not comply with United States motor carrier safety regulations and
by continuing to operate after their authority has been revoked by the
Federal Government. Indeed, over the last decade, almost 60 percent of
the fatalities in bus crashes were caused by an illegal or unsafe bus
operator.
The Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP) established by
Section 210 of the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 (49 U.S.C. 31142)
was set up to provide funds for States to use to inspect commercial
motor vehicles (CMVs) including motorcoaches. While the program
prescribed Federal standards for annual inspection of CMVs (49 CFR Part
396), the States are largely required to complete the inspection or use
a State inspection program that is comparable to, or as effective as,
the Federal inspection requirements.
The rash of motorcoach accidents in the recent past is a problem
caused in part by the lack of inspections of buses in many states. In
1998 the U.S. Department of Transportation could find that only half
the States had any CMV inspection program comparable to, or as
effective as, the Federal inspection requirements (63 Fed. Reg. 8516-
8517, February 19, 1998). That number of states has not changed.
Moreover, between FY 2005 and FY 2008 there have been less than 150,000
roadside bus inspections annually and over three million truck
inspections. That is, only one out of every twenty-four inspections
involved a bus, the carrier of fifty-five passengers. Even worse,
according to the American Bus Association, only half a dozen states
have effective bus inspection programs. Most states have largely put
their money on inspecting other CMVs, largely trucks.
While we do not quarrel with the need for truck inspections, we do
believe that more funds should be allocated to motorcoach inspections.
Indeed, we know of no metric that measures how much money goes to bus
inspections in any state. For these reasons we conclude that the states
must be required to use 10 percent (10 percent) of the MCSAP money to
inspect motorcoaches and certify its use to the Department of
Transportation. This is the most effective way to ensure that
motorcoaches remain safe.
FMCSA/MCSAP Enforcement Summary FY 2005-FY 2008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% % %
Year FY 2005 '05-'06 FY 2006 '06-'07 FY 2007 '07-'08 FY 2008 Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Compliance Reviews 12,575 21% 15,185 6% 16,115 -3% 15,622 59,497
Total Compliance 457 41% 646 91% 1,233 6% 1,306 3,642
Reviews, Buses
Federal Compliance 7,978 22% 9,722 5% 10,256 -6% 9,642 37,598
Reviews
Federal Compliance 340 48% 504 107% 1,041 0% 1,039 2,924
Reviews, Buses
State Compliance Reviews 4,597 19% 5,463 7% 5,859 2% 5,980 21,899
State Compliance 117 21% 142 35% 192 39% 267 718
Reviews, Buses
Total Number of 4,102 7% 4,403 20% 5,281 -3% 5,138 18,924
Enforcement Cases Closed
Number of Enforcement 73 70% 124 130% 285 -39% 175 657
Cases Closed, Passenger Carriers
Unsatisfactory/Unfit out- 518 -5% 494 57% 774 31% 1,015 2,801
of-service orders
Total Number of Truck 2,928,612 6% 3,093,996 3% 3,179,923 4% 3,287,738 12,483,269
OOS Inspections, Driver
Truck OOS Rate, Driver 6.60% 7.00% 6.90% 6.60%
Total Number of Truck 2,156,648 5% 2,273,467 0% 2,263,702 0% 2,270,174 8,963,991
OOS Inspections, Vehicle
Truck OOS Rate, Vehicle 23.60% 23.70% 23.20% 23.20%
Total Number of Bus OOS 35,574 49% 52,959 4% 54,854 -6% 51,339 194,726
Inspections, Driver
Bus OOS Rate, Driver 4.60% 4.00% 3.70% 4.80%
Total Number of Bus OOS 43,287 143% 105,257 20% 125,926 4% 130,942 405,412
Inspections, Vehicle
Bus OOS Rate, Vehicle 9.40% 9.00% 7.70% 7.70%
Roadside Inspections, 2,966,860 6% 3,153,079 2% 3,228,268 3% 3,336,776 12,684,983
Trucks
Roadside Inspections, 56,084 126% 126,626 17% 147,867 1% 149,669 480,246
Buses
Total New Entrant Safety 34,414 15% 39,488 -3% 38,326 -2% 37,395 149,623
Audits
Federal New Entrant 11,734 -13% 10,187 -44% 5,706 -30% 3,997 31,624
Safety Audits
State New Entrant Safety 22,680 29% 29,301 11% 32,620 2% 33,398 117,999
Audits
Total MCSAP Funding $169,391,273 8% $182,652,162 3% $188,761,276 7% $201,155,148 $741,959,859
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you for your excellent
recommendations. We will look to see that they are followed up
on. Thank you.
Ms. Claybrook, Consumer Co-Chair, Advocates for Highway and
Auto Safety, a group that advocates very strenuously, actively
for improved bus safety, I want to thank you for being here and
ask you to give your testimony.
STATEMENT OF JOAN CLAYBROOK, PRESIDENT EMERITUS, PUBLIC CITIZEN
AND CO-CHAIR, ADVOCATES FOR HIGHWAY AND AUTO SAFETY (ADVOCATES)
Ms. Claybrook. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You should know
that we are tough advocates because we advocate to you all the
time. Thank you very much.
We want to commend you and members of the Subcommittee for
holding the hearing, Mr. Chairman, on the safety of
motorcoaches and motorcoach operations, and we want to thank
Senators Brown and Hutchison for leading the effort to enact S.
453, legislation that is vitally needed for improvements in
motorcoach safety.
This month, as has already been mentioned, three tragic
crashes occurred and it marks the anniversary of the Georgia
and--excuse me--Bluffton, Ohio baseball team crash--that
happened in Georgia. This is an anniversary that we did not
want to have, when seven students were killed and 21 injured in
that crash.
And then further, of course, I want to take a moment just
to recognize that yesterday, March 29, marked the fifth
anniversary of the Beaumont, Texas bus crash in which two
members of the Westbrook High School girls soccer team were
killed and at least dozens of others were injured.
Five years later, Congress still has not enacted this
legislation to require enhanced occupant protection and
operational standards to prevent families from experiencing and
having these crashes and having the same suffering throughout
their whole families and friends.
I would like to just comment that Mr. Pantuso said that the
key is enforcement. I believe the key is not enforcement alone.
Enforcement, of course, is very important, but we have to have
new safety standards. We have to have improved bus design. The
provisions in this legislation are very, very important for
achieving that.
Those who travel by motorcoach rather than air do not
expect to be treated as second-class citizens when it comes to
safety and they do not expect the motorcoach to be a death trap
in the event of a crash.
The failures of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration to regulate this industry and the failure of the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to issue safety
standards to ensure crash avoidance and crash-worthiness of
these vehicles has contributed to needless deaths and injuries.
The National Transportation Safety Board--we thank you so
much--has been issuing safety recommendations for the
motorcoach industry and DOT for decades, and they have been
summarily ignored. For example, the NTSB first recommended that
seat belts be required on motorcoaches 40 years ago, and only
recently has NHTSA proposed a rule to do that.
Similarly, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
has rebuffed many of the NTSB recommendations over the years,
and while FMCSA has recently issued a proposal to require
electronic on-board recorders on commercial vehicles, including
motorcoaches, a longstanding NTSB recommendation, many other
NTSB recommendations to keep unsafe operators and unsafe
drivers off the road have never been considered.
Despite the development of a DOT action plan in 2009, which
we are very grateful for, only three regulatory actions from
the plan have been proposed in the intervening 16 months, that
is, seat belts, EOBR's, and the non-use of cell phones. The
delays and excuses by the bus industry and the DOT can no
longer be tolerated. Congress must step in and ensure the
safety improvements that NTSB has recommended, and there is a
vehicle for doing this and that vehicle is this legislation, S.
453. There is no doubt that when Congress sets a safety agenda,
the federal agencies respond quickly by developing action
plans, conducting tests, issuing rules that improve
transportation safety, and this is the model that should be
followed for motorcoach safety.
The bipartisan Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act is supported
by the parents and relatives of the victims and survivors, and
you have already met today John Betts and his wife from Ohio
who lost their son, David, and Yen-Chi Le from Texas, whose
mother died in Sherman, Texas. And I want to submit for the
record letters from the families of the victims of motorcoach
crashes who are unable to be with us today.
[The information referred to follows:]
3/28/2011
Hon. Frank Lautenberg, Chair,
Hon. John Thune, Ranking Member,
Surface Transportation Subcommittee,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
RE: MESA bill, S. 453
Dear Sir:
As a father of two athletic daughters I have had many occasion to
watch them board a bus which was bound for one event or another. After
March 29, 2006, I will not make that mistake again (at least not until
measures are put in place to ensure that motorcoach safety has been
enhanced). Like many others who put their children at risk--without
real knowledge of what they were actually doing--I put my daughter
Courtney at risk by letting her board a charter with her Beaumont West
Brook Soccer Team. After her bus overturned- I have learned just how
very unsafe motorcoach travel really is. I urge you to pass this Senate
Bill and make a difference for future children and passengers in
general.
I drive for a living and I see just how distracted drivers are
creating havoc--all over the roads of America. It only takes one poor,
distracted driver, or one poorly maintained motorcoach to cause
multiple fatalities and severe injuries. To be honest, every time I am
on the road and see a shiny new motorcoach it makes me sick to my
stomach. For it to have this much effect on me--imagine what it must
have on my daughter who slid down and off a highway when her
motorcoach's windows disintegrated into shards. Imagine what she must
see when she sees multiple motorcoaches, with no safety glass or
seatbelts, and reflects on not only her own pain but those who perished
around her. It is past time for change!
In short, I ask you to take action and see this bill through. I
find it amazing that the motorcoach industry would not have forced
safety measures on its own, but I have witnessed and lived its
nightmare--so I know it has not. Surely your committee will show the
foresight to get something passed which forces safety measures which
are so very far overdue!
Sincerely
Edward Garrod,
Beaumont, Texas.
______
March 25, 2011
Hon. Frank Lautenberg, Chair,
Hon. John Thune, Ranking Member,
Surface Transportation Subcommittee,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate
Washington, DC.
RE: Motorcoach Safety
Our family has had a personal tragedy, along with feeling connected
to others who have had this experience, in regard to inadequate safety
standards with motorcoach safety. We are hoping the following is truly
read and understood so that there will be no more delays in passing
this necessary long overdue bill.
(1) March 2, 2007 Atlanta, GA Bluffton Univ. Baseball Bus Crash
(2) Scott Graham Harmon, age 19 our son and brother
(3) Scott, seated in seat #4, doorside. Scott died as a result
of the first impact on top of the ramp. Blunt for trauma from
hitting the seat in front & across the aisle from him, his seat
stayed Intact. In other words, he was NOT ejected but thrown
around the inside of the bus. Fulton County Medical Examiner
(GA) stated he would have survived if he would have had a
seatbelt as there was no head trauma, no broken bones except 2
ribs.
(4) We have been told that more scientific evidence is needed
to pass the bill, my question . . . how much evidence had to be
taken for the recent updates of child restraint seats in
automobiles, which already are mandated since 1966 to be
equipped with seatbelts. How many children wonder why they get
to sit ``freely'' in a school bus/motorcoach when they don't in
a private vehicle. I drove a school bus for 12 years, you might
be surprised what the answer would be. Airplanes have mandatory
seatbelts for take off, landing or in air turbulence-why? To
keep you in the seat compartment area, just ask those on the
jet who landed in the Hudson River.
(5) Motorcoach drivers-there are many good drivers,
unfortunately, there are many that are not.
a. Go to your DMV, take a written CDL exam--no training
necessary
b. Drive a bus around the parking lot of the employer,
feel comfortable? There is a trip next week, do you
want to take it? Inexcusable!
c. Pre-trip meetings--to go over the trip, i.e.,
dangerous intersections, road construction, food
consumption, sleep requirements . . . I've been told by
companies it isn't necessary because their insurance
company doesn't require it, if there is a problem, the
driver can call on a radio/cell phone or if tired, take
a nap when they get to their destination . . . they
have to get there first!
d. Background checks-school bus drivers are
fingerprinted and FBI background checks, motorcoach
drivers?--not required
e. Down time--Supposed to be 12 hour down time between
driving a company vehicle. Our Driver drove a company
van to GA on March 1, ordered a pizza which was
delivered at 9:30 p.m., he then was up at 3:30 a.m. on
March 2nd, boarded the bus at 4:30 a.m. and the crash
was at 5:43 a.m.--you do the math.
f. Retired aged drivers--luring retirement age drivers/
couples as a ``free vacation''. There is a big
difference between driving your own vehicle than a bus
with the number of mirrors (can be distorting) vehicle
weight and length, etc.--reflexes must stay sharp.
(6) Companies--There are reputable companies that operate with
a conscience, unfortunately, there are those who don't. They
get into some trouble, they shut down and reopen under a
different name. Until a tragedy occurs, this information does
not come to light. Inexcusable!
As I previously stated, this is a short version of what needs to be
done. We are not trying to put reputable responsible companies out of
business, only make them travel as safely as possible. I realize money
is needed to make these changes, however, I'd rather be able to afford
only 2 coaches that I know are as safe as possible vs. a fleet that are
playing Russian roulette.
One last point. . .
An accident is something that happens when you do everything
possible to prevent it; a tragedy happens when one or more are
negligent.
Sincerely,
Julie M. Harmon,
Lima, OH.
______
March 29, 2011
Hon. Frank Lautenberg, Chair,
Hon. John Thune, Ranking Member,
Surface Transportation Committee,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
My name is Elise Huch, a member of the West Brook Bus Crash
Families from Beaumont, Texas. On March 29, 2006 my high school soccer
team was involved in an accident on the way to a state play-off game. I
was injured , along with many of my teammates, some very seriously.
Tragically, two of my teammates, Ashley Brown and Alicia Bonura, were
killed. Ashley and Alicia were truly inspirational girls, as teammates,
Christians and friends. They are both greatly missed.
Since the accident, the W.B.B.C.F. have worked very hard to get the
laws passed here in Texas and in Washington D.C. It has been a long
hard battle but we have been successful in passing the Ashley and
Alicia Law in Texas, which required safety belts on all new school
buses purchased beginning Sept. 2010. With that being said, please
accept this letter as my strong support for the MESA bill S. 453. I
hope that I can look forward to seeing this bill become a law. In light
of the recent accidents in NY, NJ and NH, it is time that something is
done in this country to require safer buses for all those who travel on
motorcoaches.
In the past 5 years, not a day goes by that I don't think of that
terrible day in March. I wonder if Ashley and Alicia would still be
alive had the bus been equipped with proper safety devices. Obviously,
I will never know the answer to that question, but I can do something
to honor their memory and to help prevent future Americans from
experiencing a similar tragedy, which is why I strongly support this
bill and I pray that with your help, it will soon become a law.
Thank you very much for reading my letter and allowing my voice to
be heard. I hope to someday meet you both and thank you personally for
making motor coach traveling safer in this country.
Sincerely,
Elise M. Huch,
West Brook Bus Crash Families.
______
March 29, 2011
Hon. Frank Lautenberg, Chair,
Hon. John Thune, Ranking Member,
Surface Transportation Committee,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Honorable Frank Lautenberg and Honorable John Thune,
My name is Martha Huch, Vice-President of the West Brook Bus Crash
Families. Today marks the five year anniversary of the West Brook
soccer team's fatal bus crash in Beaumont, Texas. Therefore, it is with
deep sadness that I write you this letter on a day when we remember
Ashley Brown and Alicia Bonura, the two beautiful girls that were
killed in the bus crash. My daughter, Elise Huch, was one of several
girls that were injured that day. The bus crash has changed our lives
forever. It has left a deep wound in our hearts and great sadness for
the Brown and Bonura families.
It is however, with great hope that the MESA bill S. 453 will soon
become a law that is long overdue. Since the West Brook crash, I have
been brought to my knees too many times when I hear of yet another bus
crash that has claimed yet more lives. I think of the families of the
victim and the survivors as well and feel their suffering and know the
never ending pain of living with the aftermath of such a tragedy.
The past five years we have work tirelessly to pass laws in Texas
to required safety belts on school buses. In September 2010, our dreams
of required school districts to purchase school buses equipped with 3
point shoulder harnesses was realized. However, our work is not over
yet. We will not rest until the MESA bill S. 453 is passed and becomes
a law.
I pray that God will lay his hands on all lawmakers to act
responsibly in representing the people of our country and make motor
coach travel safer for it passengers. I call upon those whom we elect
into office to become heroes in saving the lives of those they serve.
They will certainly be heroes in my eyes.
It breaks my heart to think of what my daughter went through day
fateful day. At the time, my daughter was 16 years old. The things she
witnessed were horrifying and are deeply imbedded in to her memory.
Some of the injuries she saw were similar to what grown men have
witnessed in Iraq. How is it, that in our country, young girls have to
board a bus not equipped with safety belts and end up scarred for life?
The time is now to pass the MESA bill S. 453 so that no one else has to
go through what my daughter and her teammates had to go through.
I thank you in advance for reading my letter, but more importantly,
I thank you for your efforts in making a difference in getting this law
passed. I hope that someday in the near future I will be able to shake
your hand and personally thank you for your wisdom and perseverance in
hearing our pleas for safer buses and making our dreams a reality. May
God guide you in your service to His people.
Thank you,
Martha Huch,
West Brook Bus Crash Families.
______
March 28, 2011
Hon. Frank Lautenberg, Chair,
Surface Transportation Subcommittee,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Hon. John Thune, Ranking Member,
Surface Transportation Subcommittee
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
RE: Letter of Support for S. 453, Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act (MESA)
Dear Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Thune, and distinguished
Subcommittee Members:
On behalf of the Sherman Bus Crash families, I am writing to
express my unequivocal support for the Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act
(MESA) bill sponsored by Senators Kay Bailey Hutchison and Sherrod
Brown.
My mother, Catherine Tuong So Lam, was killed in the Sherman Bus
Crash on August 8, 2008. To briefly recap, the Sherman bus crash
occurred at 12:45 a.m. on August 8, 2008. The retreaded, front tire of
the bus had blown out and the bus hit the guardrail of the overpass and
fell eight feet to the dry creek bed below. My mother was among the 17
people who died. The driver and the other 38 passengers sustained
moderate to serious injuries.
In my community, husbands have lost wives, parents have lost
children, children have been orphaned, and families have been fractured
by the burden of caring for crash victims who are stuck in between
living and death. For example, Paul was a MBA business executive with
two small children whose brain injury was so severe that he know has
the cognitive functioning of a second grader. It is not easy for me to
share such personal details about my mom and our community, but I want
you to be aware of the personal costs of allowing the motorcoach
industry to treat safety as an option and not a requirement.
The National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
estimate the cost of installing personal occupant protection systems on
motorcoaches at $7,000 per coach. The direct medical costs of those
injured or killed in the Sherman Bus Crash exceed $3.75 million. This
does not include loss of life, loss of future earnings, or continuing
and future medical costs. Given the average 25-30 year lifespan of
motorcoaches, requiring the motorcoach industry to spend $7,000 in
order to save lives is a negligible cost to the industry. But the
industry will not make motorcoach safety a requirement until Federal
regulations are in place for to ensure the safety of motorcoach
passengers.
In closing, I implore you to support S. 453, the Motorcoach
Enhanced Safety Act. If this bill had been law, my mom would be alive
today.
Sincerely,
Yen-Chi Le, Ph.D.,
Houston, Texas,
Daughter of Sherman Bus Crash victim,
Catherine Tuong So Lam.
______
March 29, 2011
Hon. Frank Lautenberg, Chair,
Hon. John Thune, Ranking Member,
Surface Transportation Subcommittee,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Lautenberg:
I am writing in support of the MESA bill, S. 453, which mandates
``three-point'' lap-shoulder seatbelts on motor coaches. Five years ago
today, the Beaumont West Brook Girl's Soccer Team was heading to a
play-off game. The chartered motorcoach they rode in did not even meet
current safety requirements to protect them. I now know, from first
hand experience, the price paid in not using seat belts on buses. I am
the mother of Ashley Brown, one of the players killed in the accident.
I believe that Ashley's life would have been saved and many injuries
prevented if the motor coach had been equipped with seatbelts.
I believe that each new motor coach purchased, from now on, should
have lap-shoulder restraints. It makes no sense to teach our children
to ``buckle up for safety'' in our personal automobiles and then send
them off on buses with no seat belts. We all know that seatbelts save
lives, especially in the case of a rollover accident.
Not just the parents and students of Beaumont ISD were affected by
the tragedy that occurred just outside of Devers, TX on Highway 90 that
rainy day in March. Our entire state of Texas was devastated when we
lost two beautiful girls, Alicia Bonura and my daughter, Ashley. We all
have to live daily with the injuries, both physical and emotional.
Now, there is no excuse. We now have the knowledge and the
technology to argue with weak Federal oversight of the motor coach
industry. There is no common sense argument against the use of three-
point seat belts on buses. So that other parents never have to
experience the same tragedy that I have endured, please help us in our
mission to enact legislation that will protect passengers of the
motorcoach industry. I thank you in advance for your favorable support
in the consideration of the MESA bill, S. 453.
Sincerely,
Melanie Brown Psencik.
Ms. Claybrook. The cost of building in safety features in
this MESA bill, S. 453, is minimal compared to the cost in
terms of life lost in just a single motorcoach crash. For
example, the recent crash on March 12, 2011 in New York
resulted in 15 fatalities, and based on DOT's value of a
statistical life of $6 million, that bus alone generated $90
million in costs for just the fatalities. This figure does not
include the enormous costs associated with numerous injuries
and surviving passengers or the huge emotional toll on the
families whose loved ones have been lost.
A number of safety technologies included in this bill have
already been developed and are being voluntarily installed in
motorcoaches, as Senator Hutchison mentioned. For example, Bolt
Bus Lines already has seat belts installed in many of its
vehicles, and Greyhound has announced in 2009 the purchase of
140 buses equipped with safety belts and advanced seating which
provide occupant compartmentalization.
In addition, other motorcoach manufacturers already offer
these safety technologies. Volvo, MCI, Prevost, and Van Hool
offer electronic stability control, advanced glazing, occupant
compartmentalization, and greater roof protection, tire
pressure monitoring systems, and some form of fire protection
and suppression system. A list of these technologies is
attached to my testimony.
The motorcoach gold-plated cost figures for safety
improvements are wildly inflated, unreliable, and undocumented.
This industry claims that the improvements in this bill would
cost between $80,000 and $89,000 per motorcoach. These absurd
and exaggerated figures are a tactic to confuse the issues and
obscure the truth. But in fact, a trade association never has
the details about costs because this information is a company
trade secret, and it would be an antitrust violation for an
association to involve itself in calculating this information
from its member companies. So instead what we get is a bunch of
hogwash. Of course, various industries use this tactic all the
time to scare Congress, and it happened when I was
Administrator of NHTSA and there were the air bags----
Senator Lautenberg. We are going to take your full
statement in the record.
Ms. Claybrook. OK.
Senator Lautenberg. We will have to move along.
Ms. Claybrook. Well, I would just thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman, and I would like to have the Committee look carefully
at these cost issues because they are not anywhere near
reality. Thank you so much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Claybrook follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joan Claybrook, President Emeritus, Public
Citizen and Co-Chair, Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates)
Good afternoon. My name is Joan Claybrook and I am President
Emeritus of Public Citizen and the Co-Chair of Advocates for Highway
and Auto Safety (Advocates), a coalition of consumer, health, safety,
medical organizations and insurers working together to advance Federal
and state programs and policies that prevent deaths and injuries on our
neighborhood streets and highways. I commend the Subcommittee for
holding hearings on the safety of motorcoaches and motorcoach
operations.
This hearing today is another in a long series of oversight
hearings held by the Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine
Infrastructure, Safety, and Security Subcommittee because of its
concern over the quality of motorcoach and motor carrier safety. The
Subcommittee held a hearing just last year, on September 10, 2010, on
motorcoach safety and prior to that held a hearing on May 1, 2007, to
receive testimony on the value of Electronic On-Board Recorders (EOBRs)
and their important contribution to reducing commercial driver
fatigue., an issue relevant to both motorcoach and motor carrier safety
enforcement. That hearing was extraordinarily important because it
showed how members of the motor carrier community have found that EOBRs
are not only valuable for keeping commercial drivers within the limits
of Federal hours of service regulations, but also help to expedite
freight delivery and conserve fuel, keep big trucks from using illegal
routes, and track motorcoaches in real-time to help ensure passenger
safety.
This month we observe the anniversaries of two tragic motorcoach
crashes. The Bluffton Ohio college baseball team bus crashed in
Atlanta, Georgia, 3 years ago on March 2, 2007. Seven (7) students were
killed and 21 injured in that crash. That tragedy is just one in a long
list of crashes that have motivated Advocates and other organizations
to support the Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act (MESA). I would also like
to take a moment to recognize that yesterday, March 29, marked the
fifth anniversary of the Beaumont, Texas bus crash, in which two (2)
members of the West Brook High School girls' soccer team were killed
and at least a dozen others were injured when the motorcoach carrying
the team swerved on Highway 90 and rolled over. Five years later,
Congress has still not enacted legislation to require enhanced occupant
protection and operational standards to prevent other families from
experiencing the same suffering as the West Brook bus crash families.
Yet, despite this history of crashes and sad anniversaries, not
much has changed. Three recent crashes of motorcoaches, in New York,
New Jersey and New Hampshire this month have joined the infamous list,
with the loss of 17 lives and 82 injuries. These crashes further
underscore the fact that compromises and half measures taken by the
motorcoach industry and safety regulators endanger the safety of the
traveling public.
Older travelers who take motorcoaches to casinos plan on gambling
but they do not expect to play Russian roulette with their safety en
route. Those who travel by motorcoach rather than by air due to cost
know the trip will take longer but they do not expect to be treated as
second-class citizens when it comes to safety. Young people who take
motorcoaches for convenience, price and the Wi-Fi do not expect the
motorcoach to be a deathtrap in the event of a crash.
Motorcoach safety is a serious concern for anyone who relies on and
uses this growing and affordable mode of transportation. Unfortunately,
when it comes to choosing a safe motorcoach, consumers have been forced
to select motorcoach carriers blindly, without adequate information on
their safety or the safety of the vehicles and drivers. Many of us in
this hearing room have put our excited children on charter buses for
out-of-town school field trips and team sporting events, boarded
motorcoaches to take part in church and community outings, or waved
goodbye to retired parents who traveled by tour coach to vacation
destinations. Some have even taken advantage of low cost fares to
travel between Washington, D.C., New York or Boston on ``curbside''
buses that leave from downtown locations rather than bus terminals.
Motorcoaches make 750 million passenger trips a year, and transport
hundreds of thousands of passengers each day, often carrying more
passengers--55 to 59 people when fully loaded--than most commuter
airline flights. Yet, motorcoach safety is not being held to the same
high safety standards as passenger aviation even though motorcoaches
operate in a much more dangerous and congested highway environment.
Motorcoach drivers are not required to meet the rigorous medical and
safety requirements of airline pilots; most of the vehicle safety
design and performance standards for passenger vehicles, especially for
occupant protection, are not required for motorcoaches; and motorcoach
companies are governed by the same weak, ineffectual safety oversight
and enforcement regime that is used for trucking freight.
Despite the widespread use of motorcoach transportation in our
everyday lives, the public is almost completely in the dark about the
safety of motorcoach transportation because of chronic and continuing
failures by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) to
exercise its legal authority to regulate the safety of this industry,
and the failure of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) to require the same basic safety improvements required for
light passenger vehicles to ensure the crash avoidance and crash
worthiness of motorcoaches. These failures have contributed to numerous
tragic motorcoach crashes in recent years.
My testimony today will address the safety problems and the
documented need to improve motorcoach safety; the means available to
provide improved occupant protection in motorcoach crashes and other
emergencies, such as fires; enhanced crash avoidance capabilities, and
the importance of strengthening Federal oversight of motorcoach
operations to ensure that unsafe motorcoach companies and drivers are
detected and kept off the road before they can do harm.
Motorcoach Crashes Are Frequent and Deadly
Over the past four decades, the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) has investigated nearly 70 motorcoach crashes and fires
that resulted in several hundred passenger deaths and many hundreds of
severe injuries. NTSB's motorcoach crash investigations over the decade
from 1998-2007, involved the deaths of 255 passengers and more than one
thousand injuries.\1\ In some of these incidents more than 20 people on
board were killed in a single crash or vehicle fire. Not all motorcoach
crashes resulting in death and injury are investigated by NTSB or any
other agency at the Federal level. I have attached to my testimony a
list of the motorcoach crashes that Advocates has compiled from the
NTSB investigation reports and reliable newspaper and wire service
reports found on the Internet. But even this list, containing over 150
motorcoach crashes and fires in the past 20 years, is far from
complete.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Motorcoach Override of Elevated Exit Ramp Interstate 75,
Atlanta, Georgia, March 2, 2007, Appendix C, National Transportation
Safety Board Accident Report HTSB/HAR-08/01, July 8, 2008 (Bluffton
University Motorcoach Crash Report).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to NHTSA data, there were 400 fatal motorcoach crashes
from 1994 through 2005 in which 571 people died.\2\ Of that total of
fatal crashes and associated deaths, 2005 was an especially tragic
year--70 motorcoach occupants died in crashes, the highest total ever
recorded. Data covering a much longer period of time, 1975 through
2005, shows 1,107 fatal crashes involving 1,117 motorcoaches and
resulting in 1,486 deaths to passengers in motorcoaches, people in
other vehicles and pedestrians.\3\ While the industry touts the
historic safety record of motorcoaches, the three recent crashes that
occurred within days of each other emphasize that we cannot rely on
statistical averages to ensure public safety. The number of deaths in
the first 3 months of this year, 21 that we know of, already exceeds
the historic annual fatality average with 9 months remaining in the
year. Rather than ignore these recurrent and all too predictable
crashes, we need to protect the public by building safety into
motorcoaches instead of hoping that the inevitable crashes will not
occur.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Data supplied by the NHTSA.
\3\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
That is why it is crucially important to have a comprehensive,
multi-faceted approach to motorcoach safety that emphasizes major
safety countermeasures for motorcoach occupant protection, as well as
dramatic improvements in motorcoach crash avoidance capabilities that
will ensure that these big, heavy vehicles provide crash protection to
the motorcoach occupants while also reducing both the number and the
severity of collisions with other highway users.
Motorcoach Crashes in Recent Years Illustrate Severe Safety Risks
While detailed investigation of the cashes that have taken place
this month are not yet available, press reports indicate that all three
motorcoaches lacked seat belts and that at least in one case there are
questions about driver fatigue and whether the driver had previous
hours of service violations. Advocates is certain that many of the same
safety deficiencies previously found by the NTSB in earlier crashes
will be found, yet again, in these new incidents. Among the major
motorcoach crashes and fires that have taken place in the past few
years the following examples are emblematic of the safety perils in
motorcoach travel:
The Bronx, New York: On March 12, 2011, a motorcoach
operated by World Wide Travel transporting passengers from a
Connecticut casino in the early morning rolled on its side on
I-95, skidded along a guardrail, and rammed into a support
pole, slicing through the upper half of the bus. Fifteen people
were killed and 18 were injured in the crash. Initial media
reports indicate that the bus swerved repeatedly before the
crash and the driver may have been fatigued. World Wide Tours
has previously been flagged by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA) for fatigued drivers.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Bus Swerved Repeatedly Before Crash, Riders Say, NY Times,
March 13, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/14/
nyregion/14bus.html and, Carnage on I-95 After Crash Rips Bus Apart, NY
Times, Mar 12, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/13/
nyregion/13crash.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&ref=nyregion.
Sacaton, Arizona: On March 5, 2010, a motorcoach owned by
Tierra Santa Inc., a California company, en route from Mexico
to Los Angeles, rear-ended a pickup truck, swerved, and rolled
over on I-10. Nine passengers were ejected from the bus,
killing six. An additional 16 were injured. A report by the
Arizona Department of Public Safety indicated that the bus
company was operating illegally, that driver hours of service
were not maintained, and that the vehicle had defective brakes.
Reports also suggested that the company's owner had previously
owned other motorcoach companies that had been shut down for
safety violations.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Bus Carrier in I-10 Crash Skirts Ban, Arizona Republic, Mar 26,
2011, available at http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/
articles/2011/03/26/20110326carriers-tierra-los-angeles.html.
Sherman, Texas: On August 8, 2008, an Angel Tours, Inc.
motorcoach with 54 passengers, restarted its motorcoach
business under a different name, Iguala Busmex, only 3 days
after it had been judged an ``imminent hazard'' by FMCSA and
prohibited from providing transportation services. In a
catastrophic crash, the Iguala Busmex motorcoach broke through
a guardrail in rural Grayson County, Texas and plummeted from
an overpass into a dry creek bed in a rollover crash that
resulted in 17 people dead and 38 injured. Angel Tours, Inc.,
had been ordered to stop operating by the FMCSA on June 23,
2008, only 6 weeks earlier. The reconstituted business, Iguala
Busmex, according to preliminary information in media reports,
had no insurance and had no Federal interstate operating
authority.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Motorcoach Run-Off-the-Bridge and Rollover, Sherman, Texas,
August 8, 2008, National Transportation Safety Board. 2009, Highway
Accident Report NTSB/HAR-09/02, available at http://www3.ntsb.gov/
publictn/2009/HAR0902.pdf.
The new company even used the same business address to restart
operations. FMCSA was unaware that Angel Tours had transformed
into the rogue motorcoach company, Iguala Busmex. In fact, the
company had no legal authority to provide motorcoach
transportation services for compensation even within the state
of Texas. In far too many cases, motor carriers both of
passengers and of freight are ordered to stop operations for
safety reasons, but then restart their businesses under
different company names, leaving law enforcement officials with
the task of identifying and proving which companies are
conducting illegal operations. Sometimes, as in this case,
Federal authorities find this out only after a tragic crash,
when deaths and severe injuries have already occurred. While
FMCSA has improved efforts to screen for reincarnated passenger
motor carriers, the agency still lacks authority to revoke
registration and impose criminal penalties on persons who
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
commit this type of violation.
The motorcoach in the Sherman, Texas, crash was operated by a
driver who had no valid medical certificate. FMCSA had also
determined prior to its ``cease operations'' order that Angel
Tours was using a driver without the company having received a
pre-employment report, a Federal requirement. Angel Tours also
failed to require drivers to prepare vehicle inspection
reports. In addition, the motorcoach was fitted with retreaded
tires on the front steer axle, another Federal regulatory
violation. It appears that this illegal tire suddenly failed
and destabilized the motorcoach, making it difficult to control
and facilitating its crash into the overpass guardrail.
Tunica, Mississippi: On August 10, 2008, a casino motorcoach
operated by Harrah's Entertainment packed with 43 tourists
rolled over in a highway intersection in northwestern
Mississippi. The roof of the motorcoach collapsed and its
windows were shattered. Three passengers died and 27 were
injured, one in critical condition.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Three Killed, Several Injured in Mississippi Bus Crash,
Associated Press, Aug 10, 2008, available at http://
www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2008/08/10/2008-08-10_three_
killed_several_injured_in_mississi-1.html.
Primm, Nevada: Another casino motorcoach crash occurred the
same day on I-15 near Primm, Nevada. Luckily, no one died in
this crash, but 29 people of the 30 people on board were
injured, three of them critically. This was the second
motorcoach crash involving casino workers that occurred between
Las Vegas and Primm. Previously, a crash injured at least 25
people before the motorcoach burst into flames and was
destroyed on January 17, 2008. Once again, it appears that
there may have been a problem of tire tread separation that
could have triggered the rollover crash.\8\
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\8\ Third Bus Crash in Three Days Injures 20, CNN, Aug 11, 2008,
available at http://articles.cnn.com/2008-08-11/us/nevada.bus_1_bus-
nevada-highway-patrol-church-trip?_s=PM:
US.
These cases, even without the benefit of a thorough crash
investigation, point out two serious safety problems. First, in
the Sherman, Texas crash, the illegal operation of the company
is an extremely serious issue, especially in light of the
company history of safety problems. Unfortunately, FMCSA
currently has authority only to impose fines for such conduct.
Criminal penalties are not available for such illegal operation
but are clearly appropriate where the company owners and
officers neglect safety and take such intentional actions in
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defiance of legal orders.
Second, although there are many safety issues and factors in these
crashes that will be investigated, it appears that tire tread
separation may have been a major contributing factor to both
the Angel Tours and Primm, Nevada, crashes. Although retreaded
tires are allowed by FMCSA on the other, non-steering axles of
motorcoaches, and on tractor-trailer rigs and straight (single-
unit) trucks operated in interstate commerce, there are no
Federal standards administered by NHTSA specifying the quality
and safety performance of retreaded tires on commercial motor
vehicles. At the present time, there are only voluntary
industry standards. Advocates asked the agency more than a
decade ago to adopt such standards to ensure that retreated,
recapped, and regrooved commercial motor vehicle tires met the
same safety performance requirements as new tires. However,
NHTSA has failed to put forward any proposal to adopt a
performance standard for retreaded tires on motorcoaches and
other commercial vehicles.
Bluffton University Motorcoach Crash: On March 2, 2007, a
motorcoach hired to transport the Bluffton University baseball
team from Ohio to Georgia vaulted a bridge parapet after taking
a left exit ramp that led to a perpendicular entrance to an
overpass above I-75 in Atlanta, Georgia. The vehicle struck the
bridge parapet at right angles and plunged to the roadway below
the ramp. Of the 35 passengers and a driver on board, seven
were killed and several others, including the coach of the
school's baseball team, were transported to the hospital with
severe injuries. Twelve of the motorcoach's occupants were
ejected, four through the windshield or left front side windows
even before the motorcoach left the roadway, and six passengers
were ejected through the left side windows when the vehicle
slammed into I-75, the impact that stopped its fall.
None of the occupants on-board had three-point safety belts
available to restrain them. Of the 59 seats on board, only the
driver's seat, the ``jump seat,'' and the first row of two
passenger seats immediately behind the driver had two-point lap
belts. The driver and his wife, both of whom had fastened their
lap belts, died.
The company that operated the over-the-road bus, Executive Coach,
received a Satisfactory safety rating from FMCSA on April 4,
2007, only a month following the crash. However, NTSB's
findings and recommendations produced by its investigation
listed several major deficiencies in motorcoach operating
safety.\9\ The vehicle issues identified by NTSB included the
lack of interior occupant impact protection; the ease with
which unrestrained passengers were ejected through large side
windows; and FMCSA's inadequate motor carrier driver oversight.
The driver issues included the fact that the motorcoach
driver's medical certification had expired, the driver's
logbook clearly had been falsified, and that the driver had
medical conditions and had taken medications that may have
impaired his ability to drive. Also, the company that operated
the motorcoach had no formal driver training program, no
written policies on driver procedures such as an emergency
response protocol for evacuation and other passenger safety
needs, and the company's alcohol and drug testing program did
not comply with Federal requirements.\10\
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\9\ Bluffton University Motorcoach Crash Report.
\10\ Title 49 CFR 382.305.
It should be pointed out that motorcoaches in foreign countries
equip their vehicles with safety protection features not
provided for passengers in the United States. For example, the
motorcoach that was involved in the Atlanta, Georgia, crash
only had a few lap belts in the front seating positions and was
not equipped with three-point lap/shoulder belts. The same
motorcoach built in Australia comes equipped with three-point
lap/shoulder seat belts at every seating position and with
seats and their floor anchors tested for maximum crash
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resistance.
Hurricane Rita Nursing Home Motorcoach Crash: On September
23, 2005, a motorcoach operated by Global Limo, Inc., carrying
assisted living and nursing home residents fleeing the imminent
landfall of Hurricane Rita, caught fire and exploded, initially
killing 24 of the 44 people on board who were residents and
employees of a Dallas-area home for seniors. Most of the
residents of the senior living facility had moderate to severe
disabilities and were not able to evacuate the motorcoach
during the fire without assistance. Evacuation involved
concerted efforts by the nursing staff, rescue personnel, and
bystanders who were able to help the residents exit the
motorcoach.
NTSB found that the motorcoach was operated in an unsafe manner and
that FMCSA oversight of motorcoach safety was lax. The major safety
issues identified through the NTSB investigation included poor fire
reporting information and inconsistent data in Federal crash data
bases; FMCSA's ineffective compliance review program; lack of adequate
emergency exits from motorcoaches; lack of fire resistant motorcoach
materials and designs; inadequate manufacturer maintenance information
on wheel bearing components; transportation of highly flammable,
pressurized aluminum cylinders; and poor safety procedures for the
emergency transportation of persons with special needs.\11\
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\11\ Motorcoach Fire on Interstate 45 During Hurricane Rita
Evacuation Near Wilmer, Texas, September 23, 2005, National
Transportation Safety Board, 2007, Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-07/
01, available at http://www3.ntsb.gov/publictn/2007/HAR0701.pdf.
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While the driver of the Global Tours motorcoach possessed a Mexican
commercial driver's license, the Licencia Federal de Conductor (LFC),
he had not obtained a Texas-issued commercial driver's license (CDL),
even though the driver had been in the U.S. since at least February
2005. Drivers are required to apply for a Texas-issued CDL within 30
days after taking up residence in Texas. This means that the driver had
no legal CDL or federally-required commercial driver medical
certificate, nor had he complied with requirements to prove his
identity, provide a social security number, supply documentation of
vehicle registration and liability insurance, and surrender his LFC.
These are legal requirements for drivers that the company should have
ensured were being met. Also, the driver was unable to communicate in
English, relying on an interpreter for his post-crash interviews,
another violation of FMCSA regulations.\12\ According to NTSB, the
driver may have been fatigued at the time of the motorcoach fire. The
driver had violated multiple requirements of the FMCSA hours of service
regulations (HOS), including having failed to take a minimum of 8
consecutive hours off-duty before working or driving, and driving for
over 15 consecutive hours starting at 3 PM on September 22, 2005, until
the fire began at about 6 AM on September 23, 2005.
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\12\ Title 49 CFR 391.11(b)(2).
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FMCSA conducted a compliance review (CR), the agency's method of
assessing the safety of a motor carrier,\13\ of the company on February
6, 2004, and found seven violations of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations (FMCSR). Nevertheless, FMCSA issued a Satisfactory safety
rating to the motor carrier just 6 days later, even though the company
had multiple Out of Service (OOS) violations prior to the CR and more
driver OOS violations prior to the September 23, 2005, motorcoach fire.
An Unsatisfactory safety rating cannot be triggered unless violations
have occurred in both driver and vehicle categories.
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\13\ See, 49 CFR Pt. 385 for a description of FMCSA's safety rating
process.
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According to NTSB in its report, the motorcoach itself was
evidently inadequately maintained. Inadequate lubrication of an axle on
the vehicle led to ``frozen'' bearings that generated extreme heat
that, in turn, triggered the fire. Fires in motorcoaches are started
from various sources, such as engine compartments, electrical wiring
and batteries, auxiliary heaters, and underinflated or failed tires.
Motorcoach fires consume many of the materials from which the vehicles
are manufactured, and are evidently a chronic problem, as admitted by
the former Administrator of FMCSA before the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways, Transit,
and Pipelines on March 2, 2006.\14\ In fact, motorcoach floors are
usually made of sheets of plywood.
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\14\ http://testimony.ost.dot.gov/test/Sandberg1.htm, May 2, 2006.
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Comprehensive Motorcoach Safety Improvements Are Stalled at DOT
Despite Urgency
From this brief review of just a few motorcoach crashes and fires,
it should be evident that motorcoach safety has not been a primary
focus of Federal agencies or the bus industry and is in dire need of
regulatory action to improve safety. The NTSB has been issuing safety
recommendations to the motorcoach industry and the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) and its agencies for decades, but those
recommendations essentially have been ignored. Unfortunately, very few
NTSB recommendations have been implemented by NHTSA and FMCSA, and
certainly not in the complete and effective manner that NTSB
recommended.
In the Bluffton University Motorcoach Crash Report, NTSB reviewed
the 40-year history of its frustrated attempts at achieving agency
action in accordance with multiple recommendations for motorcoach
drivers, passengers, vehicles, and operations. NTSB asserted that
``motorcoaches transport a substantial number of people traveling in a
single vehicle with a high exposure to crash risk,'' with other special
safety requirements, and that ``[t]hese factors demand that
motorcoaches meet the highest level of safety.'' \15\ NTSB also stated
in its findings and recommendations that NHTSA had unacceptably delayed
defining and acting on regulations for motorcoach occupant protection
safety performance standards, emphasizing that the traveling public in
motorcoach trips were inadequately protected during collisions,
especially in rollovers.\16\
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\15\ Bluffton University Motorcoach Crash Report at 52.
\16\ Id. at 54.
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For example, NTSB has repeatedly asked NHTSA to require stronger
seats and to mandate seat belt assemblies at every designated seating
position in motorcoaches. But NTSB finally had to close out these
recommendations with notations of ``Unsatisfactory Action'' because
NHTSA continually deflected NTSB's recommendations on requiring
stronger seats and mandating seat belts.\17\
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\17\ For example, see NTSB's recommendation H-71-35 that was closed
out on October 29, 1975.
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But NTSB did not give up, despite NHTSA's endless inaction. Over
and over it beat the drum in support of occupant restraints with
successive reports on horrific motorcoach crashes where restraints
would have saved many lives. For decades NHTSA deflected every one of
those recommendations. There are many other examples of critical
motorcoach safety recommendations sent to NHTSA since 1968 that were
ignored--and the result was more deaths and injuries that could have
been prevented.
Similarly, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), and its
successor agency, FMCSA, have also rebuffed many NTSB recommendations
over the years, despite evidence showing the need for major safety
countermeasures for existing passenger motor carriers and for
improvements in FMCSA enforcement. NTSB was frustrated with FMCSA's
enforcement scheme for motor carrier safety violations because the
agency would provide Satisfactory ratings to motor carriers even if
they had several serious driver or vehicle violations. FMCSA's policy
is that there must be violations in both areas to trigger an
Unsatisfactory rating that could result in a company ordered to stop
operations. But NTSB recommended that serious violations in either area
should be enough to trigger imposition of an Unsatisfactory rating.\18\
In this regard it must be pointed out that Angel Tours before the
Sherman, Texas crash had a Satisfactory rating because although FMCSA
had recorded several driver violations, there were no vehicle
violations for the company. Accordingly, under that rating system,
FMCSA had no basis for threatening the company with an Unsatisfactory
safety rating. FMCSA has repeatedly avoided acting on this NTSB
recommendation, despite several reports from the U.S. DOT Office of the
Inspector General and Government Accountability Office demonstrating
multiple weaknesses in FMCSA enforcement regimes and actions.\19\
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\18\ NTSB Safety Recommendation H-99-6, ``Change the safety fitness
rating methodology so that adverse vehicle and driver performance-based
data alone are sufficient to result in an overall unsatisfactory rating
for the carrier'', issued February 26, 1999, added to NTSB Most Wanted
List: 2000, ``Selective Motorcoach Issues,'' NTSB/SIR99/01, p. 37.
Available at http://www3.ntsb.gov/publictn/1999/SIR9901.pdf.
\19\ See, e.g., Commercial Motor Vehicles: Effectiveness of Actions
Being Taken to Improve Motor Carrier Safety Is Unknown. Report to the
Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation and Relative Agencies,
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, GAO/RCED-001-89
(July 2000); Significant Improvements in Motor Carrier Safety Program
since 1999 Act but Loopholes for Repeat Violators Need Closing, OIG
Report Number MH2006-046, April 21, 2006; Improvements
Needed in Motor Carrier Safety Status Measurement System, OIG Report
Number MH-2004-034, (Feb. 2004); A Statistical Approach Will Better
Identify Commercial Carriers That Pose High Crash Risks Than Does the
Current Federal Approach, GAO-07-585 (June 2007); Motor Carrier Safety:
Federal Safety Agency Identifies Many High-Risk Carriers but Does Not
Assess Maximum Fines as Often as Required by Law, GOA-07-584 (Aug.
2007).
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Federal Legislation Is Needed to Direct DOT to Implement Comprehensive
Motorcoach Safety Reforms and Comply with NTSB Recommendations
The delays and excuses by the bus industry and DOT can no longer be
tolerated as innocent people die and are badly injured. The Congress
must to step in and ensure that the safety improvements NTSB has
recommended for decades are adopted by the DOT agencies with the
authority to issue motor vehicle and motor carrier regulations.
Experience has shown that when Congress requires safety action, the
agencies find the ways and means to meet the challenge. Several years
ago, the Senate Commerce Committee took a leadership role in addressing
deadly rollover crashes and other major motor vehicle safety issues. In
the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act of
2005--A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU),\20\ Congress required NHTSA to
issue regulations on safety problems that had languished for years
without agency action. NHTSA has taken action to comply with each of
those vehicle safety rulemaking requirements. More recently, the
Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007 \21\ required
NHTSA to issue rules on safety problems to protect children from
dangers in vehicles that the agency had previously refused to address.
The agency is in the process of meeting its statutory obligations under
that law.
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\20\ Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity
for the Twenty-First Century: A Legacy for Users, Pub. L. 109-59 (Aug.
10, 2005).
\21\ Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007,
Pub. L. 110-189 (Feb. 28, 2008).
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There is absolutely no doubt that when Congress sets the safety
agenda, the Federal agencies respond quickly by developing action
plans, conducting tests, and issuing rules that improve transportation
safety. This is the model that Congress should follow for motorcoach
safety.
The right vehicle to accomplish this approach has already been
introduced in Congress--The Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act of 2011.
This pending legislation, S. 453, introduced on March 2, 2011, by
Senators Sherrod Brown (D-OH) and Kay Bailey Hutchinson (R-TX), and its
companion bill in the House, H.R. 873, introduced by Representative
John Lewis (D-GA), sets a reasonable and achievable regulatory safety
agenda for reforming motorcoach safety. The Motorcoach Enhanced Safety
Act deals with each of the major aspects of motorcoach safety: vehicle
design and performance, operating safety and inspection, and driver
safety, including training and medical certification.
The Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act addresses almost all NTSB safety
issues in a comprehensive manner, including crash protection of
occupants, such as seat belts and windows that prevent occupant
ejection in crashes; protection against roof crush, especially
catastrophic single-vehicle events involving rollovers; improved fire
protection and the need to use materials and technology to assist in
fire resistance and suppression; better methods to facilitate passenger
evacuation in emergency conditions; crash avoidance technology, such as
adaptive cruise control and electronic stability control to prevent
crashes; vehicle maintenance and inspection needs; and operator
qualifications, including driver skills and medical certification.
Finally, the Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act sets very reasonable
timelines for DOT, NHTSA and FMCSA to review the safety problems,
complete testing, conduct rulemaking and issue safety rules to
implement those recommendations so that lives can be saved and injuries
prevented as soon as possible.
The Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act, is supported by parents and
relatives of victims and survivors of motorcoach crashes. Many family
members who lost relatives in motorcoach crashes have traveled to
Capitol Hill numerous times since the bill was first introduced in
2007. The bill is also strongly supported by Advocates and safety
groups, including Public Citizen, Center for Auto Safety, Citizens for
Reliable and Safe Highways (CRASH), Consumers for Auto Reliability and
Safety, the Trauma Foundation, the Consumer Federation of America and
the Enhanced Protective Glass Automotive Association.
The DOT agencies with responsibility for motorcoach safety, NHTSA
and FMCSA, have failed to fulfill their safety missions. Although NHTSA
has proposed a rule for 3-point seat belts on motorcoaches, the agency
has failed to move quickly to adopt other NTSB recommendations for
crash protection and crash avoidance, even though some of those safety
improvements were included in a motorcoach safety research and testing
program and the DOT motorcoach safety plan. It is evident that, without
a Congressional directive to issue safety standards based on the NTSB
recommendations, there is no assurance that the agency will address all
the safety issues identified by the NTSB over the years, much less
establish stringent safety standards that adopt those recommendations
in a timely manner.
FMCSA has been entirely delinquent in its role as the federal
administrator of safe motorcoach operations. As with its duties to
improve general motor carrier safety, FMCSA has failed to issue or
properly enforce even the most basic safety requirements and has shown
no inclination to be proactive regarding the adoption of safety
standards and regulations to improve public safety on motorcoaches.
FMCSA rarely acts proactively and needs to be compelled by explicit
Congressional legislation to take action and, even then, the agency
frequently fails to comply with either the clear letter of the law or
to meet legislated deadlines. The safety community has had to
repeatedly sue FMCSA to compel the agency to comply with Congressional
mandates and issue effective regulations to improve key areas of motor
carrier safety.
While our testimony cannot survey all the safety provisions
addressed in these comprehensive bills, the remainder of this testimony
highlights the major gaps in motorcoach safety and how key provisions
of S. 453 and H.R. 873 will save lives, prevent injuries, and reduce
other motorcoach crash losses.
Motorcoach Occupant Protection is Inadequate and Contributes to Deaths
and Injuries
There are serious deficiencies with the crashworthiness features of
motorcoaches for protecting occupants against severe and fatal
injuries. In the 2007 Bluffton University motorcoach crash in Atlanta,
GA, and in many others investigated in the last several years by NTSB,
occupants were ejected through side windows and the windshield. Serious
injuries and deaths in motorcoach rollover crashes are highly
predictable when these vehicles do not have three-point seat belts and
fail to have the kind of windows that could withstand a crash and
prevent ejection. These severe occupant safety defects have been
documented time and again in NTSB investigations and reports.
While NHTSA has established 22 separate standards for vehicle
crashworthiness as part of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
(FMVSS) administered by the agency, nearly all of these are for light
motor vehicles (mainly light passenger vehicles that weigh less than
10,000 pounds). Most of these standards exempt motorcoaches with gross
vehicle weight ratings of over 10,000 pounds. For example, no NHTSA
safety regulation requires that motorcoaches in the U.S. have any
occupant protection systems of any kind, including seat belts, seat
mounting retention, seatback strength, whiplash protection, or upper
and lower vehicle interior occupant impact protection. Although
motorcoaches are required to comply with requirements specifying
motorcoach window retention and release for evacuation (FMVSS No. 217),
and governing the flammability of interior materials (FMVSS No. 302),
motorcoaches do not have to comply with many safety standards required
for other types of buses, including school buses, and for passenger
vehicles. As a result, motorcoach passengers are not afforded the same
basic safety features and types of protection required for passengers
in other vehicles.
Among the important safety shortcomings that need to be improved in
motorcoaches, the Motorcoach Enhancement Safety Act would require:
Seat belts: Three-point lap/shoulder belt systems have been
required for passenger vehicles since 1968 and are required on
smaller buses and on big passenger vans, yet are not required
in motorcoaches. Lap/shoulder belt restraint systems, not just
lap belts, are essential for keeping motorcoach occupants in
their seats to avoid injuries sustained within the compartment
in all crash modes.
Rollover: Motorcoaches are very top heavy, with high centers
of gravity especially when fully laden with passengers, so
their rollover propensity is much higher than for smaller
passenger vehicles. Crash avoidance technology such as
electronic stability control, now required on light passenger
vehicles, and adaptive cruise control can help keep
motorcoaches out of crashes in the first place. But since
rollovers of motorcoaches are inevitable, a strong roof crush
resistance safety standard is needed to ensure the structural
integrity of the roof that preserves occupant survival space
and prevents infliction of severe occupant trauma.
Ejection: A major safety issue in motorcoaches is preventing
occupants from being ejected during a crash, especially in a
rollover. According to NHTSA, more than half of the deaths in
motorcoach crashes are the result of occupant ejections. More
than one-third of all deaths of motorcoach occupants in
motorcoach crashes occur in rollovers, and occupant ejection is
the reason for 70 percent of occupant deaths in motorcoach
rollovers.\22\ Three-point lap shoulder belts are the first
line of defense against ejection. But in addition, for those
who are not wearing seat belts at the time of a crash, advanced
window glazing that can survive crash impacts will prevent
occupant ejection and save more lives.
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\22\ NHTSA's Approach to Motorcoach Safety, Aug. 6, 2007.
The major topics of occupant restraint within the motorcoach
passenger compartment and the additional prevention of ejection in
catastrophic events have been engaged by both the European Economic
Community \23\ and Australia.\24\ Three-point belts restraining
motorcoach occupants became mandatory in Australia 14 years ago, the
European Union has just mandated that passengers must wear safety belts
in motorcoaches beginning in May 2008, and anyone traveling by
motorcoach in Japan must use their safety belts beginning June 2008. It
is obvious that keeping motorcoach occupants safely in their seats is
desperately needed so that passengers do not impact each other, strike
unforgiving interior surfaces and equipment in motorcoaches, and are
prevented from being thrown from the vehicle. Three-point lap/shoulder
belt restraints initially are the best way to accomplish keeping each
passenger in their seat. The rest of the world is moving on to higher
levels of crash protection for motorcoach occupants while U.S. safety
regulators fail to take action.
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\23\ E. Mayrhofer, H. Steffan, H. Hoschopf, Enhanced Coach and Bus
Occupant Safety, Paper 05-0351, Graz University of Technology Vehicle
Safety Institute, Austria, 2005.
\24\ M. Griffiths, M. Paine, R. Moore, Three Point Seat Belts on
Coaches--The First Decade in Australia, Queensland Transport,
Australia, Abstract ID -5-0017, 2005. The authors report that, since
1994 when 3-point belts were required in motorcoaches, several serious
crashes have occurred, no belted coach occupant has received either
fatal or disabling injuries.
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The Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act bill contains the provisions
necessary to direct NHTSA to dramatically improve motorcoach
crashworthiness in all crash modes, including rollovers, as well as in
side and frontal impacts. Without congressional directives requiring
the issuance of new and improved safety standards by specific dates,
NHTSA will intermittently study the safety issues over many years
without addressing the major motorcoach crashworthiness and crash
avoidance safety issues that NTSB long ago recommended should be
adopted. NHTSA has proven over and over that it will delay major safety
standards that can save lives and prevent injuries, not only for years,
but also for decades, unless Congress gives it a mandate in no
uncertain terms and with firm deadlines for action.
The Cost of the Lifesaving Technologies in the MESA Bill are Minimal
The MESA bill proposes to provide motorcoach passengers the same
type of life-saving technologies that are already available and
standard equipment in passenger vehicles. These technologies are
already being offered and advertised as options by a number of
motorcoach manufacturers. The technologies include seatbelts, enhanced
protective interiors, collision avoidance devices, electronic stability
control systems, tire pressure monitoring systems, crashworthiness
protections, and event data recorders. However, the public has no
assurance of the performance quality or effectiveness of these systems
because they are not required to meet any minimum government safety
standards.
The cost of building-in these safety features for new vehicles is
minimal compared to the cost in terms of lives lost in just a single
major motorcoach crash. For example, the recent March 12, 2011 bus
crash in New York resulted in 15 fatalities. That one crash alone
generated $90 million in costs related just to the fatalities suffered
in the crash based on the current Department of Transportation (DOT)
value of a statistical life which is set at $6.0 million.\25\ That
figure does not include the costs associated with the numerous injuries
to the surviving passengers or the huge emotional toll on the families
of those killed and injured. This cost is astronomical even when
compared with even the motorcoach industry's grossly inflated per
vehicle estimated cost of between $80,000 and $89,000 for adoption of
the safety advances required in the MESA bill, and including some
additional requirements cited by the industry that are not included in
the bill. In other words, the costs associated with the loss of life in
the recent New York bus crash could pay for all of the safety advances
proposed for a fleet of over 1,000 new motorcoaches.
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\25\ U.S. DOT Memorandum from Joel Szabat, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Transportation Policy to Secretarial Officers and Modal
Administrators, dated March 18, 2009, updating the previous figure of
$5.8 million in the Departmental Guidance Memorandum, Published
February 5, 2008.
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A number of the safety technologies included in the MESA bill have
already been developed in other vehicles and are being voluntarily
installed in motorcoaches. For example, the Bolt Bus (a collaboration
between Greyhound and Peter Pan Bus Lines) already has seat belts
installed in its vehicles and Greyhound announced in 2009 the purchase
of a new 140 bus fleet equipped with seat belts and advanced seating
which provide occupant compartmentalization. In addition, some new
buses include electronic stability control (MCI, Prevost, Volvo, Van
Hool), advanced glazing (Prevost, MCI), occupant compartmentalization
(Prevost), greater roof protection (Volvo, Prevost, Van Hool,
Girardin), tire pressure monitoring systems (Prevost, MCI, Van Hool),
and some form of fire protection and suppression systems (MCI, Volvo,
Prevost, Van Hool).
The Motorcoach Industry Cost Estimates are Exaggerated
The motorcoach industry cost figures, however, are highly inflated
and unreliable. The motorcoach industry has recently circulated their
opinion on the costs that will be associated with the adoption of the
safety measures included in the MESA bill. The correct term is
``opinion'' because for many of the safety features the industry
provides limited or no support for the inflated cost figures and cites
no references for the sources of their estimates. The anonymous and
undated document disseminated by the motorcoach industry, called the
``per-bus estimated cost,'' estimates that the improvements required in
the MESA bill will cost between $80,000 and $89,000 per motorcoach.
This ludicrous estimate, nearly 20 percent of the current cost of a new
motorcoach, is yet another example of a tactic used by an industry that
opposes safety and occupant protection--inflating the real cost of
safety technology. Furthermore, while the bus trade association is
purposefully throwing around these absurd and exaggerated cost figures,
it has presented no direct data on vehicle safety costs because this is
proprietary information known to the suppliers and manufacturers and is
not shared with the trade association that lobbies on behalf of the
companies as a whole. It is also not evident whether the numbers
represent cost or price information--a big difference. In the past,
this very same approach has been used by automobile manufacturers to
oppose airbags and electronic stability control systems.
The most poignant example is the regulation of airbags in passenger
vehicles. At the time when rulemaking on airbags was being initiated,
industry representatives stated that the cost per airbag would be
between $1,200 and $1,500. Later, information obtained by a Member of
Congress who demanded that General Motors supply its true cost figures
revealed that the actual cost of manufacturing frontal airbags was
between $150 and $175. The industry was quoting prices 10 times their
actual cost. Today, as a result of mass production and further
technological improvements, the per-unit manufacturing cost of far more
sophisticated airbag units is only about $30. Furthermore, despite the
adamant opposition of industry to the airbag mandate, which they fought
for over twenty years, today it is tough to find even a single
contemporary motor vehicle advertisement or sales pitch that does not
tout the safety performance of the vehicle's airbag systems.
Another example of this industry tactic of inflating costs occurred
in the regulation of electronic stability control systems or ESC. ESC
was among the safety technology improvements required as part of the
SAFETEA-LU legislation that was crafted by the Senate Commerce,
Science, and Transportation Committee and this subcommittee in 2005.
Before that legislation was enacted, manufacturers asserted that the
cost of including ESC systems was very high. An earlier Australian
government study found that auto manufacturers were charging as much as
$2,254 for ESC as a vehicle option. The Australian government study
identified the ``approximate reasonable cost'' of ESC as $649. In
opposing the SAFETEA-LU provision, manufacturers claimed much higher
costs for ESC but NHTSA found, in a 2005 teardown analysis, that the
estimated incremental per-vehicle cost of ESC was actually only $58.
Available safety technologies have already been developed and
tested that will improve motorcoach occupant protection at reasonable,
not exorbitant, cost. While the motorcoach industry, the motor carriers
and fleets that purchase motorcoaches object to adding safety on the
buses they buy, motorcoach manufacturers and suppliers are already
providing these technologies either as options or as standard equipment
on new motorcoaches at costs far below those in the industry cost
document.
Effective Motorcoach Operation Safety Oversight and Enforcement is
Lacking
According to figures from FMCSA,\26\ there are about 3,700 U.S.
passenger-carrying companies conducting interstate operations employing
100,000 drivers to operate about 34,000 to perhaps 40,000
motorcoaches.\27\ Many of the Federal motor carrier safety regulations,
FMCSRs, that govern commercial motor carriers, vehicles, and drivers
generally, also apply to motor carriers of passengers. Despite the
relatively small numbers of motorcoaches and motorcoach companies,
FMCSA is failing in its stewardship responsibilities for motorcoaches
as badly as it is for large trucks.
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\26\ http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts-research/facts-figures/
analysis-statistics/cmvfacts.htm. There are no separate figures for
motorcoaches provided, but the United Motorcoach Association estimates
that there are probably about 45,000 to 50,000 commercial over-the-road
motorcoaches in the U.S. There is, in addition, an unknown number of
``private'' motorcoaches such as those used for schools, church groups,
and other organizations, some of which are interstate and must conform
to most Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. It is difficult to
reconcile these figures with those from FMCSA (see, the text and
footnote below) and the figures provided by the American Bus
Association in its Motorcoach Census 2005: Second Benchmarking Study of
the Motorcoach Industry in the United States and Canada, September
2006, in which it is stated that in 2004 the industry consisted of
3,500 companies operating nearly 40,000 motorcoaches.
\27\ See, Statement of John Hill, Administrator, Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration, before the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Highways, Transit,
and Pipelines, March 20, 2007. Also, see, http://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/
International/
border.asp?dvar+3&cvar=pass&redirect=HistoricalOverview.asp&p=1.
However, there are substantial discrepancies throughout FMCSA's website
on the number of passenger carriers. For example, one page providing
figures states that there were 5,211 passenger carriers registered with
the agency as of 2006. http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts-research/facts-
figures/analysis-statistics/cmvfacts.htm. There is no explanation of
what kinds of passenger carriers this includes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Almost all of NTSB's 40 years of investigated motorcoach crashes
have resulted in findings that encompass vehicle performance,
maintenance, inspection, driver qualifications, and motor carrier
company safety management. The examples of recent motorcoach crashes
provided earlier in this testimony confirm that multiple safety
problems afflict all aspects of interstate motorcoach operations.
Although severe motorcoach crashes often appear at first glance to be
the result of an isolated problem, digging deeper almost always reveals
multiple problems involving vehicle maintenance, driver qualifications
and performance capabilities, and company safety management. NTSB has
confirmed this multifactorial nature of motorcoach crashes to be true
in numerous crash investigations.
FMCSA has not only failed to adopt NTSB's safety recommendations,
the agency has also failed to issue other safety regulations needed to
improve motor carrier and motorcoach safety. As a result, major areas
of driver training and certification, motorcoach safety inspection,
data quality and systems for identifying potentially dangerous
motorcoach companies, and agency oversight and enforcement of the
FMCSRs are undeniably inadequate as had been documented repeatedly by
the U.S. DOT's OIG and by GAO. Key rulemaking actions to address these
and other issues languish year after year without action. The
Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act directs FMCSA to address major
deficiencies in its regulations governing driver qualifications,
vehicle safety condition, and motor carrier safety management.
Motor carrier safety issues that directly impact motorcoach
operating safety include:
Weak Federal and State Requirements for Motorcoach Driver
Training Among the many areas in the Motorcoach Enhanced Safety
Act aimed at improving motorcoach operational safety are
provisions intended to substantially strengthen motorcoach
driver CDL testing and training requirements. Motorcoach
drivers are required to have CDLs with a passenger endorsement
added on the basis of a separate knowledge and skills test.
However, there are no substantive training requirements in
Federal law and regulation for entry-level commercial motor
vehicle drivers, and there are none for the additional
endorsements for operating hazardous materials vehicles, school
buses, or motorcoaches. In short, there is no specific Federal
training requirement for an interstate commercial driver
transporting passengers.
Federal safety agencies spent over 20 years studying commercial
driver training issues, producing a Model Curriculum for training both
drivers and instructors and conducting rulemaking pursuant to Section
4007(a) of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991
(ISTEA).\28\ Despite this long background of deep involvement in the
needs of commercial driver training, FMCSA did an abrupt about-face in
May 2004 and issued a final rule that avoided adopting any basic
knowledge and skills training requirements, including behind-the-wheel
driving instruction, for entry-level commercial drivers.\29\ Instead,
the agency published a regulation that only required drivers to gain
familiarity with four ancillary areas of CMV operation--driver
qualifications, hours of service requirements, driver health issues,
and whistleblower protection. Not only did FMCSA not require driver
training as a prerequisite for a candidate seeking an entry-level CDL,
the agency rule excused almost all novice drivers from even being
considered entry-level commercial drivers. This rulemaking outcome was
a complete reversal from earlier agency statements that the majority of
new commercial drivers were not receiving adequate training.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Pub. L. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (Dec. 18, 1991).
\29\ 69 FR 29384 et seq., May 21, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since the FMCSA action reversed its own previous findings that
basic knowledge and skills entry-level driver training was inadequate
and should be required, Advocates and Public Citizen filed suit against
the agency. In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia found that the final rule was arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of agency discretion, and remanded the rule to
FMCSA. Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety v. FMCSA \30\ (Entry-Level
Driver Training Decision). In its opinion, the appellate court stated
that the rule ``focuses on areas unrelated to the practical demands of
operating a commercial motor vehicle'' and that the rule was ``so at
odds with the record assembled by DOT that the action cannot stand.''
\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ 429 F.3d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
\31\ Id. at 3-4.
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Incredibly, when FMCSA reopened rulemaking on commercial driver
training requirements in response to the adverse court decision on its
final rule, the agency did not propose a training curriculum
specifically designed for motorcoach operators.\32\ The curricula
content of the proposed rule is entirely oriented toward the operation
of trucks of different weights and configurations. The proposed rule
has no specific requirements anywhere just for motorcoach operators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ 72 FR 73226 (Dec. 26, 2007).
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Further, in the December 2007 FMCSA proposed rule, the minimum
number of hours of training time for entry-level student drivers of
motorcoaches plummets to 120 hours for students wanting to operate
motorcoaches and other large commercial motor vehicles with ``Class B''
CDLs.\33\ There is no explanation anywhere in the preamble of the
proposed rule or in the appendix of why this specific number of
instructional hours was selected, nor why the amount of training was
severely abbreviated from the 320 or more hours recommended in the 1985
Model Curriculum. No final rule on entry-level driver training has yet
been issued.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ 72 FR 73227-73228.
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Advocates regards FMCSA's entry-level driver training requirements
for motorcoach drivers to be unspecific to the special tasks that
motorcoach operation imposes, as perfunctory in its requirements and
its safety impact, and as falling well short of what is needed. The
proposed rule does not fulfill either the Court of Appeals'
expectations or the agency's legislated responsibilities.
Substantively, the proposed curriculum fails to ensure that motorcoach
operators will be properly trained in the multiple, significant safety
responsibilities the job demands. To add insult to injury, the proposed
rule also would impose a 3-year moratorium on requiring compliance with
training requirements for new CDL applicants.\34\ This action would
exclude tens of thousands of new CDL applicants from badly needed
knowledge and skills training requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ Id. at 73231-73232.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, twenty years after Congress required the Secretary of
Transportation to issue minimum entry-level driver training
requirements, and 6 years after the Court of Appeals upheld Advocates
legal challenge to the agency's ineffectual 10-hour classroom rule,
because it lacked any actual behind-the-wheel driver training, there
are still no requirements for entry-level motorcoach or truck driver
training.
Compliance Reviews Do Not Stop Dangerous Motorcoach
Companies From Operating--A central problem undermining agency
effectiveness in overseeing motor carrier safety and reducing
FMCSR violations is the low annual numbers and percentage of
both roadside inspections and compliance review (CRs). Based on
the results of a CR, a motor carrier is assigned a safety
rating of Satisfactory, Conditional or Unsatisfactory. For
example, the Bluffton University motorcoach crash that took
seven lives and inflicted severe injuries involved a motorcoach
company that had a Satisfactory safety rating assigned 6 years
earlier, in January 2001. Similarly, the company that operated
the motorcoach that crashed in Sherman, Texas in August, 2008,
killing 17 people, was awarded a Satisfactory safety rating
despite the fact that the company had received repeated driver
out of service orders. The truth is that a dated Satisfactory
safety rating is no assurance of contemporary operating safety
fitness, yet companies--both rogue and more responsible--use
the ``Satisfactory'' designation to promote their reputations.
The implementing regulations for conducting CRs specify criteria
for assigning one of three safety rating categories to a motor carrier:
Satisfactory, Conditional, Unsatisfactory.\35\ FMCSA is required by law
to issue a safety rating to all motor carriers.\36\ However, the agency
basically decided long ago that it would no longer attempt to fulfill
the statutory requirement.\37\ Even without attempting to assign safety
ratings to all motor carriers, FMCSA conducts CRs on only a tiny
percentage of carriers. Barely 2 percent of motor carriers receive a CR
each year, and only a tiny part of 1 percent of all registered motor
carriers are given Unsatisfactory ratings. In 2010, only 2.5 percent of
the nearly 15,000 motor carriers that were rated received an
Unsatisfactory rating. On its face, it is improbable that assigning
Unsatisfactory safety ratings to so few registered interstate motor
carriers has any deterrent effect.
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\35\ The most recent statement of the governing regulations for
determining safety fitness is the FMCSA final rule of August 22, 2000
(65 FR 50919), which was a response to the increased stringency of
safety fitness requirements enacted in Section 4009 of TEA-21 that
amended 49 U.S.C. 31144, originally enacted by Section 215 of the
Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 (Pub. L. 98-554). This final rule
amended the regulations for safety fitness determinations in 49 CFR
Pts. 385 and 386. Pt. 385 contains the controlling criteria for making
safety fitness determinations and Pt. 386 contains the rules of
practice for the agency controlling the issuance of CR ratings,
petitions, hearings, orders, and other administrative machinery for
conducting the oversight and enforcement programs of FMCSA. It should
also be noted that FMCSA recognizes that its administrative selection
of the three rating categories of safety fitness, Satisfactory,
Conditional, and Unsatisfactory, has been legislatively enshrined
through explicit mention and use of the three ratings in Section 15(b)
of the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1990. 49 U.S.C. 31144.
\36\ Section 215 of the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 requires
the Secretary to maintain, by regulation, a procedure for determining
the safety fitness of an owner or operator of commercial motor
vehicles. 49 U.S.C. 31144.
\37\ Motor Carrier Safety Program, DOT Office of Inspector General,
Report Number AS-FH-7-006, March 26, 1997. The goal of assigning safety
ratings to all motor carriers by September 30, 1992, was a self-imposed
target by FHWA that could not be attained, as pointed out in the GAO
report of January 1991, Truck Safety: Improvements Needed in FHWA's
Motor Carrier Safety Program, Report No. GAO/RCED-91-30. At the time of
GAO's preparation of this report, FHWA had not rated about 60 percent
of interstate motor carriers. As GAO points out in this report, the
agency decided that its safety oversight resources would be better
spent than attempting to safety rate all motor carriers in accordance
with legislative requirements. On October 1, 1994, FHWA discontinued
safety reviews to assess unrated motor carriers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other organizations and agencies have for many years called for
improvements to the safety rating process. For example, NTSB's current
list of the Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements--Federal
Issues \38\ argues that the safety fitness regime operates too
leniently with criteria that do not result frequently enough in motor
carriers being shut down or drivers having their licenses revoked.
Motor carriers with only vehicle or driver violations, but not both,
are allowed to continue to operate. In fact, in the past, some
motorcoach companies have been awarded Satisfactory safety ratings with
no safety scores in any of the four rating categories under the
previous rating system. In addition, high percentages of unrated
motorcoaches are still listed for many states on FMCSA motorcoach
website.\39\
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\38\ See, http://www.ntsb.gov/Recs/mostwanted/truck safety.htm. As
previously mentioned, NTSB recommends that if a carrier receives an
Unsatisfactory rating for either the vehicle factor or the driver
factor, that alone should trigger a pending Unsatisfactory rating.
According to NTSB, this recommendation ha been reissued annually since
199, but FMCSA does not plan full implementation of any changes to its
safety rating system and other oversight processes until 2010 at the
earliest.
\39\ http://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/Passenger/find_carrier.asp.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We have yet to determine whether the new Compliance, Safety,
Accountability (CSA) program, with the Motor Carrier Safety Measurement
System, which has only just been applied nationwide, will make a
significant difference in the way FMCSA manages and enforces commercial
vehicle safety on our highways.
Although the FMCSA has apparently made progress in rating new
entrant passenger motor carriers in 9 months or less, the outstanding
backlog of unrated carriers or carriers that were last rated more than
3 years ago still dominates the field.
Consumers Denied Essential, Lifesaving Information on
Motorcoach Safety--FMCSA's passenger motor carrier website
claims that it provides information on motorcoach companies so
that consumers can be confident that they are choosing safe
motorcoach companies. How does that claim hold up under close
examination?
A review of the current status of safety ratings of motorcoaches
registered in Texas is not very encouraging. There are 182 motorcoach
companies with FMCSA interstate operating numbers. Of those, 152, or 84
percent, have Satisfactory ratings. All the rest of the companies have
either Conditional ratings (12), or are Unrated (18). One company's
Satisfactory rating was awarded back in 1989--22 years ago.
Furthermore, of the 152 Satisfactory companies, 50, or 32.6 percent,
are in an ALERT status for at least one of the BASIC categories on
which carriers are rated for safety under the new CSA system, and 30
companies have insufficient information on which FMCSA could generate
an evaluation for all the BASIC Categories. And it should be stressed
that a Satisfactory rating for FMCSA only means that a motorcoach
company minimally complies with the Federal safety standards for motor
carriers--it is not a mark of superior safety.
Similarly, consumers in New Jersey have little to choose from in
selecting a motorcoach company with the best safety credentials for
long-distance trips. There are 149 companies headquartered in New
Jersey that are registered with FMCSA for interstate transportation of
passengers. However, 32 of these businesses--21 percent or nearly a
quarter--have no safety ratings at all. Three (3) companies are
operating with Conditional safety ratings. No companies have
Unsatisfactory ratings.
One hundred and fourteen (114) New Jersey motorcoach companies
carry Satisfactory safety ratings. One company received its
Satisfactory rating back in 1982, and there are eight others with
Satisfactory ratings assigned during the 1990s. It is important to
recognize that a safety rating, even a Satisfactory rating, is just a
snapshot of a company. A company's safety practices can quickly
deteriorate so that a Satisfactory rating can become meaningless in a
short amount of time. Many companies can come into compliance to
achieve a Satisfactory safety rating only to lapse in its compliance
with major motorcoach safety regulatory areas such as driver
qualifications and certification, vehicle safety maintenance, and
company safety management quality.
Of the 114 New Jersey motorcoach companies with Satisfactory
ratings, 15, or 13.2 percent, are in an ALERT status for at least one
BASIC under the current CSA system and 37 companies have insufficient
information on which FMCSA could generate an evaluation for all BASIC
Categories. Therefore, if a consumer in New Jersey wants to apply a
high standard for choosing a company, it would be best to use a
motorcoach company that has a Satisfactory rating in all five BASIC
categories. Only 2 companies of the remaining 65 companies with a
Satisfactory rating had ratings in all 5 BASIC categories; the other 62
companies had at least one BASIC, if not more, in which there was
insufficient data on which to calculate a rating. Based on Advocates'
sampling of state information on FMCSA's website, this is the case with
most states--the listing of active motorcoach companies provided by
FMCSA for each state, if rigorously evaluated by a consumer, is
dramatically reduced oftentimes to only a handful of companies to
choose from.
When motorcoaches are stopped and inspected, the results are still
discouraging. For 2010, 6.7 percent of the vehicle inspections resulted
in an out of service (OOS) order. While this figure is an improvement
over past years, it still represents a total of nearly 5,500
motorcoaches that failed inspections and had to be placed OOS.
Similarly, driver safety is a serious concern--driver inspections in
2010 placed 4.8 percent of U.S. drivers of interstate motor carriers of
passengers OOS for various violations, a total of 2,200 driver OOS
orders. These aggregate figures are frightening, especially for patrons
of interstate motorcoach companies, and they show slow progress in
substantially improving motorcoach safety on a nationwide basis.
Unknown Status and Effectiveness of State Annual Bus Safety
Inspection Programs--The Secretary of Transportation is
required to prescribe standards for annual, or more frequent,
inspection of commercial motor vehicles, including
motorcoaches, or approve equally effective state inspection
programs.\40\ In 1998 the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
issued a notice on the status of state bus inspection
programs\41\ and subsequently listed 25 of 50 states with
approved, equivalent periodic inspection programs.\42\
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\40\ Title 49 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 396; Sec. 210
of the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 (49 U.S.C. 31142).
\41\ 63 FR 8516 et seq. (February 19, 1998).
\42\ 66 FR 32863 (June 18, 2001).
It should be stressed here that the minimum period for the required
vehicle inspection is only once a year.\43\ Since it is well known that
inspection of CMVs, including motorcoaches, needs to be much more
intensive and frequent than for personal or light motor vehicles, a
once-ayear inspection regime is clearly no guarantee of safe
motorcoaches. Many companies even in states that have bus inspection
programs can come into compliance just for an annual inspection, only
to allow major safety features of their motorcoaches to fall into
disrepair or become inoperative soon after passing the annual
inspection. Moreover, Advocates could find no information from FMCSA's
website on the effectiveness of state motorcoach inspection programs to
detect safety problems or how well or for how long state motorcoach
inspection programs ensure compliance with all Federal motor carrier
safety requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ Section 210, Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984, op. cit.,
codified at 49 U.S.C. 31142.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several provisions in the Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act directly
address the issue of timely, accurate motorcoach and bus safety
inspections, including both FMCSA and state actions that are necessary,
and how FMCSA must administer the state inspection programs in
connection with the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP).
Electronic On-Board Recorders Are Long Overdue on
Motorcoaches and All Motor Carriers--Electronic On-Board
Recorders (EOBRs) have been increasingly used on large trucks
and motorcoaches for a variety of purposes, including
monitoring the drivers' hours of service (HOS) driving,
working, and off-duty time of commercial drivers, and ensuring
compliance with current HOS regulations. Many countries around
the world now require the use of EOBRs to ensure that truck
drivers comply with the limits of each nation's HOS. Currently,
all European Union countries, along with Turkey, Israel, Japan,
South Korea, Brazil, Venezuela, and Singapore, require
automated recording devices to monitor driver hours of service
compliance.
EOBRs can automatically record the hours that commercial operators
drive trucks and motorcoaches in interstate commerce. EOBRs can also
link with engines, transmissions, and global positioning system (GPS)
devices to record the distance and speed a commercial motor vehicle has
traveled and whether it has used an illegal route or traversed a
weight-posted bridge. Motor carriers that have voluntarily installed
EOBRs are still only a small percentage of commercial motor vehicles,
but motor carriers that use EOBRs praise the advantages they provide in
terms of safety and efficiency since they eliminate the need for paper
logbooks. This was stressed by a motor carrier industry witness in last
year's hearing on EOBRs conducted by this Subcommittee.\44\
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\44\ ``Electronic On-Board Recorders (EOBRs) and Truck Driver
Fatigue Reduction,'' Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine
Infrastructure, Safety, and Security, U.S. Senate, May 1, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commercial driver fatigue is a major safety problem for both
motorcoach operators and truck drivers. EOBRs are especially crucial to
raising the level of motorcoach safety by ensuring that well-rested,
alert drivers are in charge of the safety and lives of up to 58
occupants on-board. EOBRs can ensure that drivers do not exceed maximum
shift driving time and that they take the required off-duty rest time
to restore their performance at the wheel. Moreover, EOBRs on
interstate motorcoaches permit real-time monitoring of the routing and
location of a motorcoach so that, in the event of a serious event such
as a crash or fire, expeditious response by emergency medical personnel
and enforcement authorities can make a substantial difference in the
number of deaths and severe, disabling injuries that result from these
serious incidents.
FMCSA should be congratulated for finally, after years of delay,
issuing a proposed rule to require EOBRS on some commercial vehicles,
namely those driven by truck and bus drivers who are subject to the HOS
and records of duty status (RODS) requirements. The proposed rule was
only recently issued and the public comment period will not close until
late May. Advocates is supportive of the proposed rule because its
implementation will improve safety and bring motor carrier enforcement
into the modern era. However, we remain concerned that opposition to
the proposal could deter the agency from issuing a final rule. For that
reason we still believe that there is need to have congressional action
to ensure this basic, reasonable and overdue safety improvement is
completed without additional delay. At least with regard to
motorcoaches, the Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act includes a provision
to ensure this result.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Passenger transportation safety by over-the-road motorcoaches is
not held to the high safety standards of commercial passenger aviation.
Motorcoach crashes can take many lives in a single event and inflict
severe injuries on numerous passengers. NTSB's studies and crash
reports document the deadly outcome of a catastrophic motorcoach crash,
and its safety recommendations provide solutions that will dramatically
improve motorcoach safety. Because DOT and the safety agencies have not
implemented recommended safety countermeasures, despite having had
ample opportunity to do so and reams of supporting evidence, Congress
must take action to increase the level of motorcoach safety and improve
the quality of Federal and state oversight.
Advocates recommends that the Subcommittee embrace the Motorcoach
Enhanced Safety Act of 2007, S. 453. It had broad support in the last
Congress and should be a top priority for this Committee and for Senate
floor action. This legislation will ensure that motorcoach safety is
put on an equal footing with passenger car and airline occupant safety
by requiring basic safety improvements on reasonable timelines for U.S.
DOT rulemaking action. The outcome in just several years would be fewer
motorcoach crashes with fewer injuries and deaths.
We further recommend, however, that additional provisions be added
to S. 453 to address the need for the imposition of criminal penalties
for persons who illegally continue to operate as a motor carrier after
having been ordered to cease operations, to establish a performance
standard for retreaded tires used on commercial motor vehicles, and to
require event data recorders (EDRs) on motorcoaches to assist crash
investigators in reconstructing how and why each motorcoach crash
occurs. NTSB has repeatedly called for EDRs as critically important to
passenger transportation safety.\45\
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\45\ See, NTSB Recommendation H-99-53, reissued as one of the NTSB
recommendations in the recently published report on the motorcoach
crash of the Bluffton University baseball team, ``Motorcoach Override
of Elevated Exit Ramp Interstate 75, Atlanta, Georgia, March 2, 2007,''
op. cit.
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Thank you for the opportunity to provide this information to the
Subcommittee on a major safety problem. Advocates looks forward to
working with the Subcommittee and the full Committee on these issues,
and I am prepared to respond to any questions you may have.
Attachments
Motorcoach Crashes & Fires Since 1990
150 Motorcoach Crashes & Fires--At Least 323 Deaths, 2,470 Injuries
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Location Crash Description
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3-21-11 Littleton, NH Motorcoach traveling from Quebec
to Boston on I-93 rolls onto its
side and into the median after
the driver loses control in icy
conditions--23 injured.
3-14-11 East Brunswick, NJ Motorcoach traveling on the New
Jersey turnpike drives into the
median, strikes an overpass, and
slams into an embankment on the
side of the road--2 killed, 41
injured.
3-12-11 Bronx, NY Motorcoach swerves, rolls onto its
side, and skids along a guardrail
before ramming into a support
pole--15 killed, 18 injured.
2-28-11 Hagerstown, MD Pickup truck crosses the median on
I-70 and slams into a motorcoach
on the shoulder of the
interstate--1 killed, 6 injured.
2-27-11 Homosassa, FL Motorcoach and passenger vehicle
collide--1 killed.
2-21-11 San Bernardino, CA Motorcoach carrying Korean church
youth group drifts into opposing
lane on California 189 highway,
plummets down an embankment, and
slams into a tree--1 killed, 23
injured.
1-12-11 Palo Alto, CA Motorcoach carrying 35 Japanese
tourists catches on fire, causing
heavy heat damage to the engine
area and extensive smoke damage
in the passenger area.
1-11-11 Bucyrus, OH Motorcoach carrying the University
of Mount Union wrestling team
collides with a snow plow when
the motorcoach tries to pass the
vehicle on U.S. Highway 30--1
killed, 4 injured.
9-29-10 Bethesda, MD Motorcoach carrying tourists,
including children, near I-270
crashes through guardrail on a
skyramp and falls down a 45-foot
embankment, rolling over once--1
killed, 12 injured.
9-29-10 Tucson, AZ Motorcoach carrying prison inmates
rear-ends a construction vehicle
on I-10--2 injured.
9-28-10 Charlestown, WV Car crosses centerline and
collides head-on with motorcoach,
causing the bus to go over an
embankment and roll onto its
side--21 injured.
9-26-10 East Ridge, TN Motorcoach transporting college
students is struck by car on I-
75--16 injured.
9-18-10 Sanger, TX Motorcoach en route from Dallas to
Oklahoma City crashes into a
highway barrier, ejecting some
passengers through windows that
broke from the impact--18
injured.
9-12-10 Tillamook, OR Tour bus catches fire on Highway
101--8 injured.
9-11-10 Syracuse, NY Motorcoach traveling from
Philadelphia to Toronto crashes
when the driver, using his own
GPS device, attempts to drive
under low clearance railway
bridge--4 killed, 20 injured.
8-14-10 Englewood, NJ A New York-bound motorcoach
heading to the Port Authority Bus
Terminal and a police cruiser
collide--3 injured.
8-10-10 Pleasantville, PA A motorcoach heading back to
Johnstown from casinos in
Harrisburg and a car collide on
Route 56--1 killed.
8-08-10 Cedar City, UT Motorcoach carrying Japanese
tourists rolls over on I-15--3
killed, 11 injured.
8-08-10 Polk County, TN Motorcoach and a car collide on
Highway 64--1 killed.
8-04-10 Eau Claire, WI Motorcoach and moped collide.
7-22-10 Fresno, CA Motorcoach carrying 36 people from
Los Angeles to Sacramento strikes
an overturned SUV, slams into
concrete center divider, clips
another vehicle, travels off the
right shoulder of the highway and
down a 15-foot embankment before
hitting a tree--6 killed/20
injured.
6-24-10 Atlantic City, NJ A motorcoach carrying 50 gamblers
from New York City's Chinatown to
the seaside casino resort crashes
into two other vehicles-- 24
injured.
6-21-10 Rosemead, CA Motorcoach is involved in a head-
on collision after two passenger
cars collide into each other and
the impact pushes them into
incoming traffic--23 injured.
6-10-10 Florence, KY Motorcoach fire breaks out on a
bus headed from Detroit to
Tennessee--1 injured.
6-03-10 Middletown, NJ Motorcoach flips over near I-114
after the driver fell asleep at
the wheel.
6-02-10 Lynchburg, VA Two motorcoaches catch fire due to
an engine component problem,
causing more than $135,000 in
damage, on the Liberty University
campus.
5-24-10 Dearborn, MI Motorcoach fire along eastbound I-
94 closes two lanes, backs up
traffic for a quarter mile.
5-20-10 High Point, NC Motorcoach collides with van on
N.C. Highway 62--2 killed.
4-26-10 Brunswick, GA Motorcoach carrying high school
band students crashes on I-95--10
injured.
4-24-10 Rogers, AK Motorcoach carrying church members
returning from a retreat in
Little Rock, AK rolls over on I-
40--2 killed/17 injured.
3-24-10 Orlando, FL Motorcoach is rear-ended by a Walt
Disney World tour bus near the
entrance of Epcot theme park--8
injured
3-16-10 Campbellton, TX A Mexican motorcoach traveling
from San Antonio to Matamoros,
Mexico and carrying 40 people
overturns along a southern Texas
highway--2 killed/30 injured.
3-05-10 Sacaton, AZ Motorcoach en route from the
central Mexican state of
Zacatecas to Los Angeles rolls
over on I-10 South--6 killed/16
injured.
2-19-10 Buford, GA Several motorcoaches carrying 6th
grade students from Greenville,
SC to Atlanta, GA are involved in
a chain reaction bus crash--3
injured.
2-13-10 Caddo Parish, LA A pickup truck drifts into
oncoming traffic and crashes head-
on into a motorcoach carrying
country music star Trace Adkins--
2 killed/at least 5 injured.
1-26-10 Carbondale, IL Motorcoach crashes into the wall
of the University Place Shopping
Center--4 injured.
12-20-09 LeRoy, NY Motorcoach en route from New York
City to Toronto slides off
Interstate 90 after the driver
nodded off.
12-19-09 Gore Hill, MT Motorcoach en route from Helena to
Great Falls collides with the
rear of a pickup truck on
Interstate 15--3 injured.
12-06-09 Glen, NY Motorcoach carrying the rock band
Weezer slides on ice, hits the
median and some reflective posts,
crosses over the median, goes
over a guardrail and lands in a
ditch--2 injured.
12-05-09 Casper, WY Motorcoach crashes into an
overturned tractor-trailer
blocking Interstate 25 in central
Wyoming--1 killed/at least 40
injured.
12-04-09 Greenville, SC Motorcoach carrying South Carolina
students home from a field trip
runs off the road and into trees--
15 injured.
11-24-09 Oakland, CA Motorcoach catches fire closing
several westbound lanes along the
eastern span of the Bay Bridge.
11-20-09 Richmond, VA Motorcoach carrying Miley Cyrus'
crew drifts off the road and
overturns--1 killed/9 injured.
11-18-09 Austin, MN Motorcoach carrying mostly senior
citizens swerves off the freeway
and rolls into a ditch after the
driver suffered an aneurysm--2
killed/21 injured.
11-13-09 Warrensburg, NY Motorcoach carrying more than 30
students from a Montreal College
crashes through a guard rail and
lands on the median on I-87 after
the driver fell asleep at the
wheel--8 injured.
11-11-09 Chatham County, GA Motorcoach fire begins in rear
tire axle, engulfing the
motorcoach in flames.
10-31-09 Henry County, GA 2 the I-675 merge, flips twice and
comes to a rest on its side,
injuring over a dozen students.
10-10-09 McCammon, ID Motorcoach carrying 54 high school
band students crashes. Band
instructor grabbed the wheel when
she saw the driver slumped
forward and the motorcoach
veering off the road. The band
instructor is fatally injured in
the crash and dozens are injured.
9-27-09 Tampa, FL Motorcoach carrying church group
from Sarasota to Gatlinburg,
Tennessee involved in chain
reaction crash--14 taken to
hospital.
9-21-09 Columbus, OH Motorcoach carrying incoming
college students crashes into a
dump truck, severing the driver's
right leg.
9-21-09 Cranbury, NJ Motorcoach crashes into tractor-
trailer along the New Jersey
turnpike--6 injured.
9-18-09 Plymouth Twp, MI Motorcoach catches fire while
traveling from Toronto to Chicago
along westbound M-14.
9-13-09 Pleasantville, NJ Motorcoach catches fire while
driving along the westbound lanes
of the Atlantic City Expressway,
near exit 5.
9-06-09 Newburyport, MA Motorcoach catches fire while
traveling northbound from New
England to Main along 1-95. The
fire is believed to have been
caused by a rear tire blowout.
9-02-09 Houston, TX Motorcoach driver crashes into a
concrete barrier on the N.
Freeway HOV lane--6 injured.
8-17-09 Houston, TX Motorcoach traveling from Laredo
to Houston catches fire. Driver
is ticketed for expired license.
8-04-09 Dodge County, WI Motorcoach carrying Special
Olympics athletes crashes into a
guardrail and turns over--8
injured.
7-30-09 Moberly, MO Motorcoach carrying high school
students catches fire after a
tires blows out along Highway 63--
2 injured.
7-16-09 Toledo, OH Motorcoach pulls over on I-75
south after catching fire. The
driver noticed smoke coming from
the rear wheel well.
7-13-09 Riley County, KS Motorcoach carrying job corps
students is hit by a semi truck--
at least 20 injured.
7-09-09 Lauderdale County, Motorcoach carrying church youth
MS blows tire, flips 3 times and
lands on its side--2 killed/27
injured.
7-05-09 Lake George, NY Motorcoach rolls on its side and
crashes into sledge rock on the
left side of the highway--1
killed/8 injured.
7-03-09 Madison, WI Motorcoach carrying 80 passengers
crashes along Highway 151--17
injured.
6-26-09 Toledo, OH Motorcoach carrying high school
youth orchestra strikes the back
of a semi and crashes along I-80--
at least 1 injured.
6-21-09 Indianapolis, IN Motorcoach carrying Canadian semi-
pro football team crashes into
SUV--1 killed/11 injured.
6-06-09 South Strabane Twp, Motorcoach rear-ends a tractor-
PA trailer--6 injured.
5-19-09 Fairfax, VA 3 motorcoaches carrying staff and
students from Harrisonburg, VA
elementary school involved in
chain reaction crash--37 injured.
5-14-09 Carbon County, PA Motorcoach is heavily damaged
after fire that began in the
engine of the vehicle.
5-03-09 Winona County, MN 2 motorcoaches carrying Winona
County DARE students from a
Minnesota Twins game involved in
chain reaction crash--2
hospitalized and dozens injured.
5-03-09 Montgomery, AL Motorcoach carrying 29 passengers,
mostly children, catches fire
after brake defect.
5-02-09 Perris, CA Motorcoach carrying 28 people
aboard crashes returning from
Cinco de Mayo activity sponsored
by city of Colton--all 28
injured.
4-27-09 Lincoln, AL Motorcoach crashes after tire
blows out--21 injured.
4-07-09 Near Franksville, WI Motorcoach catches fire and causes
major back-up along I-94.
4-03-09 Round Rock, TX Motorcoach carrying 42 high school
band students crashes--2 injured.
3-30-09 Millard County, UT Motorcoach carrying 52 high school
choir students crashes--4
injured.
3-27-09 Franklin County, GA Motorcoach carrying 40 University
of New Hampshire college students
catches fire after tire blows
out.
3-05-09 Maysville, NC 3 Motorcoaches carrying 59 U.S.
Marines in chain-reaction crash--
14 injured.
2-19-09 Beckett, MA Motorcoach carrying minor league
hockey team crashes--5 injured.
2-15-09 West Haven, CT Motorcoach rear-ends another
motorcoach--128 injuries.
2-07-09 Honolulu, HI Motorcoach strikes and kills
pedestrian standing at a marked
crosswalk.
2-04-09 Belleplain, NJ Motorcoach rear-ends box truck.
1-30-09 Dolan Springs, AZ Motorcoach carrying Chinese
tourists crashes near Hoover Dam--
7 killed/10 injured.
1-23-09 Near Donegal, PA Motorcoach carrying tourists
catches fire after tire blows out
along PA turnpike.
12-26-08 Corona, NM Motorcoach crashes in inclement
weather--2 killed/others injured.
12-19-08 Seattle, WA Motorcoach carrying 80 young
adults crashes through guardrail--
minor injuries.
10-05-08 Williams, CA Motorcoach traveling to casino
resort crashes--9 killed/35
injured.
8-10-08 Primm, NV Motorcoach crashes after tire
failure--29 injured.
8-10-08 Tunica, MS Motorcoach crashes and roof
collapses during rollover--3
killed.
8-08-08 Sherman, TX Motorcoach carrying 55 Vietnamese-
American pilgrims crashes after
blowing a tire, skidding off of
highway, and hitting guardrail--
17 killed/40 injured.
5-11-08 Mount Vernon, MO Motorcoach tour bus carrying
gospel singer crashes--1 killed/7
injured.
4-05-08 Albertville, MN Motorcoach carrying students and
chaperones home from a band trip
to Chicago crashes, killing a 16
year-old student and injuring
dozens.
1-17-08 Primm, NV Motorcoach crashes and catches
fire--25 injured.
1-06-08 Mexican Hat, UT Motorcoach carrying 51 passengers
ran off curvy road, rolled
several times, roof was split
open, and tires were stripped
off. Passengers were thrown from
the bus. A contributing factor
was the driver's negotiation of
the turn--9 killed.
1-02-08 Victoria, TX Motorcoach crashes probably due to
driver fatigue--1 killed.
1-02-08 Henderson, NC Motorcoach crashes into tractor-
trailer--50 injured.
11-25-07 Forrest City, AR Motorcoach crashes--3 killed/15
injured.
6-25-07 Bowling Green, KY Motorcoach crashes probably do to
driver fatigue--2 killed/66
injured.
3-02-07 Atlanta, GA Motorcoach carrying Bluffton
University baseball team crashes
through an overpass bridge wall
and fell onto Interstate 75
landing on its side--7 killed/21
injured.
5-20-07 Clearfield, PA Motorcoach crashes--2 killed/25
injured.
9-06-06 Auburn, MA Motorcoach rollover crash--34
injured.
8-28-06 Westport, NY Motorcoach rollover crash--4
killed/48 injured.
3-30-06 Houston, TX Motorcoach carrying girls' soccer
team crashes and overturns--2
killed/more injured.
10-25-05 San Antonio, TX Motorcoach crashes into two 18-
wheelers after tire failure--1
killed/3 injured.
10-16-05 Osseo, WI Motorcoach crashes--4 killed/35
injured.
9-23-05 Wilmer, TX Motorcoach carrying 44 assisted
living facility residents and
nursing staff as part of the
evacuation in anticipation of
Hurricane Rita caught fire. 23
killed/of 21 injured.
7-25-05 Baltimore, MD Motorcoach crashes--33 killed.
1-29-05 Geneseo, NY Motorcoach crashes--3 killed/20
injured.
11-14-04 Alexandria, VA Motorcoach carrying 27 high school
students crashes--11 injured.
10-09-04 Turrell, AR Motorcoach crashes--14 killed/15
injured.
8-06-04 Jackson, TN Motorcoach crashes--2 killed/18
injured.
6-24-04 Phoenix, AZ Motorcoach crashes--1 killed/38
injured.
5-24-04 Anahuac, TX Motorcoach crashes--1 killed.
2-22-04 North Hudson, NY Motorcoach crashes--47 injured.
11-12-03 Apache Co., AZ Motorcoach crashes--44 injured.
10-13-03 Tallulah, LA Motorcoach crashes into tractor-
trailer--8 killed/7 injured.
2-14-03 Hewitt, TX Motorcoach crashes--5 killed/
others injured.
10-01-02 Nephi, UT Motorcoach crashes--6 killed/20
injured.
6-23-02 Victor, NY Motorcoach crashes--5 killed/41
injured.
6-09-02 Loraine, TX Motorcoach crashes into tractor-
trailer--3 killed/29 injured.
4-24-02 Kinder, LA Motorcoach crashes--4 killed and
driver medically incapacitated.
10-03-01 Manchester, TN Motorcoach crashes--6 passengers
killed/unknown injuries.
8-19-01 Pleasant View, TN Motorcoach crashes--1 killed/38
injured.
5-28-01 Bay St. Louis, MS Motorcoach crashes--16 injured.
1-20-01 Allamuchy, NJ Motorcoach crashes--39 injured.
1-02-01 San Miguel, CA Motorcoach crashes--2 killed/3
injured
6-30-01 Fairplay, CO Motorcoach crashes--45 injured.
8-27-00 Eureka, MO Motorcoach crashes--25 injured.
12-21-99 Canon City, CO Motorcoach crashes--3 killed/57
injured.
5-09-99 New Orleans, LA Motorcoach crashes--22 killed/21
injured.
4-30-99 Braidwood, IL Motorcoach crashes--1 killed/23
injured.
3-02-99 Santa Fe, NM Motorcoach carrying 34 middle
school children crashes--2 killed/
35 injured.
12-24-98 Old Bridge, NJ Motorcoach crashes--8 killed/14
injured.
6-20-98 Burnt Cabins, PA Motorcoach crashes--7 killed/16
injured.
9-12-97 Jonesboro, AR Motorcoach crashes--1 killed/6
injured.
7-29-97 Stony Creek, VA Motorcoach crashes--1 killed/32
injured.
6-06-97 Albuquerque, NM Motorcoach crashes--1 killed/35
injured.
8-02-96 Roanoke Rapids, NC Motorcoach crashes due, driver was
fatigued--19 injured.
10-14-95 Indianapolis, IN Motorcoach crashes--2 killed/38
injured.
7-23-95 Bolton Landing, NY Motorcoach crashes--1 killed/30
injured.
4-24-94 Chestertown, NY Motorcoach crashes and rolls over--
1 killed/20 injured.
1-29-94 Pueblo, CO Motorcoach crashes and rolls over--
1 killed/8 injured.
9-17-93 Winslow Twp, NJ Motorcoach crashes because truck
drifted into lane--6 killed/8
injured.
9-10-93 Phoenix, AZ Motorcoach crashes and rolls over
because of driver fatigue--33
injured.
6-26-93 Springfield, MO Motorcoach crashes--1 killed/46
injured.
7-26-92 Vernon, NJ Motorcoach crashes--12 passengers
ejected/ 6 killed.
1-24-92 South Bend, IN Motorcoach crashes--2 killed/34
injured.
6-26-91 Donegal, PA Motorcoach crashes--1 killed/14
injured.
8-03-91 Caroline, NY Motorcoach crashes--33 injured.
2-02-91 Joliett, PA Motorcoach crashes--2 killed/44
injured.
5-18-90 Big Pine, CA Motorcoach crashes--2 killed/43
injured
------------------------------------------------------------------------
What Does the Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act (MESA) Do?
It Turns Decades of Critical NTSB Recommendations into Action
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Provision of MESA (S.
453/H.R. 873) Explanation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overview of Bill Issuance of Safety Standards:
Requires issuance of standards based on
comprehensive safety recommendations of
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
for improvements in occupant protection
systems, roof crush protection, design
standards, crash avoidance, passenger
evacuation, fire mitigation, on board
recorders (EOBRs), event data recorders
(EDRs), tire pressure monitoring, and
retreaded tires.
------------------------------------------------
Content of Safety Standards:
A number of specific aspects of safety
standards, and NTSB recommendations must be
adopted in regulation.
------------------------------------------------
Research and Testing:
Requires application of existing data, current
research and completed testing on available
technology to address safety problems; allows
agency's expertise to conduct additional
research and development where necessary.
------------------------------------------------
Retrofit of Motorcoaches Built Before Standards
Issued:Senate version contains a discretionary
retrofit provision while the House version
contains a compulsory retrofit provision.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Analysis of Specific Safety Provisions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safety Belts DOT to issue a regulation within 1 year of
enactment to require new motorcoaches be
equipped with seat belts at designated seating
positions. Based on NTSB Recommendations H-99-
47 & H-99-48, and on the NTSB Most Wanted
List.*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Firefighting Equipment DOT to issue a regulation within 1 year of
enactment to require the installation of
improved firefighting equipment to suppress
fires in new motorcoaches.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Roof Strength Standard DOT to issue a regulation within 1 year
(Senate) or 18 months (House) of enactment to
require that roofs of motorcoach provide
substantial improvement in protection against
deformation and intrusion to prevent serious
occupant injury. Based on NTSB Recommendation
H-99-50, and on the NTSB Most Wanted List.*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Anti-Ejection Window DOT to issue a regulation within 1 year
Glazing (Senate) or 18 months (House) of enactment to
require advanced window glazing that resists
breaking and prevents occupant ejection at all
passenger window locations in new
motorcoaches. Based on NTSB Recommendation H-
99-49, and on the NTSB Most Wanted List.*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reduced Rollover DOT to issue a regulation within 1 year
Crashes (Senate) or 2 years (House) of enactment that
requires new motorcoaches be equipped with
stability enhancing technologies, such as
electronic stability control or torque
vectoring, to provide crash avoidance
protection and reduce the incidence of
rollover crashes. Based on NTSB
Recommendations H-99-47, H-08-15, H-10-05 & H-
10-06.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tire Pressure DOT to issue a regulation, within 2 years of
Monitoring System enactment, to require motorcoachesto have
(TPMS) direct tire pressure monitoring systems that
perform at all times, at allspeeds, on all
road surfaces, and during all weather
conditions, after repairs, andon spare tires.
Based on NTSB Recommendation H-03-17.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safety Standards for Requires upgrade of 1973 standard for safety
New Tires performance of tires used onmotorcoaches,
including enhanced endurance and high-speed
performance tests.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Retrofit of Senate: Secretary has 2 years to assess the
Motorcoaches feasibility, costs and benefits of
retrofitting motorcoaches built prior to the
issuance of the safety standards required in
the Act. Retrofit of previously built
motorcoaches is entirely in the discretion of
the Secretary.
House: Motorcoaches are required to be
retrofitted with safety belts and firefighting
equipment 2 years after the regulation is
issued, or up to 5 years in the case that the
Secretary determines hardship exists.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fire Safety and DOT to evaluate, within 18 months, flammability
Emergency Evacuation standard for exterior components, smoke
suppression, resistance to wheel well fires,
passenger evacuation and automatic fire
suppression on motorcoaches; DOT to issue new
performance requirements for fire safety and
passenger evacuation within 3 years of
enactment. Based on NTSB Recommendations H-99-
09, H-07-01, H-07-04, H-07-05, H-07-06, H-07-
07, H-07-08 & H-07-11, and on the NTSB Most
Wanted List.*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seating Safety DOT to complete research within 2 years of
enactment on enhanced seat
compartmentalization to reduce the risk of
passengers being thrown from their seats and
injured within the motorcoach; DOT to issue a
regulation 4 years after enactment to improve
seating area compartmentalization. Based on
NTSB Recommendations H-99-47, H-99-48 & H-99-
50, and on the NTSB Most WantedList.*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interior Impact DOT to complete research within 2 years of
Protection enactment and issue a regulation not later
than 4 years after enactment to establish
requirements for enhanced occupant impact
protection for the interiors of new
motorcoaches. Based on NTSB Recommendations H-
99-48, H-99-50, H-09-23 & H-09-24.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crash Avoidance Complete research within 2 years of enactment
and issue a regulation not later than 4 years
after enactment to improve motorcoach crash
avoidance. Based on NTSB Recommendations H-08-
15, H-10-05 & H-10-06, and on the NTSB Most
Wanted List.*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Entrants Amends current law to prohibit registration of
Requirements new entrant motorcoach services providers
until DOT: (a) conducts a pre-authorization
safety audit within 90 days of receiving an
application for operating authority; (b)
performs a safetymanagement review; and (c)
new entrants pass a written proficiency exam
and disclose common relationships with other
carriers in past 3 years. Based on NTSB
Recommendation H-03-02.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reincarnated Carriers Amends current law to require new entrant motor
carriers to disclose prior ownership
relationships with previous motor carriers
within past 3 years; and authorizes Secretary
to suspend or revoke grant of registration
where motor carrier failed to disclose a
material fact in registration application.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oversight of Motorcoach Amends current law to require DOT to determine
Operators (Motor the safety fitness of providers of motorcoach
Carriers) services and assign a safety fitness rating to
carriers within 3 years; DOT is also required
to establish a process for monitoring the
safety performance of such providers and to
conduct periodic safety reviews to reassess
assigned safety ratings every 3 years. Based
on NTSB recommendations H-81-15, H-87-38 & H-
99-06.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Driver Training DOT to issue a final rule in the pending
minimum training curriculum requirements,
Docket No. FMCSA 2007-27748, within 18 months
(Senate) and 6 months (House); and, report to
Congress within 2 years on feasibility of
establishing training program certification
system. Based on NTSB Recommendation H-75-009.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CDL Testing DOT to issue a final rule in the pending
rulemaking on CDL Testing Standards, Docket
No. FMCSA 2007--27659, to require a more
stringent test of driver knowledge and driving
skills within 6 months.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CDL Report Senate: DOT to issue a regulation requiring
drivers of 9-15 passenger vans to be subject
to requirements for CDL and random drug and
alcohol testing. House: DOT is required to
report to Congress within 18 months with a
plan regarding which classes of drivers of 9-
15 passenger vans should be subject to current
requirements for CDL and random drug and
alcohol testing.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CDL Medical Certificate Requires DOT to develop prerequisites for
and Physical Fitness listing medical examiners on national
Oversight registry, including courses/materials, passing
grade on written exam, certification, ability
to comply;
Requires DOT to issue rule within 18 months of
enactment requiring examiners to submit the
medical exam form to the proper state
licensing agency;
Amends federal law to require that state
licensing agencies compare the medical exam
forms received from the medical examiner with
the information received from the driver in
order to reduce fraud;
Requires DOT to review the licensing agencies
of 10 states to assess the accuracy, validity
and timeliness of submission of physical and
medical reports.
DOT to establish National Registry of Medical
Examiners within 6 months of enactment.
Based on NTSB Recommendations H-99-06, H-01-21,
H-01-22 & H-01-24, among others, and on the
NTSB Most Wanted List.*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Electronic On-Board DOT to issue rule, within 1 year, to require
Recorders (EOBRs) EOBRs on all motorcoaches to enforce hours of
service and reduce driver fatigue. Based on
NTSB Recommendations H-90-28 & H-98-23, and on
the NTSB Most Wanted List.*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Event Data Recorders Provides that 1 year after enactment DOT shall
(EDRs) prescribe performance requirements for EDRs on
motorcoaches, including vehicle operations,
events and incidents, and system information
to be recorded by EDRs, and issue a rule to
implement the performance requirements within
2 years (Senate) or 3 years (House) of
enactment. Based on NTSB Recommendations H-99-
53 & H-99-54.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MCSAP Safety Inspection DOT to issue a regulation, within 3 years of
Programs enactment, that considers requiring states to
conduct annual inspections of commercial motor
vehicles designed or used to transport
passengers. Based on NTSB Recommendations H-81-
15, H-87-38, H-05-07, H-05-08 & Hwy-99-FH102.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prohibition of Provides that within 1 year of enactment, DOT
Distracted Driving must issue regulations on the use of
electronic or wireless devices by an
individual employed as the operator of a
motorcoach based on accident analysis,
research and other information. Basedon NTSB
Recommendation H-06-27, and on the NTSB Most
Wanted List.*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rental and Leasing Amends current law to include companies that
Companies rent and/or lease motorcoaches within the
definition of the term ``employer'' as defined
in 49 U.S.C. 31132.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Registration of Brokers House Only: Amends current law to include
transportation of passengers within the
requirement for registration by brokers.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)'s Most Wanted
Transportation Safety Improvements 2009-2010 identifies critical
changes needed to reduce transportation accidents and save lives.
Available athttp://www3.ntsb.gov/recs/brochures/MostWanted_2010.pdf.
Safety Features Required by the Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act Are
Already Available and Voluntarily Installed in Some Motorcoaches
Many of the safety measures required under the Motorcoach Enhanced
Safety Act (MESA), S. 453 and H.R. 873,are already found on some newly
manufactured motorcoaches. A survey of motorcoach manufacturer websites
revealsthat brochures and marketing materials tout many of the MESA
safety measures as features or options on somemotorcoach models.
Regulatory uniformity is needed to ensure that lifesaving safety
systems such as seat belts,stronger roof strength, anti-ejection
glazing and tire pressure monitoring systems among others are not
merelyoptional equipment, but are standard features provided for the
protection of every passenger on every motorcoach.
Just as there is federal safety oversight of passenger airlines,
there needs to be federal safety oversight of motorcoachsafety. Each
year, over 750 million passenger trips are taken on motorcoaches that
carry up to 55 passengers. Theresults of a crash can be catastrophic.
While motorcoach manufacturers currently offer on a voluntary basis
certainsafety features on specific models, those safety features are
not subject to federal standards that establish minimumperformance
requirements. Passage of MESA would ensure that safety features on
motorcoaches would performeffectively in the event of a crash.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safety Features Offered on Some Motorcoach
MESA Safety Feature Models *
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Occupant Protection
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lap/shoulder seat belts Volvo and Van Hool buses are equipped
at all seating with 3-point belts.
positions Prevost buses are equipped with seat
belt anchorages.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Anti-ejection advanced Prevost has patented frameless
window glazing thermopane side windows.
MCI provides laminated glass windows
to protect against ejection.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Improved roof crush Prevost has fiber composite and
safety standards stainless steel outer shells.
Volvo models feature enhanced roof
crush strength to minimize roof collapsing.
Van Hool models are rollover certified
in accordance with European requirements.
Girardin models have reinforced
structural beams combined with steel roof
bows.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interior impact Volvo designs interiors that are soft
protection and free from protruding parts or sharp edges.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safety Technology
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rollover crash Prevost, Volvo, and MCI equip their
avoidance technology motorcoaches with electronic stability control
systems (ESC) and Anti-lock Braking Systems
(ABS).
Van Hool buses are equipped with ABS
and have the option for ESC.
Setra Coaches are equipped with ABS
but not ESC.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Collision avoidance Volvo offers Front Impact Protection
technologies (FIP).
Van Hool offers an optional lane
departure warning system.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fire Safety
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fire prevention and Prevost is equipped with automatic
smoke suppression fire suppression.
MCI is equipped with a fire-
suppression system and a fully multiplexed
solid-state electrical system.
Van Hool offers an optional fire
suppression system.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fire extinguishers and Glaval Bus is equipped with a safety
other available fire- package, including fire extinguisher, First
fighting equipment Aid kit, triangles, and backup alarm.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Emergency evacuation Prevost models have escape hatches.
features including Glaval Bus models have escape hatches
updated emergency exit and emergency duel pane egress windows.
designs and interior
lighting
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tire Safety
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Direct tire pressure Prevost is equipped with tire pressure
monitoring systems monitoring systems.
MCI and Van Hool buses are equipped
with integrated tire pressure monitoring
systems with always-on sensors.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Reference to a safety feature included on this chart does not indicate
that all motorcoach models of a specificmanufacturer are equipped with
the same safety feature or technology, but only reflects that the
safety feature ortechnology is available on at least one of the
motorcoach models built by that manufacturer either as an option or
asstandard equipment.
______
Supplement to Testimony of John Claybrook, President Emeritus, Public
Citizen and Co-Chair, Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates)
Cost of Lifesaving Technologies in the Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act
are Minimal
The MESA bill proposes to provide motorcoach passengers the same
type of life-saving technologies that are already available and
standard equipment in passenger vehicles. These technologies are
already being offered and advertised as options by a number of
motorcoach manufacturers. The technologies include seatbelts, enhanced
protective interiors, collision avoidance devices, electronic stability
control systems, tire pressure monitoring systems, crash worthiness
protections, and event data recorders. However, the public has no
assurance of the performance quality or effectiveness of these systems
because they are not required to meet any minimum government safety
standards.
The cost of building-in these safety features for new vehicles is
minimal compared to the cost in terms of lives lost in just a single
major motorcoach crash. For example, the recent March 12, 2011 bus
crash in New York resulted in 15 fatalities. Based on the current
Department of Transportation (DOT) value of a statistical life, set at
$5.8 million, that bus crash alone generated $87 million in costs just
for the fatalities suffered. This figure does not include the costs
associated with the numerous injuries to the surviving passengers or
the huge emotional toll on the families of those lost and injured. This
cost is astronomical even when compared with the motorcoach industry's
grossly inflated per vehicle estimated cost of $80,000 to $89,000 for
adoption of all of the safety advances required in the MESA bill and
some additional improvements not included in the bill. In other terms,
the costs associated with the loss of life alone in the New York bus
crash could pay for all of the safety advances proposed for a fleet of
over 1,000 new motorcoaches; even using the Bus Associations wild cost
estimates. Our research has indicated that the actual costs are well
below those quoted by the industry.
A number of the safety technologies included in the MESA bill have
already been developed in other vehicles and are being voluntarily
installed in motorcoaches by a number of companies. For example, the
Bolt Bus (a collaboration between Greyhound and Peter Pan Bus Lines)
already has seatbelts installed in many of its vehicles and Greyhound
announced in 2009 the purchase of a new 140 bus fleet equipped with
seatbelts and advanced seating which provides occupant
compartmentalization. In addition, some new buses include electronic
stability control (MCI, Prevost, Volvo, Van Hool), advanced glazing
(Prevost, MCI), occupant compartmentalization (Prevost), greater roof
protection (Volvo, Prevost, Van Hool, Girardin), tire pressure
monitoring systems (Prevost, MCI, Van Hool), and some form of fire
protection and suppression systems (MCI, Volvo, Prevost, Van Hool).
Recent information from suppliers and manufacturers indicate costs of
less than $1,400 for electronic stability control, $1,115 or less for
advanced window glazing, $600 for electronic on-board recorders, under
$3,000 for fire suppression systems and as little as $500 for fire
protection. An independent review and analysis of vehicle supplier
costs and advertised claims by motorocoach manufacturers finds that
this subset of safety technologies could be attained at a cost of about
$6,500 per motorcoach, or just over 1 percent (1 percent) of the cost
of a new motorcoach and far less than the overblown $30,000 cost figure
for these same items claimed by the motorcoach industry. While we
cannot obtain accurate data for other cost items, it is certain that
the actual costs will be found to be far less than those asserted by
the motorcoach industry. Furthermore, with widespread implementation of
these safety technologies, after the first year or two, suppliers and
manufacturers will see the significant cost reductions associated with
mass production and production experience.
Just to put the Bus Association's cost claims in perspective, even
assuming hypothetically that the industry cost estimate of $89,000 is
valid, the cost of improving the safety of motorcoaches is just pennies
per passenger, per trip. A new motorcoach makes over 400,000 passenger
trips \1\ during its useful life,\2\ that means that the additional
cost for all the MESA bill safety improvements, at the inflated
industry cost estimates, is only 22 cents per passenger trip. Is there
any passenger who would not gladly pay an extra 22 cents for major
safety improvements? And because the actual costs are far less than the
industry claims, the real cost for the MESA bill safety improvements
will be just pennies per trip.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Bourquin, P., ``Motorcoach Census Update 2010,'' Nathan
Associates, sponsored by the American Bus Association (Dec. 8, 2010).
\2\ Motorcoach Definition, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 FR
50958, (Aug 18, 2010) (``The service life of a motorcoach can be 20
years or longer'').
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The Motorcoach Industry Cost Estimates are Exaggerated, Lack
Credibility and Include Phantom Mandates
The motorcoach industry cost figures clearly are highly inflated
and unreliable. The motorcoach industry has recently circulated their
opinion on the costs that will be associated with the adoption of the
safety measures included in the MESA bill. The correct term is
``opinion'' because for many of the safety features the industry
provides limited or no support for the inflated cost figures and cites
no references for the sources of their estimates. The anonymous and
undated document disseminated by the motorcoach industry, called the
``per-bus estimated cost'', estimates that the improvements required in
the MESA bill will cost between $80,000 and $89,000 per motorcoach.
This ludicrous estimate, nearly 20 percent of the current cost of a new
motorcoach, is yet another example of a tactic used by an industry that
opposes safety and occupant protection--inflating the real cost of
safety technology. Furthermore, the bus trade association which is
purposefully throwing around these absurd and exaggerated cost figures,
has presented no direct data on vehicle safety costs because this is
proprietary information known to the suppliers and manufacturers and is
information not shared with the trade association that lobbies on
behalf of the companies as a whole. It is also not evident whether the
numbers represent cost or price information--a big difference. In the
past, this very same approach has been used by automobile manufacturers
to oppose airbags and electronic stability control systems.
The most poignant example is the regulation of airbags in passenger
vehicles. At the time when rulemaking on airbags was being initiated,
industry representatives stated that the cost per airbag would be
between $1,200 and $1,500. Later, information obtained by a Member of
Congress who demanded that General Motors supply its true cost figures
revealed that the actual cost of manufacturing frontal airbags
initially was between $150 and $175. The industry was quoting prices 10
times their actual cost. Today, as a result of mass production and
further technological improvements, the per-unit manufacturing cost of
far more sophisticated airbag units is only about $30. Furthermore,
despite the adamant opposition of industry to the airbag mandate, which
they fought for over twenty years, today it is tough to find even a
single contemporary motor vehicle advertisement or sales pitch that
does not tout the safety performance of the vehicle's airbag systems.
Another example of this industry tactic of inflating costs occurred
in the regulation of electronic stability control systems or ESC. These
were required as part of the 2005 Safe, Accountable, Flexible,
Efficient, Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-
LU),\3\ whose safety advancements were crafted by the Senate Commerce,
Science, and Transportation Committee and this subcommittee. Before
that legislation was enacted, manufacturers asserted that the cost of
including ESC systems was very high. An earlier Australian government
study found that auto manufacturers were charging as much as $2,254 for
ESC as a vehicle option. The Australian government study identified the
``approximate reasonable cost'' of ESC as $649. In opposing the
SAFETEA-LU provision, manufacturers claimed much higher costs for ESC
but NHTSA found, in a 2005 teardown analysis, that the estimated
incremental per-vehicle cost of ESC was actually only $58.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Pub. L. 109-59 (Aug. 10, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The examples of airbags and ESC technology costs point out that not
only does industry inflate costs of safety technology, but industry
cost estimates are also unreliable because they omit any consideration
of the fact that with regulation and mass production come reductions in
per-unit production costs due to production efficiencies and per-unit
savings. Moreover, to be credible, cost estimates from industry need to
include details indicating if the costs quoted are retail or production
costs, a distinguishing fact not found in many of the motorcoach
industry's cost claims. Prices for voluntarily installed systems vary
with the number of units manufactured and the level of quality and
safety specified by the manufacturer. Manufacturers are not required to
guarantee a specified level of safety performance for unregulated,
optional equipment, and can reduce costs by lowering the level of
safety they provide. The establishment of Federal standards for these
devices ensure a minimum performance capability for the safety of
passengers and a level playing field for motorcoach companies.
Other examples of the gross overestimation and overstatement of
technology and component costs include the following that have been
researched with suppliers and manufacturers:
Electronic Stability Control: The motorcoach industry claims
that it will cost as much as $3,000 for electronic stability
control (ESC) systems even though suppliers of motorcoach ESC
systems indicated a retail price to manufacturers of $1,350;
Advanced Glazing: The motorcoach industry cost document
cites a cost of $7,000 for laminated glass in all motorcoach
windows to protect occupants from ejection and cuts, even
though equipping an exemplar motorcoach, the MCI J4500, with
advanced glazing was found, at retail, to cost no more than
$1,115 more than current standard glass, less than one sixth
the cost claimed by industry;
Electronic On-Board Recorders: The motorcoach industry
claims a cost of $2,500 for EOBRs, but the FMCSA identified the
actual cost for EOBRs to be between $500 and $600;
Fire Suppression: The motorcoach industry cost document
includes the cost for an automatic fire suppression system at
$6,000, but retailers of these systems indicate that current
state-of-the-art factory installed fire suppression systems
cost less than $3,000;
Fire Protection: The motorcoach industry claims that it will
cost $11,000 to provide enhanced interior fire protection but
textile manufacturers state that the addition of a ``flame
block'' to new interiors would add only $2 per yard of
material, resulting in a total cost of less than $500 to
enhance interior fire protection, thus making the industry cost
claim 22 times the actual cost.
What is even more shocking is that the industry supports including
better fire suppression and fire protection in motorcoaches while at
the same time opposing these requirements in the MESA bill. In November
of 2010, a motorcoach industry spokesman stated that there was
``absolute agreement by all parties [attendees of the Fire in Vehicles
Conference] on the need for the early detection of high heat conditions
that can ignite a fire.'' \4\ Among other things the motorcoach
industry called for using fire resistant materials in bus construction
and installation of fire suppression systems, requirements that are
covered in the MESA bill. Given the motorcoach industry's past
opposition to the MESA bill, the industry's endorsement of quick
legislative and regulatory action on these issues was even more
surprising. Yet, the industry cost document designed for its lobbying
campaign against the legislation includes grossly inflated costs of up
to $17,000 associated with fire protection as evidence in opposition to
the bill even though the industry has stated its ``absolute agreement''
regarding the necessity for these safety measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ ``Preventing bus fires: What must be done?'', BusRide. Nov. 22,
2010, available at http://busride.com/2010/11/preventing-bus-fires-
what-must-be-done/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to grossly inflating the costs of a number of items
that are required in the MESA bill, and ignoring efficiencies that
reduce production costs, the motorcoach industry cost document includes
the costs of technologies and items that are either not required by the
MESA bill or which are subject to future research and agency decision
so that any cost estimate is entirely speculative since the ultimate
requirement is unknown. For example, the motorcoach industry originally
claimed a cost of $4,500 for the inclusion of improved fuel systems,
enhanced conspicuity and adaptive cruise control. However, none of
these improvements are required in the proposed bill.
The industry also included cost claims for items that would be
subject to further agency study, at the behest of the motorcoach
industry, so no decision as to specific performance requirements would
be made by the agencies until 2 or 3 years later. Nevertheless, without
knowing what will eventually be required, if anything, the motorcoach
industry has estimated that the per-bus cost for improved exits for
evacuation, an automatic fire suppression system, emergency interior
lighting, improved compartmentalization, enhanced interior impact
protection and collision avoidance systems will cost a minimum total of
$19,000 per vehicle. These items are all subject to a further 2-3 years
of research and examination before any rulemaking would begin. This
makes any assertion of cost by the industry without knowing the
specific requirements highly speculative.
In the latest update of their cost claims, the industry continues
to claim costs for items which are already the subject of regulatory
action that is, they are very likely to be required in final rules
regardless of enactment of the MESA bill. These items include $15,000
for seatbelts, $2,500 for electronic on-board recorders (EOBR), and
$600 for upgraded tires. All of these items are currently the subject
of notices of proposed rulemaking issued either by NHTSA or FMCSA
within the last year, illustrating that DOT has identified these items
as important safety features. Even for these essential, long overdue
safety improvements, the industry has inflated the cost, for example
while the industry claimed a cost of $2,500 for EOBRs, FMCSA identified
the actual cost for EOBRs to be between $500 and $600.
Finally, the industry indicated at several points in their cost
claims that retrofit costs for several of the safety enhancements would
be triple the already inflated and speculative costs for those same
items in new motorcoaches. This claim is made despite the fact that the
motorcoach industry has been successful in making retrofitting entirely
discretionary instead of mandatory in the bill. That means that none of
the technological safety improvements required by the MESA bill for new
motorcoaches would be applicable to existing motorcoaches, that is,
motorcoaches built prior to the issuance of the final rule, unless the
Secretary of Transportation separately determines that such safety
improvements are warranted for older motorcoaches. The only safety
improvement that the Secretary and NHTSA have indicated might
potentially be considered is for the retrofit of seatbelts and, even in
that case, it would only apply to the most recently built motorcoaches,
i.e., only to motorcoaches built after the date the final rule is
issued and before the date on which full compliance is required. This
means that only a very limited number of motorcoaches would be subject
to any retrofit and some of those would probably be already equipped
with seatbelts anyway.
The industry cost claims related to motorcoach safety are highly
inflated, entirely speculative, undocumented, and most are just
incorrect. The recent New York bus crash and many others like it over
the years illustrate that even based on the industry's suspect cost
estimates, providing superior safety for motorcoach occupants can be
justified in terms of benefit/cost analysis by avoiding or preventing
just one serious crash. Research has shown that motorcoach safety
technologies are available and affordable. History illustrates how
widespread industry adoption of technology greatly increases the safety
of passenger vehicles and the affordability of these technologies.
Senator Lautenberg. We will do that. Thank you very much.
Mr. Medford and Ms. Ferro, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration has made substantial progress on only three of
the seven priority items outlined in DOT's 2009 Motorcoach
Safety Action Plan. But in light of recent accidents, how do we
expedite completing the remaining elements of the action plan,
Ms. Ferro? Again, I caution you to make the answers as short as
you can, please.
Ms. Ferro. Yes, sir. As you said, Mr. Medford and I will
share this answer.
Of the seven, four were FMCSA-specific. The one that is
outstanding is relating to the operating knowledge of
applicants, in effect, pre-application testing. That is an
element that we continue to work on. We did issue an NPR, and
we had our Motorcoach Safety Advisory Committee also recommend
components of what a pre-application knowledgeability test
would be for applicants for motorcoach passenger carrier
authority. That is still an element that is under review. You
are correct. It is not complete.
The other elements, electronic on-board recorders, cell
phones, and the vetting process to ensure a tighter screening,
in other words, raising the bar to come into the industry, are
well underway and we have every intent of completing them.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Medford, is there anything you want
to add to that?
Mr. Medford. I will just add, Senator, that the 2009 plan
that the Secretary directed be put together in terms of
research and regulation of the motorcoach is a complete rehaul
and makeover for bus safety. We have research in almost every
aspect of safety with respect to the bus and regulatory
activities started on those. I will just give you a quick list.
We are doing seat belts on buses.
We are doing electronic stability control research on buses
and ready to propose a regulation.
We have completed the research on both the side structural
integrity and the roof integrity on roof crush, and we are
ready to propose this year a regulation for that.
We have already proposed a regulation for all heavy-duty
trucks, or tires, which will account for both under-inflation,
high-speed performance, and load endurance that did not exist
before.
We have completed research on emergency egress with respect
to what it takes to make sure we get occupants during a crash
out quickly.
Senator Lautenberg. Are you satisfied with the pace of
things, Mr. Pantuso? Sorry. Mr. Medford?
Mr. Medford. I think we are dedicated to getting this done
as fast as we can. We have missed some of the milestones. And I
think what we have found is we have taken on a large effort in
order to get this done, and we are committed to moving as
quickly as we can, but we do want to do it based on good
science and good engineering.
Senator Lautenberg. We would appreciate an even faster
response, but we want it thorough. So we appreciate that.
Ms. Ferro--or Mr. Pantuso, the current system relies on
drivers to notify their employers if their driving privileges
are suspended, but because of this loophole, the bus driver in
the New York accident was able to hide his suspended license
from his employers and at least 11 other New York drivers,
including a school bus driver, were able to do the same thing.
What can we do here to make sure that we have a system in place
that alerts companies when one of their drivers has a suspended
license?
Ms. Ferro. Would you like me to start, Mr. Chairman?
Senator Lautenberg. Well, let me start with Mr. Pantuso,
please.
Mr. Pantuso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The issue of not
having adequate driver information is nothing new. When we look
back at the 1998 Mothers Day crash in New Orleans, there was a
lack of information about the driver, about his medical
condition. This accident that happened in New York is the same
information, just lack of information that is available many
times to the operator, to the owner of the company. We think
there has got to be much more vigorous information available.
It has got to be managed at the state level, but it has got to
be shared among states so that we do not see drivers moving
from state to state, bad drivers moving, to be employed by
operators who really do not know much about them other than the
fact that they have walked through the door with a current CDL
with a passenger endorsement.
We also think that passenger endorsement should be
something very special, should be much more rigorous than a
standard commercial driver's license, and should be looked at
differently by the agency and by the states.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you.
While I have a moment left here, I would ask Ms. Hersman a
question. The bus operator that crashed in New Jersey has a
driver safety record worse than 99.6 percent of all bus
companies. But the FMCSA gave the company a satisfactory
rating. Now, I think we have taken care of that with the
suspension that has been offered. So I do not know whether
there is anything else you would like to add to what has taken
place except to say that their license has been suspended.
Ms. Hersman. This is an issue that is consistent in
accident investigations. If you have an indication of problem
drivers or vehicles, the time to address it is when those
issues arise, not after a fatal accident occurs when you
conduct a full compliance review and then place an operator out
of service. The reason why this information is being collected
at the roadside is to give early indications of a problem, and
the reason why this driver was rated in the worst 99th
percentile was because of those roadside inspections where they
had violations of hours of service or problems with the driver
records.
Senator Lautenberg. So it was late and should never have
occurred. We cannot go back in time, but we can learn for the
future.
Now Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Hersman, many of the safety benefits in the Brown-
Hutchison legislation will be derived by rulemakings. These
rulemakings would require updates to bus safety technologies.
And I know you referred to some of these things in your
remarks. But is there a particular technology that you believe
would bring the greatest safety benefit if it was installed in
motorcoaches?
Ms. Hersman. There are a number of different technologies,
and the important thing is to do good research to quantify
those as far as the benefits. That is not the NTSB's mandate,
but it is the mandate of those agencies that actually
promulgate the rules.
We know that the technology exists. My minivan has adaptive
cruise control in it. It is 5 years old. We have mandates for
electronic stability control in passenger vehicles, but those
technologies are so important for heavy vehicles, for buses and
for trucks. If you are involved in a collision and you are hit
from the rear by a heavy truck or a heavy bus, the outcome will
be much more significant than if you are hit by a passenger
car.
We know that we have fatigue issues, and so identifying
lane departure warning systems, electronic stability control to
keep vehicles from rolling over, adaptive cruise control, and
advance collision warning systems--these technologies can
prevent the accidents from occurring in the first place. These
technologies do exist, and it is important that they be applied
to the vehicles that are most in need of them. That is why we
have this issue on our ``most wanted'' list.
Senator Thune. If you stay outside the realm of technology
improvements, what would be your top priority for DOT? In other
words, what more is there that the government could or should
do to keep bad drivers and dishonest carriers off the road?
Ms. Hersman. The NTSB has made recommendations that are on
our ``most wanted'' list about better oversight. These
recommendations are from 1999. For years before that, we looked
at this issue. Drivers and vehicles are very good indicators of
whether or not a company is going to have problems. Senator
Lautenberg just referred to the bad driving record of this
company in New Jersey. Unfortunately, we have seen time and
time again in our accident investigations that some of these
indicators are there. We know what the national average is for
out-of-service vehicles or out-of-service drivers, and when you
see companies that have two times the national average, and
three times the national average, that is a red flag that needs
to be addressed. We want to make sure that if companies have
drivers or vehicles that are at poor quality, that are giving
bad data at roadside inspections, that those companies be
placed out of service, and that they be issued unsatisfactory
ratings and those problems be addressed.
FMCSA has been working on CSA for many, many years, and
they have told us that CSA will likely address these issues,
but we have not seen that initiative yet.
Senator Thune. Let me ask Ms. Ferro. The FMCSA is working
to prevent carriers who have been previously placed out of
service from being granted operating authority under a
different name, and they are referred to as ``chameleon'' or
``reincarnated'' operators. At least that is the terminology
that is used in the industry. Do you believe that the new
applicant screening system is effective at catching these
operators when they try to re-enter the market? Is there
anything else that your agency ought to be working on in this
area?
Ms. Ferro. Senator Thune, yes. The vetting system that we
referred to that you referred with regard to reincarnated
entities or companies that are trying to evade enforcement
action currently applies only to household goods carriers and
passenger carrier authority applicants. We have found that
program to be very effective. What we are finding now is they
are being rejected time and again and looking for other ways to
get around--that small number of entities that is going to try
and continue to push the limits. Consequently, we have taken
action by identifying the carriers we have rejected and
researched whether there is ongoing activity either through our
violation database or their own advertising and gone after them
as unauthorized carriers.
The next step in a vetting program, as proposed in our
Fiscal Year 2012 budget, is in fact a vetting program that
applies to any applicant for authority, whether that is a
freight carrier, a passenger carrier or household goods. That
is the next step in this evolution in order to catch the entire
population. Again, it is a few perpetrators, but they, as we
have already seen, do serious damage and we have got to stop
them. So those are the best strategies right there.
Senator Thune. Let me ask Mr. Pantuso that question too
because, obviously, this has got to be a major issue among your
members. These entities give good actors a bad name, and I am
wondering how does your organization assess FMCSA's efforts to
keep these ``chameleon'' or ``reincarnated'' carriers off the
road?
Mr. Pantuso. Thank you very much, Senator. I think you are
right. They very much give us a bad name. When you look at the
history of the industry, we have a very safe history. It is a
very few carriers that give the industry the black eye.
When we look at the CSA system or the safety management
system, we think it is a far step above what has gone on
before, but we think there could be some changes. For example,
we think trucks and buses should be separated in that system.
There ought to be a different way to look at buses from trucks.
We think that the database should be searchable so that the
customer, whether it is an individual or whether it is somebody
who is chartering a bus, has the ability to go in and search in
a different way than currently exists those buses in their
area, which ones are the safest, which ones are the least safe.
We think that will go a long way to help the market drive the
bad folks out.
And we also think that when alerts appear, that somebody
should go and immediately visit that company.
Senator Thune. Thank you. I see my time has expired, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you all very much.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much.
Senator Udall?
STATEMENT OF HON. TOM UDALL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for
holding this hearing.
Mr. Medford, I wanted to focus a little bit on the issue of
seat belts, and I am pleased to hear you have initiated a
rulemaking to require seat belts in all motorcoach seating
positions. Do you have any data on seat belt use in
motorcoaches and should we be going further to ensure that not
only are seat belts available but are they used, and if so,
what additionally should be done?
Mr. Medford. Thank you, Senator Udall. It is a great
question.
We do not have, of course, any good data in the United
States since hardly any buses are equipped with seat belts. But
the best information that we have comes from Australia who has
had seat belts for many years. The latest information from
Australia is that about 20 percent of bus riders use the belts.
So we believe, based on what we know about passenger car
vehicles in the United States, that there is a lot of effort
that is needed by the state authorities which are really the
people that govern the use of belts in vehicles. It is both an
enforcement effort and an education effort that has to be
sustained for a long period of time. So I think we agree that
just putting the belts on the buses will not be a sufficient
safety strategy for us in the United States and that we will
need to work with States and authorities to find ways to
educate consumers and to get States to monitor and perhaps pass
laws that affect seat belt use.
Senator Udall. What did the Australian data show, exactly?
Mr. Medford. The only thing I recall from the Australian
data--and we can follow back if we have better information--is
that they just surveyed the use in Australia and found that it
was low. I do not know what strategies they have used to
increase that, but we would provide that for the record for
you. I am just not familiar with it.
Senator Udall. That would be great if you would do that.
Ms. Claybrook, do you have any thought on the seat belt
issue?
Ms. Claybrook. Well, you know, you cannot take off in an
airplane without having your belt fastened. So, if the bus
driver is not going to drive the bus until everyone has their
belt on, then you are going to have 100 percent usage. And
these are in interstate commerce. So I see no reason why there
cannot be a federal requirement, just as there is for an
aircraft, that you have to have your belt buckled. And it
works. You know, it works. I think that to say that this has to
be a state authority issue--how is the state going to enforce
this? I think it has to be enforced through a federal rule.
That would be my reaction to your question. I think it is a
great question and I would certainly hope that this would
occur.
Senator Udall. Do any of the other panelists have any
thought on this issue on her comment or any other part of this?
Yes, Mr. Pantuso?
Mr. Pantuso. Thank you, Senator. Yes, absolutely, a couple
of thoughts. First of all, in Australia it has also been our
understanding--and we will certainly double check--that it is
certainly mandated that the passenger buckle the seat belt, but
the onus is on the passenger. And I think on a going-forward
basis, as we look to increase the number of seat belt equipped
coaches, which obviously is coming very, very rapidly, that has
to happen here. The driver cannot be the driver, the hostess,
the flight attendant, and all things to all people. So the onus
really has to be on the passenger to make sure, just as you are
in your car, you are responsible for buckling your seat belt.
Ms. Claybrook. But Mr. Pantuso said that the key to this
was enforcement. So I do not know why he would not be in favor
of this.
Senator Udall. Ms. Hersman?
Ms. Hersman. One thing that we do have experience with are
restraint systems used in different modes of transportation,
and I will tell you that we have seen a shift in our culture
with respect to restraint use. I suspect all of you have had
the same experience that I have. When I was a child, we did not
wear our seat belts in the car. We traveled in a station wagon
and we sat or laid down wherever we could. Now, I have my own
children, and they have been buckled up in appropriate
restraints since the time that they left the hospital. They
will not allow me to pull out of the garage without telling me
that I need to buckle up. Having vehicle-appropriate seat belts
in the buses will allow passengers who choose to use them to
wear them. And I do think that we have gone in a generation's
time, we have gone from very low seat belt usage in this
country to over 80 percent usage nationwide, and in some states
the compliance is significantly higher. You have to have the
belts available in order for people to take advantage of them.
Senator Udall. Thank you very much. I think this panel, Mr.
Chairman, has given excellent testimony. Thank you.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you.
Senator Pryor?
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PRYOR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
having this.
First, I want to add my agreement to what Senator Thune was
talking about a few moments ago with the rogue motorcoach
carriers. That is a concern of mine.
But, Mr. Medford, let me start with you, if I may. In the
Motorcoach Enhanced Safety legislation, S. 453, Senator Brown
and Senator Hutchison--one provision in the bill says basically
that NHTSA has to have regulations within a year for safety
belts, improved roof crush standards, advanced window glazing,
and electronic stability control technologies. Of course, I
have a question about the cost of all that.
But I also want to ask you is that an adequate amount of
time for you to try to do all of that in one year.
Mr. Medford. It is really a very big challenge. To the
extent that we were far along on some of those things, as you
know, we have already proposed a seat belt requirement, and so
we probably could finish the seat belt rule in that kind of a
period of time. But most of those time periods really are not
sufficient to do the research and the adequate requirements
that are required for Federal rulemaking. I think that we would
need some more time. We would like to discuss that with the
members.
Senator Pryor. If you did all those things, does NHTSA have
an estimate of how many lives that might save a year?
Mr. Medford. I am not sure that we have one--we do not have
estimates for all of those technologies. We have done them for
those packages that we put together for regulations so far, but
we do not have them for all.
Senator Pryor. I do have a question about the cost. Ms.
Claybrook, why do I not start with you? I know it will add to
the costs of the vehicles. Do you have an estimate about how
much cost that will add?
Ms. Claybrook. We do not have a cost for the entire bill,
but we do know that the claims of the bus industry are grossly
exaggerated. And for some of the major systems, it would be
about $7,000, about one percent of the cost for a motorcoach.
But given the number of trips that any motorcoach takes, we
estimate it is about a nickel to ten cents per occupant, per
passenger for all the safety provisions in the bill. It is a
gross estimate because we do not always have the exact data
from the industry. But we have talked to a lot of suppliers,
and we believe that it is a minuscule amount.
And certainly if you ask any occupant of one of those buses
would they pay an extra 5, 10, or even 20 cents for safety
provisions such as roof crush and safety belts and occupant
compartmentalization and tire safety and tire inflation
measurement and all these other provisions that are in the
bill, no one is going to say no.
And so it is spread out among so many trips for that one
particular bus, 400,000 trips. I mean, it is huge. So we think
that it is a very de minimis cost.
Senator Pryor. Mr. Pantuso, it sounds like you may disagree
with that.
Mr. Pantuso. I very much disagree with that. Thank you,
Senator, for asking.
Absolutely we have looked at the cost. We have talked to
the manufacturers. On the issue of seat belts alone--and again,
we are not opposing seat belts in new buses--but manufacturers
will tell you that it is somewhere in the neighborhood of
$13,000 to $15,000 for a new coach to put seat belts in. In the
case of retrofitting an existing coach, they are estimating
retrofits at somewhere in the neighborhood of $40,00 to
$45,000. All the additional changes that could take place on
the coach if all of the changes are made, are going to amount
to $75,000. If you look at the cost of a motorcoach less than a
decade ago, it was about $350,000 per vehicle. Now it is about
$500,000 per vehicle. The fleet is aging. It is about 60
percent older than it used to be because people cannot afford
to buy new equipment. We used to have a number of domestic
manufacturers of equipment. We no longer have domestic coach
manufacturers. So the cost is really having an impact on the
industry itself and on their ability to comply with the
regulations.
Ms. Claybrook. Could I just say, Senator, that over time
these costs go down. So the first year that you put something
in, of course, it is much more expensive. The first year for
air bags was $175. Now it is $30. So these prices go
dramatically down and particularly where there is mass
production and there is a mandate for them to be in all
vehicles. So if it is optional equipment, it is much more
expensive. If it is mandated equipment, it is much less
expensive.
Senator Pryor. All right. Let me ask Ms. Ferro a question--
I just have a few seconds left--and that is, on electronic on-
board recorders. Of course, fatigue and highway safety is a big
concern. Tell me your feelings what you believe we should do in
terms of requiring electronic on-board recorders for buses but
also for 18-wheelers and other carriers that are on the road.
Ms. Ferro. Senator Pryor, the FMCSA is on record as
advancing an electronic on-board recorder proposed rule for
virtually all motorcoach and freight-carrying commercial
vehicles. The only ones that are excepted are those that
maintain time cards as opposed to logs or records of duty
status. So 95 percent of the industry would be covered under
the proposed rule that we have put forward. As we explained in
our rule proposal, we find it a much better tool, as has been
documented time and again, for employers to monitor compliance
with hours of service, for us to monitor and enforce, and our
state law enforcement partners.
Senator Pryor. Mr. Chairman, I know that I am out of time,
but I was wondering if I could ask each one of the panelists to
comment on electronic on-board recorders. Mr. Medford?
Senator Lautenberg. Please do.
Mr. Medford. I do not have expertise here, but I think it
makes great sense to me.
Ms. Hersman. I am not often in the position of
complimenting the Department, but I do want to recognize
Administrator Ferro and her team for their efforts on EOBR's.
The original rule that was proposed several years ago was a
very de minimis rule and was almost a punitive measure. We
believe that EOBR's should be required for all operators so
that it does level the playing field; we have many operators
who are using EOBR's on their fleets system-wide. We think that
everyone should be using them and that it will help with hours
of service compliance.
Mr. Pantuso. Senator, regarding on-board recorders, we
certainly do not oppose that, but I go back to my original
statement. Enforcement is key and enforcement is number one. I
would guess that a couple of the recent accidents that we have
seen--the drivers were probably not over the hours and probably
were compliant. Without the enforcement, it does not matter
what electronic technology or technologies you have. You have
got to enforce the rules, especially for carriers that you know
are in violation.
Ms. Claybrook. Of course, EOBR's are designed for
enforcement, and so I should think you would favor them, Mr.
Pantuso. But we certainly do. That is incredibly important for
important hours-of-service enforcement too.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lautenberg. Yes. Ms. Ferro, I do not know whether
you remember our discussion as you were taking this post about
on-board computers.
Ms. Ferro. And I would say, above all, I want to commend
you and compliment you for your leadership on on-board
recorders. Your message was very clear and has been very
consistent in that regard, and we are very pleased to be on
that track.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you.
I want to ask Mr. Pantuso a question here. The New York bus
crash was, I guess, one of the worst bus accidents that we have
seen. And the accident raised several safety concerns including
the fact that the driver was able to hide a prior suspended
license. Now, is there a shortage of driver availability?
Mr. Pantuso. I would say, Senator, for commercial vehicle
drivers, whether it is buses or trucks, there continues to be a
shortage of drivers. Absolutely.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, might that accidentally or
unintentionally cause a company to get desperate and search for
personnel to kind of ignore a poor driving record?
Mr. Pantuso. I do not think, Mr. Chairman, regardless of
the shortage of drivers, regardless of cost, regardless of any
method of doing business, that safety should ever be
compromised. So regardless of whether there is a shortage or
not, it should never be a compromise for safety.
Senator Lautenberg. I do not know whether it could happen.
With that, I thank you all for your testimony. I think this
was a very good hearing, and we know that we have got to stay
on the job, that responses have to be quick and thorough, and
that we continue to be able to tell the American people you
will be safe when you get in that bus. Thank you all very much.
Ms. Claybrook. Mr. Chairman, I want to be sure that my
supplemental statement is included in the record. Mr. Chairman,
I just want to be sure my supplemental statement on costs is
included in the record.
Senator Lautenberg. Absolutely.
Ms. Claybrook. Thank you.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
April 13, 2011
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV,
Chairman,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg,
Chairman,
Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and
Security Subcommittee,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairmen Rockefeller and Lautenberg:
I would like to thank you for holding this important hearing on
Ensuring the Safety of Our Nation's Motorcoach Passengers. Chairman
Lautenberg and I share a unique and unfortunate connection to this
issue, having both experienced devastating motorcoach accidents in our
home states in recent weeks.
As you are aware, a bus operated by World Wide Tours was involved
in a horrific crash in New York during the early morning hours of March
1th that left 15 individuals dead and countless others injured. In the
days and weeks following this crash, details have emerged which raise
significant questions about oversight of the low-cost intercity
motorcoach industry. I am especially concerned about this because, in
the last decade, intercity bus service has seen a significant increase
in ridership across the Northeast Corridor, and in New York City in
particular. This rising popularity of intercity bus travel is largely
due to low-cost ``curbside'' carriers which do not operate out of
terminals like traditional bus services, but instead use city streets
and sidewalks to drop off and pick up passengers. According to a recent
New York City Department of City Planning study, curbside bus travel in
the Chinatown area of Manhattan has increased significantly since 1997
when the first buses began shuttling passengers between Manhattan and
other states' Chinatowns, producing more than 2000 arrival and
departures weekly.
The March 12 crash has triggered an investigation by the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) who are now looking into the causes
of this accident. I have called on the NTSB to expand its investigation
of the incident to review the possible safety risks that curbside bus
carriers pose, the efficacy of current regulations for these carriers,
and whether or not new regulations or better enforcement are needed.
NTSB has agreed to my request and will conduct an additional study on
the safety aspects of the low-cost intercity motorcoach industry. I
look forward to the results of this study and the crash investigation
and am committed to working with you and the Department of
Transportation (DOT) to increase safety protections within this
industry.
DOT regulations require bus operators to ensure passenger safety,
adequately maintain buses and place strict requirements on driver
qualifications. Unfortunately, the events of March 12 demonstrate a
clear failure of the system which puts the public in harm's way. For
this reason, I am also a cosponsor of the Motorcoach Enhanced Safety
Act, sponsored by my colleagues Senators Brown and Hutchinson. This
bill would implement NTSB safety recommendations to protect passengers
and keep unsafe buses and drivers off the road. Most importantly, it
will save lives. I am pleased that your Committee has reviewed this
bill and I fully support its passage.
Thank you for holding this timely hearing to review the safety of
our Nation's motorcoach industry. I look forward to continuing to work
with you to promote safety on our roads.
Sincerely,
Charles E. Schumer.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Hon. Anne S. Ferro
Question 1. Administrator Ferro, the Motorcoach Safety Action Plan
includes a priority action item for FMCSA to establish new rules to
prohibit texting and limit the use of cellular telephones and other
devices by motorcoach drivers. This is also addressed in my distracted
driving bill. When will FMCSA complete this rulemaking?
Answer. Driver distraction is a serious safety problem that must be
addressed to continue improving commercial motor vehicle (CMV) safety.
FMCSA developed an approach that involves Federal rulemaking, outreach,
and enforcement.
On September 27, 2010, FMCSA published a Final Rule prohibiting
texting by all CMV drivers while operating in interstate commerce and
imposing civil penalties on drivers and motor carriers that violate the
prohibition. The Final Rule also provides for commercial driver's
license (CDL) holders' disqualification when they have multiple
convictions for violating a State or local law or ordinance on motor
vehicle traffic control that prohibits texting. The Agency is working
closely with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and
with our State and local safety partners in developing enforcement
strategies for those who violate this rule.
On December 21, 2010, FMCSA published a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) that would restrict the use of hand-held mobile
telephones. The Agency proposed new driver disqualification sanctions
for interstate drivers of CMVs who fail to comply with this Federal
restriction and for CDL holders who have multiple convictions for
violating a State or local law or ordinance on motor vehicle traffic
control that restricts the use of hand-held mobile telephones. The
comment period for the NPRM recently closed, and the Agency plans to
issue a Final Rule by the end of 2011.
Question 2. Administrator Ferro, FMCSA has not fully implemented
its new safety enforcement model despite it being originally scheduled
to be operational at the end of 2010. Part of the reason is because
FMCSA has not yet implemented the safety fitness rating criteria. When
will FMCSA complete the safety fitness determination rulemaking?
Answer. Later this year FMCSA plans to issue a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking that will propose changes to our current Safety Fitness
Rating Methodology for commercial bus and truck companies. Through this
proposed rule, FMCSA would determine a carrier's safety fitness based
on data consisting of crashes, road inspection results and violation
history rather than exclusively data from the standard compliance
review. This proposed rule would enable FMCSA to assess the safety
performance of a greater segment of the commercial motor carrier
industry with the goal of further reducing large truck and bus crashes
and fatalities. The FMCSA anticipates completion of the rulemaking in
2012.
Question 3. Administrator Ferro, I remain deeply concerned about
the Administration's proposal to restart the Mexican cross border truck
program, and I want to make sure that any program will make public
safety and economic security priority number one. Furthermore, I am
concerned that the Mexican government has refused to allow U.S.
companies to own Mexican bus companies that provide domestic service in
Mexico, despite our country allowing Mexican companies to own U.S.
companies providing domestic bus service in the Unites States. Do you
agree that the Mexican government's actions against the U.S. bus
industry are restricting these American companies from competing?
Answer. Chairman Rockefeller, I would first like to address your
concerns about the Administration's proposal to begin a new U.S.-Mexico
cross-border long-haul trucking pilot program. Safety is our number one
priority. In developing the concepts for the new pilot program, we were
guided by the safety concerns that Congress and other stakeholders
raised about the previous pilot program. Secretary LaHood personally
reached out to approximately 30 Members of Congress, and DOT/FMCSA met
with the representatives from various organizations including the
Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety,
and the Truck Safety Coalition.
In addition, as a result of input we received from, and
recommendations issued by, FMCSA's Motor Carrier Safety Advisory
Committee, we included program elements that the Department believes
will further enhance the safety requirements above those set in the
previous program. For example, we propose to use electronic on-board
recorders to track participating Mexican vehicles as they operate in
the United States and to verify each driver's compliance with hours-of-
service requirements. We intend to continue to inspect vehicles at a
heightened level of monitoring, while at the same time recognizing the
safety performance of those Mexico-domiciled motor carriers that prove
they can operate safely in the United States. We believe that these and
the other safety features outlined in our April 13, 2011, Federal
Register notice will ensure safety for the general public and help the
United States meet its international obligations.
As we continue to work out necessary program requirements for a new
cross border pilot program for the transportation of cargo by Mexico-
domiciled commercial motor vehicles--with reciprocal access rights
accorded by the Government of Mexico to United States-domiciled motor
carriers--we recognize a significant amount of work needs to be done
regarding cross-border transportation of passengers by motorcoach.
Under NAFTA, the Government of Mexico must allow for reciprocal
investment and access opportunities for United States-domiciled
motorcoach companies that wish to perform domestic operations in
Mexico. We are committed to working with the Office of the United
States Trade Representative and Department of Commerce on this issue.
Question 4. What steps is the Administration taking to resolve this
issue?
Answer. The prohibition of U.S. ownership in Mexican motorcoach
companies that provide domestic transportation services is primarily a
NAFTA investment and trade issue. We have made the Office of the United
States Trade Representative and Department of Commerce aware of the
issue. Additionally, Secretary LaHood has identified this as an issue
with Mexico's Secretary of Communication and Transportation. We believe
that successfully addressing the cross-border truck access issue will
also enhance our ability to successfully resolve this issue.
Question 5. Administrator Ferro and Deputy Administrator Medford,
the President's FY 2012 budget proposes to expand the Highway Trust
Fund into a new Transportation Trust Fund that would fund all of the
Federal surface transportation programs. I am concerned that the
funding level for DOT's safety programs could be put at risk because
the Highway Trust Fund does not currently generate sufficient revenues
to support the programs it is supposed to fund. Administrator Ferro and
Deputy Administrator Medford, how does the Administration propose to
make sure Federal transportation safety programs receive full funding
and are not undercut by commitments to other surface transportation
programs?
Answer. Under the DOT Fiscal Year 2012 Budget, existing Highway
Trust Fund revenues will continue to be dedicated to highway and motor
carrier safety. In addition, the Budget includes new (or increased)
revenues sufficient to ensure solvency of the Transportation Trust Fund
through 2021. As a matter of policy, the Administration believes the
proceeds from existing Highway Trust Fund excise taxes should continue
to be dedicated solely to the Highway and Mass Transit accounts, and no
existing revenue would be diverted to the new accounts for rail and the
National Infrastructure Bank. The additional revenues would be
sufficient to maintain the solvency of the Transportation Trust Fund,
but are not associated with any specific policy proposal. Rather, the
Administration intends to work with Congress to authorize sufficient
revenue for the Transportation Trust Fund.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Claire McCaskill to
Hon. Anne S. Ferro
Question 1. USA Today published an article on March 23, 2011
stating that two tour bus companies involved in fatal crashes in March
have not received full government safety audits in more than 2 years,
even though roadside inspections found problems that were serious
enough to place them on ``alert'' status. Why have these audits not
occurred? How rampant is the lack of audits?
FMCSA implemented additional components to the passenger carrier
program to monitor the compliance and safety of motorcoach companies
separately from trucking companies. For example, unauthorized for-hire
motorcoach companies that have operational activity, such as
inspections, are made a top priority for an on-site investigation. In
addition, motorcoach companies with below industry median performance
in a CSA criteria, or operating more than 2 years without an on-site
investigation, or operating more than 5 years since the previous on-
site investigation are a priority.
The SMS did identify for intervention the motorcoach company
involved in the New Jersey crash, and FMCSA had assigned an
investigator to conduct an on-site compliance review. FMCSA was in the
process of scheduling the review when the crash occurred.
FMCSA is responsible for the oversight of more than 500,000 truck
and bus companies. This includes approximately 4,000 motorcoach
companies. In the last 6 years we have significantly increased our
focus and resources on motorcoach companies. On average we conduct an
on-site compliance review on each motorcoach company every 3-4 years.
The Agency has cut this time-frame by more than half since 2005 when
the average time between on-site compliance reviews was more than 8
years.
Question 2. The article also states that 433 of the 3100 motor
coach operators are listed as on ``alert'' by FMCSA. I understand that
alerts are based on spot inspections of buses and drivers. How many of
the operators are actually inspected? Do you have any reason to believe
that the number of operators who are on alert may actually be higher
than the 433 than were cited? How many of the companies are bus tour
companies that operate in MO and/or transport passengers into MO from
other states?
Answer. The FMCSA and our State partners increased the on-site
compliance reviews conducted on motorcoach companies by 128 percent,
from 457 in 2005 to 1,042 in 2010. Inspections of motorcoaches
increased 98 percent during the same period, from 12,991 in 2005 to
25,703 in 2010.
The number of motorcoach companies registered with FMCSA changes as
new companies enter the business and others withdraw. Currently, we
have approximately 4,000 motorcoach companies registered. In addition,
the SMS is updated monthly to incorporate the new data generated by the
inspections and compliance reviews. The number of ``alerts'' will
change with each update.
In Fiscal Year 2010, the FMCSA Missouri Division and our State
partners conducted compliance reviews on 32 of the approximately 40
motorcoach companies domiciled in Missouri. In addition, we conducted
1,295 inspections in Missouri on passenger carrying vehicles and
drivers. Approximately 35 percent of the inspections conducted in
Missouri were on passenger carrying vehicles and drivers operated by
companies domiciled in other States.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to
Hon. Anne S. Ferro
Question 1. Although you testified that an on-site compliance
review is conducted for each carrier every three to 4 years, Ms.
Claybrook testified that some safety ratings have been in place for
over 20 years. That hardly seems recent enough to be confident in the
carrier's compliance. What is the FMCSA doing to ensure that every
company has a rating that is current?
Answer. FMCSA is responsible for the oversight of more than 500,000
truck and bus companies. This includes approximately 4,000 registered
motorcoach companies. Currently, FMCSA conducts on-site compliance
reviews to assign safety ratings. In the last 6 years, we have
significantly increased our focus and resources on motorcoach
companies. Specifically, FMCSA and our State partners increased the
compliance reviews conducted on motorcoach companies by 128 percent,
from 457 in 2005 to 1,042 in 2010. In 2008, we implemented a policy
that any passenger carrier with no safety rating or a safety rating
more than 5 years old received a higher compliance review priority.
The combination of these actions increased the frequency of
conducting a compliance review on a motorcoach company and reduced the
average time between reviews from 8 years to 3-4 years. We are well on
our way to ensuring that all passenger carriers receive a new safety
rating every 5 years or less under our current Safety Fitness Rating
Methodology. From the testimony, it is not clear whether Ms.
Claybrook's characterization of the age of some safety ratings was
referring to the age of safety ratings issued to passenger carriers
or--more likely--ratings issued to some of the more than 500,000
trucking companies we also regulate. In any case, we are taking action,
described in the next paragraph, to improve our ability to make safety
fitness determinations more frequently and on more motor carriers.
Later this year, FMCSA plans to issue a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking that will propose changes to our current Safety Fitness
Rating Methodology for commercial bus and truck companies. Through this
proposed rule, FMCSA would determine a carrier's safety fitness based
on data consisting of crashes, road inspection results and violation
history rather than exclusively data from the standard compliance
review. This proposed rule would enable FMCSA to assess the safety
performance of a greater segment of the commercial motor carrier
industry, with the goal of further reducing large truck and bus crashes
and fatalities. The FMCSA anticipates completion of the rulemaking in
2012.
In the interim, FMCSA implemented additional components to the
passenger carrier program to monitor the compliance and safety of
motorcoach companies separately from trucking companies. For example,
unauthorized for-hire motorcoach companies that have operational
activity, such as inspections, are made a top priority for an on-site
investigation. In addition, motorcoach companies with below industry
median performance in the CSA criteria, or operating more than 2 years
without an on-site investigation, or operating more than 5 years since
the previous on-site investigation are a priority.
Question 2. I am shocked to learn, that, as Ms. Claybrook
testified, despite studies and a rulemaking required by ISTEA in 1991,
today there are essentially no Federal requirements for a commercial
driver's license. I understand that the FMCSA is moving toward issuing
a final rule to address this concern. Can you tell me what the FMCSA is
proposing and the timeline for implementation?
Answer. There are extensive Federal requirements for a commercial
driver's license (CDL). Federal regulations for CDLs were first
required by the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986. The
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) published the first Final Rule
implementing the requirements on June 1, 1987. Additional regulations
have been issued in response to program needs and Congressional
actions. All commercial motor vehicle drivers subject to the
regulations were required to obtain a CDL that met the Federal
standards by April 1, 1992.
When FMCSA was created in 2000, the Federal oversight
responsibility for CDL was transferred from FHWA. The current Federal
regulations detailing the CDL requirements for drivers and their
employers are contained in Title 49 CFR Part 383--Commercial Drivers
License Standards; Requirements and Penalties. The Federal regulations
for States issuing CDLs are contained in Title 49 CFR Part 384--State
Compliance with Commercial Driver's License Program.
In December 2007, FMCSA initiated a rulemaking to require behind-
the-wheel and classroom training for persons who must hold a commercial
driver's license to operate commercial motor vehicles in interstate
commerce. This action was in response to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit's December 2005 decision remanding the
Agency's May 21, 2004, Final Rule, ``Minimum Training Requirements for
Entry-Level Commercial Motor Vehicle Operators'' to the Agency for
further consideration.
The notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) would require 120 hours of
training for entry-level drivers of heavy trucks seeking a Class A CDL
and 90 hours of training for those seeking either a Class B or Class C
CDL. Drivers of motorcoaches and school buses employed by private
entities (typically contractors to local educational agencies) are
Class B CDL holders, and would be required to obtain 90 hours of
training under the proposal. The proposed training program is split
between classroom and behind-the-wheel training, with the on-road
component requiring at least 44 hours for Class A and 32 hours for
Classes B and C. FMCSA is currently drafting a final rule to follow-up
on the 2007 NPRM. The Agency anticipates publication of the final rule
by the end of 2011.
On December 1, 2008, FMCSA also published a final rule merging the
medical certification and CDL issuance and renewal processes. The rule
improves the Agency's and the States' ability to monitor the medical
certification status of interstate CDL holders. The final rule requires
CDL holders to provide a copy of their medical certificate to the State
driver licensing agency in order to be granted a CDL or to maintain
their existing interstate driving privileges. If a driver fails to
renew the medical certificate, or if the driver fails the physical
examination, the CDL will be downgraded automatically to prohibit the
operation of CMVs in interstate commerce. The final rule became
effective on January 30, 2009. States must implement the information
technology system changes necessary to comply with the rule by January
30, 2012. All CDL holders must comply with the requirements to submit
the medical certification information to the States by January 30,
2014.
The final rule also required States to make the CDL driver's
medical certification status available electronically to motor carrier
safety enforcement personnel. FMCSA and State enforcement personnel
would then be able to determine during a roadside inspection whether a
driver is medically qualified by reviewing the electronic record
maintained by the State licensing agency. Federal, state, and local
government enforcement officials would query the Commercial Driver's
License Information System (CDLIS) or the National Law Enforcement
Telecommunication System to determine whether the driver had the
required medical certification--something they cannot accomplish today.
On September 27, 2010, FMCSA published a Final Rule providing for
CDL holders' disqualification when they have multiple convictions for
violating a State or local law or ordinance on motor vehicle traffic
control that prohibits texting. On December 21, 2010, FMCSA published a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that would also restrict the use
of hand-held mobile telephones. The Agency proposed new driver
disqualification sanctions for interstate drivers of CMVs who fail to
comply with this Federal restriction and for CDL holders who have
multiple convictions for violating a State or local law or ordinance on
motor vehicle traffic control that restricts the use of hand-held
mobile telephones.
Question 3. Ms. Ferro, in your testimony you state that informal
leasing creates difficulty in determining who is responsible for
motorcoach vehicle safety and that the FMCSA is committed to initiating
a rulemaking to address this concern. What is your timeline for this
rulemaking?
Answer. The proposed timeline will be determined when the
rulemaking is initiated.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison to
Hon. Anne S. Ferro
Question 1. What is the status of the Motorcoach Safety Action Plan
items under FMCSA's jurisdiction? What are the top action item
priorities for your agency?
Answer. The majority of the FMCSA-related Motorcoach Safety Action
Plan (Plan) items are either completed or on track for completion. The
Plan listed 7 priority items, 3 assigned to the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration and 4 assigned to FMCSA. Listed below are
FMCSA's priority items from the Plan and the actions taken by FMCSA in
regard to the items.
Initiate rulemaking to require electronic on-board recording
devices on all motorcoaches to better monitor drivers' duty
hours and manage fatigue.
On April 5, 2010, the Agency took a significant step
toward improving compliance with hours-of-service
regulations by publishing a final rule mandating the use of
electronic on-board recorders (EOBRs) by motor carriers
that transport passengers or property and that demonstrate
serious non-compliance with the hours of service (HOS)
rules. This action will reduce the likelihood of falsified
or incomplete records of duty status. The final rule
establishes: (1) new performance-oriented standards for
EOBR technology; (2) a mandate for certain motor carriers
to use EOBRs to remediate regulatory noncompliance (a
remedial directive); and (3) incentives to promote
voluntary EOBR use by all carriers. It is expected that
approximately 5,700 motor carriers each year will be
required to use EOBRs.
On February 1, 2011, the Agency published a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to expand the requirement for
motor carriers, including passenger carriers, to use EOBRs
and to require nearly all motor carriers to systematically
monitor their drivers' compliance with HOS requirements.
Specifically, FMCSA proposed mandatory installation and use
of EOBRs in interstate commercial motor vehicles (CMVs)
currently required to complete records of duty status,
including passenger carrier operations. Additionally, the
preamble to the rulemaking requests data and information
about the safety of short-haul passenger carriers currently
not required to maintain records of duty status.
Initiate rulemaking to propose prohibiting texting and
limiting the use of cellular telephones and other devices by
motorcoach drivers.
On September 27, 2010, FMCSA published a Final Rule
prohibiting texting by all CMV drivers while operating in
interstate commerce and imposing civil penalties on drivers
and motor carriers that violate the prohibition. The final
rule also provides for commercial driver's license (CDL)
holders' disqualification when they have multiple
convictions for violating a State or local law or ordinance
on motor vehicle traffic control that prohibits texting. We
are working closely with the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration and with our State and local safety
partners in developing enforcement strategies for those who
violate this rule.
On December 21, 2010, FMCSA published an NPRM that would
restrict the use of hand-held mobile telephones. The Agency
also proposed new driver disqualification sanctions for
interstate drivers of CMVs who fail to comply with this
Federal restriction and for CDL holders who have multiple
convictions for violating a State or local law or ordinance
on motor vehicle traffic control that restricts the use of
hand-held mobile telephones. The comment period for the
NPRM recently closed, and the Agency plans to issue a final
rule later this year.
Enhance oversight of carriers attempting to evade sanctions.
FMCSA launched several initiatives to enhance its
oversight of motorcoach companies, the drivers they employ
and the vehicles they operate. These efforts include strict
enforcement of the current safety regulations, more
rigorous scrutiny of all passenger carrier applications for
operating authority, implementation of the Safety
Measurement System (SMS) to identify at-risk carriers for
targeted enforcement as part of our new Compliance, Safety,
Accountability program, or ``CSA,'' and improved oversight
of the medical certification process for drivers.
FMCSA routinely conducts strike force activities at
national, regional and local levels to enhance our overall
motorcoach enforcement program. The venues range from
traditional areas such as the northeast corridor to
activities conducted at sporting events, amusement parks
and national parks. The number of inspections conducted per
event may range from 50 or less for a local, 1 day activity
to more than 8,500 for a 2-week national activity. In
addition to inspections some strike force events include
compliance reviews and new entrant safety audits. Again the
amount of activity will depend on the size and location of
the strike force.
FMCSA increased the compliance reviews conducted on
motorcoach companies by 128 percent, from 457 in 2005 to
1,042 in 2010. Inspections of motorcoaches increased 98
percent during the same period, from 12,991 in 2005 to
25,703 in 2010. Passenger carrier enforcement cases rose
from 36 in 2008 to 44 in 2010, a 22 percent increase.
Between Fiscal Years 2007-2010, FMCSA placed 75 passenger
carriers out-of-service for being unfit to operate, after
receiving an unsatisfactory rating.
In August 2008, FMCSA implemented a more robust
investigation of applications for passenger carrier
operating authority. This was a necessary step toward
preventing the reincarnation of unsafe passenger carriers
that choose to evade FMCSA enforcements and penalties
rather than operate in compliance with the regulations.
Through the vetting program, FMCSA conducts an
investigation to determine whether the applicant is fit,
willing, and able to comply with the safety and other
applicable regulations, or if the applicant is attempting
to evade enforcement actions for violations committed under
another business name. As of March 28, FMCSA had applied
the vetting process to 2,666 applications for passenger
carrier operating authority. The Agency granted operating
authority to 1,995 applicants, 669 carriers failed to
successfully complete the application and either withdrew
their applications or the application was rejected because
the carrier failed to respond to inquiries from the Agency,
and 2 applications were rejected because the Agency
determined the applicant was a reincarnation of another
unsafe motor carrier. To date, 24 percent of applicants
have had their applications for operating authority
rejected. During this process the Agency continuously
identifies and implements more effective and efficient
procedures.
Establish minimum knowledge requirements for applicants
seeking FMCSA authority to transport passengers.
On August 29, 2010, FMCSA published an Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (APRM) requesting public comment on the
methods the Agency should consider implementing to provide
further assurance that a new applicant carrier is
knowledgeable about the applicable safety regulations
before being granted new entrant authority. This rulemaking
includes all applicants in addition to passenger carriers.
The Agency announced that it was considering whether to
implement a proficiency examination as part of our revised
New Entrant Safety Assurance Process and sought information
concerning issues that should be considered in the
development and use of such an examination. In addition,
the Agency requested comments on other alternatives to a
proficiency examination to complement the processes already
in place to demonstrate that new entrant carriers are
knowledgeable about applicable safety requirements.
The FMCSA also tasked its Motor Carrier Safety Advisory
Committee (MCSAC) to provide suggestions or recommendations
on approaches that could be implemented to improve the
existing new entrant safety assurance processes,
procedures, and requirements for ensuring that new entrant
motor carriers are knowledgeable about Federal motor
carrier safety mandates prior to beginning operations in
interstate commerce. The MCSAC provided its letter report
in September 2009 (available at http://mcsac.fmcsa.dot.gov/
documents/Final%20Report%2009-03.pdf), which included
recommendations for mandatory testing of certain company
officials responsible for ensuring compliance with the
safety regulations and putting into place safeguards for
ensuring that the individual taking the test would actually
be responsible for implementing or maintaining the
carrier's safety management controls.
In addition to the rulemaking, FMCSA is conducting a study
to evaluate the effectiveness of some of the
recommendations. The phased research is progressing on
analysis of safety performance cost effectiveness for
fostering a safety culture in new entrants via training and
testing their knowledgeability. The initial report is a
detailed analysis of changes in safety performance that
resulted from a experimental new entrant training effort.
Preliminary results from that research are encouraging.
The Agency is currently reviewing the comments to the
ANPRM and the MCSAC report in preparation for developing an
NPRM to request public comment on a regulatory approach for
ensuring new entrant carriers have the knowledge needed to
comply with the Federal safety regulations.
Question 2. Can you please describe FMCSA's efforts to keep unsafe
or unqualified bus drivers off of the road? How many actions have you
taken in the past 2 years that led to the suspension or removal of
these drivers?
Answer. In Fiscal Year 2009, there were a little more than 99,000
bus inspections conducted by FMCSA and State/local law enforcement
agencies. The bus driver out-of-service rate was 4.2 percent. In Fiscal
Year 2010, we conducted more than 95,000 bus inspections resulting in a
4.9 percent out-of-service rate for bus drivers.
FMCSA continues to actively engage State and local law enforcement
agencies to increase routine traffic enforcement of all CMV operators,
including bus drivers. FMCSA also works with State and local courts and
State Driver Licensing Agencies to ensure the timely, complete, and
accurate posting of convictions and disqualifications so that bus
drivers convicted of certain offenses lose their privileges to operate
these vehicles. As data quality improves, more unsafe drivers are
removed from the highways. Beyond conducting inspections and placing
drivers out-of-service for violations such as driving while suspended,
failure to be medically qualified, or drug and alcohol use, FMCSA has
no authority to engage in routine traffic enforcement of CMV operators.
However, violations cited during FMCSA inspections can lead to the
driver's disqualification, which prohibits operation in interstate
commerce. Further, violations cited during State/local law enforcement
inspections that lead to conviction can result in disqualification from
operating a CMV.
Question 3. SAFETEA-LU, the last highway reauthorization bill that
became law in August 2005, required FMCSA to establish a national
registry of medical examiners by August 2006. Yet this registry has not
yet been established. The bus safety legislation introduced by Senator
Brown and myself would mandate that this requirement be completed
within 6 months of the bill's enactment. Why is there a delay in
establishing this registry, which is now over 5 years behind?
Answer. The rulemaking schedule for the National Registry of
Certified Medical Examiners was revised because of substantial effort
required on other significant rulemakings such as the Hours of Service
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), Electronic On-Board Recorders
NPRM, Prohibition Against Texting Final Rule, Restriction on Handheld
Cell Phones NPRM, and CDL Learner's Permits Final Rule. The Agency has
greatly increased the number of safety rulemakings being issued each
year and we fully intend to issue the National Registry Final Rule in
2011.
Question 4. Unsafe reincarnated or ``chameleon'' carriers are one
of the major issues in motorcoach safety. Our legislation would permit
FMCSA to revoke existing operating authority if the Agency finds that a
carrier has failed to disclose its prior operating history. What more
can FMCSA do to address this serious safety problem of reincarnated
carriers?
Answer. Under current statutes, we do not have the authority to
deny a motorcoach company's application for a USDOT number. The
authority to consider requiring the disclosure of recent affiliation
with other carriers as a condition of USDOT number issuance will help
prevent reincarnated carriers. Congress could grant this authority to
FMCSA within a broader authority to consider requiring safety audits
prior to USDOT number issuance if the benefits justify the costs.
Though not related to reincarnated carriers, Congress could also
grant authority to FMCSA to consider requiring safety management
interviews and written examinations when justified by the benefits.
These requirements could replace the need for post-registration safety-
audits. The motorcoach company will still be required to undergo the 18
month monitoring period established by section 31144(g) of Title 49
U.S.C.
Question 5. I understand FMCSA is undertaking a rulemaking to
review the minimum knowledge requirements for bus drivers, but that you
have fallen behind schedule in that effort. Comments to the proposed
rule were due in October 2009, but we have not seen a final rule. When
does FMCSA plan to release a final rule addressing this issue?
Answer. FMCSA issued the ANPRM addressing the Motor Carrier Safety
Improvement Act of 1999, (P.L. 106-159, December 9, 1999), Section
210(b) new entrant motor carrier knowledgeability requirement on August
25, 2009. Section 210(b) of MCSIA says:
. . . the Secretary shall consider the establishment of a
proficiency examination for applicant motor carriers as well as
other requirements to ensure such applicants understand
applicable safety regulations before [emphasis added] being
granted operating authority.
FMCSA does not have background information about the cost-
effectiveness or safety performance of new entrant motor carriers that
would result from requiring a test or other requirements to ensure new
entrants are knowledgeable about the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations (FMCSRs). Thus, the August 25, 2009, ANPRM included a
number of questions intended to elicit information on options to assist
in carrying out this consideration of whether to proceed with a
rulemaking. Responses to the ANPRM's questions did not provide any
clear direction for how FMCSA should proceed with this consideration.
At the same time as the ANPRM, FMCSA also requested the Motor
Carrier Safety Advisory Committee (MCSAC) provide recommendations on
how to ensure new entrants know the FMCSRs before being issued a USDOT
number. Their recommendations can be found at http://
mcsac.fmcsa.dot.gov/documents/Final%20
Report%2009-03.pdf.
Since the mandate is to consider whether to establish some
requirement or requirements, FMCSA needs well supported cost-
effectiveness data if we are to undertake a rulemaking. Thus, the
Agency's Research Division undertook a demonstration project to acquire
cost-effectiveness data that could support a rulemaking.
Because we cannot require any action by a motor carrier relating to
Section 210(b) prior to issuing a final rule, the research project--in
keeping with ideas of the MSCAC to promote development of a safety
culture in new entrants--is testing proactive training of new entrants
as soon after they receive their USDOT number, and before they receive
the required Safety Audit. The current demonstration project is using a
classroom style of delivery.
Preliminary results comparing improvement in safety performance of
those new entrants who receive the training, with a representative
control group, are very compelling that such training, accompanied by
performance testing, is very effective. A detailed analysis of
effectiveness of this approach is nearing completion for submission to
FMCSA. We will be adding an analysis of cost for this approach shortly.
The next step is to develop and test a hybrid training curriculum
incorporating computer assisted methodologies delivered with a
facilitator in a classroom setting--such as in community colleges with
computer work stations. Theory shows such an approach could lower the
cost, more effectively influence the new entrants that are resistant to
the ideas, and make it easier to find personnel capable of facilitating
such training nationwide.
Additionally, FMCSA is developing Web based training it plans to
post on the Agency's website available to any interested new entrants
that are located in parts of the country served by broadband access to
the Internet. This web-based media would form a logical augmentation
resource to whatever might be required as part of a knowledgeability
requirement before being issued a USDOT number.
Once the cost-effectiveness data is available for the hybrid
approach, the next step will be the publication of an NPRM based on the
research results for these alternatives. Comments received to the
docket on the alternative approaches will then support the next step
toward issuing a final rule.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Hon. Anne S. Ferro
Question. Beyond new technologies, what is the most important thing
the government can do to reduce the number of bus accidents? In other
words, how do we prevent bad drivers and dishonest companies from
entering this business?
Answer. There are two actions that will aid in preventing bad
drivers from acquiring a commercial driver's license.
First, we believe full implementation of the 2005 Test Model System
in all 50 States and the District of Columbia will prevent potentially
bad drivers from passing the new CDL test. The upgraded skills test is
more difficult to pass and the new scoring sheets for the skills test
allow examiners to identify poor driving behavior multiple times
throughout the test. Currently some States are still using a CDL test
developed in the late 1990s.
One obstacle to achieving full implementation is that some States
are reluctant to adopt standardized or preferred testing because of the
perceived high costs associated with building new facilities that will
cover all the testing scenarios. This is a misperception. Although the
testing does cover all of the basic maneuvering required by a CDL
driver, it allows for adaptations by including a list of testing
scenarios which enables the States to pick the specific task to test at
a given facility. There is no need to build new pads or docks.
The 2005 Test Model provides flexibility for each State while still
assuring competency by the driver being tested. Almost all the States
have accepted this Model but there is some push-back by others. Using
the new test does ``raise the bar'' for proficiency testing.
Second, FMCSA does not have the statutory authority to prevent an
applicant from being issued a CDL based on his or her previous driving
record. The current legal standard is possession of a valid base
license on the day the CDL is issued. If the applicant has passed the
appropriate tests, the State cannot deny him or her a CDL, even if the
person's driving history shows a pattern of violations or poor
performance. We believe this is a safety gap in the overall program.
As to how to keep dishonest companies from entering the business,
implementing the changes discussed in our response to Senator
Hutchison's question about reincarnated carriers would move the FMCSA
goal of raising the bar to entry forward.
______
Response to Written Questions submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Ronald Medford
Question 1. Deputy Administrator Medford, ten action items of the
Motorcoach Safety Action Plan fall under NHTSA's jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, NHTSA has slipped on various milestones listed in the
Plan. What are the reasons for these delays?
Answer. While there have been minor delays on some of the
milestones, NHTSA has made good progress on its motorcoach safety
initiatives. NHTSA completed its three priority action items listed in
the Motorcoach Safety Action Plan and established the next milestones
to complete the regulatory process. Some of the milestones in the Plan
were delayed due to the need for additional coordination, completion of
scientific testing, or additional study (i.e., new issues identified
from testing that required further evaluation).
Question 2. Has NHTSA set new milestones to complete these action
items, and what is NHTSA doing to ensure that these milestones are met?
Answer. For those action items that were delayed, the agency set
new milestones and prioritized its work to ensure that the milestones
will be met. Specific details can be found in NHTSA's Vehicle Safety
and Fuel Economy Rulemaking and Research Priority Plan 2011-2013. (The
plan follows.)
Question 3. Administrator Ferro and Deputy Administrator Medford,
the President's FY 2012 budget proposes to expand the Highway Trust
Fund into a new Transportation Trust Fund that would fund all of the
federal surface transportation programs. I am concerned that the
funding level DOT's safety programs could be put at risk because the
Highway Trust Fund does not currently generate sufficient revenues to
support the programs it is supposed to fund. How does the
Administration propose to make sure federal transportation safety
programs receive full funding and are not undercut by commitments to
other surface transportation programs?
Answer. Under the DOT Fiscal Year 2012 Budget existing Highway
Trust Fund revenues will continue to be dedicated to highway and motor
carrier safety. In addition, the Budget includes new (or increased)
revenues sufficient to ensure solvency of the Transportation Trust Fund
through 2021. As a matter of policy, the Administration believes that
the proceeds from existing Highway Trust Fund excise taxes should
continue to be dedicated solely to the Highway and Mass Transit
accounts, and no existing revenue should be diverted to the new
accounts for rail and the National Infrastructure Bank. The additional
revenue would be sufficient to maintain the solvency of the
Transportation Trust Fund, but are not associated with any specific
policy proposal. Rather, the Administration intends to work with
Congress to authorize sufficient revenue for the Transportation Trust
Fund.
______
NHTSA Vehicle Safety and Fuel Economy Rulemaking and Research Priority
Plan--2011-2013
I. Introduction
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's primary
mission is to ``save lives, prevent injuries, and reduce economic costs
due to road traffic crashes.'' One of the most important ways in which
the agency carries out its safety mandate is to issue Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS). Through these rules, NHTSA strives to
reduce the number of crashes and to minimize the consequences of those
crashes that do occur. NHTSA's mission also includes issuing Corporate
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards under the Energy Independence and
Security Act of 2007. Increasing fuel economy not only contributes to
energy security, but also addresses climate change by reducing tailpipe
emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2).
This NHTSA Vehicle Safety and Fuel Economy Priority Plan describes
the projects the agency plans to work on in the rulemaking and research
areas for calendar years 2011 to 2013. This is not an exhaustive list.
Only programs and projects that are priorities or will take significant
agency resources are listed. Furthermore, NHTSA's enforcement, data
collection, and analysis programs--vital elements in achieving NHTSA's
goals--have their own set of priorities that are not listed here. Each
of these programs supports NHTSA's rulemaking and research priorities
by providing necessary safety data, economic analysis, expertise on
test procedures, and technical issues gleaned from enforcement
experience.
This plan is an internal management tool as well as a means to
communicate to the public NHTSA's highest priorities to meet the
Nation's motor vehicle safety, energy and environmental challenges.
Among them are programs and projects involving rollover crashes,
children (both inside as well as just near vehicles), motorcoaches and
fuel economy that must satisfy Congressional mandates or Secretarial
commitments. Since these are expected to consume a significant portion
of the agency's rulemaking resources, they affect the schedules of the
agency's other priorities listed in this plan. This plan lists the
programs and projects on which the agency anticipates working even
though there may not be a rulemaking notice planned to be issued by
2013, and in several cases, the agency does not anticipate that the
research will be completed by the end of 2013. Thus, in some cases, the
next step would be an agency decision in 2013 or 2014. NHTSA is also
currently in the process of developing a longer-term motor vehicle
safety strategic plan that would encompass the period 2014 to 2020.
II. Background
Motor vehicle crashes killed more than 33,000 people and injured
over 2.2 million others in 2009. In addition to the terrible personal
toll, these crashes make a huge economic impact on our society with an
estimated annual cost of $230 billion,\1\ an average of $750 for every
person in the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ These estimates are in year 2000 dollars
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Motor vehicle crashes can be viewed through several different
perspectives:
Vehicle type;
Crashworthiness;
Crash avoidance;
Crash partners;
Body region injured; and
Societal costs.
Figure 1 and Table 1 look at fatalities by vehicle type. Passenger
vehicles still account for the majority of fatalities (68 percent or
25,351 fatalities), but also account for about 90 percent of the
vehicle miles traveled (VMT).
Figure 1: Fatalities by Vehicle Type, 2009
Table 1.--2009 U.S. Fatalities by Person Type
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fatalities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Fatalities 33,808
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Vehicle Occupants 23,382
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Motorcyclists 4,462
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Truck, Bus, Other Vehicle Occupants 1,092
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nonoccupants 4,872
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pedestrian 4,092
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pedalcyclists 630
------------------------------------------------------------------------
From the crashworthiness perspective, NHTSA looks at occupant
fatalities or crash types by what part of the vehicle was struck first.
Typically for passenger vehicles the initial impact point in fatal
crashes would be frontal in 55 percent of fatalities, side impacts in
26 percent, non-collisions (which include rollovers) in 7 percent, rear
impacts in 5 percent, and other or unknown locations in 6 percent.
However, rollovers can be examined as the initial impact, or as any
event in the crash. If rollovers are examined as any event in the
crash, almost 9,000 rollovers occur per year in fatal crashes, or about
20 percent of the vehicle total.
From the crash avoidance perspective, NHTSA looks at types of
crashes that might be mitigated by new technologies. Based on the
General Estimates System (GES) and the Fatality Analysis Reporting
System (FARS), four types of crashes total 85 percent of all crashes.
These include Run-Off-Road (23 percent), Rear-End (28 percent), Lane
Change (9 percent), and Crossing Path (25 percent). Those same four
types of crashes also equal 75 percent of all road fatalities. These
include Run-Off-Road (41 percent), Rear-End (5 percent), Lane Change (4
percent), and Crossing Path (14 percent).
The fourth perspective of looking at fatal motor vehicle crashes is
crash type with respect to what the vehicle impacted, if anything, as
the most harmful event (see Figure 2). For both passenger cars and
light trucks in 2009, frontal crashes with other motor vehicles account
for the highest percentage of vehicles involved in fatal crashes, 32
percent and 36 percent respectively. For passenger cars in fatal
crashes, side impacts with other motor vehicles account for 16 percent,
and collision with fixed objects accounts for 20 percent of vehicles in
fatal crashes. In fatal crashes involving light trucks, non-collisions
(which include rollovers) remain an issue, accounting for 23 percent of
vehicles involved.
Electronic Stability Control (ESC) is changing the fatal crash
picture as more and more new vehicles come equipped with ESC and the
on-road fleet of ESC increases. ESC is dramatically reducing the number
of run-off-road crashes and rollovers. NHTSA is performing a follow up
evaluation of ESC and is already assuming reductions in relevant target
populations when new safety standards are being analyzed.
A fifth and a sixth perspective are those of body region injured
and societal costs. Brain injuries and ankle and knee injuries that
have long-term disability associated with them have very high societal
costs.
NHTSA looks at crashes from all these different perspectives in
determining the priorities for the agency. Countermeasures affect
different types of crashes in different ways and have to be examined
individually and compared to the applicable target population.
Figure 2: Vehicles Involved in Fatal Crashes by Most Harmful Event,
2009
Priority Programs and Projects
Programs and projects that warrant priority consideration fall into
the following four categories: (1) large safety benefits; (2)
vulnerable populations; (3) high-occupancy vehicles; and, (4) other
considerations.
Programs and projects that are in Category 1, large benefits, have
the potential for large safety benefits based upon factors such as:
The size of the target population;
The effectiveness of countermeasures and their potential to
save lives and prevent injuries;
The availability and practicability of these
countermeasures; and
The potential that countermeasures could be developed in the
future that could be reasonably effective against a large
target population.
It should be noted that some projects require additional research
before specific countermeasures can be identified and their benefits
can be quantified and therefore the priority designation is based on
the agency's judgment of potential safety impacts.
Programs and projects in Category 2, vulnerable populations, affect
children, older people, the vision-impaired, or other populations that
are considered vulnerable.
Category 3, high-occupancy vehicles, involves buses or motorcoaches
and other high-occupancy vehicles.
Category 4, other considerations, includes priority projects that
may not be captured in the other categories, but either reduce the
impact of motor vehicles on energy security and climate change or
address other specific items.
Other Significant Programs and Projects
This plan also includes a comprehensive list of other significant
programs and projects on which the agency expects to work in the 2011-
2013 timeframe. This area is fluid, because the agency receives
petitions that require action, Congress may request that the agency
address other areas, the Administration may set additional and/or
different priorities, or some event may influence NHTSA's priority
agenda. For example, the agency could add projects based on its
evaluation of current standards as required by Executive Order 12866 of
September 30, 1993 and the new Executive Order 13563 of January 18,
2011, Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review.
Some programs and projects described in the plan require additional
research before any rulemaking action can be taken. These programs may
not be priorities now because NHTSA is not confident that an effective
countermeasure can be found. However, with research on-going, there is
the possibility that countermeasures may be discovered that have
significant death and injury reduction benefits.
Dates Provided
Programs and projects that are in the research stage are noted with
milestones indicating when NHTSA plans to decide whether and how to
proceed. In general, this is an agency decision about whether the
program or project is ready and worthy to move from the research stage
into the rulemaking stage, whether the program or project requires
further research, or whether the potential benefit does not warrant
further allocation of resources. This ``agency decision'' is based on
many factors, including estimates of the target population, readiness
of technology, potential effectiveness of countermeasures, development
of a test protocol, and what information remains unknown. (Dates are
given in calendar years, not fiscal years.)
For projects that NHTSA believes will be in the rulemaking stage,
the agency has indicated dates when it anticipates issuing a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) or a Final Rule. Those dates are subject to
change for a variety of reasons, such as complications encountered in
the research phase, or new priority activities interrupt a project's
progress, etc.
Program Areas
The projects have been divided into the following program areas:
light-vehicle crash avoidance and mitigation advanced technologies,
motorcycles, rollovers, front-impact occupant protection, side-impact
occupant protection, rear-seat occupant protection, children, older
people, global technical regulations (international harmonization),
heavy vehicles, CAFE, and others (a catchall category for projects that
don't fit in the listed program areas).
Crash avoidance projects and programs are listed first because
their focus is on the first opportunity to save lives and reduce
injuries by preventing crashes from occurring in the first place. In
addition, they serve to reduce property damage and traffic congestion
that are the inevitable result of most crashes.
III. Priority Projects by Program Area
Light-Vehicle Crash Avoidance and Mitigation--Advanced Technologies
Forward Collision Avoidance and Mitigation
Description: Develop performance criteria and objective tests to
support the identification of effective advanced safety technologies
that provide a warning of an impending forward collision and/or
automatically brake/slow the vehicle. NHTSA has developed a forward
crash warning test for New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) purposes that
will appear in NCAP data on a warning system in model year 2011
vehicles The agency will decide whether to initiate rulemaking to
require forward collision warning and/or automatic crash-imminent
braking.
Priority Category: Large Benefit
Next Milestone: Agency decision in 2011
Vehicle Communications
Description: Advanced technologies that utilize vehicle-based
sensors have been demonstrated to be effective at helping drivers avoid
crashes. Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications can improve the
effectiveness and availability of these safety systems. Communications
can also enable numerous other safety applications, such as speed
management and intersection collision avoidance. Human factors research
to examine the interaction between driver, vehicle, and the environment
is underway. Vehicle-to- infrastructure (V2I) work is also being
considered. The agency will assess the research data, technologies and
potential countermeasures and decide on next steps.
Priority Category: Large Benefit
Next Milestone: Agency decision in 2013
Distraction
Description: Driver distraction presents a significant and complex
problem in highway safety. The agency published a comprehensive
distraction plan in April 2010. This plan frames the issue, discusses
safety consequences, presents agency goals, and lays out upcoming
research initiatives that include both technological and behavioral
approaches. The Strategic Highway Research Plan II (SHRP2) initiative
will provide data on distraction.
Priority Category: Large Benefit
Next Milestone: Publish guidelines for visual manual
distraction in 2011
Vehicle Based Alcohol Detection (Basic Research)
Description: NHTSA entered into a 5-year cooperative agreement with
the Automotive Coalition for Traffic Safety (ACTS) in early 2008 aimed
at conducting basic research on alcohol detection technologies to
reduce drunk driving that could have widespread deployment and are non-
invasive, reliable, accurate, and precise. To achieve this goal the
project aims to: (1) assess the current state of alcohol detection
devices, and (2) support the development and testing of prototypes and
subsequent hardware that may be installed in vehicles. The prototypes
would then undergo extensive laboratory and field testing. The agency
will assess the research data and technologies and decide on next
research steps.
Priority Category: Large Benefit
Next Milestone: Agency decision in 2013
Children
Child Restraints in Side Impacts
Description: Propose test procedures in FMVSS No. 213 to assess
child restraint performance in near-side impacts. Amend Part 572 to add
the Q3s dummy, the 3-year-old side impact version of the Q-series of
child dummies.
Priority Category: Vulnerable Population
Next Milestone: NPRM in 2012
New Car Assessment Program Vehicle-Child Restraint System (CRS) Fit
Program
Description: A consumer service program that provides vehicle-CRS
``fit'' recommendations on www.safercar.gov by encouraging vehicle
manufacturers to voluntarily recommend child restraint models that
``fit'' in each vehicle.
Priority Category: Vulnerable Population
Next Milestone:
Request for comments: February 25, 2011
Final Notice: 2012
Rear Visibility of Vehicles
Description: A backover crash involving a light vehicle at low
speed is tragic, with a small child or elderly person most often being
the victim. The agency has conducted research on a variety of rear-
visibility technologies to mitigate these types of crashes. NHTSA
published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on rear visibility on
12/7/10.
Congressional Requirements: The Cameron Gulbransen Kids
Transportation Safety Act of 2007
Priority Category: Vulnerable Populations
Next Milestone:
Public Hearing March 23, 2011
Final Rule: December 2011
Power Windows
Description: A rulemaking to consider requiring power windows on
motor vehicles to automatically reverse direction when closing when
such power windows detect an obstruction to prevent children and others
from being trapped, injured, or killed. An NPRM was published September
1, 2009. After further review, the agency has withdrawn this rulemaking
action.
Congressional Requirements: The Cameron Gulbransen Kids
Transportation Safety Act of 2007
Priority Category: Vulnerable Population
Last Milestone: Withdrawal March 2, 2011
Heavy Vehicles \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ``Heavy vehicles'' include most vehicles over 10,000 pounds
GVWR, including truck tractors, single-unit trucks, buses,
motorcoaches, etc.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Truck Tractor and Motorcoach Stability Control
Description: Develop test procedures for a standard on stability
control systems for truck tractors and motorcoaches. The stability
control system is aimed at addressing rollover and loss of control
crashes.
Priority Category: Large Benefit
Next Milestone: NPRM: 2011
Medium Truck and Bus Stability Control
Description: Develop test procedures for a standard on stability
control for medium trucks, buses, and all other vehicles over 10,000
pounds GVWR not covered in the truck tractors and motorcoaches
activity. The agency will decide whether to initiate rulemaking to
require such systems on these vehicles.
Priority Category: Large Benefit
Next Milestone: Agency decision in 2014
Heavy-Vehicle Forward Collision Avoidance and Mitigation
Description: Develop performance criteria and objective tests to
support the identification of effective advanced safety technologies
that provide warning of an impending forward collision and/or
automatically brake/slow the vehicle. The agency will assess the
research data, technologies and potential countermeasures and decide on
next steps.
Priority Category: Large Benefit
Next Milestone: Agency decision in 2013
Motorcoach Lap/Shoulder Belts
Description: The NPRM, published August 18, 2010, proposed
requiring lap/shoulder belts for motorcoaches. This action supports the
DOT Motorcoach Safety Action Plan (HS 811 177) and related NTSB
recommendations.
Priority Category: High-Occupancy Vehicle
Next Milestone: Final Rule: 2012
Motorcoach Fire Safety
Description: Consider upgrading the fire standards that apply to
motorcoaches. This action supports the DOT Motorcoach Safety Action
Plan (HS 811 177) and related NTSB recommendations. The agency will
decide whether to initiate rulemaking to upgrade the fire standards
that apply to motorcoaches.
Priority Category: High-Occupancy Vehicle
Next Milestone: Agency decision in 2012
Motorcoach Emergency Evacuation
Description: Consider upgrading the motorcoach evacuation
standards. This action supports the DOT Motorcoach Safety Action Plan
(HS 811 177) and related NTSB recommendations. The agency will decide
whether to initiate rulemaking to upgrade the motorcoach evacuation
standards.
Priority Category: High-Occupancy Vehicle
Next Milestone: Agency decision in 2011
Motorcoach Rollover Structural Integrity
Description: Propose new rollover structural integrity requirements
for motorcoaches. This action supports the DOT Motorcoach Safety Action
Plan (HS 811 177) and related NTSB recommendations.
Priority Category: High-Occupancy Vehicle
Next Milestone: NPRM: 2011
Fuel Economy
Passenger Car and Light-Truck Fuel Economy Standards (Corporate Average
Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards) for Model Years 2017-2025
Description: Fuel economy regulation of light-duty vehicles. The
Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) requires that CAFE
standards be prescribed separately for passenger automobiles and non-
passenger automobiles for each model year and that combined fleet fuel
economy achieves at least 35 mpg by model year 2020. For model years
2021 and beyond, EISA requires that the standards be set at the maximum
feasible for each model year. On March 31, 2010, DOT and EPA issued a
joint final rule for MY 2012-2016 passenger cars and light trucks. On
May 21, 2010, President Obama issued a memorandum directing NHTSA and
EPA to conduct a joint rulemaking (NHTSA regulating fuel economy and
EPA regulating greenhouse gas emissions) for 2017-2025 model year
vehicles, and to issue a Notice of Intent to Issue a Proposed Rule
(NOI) by September 30, 2010.
Congressional Requirements: Energy Independence and Security
Act (EISA)
Priority Category: Energy Security and Climate Change Benefits
Next Milestone: NPRM: 2011
Final Rule: 2012
Medium/Heavy-Duty Vehicles and Work Truck Fuel Efficiency Rules
Description: Fuel efficiency regulation of medium- and heavy-duty
vehicles and work trucks. As required by EISA, the National Academy
provided Congress with a report on March 18, 2010. The NHTSA study was
issued October 25, 2010. EISA also requires NHTSA to complete a final
rule establishing a fuel efficiency program for these vehicles 24
months after the completion of the NHTSA study and to provide at least
4 full model years of regulatory leadtime and 3 full model years of
regulatory stability (i.e., the standards must remain in effect for 3
years before they may be amended). On May 21, 2010, President Obama
issued a memorandum directing NHTSA and EPA to conduct a joint
rulemaking (NHTSA regulating fuel efficiency and EPA regulating
greenhouse gas emissions), and to issue a final rule by July 30, 2011.
Under consideration are rules for trucks produced in 2014-2018. An NPRM
was published 11/30/10.
Congressional Requirements: Energy Independence and Security
Act
Priority Category: Energy Security and Climate Change Benefits
Next Milestone: Final Rule: 2011
Fuel Economy/Greenhouse Gas Labeling Rule
Description: EISA mandates NHTSA to develop a labeling system for
new automobiles with information on fuel economy, greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions, and other emissions. EPA and NHTSA are combining efforts to
create a rating system. An NPRM was published 9/23/10.
Congressional Requirements: Energy Independence and Security
Act
Priority Category: Energy Security and Climate Change Benefits
Next Milestone: Final Rule: 2011 (per statute 6/19/11)
Consumer Education Campaign and Alternative Fuel Labeling
Description: EISA mandates NHTSA to develop a fuel economy
education program. This entails: (1) Labeling vehicles with a permanent
and prominent display of automobiles capable of operating on
alternative fuels. (2) Requiring owner's manual for vehicles capable of
operating on alternative fuels to include information describing
capability and benefits of using alternative fuels (e.g., renewable
nature and environmental benefits). (3) Improving consumer
understanding of automobile performance with regard to fuel economy and
greenhouse gas and other emissions. (4) Informing consumers of the
benefits of using alternative fuel in automobiles. (5) Identifying
locations of stations with alternative fuel capacity. (6) Establishing
a consumer education campaign on fuel savings that would be recognized
from the purchase of vehicles equipped with thermal management
technologies, including energy efficient air conditioning systems and
glass. (7) Requiring a label to be attached to the fuel compartment of
vehicles capable of operating on alternative fuels, with the form of
alternative fuel stated on the label.
Congressional Requirements: Energy Independence and Security
Act
Priority Category: Energy Security and Climate Change Benefits
Next Milestone: NPRM: 2011
Tire Fuel Efficiency Consumer Information Program
Description: EISA mandated that NHTSA develop a national tire fuel
efficiency consumer information program ``to educate consumers about
the effect of tires on automobile fuel efficiency, safety, and
durability,'' and ``to assist consumers in making more educated tire
purchasing decisions.'' On March 30, 2010, NHTSA published a final rule
to establish the test methods to be used by tire manufacturers for this
new program, however it did not specify how the information will be
explained and provided to consumers. This information will be provided
to consumers at the point of sale and online and will encourage the
purchase of better performing replacement tires. NHTSA is conducting
additional consumer testing and trying to resolve important issues
raised by public comments on the agency's proposal regarding the
program. NHTSA will proceed with the testing and then develop and
publish a new proposal for these aspects of the new program.
Congressional Requirements: Energy Independence and Security
Act
Priority Category: Energy Security and Environmental Benefits
Next Milestone: NPRM: 2012
Other
Alternative Fuel Systems
CNG
Description: Research is required to assess the causes of high
pressured cylinder ruptures on aging CNG vehicles which have occurred
during refueling and in vehicle-related fires. NHTSA is working with
the Department of Energy and the Clean Vehicle Education Foundation to
obtain used cylinders of the types that have failed for evaluation. The
goal is to improve safety codes and standards to prevent these failure
modes in future cylinder designs. The agency will assess the research
data and decide on next steps.
Priority Category: Environmental Benefits/Safety Concerns
Next Milestone: Agency decision in 2013
Batteries
Description: NHTSA is researching the potential safety risks posed
by battery storage devices through basic research and cooperative
agreements with vehicle OEM's and/or battery manufacturers. The agency
has initiated a basic study on the potential failure modes for lithium
ion battery storage systems, and is developing an RFP for vehicle and
battery OEMs to analyze risks and develop technical requirements,
appropriate test procedures, and acceptance criteria, considering a
broad range of potential lithium ion storage strategies. The agency
will also develop a research approach to examine methods to ensure the
safety of the complex electronic control systems that are inherent to
these battery technologies. With the results of these programs, the
agency will assess the research data and decide on next steps.
Priority Category: Environmental Benefits/Safety Concerns
Next Milestone: Agency decision in 2014
IV. Other Significant Projects by Program Area
Light-Vehicle Crash Avoidance and Mitigation--Advanced Technologies
Lane Departure Prevention
Description: NHTSA has developed a test for NCAP purposes that will
appear in NCAP MY 2011 data on a lane departure warning system. Lane
departure prevention or automatic lanekeeping is the next step in
development. NHTSA would work toward developing performance criteria
and objective tests to support identification of effective advanced
safety technologies that keep drivers in their lanes. The agency will
assess the research data, technologies and potential countermeasures
and decide on next steps.
Next Milestone: Agency decision in 2011
Blind Spot Detection
Description: Examine the potential of sensors and mirrors to detect
vehicles in blind spots to assist in lane changing. The agency will
assess the research data, technologies and potential countermeasures
and decide on next steps.
Next Milestone: Agency decision in 2013
Sound for Hybrid and Electric Vehicles
Description: Develop performance requirements for a sound that
allows blind and other pedestrians to detect a nearby electric or
hybrid vehicle operating below speeds at which tire noise, wind
resistance and other factors provide audible cues.
Congressional Requirements: Pedestrian Safety Enhancement Act
of 2010
Next milestones: NPRM: 2012
Pedestrian Detection
Description: Determine ability of sensor systems to detect a
pedestrian and then reduce vehicle speed. The agency will assess the
research data, technologies and potential countermeasures and decide on
next steps.
Next Milestone: Agency decision in 2013
Motorcycles
Motorcycle Helmet Labeling
Description: Amend labeling of motorcycle helmets to reduce sale
and use of novelty helmets. The agency published an NPRM in October
2008.
Next Milestone: Final Rule: 2011
Rollovers
Dynamic Rollover Test Research
Description: The agency is currently undertaking a multi-year
project to study the feasibility of a dynamic rollover test to identify
occupant injury risk. Issues such as the field-relevance, repeatability
and reproducibility and adaptability to incorporate vehicle based
countermeasures for such a test are being explored. Additional research
is underway to determine an appropriate crash dummy that can predict
rollover injury mechanisms as well as evaluate occupant restraint
performance in rollover crashes such as pretensioners, integrated seat
belts, 4-point belts, and air belts. The agency will assess the
research data and decide on next steps.
Next Milestone: Agency decision in 2014
Front Impact Occupant Protection
Seat Belt Reminder Systems
Description: Seat Belt Reminder Systems tell drivers and front-
right passengers they have not buckled up. Many different systems are
currently being provided in new cars, but NHTSA does not have a
standard requiring them. This project will consider whether to develop
performance requirements for seat belt reminder systems to improve seat
belt usage. The agency will decide whether to initiate rulemaking to
improve seat belt usage.
Next Milestone: Agency decision in 2011
Small Overlap/Oblique Frontal Crashes
Description: Analysis of frontal-crash fatalities for those belted
with air bags shows offset and oblique crashes as the second largest
group of fatalities after those of extreme severity. NHTSA will develop
test procedures for these crashes and examine the potential for
reducing fatalities and injuries. The agency will decide whether to
initiate rulemaking to address these types of crashes.
Next Milestone: Agency decision in 2011
Next Generation NCAP
Description: In the final decision notice published on July 19,
2008, the agency discussed possible future enhancement efforts (beyond
the newly enhanced program) in frontal impact, side impact, rear impact
and rollover programs. The agency will consider updating injury
criteria in frontal and side impact programs, adjusting the baseline
injury risk in all three programs to ensure that vehicles are measured
against a meaningful benchmark, revising testing protocols, and
providing improved consumer information. The agency also plans to
conduct real-world crash data analyses to identify crash modes and
additional beneficial advanced technologies for the NCAP program beyond
ESC, LDW, and FCW systems. Where appropriate, the agency will develop
relevant advanced technology test procedures.
Next milestone: Multiple decisions from 2012 through 2013
Rear-Seat Occupant Protection
Low Delta V Restraint Protection
Description: Evaluation of air belt or other technologies suitable
for improving thoracic protection to older persons in low-speed
crashes. The agency will assess the research data, technologies and
potential countermeasures and decide on next steps.
Next Milestone: Agency decision in 2014
Side-Impact Occupant Protection
Side Impact Dummies--Adults
Description: The agency is participating in an international
research effort to determine biofidelity, repeatability and
reproducibility and associated injury criteria for the 5th percentile
female and 50th percentile male family of WorldSID side-impact dummies.
The efforts of this collaboration will help to prepare the dummies for
Federalization. The agency will decide whether to initiate rulemaking
to Federalize each or either of the dummies.
Next Milestone: Agency decisions in 2014
Children
Improve Frontal Protection for Children--Booster Seats
Description: Add into FMVSS No. 213 ``Child Restraint Systems''
requirements for booster seats for older children, and add a 10-year-
old crash test dummy to Part 572. A SNPRM was published 11/24/10.
Next Milestone: Final Rule: 2011
Improve Frontal Protection for Children--Lower Anchors and Tethers for
Children (LATCH)
Description: Address issues related to using LATCH in the center
rear seat, tether anchorage locations, weight limit differences between
child safety seats and tether anchorages, and labeling of anchorage
locations. The agency will decide whether to initiate rulemaking to
address LATCH-related issues.
Next Milestone: Agency decision in 2011
Improve Frontal Protection for Children--Test Requirements
Description: Examine how well the test parameters of the FMVSS No.
213 sled test replicate the real world, including crash pulse, test
velocity, excursion limits, the test seat, adding a lap/shoulder belt,
etc. The agency will assess the research data, existing requirements
and potential countermeasures and decide on next steps.
Next Milestone: Agency decision in 2013
Older Persons
Description: The agency is developing a plan to coordinate intra-
agency older driver safety activities in data collection and analysis,
vehicle, human factors and behavioral research and program activities
to meet agency and departmental goals for older occupants. The results
from this work may help to direct regulatory programs aimed at enhanced
older occupant protection.
Next Milestone: Develop an agency plan in 2012
Global Technical Regulations
Pedestrian
Description: Based on GTR 9, Pedestrian Impact Protection, NHTSA
will propose regulations affecting the hood and bumper areas of light
vehicles to reduce injuries and fatalities to struck pedestrians. The
pedestrian dummy leg, if proposed, would be added to Part 572.
Next Milestone: NPRM: 2011
Head Restraints--Phase 1
Description: Amend FMVSS 202 based on the requirements in GTR 7.
Next Milestone: NPRM: 2011
Head Restraints--Phase 2
Description: Working with the international community under WP.29,
the agency will assess several rear-impact dummies, including the
BIORID II, determine the most biofidelic one, and assess next steps.
The agency will also work with the international group on the
development of a dynamic test to assess the potential for whiplash
injuries based on the biofidelic responses of the rear-impact dummy.
The agency will assess the research data, dummy performance and
potential countermeasures and decide on next steps.
Next Milestone: Agency decision in 2013
Global Technical Regulation for Hydrogen-powered Vehicles--Phase 1:
Description: Develop and establish a Global Technical Regulation
(GTR) for Hydrogen-powered Vehicles, including fuel-cell vehicles that:
(1) attains or exceeds the equivalent levels of safety as those for
conventional gasoline fueled vehicles; and, (2) is performance-based
and does not restrict future technologies. The GTR will include
performance requirements for the whole vehicle as well as specific
components and subsystems with focus on the following areas:
Performance requirements for fuel containers, pressure
relief devices, and fuel lines.
Electrical safety and protection against electric shock for
in-use and post-crash situations.
Performance requirements for sub-systems integration in the
vehicle.
Maximum allowable hydrogen leakage for in-use and post-crash
situations.
Additionally, this work will encompass foundational research that
will be necessary to determine future requirements, such as research on
performance of high-pressure cylinders in fires, localized flame
impingement on cylinders, electrical integrity of high- voltage fuel
cell propulsion systems, and developing criteria for post-crash
hydrogen leakage.
Next Milestone: Agency Decision in 2012
The agency will assess the research data and decide on next steps.
Heavy Vehicles
Heavy-Vehicle Event Data Recorders
Description: Develop performance requirements for heavy-vehicle
event data recorders (EDRs). The agency will decide whether to initiate
rulemaking to require EDRs in newly manufactured heavy vehicles.
Next Milestone: Agency decision in 2011
Heavy-Vehicle Truck Tires
Description: Upgrade the endurance test in FMVSS 119 ``New
Pneumatic Tires for Vehicles Other Than Passenger Cars'' and add a new
high-speed test for heavy-vehicle tires. The NPRM was published 9/29/
10. The agency will assess the docket comments and research data and
decide on next steps
Next Milestone: Agency decision: 2012
Heavy-Vehicle Speed Limiters
Description: NHTSA was petitioned by the American Trucking
Association and Roadsafe America to require the installation of speed
limiting devices on heavy trucks. In response, NHTSA has requested
public comment on the subject and received thousands of comments
supporting the petitioner's request. Based on the available safety data
and the ancillary benefit of reduced fuel consumption, NHTSA published
a grant notice on 1/3/11 were we announced our intention to propose a
new Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard that would require the
installation of speed limiting devices on heavy trucks.
Next Milestone: NPRM: 2012
Truck Underride Guards
Description: Analysis of frontal fatalities for those with air bags
and wearing seat belts showed truck underride as the third largest
group of fatalities behind extreme severity crashes and corner/oblique
impacts. Evaluation shows more severe intrusion in offset crashes. The
agency will assess research data and decide on the next steps.
Next Milestone: Agency decision in 2012
Other
Biomechanics Program
Description: The biomechanics program develops injury assessment
methods including advanced anthropometric test device (ATD) research
and associated injury criteria. A comprehensive research plan has been
developed that will generate injury mechanism data, advanced dummy
performance characteristics and assessment of potential countermeasures
to reduce injury. Priority programs and timelines are:
Next milestone: Publish biomechanics plan in 2011
Rotational brain injury criteria--Agency decision 2011
Multi-point chest injury criteria--Agency decision 2012
THOR 50th percentile dummy--Agency decision 2013
THOR 5th percentile dummy--Agency decision 2014
Advanced 3-, 6-, 10-year-old child dummies--Agency decision
2014/2015
Advanced Automatic Collision Notification (AACN)
Description: AACN provides emergency personnel with pre-arrival
information (crash severity, GPS coordinates, other occupant and
vehicle data) when a severe crash occurs. The agency is working with
the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and EMS providers to examine
required data elements and potential benefits and triage capabilities
of AACN to transport those seriously injured to a Level 1 trauma
hospital. The agency will review research results and decide on next
steps.
Next Milestone: Agency decision in 2013
Lighting Standard
Description: Develop a performance-based standard for FMVSS No. 108
``Lamps, Reflective Devices, and Associated Equipment.'' The agency
will decide whether to initiate rulemaking to upgrade FMVSS No. 108 to
a performance-based standard.
Next Milestone: Agency decision in 2012
Tire Aging
Description: Require an oven-aging test for tires prior to running
them through an endurance test. This could help reduce tread
separations that occur in hot weather States. The agency will test
tires that meet FMVSS 139 and then decide whether to initiate
rulemaking to require an oven-aging test.
Next Milestone: Agency decision in 2012
Light Vehicle EDR Requirement
Description: Expand the availability and future utility of EDR data
captured in light vehicles. The agency is developing a rulemaking
proposal to require EDRs on light vehicles to which Part 563 applies
and an advance proposal for future enhancements to their capabilities
and applicability.
Next Milestone: NPRM: 2011
ANPRM: 2011
Update Accelerator Control Standard (FMVSS 124)
Description: The agency is considering several revisions to FMVSS
No. 124. First, we are considering revisions to the test procedures for
vehicles with electronically controlled throttles as well as electric
vehicles and hybrid vehicles. These test procedures are the product of
several workshops and public meetings. Second, we are considering
adding a new requirement for a brake-throttle override system on light
vehicles. Under certain conditions, this would require that the braking
system overrides the throttle control in the event of a conflict.
Next Milestone: NPRM: 2011
Update FMVSS No. 114 for Keyless Ignitions
Description: The agency is considering several revisions to address
emerging safety concerns regarding keyless ignition controls. The
concerns are drivers who are unable to shut down the propulsion system
of their vehicle in the event of any on-road emergency; drivers who
shut off the propulsion system without putting their vehicle in
``park'' and walk away from the vehicle, leaving it prone to roll away;
and drivers who do put their vehicle in park, but inadvertently leave
the propulsion system active increasing the risk of carbon monoxide
poisoning in a closed environment.
Next Milestone: NPRM: 2011
Pedal Placement
Description: Examine pedal placement and spacing and examine
minimum clearances for foot pedals with respect to other pedals, the
vehicle, floor, and any other potential obstructions. The agency will
assess the research data and potential countermeasures and decide on
next steps.
Next Milestone: Agency decision in 2013
V. Crosswalk between 2009-2011 Rulemaking and Research Priority Plan of
October 2009 and this Plan
This section provides a comparison to the October 2009 plan, a
project by project progress review, and a short description of what
priority actions have occurred in the last year.
Comparison to the October 2009 Plan
The following bullets provide a summary comparison of the October
2009 published 2009-2011 plan and this 2011-2013 plan. The plan is a
dynamic document that changes as new issues or circumstances arise.
These tables were updated in early March 2011. Tables 2 and 3 at the
end of this section provide a project by project short description of
what has occurred over the past 2 years, the NPRMs and Final Rules
issued, the decisions made, and the differences in the plans.
There were 56 projects in the 2009-2011 plan and there are
53 projects in the 2011-2013 plan. Combining the two plans,
there are 67 separate actions.
Of the 56 projects in the 2009-2011 plan, 25 were priority
projects and 31 were other significant projects. Of the 53
projects in the 2011-2013 plan, there are 23 priority projects
and 30 other significant projects.
Of the 25 priority projects in the 2009-2011 plan, the
schedule for 1 was moved forward, 3 were completed with final
rules, 1 had a final rule issued but more work is continuing, 7
project deadlines were met (typically issuing an NPRM or making
an agency decision), progress has been made on an additional 4
projects and they are still on schedule, 1 was combined with
the hydrogen GTR project in the other significant projects, and
8 projects are behind the original schedule.
There were 3 new priority projects added for the 2011-2013
plan.
Of the 31 ``other significant projects'' in the 2009-2011
plan, 1 was moved forward, 1 was completed with a final rule, 5
project deadlines were met by making an agency decision,
progress has been made on 7 projects and they are still on
schedule, 12 are behind schedule, 4 have been delayed beyond
2013, and I was dropped from the plan because we decided it did
not reach a priority level of being an ``other significant
project.''
8 new ``other significant projects'' were added for the
2011-2013 plan.
In summary, in the last 2 years (2009-2010) the agency completed
more projects and made more progress on its priority list (17 of 25
priority projects were completed or are on schedule), than on the
``other significant projects'' list (progress made on 14 of 31
projects).
Several abbreviations are used for Tables 2 and 3, to manage the
width of the tables.
These are:
AD--Next agency decision
FR--Final Rule
Guide--Guidelines for visual manual distraction
HV--Heavy Vehicle
NI--Not included in the plan
Notice--A non-rulemaking notice, concerning issues like NCAP,
consumer education, or a notice of intent.
NPRM--Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
RFC--Request for Comment
TBD--To be determined
Under the ``Progress?'' column, the abbreviations are:
+ Completed the action or completed the first milestone on time
+/- Completed an action but are behind the original schedule for
the next action
- Behind original schedule
AS Ahead of Schedule
Delay Likely not to have staff available to work on this until
after 2013
Drop Taken off the priority list
OS On Schedule, progress has been made and we remain on schedule
Table 2--Priority Projects
Comparison between the 2009-2011 Plan (October 2009) and this Plan for
2011-2013
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Priority 2009-2011 2011-2013 Discussion of
Projects Plan Plan Progress? Changes
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Forward AD 2011 AD 2011 OS
Collision
Warning
Lane Departure AD 2011 AD 2011 OS Moved out of
Prevention Priority Projects
to Other
Significant
Projects
Vehicle AD 2013 AD 2013 OS
Communication
s
Distraction Plan 2010 Guide 2011 + Plan published April
2010
Alcohol AD 2012 AD 2013 - Need time to analyze
Initiative results of research
Ejection NPRM 2009 NI +FR Final Rule published
Mitigation FR 2011 1/19/2011
Child AD 2010 NPRM 2012 + Agency decision was
Restraints in made in 2010 to
Side Impact move forward with
an NPRM
NCAP Fit Notice RFC 2011 - Decided to send out
Program 2010 Notice a Request for
2012 Comments
Rear NPRM 2009 Withdrawl +/- NPRM published 12/7/
Visibility 2011 2010
Power Windows NPRM 2009 Withdrawal +/- NPRM published 9/1/
FR 2010 2011 2009; Final
Decision date
changed via Letter
to Congress;
Decision to
Withdraw NPRM
Brake NPRM 2009 NI +FR Completed, NPRM
Transmission FR 2010 published 8/25/2009
Shift FR published 3/31/
Interlock 2010
HV Truck NPRM 2010 NPRM 2011 - Additional
Tractor Coordination
Stability Required
Control
Medium Truck NI AD 2014 Add Added to Plan
and Bus
Stability
Control
HV Forward AD 2011 AD 2013 - Resources
Collision reallocated to
Avoidance medium truck and
bus stability
control
Motorcoach Lap/ NPRM 2009 FR 2012 +/- NPRM published 8/18/
Shoulder FR 2010 10, required
Belts additional
coordination
Motorcoach AD 2011 AD 2012 - Staffing constraints
Fire Safety forces delay
Motorcoach AD 2010 AD 2011 - Staffing constraints
Evacuation forces delay
Motorcoach AD 2009 NPRM 2011 + Previously named
Rollover Motorcoach Roof
Structural Strength; Decision
Integrity to proceed with
rulemaking
Fuel Economy FR 2010 NI +FR Completed, FR issued
MY 2012-16 3/31/2010
light vehicle
CAFE
Fuel Economy NI NPRM 2011 Add OS Added to Plan; NOI
MY 2017-25 FR 2012 published 10/13/10,
light vehicle SNOI published 12/8/
CAFE 10
Fuel Economy AD 2011 FR 2011 AS NPRM published 11/30/
Medium/Heavy 10
Truck
CAFE/ NPRM 2010 FR 2011 + NPRM published 9/23/
Greenhouse 10
Gas Labeling
Rule
Fuel Economy NPRM 2010 NPRM 2011 - Additional
Consumer coordination
Education required
Fuel Tank NPRM 2010 OS Combined with
Labeling consumer education
Program
Consumer Tire NPRM 2009 NPRM 2012 +FR/- NPRM published 6/22/
Rating 2009 FR published 3/
Program 30/2010, but more
work to do on label
CNG NI AD 2013 Add Added to Plan
Batteries AD 2011 AD 2014 - Research Ongoing
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 3--Other Significant Projects
Comparison between the 2009-2001 Plan (October 2009) and this Plan for
2011-2013
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other
Significant 2009-2001 2011-2013 Progress? Discussion of
Projects Plan Plan Changes
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Blind Spot AD 2013 AD 2013 OS
Detection
Sound for AD 2010 NPRM 2012 + New Act, have made
Electric significant
Vehicles progress
Pedestrian NI AD 2013 Add Added to plan
Detection
Motorcycle FR 2010 FR 2011 - More complicated
Helmet than originally
Labeling thought
Motorcycle AD 2010 NI + Decision to evaluate
Braking--ABS with more data
later
Restraint AD 2010 NI + Decision made to add
Effectiveness into Dynamic
in Rollovers Rollover project
Dynamic NI AD 2014 Add Added to Plan
Rollover
Seat Belt AD 2011 AD 2011 OS
Reminder
System
Oblique/Low AD 2011 AD 2011 OS Agency decided in
Offset 2010 to continue
Frontal research
Compatibility AD 2010 NI + Decision to remove
from plan
Pre-Collision AD 2010 NI Delayed Staffing constraints
Air Bag/ forces delay
Safety System
Activation
Next AD 2010-12 AD 2012-13 - Staffing constraints
Generation forces delay
NCAP
Monroney Label NPRM 2009 NI Drop Taken off plan, not
NCAP a priority FR
planned for 2011
Rear Seat Low AD 2012 AD 2014 - Staffing constraints
Delta V forces delay
Side Impact AD 2011 AD 2014 - International
Dummies--Adul Research effort
ts
Children--Boos SNPRM 2009 FR 2011 - SNPRM published 11/
ter Seats 24/10. Staffing
constraints forces
delay
Children--LATC AD 2011 AD 2011 OS
H
Children--213 AD 2010 AD 2013 - Staffing constraints
Frontal Test forces delay
Requirements
Older Occupant AD 2010 Plan 2012 + Agency decision to
Protection develop a plan
Pedestrian GTR NPRM 2010 NPRM 2011 - Staffing constraints
forces delay
Motorcycle FR 2010 NI Delayed Staffing constraints
Brakes--GTR forces delay
Glazing--GTR NPRM 2009 NI Delayed Staffing constraints
forces delay
Head NPRM 2010 NPRM 2011 - Staffing constraints
Restraints--P forces delay
hase 1 GTR
Head AD 2013 AD 2013 OS
Restraints--P
hase 2
Hydrogen GTR NI AD 2012 Add Added to plan
HV Stopping FR 2009 NI + FR Completed--FR
Distance published 7/27/09
HV Event Data AD 2010 AD 2011 - Staffing constraints
Recorder forces delay
HV Truck Tires NPRM 2009 AD 2012 - NPRM published 9/29/
10, staffing
constraints forces
delay
HV Speed NI NPRM 2012 Add Granted petition 1/3/
Limiters 11 and added to
plan
HV Truck NI AD 2012 Add Added to Plan,
Underride Evaluation shows
Guards problem in offset
crashes
Biomechanics AD 2011-15 Plan 2011 OS Publish biomechanics
Program plan first
Advanced AD 2010 AD 2013 - Requires further
Automatic study
Collision
Notification
Lighting AD 2012 AD 2012 OS
Standard
Rear Turn AD 2009 NI Delayed Staffing constraints
Signals forces delay
Tire Aging AD 2010 AD 2012 - Assess tires that
meet new FMVSS 139
Light Vehicle AD 2012 NPRM 2011 AS Moved up and
EDR and ANPRM considering in two
2011 parts, issuing an
NPRM for one and
ANPRM for other
Brake Override NI NPRM 2011 Add Added to Plan
and update
FMVSS 124
Keyless NI NPRM 2011 Add Added to plan
Ignition
Systems
Pedal NI AD 2013 ADD Added to plan
Placement
------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to
Ronald Medford
Question. Last year I introduced legislation to require event data
recorders in all vehicles. If it had been adopted it would have
included motorcoaches and buses. The NTSB has recommended EDRs in
vehicles since 1997 and last year the Society of Automotive Engineers
established minimum standards for heavy vehicle EDRs. What is NHTSA
doing to move toward addressing the recommendation?
Answer. For the past several years, NHTSA has been working with the
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Truck and Bus Committee in the
development of SAE Recommended Practice J2728, ``Heavy Vehicle Event
Data Recorder (HVEDR)--Base Standard.'' This recommended practice was
published in June 2010. The agency is currently in the process of
identifying appropriate performance requirements to be considered for
HVEDRs. SAE J2728 will assist the agency in formulating potential
performance requirements. However, the agency must also identify any
implementation issues and economic impacts, as well as other data
collection needs. NHTSA is will be making an agency decision on whether
it will regulate HVEDRs in 2011.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison
to Ronald Medford
Question 1. What is the status of the Motorcoach Safety Action Plan
items under NHTSA's jurisdiction? What are the top action item
priorities for your agency?
Answer. The Motorcoach Safety Action Plan (the Plan) identified 10
items under NHTSA's jurisdiction. The top three priority action items,
Plan milestones and status for NHTSA are:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Action Item Milestone Date Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initiation of Q1, 2010 The notice of proposed
rulemaking for the rulemaking (NPRM) was
installation of seat published in August 2010.
belts The agency is analyzing
comments and expects to
issue a final rule requiring
seat belts on motorcoaches
in 2012.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Evaluation and Q4, 2009 Evaluation of test procedures
development roof was completed in July 2009,
crush performance and an agency regulatory
requirements decision was made in January
2010. The agency is
considering an NPRM for end
of 2011.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Development of Q4, 2009 An agency regulatory decision
performance was made in December 2009.
requirements and The agency is considering an
assessment of the NPRM for end of 2011.
safety benefits of
stability control
systems on
motorcoaches
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Plan identified seven additional items under NHTSA's
jurisdiction:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Action Item Milestone Date Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Expand research on 2010 In 2010 NHTSA expanded crash
crash-avoidance avoidance research on
warning systems motorcoach vehicles from a
stability control focus
(possible NPRM in end of
2011) to include research of
crash avoidance warning
systems. The research
parallels similar agency
efforts focused on truck
tractors.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initiate rulemaking Q2, 2010 NPRM was published in
to improve tire September 2010. We are
performance assessing comments and
research data, and an agency
decision is expected in
2012.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Evaluate the 2008-2011 NIST study was completed in
feasibility of more December 2010. Now, the
stringent motorcoach agency is conducting
flammability additional research
requirements necessary to develop test
procedures. See also status
for fire detection and
protection systems.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Evaluate the need for 2008-2011 Agency decision has been
and performance of delayed until 2012.
fire detection and Additional research is
protection systems needed to identify test
procedures and performance
requirements and to evaluate
existing fire detection and
suppression systems. We
expect to complete this
research in 2012.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accelerate research 2009-2010 Testing was completed in Q2,
on improved glazing 2011. Further testing to
and window retention evaluate different window
techniques designs and candidate
performance requirements is
currently underway. Agency
decision is expected in
2011.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Develop enhanced 2010 The assessment of egress
emergency egress requirements was completed
requirements, with in Q3, 2010. The agency is
special attention to currently estimating the
children, older cost of various egress
people, and people options.
with disabilities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Make agency decision Q2, 2010 Agency decision has been
on installation and delayed to 2011. We are
performance currently identifying
characteristics of implementation issues
heavy vehicle event related to appropriate
data recorders performance requirements,
(HVEDRs) on economic impacts and data
motorcoaches collection needs so that the
agency can make a decision
on whether to regulate
HVEDRs this year.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 2. In the 2009 ``Motorcoach Safety Action Plan,'' DOT
identified 32 action items, including seven priority areas to improve
the safety of buses, three of which are under NHTSA's jurisdiction.
NHTSA acknowledges they are behind schedule on two of these three
priority items, including a rulemaking for seatbelt installation, and
the development of roof crush and vehicle integrity standards. What are
the reasons for these delays?
Answer. While there have been delays on some of the milestones,
NHTSA has made good progress on its motorcoach safety initiatives.
NHTSA completed its three priority action items listed in the
Motorcoach Safety Action Plan and established the next milestones to
complete the regulatory process.
The NPRM requiring seat belts on motorcoaches was delayed from Q1,
2010 to Q3, 2010 because additional testing and evaluation were
necessary as new technical issues were identified during initial tests;
complications developed with the compliance test methods; obtaining
reliable cost estimates took longer than anticipated; and additional
coordination was necessary with multiple agencies on several difficult
issues that arose during the rulemaking process. The agency expects to
develop the final rule in 2011 with anticipated publication in 2012. An
agency decision for motorcoach rollover structural integrity was
slightly delayed because estimating the cost of the various proposals
under consideration took longer than anticipated. The testing of
motorcoach roof crush procedures and performance requirements was
completed according to schedule.
Question 3. What is the status of the seatbelt rulemaking? When is
it to be completed, and when can we expect that seatbelts will be
required on buses?
Answer. On August 18, 2010, NHTSA issued a NPRM that would require
all new motorcoaches sold in the U.S. to be equipped with lap/shoulder
belts to enhance motorcoach occupant protection in crash and rollover
events, primarily by preventing occupant ejections. The agency is
currently analyzing NPRM comments and expects to publish a final rule
in 2012. If the proposed lead time requirements are adopted in the
final rule, seat belts would be required on motorcoaches 3 years after
final rule publication.
Question 4. I understand NHTSA is also undertaking a review of
window glazing and window retention to research performance
requirements, but that this action is also delayed. What is the status
of this rulemaking? When will it be completed?
Answer. The effectiveness of window glazing for passenger safety,
especially occupant ejection, is closely related to the structural
integrity of the motorcoach. Specifically, glazing is most effective
when the structural integrity of the motorcoach is sound. For this
reason, the agency prioritized its efforts to focus on improving
structural integrity as well as requiring seat belt installation to
reduce occupant ejection before completing its research on window
glazing. Accordingly, the agency determined that this staggered
approach would be the most effective and expedient method of ensuring
an effective glazing requirement.
The findings from this preliminary research indicate that further
testing and development is warranted. Additional testing to establish
performance requirements is currently underway, and an agency decision
is expected in 2011.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Ronald Medford
Question. NHTSA is primarily responsible for the rulemaking on
seatbelt installation, among other items in the Motorcoach Safety
Action Plan. I understand the seatbelt rulemaking has fallen behind
schedule, and that a final rule is not expected until later in 2012.
Some operators are already purchasing new motorcoaches with seatbelts
installed. Have you consulted with these companies to ensure that their
seatbelts will likely meet NHTSA requirements when the rule is finally
released?
Answer. During the rulemaking process, the agency met with
motorcoach manufacturers, seat manufacturers, motorcoach operators and
their associations at the request of these organizations. The agency
considered and documented the input of these organizations in
development of the NPRM, and will continue to do so in the development
of the final rule. The agency also conducted its own testing on
motorcoach seats currently equipped with seat belts. Based on these
test results, the agency has determined that these seats equipped with
seat belts would meet the requirements of the NPRM. These test results
are available on www.regulations.gov (Docket No. NHTSA-2010-0112).
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison to
Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman
Question 1. There are currently 100 open safety recommendations for
motorcoach safety. In your view, what are the most important
recommendations that, if acted on, would add the most safety benefit?
Answer. Several of NTSB's open motorcoach safety recommendations
are included on the Most Wanted List (MWL) of Transportation Safety
Improvements. Among these motorcoach items on the MWL is occupant
protection improvement, with recommendations directed to the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). In 1999, the NTSB issued
recommendations asking NHTSA to develop performance standards for
motorcoach occupant protection systems that account for all types of
crashes (H-99-47) and to develop performance standards for motorcoach
roof strength that provide maximum survival space for all seating
positions (H-99-50). The NTSB has cited inadequate occupant protection
as a contributing cause in its last five motorcoach accident reports.
Both Safety Recommendations H-99-47 and -50 are currently classified
``Open--Unacceptable Action.''
The NTSB would also like to see carriers operating with unsafe
vehicles or unsafe drivers taken out of service. In 1999, the NTSB
issued Safety Recommendation H-99-6 as a result of its special
investigative report on select motorcoach issues. The two most
important factors in safe motor carrier operations are the operational
status of the vehicles and the performance of the individuals who drive
them. If there are significant problems with vehicles or with the
qualifications or fitness for duty of drivers, the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) should rate the carrier as
unsatisfactory, forcing correction of the problems within a specified
time. Increased FMCSA oversight is critical because problems in either
of these areas could result in severe consequences for safety, and if
such problems persist, a motor carrier's authority to operate should be
revoked. The NTSB has called on FMCSA to so revise its safety fitness
rating methodology, but safety Recommendation H-99-6 is currently
classified ``Open--Unacceptable Action.''
Finally, the NTSB has recommended that the FMCSA do more to prevent
medically unfit drivers from operating commercial vehicles. The Board
has determined that serious flaws exist in the medical certification
process for commercial vehicle drivers--flaws that can lead to
increased highway fatalities and injuries for commercial vehicle
drivers, their passengers, and the motoring public. The NTSB has issued
a series of recommendations to strengthen the medical certification
process to prevent medically unfit drivers from unsafely transporting
passengers. These recommendations include ensuring that medical
examiners are properly qualified and trained (H-01-17); developing a
tracking mechanism for previous medical certifications (H-01-18);
providing clear, updated medical regulations to guide examiners (H-01-
19); developing clear, accessible guidelines for medical examiners (H-
01-20); developing a review process that prevents the inappropriate
issuance of medical certifications (H-01-21); and developing a
mechanism for reporting medical conditions that arise between
certifications (H-01-22). Half of these recommendations are currently
classified ``Open--Unacceptable Action.''
Question 2. How can we keep unsafe or unqualified drivers off the
road?
Answer. The NTSB's Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety
Improvements also includes the issue of removing unsafe drivers from
our Nation's highways, for which there are three key elements:
Preventing medically unfit drivers from operating commercial
vehicles. The NTSB has issued a series of safety
recommendations, listed above, to strengthen the medical
certification process and make it more difficult for medically
unfit drivers to operate a commercial vehicle.
Identifying those companies that use unsafe operators (H-99-
6). Once identified, these carriers should be rated
``unsatisfactory,'' thereby forcing them to rectify the issue
within a specified time. If driver problems persist, the
carrier should have its authority to operate revoked.
Ensuring that drivers do not violate hours of service (H-07-
41). Fatigued drivers are unsafe drivers. The NTSB has
recommended that the FMCSA require all carriers to use
electronic on-board recorders (EOBR) to ensure that drivers do
not exceed their hours of service.
Finally, though not on the Most Wanted List, the NTSB has recently
recommended that the FMCSA require carriers to install cameras on their
vehicles that record the driver and the roadway environment in the
event of a crash or sudden deceleration (H-10-10). The NTSB has
recommended that the FMCSA require that carriers review the camera data
in conjunction with other performance data to verify that driver
actions are in accord with company and regulatory rules and procedures
essential to safety (H-10-11).
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison to
Peter J. Pantuso
Question 1. Do you only support ``Research and testing'' of the
vehicle safety improvements to establish standards, or do you support
requiring this equipment on newly manufactured buses once the standard
is developed?
Answer. ABA supports integrated research and testing of all safety
enhancements for motorcoaches. We believe that the motorcoach is
comprised of a series of safety systems that work in concert to protect
the passenger. Our goal is to ensure that research and testing lead to
either a single rulemaking or several interrelated rulemakings that are
based on the research and applied to the manufacture of new
motorcoaches. Our goal is to ensure that rules are promulgated in a
fashion that uses an integrated systems approach and enhances safety
while not degrading the effectiveness on one system by enhancing
another.
Question 2. At our September 2008 bus safety hearing, you testified
that the reason industry has not installed seat belts is the lack of
Federal standards, implying that it was a failure of government, not
industry, that has prevented seat belts on buses. Do you still believe
this is the case?
Answer. Yes. The lack of a Federal standard for seat belts has been
the primary reason that the industry has not implemented seatbelts on
all new coaches. Seatbelts are not universal in their design, points of
restraint, strength tolerances (G force) and anchorages. Our goal in
pushing for research and testing was to ensure that the correct
standard was developed given the crash environment of a motorcoach.
Just as seatbelts in cars are different today than 30 years ago and
seatbelts in airplanes are different than those in cars, we understand
that a 45 foot motorcoach weighing 52,000 lbs. will require a specific
belts, seat anchorage and floor strength. A very relevant example of
the need for testing and research is the fact that NHTSA did not
determine whether a two or three point seatbelt standard was
appropriate for bus operations until after it had analyzed the testing
data. If a motorcoach owner had installed two point belts before NHTSA
had finished its research and testing on seat belts that owner could
now be faced with the costs of installation, the liability in an
accident for having a different standard and finally the requirement to
remove the belts from the coach. In addition, smaller carriers may lose
their insurance coverage if they install safety equipment that does not
conform to federal standards.
The requirement of a Federal standard goes beyond the choice of a
two point or a three point belt. Depending on the G force requirement
the belt must withstand, a bus manufacturer may have to redesign or
replace seats, strengthen the floor or otherwise reconfigure or rebuild
the motorcoach to install belts safely. Of course, cost is an issue but
there are other factors. First, if there is a retrofit requirement,
there is the question of whether such a standard can apply uniformly
across the industry based on differing models, vehicle age and
specifications. A second question is what company, operator or
individual can properly install the seat belts either as a part of the
original equipment or as a retrofit item and in what time frame. There
is only one domestic motorcoach manufacturer and a total of four large
manufacturers worldwide and the total number of motorcoaches entering
the U.S. market from all sources is approximately 1,200 a year. The
ability of any bus operator to have seat belts installed quickly is
limited by this lack of readily accessible facilities. Additionally,
without a Federal standard for new coaches there is the possibility
that individual states will enact their own inconsistent standards
ensuring only that an operator cannot legally operate in one or more
states. A Federal standard is crucial to seat belt installation in the
industry.
Question 3. Based on your 2008 testimony, I concluded that the bus
operators are relying on Federal standards to guide the industry in its
safety improvements. What Federal safety requirements do you believe
need regulatory clarity? Is the industry making any safety improvements
on its own in areas addressed in our legislation, and if not, why not?
Answer. Generally, whenever the Federal Government has an idea for
improving safety, we in the bus industry applaud it. What is important
is that when there is such an idea, that the issue be fully researched
and studied. S. 453requires that NHTSA begin implementing regulations
on several safety measures. ABA agrees that those measures should be
researched to see if the standards should be updated. Specifically, I
refer to window glazing, fire suppression and prevention, emergency
egress and roof strength. Those topics must be researched to determine
if regulatory clarity is needed. Furthermore, ABA believes that the
standards for obtaining authority to operate should also be increased
as well as the standards by which individual states issue commercial
driver's licenses (CDLs) with passenger endorsements.
As for the industry's safety improvements, ABA operators are
placing Global Positioning Systems (GPS) in their motorcoaches for real
time information about their buses locations. For this the industry has
relied on the Intercity Bus Security Grant Program, a competitive grant
program administered by the Department of Homeland Security. Greyhound
Lines, one of ABA's largest members has used some IBSGP funds as well
as its own money for other security upgrades. ABA members are also
installing Electronic On- Board Recorders (EOBRs) in their equipment. A
step made possible by the establishment of definitive EOBR performance
standards. As to why other steps have not be taken, I can only restate
ABA's main point, viz. that federal standards are the fundamental
necessity for most safety equipment required for interstate motorcoach
operators.
Question 4. What, if anything, is the bus industry doing to prevent
reincarnated or chameleon carriers from operating, which are a blemish
to the industry?
Answer. We wholly agree with Senator Hutchison. These reincarnated
carriers are a blemish on the industry. ABA has for several years
advocated higher standards for those who wish to enter the motorcoach
industry. Several years ago I testified before the House T & I
Committee on the need to investigate the wave of new curbside bus
operators who were driving in interstate commerce without insurance,
discernable maintenance facilities, which denied boarding to disabled
citizens and even failed to employ drivers who spoke English. The so
called reincarnated carriers are a subset of those illegal or unsafe
operators and ABA supports vigorous efforts to get them off the roads.
Thus, ABA advocates that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA) pay more attention to the financial background
and resources of motor carrier operators before they are given
authority to operate in order to prevent ``bad actors'' from entering
the industry. And we would support any legislation that allowed FMCSA
to take the license plates off of the buses of any illegal motorcoach
operators as well as operators who are place out of service by the
agency. However, I must reiterate our support for more bus inspections
and a requirement that every state have a bus inspection program that
meets the minimum Federal standard. Moreover, ABA believes that a
portion of the funds provided the states for inspections by the Motor
Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP) should be set aside for bus
inspections. Finally, if states are unwilling or unable to meet a bus
inspection standard then a percentage of their MCSAP funds should be
withheld and private inspectors hired to perform the task. Without a
uniform bus inspection program, bad operators will gravitate to states
with less stringent requirements. Such ``safe harbor'' states for
illegal carriers must be closed or reducing fatalities will be more
difficult no matter the vehicle enhancements mandated for motorcoaches.
Question 5. If the lack of federal standards is an impediment to
seatbelt installation as you previously testified, how is it that one
of your largest member companies (Greyhound) moved forward with
seatbelt installation on all newly manufactured buses? Do you expect
other member companies to take action on their own?
Answer. In my opinion Greyhound's very laudable action is not the
answer for the largely small business motorcoach industry. Greyhound is
essentially betting that the standard it is using to equip its buses
with seat belts will ultimately be the one approved by NHTSA. If NHTSA
does not approve that standard, liability concerns and insurance
requirements may force Greyhound to remove and exchange the belts it
has installed. What seems to be in Greyhound's favor is that given its
size in the industry, resources available to it, and its motorcoach
replacement schedule it may be able to meet the ultimate NHTSA standard
on an accelerated time schedule and with the expenditure of fewer
resources. For the bulk of the motorcoach industry, such a large scale
move is not financially or logistically possible. Over 80 percent of
our industry operates fewer than 10 motorcoaches and does not have the
financial or technical capabilities of a Greyhound Lines. While there
are more and more motorcoaches with seat belts coming into the Nation's
fleet, I do not expect a large scale move to seat belts until a Federal
standard is adopted.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Peter J. Pantuso
Question. Many rural communities rely on bus service as their only
means of intercity transportation, and there are more than 8 times as
many communities served by bus than air in the United States. What is
the bus industry doing to ensure that rural Americans continue to have
access to bus service?
Answer. ABA strongly supports the so-called 5311(f) program (49
U.S.C. 5311(f)) which provides money to States to improve rural
transportation service. In some states private bus operators are
granted money by the states to extend their services to more rural
areas in the states. Jefferson Lines, an ABA member company, has a long
and good history of working with South Dakota to bring more service to
the state. ABA has called for an increased percentage allocation in
5311(f) funding in the coming transportation reauthorization bill. ABA
also supports making permanent the Federal Transit Administration's
(FTA) private match pilot program. This program allows states to expand
section 5311(f) projects to include local match provided by the cost of
the unsubsidized intercity bus service that connects with the
subsidized service. This increases the percentage of the net cost of
the subsidized service that section 5311(f) funds can subsidize from 50
percent to 100 percent of the operational loss and requires
collaboration and connection for services using the private match
process. This program is also a great example of flexible spending in
that if states certify through a consultation process that they have no
unmet rural transportation needs the 5311(f) funds may be used for
other projects.
Finally, In order to reconnect rural communities that have been
isolated from the broader transportation network with the contraction
of EAS, ABA supports the beginning of an Essential Bus Service pilot
program within U.S. Department of Transportation as a supplement to the
very expensive Essential Air Service. In an EBS private operators would
be empowered to create connections between non-urbanized areas and hub
airports. It would also allow operators to make stops at intermediate
points to expand the accessibility of the traveling public to the
transportation network.
Thank you for this opportunity. ABA looks forward to continuing to
work with you to enhance the safety of motorcoach passengers, employees
and increase the transportation options available to the traveling
public.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison to
Joan Claybrook
Question 1. Is there one single safety improvement that you would
recommend above all others to improve the safety of bus occupants?
Answer. There is no single safety improvement that will ensure
passenger safety on motorcoaches in a crash. While seat belts are
obviously necessary, seat belts alone will not be enough to protect
passengers in a crash. There is no silver bullet that will prevent
crashes and protect bus occupants. That is why I support the
comprehensive approach to improve safety taken by the Motorcoach
Enhanced Safety Act. In order to prevent crashes, safety improvements
are needed to make sure that drivers are highly qualified and able to
operate motorcoaches safely, that states have competent maintenance and
inspection programs to catch safety problems, and that new motorcoaches
are built with safety technologies that can help avoid a crash. When a
crash does occur, motorcoaches need to be designed to protect the
passenger compartment and roof from collapse in a rollover crash or
collision with highway bridge abutments, roadside appurtenances and
obstacles, as well as impacts with other vehicles. Improved structural
integrity can provide a margin of safety from interior injuries for
both belted and unbelted occupants, and motorcoaches can be equipped
with modern systems that suppress fires, protect against smoke
inhalation and allow for quick passenger evacuation.
Question 2. With respect to DOT's implementation of the Motorcoach
Safety Action Plan, I've noted that they are behind in several key
areas, including stability control systems, roof crush standards, and
minimum knowledge requirements for operators. How will DOT keep on
track with implementing the Motorcoach Safety Action Plan?
Answer. Unfortunately, the DOT has already fallen behind in
executing some of the key items in the Motorcoach Safety Action Plan.
This is regrettable, but such delays will only become longer and more
pronounced as the issues covered by the Action Plan become more
technical. As important, many safety items in the DOT Action Plan have
no specific deadlines. Public safety on motorcoaches should not be left
to the mercy of bureaucratic procedures or subject to delays due to
other priorities. That is why a clear mandate from Congress with
specific deadlines are necessary to keep DOT on track and to ensure
that motorcoach safety does not take a back seat within DOT.
Question 3. The bus industry has expressed concerns over their
estimated costs of the safety improvements that could be required under
this legislation, depending on what is actually required after the
Secretary completes the directed studies on each safety provision
(industry estimates costs at $89,000 per bus). Do you have any specific
information that leads you to believe the industry estimated costs are
inflated? Which safety improvements did you analyze? To what degree has
the industry inflated the costs? How did the Advocates derive their
lower figures?
Answer. Information that debunks the exaggerated cost claims of the
bus industry are included in the Supplemental Statement I submitted to
the committee at the hearing. Advocates' staff directly contacted
motorcoach manufacturers and suppliers to obtain cost information and
estimates on specific safety features and equipment. Other information
was gathered from public sources including advertising and DOT agency
reports. Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety looked at the industry
cost claims for a range of safety features including electronic
stability control (ESC), advanced glazing, electronic on-board
recorders, fire protection equipment and fire suppression systems.
Industry claims for these safety features were at least double and in
some cases 4 to 5 times the cost quoted by the people who build
motorcoaches. In one case, the industry cost figure cited is 22 times
the actual cost we were quoted by a motorcoach supplier for comparable
protection.
Our figures show that the cost for upgrading safety on new
motorcoaches is only a fraction of the $89,000 cost claimed by industry
and amounts to about 10 cents a ride for the average motorcoach.
The industry cost figures are highly inflated for four reasons.
First, this is a tactic used to scare Congress away from taking action
that would improve public safety. The industry has an interest in
getting people to believe that the cost burden is tremendous in order
to stave off action. Second, the industry is prohibited by antitrust
law from sharing actual cost information among its members that
participate in a trade association. Since they are not allowed to share
and discuss pricing and cost data, they cannot obtain cost information
from bus manufacturers and suppliers and thus are relying on inaccurate
information from less dependable sources. Third, since regulations
requiring specific performance requirements or equipment have not yet
been issued, there is no way the industry can accurately predict what
the regulations will require and what the actual cost will be. Finally,
the industry does not take into account cost reductions and savings
that come with mass production and improvements in design. The cost of
any item is reduced, sometimes by an order of magnitude, when
efficiencies of scale are introduced during mass production. Industry
has not taken this factor into account in its cost figures.
______
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine
Infrastructure, Safety, and Security,
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Re: Hearing on ``Ensuring the Safety of our Nation's Motorcoach
Passengers''
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Thank you for allowing the American Bus Association to submit for
the record of the hearing held on Wednesday, March 30, 2011 this
explanation of the costs associated with implementing the mandates
contained in S. 453, the ``Motorcoach Enhanced Safety Act of 2011''
introduced by Senators Brown and Hutchison.
S. 453 contains some eighteen safety mandates which the bill
requires be implemented between one and three years after enactment.
The implementation of these mandates will cost hundreds of millions of
dollars while the bill does not allow any time for testing or
integrated implementation for many of these mandates. Thus, the cost of
increasing the roof strength of motorcoaches could be increased many
times if after requiring increased roof strength, the NHTSA required
motorcoaches to undertake advanced window glazing which could require
bus companies to rip off the roofs of buses in order to implement a
window glazing mandate. Given the number of mandates S. 453 requires,
this circumstance could be repeated many times.
The number of mandates to be implemented alone will cost many
hundreds of millions of dollars to retrofit the 32,000 motorcoaches in
the motorcoach fleet. Industry sources estimate that for a large
carrier implementation of all 18 mandates would cost upwards of $60,000
per motorcoach. ABA members insist that for smaller carriers the prices
for implementation would be higher as smaller carriers would not be
able to command a volume discount for implementation that the largest
carriers could demand. Moreover, the costs of implementation would be
built into the cost of new motorcoaches, thus any suggestion that bus
operators could pay for these mandates over time is ludicrous.
Equally wrong is the notion that as these mandates are implemented
the prices for these mandates will decrease. Only 1,200 motorcoaches
are built for the United States market each year from all sources and
there is only one domestic motorcoach manufacturer. This limited volume
in total sales will diminish the economies of scale that advocates tend
to point to as a primary driver to reduce costs. One cannot simply draw
parallels in implementation to the auto industry as the overall vehicle
production in the motorcoach industry is de minimis. Additionally, the
timelines in S. 453 require immediate implementation which will
disproportionally hurt the majority of small businesses that make up
the motorcoach industry. With 80 percent of the industry owning 10 or
fewer vehicles the vast majority of new vehicle production will flow to
the small number of larger companies that have the capital to invest in
new coaches. The strain placed on the supply chain and the lack of a
down market for used buses will force many companies out of business.
Finally, may I point out that NHTSA, the agency that will oversee
the development and implementation of these mandates, notes that
retrofitting motorcoaches with seat belts alone, only one of the 18
mandates in S. 453, would cost up to $40,000 per motorcoach (see 75
Fed. Reg. 50958, 50979).
Thank you for this opportunity to supplement the record. ABA looks
forward to continuing to work with you to ensure safety for the
Nation's 32,000 motorcoaches and the bus industry's 750 million
passengers.
Sincerely,
Peter J. Pantuso,
President and CEO,
American Bus Association.
______
April 2011
Letter ``Clarification Regarding Seat Belts Use Rates on Motorcoaches''
from Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety
During the question and answer period of the hearing on motorcoach
safety before the Subcommittee, Senator Tom Udall (D-NM) asked a
question regarding seatbelt use in motorcoaches. In his response, the
Deputy Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA), Ronald Medford, stated that ``about 20 percent
of bus riders use the belts.'' Mr. Medford followed up his response by
stating that the 20 percent figure was from Australia where ``they just
surveyed the use in Australia and found that it was low.'' Advocates
for Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates) would like to clarify the
record on this point and submit information that indicates that Mr.
Medford's response was inaccurate and omitted important, pertinent
facts.
The Australian Study Was Not Really a ``Study''
To begin, the work from which Mr. Medford draws his figures was not
a scientific study but rather a review of existing information on the
Australian experience with ``three point seat belts on coaches.'' \1\
Not only did the author of the review not conduct any research, but he
clearly stated that ``no objective scientific observational studies
have been conducted of seat belt wearing rates on coaches in
Australia.'' \2\
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\1\ Griffiths, M., Paine, M., Moore, R., Three Point Seat Belts On
Coaches--The First Decade In Australia, 2005.
\2\ Id at 5.
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There Is Currently No Verified Belt Use Rate On Motorcoaches in
Australia
The review article makes clear that there has not been any
objective study of motorcoach belt use rates in Australia. In fact, the
only documented report cited in the article indicates that the use rate
in one investigated fatal bus crash yielded a belt use rate of 90
percent.\3\ The lower estimate of 20 percent belt use in motorcoaches
cited by Mr. Medford comes from ``(unpublished) Police anecdotal
records.'' \4\ Thus, Mr. Medford was citing unverified information that
is not accepted as credible and valid. While this unverified figure of
20 percent is mentioned in the Australian review article, the authors
of the review specifically state that of the 52 occupants of one bus
crash, only 5 were injured (2 fatally injured); all 5 injured occupants
were unrestrained.\5\ That also means that all the restrained occupants
were uninjured. Mr. Medford neglected to mention this in his testimony.
The authors also stated that, in Australia, ``[s]ince 1994 there have
been several serious bus crashes but no seat belt wearing occupant has
been reported as receiving fatal or disabling injuries in any of these
crashes.'' \6\ Again, this important fact was not addressed by Mr.
Medford in his response to Senator Udall's question.
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\3\ Id.
\4\ Id.
\5\ Id. at 3.
\6\ Id.
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Proposed Rule Shows Even with Low Use Rates Seat Belts are Effective
Finally, NHTSA itself, in the Preliminary Regulatory Impact
Analysis (PRIA) conducted as part of the rulemaking process for NHTSA's
proposed rule to require seatbelts in motorcoaches, indicated that a
belt use rate of only 24 percent in motorcoaches would make the rule
cost effective.\7\ Yet another fact that Mr. Medford failed to mention
in his response.
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\7\ Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis: FMVSS No. 208
Motorcoach Seatbelts, NHTSA, August 2010, NHTSA-2010-0112-0006.1, page
78.
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