[Senate Hearing 112-338]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-338
AGRO-DEFENSE: RESPONDING TO
THREATS AGAINST AMERICA'S AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SYSTEM
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HEARING
before the
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,
THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE
of the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 13, 2011
__________
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
JON TESTER, Montana RAND PAUL, Kentucky
MARK BEGICH, Alaska JERRY MORAN, Kansas
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Nicholas A. Rossi, Minority Staff Director
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
Joyce Ward, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
MARK BEGICH, Alaska JERRY MORAN, Kansas
Lisa M. Powell, Majority Staff Director
Jessica K. Nagasako, Professional Staff Member
Rachel R. Weaver, Minority Staff Director
Jena N. McNeill, Professional Staff Member
Aaron H. Woolf, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statement:
Page
Senator Akaka................................................ 1
Prepared statement:
Senator Moran................................................ 33
WITNESSES
Tuesday, September 13, 2011
Colonel John T. Hoffman (Ret.), Senior Research Fellow, National
Center for Food Protection and Defense, University of Minnesota 3
Paul Williams, DVM, Director of Agriculture, Food and Veterinary
Programs, Division of Homeland Security, Georgia Emergency
Management Agency.............................................. 5
Lisa Shames, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S.
Government Accountability Office............................... 16
Doug Meckes, DVM, Director of Food, Agricultural, and Veterinary
Defense Division, Office of Health Affairs, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 18
Ted Elkin, Director, Office of Food Defense, Communication and
Emergency Response, Center for Food Safety and Applied
Nutrition, Food and Drug Administration, U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services...................................... 20
Sheryl K. Maddux, Deputy Director, Office of Homeland Security
and Emergency Coordination, U.S. Department of Agriculture,
accompanied by John R. Clifford, DVM, Deputy Administrator and
Chief Veterinary Officer for the Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service............................................. 22
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Elkin, Ted:
Testimony.................................................... 20
Prepared statement........................................... 66
Hoffman, Colonel John T. (Ret.):
Testimony.................................................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 34
Maddux, Sheryl K.:
Testimony.................................................... 22
Prepared statement........................................... 79
Meckes, Doug:
Testimony.................................................... 18
Prepared statement........................................... 57
Shames, Lisa:
Testimony.................................................... 16
Prepared statement........................................... 47
Williams, Paul:
Testimony.................................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 43
APPENDIX
Questions and responses for the record from:
Dr. Meckes................................................... 92
Mr. Elkin.................................................... 95
Ms. Maddux................................................... 102
Background....................................................... 108
AGRO-DEFENSE: RESPONDING TO
THREATS AGAINST AMERICA'S AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SYSTEM
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TUESDAY SEPTEMBER 13, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce,
and the District of Columbia,
of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m., in
room SD-628, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K.
Akaka, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Akaka and Moran.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. I call this hearing of the Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management (OGM), the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia to order. I want to
welcome our witnesses. Aloha and thank you so much for being
here.
Today the Subcommittee will examine the Federal
Government's progress in implementing the Nation's food and
agriculture defense policy. Specifically, we will look at our
readiness to respond to and recover from a terrorist attack and
natural disasters affecting food and agriculture, and we will
be reviewing a new Government Accountability Office (GAO)
report on that topic.
Protecting agriculture is critically important to the well-
being of Americans. The U.S. agriculture and food sector
annually generates more than $300 billion worth of food. One in
12 American jobs is in this sector. Agro-terrorism, such as the
deliberate introduction of animal and plant diseases, poses a
critical threat to both public health and the world economy.
The agricultural and food system is particularly vulnerable
because relatively unsophisticated methods could produce
tremendous damage. For instance, foot-and-mouth disease is a
highly contagious disease affecting cattle and certain other
animals. It can easily be transmitted by aerosol, clothing, and
shoes.
The impact of a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak could be
devastating to our country's economy. The 2001 outbreak in the
United Kingdom (UK) resulted in the slaughter of approximately
7 million animals, and financial losses of $8 billion to
agriculture, tourism, and other sectors. In 2002, documents
from an al-Qaeda training camp showed that the terrorist group
had researched how to compromise U.S. food supplies.
As we mark the 10-year anniversary of the September 11,
2001, attacks, we may not be facing a specific agro-terror
plot, but we must remain vigilant.
I would like to highlight several issues that particularly
concern me. The Government Accountability Office will testify
that there is no centralized coordination to oversee the
Federal Government's progress in implementing Homeland Security
Presidential Directive (HSPD) 9 which spells out our Nation's
agro defense policy. This means we cannot be sure of the
effectiveness of agencies' efforts.
Additionally, I am concerned about how well Federal
agencies are working with each other and their State, Tribal,
local, and industry partners. No single agency has the ability
to address these threats and challenges alone. All levels of
government, industry, and citizens need to work together to
limit the consequences if an attack occurs. We will look at
different areas where coordination and collaboration is
critical, such as information sharing, surveillance, and
disaster assistance.
I am also concerned about the Federal veterinarian
workforce and its ability to respond to major animal disease
outbreaks, such as the bird flu or foot-and-mouth disease.
Federal veterinarians perform critical food safety research and
public health functions.
I held a hearing in 2009 on this topic, where GAO
identified several challenges, including troubling veterinarian
shortages at numerous agencies involved in food safety
inspections and responding to these disease outbreaks. Since
that hearing, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has
established a council that brings Federal agencies together to
work on this issue. I look forward to hearing about what
progress the agencies here today have made in this area.
Since the September 11, 2001, attacks, we have taken steps
to prepare for an attack on our food or agricultural systems,
but I remain concerned that America is not ready to effectively
respond and recover from an agricultural food event. I look
forward to hearing from our witnesses this afternoon and to a
productive discussion with you.
I look forward to hearing from our first panel and welcome
you here today. Colonel John Hoffman, who is the Senior
Research Fellow at the National Center for Food Protection and
Defense (NCFPD), at the University of Minnesota, and Dr. Paul
Williams, the Director of Agriculture, Food, and Veterinary
Programs at the Georgia Emergency Management Agency.
As you know, it is the custom of the Subcommittee to swear
in all witnesses, and I would ask both of you to stand and
raise your right hand.
Do you swear that the testimony that you are about to give
before the Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
Mr. Hoffman. I do.
Dr. Williams. I do.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. It will be noted for the record
that the witnesses answered in the affirmative.
Before we start, I want you to know that your full written
statements will be part of the record, and I would also like to
remind you to please limit your remarks to 5 minutes. Colonel
Hoffman, will you please proceed with your statement?
STATEMENT OF COLONEL JOHN T. HOFFMAN (RET.),\1\ SENIOR RESEARCH
FELLOW, NATIONAL CENTER FOR FOOD PROTECTION AND DEFENSE,
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
Colonel Hoffman. Chairman Akaka, I am honored to represent
the National Center for Food Protection and Defense, a U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Center of Excellence
(COE), to provide my perspective on the progress and continuing
needs in the effort to defend the Nation's food supply
infrastructure from intentional attacks and catastrophic
failure.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Colonel Hoffman appears in the
appendix on page 34.
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We believe the global integration and overall complexity of
the food supply chain requires that we continue to improve our
extensive food safety system and aggressively deploy and mature
our food defense capabilities.
The availability of sufficient and safe food is key to the
health and stability of any Nation. Food is the one
infrastructure you cannot opt out of. The dual mission of
safety and defense, collectively referred to as food
protection, must have the same standing and dedication of
resources as protecting any other infrastructure.
Despite the significant progress in food protection
resulting from Homeland Security President Directive (HSPD)-7
and HSPD-9, and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), sector-specific plans
under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), and
the impending implementation of the new FDA Foods Modernization
Act, much remains to be done.
Thousands die and hundreds of thousands are sickened each
year by food-borne illness. Dr. Robert Scharff estimated in his
article on health-related costs from food-borne illness in the
United States, that the cost to the Nation is at least $152
billion. Some contend it is closer to $1.4 trillion once
private sector costs are included.
Given the current level of food-borne illness in the United
States, the concentration of supply chains, our growing
reliance on food imports from Nations with suspect food safety
standards, and the increasing frequency of economically
motivated adulteration events, how will we know an actual
terrorist attack has taken place, as opposed to another routine
food-borne illness event.
In fact, it may not take weeks, but months to recognize
that an intentional attack on our food system is unfolding.
Recent events such as the contamination of green peppers with
Salmonella St. Paul from Mexico, and this summer's bean sprout
contamination with E. coli in Germany demonstrate the large
geographic footprint, the potential for extensive casualties,
substantial financial burden, and political cost where only a
small quantity of one product in international trade is
involved.
This has not been lost on our potential adversaries. For
example, the following is a translation provided by the Counter
Agro Terrorism Research Center (CATRC), in Israel of a recent
post to a Jihadist internet forum: ``I say, and may Allah help
us to success, the qualities of the E. Coli, as well as the
ability to develop it into biological weapon, bio-engineered in
a laboratory, make the E. coli a most attractive candidate and
a significant element in biological warfare, spreading
violently, and killing silently, irritating the enemies and
tearing their guts apart.'' Chilling to hear.
Key provisions of HSPD-9 have been implemented with varying
degrees of success. Functional information surveillance,
deployment of preventive controls, and mitigation strategies
have all suffered from distributed responsibilities across
government, gaps in overlaps and agency authorities and their
capabilities, and concerns about unintended consequences.
The variability of food safety governance from local to
State to Federal is another key problem in deploying and
maturing an effective food defense system. Simply put, there is
no single, coherent, clearly delineated line of authority over
our Nation's food defense efforts.
The various and not insignificant challenges are further
complicated by concerns over proprietary information
protection, liability issues, and the difficulty of
implementing an effective system that does not unnecessarily
drive up the cost of food. The unfortunate truth is that we as
a Nation lack effective surveillance for emergent high
consequence food borne illness events, domestic and global.
At present, our primary detection capability is the
emergency room. This limits us to a detect to respond
capability. Relying primarily on a response-focused detection
system is expensive, both in terms of human suffering and
economic impact.
While we can start in many places, what we need most is to
expand surveillance and detection to include points much
earlier in these events' time lines. This would enable
mitigation strategies or preventive controls to be informed by
surveillance and detection.
There are two detection modes that need to become our
objective capabilities, both of which are envisioned in the
Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA). First and more reasonably
developed, with commitment, appropriate senior leadership
emphasis and some moderate resourcing is detect to protect.
This capability detects and identifies serious emergent events
closer to the first casualties so as to intervene and protect
more of the population that might otherwise be exposed.
Ultimately, we need to move to a detect to prevent policy,
where surveillance detects contaminated adulterated products
before they are consumed and emergent events in foreign
countries are detected before they reach the United States.
Such capability, combined with new risk assessment, event
modeling, diagnostic tools, and improved mitigation and
response capabilities could render our food supply chain a less
attractive target for our adversaries.
From many perspectives, the Food Modernization Safety Act
may place too much of the early intentional threat
identification task on the private sector where there is only
limited capability to fulfill this role. As a result, we may be
blindsided by an intentional food-based attack on this Nation
some time soon.
Such an event could deal a devastating blow to the psyche
of the Nation, it could have a decades-long impact on our
national economy, productivity, national security, and our own
food security. Successful implementation of the FSMA, which
recognizes the risk covered in the spectrum of biological to
chemical to radiological, will certainly reduce incidents of
food borne illness, but a lot remains to be done.
Aligning government authorities, supporting an increasingly
complex nature of responsibilities across government and
industry, and averting criminal and terrorism-related
contamination events without unduly increasing the price of
food is a daunting challenge. As many in the food and
agriculture sector have stated, food is the ultimate weapon of
mass distribution and agriculture is the ultimate weapon of
mass unemployment.
Failure to effectively deploy a national food and
agricultural defense capability represents a major strategic
risk to the Nation. This risk begs additional focus, new
approaches to our food system, preventive controls,
surveillance, and early event detection. We ignore these at our
peril. Thank you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Colonel Hoffman. Dr.
Williams, please proceed with your statement.
STATEMENT OF PAUL WILLIAMS,\1\ DVM, DIRECTOR OF AGRICULTURE,
FOOD, AND VETERINARY PROGRAMS, DIVISION OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
GEORGIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
Dr. Williams. Senator Akaka, I appreciate the opportunity
to appear before you today and give you an overview of the
State's perspective to the implementation of HSPD-9 and the
Emergency Support Function (ESF-11). From the State's
perspective, the entire concept of ESF-11 and integrated
agriculture emergency management did not begin with September
11, 2001. It began in the 1990s as a result of natural
disasters.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Dr. Williams appears in the appendix
on page 43.
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In 1994, Georgia, Florida, and Indiana became the first
States in the Nation to have an ESF-11 in the State Emergency
Operation Plan. In 1995, the National Institute of Animal
Agriculture comprised of the Nation's largest agribusinesses,
recommended that the Federal Government install an ESF-11 in
the Federal Response Plan (FRP).
In 2001, the National Emergency Management Association
(NEMA) contracted with the Georgia Emergency Management Agency
(GEMA) to write a model ESF-11 to be added to the Federal
Response Plan. In 2002, the Gilmore Commission recommended to
the White House Advisory Council to the President that the
intent of the model be placed in the new National Response
Plan. This is the genesis of ESF-11.
The concept of Animal Health Emergency Management (AHEM)
and Agriculture and Food Defense has for the most part been a
capability that has found its leadership, direction, and energy
at the State level. Federal agencies have, for the most part,
participated with a reluctant acceptance.
In the broad context of Food Defense and Critical
Infrastructure, there is a reluctance to provide the same level
of commitment as they have in food safety. The Department of
Homeland Security, although having statutory responsibility for
all elements of the National Response Framework (NRF),
including Critical Infrastructure, frequently abdicate their
responsibility for leadership and oversight to the sector
specific agencies that view these responsibilities ``as other
duties.''
States have grown increasingly frustrated with the lack of
a comprehensive strategy for coordination and implementation of
a State, regional, and national Agriculture and Food Defense
Risk Reduction Plan that addresses the elements of national
critical infrastructure.
Preliminary assessments done by each State demonstrate that
as much as two-thirds of what their citizens consume came from
another State. Food defense requires State, regional, and
national coordination. To accomplish regional capabilities,
States have begun to organize. Ten southern States formed the
State Animal and Agriculture Disaster Response Alliance
(SAADRA). In the Midwest, 12 States formed the Multi-state
Partnership to begin work on food defense issues.
In 2009, these two regional Alliances met to discuss common
goals and objectives. We identified early on a major problem.
Six years after HSPD-9, the Government Coordinating Council
(GCC) had yet to develop a definition of a National Agriculture
or Food Critical Infrastructure Site. As a result, for 6 years
after HSPD-9, there were no such sites identified in the United
States except for Federal buildings.
In January 2010, over 100 representatives from 30 States
met with the Department of Homeland Security, Homeland
Infrastructure Threat Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC). After 3
days of meetings, HITRAC accepted the States' recommendation
for a definition. By June 2010, over 1,400 Level 2 Agriculture
and Food National Critical Infrastructure Sites had been
identified and validated by HITRAC.
Training and exercise has changed little since 2005 and
does not address the measure of effectiveness of our capability
as required by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.
In 2009, Georgia hosted and conducted a full scale, live
agent exercise at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
(FLETC). Over 300 participants from 60 local, State, Federal,
and private sector agencies and organizations participated. The
scenario, a chemical attack on the U.S. food supply, created
80,000 illnesses and 40,000 deaths in an unmitigated attack.
In the exercise, a consequence model, funded by the State
Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP), tracked the 14 target
capabilities exercised and the consequence reduction of each.
At the end of the exercise, it could be demonstrated that the
actions taken by the participants reduced the number of
illnesses to 27,000 and the number of deaths to 12,000.
States have demonstrated the ability to advance the
capabilities necessary for true agriculture and food defense.
This requires funding. From 2003 to 2007, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) reported that the Agriculture and Food
Sector received approximately one percent of the State Homeland
Security Grant Program funds.
Recently, the U.S. Animal Health Association (USAHA),
through a resolution, requested funding for a regional exercise
and training. FEMA denied this request, stating that from 2007
to 2011, the Agriculture and Food Sector had received 20
percent of the State Homeland Security Grant Program funds. The
States refute this amount following a polling of States by the
SAADRA group. All States report no increase in funding to the
agriculture and food sector from 2007 to 2011.
We must continue to measure the effectiveness of our
capability. A list of accomplishments to be checked off as done
does not answer the question, ``are we safer today than we were
before? '' Understanding the Agriculture and Food System as
Critical Infrastructure will allow us to prioritize response so
that each natural disaster does not carve away another piece of
our economic viability that does not return. Thank you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Dr. Williams, and thank
you both for your testimony.
Colonel Hoffman, you testified that there is little doubt
that those who want to do us harm will study disease and food-
borne illness events and that agro-terrorism presents
substantial risks to the United States. I would like to hear
more from you about the threat.
Would you please discuss why you believe terrorists may be
attracted to using food as a weapon, and what economic and
social costs a serious food-based attack could have nationally
and globally?
Colonel Hoffman. Well, Senator, at the beginning you
mentioned the foot and mouth disease (FMD) risk. As was
demonstrated in the U.K. in 2001, the impact on society, the
cost to the Nation, in this case Britain, to deal with an event
like that went far beyond anybody's expectations. And, in fact,
the full appreciation of the impact on the country socially,
economically from a trade standpoint, and just everyday life,
was not fully appreciated for years afterwards.
This is not lost on our enemies. They recognize this, as
was demonstrated in the records that were found at Tarnak Farms
in Afghanistan. Obviously they had been thinking about this
because we found written evidence that was the case. These
events were horrendous and they had tremendous impact.
Food, for the human side, is simply the fastest way to make
things happen. This quote that I provided to you is actually an
extract from a much larger translation from a blog in a
Jihadist forum where they actually discuss why food makes a
good weapon or a modality to deploy a weapon, and how effective
even common pathogens can be.
And I think, while we have given appropriate focus to what
we call select agents, the more virulent, more dangerous
pathogens, these common everyday pathogens like E. coli, which
surface in our food supply system with unnerving frequency
anyway, could be easily weaponized and the systems for
deploying it are demonstrated with every one of these food
outbreaks. And the cost of these food outbreaks, as with
Salmonella St. Paul, where 44 States were impacted and many,
many people were made ill.
This is documented in the media. They can study the media,
they can see what happened, they can see very clearly how the
event unfolded, and they provide what we call die studies for
somebody to look at it and examine how one of these events may
occur.
I am not suggesting this would be easy to do, but I am also
suggesting it would not be difficult for somebody with
determination and some very limited resources. So I believe
that the risk is there. I think that implementing the various
defense plans that have been promulgated already by the
agencies, but also fully implementing, fully resourcing the
Food Safety Modernization Act would help go a long way toward
making defense a reality.
But I am also concerned about accountability and how we
make that happen and how we hold people accountable to make
sure those defense plans are put in place.
Senator Akaka. Thank you Colonel Hoffman. You testified
that even if the 2011 Food Safety Modernization Act is funded
and regulations are put in place, that there still remains the
challenge that there is no single authority in charge of all
aspects of the system.
Will you please elaborate on why you believe it is
important to have one authority in charge of food defense?
Colonel Hoffman. I think the simplest way to describe that
need is that it is very difficult to bring to bear, if you
will, the majority of their resources to effectively focus your
resources on a critical need when the use of those resources
and accountability for those resources if fragmented across
numerous agencies.
And this is by no means a criticism of those agencies. They
are doing what they think are their priorities, their mandates,
and what their leadership views needs to be done. But the
simple truth is, this results in gaps and overlaps. And lacking
that clear line of authority and accountability for steps that
have been taken, the preparation for a defense is going to
leave gaps.
It is going to leave those overlaps in place. We will not
effectively use the limited resources we have, and in today's
economy, that is unacceptable. We have to do a better job of
effectively using the resources we have, applying them in the
most effective manner, and achieving the greatest level of
defense we can with the modest resources available.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Dr. Williams, you raised concern
about the lack of leadership and commitment from the Federal
Government on a comprehensive strategy for agriculture and food
defense. Will you please elaborate on these concerns?
Dr. Williams. Yes, sir. The concerns that we have at the
State level are, I think, vastly different than some of the
concerns that you see at the Federal level. We, at the State
level, have to deal with this issue from a situation where it
is in our backyard. In other words, every incident occurs in
someone's county, someone's municipality that type of issue.
And so, the capability that we have has to be driven down
to that particular level, and there is no coordination
currently to really accomplish that. I mentioned in my
testimony the issue of not having the ability to identify
critical infrastructure sites in our States and in our
counties.
An ag and food critical infrastructure site is a site that,
if compromised, could cause 10,000 or more casualties, affect
five or more States, and could take longer than a year to
recover. That is a Level 2 national critical infrastructure ag
and food site.
As I mentioned, up until 2010, we did not have any of those
sites identified at the State and local level so that we could
even begin preparedness to prepare for any type of mitigating
actions for those particular sites. We did not know they
existed. Today we know that they exist.
But one of the things that we have to do to manage those
types of assets at the State and local level is to be able to
identify them, place them in what is called the Automated
Critical Asset Management System that is operated by the State
and local law enforcement, where we begin at that grassroots
level to be able to provide the type of security that we need
for those types of sites.
We cannot protect everything, but we have to begin to
protect those things that can be most injurious to us if we are
attacked. And we have had really no leadership or direction for
how to actually do that. The States have been doing it by
ourselves, more or less, as I mentioned, through some of those
compacts.
We have over 30 States right now that are part of regional
compacts and we are adding States every day. The testimony that
I gave to you earlier was not just my opinion. Thirty States
reviewed my testimony before I submitted it to you. And so, it
is a general consensus of what we are all seeing out there.
And so, we are looking for ways to begin to develop a
State, regional, and national comprehensive food defense
capability and we do not have that right now.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Dr. Williams, according to your
testimony, FEMA reports that from 2007 to 2011, the agriculture
and food sector received approximately 20 percent of State
Homeland Security Grant Program funds. You refuted that number,
indicating that in 2003 to 2007, FEMA reported that only one
percent of these funds went to the agriculture and food and
that the States' you surveyed reported no increase in funding
from FEMA.
Have you been able to determine the source of this
discrepancy? Also, what impact has low funding levels had on
preparing for a food and agriculture incident?
Dr. Williams. The States did refute that amount of 20
percent, and I can certainly supply you with all of the reports
from 2003 to 2007 where FEMA stated that the States had
received one percent of the State Homeland Security Grant
Program funds, which is really how States develop their
preparedness.
Each State, based on population and risk and various and
sundry other types of triggers, receive X amount of dollars.
And out of that, the States determine what they actually are
going to fund. As we have formed these regional alliances, we
began to share information as to how much funding we were
actually getting to develop preparedness for food defense, and
we have a lot of data that I could share with you that shows
each State's allocation for those actions from 2003 forward.
We were unaware that there was any discrepancy being
reported until the U.S. Animal Health Association requested
funding for training and exercise and were denied, and in the
denial letter, FEMA reported, at that time, that there was from
2007 to 2011 there was 20 percent going to the ag and food
sector at the State level.
We refuted that and we have sought to be able to validate
the discrepancy by polling each State, and from 2003 to--excuse
me--from 2007 to 2011, we have a spreadsheet that shows how
much each year each State actually got for those purposes.
Where the 20 percent came from we do not know.
Now, we have asked FEMA to supply us where those figures
came from and they have refused to give us that information. So
why there is a discrepancy I am not really sure.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. I would like to call on
the Senator from Kansas, Mr. Moran. Thank you so much for being
here and for any opening remarks you may have and questions.
Senator Moran. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I
would just express--I will submit my opening statement for the
record, other than to express my appreciation to you for
hosting and holding this hearing.
Senator Akaka. It will be included in the record.
Senator Moran. This is a significant issue, certainly for
our country. As a Kansan, this is a significant issue for us.
Food safety and cultivation agriculture is a significant
component of our economy and just the rumor of a contaminant
has dramatic consequences upon the agricultural industry and
certainly upon the prices received.
And so, I want to make certain that we, as a Congress, and
the Department of Homeland Security and others involved in this
topic are doing the necessary things to protect our food
supply.
In that regard, let me just ask a broad question, and maybe
I will start with you, Dr. Williams. Your sense of the
commitment by the Department of Homeland Security is, is food
and agricultural safety a priority, a focus of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security?
Dr. Williams. I think it is a concern of Homeland Security.
One of the worst things that we did following September 11,
2001, was to coin the term agro-terror. The moment that we did
that we stovepiped ourselves as something different.
If you actually look at an attack on agriculture, whether
it be foot and mouth disease or avian influenza or any of those
types of things, it actually is a Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) attack. It is an
attack using a chemical, biological, or radiological agent on
the food supply, whether it is to impact economically,
agriculture or food, or whether it is to use the agriculture
and food supply as a method of disseminating a chemical,
biological, or radiological agent.
CBRNE, going back to the question about the FEMA funding,
from 2003 to 2007, FEMA reported that there were five target
capabilities that received 56 percent of all the State Homeland
Security Grant Program money. One of those was critical
infrastructure, which is one reason we are desperate to be in
the critical infrastructure game.
The other one was CBRNE. That was one of the five most
funded target capabilities. And so, we are beginning to look at
those attacks on the food supply as a CBRNE event, rather than
an agro-terror event. I am not sure if that answers your
question, but----
Senator Moran. And the result of that distinction is what?
What does that mean in practical terms?
Dr. Williams. In practical terms, that means that we were
not at the funding table, and States----
Senator Moran. So the categorization matters as far as the
priority or emphasis, at least in funding, that comes from the
Federal Government?
Dr. Williams. Absolutely. I actually work for the State
Administrative Agency in my State. We are the ones that
actually manage all of the State Homeland Security Grant
Program funds, and my area of expertise is ag and food defense.
And I, on a weekly basis, tried to make a point that we needed
funding for the ag and food sector for various reasons, for
CBRNE and for especially critical infrastructure.
And I was told for over 6 years that until we have a
definition of an ag and food critical infrastructure site, we
are not eligible for any of those funds. So there were 6 years
lost in my State, in your State, and in every State.
Senator Moran. Is there an understanding within the
security community as to where a contamination might most
likely occur? What is the distinction between plant agriculture
and livestock agriculture? Is it more clear that we are more
susceptible or our vulnerabilities lie on the livestock side?
And in addition to the production side of agriculture, then
is it more likely that something happens in production
agriculture versus something that happens as the food is
processed in the food chain?
Dr. Williams. That is a complicated question.
Senator Moran. Where are the greatest risks, is my
question, I guess.
Dr. Williams. Well, I think the greatest risk for economic
damage probably comes in the production agriculture side, from
the introduction of a foreign animal disease or something of
that nature.
Senator Moran. And it is on the animal side?
Dr. Williams. On the animal side. If you are looking at the
ability to kill people, it is obviously in the processing side
of things so that you are actually creating a product that is
going to be directly consumed by the public. It is also those
things that are going to be consumed rapidly, in other words,
things that are either packed on ice or stored not in cans,
things of that nature.
Things that are going to sit on a shelf for a long period
of time are not as attractive as something like seafood, for
instance, that is going to be disseminated and eaten by the
public within literally 72 hours. Those are particularly
vulnerable and particularly dangerous areas.
Senator Moran. Is our focus more on prevention or upon
containment?
Dr. Williams. I think our focus is primarily on response. I
think something happens, we respond. There is not enough effort
being made to prevent these things from happening at all. I
mean, let us face it. There is going to be less consequences if
it never happens.
And one of the things that we are challenged with, and that
is one of the reasons that the critical infrastructure piece is
so important, is that one of the things that we are forced to
do in complying with the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan, is to look at critical nodes, and then when we to look at
those critical nodes from where are their supply chains, what
are their distribution footprints, and we begin to develop a
picture of what that system or subsystem begins to look like in
a State, in a region, and across the country. This helps define
risk.
I had actually met with the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (FBI) last week with our Fusion Center folks and
one of the things that they brought up is that intelligence is
bits and pieces of information. And people describe that as a
piece of a puzzle. Well, one of the FBI agents said something
that I thought was particularly good in describing our
situation.
A puzzle comes in a box with a picture of what the puzzle
looks like on the top. We are forcing our intelligence people
to take bits and pieces of the puzzle and put it together with
no picture of what the puzzle even looks like.
And through our efforts of painting that picture through
critical infrastructure, we are able to begin to describe what
that picture of the puzzle looks like. And we have a better
chance of interdicting and preventing some of these things from
happening to begin with.
Senator Moran. When you say our focus is more on the
containment side, do we have the necessary scientific and
technological base of information to know what the response is
to be? Is our science sufficient to respond? As you indicate,
the most likely attack or introduction of an agent would be on
the side of livestock.
Do we have the scientific basis to know what to do when
that occurs or is there research yet to be done?
Dr. Williams. I think that we have a good capability to
respond. It is not an accident that we have not had foot and
mouth disease in this country since the 1960s or 1950s
possibly. Good surveillance, good programs to control and
eradicate those types of things, import/export rules and
regulations, those all protect us from those types of events.
I think we have the ability to identify an incident after
it has occurred and to respond to it reasonably well. One of
the things that we saw--and I hate to keep giving a historical
perspective--but one of the things that we started seeing in
the mid-1980s was a depletion of the agriculture and food
response community as far as people are concerned.
We have fewer and fewer people available at the State and
field level to respond to one of these types of incidents. And
that was one of the reasons that we developed Animal Health
Emergency Management and Agriculture Emergency Management, is
because we were able to dip into the emergency management
community to get the resources that we no longer had in the ag
and food community.
And that is still true today. Even though there has been
some improvements in the workforce, we still do not have enough
boots on the ground to be able to respond to a major event
without utilizing the entire emergency management system.
Senator Moran. Doctor, thank you very much. Colonel, I did
not intend to ignore you, although I finally, in visiting with
Georgia, I can understand. Appreciate the conversation, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. Let me start a second
round of questions. Colonel Hoffman, you raise concerns that
the intelligence community does not focus adequately on
emerging dangers within the global food and agriculture sector.
You stated that this could result in us being blindsided by the
next event.
Would you please describe what you believe the appropriate
level of assessment would look like?
Colonel Hoffman. I would be happy to.
Senator Akaka. Also, what steps need to be taken to achieve
this?
Colonel Hoffman. I would be happy to do that. I think it
would be useful to start with an example of one of the
shortcomings, because I believe that our intelligence folks do
a great job in many areas, but I do not believe that they have
sufficient mandate or instruction for actually collecting the
kind of information that we need.
I would start with the example of melamine in wheat gluten.
When that event occurred, that product was brought into the
United States as a supposedly human food grade product. It was
purchased by one company from another company through a
commodity brokerage arrangement. The broker went out and found
the product in a foreign country, imported it into the United
States, and sent it to the company that ultimately used it in
pet food, fortunately.
Well, the reality is that the situation was actually
understood by others in the international community and we seem
to have been totally blindsided by that event.
For example, the Chinese entities involved had already been
caught putting melamine in products like that in other
countries. All right? Two specifically were Australia and the
European Union where they had been banned from importing those
products because of their tendency to do that.
Yet, that information was not readily available to our
industry, was not known by various agencies in the U.S.
Government or the State governments that was the case. The
product was allowed to come into the country without inspection
and forwarded directly to that firm and put into the
marketplace.
We need to fix that. We need to create a capability,
establish requirements and collection plans, if you will, in
the intelligence community to begin to identify when there are
changes or shifts in commodity actions in other countries or
where there are players who may be cheating on the system.
And there are indicators out there if we are tuned to watch
them, and I am afraid we are not, and I believe that this level
of surveillance and detection that I have been referring to
needs to move beyond the traditional that we are doing looking
for indicators of biologic events for human disease.
But actually out into the agriculture community, the food
production community around the world to watch for indicators
that there are nefarious players, there is somebody preparing
to or conducting economically motivated adulteration, or
somebody worse may be planning to exploit the food supply
chain.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Dr. Williams, as you may know, my
home State will be hosting the Asian-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) meeting this fall which Secretary Napolitano
has designated as a national special security event (NSSE). I
understand that you were a member of an advisory committee for
a previous NSSE event.
What are some of the things that we should be focusing on
to ensure a safe and secure event in regard to food?
Dr. Williams. A national special security event is a
challenge. My first exposure to one was actually the 1996
Olympic games, but most recently, the 2004 G-8 Summit that was
held in Sea Island, Georgia. And the thing that was obvious to
us in developing a food defense plan for the Group of 8 and all
30 heads of State that also attended, was they were all fed in
congregate feeding areas. In other words, there were areas that
were secured so that they could have their luncheons and their
dinners and so forth.
It takes at least 6 months, preferably a year, of
preparation to put together a food defense plan that is
adequate. So planning ahead of time is really important. It is
not rocket science. In doing the G-8 Summit, we basically met
with the White House food staff and we met with the venue that
was actually going to be preparing all the food for the Group
of 8.
And we questioned them and we found that they were
customarily getting food from over 60 vendors that supplied the
various types of food that would be prepared for the President
and the rest of the Group of 8.
We looked at those vendors and many of those vendors did
not have the ability to secure their food that we felt was
adequate. Now, we, being the State of Georgia, both public
health and agriculture and emergency management and USDA and
FDA, and it was a very good partnership in preparing for that
particular event.
An FDA team was responsible for the Group of 8. There were
17 other congregate feeding stations for first responders and
other people that were part of those delegations. The
responsibility for those other 17 congregate feeding areas fell
upon the State, as it would in your State, as far as public
health and agriculture, to secure the food that would go into
those congregate areas.
What we actually did is we simply reduced the number of
vendors from 60 to about three vendors that we could actually
provide adequate food security and defense for. Most of those
three companies actually had the ability, as a company, to
provide the level of security that we actually thought
necessary.
All of the food that was purchased for the event, with the
exception of a few perishable products, was actually purchased
months ahead of time and put in refrigerated warehouses where
they had 24-hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week armed law enforcement.
And the food that went to the Group of 8 actually moved to
those sites in sealed trucks with a law enforcement escort.
Like I say, it is labor-intensive, but it is not
particularly rocket science. It is just figuring out what it is
that you can protect that will provide the most security for
those that are attending the event.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. I would like to give both of you
an opportunity to provide any final statements or comments. Dr.
Williams, let me call on you first.
Dr. Williams. Actually, you have asked me to talk a lot
today and I certainly appreciate the opportunity. Actually, for
those of us at the State level, this is a particularly unique
opportunity to say in front of a group like this the concerns
that we actually have.
Today at 11 o'clock, a conference call with the SAADRA,
States, the southern States, and the Midwest Multi-State
Partnership, took place and there was great excitement that we
were actually going to get an opportunity to have our view of
this actually heard. I appreciate the opportunity for doing
that.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. Colonel Hoffman.
Colonel Hoffman. I would simply like to say that I very
much appreciate the opportunity to come and be a part of an
effort like this. This seems to me, like a step toward re-
invigorating the process of getting food defense established as
a priority and funded here in the United States. I thank you
very much for the opportunity and commend you for holding the
hearings.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. Senator Moran, do you
have any further questions?
Senator Moran. Mr. Chairman, just one additional question.
You mentioned Australia and another country in regard to
knowing something that we did not know and prohibiting the
information did not become available or we were not aware. Are
there countries out there that are role models for us, Colonel
Hoffman? Are there things that other countries are doing better
that we ought to look at?
Colonel Hoffman. Well, first I would say nobody is doing it
perfectly, and that is evidenced by the events that occur in
those countries. But I think there are lessons to be learned.
Australia is a good example of how they handle imports, how
they monitor food and agriculture products coming into their
country, and the focus that they put on early detection and
prevention at the border. I think we can learn from that.
I think in partnership with the EU, there is a lot we can
do to improve our ability to prevent port-shopping and the
kinds of things that nefarious players do to try to get things
into our countries. So I think this is going to have to be a
partnership with other countries, just as it has to be a
partnership with government and industry to solve it.
Senator Moran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Senator Moran. I want
to thank our first panel. Your testimonies have been valuable
to us this afternoon and I want to again thank you for your
point in trying to focus on this agro-terrorism here in our
country. Thank you very much.
I would like to ask the second panel now to come forward. I
want to welcome our second panel. Ms. Lisa Shames, who is the
Director of Natural Resources and Environment at the Government
Accountability Office; Dr. Doug Meckes, Director of Food,
Agricultural, and Veterinary Defense Division at the Office of
Health Affairs at the Department of Homeland Security; Mr. Ted
Elkin, Director of the Office of Food Defense, Communication
and Emergency Response at the Food and Drug Administration at
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS); Ms. Sheryl
Maddux is the Deputy Director, Office Homeland Security and
Emergency Coordination at the Department of Agriculture, and
she is accompanied by Dr. John Clifford, who is the Deputy
Administrator and Chief Veterinary Officer for the Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). Dr. Clifford is not
providing a statement, but is available to respond to
questions.
It is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear in all
witnesses and I would ask you to please stand and raise your
right hands.
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to
give this Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
Ms. Shames. I do.
Dr. Meckes. I do.
Mr. Elkin. I do.
Ms. Maddux. I do.
Mr. Clifford. I do.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Let the record show that all
witnesses responded in the affirmative.
Before we start, I want you to know that your full written
statements will be made a part of the record and I would also
like to remind you to please limit your oral remarks to 5
minutes. Ms. Shames, please proceed with your statement.
STATEMENT OF LISA SHAMES,\1\ DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Shames. Thank you. Chairman Akaka, Senator Moran, I am
pleased to be here today to discuss the defense of this
country's food and agriculture system. Senator Akaka, as you
observed in your opening statement this is an especially timely
issue in observing the tenth anniversary of September 11, 2001.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Shames appears in the appendix on
page 47.
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As one could imagine, any natural or deliberate disruption
could present a serious threat. My testimony today highlights
GAO's key findings from a report that was requested by Senator
Akaka and is being released today. GAO's overall message is
twofold. First, there is no centralized oversight of the
Federal Food and Agricultural Defense policy, and second, USDA
faces challenges in implementing its responsibilities.
Regarding GAO's first key finding, that there is no
centralized oversight, we found that food and agriculture
defense responsibilities cut across several Federal agencies.
For this reason, centralized oversight is critical to help
ensure an effective response.
At one time, DHS and the White House Homeland Security
Council collected information from agencies about their various
activities, but that has ceased. Because there is no
centralized oversight, it is unclear if efforts to protect food
and agriculture are well-designed and can reduce the Nation's
vulnerability to and the impact of terrorist attacks, major
disasters, and other emergencies.
GAO's second key finding is that USDA does not have a
departmentwide strategy for implementing its food and
agriculture defense responsibilities. Such a strategy is
essential to guide progress in achieving national security
goals. Instead, USDA has delegated these responsibilities to
its agencies.
Although these agencies have taken steps to implement the
Department's response and recovery responsibilities, they face
challenges. For example, the National Veterinary Stockpile
(NVS), was developed to respond to the 17 most damaging animal
diseases such as a highly pathogenic avian influenza.
Positively, critical supplies have been acquired, guidance has
been developed, and a full-time liaison was hired to help the
States.
However, there are still complex implementation challenges.
In particular, vaccines and diagnostic test kits for certain
diseases have either not been developed or may be too costly
for purchase. Also, some vaccines could take longer than the
required 24 hours to deliver to the States. And finally, there
may be missed opportunities with HHS to leverage resources with
the Strategic National Stockpile which contains medical
supplies for human health emergencies, and as such, may be
useful for responders in animal emergencies.
Repeating your opening statement that responding to an
outbreak of a highly contagious disease, Senator Akaka, you
mentioned specifically foot and mouth disease. It also presents
challenges as we have seen in the recent outbreaks in Japan,
Korea, and the United Kingdom.
In particular, animals infected with foot and mouth disease
should be disposed of within 24 hours. But USDA has told us
that it could take as long as 80 days to depopulate a single
feed lot. While burial has been the preferred disposal method,
USDA officials told us that this may not be feasible on a large
scale, and could have public health consequences if done
incorrectly.
Positively, USDA's draft response plan for foot and mouth
disease considers other approaches such as vaccines for at-risk
animals that could help mitigate these concerns.
USDA also faces challenges coordinating the Federal food
and agriculture response for natural disasters, including
hurricanes, floods, and winter storms. There have been 28 in
the last 5 years. Positively, State officials we met with said
that having a single USDA coordinator facilitated communication
and contributed to a successful response.
However, State officials also told us that because multiple
Federal agencies become involved, responsibilities are not
always clear and could delay a response. These delays could
pose a public health risk. In one case during Hurricane Ike,
water surges washed cattle, horses, and poultry 15 to 20 miles
inland, leaving dead livestock in backyards, in front of
hospitals, and on highways. We were told that time was lost
because it was unclear if USDA or the Corps of Engineers was to
carry out the disposal. In the end, it was USDA that carried it
out.
In addition, we found that USDA has not consistently
prepared after-action reports. These are documents that
summarize what went well and what needed improvement during an
emergency. Without a more consistent and comprehensive
reporting process, USDA managers may not have the necessary
information to identify gaps and address them through
corrective actions to help ensure that past mistakes are not
repeated.
In our report, we are making numerous recommendations to
help ensure that the Federal Government can effectively
implement a food and agriculture defense, and adequately
respond to and recover from emergencies affecting food and
agriculture. All the agencies we evaluated concurred with our
recommendations.
This concludes my prepared remarks and I would be pleased
to answer any questions that you may have.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Ms. Shames. Now I will
call on Dr. Meckes. Please proceed with your statement.
STATEMENT OF DOUG MECKES,\1\ DVM, DIRECTOR OF FOOD,
AGRICULTURAL, AND VETERINARY DEFENSE DIVISION, OFFICE OF HEALTH
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Dr. Meckes. Thank you, Chairman Akaka, Senator Moran. My
name is Dr. Doug Meckes and I am the Branch Chief for the Food,
Agricultural and Veterinary Defense Branch of the Office of
Health Affairs (OHA) at the Department of Homeland Security.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you regarding DHS's
efforts to defend our Nation's agriculture, food, human and
animal health in an all-encompassing one-health approach.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Dr. Meckes appears in the appendix on
page 57.
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A central tenet of the DHS mission is protecting the
Nation's agriculture, food, human and animal health in the face
of all hazards. DHS works to complement the efforts of our
partners, including other Federal agencies, that focus on food
and agriculture safety to protect our agriculture and food
systems which are critical to our public health and to our
economic well-being.
Homeland Security President Directive-9, Defense of the
United States Agriculture and Food, establishes national policy
to defend the agriculture and food system against terrorist
attacks, natural disasters, and other emergencies. DHS is
responsible for coordination of the overall national effort to
protect critical infrastructure and key resources of the United
States.
OHA is specifically charged by the Secretary of DHS with
providing oversight and management of DHS's implementation of
HSPD-9, and coordinating those efforts with other Federal
departments and agencies, State, local, Tribal, and territorial
governments, and the private sector.
While much remains to be achieved, DHS has approached HSPD-
9 tasks and responsibilities in the spirit of collaboration and
coordination. With the release of HSPD-9 in February 2004, the
Secretary of DHS was identified as the lead and co-lead for
specific tasks within HSPD-9. Today I will provide an overview
of DSH activities, initiatives, and progress with regard to
several of these tasks.
One of OHA's primary responsibilities is to mitigate the
consequences of biological incidents through early detection.
Within DHS, OHA operates, manages, and supports the
Department's biological defense and surveillance programs. The
BioWatch Program provides for the detection of aerosolized
biological agents and the National Biosurveillance Integration
System (NBIS) provides the means to develop and maintain an
integrated, real-time, multi-discipline surveillance picture.
In order to develop resources capabilities related to
agriculture and food, State and local governments must
integrate the agriculture and food interests into their
emergency planning efforts. To facilitate this integration, OHA
partnered with the National Center for Food Protection and
Defense to develop the Food Sector Food and Agriculture
Readiness Measurement Toolkit.
This tool allows the States to self-assess the strengths of
their food emergency resources plans. Four States are currently
testing the FARM toolkit.
OHA also partnered with the Center of Excellence for
Emerging Zoonotic and Animal Diseases (CEEZAD) to develop a
partner page on the lessons learned, information-sharing portal
where emergency providers and Homeland Security officials can
access an online network of content related to lessons learned,
best practices, innovative ideas on food, agriculture, and
veterinary defense.
A standardized, unified response plan is imperative for
effective incident management. The Food Emergency Response Plan
(FERP) template assists States with the development of a food-
related emergency response plan, which can be integrated into
existing all-hazards response planning. OHA partnered with the
National Association of the States' Department of Agriculture
to revise and update the Food Emergency Response Plan template
to align it with the national response framework.
With 20 percent of the United States gross national product
coming from agriculture, the importance of the private sector
in defending our food supply and keeping our economy strong is
critical. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan provides
a unifying structure for a public/private partnership model to
enhance the protection of the Nation's critical infrastructure.
For the food and agriculture sector, DHS's Office of
Infrastructure Protection (IP) and the sector-specific lead
agencies, USDA and FDA, co-chair the Government Coordinating
Council which developed a sector-specific plan to advance
security. The GCC acts as the counterpart and partner to the
private industry-led Sector Coordinating Council (SCC) to plan,
implement, and execute sufficient and necessary sector-wide
security programs for the Nation's agriculture and food
sector's critical assets.
DHS's Science and Technologies (S&T's) Office of University
Programs taps the expertise of our Nation's colleges and
universities to address pressing homeland security needs
through the Centers of Excellence Program. The Centers of
Excellence engage the academic community to enhance the
Department's Homeland Security capabilities for the agriculture
and food sector.
In addition to the National Center for Food Protection and
Defense, at Minnesota and CEEZAD at Kansas State University,
OUP has created the National Center for Foreign Animal and
Zoonotic Disease (FAZD) Defense at Texas A&M.
Senators Akaka and Moran, I have touched briefly on just a
few aspects of DHS engagement in the agriculture and food
sector, and I am pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Dr. Meckes. Mr. Elkin,
would you please proceed with your statement?
STATEMENT OF TED ELKIN,\1\ DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FOOD DEFENSE,
COMMUNICATION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY
AND APPLIED NUTRITION, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Mr. Elkin. Good afternoon, Chairman Akaka and Senator
Moran. I am Ted Elkin, Director of the Office of Food Defense,
Communication and Emergency Response for the Center for Food
Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN) at the Food and Drug
Administration, which is part of the Department of Health and
Human Services. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our
food defense activities.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Elkin appears in the appendix on
page 66.
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Food safety and food defense continue to be top priorities
for FDA. A terrorist attack on the food supply could have both
severe public health and economic consequences, while damaging
the public's confidence in the food we eat.
FDA is the Federal agency that regulates all the food we
eat except for meat, poultry, and processed egg products which
are regulated by our partners at the U.S. Department of
Agriculture.
FDA's primary mission is to protect the public health.
Ensuring that FDA regulated products are safe and secure is a
vital part of that mission. While performing our mission, we
play a central and a leadership role in the Nation's defense
against acts of intentional contamination. It is FDA's goal,
working closely with other government and private sector
stakeholders, to reduce the likelihood that an FDA-regulated
product could be used to poison or otherwise harm Americans.
We also help ensure that the Nation's public health system
is prepared to deter a potential threat and is ready to respond
to an act of intentional contamination, including terrorism.
FDA has been working closely with DHS, USDA and other Federal
agencies to implement the Homeland Security Presidential
Directives. HHS and USDA exercise key responsibilities as food
sector-specific agencies and serve as co-leads for the food
sector within the Government Coordinating Council.
The GCC is charged with coordinating agriculture and food
defense strategies, activities, and communication across
government and between the government and private sector
partners. The Food and Agriculture Sector is a public/private
partnership that combines expertise from several Federal
agencies, as well as that of State, local, tribal, and
territorial officials, and the private sector, including more
than 100 trade associations and individual firms participating.
Mr. Chairman, I would now like to describe FDA's other food
defense activities. FDA's risk-based approach to food defense
helps the Agency determine where to focus its resources. As
part of its efforts to anticipate threats to the food supply,
FDA has conducted extensive scientific vulnerability
assessments of different categories of food, determining the
most serious risks of intentional contamination with different
biological or chemical agents during various stages of food
production and distribution.
Results of these updated assessments are being used to
develop technology interventions and mitigation strategies,
identify research needs, and provide guidance to the private
sector. FDA has made available vulnerability assessment
software for the food industry to determine the vulnerability
of individual food facilities to attack.
FDA has also developed and made available other tools to
help our stakeholders implement and enhance food defense
measures. The Food-Related Emergency Exercise Boxed Set
released in July, is a compilation of five scenarios based on
intentional and unintentional food contamination events, which
was developed in collaboration with the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) and USDA. The Food Related Emergency Exercise
Boxed (FREE-B), is designed to assist government regulatory and
public health agencies in assessing food emergency response
plans, protocols, and procedures. It provides stakeholders with
a variety of options to test and improve their capabilities to
respond to food-related human or animal health emergencies.
The Food Defense Mitigation Strategy Database launched in
March 2011 is a new resource outlining preventive measures
designed for companies that produce, process, store, package,
distribute and/or transport food or food ingredients.
Two additional training tools that FDA has developed are
Employee FIRST and ALERT to educate front-line food industry
workers and managers about how to lower the risk of intentional
food contamination.
Before concluding, Mr. Chairman, I would like to briefly
mention the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, which will
provide further protections for American consumers from both
intentional and unintentional contamination. FSMA gives FDA a
modern mandate and toolkit to improve the safety of the
country's food supply. It shifts our food safety focus from
reaction and response to prevention, so that prudent prevention
measures will be systematically built into all parts of the
food system.
Specifically to address the threat of intentional
contamination, FSMA directs FDA, in consultation with DHS and
USDA, to issue regulations to require appropriate science-based
mitigation strategies or measures to protect certain high-risk
foods against intentional contamination. Previously, FDA could
recommend, but not require, implementation of such food defense
measures.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, due to the enhancements being
made by FDA and our food defense partners, the United States
food defense system is stronger than ever before. Although we
have made progress, we are continuously working to improve our
ability to prevent, detect, and respond to terrorist threats
and other acts of intentional contamination.
Thank you for this opportunity to discuss our food defense
activities. I would be pleased to respond to any questions.
Thank you.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Elkin. Ms. Maddux,
would you please proceed with your statement?
STATEMENT OF SHERYL K. MADDUX,\1\ DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY COORDINATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF AGRICULTURE; ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN R. CLIFFORD, DVM, DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR AND CHIEF, VETERINARY OFFICE FOR THE ANIMAL AND
PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE
Ms. Maddux. Chairman Akaka and Senator Moran, I want to
thank you for holding the hearing today on the important topic
of responding to threats against America's agriculture and food
system. On the heels of the 10-year anniversary of the
devastating attacks of September 11, 2001, we are reminded of
the need for improved vigilance and the importance of
partnership and collaboration at all levels of government and
with the private sector.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Maddux appears in the appendix on
page 79.
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The U.S. Department of Agriculture considers defense of the
food and ag sector a critical component of our mission to
provide leadership on food, agriculture, natural resources, and
related issues based on sound public policy, the best available
science, and efficient management.
The sector is composed of a complex system and has the
capacity to feed people within and beyond the boundaries of our
Nation. These systems, which are almost entirely under private
ownership, operate in a highly competitive global market,
strive to operate in harmony with the environment, and provide
economic opportunities and improve quality of life for the
rural and urban citizens of the United States and others around
the world.
The sector is dominated by small businesses that employ the
majority of the food industry workforce and account for roughly
one-fifth of the Nation's economic activity. Further, the
sector supply chain operates at the international level with
more than 20 percent of all U.S. imports being food products.
My knowledge in the area of agriculture and food defense is
comprehensive because for the past 9 years, I have been on the
Department's career managers most closely and deeply involved
in the Department of USDA's plans and operational programs.
As Branch Chief of the Disaster and Emergency Operations at
the U.S. Forest Service headquarters in Washington, DC, when
the events of September 11, 2001, occurred, I was the highest
ranking USDA career civil servant engaged with these issues
based on my 21-year career as a U.S. Forest Service employee
and program manager.
The events of September 11, 2001, propelled the Department
and myself with it into the rapids of change unleashed by these
attacks. I served personally on the ground, both in New York at
Ground Zero, and at the Pentagon. I was hand-picked by the
Secretary of Agriculture in 2002 to develop USDA's internal
plan, and also to represent USDA in joint efforts with the
White House Homeland Security Council, and other Federal
departments and agencies.
Thus, I have played a major role in interpreting the
principles, practices, regulations, and laws governing homeland
security, emergency preparedness, continuity of operations of
government, and the process of actually designing, implementing
national level strategies and action plans to protect the
safety and security of the Nation's food supply, research
facilities, materials, and USDA employees.
USDA has made significant progress in ability to defend the
agriculture and food systems since the events of September 11,
2001. USDA's Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS), Animal and
Plant Inspection Service, and the National Institute of Food
and Agriculture enhance security through programs aimed at
inspecting native and foreign agricultural products, conducting
vulnerability assessments, and maintaining laboratory networks
capable of rapidly identifying disease and pests that could
have drastic consequences on our economy.
Likewise, the Agriculture Research Service operates
laboratories and funds research in the United States and abroad
that seek to advance our ability to identify, remediate, and
even prevent harmful pathogens that threaten the food and
agriculture industry.
Our USDA team has collaborated closely with Federal
partners as well as State, local, tribal, and territorial and
private partners to address critical components of the
government's food defense plan. For example, in response to the
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7 and in close
collaboration with FDA and DHS, USDA helped to establish the
Food and Agriculture Government and Sector Coordinating
Councils.
We are currently participating in the Sub-Interagency
Policy Committee led by the National Security staff to develop
a national strategy for biosurveillance. In addition, USDA has
formed a One Health Working Group to augment the respective
missions and participating USDA agencies and offices. USDA
agencies continue to develop and implement monitoring
surveillance programs in collaboration with the Federal, State,
local, tribal, and territorial and private sector partners.
We actively participate in the National Biosurveillance
Integration, Interagency Working Group, and in addition, FSIS
has a full-time liaison working at the DHS National Biological
Integration Center. APHIS also participates in that activity by
routinely providing subject matter expertise and information
sharing on animal health situational awareness on both the
domestic and international issues.
These and other issues in the area of surveillance,
detection, response, and recovery are central to the ongoing
work we are doing to increase our capability and our capacity
to respond to an emergency. As the quick overview has shown,
USDA plays a critical role in the Nation's security. Even in
the current economic environment, it is critical that the
agriculture industry continue to maintain and advance its
capability and capacity to protect the U.S. food supply.
Threats assume many forms, from natural hazards or acts of
terrorism, that would inevitably cause losses in productivity
that could decrease food availability for United States
consumption, increase commodity prices, decrease exports, harm
the national and international confidence in United States
products, force smaller farms and ranches out of business, and
additional monetary losses on a large scale recovery effort.
USDA will continue to push forward in its effort to build a
strategic and efficient approach to improving the safety and
security of the Nation's food supply. Mr. Chairman, that
concludes my statement. I am joined today by Dr. John Clifford
who is the Deputy Administrator and Chief Veterinary Officer
for APHIS's Veterinarian Services Program. So we would be happy
to answer any questions.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Ms. Maddux.
I want to ask Ms. Shames, as you stated in your testimony,
GAO found no centralized coordination to oversee governmentwide
progress in implementing the Federal Food and Agriculture
Defense Policy. Would you please elaborate on the implications
of the findings?
Ms. Shames. What we found when we conducted this review was
that at one time, the Department of Homeland Security, DHS, and
the Homeland Security Council had collected information on what
the various agencies' activities were, but interest waned a
couple of years ago and we found that sort of oversight ceased.
It has not started again. It is something that we
recommended that both DHS and the Homeland Security Council
resume. In particular, we recommended that there be an
interagency process established, that agencies be encouraged to
participate in that process, and the agencies, DHS and the
Homeland Security Council staff agreed with that.
The implications, of course, are that it puts the country
at risk if we do not know what agencies are doing, and it puts
us at risk that we cannot have a coordinated response if there
were a food and agriculture emergency.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Dr. Meckes, GAO recommended that
the Department resume its efforts to coordinate agencies'
overall HSPD-9 implementation efforts. What steps will the
Department take to implement GAO's recommendation?
Dr. Meckes. Senator Akaka, as Ms. Shames mentioned, the
Office of Health Affairs, DHS, had previously engaged in a
benchmarking of HSPD-9 performance across the interagency.
During 2007 and 2008, early 2009, we had literally a champion
within the Homeland Security Council that supported us and
worked with us to gather information and track the
implementation of HSPD-9.
As was mentioned, in 2009, our champion departed the
Homeland Security Council (HSC) and then the National Security
Council (NSC) was formed with the merger of NSC and HSC. The
interest waned in the agriculture and food sector and the
implementation of HSPD-9. At this point, we stand ready to
support the National Security staff in whatever manner or
fashion is deemed appropriate for DHS to participate in renewed
efforts to monitor implementation.
Senator Akaka. The next question is a followup for Mr.
Elkin and Ms. Maddux. GAO's report states that White House
National Security staff indicated that they are looking to re-
engage on HSPD-9 oversight. My question for you is, what
interaction have you had recently with the White House on food
and agriculture defense issues? Mr. Elkin.
Mr. Elkin. I am not aware of that many White House
activities that we have had from the perspective, if I could,
in terms of the questions that you were asking earlier. For the
Department, for the FDA and our partnership with the USDA, I
mean, that is very much an engaged effort. When we train for
exercises, we certainly try to have our Office of Crisis
Management coordinate these activities higher and further
through other agencies. I do not know exactly what the quote
was in regard to White House involvement, but I will try to
flesh that out.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Ms. Maddux.
Ms. Maddux. I think what we have to look at, even though
they have not had someone that was assigned as their food and
agriculture coordinator that they have had in the past, they
have continued to look into dealing with food and agriculture
throughout their other interagency policy committees. So the
Domestic Resilience Group that I sit on, a lot of the
activities, even though they are not directly related to food
and ag, they do touch on different aspects of how we would look
at recovery through the type of response.
Most recently, through the new Presidential Policy
Directive-8 with the new preparedness goal that we are working
on, that will have to also be folded into anything that we
would do in ag and the food defense with HSPD-9. So even though
we do not have a regular person looking on, there are aspects,
if you break down HSPD-9 into the different taskings that are
there that get picked up, it is just that it is the overall
coordination of how they are looking at it is not put there.
We continue to emphasize it within the Department because
we still meet with all of our agencies on a monthly basis and
do a monthly report. So we know how folks are doing on their
HSPD-9, and then we also work with our partners as we put that
information into the Annual Sector Report.
Senator Akaka. Dr. Meckes, like I mentioned during the
first panel, Hawaii will be hosting the Asia-Pacific Economic
Summit meeting in November of this year. What steps has the
Department taken to ensure a safe and secure event in regard to
agro defense?
Dr. Meckes. Chairman Akaka, we have not been privy to any
of those activities thus far. I am certain that the National
Special Event team is working that issue, but we provide
consultation to them in regards to specific questions that
might arise. So should those come to pass, I will certainly
provide that information. But at the present time, we have not
been involved in any of those planning efforts, or the Food and
Agriculture been in any defense.
Senator Akaka. Well, thank you very much. Let me call on
Senator Moran for any questions he may have.
Senator Moran. Chairman Akaka, thank you very much. I
appreciate the testimony this afternoon. I do not know who
exactly to direct this question to. Perhaps it is the
Department of Agriculture, the Department of Homeland Security.
Have there been known attempts to introduce foreign animal
diseases to our agricultural food safety system? How serious
are the threats? And what analysis has been done to suggest
that this is a real threat to our food and agriculture system?
Dr. Clifford.
Mr. Clifford. Thank you, Senator. There have not, to my
knowledge, been any actual known attempts for introduction. I
think as Colonel Hoffman had stated, we were aware of those
reports earlier, post-September 11, 2001, that those types of
things have been discussed by terrorist groups. But to our
knowledge, there has not been any attempt.
Now, having said that, our work at USDA is to protect
American agriculture, both plant and animal, from any
introduction regardless of whether it is intentional or not
intentional, and our response would be the same to either
event. So we prepare for the event regardless.
Senator Moran. That is a good point. Even though it may be
intentional or it may not be intentional, the consequences
could be very similar and very devastating. Is that true?
Mr. Clifford. Yes, and it also is dependent upon the agent
that they are introducing. So I would also add that in our
preparedness, we do pathway analysis. We look at risk analysis
on most likelihood of introduction of different types of
diseases.
Now, other than the terrorist threat, the most likely way
for these types of diseases to enter the United States today is
through accidental introduction, not through intentional
introduction. Our import requirements are stringent, they are
not zero risk-based. We do not close our borders, but they are
a risk-based approach to minimize the introduction of foreign
animal diseases into the United States.
And as previously stated, we actually have not had a case
of foot and mouth disease in this country since 1929. We have
had an introduction in the last probably 8 to 10 years ago of
exotic Newscastle disease in California. That in itself was a
very devastating event for us, which we were able to respond to
and address appropriately.
Senator Moran. I mentioned this earlier, but I would
reiterate, even the rumor of the disease introduction, whatever
disease it is, has had tremendous consequences in market
prices. But particularly even today, we are fighting to get our
export markets back from really the rumor of BSE, for example.
So the threat is certainly something to be concerned about, but
in the absence of an actual introduction, other countries use
this to their advantage, certainly to our--to their advantage
economically.
Mr. Clifford. Yes, sir, they do, and especially in a number
of areas. I think, BSE is an issue that we have appropriately
addressed throughout the world. It is a disease that is on a
decline, but it is still used politically to block trade.
With regards to diseases like foot and mouth disease, I
think it is important, as noted in the GAO report. If we get
foot and mouth disease into the United States, in certain parts
of the country, it could be very devastating.
But as an organization that is looking at the best interest
for the livestock industry in the United States, we have to
take a new approach, a new look to the way we address these
diseases today. We cannot just have a scorched earth-type
policy where we go out and kill and destroy millions and
millions of animals, like we saw in the U.K. with burning
carcasses.
So we have to look at the development of new technologies,
new vaccines to be able to address these in a more practical
way where we minimize the amount of the animals that we are
putting down and the destruction, and also, at the same time
preventing spread of that disease from one herd to the next.
Senator Moran. That is a segue to a line of a couple of
questions that I wanted to followup, but it is also in line of
my question to the gentleman, the previous witness from Georgia
about prevention versus reaction or containment. You are
suggesting that we need to have a greater emphasis or we are
emphasizing more the prevention through vaccines and, I assume,
other methods as compared to simply--it is not simple, but
killing cattle after the fact.
Mr. Clifford. Correct. And I would agree. The best approach
is prevention, and prevention comes through early detection and
that means you have to have good strong surveillance systems to
be able to detect that. So those are the types of approaches we
need to take.
At USDA, one of the things that we are doing is we used to
approach diseases from a standpoint of pulling samples on
animals to test for a single or maybe two diseases. We are
looking at implementation of a comprehensive surveillance
approach and the first species we are looking at doing this for
is swine, where we are looking at multiple disease issues with
a single sample. So that we are doing the rights types of
surveillance for multiple surveillance streams.
But the thing is, those things do not always get the
attention or the resources because they are not the issue today
that is on the front page. It is a prevention issue. It is not
a response and reaction issue.
Senator Moran. Well, in addition to surveillance and, Dr.
Meckes, your testimony talks about food and agricultural
research, and you talk about the potential of a vaccine
scheduled for completion based upon approval of APHIS and the
regulatory process, in 2012.
Do we have the scientific--let me say it this way. Through
science and research, do we have the ability to develop the
necessary vaccines and antivirals, the diagnostic capabilities
to reduce the damaging economic and health consequences from
the introduction of animal disease?
Dr. Meckes. Senator Moran, as you are well-aware, the
threat of foot and mouth disease to your State of Kansas is
always on the mind of those of us involved in agriculture.
Senator Moran. Thank you.
Dr. Meckes. And certainly, the development of a vaccine has
been one of the foremost efforts at Plum Island Animal Disease
Center off the coast of New York. We are, in fact, in concert
with the USDA, APHIS, and USDA Agricultural Research Service
(ARS), close to developing a vaccine that will be available for
foot and mouth disease.
As to the specifics of the disease, the nature of it, I
would ask that I could provide you with additional followup
from the Science and Technology Directorate of the Department
of Homeland Security that is working toward that end.
Senator Moran. Well, that would be fine, sir. Let me ask a
broad question which is, is that the hope for the future, is
that we can develop the necessary capabilities through science
and research so that the consequences of the introduction of
one of these diseases is minimized so that really no terrorist
ever decides, This is the way to attack the United States
because the economic and life-threatening consequences of that
introduction no longer are significant? Are we headed to that
point? Is that a goal?
Dr. Meckes. Absolutely, and I would suggest that it is not
only a goal for all the critters in the country, it is a goal
for folks as well, and the efforts that are ongoing at Plum and
potentially NBIF, once the construction is complete there, will
go a long ways toward, as Dr. Clifford said, preventing the
disease and thereby eliminating it as a threat to our country.
Senator Moran. Secretary Napolitano testified this morning
in a full Committee hearing and indicated that we have a ways
to go--this is my summary of what she said--in preparedness on
agro bioterror and that NBIF, the facility needs to be built.
What opportunities--and again, the Department of Agriculture or
Department of Homeland Security, what expanded opportunities
for research and vaccine development would be available with a
Biosafety Level 4 facility that would reduce the risk to
agriculture and humans?
And in your testimony, Ms. Maddux, you talk a lot about
that bio and agro defense facility.
Dr. Meckes. Dr. Clifford, go ahead.
Mr. Clifford. I think it is very important for us to have
state-of-the-art facilities to be able to do our work in
foreign animal disease diagnostics and research, which means
not only having biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) capabilities, but the
BSL-4 capabilities that you are responding to, to be able to
work on diseases of concern that have not just an animal health
concern, but human health concern, and can be worked with
safely in these laboratories.
We do not currently have that capability at Plum Island to
do that type of work. That facility is reaching the end of its
life span and so, it is very critical that we be able to have a
state-of-the-art facility, to be able to do this type of work
in.
Senator Moran. Dr. Meckes.
Dr. Meckes. Absolutely, Senator Moran, we concur. There is
a crying need for a facility of this nature in this country at
this time. Thank you.
Senator Moran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. We will have a second round of
questions. Dr. Meckes, HSPD-9 directs the DHS to work with its
Federal partners to enhance our ability to detect an attack
through biological threat awareness. In response, DHS created
the National Biosurveillance Integration System. However, in
2009, GAO found that NBIS was not fully equipped to carry out
its mission because it lacked data and personnel from its
partner agencies.
Will you please discuss coordination and any other
challenges the Department has faced in carrying out this
responsibility?
Dr. Meckes. Chairman Akaka, as a member of the Office of
Health Affairs, like so many of my fellow members, we are
deeply committed to the idea of a National Integrated
Biosurveillance Program within the country, and we work closely
with our colleagues at the NBIS and at the Center to provide
updates on a daily basis.
As a matter of fact, one of my staff is currently detailed
to NBIS to provide food and agriculture expertise for their
daily operations. We support their efforts. I think Colonel
Hoffman spoke to this idea of detection to protect and even
detection to prevent, and it is only through the capability of
biosurveillance, gathering data, integrating data, analyzing
data, and characterizing data will we ever have that
capability.
Senator Akaka. I would like to give the FDA and USDA an
opportunity to discuss their efforts to coordinate with DHS on
NBIS. Mr. Elkin.
Mr. Elkin. Our role in NBIS is that of support. We have our
directed information sharing to efforts like Food Shield and
HSIN, which are their networks, but our role in NBIS, I think,
has been just to provide the information sharing support and
data that we could. But I do not know that we have an ongoing
detail in that regard.
Senator Akaka. Ms. Maddux
Ms. Maddux. USDA has been involved with NBIS since the very
beginning. We have had members on the NBIS interagency working
group. I have been the representative to the NBIS Interagency
Oversight Council. We have done a lot of work, realizing that
it is challenging when you are looking at all of the data that
they are looking at coming into the integration center.
And so, they have listened to the interagency partners and
we have moved forward in that we updated, recently updated the
charter that we had when the NBIS project first took place, to
where now all the partners are signatories on that charter
versus just DHS being a signatory to it.
We are in the process of creating an NBIS strategic
direction which will help us, as partners, know exactly, and
define what we are looking at, where we wanted to head for the
future, the gaps, the areas we need to examine. And that should
be ready to go to the Interagency Working Group in October.
And we are also, working, as I mentioned, with the National
Security staff on the National Strategy for Biosurveillance. So
I feel that the folks over at the National Biosurveillance
Integration Center and the individuals that are managing NBIS
have really listened to the partners and taken some steps to
where I think as we move forward, even though it is going to be
a challenge, that we are going to end up where we need to be in
the future.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. I have a question for
Ms. Shames and I would like Dr. Clifford to respond to Ms.
Shames' comments. Ms. Shames, your testimony states that
although agencies have taken positive steps on veterinarian
workforce issues such as creating the Advisory Council, they
still need to evaluate the veterinarian workforce needed during
a catastrophic event. Will you please elaborate on this?
Ms. Shames. Yes, I can. This was a report that you asked us
to do, Senator, and we were pleased to testify on the results a
couple of years ago. Basically we found challenges at two
levels. First of all, the Office of Personnel Management did
not really have a governmentwide understanding of the Federal
Government's veterinarian capacity and we know that it is a
mission-critical position throughout the government.
We also found that several agencies, including HHS and
USDA, had not done a workforce plan, again, for veterinarians
which were considered mission critical for them to fulfill
their strategic goals. Based on what we have found in our
updates, OPM has looked governmentwide, has developed this
interagency forum, and has developed a strategic workforce
plan.
However, on the agency front with HHS and USDA, they have
not yet completed their workforce plans. And as you mentioned,
in a catastrophic event, veterinarians play a key role. One
thing in particular that we found at USDA that underscores the
need for a departmentwide approach is that we found that
veterinarians were entering USDA through the slaughter plants
because it is not a very pleasant job, it has a chronic issue
of vacancies, and as soon as these veterinarians were able,
they moved on to other parts of USDA.
So we found that in USDA, the left hand did not know what
the right hand was doing and that is why we thought that such a
departmental approach was especially important.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much. Your response to her
comments, Dr. Clifford.
Mr. Clifford. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We do agree
with the GAO report that there is an issue and concern about
the veterinarian workforce, and it is not the number of
graduates, per se, coming out, but it is the number of
graduates that are going into food animal-type medicine and
have an interest in that area.
Having said that, with regards to the Food Safety
Inspection Service through new hiring authorities, using
incentives such as repayment of student loans, incentives for
hiring and working for them, have been able to reduce their
vacancy rate from about 15 percent to about 7 percent.
Also, with regards to veterinarian workforce plans, I do
not know about the departmental level. I know that within
APHIS, Veterinary Services, we have a workforce plan for our
needs with regards to veterinarians based upon our current
resources.
We also do things like the National Animal Health Emergency
Response Corps (NAHERC). We have to utilize this--we are not
going to be able to employ--the Federal Government is not going
to be able to employ enough veterinarians to be able to handle
all types of situations. So it is important for us, and through
our Veterinary Accreditation Program, to call upon the private
sector and other sectors to assist us in those events, not just
utilizing the resources within the Federal Government, from
other government sectors such as FSIS, who is the largest
employer of veterinarians, in APHIS Veterinary Services, who is
the second largest employer of veterinarians in the Federal
Government, but the private sector.
We have over 600 private veterinarians that are signed up
for that activity in case of a national emergency, and we have
over 900 animal health technicians to assist in that area. In
addition, other things that we're doing is that during an
event, an occurrence, in a response, things that we would have
traditionally done and assigned with veterinary oversight, we
are finding new ways of handling that oversight to free up our
veterinarians to be able to address the specific disease
issues.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Let me call on the Senator from
Kansas, Senator Moran, for any further questions.
Senator Moran. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have no
additional questions and I know that a vote has been called at
4:17. So I appreciate the opportunity to join you here today
and appreciate the testimony of our witnesses.
Senator Akaka. Thank you Senator Moran. I would like to
thank all of our witnesses for being here today. This is a very
important issue that deserves our utmost attention.
It is clear that we have made some good progress to improve
our food and agriculture defenses since the establishment of
HSPD-9. However, more work needs to be done. I look forward to
working with the Administration and my colleagues in the Senate
to make sure we have robust capabilities to defend against both
intentional and natural threats to the food and agriculture
systems.
The hearing record will remain open for 2 weeks for
additional statements or questions other Members may have for
you. So the hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:24 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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