[Senate Hearing 112-234]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-234
DEFENDING U.S. ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE CHANGING ARCTIC: IS THERE A
STRATEGY?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANS, ATMOSPHERE, FISHERIES, AND COAST GUARD
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 27, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
----------
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts Ranking
BARBARA BOXER, California OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROY BLUNT, Missouri
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
TOM UDALL, New Mexico PATRICK J. TOOMEY, Pennsylvania
MARK WARNER, Virginia MARCO RUBIO, Florida
MARK BEGICH, Alaska KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
DEAN HELLER, Nevada
Ellen L. Doneski, Chief of Staff
James Reid, Deputy Chief of Staff
Bruce H. Andrews, General Counsel
Todd Bertoson, Republican Staff Director
Jarrod Thompson, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Rebecca Seidel, Republican General Counsel and Chief Investigator
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANS, ATMOSPHERE, FISHERIES, AND COAST GUARD
MARK BEGICH, Alaska, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine, Ranking
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey MARCO RUBIO, Florida
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
MARK WARNER, Virginia DEAN HELLER, Nevada
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on July 27, 2011.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Begich...................................... 1
Statement of Senator Snowe....................................... 3
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 22
Witnesses
Ambassador David A. Balton, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans
and Fisheries, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental
and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Department of State............... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard........ 9
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Rear Admiral David Titley, Oceanographer of the Navy and
Director, Task Force Climate Change............................ 15
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Peter E. Slaiby, Vice President, Shell Alaska.................... 32
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Scott Borgerson, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Institute for Global
Marine Studies................................................. 43
Prepared statement........................................... 45
Andrew T. Metzger, Ph.D., P.E., Assistant Professor, Department
of Civil and Environmental Engineering, College of Engineering
and Mines, University of Alaska, Fairbanks..................... 48
Prepared statement........................................... 50
Appendix
Jane Lubchenco, Ph.D., Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and
Atmosphere, and Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, prepared statement 61
Fran Ulmer, Chair, U.S. Arctic Research Commission (USARC),
prepared statement............................................. 66
Response to written question submitted to Ambassador David A.
Balton by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 68
Hon. Mark Begich............................................. 68
Response to written questions submitted to Admiral Robert J.
Papp, Jr. by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 69
Hon. Mark Begich............................................. 71
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to
Rear Admiral David W. Titley................................... 74
Response to written questions submitted to Peter E. Slaiby by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 76
Hon. Mark Begich............................................. 78
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John D.
Rockefeller IV to Andrew T. Metzger, Ph.D., P.E................ 79
DEFENDING U.S. ECONOMIC INTERESTS
IN THE CHANGING ARCTIC:
IS THERE A STRATEGY?
----------
WEDNESDAY, JULY 27, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and
Coast Guard,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Mark Begich,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK BEGICH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Begich. Thank you all very much. Thanks for being
here. The Ranking Member is on her way, but we may go ahead and
start in just a second here. I appreciate you being patient
while I came from a Veterans Committee meeting, in which we
were talking about long-term care for our veterans. So I
appreciate your patience.
Today our topic is ``Defending U.S. Economic Interests in
the Changing Arctic: Is There a Strategy?'' So today is the
discussion of hopefully there is and, if not, we hope to have a
long-term discussion and start to move forward.
Again, good morning. I'd like to welcome our witnesses and
thank them for taking the time to testify before the Committee
today.
Any Alaskan can tell you our State is ground zero for the
changes apparent in the Arctic today. Sea ice disappearing
faster than scientific models have predicted; open seas eroding
the coastline and thawing permafrost, undercutting our many
villages along the coast. And warm water temperatures are
changing the migration patterns of our fish and marine mammals.
The opening of this fifth ocean has broad implications for
our nation. It's been said there's suddenly a lot more water up
there, and it's our responsibility. We need to make sure our
nation is prepared to fulfill that responsibility and address
the implications for national security, energy development, and
increased marine shipping and tourism.
The responsibilities and opportunities of the changing
Arctic are the subject of today's hearing on our nation's
economic interests in the Arctic and whether we have a strategy
to address these. Consider energy. The Beaufort and Chukchi
Seas contain an estimated 28 billion barrels of oil, almost
twice as much as has already been produced from Prudhoe Bay,
and 38 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.
I'm pleased that President Obama supported my push to start
utilizing Alaska resources to support America's energy needs.
As we look to future energy development, we need to proceed
carefully, safely, and make sure communities are fully prepared
and engaged. I welcome the testimony of Shell Oil's Pete Slaiby
on the second panel today.
The diminishing ice pack is also opening new routes for
marine shipping, which can cut distances for transcontinental
shipping in half. This year is expected to see a record number
of sailings of cargo vessels through the northern sea route on
top of Russia, including tankers.
With increased energy development and maritime activity,
our nation must ensure that the Coast Guard has the
capabilities to operate in the Arctic waters, to guard our
borders, protect life, safety, and the environment, and ensure
safe commerce. That includes icebreakers, which we are sorely
lacking. It also includes other cutters and aircraft hangars,
crew quarters, communication capabilities, and other
infrastructure needed to do the job. I look forward to
exploring those needs in more detail today.
We also need a strategy toward addressing the international
issues that exist in the opening Arctic. On that front, the
most important single step our nation needs to take for the
future Arctic governance is the ratification of United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. Even while we have abided by
its terms, the United States is among a handful of nations
which have not ratified the Law of the Sea. And the company we
keep by not ratifying this law, this convention, includes the
likes of Libya, Iran, and North Korea, a list, honestly, we
don't need to belong to.
As the world's leading maritime power, the only way the
United States can make sure that the rules are followed and to
protect the freedom of navigation, to advance our commercial
and national security interests, is by being party to the
convention. And, only as a party to the convention can we
protect our rights as a coastal state and secure international
recognition of the outer limits of the continental shelf. The
extended continental shelf in the Arctic is estimated at almost
twice the size of California.
It's huge, even by Alaska standards.
There are other strategic needs in the Arctic as well, such
as addressing border disputes, fisheries in international
waters, and more, which we will talk about today.
The coming years bring great challenge and opportunities to
the Arctic and the United States has a major role to play. To
fulfill that role and responsibility, we must address the
broader policy and implications of an ice-diminishing Arctic on
the diplomatic, scientific, and national security fronts. We
must make the needed investments to maintain leadership at the
top of our globe.
Before I introduce the first panel, I will ask the ranking
member, Senator Snowe, if she'd like to make a few statements.
Senator Snowe.
STATEMENT OF HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MAINE
Senator Snowe. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
calling this hearing to explore our economic opportunities in
the Arctic.
With the release of the Coast Guard's High Latitude Study
on July 20 of this year, it's certainly timely that we
understand the infrastructure, research, and legislative
priorities necessary to promote economic growth in the region.
In June this subcommittee reviewed the Coast Guard budget and
discussed the lack of icebreaking capacity and its implications
for the Coast Guard, and I'm certain as well we'll hear from
the Navy today about its reliance on the icebreaker fleet.
At the same time, indisputably our hearing today stems from
the fact that climate change has dramatically changed the
Arctic environment and receding sea ice will require new patrol
and response capacities as shipping routes open, vessel traffic
increases, and competing claims to resources are made in areas
previously inaccessible due to year-round ice.
Scientists predict that the Arctic may shift from an ice-
covered environment to a recurrent ice-free ocean in the summer
in as few as 20 years. In fact, scientists at the National Snow
and Ice Data Center are seeing record ice melt this summer, and
the ice extent is currently lower than it was in 2007, the year
there was a shocking record low. As of July 17, Arctic sea ice
extended only 2.9 million square miles, 865,000 square miles
below the 1979 to 2000 average.
New open waters will increase the potential for shippers to
save several days and thousands of miles of travel between Asia
and Europe or North America. While significant increases in
vessel traffic remain impeded by operational costs in the
northern latitudes, we cannot stand idly by and wait to address
the capability of our Coast Guard and Navy to protect American
safety and security interests.
The Coast Guard has actively pursued an Arctic mission
analysis and I'm pleased that the High Latitude Study is now
available to guide Congressional decisionmaking. This study
identifies significant capacity gaps in four key mission areas:
defense readiness, ice operations, marine environmental
protection, and port security.
The Coast Guard takes seriously its statutory obligations
to protect our sovereignty, human lives, infrastructure, and
the unique Arctic environment and the root cause of its
inability to perform at the level we expect is a stark lack of
polar icebreaking capacity. The current status of our
icebreaker fleet, with only one medium active vessel in
operation, poses an unacceptable risk to our nation. Icebreaker
construction would take 8 to 10 years after we make a decision
to grow the fleet, of course, so it is imperative that we begin
to identify concrete steps to address our nation's long-term
requirements.
Admiral Papp, you've commented on the Coast Guard budget
hearing in April that one thing that keeps you up at night is
the Coast Guard's inability to respond to any sort of disaster
in the Arctic. It therefore comes as no surprise to you, I
assume, that the High Latitude Study found that we were
constrained currently by inadequate communications system
capabilities, limited forward operating bases, and shortfalls
in our environmental response and mitigation capabilities in
ice-covered water.
With small communities' cold climate transportation
challenges, the most basic provisions will prove difficult to
meet in the Arctic should we have to locate people to a remote
site. We even lack adequate places to house people or vehicles.
Unfortunately, in this difficult budget climate and due to
the realities of acquisition and construction processes,
meeting those infrastructure requirements is a goal that is
years away. As a positive step, in 2009 the U.S. led the
successful development of an international search and rescue
initiative in the Arctic, negotiated under the auspices of the
Arctic Council. Yet, given the security issues that may be
posed by growing open water and the discovery of new sea
routes, the United States must be at the table and have all the
tools at the ready to address emerging threats to our nation's
sovereignty, whether through competing resource claims or
maritime passage along our shores and international straits.
The United States as a maritime nation should continue to
be a strong leader in the development of international ocean
policy. A cornerstone of this will be how we address the
significant changes occurring in Arctic waters and how we use
the lessons we are learning there to inform mitigation and
prevention efforts to address climate changes along our
Atlantic and Pacific coasts. The effects of climate change are
being felt already around this country, and the Arctic is the
canary in the coal mine.
I look forward to an illuminating discussion today and I
welcome all of you here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Senator Snowe.
Again, we want to thank the first panel here today and look
forward to your testimony. We have on the panel today:
Ambassador David Balton, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans,
Fisheries, Bureau of Oceans and International Environment and
Scientific Affairs, U.S. Department of State. That's a long
title.
Admiral Papp, again it's always good to see you, Commandant
of the United States Coast Guard; and Rear Admiral Titley,
Oceanographer and Navigator of the Navy, United States Navy.
Again, thank you all three for being here. We'll start with
Ambassador Balton, if you could go ahead, and then we'll kind
of just go down the list here. Ambassador, thank you.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR DAVID A. BALTON, DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR OCEANS AND FISHERIES,
BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Balton. Thank you very much, Chairman Begich,
Ranking Member Snowe. I'm pleased to be here today. I have a
written statement and ask that it be included in the record.
Senator Begich. Without objection.
Ambassador Balton. Mr. Chairman, as you noted, the Arctic
is changing in fundamental ways. Much, though not all, of this
change is resulting from the warming Arctic climate. As you
noted, Arctic sea ice is retreating, Arctic land glaciers are
receding, coasts are eroding, Arctic permafrost is thawing.
Much of this change presents serious challenges for Arctic
residents and for governments. But with these challenges come
certain opportunities, particularly economic opportunities.
Over the next few minutes I will try to outline some of the
steps we are taking at the international level to facilitate
and manage economic activity in the Arctic. I will close with
some remarks about why the United States must accede to the Law
of the Sea Convention if we are to advance our economic
interests in the Arctic most effectively.
Mr. Chairman, in early 2009 the U.S. Government released an
updated U.S. Arctic region policy. That policy remains in
effect. The impetus to update this policy arose from the many
changes that had taken place in the Arctic in the previous 15
years, including the region's emerging economic opportunities.
The other Arctic nations are also moving ahead with
policies to take advantage of these same economic
opportunities. Part of our mission and our challenge is to
manage economic development across the Arctic so that it
proceeds in an orderly and responsible fashion. Here are just a
few of things we are doing, the tip of the iceberg, no pun
intended.
Using our policy, we are working closely with Russia, which
holds vast hydrocarbon and other mineral deposits in the
Arctic, to share our experience in managing the development of
such resources. The Russian government, the Geological Survey
of Canada, and the United States Geological Survey have also
jointly mapped mineral potential across the Arctic. The United
States and Canada are conducting research to develop
technologies to locate Arctic methane hydrate deposits for
potential production. The United States and Canada also plan to
cooperate on the regulatory process of the proposed Alaska
Natural Gas Pipeline.
Now, the main forum in which we work with other Arctic
nations is the one that Senator Snowe mentioned, the Arctic
Council. The Council is valuable on a lot of fronts, not least
of which is because it serves as a venue in which the Arctic
indigenous peoples can collaborate with governments there on
many issues of concern.
This council, the Arctic Council, is evolving in a number
of very useful ways. In May, for example, Secretary Clinton
signed the search and rescue agreement that Senator Snowe
referred to. This is the first-ever legally binding agreement
adopted under the auspices of the Arctic Council. This
agreement will support economic activity in the Arctic where
infrastructure and support services are sparse.
While she was at the meeting, Secretary Clinton also joined
with other colleagues at the Arctic Council in launching a new
set of negotiations on oil spill preparedness and response,
which the United States will co- chair.
Let me say a word about Arctic fisheries. Outside the
Arctic Council, we are advancing our interests in the
management of the potential for increased Arctic fisheries as
they may expand into the Arctic region with the warming of the
waters.
I note that the United States has taken an unprecedented
step at home. We have closed the portion of the U.S. exclusive
economic zone north of Alaska to new commercial fisheries. Why?
Well, essentially because we don't yet have sufficient
knowledge of those waters to manage fisheries in that area
properly.
We at the State Department have encouraged our immediate
Arctic neighbors--Russia and Canada--to consider taking
comparable action in waters under their jurisdiction in the
Arctic. And we are seeking a broader agreement that nations
should not authorize their vessels to fish in the high seas
portion of the central Arctic Ocean until we have an
international mechanism for managing fisheries in that area.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I must say that the most significant
step we can take as a nation to advance our economic interests
in the Arctic would be to accede to the Law of the Sea
Convention. As you noted, the Convention provides the basic
legal framework applicable to economic activities in all
oceans, including the Arctic Ocean. The Convention contains
highly favorable rules that benefit the U.S. oil and gas
industry, the shipping industry, the telecommunications
industry, and the fishing industry, among others. Only as a
party, though, could the United States fully secure those
benefits, and that is why these industries support U.S.
accession to the Convention.
While those benefits would apply in all regions, the Arctic
region presents a particularly compelling case for why the
United States must be party to the Convention. We are the only
Arctic nation not party. We are the odd one out. We are the
only nation bordering the Arctic Ocean that is not in a
position to fully secure rights to our continental shelf, which
may extend 600 miles north of Alaska.
From a geostrategic perspective, we need to be a party to
the Convention to take complete advantage of our stature as a
major maritime power and as an Arctic nation.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify. I would be
pleased to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Balton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador David A. Balton, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries, Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Chairman Begich, Ranking Member Snowe, members of the Subcommittee,
I am David A. Balton, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Oceans and Fisheries. I am pleased to be here today to discuss with you
how we work with our fellow Arctic nations to promote and advance our
economic interests in the Arctic region.
As you know, the frozen areas of the Arctic are melting and
thawing, and this phenomenon is triggering ever-increasing public
interest in this little-known and mysterious area of the world. We have
all heard much lately about the oil and gas deposits in the off-shore
areas of the Arctic, including Alaska, and though we hear less about
other kinds of human activity in the Arctic such as increases in
shipping and tourism. These things are happening now. We must be
prepared to manage Arctic economic activity in ways that both secure
our economic interests and also protect the environment. It is in part
for these reasons that we reviewed and updated our Arctic policy in
2009.
United States Arctic Region Policy
On January 9, 2009, the past Administration released an updated and
revised U.S. Arctic Region Policy for the first time since 1994.
Shortly after the current Administration came to office, it reaffirmed
that this policy remains in effect.
The impetus to update the Arctic Region Policy arose from the many
changes that have taken place in the Arctic over the previous 15 years,
including growing interest in the region's economic assets. The policy
sets forth seven areas of policy:
National Security and Homeland Security Interests
International Governance
Extended Continental Shelf and Boundary Issues
International Scientific Cooperation
Maritime Transport
Economic Issues, Including Energy
Environmental Protection and Conservation of Natural
Resources
Arctic Resource Potential
The Arctic regions of Russia, the United States, and Norway contain
the largest amounts of discovered Arctic oil and gas resources. Russia
has 75 percent of known oil reserves and 90 percent of known gas
reserves, and likely contains the vast majority of undiscovered
resources of oil and gas. Russia ships up to 140 million barrels of oil
per year along the Arctic Russian and Norwegian coasts. Norway
transports up to 180 million barrels of oil and gas condensate per year
from Norwegian Sea platforms. The potential for oil and gas in the
areas of possible U.S. extended continental shelf is still largely
unknown, but has the potential to be significant. Russia also holds
vast non-energy mineral deposits and engages in significant mining
activity in the Arctic.
U.S. Government agencies are actively involved in sharing our
experiences in the area of oil and gas management with Russia, which
continues to express interest in cooperation in Chukchi Sea oil and gas
activities. Russia also holds vast non-energy mineral deposits and
engages in significant mining activity in the Arctic. The Russian
Government, the Geological Survey of Canada and the United States
Geological Survey have jointly mapped pan-Arctic mineral potential. The
United States and Canada are conducting research to develop
technologies to characterize Arctic methane hydrate deposits with a
long-term goal of potential production of methane. Research is also
underway in the United States, Canada, Norway, Germany and other EU
countries on the methane hydrate role in terms of seafloor hazards and
global climate change. The United States and Canada also plan to
cooperate on the regulatory process of the proposed Alaska natural gas
pipeline.
The National Ocean Policy for the stewardship of the ocean, our
coasts, and Great Lakes established by President Obama in 2010
recognizes the Arctic as a national priority. Implementation of this
policy will address environmental stewardship needs in the Arctic Ocean
and adjacent coastal areas through the identification of better ways to
conserve, protect, and sustainably manage Arctic coastal and ocean
resources, effectively respond to the risk of increased pollution and
other environmental degradation on humans and marine species, and
adequately safeguard living marine resources. The policy stresses
collaborations and partnerships and communicates to other Arctic
Nations the commitment of the United States to support science based
decision-making and an ecosystem-based approach to managing human
activities at sea, including using tools, consistent with international
law, such as coastal and marine spatial planning.
The Arctic Council
The Arctic Council is the main forum we use to advance our
economic, environmental and other Arctic interests with the Arctic
nations. The Arctic Council also gives us a forum in which the
indigenous peoples living in the Arctic collaborate on many issues of
concern. The Council has been very successful for the United States in
that we have led or co-led many of its important projects including the
2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, the 2008 Arctic Oil and Gas
Assessment, and the 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment. In May
2011, Secretary Clinton signed an agreement on Aeronautical and
Maritime Search and Rescue Cooperation in the Arctic, the first-ever
legally binding agreement negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic
Council. This agreement is key to supporting economic development
activity in the Arctic, where infrastructure and support services for
search and rescue are sparse.
Secretary Clinton also joined with her colleagues in creating a
Task Force on oil spill preparedness and response, which the United
States will co-chair with Russia. This Task Force is an excellent
opportunity to join with our fellow Arctic nations to prepare for
offshore oil exploration and development so that if a spill does
happen, we will be better-positioned to address it. We will include the
lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon spill as we develop an
international instrument on oil spill cooperation in the Arctic, where
coordination of international efforts would likely be critical to
mounting an effective response. The United States has recently proposed
a new Arctic Maritime and Aviation Infrastructure Initiative which, if
agreed by the other seven Arctic Council members, would examine the
current state of Arctic infrastructure, how it measures up to current
and future economic development needs, and recommend to governments
what infrastructure investments they should consider in order to
support sustainable economic development in the region such as oil and
gas development, shipping, and tourism.
Arctic Fisheries
The Department of State and other agencies are also working to
advance our interests in the proper management of fisheries that may
expand into the Arctic region. Over the past few years, two significant
developments in the United States have encouraged us to take action on
this matter. First, in 2008, Congress passed a Joint Resolution calling
on the United States to work with other Arctic nations to develop one
or more agreements for managing fisheries that may expand into new
areas of the Arctic Ocean. Second, the United States took the
unprecedented step of closing the portion of the U.S. Exclusive
Economic Zone north of Alaska to new commercial fisheries--essentially
because we do not yet have sufficient science and understanding of
these Arctic ecosystems to manage new fisheries there appropriately.
We have regularly engaged the other Arctic nations on this subject,
both bilaterally and multilaterally. Last month, thanks primarily to
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the United States
hosted a meeting of scientists to consider steps to improve our
collective understanding of the marine environment in the Arctic so as
to better predict when and where new fisheries may be possible. On a
broader note, we are seeking agreement that nations should not
authorize their vessels to fish in the high seas portion of the central
Arctic Ocean until there is an adequate international mechanism in
place for managing fisheries in that area.
International Science Cooperation
We are benefiting from the increased investment in science during
the International Polar Year (2007-2009). The intensified IPY science
and education activities, coordinated by the U.S. National Science
Foundation on behalf of many U.S. agencies, invigorated international
science cooperation in polar regions. These enduring international
science partnerships, that are fostered under science and technology
agreements coordinated by the State Department as well as memoranda of
understanding between research entities in the U.S. and foreign
partners, advance diplomacy in the Arctic region. Moreover, joint
international science activities leverage the U.S. ability to achieve
understanding of the environment that underpins our economic activities
in the Arctic.
Law of the Sea Convention
Finally, we could significantly advance our economic interests in
the Arctic by joining the Law of the Sea Convention.
The Law of the Sea Convention provides the basic legal framework
applicable to such activities, including the rules applicable to
navigation, the determination of the outer limits of the continental
shelf, fishing, environmental protection (including in ice-covered
areas), and marine scientific research.
Unfortunately, the Convention remains a key piece of unfinished
treaty business for the United States.
Of course the Convention's provisions are highly favorable to U.S.
national security interests, because navigational rights and freedoms
across the globe for our ships and aircraft are vital to the projection
of sea power.
In addition, the Convention's provisions are highly favorable to
U.S. economic interests, in the Arctic and elsewhere.
First, the Convention provides the legal certainty and
predictability that businesses depend upon.
Second, it sets forth rules that promote and protect their
interests.
The Convention gives coastal States an exclusive economic
zone (EEZ) extending 200 nautical miles offshore, encompassing
diverse ecosystems and vast natural resources such as
fisheries, energy, and other minerals. The U.S. EEZ is the
largest in the world, spanning over 13,000 miles of coastline
and containing 3.4 million square nautical miles of ocean--
larger than the combined land area of all fifty states.
The Convention also gives coastal States sovereign rights
for the purpose of exploiting and managing resources of the
continental shelf, which can extend beyond 200 nautical miles
if certain criteria are met. The United States is likely to
have one of the world's largest continental shelves,
potentially extending beyond 600 nautical miles off Alaska.
Only as a Party could we take advantage of the treaty procedure
that provides legal certainty and international recognition of
the U.S. continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.
The Convention provides a mechanism for U.S. companies to
obtain access to minerals of the deep seabed in areas beyond
national jurisdiction.
The Convention guarantees the ability to lay and maintain
submarine cables and pipelines in the EEZs and on the
continental shelves of other States and on the high seas.
The Convention secures the rights we need for commercial
ships to export U.S. commodities and protects the tanker routes
through which half of the world's oil moves.
The Convention is the foundation upon which rules for
sustainable international fisheries are based.
More broadly, U.S. accession is a matter of geostrategic importance
in the Arctic, in terms of both symbolism and substance. We are the
only member of the Arctic Council that is not a Party. We are the only
State bordering the Arctic Ocean that is not in a position to fully
secure our continental shelf rights. We need to be a Party to the
treaty to have the level of influence in the interpretation,
application, and development of law of the sea rules that reflects our
maritime status. We need to be a Party to the treaty to fully claim our
rightful place as an Arctic nation.
The United States has been an Arctic nation since the Alaska
purchase in 1867. Although many Americans do not think about our
country in connection with the Arctic, those of us in Alaska and in
Washington, D.C. think about it a lot, and we are working hard to
preserve this beautiful, pristine place, increase its resilience, and
protect our important interests there.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Ambassador.
What I'd like to do now is, Admiral Papp.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL ROBERT J. PAPP, JR., COMMANDANT, U.S.
COAST GUARD
Admiral Papp. Good morning, Chairman Begich and Senator
Snowe. It's good to see you both again and thank you for having
me up here for this hearing, and for your continuing support of
our Coast Guard, especially our hardworking Coast Guard men and
women. As I previously stated, it's my highest honor to lead
and represent them.
America is a maritime nation. Most of our citizens are
keenly aware of the importance of our oceans. But America is
also an Arctic nation. However, few Americans outside of Alaska
are aware that we are also an Arctic nation, largely because
the northern Arctic waters have been frozen and inaccessible.
But rapid change is occurring, as has been noted here.
Arctic ice is diminishing and in summer months an entire new
ocean is emerging. These waters are spurring an increase in
human activities, such as natural resource exploration,
shipping, and ecotourism.
For more than 221 years, our nation has relied upon the
U.S. Coast Guard to protect those on the sea, to protect
against threats delivered by the sea, and even protect the sea
itself. Our challenge today is to ensure we have a Coast Guard
capable of meeting these same responsibilities in this new
area.
However, posturing our forces to do so presents us with
many challenges. Operations in the Arctic's extreme cold,
darkness, and ice-infested waters require specialized
equipment, infrastructure, and training. Our current Arctic
capabilities are very limited. We have only one operational
icebreaker. We do not have any coastal or shoreside
infrastructure. We do not have a seasonal base to even hangar
our aircraft or to sustain our crews.
By way of example, after assuming my watch as Commandant
last May one of the first things I did was to travel to the
Arctic. One of the places I visited, along with you, Mr.
Chairman, was Barrow, but we did not stay overnight. Next week
I'm headed back up to the Arctic and I will return to Barrow.
This time I'm planning to remain overnight. But it's also been
a real challenge to find enough lodging even for our small
travel party. Imagine if we had to mount a major pollution
response. We'd have to create our own infrastructure.
Last spring, a Russian ice camp unexpectedly broke up 630
miles north of Point Barrow, within the U.S. search and rescue
area of responsibility. Russia sent one of their icebreakers to
respond. If we'd been asked to respond within our SAR area of
responsibility, we could not have done so. Indeed, had it been
a U.S. team we would likely have had to request a foreign
icebreaker to conduct the rescue.
This case highlights the need for sufficient Arctic surface
capabilities. When weather prevents planes from flying, you
need ice-capable ships to perform search and rescue. Ice-
capable ships will also be required to conduct any Arctic
pollution response.
The threat posed by the increase in Arctic shipping traffic
is also very real and expanding. The use of Russia's northern
sea route is increasing and in 2009 Russian icebreakers
escorted the first several ships through the passage. Last
year, in 2010, for the first time in modern history the
northern sea route was completely ice-free and at least eight
vessels transited through the passage. This year Russia is
planning to do at least 15 escorts, including six convoys with
oil tankers, as well as cargo vessels and bulk tankers.
While this represents a moderate increase in traffic, all
vessels sailing the northern route will have to exit into the
Bering Sea. Therefore we have undertaken a Bering Strait port
access route study to determine the navigational, vessel
traffic, and other safety requirements.
The bottom line is that shipping traffic through the waters
containing our richest fisheries is on the rise. The Arctic is
also rich in natural gas and oil. Oil companies continue to bid
on leases in the Beaufort and Chukchi Sea. Royal Dutch Shell is
seeking permits to drill five exploratory wells in the Chukchi
and Beaufort Seas and other oil companies plan to submit
exploration plans.
Although private industry may assert they're adequately
prepared to respond to a spill, we must also determine what
response capability our Coast Guard and nation needs so we can
mount an adequate response as exploration advances toward
production.
Arctic governance is also a challenge. The Law of the Sea
Convention has emerged as the governing legal framework.
However, the United States is the only Arctic nation that has
yet to accede to the Law of the Sea Treaty. In order to
exercise leadership and make claims to the extended continental
shelf and effectively interact with other Arctic nations, we
urgently need the Senate to accede to the treaty.
Arctic waters are not limited to north of the Bering Sea,
but also encompass the Bering Sea north of the Aleutian
Islands. Our ability to provide persistent presence and operate
in the harsh Bering Sea is essential to the protection of our
fish stocks, our fishermen, and our fishing industry. This is a
$4.6 billion industry that is responsible for thousands of
jobs.
Completion of our National Security Cutter is vital to our
ability to continue this high seas mission. National Security
Cutter Number 1, the Cutter BERTHOLF, just finished her first
Alaska patrol, exhibiting remarkable seakeeping ability that
enabled her to launch and recover her boats, boarding teams,
and helicopters in sea states that would have challenged our
existing legacy cutters.
National Security Cutter Number 2, the Waesche, is
completed and operating. Number 3, the Stratton, which was
christened by the First Lady in July of 2010, is complete and
undergoing builder's trials, and steel is being cut on Number
4, and I'm going down to Pascagoula on Friday to see Numbers 3
and 4. And I'm pleased to announce that we're completing our
purchase negotiations on Number 5.
But a stable, predictable funding strategy for the three
remaining National Security Cutters will provide incentive for
the shipbuilder for advantages in pricing, and we definitely
need at least eight National Security Cutters to preserve our
future ability to patrol the high seas, not just in the Bering
Sea, but also to confront threats in other high seas
approaches, such as illicit drug trafficking in the Eastern
Pacific Ocean.
You now have in hand our recently completed High Latitude
Study. This is an outstanding first-time broad-based look at
all our missions in the high latitude regions. This will serve
as a building block to help look strategically at our
requirements and risks in what is becoming one of the most
important new regions of the world.
The Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology
Directorate, in cooperation with the U.S. Arctic Research
Commission, is also assisting in studying our future needs for
the Arctic infrastructure, communication and sensors.
In the 1600s the British writer Thomas Fuller declared,
``He that will not sail 'til all the dangers are over must
never put to sea.'' Senators, I'm a sailor. The dangers, risks,
and challenges of the Arctic exist. It's time to address them
and we must put to sea.
So thank you for this opportunity to testify today and I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Papp follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr.,
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard
Good morning, Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison and
distinguished members of the Committee. I am pleased to be here today
to discuss the Coast Guard's operational presence in the Arctic. I
thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.
An Evolving Arctic
The United States is an Arctic Nation, and the Coast Guard has been
operating in the Arctic Ocean since Alaska was a territory to assist
scientific exploration, chart the waters, provide humanitarian
assistance to native tribes, conduct search and rescue, and law
enforcement. Today our mission remains remarkably similar to what it
was in 1867; however, as open water continues to replace ice, human
activity is increasing. With increasingly navigable waters, comes
increased Coast Guard responsibility.
Along with our statutory responsibilities, U.S. Arctic policy is
set forth in the 2009 National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)
66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 25. The Arctic
Region Policy directive identifies objectives for the Arctic while
acknowledging the effects of climate change and increased human
activity. Importantly for Coast Guard, NSPD 66 specifically directs
relevant agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security to
work with other nations and through the IMO to provide for safe and
secure Maritime Transportation in the Arctic. NSPD-66 also directs the
Secretaries of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, in coordination
with heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies to
carry out the policy as it relates to national security and homeland
security interests in the Arctic. Executive Order 13547 (National
Policy for the Stewardship of the Ocean, Our Coasts, and the Great
Lakes) adopts and directs Federal agencies to implement the
recommendations of the Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force. These
recommendations include, as one priority objective, identifying and
implementing actions to address changing conditions in the Arctic
through better stewardship. Coast Guard is moving forward to execute
its responsibilities under these directives.
The Coast Guard is the Nation's principal maritime safety,
security, environmental protection and law enforcement entity. We have
the lead role in ensuring Arctic maritime safety, security and
stewardship. To meet NSPD 66's and EO 13547's direction, the Coast
Guard is working closely with its many inter-agency partners, and
Alaska State, local and tribal governments. For the past 4 years, we
have been conducting limited Arctic operations during open water
periods. However, we face many challenges. Some Arctic operations
demand specialized vessels, aircraft, and crews trained to operate in
extreme climate.
Operationally, in order to meet the NSPD 66's and EO 13547's
requirements, we need to determine our Nation's vessel requirements for
transiting in ice-laden waters, consider establishing seasonal bases
for air and boat operations, and develop a force structure that can
operate in extreme cold and ice. As a matter of policy and stewardship,
we encourage the Senate to ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty. Law of the
Sea has become the framework for governance in the Arctic. Every Arctic
Nation except the United States is a party. As our responsibilities
continue to increase in direct proportion to the Arctic's emerging
waters, it is more vital than ever that the U.S. ratified to Law of the
Sea.
Arctic Trends
The Arctic domain has been gaining national attention. Gradually
increasing accessibility to waters previously covered by ice has
increased the significance of maritime issues including freedom of
navigation, offshore resource exploration and exploitation, and
environmental preservation. Observations and trends relevant to USCG
operations include:
Dynamic changes in ice conditions: The recession of the ice
edge continues to open new water in the summer months. While
there is less ice and more water, the unpredictable movement of
existing ice flows and uncharted waters beneath a previously
frozen sea could present risks to ships that venture into these
waters.
Offshore Resource Development: Oil companies such as Shell
are in the process of taking advantage of drilling and
exploratory opportunities in the Arctic. In May 2011, Shell
submitted a plan of exploration to the Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) that details
company plans to drill exploratory wells in the Chukchi Sea
beginning in 2012. Other companies, including ConocoPhillips
and Statoil, own leases on the Arctic outer continental shelf
and may submit exploration plans as well. Shell is currently in
the process of retrofitting a mobile offshore drilling unit
(MODU), the Kulluk, designed for drilling in the offshore
Arctic environment and plans to have the drilling platform
operational in the spring of 2012.
Fish Stock Migration: As the ice edge recedes and water
temperatures change, there have been anecdotal reports that
fish stocks are moving northwest. The North Pacific Fishery
Management Council is currently conducting a study to gather
more reliable data on fish stock migrations. The Bering Sea
remains one of the world's richest biomasses, and if fish
stocks are in fact migrating north, fisherman will follow,
which could lead to increased foreign incursions into the U.S.
EEZ.
Extended Continental Shelf: This summer marks the fourth
year the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter (CGC) HEALY and the Canadian
icebreaker LOUIS S. ST. LAURENT will work together to collect
seismic and bathymetric data in the Arctic Ocean. This data is
necessary to delineate the outer limits of the continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles according to the criteria set
forth in the Law of the Sea Convention.]
Supporting Execution of the National Arctic Policy Objectives
The vast Arctic is primarily a maritime environment and the U.S.
Coast Guard has the same responsibilities in the Arctic Ocean as it
does in all other waters it patrols. The Arctic, more so than any other
ocean, is environmentally fragile, lacks infrastructure, and remains a
very harsh operating environment. At the same time, within the risk
reduction framework that drives our allocation of assets and resources,
we recognize that the Arctic poses greater long-term planning
challenges that overshadow the immediate tactical challenges we face
today.
Given the scope of these challenges, we have adopted a ``whole of
government'' approach and are leveraging international partnerships to
pursue our interests. The Coast Guard's strategic approach is to ensure
we pursue the capability to perform our statutory missions so we can
ensure the Arctic is safe, secure, and environmentally sustainable.
This strategy is consistent with our Service's approach to performing
its Maritime Safety, Security and Stewardship functions. In accordance
with our risk reduction framework, we will do our part to build legal
regimes, domain awareness, and a force structure that can operate in
extreme cold and ice.
Our approach also accounts for seasonal changes and conditions in
the environment. While the Arctic is increasingly open in warmer
months, its waters remain mostly ice-covered.
Meeting Homeland Security Needs in the Arctic
As part of a multi-agency effort to implement the Arctic Region
Policy, we continue to push forward and assess our Arctic operational
limits. In 2008, 2009 and 2010 we set up small, temporary Forward
Operating Locations on the North Slope in Prudhoe Bay, Nome, Barrow and
Kotzebue, AK to conduct pulse operations with Coast Guard boats,
helicopters, and Maritime Safety and Security Teams. We also deployed
our light-ice capable 225-foot ocean-going buoy tenders to test our
equipment, train our crews and increase our awareness of activity.
Additionally, from April to November we fly two aircraft sorties a
month to evaluate private, commercial, and governmental activities.
These initial missions have provided valuable information that we are
applying to future operations, infrastructure requirements and force
structure development.
Protecting the Maritime Environment
To protect the Arctic environment, we engage industry and the
private sector to address their significant responsibilities for
pollution prevention, preparedness, and response capability.
Recognizing that pollution response is significantly more difficult in
cold, ice and darkness, enhancing preventative measures is critical.
Those engaging in offshore commercial activity in the Arctic must also
plan and prepare for emergency response in the face of a harsh
environment, long transit distances for air and surface assets and
limited response resources. We continue to work to facilitate
awareness, contingency planning, and communications.
While prevention is critical, USCG must be able to respond to
pollution incidents where responsible parties are not known or fail to
adequately respond. We have exercised the Vessel of Opportunity
Skimming System (VOSS) and the Spilled Oil Recovery System (SORS) in
Alaskan waters, but we have yet to conduct exercises north of the
Arctic Circle. Both of these systems enable vessels to collect oil in
the event of a discharge. The VOSS is deployable and capable of being
used on a variety of ships and the SORS is permanently stored and
deployed from the Coast Guard's 225-foot ocean-going buoy tenders.
However, these systems have limited capacity and are only effective in
ice-free conditions.
The Coast Guard needs to test and evaluate these systems in icy
waters. Notably, the President's Fiscal Year 2012 Budget supports
research and development work, including research on oil detection and
recovery in icy water conditions.
Fisheries are also a major concern. The National Marine Fisheries
Service, based on a recommendation from the North Pacific Fisheries
Management Council, has imposed a moratorium on fishing within the U.S.
EEZ north of the Bering Strait until an assessment of the practicality
of sustained commercial fishing is completed. Regardless of the outcome
of this assessment the Coast Guard will continue to carry out its
mission to enforce and protect living marine resources in this region.
Facilitating Safe, Secure, and Reliable Navigation
We continue to update our Waterways Analysis and Management System
to determine navigational requirements, vessel traffic density and
appropriate ship routing measures. We are also moving forward with a
Bering Strait Port Access Routing Study, which is a preliminary
analysis to determine navigational and vessel traffic and other safety
requirements. This study is in the initial phase and, because the
Bering Strait is an international Strait, we require coordination with
the Russian Federation before we can forward it to the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) for consideration.
Supporting Multi-Agency Arctic Region Policy Implementation
The Coast Guard continues to support international and multilateral
organizations, studies, projects and initiatives. We are actively
working with the Arctic Council, IMO and their respective working
groups. We are also conducting joint contingency response exercises
with Canada and we maintain communications and working relationships
with Canadian and Russian agencies responsible for regional operations
including Search and Rescue (SAR) and law enforcement. Additionally,
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently signed an Arctic SAR
agreement, which memorialized the intent of all Arctic nations to
cooperate in SAR operations. We will continue to engage Arctic nations,
international organizations, industry and Alaskan state, local and
tribal governments to strengthen our partnerships and inter-
operability.
In particular, our engagement with Alaska Native Tribes continues
to be highly beneficial. Our efforts to learn from their centuries of
traditional knowledge--and their willingness to share it with us--have
made our operations safer and more successful. This year, we are again
conducting small-scale visits to tribes in remote villages on the North
Slope and along northwestern Alaska to conduct boating safety exchanges
and provide medical, dental, and veterinary care. We are working hard
to ensure tribal equities are recognized, considered and indigenous
peoples and their way of life are protected to the greatest extent
possible. We look forward to continuing to strengthen our partnerships
with our Native Alaskan friends.
CGC HEALY is presently supporting Arctic research efforts
throughout the summer and into early fall. These operations are
supporting research by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), Naval Research Lab, National Science Foundation,
Office of Naval Research, and the Department of State. Presently, NASA
scientists are aboard CGC HEALY conducting their ICESCAPE mission--
``Impacts of Climate on Ecosystems and Chemistry of the Arctic Pacific
Environment'' to study the impacts of climate change in the Chukchi and
Beaufort seas. NASA does part of this mission from space--but also
needs ``boots on the ice'' to better understand their satellite data in
this complex and emerging region.
Law of the Sea Treaty
All other Arctic nations and most other nations worldwide have
acceded to the Law of the Sea Treaty. Arctic nations are using the
treaty's provisions in Article 76 to file extended continental shelf
claims with the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
(CLCS) in order to expand the territory over which they have exclusive
rights to resources on and beneath the Arctic seabed. If the U.S. made
an extended continental shelf claim, we could potentially assert
sovereignty over 240 miles of additional seabed territory out to 440
miles from our land base line, far beyond the existing 200 nautical
mile Exclusive Economic Zone. This area reportedly contains some of the
richest, undiscovered deposits of oil and natural gas in the Arctic.
However, until the U.S. accedes to the Law of the Sea Treaty, it is
unlikely CLCS will entertain any U.S. submission of an extended
continental shelf claim. Acceding to the Law of the Sea Treaty also
provides us with standing to work within the Law of the Sea Convention
framework with other Arctic Nations on issues such as environmental
stewardship. As such, I join with a number of other senior
Administration, military, industry, and academic leaders in supporting
favorable action on the part of the U.S. Senate to accede to the Law of
the Sea Treaty.
Current Arctic Capacities and Limitations
The U.S. Coast Guard's extensive history of Arctic service provides
both experience and an expansive network of governmental, non-
governmental, and private partnerships to draw upon. However, while our
summer operations continue to provide valuable lessons and help us gain
insights regarding the Arctic, we must acknowledge the seasonal
limitation of these efforts and the fact that we still have much to
learn about Arctic operations.
There are few national assets capable of operating in the harsh
Arctic maritime environment. As new capabilities are developed, the
Coast Guard will work to ensure its force structure is appropriately
sized, trained, equipped, and postured to meet its Arctic mission
requirements. Currently, the Coast Guard has one operational ice
breaker, the 11-year-old HEALY, a medium icebreaker or PC3,
specifically adapted for scientific research. Our two heavy polar ice
breakers are not operational. The 34-year-old POLAR SEA has been out of
commission due to a major engineering casualty, and is now in the
process of being decommissioned. The 35-year-old POLAR STAR, which has
been in a caretaker status since 2006, is currently undergoing a major
reactivation project, funded by 2009 and 2010 appropriations, and is
expected to be ready for operations in 2013. Surface capability is
vital to meet our responsibilities in the region. Although the risk of
an incident in ice-covered U.S. waters is currently low, our Nation
must plan for ice capable assets in the future that can effectively
carry out search and rescue and environmental response in ice-laden
waters. In the near term, the Coast Guard can utilize the HEALY to
manage the response or rely on our foreign arctic partners that have
icebreakers operating in the area.
The Coast Guard's most immediate operational requirement, however,
is infrastructure. Energy exploration is underway on the North Slope of
Alaska, but the existing infrastructure is extremely limited. We need a
seasonal facility to base our crews, hangar our aircraft and protect
our vessels in order to mount a response.
Conclusion
With an emerging Arctic Ocean come increased national operational
responsibilities. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 66/
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 25 and Executive Order
13547 direct Coast Guard developing mission objectives. We also must
meet our persistent statutory responsibilities. To meet these
objectives and responsibilities, we have much work to do.
We must build toward a level of mission performance and
preparedness commensurate with the relative risks posed by Arctic
activity; we must continue working amongst the interagency to refine
future mission requirements, identify the precise mix of national
assets, capabilities and infrastructure needed to meet these
requirements, and look for collocation opportunities. We must continue
to seek out opportunities with our Arctic neighbors and the global
community to address the critical issues of governance, sovereignty,
environmental protection, and international security.
While there are many challenges, the increasingly wet Arctic Ocean
also presents unique opportunities. The relatively undeveloped
infrastructure, current low commercial maritime activity levels, and
developing governance structure provide an opening to engage in
proactive, integrated, coordinated, and sustainable U.S. and
international initiatives. We look forward to working with the Congress
on how we can support our national objectives and responsibilities in
the emerging Arctic Ocean.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to
your questions.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Admiral.
The next person is Rear Admiral Titley, please.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL DAVID TITLEY,
OCEANOGRAPHER OF THE NAVY AND DIRECTOR,
TASK FORCE CLIMATE CHANGE
Admiral Titley. Thank you, sir. Senator Begich, Senator
Snowe, Senator Klobuchar, colleagues: I wish to thank you for
the opportunity to address you today regarding the Navy's
interests, capabilities, responsibilities with respect to the
changing Arctic.
My name is Rear Admiral David Titley. I'm the Oceanographer
of the Navy and the Director of the Navy's Task Force on
Climate Change. I've submitted a written statement and request,
sir, to include that in the record.
Senator Begich. Without objection.
Admiral Titley. Task Force Climate Change--the Chief of
Naval Operations in 2009 in May established Task Force Climate
Change to address the implications of climate change for
national security and naval operations, with a near-term focus
on the Arctic. Today I'm speaking about the Navy's strategic
Arctic vision and Arctic road map.
As both the Chairman and Ranking Member noted, the U.S. is
a maritime nation and the Arctic is a maritime environment. The
Navy is watching with great interest the changing environment
in this region. Despite a consistent downward trend in Arctic
sea ice extent and volume, the Arctic will remain ice-covered
in the winter throughout this century and remains a very
challenging operating environment at any time of year.
The changing Arctic has important national security
implications for the Navy. As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, it
is the opening of the fifth ocean, and what I like to say
sometimes is this is for the first time in 500 years that the
West has had a new ocean. The last time this happened was due
to the actions of a gentleman named Columbus.
Strategic guidance on the Arctic is articulated in National
Security Presidential Directive 66, the Arctic region policy.
The 2010 national security strategy and the 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review and the National Maritime Strategy provide
additional strategic guidance on the Arctic.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently released a
report to Congress on Arctic operations and the Northwest
Passage. This report states: ``The overarching strategic
national security objective is a stable and secure region where
U.S. national interests are safeguarded and the U.S. homeland
is protected.''
Potential impacts of a changing Arctic require adaptation
efforts that are informed by the best possible science and
initiated at the right time and cost. The Arctic report to
Congress also states: ``Existing Department of Defense posture
in the region is adequate to meet near to mid-term U.S. defense
needs.''
The report recognizes that assured Arctic access to support
national interests could be provided by a variety of proven
capabilities, including submarines and aircraft. The challenge
is to balance the risk of being late to need with the
opportunity cost of making premature Arctic investments.
Navy action in the Arctic is guided by its Arctic roadmap,
which was released in November 2009. Navy Arctic strategic
objectives, released in May 2010, specify the objectives
required to ensure the Arctic remains a stable and secure
region. These objectives are aligned with Department of Defense
priorities.
The Navy is actively leveraging interagency, international,
and academic partnerships to ensure it has access to the best
science and information and to avoid duplication of effort. The
Navy engages regularly and has friendly relations with all
Arctic nations.
To echo the comments of both Ambassador Balton and Admiral
Papp, international relations are enhanced immeasurably by the
rule of law. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea provides that rule of law, which would help our forces best
to protect United States interests in the Arctic. The Chief of
Naval Operations iterated his support before the Congress
several months ago in his Fiscal Year 2012 posture statement,
recognizing that it is essential that the United States become
a full party to the treaty.
The Arctic is an ocean in the midst of rapid change, which
is likely to change the nature of human maritime activity in
that region. The Navy's job is to maintain readiness to operate
in every ocean as required. The Navy understands the challenges
and opportunities that a changing Arctic environment presents
to its missions. We are conducting the assessments necessary to
inform future investments and are initiating adaptation
activities in areas where we have enough certainty with which
to proceed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to answering
any questions the Subcommittee might have.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Titley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral David Titley, Oceanographer of the
Navy, Director, Task Force Climate Change
Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee and distinguished
colleagues, I want to thank you for the opportunity to address you
today regarding the Navy's interests, capabilities, and
responsibilities with respect to the changing Arctic. My name is Rear
Admiral David Titley and I am the Director of Navy's Oceanography,
Space, and Maritime Domain Awareness programs, Oceanographer of the
Navy and the Director of Navy's Task Force Climate Change. The Chief of
Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, established Task Force Climate
Change in May of 2009 to address implications of climate change for
national security and naval operations with a near-term focus on the
Arctic. Today I am speaking about the Navy's strategic Arctic vision
and Arctic Roadmap.
The U.S. is a maritime nation, and the Arctic is a maritime
environment. The Navy is watching with great interest the changing
environment in the Arctic. September 2007 saw a record low in sea ice
extent and the declining trend has continued--September 2010 was the
third lowest extent on record and the overall trend has shown an 11.2
percent decline per decade in seasonal ice coverage since satellites
were first used to measure the Arctic sea ice in 1979. Perhaps more
significantly, estimates from the University of Washington's Applied
Physics Lab show that the volume of sea ice continues to decrease
dramatically. In September 2010, the ice volume was the lowest recorded
at 78 percent below its 1979 maximum and 70 percent below the mean for
the 1979-2009 period. Despite these changes to sea ice, the Arctic will
remain ice covered in the winter through this century and will remain a
very challenging operating environment. The changing Arctic has
important national security implications for the Navy.
Strategic guidance on the Arctic is articulated in National
Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 66/Homeland Security
Presidential Directive (HSPD) 25, Arctic Region Policy.\1\ NSPD-66
requires that naval forces be prepared to execute missions in the
Arctic, including missile defense, strategic sealift, maritime presence
and security, and freedom of navigation and overflight. The 2010
National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) provide additional strategic guidance on the Arctic. The
QDR identifies the Arctic as the region where the influence of climate
change is most evident in shaping the operating environment and directs
DoD to work with the Coast Guard and Department of Homeland Security to
address gaps in Arctic communications, domain awareness, search and
rescue, and environmental observation and forecasting capabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Department of Defense, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense
Policy. ``Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest
Passage.'' 19 May 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Navy's Maritime Strategy identifies that new shipping routes
within the Arctic have the potential to reshape the global
transportation system. For example, the Bering Strait has the potential
to increase in strategic significance over the next few decades as the
ice melts and the shipping season lengthens, and the private sector
begins to ship goods across the Arctic rather than through the Panama
Canal. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently released an
``Arctic Report to Congress'' on Arctic operations that addresses
strategic national security objectives, needed mission capabilities, an
assessment of changing the Unified Command Plan (UCP), needed basing
infrastructure, and the status of and need for icebreakers. This report
states ``the overarching strategic national security objective is a
stable and secure region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded
and the U.S. homeland is protected.'' This objective is consistent with
a regional policy that reflects the relatively low level of threat in a
region bounded by nation states that have not only publicly committed
to working within a common framework of international law and
diplomatic engagement, but also demonstrated ability and commitment to
doing so over the last fifty years.''
The potential impacts of a changing Arctic require adaptation
efforts that are informed by the best possible science, and initiated
at the right time and cost. The Arctic Report to Congress also states:
``Existing DOD posture in the region is adequate to meet near-
to mid-term U.S. defense needs. DOD does not currently
anticipate a need for the construction of a deep-draft port in
Alaska between now and 2020. Given the long lead times for
construction of major infrastructure in the region, DoD will
periodically re-evaluate this assessment as the Combatant
Commanders update their regional plans on a regular basis.
The United States needs assured Arctic access to support
national interests in the Arctic. This access can be provided
by a variety of proven capabilities, including submarines and
aircraft, but only U.S.-flagged ice-capable ships provide
visible U.S. sovereign maritime presence throughout the Arctic
region. Significant uncertainty remains about the rate and
extent of climate change in the Arctic and the pace at which
human activity will increase. The challenge is to balance the
risk of being late-to-need with the opportunity cost of making
premature Arctic investments. Not only does early investment
take resources from other pressing needs, but the capabilities
would be later in their lifecycle when finally employed. Given
the many competing demands on DOD's resources in the current
fiscal environment, the Department believes that further
evaluation of the future operating environment is required
before entertaining significant investments in infrastructure
or capabilities.''
The Navy is already conducting further evaluation, guided by its
``Arctic Roadmap'' that was released in November 2009. This Roadmap is
a five-year plan that details specific action items related to
assessing current readiness for Arctic operations, increasing
operational experience through Arctic and sub-Arctic training
exercises, increasing collaborative efforts with joint, interagency,
and international stakeholders for operations and training, and
improved environmental understanding. The Navy Arctic Strategic
Objectives, released in May 2010, specify the objectives required to
ensure the Arctic remains a stable and secure region where U.S.
national and maritime interests are safeguarded and the homeland is
protected.
In the summer of 2010, the Navy participated in the national
security portion of Canada's largest annual Arctic exercise, Operation
NANOOK/NATSIQ, which provided our sailors valuable operating
experiencing in the region. In March 2011 the Navy conducted its
biennial ice exercise ICEX organized by the Navy's Arctic Submarine
Lab, which allows the collection of valuable scientific data used by
the Navy, Federal Government, and academic researchers to understand
and better predict changing conditions in the region. The Navy has
gathered experts at the Naval War College and other institutions to
think through future scenarios, specifically focused on the Arctic
region. The Navy is currently conducting a Capabilities Based
Assessment for the Arctic to identify capabilities required for future
operations in the region and possible capability gaps, shortfalls, and
redundancies. Assessments such as these will inform Navy strategy,
policy, and plans to guide future investments.
Furthermore, the Navy is actively leveraging interagency,
international, and academic partnerships to ensure it has access to the
best science and information and to avoid duplication of efforts. We
are participating, in coordination with appropriate DoD offices and the
Coast Guard, in many of the interagency efforts focused on the Arctic,
including the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee chaired by
the National Science Foundation, the National Ocean Council's Arctic
Strategic Action Plan, and the Arctic Policy Group coordinated by the
State Department. As an example, the Office of Naval Research has
developed initiatives that will improve monitoring and prediction of
critical environmental changes in the Arctic, including the marginal
ice zone in which the Navy and Coast Guard may be required to operate.
The President requested funding for these initiatives in his FY12
budgets. Finally, the Navy engages regularly with and has friendly
relations with all Arctic nations.
International relations are enhanced immeasurably by the rule of
law. This is especially true in an austere environment like the Arctic,
where access by U.S. forces in times of need is more challenging. The
Law of the Sea Convention provides that rule of law which would help
our forces best protect U.S. interests in the Arctic. However, our
Nation has still not acceded to this important treaty. As stated by the
Chief of Naval Operations before Congress several months ago in his
FY12 posture statement:
``The Law of the Sea Convention provides a regime with robust
global mobility rules. I believe it essential that the United
States become a full Party to the treaty. The Convention
promotes our strategic goal of free access to and public order
on the oceans under the rule of law. It also has strategic
effects for global maritime partnerships and American maritime
leadership and influence. Creating partnerships that are in the
strategic interests of our Nation must be based on
relationships of mutual respect, understanding, and trust. For
the 160 nations who are parties to the Law of the Sea
Convention, a basis for trust and mutual understanding is
codified in that document. The treaty provides a solid
foundation for the U.S. to assert its sovereign rights to the
natural resources of the sea floor out to 200 nautical miles
and on the extended continental shelf beyond 200 nautical
miles, which in the Arctic Ocean is likely to extend at least
600 nautical miles north of Alaska. As a non-Party to the
treaty, the U.S. undermines its ability to influence the future
direction of the law of the sea. As the only permanent member
of the U.N. Security Council outside the Convention, and one of
the few nations still remaining outside one of the most widely
subscribed international agreements, our non-Party status
hinders our ability to lead in this important area and could,
over time, reduce the United States' influence in shaping
global maritime law and policy. The Law of the Sea Convention
provides the norms our Sailors need to do their jobs around the
world every day. It is in the best interest of our Nation and
our Navy to ratify the Law of the Sea Convention. We must
demonstrate leadership and provide to the men and women who
serve in our Navy the most solid legal footing possible to
carry out the missions that our Nation requires of them.''
In conclusion, I will borrow a quote from Dr. John Holdren,
Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, who says, ``We
must avoid the unmanageable, and manage the unavoidable.'' The Arctic
is an ocean in the midst of rapid change, which is likely to change the
nature of human maritime activity in that region. The Navy's job is to
maintain readiness to operate in every ocean as required. The Navy
understands the challenges and opportunities that a changing Arctic
environment presents to its missions. We are conducting the assessments
necessary to inform future investments and are initiating adaptation
activities in areas where we have enough certainty with which to
proceed. Thank you Mr. Chairman and I look forward to answering any
questions the Subcommittee may have.
Senator Begich. Thank you all very much, and thank you for
your opening statements. It's an impressive panel, and what
we'll do is we'll probably have two rounds of 5 minutes each of
questions. I'll start with the Ranking Member and then again
we'll do 5 minutes each, and then do probably a second round,
depending on where the discussion goes.
Senator Snowe.
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Papp, I mentioned earlier in my statement your
response to a question that was posed by Chairman Begich in the
last hearing about what keeps you up at night--and this was
obviously a serious concern about what could happen up in the
Arctic. How does the Arctic Council's search and rescue
initiative support the Coast Guard's mission requirements in
the Arctic?
Admiral Papp. The search and rescue agreement sets us up
with the boundaries for each country, the area that they're
responsible for, sets up regimes for communication and
cooperation between the countries in the Arctic, and then there
are still some responsibilities, though, that have to be
fulfilled by the nation itself.
So the challenge that I find is, while we have the regimes
in place now by signing the treaty, I need the resources to be
able to carry out those responsibilities in the Arctic. We were
confronted by this just 2 weeks ago when there was a report of
about 2 dozen fishermen from Barrow that were stuck out on the
ice. The ice broke away. We had to send a helicopter from down
in Kodiak, which is about a 1,000-mile trip over three mountain
ranges, to get up there to perform a rescue.
Fortunately, they have a small helicopter that's up on the
North Slope, that was able to go out there very precariously
and get the people off. But if we had had to respond, it would
have been very difficult and put their lives at risk.
Senator Snowe. Not to mention weather conditions, if they
had been vastly different as well.
So how long did that helicopter ride take from Kodiak?
Admiral Papp. Actually, it takes them hours, and I don't
have the exact number of hours. We were able to turn around
before getting there because the other helicopter that's up
there was able to recover the people off the ice. But we
essentially have to fly up there and then have to refuel and
then prosecute the case and, as I've stated before, there's
very few facilities for us up on the North Slope once you get
there.
Senator Snowe. How many search and rescue cases have the
Coast Guard been able to respond to?
Admiral Papp. We--ma'am, I don't have any data or
statistics on that. I would have to get back to you on that.
There are cases that we've been unable to respond; other people
have carried it out.
The other challenge we find up there is we just don't know
what we don't know. We've worked with the people in the
villages and in the towns up there and in fact as we've studied
the culture many times they have a belief that if they fall
into the water it is preordained that they were supposed to
fall in. We have tried to convince them to do things like
wearing life jackets, which we've been somewhat successful at
doing. But it's an entire change of culture.
So we don't know how many have been lost up there over the
years, and we have no way of communicating up there. So it's
very difficult to find out in a timely fashion when something
happens and how we would get up there.
Senator Snowe. I think it would be helpful for the
Committee to know exactly how many you were not able to respond
to and where the Coast Guard had to rely on others to prosecute
those rescues. Because I think it is critical.
Admiral Papp. We'll be glad to provide that.
[The information requested follows:]
For FY 2008-2010, there were 296 Alaskan Search and Rescue (SAR)
cases that required assistance from other government agencies,
industry, and/or good Samaritans. Of these 296 Alaskan SAR cases that
required assistance from other government agencies, industry, and/or
good Samaritans, 46 were in the Arctic.
Senator Snowe. On the High Latitude Study, do you agree
with--and I'd like to also hear from you, Admiral Titley, as
well--on the findings of requirements for Coast Guard vessels?
As I understand it, the recommendation included three medium
icebreakers. Am I correct in saying that, three medium
icebreakers?
Admiral Papp. I agree with the mission analysis. As you
look at the requirements for the things that we might do up
there if it's in the nation's interests, it identifies a
minimum requirement for three heavy icebreakers and three
medium icebreakers. Then if you want a persistent presence up
there, it would require--and also doing things such as breaking
out McMurdo and other responsibilities--then it would take up
to a maximum of six, six heavy, and four medium.
Senator Snowe. Right. Do you agree with that?
Admiral Papp. If we were to be charged with carrying out
those full responsibilities, yes, ma'am, those are the numbers
that you would need to do it.
Senator Snowe. Admiral Titley, how do you respond to the
High Latitude Study? Has the Navy conducted its own assessment
of its capabilities?
Admiral Papp. Ma'am, we are in the process right now of
conducting what we call a capabilities-based assessment, that
will be out in the summer of this year. We're getting ready to
finish that up.
The Coast Guard has been a key component of the Navy's task
force on climate change literally since day one, when the Chief
of Naval Operations set this up. That morning, we had the Coast
Guard invited as a member of our executive steering committee.
So we've been working very closely with the Coast Guard, with
the Department of Homeland Security.
I think Admiral Papp said it best as far as the specific
comments on the High Latitude Study, but we have been working
very closely with the Coast Guard.
Senator Snowe. Would the Navy and the Coast Guard be able
to share capabilities and resources?
Admiral Papp. Well, in a small way this is a ``Back to the
Future'' type question. After World War II, we had eight
icebreakers shared between the Navy and the Coast Guard. We had
a requirement for it during the Cold War years because we had a
national imperative. We had the Distant Early Warning system or
the DEW line that was across the North Slope, and each summer
the Navy led a task force to do the resupply of the DEW line.
The Coast Guard always took part as a part of the task
force in providing icebreakers. Over the years, though, we
diminished. We went from--when the Navy finally transferred all
the icebreakers to the Coast Guard, we had six WIND-class
icebreakers. Progressively we gave up one after another,
another. Then we built POLAR SEA and POLAR STAR in the early
70s and decommissioned all the rest of them. So now we're left
with two. Both of them are inoperable.
Senator Snowe. What was the high water mark for the number
of icebreakers that the Coast Guard had?
Admiral Papp. Eight, ma'am.
Senator Snowe. Eight was the high water mark?
Admiral Papp. It's a very interesting story. We did a
little research on this. It was--acquisition processes must
have been easier in those days, because we went into our
history books and there was actually a note from President
Roosevelt in 1940 to Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau
saying: ``Henry: Build me the world's best icebreakers.'' And
we launched on that and ultimately built six of the WIND-class
and two others, for a total of eight after World War II.
Senator Snowe. Those were the days.
Senator Begich. Those were the days.
[Laughter.]
Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
How easy it was.
Thank you, Senator Snowe.
Senator Klobuchar.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much to both the Chairman
and Ranking Member. I was telling them how interested I am in
this issue, I guess for a few reasons. One, I think it is
really incredibly important, diplomatic and military and
economic challenges. Second, I chair the Canadian-U.S.
interparliamentarian group along with Senator Crapo and so
we've been working with the Canadians on the issues.
The third is that Minnesotans always have a fondness to the
Arctic because we figure it's the only place colder than our
state. But I will note the Arctic has not been the one where
the cars have tested and said, if this car can go in a colder
place maybe you should live somewhere else. It's testing in
Embarrass, Minnesota, and Baudette, Minnesota. So we're just
glad the Arctic's out there as a colder place.
My first question really for you, Ambassador Balton, is--
and then maybe other panelists can chime in--is the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea Treaty. I share your view, as
I know some of the other panelists, that we need to ratify that
treaty. I continue to be concerned by the arguments by some who
claim that ratifying the treaty somehow weakens our national
security.
Can you take a moment--I know you talked about the value of
it--to address some of the concerns raised by opponents, such
as fears that the international bodies administering the treaty
will be hostile to U.S. interests or other things?
Ambassador Balton. Thank you very much for this
opportunity, Senator. I think any sober assessment of U.S.
interests in the oceans leads to the conclusion that we should
have been party to this Convention long ago. The rules built
into the Convention are highly favorable on a number of
grounds, including for national security. The rules allow U.S.
military and, I would say, commercial vessels as well, to go
wherever they need to go in the oceans. While most countries
follow those rules most of the time, our status as a non-party
does not give us the standing and stature we would have as a
party to ensure respect for those rules all the time.
We say those rules reflect customary international law, but
that is a shaky basis on which to put such important rights.
Customary international law, depending as it does on the
practice of states, is subject to erosion over time. Only as a
party to the Convention can we lock in these rights.
Senator Klobuchar. How would it help us with the Arctic and
some of the issues that we're dealing with?
Ambassador Balton. The Arctic presents a particularly
compelling reason for why we should be party. Here's just one
example, perhaps the most interesting. Under the Convention, a
nation such as the U.S. gets the first 200 miles of sea floor
off its coast as its continental shelf outright. Then, if the
area beyond 200 miles from shore meets certain criteria, the
nation can claim that area as well.
Why is that important? It gives the Nation exclusive rights
to explore and exploit all of the resources of that sea floor--
oil, gas, minerals, sedentary species. All the other countries
of the Arctic are party to the Convention and they're using a
mechanism in the Convention to perfect their claim to areas of
sea floor in the Arctic and elsewhere. For the United States,
although we are investigating and collecting data on different
areas that we may be able to claim, as a non-party we can't go
through this process to secure title and international
recognition for our extended continental shelf in the Arctic or
elsewhere.
Senator Klobuchar. Did you want to add anything to that,
Admiral Papp or Rear Admiral Titley?
Admiral Papp. Yes, ma'am. Maybe I can answer it more from
the view of an operator. I've never really understood the
resistance to this. We have an Antarctic Treaty. For sailors we
have rules of the road that are agreed to through international
organizations, such as the International Maritime Organization,
which the Coast Guard leads the delegation to. And we all
understand the predictability, the guidance that these rules
give us on how we operate at sea.
The sea is not like operating on the land, where you have
streets and traffic signs and everything else. You have no
markers out there, but you have rules and understandings on how
you operate within the rules and predictability on how other
people will operate in those rules as well.
This treaty seems to me to give us great understanding and
predictability on how we deal with freedom of the seas and how
we operate on the seas. As a law enforcement agency that's
responsible for operating within the laws, this is just vital
for us to carry out our responsibilities in the Coast Guard and
for the nation.
Senator Klobuchar. Rear Admiral?
Admiral Titley. Yes, ma'am. Thank you very much for the
opportunity to comment on this. It's something the Navy--
accession to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea--is
something the Navy believes in very, very strongly. I'm sure
many of you have heard in the media, especially a year or 2
ago, people talk about the Arctic as the Wild West and it's the
race for resources and it's like Oklahoma in the 19th century
all over again. That really is not true, but the reason it is
not true is because of the U.N. Convention of the Law of the
Sea, which, as my colleagues have mentioned, has been ratified
by every other Arctic nation except the U.S.
That really does provide the governance structure. We are
not looking for--the Arctic Council said, we don't need a
treaty like the Antarctic Treaty, because we have the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea. But the Law of the Sea is not
frozen in time. It's not immutable to change. And if we are not
on the inside, then that change may take place in ways that is
not advantageous to the United States.
Senator Klobuchar. Because we're not on the treaty dealing
with the other people on some of the economic issues.
Admiral Titley. So the leadership is--other countries are,
frankly, looking for the U.S. to be able to show leadership,
and it's hard to show leadership in this treaty when we are not
a party to it.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
I have a couple quick questions. Let me follow up, Admiral
Papp, with regards to the cutters, the icebreakers, the kind of
infrastructure needs of the Coast Guard, not only for the
Arctic, but overall. Obviously, we're focused on the Arctic
today.
Can you--you now have the High Latitude Study. You have
knowledge of kind of the general range of things you might need
based on the level of mission you need. What is the next step
to be aggressive about fulfilling these needs if we're serious
about what we want to do in the Arctic, no matter what we want
to do? Maybe fisheries or management of the transportation
routes, oil and gas development. What's the next step to be
aggressive in ensuring that we do the job we need to do to make
sure your missions have the infrastructure you need, so you
don't have to have a helicopter from Kodiak coming 1,000 miles
or having to borrow--probably it was the North Slope Borough's
helicopter, I'm guessing, Mayor Itta's--in order to satisfy the
need there?
What's the next step? Funding I know is a critical piece,
but is that the only piece, or what do we need to do here?
Admiral Papp. As Commandant I've got three
responsibilities. First is to carry out the real-time now
operations. The next is to start preparing for the future; and
then the third is looking out probably a couple of decades and
trying to determine what our needs are. That's part of the
leadership responsibilities, to look forward and determine what
we're going to need, not just focus on year to year.
So the High Latitude Study does that. That's part of the
process, doing the mission analysis based upon the
responsibilities that we have under statutes. That has given us
a guideline to go by, and the next step for us in the Coast
Guard is to work out a concept of operations. We're in the
process in a number of areas, going back and taking our
strategy and working out our concept of operations, whether
it's terrorism, how do we provide layered security for the
United States. We also have to begin work on our Arctic
strategy.
Another part that will play in there, as you saw last year,
is our experimentation over the last three summers on what
resources work up there, getting a better idea for what
infrastructure that does exist, and then apply that along with
our concept of operations, and then start putting resource
proposals forward. And not just for the Coast Guard, but we
need to look across the interagency at the other services and
the other departments to determine who has resources out there
that we might be able to leverage against, that we might be
able to apply, and then our resource proposals should fill in
those gaps.
Senator Begich. Is there--is part of that looking at the
other agencies, but also looking at, as we assume development
will occur at some levels up there, maximizing some of the use
of their capacity? I know, for example, that on the Aleutian
Chain, when we had I can't remember what vessel it was that had
run loose, and it was actually--I think it was an oil company
vessel that assisted in moving that from potentially a
hazardous situation, because the Coast Guard could not move
fast enough or they didn't have equipment in the region.
Is that part of it, not only agency, but to look at what
other company and government resources, local government
resources, might be available to maximize the whole plan?
Admiral Papp. Yes, Mr. Chairman. If we focus on offshore
drilling, that will be part of the permitting process. The
Department of the Interior will review plans and, most
importantly, whatever response plans are required for the
potential discharges, spills, other disasters that might happen
up there. The Coast Guard will get a review of those as well to
look and use our judgment to see whether the companies are
providing sufficient resources.
But just as they did, clearly the Coast Guard didn't
respond all by itself in Deepwater Horizon, we depended heavily
upon the resources provided by the oil companies. The Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 put that process in motion. We've learned
some lessons and some shortfalls of OPA 1990. We probably will
take those lessons and apply them in some way, shape, or form
to response plans up on the North Slope.
But if the company fails, if the response plan fails, the
Federal Government must in some way be able to back it up with
some level of resources. We had plenty of resources, starting
from bases to communications systems to helicopters, air
stations, etcetera, in the Gulf of Mexico. If this were to
happen off the North Slope of Alaska, we would have nothing.
We're starting from ground zero today.
Senator Begich. Very good.
If I can ask, Ambassador, to kind of follow up on that. I
know the Arctic Council's passage of the search and rescue was
one. Can you tell me the kind of status of similar agreements
around oil and gas cleanup that may be being discussed or
moving forward?
Ambassador Balton. Yes, thank you, Senator. At the Arctic
Council meeting in May, the ministers, including Secretary
Clinton, agreed to launch a new round of negotiations. This
would be to create some kind of instrument to cooperate on oil
spill preparedness and response in the Arctic, just what
Admiral Papp was talking about.
The United States is not the only nation that is not well
prepared for this. So through such an agreement we can at a
minimum improve coordination and cooperation among the Arctic
nations in the event of a spill. Then the agreement itself
could provide the impetus for all Arctic nations, including the
U.S., to actually secure increased resources to handle the
spill.
We are all very aware of what Admiral Papp just said, that
if the Deepwater Horizon spill had happened north of Alaska the
ability to clean it up would have been sorely lacking and the
disaster would have been even worse.
Senator Begich. Very good.
Let me stop there and go to our second round. Senator
Snowe.
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me follow up on that, Ambassador Balton. So are there
assets or a plan in place on the part of the United States or
in conjunction or concert with other countries in the event of
an oil spill?
Ambassador Balton: Yes, Senator, we do have agreements with
a number of other nations on oil spill cleanup. We have a
bilateral understanding with Russia. We have something else in
place with Canada. What is lacking, however, is something that
is pan-Arctic that would allow assets to be shared and
communication to be enhanced across all Arctic nations. That is
the advantage we see in producing an Arctic-wide oil spill
preparedness response agreement much like the Arctic search and
rescue agreement is intended to link or knit together the eight
Arctic nations.
Senator Snowe. I see. It is comprehensive; it does include
all eight nations.
Ambassador Balton. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Snowe. Now this is very limited.
Ambassador Balton. Yes.
Senator Snowe. How long would it take to expand? Does that
require another agreement?
Ambassador Balton. Probably. We will--the first round of
talks on an oil spill preparedness and response system will
take place in October in Oslo. I will actually be co-chairing
those talks. Our aim is to have a product for nations to
consider by May 2013 when the Arctic Council next meets at the
ministerial level.
Senator Snowe. That's quite a ways away.
Ambassador Balton. It is. That's about as much time as it
took to do the Arctic search and rescue agreement. Maybe we can
do this one a little faster. But that is actually the time when
the ministers will next meet and would be able to sign such an
agreement if we produce one by then.
In the meantime, there is work we can do to improve on the
status quo and I hope that goes forward on an operational----
Senator Snowe. So you depend on industry's capacity? Would
you depend on the shipping companies to do the cleanup at this
point?
Ambassador Balton. It depends on the nature of the spill.
If it comes from a tanker, yes, shipping companies would have a
responsibility, shared with the government, I would say. If it
came from a drilling installation, it would be the drilling
company, it would be the responsible party. But, as Admiral
Papp says, if they do not have the resources in place it would
be incumbent upon the government to do what we could to help in
a disaster of that sort.
Senator Snowe. Do we have any assets in place that could do
that, Admiral Papp, currently?
Admiral Papp. No, ma'am.
Senator Snowe. No. So there are no assets. But if we had
the assets, would having an adequate response capability
require additional training, as well?
Admiral Papp. Well, the response plans that the companies
put in will have a requirement for response capability, and I'm
sure that the oil spill response organizations, the OSROs, will
respond to the economic incentive, the business that will be
created by that.
One of the things, though, that we learned from Deepwater
Horizon was if you don't think through what is the worst
possible case, it's difficult for you to plan on how much
equipment is needed. We had to turn on oil boom manufacturers
around the world to supply us. We had to employ thousands of
fishing boats to go out there and do skimming operations. None
of that exists up on the North Slope. We have zero to operate
with at present. So now's the time to start thinking that
through and determining what we'll need up there.
Senator Snowe. Well, that is true of the Deepwater Horizon.
It was the worst case scenario and there was no preparation,
especially at that depth, and with that type of an explosion.
But we had no preparation, no contingency plans, in place.
I realize that Arctic drilling would not be comparable in
depth, but it has other serious problems, with no
infrastructure in place at all, and we are starting without
response assets. So that is highly problematic.
How long would it take to meet minimum requirements? Just
to activate the POLAR STAR, which is obviously being repaired--
will take until 2013, is that correct?
Admiral Papp. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Snowe. So to build a new icebreaker--takes 8 years?
Admiral Papp. Oh, years, yes, ma'am.
Senator Snowe. So this is really a long-term planning that
we're talking about.
Admiral Papp. It is, and there are other demand signals
that come in. We right now, as you well know, we only have the
HEALY that's available and that's operating in the Arctic. Just
this week we've gotten inquiries at the staff level about the
possibility of breaking out McMURDO. The National Science
Foundation has been contracting with a Swedish company to
provide an icebreaker down there for the last couple of years
and Sweden has decided that their national interests need that
icebreaker, so that the ship is not available. We've gotten an
inquiry to look at the feasibility of sending HEALY down to the
Antarctic, which would leave us with nothing up in the Arctic,
and we just can't turn around POLAR STAR quickly enough to
start doing that business.
So we're really in what we call a stern chase right now,
we're in a bad position trying to catch up.
Senator Snowe. Thank you.
Senator Begich. Senator Klobuchar.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much.
We've heard a lot of discussion today about expanding the
options for travel and trade through Arctic waters. A lot of
people, as you've acknowledged, have been talking about that.
Yet, Admiral Papp, as you rightly point out, the dynamic
changes in ice conditions appear at present to make it
difficult with these ice cutters in the region.
So in your opinion is it premature to start laying out
ground rules for navigation in the seas, while we still can't
navigate, or should we be drafting regulations so that we're
ready when a northern sea route has opened?
Admiral Papp. Ma'am, we're in the process of that right
now. We're putting together our side and how we think we might
operate and how we might control the traffic in the Bering Sea.
That of course is going to require cooperation across the
inter-agency, with the State Department, with the Navy and
others, and then take it to Russia as well and start
negotiating with them.
Fortunately, we've got a number of venues to be able to do
that, the Arctic Council being one of them. This fall I'll be
traveling to Japan to take part in what we call the North
Pacific Coast Guard Forum, in which we've got great
relationships with the Russian border guards, our equivalent on
the Russian side, and other countries over there, but most
importantly Russia.
We are continuously exchanging people between our Coast
Guard's 17th Coast Guard District in the Russians to gain
familiarity with procedures and cooperation up there.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you.
Rear Admiral, Ambassador Balton and Admiral Papp have been
talking about these diplomatic relations that we have with
these other countries up in the Arctic. Do we have similar
relations on the military side?
Admiral Titley. Yes, ma'am. Thanks for the question. In
fact, we were in Oslo not 3 weeks ago conducting the first ever
Arctic military roundtable. It was a conference sponsored by
the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the U.S. European
Command. Navy was one of the players. We were able to have all
eight Arctic militaries except for Sweden, and that was just a
technical issue on their part. The Russians were represents by
the border guard. As Admiral Papp mentioned, we have good
relations with them.
Really, it was not in any way to supplement or supplant the
Arctic Council, but it was a way to start establishing
relationships at the senior level in the militaries, to be able
to work through issues of common concern. I believe we decided
to hold another meeting here in about a year and we're starting
working groups sort of at the captain level to start working
specific agendas. So that's just one example, ma'am, of how the
Navy and the Department of Defense are pushing to ensure that
that type of relationship, in addition to the diplomatic and
Coast Guard relationships, exist.
Senator Klobuchar. I just want to end up back on Law of the
Sea. I was asking our staff member here, Marian, about when,
what the status, because I remember when it passed through the
Foreign Relations Committee and I think she said that was in
2007, I think. And it just seems to me when you have the
military, the Coast Guard, diplomatic people, I know Shell, the
oil company, people seeing the value of this treaty, why we're
not moving forward. And I just wondered if you knew any,
without getting into any of the politics of it, what the status
is? Is there any movement right now to move this ahead when the
Senate has to do its job and ratify this treaty?
Ambassador Balton. Perhaps I can answer that. You're right,
twice actually the Senate Foreign Relations Committee favorably
voted on the Convention, once in 2003 and again in 2007. My
understanding is that Senator Kerry as Chair of the Committee
is interested in trying again this year.
As far as the Administration is concerned, we very much
support that. We see the Convention as nonpartisan. This
Administration certainly supports it. So did the last one.
Senator Klobuchar. Right. President Bush supported it.
Ambassador Balton. So did the one before that. A wide range
of U.S. businesses, companies that do business in the oceans,
all support accession, as of course our national security and
diplomatic teams, and many other stakeholders out there.
So we are hoping that the Convention will be considered on
the merits. It's not, it should not, be a political or partisan
issue, and we think that any sober assessment of those merits
would lead to the conclusion that we should join.
Senator Klobuchar. Admiral Papp?
Admiral Papp. From a very practical point of view, it ties
our hands. We go to the International Maritime Organization and
I don't think we ever enter into a conversation without them
reminding us that we are not signatories to this, that we have
not acceded to it. On an even down in the weeds practical
matter, the Coast Guard deals with many bilateral agreements to
allow us to conduct law enforcement operations with the
countries of South and Central America, and just trying to get
agreement on baselines, territorial seas, etcetera, which are
governed by this, we run into difficulties in these bilateral
negotiations because we are not signatories to the treaty, and
we are reminded of it.
The Coast Guard forums that I go to, almost all my
bilateral meetings with the members who attend those meetings
start off with a reminder to us that the United States is the
one major power that has not acceded to the treaty. So I could
probably get much more productive business done if we acceded
to it and we took that off the table in terms of something that
has to be worked through.
Senator Klobuchar. Very good. Anything more?
Admiral Titley. Yes, ma'am. Really, a very similar
experience in the Navy to what Admiral Papp experiences in the
Coast Guard. In fact, I have a running bet with the one person
who travels with me whenever I speak internationally that
either the first or second, no later than the second, question
will be: Why isn't the United States----
Senator Klobuchar. See, I try to make you at home here.
[Laughter.]
Admiral Titley. And that's every single time, every forum,
we get that. Admiral Roughead tells me that at his level, at
the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy staff, chief of Navy staff
level internationally, he gets the exact same question.
But more substantively, other nations are looking to the
United States for leadership in this area and our allies, our
partners, fervently wish we were a member of this treaty.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you. I just want to end by
thanking you, Admiral Papp, for the work the Coast Guard is
continuing to do at Lake Superior, and also the work where you
helped with this fishing guide issue. I want to report I was up
in International Falls on the Canadian border and everything
appeared fine with the fishing guides. We had a tug of war over
the Canadian border. I will not say which country lost, but in
any case I want to thank you for the help that you've given us.
Admiral Papp. Thank you very much, ma'am.
Senator Begich. Let me ask just a couple quick questions.
First, to close out this round, Admiral Papp, let me follow up
a little bit on Senator Snowe's comments regarding the
capabilities and what's available. There's a couple things. For
example, we have control when there's oil and gas development
in the Arctic by permitting process to ensure that capabilities
would be in place, to a level that all Federal agencies at some
point, if they agree, are capable; is that a fair statement? In
other words, they're not going to get a permit if they're not
capable of cleaning it up.
Admiral Papp. Oh, absolutely. And we are working hand in
glove with the Department of Interior's Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management Regulation and Enforcement, or OEMRE or BOEMRE or
whatever we want to call it nowadays. But as you know, we've
worked together with them on the investigation process of
Deepwater Horizon, and we will be joined at the hip as we
approach these new drilling options up in the Arctic.
Senator Begich. My biggest concern is at the end of the
day--and we'll see on the next panel, but I believe that the
oil and gas industry will do the necessary precautionary
measures. My biggest concern is those vessels that are coming
from one country to the next. As mentioned, I think you
mentioned 15 escorted vessels, up from 8 or 7 or so. Those are
the ones that make me nervous because I have no clue where
they're flagged from, what their safety standards are, even
though we do have international rules to some extent.
That is what concerns me most. As we know, I think it was
last year, if I remember right--maybe it was the year before;
time flies around here, but I think it was last year--when one
ship ran aground with I think it was 1,500 gallons if I
remember right. That's what concerns me most, not necessarily
the industry of oil and gas, because they're going to be
required by our regulatory process.
Is that an issue that also as the Coast Guard looks at oil
and gas, they look at this other piece, which is the shipping
and what's going to happen there, and how we manage that?
Because it's both life, rescue, as well as if they run around
and they're carrying a full load of diesel fuel to operate? Is
that a fair statement?
Admiral Papp. Yes, Mr. Chairman, and that's probably what
gives me the most concern, is because the increase of shipping
through the Bering Straits. I mean, my goodness, just with the
last 2 years we've had people trying to cross the Bering Strait
with parasails and with jet skis. So the activity is picking
up. At some point in time, you will have an oil tanker or a
freighter or something up there that breaks down, goes adrift,
and in all likelihood would drift toward our shores, and it's a
narrow strait.
Right now, we're generally only able to maintain one high-
endurance cutter in the Bering Sea. The ability to get up
there, I'm sure we could probably get up there in time to
provide some sort of response.
Senator Begich. But it would be tight.
Admiral Papp. It's tight, and plus they're becoming
increasingly unreliable in terms of being 40-plus-year-old
ships. So getting the National Security Cutters up there is
important. But also having an ability to get aircraft there on
short notice is important as well, some way of basing aircraft
up on the North Slope and having the facilities to sustain
them, at least seasonally, when the ship traffic is going
through there.
Cruise ships. One of the things that keeps the Coast Guard
in business in the Caribbean is going out and picking injured
or ill passengers off cruise ships. We have the helicopters and
the air stations to do it. We don't have that up in the Arctic
and cruise ships are going through there as well.
Senator Begich. That's right. Those will increase. We know
that.
Let me ask, to both Admiral Papp and Admiral Titley:
deepwater port and infrastructure. I know in Alaska we're
debating, can we do a port, some sort of infrastructure, and I
think the High Latitude Study tells us a lot, as well as other
studies, that the water is so shallow you can't really do it on
shore. You've got to probably end up in federal waters, doing a
deepwater port of some concoction.
Do either one of you have comments on that? I just
visualize that if industry progresses, the tourism industry
progresses, shipping progresses, the needs of infrastructure, a
deepwater port is going to be critical up there. And I'm not a
scientist, I'm not in your guys' business, but I just think,
based on the dimensions and the depths, it's going to be in
Federal waters in order to accomplish the deepwater capacity.
Admiral Papp. Well, as you remember, Mr. Chairman, that was
one of the first things I was looking for up there.
Senator Begich. Right.
Admiral Papp. The real nearest deepwater port is Dutch
Harbor, which is about 1,400 miles away from the North Slope,
Barrow for instance. So any ship that goes up there really has
to be self-sustainable. It has to have enough fuel, supplies,
food, water, to be able to sustain itself at present.
Icebreakers are able to do that. They can go up there for
months at a time. They have a hangar, they have a helicopter or
two helicopters. They are almost like a floating city. That's
one of the reasons why I feel very strongly about the ability
for us to carry out operations requires us to have a ship that
can sustain itself up there, because there are no deepwater
ports to pull into.
Nome comes about the closest right now, and I was impressed
to see that pier, because the first time I went to Nome there
was no pier. But even with that----
Senator Begich. They really want a port. That's why they're
building that.
Admiral Papp. But I think the maximum depth there was 24
feet, and to extend that pier out there I think it would only
be carried away by the ice. So a deepwater port is going to be
a severe challenge, and there won't be places for the ships
that travel through there to pull into, at least in the
foreseeable future.
Senator Begich. Rear Admiral?
Admiral Titley. Yes, sir, thank you. I would really echo
Admiral Papp's comments on the challenges of a deepwater port.
It was one of my takeaways when I was up in Barrow, and I did
stay overnight. But it's really just this sandy, shoaly spit,
and Prudhoe Bay really isn't much better as far as getting
ships anywhere near the shore. So you either have to do either
small boat or helicopter type transfer.
When we've looked at Nome, we came up with very similar
conclusions to what Admiral Papp did. If I understand my
scientists right, it's a granite bottom, so you can't just
bring in a dredge and say, well, let's make that 24 feet 30
feet or 32 feet. So there are real, real challenges, and I
believe there are some locations that might potentially be
suitable, but then there's no land-based infrastructure. And
with the permafrost changing, that is a non-trivial issue.
So in the Navy, ships like our oilers, like our amphibious
ships that have long legs, are the kinds of--we have to think
about how do you self-deploy, how do you sustain yourself in
this very, very austere environment. Right now, sir, the
Department of Defense, we believe we can meet today's missions
with today's capabilities, but we're constantly reassessing
that, sir.
Senator Begich. Very good.
Well, again, thank you all very much. Thank the panel for
being here. There is additional questions I know people have
that they will submit for the record. Again, thanks to the
first panel. We'll line up the next panel. Thank you all very
much. Next panel.
[Pause.]
Senator Begich. Our third panelist may have stepped out. He
may not have realized. Maybe he's out lobbying the admirals.
[Pause.]
Senator Begich. Let me go ahead and we'll start this next
panel, and they'll search and rescue. We'll send the Coast
Guard out for Dr. Metzger.
But we wanted to thank you for being here, thank you for
being patient in our first panel. We wanted to get some
additional items on the record. We are joined by Pete Slaiby,
Vice President of Alaska Ventures, Shell Oil Company; Dr. Scott
Borgerson, Senior Fellow, Institute for Global Maritime
Studies; and hopefully Dr. Andrew Metzger, Assistant Professor
at the University of Alaska-Fairbanks.
Let me again thank you all for being here. Your testimony
will also be entered into the record, your written testimony.
But please, we'll start with Mr. Slaiby. We'll give it a second
as they close the door.
Go ahead.
STATEMENT OF PETER E. SLAIBY,
VICE PRESIDENT, SHELL ALASKA
Mr. Slaiby. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
members of the Subcommittee. I appreciate your invitation to
speak to you today on the economic opportunities in the Arctic.
My remarks focus on the vast and long-term economic benefits of
developing Alaska's extraordinary offshore oil and gas
resources, resources potentially large enough to create
generations of jobs and vitalize entire economies.
Our government estimates Alaska offshore holds world-class
resources in the realm of 27 billion barrels of oil and over
120 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. It could be much more.
With Alaska's offshore production, we can reduce foreign
imports, improve our balance of trade, and keep U.S. dollars at
home to fuel our own economy. With Alaska offshore production,
nearly 55,000 jobs per year will be created for generations.
These are long-term, well-paying jobs, both in Alaska and the
Lower 48.
Alaska OCS production will generate, conservatively, $197
billion in government revenue from royalties at a modest oil
price, at today's oil price probably closer to $300 billion.
Finally, it will continue to contribute to the long-term
viability of an asset of national importance, the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline System, or TAPS. For the last 30 years, TAPS has been
a major supply line to the U.S., delivering more than 17
billion barrels of oil. Because of the declining oil production
in Alaska, TAPS is running at one-third capacity and is at the
risk of shutting down unless more oil, Alaskan oil, is
produced.
We firmly believe the estimated reserves in the offshore
provide Alaska the best chance to fill that pipeline once
again. We believe these potential resources may become a
national--excuse me--an asset of national significance as well,
and, most importantly, Senator, we believe that these assets
can be safely produced. We remain ready to prove it.
Shell has been prepared to explore in Alaska's offshore
since 2007. After years of regulatory wrangling, I'm hopeful
that our exploration program will go forward in 2012. Unlocking
the economic opportunity in the Alaskan offshore has been
delayed too long.
At the government's invitation, Shell participated in
offshore lease sales in Alaska beginning in 2006. Since then,
we have paid the government more than $2 billion for those
offshore leases in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas and invested
more than $1.5 billion to prepare for an exploration program
that meets and exceeds regulatory requirements. Despite our
most intense efforts, we have yet to drill a single well, and
this is highly unusual.
When the Federal Government holds a lease sale, it is in
fact saying offshore exploration and development is desired. If
a company presents a plan that meets these regulatory
requirements, that plan should be permitted.
It's important to keep in mind that exploration is a
temporary, short-term operation. Our initial Alaska wells will
take approximately 30 days to drill and evaluate. Data will be
gathered and the well will be permanently plugged and
abandoned. These are not complex wells.
There is no question the bar should be high in the Arctic.
We support high standards and a robust permitting process. But
the process must work and currently the government's permitting
and regulatory process is not equipped to deliver. Delays are
frustrating and disappointing, you might even say
irresponsible. The delays undermine the confidence of those who
would seek to invest in the U.S. and create economic value
here.
To fully unlock economic opportunities in Alaska,
policymakers should support a regulatory process that is clear
and efficient, one that ensures development is done in a
responsible and sustainable way. Specifically, statutes and
regulations must be clear, with firm time lines for delivery of
permitting, and funding must be provided to regulatory agency
staff and analysts for the required permits. Current budgeting
constraints should not be allowed to undermine the long-term
value of the Alaskan offshore development.
In addition, we believe the U.S. should ratify the Law of
the Sea Treaty and evaluate what additional resources should be
deployed in Alaska.
Thank you and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Slaiby follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter E. Slaiby, Vice President, Shell Alaska
Introduction
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the
opportunity to testify today. I would like to thank you for this
hearing to examine the economic opportunities in the Arctic areas of
the United States.
My name is Pete Slaiby. I am the Vice President of Shell Alaska and
I lead a team of professionals who since 2007 have been ready to begin
exploring for domestic oil and gas reserves off the coast of Alaska. It
has long been Shell's belief that Alaska's offshore holds world-class
hydrocarbon volumes. Shell has invested more than $3.5 billion for the
opportunity to validate that optimism.
Alaska should continue to play a major role in meeting the energy
needs of American consumers and American businesses, but achieving this
requires action and political will. Developing these Arctic resources
will extend the life of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) and
also create thousands of jobs; amass hundreds of billions in revenue
for local, state and Federal coffers; reduce imports; and improve the
balance of trade.
Although regulatory and legal challenges have blocked the drilling
of even a single well, I am hopeful that in 2012 we will be able to
move forward with exploration wells in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas.
Since returning to Alaska to purchase leases in 2005, Shell has drilled
more than 400 exploration wells around the world. I remain hopeful that
the barriers to exploring in Alaska's Outer Continental Shelf will be
addressed so that Shell can begin its exploration drilling in 2012.
Today I will focus on the economic benefits of developing our
Nation's Arctic oil and gas resources. Specifically:
Global energy demand forecasts, and the critical role that
oil and gas will play in meeting future energy needs and in
fueling the economy.
Alaska's offshore resource potential, and the benefits to
the Nation of developing those resources.
Shell's proposed exploration program in Alaska and the
challenges that have blocked the program.
And finally, recommendations for moving forward.
Global Energy Demand
The world must grapple with the reality that global energy demand
is projected to increase by roughly 50 percent over the next 20 years
and could double by 2050. The global recession will eventually fade and
as economies recover, demand will accelerate. A key driver will be
strong economic growth and a vast, emerging middle-class in developing
nations.
To address this demand, we will need all sources of energy--
hydrocarbons, alternatives, renewables and significant progress in
energy efficiency. Oil and gas will be the dominant energy source for
decades. Renewables and energy efficiency will play an ever-increasing
role. Shell is actively pursuing research and development into next-
generation biofuels. We also have a wind business in North America and
Europe.
Future growth for alternative energy forms will be paced by the
speed of technological development, public and private investment
capacity, government policies, and the affordability of energy supply.
Still, it takes several decades to replace even one percent of
conventional energy with a renewable source. The effort to tip the
scale toward more renewable sources of energy is worthwhile but even
unprecedented growth in renewables would leave an enormous energy gap
that must be filled with oil and gas.
As we move to meet the world's energy needs, environmental
challenges must be met and policies kept in place to ensure responsible
energy development that allows our economy to grow.
Governments have a role to play in defining policies to foster a
viable, efficient and workable marketplace that allows technology and
innovation to move forward. Industry--and most particularly the energy
industry--has an important role to play as well.
U.S. Oil and Gas Resource Potential
The President recently acknowledged that reducing dependence on
imports was a national policy imperative. We agree. The U.S. is
resource-rich in many ways, especially in oil and gas. Yet, in recent
years our country has imported more than 60 percent of its petroleum.
This comes at a significant cost. According to the EIA:
Petroleum net imports will average 9.7 million barrels per
day in 2011 and 10 million barrels per day in 2012, comprising
50 percent and 52 percent of total consumption, respectively.
Imports cost the U.S. more than $350 billion last year.
Producing more oil and gas in our own country is a ``win-win''
proposition. It provides real economic and security benefits. With
increased domestic production, less money is exported from the U.S.,
more money is invested here and federal revenues increase through
royalties and taxes. Resources can be developed with appropriate
environmental protections based on solid science and an understanding
of ecosystems and the impact of oil and gas activities on them.
I offer an example from the OCS:
According to the U.S. Government, 420 trillion cubic feet of
natural gas and more than 86 billion barrels of oil are yet to be
discovered on the OCS, including Alaska.
The greatest offshore resource potential lies in four key areas:
the Gulf of Mexico, Alaska and the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts.
Gulf of Mexico--This has been the heartland of U.S. offshore
activity. The industry has been in the Gulf for more than 60
years, producing more than 10 billion barrels of oil and more
than 73 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Estimates state
there are at least 45 billion barrels of oil and more than 233
trillion cubic feet of gas remaining.
Alaska OCS--World Class Potential--The Alaska offshore
likely holds some of the most prolific, undeveloped
conventional hydrocarbon basins in the world. Conservative
estimates from the Bureau of Ocean and Energy Management
Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) place roughly 27 billion
barrels of oil and more than 120 trillion cubic feet of gas in
the Alaska OCS.
Atlantic and Pacific Coasts--Assessments of these areas have
not been updated in decades, but the estimate is that the
Atlantic Coast holds 4 billion barrels of oil and 37 trillion
cubic feet of gas and the Pacific Coast holds 10 billion
barrels of oil and 18 trillion cubic feet of gas.
History of Alaska OCS
The world has long been aware of the Arctic's vast resources. In
total, more than 500 exploratory, production, and disposal wells have
been drilled in the Arctic waters of Alaska, Canada, Norway and Russia.
As a result of Federal OCS lease sales in the 1980s and 1990s, more
than 35 wells have been safely drilled in the U.S. Beaufort and Chukchi
Seas.
Shell is proud of its offshore legacy in Alaska, having produced in
the state waters of Cook Inlet in Alaska for more than 30 years
beginning in 1964. In the late 1970s and mid 1980s, Shell drilled
exploration wells offshore in the Gulf of Alaska, St. George Basin and
the Bering Sea. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Shell drilled
exploration wells in the Beaufort Sea and later drilled four of the
five exploration wells ever drilled in the Chukchi Sea.
Although oil and gas were found, Shell chose not to proceed to
development. We plugged and abandoned those exploratory wells for
economic reasons--including the fact that, at that time, TAPS was
already running near capacity.
Since 2005, the Federal Government has held several more OCS lease
sales in Alaska. Shell participated in these lease sales and, in fact,
is now the majority leaseholder in the Alaska offshore. Shell has paid
the Federal treasury nearly $2.2 billion for ten-year leases in the
Beaufort and Chukchi Seas. Additionally, Shell has invested more than
$1.5 billion and 6 years preparing for an exploration drilling program
with unparalleled mitigation and safety measures. Shell's work includes
multiple years of 3D seismic data collection, first-of-its-kind
baseline science, shallow hazard surveys, geotechnical programs,
numerous social investment initiatives and hundreds of meetings with
North Slope residents.
The Benefits of Developing the Alaska Offshore
The benefits of developing Alaska's offshore oil and gas resources
are many--not only to Alaska, but also to the Lower 48. Development
would fuel U.S. economic growth for decades to come.
A study conducted in 2010 by Northern Economics and the Institute
for Social and Economic Research (ISER) at the University of Alaska
(using USGS resource data) details the potential national benefits of
developing the oil and gas resources of the Alaska OCS:
An annual average of 54,700 new jobs would be created and
sustained through the year 2057, with 68,600 jobs created
throughout decades of production and 91,500 at peak employment;
A total of $145 billion in new payroll would be paid to
employees through the year 2057, including $63 billion to
employees in Alaska and $82 billion to employees in the rest of
the U.S.; and
A total of $193 billion in government revenue would be
generated through the year 2057, with $167 billion to the
Federal Government, $15 billion to the state of Alaska, $4
billion to local Alaska governments, and $6.5 billion to other
state governments at a modest oil price.
Several important implications for national policy and domestic
supply are raised in the study including:
Alaska OCS development maximizes the value of Alaska's and
the Nation's oil and gas resources by enhancing both value and
volume. Using TAPS' existing infrastructure, which is currently
operating far below capacity, would enhance value by lowering
transportation costs. Further, the new expanded infrastructure
needed to connect to TAPS would enable potential development of
satellite fields such as the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska
(NPRA).
Alaska OCS development would extend the operating life of
TAPS and increase the viability of an Alaska gas pipeline, due
to greater certainty of the available gas resource base to fill
it.
To elaborate, Alaska's OCS likely has at least one-third more oil
than has been produced in Prudhoe Bay, moved through TAPS and used to
fuel the U.S. for the past 30 years. It is two-and-a-half times what
has been produced in the Gulf of Mexico since 1990.
An independent assessment of industry-wide development of Alaska's
Beaufort and Chukchi Sea OCS concluded that an average of about 700,000
barrels of oil per day would be produced for 40 years. This is
equivalent to our 2010 oil imports from Iraq (506,000 bbl/day) and
Russia (137,000 bbl/day) combined. This same study found that Alaska
OCS production would peak at 1.45 million barrels of oil per day in
2030 (and 2.1 billion cubic feet of gas per day in 2050). This is more
than our 2010 oil imports from some of our major importing nations,
e.g, Mexico (1.03 million bbl/day), Saudi Arabia (958,000 bbl/day),
Nigeria (996,000 bbl/day), or Venezuela (827,000 bbl/day).
Such production numbers, which could potentially eliminate the need
for imports from one of our largest foreign suppliers, is significant,
and even more so in a world of increasing geopolitical instability.
A major benefit from Beaufort and Chukchi development would be the
long-term viability of TAPS. Since 1977, Alaska has supplied the U.S.
and its refineries with vast quantities of domestic oil via TAPS,
totaling roughly 17 billion barrels through 2010. The construction and
operation of the pipeline has also provided hundreds of thousands of
high paying jobs in Alaska and the nation, helping lift America out of
one of its worst economic downturns. A generation of Americans worked
to build TAPS; and it remains not only an economic engine, but a symbol
of American know-how and ingenuity. Unfortunately, without a reliable
new resource base, TAPS' future is uncertain.
Production in Prudhoe Bay has fallen significantly in recent
decades. At its height, TAPS supplied the Nation with 2.1 million
barrels of oil per day or about one-third of the Nation's oil
production.
Today, TAPS supplies only 600,000 barrels per day; still 11 percent
of our domestic supply but far from its peak throughput of more than 2-
million barrels a day in the early 1990s. If the throughput in the
pipeline continues to decline and no new supplies are developed, TAPS
will eventually be shut down, cutting access to one of the largest
sources of domestically produced oil in the country. A recent low-flow
impact study sponsored by TAPS operator, Alyeska Pipeline Service,
concluded that corrosion, wax build-up and potential freezing of the
pipeline could occur at 350,000 barrels per day. At the current rate of
decline, that number could be reached in less than 15 years. In a
shutdown scenario, our already increasing dependence on imported oil
will accelerate and the U.S. balance of payments and Federal revenues
will both get worse.
Unfortunately, we have already witnessed a preview of life without
TAPS. A temporary shutdown of TAPS earlier in 2011 had an immediate
impact on crude prices, jeopardized the continuity of the U.S. West
Coast refinery infrastructure, and resulted in a spike in U.S. reliance
on Russian crude supplies. This could be a harbinger of things to come
unless we develop new resources in Alaska.
Fortunately, the U.S. has an opportunity to prevent this scenario
from reoccurring. According to Northern Economics and ISER at the
University of Alaska in the report previously discussed, if OCS oil is
transported through TAPS, the higher volume of throughput would reduce
the TAPS tariff and extend the life of TAPS for decades. Doing so would
require new pipelines that connect offshore fields in Camden Bay and
the Chukchi Sea to TAPS. These projects would certainly rank among the
largest private sector construction projects in U.S. history.
It is clear that resource development, such as OCS oil and gas
production, is the first step in wealth creation. It has an enormous
economic multiplier effect. Jobs and revenues created by oil and gas
development reverberate throughout our economy, producing long-term,
high paying jobs. It creates a need for domestic manufacturing
capabilities, steel production, transportation, infrastructure
development, electronics and high-tech components. Alaska OCS
development is a genuine long-term economic stimulus plan.
In addition, by exploring and developing our Alaska OCS resources,
the U.S. has an opportunity to reaffirm its global role as an Arctic
nation. It is no secret the Arctic is becoming a critical location from
a geopolitical and strategic perspective. Arctic nations are
increasingly interested in international boundaries and opportunities
for resources and economic development.
Recently, Norway and Russia signed a maritime border delimitation
agreement that settled a long-standing seaward boundary dispute in the
Barents Sea. The motivation for the agreement was mutual cooperation
that would allow the development of offshore Arctic oil and gas
resources. Elsewhere, Arctic nations are asserting their claims to
continental shelf borders in accordance with the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. For instance, reports indicate
Denmark is considering claiming the North Pole as an extension of
Greenland territorial waters. Even nations outside the Arctic are
positioning themselves for Arctic resource development.
Without action, our country risks falling even further behind the
rest of the world in developing its Arctic resources. In Norway,
Russia, Greenland and Canada, Arctic resources are highly valued and
new exploration is already underway. We have an opportunity to develop
our own Arctic resources and the infrastructure appropriate to
facilitate our presence in this valuable region, especially during
tough economic times.
Offshore Safety Standards
Before moving to a discussion of Shell's Alaska OCS exploration
program, it remains appropriate to acknowledge the Deepwater Horizon
incident in the Gulf of Mexico. The incident forced a re-examination of
offshore operations and led to new regulatory requirements that have
raised the bar on safety and led to substantial changes in the way the
industry operates. There is no question that the industry must be held
to the highest standards for protecting the environment and the health
and well-being of our workers and the communities in which we operate.
The following are just a few of the new regulatory requirements
systems recently adopted by the Federal Government and industry:
The Interim Final Drilling Safety Rule is focused on
minimizing the likelihood of an incident and addresses barriers
that should be in place to prevent a hazard. Preventing an
incident is a top priority.
Responding to an incident is now substantially enhanced with
new requirements for containment capability. The Marine Well
Containment Company (MWCC), which Shell initially formed in
partnership with three other oil and gas companies, is designed
to do just that. The MWCC is a stand-alone organization
committed to improving capability for containing a potential
underwater well control incident in the Gulf of Mexico.
A new Center for Offshore Safety will be created to promote
the safety of offshore operations and enhance the government's
regulatory role. The Center will provide an effective means for
sharing best practices. Members will be subject to independent,
third-party auditing and verification to ensure integrity. The
Center will operate around an existing safety framework known
as RP75, or ``Recommended Practice for Development of a Safety
and Environmental Management Program for Offshore Operations
and Facilities.''
Industry has also greatly increased its resources to respond
to a major oil spill by adding vessels, equipment and
personnel. Significant research and development is ongoing for
oil spills in ice.
Shell has taken the lead as operator of the Subsea Well
Response Project (SWRP) to be based in Stavanger, Norway. Nine
major oil and gas companies will work pro-actively and
collaboratively progress development of subsea well
intervention and oil spill response equipment that can be
deployed swiftly to different regions in the world.
In addition to regulatory requirements, a company must foster and
promote safety relentlessly each day. At Shell we call this Goal Zero.
Everyone who works for us--both employee and contractor--is expected to
comply with the rules; intervene when anything looks unsafe; and
respect people, the environment and our neighbors. Compliance is not
optional.
We have personal safety systems and procedures with clear, firm
rules; simple ``do's and don'ts'' covering activities with the highest
potential safety risk, such as getting proper authorization before
disabling safety-critical equipment and protecting against falls when
working at heights.
We have process safety systems to ensure the safety and integrity
of our operations and assets. Process safety is also managed through a
variety of tools, such as well and facility design standards;
established ``operating envelopes'' not to be exceeded; maintenance and
inspection intervals for safety critical equipment; and an effective
Management of Change process.
Our approach also requires that all our drilling contractors
develop a Safety Case to demonstrate major risks are properly managed.
A Safety Case shows how we identify and assess the hazards on the rig;
how we establish barriers to prevent and control the hazards; and how
we assign the critical activities needed to maintain the integrity of
these barriers. Further, it guides the rig and crews in risk
management; and ensures staff competency, especially for those new to
the rig.
Shell's Alaska Exploration Program
Shell is planning an offshore oil and gas exploration program in
Alaska's OCS in 2012 during the four-month open water season. This
program could include drilling multiple wells in both the Beaufort and
Chukchi Seas, site clearance surveys and baseline science studies. It
is important to note that an exploration program, unlike a development
and production program, is a temporary, short-term operation. In the
Alaska OCS, an exploration well is anticipated to take approximately 30
days to complete, at which time the well will be permanently plugged
and abandoned and the site cleared. Shell's exploration program will
meet or exceed all applicable regulatory requirements for the
protection of health, safety and the environment.
Shell has been committed to employing world-class technology and
experience to ensure a safe, environmentally responsible Arctic
exploration program--one that has the smallest possible footprint and
no negative impact on North Slope stakeholders or traditional
subsistence hunting activities. Aspects of the 2012 program have been
under evaluation by Federal agencies since 2006. At every step, Shell
has worked with Federal agencies, the State of Alaska, and local
communities to develop a program that achieves the highest technical,
operational and environmental standards.
My discussion here focuses on the following points:
1.The currently available science regarding the Arctic is
extensive and more than adequate for an exploration program;
2.The shallow water, low pressure Alaska OCS wells differ
significantly from Gulf of Mexico deepwater exploratory wells;
and
3.The oil spill prevention, containment, mitigation and
response plans included in Shell's 2012 Arctic exploration plan
are robust and comprehensive and were largely in place even
before the BP Macondo incident.
Arctic Baseline Science
Some argue that there is insufficient scientific data regarding the
Arctic and, therefore, exploration in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas
should not go forward. This is not accurate. In fact, the available
scientific data is more than adequate to identify and evaluate the
impacts of an exploration program that is, by definition, a short-term,
temporary operation.
The recent release of the United States Geologic Survey (USGS)
scientific gap analysis commissioned by Secretary Salazar does not
differentiate between exploration and development, nor does it satisfy
the original mission of accurately cataloguing existing scientific data
specific to the Arctic. The cursory review that was done is merely a
compilation of selected reports done over the years but does not
analyze the present landscape.
The report also fails to acknowledge the data available from years
of Arctic oil spill response research, technology development, as well
as the tested tools, techniques and assets capable of Arctic oil spill
recovery and response. Regional Alaska Native Corporations, North Slope
and Northwest Arctic communities, Federal agencies, marine mammal
commissions and industry have volumes of current scientific data that
were not considered as part of this analysis.
The categories of scientific data available include: tides and
ocean currents, weather (e.g., wind and its effect on currents,
precipitation), ice conditions, baseline environmental data related to
species found in the arctic (e.g., benthic, fish, birds, marine
mammals, etc.), assessments regarding the impacts of oil and gas
exploration activities on those species, and, specifically, information
assessing the impacts of an oil spill on those resources, in the highly
unlikely event of an incident during exploration drilling.
Since 1973, Federal agencies have performed more than 5,000
environmental studies to better understand the Alaska OCS and coastal
environment, and document or predict the effects of offshore oil and
gas activities. The former Minerals Management Service Environmental
Studies Program spent more than $600 million dollars (more than $1
billion in inflation adjusted dollars) for studies under the guidance
of the OCS Scientific Committee, which advises the Secretary of
Interior. About half of these funds have been directed to Alaska.
The advancement of scientific knowledge will continue. This
expanded knowledge is critical because it informs government regulators
who must issue permits, it informs policymakers who must develop sound
energy and environmental policy and it informs our operational
decisions. In fact, Shell is contributing to advancing Arctic science
in several ways. Since returning to Alaska in 2005, Shell has spent $60
million engaging in an aggressive environmental studies program in the
Arctic offshore. Shell has worked in a collaborative manner with a wide
range of stakeholders, including industry partners, local, state, and
Federal Governments, universities, and non-government organizations to
share resources and facilitate the further development of our
understanding of the Arctic marine ecosystem.
Shell has also taken the lead in the development and implementation
of new technologies, including unmanned aerial systems, acoustic
recorders, and integrated ecosystem studies to advance capacities to
work in this challenging offshore environment. Shell fosters and funds
such diverse research as computer assisted identification of marine
mammal calls, greatly enhancing the capacity to utilize acoustic
sampling technologies, satellite tagging of whales and seals, ice and
weather forecasting and physical oceanography.
Recently, the North Slope Borough (NSB) and Shell entered into a
multi-year collaborative science agreement that will enable impacted
North Slope communities to build capacity for scientific research and
independent review of studies, exploration and development plans and
regulatory documents. The research program established under this
agreement will be guided by an Advisory Committee of representatives
from each of the coastal communities (Point Hope, Point Lay,
Wainwright, Barrow, Nuiqsut and Kaktovik), scientists from the NSB and
Shell, and independent scientists. This committee will be responsible
for identifying critical issues, setting investigative priorities, and
integrating traditional knowledge with science. The current agreement
is between the NSB and Shell, but it anticipates expansion of the
studies program through additional funds from third parties, which may
include private or public sources.
If exploration leads to a commercial discovery, even more science
will be needed. Consistent with the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act's
(OCSLA) multi-stage process, development and production activities will
build on the information gathered through the exploration stage. The
first development in the Arctic OCS will require the preparation of an
additional environmental impact statement. The issues to be addressed
in that document will be determined during a public scoping process.
Since 2006, Shell has spent almost $90 million pre-investing in data
acquisition, studies, and research and development that will support
environmentally sound offshore development. Information gathered during
these earlier OCSLA stages (including exploration) will form the basis
for that scoping process, as well as the identification of any issues
that may require additional research or study before informed
decisionmaking.
This approach was recently validated in the final version of the
President's Oil Spill Commission report, which states: ``The need for
additional research should not be used as a de facto moratorium on
activity in the Arctic, but instead should be carried out with specific
time frames in mind in order to inform the decisionmaking process.''
Exploration in Alaska's OCS Compared to Exploration in Deepwater Gulf
of Mexico
The drilling conditions for Shell's proposed 2012 Alaska OCS
exploration program are typical of wells that have been safely drilled
for decades in shallow water around the world. The Alaska OCS wells are
in shallow waters and have much lower reservoir pressure, which is
vastly different from the conditions found in the deep waters of the
Gulf of Mexico. This increases the safety margin.
The Deepwater Horizon was drilling the Macondo well in 5,000 feet
of water and down to a depth of 18,000 feet. The pressure encountered
in the Macondo well was about 15,000 psi based on mud weight at total
depth. The water depth, well depth and pressure make the Macondo well
and other deepwater Gulf of Mexico wells far more technically complex
than the shallow wells that will be drilled off the coast of Alaska.
In Alaska's Beaufort Sea, the wells will be in 150 feet of water or
less. The wells will be between 7,000 to 10,000 feet deep. We have
reservoir pressure models based on previously drilled wells in the
Chukchi and Beaufort Seas that show the pressure at total depth in our
initial exploration wells will be no more than 6,000 psi.
With lower anticipated bottomhole pressure in the Alaska wells, all
of the mechanical barriers in Shell's well design have higher overall
safety margins between operating pressure and mechanical barrier design
pressures. Even if the riser from the drill rig to the blow-out
preventer on the seafloor was breeched, as it was in Macondo, the
weight of the drill mud in the downhole pipe would maintain well
control and prevent a blowout. To reiterate, Shell's 2012 Arctic well
program is exploratory. The well will not be converted to a production
well. It will be permanently plugged and abandoned per Federal
regulations.
Oil Spill Prevention and Response
Oil spill prevention and response planning remains a top priority.
Shell's Oil Discharge Prevention and Contingency Plan is robust. We
have invested in an unprecedented oil spill response capability to
support our drilling plans in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas. Our spill
recovery equipment is state-of-the-art, widely acknowledged by experts
as proven and effective under cold-climate conditions and designed to
remove the worst-case discharge.
Shell developed a three-tier or layer system for use in the Alaska
OCS in 2007.
1.The first tier is located onsite, always less than an hour
from the drilling rig. It is a dedicated fleet of purpose-built
vessels and specialized oil containment equipment, which will
be on-site 24/7 before a drill bit ever touches the sea floor.
2.The second tier is located to capture oil that might move
away from the drill rig; termed near-shore recovery.
3.The third layer involves pre-staged shoreline protection.
This, along with the first two tiers involves extensive use of
both local residents and traditional knowledge.
Shell's oil spill response personnel routinely practice and conduct
spill response drills. The response system consists of dedicated oil
spill response assets including:
Offshore recovery vessels with skimmers and boom,
Near-shore barges with skimmer and boom,
Shallow water vessels with skimmers and boom,
Pre-identified protection strategies and equipment for
environmentally and culturally sensitive sites, and
Onshore oil spill response teams to deploy and support the
above.
These assets are staffed during operation around the clock with
trained crews provided by Alaska Clean Seas, Arctic Slope Regional
Corporation, and Ukpeagvik Inupiat Corporation.
Design Prevention, Containment and Spill Response
Shell has design standards and practices that have enabled us to
safely drill many deepwater and shallow water wells worldwide in a
variety of conditions, including the Arctic. Shell will rigorously
apply these standards in all well operations on the Alaska OCS. As
described above, the conditions of the well mean that prevention
through the mechanical barriers built into the design have a high
margin of safety.
The blow out preventers (BOPs) that Shell will use have been
extensively maintained, inspected and tested by third party
specialists. The BOPs have been validated to comply with the original
equipment manufacturer specifications, in accordance with API Recommend
Practice No. 53. Shell's BOPs will have two sets of shear rams and
comply with all regulatory requirements and NTLs (Notice to
Leaseholders).
We will also maintain the ability to mechanically cap the well in
the unlikely event of a BOP breach. In fact, all existing Shell wells
in deep water around the globe can be capped. The design and
construction of these wells allows them to withstand the pressure
build-up that results when the well is capped. If the blow-out
maintains mechanical integrity in the borehole and wellhead, a
``capping and containment'' operation would be employed. Mechanically
capping the well, for example with an additional pre-engineered BOP,
has the ability to reduce or even stop the flow, but may require a
surface collection system. The benefit of this response methodology is
that it reduces or completely halts the flow of oil entering the water
column. This capping method was eventually proven successful in
terminating the well bore flow even at Macondo, and has been an
integral part of well control descriptions in industry's recently
approved permits in the deepwater Gulf of Mexico return to drilling.
In the extremely unlikely event that the wellhead integrity is
compromised and an uncontrolled flow occurs, we would employ a pre-
fabricated ``subsea collection'' system. This would consist of a
capping stack that would be located on top of the blowout preventer,
collecting fluids to a surface barge where gas, oil and water can be
separated prior to storage and disposal. Separated gas would be flared;
separated oil and water would be stored in tanks for subsequent
disposal offsite or flared.
Collecting the flowing fluids close to their source of origin
prevents or limits the flow of oil into ocean waters, and optimizes the
suite of surface oil spill response capabilities by engaging the
problem at its source. This is a key part of the strategy that Shell
has employed in Alaska, even pre-dating the Macondo blowout. Surface
oil spill response equipment would remain on station in the immediate
area. Given we will have two functional drilling vessels in our 2012
exploration operations, each drilling rig will act as the relief backup
well drilling unit for the other. Each can immediately stop operations
and respond to drill any ultimate relief well.
Oil in Ice
A significant amount of oil-in-ice research has been completed over
the last 30 years and more is underway. A four-year program known as
the Joint Industry Project (JIP), under the management of SINTEF
Norwegian Research Institute, was sponsored by six international oil
companies, including Shell, and involved a host of international
scientists including those from the Department of the Interior.
The purpose was to advance knowledge, tools and technologies for
oil spill response in ice-covered waters. The program examined:
The fate and behavior of oil spilled in Arctic conditions;
In-situ burning of oil in Arctic and ice-covered waters;
Mechanical recovery of oil in Arctic and ice-covered waters;
Use of chemical dispersants in Arctic and ice-covered
waters;
Monitoring and remote sensing of oil in and under ice;
Preparation of a generic oil spill contingency plan; and
Field experiments at Svalbard, Norway, in offshore ice-
covered waters.
In May 2009, the group spent two weeks in the pack ice in the
Norwegian Barents Sea to study the behavior of oil spills in Arctic
waters and to test various response options in realistic oil-in-ice
conditions. The tests proved that ice can act as a natural boom or
protective barrier to confine and reduce the spread of an oil spill and
to provide a longer window of opportunity in which clean-up
technologies can be used effectively. These tests are the most wide-
ranging research and development programs ever undertaken to evaluate
Arctic oil spills.
These real-world offshore tests marked the final stage in the
largest and most wide-ranging international research and development
program ever undertaken to enhance detailed understanding, to further
improve and develop spill-response technologies and to increase the
ability to react rapidly in the event of an accidental oil spill in
ice-covered conditions. The summary of that research showed that by
using a suite of available tools (all of which are part of Shell's
Alaska tool kit), including Arctic-tested booms and skimmers, and in-
situ burning and dispersants, the majority of oil could be cleaned up
in a variety of Arctic conditions; including broken ice and slush.
Shell has already committed to several more years or oil-in-ice
research in Norway. Beyond those large-scale field trials, we are also
pursuing test projects in Alaska that will better inform our approach
to oil spill response. In Situ Burning is well-proven in open water
conditions and in an effort to expand our ability to ignite a large
pool of oil using a fixed-wing aircraft, Shell recently conducted a
``Proof-of-Concept'' test program at the Beacon Training Center in
Kenai, Alaska in 2010. The tests were successful in showing that safe
and effective ignition was possible from a fixed wing aircraft. That's
key as we consider the long distances our aircraft may have to travel
if an in situ burn is necessary offshore.
Shell is also a leading sponsor of a Joint Industry Project that
will help determine the sensitivity of key Arctic species to chemically
and physically dispersed petroleum under Arctic conditions. Partners in
the project include the University of Alaska Fairbanks and Barrow
Arctic Science Consortium, with all dispersant testing being done at
the Barrow Arctic Research Center in Barrow, Alaska.
Regulatory Challenges in the Arctic OCS
Shell participated in several Alaska OCS lease sales at the
invitation of the Federal Government. Although the leases were issued
to Shell, the government's permitting and regulatory process has not
been equipped to deliver. As a result, Shell has been blocked from
drilling even a single exploration well.
Let me stress that this is highly unusual. The Federal Government's
decision to hold a sale is, in effect, a decision that OCS exploration
and development is desired. The Federal Government performs years of
in-depth analyses before holding an OCS lease sale. Therefore, an
exploration or development plan that meets regulatory requirements is
approved. In the case of Shell in Alaska, we have met and exceeded the
regulatory requirements and still have not been able to drill a well.
Each of our 414 leases in the Beaufort Sea and the Chukchi Sea has
a ten-year term. A lease will expire and return to the Federal
Government at the end of its term, if substantial steps to develop it
are not taken.
So, Shell is in a ``Catch-22.'' We have invested more than $3.5
billion in leases and in supporting infrastructure--equipment, support
vessels, baseline studies, and workforce training--in order to take the
first step to explore for oil and natural gas. We have assembled what
is arguably the most environmentally sensitive and thoroughly
responsible exploration plan in history. Yet, for reasons largely
beyond our control, permits have not been issued. Since our leases are
only valid for a limited time, we are ready to move forward.
A Robust Regulatory Process Is Critical
Let me be clear, Shell fully supports a robust permitting process.
Shell does not seek lower environmental standards for Arctic OCS
activities or a less exhaustive public permitting process. Such a
process protects people and the environment and ensures safe and
responsible operations. The bar is high in the Arctic, and it should
be. Shell fully understands and supports this. We are ready to proceed
with an exploration program that does precisely that.
But the regulatory framework should be clear and consistent; and
the regulatory process should be properly funded, efficient and robust.
The process should lead to timely decisions. Regardless of one's views
on oil and gas development, we can all agree that endless delays by our
government are wasteful to the taxpayer and should not be tolerated.
Permitting for oil and gas activity must be done thoroughly and to the
letter of the law. Without that, legal challenges are likely and can
also act to block a program.
The recent formal creation of Federal working group dedicated to
pursuing domestic energy solutions in Alaska is welcome news to Shell
and builds on conversations we have had with this administration
related to responsible offshore exploration in the Arctic. We're
hopeful this effort to coordinate various regulatory workstreams will
lead to more data, a more efficient permitting process and ultimately,
a stronger permit.
Recommendations: How Do We Move Forward?
Now I would like to look forward--to where we go from here and what
policymakers should do.
Developing the oil and gas in our Nation's Arctic OCS will require
governments at all levels--Federal, state and local--to work together
to develop a workable regulatory framework and to provide focused
funding and staff for the work.
Specifically:
Federal permitting agencies must have adequate, trained
staff with appropriate expertise and direction to execute the
program. Alternatively, the agencies must be given the
authority and the direction to do the permitting work through
outside experts. This can be accomplished through arms-length
funding from pre-approved third-party contractors. Lack of
staff should be no excuse for delaying permitting work.
The Federal Government must pursue data collection and
analysis necessary for environmental studies, ecological
characterization and baseline science required for potential
development activities. I stress that existing data is
available for exploration. This critical work is required by
various statutes and underpins permitting of work in the Arctic
OCS. Again, if funding is an issue, the government should be
allowed to do the work through arms-length funding from third
parties.
Federal and state regulatory agencies must work through a
coordinated permitting process. Multiple agencies are now
involved in issuing multiple permits for a single offshore
project. Duplication and inefficiency lead to delay and waste.
Statutes and regulations should be clear and the permitting
process transparent. Agencies should be forced to set and meet
milestones for reviewing and processing permit applications.
They should have firm timelines for permit delivery. These
activities should be coordinated through one office that works
with all needed agency participants and contractors to ensure
timelines are followed. In short, the government must respond
to permit applications in a timely and competent manner.
Second, looking more broadly to Arctic economic opportunities for
our country, the U.S. should ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty. While
Shell's Alaska OCS program is not dependent upon this action, U.S.
ratification of the Treaty is in the best interest of both national and
economic security. The Treaty provides a clear and well-accepted
framework for resolving maritime border questions and for ensuring that
the U.S. controls the OCS off its coast.
Ratification could lead to international cooperation (such as the
maritime border delimitation agreement recently signed between Norway
and Russia). Ratification could also provide future protection for the
import and export of petroleum and production and improved capabilities
for search and rescue and environmental protection.
Third, policymakers should consider what physical presence the
Federal Government should have along Alaska's Arctic coastline. At a
time when nations both in and out of the Arctic are mapping the Arctic
surface and seafloor, it seems appropriate to develop a strategic plan
for how and when U.S. manpower will be deployed in the U.S. Arctic and
what the U.S. government's contribution will be to that deployment.
Even though the lack of a U.S. Government presence and
infrastructure in the Arctic does not inhibit or hinder Shell's
proposed exploration program, we support funding for the U.S. Coast
Guard and other Federal agencies to identify and pursue resources
needed to ensure responsible development of economic opportunities in
the Arctic.
Conclusion
Oil and gas will remain critical sources of energy for decades to
come. There are broad and sustained benefits in developing our own
resources in the Arctic OCS. The U.S. Arctic is resource-rich and
tapping those resources will create jobs, power the economy, put
billions into dwindling government coffers, provide energy security,
reduce imports and reduce our trade deficit. We can ill afford not to
embrace this momentous economic opportunity.
Thank you. I am happy to answer any questions.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
Dr. Borgerson.
STATEMENT OF SCOTT BORGERSON, Ph.D., SENIOR FELLOW, INSTITUTE
FOR GLOBAL MARINE STUDIES
Dr. Borgerson. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator Snowe.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to be here today.
My short answer to the title of today's hearing, ``Is There
a Strategy?,'' is no. I'll elaborate why and what we might do
to fix it in my testimony. So as to not repeat what we heard on
the first panel about the realities of climate change, the
facts of the Arctic's opening, I'll skip over that part of my
testimony, but would like it to be noted that it's submitted
for the record.
Senator Begich. It is.
Dr. Borgerson. Creative local, state, and federal
initiatives can ensure that we seize this historic economic
opportunity presented by the Arctic's radical transformation
and do so in a way that I think is sustainable, both for the
environment and for local populations, and this is important,
as well as in the Nation's clear-eyed national security
interests. I'm advocating that the U.S. embrace and embrace in
a big way, as I did in an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal last
Friday along this theme, what might be the world's last and
potentially most attractive emerging market.
It's a mistake to leave Alaska in the proverbial icebox. In
addition to the oil and gas resources we just heard about, the
Arctic is home to some of the world's largest precious metals
deposits, as well as fresh water, which is increasingly
important in a warming world. Another resource is the Arctic
sea routes, which if realized would be many thousands of miles
shorter than traditional sea ways around the two capes or
through the two canals. With massive tidal, wind, and
geothermal capacity, the Arctic also has renewable energy
potential.
While the U.S. sits on the sidelines, other Arctic nations
are moving forward with ambitious development programs. Russia
is actively working to open the Barents region. Canada is doing
the same in the Yukon. Norway and Iceland each of multi-billion
dollar energy projects under way. And Greenland, for now still
under Danish rule, is exploring 31 billion barrels of oil
estimated to be off its coast.
Before detailing what kinds of strategic investments should
be given priority in the American Arctic, let me say generally
first that I think the overall approach needs to be balanced.
In my view, neither extreme of the ``Drill, Baby, Drill'' crowd
and the idea that Alaska can somehow build a bright future on
oil and gas extraction alone, versus the equally unrealistic
position that the entire State is to be set aside as a nature
preserve with zero development, is acceptable or realistic.
Rather, I believe a comprehensive approach should be
undertaken that is predicated upon environmental best practices
to ensure we meet our responsibilities as stewards of this
pristine frontier, is sensitive to the economic and human
rights of indigenous communities, is supportive of increasing
domestic oil and gas production, while simultaneously and
aggressively accelerating renewable energy projects, is
appreciative of the central importance of resource owners, and
is forward-looking in positioning the State 1 day that it will
ultimately transform from primarily an exporter of natural
resources to a vibrant, innovative, and dynamic economy further
up the value chain.
Some other comments and thoughts are in my testimony, but
let me skip ahead, submit it for the record--but let me skip
ahead to some policy suggestions for your consideration that
might help the U.S. have a twofold strategy, one of both
mitigating the risks, which you heard a lot about in the first
panel, as well as, importantly, embracing the opportunities in
the new Arctic.
First--and I put it first for a reason--let me add my voice
to the chorus. It's long overdue that the U.S. accedes to the
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. I wrote a study at the
Council on Foreign Relations articulating all the reasons why
it's in our national security interest to do so. It has broad
bipartisan support. I think there is not a serious voice in the
national security establishment that would not endorse our
acceding to the treaty, and it's embarrassing, frankly, as a
Nation that we've not yet. I'd be happy to speak to that during
the question-answer session if there are questions tied to the
treaty.
Second, one creative idea that came out of a recent
conference I attended in Anchorage, I know you spoke at,
Senator Begich, The Arctic Imperative, is the idea of somehow
using Alaska's really incredible budget reserves and the
permanent fund, which is especially unique in this current
budgetary environment, in a sovereign wealth fund-type model,
and there are established models abroad, and I can speak to
that a little bit, to facilitate private investment.
Three, tied to that, craft ambitious federal-state
strategies for attracting foreign capital. I think that's
consistent with the President's recent statement along these
lines. We're open for business and should welcome foreign
capital to help develop the American Arctic.
Four, unshackle local commerce. Frankly, Washington, D.C.,
needs to get out of the way of Alaskan development and I think
can strike an important balance between environmental
sustainability and development with some overarching
legislation.
Fifth, work with Canada on the Beaufort maritime boundary
line and Northwest Passage disputes.
Sixth, recapitalize the nation's icebreaker fleet, as we've
heard about today.
Seventh, amend the U.S.-build provision of the Jones Act.
That's sometimes controversial, but I think important.
A deepwater port, studying other emerging markets, and then
supporting science, which is an important foundation for these
policy decisions.
I look forward to speaking to any of those ideas or
answering any questions you might have in the question-answer
period. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Borgerson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Scott Borgerson, Ph.D., Senior Fellow,
Institute for Global Maritime Studies \1\
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\1\ The Institute for Global Maritime Studies is a publicly
supported, non-profit educational organization, dedicated to exploring
a wide range of policy issues relating to the sea. The Institute's
purpose is to foster greater public awareness of the importance to
humankind of the oceanic world, and it is committed to advancing the
national welfare and the public good.
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Mr. Chairman:
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in today's hearing
``Defending U.S. Economic Interests in the Changing Arctic: Is There a
Strategy?'' My short answer is NO. While I have seen some interesting
proposed legislation in Juneau and Washington, from my perspective I
have not yet heard a strategic vision articulated for America's future
in the new Arctic.
The radical climate change underway in the high latitudes is well
chronicled and an accepted fact among the scientific community. It is
happening and undeniable no matter what one's political stripes. My
testimony, however, is not concerned with the causes of the warming or
potential mitigation remedies that are indeed important, but rather
with what practical steps should be taken because of this new reality.
Creative local, state and Federal initiatives can ensure that we
seize this historic economic opportunity presented by the Arctic's
radical transformation and do so in a way that is sustainable both for
the environment and for local populations as well as being in the
country's clear-eyed national security interests.
I am advocating that the U.S. embrace, and embrace in a big way,
what might be the world's last and potentially most attractive emerging
market as opposed to leaving Alaska in the proverbial icebox.
Long literally and figuratively frozen to outside investors, the
Arctic now has melting sea ice and thawing tundra that are yielding
huge resource opportunities. According to the U.S. Geological Survey
and Alaskan state studies, 22 percent of the world's undiscovered oil
and gas reserves are to be found in the Arctic. On the North Slope
alone, there are an estimated 40 billion barrels of oil and 236
trillion cubic feet of gas.
The Arctic is also home to some of the world's largest precious
metals deposits, as well as fresh water, which is increasingly
important in a warming world. Another resource is the Arctic's sea
routes, which, if realized, would be many thousands of miles shorter
than traditional seaways around the two capes or through the two
canals. With massive tidal, wind and geothermal capacity, the Arctic
also has renewable energy potential.
While the U.S. sits on the sidelines, other Arctic nations are
moving forward with ambitious development programs. Russia is actively
working to open the Barents region. Canada is doing the same in the
Yukon. Norway and Iceland each have multibillion-dollar energy projects
underway. And Greenland, for now still under Danish rule, is exploring
31 billion barrels of oil estimated to be off its coast.
Before detailing what kinds of strategic investments should be
given priority in the American Arctic, let me say generally first that
I think the overall U.S. approach needs to be balanced. In my view,
neither extreme of the ``drill baby drill'' crowd and the idea that
Alaska can somehow build a bright future on oil and gas extraction
alone, versus the equally unrealistic position that the entire state is
to be set aside as a nature preserve with zero development is
acceptable.
Rather, I believe a comprehensive approach should be undertaken
that is predicated upon environmental best practices to ensure we meet
our responsibilities as stewards of this pristine frontier, is
sensitive to the human and economic rights of indigenous communities,
is supportive of increasing domestic oil and gas production while
simultaneously and aggressively accelerating renewable energy projects,
is appreciative of the central importance of resource owners, and is
forward looking in positioning the state one day to transform from
primarily an exporter of natural resources into a vibrant, innovative
and dynamic economy farther up the value chain.
For example, why aren't Anchorage, Fairbanks and other Alaskan
cities already mostly powered from green sources and world leaders in
the development of alternative energy technologies? Why isn't Alaska
more centrally part of the explosive growth in Asian economies that are
in relative close geographic proximity? Why isn't Alaska aggressively
pursuing a host of exciting investment opportunities including
infrastructure expansion and rare earth mineral projects? Why isn't
Alaska with its vast Arctic resources at the forefront of leading the
Nation out of its current economic funk? Why shouldn't the American
Arctic be the future financial, intellectual, and logistics epicenter
for this increasingly important region?
Here are some policy proposals for your Committee's consideration
that might better position Alaska and the United States to mitigate the
risks and embrace the opportunities of the new Arctic:
1. Formally accede to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). There are numerous global strategic imperatives for
why this is long overdue and urgently needed. In the Arctic,
more specifically, the convention includes provisions for
extending U.S. sovereignty over its extended continental shelf;
allows for stricter environmental standards over Arctic
shipping; establishes protocols for managing the Bering Strait
which will become a key maritime choke point; and protects the
mobility of U.S. flagged vessels and those of our allies in new
Arctic transit routes, to name but a few.\2\
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\2\ For a summary of the arguments for and against acceding to the
Convention see ``The National Interest and the Law of the Sea,''
Council on Foreign Relations Special Report by Dr. Scott Borgerson, May
2009.
2. Consider enabling Alaska's $13 billion constitutional budget
reserve and its $40 billion Triple-A rated permanent fund to
function like an Alaskan Sovereign Wealth Fund. Deploying this
capital reserve smartly alongside private monies would allow
Alaska to accelerate Arctic development projects that are
shovel-ready. If the money were steered toward increasing oil
production and financing renewable energy projects--both
administration priorities--it would have the added benefit of
helping the country reduce its dependence on Middle East oil.
The Alaska Industrial Development and Export Authority and an
envisioned State Infrastructure Bank might be useful vehicles
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for promoting these investments.
3. Craft ambitious Federal and state strategies for attracting
foreign capital. This would be consistent with the President's
formal commitment last month to an open national investment
policy. As our recent deficit challenges underscore, welcoming
any investor interested in the American Arctic would create
meaningful new jobs and contribute to economic recovery. Of
course, any foreign investment will need to navigate the
interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States designed to safeguard national security interests.
4. Unshackle local commerce. This might be aided by a
congressional ``Arctic Preservation and Development Act'' that
could lay out the rules of the game, balancing environmental
protection and the state's economic interests. This legislation
should be pursued irrespective of ANWR, and focus more on
creative ideas of how environmentalists and industrialists can
sit around the same table working in common cause to open
Alaska up to development while doing so with the highest
conservation standards.
5. Resolve our differences with Canada over our Beaufort Sea
maritime boundary line and the Northwest Passage. The U.S. and
Canada enjoy a special relationship and I believe conditions in
Ottawa are ripe to strike a deal. We should come to agreement
on a compromise maritime boundary line in the Beaufort Sea so
that offshore energy production can proceed there. We should
also deepen and widen our collaboration over the Northwest
Passage, creating a joint-Arctic Navigation Commission to
promote and safeguard commerce through both nations' waters
using the St. Lawrence Seaway as a model. In general, the U.S.
should approach the Arctic in a spirit of enthusiastic
diplomacy and champion other collaborative diplomatic
initiatives such as strengthening the Arctic Council,
formalizing an Arctic Ambassadorship, and establishing a North
Pole marine preserve.
6. Recapitalize the nation's icebreaker fleet. The country
finds itself in a dire predicament of being an Arctic nation
with one dying heaving icebreaker. Icebreakers are needed for
the same Coast Guard missions that exist on America's other
four coasts such as supporting commercial shipping, research
and science, search and rescue, oil spill response, and
projecting sovereignty. Given the precipitous decline in this
nation's shipbuilding capacity, even if Congress appropriates
monies for new ships today, given the long lead time to build
these complex vessels they likely wouldn't be operational until
after the Arctic is already seasonally ice free. An interim fix
might be to lease foreign icebreakers until new ships can be
built, but by doing this we are in effect outsourcing our
sovereignty, which is unthinkable for the world's greatest
naval power but probably necessary as an interim fix.
7. Amend the U.S. ``build'' provision of the Jones Act. The
Jones Act--a protectionist policy that requires all domestic
maritime cargo be carried on vessels that are owned, flagged,
crewed, and built in America--has killed the U.S. merchant
marine and hurts Alaska and other noncontiguous states and
territories more than it does the rest of the country. Because
of the market distortions created by the U.S. build provision,
constructing a commercial tanker in the U.S. costs 2-3 times
more than building the equivalent ship abroad, even in
countries with higher labor and environmental costs. Relaxing
this restriction to allow foreign built vessels into domestic
trade routes would decrease the cost of Alaska's seaborne
imports and make its exports more competitive. Commercial
shipping is also a less carbon intensive form of transportation
for freight intensive cargo. Waving the domestic build
requirement would have the added benefit of helping rejuvenate
America's shipyards with the likely effect of reducing the cost
of building new icebreakers.
8. Develop a deep-water port for both private shipping and as a
regional Coast Guard base. This port should be built with the
vision of 1 day becoming a high latitude equivalent of
Singapore which profits handsomely from its geostrategic
location on the Malacca Straits. Careful study should be given
to the optimal port among existing candidates, and then a
public-private partnership pursued to build out new Coast Guard
facilities alongside commercial piers. In addition to Coast
Guard and other military traffic, this port should be designed
to support fishing boats, dry bulk tankers, offshore support
vessels and cruise ships.
9. Study other emerging markets. What are the best practices to
emulate and pitfalls to avoid from previous emerging market
examples that are more or less analogous to Alaska's position
today such as Mongolia, Peru and Brazil? What are optimal
investment models in the American Arctic? How can creative
public policies in the form of tax incentives jumpstart
innovation and entrepreneurism?
10. Support science. Looking to the Arctic Research Commission
for direction, how can strategic investments in scientific
research help jump-start economic development? Some examples
include bathymetric surveys, climate studies, fish stock
accounting, and seismic research. Sound science leads to better
public policy and therefore solid foundations for spurring
economic growth.
America and Alaskans have a rare multigenerational opportunity of
facing a relative blank canvas for greenfield investments. It would be
a mistake to press ahead hastily and exploit the American Arctic with
reckless abandon. At the same time, it's neither fair to Alaskans nor
good for the country to use litigation and legislation to stonewall
progress. No other state would settle for being made into a theme park.
The uncertainty created by the absence of a comprehensive U.S. Arctic
development strategy is an investment killer.
If the U.S. can wake up to the Arctic potential it possesses,
Secretary of State William Seward's 1867 purchase of Alaska for $7.2
million could turn out to be the single greatest investment in American
history.
Thank you and I look forward to answering your questions and
expanding on any of these points during the follow on question and
answer period.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
Dr. Metzger.
STATEMENT OF ANDREW T. METZGER, Ph.D., P.E., ASSISTANT
PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING,
COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING AND MINES,
UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA, FAIRBANKS
Dr. Metzger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the
opportunity to provide the testimony on the challenges of
infrastructure in the Arctic. As an engineering professor at
University of Alaska-Fairbanks, I've been studying the topic of
Arctic marine civil infrastructure for the past 2 years as a
researcher. During this time I've traveled in the region and
conversed with many Arctic stakeholders from government,
industry, and local communities.
On the topic of infrastructure challenges for stakeholders,
early in the study I was immediately struck by the overall lack
of infrastructure. Existing roadways are generally undeveloped
and not connected to the contiguous highway system. There is no
rail system. Transportation typically consists of annual barge
service along with air service that is more frequent. Any
materials missing from the barges have to be either flown in or
barged in the following year.
As far as existing port and harbor facilities, there is a
port in Nome. This facility has a draft of approximately 24, 25
feet, and has limited dockage. There's a pier servicing the Red
Dog zinc mine, but this facility is specialized for loading
ore. There's a number of shallow-draft barge facilities in the
region as well.
There's an extensive network of air strips. The majority of
these are intended for small aircraft, although jet service is
available in a few locations. Presently, the norm in the Arctic
coastal communities is that existing housing, water,
wastewater, and power utilities only marginally meet the
demands of the community. Communities would likely be
overwhelmed with an influx of people.
Rigors of the Arctic cannot be overstated. People and
facilities in this environment must contend with extreme cold,
permanently frozen soil, or what we call permafrost, and lack
of daylight in the winter. In addition, coastal areas must
endure intensive wind and wave conditions, subsea permafrost,
accelerating erosion, and potential catastrophic hazards from
sea ice.
Due to severe winter temperatures, many activities are
hindered or cease altogether. Because of this, construction is
often confined to 3 or 4 favorable months of the summer.
Permanently frozen soil extending out into the sea is known to
exist, but is not well documented or studied. This so-called
subsea permafrost will affect dredging and requires
extraordinary care when building on it.
Delays caused by adverse wind, waves, and ice movement are
commonplace and delivery schedules are routinely altered by
days or longer. Coastal erosion will significantly impact
marine infrastructure in the Arctic. The soil that is washed
away from shore eventually settles on the sea floor. This
action can fill dredged navigation channels and the erosion
itself can consume shoreside infrastructure. The latter has and
is occurring in Arctic coastal communities.
The presence of sea ice is cause for concern and must be
handled with care. Massive ice flows pushed by wind move along
and in to the shore. These ice flows can be thought of, if you
will, as enormous bulldozers. This mass of ice will impact
marine structures with extraordinary force. It's not uncommon
for these bulldozers to ride up on shore some distance, and a
spectacular example of this occurred at Barrow this spring.
Ice flows gouge the sea floor and can destroy subsea
pipelines, as well as dredged navigation channels. It must be
noted that each year there's thousands of these bulldozers at
work along the coast.
These facts must be addressed in locating and designing
infrastructure along the Arctic coast. In a broader context, we
design civil infrastructure for the extreme, not the mean.
Quantitative information about extremes of waves, winds,
currents, and sea ice conditions is not readily available for
the Arctic, and there are few engineers and construction
contractors that have considerable experience in the region.
I'd like to be clear that none of these comments are meant
to indicate Arctic marine infrastructure is impractical.
Rather, they are meant to briefly outline some of the
challenges we face and information we need to be successful.
On the topic of investments in infrastructure, based on the
information I've gathered from Arctic stakeholders, I'll
summarize the sentiments concerning Arctic infrastructure as
follows: Build it and we'll use it.
The ability to refuel and resupply at higher latitudes
appears to be a limiting factor for maritime operations. An
adequate refuel and resupply point much farther north than
Dutch Harbor would greatly benefit a number of stakeholders.
Such a facility could be a port. It could also be a
lightering facility, an offshore fuel mooring, and there are
other possibilities. While the port option may be most
desirable to some stakeholders, latter options are potential
near-term goals that would enhance our ability to operate in
the Arctic, possibly serving as interim measures until a port
can be built.
The presence of a port in the Arctic will likely promote
diverse economic development. However, a port facility is just
that, a port, a portal or a doorway, a transition between modes
of transportation. One side of the door is, of course, marine
transportation. A port driven by economic opportunity will
require a companion project on the other side of the door. The
companion project would likely be rail, roadway, or even
aviation infrastructure.
A key area of need is basic shoreside civil infrastructure.
Facilities with adequate lodging, water, wastewater, and
storage facilities are not generally available, but will be
needed to support any significant operations or developments.
In my opinion, development of shoreside civil infrastructure is
necessary before any other infrastructure development.
Thank you. That concludes my statement.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Metzger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Andrew T. Metzger, Ph.D., P.E., Assistant
Professor, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, College
of
Engineering and Mines, University of Alaska, Fairbanks
Thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony on the
challenges of infrastructure in the Arctic. As an engineering professor
at the University of Alaska Fairbanks that specializes in marine civil
infrastructure, I have been studying the topic of Arctic Marine Civil
Infrastructure, in the context of engineering design and construction,
for the past 2 years. During this time, I've visited communities on the
North and Northwestern Alaska coastlines and conversed with many Arctic
stakeholders including Federal and State Agencies, oil-and-gas and
mining interests as well as residents of communities in the region.
Before I continue, I would like to clarify that by marine civil
infrastructure, I am referring to civil engineering infrastructure that
supports maritime operations.
Infrastructure Challenges for Stakeholders
When I began my work on this topic, I was immediately struck by the
overall lack of infrastructure. Existing roadways are generally
undeveloped and not connected to the contiguous highway system. There
is no rail system. Transportation consists of annual barge service
along with air service that is more frequent. Since barge traffic is
sporadic during the one or two months of ice free seas, all materials
must be carefully scheduled as much as a year in advance. Any missing
materials must be either flown in or sent via barge the following year.
I've also come to understand that the lack of infrastructure has
precluded development of significant mineral resources in Arctic
regions of Alaska.
As far as existing port and harbor facilities: There is a port in
Nome, Alaska. This facility has a draft of 25 feet and limited dockage.
There is a pier servicing the Red Dog zinc mine, but this facility is
specialized for loading ore onto vessels that lighter to larger vessels
offshore. An assortment of other facilities servicing barges also exist
in the Arctic; along the coasts and in some of the major river systems.
These barge facilities are characterized by shallow depth;
approximately 10 feet or less.
Presently, the norm for Arctic coastal communities is that existing
housing, water, wastewater and power utilities only marginally meet
community needs. Consequently, shore side support for escalating
maritime activities, as well as development of any new marine
infrastructure, will likely overwhelm these communities.
The rigors of the Arctic cannot be overstated. People and
facilities in this environ must contend with extreme cold, permanently
frozen soil (permafrost) and lack of daylight in winter. In addition,
coastal communities and marine infrastructure must contend with intense
wind and wave conditions, subsea permafrost, accelerating erosion and
potentially catastrophic hazards from sea ice. These harsh conditions
will significantly shape development of marine infrastructure in the
Arctic as well as stakeholder activities.
Extreme cold impedes the ability of humans to do tasks and can
cause equipment to operate at a diminished rate or not at all. There is
a point at which productivity is essentially zero and activities must
be stopped; primarily due to the inability of emergency responders to
operate. During the winter months it should be anticipated that
operational and construction activities will be hindered or halted
altogether. Because of this, most construction activities will be
confined to three or four favorable months in the summer.
Permanently frozen soil extending out into the sea is known to
exist but is not well documented or understood. This subsea permafrost
presents two challenges. First, it may make dredging impractical since
frozen soil tends to be more like rock. Second, if exposed by dredging,
and as climatic warming continues, the permafrost will melt. This will
require carefully designed foundation structures which can either keep
the permafrost frozen or perform well should the permafrost melt. The
presence of subsea permafrost will also affect navigation channel
design and construction.
Those who routinely transport freight in the Arctic are keenly
aware of intense winds and waves that can occur. Delays caused by
adverse winds, waves or ice movement are commonplace. Committee members
may be familiar with the popular television show, Deadliest Catch, and
can imagine these challenges, and understand how delivery schedules are
routinely altered by days or even weeks. Another way to think of this
is to contemplate a long route crossing intense weather and rough seas,
to a remote location, with no supplies or safe haven along the way. It
is easy to see the challenge of planning and logistics for operations
or construction in the Arctic.
Eroding coastlines, exacerbated by longer periods of exposure to
wave action (a result of diminishing sea ice) will impact marine civil
infrastructure in the Arctic. The soil that is washed away from the
shore could be described as flowing mud. Water transports this mud
which eventually settles on the seafloor. This action can fill dredged
navigation channels and the erosion itself can consume shore side
infrastructure. The latter has and is occurring in some Arctic coastal
communities.
The presence of sea ice is cause for concern and must be handled
with care in the design and construction of coastal infrastructure.
``Ice out,'' when the ice finally breaks away from the shores in late
spring and summer, is an exciting time for every community along
Alaska's northern coastline because it allows fishing and the delivery
of supplies. However, just as the ice is moved offshore by the wind, it
can be blown back to shore in a matter of hours. When this happens, an
ice floe can act like a bulldozer as it is blown toward shore. The ice-
mass will impact marine structures with extraordinary force. And, it is
not uncommon for these ``bulldozers'' to ride up on shore for some
distance. These facts must be addressed in siting and designing
infrastructure along the Arctic coast. The portion of the ice floe
beneath the water will gouge the seafloor, excavating soil and forming
trenches. This action can destroy subsea pipelines as well as dredged
navigation channels. And it must be noted that each year there are
thousands of these bulldozers in the shallow waters along the Arctic
coast of Alaska. Virtually no portion of the U.S. Arctic coast is
unaffected by sea ice.
Creating new infrastructure in the Arctic will be constrained by
the fact that researchers know so little about it--from an engineering
perspective. Arctic infrastructure challenges are unique and there are
few engineers and construction contractors that have considerable
experience with them.
In a broader context, reliably engineered systems--systems with an
acceptably low probability of failure--require adequate knowledge of
demands placed on the system. Simply stated, we design engineered
systems for the extreme, not the mean. Quantitative information about
the extremes of environmental conditions in the Arctic, including
waves, wind, currents and, sea-ice conditions, is not readily
available. Therefore, information needed to design reliable
infrastructure in this region is generally not available.
I would like to be clear, none of these comments are meant to
indicate Arctic Marine Infrastructure is impractical. Rather, they are
meant to briefly outline some of the challenges we face and information
we need to be successful.
Investments in Infrastructure
In the venues I've attended on the Arctic and its challenges, and
comments from the various stakeholders, I will summarize sentiments
concerning arctic marine infrastructure as follows: ``Build it and
we'll use it.''
In the context of maritime operations, the most limiting factor
appears to be the ability to refuel and resupply in the higher
latitudes of the Arctic. In light of this, an adequate refuel and
resupply point, much further north than Dutch Harbor, would greatly
benefit arctic maritime operations for a range of stakeholders. Such a
facility could be: a port; a lightering facility--in which fuel and
supplies are stored on land and transported to vessels offshore via
smaller craft; offshore fuel moorings--a vessel mooring connected to a
subsea pipeline conveying fuel from storage tanks onshore (this option
could be coupled with lightering for supplies). There are other
possibilities beyond what I have stated.
While the port option may be most desirable to some stakeholders,
the latter options are potential near term goals that would enhance our
ability to operate in the Arctic. Concepts like the lightering facility
or the fuel mooring may also be approached as interim measures that
will provide some level of service until a port can be built.
In consideration of new economic opportunities in the Arctic, the
presence of a port will likely promote diverse economic development.
However, a port facility is just that, a ``port,'' a ``portal'' or
``doorway''; a transition between modes of transportation. On one side
of the ``door'' is, of course, marine transportation. An economically
driven port will require a companion project on the other side of the
door. This is the case for all other economically orientated ports in
the Nation. The companion project would likely be rail, roadway or even
airport infrastructure.
Another key area of need is basic shore side civil infrastructure.
Facilities with adequate lodging, water, wastewater and storage
facilities necessary to support significant seasonal or sustained
operations by private or government entities are not generally
available. In my view, development of shore side civil infrastructure
is necessary before any other infrastructure development.
Thinking long term, and in consideration of all stakeholders'
needs, it may be beneficial to pursue the question of marine
infrastructure needs in terms of an Arctic Marine Transportation
System. While a single infrastructure asset will benefit one or more
stakeholders, a well-planned system of civil infrastructure assets
could potentially be even more beneficial to a wider set of
stakeholders. Defining such a system beforehand will surely result in
more efficient use of resources than a system pieced together in a
discretionary manner.
Thank you.
This concludes my written testimony.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much. Thank you all for
giving your testimony. We'll open for questions. I'll start
with Senator Snowe in a 5-minute round.
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Slaiby, last week I understand that your colleagues
briefed the Committee staff regarding prevention and oil spill
response strategy that Shell has developed for the Arctic
leases. I know that we're in the exploratory phase and there's
a difference in terms of depth between the wells your company
is exploring as opposed to what occurred in the Gulf with the
Deepwater Horizon explosion.
Your contingency plan is predicated on a multi-tiered
vessel strategy, as I understand, one for the skimming vessel
and then of course having containment vessels to come to the
scene before the skimming vessels would be filled. The Pew
Environment Group disputes your company's claim that the oil
response vessel, the NANUQ, would be able to deploy fast enough
to respond to a spill in the Chukchi Sea, that your response
vessels are not actually on the scene and would take longer
than you claim to arrive there. What is your response to that
assertion?
Mr. Slaiby. Senator Snowe, thank you for the question. We
are required to have vessels deployed within 60 minutes of a
spill. This is something that we have done in full recognition
that we are in a remote area and have to design our operating
practices along that line. It's actually more than one vessel,
Senator. It's a number of vessels that would be responsible for
deploying a boom.
Senator Snowe. So you could meet that requirement of
response within 60 minutes?
Mr. Slaiby. We will beat that requirement of 60 minutes.
Senator Snowe. So you're saying that what the Pew
Environment Group indicates is wrong?
Mr. Slaiby. I won't comment specifically on what's in the
report. I did read the report and we take exceptions to certain
areas that they report.
Senator Snowe. On this one specifically?
Mr. Slaiby. This one specifically.
Senator Snowe. We thought, as you know, and we talked about
it earlier, that BP was prepared for the worst case scenario,
having been approved by our agency, the MMS, and ultimately we
discovered otherwise. Now, the Interior Department estimated
recently that a hypothetical blowup in an oil well on the
Chukchi Sea could release 1.4 million barrels within 39 days.
Has your contingency planning been based on that scenario?
Mr. Slaiby. Senator, the study that was done by the DOE
involved a worst case discharge of a particular sand. We will
not be drilling those type of sands. We will be using the
required notice to lessees to calculate the worst case
discharge for the reservoirs that we will drill, and BOEM will
agree--we will come to an agreement on our ability to recover
that worst case discharge.
Senator Snowe. So they're saying--you're saying that it's
in different types of sand than they were using for estimates?
Mr. Slaiby. The worst case discharge that was presented as
part of this supplemental EIS, Senator, was to inform the
decisionmaker, Secretary Salazar, of what could be the possibly
worst worst case if, hypothetically, all were to go wrong.
Senator Snowe. So what would be your worst case scenario?
What have you designed your contingency plans for?
Mr. Slaiby. We have designed our contingency plans to
recover 25,000 barrels a day mechanical recovery. We would have
additional recovery available beyond that, in other words, in
situ burning, dispersants, capping and containment, that
actually fit above and beyond the mechanical skimming.
Senator Snowe. Does the Interior Department agree with
that?
Mr. Slaiby. The Interior Department agrees with that, but
wants to see the mechanical efficient--the mechanical skimming
agree with the worst case discharge number.
Senator Snowe. Speaking of dispersants, that was the other
dimension to the Deepwater Horizon. There, the use of
disperants was unprecedented in terms of amount, and obviously
we're still learning about the effects and the impact on sea
life. We know that, ironically, the dispersants that were used
in the Gulf became more toxic to some sea life after they had
been mixed with oil.
I understand that you completed a $2.5 million 2-year study
in collaboration with the University of Alaska at Fairbanks to
look at the impact of dispersant use on marine life and living
sources. You've tested those in cold water, both in the ocean
and the Ohmsett test facility, in collaboration with the Bureau
of Ocean Energy Management Regulation and Enforcement.
What differences do you see in the impact of dispersants in
the cold waters where you tested and the Gulf of Mexico?
Mr. Slaiby. Well, Senator, I'm not familiar with all the
details on exactly what the differences are. I know that the
study that we are doing right now in Barrow, Alaska, actually,
has not been completed, but the results have been encouraging
with respect to the preservation of biota and the ability to
actually make an impact over there. There are bacteria that
will eat the oil.
Senator Snowe. Will there be further reports on the results
of this study?
Mr. Slaiby. The study will have to be peer reviewed and
then it will be released, I suspect by the end of the year.
Senator Snowe. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much. We'll probably have a
couple more back and forths here, but, Mr. Slaiby, let me ask
you a couple for the record so we understand the differences.
The depths that you'll be exploring in will be what? How deep
of water will you be in?
Mr. Slaiby. Senator, it will be in about 140 feet to about
120 feet of water.
Senator Begich. What is the pressure per square inch
compared to the Gulf? I know in the Gulf it was a couple
thousand, if I remember. I can't remember it exactly. The
depths were 5,000. What's the pressure that you'll be dealing
with or you think you'll be dealing with?
Mr. Slaiby. We actually have a pretty good idea because we
have drilled wells here.
Senator Begich. Right, in the early 80s, right?
Mr. Slaiby. In the 80s and 90s.
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Slaiby. So we believe we've got a very good handle on
the pressures. They'll be about a third of the pressure that we
saw on the BP Deepwater Horizon, anywhere from 5 to 7,000
pounds.
Senator Begich. You had noted, and I knew you had done
this, that you had done drilling in the 80s and 90s,
exploratory wells. Would it be fair to say when you did those
wells to where we are today the scientific knowledge for
cleanup and other activity and just the technology has advanced
somewhat?
Mr. Slaiby. Senator, I would say more than somewhat. I
mean, clearly the drilling technology is vastly improved. I
think cleanup technology and actually well control technology
were able to be--were improved last year in the Deepwater
Horizon incident. We will be deploying a capping system that
will be in the theater when we start. We're also deploying and
started contracting for a containment system. So these are huge
advances and really work to our benefit of keeping the oil on
the scene.
Senator Begich. And blowout preventers, how does that work
in your business?
Mr. Slaiby. We have very simple wells, so we are able to
put--and I know that everybody became a drilling engineer last
summer.
Senator Begich. 308 million engineers now.
Mr. Slaiby. It's quite impressive.
But we have gone to using a weekly inspection--weekly
testing, excuse me, of the BOPs, functional testing. We're also
putting in two of the shearing rams in our BOP. Because these
are very simple wells, we're able to do that.
The one other thing I might add is, even if the BOP were to
become inoperable, there will be, because of the lower
pressures of these wells, enough drilling fluid in that well to
control the outflow. A very different situation than in
deepwater Gulf of Mexico.
Senator Begich. And access to the well, because it's
obviously a lot more shallow, is--robotics were used in the
deep water. What is used here if you have to get to the well?
Is it a combination?
Mr. Slaiby. We could use divers, we could use remote-
operated vehicles.
Senator Begich. So people could actually be down there?
Mr. Slaiby. People would be. This would be within the
range. We will probably use--we'll have divers, but we would--
our first recourse would be the remote-operated vehicles.
Senator Begich. Remote operation.
Again, thank you for that. You heard my question to Admiral
Papp. I will say this as an Alaskan. Any time we think of oil
and gas, we get sued. You don't have to do anything. But the
standards I think are much higher because of that in a lot of
ways, because of the process you go through. The review is much
higher.
Is the statement that I made--I know Admiral Papp responded
to it, and that is, you're not going to be able to drill there
unless you have a plan that's going to take the worst case
scenario, as well as other conditions that are around your
efforts, as well as other efforts; is that fair to say?
Mr. Slaiby. It's clear to say from a number of different
fronts. Shell would not be working in the Arctic had we
believed that there was something, an event that we could not
control. We simply would not be there. I believe we have the
best oil spill response plan anywhere in the world.
Senator Begich. Very good.
Dr. Borgerson, let me go to the broader sense. And I
appreciate you had kind of a shopping list of things that could
be done. We've taken a little time here on oil and gas, but
there are other opportunities in the Arctic. You had made the
note, how do you balance this between kind of both extremes,
lockup or let anything happen everywhere.
How do you get to that balance when you're talking about
oil and gas or you're talking about potential mineral,
fisheries, tourism, shipping opportunities? It's a wide range.
Can you give me kind of a sense, how you think there's an
ability to get to a balance here? I believe there is because it
is a unique frontier of development, but we have to protect the
unique environment up there. Give me a little bit more thought,
if you could? I know you have some in your written testimony,
but if you could.
Dr. Borgerson. Of course, the devil is in the details
there, and this town is great at compromise and balance, this
week in particular.
Senator Begich. I'm not sure if you were going to say there
are a lot more devils around for a second there.
Dr. Borgerson. Maybe true.
I think the key is getting all the stakeholders in at the
beginning and not just sort of paying lip service or rhetoric
to one side or the other, but trying to get sort of reasonable
Alaskans and non-Alaskans around the table buying into the
process, buying into the effort. Some of the environmentalists
that I know are at Anchorage and have Alaska in their
portfolio. I sort of approached them informally with this sort
of concept before coming down here, and they were sort of: Wow.
The notion of being brought to the table to help shape the
guidelines in a very collaborative way I think was very
appealing to them.
I think it should be more than, of course, just the
environmental side versus industry. I think in particular local
indigenous communities have a huge voice to play here, and I
know they want to be heard. So whether it's a commission--I've
heard some ideas in Juneau about infrastructure banks or other
kinds of ways to facilitate both the investment and the
dialogue around those things. My sense is to sort of get the
various stakeholders around the same table, rolling up their
sleeves, try and strike the right balance, and then getting out
of the way and letting progress proceed.
Senator Begich. Very good. Let me stop there and see if
Senator Snowe has some additional questions. Then I have one
and I'm going to talk about deepwater ports in my next
questions.
Senator Snowe. Dr. Borgerson, you heard earlier this
morning and obviously are very familiar with the fact that
other than one medium icebreaker, that we virtually have no
capacity in that regard, and it's going to take quite some time
before we can obtain additional capacity. There was some
discussion actually yesterday in the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure about the whole idea of
leasing icebreakers.
You wrote an article in the Huffington Post in 2008 saying
that leasing icebreakers outsources our sovereignty. What are
your concerns with leasing?
Dr. Borgerson. I think that op-ed in the Huffington Post
was reprinted from the New York Times. But if we want to be an
Arctic power, just like in the world's other oceans off our
other coasts, we can't essentially lease foreign icebreakers
and put our flag on the back and pretend somehow we're the
world's naval power, which we are. If you look at how much we
spend on our Navy and the size of the Navy vis-a-vis the other
countries, we dwarf them in naval capacity.
The Coast Guard is not blameless here, by the way. In some
ways, the Coast Guard sold icebreakers out for the deepwater
program to recapitalize its other assets. There's a lot of
blame to go around for why the country finds itself in this
position.
The reality is we've got sort of one and a half, however
you count, of tired icebreakers, and you've heard, even if the
Senate or the Congress were to allocate dollars today, they
likely wouldn't be launched until years after the Arctic is
seasonally ice free and, depending what scientists you talk to,
maybe even longer than that.
So we're stuck. There has to be a bandaid solution, I
suppose, in trying to bridge the gap here. But I think it's
just unacceptable for a number of reasons beyond oil spill
response, but search and rescue, projecting sovereignty,
regulating shipping, and the other sort of things that the
Coast Guard and Navy do on all of our coasts and around the
world's oceans are true in the Arctic Ocean as they are
elsewhere.
Senator Snowe. I don't disagree with the concerns that you
raise. Obviously, we want to have our own icebreakers. But how
do you envision that the Coast Guard fills this gap in the
meantime? It's going to be a long-standing gap, obviously, and
based on the High Latitude Study it would indicate that the
capacity needs to be six heavy and four medium basically.
That's a dramatic gap, considering where we stand today.
I understand about the Deepwater acquisition issue. I lived
the whole saga, unfortunately, having many concerns about that-
-how it came about and what happened. But we were starting
basically from a very difficult position in terms of what needs
to be done, and then of course all the contractual problems
that emerged as a result. So that set back the program, not to
mention the appropriations process, all in combination. So I
understand what you're saying.
So how do you think the Coast Guard should respond, and-or
the Navy, for that matter?
Dr. Borgerson. Well, the Navy is in even worse shape than
the Coast Guard. Its surface vessels are not, as I understand
it, capable of sailing in water that's filled with ice. So
submarines are a whole other bag. So take those off the table.
It depends on who you ask on time. I'm a bit of a skeptic
here and I'll hedge and say I think 10 years is optimistic. I
think you're talking 15 to 20 maybe, in between. Some of the
climate scientists I talk to, just as a footnote to that, think
we could be ice-free in summer in the next 5 years, maybe 10.
All the models have been overly conservative.
So the proposals I've heard are you have to look to
foreign-built ships--this speaks to the Jones Act a bit--or
beginning to build U.S. vessels for this purpose, have them
essentially be civilian-crewed, maybe put a Coast Guard officer
as a shipwrighter on board, where he could exercise sort of
classic boarding officer authorities and that kind of thing.
But they would not be taxpayer-built or operated vessels. They
would have to be built in foreign yards, or built here--and
I've seen some proposals of what those ships might look like,
but they couldn't be sort of a full Coast Guard contingent. It
would just be sort of an outsourced type thing, as an interim
fix.
The danger of those interim fixes is they can become
permanent. So in this fiscal environment it can be easy to say,
oh, that's working, etcetera, and not build the icebreakers and
just sort of prolong what I think is a non-optimal situation.
Senator Snowe. So at the very least, we ought to be
pursuing aggressively the icebreaking capacity.
Dr. Borgerson. We should have been building icebreakers----
Senator Snowe. Your concern is that the last thing we ought
to do is turn to other countries for building ships. We ought
to be able to do that here.
Dr. Borgerson. 5 years ago we should have started building,
laying steel for these replacement ships.
Senator Snowe. Absolutely. And there's a host of problems
as to why in terms of what happened here in the appropriations
process, given the lead time and how much money you give in
which years above and beyond everything else. There was a lack
of capitalization for this project.
And you had a Coast Guard dealing with 50-year-old ships,
in some cases 60. It was horrific, given the environment
they're generally working under. Not exactly a calm
environment. They're generally in stressful situations and
that's why they do what they do.
In any event, it's remarkable. Think about Hurricane
Katrina. That's a good example. They were doing, with some very
aged aircraft and ships, remarkable things. So you could say,
well, we ought to put Members of Congress in that equipment,
and maybe they would think very quickly and very differently.
Dr. Borgerson. Just a footnote to that. I was a Coast Guard
patrol boat captain in 2001. Driving ships in hurricanes that
were built for Vietnam rivers is sobering.
Senator Begich. Good to see you here.
Senator Snowe. Yes, right.
[Laughter.]
Senator Begich. Thank you.
Senator Snowe. Well, thank you.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
Let me ask, Dr. Metzger or whoever might feel comfortable
answering this, in regards to--again, in the last panel I asked
about a deepwater port and the capacity, and there was some
discussion of Nome, but distance and so forth. Some have
approached me and talked about an idea of a freestanding
deepwater port in federal waters. I'm not an engineer. I don't
claim to be one. I don't want to be one, no disrespect. It's a
lot of work in figuring out how that all will work in the
Arctic.
But is there any credibility to that kind of thinking, that
there is--we're going to need a deepwater port, because these
ships--correct me if I'm wrong--the ships you're building,
they're 300-plus feet long. These are deep. I don't know what
the draft is, probably 40 feet or more. So these are huge ships
and will be bigger, is my bet, based on what's going to happen
up there.
Does that make sense, to do a deepwater port in those
federal waters, and maybe it's a freestanding? When I say
freestanding, an anchored port.
Dr. Metzger. Yes, yes, it does. That is a model that would
keep you away from having to dredge so far out to sea because
it's so shallow. A fixed structure, fixed permanently,
permanently built structure, that's one option.
There are also ideas that some people on my side have been
kicking around, seasonally deployed facilities, a floating
facility that can be taken out and moved away, stored, so to
speak, for when the ice is in. So yes, there are definitely
possibilities for having--moving the facility, mooring
facility, port facility, further offshore to avoid dredging.
Senator Begich. Very good.
Mr. Slaiby, I'm not going to get into the coastal zone
management issue of the state of Alaska and the lack that they
have one there, but I will put that on the record. Without
that, it creates some problems for a deepwater port development
in Federal waters, but that's another battle, not for you to
take on, but one that I need to deal with with the Governor and
the state.
But I'm assuming as you see the future, if we can step, and
actually for Dr. Borgerson, too, as you see the future of
development, yours specifically in oil and gas and maybe yours
in kind of a broader sense, the need for that deepwater port,
at least from my perspective--and I'm asking if this makes
sense, again--is multifaceted. It is oil spill servicing, it is
oil and gas servicing, it is servicing for those in rescue
potential, Coast Guard capacity, and dependent on defense
needs, because I think that is becoming--NORAD I know is now
reexamining their role, as we heard briefly here--that if there
is a port, it could be multi-functional, as long as we think
long term.
Whoever wants to answer that first.
Mr. Slaiby. I can start maybe on the first part. I do
believe that a port offshore can be designed to withstand ice
conditions. Senator, you grew up looking at it in the Cook
Inlet. Those platforms have been out there for over 40, 45
years.
Senator Begich. Yes.
Mr. Slaiby. The second point I would make is that there
does need to be a solution that incorporates the stakeholders.
I've--we've spent about 400 trips into the North Slope Borough
talking with different stakeholders. Huge issues about how that
port is located, where it sits, who it sits with. It's one that
really needs to incorporate the federal government, state
government, local governments, and industry, which bridges to
the third point.
I'm very, very content that we can do what we need to do in
our exploration plan, including servicing oil spill response,
with the assets we have in place. For longer term, yes, I do
think it would be very helpful for servicing platforms on
prolonged periods of time and the other industries and
infrastructure needed to support that.
Senator Begich. Very good.
Dr. Borgerson.
Dr. Borgerson. I always think of Singapore when this issue
comes up. It also sits on an important strategic choke point
linking oceans. Once a sleepy town with not much
infrastructure, now the world's largest seaport. Could Alaska 1
day host a future Arctic Singapore? It's sort of interesting to
think about.
Should the--I'm not sure what the exact candidate or port
should be. I've heard different ports mentioned. Adak has got a
lot of facilities there. I know there's a number of candidates
in the running for who might get that port. To me, though,
maybe more importantly is the model. I think a public-private
model makes perfect sense up there, to share the cost, to be
force multipliers on the resources there, and that there should
be--there are models in the Lower 48 for how that might work
with various port authorities, of how you might sort of
leverage private capital, industry, along with the need for,
we've heard, a regional Coast Guard base, not just regional
traffic, but also some of the inter-ocean traffic that Admiral
Papp spoke to you about as well.
Senator Begich. I think you got to my next question, which
was can it be a public-private partnership. My sense is yes,
because you're starting really from scratch. So you don't have
necessarily port jurisdictional issues. You have interested
communities right now, but none of them have ports of this
potential magnitude if you design it--you can design a quick
port, maybe service a few industry folks.
But I guess my vision is that this goes to where you just
talked about, that it has a much larger capacity, if we do this
right and think about not just the next 10 or 15 years, but the
next 50 years, of how do we service what could be going on up
there as long as we can engineer it right. There is probably
something that will be needed, no matter who's transporting
what.
Dr. Borgerson. I couldn't agree more. It's really, from
sort of a planning point of view, an exciting opportunity to
have a greenfield in which to do it right from scratch. If you
look at L.A.-Long Beach, which has a lot of urban issues around
it, or Port Authority of New York-New Jersey, obviously,
interesting geography. The Bayonne Bridge has essentially
limited how much the Port of New York can grow, and there were
parochial interests that dictated the height of that bridge and
now New York is not built to be the port of the future with
that sort of limitation.
I think definitely, as far as I understand it, the private-
public model and sort of doing it with the strategic long view
in mind is the way to go in the Arctic.
Senator Begich. Let me thank the panel very much for being
here today. Your written testimony is all part of the record.
We'll keep the record open for 2 weeks. I know there are some
other questions that I have that I'll just submit for your
response.
But again, thank you. This is very enlightening, both of
the panels. The Arctic is an incredible last frontier for all
of us and the question is how do we manage it for all the
economic opportunities and make sure it works for the
environment that it's in.
Thank you all very much. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:31 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Jane Lubchenco, Ph.D., Under Secretary of
Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, and Administrator, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce
Chairman Begich, Ranking Member Snowe, and distinguished members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to submit testimony on
U.S. strategies to address the changing Arctic and to highlight some of
the actions NOAA is taking to address Arctic issues. My name is Jane
Lubchenco, Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere and
the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA). On behalf of NOAA, I would like to thank the
Committee for its continued attention to the issues associated with a
changing Arctic and the myriad impacts to its people and the ecosystems
on which they depend. I would also like to recognize Chairman Begich
and the other Members of this committee for their leadership and
support on Arctic issues, including the Arctic-related legislation that
you are working to advance in this Congress.
I will now describe some of the actions NOAA is taking to address
Arctic issues. This hearing puts a well-deserved spotlight on emerging
Arctic opportunities and challenges, and the Federal Government's role
in helping the United States to take advantage of those opportunities.
The Administration is currently working to implement the January 2009
Directive (National Security Presidential Directive 66/Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 25) on Arctic Policy, the July 2010
Presidential Memorandum on arctic research policy, which reinvigorates
interagency research coordination in the Arctic, and the July 2010
National Ocean Policy's recognition of the Arctic as an area of special
emphasis. Adopted by the President via Executive Order 13547 on July
19, 2010, the National Ocean Policy calls for ``better ways to
conserve, protect, and sustainably manage Arctic coastal and ocean
resources . . . new collaborations and partnerships to better monitor
and assess environmental conditions . . . [and] improvement of the
scientific understanding of the Arctic system and how it is changing in
response to climate-induced and other changes.'' On July 12, 2011, the
President issued Executive Order 13580 to establish an Interagency
Working Group on Coordination of Domestic Energy Development and
Permitting in Alaska. The purpose of this working group is to
coordinate the efforts of Federal agencies responsible for overseeing
the safe and responsible development of onshore and offshore energy
resources and associated infrastructure in Alaska and the U.S. Arctic
Outer Continental Shelf (OCS).
As you know, there is now widespread evidence of climate change in
the Arctic region, most dramatically observed in loss of sea ice. In
four of the last 5 years, we have witnessed the lowest sea ice extents
on record, as well as a 35 percent decrease in thicker multi-year sea
ice. Shifts are evident in ocean ecosystems from the Aleutian Islands
to Barrow, and across the Arctic Ocean, due to a combination of Arctic
warming, natural variability, and sensitivity to changing sea ice
conditions.
As sea ice retreats and the Arctic becomes more accessible,
cascading needs for information, readiness, response, and assistance
are created. NOAA is receiving increasing requests for timely weather
forecasts and disaster warnings, improved seasonal and long-range
forecasts of sea ice and other conditions, more comprehensive and
current navigation charts, tide tables, and elevation data, improved
oceanographic information, and more baseline data on protected species
and ecosystems. The maritime community is anticipating a future open
Arctic trade route and is concerned about accurate navigation charts,
weather and disaster forecasts and emergency response capacity. The
fossil fuel industry is seeking permitting approvals for oil and gas
exploration in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas for 2012, with increasing
information needs concerning potential impacts, behavior of oil in
frigid waters, and appropriate response capacity.
Economic drivers can also threaten marine and coastal ecosystems as
well as Arctic inhabitants already affected by the rapidly changing
climate. Native coastal communities are requesting assistance in
relocating entire villages or burial grounds, information about likely
changes in whales, seals and fish, and more accurate weather and
oceanographic conditions. They are faced with changing precipitation
patterns, later freezing and earlier thawing of snow and ice, damaging
storm surge with loss of the sea ice barrier protecting homes and
businesses on the coast, and changing sea level. Furthermore, changes
in the Arctic may affect climate and the functioning of ecosystems
around the globe, so changes in the region affect us all. Climate
changes already apparent in the Arctic may portend future changes in
global climatic conditions.
As the United States begins to confront these Arctic challenges, it
is evident that understanding and effectively managing the changing
ecosystems, expectations, and opportunities in the Arctic requires a
solid foundation of ecological and socioeconomic information. Yet
despite the wealth of traditional ecological knowledge, exploration,
and research to date, even the most basic data are lacking. Interagency
and stakeholder dialogues, such as the ongoing interactions in
conjunction with developing the National Ocean Policy's Arctic
Strategic Action Plan, continually underscore this point: Federal
agencies need accurate information about human and environmental
conditions in the region in order to comprehensively manage the various
U.S. Arctic interests and support effective stewardship and investment
decisions.
NOAA recognizes that a strategic approach leveraging our strengths
and those of our sister agencies with Arctic-relevant missions is
essential if the United States is to take advantage of emerging
economic opportunities there without causing irreparable harm to this
fragile region. As the uses of the Arctic environment evolve, NOAA
believes it is important that decisions and actions related to
conservation, management, and use are based on sound science and
support healthy, productive, and resilient communities and ecosystems.
We seek to better understand and predict changes there. We recognize
that because the region has been relatively inaccessible, and without
widespread need for such information, the Arctic is deficient in many
of the science, service and stewardship capabilities that NOAA provides
to the rest of the Nation.
To facilitate internal and external coordination on Arctic
requirements, NOAA has developed a comprehensive Arctic strategy that
integrates and aligns our numerous and diverse capabilities within the
broader context of our Nation's Arctic policies and research goals, and
supports the efforts of our international, Federal, state and local
partners and stakeholders. NOAA's Arctic Vision and Strategy (available
at http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/docs/arctic_strat_2010.pdf) has six
priority goals, derived directly from stakeholder requirements:
(1) Forecast Changes in Sea Ice
(2) Strengthen Foundational Science to Understand and Detect
Arctic Climate and Ecosystem Changes
(3) Improve Weather and Water Forecasts and Warnings
(4) Enhance International and National Partnerships
(5) Improve Stewardship and Management of Arctic Ocean and
Coastal Resources
(6) Advance Resilient and Healthy Arctic Communities and
Economies
These goals were selected because they represent areas where NOAA
has the expertise to address emergent Arctic issues that meet two key
criteria: providing the information, knowledge, and policies to meet
NOAA mandates and stewardship responsibilities; and providing the
information, knowledge, and services to enable others to live and
operate safely in the Arctic. We also believe that these are the
highest priority areas where NOAA can have an impact on environmental
and economic sustainability in the Arctic.
Within NOAA's existing capacity for Arctic action, we have had some
modest successes in implementing our strategic goals. On sea ice, for
example, NOAA and its partners, including the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory, issued the
2010 and 2011 Arctic Report Cards, showing summer sea ice extent well
below 1990s levels with sea ice thinning, older sea ice disappearing,
and ocean temperatures warming. The loss of sea ice affects marine
access, regional weather, ecosystem changes, and coastal communities.
As ice cover diminishes, marine food webs are expected to dramatically
shift from seafloor-dominant systems that favor species such as crabs
to water column-dominant systems that favor commercial fish species
such as pollock. The understanding of ice as a habitat also has
implications for oil spill response and damage assessment. As the
Arctic Ocean becomes seasonally passable and tourism, oil and gas
exploration, and shipping increase, floating sea ice and changing
marine weather will present a major threat to maritime safety and
increase the potential for oil spills from vessel traffic in the
region. Sea ice also has significant implications for effective oil
spill response and assessment.
NOAA currently conducts operational sea ice analysis and forecasts,
evaluating sea ice projections through Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change climate models, conducting and analyzing along with
NASA, satellite and airborne observations of sea ice freeboard or
thickness, improving satellite image analyses, and contributing to the
international Arctic buoy program. NOAA's National Weather Service has
a sea ice desk at the Anchorage Weather Forecast Office, which provides
operational sea ice forecasting in Alaska. NOAA's National
Environmental, Satellite, Data, and Information Service partners with
the Navy and Coast Guard to maintain the National Ice Center in
Suitland, Maryland, which provides operational analyses and forecasts
of sea ice conditions and hazards in the Arctic and collaborates with
the National Weather Service sea ice desk to provide Alaska products 5
days a week. NOAA also supports the National Snow and Ice Data Center,
along with NASA and NSF, within the Cooperative Institute for Research
in Environmental Sciences at the University of Colorado, where a vast
array of Arctic data are stewarded and made available to both academic
and public users.
NOAA's National Weather Service delivers marine weather forecast
services to protect life and property, enhance the economy and fulfill
U.S. obligations under international treaties for the safety and
security of marine transportation, energy (oil and gas) exploration,
and tourism activities, and to protect northern and western Alaska
coastal communities from storm surge and other inundation hazards.
Major stakeholders and partners, including the U.S. Coast Guard and the
State of Alaska Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management,
require more useful weather and water information for planning and
decisionmaking to protect lives, property, and manage the region's many
resources. Arctic populations rely heavily on aviation and marine
weather for safe transportation and access to goods and services.
The Arctic region has very little of the information infrastructure
needed to provide weather forecast and warning services of a caliber
comparable to mid-latitudes. A primary reason for this discrepancy is
the relative coarseness of observation fields to support meteorological
and oceanographic modeling and environmental observations and studies
supporting weather and ice forecasts highly limited in both geographic
scope and frequency. The Arctic region also presents unique numerical
modeling challenges with respect to the dynamic coupled interaction of
the ocean, sea ice and atmospheric processes both in near-term and
long-term prediction scales. For example, there is inadequate real-time
meteorological data in U.S. Arctic waters to support accurate
forecasting of ocean storms, which have the potential to threaten
marine transportation, offshore oil and gas operations, and the Arctic
coastal communities. The November 2009 failure of NASA's QuikSCAT
satellite scatterometer to continue providing ocean surface wind speed
and direction and sea ice thickness estimates after more than a decade
of operation, the need for continued access to synthetic aperture radar
(SAR) data, and the potential for a gap in satellite coverage in 2016-
2017 due to the impacts of reduced funding in Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 for
our next polar-orbiting satellite, the Joint Polar Satellite System
(JPSS), pose challenges to Arctic weather and sea ice services
capability. JPSS will contain the replacement for the NASA MODIS
instrument, which is a critical tool for mapping sea ice and studying
other Arctic features, currently in operation on NASA's Terra and Aqua
satellites, which have already exceeded their expected lifetime.
In data-sparse areas like Alaska, polar-satellite data is critical
to weather forecasting. Light aircraft aviation is a $400 million a
year industry in Alaska and since many Alaskan communities are not
accessible by roads, residents often rely on aircraft as a primary mode
of transportation. Furthermore, since geostationary satellite coverage
is not available in large areas of the Arctic, NOAA's Search and Rescue
beacon program (SARSAT) relies heavily on polar-orbiting satellites to
receive signals from distressed mariners and aircraft personnel. NOAA
did not receive the full $1.060 billion requested in the President's FY
2011 budget, which was needed to meet the planned launch date for JPSS
to maintain continuity of observations. As a result, NOAA could face a
data gap in the U.S. civilian polar orbit, on which both civilian and
military users rely, beginning in 2016. This information is critical in
real-time forecasting and warning of events such as rapid sea ice
formation, river ice jams, and storms carrying hurricane force winds
that are major hazards for life, property, and economic activities in
the Arctic. Losing this critical piece of national infrastructure at
the time when Arctic development is expected to ramp up could
significantly hamper our Nation's ability to protect U.S. assets in
this region.
Improved sea ice and marine weather forecasting would assist the
energy, maritime shipping and transportation industries, which use
operational and seasonal forecasts for safety and resource exploration.
Improvements in the sea ice and weather services that NOAA is currently
able to provide, particularly model resolution and forecast frequency,
and the integration of different types of observations (including sea
ice characteristics and indigenous knowledge) into the forecasts would
enhance our understanding of the Arctic environment. Accurate forecasts
and models depend on the ability of NOAA and its partners to deploy a
variety of sensing devices--from buoys to airborne and satellite
sensors. NOAA's goal is to provide accurate, quantitative, daily-to-
decadal sea ice projections to support infrastructure planning,
economic development and ecosystem stewardship.
These changes in climate and sea ice are also driving changes in
marine ecosystems (including species abundance and composition) in ways
not yet fully understood. Biophysical and chemical changes in the
ocean, combined with increasing human uses will impact the Bering,
Chukchi, and Beaufort Seas. Currently, commercial harvest of
groundfish, shellfish, salmon and other resources, primarily in the
Bering Sea, constitute almost 50 percent of marine fish landings in the
United States. Further, these same resources, plus various species of
marine mammals, seabirds, and other marine life are critical to the
maintenance of the subsistence lifestyle of over 40,000 indigenous
people who inhabit small towns and villages on Alaska's Arctic
coastline. Broad-scale biological observations are needed to understand
how a changing climate and environment will impact the food web and
other aspects of the ocean ecosystem, and help NOAA evaluate the
impacts of man-made changes to the equation, such as permitting new
drilling activity. However, NOAA's current climate modeling capacity is
too gross to meet user needs for regional and local scales, and the
uncertainties are large. Similarly, it is beyond the scope of existing
ecosystem models to provide reliable indications of how loss of sea ice
and increasing ocean temperatures will impact key species such as
pollock, cod, salmon, and crab, as well as ice seal species and Arctic
cetaceans (e.g., bowhead, gray, humpback, and beluga whales). NOAA has
also worked closely with its international partners for decades to
monitor changes in atmospheric composition, for which the changing
arctic is anticipated to have significant influence in the future.
To support these foundational science needs, NOAA is striving on
many fronts to improve baseline observations and understanding of
Arctic climate and ecosystems in order to reduce the uncertainty in
assessing and predicting impacts caused by a changing Arctic. For
example, NOAA is conducting ocean acidification experiments on pollock
and king crab, process studies on Steller sea lions and fur seals, and
cooperative studies with Department of Interior's Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) on bowhead
whales. NOAA also continues monitoring of atmospheric levels at coastal
Arctic observatories in partnership with other agencies and nations.
All of this work is heavily dependent on in situ and remote sensing
observations of the ocean and atmosphere, shipboard sampling, and long-
term, community-based research on marine species. Due to the
interconnected nature of Arctic ecosystems, the United States will need
to continue to improve collaboration and engagement with other Arctic
nations through international mechanisms, such as the Arctic Council
and our bilateral relationships, to better understand, observe,
research, and manage Arctic resources. This includes joint efforts such
as working with Russia for elements of a distributed biological
observatory. The 2011 cruise for the Russian-American Long-term Census
of the Arctic (RUSALCA) to sample and deploy instruments in U.S. and
Russian territorial waters has just ended. Stemming from a 2003
Memorandum of Understanding for World Ocean and Polar Regions Studies
between NOAA and the Russian Academy of Sciences, this annual three-
week RUSALCA cruise collects biological, geological, chemical and
physical oceanographic samples to benchmark Arctic conditions and
contribute to foundational Arctic science.
NOAA also provides leadership and resources to support Arctic
governance and science organizations. Specifically, NOAA continues to
support the Arctic Council and its working groups, which monitor and
assess biodiversity, climate, and the health of humans and ecosystems,
and contribute to international approaches to oil spill response,
ecosystem and protected area management, as well as management of
shipping. Coordination across Federal entities, such as that provided
by the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee and the Committee
on the Marine Transportation System's Arctic Integrated Action Team,
are also essential to implement overarching U.S. Arctic Policy goals,
particularly those identified by the U.S. Arctic Region Policy (NSPD
66/HSPD 25) and the National Ocean Policy. NOAA's partnerships with
Alaska Native Organizations to co-manage marine mammals continue as
important collaborations for stewardship of protected species.
In May 2011, I signed a Memorandum of Understanding between NOAA
and BOEMRE to ensure effective scientific and regulatory cooperation on
OCS energy exploration and development. This agreement is intended to
facilitate development of baseline observations and environmental
studies needed to assess Arctic drilling. Leveraging relationships such
as this to build sustained observations will enable researchers to
study the effects of oil and gas exploration, sea ice loss, ocean
acidification, and sea surface temperature warming on Arctic ecosystems
over time. This information will also inform NOAA's ecosystem
stewardship, private sector economic development, and Coast Guard and
Navy missions.
Currently, Alaska has limited geospatial infrastructure; sparse
tide, current, and water-level prediction coverage; obsolete shoreline
and hydrographic data; poor nautical charts; and inadequate oil-spill
response capacity. Most Arctic waters that are charted were surveyed
with obsolete technology, some dating back to the 1800s, before the
region was part of the United States. Most of the shoreline along
Alaska's northern and western coasts has not been mapped since 1960, if
ever, and confidence in the region's nautical charts is low. NOAA's
navigation services provide baseline scientific data, such as
hydrography, shoreline mapping, oceanography, tides, currents,
positioning and geodesy, that benefits not only navigation, but also
supports more informed decisions for other economic development and
resource management processes. The establishment of an adequate
geospatial infrastructure would help inform Arctic management and
policy decisions that seek to balance economic development with
ecosystem protection and cultural heritage. The National Ocean Policy
includes an emphasis on the Arctic among its priority objectives and a
Strategic Action Plan on Changing Conditions in the Arctic, which
addresses these topics, is under development.
NOAA has made some progress in support of safe marine
transportation, coastal resilience and oil spill response readiness,
including finalizing an Arctic Nautical Charting Plan after
consideration of stakeholder input. This plan provides a detailed
scheme for additional nautical chart coverage in U.S. Arctic waters and
describes the activities necessary to produce and maintain the charts
for safe navigation. NOAA continues its Arctic hydrographic survey
effort in FY 2011 with the Survey Vessel Fairweather currently up near
Kotzebue, to update nautical charts for navigation and support the safe
installation of an offshore lightering facility for fuel oil. Since
2007, we have acquired approximately 2,100 square nautical miles of
hydrographic data with modern survey methods (multibeam sonar) in the
Arctic as defined by the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984. This
includes about 726 square nautical miles for survey work done in 2009
to survey the Pribilof Canyon. The U.S. EEZ in the Arctic encompasses
568,000 square nautical miles, about a third of which is considered
navigationally significant, and most of which was surveyed with
obsolete technology dating back to the 1800s. Thirty eight thousand
square nautical miles of navigationally significant area have been
identified as highest priority for survey. Building on this need for
modern survey data, NOAA worked in its role as U.S. representative to
the International Hydrographic Organization to establish an Arctic
Regional Hydrographic Commission with other Arctic member states in
2010 for international collaboration on hydrographic surveying,
nautical charting, and other mapping activities.
In addition, NOAA is building on existing partnerships to acquire
gravity data in Alaska so that by the end of FY 2012 most of the state
will be covered. This project, Gravity for the Redefinition of the
American Vertical Datum, will vastly improve elevation measurements by
correcting meters-level positioning errors to two-centimeter accuracy,
which will help coastal communities and the private sector to develop
climate change adaptation strategies and make decisions on
infrastructure hardening, erosion and flood controls. Based on State of
Alaska Immediate Action Working Group identified priority areas, NOAA
also deployed seven short term tide stations to support surveying and
update tide predictions, as well as for NOAA's Vertical Datum
Transformation Tool, which links bathymetry to topography to enable the
development of inundation and erosion models. NOAA is now evaluating
the technology and strategies needed for long-term monitoring of tides,
water levels, and currents under harsh Arctic conditions. Finally,
collaboration with Canada continues on joint seafloor mapping missions
to help define the limits of the extended continental shelf in the
Arctic per criteria set forth in Article 76 of the Law of the Sea
Convention. An expedition is occurring now to map the seafloor using
multibeam sonar, image the underlying sediment layers, collect dredge
samples and gravity data, and conduct under-ice Autonomous Underwater
Vehicle operations. The U.S. could significantly advance our economic
interests in the Arctic with respect to extended continental shelf and
other activities by joining the Convention.
NOAA can also support the spill response capacity of industry and
Coast Guard first responders and other Arctic stakeholders, including
coastal communities, Alaska Native villages, and the State of Alaska by
building the same interactive online mapping tool for the Arctic as was
used during the Gulf spill response. More commonly known in the
responder world as the Environmental Response Management Application,
or ERMA, this powerful tool is a web-based Geographic Information
System tool designed to assist both emergency responders and
environmental resource managers who deal with incidents that may
adversely impact the environment. The data within ERMA also assist in
resource management decisions regarding hazardous waste site
evaluations and restoration planning. ERMA also includes human use and
human dimension data components and, for the Arctic, would include sea-
ice conditions. Federal, state and tribal governments will be able to
use this information and the ERMA interface not only to address oil
spill planning and response, but also to assess sea-ice and shoreline
erosion information. It is NOAA's hope to bring this technology online
sometime next year. We also know that ERMA is only as good as the
information within it, so the sharing of new datasets among agencies,
the state, academia and the private sector to improve the platform is
essential.
In conclusion, NOAA is striving to bring its diverse capabilities
to bear on the cultural, environmental, economic, and national security
issues emerging as a result of changes in the Arctic. The breadth and
complexity of these impacts require a concerted, systematic and rapid
effort with partners from international to local levels. NOAA's
scientific capabilities are being deployed to increase understanding of
climate and other key environmental trends, to predict the ecosystem
response to those trends, and to offer the technical expertise needed
to develop policy options and management strategies for mitigation and
adaptation to the environmental challenges in the Arctic region. NOAA's
service capabilities are supporting safety and security needs for
fishing, marine mammal protection, marine and other modes of
transportation, energy, infrastructure, and mineral exploration in the
unique Arctic environment. The choices we make today will have pivotal
impacts on the future state of the Arctic. There is a great deal of
work to be done, and NOAA, in collaboration with our partners, is
committed to strengthening Arctic science and stewardship, and
providing the information, products, and services needed by our Arctic
stakeholders. Key to enhancing these efforts will be the coordinated
implementation of the National Ocean Policy's Arctic Strategic Action
Plan.
Thank you again for the opportunity to present NOAA's role in the
Arctic. We appreciate your leadership and the time and attention the
Subcommittee is devoting to this important issue, and look forward to
working with you in future.
______
Prepared Statement of Fran Ulmer, Chair,
U.S. Arctic Research Commission (USARC)
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to offer comments on this important topic. As you know,
Federal, state and local governments, as well as private industry and
non-profit organizations, are in the process of creating strategies to
economically and sustainably develop the Arctic. It is important to
support scientific research in the Arctic in order to implement
informed policy that capitalizes on economic opportunities as well as
implements environmental protections to ensure social and economic
viability for future generations in the Arctic.
My name is Fran Ulmer, and I was recently appointed Chair of the
U.S. Arctic Research Commission (USARC).\1\ My testimony represents the
view of USARC, an advisory body to the President and to Congress. The
Commission formulates its positions independently in public meetings
and publishes these in reports, referred to below.
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\1\ Under the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984, the seven
Commissioners of the USARC are appointed by the President and report to
the President and the Congress on goals and priorities of the U.S.
Arctic Research Program. The program is coordinated by the Interagency
Arctic Research Policy Committee, (IARPC), a National Science and
Technology Council subcommittee, that is chaired by National Science
Foundation Director Dr. Subra Suresh, who is also an ex-officio member
of the Commission. See www.arctic.gov for Commission publications,
including the Commission's Goals Report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Arctic Ocean is increasingly accessible, and transformational
economic opportunities are emerging. Opportunities include oil and gas
exploration and development, tourism, and commercial shipping. Ice
coverage is shrinking in the Arctic, and shipping lanes are relatively
ice-free during the summer for longer periods than in the past.
Climate change is easily observable in the Arctic: consistently
warmer temperatures, thawing permafrost (permanently frozen ground),
melting glaciers, earlier spring thaws and later winter freeze ups,
less predictable ice cover on interior rivers, more powerful storms and
dramatic coastal erosion imperiling dozens of coastal villages, and a
slow but consistent march northward of flora and fauna seeking cooler
temperatures. The impacts on communities and infrastructure are
expensive. A few examples follow. Ice cover on the Arctic Ocean serves
as a blanket, reducing the power of winter storms and wave action. The
retreat of sea ice means that the storm surges and waves are more
powerful and more damaging to the coast. As a result of that, and
higher sea levels, communities are losing private and public
infrastructure and several dozen villages are seeking funds to
reinforce coastlines in hopes of protecting people and buildings. Other
villages are in the process of moving or planning to move. Some areas
are increasingly inaccessible because permafrost is thawing, making the
ground ``soft'' for many of the warmer months. Soft, boggy ground
jeopardizes the limited roads, airports, pipelines, and buildings that
exist in the Arctic, and reduces the months that both residents and oil
companies can use ice roads for access.
Climate change, tourism development, and international investment
in the Arctic are moving faster than our limited understanding of
arctic ecosystem functions. The pace of change in both natural systems
and human use patterns demands increased focus on and attention to
arctic research. Scientific research must inform policy decisions to
maximize economic opportunities while ensuring long-term sustainability
and environmental protection. Timely examples are marine
transportation, adventure cruises, and oil and gas exploration, all of
which need shore-based infrastructure to be safe and reliable. Research
can better inform decisions about where to develop ports that will be
safe from dramatic coastal erosion or how to address oil spills more
effectively in an ice-filled environment.
Baseline mapping of Arctic lands, both on- and offshore is
essential to improve safety and inform decisions. Arctic observations,
with an emphasis on weather, climate and environment, and how they are
evolving, are needed to accurately plan for development in the Arctic.
There are many Arctic research efforts worth noting and I highlight
a few. The Alaska Ocean Observing System addresses regional and
national needs for ocean information--including Arctic regional data.
This system, primarily funded by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, is a network of air-, land-, and sea-based instruments
that collects a host of valuable oceanographic, atmospheric, and
biological data, which are then turned into information and tools for
the use of the nation.
The Sea Ice Zone Observing Network (SIZONET) is an
interdisciplinary project, supported by the National Science
Foundation, and led by the University of Alaska Fairbanks. SIZONET has
implemented an integrated program to observe seasonal ice in the
context of the sweeping environmental, geopolitical, and socio-economic
change in the North. By assessing the nature and extent of sea ice
system services, SIZONET is building an integrated observation network
that will lead to prediction of key trends that provides maximum
benefit for the broadest range of affected parties.
Internationally, Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks (SAON), a
group important in the coordination of Arctic observing data on an
international scale, has entered a second phase of its work. The
continuing process consists of representatives from the eight Arctic
countries, permanent participants in the Arctic Council, and Arctic
Council working groups. With the inclusion of representatives from the
International Arctic Science Committee and the World Meteorological
Organization, SAON is also connected to the Arctic science, observing,
data management activities and interests of the non-Arctic countries,
as well as to global observing systems.
I attach the U.S. Arctic Research Commission's Report on Goals and
Objectives to provide a more comprehensive overview of Arctic research
priorities for the nation.
[To view this report, go to http://www.arctic.gov/publications/
usarc_2009-10
_goals.pdf.]
Research also provides the data necessary to advance responsible
development plans and to help protect against potential impacts related
to development of the Arctic's vast natural resources. The Commission
is encouraging research in oil spill prevention and containment,
response and fate/effects. I attach a white paper from the Commission
on oil spill research priorities that makes specific recommendations on
these issues.
[To view the white paper from the Commission on Oil Spill Research
Priorities go to http://www.arctic.gov/publications/usarc_oilspill_5-
26-10.pdf]
The Commission appreciates this Subcommittee's interest in research
to maximize Arctic economic opportunities in the Arctic. Timely Arctic
scientific research is key to inform pivotal strategic decisions at
this time in our history.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to
Amassador David A. Balton
Question. Several Arctic powers that are parties to UNCLOS, namely
Russia, Denmark, Norway, and Canada, are exploring ways to exert
sovereign control over the increasingly accessible oil and gas reserves
of the region. To this end, they have submitted or are in the process
of submitting expanded continental shelf claims to the Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The U.S., as a non-party to the
Convention, cannot participate as a member of the Commission and as a
result cannot submit a claim under Article 76. Ambassador Balton, it's
my understanding that other Arctic powers, like Russia, are actively in
the process of submitting claims for expanded continental shelf limits
claims.
How might an accepted claim of a foreign power affect our
sovereignty?
Can we, if it has sound scientific backing, legitimize a
claim to an expanded continental shelf when we remain a non-
party to UNCLOS?
Is it true that even if we were to accede to the Convention
tomorrow and submitted an OCS limit claim, we would be stuck at
the back of the line?
Are we already too late to the party?
Answer. As Parties to the Convention, Russia, Norway, and Denmark
have each made at least partial submissions to the Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf, an expert body established by the
Convention that makes recommendations to coastal States relating to the
outer limits of their continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles
(extended continental shelf or ECS). Canada intends to make its
submission in 2013 and Denmark intends to make another partial
submission in 2014. As a non-Party, the United States is the only
Arctic coastal State that is unable to avail itself of this treaty
procedure.
The Commission only advises on what is continental shelf and what
is not. Where two States both claim or could claim a particular area of
continental shelf, the Commission does not have the authority to make
recommendations concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf
between such States. Further, any recommendations of the Commission on
the outer limits of an Arctic coastal State's continental shelf cannot
prejudice boundary questions, including subsequent boundary agreements
that may be negotiated between Arctic coastal States.
With respect to our own ECS, the United States has established an
interagency task force to gather and analyze the data necessary for the
United States to establish the outer limits of its continental shelf,
including in the Arctic. A State does not need to be a party to the Law
of the Sea Convention to be entitled to continental shelf beyond 200
nautical miles. However, joining the Convention would put our customary
law rights with respect to the shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (nm) on
the firmest legal footing, that is, treaty law, and it would give us
access to the procedure set forth in the Convention that provides legal
certainty and international recognition of such rights. Joining the
Convention would also allow us to nominate a U.S. national to the
Commission.
We are not too late. We should join the Convention as soon as
possible in order to secure our rights with respect to the shelf,
secure our navigational rights and freedoms, maximize U.S. influence in
law of the sea-related institutions, and otherwise take advantage of
the range of benefits that would accrue to the United States as a
party.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to
Ambassador David A. Balton
Question 1. While the U.S. is a non-party to the Convention, past
and present administrations, and the Armed Forces, operate under the
premise that UNCLOS is a codification of ``customary international
law.''
Can you explain what this means?
So can customary international law change over time?
Shouldn't we be concerned that without ratifying UNCLOS, we
may be left in the lurch by the changing practices of other
states, particularly ones that continually flout international
norms or at the very least ones that go against our interests?
Answer. While we have been relatively successful to date in relying
on customary international law to protect our interests, that law can
change based on the practice of countries and is ultimately something
we cannot control. As a party, the United States would ``lock in'' the
Convention's favorable set of rules as treaty rights. Moreover, joining
the Convention would enable the United States to take advantage of
treaty procedures to nominate/designate experts to treaty institutions
and to sponsor U.S. companies to secure deep seabed mining rights--none
of which is the case under customary international law.
Question 2. The Law of the Sea is recognized by the international
community as the ``Constitution'' for the world's oceans. Like our own
nation's Constitution, the Law of the Sea can be amended and changed as
new situations arise--but only by member nations and the U.S. cannot
participate in this process because of its failure to ratify the
treaty.
Which member countries are currently offering amendments?
What types of amendments are these countries offering?
How will these proposed amendments affect U.S. interests in
the Arctic, both in the present and the future?
Answer. To our knowledge, the Parties to the Law of the Sea
Convention have not yet made any formal proposals to amend the
Convention. If such a proposal came forward, though, the United States
would have limited ability as a non-party to influence the
consideration of that proposal.
In addition, the United States would be in a much stronger position
as a party to the Convention to defend its highly favorable provisions
from being misinterpreted or misapplied--even in the absence of a
proposal for amendment.
The Convention provides the basic legal framework applicable to the
Arctic Ocean. All other Arctic nations are party to the Convention. The
United States, which has vital interests in this region, is the odd one
out.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr.
Question 1. With no heavy icebreaker and only one medium
icebreaker, U.S. capabilities in the polar regions stand in stark
contrast to the icebreaking capabilities of other nations in the
Northern Hemisphere. Most notably, Russia has twenty-five icebreakers--
eight of which are heavy icebreakers--and is using them to assert
sovereign control over the Arctic region and its many valuable
resources. Other Arctic countries with significant icebreaking
capability include Finland, with seven icebreakers; Sweden, with seven;
and Canada, with six. In this regard, it is worth noting that a May 21,
2008, letter to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Commander of U.S. Northern Command, Commander U.S. Transportation
Command, and the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command emphatically
stated, ``To assert our interests in these regions, the United States
needs assured access with reliable icebreaking ships''. This letter
also stated that the icebreakers were essential instruments of the
United States policy in the Polar Regions and included recommendations
for the construction of new polar icebreakers for the Coast Guard and
adequate funding to keep existing icebreakers ready and viable.
Admiral Papp, I understand that operating in the Arctic extends
well beyond just icebreakers. But everyone agrees, including the Joint
Chiefs, that icebreakers are crucial to assert U.S. interests in the
Arctic region. Is it only a lack of funding that is preventing you from
going ahead and building a replacement icebreaker?
Answer. Obtaining funding for replacement icebreakers is only one
critical element to a major acquisition project. Funding is required to
complete acquisition documentation, survey and design work, and
construction. Per the Coast Guard's Major Systems Acquisition Manual, a
sequence of analyses and reports must be completed prior to moving
forward on an acquisition project. Specifically, a Mission Analysis
Report, Mission Needs Statement, Concept of Operations and an
Operational Requirements Document must be completed before moving into
design and build phases. Additionally, coordination with other Federal
partners will be necessary to ensure that an icebreaker incorporates
technical requirements to support the missions of multiple agencies.
All of the documentation and analysis is critical when considered a
major acquisition to understand the needs, how it will operate, and
what alternatives are available, so as to make best use of funding, if
appropriated.
Question 2. You have noted in your written testimony that the Coast
Guard has adopted the ``whole of government'' approach to dealing with
the Arctic. That presumably means a ``whole of government'' approach to
your icebreaking needs. Is that correct? Have you used this ``whole of
government'' approach with any other Coast Guard asset?
Answer. While the Coast Guard is responsible for operating and
maintaining the national fleet of polar icebreakers, they are just one
part of a ``whole of government'' approach to implement national Arctic
policy. The United States is an Arctic Nation and as such there is a
need for a whole of government solution to meet U.S. policy objectives
in the Arctic which are articulated in the National Ocean Policy (Ex.
Order 13547), 2010 National Security Strategy and National Security
Presidential Directives 66 and/Homeland Security Presidential Directive
25.
As with other Coast Guard missions, a ``whole of government''
approach involves partnering with International, Federal, State, and
local stakeholders to meet mission demands. Depending on the specific
mission, a ``whole of government'' approach is routinely taken, as
Coast Guard missions often require close coordination with key
stakeholders. This approach is especially critical in the Arctic based
on the limited infrastructure and facilities available. For example, we
have a longstanding agreement with the National Science Foundation to
co-support an Arctic Icebreaker Coordinating Committee that advises on
science outfitting and scheduling of USCG Icebreakers for Arctic
research. This approach has enabled over a decade of research missions
primarily on the CGC HEALY by the National Science Foundation but also
including the polar class icebreakers and other research agencies.
Additional ``whole of government'' approaches include the recently
signed International Arctic SAR agreement, coordination with the Alaska
Air National Guard and the North Slope Borough for SAR cases in the
Arctic.
Expected increases in vessel traffic in the Bering Straits and
north can be expected to increase the risk of collision with marine
mammals, fuel spills, and displacement of wildlife although there are
no assessments at this time of the extent of such impacts. The
capability of the U.S. Coast Guard to perform its vessel safety and oil
spill response functions has substantial bearing on natural resource
protection.
Question 3. With only one functional icebreaker, how will USCG
maintain crew proficiency in icebreaking operations?
Answer. The Coast Guard is maintaining crew proficiency in
icebreaking operations through: icebreaking simulations, temporary duty
assignments to CGC HEALY and other domestic icebreaking assets.
Additionally, the Coast Guard is looking at potential international
professional engagements on foreign icebreaking assets. In fact, a
Coast Guard Icebreaker Captain is sailing on the Russian vessel that
NSF is chartering for the McMurdo break-in mission in January 2012.
Question 4. CMSP has been used in New England to successfully
reduce conflicts between shipping activities and marine mammal
migrations. In the Arctic, melting ice has resulted in increased
shipping access to the Bering Strait, leading to a greater likelihood
of ship collisions with protected marine mammals. Do you think that it
is necessary to implement a CMSP process for the Arctic in the near
term to avoid whale ship-strikes and other user conflicts?
Answer. The Coast Guard is committed to supporting the
implementation of Coastal and Marine Spatial Planning (CMSP) in all
regions of the United States under the auspices of the National Ocean
Council, consistent with Ex. Order 13547, July 19, 2010, ``Stewardship
of the Ocean, our Coasts, and the Great Lakes.'' The rationale for CMSP
is contained in the Final Recommendations of the Interagency Ocean
Policy Task Force and other materials the Council has prepared and is
developing. One of the examples of successful interagency cooperation
to balance the interests of maritime trade, offshore energy, and
environmental protection as contained in the Final Recommendations was
that of the Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary, located just off
of the always busy Boston, Massachusetts, harbor. Major benefits of
interagency planning and working closely with all stakeholders were to
reduce the potential of ship strikes with little adverse impact on
shipping. The Coast Guard played an active role in that planning and
review process.
Alaska/Arctic is one of the nine regions of the country where the
National Ocean Council is working to implement CMSP. Regional planning
bodies (RPBs) composed of Federal, State, and tribal partners
(including Alaska Native entities) will form to develop coastal and
marine spatial (CMS) plans for each region or, in some cases, sub-
regions. Each RPB will be informed by its members, scientists,
industry, other concerned stakeholders, and the general public in
developing their regional CMS plans. Avoidance of collisions between
ships and marine mammals is one of the many issues that the RPBs will
consider. The RPB, in implementing key principles and elements of the
CMSP process, will consider how to mitigate and plan for conflicts
among human uses as well as conflicts between human uses and the
environment. The expected increase in commercial vessel traffic in
Arctic and Alaskan waters will likely pose significant conflict use
challenges that the RPB will seek to resolve. The Coast Guard is
committed to being part of this process in all nine regions.
In the meantime, the Coast Guard is undertaking studies to analyze
the nature and effects of ship traffic passing through the Bering
Strait and into the Chukchi Sea to promote vessel safety and the needs
of all concerned. On November 8, 2010, the Coast Guard published a
Notice of Study and request for comments for a ``Port Access Route
Study: In the Bering Strait'' in the Federal Register (75 FR 68568).
The Coast Guard recently extended the public comment period until
September 6, 2011. What is learned during this process, as well as the
routing measures and best practices that are developed, will be
implemented under existing statutory authority and then incorporated
into the CMSP process.
The Coast Guard agrees with the other Federal agencies about the
importance of ensuring CMSP serves as a tool to promote a more
integrated and proactive approach to planning and managing the existing
and emerging uses of our oceans and coasts. Although there is currently
a low volume of shipping and other opportunities to plan waterway
safety and environmental stewardship exist, near-term implementation of
CMSP is the preferred integrated approach to reducing ship strikes and
resolving other anticipated conflicts. Ship traffic through the Arctic
and Bering Sea will increase in the future as a result of diminishing
sea ice; accordingly, it is imperative that an early, proactive
approach be taken to mitigate the resulting greatly increased noise and
other potential environmental impacts on marine mammal populations, as
well as on the native communities which depend upon them through
traditional subsistence hunting.
Question 5. How would the implementation of CMSP in the Arctic
affect Coast Guard operations there?
Answer. The Coast Guard anticipates no adverse operational impacts
from implementing Coastal Marine Spatial Planning (CMSP) in the Arctic.
Implementing CMSP will promote and leverage a broad range of existing
Coast Guard priorities and equities, including safety, security, and
stewardship, in the region.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to
Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr.
Question 1. Given the $4 to $7 billion the High Latitude Study
identifies in icebreaker needs, there is a lot of discussion about the
wisdom of outsourcing our homeland security activities by leasing or
chartering icebreakers. Can you comment on the wisdom of leasing
icebreakers instead of having government-owned assets?
Answer. In general, executing Homeland Security activities can be
accomplished from a leased vessel only if primarily operated by a Coast
Guard crew and flagged as a U.S. Coast Guard vessel. To fully evaluate
the applicability of a capital lease, its utility and operational
flexibility must be considered against the initial acquisition costs.
Additionally, based on current fiscal policy, scoring of the initial,
full budget authority for the length of a capital lease must be
considered when evaluating the benefits of leasing over a capital
acquisition.
Question 2. Are there Coast Guard missions that cannot be performed
on leased or chartered vessels? Are those missions critical
capabilities or just ``nice to have'' on icebreakers?
Answer. The ability to conduct inherently governmental missions
from a leased asset is a critical factor when operating in the arctic.
All Coast Guard missions could be conducted on a leased vessel operated
under a demise charter to the Coast Guard, properly marked as a Coast
Guard Cutter, obtained in accordance with applicable laws and
regulations, and crewed by all active duty Coast Guard.
Question 3. In 2010, the cruise ship Clipper Adventurer ran aground
in the Canadian Arctic, on a shoal which was charted at 60 feet, but
was actually about 9 ft. and it took the Canadian Coast Guard days to
reach the vessel. What is the state of our nautical charts in the
Arctic? Could a similar thing happen in U.S. waters? How long would it
take the Coast Guard to respond?
Answer. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's
(NOAA) Office of Coast Survey has responsibility for charting waters
under U.S. jurisdiction to the limits of the Exclusive Economic Zone.
NOAA considers the nautical charting data in much of the U.S. Arctic to
be inadequate or nonexistent. According to NOAA's U.S. Coast Pilot,
much of the Bering Sea area is ``only partially surveyed, and the
charts must not be relied upon too closely, especially near shore.''
A nautical chart shows water depths (soundings obtained from
hydrographic surveys), shoreline, prominent topographic features, aids
to navigation, and other information pertinent to marine
transportation. Nautical charts serve multiple purposes. Not only do
they aid navigation and promote vessel safety, but they also have
scientific value. Models describing storm influence on coastal erosion,
for instance, require information on nearshore bathymetry. Acquiring
adequate bathymetric data for the nearshore zone of the Beaufort and
Chukchi seas would improve our ability to forecast the condition of the
rapidly changing arctic coastal zone. Forecasts of coastal zone change
are important to infrastructure planning, natural resource management,
and for local communities.
The water depth information in U.S. Arctic waters is a major
concern. The soundings along the northern Alaska coast and south to the
Bering Strait were obtained between 1940 and 1969 from hydrographic
surveys capable of only partial bottom coverage, some using lead lines.
The discrete point soundings obtained using lead lines can be more than
500 meters apart. Widely spaced soundings do not contain enough data to
detect pinnacles, rocks, shoals, and other obstructions that protrude
above the sea bottom and may not reflect actual water depths in the
surrounding area.
Along the northern Alaska coast, the 10-fathom (60 feet) curve lies
2 to 20 miles offshore. Soundings inside the 10-fathom curve are
charted anywhere from one-half to three-quarters of a nautical mile
apart. However, in some areas, the charted soundings are spaced as much
as four nautical miles apart. Historical sounding positions were
obtained using less accurate positioning technology than what is
available to modern vessels using the Global Positioning System (GPS),
Differential GPS, Electronic Chart Display, and Information Systems).
Modern hydrographic surveying technology includes the use of single
beam and multibeam echosounders, along with side scan sonar. Multibeam
technology obtains millions more soundings than single beam systems and
covers a wide swath of the ocean floor, depending on the depth (deeper
water equates to wider swath, shallower water equates to narrower
swath). Side scan sonar is towed behind the survey vessel and the data
obtained assists in detecting objects (wrecks, rocks, or other
obstructions) that project from the sea floor. Until full coverage
bottom surveys obtained using multibeam echosounders and/or side scan
sonar are completed, the extent of potential hazards will not be known.
Side scan sonar and multibeam systems provide nearly 100 percent bottom
coverage of the sea floor, greatly enhancing the ability to detect
hazards undiscovered by earlier, less modern surveys.
During the 2010 field season, the Office of Coast Survey's
Hydrographic Surveys Division undertook hydrographic survey projects in
the Bering Strait, Port Clarence, and Kuskokwim River--collecting over
300 square nautical miles of hydrographic data. However, this is only a
small portion of the estimated 40,000 square nautical mile U.S. Arctic
hydrographic survey requirement. Much of the data needed for improving
charts in the U.S. Arctic still needs to be obtained through modern
hydrographic surveys, water level information, geodetic control, and
shoreline/channel delineation.
A similar incident could take place in U.S. Arctic waters. The time
of the year, the location of the incident, and weather conditions would
determine the length of time it would take the Coast Guard to respond.
If a Coast Guard icebreaker is not in the area and a Coast Guard High
Endurance cutter is patrolling the Bering Strait, the High Endurance
cutter could arrive on scene within 24-48 hours. It would take about 5
days for a Coast Guard buoy tender to transit from Kodiak to Point
Barrow, depending on weather conditions.
The Coast Guard would also likely deploy a C-130 aircraft and an H-
60 helicopter from Coast Guard Air Station Kodiak. Both would have to
travel approximately 900 nautical miles across the Alaskan mainland.
The transit time for a C-130 would be approximately 4 hours and it
would be limited to dropping survival gear at the site The H-60s
transit time would be approximately 9 hours and would require two air
crews and one refueling stop.
The Coast Guard would also likely engage rescue squadrons of the
Alaska Air National Guard out of Ellison Air Force Base near Fairbanks
and Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson near Anchorage for assistance.
Additionally, the Coast Guard would request assistance from other
partners, such as the North Slope Borough search and rescue helicopters
and fixed wing aircraft.
Search and rescue operations in the U.S. Arctic are extremely
difficult due to weather, distances, and lack of infrastructure. In
2011, two exercises focused on U.S. Arctic rescue response were
conducted. In May, a table top exercise was conducted in Barrow to
discuss the rescue of a large number of passengers from a cruise ship.
In July, a joint operations field exercise was conducted with the U.S.
Air Force and the North Slope emergency response organizations to
search for people in the water in the Beaufort Sea. Both exercises were
successful as they worked to build interagency partnerships and
familiarity with asset capabilities and limitations, while seeking to
fully understand the challenges that that would be encountered during
an actual incident.
Question 4. The Coast Guard has been studying the full range of
capabilities needed for the Service to meet its statutory mission
requirements and the requirements of the U.S. Navy in the polar
regions, identifying gaps in mission capabilities in the regions and
the number and types of assets--including polar icebreakers--needed to
close the gaps. I understand the Coast Guard is now taking the results
of this High Latitude Study and conducting a Mission Analysis Report to
look at the mission requirements in greater detail. When this is
complete, a Mission Needs Study will look at various options how the
Coast Guard will accomplish the missions. How many more studies need to
occur to take action? And where does the DHS Arctic Study fit into this
picture?
Answer. The Coast Guard is using the results of the High Latitude
Study to inform its planning processes moving forward as maritime
activity evolves in the region. The Coast Guard will continue to
monitor and assess activity in the region with its current operations
and assets and proceed with a risk-based, phased resourcing approach
designed to address the highest operational needs, including the
establishment of infrastructure and communications systems to support
operations as the level of activity requires it. The study will also be
used to inform a whole of government solution to address U.S. national
requirements in the Polar Regions.
Question 5. In your opinion, what is the most important piece of
information that you learned from the High Latitude Study?
Answer. Based on the current and projected level of activity in the
Arctic, the Coast Guard is challenged to meet is statutory mission
responsibilities now and likely will not be able to meet requirements
in the future without investment in infrastructure or capabilities
required for the polar regions.
Question 6. What is the Coast Guard doing with the results of the
High Latitude Study?
Answer. The Coast Guard is using the results of the High Latitude
Study to inform its planning processes moving forward as maritime
activity evolves in the region. The Coast Guard will continue to
monitor and assess activity in the region with its current operations
and assets and proceed with a risk-based, phased resourcing approach
designed to address the highest operational needs, including the
establishment of infrastructure and communications systems to support
operations as required. The study will also be used to inform a whole
of government solution to address U.S. national requirements in the
Polar Regions.
Question 7. Most of the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas are shallow near
shore. Arctic coastlines of Alaska lack shore-side infrastructure
needed to support escalating maritime operations. Ideas such as
designing an offshore vessel mooring or a deepwater port to support
operations are being recommended for consideration. Last Congress I
proposed legislation that would require a study on the feasibility and
potential of establishing a deep water sea port in the Arctic to
protect and advance U.S. strategic interests within the Arctic region.
Do you think there should be a deepwater port in the Arctic?
Answer. The Coast Guard expects that greater infrastructure will be
required in Alaska's Arctic region to support the expanding oil and gas
production, mining activities, shipping, fishing, and other human
activities of increasing importance there, while protecting the marine
environment and promoting the interests and equities of the indigenous
populations. However, given the lack of a natural deepwater port, the
tremendous challenges to dredging, building, and maintaining such a
facility, including the huge initial and ongoing capital costs, the
very small resident population, and significant resource obstacles that
lie ahead, it will be extremely challenging to invest in the
infrastructure needed to address the issues previously described. One
might expect that commercial interests, who also have infrastructure
needs, could provide leveraging opportunities for Federal agencies as
the future needs become clearer.
Note that, the State of Alaska and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE) completed a joint three-year study to look at the issue of
whether there should be additional ports and harbors in Alaska. The
State of Alaska, with matching funds from USACE, is funding the
project. The Coast Guard, along with National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration and Department of Defense, have actively participated.
More information is available at http://www.poa.usace.army.mil/en/cw/
AKPortsStudy.htm.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to
Rear Admiral David W. Titley
Question 1. The Task Force Climate Change was created by the Chief
of Naval Operations in May 2009 to ensure the Navy is ready to meet any
potential challenges to mission requirements, force structure and
infrastructure created by a changing climate. Of any region on earth,
the Arctic is experiencing climate change effects the most rapidly. As
the sea ice melts, it is estimated that the Arctic will become
seasonally navigable by mid-century. What is driving the U.S. Navy's
interest in climate change?
Answer. The policy guidance for the U.S. Navy with respect to
climate change includes ``A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower,'' known as The Maritime Strategy or CS-21 and the Quadrennial
Defense Review 2010. CS-21 and QDR 2010 identify climate change as a
national security priority. Executive Order 13514 ``Federal Leadership
in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance ``also requires
Federal agencies to set goals for climate change mitigation and energy
efficiency.
Question 2. How do climate changes in the Arctic rank as compared
to other challenges the Navy sees around the world?
Answer. Nowhere is the Earth's climate changing more dramatically
than in the Arctic. Decreasing sea ice is making the Arctic Ocean more
accessible to human activity including oil and gas exploration,
maritime shipping, commercial fishing, and adventure tourism. The Navy
views the Arctic as a challenge, not a crisis; the risk of conflict in
the region is low. In support of U.S. national security interests as an
Arctic nation, the U.S. Navy is taking a deliberate approach in order
to be prepared and ready to respond to future tasking in the region to
ensure the Arctic remains a stable and secure environment.
Question 3. What are the other climate-related issues around the
world that the Navy foresees?
Answer. Climate change has numerous implications for naval force
structure and operations outside of the Arctic including:
Sea level rise, and increased storm surge may adversely
affect Navy coastal installations.
Sea level rise may impact availability of foreign ports and
strategic assets.
Changes in the distribution and availability of water,
agriculture, fisheries, coastal lands, and other natural
resources may increase demand for naval peace-keeping,
humanitarian response, and disaster relief missions
Question 4. How will the increased access to the Arctic through the
Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route caused by melting sea ice
impact the Navy?
Answer. The Navy must be prepared to operate in the Arctic Ocean
just as it does in every other ocean. The harsh environment of the
Arctic, however, will present the Navy with challenges associated with
the cold weather environment that go beyond those of other oceans. The
Navy is in the process of assessing the impacts of Arctic operations
through execution of the Arctic Roadmap.
Question 5. What are the greatest challenges to Naval operations
from a changing Arctic environment, and how is the Navy planning for
these changes?
Answer. The Navy is currently executing its Arctic Roadmap, which
is a 5 year plan to identify the challenges posed by a changing Arctic
and to assess the impact of these changes on naval operations and
readiness. Phase 1 of the Arctic Roadmap is the study and assessment
phase which includes an Arctic Mission Analysis and an Arctic
Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA). Together these studies articulate
the primary missions of the U.S. Navy in the Arctic and the describe
the gaps in the Navy's ability to conduct these missions. The Arctic
Mission Analysis, signed on 15 August 2011, describes the primary
missions for the Navy in the region and how they will change over the
next 30 years. The two mission areas that have been identified to
increase through 2040 are Theater Security Cooperation and Maritime
Security, which includes search and rescue and Maritime Domain
Awareness. The Arctic CBA is scheduled to be completed by mid-September
2011 and will articulate the principle gaps in the capabilities
necessary for the Navy to operate in the Arctic and form the basis for
U.S. Navy future year's investments.
Question 6. After the DOD-NOAA ``divorce'' on polar-orbiting
satellites, it was agreed that DOD satellites would have a morning
orbit and NOAA satellites would cover the afternoon orbit. Both provide
data for numerical weather models, which are a primary forecasting
tool, for both DOD and civil users. As you know, NOAA now forecasts a
``gap'' in their polar-orbiting satellite coverage in 2016.--How
important are accurate weather forecasts to Naval operations, and
military operations generally?
Answer. Accurate and timely atmospheric and oceanographic forecasts
are key components of Battlespace Awareness and Intelligence
Preparation of the Environment and are critical for safe and efficient
Naval and military operations.
Question 7. Does this mean you will be relying on NOAA's Joint
Polar Satellite Systems for data from the afternoon orbit?
Answer. The President's decision to restructure the National Polar-
orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) assigned
responsibility for the afternoon orbit to NOAA and the early morning
orbit to DOD. NOAA and DoD will share data with each other from their
respective orbits.
Question 8. Since a gap in JPSS coverage is projected, will not
having that data degrade weather model output and thus forecast
quality?
Answer. Navy uses data from all available U.S. and international
satellite sources for its global atmospheric and oceanographic models,
to include all three polar satellite orbits and several geostationary
satellites. The loss of data from any one orbit or satellite will
affect the numerical model forecast quality. Quantitative impacts of a
loss of data from a particular orbit or satellite type will be assessed
in the context of all available data.
Question 9. Would this impact affect military weather forecasts
just for the U.S. or will affect overseas operations as well?
Answer. Satellite-based data is assimilated into the Navy's global
atmospheric and oceanographic models which are subsequently scaled and
tailored to deliver localized environmental (weather and oceanographic)
forecasts for Naval operations around the globe. Overseas operations,
particularly over water, around the globe will be more affected by the
loss of weather satellite data than in the United States.
Question 10. Icebreaking needs for our Nation were once
predominately conducted by the Navy but in 1965, the Navy permanently
transferred responsibility for icebreaking and mission requirements in
the Polar Regions to the Coast Guard. The Navy has stated that the
Arctic is critical to national defense and maintaining a continued
presence in the region on the surface, subsurface, and in the air is
required.--How critical is the Coast Guard's icebreaking capability to
the U.S. Navy?
Answer. The Coast Guard's icebreaking capability supports the U.S.
Navy's desired end state of maintaining the Arctic as a safe, stable
and secure region where U.S. national and maritime interests are
safeguarded and the homeland is protected. Additionally, the Office of
the Secretary of Defense's 2011 Report to Congress on Arctic Operations
and the Northwest Passage states ``there is a current and continued
future imperative to provide a sovereign maritime presence in the
region.'' This aligns with Annex E to the Memorandum of Agreement
between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland
Security on the use of Coast Guard Capabilities and Resources in
Support of the National Military Strategy which states that ``Coast
Guard icebreakers are the only means of providing assured surface
access in support of Department of Defense missions.'' As the U.S. Navy
does not possess any ice-capable surface combatants, the Coast Guard
has the only icebreaking vessels capable of supporting the six core
Navy missions in the Arctic.
Question 11. How concerned is the Navy with the Coast Guard's lack
of icebreaking capability and is this considered a national defense
vulnerability?
Answer. The U.S. Navy is very concerned about the U.S. Coast
Guard's degraded icebreaking capabilities. Having sovereign icebreaking
vessels capable of supporting the six core Navy missions and supporting
the a broad range of Department of Defense and Department of Homeland
Security missions is important for protecting U.S. national interests.
With no service icebreaking requirements currently identified, the
Coast Guard provides the only means for access to much of the Arctic.
Lacking this enabler, and with the Office of the Secretary of Defense's
statement of requirement in the 2011 Report to Congress on Arctic
Operations and the Northwest Passage to be able to persist in the
Arctic to protect sovereign interests, the Navy may not have the means
to meet that requirement.
Question 12. How limited is the Navy in the Arctic without Coast
Guard icebreakers?
Answer. The lack of Coast Guard icebreakers currently does not
impact the Navy's ability to perform its core mission of preventing
conflict. However, lacking any ice-capable surface combatants, the U.S.
Navy is limited in the near term to operating only in the ice-free
waters of the Arctic during those times of year when the sea ice is
minimal. Coast Guard icebreakers would represent the only military
vessels capable of conducting Arctic operations year round. The recent
Navy Arctic Mission Analysis states that the potential for armed
conflict in the Arctic in the near-term (through 2020) is low. However,
the Navy is conducting several analyses, including the potential need
for ice-capable surface combatants, to ensure it can capably perform
all six core Navy missions to meet expected mid and long term Arctic
operating needs.
Question 13. One of the major challenges in the Arctic is the lack
of infrastructure needed to support escalating maritime operations. The
vast areas of the Arctic have insufficient infrastructure to support
safe marine shipping and respond to marine incidents and emergencies in
the Arctic. This area lacks critical infrastructure components to
support communications, safe navigation, search and rescue assets,
pollution response assets, and port facilities where ships may need to
take refuge, refuel, resupply or discharge waste.--What kind of
investments in infrastructure is needed to meet Navy strategic
objectives in the Arctic?
Answer. The U.S. Navy is continually re-evaluating its Arctic
infrastructure needs. As such, the Navy is currently participating in a
number of ongoing studies and assessments related to these
infrastructure needs. Although military infrastructure in the region is
limited, the low threat of military conflict between Arctic nations
currently does not necessitate substantial near-term investments in
military bases and infrastructure. However, as ice coverage recedes and
human activity in the Arctic begins to increase, the Navy may need to
accelerate its need to field capabilities and build infrastructure in
order to provide a persistent presence in this harsh environment.
Question 14. Do you think the Navy should be making investments in
the Arctic in a fiscally-constrained environment?
Answer. Substantial U.S. Navy near term investment (next 5-10
years) in the Arctic, especially given the current U.S. Fiscal
situation, is not currently planned or anticipated. However, it will be
important to periodically re-evaluate our investment needs to ensure
our Arctic capabilities investments are sufficient to meet any emerging
threats to U.S. national security.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Peter E. Slaiby
Question 1. On Wednesday, August 10, 2011, an oil leak began and
was detected by Shell UK, stemming from the flow line of its shallow
water Gannet Alpha platform, located 112 miles east of Aberdeen,
Scotland in the North Sea. Though the initial leak was stopped, it has
now emerged that a smaller flow from the same source is ongoing. It is
estimated that as of Monday, August 15, approximately 54,600 gallons
(1300 barrels) have spilled into the sea in what has become the worst
spill in UK waters in the past decade. Though the leak began on August
10th, why was the British public not informed of its existence until
August 12th? Is this how Shell would respond if a spill were to occur
in U.S. Arctic waters as a result of its activities?
Answer. In this particular instance we wanted to get a full
assessment of the situation prior to engaging the press. You will note,
however, that we engaged immediately with the regulatory bodies as
quickly as the leak was detected. We have provided updated information
as appropriate while dealing with the situation.
Question 2. The regulatory regime of the United Kingdom and the
safety of North Sea production operations are regularly touted as
industry ``gold standards.'' Yet Shell has admitted that the ongoing
Gannet Alpha incident constitutes ``a significant spill in the context
of annual amounts of oil spilled in the North Sea.'' Additionally,
Shell technical director Glen Cayley has acknowledged that the ongoing
leak has been difficult to stem because it ``is in an awkward position
to get to* and really getting into it amongst quite dense marine growth
is proving a challenge.'' Mr. Slaiby, at the hearing on July 27, you
indicated Shell would not be working in places like the Arctic if the
company believed something might happen that you couldn't control. If
you're having difficulties responding to an incident in an area with a
well-established history of oil production, shouldn't Americans be
concerned with Shell's ability to prepare for and respond to a spill in
an inherently more challenging and remote environment, such as U.S.
Arctic waters, one where capabilities have yet to be truly tested?
Answer. While the Gannet Alpha incident is regrettable, the leak is
not related to a well control incident nor does it correspond with the
exploration plans we have planned for Alaska. The exploration program
planned in the Alaskan Arctic is not comparable to a leak in a
flowline. We continue to have confidence in our ability to operate in
the North Sea and will learn from this incident as the investigation is
completed. This learning will improve our operations around the world.
Question 3. In early August, the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) released a major report titled, ``Environmental
Assessment of Ogoniland.'' The report details the findings of an
independent scientific assessment and demonstrates that the impacts of
oil pollution from over 50 years of operations in southeast Nigeria are
far more significant than once thought, potentially warranting ``the
most wide-ranging and long term oil clean-up exercise ever undertaken
if contaminated drinking water, land, creeks and important ecosystems
such as mangroves are to be brought back to full, productive health,''
one that may take 25 to 30 years. Beyond its disastrous scientific
findings, the report implicates Shell Petroleum Development Company as
a key contributor to this disaster, accusing the company of chronically
failing to live up to its own safety procedures and environmental
standards and colluding with government officials to cover up oil spill
sites. Shell faces hundreds of millions of dollars in damages for two
massive oil spills that occurred in the region as a result of the
rupture of the 2008 Bodo-Bonny trans-Niger pipeline; originally
claiming that less than 40,000 gallons were spilled in Bodo, Ogani,
Nigeria, your company now accepts liability for a spill experts
estimate could rival that of Exxon-Valdez. Mr. Slaiby, Shell has spent
billions upon billions of dollars on spill preparedness in the Arctic,
and has made considerable efforts to brand itself as a responsible and
proactive industry leader when it comes to the safety of its oil
exploration and production activities. Even with everything Shell has
done in this regard, what kind of credible assurances can you really
make in the wake of these developments that Shell is and will be, to
use your words, ``committed to employing world-class technology and
experience to ensure a safe, environmentally responsible Arctic
exploration program?''
Answer. Oil spills in the Niger Delta are a tragedy, and the Shell
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC) takes them very
seriously. That is why we have always accepted responsibility for
paying compensation when they occur as a result of operational failure.
SPDC has always acknowledged that the two spills in the Bodo area in
2008, which are the focus of extensive media reports today, were caused
by such operational failure. Even when, as is true in the great
majority of cases, spills are caused by illegal activity such as
sabotage or theft, we are also committed to cleaning up spilt oil and
restoring the surrounding land.
It is unfortunate that inaccurate reporting has created the
impression that SPDC in particular and oil companies in general are
responsible for all oil spills in Nigeria. The two spills at issue here
resulted in around 168,000 gallons of spilled oil. It is regrettable
that any oil is spilled anywhere, but it is wildly inaccurate to
suggest that those two spills represent anything like the scale which
some reports refer to, such as a comparison to the Exxon Valdez spill
(10.8 million gallons). Concerted effort is needed on the part of the
Nigerian government (which itself owns a majority interest in the
assets operated by SPDC under a joint operating agreement with the
Nigerian state oil company, NNPC), working with oil companies and
others, to end the blight of illegal refining and oil theft in the
Niger Delta, both of which perpetuate poverty. This is the major cause
of the environmental damage which media reports have so graphically
illustrated.
It is inappropriate to compare the situation in Nigeria with
exploration in Alaska. Domestic exploration does not experience
sabotage and civil unrest which are the root causes of most of the
environmental damage in Nigeria.
In Alaska, as elsewhere in the world, we are committed to
operational standards that meet or exceed regulations. We are also
committed to ensuring the communities that we work in participate fully
in the economic benefits that oil and gas development will bring. This
is perhaps at the root of many of the issues in Nigeria.
Question 4. The Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission, the organization
of native communities living in the Arctic which depend on a
subsistence hunt of bowhead whales for their cultural and nutritional
health, does not support the expansion of offshore oil and gas
activities in the Arctic because of the unknowns associated with such
projects and concerns about oil spills. Local communities are not
convinced that industry or the government is currently capable of
remediating an oil spill, and want to make sure that oil and gas
development does not endanger the communities' resources. How does
Shell take the indigenous concerns about offshore oil and gas
development into account in their development plans for the Arctic?
Answer. Shell takes indigenous concerns very seriously and has been
working closely with the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission (AEWC) to
address their concerns associated with the potential impacts of oil and
gas activities on subsistence hunting. In addition, Shell has
voluntarily committed to a ``zero discharge'' policy for certain waste
streams in the Beaufort Sea (federal law permits such discharges) in
response to requests from the AEWC.
Shell has entered into an agreement with the North Slope Borough
(NSB) to fund a science program for an initial term of 5 years, which
is administered by the NSB Mayor's Office. The Steering Committee,
which governs the direction of scientific studies, is dominated by
local residents to ensure the incorporation of indigenous concerns.
Shell also conducts annual Plan of Cooperation meetings with every
impacted coastal community to share results of science data collection
efforts, plans for the upcoming season and to solicit questions and
concerns about Shell's program. The solicitation of input is not just a
paper exercise; stakeholder input has resulted in a substantial
mitigation program including:
1. Communications Plan to avoid conflict with subsistence
hunters
2. Commitment to hire subsistence advisors and marine mammal
observers
3. Development of a robust marine mammal monitoring protocol
4. Real time ice and weather forecasting
5. Collaboration with coastal communities on transit routes
Question 5. In the event of a catastrophic oil spill, how would
Shell compensate these communities whose nutritional needs and way of
life depend completely on Arctic natural resources?
Answer. As in other parts of the world where it operates, Shell is
committed to being a good neighbor. One example of this is Shell's
commitment to fund mitigation measures in the unlikely event of an oil
spill that has a significant potential to affect subsistence species or
a spill that is followed by a reduction in availability of species for
subsistence. The Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope (ICAS), AEWC and
the NSB could request funds from a third party that would make funds
immediately available for distribution. Shell's commitment is backed by
a substantial financial instrument. The purpose of the mitigation funds
includes transportation of hunters and equipment to alternate hunting
sites and acquisition and transportation of alternate subsistence food
supplies.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to
Peter E. Slaiby
Question 1. As part of larger efforts to improve oil spill
response, oil companies such as Shell conduct intentional spills of
limited amounts of oil to better understand the properties of oil in
the environment. Some Arctic countries, such as Norway, allow this kind
of testing in their waters. While the EPA has the authority to provide
Clean Water Act waivers for such testing, our staff is unaware of any
waivers that have been issued. It's my understanding that your company
conducts limited controlled spills in foreign waters to better
understand the properties of spilled oil in the environment. Can you
share with us how these activities have improved oil spill response
capabilities?
Answer. As part of Joint Industry Projects (JIPs) and other R&D
work, Shell participates in cooperative efforts with industry,
regulatory agencies, academia, and research institutions that perform
experimental spills. These experimental spills provide an excellent
opportunity to further advance knowledge in a laboratory or small test
basin which can be extrapolated to a larger scale. During an
experimental spill, testing can take the place of new technology
dealing with mechanical skimmers, booming, dispersants, in-situ
burning, detection and monitoring of oil, environmental fate and
effects, oil behavior in cold environments, and other data gathering.
While industry keeps as a top priority the prevention of any spill,
opportunities to test new or advanced technology are limited and
difficult to perform during an actual spill in which the priority is to
properly respond and clean up the spill. The last experimental spill
conducted was in 2009 as part of the SINTEF Oil in Ice JIP which
resulted in many learnings and significant advancements regarding spill
response in Arctic conditions. We utilized the information gathered
from the in-situ burn and the use of dispersants during the
experimental spill at Svalbard to further enhance the use of these
response tools in our contingency plan. The results of the SINTEF JIP
have been reported and the summary can be found at the following link:
http://www.sintef.no/project/JIP_Oil_In_Ice/Dokumenter/publications/JIP
-rep-no-32-Summary-report.pdf.
Question 2. Would testing in U.S. waters improve our understanding
of how spilled oil behaves in the environments of places we'd actually
be drilling in?
Answer. Yes, the information gathered during experimental spills is
very valuable in learning how oil behaves in the environment although
we don't believe the work done in Norway is less relevant. It also
would be of great benefit for testing new and advanced technology,
developing strategies and tactics for response, improving modeling of
oil movement and dispersion, and other areas. When a JIP performs an
experimental spill, detailed planning goes into effect to maximize the
knowledge and data gathering that occurs during the test.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Andrew T. Metzger, Ph.D., P.E.
Question 1. One of the major challenges in the Arctic is the lack
of infrastructure needed to support escalating maritime operations. The
vast areas of the Arctic have insufficient infrastructure to support
safe marine shipping and respond to marine incidents and emergencies in
the Arctic. This area lacks critical infrastructure components to
support communications, safe navigation, search and rescue assets,
pollution response assets, and port facilities where ships may need to
take refuge, refuel, resupply or discharge waste. Dr. Metzger, what are
the greatest challenges for building marine infrastructure in the
Arctic?
Answer. From the perspective of civil engineering and construction,
I believe the four greatest challenges for building marine
infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic are as follows:
Permitting--The permitting process for construction of marine
infrastructure, both coastal and offshore, will be difficult
for anyone to gauge in advance. However, one should expect
considerable lead time before ground is broken on any new
construction project in the Arctic marine environment. I would
anticipate one to several years of permitting lead time,
depending on the scope of the project.
Logistics--It would be difficult to overstate the logistical
challenges of construction in an Arctic maritime environment.
This is due primarily to remoteness and the fact the region is
relatively undeveloped. Almost every component of a constructed
facility will be shipped to the site from considerable
distance; probably by barge from the west coast of the
contiguous United States. The Barrow Replacement Hospital,
presently being constructed in Barrow, Alaska, is a good
example of this situation. Every beam, window, door know,
screw, and all other construction materials needed for a modern
hospital was shipped via barge from Seattle, Washington.
Shipments also included vehicles, equipment, construction
worker housing, fuel and most other supplies required for the
2-year project. The planning for such a project must be
comprehensive and precise. A forgotten or damaged item must be
flown in, often from outside Alaska, or barged in the following
summer. One should anticipate mobilization and material costs
to be in excess of what could be expected along the East, Gulf,
West or Great Lakes coasts. It should be anticipated that the
project will take longer (than analogous facilities in the
contiguous US) to construct due to these complications; coupled
with the very short construction season in the Arctic.
Existing Civil Infrastructure--As stated in both my written and
oral testimony: the lack of basic shore side civil
infrastructure, including lodging, water, wastewater and
electrical power facilities, will obstruct marine
infrastructure development in the Arctic. The civil works at
most communities in this region cannot support more than
minimal influx of additional people. New civil works (lodging,
water, wastewater, power) will likely be required to
accommodate any significant workforce as well as operators of a
finished facility.
Incomplete Knowledge Base--The Arctic is a severe environment.
Marine civil infrastructure built in this environment must
withstand extreme environmental conditions. Numerical
quantities describing the extremes of environmental are needed
to build facilities with reliable performance. While the
scientific community has studied the Arctic for quite some
time, and in considerable detail, we have very little
information available about actual numerical values of extremes
(e.g., wind, waves, sea-ice conditions) over time. Extreme
values are needed to build civil infrastructure with reliable
performance.
Question 2. How robust is the research on building in the Arctic?
Answer. I would describe research on building terrestrial
infrastructure in the Arctic as ``robust.'' A substantial amount of
scientific literature and experience-based expertise for on-land
projects exists. Notable examples of successful land-based projects
include: the Trans-Alaska Pipeline (TAPS), facilities at Prudhoe Bay,
the Dalton Highway adjacent to the TAPS route, as well as a host of
other constructed facilities.
Specific areas in which I would refer to our knowledge base as
``robust'' include: construction in/on terrestrial permafrost, material
performance in cold temperatures, Arctic utilities (water, wastewater
and housing).
Research and experience designing and constructing marine civil
infrastructure is not as developed as the storehouse of knowledge for
land-based Arctic infrastructure. However, examples of successful
projects do exist. A port has been constructed in in Nome, Alaska;
artificial islands, like the Northstar project, have been constructed
at the Prudhoe Bay facility.
Topics in which further study, from an engineering perspective, is
warranted include sub-sea permafrost, the coastal transition zone, and
sea-ice. Sea-ice represents a major challenge for designing,
constructing and maintaining coastal and offshore marine
infrastructure. A considerable amount of information was gained during
the first ``push'' to develop oil resources in the Arctic, circa 1980s.
However, much of this information warrants updating given recent
knowledge of geophysical processes in the Arctic.
Question 3. You mentioned in your testimony that environmental
conditions in the Arctic are not conducive to currently building
reliable Arctic infrastructure. What do engineering societies and
academia need to develop Arctic design standards?
Answer. To develop Arctic design standards, the engineering
community and academia will need a robust understanding of the
magnitude of environmental metrics and their probability of occurring
over time. This understanding must also account for changes in
environmental parameters occurring as a result of climate change. As
stated in my testimony, we do not design for the mean; we must design
for the extreme. Rationally derived quantities for extreme values of
environmental demands including wind, wave and ice conditions are
necessary to conclude, with certainty, that a facility is ``reliable.''