DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PLANS AND PROGRAMS RELATING TO COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTERNARCOTICS, AND BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
APRIL 12, 2011
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OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KAY R. HAGAN, CHAIRMAN

Senator HAGAN. The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities will now come to order. I appreciate my colleague the Ranking Member Senator Portman for also joining us, and our witnesses here today.

This afternoon, the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee is actually holding its first hearing of the 112th Congress and, as its name indicates, this subcommittee focuses on new and non-traditional threats to our security and on the capabilities we need to address those threats. This includes threats ranging from terrorism to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
(WMD) to improvised explosive devices (IED). We also oversee the
development and use of the spectrum of responses to these threats,
from the most basic research to the most advanced technologies,
and the policies and programs to counter these threats.

Today we will examine the plans and programs of the Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD) to counter a number of irregular threats
that fall under the oversight of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD–SOLIC),
and Interdependent Capabilities, a very long mouthful, better
known as ASD–SOLIC.

Our witnesses this afternoon have responsibility for a wide range
of issues and the subcommittee looks forward to hearing your views
on current and emerging threats, as well as DOD's plans and pro-
grams designed to respond to them. In particular, these include
counterterrorism, building political partnership capacity, counter-
narcotics, stability operations, information operations, and security
assistance programs.

Mr. Garry Reid is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Combating Terrorism and is currently the
acting Assistant Secretary for SOLIC. In this position Mr. Reid has
responsibility for DOD's plans and programs for combating ter-
rorism, counterinsurgency, and other aspects of irregular warfare.

Among these programs is the section 1206 train and equip pro-
gram for building the counterterrorism and stability operations ca-
pabilities of partner foreign nations, which DOD and the Depart-
ment of State (DOS) jointly manage under an innovative dual-key
arrangement. Mr. Reid also oversees the development and employ-
ment of special operations capabilities as they relate to foreign in-
ternal defense, military information support, and other indirect ap-
proaches to countering transnational threats.

The United States and our allies continue to be threatened by al
Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations. As we have seen
in recent years, this threat emanates not only from the border re-
gion between Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also from al Qaeda
franchises in Yemen, Somalia, and northwest Africa. These groups
have made clear their desire to strike western and U.S. targets. We
must remain mindful of the potential for these groups to execute
attacks with significant and destabilizing effects, often with limited
planning and at a very low cost. The 2009 Christmas Day airliner
bombing attempt over Detroit is a chilling reminder of that fact.

The subcommittee looks forward to hearing of DOD's efforts to
counter these violent extremist groups, both indirectly through
training, advising, informational and other means, and when nec-
essary directly, through offensive military operations.

Dr. James Schear is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense
for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations. Dr. Schear has
responsibility for DOD's role in global stabilization and reconstruc-
tion operations, foreign disaster relief, humanitarian assistance,
and international peacekeeping. He also oversees DOD efforts to
work with partner nations to improve security and governments in
areas of current or potential conflict. These activities are an impor-
tant part of our efforts to reduce threats to our security and that
of our partners.
The activities overseen by Dr. Schear inherently involve other U.S. Government agencies and international partners, and I hope, Dr. Schear, that you will discuss DOD efforts as part of the broader U.S. whole-of-government approach to improve the stability and security of vulnerable populations and regions, thereby reducing the ability of violent extremist groups to take root, spread their message, recruit, and plan attacks against the United States and our allies.

I hope, Dr. Schear, that you will also speak to U.S. contributions to United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations, such as the U.N. peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in the form of military observers and staff officers.

Mr. William Wechsler is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats. Among other things, Mr. Wechsler leads the development of DOD policies and plans to disrupt the flow of illegal narcotics, counter the threat from piracy, and interrupt the financing of violent extremist groups. In terms of that counternarcotics mission, one of the key authorities to provide assistance to domestic and foreign law enforcement agencies will expire at the end of this fiscal year. We look forward to hearing whether DOD intends to request an extension of this authority and whether any modifications are needed.

In recent years, it has become increasingly clear that disrupting the flow of money, the lifeblood of violent extremist organizations and Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCO), could have a substantial impact on their ability to recruit, sustain, and conduct operations. Confronting the formal and informal networks that move illicit goods requires a global effort involving interagency and international partners. We look forward to hearing from Mr. Wechsler regarding DOD’s efforts to identify and counter these networks and what more needs to be done as we move forward.

I am proud to note that many of the DOD efforts we will discuss this afternoon are being carried out around the world by U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF), many of whom I have to say call North Carolina home. As always, we owe them and their families a debt of gratitude for their sacrifice and service to our country.

I’d like to now turn to my colleague and ranking member of this subcommittee, Senator Portman, for his opening remarks. Senator Portman.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROB PORTMAN

Senator Portman. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate being here with you for our first hearing and I look forward to working with you and other members of the subcommittee on these critical issues.

You just outlined some very difficult and complex challenges we face, our military faces, our Nation faces, and I join you in thanking these gentlemen for joining us and for your service and for the service of so many men and women who are today serving under you and serving in our military.

The determined and increasingly adaptive foes we have out there continue to threaten our stability and safety of the world, of certainly American citizens, here at home and abroad. Again as Senator Hagan has outlined, we have huge challenges ahead of us.
At the same time, we have a huge fiscal challenge here in Washington. So as the world becomes more complex and more difficult, we're also facing a looming fiscal crisis that all of us know needs to be addressed. If it's not, it will only further complicate our ability to navigate some of these challenging issues that are raised today.

So part of what I think we'll look for in this subcommittee will be to ensure that the threats that are out there are being addressed, that the priorities of DOD are matched appropriately with those threats, and to ensure that taxpayer dollars are being used in the most efficient and cost-effective way possible.

We've seen over the past couple of weeks and months that it's difficult to predict what's going on around the world. If anything, we've learned that it's mostly unpredictable. I don't think any of us here would have expected the Arab spring to have ushered in such big changes, going all the way from the eastern Mediterranean to North Africa and down the Arabian peninsula, over the past few months. These have enormous and I think lasting implications for our security interests in the area.

Sustained U.S. engagement in my view will be required, particularly during this period of great transition, and terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda will be trying to take advantage of this as well. We need to ensure that they're unable to establish new bases of operation.

Closer to home, since we're also talking about counternarcotics today, we have these TCOs that continue to expand their reach, multi-billion dollar networks, often expanding it ruthlessly, and affecting our citizens more and more. While the threat posed by these organizations is great, I think we have seen some successes. I would think the success in Colombia, for instance, in partnering with the United States has led to greater security, stability, and partnership with the Colombians. So I think we know we can make a difference and we must.

Madam Chair, I'll be brief in my statement to get to the witnesses because we have some terrific knowledge here to be passed along to the committee and for the record. Again, I look forward to hearing what DOD views as the greatest threats facing our Nation, to ensure that we are aligned properly to address those threats, what you're doing to counter them, and what you think in terms of our current resourcing and statutory authorities, are they sufficient to meet those threats.

So again, thank you all for being here today.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Senator Portman.

I know that our three witnesses have all submitted written testimony, so I would like to now call on you to share with us your comments today, and then we'll have some questions. Mr. Reid, if you can begin.

STATEMENT OF GARRY REID, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND COMBATTING TERRORISM

Mr. REID. Thank you, Chairman Hagan. I started my Special Forces career about 34 years ago on the rolling sand hills of your
beautiful State, which we referred to as “Pine Land,” and it’s a
pleasure to be back here with you today; and with you, Senator
Portman, as well. To the whole group here, thank you for inviting
all of us here today to testify and for the opportunity to share with
you the plans, policies, and programs we pursue to address these
important security threats you both identified.

In terms of the entire office, the responsibilities of the ASD–
SOLIC, and Interdependent Capabilities span a wide range of issue
areas, from counterterrorism and direct action to security assist-
ance, humanitarian assistance, support to multinational peace-
keeping operations, and countering narcotics trafficking. Each of us
will speak to our own perspectives on the current and emerging
threats from the vantage point of our respective portfolios, noting
that these issues complement one another as we collectively work
together to support our U.S. military forces and our national secu-

rity policy to address these threats.

As I'm sure you know, the Office of the ASD–SOLIC was estab-
lished to provide senior civilian supervision of special operations
activities and low intensity conflict, including oversight of special
operations policy and resources. We are the principal civilian advis-
ors to the Secretary of Defense on these matters and provide senior
management for special operations and low intensity conflict within
DOD.

As a policy office, the responsibilities of the ASD–SOLIC are
unique in that they include service secretary-like roles, such as
providing overall supervision of the preparation and justification of
special operations program and budget, while also including pro-
viding civilian oversight and supervisory responsibilities, such as
developing policy and reviewing plans for the conduct of sensitive
special operations and coordinating those activities within the
interagency and overseeing their execution.

As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Oper-
ations and Combatting Terrorism, I serve as the principal adviser
to the ASD–SOLIC for DOD policies, plans, authorities, and re-
sources related to special operations, irregular warfare, with special
emphasis on counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, unconventional
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resources related to special operations, irregular warfare, with special
emphasis on counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, unconventional
warfare (UW), sensitive special operations, and other activi-
ties as directed by the Secretary of Defense.
My office works closely with Admiral Eric Olson, the commander of SOCOM and his staff, to ensure these forces have the equipment and resources they need to perform their demanding missions.

Several key initiatives we are pursuing in fiscal year 2012 and building towards 2013 and beyond will enhance SOCOM’s flexibility and effectiveness. These include: modifying and expanding our heavy lift helicopter fleet, the MH–47 Golf; recapitalizing our medium-lift fleet, the MH–60, and the Kilo and Lima platform variants; increasing the total production of our tilt-rotor CV–22 Ospreys, which have proven themselves in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

We have also been working with the command to recapitalize SOCOM’s Vietnam-era C–130 gunship fleet with newer C–130 Juliet models and to advance the nonstandard aviation program to deliver a variety of smaller aircraft that provide intra-theater lift capability. Through these and many other initiatives, we are ensuring our special operators have the tools they need to prevail in current and future conflicts.

As Secretary Gates has mentioned on many occasions, America’s dominance in traditional warfighting has created powerful incentives for our adversaries to use alternative methods to counter U.S. influence and interests. For the foreseeable future, the most likely contingencies the United States will face involve what we term irregular warfare.

Since 2006, our office has been central to the support of this strategic shift in DOD to improve capabilities and expand DOD capacity for irregular warfare. For example, we have issued guidance and implemented policy on irregular warfare capabilities. We sponsored and I led the DOD 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review team on irregular warfare. We’ve strengthened our conventional force capabilities for key enablers such as security force assistance, expanded our manned and unmanned aircraft systems for intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance, and improved our counter-IED capabilities.

We’ve also worked to enhance language and cultural focus within the general purpose forces, focused on building up regional expertise for Afghanistan and Pakistan in particular, as well as working across the Department to increase counterinsurgency, stability operations, and counterterrorism competency in our conventional forces.

Another core mission that has grown demanding in the last several years is our role in providing oversight of DOD’s global operations against al Qaeda and its affiliates, including in Iraq and Afghanistan. I represent the Secretary of Defense on various working groups in the interagency and maintain active liaison with those agencies that have responsibility for national security policy as it relates to special operations and combatting terrorism.

In line with the President’s and the Secretary’s priorities, a significant degree of our attention is providing oversight for sensitive operations. I oversee development of these operations and others for policies for CT, including combatting terrorism technology and capability development, and I assist, as you mentioned, Madam Chairman, with the administration and implementation of our section 1206 global train and equip authorities and our section 1208 support to special operations authorities, both of which are impor-
tant tools in the CT fight and for which we appreciate this committee’s continued support.

These are among the force development and policy activities that are brought to bear in executing the President’s and the Secretary’s priorities, including prevailing in today’s conflicts in Afghanistan and defeating al Qaeda and affiliated groups around the world.

My office has provided extensive support on the counterterrorism and special operations and overall operational aspects of three administration-wide reviews of strategy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our current assessment is that strategy is working and we believe we’ve constrained al Qaeda significantly in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area and degraded their capability to plan and conduct operations externally.

We’ve devoted considerable resources to bringing our U.S. and partner nations counterinsurgency capabilities to bear, and especially by working to rapidly field capabilities to support them, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), counter-IED, and increased rotary wing capabilities.

Our efforts against al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan have forced them to diversify into other regions. This network they have established is a broad syndicate of affiliate organizations in places such as the Arabian Peninsula, East Africa, and elsewhere, and these are of great concern to us as well.

In the Arabian Peninsula, al Qaeda poses the most immediate terrorist threat to U.S. interests in the homeland outside Afghanistan-Pakistan. Accordingly, we are working closely with our Yemeni security partners to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, deny them sanctuary, degrade their capability to plan, organize, and train for attacks against the U.S. Homeland and our interests.

In East Africa, we’re supporting our regional partners to counter the terrorist threat posed by Al-Shabaab, an Islamic terrorist group with nationalist roots but global aspirations and visible alignments with al Qaeda core. Our approach recognizes that a U.S. military presence in this region would be counterproductive and we work very closely through the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to counter Al-Shabaab, to provide the TFG, the Somali Government, with the time and space it needs to develop its own institutions, and to support the AMISOM mission of a peacekeeping and disengagement force in Somalia.

Elsewhere in Africa, such as in Mali and other trans-Saharan countries, we’re working closely with security partners in these areas to counter the growing threat posed by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

Just a last look around the world, in Southeast Asia, the Philippines has been and remains an important and capable military partner of the United States and they have worked aggressively with us to counter the threat from al Qaeda and its affiliates in the region. Over the last 9 years our military efforts have successfully contained the threat posed by terrorist groups in the Philippines and prevented al Qaeda from strengthening their foothold in Southeast Asia.
Through their ability to execute high-end lethal strikes, as well as their competence in preventing festering problems from turning into far-reaching and expensive crises, our U.S. SOF have proven their immeasurable value for securing our national interests. The wars we have been engaged in over the last decade have amply demonstrated how much more valuable those critical skills and competencies will be in the future.

We appreciate this committee’s continued support for our work to support these extraordinary men and women who undertake some of the Nation’s most demanding missions. Thank you again, Madam Chairman and Senator Portman, for your inviting us here today, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Reid follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. GARRY REID

Chairman Hagan, Senator Portman, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting us to testify at this hearing today and for the opportunity to share with you the core plans, policies, and programs we pursue to address global security threats. The missions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities ASD(SOLIC&IC) span a wide range of issue areas, from counterterrorism and direct action to security assistance and humanitarian assistance; from support to multinational peacekeeping operations to countering narcotics trafficking. We will each speak to our perspectives on current and emerging threats from the vantage point of our respective portfolios, noting that these issue areas complement one another as we collectively work to support U.S. military forces and address these threats.

I. OUR MISSION

Special Operations Forces (SOF) are a uniquely specialized component of our U.S. Armed Forces trained to conduct operations, including counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, military information support operations, and counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, in areas under enemy control or in politically sensitive environments. Over the last half century, these forces have repeatedly proven their ability to act with speed, agility, and precision, making them an invaluable asset for national strategic missions of an extremely sensitive nature. Trained particularly to work by, with, and through local partners, at the same time SOF have historically executed the lion’s share of indirect and unconventional U.S. military missions, such as training and advising foreign militaries or providing support to civilian authorities abroad.

Since September 11, the critical need for these core capabilities has increased exponentially. Furthermore, as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated, these skill sets can no longer be thought of as capabilities reserved for SOF but must also be inculcated in our conventional forces as well. Key trends shaping the future security environment, such as the growth and power of non-state actors, increasing instability in already fragile states, and lowered barriers for entry to develop and acquire advanced technologies, suggest that the skill sets that SOF bring to bear will likely continue to increase in importance for the foreseeable future.

As mandated by section 138 of title 10, U.S.C., the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict ASD(SOLIC) was established to provide senior civilian supervision of special operations activities and low intensity conflict, including oversight of special operations policy and resources. We are the principal civilian advisors to the Secretary of Defense on special operations and low intensity conflict matters, and after the Deputy Secretary of Defense, provide service Secretary-like roles, such as providing overall supervision of the preparation and justification of SOF programs and budget, while also including civilian oversight and supervisory responsibilities, such as developing policy and reviewing plans for the conduct of sensitive special operations, coordinating those activities within the interagency, and overseeing their execution.

As Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism, I serve as the principal advisor to the ASD(SOLIC&IC) for DOD policies,
plans, authorities, and resources related to special operations and irregular warfare, with special emphasis on counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, sensitive special operations, and other activities as specified by the Secretary of Defense. In addition, I serve as the principal crisis manager for the Office of the ASD(SOLIC&IC) in response to international and/or domestic activities related to special operations and combating terrorism. I was also recently assigned responsibility for overseeing Department of Defense Information Operations.

**Special Operations Policy**

Within this broad set of responsibilities, one core mission of my office is to provide oversight of the Special Operations Command, which has grown significantly since 2001. Created by Congress in 1986, SOCOM is charged with responsibilities to organize, train, and equip SOF, including those that comprise the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, the Air Force Special Operations Command, Naval Special Warfare Command, and the Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command. Each component ensures SOF are highly trained, properly equipped, and capable of rapid global deployment. In 2001, the Department of Defense gave SOCOM the mission to synchronize planning of the department’s global campaign against violent extremists. On average more than 12,000 SOF and support personnel are deployed around the world, with a significant majority assigned to the CENTCOM area of responsibility. Since 2006, we’ve increased the baseline budget for SOCOM by about 50 percent and in fiscal year 2012, SOCOM will grow by 2,209 military and civilian authorizations. We created five additional Special Forces Battalions and Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations/Military Information Support Operations units in order to provide additional support for SOF and the regular Army.

Several key initiatives we are pursuing in fiscal year 2012 will enhance SOCOM’s flexibility and effectiveness. This year, the last of the originally planned 61 MH–47Gs began modification, and procurement of eight additional MH–47Gs is underway. As part of the recapitalization of MH–60 K/L platforms, SOCOM will also field the first of 72 planned MH–60M helicopters. We would like to bring the total production of the tilt-rotor CV–22, which provides long-range, high-speed infiltration, extraction, and resupply to Special Operations teams in hostile, denied, and politically sensitive areas, to 43 aircraft. We have also been working with the command to recapitalize SOCOM’s Vietnam-era AC–130 gunship fleet with AC–130J models. My office continues to play a critical role in advancing the Non-Standard Aviation Program and delivering a variety of smaller aircraft to provide intra-theater airlift capacity. A new Aviation Foreign Internal Defense program starts in fiscal year 2012 to train, advise, and assist partner nations in a variety of special operations missions and capabilities. SOF Warrior line items consist of Small Arms and Weapons for SOF warfighters; SOF Visual Augmentation, Lasers and Sensor Systems to provide day and night visual augmentation systems for SOF troops; SOF Tactical Vehicles; and SOF Soldier Protection and Survival Systems that provide specialized equipment to improve survivability and mobility of SOF. To address shortfalls resulting from fielding new capabilities, a growing force structure, and aging infrastructure that was inherited without a future recapitalization budget, we are also making a significant investment in Military Construction (MILCON), raising the MILCON funding minimum from 4 to 6 percent to support this priority in future budgets.

**IW Capabilities**

America’s dominance in traditional warfighting has created powerful incentives for adversaries to use alternative methods to counter U.S. influence and interests. For the foreseeable future, the most likely contingencies the United States will face will involve irregular warfare. Since 2006, my office has also been principally involved in supporting the strategic shift within the Department to improve capabilities and expand DOD capacity for irregular warfare.

The 2010 QDR aimed to rebalance U.S. military capabilities to emphasize flexibility of the force and investment in key enablers. My office has helped to implement this strategic shift by issuing directives and policy instructions, for example, on Irregular Warfare (IW), and by providing guidance on a range of issues from Security Force Assistance to counterinsurgency skills and training. We’ve also focused on implementing key QDR initiatives, such as strengthening and institutionalizing conventional force capabilities for Security Force Assistance; strengthening and expanding capabilities for training partner aviation forces; increasing the availability of Rotary Wing assets; expanding and modernizing the AC–130 fleet; expanding Manned and Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; and improving Counter-IED capabilities. We’ve also worked to enhance linguistic and cultural abilities, focusing on building regional expertise for Af-
ghanistan and Pakistan in particular, as well as worked across the Department to increase counterinsurgency, Stability Operations and counterterrorism competency and capacity in our conventional forces.

**Oversight of Combating Terrorism**

Another core mission that has grown more demanding in the last several years is our role in assisting the ASD(SOLIC&IC) in providing oversight of the Department's global operations against al Qaeda and its affiliates, including in Afghanistan and Iraq. I represent the Secretary of Defense on various working groups in the interagency arena and maintain an active liaison with those agencies that have responsibility for national security policy as it relates to special operations and combating terrorism. In line with the President's and Secretary's priorities, as well as the unprecedented scale and scope of operations in which U.S. forces are involved, a significant degree of our attention is devoted to providing the oversight required for sensitive operations.

I also oversee development of special operations policies for counterterrorism, including combating terrorism technology and capabilities development, and assist with the administration of Section 1206 and 1208 authorities. One of our most important tools in the counterterrorism fight has been Section 1206 authority. This authority gives the Department the ability—with the concurrence of the Secretary of State—to quickly respond to build our partners' capabilities to confront urgent and emerging terrorism threats and support those fighting alongside us in Coalition operations. Section 1208 authorities allow SOF to provide support (including training, funding, and equipment) to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations to combat terrorism. Since its enactment in 2005, Section 1208 has been a critical authority for the war against al Qaeda and for counterterrorism and related counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We appreciate the committee's continued support for both Section 1206 and 1208.

**Information Operations**

Over the past year, DOD has performed an intensive review of the oversight and management of Information Operations (IO) and several capabilities which support IO, including Military Information Support Operations (MISO, formerly Psychological Operations). As a result of the Secretary's directed study of the Department's expenditures and management for IO, several changes have been made, including the consolidation of oversight and management of IO and MISO together within SOLIC. The Department also performed an exhaustive policy review of all MISO programs and activities to ensure these activities adhered to policy, were directly linked to military objectives, and were coordinated with the State Department at both the DOD and COCOM levels. As has been reflected in several reports this administration has submitted to Congress over the past year, Combatant Command IO programs and activities have matured over the past year enabling IO to be utilized a component of every recent military operation, to include Odyssey Dawn.

**Counter Terrorism Technical Support Office**

The Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO) operates as an interagency program office under the ASD(SOLIC&IC) to field rapid combating terrorism solutions. Working closely with over 100 Government Agencies, State, and local government, law enforcement organizations, and national first responders, CTTSO leverages technical expertise, operational objectives, and interagency sponsor funding. This collective approach to resource and information sharing positions the CTTSO to gather front line requirements that service multiple users—a distinct advantage in the combating terrorism community.

**II. ON THE GROUND**

These force development and policy activities are brought to bear in executing the President’s and the Secretary’s priorities, including prevailing in today's conflict in Afghanistan and defeating al Qaeda and affiliated groups around the world.

**Support to the Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy**

My office provided extensive support on the counterterrorism, special operations, and overall operational aspects of three major administration-wide reviews of strategy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. Upon taking office, President Obama committed tens of thousands of additional U.S. forces to Afghanistan, and an additional 30,000 surge forces in December 2009, to support our core goal in the region: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, to deny it safe haven in the region, and to prevent it from again threatening the United States and our allies. In Afghanistan,
the Taliban are still largely aligned with al Qaeda, and al Qaeda leadership still enjoys a sanctuary in adjacent Pakistan. Working with our interagency partners through a range of counterterrorism efforts, we believe we have constrained al Qaeda and their affiliated groups in the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan and have significantly degraded their ability to plan and conduct operations throughout the theater.

Our office has also been extensively involved in the Secretary’s effort to bring counterinsurgency capabilities to bear on the current Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy. For example, the Department has made considerable efforts to improve Security Force Assistance capabilities, including adding 500 personnel to train-the-trainer units, in order to enable the effective transition of security responsibilities to host nation forces. We continue to work aggressively to implement the Secretary’s goal of fielding capabilities that support the counterinsurgency and irregular conflicts we are currently in, such as through Unmanned Aerial Vehicles programs, counter-Improvised Explosive Device capabilities, and increasing funding for rotary wing lift. We’ve also supported the Joint Staff with the Afghanistan-Pakistan Joint Staff, an initiative that supports the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy by identifying, selecting, and training a cadre of counterinsurgency and regional experts to deploy to the region on a rotating basis, build strategic relationships with local partners, and enhance the capacity of local security institutions.

Global SOF Engagement

The al Qaeda core sanctuary in Pakistan is enabled and assisted by a broad network of affiliates, including facilitators, financiers, and training sites. The rise of these affiliate organizations in the Arabian Peninsula, East Africa, and elsewhere are of great concern to us.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) poses the most immediate terrorist threat to U.S. interests and the Homeland outside the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Accordingly, we work closely with Yemeni security forces to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat AQAP in Yemen, deny them sanctuary, and degrade their ability to plan, organize, and train for attacks against the U.S. Homeland and our interests. To counter this threat, the United States adopted a balanced approach that addresses both the short- to mid-term requirement to build Yemeni counterterrorist (CT) capacity and capability and the long-term requirement to address Yemen’s fundamental needs across the security, economic development, political, and social spectrums.

The current unrest and political upheaval in Yemen have obviously forced us to look closely at our approach. We believe that the current protracted political issues are having an adverse impact on the security situation in Yemen. We’re monitoring the situation closely. As with every country, we regularly evaluate our assistance and CT cooperation to ensure it is being used appropriately and is as effective as possible. Our shared interest with the Yemeni Government in fighting terrorism, particularly defeating AQAP, goes beyond specific individuals. As such, our focus over the course of the last several years of daily contact with the Yemeni CT apparatus has been to professionalize their CT institutions, not to bolster individual personalities.

In Somalia, we support our partners to counter the terrorist threat posed by al-Shabaab, an Islamic terrorist group with nationalist roots but global aspirations. The group shows increasing signs of affiliation with al Qaeda and has made significant public overtures to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda senior leadership. Al-Shabaab has also reached out to Somali diaspora groups around the world, asking many Somalis with western passports, like American Omar Hammami to join the jihad in Somalia. Al-Shabaab’s terrorist attacks against Uganda last July showed their desire to export terror across the region and threaten any country that dares to attack them.

Countering al-Shabaab is not an easy task. Our interagency partners have proven particularly effective in tracking Somali individuals of concern and preventing them from staging attacks. Our policy recognizes that a U.S. military presence would be counter-productive so we work with and through the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to counter al-Shabaab and give the TFG the time and space it needs to develop viable institutions and security forces. The Department of State provides substantial financial support to AMISOM and this year, DOD began providing U.S. military trainers for Ugandan and Burundian predeployment training. In addition, SOF forces regularly conduct military-to-military exercises and training with Kenya, Uganda, and other regional partners. We have also provided substantial Section 1206 CT assistance to East African states. We continue to monitor al-Shabaab closely and employ our various tools to counter this threat.
The Philippines is an important and capable military partner of the United States and has worked aggressively with us to counter the threat from al Qaeda in the region. Over the last 9 years, our military's efforts have successfully contained the threat posed by terrorist groups in the Philippines and prevented al Qaeda from establishing a foothold in South East Asia. Initiated in 2001, Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF–P) is spearheaded by the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines which works side by side with the Armed Forces of the Philippines to reduce the effectiveness of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and deny these organizations the use of Philippine territory as a safe haven. OEF–P operations have been successful at hindering ASG/JI abilities to conduct terrorist operations and eliminating numerous key terrorist leaders. These activities also benefit the Philippines by facilitating a safe environment for numerous civic action projects, such as Dental Civil Action Programs and Medical Civil Action Programs, to provide Philippine people in remote areas much needed health care assistance.

III. CLOSING

Through their ability to execute high-end lethal strikes, as well as their competence in preventing festering problems from turning into far-reaching and expensive crises, SOF have proven their immeasurable value for securing our national interests. The wars we have been engaged in over the last decade have amply demonstrated how much more critical those skills and competencies will be in the future. We appreciate the committee’s continued support for our work to support these extraordinary men and women who undertake some of the Nation’s most demanding missions.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Reid. You certainly have a lot to oversee for the special operations-combatting terrorism.

Dr. Schear, if you can give us your opening statement, please.

STATEMENT OF JAMES A. SCHEAR, Ph.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY AND STABILITY OPERATIONS

Dr. SCHEAR. Thank you so much. Madam Chair, Senator Portman, thank you very much for the opportunity to join my colleagues here today to testify about SOLIC’s roles and responsibilities in countering transnational threats to peace and stability. I’d also like to underscore my appreciation for the unwavering support this committee provides to our dedicated service personnel in their performance of their diverse and often dangerous missions.

Madam Chair, with your permission I’ll submit my full statement for the record.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you.

Dr. SCHEAR. Thank you.

As the chief steward of SOLIC’s Office of Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, “PSO” for short, I oversee a wide-ranging portfolio that spans both preventive, responsive, and partner-focused activities aimed at bolstering security and advancing U.S. interests in regions threatened by extremist violence and natural disasters. My written statement covers much of this ground in detail and I’d be happy to explicate any aspect of it that you wish, including U.N. peacekeeping, but in my brief prepared remarks I thought it might be most useful for me to highlight PSO’s coalition support activities, our work on foreign disaster relief, our Afghan-focused ministry of defense advisers program, and last but not least, our proposal for a new global security contingency fund, which is being advocated by Secretaries Clinton and Gates.

In the area of coalition support, my team oversees and implements specialized authorities and appropriations that allow willing
and able international partners to deploy and operate with us, strengthening both our forces and our international legitimacy. In Afghanistan, for example, over 26 nations receive lift and sustainment support as they serve alongside the U.S. military. The importance of this assistance cannot be overstated. The prospect of operating with 26 fewer partners would dramatically change the complexion of our Afghan-focused efforts.

With this support, our Services also benefit from deeper ties with 26 foreign militaries that are now more capable. Most recently, we have also provided some logistics and support using our global lift and sustain authority to eligible partners operating with us under the rubric of Operation Unified Protector, which is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Libya-focused operation.

Our ability to forge effective coalitions is essential to spreading the burdens of global security, but it does involve some heavy lifting. For example, at one point we discovered internally that we really had no well-developed system for accepting a potential coalition partner’s offer, based upon a clear understanding of the likely costs and benefits of that partner’s participation. So our office created a review process to ensure proper consideration of such offers so that we could get the maximum return on our investment while also avoiding excessive commitments to partners whose capabilities did not match our combatant commander’s needs.

We also have primary responsibility for oversight of our military’s humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions. DOD is not the lead U.S. Government agency for foreign disaster relief. We operate in support of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), typically in high-end disasters that overwhelm the response capability of civilian relief providers.

What this means is that when, say, an earthquake hits Haiti or a tsunami and earthquake hit Japan my team makes sure that our military capabilities are used appropriately and with proper authorization. Because we work on disasters in every region, we strive to ensure that the right people from our interagency community are involved, that our combatant commanders are appropriately linked with USAID, that they know what sort of support is permissible, and that they have sufficient funding and authorities to carry out their mission.

To give you a better idea of our work, I’ll proffer up a few examples. When a typhoon hit the Philippines last October, U.S. Pacific Command’s (PACOM) helicopters were vital in transporting civilian assessment teams to survey hard-to-reach areas. More recently, in Japan we supported Secretary Gates and Admiral Willard in expediting approval for the use of our overseas humanitarian disaster and civic assistance account to fund our relief operations, and we fast-tracked arrangements to deploy U.S.-based urban search and rescue teams in support of our Japanese allies.

Finally in the wake of the popular uprising in Libya we have assisted a range of DOS-led activities supporting the repatriation of foreign migrant workers fleeing the Qadhafi regime’s brutal crackdown.

Madam Chair, I would be remiss if I failed to underscore our partner-focused contributions to the Afghan campaign. Both my colleagues and I invest much time and effort to ensure that U.S.-
trained and equipped indigenous forces can operate effectively and responsibly as we transition out, graceful transition out of Afghanistan.

A key element of that effort is to strengthen Afghan security ministries in a way that sustains our tactical-level investment. For this reason, SOLIC launched the ministry of advisory defense program—ministry of defense advisor (MODA) program. Its mission is to generate high-quality, well-trained civilian experts who can establish lasting links to their partner ministries. MODA has been so successful that within 2 months after our first deployment of 17 advisors to Kabul, General Petraeus quickly challenged us to recruit, train, and deploy 100 more before the end of this year.

MODA’s value added can be measured in very tangible, straightforward ways. As Napoleon once observed, an army marches on its stomach. When the Afghans last year were wrestling with the issue of how best to reorganize and upgrade their slaughterhouse, we dispatched an adviser from our Defense Commissary Agency to assist our Afghan partners in that effort. With his extensive background and skills, our field commanders report that he’s had an enormously positive impact.

Madam Chair, I’ve discussed briefly the work that we do in support of ongoing operations. Our other main focus is on providing capabilities to prevent the onset of recurrence of conflict. We do this through our focus on stability operations across DOD, as well as on targeted programs and policies focused on partner capacity-building. Secretary Gates has rightfully made partner capacity-building a high priority for our Department. Doing so adroitly requires, however, that we successfully navigate what the Secretary has dubbed a patchwork of specialized authorities and funding sources, which has evolved for the most part in a very different security environment than the one we face today.

My team is a kind of navigation aid for our combatant commanders and our regional offices in this effort. We’ve developed and maintain an online information repository about security cooperation tools that is used DOD-wide.

We’re also working to better meet the challenges imposed upon us by today’s exceptionally volatile security environment, which leads me to my final point, regarding our proposal for a global security contingency fund. One of the key challenges we face is how to react to threats and opportunities that emerge within a given budget cycle and to recalibrate assistance as or when situations change on the ground. We are challenged not only by a multi-year planning, programming, and funding cycle, but also by interagency structures that are not as agile as they should be in the face of transnational threats that span the portfolios of multiple agencies.

To address this challenge, Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates have launched a proposal for a pilot program called the global security contingency fund. If enacted by Congress, the two Departments would have a 3-year timeframe to demonstrate a new business model and provide a much-needed tool for responding to emergent challenges and opportunities.

Under this fund, the DOS and DOD would literally work side by side to provide security assistance to foreign partners, including the military, interior, border, maritime, and counterterrorism secu-
rity forces of those countries and their governing institutions. This new fund could also provide assistance for justice sector, rule of law, and stabilization programs when the capacity of civilian agencies is challenged by conflict or instability.

A key feature of the fund is that it would be operated by a small staff of DOS, DOD, and USAID employees working in the same office. That staff would be supplemented by experts from other U.S. Government agencies as appropriate. The fund would be used to meet requirements that both secretaries identify as critical and it would allow both Departments to provide targeted funding for that purpose.

Perhaps most critical, the fund would give the U.S. Government a tool to be more responsive to challenging real-world situations. The United States is constantly striving to become more agile and smarter in how we create stronger partners in our common interests of building a more robust, sustainable security environment. We hope you will support this fund and look forward to continuing to work with you on its development and to addressing the security challenges we face today.

Again, my thanks for this opportunity to testify.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Schear follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. JAMES SCHEAR

Chairman Hagan, Senator Portman, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to testify today about the global programs and capabilities Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations (PSO) brings to the Department of Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Government.

I'll begin by giving you a brief overview of our policy responsibilities, including both those that focus on supporting U.S. military operations as well as those designed to mitigate or prevent conflict that might otherwise draw in U.S. forces. I'll then turn to one of the key capabilities we would like to have, the joint proposal by the Secretaries of Defense and State for a Global Security Contingency Fund, and another opportunity to enhance our capabilities.

I. SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS

Like my colleagues, a key priority for my office is supporting ongoing military operations. Our work supports both kinetic and non-kinetic operations, including coalition support for U.S. operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and non-combatant evacuation operations, international peacekeeping operations, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and ministerial development in Afghanistan.

In the area of coalition support to U.S. operations, my office oversees and implements specialized authorities and appropriations to allow willing and capable international partners to deploy and operate with us, strengthening both our forces and our international legitimacy. For example, over 26 nations received lift and sustainment support as they served alongside the U.S. military in Afghanistan. Needless to say, the prospect of operating with 26 fewer partners would change the complexion of the Afghanistan effort. It also has meant that the U.S. military has deeper ties with 26 militaries that are now much more capable. Most recently, we are also providing logistical support using Global Lift and Sustain authority to eligible partners operating with us under the rubric of Operation Unified Protector, NATO's Libya-focused operation.

The ability to build coalitions is essential to spreading the burden of global security. Our expertise not only ensures that funds are optimized to assist the needs of our partners, it also allows us to rationalize the provision of that assistance. For example, at one point, we had no agreed-upon system for saying "yes" or "no" to partners offering to join the coalition. So, we sometimes had officials accepting a partner's offer without understanding the costs and benefits of a given partner's participation. Our office created a system to ensure proper review of such offers so that we could get the maximum return on our investment in coalition partners while also avoiding excessive commitments to partners whose capabilities did not match the combatant commander's needs.
We have primary responsibility for the oversight of our military’s humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) leads the government’s response, so we are always in a supporting role. What that means in real terms is that when an earthquake hits Haiti or a tsunami hits Japan, my office makes sure that military assets are used appropriately and with proper authorization. We make sure that the U.S. military is prepared to be a “responder of last resort” when foreign disasters overwhelm the capacity of the host nation and international first-responders to manage. Because we work on disasters in every region, we are able to ensure that the right people from DOD are involved in the interagency process, that our combatant commanders are appropriately linked with USAID, they know what sort of support is permissible, and they have sufficient funding and authority to carry out their mission. While every disaster is different, our knowledge of what military assets have been helpful in various scenarios can be critical to quickly providing effective assistance.

To give you a better idea of our work in this critical area, let me give you some examples. When a typhoon hit the Philippines last October, we were able to transport USAID’s assessment team in PACOM helicopters to survey hard-to-reach areas. This was critical to determining what the total US government response should be and what unique military assets should be provided. In Japan, we quickly worked with Admiral Willard’s team to get Secretary Gates’ approval to use Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funds for assistance operations, including getting both Fairfax and Los Angeles civilian urban search and rescue teams’ heavy equipment on the ground within 72 hours. In Libya, in order to address stabilization concerns associated with democratizing governments in Egypt and Tunisia, we have assisted with the airlift of third country nationals.

In addition to supporting ongoing operations, we also do the steady-state work with partners so that their militaries are better prepared to support their governments’ disaster response needs. Not only does this create real and lasting capabilities in partners, it also is an area where we can build relationships in some countries where other types of military engagement are not welcome. My team also is integrated into crisis action planning meetings to ensure lessons from previous disasters are learned and applied across the government.

The same team that does this work also plans for and ensures the proper execution of military evacuations of Americans overseas. At the request of the Department of State, DOD assists in the evacuation of American citizens, allies, and third-country partners from unstable and unsafe environments. Working with Crisis Operations at State, the Joint Staff, and regional desks, FSO maintains resident expertise DOD leadership requires, and FSO provides the crucial link between the two Departments.

My office also provides policy advice on DOD support to U.N. and multinational peacekeeping operations, oversees the execution of peacekeeping support, and works with interagency partners to coordinate overall U.S. Government support for peacekeeping. For example, we work closely with the State Department as the joint manager of their Global Peace Operations Initiative to train and equip more foreign peacekeepers. Our Geographic Combatant Commanders are the implementers for 50 percent of the program. We work with the State Department on providing U.S. officers to key positions at U.N. headquarters and in U.N. missions. We also provide critical expertise on realistic mandate goals so that U.N. missions can succeed.

Another critical area of support to ongoing operations is our oversight and coordination of EOD policy and capacity across DOD. In addition, we provide policy and subject-matter expertise in support of DOD efforts to support civilian authorities preventing and disrupting attacks using explosives in the homeland. Recently, we worked with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Army (and General Counsel) to provide EOD expertise and to loan specialized equipment to FBI agents investigating a suspect in connection with a failed bomb attempt at a Martin Luther King, Jr. parade in Spokane, WA. This support to local authorities allowed Federal agents to safely secure the suspect in an otherwise unpredictable and extremely dangerous situation.

Last, I want to point out a tool that we developed and fielded to Afghanistan. Like both of my colleagues here today, we are constantly trying to adapt to the urgent needs of our commanders in the field. In our case, we help address the need to build functioning Afghan security institutions so that the security forces we train can be sustained and remain effective. It became clear in Iraq and Afghanistan that we needed better tools to train these nascent security institutions. For that reason, we created the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) program. It is a way of generating high-quality, effective civilian advisors who establish lasting links to partner ministries. Some of the key features of the program are the 7 weeks of pre-deployment training, the ability to stay in Afghanistan from 1 to 2 years, the ability to provide
backfill personnel to home organizations when someone is deployed as an advisor, and the enduring ministry-to-ministry partnerships that are created because the program draws primarily from senior civil servants. Prior to MoDA, untrained military personnel or contractors did all of the U.S. Government’s advisory work at the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior. MoDA is the first program to provide realistic and useful training for ministerial advisors. It has been so successful that after the first 17 advisors served in Kabul for a couple of months, Lieutenant General Caldwell, head of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, asked to send some of his military advisors to the training and General Petraeus requested at least 100 advisors before the end of the year.

In all of our support to current operations there is a recurring theme of unique expertise and interagency collaboration. We support our warfighters with real tools, with expertise on how to use those tools, and by ensuring interagency agreement and alignment so that they and the U.S. Government can be most effective.

II. SUPPORT TO PREVENTION

So far, I’ve discussed the work we do in support of ongoing operations. Our other main focus is on providing capabilities to prevent or recover from conflict. We do this both through our focus on stability operations capabilities across the Department and targeted programs and policies to build partner capacity.

When it comes to Stability Operations, we are future oriented. It isn’t just Operation Iraqi Freedom Redux—it’s broad “stabilization” in the sense of supporting civilian-led programs, targeting assistance that stimulates local economies, marginalizing violent extremists, preventing future conflict, and laying a foundation for longer term governance and capacity building. A critical enabler to this effort is the civilian-military working relationship across the interagency. While every office works on interagency collaboration, we focus on its necessity for successful stability operations from the strategic to the tactical level. We are focused on moving beyond coordination meetings, to coordinated interagency pre-deployment training and ensuring that our doctrine and concepts prepare our military personnel to be effective in interagency and multi-partner environments. For us, stability operations are both a part of preventing escalating conflict and a part of post-conflict recovery.

In many cases, it also is critical to building a successful exit strategy for current conflicts. PSO’s stability operations experts worked closely with and advised Department of State counterparts who built the U.S. Government Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Afghanistan, which will usher in transition in its broadest sense, from military to civilian governance across all sectors.

PSO also is incubating the DOD capability to sustain our train and equip investments through ministerial level capacity-building programs, specifically the relatively new Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) and the MoDA program I mentioned earlier. DIRI supports the development of partner defense ministries through regular engagements with partner defense ministries that are aimed at identifying their capability gaps and then working to fill them. DIRI provides teams of subject matter experts to work with a partner nation on a periodic, sustained basis. For example, we will meet with a partner to identify the needs and establish a work plan. In one country we might be helping them with their first realistic strategic defense plan and in another it may be an effort to help them create a personnel system that tracks the specialties and training of personnel so they can be used to best effect. In all of these cases, both the goal of the work plan and the process of achieving it create new capabilities in partners which often have a multiplying effect on their overall military capacity.

By contrast, MoDA supplies dedicated and experienced DOD civilians who can forge long-term professional relationships with their international defense-ministry counterparts in similar specialties. Again, MoDA sends senior defense civilians who are trained to be advisors. For example, when the Afghans were struggling with how best to feed their troops and how to run and organize a slaughter house, we were able to send an advisor from the Defense Commissary Agency. With his extensive background and skills together with the advisor training, he was effective immediately in country.

We’re a “solution provider” in other ways. Secretary Gates rightfully makes developing the capabilities of our partners a high priority for the Department. As he stated in our most recent Quadrennial Defense Review, “U.S. security is inextricably tied to the effectiveness of our efforts to help partners and allies build their own security capacity.” That said, DOD is attempting to execute the security cooperation mission with what the Secretary terms a “patchwork” of specialized legislative authorities and funding sources that evolved in a very different security environment. For the security cooperation planner at a geographic Combatant Command who will
serve for 1 to 2 years and then go back to more traditional military work, it is very challenging to understand the tools and funding available to work with our partners. Even once they have a good sense of the tools and funding, actually accessing those tools and funding for a given partner can take years.

My office assists the combatant commanders and our regional office colleagues to navigate this patchwork. We also work on improving our planning efforts and strategies so that they include realistic requirements or clearly identified gaps in our ability to deploy and train a dependable and effective partner militaries. To give you an example, under different leadership, this office identified a critical gap in our counter terrorism strategies and pursued what is now called the “1206” legislation. As you know, 1206 has been a vital tool in our counter terrorism and building partnership efforts. After working with Congress to establish the tool and its operations, it is now overseen by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Reid, in coordination with the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the Department of State, as part of our broader counter terrorism work. Today, we are working with the Joint Staff to create network-based information tools to track security cooperation activities in countries from the bottom-up. We have already implemented an online information repository about security cooperation tools that is used DOD-wide. We also are working to create an office to better evaluate the impact of our security cooperation tools.

We are trying to fill new gaps that have emerged by creating new tools or improving existing tools.

III. OPPORTUNITIES

This leads me to my final points, the opportunities we have today to enhance our capabilities. Let me mention one relatively simple fix and then discuss a more overarching tool we’d like to create.

The simple fix I’d like to bring to your attention regards Humanitarian Mine Action. The goal of the DOD Humanitarian Mine Action program is to relieve human suffering and the adverse effects of landmines and explosive remnants of war on noncombatant civilians while advancing the combatant commanders’ security cooperation strategies and U.S. national security objectives. Through the Humanitarian Mine Action Training Program, DOD executes “train-the-trainer” programs of instruction designed to develop international partners’ capabilities for a wide range of HMA activities including demining training. Over the past decade, we have seen a number of casualties and deaths linked to the improper storage of munitions. This is particularly distressing when it occurs in densely populated areas as we saw recently in Tanzania and Albania. Rather than use our programs solely to help clean up the ordnance once it has exploded and harmed innocent civilians, we would like to modestly include training on how to safely stockpile conventional munitions so we can work to prevent those disasters. To do this, no new funding is required as we can accomplish this mission within existing OHDACA funding.

One of the key challenges we face is reacting to threats and opportunities that emerge within the budget cycle and recalibrating assistance as situations change on the ground. We are challenged not only by the lengthy budget cycle but also by an interagency structure that does not incentivize whole-of-government approaches, even though we know they are usually the most effective. The fact is that many of the security challenges we see today can most effectively be addressed if we improve partner governance, justice sector capacity, border security, and basic functioning. This requires civilians at DOD and the interagency working with the military as seamlessly as possible.

We all recognize how important this is in Afghanistan to ultimately reaching our objectives and withdrawing from that war-torn nation leaving behind a government that can secure its borders, enforce the law, and serve the population. The concept transfers to other circumstances where a security situation may be ambiguous and an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.

To address these needs and gaps, Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates developed a pilot program called the Global Security Contingency Fund. If enacted by Congress, the two Departments would have 3 years to demonstrate a new business model and provide a much-needed tool for responding to emergent challenges and opportunities.

Under the Fund, the Departments of State and Defense would literally work side-by-side to provide security assistance to partner governments, including military, interior, border, maritime, and counterterrorism security forces, and their governing institutions. This new Fund also could provide assistance for the justice sector, rule of law, and stabilization when the capacity of civilian agencies is challenged by conflict or instability. A key feature of the Fund is that it would be operated by a small staff of State Department, USAID, and DOD employees working in the same office.
and would be accountable to both Departments. That staff would be supplemented by other interagency experts depending on the requirements that need to be met. The Fund would be used to meet requirements both Secretaries identify as critical and allow both Departments to provide funding for the work agreed upon. Perhaps most critical, the Fund would give the U.S. Government a tool to be more effective in its assistance by allowing for within budget cycle commitments that are responsive to fluid real-world situations.

IV. CONCLUSION

The United States is constantly striving to become more agile and smarter about how we create stronger partners and lasting security. This means having tools that are better adapted to today's security environment and having a strong partner in Congress to ensure that the tools meet America's needs. We hope that you will support the Fund and look forward to continuing to work with you to address today's new security challenges and opportunities. Thank you, again for this opportunity to testify about the capabilities we provide, including those that focus on supporting U.S. operations and those designed to prevent the obligation of U.S. military forces and some of the key capabilities we would like to have. I look forward to your questions.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Dr. Schear. I do want to say to all of you that your written statements will be included in the record in full.

Now, Mr. Wechsler, for your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM F. WECHSLER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS AND GLOBAL THREATS

Mr. WECHSLER. Thank you very much. I'll try to be brief.

Chairman Hagan, Senator Portman, like my colleagues, I really do appreciate the opportunity to be here. It's quite an important subject on which you called this hearing.

I want you to know that all of our efforts working together really do have a significant impact on our efforts in Afghanistan and where we confront other transnational threats. My job, as you noted, is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats. We support the national counterdrug control strategy and the national security strategy by providing assistance to local, State, Federal, and foreign agencies to confront the drug trade and narcoterrorism.

DOD supports law enforcement through detection and monitoring of drug trafficking, sharing information, and helping countries build their own capacity. Our counternarcotics efforts are focused on maintaining force readiness through drug screening for the armed services and outreach to DOD families and their communities.

I give Congress credit for having had the vision to recognize the important role DOD can and should play to counter the threat of drug trafficking. This was an initiative led by Congress in the late 1980s and one that in many respects was visionary, considering the types of threats that we have confronted since then.

The legislative authorities that you mentioned in your opening statement are absolutely critical to continuing this mission set for DOD. They have been adjusted slightly over the years as the threat itself has developed, and I look forward to working with you and your staff to continuing that progress in the years ahead.

In Afghanistan, our efforts support the warfighter by building Afghan capacity through information-sharing. In many ways, coun-
ternarcotics authorities and funding act as a bridge between law enforcement efforts and more traditional military operations. While DOD has traditionally provided military support to law enforcement activities going back years, in Afghanistan the expertise and authorities of our law enforcement partners are really supporting our military mission. This is quite critical because the reality is that we’re not going to win this war on the basis of legal authorities and expertise that exists within DOD alone. We’re only going to win this by bringing together the whole of government, all of our expertise, and doing what we can do in DOD to support our interagency partners.

Narcotics account for a large proportion of Afghanistan’s economy and contribute to insecurity, corruption, poor governance, and stagnation of economic development. Approximately 84 percent of all Afghanistan’s poppy production is concentrated in the south and southwest provinces, areas under primary Taliban control. Our revised counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan is incorporated into the overall counterinsurgency strategy and places greater emphasis on interdiction efforts, those joint military-law enforcement operations, and on alternative livelihoods.

Closer to home, as was mentioned by Senator Portman, Mexico continues to confront escalating drug-fueled violence, particularly along its northern border with the United States. Our counternarcotics support to Mexico is implemented primarily through U.S. Northern Command and includes subject matter exchanges, training, equipment, and information-sharing. Most of DOD cooperation with Mexico falls under our counternarcotics program.

When I entered office we were spending very close to zero in this area and now we are allocating over $50 million every year in this area. I would consider this to be one of those emerging issues that you discussed.

Central America as well continues to face an increasing pressure from drug trafficking and related violent crime, largely as a result of the progress that has been made by the governments of Mexico and Colombia in confronting these organizations. Colombia is a special case, as was mentioned by Senator Portman, in my mind indeed perhaps the greatest success of U.S. national security policy in the last 10 years, a bipartisan success, a very cost-effective success, a counterinsurgency success, and one from which I believe a great many important lessons can be drawn for our wider efforts around the world.

I recently traveled to West Africa, another emerging area, to get a first-hand look at the region where weak governance is increasingly being exploited by drug traffickers as they target the lucrative and growing European market for cocaine. This trend has a number of important national security implications, such as undermining governance and stability in the region and providing a funding stream to western hemisphere criminal organizations that traffic drugs to the United States. This will be a subject for the G-8 under French leadership, after which the Lisbon Conference. We’re doing an awful lot more in this area compared to what we had been doing in years past.

The globalization of the legitimate economy has benefited the illicit economy in many of the same ways. Today nearly every coun-
try in the world now suffers to some degree from the illicit, illegal drug trade. Make no mistake, the drug trade is by far and away the largest illegal activity that happens around the world. Indeed, the networks that are built on the foundation of the drug trade around the world are the very same networks that all sorts of other transnational threats sit upon, use, and employ. We have to be able to go against this criminal nexus in order to go against the other aspects of the transnational crime.

Indeed, we see this, the TCOs themselves, diversifying into other criminal activities. One of the issues that we need to work on together with you is the fact that our bureaucracies, our legal authorities, are all designed—many of them are designed on single-issue threats when in fact the threat that we’re facing around the world is a nexus of all these threats that come together. That’s what we see out there in the world and that’s what we have to build our bureaucracies and our legal authorities around.

Our counternarcotics activities in DOD employ two principal force multipliers to make the best use of finite resources available, and we are aware of the finite resources that are available. We’re proud to say that I believe that if you go back over the decades in the DOD counternarcotics program what you’ll see is it’s one of the most cost-effective programs that we have.

Our two principal force multipliers are: first and foremost, building partner capacity among our international partners, so we enhance their ability to work with their U.S. counterparts to maximize the value of taxpayer dollars as a force multiplier.

Second, we stress intelligent and information-driven operations. Targeting based on cued intelligence is much more cost-effective than trying to patrol vast areas of air or maritime or other assets. Part of this queued intelligence is something we’re spending an awful lot more time on and hopefully will be able to talk about more today, our counter-threat finance efforts, because it’s the money, as you mentioned, Madam Chairman, that is really driving a lot of these transnational threats.

It’s important to recognize, just to conclude, that when we discuss the transnational nature of this threat that does also include criminal activities that take place inside the United States as well. For instance, the influence of Mexican TCOs extends well beyond the Southwest border to cities across the country, including Atlanta, Chicago, and Detroit. All of your constituencies are confronted by this threat.

Unfortunately, coordination of domestic and international activities can be especially challenging inside the executive branch. Once again, here DOD can play an important supporting role to facilitate coordination and information-sharing throughout mechanisms such as a Joint Interagency Task Force South in Key West, which I believe is really one of the best models of interagency coordination in the last couple of decades.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify. I welcome your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wechsler follows:]
Chairman Hagan, Senator Portman, and other distinguished members of the subcommittee, I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the Department’s counternarcotics (CN) efforts alongside my colleagues Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) Reid and DASD Schear. I am convinced that the complementary efforts across Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (SO/LIC&IC) are having a significant impact on our efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan and on a wide range of other transnational threats around the world.

Before discussing some of the latest trends we are seeing in the threat of transnational organized crime, I would like to provide you with a brief overview of our organization, strategy, budget, and programs.

COUNTERNARCOTICS AND GLOBAL THREATS PROGRAM OVERVIEW

The Department of Defense (DOD) supports the administration’s National Drug Control Strategy by providing assistance to local, State, Federal, and foreign agencies to confront the drug trade and narco-terrorism. DOD support for law enforcement includes detecting and monitoring drug trafficking, sharing information, and helping countries build their capacity to confront drug trafficking. DOD counternarcotics efforts are also focused on maintaining force readiness through demand reduction programs for the armed services.

Through its combatant commands, the military departments, and the defense agencies, DOD provides unique military platforms, personnel, systems, and capabilities that support Federal law enforcement agencies and foreign security forces involved in counternarcotics missions. The DOD counternarcotics mission targets those terrorist groups worldwide that use narcotics trafficking to support terrorist activities by deploying counternarcotics assets, in cooperation with foreign governments, in regions where terrorists benefit from illicit drug revenue or use drug smuggling systems.

The Office of DASD for Counternarcotics and Global Threats (CN&GT) is the single focal point for DOD’s CN activities, reporting to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The office of the DASD(CN&GT) was established to ensure that DOD develops and implements a focused counternarcotics program with clear priorities and measured results. Consistent with applicable laws, authorities, regulations, and funding, the office ensures that sufficient resources are allocated to the counternarcotics mission to achieve high-impact results.

All DOD counternarcotics programs, with the exception of Active Duty military pay and Service operations tempo, are funded through the DOD Counternarcotics Central Transfer Account (CTA). The CTA was established by the fiscal year 1989 Defense Appropriations Act and designed to allow for maximum flexibility to respond to ever-changing drug trafficking patterns. In fiscal year 2012, the Department has requested $1.16 billion for CN efforts through the CTA. Of this total, approximately 13 percent would go to support demand reduction, 20 percent to support domestic law enforcement assistance, 18 percent to support intelligence and technology programs, and 48 percent to support international counternarcotics activities.

We take pride in our efforts to reduce drug abuse in the Armed Forces and Defense workforce and in providing outreach to DOD families and their communities. The DOD role in illegal drug demand reduction concentrates principally on eliminating drug abuse in the U.S. Armed Forces and Defense civilian workforce as well as reaching out to DOD families and their communities to reduce drug abuse. To address rising prescription drug abuse rates, DOD plans to implement recommendations from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for its Drug Demand Reduction Program to expand testing to include commonly abused prescription drugs, establish random unannounced drug testing in-theater, establish mobile collection teams, complete the prescription drug verification portal, and make drug prosecution statistics part of readiness reporting. The National Guard, acting under the authority of the State and territorial governors, also plays an especially important role through community outreach and helping at-risk youth resist drug-related temptation. These programs are consistent with the President’s National Drug Control Strategy, which points out:

The demand for drugs can be further decreased by comprehensive, evidence-based prevention programs focused on the adolescent years, which science confirms is the peak period for substance use initiation and escalation into addiction. We have a shared responsibility to educate our young people about the risks of drug use, and we must do so not only at home, but also in schools, sports leagues, faith communities, places of work, and other settings and activities that attract youth.
We are in the final stages of developing a DOD Counternarcotics and Global Threats Strategy that will more clearly align our efforts with President’s National Security Strategy, the National Drug Control Strategy, as well as with the Quadrennial Defense Review’s four priority objectives: (1) Prevail in Today’s Wars, (2) Prevent and Deter Conflict, (3) Prepare to Defeat Adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and (4) Preserve and Enhance the All-Volunteer Force. This Strategy will be based on national-level guidance and will establish an integrated set of strategic goals and objectives to address the national security implications of drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime and to help prioritize programs and activities. The Strategy will outline where Defense capabilities can be brought to bear in support of a whole-of-government approach to address this national security concern. I would welcome the opportunity to brief you or your staff on the Strategy as soon as it is made available.

EFFORTS IN U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

In Afghanistan, DOD’s counternarcotics efforts are focused on building Afghan capacity, through information sharing, training and equipping, and infrastructure. While DOD has provided military support, as needed, to counternarcotics law enforcement activities, in Afghanistan the opposite is also true. In Afghanistan, the expertise and authorities of our law enforcement partners also contributes to advancing essential national security objectives. While relatively little of the heroin produced in Afghanistan is ultimately bound for the United States today, U.S. law enforcement agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Agency have been at the forefront of our counternarcotics efforts in support of broader U.S. national security interests.

Narcotics account for a large proportion of Afghanistan’s economy, and they contribute to insecurity, corruption, poor governance, and stagnation of economic development. It is essential to address the drug trade and its effects in order to conduct a successful counter-insurgency campaign. Approximately 84 percent of all Afghanistan’s poppy production is concentrated in the south and southwestern provinces. These areas are primarily controlled by the Taliban, which benefits financially from this trade.

Building on what worked in Colombia, while recognizing regional differences, our revised counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan emphasizes support for a “whole-of-government” approach that is incorporated into the overall stabilization strategy and places greater emphasis on interdiction and agriculture and rural development. In 2010, Afghan National Security Forces conducted approximately 300 operations supported by DOD, primarily in the south. These operations led to the destruction of approximately 55 tons of opium, 2 tons of morphine, 12 tons of heroin, 74 tons of hashish, 34 tons of chemicals used to produce heroin, and numerous weapons and munitions. In Pakistan and Central Asia, DOD counternarcotics activities focus on containing the flow of narcotics emanating from Afghanistan by supporting improved border security and interdiction capacity and improved information sharing.

CN&GT’s efforts in the region complement other SO/LIC&IC activities to support that warfight. In many ways, CN authorities and funding act as a bridge between law enforcement efforts and more traditional military operations. For instance, CN&GT programs also support counter-narcoterrorism training provided by U.S. Special Operations Forces in the region that directly support counter-terrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) objectives. In fiscal year 2009, CN&GT provided counternarcotics-funded helicopters in support of broader CT/COIN objectives in Pakistan. CN&GT also joins the Department of Homeland Security (CBP/ICE) in providing critical support for Operation Global Shield, a World Customs Organization (WCO) effort to combat the illicit transport and use of precursor chemicals by terrorist and other criminal organizations some of which are used to manufacture improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Where Partnership Strategy and Security Operations’ Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) program provides support to the Ministry of Defense, CN&GT efforts are focused on building capacity of law enforcement units within the Ministry of Interior such as the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), the National Interdiction Unit (NIU), the Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU), and Aviation Interdiction Unit (AIU).

CN efforts in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility complement counter-terrorism, DOD’s partnership strategy, and stability operations. All three of these pillars need to be coordinated for greater effect. Often, as in the case of Pakistan, CN efforts allow DOD to establish a base for follow-on CT/COIN and stability operations. In 2006, CN funding was used to begin building-up Pakistan’s border security forces in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas region based on the
amount of drugs transiting this region headed to the Makron Coast from Afghanistan. The drug trade is inherently associated with creating instability and is often a localized funding source for insurgent and criminal groups.

CN&GT coordinates with SO/CT on 1206 reporting requirements. This annual review of CT funding by CN experts helps to eliminate overlaps and identify areas for improved coordination. Leveraging the expertise of the Counter-Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office and its relationship with CN&GT, SO/CT was able to procure a utility aircraft for Yemeni security forces with Section 1206 funding at the end of fiscal year 2010.

Emerging Threats
Closer to home, Mexico continues to confront escalating drug-fueled violence particularly along its northern border with the U.S. Gunmen associated with drug trafficking organizations routinely carry out sophisticated attacks against Mexican law enforcement and military personnel. The Department of Defense’s counternarcotics support to Mexico is implemented primarily through U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and includes training, equipment, and information sharing as well as indirect support to units of the Mexican armed forces with counter-narcoterrorism missions. We are also working with U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and NORTHCOM to develop a joint security effort in the border region of Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize. Most of DOD’s cooperation with Mexico falls under the Department’s counternarcotics program, and we expect to allocate approximately $51 million in fiscal year 2011 to support Mexico. This allocation is a dramatic increase from previous funding levels for Mexico. Before 2009, for example, funding for Mexico was closer to $3 million a year.

Central America continues to face increasing pressure from drug trafficking and related violent crime, largely as a result of the progress that has been made by the Governments of Mexico and Colombia in confronting these organizations. A Congressional Research Service report published this March illustrated this graphically by mentioning that, despite the incredible drug-fueled violence in Mexico, the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants for all Central American nations is significantly higher (with the exception of Costa Rica). These trends are directly attributable to illicit trafficking of all forms of contraband such as drugs, weapons, bulk cash, counterfeit and stolen goods, and persons. These law enforcement issues have important ramifications for the national security of Mexico, the Nations of Central America, and the United States. The Central American Citizen Security Partnership, announced by President Obama in El Salvador last month, seeks to “address the social and economic forces that drive young people toward criminality.” The implication for DOD is that we will work even harder to broaden and deepen our interagency and international partnership approach and take a holistic view of security. As always, DOD will play a supporting role to the overall strategy, led by the White House and the State Department, avoiding any over-emphasis on military responses.

I recently traveled to West Africa to get a first-hand look at a region where weak governance is increasingly being exploited by drug traffickers as they target the lucrative and growing European market for cocaine. This trend has a number of important national security implications, such as undermining governance and stability in the region and providing a funding stream to Western Hemisphere criminal organizations that traffic drugs to the United States.

Drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime have become a truly global phenomenon. The globalization of the legitimate economy has benefitted the illicit economy in many of the same ways. Today, nearly every country in the world now suffers to some degree from illegal drug consumption, production, or drug-related corruption and violence. Where once DOD’s counternarcotics efforts were focused in the Western Hemisphere, today we are supporting counternarcotics activities worldwide—most notably in Afghanistan and with its neighbors, but also in places such as West Africa and Central and Southeast Asia.

Transnational criminal organizations (TCO), are becoming increasingly networked as they form relationships with each other and at times with insurgent or terrorist groups. These relationships range from tactical, episodic interactions at one end of the spectrum, to full narcoterrorism on the other. This “threat networking” also undermines legitimate institutions in ways that create opportunities for other threats. TCOs are increasingly diversifying into other forms of criminal activity in order to spread risk and maximize potential profit. In some regions, for example, drug trafficking TCOs also engage in kidnapping, armed robbery, extortion, financial crime and other activities.

It is important to note that DOD counternarcotics support activities are carried out at the request of and in coordination with U.S. or foreign law enforcement officials. DOD support includes training, equipment, information sharing, communications, intelligence analysis, and other cooperation. I give Congress the credit for
having had the vision to recognize the important role DOD can and should play to counter the threat of drug trafficking, and particularly in supporting broader law enforcement efforts. DOD counternarcotics activities employ two principal “force multipliers” to make the best use of finite resources available. These are particularly important in the current fiscal environment. First, we emphasize networked partnership, both with other countries and among U.S. institutions. Through building capacity among our international partners, we enhance their ability to work with their U.S. counterparts and maximize the value of taxpayer dollars.

Second, we stress intelligence and information-driven operations. For example, DOD increasingly provides detection, monitoring, and law enforcement “end game” support, based on “cued” intelligence. Such targeting is more cost-effective than trying to patrol vast areas with limited air, maritime, or other assets.

It is important to recognize that when we discuss the transnational nature of this threat, this includes criminal activities that take place outside as well as within the United States. For instance, the influence of Mexican TCOs extends well beyond the Southwest border to cities across the country such as Atlanta, Chicago, and Detroit. Unfortunately, coordination of domestic and international activities can be especially challenging. Such coordination is, however, also increasingly important in an age when criminal globalization, threat networking, and diversification are making distance and borders less important. In this regard, DOD can play an important role in facilitating coordination and information sharing through mechanisms such as Joint Task Force-North in El Paso and Joint Interagency Task Force-South in Key West—both of which are models of interagency and international cooperation.

CONCLUSION

The transnational illicit drug trade is a multi-faceted national security concern for the United States. The drug trade is a powerful corrosive force that weakens the rule of law in affected countries, preventing governments from effectively addressing other transnational threats, such as terrorism, insurgency, organized crime, weapons trafficking, money laundering, human trafficking, and piracy. Many of the global and regional terrorists who threaten interests of the United States finance their activities with the proceeds from narcotics trafficking. The inability of many nations to police themselves effectively and to work with their neighbors to ensure regional security represents a challenge to global security. Extremists and international criminal networks frequently exploit local geographical, political, or social conditions to establish safe havens from which they can operate with impunity.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I welcome your questions and comments.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Reid, Dr. Schear, and Mr. Wechsler.

We will now have 8 minutes to do questions. Mr. Wechsler, counter-threat finance activities, which you’ve just been discussing, fall into your portfolio. I understand that your office has been active in setting up threat finance cells in Afghanistan and Iraq. A number of administration officials have indicated, however, that the most significant source of money funding terrorism comes from our Gulf States. What is your organization doing to identify and counter the flow of money from these nations? I hear there’s actually some points of the year called the “funding season.”

Mr. WECHSLER. You’re indeed correct, Madam Chairman. One of the challenges in this area is exactly what you said, that the fundraising networks are global in nature. So when we create mechanisms to facilitate coordination in Iraq and in Afghanistan, those aren’t enough. We need to go outside of those areas to really deal with it.

It’s very important to recognize the work that we have done inside those war zones in order to collect the right kind of information, in order to bring it together, to map the networks, to identify the key nodes, and then, most importantly, to identify the key aspect of U.S. power that is most relevant for attacking that particular node. Sometimes it may be military activities—our friends
in the Special Forces. Sometimes it will be a law enforcement operation. Sometimes it will be a host country law enforcement operation. Sometimes it will be an influence operation. Sometimes a Treasury designation. Sometimes diplomatic activity.

We have to have the mechanisms that can make those decisions, and that’s what we’re building up in the war zones.

Outside the war zones, you take one of these action arms completely off the table as far as DOD, so we need to rely on our interagency partners. But even there, there are roles that DOD can do because, in some cases our interagency partners, according to the tasks that they’ve been given by Congress, don’t necessarily see it directly in their interest.

Just as an example, the folks at the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) do an absolutely fantastic job at meeting their mission of keeping drugs out of the United States. Very little of the drugs that come out of Afghanistan and go through the Gulf and are part of those networks that end up funding our enemies come to the United States. So if you just look at their mission set, they wouldn’t have a lot of people in the Gulf. Indeed, when I went out there last January they had, DEA, had one person in Cairo that covers 14 countries and the Gulf.

So what we said is: We have a mission and we need your authorities. So what they have done, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement and, most recently, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, have gotten together and come up with a plan to have greater staffing in the Gulf, so that they can use their authorities to go after these financial networks with those host countries. We in DOD can support them with resources, but also with planning and analytical skills. So that’s how we go about dealing with that problem.

Senator HAGAN. Do you actually pay the Treasury for their personnel and providing them with intelligence?

Mr. WECHSLER. We do, not in providing them directly with intelligence, but we do make sure that we can provide the kind of resources that are necessary, whether that is physical space in buildings and in computers and those kind of tools that they use. In some cases we provide resources for TDY and travel and efforts like that. There are limitations on exactly what we’re able to pay for legally and we don’t go across those lines. But we want to make sure that in this relatively small amount of money that we can provide, which is hugely cost-effective for us to have Treasury as part of the war effort, that that’s not the reason why we fail in this area.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you.

Mr. Reid, let me ask you a question on Afghanistan counterterrorism operations. According to published reports, the tempo of counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan by U.S. and the Afghan SOFs has increased dramatically in recent months and demonstrated significant results. General Rodriguez stated that the Afghan people are playing an interestingly important role in the success of these operations by helping to provide significantly more tips because they see the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) out among them more than they ever had because of the increase in the number.
Do you agree with General Rodriguez that the increased presence of ANSF has resulted in better intelligence because the population is more likely to come forward with information?

Mr. Reid. Thank you, Madam Chair. In short, yes, I do agree with that assessment, and we are into a period now where it’s logical we would see an increase in the pace of activity, given our uplift in forces as the President authorized in the last review and the weather, climate factors in Afghanistan in the so-called spring and summer fighting season kicking off. So there is a logical increase.

With respect to the support of the population, again fundamental to our strategy is to put the Afghan forces in the lead. As we build toward a responsible transition, we will see more and more of Afghan forces in the lead. That does engender greater support by the local populace. We see this in our village stability operations, in our Afghan Local Police (ALP) Program, which has taken off rapidly, is building up beyond 5,000 forces that are involved in the ALP. It’s a village security, non-Kabul-driven local governance, local security apparatus that fits in with the ANSF in the big picture, but on the village level it is their own actions to push back on Taliban influence. This creates an information network. It creates an operational capacity that spreads the reach of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police to achieve this exact effect, which is a shifting of public sentiment towards an anti-Taliban position that is vital to the success in the counter-insurgency.

Senator Hagan. I was in Afghanistan in January and had an opportunity to go to the training center there for the ANSF and was quite impressed with the group that we saw.

There’s also reportedly 85 percent, I think what you’re talking about, of counterterrorism operations that take place without a shot being fired. In light of disagreement between NATO and the Afghan Government over civilian casualties, what actions have been taken by the counterterrorism forces to avoid civilian casualties in Afghanistan? Do you believe it is accurate to say that 85 percent of these counterterrorism operations are conducted successfully without a shot being fired?

Mr. Reid. That’s true, and I believe that came across at a briefing and we went back and said, is that a footnote anecdote or is that supportable? The facts are—and it’s a difference, and I’m sure in previous times—you’ve been down at Fort Bragg and seen the counterterrorism demonstrations with the explosions and the breaching and everything. It’s still a very valuable skill.

But what we have learned in this war, and particularly in these type of operations, is just going out there and calling them out is effective, and that’s what you’ve seen. That’s what we talk about, without shots being fired.

It’s also been optimized in Afghanistan by the use of the Afghan forces as well, so now they have their own folks calling them out. They know what happens if they don’t come out, so they tend to do that.

With respect to civilian casualties, clearly just a horrible, horrible incident when it does occur. We’ve taken many steps to minimize this with our strike policies, our call for fire policies, our verifications of the targets. It is an ugly, unfortunate aspect of war-
fare, and among the population, that I would say we will never completely eliminate, but the target control, fire control systems, have been strengthened to the point where we have greatly reduced them, and we will continue to do so.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. Senator Portman.

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you for your testimony, gentlemen. You raise so many issues and there are lots to get further information on. I would say that, based on your responses to the chair’s questions, your two worlds kind of coincide on the issue of counter-drug programs and narcotics, because I assume you would agree that not just with regard to the Taliban, but generally with regard to terrorist groups, narcotics often plays a role in terms of the funding.

Do you have any sense of what part of the Taliban’s resources, for instance, come from the trafficking of narcotics?

Mr. WECHSLER. Senator, I’ve seen a lot of estimates that try to get to those exact percentages and I wouldn’t stand behind any of them. But what I can say is that it is without question that a very significant proportion of the Taliban’s resources come from the narcotics trade and various elements of the narcotics trade. Sometimes it is direct involvement. Sometimes it is taxing it. Sometimes it is facilitating it. Sometimes it’s using the drug trafficking organizations themselves as mechanisms to move people, IEDs, other materials, into war zones. There is a mutually supportive relationship in many places that requires us to take down those networks.

Senator PORTMAN. The Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction tells us that we have spent as American taxpayers $1.5 billion between 2002 and last year on counterdrug activities in Afghanistan alone, $1.5 billion. This year’s budget request from the President I see includes nearly $400 million in the overseas contingency operations area for these same efforts.

You’ve talked a little about this, but what’s our objective and is it working? That’s a lot of money and there’s still a lot of trafficking.

Mr. WECHSLER. Yes. The objective is—there are short-term objectives and long-term objectives. The long-term objectives are counternarcotics objectives, that we want to return Afghanistan to what it was in the 70s when it was not the world’s leading source of opium.

The short-term objectives, though, are integrated into our counterinsurgency objectives, and those are not counternarcotics for counternarcotics’ sake directed, but they are counternarcotics in order to help break the nexus of the Taliban and the drug trafficking organizations. It’s interdiction-related and it’s also to support the individual farmers.

You may recall that a couple of years ago the U.S. Government—mostly DOS, not DOD—spent an awful lot of money on eradication programs. What we’ve done is we’ve halted those efforts and said that if there are going to be eradication programs, they’re going to be governor, local governor-led eradication programs, because what we found is that in many cases those were not only not productive, but they were counterproductive. What you ended up doing was making enemies out of all the farmers that have lost their liveli-
hood, not impacted the Taliban’s finance, and just created more recruits for them.

So what we are doing instead of targeting the farmers, we’re targeting the illicit networks behind the Taliban and the drug trafficking organizations. To that respect, they have been quite effective. Just a couple of things—and they’ve really been effective in this year as the capacities that we built over time, including Afghan capacities, it must be stressed, have really come into, working together with our military capacities.

So in 2010, for instance, ANSF conducted 298 DOD-supported CN interdiction operations. The majority of these operations were in the south, resulting in the destruction of 56 tons of opium, 2 tons of morphine, 11 tons of heroin, and 74 tons of hashish. These are incredible numbers. It’s an amazing amount, and every one of those are things that are taken away from our enemy, and we’re starting to see evidence that it is having an effect on them at a strategic level.

Senator PORTMAN. I would just make an editorial comment. You talked earlier about your work and it’s very important and I appreciate what you do, Mr. Wechsler. But you focused all on the supply side and not on the demand side, and you should take credit for some of the work that the Guard, the Reserves, and some of your active duty are doing on the demand side, too. Ultimately that’s going to be the way to get at this in my view. So tons of narcotics we’re talking about apprehending or finding in the Taliban context, that’s terrific news. I hope they’re not all back next year. As long as there’s a market that seems to materialize. I understand most of that opium goes to Europe, but in terms of what you do here in this country I think it’s incredibly important vis-a-vis Mexico and other problems. So add your demand side accolades to what your team is doing.

Just quickly on U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). You talked about the interagency coordination and you talked about Colombia as being an example. You said that you thought that what I said about it earlier was accurate, that it’s an example where something worked. Can I ask you something a little off DOD’s radar screen, but something very topical for us. Recently General Fraser, SOUTHCOM commander, talked about the potential trade-opening agreement with Colombia as “a very positive, beneficial aspect for our cooperation because of the growing capacity to support the capabilities of the armed forces and law enforcement.” Do you see a connection between us finally agreeing with Colombia and moving forward on this trade-opening agreement, which as you know was negotiated with President Uribe 4½ years ago, as being beneficial to I guess all of your objectives with regard to fighting the narcotics trade in Colombia and with regard to the other geopolitical benefits of a strong ally in Latin America?

Mr. WECHSLER. I do indeed, Senator. It’s important to recognize how far Colombia has come. I remember I was working at the White House at the end of the Clinton administration. I’ll always remember this number: In 1999 two-thirds of the Colombian public believed that the FARC was going to take Bogota. That’s incredible. Two-thirds of the people in Afghanistan do not believe that
the Taliban is going to take Kabul right now. That’s where Colombia was.

In 10 years time, they have gone from a major exporter of insecurity in the region to a major exporter of security in the region, helping the Mexicans, and helping their Central American partners. They have a new government that still has a war that they’re fighting. That must be stressed. It has not been won yet. There’s been great progress, but it’s not been won.

They are looking to the United States to try to understand what the relationship continues to be, and a key part of that relationship is going to be the free trade agreement.

Senator Portman. Do you think it would strengthen President Santos’ hand vis-a-vis the FARC and other illicit organizations operating in Colombia?

Mr. Wechsler. I think it will strengthen the hand of President Santos and everybody else who, in Colombia, who is talking about a strong Colombian-U.S. relationship.

Senator Portman. I don’t know how much time I have, Madam Chairman. My clock’s not working, which is really a dangerous thing for a Senator.

Senator Hagan. One more question.

Senator Portman. Dr. Schear, thank you for your testimony. You talked about coalition-building. I loved your quote. You said it requires some heavy lifting, literally and figuratively, right? So we do have some capabilities that other countries don’t have.

We hear a lot about the close air support in Libya, for instance, being essential to continuing to make progress and that when we pulled out and NATO took the lead we lost some of that capability. How do you respond to that?

Dr. Schear. Sir, I wouldn’t dispute the point, but I would probably defer to my colleagues who are more in the——

Senator Portman. You’re the coalitions guy, though.

Dr. Schear. I’m the coalitions guy, and we’re seized with the opportunity to build coalitions to find the best fit. In a case such as Libya, as you quite rightly infer, there are a range of missions and missions like close air support probably are somewhat more on the high end of capacity and issues of discriminating targets from surrounding civilian areas is a big challenge.

Senator Portman. Just quickly, a follow-on question. Japan: Are we doing everything that we can be doing and have we responded to everything the Japanese have asked us to do?

Dr. Schear. We have made an enormously positive contribution to the response to a very complex situation, which continues to unfold, I have to say. The Fukushima Daiichi reactor facility is stabilizing, but I would say Japan has certainly got a ways to go before we can put that fully behind them.

Senator Portman. Do you feel like we’re responding to the requests from the Japanese Government?

Dr. Schear. Yes, we are. We have an incredible team out there, U.S. Forces Japan supported by PACOM, with more than 20 ships and 14,000 service personnel engaged, with many aircraft providing lift into the areas. Our foreign consequence management capabilities are being deployed out there for both training and direct response purposes.
Senator Portman. Our UAVs are being used, I understand?

Dr. Schear. UAVs are part of the repertoire. We’re also conscious of the fact we have a force protection requirement, given the numbers of service personnel and American citizens in the Honshu, northern areas of Japan. So we’re very cognizant of that.

But I would say thus far we’ve been doing a fairly strong response in a very positive way, sir.

Senator Portman. Thank you, Madam Chair.


Senator Brown. Thank you, Madam Chair.

When I went to Afghanistan I was amazed. A quarter mile outside the forward operating base you have farmers with poppy plants right there, and we’re flying over them every single day. They’re up waving at us. The whole eradication thing, I get it, but the cost-benefit analysis—we lose a farmer, and the amount of money that’s being derived, just the numbers that you just said of the actual product that we’ve destroyed, it’s mind-boggling.

I mean, I’m hopeful that there’s a way to strike a good balance so we don’t have to have our pilots flying out and seeing all the poppy plants that are just there and the farmers waving at us.

That being said, I wanted to shift gears a little bit, because that was kind of the nature of what the chairman and the ranking member were talking about. But according to Iranian state-owned press—and this will be to Mr. Reid—the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) indicated that the IRGC units in his mission would undergo a structural change or reform to align with recent regional developments. Have you noticed or anticipate a change in regional strategy to take advantage of the instability in the region?

Mr. Reid. I think the details of a good response to you, Senator, would probably be better in a closed conversation.

Senator Brown. Great. Let’s do that, then. We’ll make a point to do that.

Mr. Reid. Yes, sir.

Senator Brown. So noted. Thank you.

I’ll just then follow up. What’s your assessment then—and it can be to Dr. Schear as well. There’s been a lot of investment in training and equipping of Iraqi special operations forces. These forces have been effective in planning and carrying out operations against al Qaeda in Iraq. What’s your assessment on the capability of the Iraqi SOF and how will this significant progress be affected if all the U.S. military forces are withdrawn from Iraq by the end of the year?

Mr. Reid. We think the Iraqi special forces were an early sign of our success in training the Iraqi military and they were very responsive and engaged from early on in the conflict. The organizations have matured over the years and they are currently and have been for some time now sufficiently planning, leading, and conducting effective counterterrorism operations in Iraq, albeit however with continued U.S. support.

Looking forward, of course, some details to be filled in about next year in Iraq and what our capabilities will be, but I can say that we are planning an Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq that will have room within that for advising and assisting and equipping
functions, as other security cooperation offices do, and we will build upon that as a basis for continued assistance and oversight of Iraqi capabilities, including the SOFs.

Senator BROWN. So do you think the Iraqi Government will request a limited presence beyond next year aside from that?

Mr. REID. I think it's to be determined what President Maliki will ask for. We hear reports and discussions of different things being considered, but I think that remains to be seen, Senator.

Senator BROWN. If we in fact leave altogether, what do you think the likelihood of them to be able to maintain stability is? Low, medium, high? Do you have any sense on that?

Mr. REID. Well, I think the evidence is they're currently doing the bulk of the security and we're confident that they can shoulder the load going forward. But again, we do intend to have a robust security cooperation office in U.S. Embassy Baghdad.

Senator BROWN. Mr. Wechsler, the National Guard plays an important role in the conduct of DOD counterdrug activities. How is the National Guard being utilized in ongoing and planned DOD counterdrug programs, number one? Number two, any additional requests for authority in terms of rules of engagement, or rules of interdiction at all?

Mr. WECHSLER. The National Guard has done an extremely good job through the State plan process at supporting State and local law enforcement under the direction of the governors. I don't foresee any change in legal authorities required because they do have the legal authorities to provide that support.

What I am hopeful for is as we develop—as the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security develop greater mechanisms and strategies to combat the efforts inside the United States that I was discussing previously that relate to the threats that are outside the United States, that our National Guard efforts can be increasingly deployed against those problem sets.

Senator BROWN. Mr. Reid, I have a question about Somalia that I think is probably a closed session one as well, if we could maybe deal with that at some point and I'll have Bo on my staff connect with you. But talking about al Qaeda's ability to use 21st century technology to spread its message and recruit terrorist candidates, what's DOD doing to counter that propaganda effort? Not only that, but other organizations. What are you trying to do to that kind of combat?

Mr. REID. Thank you, Senator. We do have a wide range of programs in this area in DOD. We work very closely with our DOS colleagues and their global strategic communications effort. I agree with you, the details of some of those we should probably talk about in a closed session.

Senator BROWN. Great, great. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Senator HAGAN. Senator Brown, Senator Portman and I both are interested in having a closed session. So when you look at the title of this committee, being the “Emerging Threats and Capabilities,” I think we obviously will ask for a closed session, and we'll try to schedule that together.

I might ask a few more questions and then Senator Portman. I want to go back to Libya. Mr. Reid, how would you characterize the
situation in Libya? Given your responsibilities for unconventional warfare, have you had any involvement in assessing the training and equipping requirements of the Libyan rebels? Just sort of a series of questions and thoughts on Libya.

Mr. REID. I'll take the first part. It's a little bit easier to talk open here, just based on my own experience and assessment. Obviously, as an opposition movement they are dealing with an uphill battle with a longstanding oppressive regime that makes little distinctions about attacking civilians, civilian targets. So a very difficult situation for any opposition.

Again just speaking in the abstract, they have some advantages based on the geography of the situation and they have shown great strength and motivation as a group. Difficult for them. Again, if you look at this in the context of history, you would probably have wanted to start off with a much longer lead of developing your uprising. This sort of was spontaneous to some extent based on events in the region. So I think that clearly posed some challenges for the group.

With respect to the details of things, of course, as a Defense official and working with our special operations, clearly we have no U.S. forces on the ground in Libya and the strength of the U.S. support to the opposition, as noted by Senator Portman, was through the air and now continued by our NATO partners.

I would just go back and say, with respect to the differences in U.S. air power and that posed by the current effort, not to take anything away from our NATO partners, but we've been saying for quite a while the reason our enemies seek to avoid direct confrontation is because of the overwhelming firepower of the U.S. military and I think that's what you saw happening. I wouldn't recommend anybody mess with the U.S. Navy or the U.S. Air Force in that type of environment, because their capabilities are clearly overpowering and precise.

Going forward, obviously we have some nascent engagements on the diplomatic side. The United States continues to support the NATO effort, and what you see on a day-to-day basis is a back and forth now where neither side seems to be able to dominate the other. There's been a shifting back and forth between Ajdabiya and Misurata. Brega in the middle seems to be a balance point. When the rebels—when the opposition gets the Brega, the government kind of gets on its heels, and then they regroup and come back. It's just a day-by-day situation right now.

Senator HAGAN. There's been discussion about arming the rebels or not arming the rebels. Certainly I think a lot of people are concerned about exactly who the rebels are. What are your thoughts on that?

Mr. REID. I think that's a great point, and we would always have to be careful in any situation that we knew upfront clearly who we're dealing with, and it has been much discussed by the Secretary of State and others that we're in that process right now of trying to get a further understanding before we take further steps.

Senator HAGAN. Mr. Wechsler, on counter-piracy efforts off Somalia: Despite a significant and concerted international effort which includes various U.S. agencies and the U.S. military, piracy in the northwestern Indian Ocean and the approaches to the vital
sea lanes through the Gulf of Aden continues largely unabated. The tragic deaths of the four Americans recently aboard the sailing vessel Quest was yet another vivid reminder of how dangerous these waters have become and the need to find ways to bring the piracy under control and hopefully defeat it.

We’re interested in your assessment of the overall counter-piracy efforts to date and what changes you think are necessary in our policies and approaches to better drive the pirates out of business?

Mr. WECHSLER. Sure, thank you. The solution set for this problem—first I want to say, your characterization of the problem is exactly correct. It’s been growing and left unabated it will continue to grow.

Senator HAGAN. How many ships are under hold right now, do you know?

Mr. WECHSLER. I don’t know, but we can get you the answer to that, because it does change from time to time.

[The information referred to follows:]

As of today (April 12, 2011), 26 vessels are currently being held—25 of them for ransom—along with 542 crewmembers.

Mr. WECHSLER. The solution will not be found on sea. The solution to this problem, as has almost always historically been the case for piracy, will take place on land. The area that the pirates cover would not effectively be patrolled by all of the ships of all of the navies of all the countries of the world, it is that vast. It cannot be patrolled in this way.

But that is not to say that there aren’t more things that can be done at sea. One of the clearest conclusions from the last couple of years about this is that the ships that abide by all of the best practices and then those who go beyond the best practices, they are the ones that are not successfully pirated.

Indeed, one of the most controversial elements is the suggestion that many have made inside the United States that all these ships carry armed personnel on them to protect themselves against pirates. We see consistently that those with armed personnel on side, not military personnel but privately held armed personnel, do not get pirated. Then of course, if you combine that with other best practices, such as traveling fast, traveling high, traveling in bad weather, having citadels that can protect you and control the ship and have radio equipment, having barbed wire on the sides, if you follow these practices you are not taken has been our history.

Senator HAGAN. What was the part about the bad weather? I’m sorry?

Mr. WECHSLER. The pirates are in small ships that cannot sail in bad weather. So if you are in a large ship and can go in bad weather, you successfully avoid pirates.

But there’s a whole series of these practices, and the vast majority of ships that are taken are not abiding by these practices. So that is the number one thing that we can do on the water.

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. Senator Portman.

Senator PORTMAN. Mr. Reid, I don’t want to get you in trouble, so I’m sure you’ll monitor yourself here. I just have to follow up on your Libya comment and the fact that we do have certain capabilities that other countries don’t have, including our NATO allies, as much as we appreciate them. Close air support was something I
asked about earlier. Forgetting the decision to engage, once we did engage it seems like our close air support, A–10s, AC–130s, our ability to, as you say, inflict damage in a way that makes our enemies concerned about taking us on, that was largely lost, as I understand it, when the command was shifted to NATO. Is that accurate?

Mr. REID. I apologize, Senator. I’m not sure I understood the question.

Senator PORTMAN. Well, my question is whether those unique capabilities that our Air Force has as compared to France and Britain and other NATO partners—it seems to me that was lost, that capability, when the command shifted. Is that accurate?

Mr. REID. I apologize again, but I think I’m out of facts here for you.

Senator PORTMAN. That’s fine. I don’t want to put you in a situation, I really don’t. But this is the concern that has been expressed by many of us, that once you engage in order to continue to make progress you have to continue to have that capability you talked about earlier, and it seems as though our NATO allies have not been able to make the same progress, and in fact there have been some reversals. Today I’m understanding once again there is some threat to some of the cities that the rebels previously had held.

So anyway, I won’t push you on it except to say that’s something that I think ought to be a subject for your group and others to look at.

Can I ask you about your thoughts on how what’s going on, the upheaval, the Arab spring, from again the eastern Med all the way around North Africa and certainly the Arabian Peninsula, how that’s affected our fight against terrorism, specifically al Qaeda? Has it made it more difficult for us? Do you see any evidence of al Qaeda taking advantage of the situation? I guess specifically, in Libya, do you see al Qaeda taking advantage of the anti-Qadhafi efforts that are underway?

Mr. REID. Thank you, Senator. I think it’s a great question and one that we have considered in many different fora. What’s most remarkable to me about the situation which you’re referring to is that al Qaeda has not found this to be a springboard to increased resonance. I think it was Denis McDonough that said this in a speech, that al Qaeda’s number two, Zawahiri, spent time in prison, exiled from his homeland, dedicated his entire life to changing the government in Egypt, and what he was incapable of doing the popular uprising did in a very unorganized manner in a period of weeks, less than a month.

It’s a very powerful statement to consider, and what it points to is the inability of the al Qaeda narrative to resonate anywhere, including where we might have feared it would resonate the most, which is in Arab countries, and the facts don’t support that. Al Qaeda has not found the uprising in the Middle East or in Africa to be a springboard into anything and they are largely on the sidelines, which is good.

Of course, with instability comes opportunity. As a special operator myself, I know that, and they know that as well and they certainly would like to try. You can see signs, and we can give you
details in a separate session, but you can see efforts they make, and we can pick up on this. But they're largely ineffective.

The Libya question can probably be more precisely scoped dealing with the free access to weaponry than is the case with Qaddafi's losing control of certain weapons and material, and that has concerned us and there are some separate activities to deal with those as well.

But throughout the region there is a great concern about this very question, and again none of these countries want an al Qaeda-dominated society or an al Qaeda-dominated government, and I think that's what you see happening.

Now again, as you mentioned, Senator, no one can predict from day to day, week to week, what's happening with some of these places. But I think it's fair to say thus far this has not created a wellspring of pro-al Qaeda sentiment in any of the locations, and in fact the opposite being the case, that the forces of democracy and self-determination are much more powerful in these places where this has played out.

Senator PORTMAN. Yemen is a place where there's a lot of concern right now, specifically concern about al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula taking advantage of that unrest. But even there, you don't see al Qaeda making gains?

Mr. REID. Certainly in the remote areas they've had some tactical success, and I think you could attribute much of that to the diversion of military capabilities to Sana'a in the role of regime protection, which is certainly a cause of concern for us. It's also reflective of the problems that we are trying to deal with in Yemen, which is extending the sufficiency and the mandate of the Sana'a-based security forces in the provinces, the opposite direction.

So as much as we have tried to work with the Yemeni armed forces to establish a greater foothold in the tribal regions, we were not to that point when this particular scenario developed. So I think you see some shifting back. But I predict they would be short-lived gains and when they get through this political crisis—and there will be some resolution at some point—we believe again that the will of the security forces and the will of the population of the Yemeni people is against a strong al Qaeda presence.

They certainly have exploited the safe haven areas, the very remote regions, much similar in ways to what you see in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, they have never been fully controlled by a central government, and they certainly are opportunistic right now. But I believe that the security mechanism will get its feet back under it when we get through this political crisis that they're going through right now.

Senator PORTMAN. That was a positive assessment; I appreciate it. I hope that you're right in terms of Yemen.

In terms of Pakistan and Afghanistan, there has been very little positive news. Yet we do hear some rumors about rifts developing between the leadership in Pakistan, Taliban leadership particularly, and the fighters who are actually in the fight in Afghanistan. I don't know if you can comment on this in the open record, but there is a report this morning, for instance, that 15 members of the Taliban, including an alleged provincial leader, defected to the Af-
ghan Government in the Kandahar Province. I don't know if you're aware of those reports or if you think they're accurate or not.

My bigger question would be, is this a trend? Do you see the possibility of more defections, and do you see that, again this rumored delinkage between some of the leadership between Pakistan and fighters on the ground?

Mr. REID. I'd say two things about that. First of all, as we mentioned earlier, they are just now beginning to feel the full weight of the fully resourced counterinsurgency campaign that the President committed to last year as we brought our forces in over the winter and as we intensified our effort to expand the ANSF. The Taliban is really right now—here we are in April—feeling what the summer's going to look like and it's not going to be a pleasant summer.

There will be violence in Afghanistan over the summer and there will be——

Senator PORTMAN. You don't expect the normal resurgence that happens in the summer?

Mr. REID. No, I do not, based on the resourcing and the forces there. I think the signals you're seeing of reintegration, reconciliation movements within these populations of Taliban is exactly the effect that we intend to create, and we've opened up those opportunities. We've expanded the security forces, trying to bring people over to the other side.

Recall too, the history of 2001. We didn't defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan through total overwhelming firepower. We created a situation where those fighters realized that it was not productive to be on the losing side and they changed sides, and many of them fled across the border. Many of them stayed and took up the other side. So there is a reconcilable population that we know about. It's clearly there, and we're appealing to it and you're starting to see these shifts. As the strategy plays out over the summer, I believe you'll see more of that and we will be on track, as General Petraeus recently testified and Secretary Flournoy, with this transition process that we're involved in right now.

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you.

My time's expired, but I want to thank all three of you and I look forward to further conversations.

Senator HAGAN. I might ask one or two questions, and also if you have any more Senator Portman.

On the DRC, during the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing regarding AFRICOM last week, General Ham indicated that his command has had limited success in working with the security forces in the DRC. He cited issues of vetting, human rights abuses, and the absence of a plan for sustained engagement. I would like to have any of you who would want to speak on this question have an opportunity to answer, as you all have unique areas and tools to engage in a place like the DRC. How could the United States build a strong and enduring engagement strategy in this country, or is it better not to engage in a country like the DRC because of corruption and other longstanding issues?

Dr. SCHEAR. Madam Chair, you're absolutely right. It's a major challenge, both conceptually and practically. The armed forces of the DRC include a range of formerly warring rebel groups and dis-
parate factions. Trying to integrate them and right-size that organization and subject it to legitimate command and control is a big challenge, and I underscore General Ham’s frustrations. He’s reflecting on behalf of AFRICOM that this has proved a challenge, both with respect to gaining full partnerships with the government, working effectively with other countries, including within the U.N. grouping that has certain security duties, especially in the east, and finding out what the best fit would be in terms of both funding and authorities to achieve a desirable effect.

This is pushing a big boulder up a hill, quite frankly. DRC is a huge country, riven by violence since the mid-1990s.

Senator HAGAN. So much of that directed against women.

Dr. S. CHEAR. Absolutely. This has been a very intense focus for our interagency colleagues writ large, and finding the best mix of training, understanding both the culture and the operational imperatives which gives rise to such awful violence is part of it, and then figuring out exactly what level of training could be delivered, imparted, if you will, to Congolese service personnel and their institutional overseers, is a huge challenge.

I can’t offer you any panaceas or any solutions here, other than to say it’s a source of very active concern for us.

Senator HAGAN. Mr. Reid or Mr. Wechsler?

Mr. R. EID. I would just add, and actually borrow off of Dr. Schar’s opening comments, because if it came to me and my office to deploy special operators to the Congo for a short-term engagement we would immediately start looking at authorities and resources, and that’s what we do. What I have is really confined into support to special operations and support to counterterrorism.

What Jim talked about opening up here with the global contingency fund is a perfect example, as he just talked about, where this isn’t all just a Defense problem, we need multiple vectors of security assistance, reform applications to a DRC situation. To do that effectively, we need a flexible authority to work within and not something that’s boxed into a very tight requirement, that’s only good for that year of execution, and these other things.

This is why we’re all jealous of Will here with the 1004 authority. It’s multi-year, you can do other things with it. We’d love to have something like that to deal with these kinds of problems.

So, not making any excuse, we can do certain things on the margins anywhere in the world and, given the right factors, we can surge into anything. But we know—and I’ve been on many deployments into Africa—where we get in there and get it wrong, it’s not going to fix anything.

It isn’t always led with special operators or it isn’t always led with military forces, but a really tight package of the right mix of interagency. I think that’s where we are with this other authority.

Thank you.

Mr. W. WECHSLER. I’d just add one thing. It’s a little outside my lane, but, given the other conversations that you’ve had; I was at the National Security Council working on peacekeeping operations when late President Kabila was marching down from Kisingani to take out the Mobutu regime. The Mobutu regime was one of the more brutal in the world at the time and we were very happy for that to go.
But at the same time, what happened since wasn’t a period of happiness for the people in that area. As we encounter these volatile regions of the world, we always need to remember that just getting rid of somebody bad isn’t the end of the story, and we have to make sure that we, as Secretary Reid was talking about, understand who we’re dealing with on the other side and what the next steps are before we take action.

Senator HAGAN. I want to follow up on the pooled fund initiative and have a couple of questions on that. Are you confident—this is for whomever again wants to answer this. Are you confident that DOS is committed to making this initiative work jointly? Do you have any concerns that the joint arrangement would be too unwieldy? Are there benefits to having a joint arrangement that offset the procedural challenges of implementing this program jointly?

Then do you have any concern that this initiative is too much of a militarization of foreign policy?

Dr. SCHEAR. Madam Chair, by way of a quick set of responses, we think the pooled initiative actually is a good blending of the two Departments’ equities. It reflects the DOS’s overall leading role in the provision of foreign assistance, but it would be well lashed up with DOD’s special concerns about security and defense policy, especially in volatile transnational threat-riven areas. So we think it would be a good balance.

We think this proposal would help us in a very agile fashion respond to emergent challenges within a budget year of execution. We are not proposing to expand the amount of resources going into countries that are already claiming very large amounts of U.S. foreign assistance, but it would help us navigate between and among funding streams in an agile way.

We think, further, it would incentivize interagency cooperation. If we have a joint team working together in a top-down fashion, we wouldn’t be just depending on nominations coming up the chain and taking a fair amount of time to work themselves out. We would reflect the top-level priorities, but we would seek the advice and the input of the field both at the embassy country team and at the combatant commands.

So it wouldn’t just be the 3,000-mile screwdriver. We would be looking for input. But we think that, because both secretaries and their leadership teams are committed, that we have a good chance. We absolutely believe the DOS is strongly behind this. It will be a work in progress. We’ll have to give you updates, if we’re fortunate enough to have the opportunity to start this pilot, to work with Members of Congress on an energetic engagement so we can consult with you and get feedback.

But generally speaking, I think we would view this as a very good opportunity to show how we can work collegially with another very important department.

Thank you.

Senator HAGAN. I had one other question and then I’ll turn it over to Senator Portman. That is, you mentioned, Dr. Schear, about the humanitarian aid to Haiti during the earthquake and then obviously Japan. What is going on in Haiti right now? How involved are we?
Dr. SCHEAR. SOUTHCOM continues to have a coordination cell there resident. Very keenly aware that Haiti, with its large displaced population still living essentially in tent cities in and around Port au Prince, is very vulnerable.

Senator HAGAN. I did have an opportunity to go there recently.

Dr. SCHEAR. So you’ve seen.

Senator HAGAN. About 800,000 people in these tent cities.

Dr. SCHEAR. Yes.

Senator HAGAN. It was an incredible sight to see.

Dr. SCHEAR. Tragically, we’d have to say that more than a year after the earthquake Haiti is getting back to abnormal. This is not a situation which would enable that country to withstand another major hurricane hit. We were very fortunate in the last season that we didn’t have such a direct hit. But we’re very concerned about it.

Our USAID colleagues continue to be engaged. We nudge them along occasionally on specific areas. But the key issue is government rebuilding, and this is an internal challenge for the Haitians. The tragedy was that the Government of Haiti took a huge hit with that earthquake, and getting them back in the wake of an election finally, with a result that we hope will lend itself to further development, would get that country back on its feet.

I continue to be impressed, as I suspect you were too, by the ingenuity and creativity of individual Haitians. It’s just remarkable how well they can cope. But as a society and certainly as a government, they’ve had big challenges. So we remain attentive to their needs and are watching very carefully to ensure that we can react in an expeditious way if there’s a further natural disaster.

Senator HAGAN. Senator Portman.

Senator PORTMAN. I promise this will be my last round and we’ll let you guys go.

On this idea of the global security contingency fund, it’s certainly something we might be willing to take a look at. As I said at the outset, we are working today within very different budget constraints even than a few years ago. The deficit is 10 times bigger than it was 4 years ago, if you think about that, and we must adjust accordingly. So it’s our ability to project force and it’s our ability to play an active role even where we’re not directly involved as a military, but where the DOS, USAID, and others are involved.

So as you’re talking about this contingency fund I assume you’re talking about taking funds out of other areas, both DOD and DOS. Of course, DOS would say that DOD has all the money, which I used to hear at the Office of Management and Budget quite a bit. But what is your proposal there, Dr. Schear? Where do the funds come from?

Dr. SCHEAR. Under the terms of the proposal that we’re putting forward, we would be requesting $50 million in actually DOS appropriation and transfer authority for both Departments to transfer up to an additional $450 million to cover urgent needs.

Now, given your background, you well know that $450 million would be a very large lift indeed, certainly for State, and I will say also for DOD in the current budget climate. This is not a proposal which is designed to spend a lot of money. We are not going to try and spend up to any given threshold. It’s just to meet emergent re-
quirements in a way that we think could actually promote cost efficiencies. If we can transfer money across funding streams in a way that better targets a specific potential need, we don’t have to come for niche authorities in special cases or to otherwise find less optimal ways to fund something.

But we will be looking hard within our own Defense-wide funding for available resources as and when emergent needs come up. This is clearly something on our radar. Our Secretary, our Controller and policy offices are all scrutinizing this very carefully.

Senator PORTMAN. I’m sure they are, given the Secretary’s commitment to finding additional savings in the area of tens of billions of dollars. This is less than that, but it’s also—if you want a little unsolicited advice, that’s going to be worth what you pay for it, it has to be, because there are efficiencies specifically that DOS and DOD are now expending funds that would not have to be spent because of the ability to coordinate better and to be more preventive perhaps and more involved in, as the Secretary talks about, soft power from the DOD perspective.

So we’ll be eager to see the request, but also the analysis as to what its impact would be on the budgets going forward.

Quickly with regard to Mexico, obviously a huge concern here in this country, as it should be. I think—Mr. Wechsler, about 35,000 people or so have now died just in the Calderon administration time period, and the brutality of the cartels is breathtaking.

My question is, what is your assessment? I think I heard earlier—Dr. Schear, did you say we are spending $50 million a year, or Mr. Wechsler? How much are we spending? Is that the actual total amount of our expenditures, including some of the funding that’s going through other channels than the DOS? Is it working, and what are we doing that’s effective and what should we be doing that we’re not doing?

Mr. WECHSLER. Any discussion of Mexico has to begin, Senator, with an acknowledgment of the real strength and commitment of the Calderon administration in taking on this fight and taking the fight to the TCOs in a way that hadn’t been done previously. There are elements of the fight that they’ve been doing that have been quite successful and there are elements of their fight that have been less successful, as President Calderon himself says quite clearly.

The U.S. Government writ large effort has been under the Merida Initiative, designed at the end of the Bush administration to do a 3-year DOS-led, $1.3 billion program for Mexican support. I should note that it differs in one important respect from Plan Colombia, that in Plan Colombia it was a fully whole-of-government integrated plan, including DOD as a support organization. This was not the case with Merida. So our efforts that we are doing, which was the $50 million that I was referring to, are being designed to complement these efforts that are DOS-led.

Everything that DOD does, which is not in any way the lead for the U.S. Government, nor should it be, is done at the request of the Mexican Government. That’s important to stress. We do absolutely nothing that is not at the request of the Mexican Government. A great deal of the work that we do are supporting civilian agencies as well as military organizations.
Senator PORTMAN. On the funding for a second, adding these numbers together, it looks like we’re talking roughly $500 million when you add the DOD 50 plus roughly a third of the 1.3. Is that roughly what we’re spending annually during this time period of the Merida commitment?

Mr. WECHSLER. There is a commitment—to be very blunt about it, the first 2 years of the Merida commitment, DOS was unable to expend the money during those years at a high enough level. So this year the President has, and the Secretary of State, have committed to delivering $500 million of DOS Merida funds in this calendar year, which will be a wonderfully helpful thing for the Mexicans.

At the same time, what we have done in these efficiencies efforts that you describe is try to scrub as much of our CN accounts and to close down programs that are not unsuccessful, but are just less high on the priority list, in order to shift money towards Mexico, and doing that in this year and going forward across the Future Years Defense Program. Indeed, when I took on this job one of my very first meetings was to have a budget meeting, and I decided that we were only spending $3 million out of our budget on Mexico and that the U.S. Government as a whole was spending very little on the area of southern Mexico and northern Guatemala and Belize, which is a really——

Senator PORTMAN. Northern triangle.

Mr. WECHSLER. Exactly. So we put forward a proposal to increase the amount of money, and Congress thus far has approved it, to increase the amount of money that we were spending in that area, because that seemed to be an underresourced area.

Senator PORTMAN. By the way, in that area apparently incredible violence. One of your commanders recently said that outside of a war zone it was the most dangerous place he can imagine.

Is that all about traffickers fighting for position coming up from further in the south? Or what is it about the northern triangle area that has become so dangerous?

Mr. WECHSLER. It’s a lack of full government control.

Senator PORTMAN. This would be parts of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Southern Mexico, I take it?

Mr. WECHSLER. Exactly. It is in part a problem of those countries themselves and their security control over there. But what they are also being affected by is the Mexican TCOs that are moving south. The Zetas, which are the most violent of and have really moved the overall level of violence to a great degree, abetted by the other TCOs in Mexico, they have moved south into Guatemala and are contributing to the spike in violence that we see there as well.

In part they’re doing that as a result of the success that President Calderon has had, but in part it’s also just moving to get greater control over different legs in the value-added change from the farmer to our streets in America.

Senator PORTMAN. How about Panama? Where does Panama fit in this? We also are working on a trade-opening agreement with Panama, and it has been a great partner on security and I understand they have a good cooperative arrangement with us at every level, including DOD.
Mr. WECHSLER. They do indeed, although it needs to be said that they’re not—they have challenges themselves, challenges that we need to work with them on. But there is a great level of cooperation to work on those challenges, particularly in individual areas.

Senator PORTMAN. Can I get you on the record on that trade-opening agreement also? Would that help by establishing a better commercial relationship with Panama to strengthen their hand in dealing with narcotraffickers and others who might use that as a financial haven?

Mr. WECHSLER. Anything that would help, that would encourage, as this would, to encourage the Panamanians to make further improvements on their anti-money-laundering regime and their ability to go after the money, which is one of the predominant challenges that exists in that country.

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Senator HAGAN. Mr. Reid, Dr. Schear, and Mr. Wechsler, thank you so much for your testimony today, your preparation, the job that you’re doing. I know that these are very difficult times for so many places around the world and I really do appreciate what you’re doing.

I do want to say that we’re going to keep the record open for any colleagues that may have questions for the record, until the close of business day on Friday. Also, we will be having a closed session and staff will coordinate that schedule with you.

With that, this subcommittee meeting is adjourned. Thank you.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KAY R. HAGAN

DOD POLICY ON BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

1. Senator HAGAN. Mr. Reid, Dr. Schear, and Mr. Wechsler, a number of the emerging, transnational threats the United States now faces are rooted in states with weak governments or under-governed spaces, such as Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere, whose governments lack sufficient capacity to exercise governance and provide security throughout their territory. While security assistance has traditionally been a Department of State (DOS) function through such programs as Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, in the last several years the Department of Defense (DOD) has sought, and Congress has provided, a number of new authorities for building our partners’ capacities to meet threats within their territories. Given the nature of the extremist threats emerging in a number of weak states, how important in your view are efforts to build the capacities of partner nations to provide security and conduct counterterrorism and stabilization operations?

Mr. REID, Dr. SCHEAR, and Mr. WECHSLER. In the decades to come, the most lethal threats to the United States’ safety and security are likely to emanate from states that cannot adequately govern themselves or secure their own territory. Dealing with such fractured or failing states is, in many ways, the main security challenge of our time. The United States recognizes that the security sectors of at-risk countries are really systems of systems tying together the military, the police, the justice system, and other governance and oversight mechanisms. As such, building a partner’s overall governance and security capacity is a shared responsibility across multiple agencies and departments of the U.S. Government, including DOD—and one that requires flexible, responsive tools that provide incentives for cooperation. In particular, section 1206 train and equip authority, and sections 1004, 1033, and other DOD counternarcotics authorities continue to be critical tools to meet DOD’s building partner capacity needs.

In fiscal year 2012, the administration is seeking a new authority called the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) to respond more effectively to emergent challenges and opportunities such as these. The GSCF would allow DOD and DOS to provide assistance to security forces as well as rule of law, judicial sector, and stabilization assistance when civilians are challenged by a lack of security, and where
the provision of assistance can help prevent instability, or advance regional security. Programs under this fund would be jointly formulated by the DOS and DOD and would require approval by both Departments prior to implementation. Through the GSCF, we aim to combine the strengths of both Departments, and to call upon the expertise of the U.S. Agency for International Development and other departments and agencies to devise the most effective assistance programs possible to meet a particular strategic need.

2. Senator HAGAN. Mr. Reid, Dr. Shear, and Mr. Wechsler, do you believe that building the capacity of foreign security forces is a core function of DOD?

Mr. REID, Dr. SCHEAR, and Mr. WECHSLER. Yes. Arguably the most important military component in overseas operations is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern themselves. The standing up and mentoring of indigenous army and police—once the province of Special Operations Forces (SOF)—is now a key mission for the military as a whole. As the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) concluded, the United States is likely to face future scenarios requiring a similar tool kit of capabilities as that being implemented in current operations, albeit on a smaller scale. In these situations, the effectiveness and credibility of the United States will only be as good as the effectiveness, credibility, and sustainability of its local partners. This strategic reality demands that the U.S. Government get better at building partner capacity—helping other countries defend themselves or, if necessary, fight alongside U.S. forces by providing partner forces with equipment, training, or other forms of support.

The President and Secretary of Defense have directed Combatant Commanders to address security challenges in their regions, and DOD assigns to them responsibilities that require building partner capacity. Such efforts also can generate substantial dividends for U.S. security outside major warfighting venues. In Colombia, for example, a robust U.S. capacity-building effort, backed by bipartisan congressional support, has weakened antigovernment insurgents, helped free captive Americans, and promoted stability in our own hemisphere. In turn, Colombia is partnering with the United States to provide training to other countries; with cultural advantages they are also effective at capacity building.

Improving how the United States builds partner capacity is an essential national security requirement that will endure for the foreseeable future. This is a cost-effective effort that requires focused, efficient, predictable funding and adequate authorities to provide the right training and equipment at the right time to the right partner nation’s forces. When DOD applies its resources to build partner capacity in a manner that complements the efforts of the State Department and other interagency counterparts, experience has demonstrated that this is a valuable return on investment for the American taxpayer and a worthwhile mission for DOD. Given the importance of this issue to the United States and its partners and allies, the solution requires a whole-of-government approach.

3. Senator HAGAN. Mr. Reid, Dr. Schear, and Mr. Wechsler, what should be the respective roles of DOD and DOS in building partner capacities?

Mr. REID, Dr. SCHEAR, and Mr. WECHSLER. One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win: economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more—these, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success. For this reason, building a partner’s overall governance and security capacity is a shared responsibility across multiple agencies and departments of the U.S. national security apparatus—and one that requires flexible, responsive tools that provide incentives for cooperation. Our execution of and any government decision regarding building partner capacity should reinforce DOS’s leading role in crafting and conducting U.S. foreign policy, including the provision of foreign assistance, of which building security capacity is a key part. Proper coordination procedures ensure that urgent requirements for military capacity building do not undermine the United States’ overarching foreign policy priorities.

That said, DOD brings important expertise and capability for building partner capacity, such as building up the operational capacity of partner nations by training and equipping troops and mentoring them in the field, building the institutional capacity of ministries of defense, and providing military-unique support for counter-narcotics.

Consistent with DOD and DOS’s shared responsibility to build partner capacity, for fiscal year 2012, DOD and DOS propose to create a GSCF that would provide
security and rule of law assistance when civilians are challenged by a lack of security, and where the provision of such assistance could help prevent instability, or advance regional security. The GSCF would create a more robust capability to respond to crises, emergent challenges, and new opportunities across a range of assistance types to a range of entities in the security sector. This proposal also would pilot a new business model for addressing security challenges by incentivizing collaboration and multiplying the effectiveness of U.S. Government security sector capabilities. Programs under this fund would be jointly formulated by DOS and DOD and would require approval by both departments prior to implementation.

4. Senator HAGAN. Mr. Reid, Dr. Schear, and Mr. Wechsler, in your view, are there areas where DOD has an advantage over DOS in delivering capacity-building assistance?

Mr. REID, Dr. SCHEAR, and Mr. W ECHSLER. We should continue to reinforce DOS’s lead role in crafting and conducting U.S. foreign policy, including foreign assistance, of which building security capacity is a key part. Proper coordination and concurrence procedures ensure that urgent security capacity building requirements do not undermine the United States’ overarching foreign policy priorities.

That said, DOD has an advantage over DOS in providing certain capacity-building assistance, such as building the operational capacity of partner nations by training and equipping troops and mentoring them in the field, building the institutional capacity of ministries of defense, and providing military-unique support for counternarcotics. DOD should take a lead role, subject to the procedures noted above, in building partner security capacity in areas such as disrupting and defeating transnational threats, supporting self-defense, and contributing to coalition operations, although DOD should continue to draw upon DOS and other departments and agencies’ expertise to support and synchronize such building partner capacity efforts.

The DOD–DOS fiscal year 2012 proposal to create a GSCF could help both departments, with the input of all relevant U.S. departments and agencies, develop innovative, effective assistance programs to provide assistance across multiple security sectors and implement such programs by leveraging the expertise of relevant U.S. departments and agencies.

5. Senator HAGAN. Mr. Reid, Dr. Schear, and Mr. Wechsler, are there areas where DOS should take the lead with DOD in support?

Mr. REID, Dr. SCHEAR, and Mr. W ECHSLER. Our execution of, and any government decision regarding, building partner capacity should reinforce the DOS’s leading role in crafting and conducting U.S. foreign policy, including the provision of foreign assistance, of which building security capacity is a key part. Proper coordination procedures ensure that urgent requirements for military capacity building do not undermine the United States’ overarching foreign policy priorities.

DOS should continue to lead in efforts to build partner capacity in a number of areas, such as improving governance, bolstering development, strengthening legitimate and effective public safety and justice, and promoting universal values, although DOS should continue to draw upon DOD and other departments and agencies’ expertise to support and synchronize such building partner capacity efforts.

We also need to move beyond the old debates about what is in DOD’s “lane,” what is in DOS’s “lane,” and so on. Instead, we should focus on the mission as a whole and how the U.S. Government can best achieve our national objectives—how we can most effectively leverage existing capabilities, resources, and expertise to achieve those objectives, while simultaneously seeking new and more effective ways to build partner capacity in the longer term.

Again, the DOD–DOS proposal to create a GSCF in fiscal year 2012 would provide the two departments with the flexibility to leverage the expertise of DOS, DOD, or any other U.S. department or agency to provide a certain type of assistance.

SECTION 1206 TRAIN-AND-EQUIP PROGRAM

6. Senator HAGAN. Mr. Reid, in response to DOD’s request for additional authority to respond to urgent and emerging security threats from ungoverned spaces, Congress established in 2006 the section 1206 train-and-equip program as a pilot program. The 1206 program currently allows the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to spend up to $350 million per year to build the capacity of partner nations’ military forces to conduct counterterrorism operations or to conduct stability operations in conjunction with U.S. forces. What is your as-
essment of the section 1206 dual-key process requiring joint DOS and DOD approval of programs?

Mr. Reid. Program development and collaboration in the field between the Chief of Mission and the combatant commander is the first step in a rigorous inter-departmental process to target our section 1206 assistance toward appropriate military units within a country. This collaboration is continued between DOD and DOS in Washington. We have established a process where each regional and functional office prioritizes projects according to that office’s expertise. The “wisdom of crowds” approach ensures the highest priority proposals rise to the top, while giving both sides a veto if particular projects run counter to particular mission objectives.

We believe the dual-key process makes section 1206 programs stronger and more effective and has yielded significant dividends in the form of high-quality programs.

7. Senator Hagans. Mr. Reid, how well is that DOD-DOS coordination working?

Mr. Reid. We believe the dual-key process makes section 1206 programs stronger and more effective, and has yielded significant dividends in the form of high-quality programs. The process is not without occasional friction, but the vast majority of section 1206 programs are formulated and approved without contention.

8. Senator Hagans. Mr. Reid, is this a model for other security assistance programs in your view?

Mr. Reid. Yes. Section 1206 has proven to be an effective authority for conducting security cooperation in response to a changed security environment in the wake of September 11. The dual-key concurrence mechanism is a particularly important feature of section 1206 that drives deliberate coordination between departments in the executive branch, optimizing the value of our assistance programs to foreign partners. The lessons we’ve learned through our experience in developing, vetting, and implementing section 1206 programs help us as we look for ways to improve our support to partners in combating terrorism and contributing to multinational stability efforts. These lessons are also relevant as the administration looks to develop new security sector assistance tools to address emerging problems that bear on U.S. security, such as the GSCF. Although the GSCF differs from section 1206 in its top-down driven project nomination and broad focus on security sector issues writ large, it builds on the fundamental principle of joint formulation and concurrence reflected in section 1206.

9. Senator Hagans. Mr. Reid, some foreign policy experts have criticized the DOD section 1206 train-and-equip program as duplicating existing DOS security assistance authorities such as FMF and contributing to a militarization of U.S. foreign policy. How do you respond to the criticism that DOD’s section 1206 authority duplicates traditional DOS authorities like the FMF program?

Mr. Reid. The FMF program is a critical tool for executing our foreign policy; it is key to improving bilateral relationships, encouraging behavior in the U.S. interest, increasing access and influence, and building capacity where host-nation and U.S. interests align. Because many countries rely on FMF as a major resource for their military procurement budgets, the allocation of these resources is affected by host-nation preferences and political engagement. Secretary Gates has argued consistently for increased funding for Title 22 programs—including FMF—because our diplomats need additional resources to advance U.S. interests. Such funding, however, does not address all the combatant commanders’ need for tools to build capable, reliable, and interoperable partners as they prepare for—and seek to minimize the necessity for—high priority missions in their areas of responsibility (AORs).

On the other hand, we use the section 1206 authority as a responsive and agile tool to meet urgent and emergent threats and opportunities to build tangible partner capacity. It is not viewed as a political tool to satisfy the desires of foreign governments, but rather as a strategic way to address critical counterterrorism needs as identified by the U.S. Government inside current budget cycles. There has been no attempt to ensure that all regions are provided assistance under this authority—or that all elements of a foreign military are provided with equipment. To the contrary, section 1206 programs are targeted at countries—and particular military units within countries—where focused training and equipment will have the most significant impact in achieving the objectives of the section 1206 authority. Building partner capacity meets a vital and enduring military requirement and we have been careful to avoid using section 1206 as a tool of international politics precisely because military rather than political needs define the appropriateness of funding particular activities.
10. Senator HAGAN. Mr. Reid, what safeguards are built into the 1206 program to prevent such duplication?

Mr. REID. Each program proposal is jointly formulated by DOD and DOS representatives in the field, and the submissions must describe why the identified requirement should not be addressed using traditional security assistance tools. Upon receipt of the proposals, they are reviewed and evaluated by regional and functional offices across both Departments; a critical part of that evaluation is a determination of whether the use of other tools—such as FMF, counternarcotics, or cooperative threat reduction authorities—are more appropriate for a particular requirement.

This “wisdom of crowds” approach ensures the highest priority proposals rise to the top, while giving both sides a veto if particular projects run counter to particular mission objectives. The process culminates with the approval by the Secretary of Defense and the concurrence of the Secretary of State.

11. Senator HAGAN. Mr. Reid, the 1206 program was designed to provide a more flexible means to respond to emerging threats that may not have been anticipated as part of the budget preparation cycle. Yet, our ability to deliver equipment still lags behind, often taking 12 to 18 months after a 1206 assistance program is proposed, vetted, and approved. How successful has the 1206 program been in delivering equipment and training in response to emerging threats in a timelier manner than traditional security assistance under FMF?

Mr. REID. The flexibility of the section 1206 authority comes from the speed and agility of its decisionmaking cycle. Each and every section 1206 program is identified, vetted, and executed in a single fiscal year. Put more simply, the authority allows the U.S. Government to act in months rather than years.

In addition, we are always looking for ways to improve delivery timelines. Based on lessons learned from previous years, and best practices established though the provision of equipment under other DOD authorities, we notified Congress earlier this year of our intent to use $12 million in fiscal year 2011 section 1206 funding to ensure section 1206 equipment is delivered as quickly as possible. Specifically, these funds will be used in section 1206 programs to provide pre-shipment consolidation and premium transportation services in order to help expedite the provision of section 1206 equipment to recipient units.

12. Senator HAGAN. Mr. Reid, what remains the main impediment under the 1206 program to delivering equipment when it is needed?

Mr. REID. Meeting urgent and emerging requirements within the existing contracting system and on the acquisition timelines of the defense industrial base can be challenging. We continue to work with our partners in the acquisition and contract community to find ways to expedite the provision of section 1206 equipment.

We are working to increase the speed, agility, and responsiveness of the FMS system. One such initiative is to recapitalize the Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF) to reduce the amount of time that partner countries have to wait to receive urgently needed defense articles. Initially authorized in 1981, the fund provides the DOD with a means to procure defense articles in anticipation of their future transfer to foreign countries and international organizations. The DOD will use the fund to purchase items that have long procurement lead-times and will likely be needed by partner countries during future contingencies. The SDAF will allow the U.S. Government to deliver the urgently needed items in less time than would otherwise be possible. In addition, the fund will help to maintain the readiness of U.S. forces since it will reduce the need to divert critical assets from U.S. service inventories to fulfill urgent foreign requirements. The administration is requesting obligation authorization from Congress to recapitalize the fund beginning in fiscal year 2012.

13. Senator HAGAN. Mr. Reid, one criticism of the section 1206 train-and-equip program is that assistance is provided to address emerging threats without sufficient assurances that the program will be sustained over time. Because the vast majority of 1206 programs are with lower income countries, sustainment of these programs may have to be incorporated into FMF funding plans for subsequent years. How do you address concerns over the sustainment of 1206 programs if the recipient country lacks the resources to sustain the programs on its own?

Mr. REID. We have articulated a clear approach to sustainment in the past: Section 1206 authority could be used to begin critical programs, after which we would work with host nations to identify national funds or, failing that, include sustainment requirements in FMF requests. Our annual guidance, issued jointly by DOD and DOS to our combatant commands and embassies, stipulates that Security Assistance Officers and the U.S. Embassy Country Teams identify the appropriate approach for sustainment in each country. We have at times reduced proposed pro-
grams when the size of the request would be difficult for the host nation to sustain. We also seek to mitigate risk-of-sustainment problems by including in section 1206 programs 2-year spare parts packages and training to operate and sustain equipment, including train-the-trainer support. This approach supports effective near-term use of the equipment and also helps minimize out-year costs. For longer-term funding, this approach relies either on the host nation to commit funds or on Congress appropriating the administration’s FMF funding requests.

14. Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid, once a 1206 program has provided equipment or training in response to an emerging threat, when should that security assistance be handed off to more traditional security assistance programs like FMF?

Mr. Reid. We have articulated a clear approach to sustainment in the past: Section 1206 authority could be used to begin critical programs, after which we would work with host nations to identify national funds or, failing that, include sustainment requirements in FMF requests. Our annual guidance, issued jointly by DOD and DOS to our combatant commands and embassies, stipulates that Security Assistance Officers and the U.S. Embassy Country Teams identify the appropriate approach for sustainment in each country. We have at times reduced proposed programs when the size of the request would be difficult for the host nation to sustain. We also seek to mitigate risk-of-sustainment problems by including in section 1206 programs 2-year spare parts packages and training to operate and sustain equipment, including train-the-trainer support. This approach supports effective near-term use of the equipment and also helps minimize out-year costs. For longer-term funding, this approach relies either on the host nation to commit funds or on Congress appropriating the administration’s FMF funding request.

15. Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid, what criteria do you use to determine when a program should graduate out of the section 1206 program?

Mr. Reid. We use section 1206 authority to begin critical programs, after which time we work with host nations to identify national funds or, failing that, include sustainment requirements in FMF requests. This means we usually do not provide section 1206 to build a specific capacity for more than 3 years. Such a window of time allows us to work with host nations to identify national funds or, failing that, include sustainment requirements in FMF requests. Although the urgency of a particular threat may alter this calculus, we understand the view of Congress—and this committee in particular—is that section 1206 is not a substitute for traditional security assistance authorities such as FMF.

16. Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid, has DOD developed plans for monitoring the outcomes of these projects, as recommended by a 2010 Government Accountability Office study?

Mr. Reid. Yes. As more section 1206 programs reach maturity, DOD is initiating a more formal assessment effort. Such an effort will be built on information collected in the program proposal process, which includes baseline information, expected program milestones, and quantitative and qualitative metrics to measure the program’s effectiveness. As a first step in assessing section 1206 programs, DOD contracted for the RAND Corporation to identify key stakeholders, their roles, and sources of data in support of a comprehensive assessment of the programs. Part of this step involves determining DOD’s capacity to implement an integrated assessment framework developed by RAND’s National Defense Research Institute (NDRI) in 2009. This integrated framework includes preparatory elements, such as developing assessment guidance, designing processes, and providing training, as well as the actual conduct of assessments and the analysis of their results. The capacity to implement such a framework includes, for example, stakeholders at every level of a program who have access to data that would support assessments, guidance to establish processes and to govern the conduct of assessments, and the assessment skills possessed by personnel within the stakeholder organizations. Determining this capacity will enable the development of a framework to assess specific programmatic efforts within the section 1206. This study is near completion, and its conclusions will provide a foundation for a more comprehensive assessment of individual programs from across different fiscal years that DOD intends to begin in late fiscal year 2011.

PERSONNEL SUPPORT TO UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

17. Senator Hagan. Dr. Scheer, today, the United States has military officers serving within the United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping missions in Haiti, Liberia,
and a few other peacekeeping missions. Many of our partners in NATO also have officers deployed in support of these missions. Can you discuss the pros and cons of these personnel contributions?

Dr. SCHEAR. The primary benefit of current U.S. military contributions is the ability to improve the operational effectiveness and management of their missions by filling key staff positions, and the resulting insight into the mission that U.S. military participation provides for U.S. Government policymakers. When evaluating whether or not to provide staff officers to a U.N. peacekeeping operation, the primary criteria include whether the country involved is a U.S. Government policy priority, and whether the position to be filled can affect the operational effectiveness and management of the mission.

The challenge to U.S. participation is the potential strain on high demand/low density skill sets required for staff officers (i.e., intelligence, logistics, civil affairs (CA), et cetera) and ensuring adequate force protection for military personnel. The use of both Active Duty and Reserve component personnel helps to alleviate the strain on specific skill sets while providing a broader pool of candidates. The Department ensures that adequate force-protection (secure housing, availability of sidearms, etc.) and appropriate legal (Status of Forces Agreements or comparable legal safeguards) measures are in place to protect U.S. military personnel assigned to U.N. missions.

18. Senator HAGAN. Dr. Schear, what would be the pros and cons of the United States providing additional contributions to U.N. peacekeeping missions?

Dr. SCHEAR. Providing additional contributions to U.N. peacekeeping missions would provide a number of benefits.

- Increased U.S. contributions would provide additional expertise and capabilities in support of U.N. peacekeeping missions, help ensure the success of the mission, and support stability in the affected country or region. For those missions of particular interest to the United States, successful peacekeeping operations reduce the risk of costlier U.S. involvement in the event of renewed or continued conflict.
- Increased U.S. contributions would also send a political message both to host nations and U.N. member states that the United States values and supports international peacekeeping. With respect to the specific peacekeeping mission, the increased contributions would indicate that the United States views that mission as a priority.
- Increased U.S. contributions could also encourage other nations to contribute (or increase their contributions) to peacekeeping operations.

Any decision to increase U.S. contributions—specifically in terms of U.S. military personnel—must take into account, however, the impact on the force. The U.S. military is stretched thin from extensive deployments over the past decade. U.S. military personnel need time off from multiple deployments, and the demand for some skill sets typically exceeds the available capacity. The provision of large numbers of U.S. personnel will be unfeasible in the near future in light of the existing operational demands. However, the United States can continue to place U.S. officers in key staff positions that can help improve the performance of the mission, and can look to opportunities where U.S. forces can contribute to the success of peacekeeping missions in other ways (such as U.S. support for MINUSTAH in the wake of the Haiti earthquake).

19. Senator HAGAN. Dr. Schear, what would be the pros and cons of personnel contributions to the U.N. peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?

Dr. SCHEAR. The United States has two military personnel deployed to the U.N. Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), one deployed to Kinshasa, and one deployed to Goma. Both are military intelligence officers serving in the mission’s G2 (information) division. These two officers are filling a critical demand, for which U.S. assistance was specifically requested. The most significant benefit of these officers’ presence is their positive impact on the way the mission collects, organizes, and analyzes information, and their ability to draw on analytical support from AFRICOM as appropriate. Improving the mission’s information capabilities supports the mission’s operational and strategic planning, particularly regarding MONUSCO efforts to counter the Lord’s Resistance Army.

Increasing the U.S. military contributions to MONUSCO could improve the mission’s operational capacity and would be in line with U.S. Government policy priorities in the region. The MONUSCO military staff currently has a full complement of officers, but DOD would consider positions that come available (when countries
decide that they will no longer fill certain positions) in areas such as planning, operations, logistics, CA and military justice.

The challenge to U.S. participation is the potential strain on high demand/low density skill sets required for staff officers (i.e., intelligence, logistics, CA, et cetera), and ensuring adequate force protection for military personnel. Additionally, certain positions in this mission require French language capability, which limits the number of potential candidates within the U.S. military. The MONUSCO area of responsibility is a particularly challenging environment for force protection given the periodic attacks on MONUSCO troops, and sensitivities regarding the carrying of sidearms (sidearms are not allowed in many areas in Kinshasa and Goma). However, MONUSCO has implemented thorough security procedures to ensure the safety of its officers, and DOD reviews the specific security concerns at each duty location to ensure appropriate force-protection measures are in place.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR INDIRECT ACTIVITIES

20. Senator HAGAN. Mr. Reid, some observers contend that the national intelligence agencies focus their assistance on SOFs in Afghanistan engaged in direct action, or kill/capture operations, against terrorists and insurgents. As a consequence, it is alleged, general purpose forces and SOFs engaged in indirect activities including foreign internal defense and population protection, like village stability operations, receive less intelligence support. Do you believe the Intelligence Community (IC) is adequately focused on supporting both direct and indirect lines of operation in Afghanistan and elsewhere?

Mr. REID. Yes. Over the last several years, the Department has worked to drastically increase intelligence support to warfighters across the board. In response to combat commanders’ requests for greater numbers of data-collecting systems, the Department created the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Task Force to rapidly field ISR platforms. Through such efforts, the Department has expanded Predator/Reaper orbits and upgraded the capabilities of our airborne ISR systems, making a dramatic impact on the battlefield. Over the past year, the IC has also provided significant support to the surge of troops to Afghanistan through Attack the IED Network (AtN) capabilities, addressing the leading cause of casualties to U.S. and coalition partners. These capabilities include adding a significant number of intelligence analyst, C–IED enablers, and Persistent Surveillance systems to enable both general purpose and special operating forces understand and attack IED networks.

As mobilizing the local population in rural areas for village stability operations has become an increasingly critical element of our strategy in Afghanistan, the IC has also put greater emphasis on developing a comprehensive understanding of the socio-cultural environments within which terrorist networks and insurgent forces operate. Stability Operations Information Centers in Afghanistan are now generating comprehensive District Assessment reports and the ISR Task Force and the U.S. Central Command are working to develop an integrated information sharing environment to support indirect lines of operation in Afghanistan. In March 2010, USD(I) commissioned the Intelligence Task Force of the Defense Science Board to evaluate how intelligence can most effectively support counterinsurgency operations. The Board is currently compiling its findings and recommendations and is scheduled to complete its work by the end of calendar year 2011.

SOMALIA

21. Senator HAGAN. Mr. Reid and Dr. Shear, during his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 7, General Carter Ham, the Commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), suggested that DOD needed to take a more regional approach to address the threat emanating from Somalia. This would seem to indicate that more work should be done with Somalia’s neighbors—Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti—and perhaps with the sub-regional governments in Somalia. If General Ham approached your office indicating that he needed more support to counter the growing terrorist threat in Somalia, what tools and authorities would you propose using to help him address the situation through a regional framework?

Mr. REID and Dr. SHEAR. General Ham has already begun to pursue a number of promising initiatives, utilizing various tools and resources for the challenges he faces. For capacity building, section 1206, complemented by smaller programs such as the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) allow AFRICOM to build regional CT capabilities and relationships with key leaders in the international CT community. Section 1208 provides resources for U.S.-partner
combined CT operations. AFRICOM is also increasing its operational collaboration with regional partners to monitor and counter terrorist threats. Persistent relationships with regional governments, complemented by episodic mil-mil engagements (e.g., Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET)) have helped develop a level of interoperability that is improving our ability to jointly combat terrorism. Finally, AFRICOM, OSD, and the Joint Staff continue to work with State and other interagency partners to develop an integrated CT strategy that coordinates and leverages our various CT authorities and resources in East Africa. AFRICOM has begun assisting the State Department with identifying its security assistance priorities, and the Command recently began supporting State-led training for the African Union Mission in Somalia.

22. Senator HAGAN. Mr. Reid and Dr. Schear, Somalia is a unique problem set as it is a failed state. Is DOD’s security assistance program equipped to address the threats emanating from Somalia?

Mr. REID and Dr. SCHEAR. Our security assistance authorities are not ideal for addressing threats emanating from failed states. Most of our security assistance tools require us to work with national military forces, which is not possible in a failed state that the U.S. Government does not recognize as a sovereign nation.

Given these challenges, we take a regional approach to countering the threats emanating from Somalia. Section 1206 authority allows us to build CT capacity in East African states to prevent the threat from spilling out of Somalia. The section 1208 authority is available for working with regional partners to conduct U.S.-led CT operations. Other authorities, such as JCET and IMET, allow us to build relationships with East African CT authorities. The State Department’s Peacekeeping Operations funding is somewhat more flexible and can be used to support Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Where appropriate, DOD advises and coordinates with State on these programs assisting entities, including the African Union Mission in Somalia and the TFG, inside Somalia. Finally, we’re increasingly collaborating with other nations, such as the United Kingdom, which have different security assistance authorities, to support Somaliland and other subnational entities.

23. Senator HAGAN. Mr. Reid, al Qaeda and affiliated violent extremist groups work hard to appeal to local populations. The composition and size of these groups in comparison to the U.S. Government permits them to make and implement policy decisions very quickly. Do you believe DOD and other agencies within the U.S. Government are appropriately organized to respond effectively to the messaging and influence efforts of al Qaeda and other affiliated terrorist groups?

Mr. REID. DOD MISO and influence programs and activities are tailored for each audience they address. Depending upon the unit or the organization being supported, MISO units are trained to develop activities and products to influence the behavior of a single individual or larger target audience. DOD adjusts its MISO units in size and composition to the operation they must support based on approved DOD programs and coordinated with the Interagency as required.

24. Senator HAGAN. Mr. Reid, what do you believe is the appropriate role for Military Information Support Teams (MIST) in relation to these activities?

Mr. REID. A MIST supports the achievement of military objectives in both war and peace while working together with a country team and Chief of Mission in any country where it works. While a MIST often works from the U.S. Embassy, its role therein is to support the achievement of objectives laid out by the combatant command and its subordinate component commands. There are many instances in which MISTs work collaboratively with the Embassy staff because mission objectives overlap.

25. Senator HAGAN. Mr. Reid, I understand that U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) deploys personnel to work with country teams in many priority countries where we are not in a shooting conflict, but rather trying to stop the spread of extremist ideology. Please describe the value you believe these special operations personnel bring to the work of country teams. What is done to make sure the goals of special operations personnel deployed to these countries are aligned with those of the ambassadors they are working with?
Mr. Reid. DOD, including SOCOM, leverages long-established processes and mechanisms for planning, de-confliction, and partnered efforts to enhance mutually supporting objectives with our interagency partners. DOD extensively coordinates its efforts to combat terrorism with the National Security Staff, Chiefs of Mission, Chiefs of Station, relevant departments and agencies, and field activities to enable the broadest interagency collaboration consistent with maintaining the security of our efforts. We recognize that this is a constant process that requires regular and routine interface at multiple levels within the respective organizations. We have made wide use of the Joint-Interagency Task Force model to bring our interagency colleagues into a collaborative planning and execution forum, and vigilantly look for ways to share best practices and make adjustments to the process.

26. Senator Hagan. Mr. Reid, given the high demand for special operations personnel around the world, how is the decision made by SOCOM and the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) to deploy a special operations team to a certain country and is that decision reevaluated over time?

Mr. Reid. The decision to deploy special operations personnel in support of country teams around the world is the result of collaborative process undertaken between GCCs, country teams, SOCOM, and DOD. Based on the President’s National Security Strategy and the Secretary of Defense’s National Defense Strategy and Guidance for Employment of the Force, the GCC draft Theater Campaign Plans to accomplish U.S. policy goals and regional/country objectives. GCCs develop requests for forces to conduct engagements in support of their regional strategy, which are submitted to the Joint Staff for validation. The Joint Staff assesses each request against priority countries and strategic risks, and then tasks SOCOM with developing sourcing solutions for validated requirements which are ultimately approved by the Secretary and published annually in the Department-wide Global Force Management Allocation Plan.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JACK REED

BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY—NATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

27. Senator Reed. Mr. Reid and Dr. Schear, over the past 5 years, DOD has constituted a capability to train-and-equip foreign militaries. Correspondingly, the DOS’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has a number of programs targeted at capacity building of their national law enforcement partners, but much of this capacity building is done by contractors. DOD has expressed interest in engaging with national law enforcement units focused on counterterrorism, but, with the exception of counternarcotics training, legal constraints prevent DOD from engaging in this activity. Do you believe there should be more emphasis on building the capacity of our partner’s national law enforcement entities?

Mr. Reid and Dr. Schear. Yes. One of the most important lessons from our experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere has been the decisive role reconstruction, development, and governance plays in any meaningful, long-term success. We need partners and allies who can effectively secure their own borders, work with us to address transnational threats like terrorism, and provide legitimate and effective security and governance to their populations.

Although we only play a supporting role to the lead law enforcement agencies, we anticipate requirements to build the capacity of partner nations’ law enforcement entities will continue to increase, and we should improve interagency planning, coordination, and capacity to meet such requirements. DOD Counternarcotics programs have developed a successful model for supporting international law enforcement partners in cooperation with DOS/INL, Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and key agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and FBI.

Again, the DOD–DOS proposal to create a GSCF in fiscal year 2012 could yield more effective programs for building law enforcement capacity and integrating law enforcement capacity in a broader security sector framework in a given country. The GSCF would provide the two departments with the flexibility to leverage the expertise of DOS, DOD, or any other U.S. department or agency to provide assistance for militaries and other security forces as well as rule of law, judicial sector, and stabilization assistance when civilians are challenged by a lack of security. The GSCF would add a more robust capability to respond to crises, emergent challenges, and new opportunities across a range of assistance types to a range of entities in the security sector. This proposal also would pilot a new business model for addressing
security challenges by incentivizing collaboration and multiplying the effectiveness of U.S. Government security sector investments.

28. Senator REED. Mr. Reid and Dr. Schear, what is your view of giving the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or DEA the mandate and funding to engage in these sorts of activities? Should DOD be engaged in this mission?

Mr. REID and Dr. SCHEAR. Building a partner's overall governance and security capacity is a shared responsibility across multiple agencies and departments of the U.S. Government—and one that requires flexible, responsive tools that provide incentives for cooperation. Indeed one of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win: economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more—these, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success.

Currently DOD cooperates with DEA and FBI (and other departments and agencies) to help build partner capacity for counternarcotics, and with FBI for counterterrorism and counter-WMD programs. Although we only play a supporting role to the lead law enforcement agencies, we anticipate requirements to build the capacity of partner nations' law enforcement entities will continue to increase, and we should improve interagency planning, coordination, and capacity to meet such requirements. DOD should absolutely remain engaged in this activity, and we support additional funding for the DOS, which also provides funding for law enforcement and judicial sector programs executed by DOJ, DHS, and other departments and agencies.

29. Senator REED. Mr. Reid and Dr. Schear, what is DOD's view of this missing capacity to train law enforcement/gendarmerie training capability? Are there specific areas where DOD is interested in engaging?

Mr. REID and Dr. SCHEAR. Building local capacity for law enforcement is critical for transitioning from counterinsurgency and counter terrorism operations to law enforcement activities. As such, our own government's civilian capacity to assist developing nations is critical to advancing U.S. security interests. Other agencies must be given the resources needed to engage effectively around the globe. DOD's efforts need to be complemented by other agencies with different core competencies to assist developing partners as they create effective and accountable government institutions.

Although we only play a supporting role to the lead law enforcement agencies, we anticipate requirements to build the capacity of partner nations' law enforcement entities including gendarmerie will continue to increase, and we should improve interagency planning, coordination, and capacity to meet such requirements. DOD Counternarcotics programs have developed a successful model for providing training, equipping, and other support to international law enforcement partners (including foreign police, border guards, coast guards, etc.) in cooperation with DOS/INL, DOJ, DHS, and key agencies such as DEA and FBI.

30. Senator REED. Mr. Reid, the previous Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, Mike Vickers, advocated for DOD to support more robustly other departments and agencies of government in countering the message of violent extremists through information operations and strategic communications programs. How do you foresee DOD increasing its support of DOS and/or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)?

Mr. REID. The global media environment we are now in makes cooperation and collaboration among different departments and agencies critical to ensure consistency and efficacy of the U.S. global message. DOD supports these interagency strategic communication efforts by making our capabilities available to support other departments and agencies and by maintaining operational transparency. DOD maintains unique capabilities to reach audiences in denied areas, as well as to promulgate information that supports military objectives and, where appropriate, that contributes to the communication strategies of the larger U.S. Government. DOD information activities, such as MISO and public affairs, are coordinated with other agencies as appropriate. When executed outside areas of military conflict, these activities undergo review by the country teams, which include CIA and State Department representatives. DOD also works closely with State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and supports the newly established Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications.
31. Senator Reed. Mr. Reid, do you believe DOD has the authority for expanded support operations?

Mr. Reid. Yes, our extant authorities, which allow us to ensure regional stability and security through our combatant commands, grant authority to provide expanded support where and when required. We will continue to leverage long-established processes and mechanisms for planning, de-confliction, and partnered efforts to enhance mutually supporting objectives with our interagency partners.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

32. Senator Reed. Mr. Reid, I want to ask about information operations. In your view, has DOD done enough to explain the measures of effectiveness for these programs?

Mr. Reid. DOD's efforts to develop measures of effectiveness have not, in the past, received the level of effort necessary, and we are taking steps to correct that. One of the missions of the re-organized Joint IO Warfare Center will be to develop these assessments in support of COCOM missions. We also work closely with other departments and agencies that are challenged with developing measures of effectiveness for their own information programs.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES

33. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Reid, section 167, title 10, U.S.C. defines 10 activities as special operations activities insofar as each relates to special operations. While there is a catchall proviso listed as well, designating such other activities, as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense as special operations activities, given the 2006 realignment of all Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations (PSYOP)/MISO forces from SOCOM where they supported both the general purpose force and SOF's, to the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC), where they now primarily support the general purpose force. Should CA and PSYOP have remained on this list of special operations activities?

Mr. Reid. The 2006 realignment migrated Reserve component U.S. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations (USACAPOC) forces from the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) to the USARC. It did not change longstanding force apportionment, training, and operational support relationships. U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) CA Brigades and PSYOP/Military Information Support to Operations (MISO) Groups and Companies continue to support general purpose force Corps, Joint Task Forces, and Brigade Combat Teams (BCT). USAR CA Battalions continue to support General Purpose Force (GPF) Divisions as well as each Special Forces Group. The USAR PSYOP/MISO force now provides exclusive support to the GPF, while the active Component PSYOP/MISO force continues to support GPF and SOF.

Over the course of our engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, the responsibilities of general purpose forces for population-centric operations have expanded. Accordingly, CA units now provide significant support to both special and conventional operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Nevertheless, CA can be considered a special operations activity when Active component Civil Affairs Forces assigned to USASOC are conducting special operations as section 167, title 10, U.S.C. suggests.

34. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Reid, given this change of command and control, how do you reconcile the fact that Reserve component CA and PSYOP/MISO soldiers continue to perform what is technically defined as a Special Operations activities without commensurate authorities, training, equipping, or funding every time they deploy in support of combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa? What can be done to clarify this statutory discrepancy?

Mr. Reid. As section 167, title 10, U.S.C. suggests, CA and PSYOP/MISO are special operations activities insofar as they relate to special operations. Reserve component CA and PSYOP/MISO are not SOFs, so there is no discrepancy.

Nevertheless, the majority of Army CA and PSYOP/MISO forces are Reserve component forces and have operated in direct support of general purpose forces during full spectrum operations. In acknowledgement of this fact, the Secretary of the Army (Office of the Assistant Secretary Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs) is conducting analysis of options to address responsibilities for the training and equipping of CA forces. These options include possible amendment of Title 10
U.S.C., section 3013(c) to add lead agent responsibility for both CA and Military Government to the Secretary of the Army's enumerated responsibilities. This analysis seeks to alleviate the burden on the special operations community to perform operational responsibilities for GPF CA that would normally be performed by a Service headquarters.

The Army's review of CA is being carried over into the SOCOM (the Joint Proponent for MISO) discussions regarding the PSYOP/MISO force. As SOCOM looks at efficiencies and the future role of MISO, it is working to determine the most effective method for providing continued whole-of-DOD support. ASD(SO/LIC), in partnership with SOCOM, expects to produce a comprehensive MISO report over the coming year that provides a strategy proposal for the future MISO force.

CIVIL AFFAIRS CAPACITY

35. Senator CHAMBLISS. Mr. Reid, in your written statement to the committee you mention creating additional CA and PSYOP/MISO units in order to provide additional support for SOFs and the regular Army. While Active and Reserve component CA and PSYOP/MISO forces are certainly in high demand with lower than average dwell times, TRADOC has clearly documented gaps—language skills, cultural acumen, functional specialty, and planning expertise—in CA capabilities that remain unresolved today. When coupled with a lack of habitual relationships with BCTs and SOFs alike, is creating additional CA and PSYOP/MISO capacity the proper way to solve a capability shortfall?

Mr. REID. The current operational tempo to support requirements in the CENTCOM Area of Operations has impacted sustainment of CA existing habitual, regionally-oriented relationships with BCTs and SOF. DOD has recognized this problem and has invested substantially in CA growth over the past several years in order to address some of these gaps. Army CA is programmed to grow to 187 CA companies (25 SOF, 30 Active component (AC), 132 Reserve Component (RC)) by fiscal year 2013; up from 76 CA companies (6 SOF, 70 RC) in fiscal year 2006. This increased CA capacity will regenerate and enhance these habitual relationships with BCTs and Special Operations units, thus improving the capability shortfalls described. Additionally, a SOCOM/JFCOM co-sponsored Capabilities Based Assessment of CA identified similar gaps at the operational and strategic level. Detailed solution recommendations are being forwarded for consideration to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Army.

The same language and cultural concerns have been cited for the Active component (AC) PSYOP/MISO support to SOF and the combatant commands. As such, the SOCOM Commander has proposed an internal adjustment to reorganize the AC MISO force, the details of which are still under consideration within DOD.

36. Senator CHAMBLISS. Mr. Reid, would embedding CA within Army BCTs help resolve some or all of these capabilities gaps while also conserving resources during an era of increasingly constrained budgets?

Mr. REID. While we may gain tactical and operational benefit from assigning CA companies to BCTs, there are currently not enough CA companies in the current force structure to make this possible. By contrast, the assignment of General Purpose Force CA Battalions and their organic companies from the newly authorized Active component 85th CA Brigade to the respective Army Service components of the geographic combatant commands allows greater operational flexibility for the combatant command commander and the Army Service component commander to allocate CA forces to accomplish Theater Security Cooperation and civil military engagement missions.

37. Senator CHAMBLISS. Mr. Reid, in these tight financial times where we seek efficiencies wherever we can find them, is creating additional CA and PSYOP/MISO force structure the best use of taxpayer funds?

Mr. REID. Ineffective governance can create areas of instability for terrorists and insurgents to exploit and for violent ideologies to spread. Assessments of the future security environment demand that the United States retain and enhance capabilities for succeeding against these kinds of challenges. Current programmed growth within DOD’s CA and MISO communities has been based on existing non-OIF/OEF requirements to support the execution of each Combatant Command’s Theater Security Cooperation Plans. Current and already programmed CA force structure posses sufficient capacity to meet requirements for execution of current Theater Security Cooperation Plan requirements.
38. Senator CHAMBLISS. Mr. Reid, in your view, is CA an Army or a SOF capability?

Mr. REID. CA is a capability that supports both conventional and SOF. As part of DOD’s overall rebalancing effort, the responsibilities of conventional forces for population-centric operations have greatly expanded. General Purpose Forces’ access to and integration with CA units is an important part of that overall strategic shift. Between fiscal years 2001 and 2015, the CA community will have grown from 5,149 manpower authorizations to 11,702 personnel. This investment includes a significant growth within the Active component, both for General Purpose Forces and SOF, from 208 manpower authorizations in fiscal year 2001 to 3,224 authorizations in fiscal year 2015. SOCOM and the Army are currently undertaking an examination of this evolution to determine if CA has moved beyond a purely SOF capability. The results of this examination will properly align the CA force to continue to provide the required support to both communities.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS/MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS

39. Senator CHAMBLISS. Mr. Reid, given the importance of PSYOP and Information Operations and the well-publicized challenges we have in executing these responsibilities in comparison to al Qaeda, the fact that we have not selected a PSYOP/MISO officer as a general officer and empowered him/her to lead our information efforts overseas puzzles me. Special Forces are a critical enabler and they have general officer billets. Would not the selection of someone who has devoted his/her life to the profession of persuading, informing, and influencing foreign target audiences overseas assist us in improving our performance in this critical aspect of our efforts overseas?

Mr. REID. The MISO community remains small and segmented by component within the Army, which houses the majority of MISO forces. Though still an exception, the Army recently promoted an information operations officer to brigadier general. This officer commanded the first Information Operations Command and now serves in the U.S. Cyber Command as an operations officer. In addition, the SOCOM Commander has submitted a Force Design Update requesting the establishment of a MISO Command. As the request is processed through the Army Force Management process, the Army will decide if a general officer is appropriate to lead this new command.

40. Senator CHAMBLISS. Mr. Reid, why are there no general officer billets in PSYOP/MISO?

Mr. REID. The MISO community remains small and segmented by component within the Army, which houses the majority of MISO forces. Though still an exception, the Army recently promoted an Information Operations officer to Brigadier General. This officer commanded the first Information Operations Command and now serves in the U.S. Cyber Command as an operations officer. In addition, the SOCOM Commander has submitted a Force Design Update requesting the establishment of a MISO Command. As the request is processed through the Army Force Management process, the Army will decide if a general officer is appropriate to lead this new command.

INFORMATION DOMINANCE

41. Senator CHAMBLISS. Mr. Reid, shortly after their most recent attempts to cripple international commerce by bringing down a commercial aircraft enroute to America, al Qaeda was publishing their efforts worldwide via their English-language online magazine, Inspire. Too recent a change in strategy to have received much attention yet, this dangerous new pronouncement is noteworthy precisely because it was made publicly. More importantly, al Qaeda used this forum to announce a marked shift from historically accepted terrorist dynamics to a clear-cut strategy of attrition designed to economically cripple the west.

“Moving away from the expensive and carefully coordinated attacks of September 11 on New York and the 7/7 London bombs, al Qaeda in Yemen says it is now going to focus on smaller, cheaper strikes in an effort to bleed the enemy to death through a strategy of a thousand cuts. One article enlightens readers on how two Nokia mobiles, two HP printers, cheap explosives and 3 months’ work for a team of less than six, has forced Barack Obama to frantically pump dollars into airport security, further weakening the American economy. The publication says the technical know-how of making parcel bombs will be disseminated to militants in countries with looser security restrictions than in Yemen. Is al Qaeda’s dominance in the informa-
tion arena an emerging threat to our collective national security? If so, given the statutory and regulatory limitations on U.S. strategic communications efforts, how can we counter their efforts in this domain?

Mr. Reid. The information domain is global in scope and our enemies will attempt to use this domain to achieve a comparative advantage. DOD cannot be the sole responder to violent extremist activity in this domain, and hence we work diligently with DOS and the IC to combat the spread of propaganda, including the information in Inspire magazine. It is also important that we not bring more attention to these efforts simply by reacting to every piece of information that becomes available. Doing so can inadvertently provide such announcements with a wider audience. It may be appropriate to review and, where necessary, update statutes written for a time when information was not as readily and instantly available.

CIVIL AFFAIRS IN QDR STRATEGY

42. Senator Chambliss. Dr. Schear, the 2010 QDR reinforced the focus on stability operations as an integral and co-equal element of full spectrum operations. As such, the role of CA forces as subject-matter experts for key stability tasks was elevated in two directives included in the Rebalancing-the-Force section of the QDR and identified as enhancements to the capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces. The first directive—expand CA capacity—provides resources and potential, creates opportunity, and presents challenges. The second directive—“increase counterinsurgency, stability operations, and counterterrorism competency in general purpose forces”—an important implied task for CA that presents its own opportunities and challenges. How do you reconcile the elevated status of stability operations, and by extension the importance of CA, within the 2010 QDR with the well-documented current gaps in CA capabilities? Do we have the forces we need in this area, or is this an area we still need to grow?

Dr. Schear. SOCOM and the Army have determined that current and already programmed CA force structure possess sufficient capacity to meet the requirements of current operations within CENTCOM AOR and the COCOM generated demand signal for execution of current Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) requirements. The capability shortfalls within the CA force are being addressed in detail by the respective services and SOCOM and solution sets are being provided through the CA Capabilities Based Assessment. Implementation of those solutions, by the services, will eliminate much of the existing capability gaps. The Department has the correct force capacity to meet current requirements, and should resist the temptation to create a “new capability or increase capacity” when simply enhancing capabilities within current force structure, through additional, enhanced, or new training; structure and manning updates; and progressive equipping coupled with continued evolution of the roles, missions, and responsibilities of the current CA force, will suffice.

COUNTERNARCOTICS AND GLOBAL THREATS

43. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Wechsler, regarding the threat of Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCO), you comment in your written statement that, “It is important to recognize that when we discuss the transnational nature of this threat, this includes criminal activities that take place outside as well as within the United States. For instance, the influence of Mexican TCOs extends well beyond the southwest border to cities across the country such as Atlanta, Chicago, and Detroit. Unfortunately, coordination of domestic and international activities can be especially challenging.” You go on to comment that, “DOD can play an important role in facilitating coordination and information sharing through mechanisms such as Joint Task Force-North in El Paso and Joint Interagency Task Force-South in Key West—both of which are models of interagency and international cooperation. This issue of information sharing has always concerned me because too often there have been unnecessary barriers to organizations within the U.S. Government receiving information crucial to their mission that another organization in the U.S. Government already has. My question for you regarding this issue is, are there barriers that are unnecessary, and are you able to give and receive information with domestic agencies and across DOD and the IC that you need to in order to best accomplish your mission, and for the other agencies involved to best accomplish their mission?”

Mr. Wechsler. DOD develops, analyzes, and shares counternarcotics-related information to the full extent permitted by law with other U.S. Federal agencies, as well as with State and local authorities and foreign counterparts, utilizing a flexible web of agreements and task forces. This may include DOD providing information
to other U.S. agencies, which then share the information with third parties under those agencies’ legal authorities and arrangements. Generally speaking, these arrangements work well, in part because U.S. and foreign authorities have been cooperating against transnational drug trafficking for many years. The DOD counternarcotics program supports several activities to facilitate information-sharing, including (but not limited to):

- Anti-Drug Network, which provides classified computer links among Federal and State law enforcement agencies, as well as secure but unclassified connections among Federal, State, local, regional, tribal and foreign drug trafficking interdiction mission partners;
- Intelligence and information analysis and dissemination training programs;
- Multi-discipline intelligence analysis and linguistic support to other agencies;
- The Joint Narcotics Analysis Center in Afghanistan;
- Tactical Analysis Teams (TATs) supporting U.S. Embassies in 18 countries; and
- Cooperating Nations Information Exchange System (CNIES) enabling graphical display of sanitized aerial and maritime radar tracking information among U.S. and foreign partners.

44. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Wechsler, is there any assistance that Congress may be able to provide?

Mr. Wechsler. I appreciate the question, Senator, and the longstanding support the Congress has provided for the Department’s counternarcotics efforts. In the current challenging fiscal environment, we understand that we are constantly competing for finite Federal resources and believe we are providing excellent value for the American taxpayer.

More specifically, several of the Department’s key counternarcotics authorities will expire at the end of fiscal year 2011. These authorities include: (1) Section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of Fiscal Year 1991, as amended, our foundational authority to provide critical counterdrug support to State, local, Federal, and foreign law enforcement partners; (2) Section 1021 of the NDAA of Fiscal Year 2005, as amended, which authorizes support for Colombia’s unified counterdrug and counterterrorism campaign; and (3) Section 1022 of the NDAA of Fiscal Year 2004, as amended, which allows counterdrug funds to be used to support counterterrorism activities worldwide.

Over the years, these authorities have been critical to the progress we have made in detecting and monitoring drug trafficking through the Caribbean and building counternarcotics capacity in Colombia and elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere. Sections 1004 and 1022 are particularly important to our efforts to confront narcotics production and trafficking in Afghanistan—a key source of revenue for the Taliban. We look forward to working with the committee to ensure these unique and flexible tools are reauthorized in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012.

COUNTERNARCOTICS

45. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Wechsler, the twin border cities of Ciudad Juarez and El Paso, TX, are a primary crossing point for drugs smuggled into the United States. Control of drug routes in Chihuahua, the State along New Mexico and West Texas where Juarez is located, is vital to the continued growth of drug cartel operations. In recent testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Admiral Winnefeld, Commander, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), stated that: “criminal groups have killed more than 35,000 people since December 2006.” While some experts believe that drug violence will remain a significant problem on both sides of the border for years to come, other U.S. authorities now believe, based on information from confidential informants with direct ties to Mexican drug gangs and other intelligence, that Mexico’s most powerful kingpin—Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman—and the Sinaloa cartel is winning Mexico’s drug war, edging out the rival Juarez gang for control over the coveted trafficking routes through Juarez. While that is one assessment, what is your assessment of the status of the drug war between these rival drug cartels and, more to the point, what else can we do to help stem the flow of drugs, people, weapons, and money across our southern border?

Mr. Wechsler. Ciudad Juarez has suffered especially high rates of violence in part because it is contested among several TCOs, principally the Sinaloa Cartel, the Juarez Cartel (aka Vicente Carrillo Fuentes Organization) and the Zetas as well as less-sophisticated actors such as the Barrio Azteca gang. I would hesitate to say who
is winning or losing this struggle, except to make the point that all Mexicans ultimately lose, not only when criminal organizations fight one another but also if any criminal organization is able to gain effective dominance over an area. I therefore applaud the courageous efforts of the Mexican authorities to build rule of law throughout the country, including in some of the most difficult locations.

The United States should certainly do more, in my opinion, to provide training, equipment, and information to help Mexican efforts. In particular, the United States can share some of its experience, and that of other countries, in coordinating all aspects of national power (including law enforcement, defense, intelligence, judicial, and economic development efforts) to build campaigns to dismantle transnationally-networked adversaries. In doing so, however, U.S. authorities are careful to bear in mind that the situations in places like Ciudad Juarez are very different from places where the United States has been more directly involved. We must, therefore, adapt lessons learned elsewhere, not try to adopt them outright. The United States should also redouble its efforts to reduce the flow of both firearms and drug money from the United States to Mexico, as well as to diminish U.S. consumption of illegal drugs.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN CORNYN

46. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Wechsler, in your prepared testimony, you note that DOD, SOUTHCOM, and NORTHCOM are working to develop a joint security effort in the border region of Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize. Please provide further details on this effort.

Mr. WECHSLER. Starting in 2009, DOD realized that as Colombia and Mexico brought more effective pressure on TCOs, the TCOs would disperse into even more vulnerable countries in Central America. Powerful TCOs interact with less sophisticated, but large-scale, street and prison gangs, some of which maintain international networks, including in the United States. An estimated 96 percent of cocaine that departs South America for the United States first arrives in Central America, before continuing through Mexico. Although Central American countries differ significantly, weak rule of law and severe social inequality can engender environments in which TCOs can operate with varying degrees of “impunity.” Violence in the region, which has long been high, has increased dramatically in recent years. DOD, therefore, worked with authorities from Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize, as well as from several U.S. agencies, to design a set of programs that are starting in 2011. In the meanwhile, the U.S. and Central American Governments launched broader security cooperation efforts, notably the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARI), which the DOD counternarcotics program complements. The goals of the U.S.-fostered effort are to help Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize strengthen governmental control over remote border regions, improve land, sea, and air domain awareness and response capabilities and support regional security cooperation efforts. The program puts a particular emphasis on helping the three countries improve controls over their littoral waters, where most drug trafficking takes place. Support includes patrol boats, night vision equipment, communications equipment, maritime sensors, and associated training. DOD will also provide infrastructure support in Guatemala and Belize. Specifically, the DOD counternarcotics Mexico-Guatemala-Belize Border Region Program helps:

• Improve regional border (including airspace and maritime) security through training, equipment, information sharing, and infrastructure;
• Enhance drug smuggling interdiction capacity and capabilities by helping improve mobility and training for partner country interdiction forces, including for combined operations with the United States and/or each other;
• Improve regional sea, air, and land domain awareness by developing intelligence, command, and control capabilities to integrate maritime and air operations. This emphasizes leveraging Joint Interagency Task Force-South operations; and
• Foster partnerships, including complementing the Merida Initiative and CARI.

47. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Wechsler, what disparities have you found between the current counter-trafficking approaches and capabilities of NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM?

Mr. WECHSLER. NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM’s respective geographic areas of responsibility are very different in nature, since NORTHCOM covers the United
States, as well as Mexico, the Bahamas, and Canada, while SOUTHCOM covers 31 fellow American countries and 10 territories. DOD’s counternarcotics (CN) and related support to law enforcement agencies within the United States are governed by significantly different legal authorities, as well as policy directives, as compared to DOD’s security cooperation with foreign countries. Nevertheless, NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM work very closely with each other to ensure that no “seam” emerges between their efforts, highlighted by implementation of a special Mexico, Guatemala, Belize Border Region counternarcotics program (see question #46.)

NORTHCOM’s role in supporting the CN efforts of U.S. Federal, state and local law enforcement agencies is carried out principally via Joint Task Force-North (JTF-North). JTF-North provides active duty military support to law enforcement agencies to detect, monitor and disrupt the interdiction of suspected transnational threats within and along the approaches to the continental United States. This includes fusing and disseminating intelligence, contributing to a common operational picture, coordinating support to other agencies, and supporting NORTHCOM’s co-ordination and support categories include: operational intelligence, engineering and training. (The National Guard also provides support to counternarcotics law enforcement in the United States. See question #58.) NORTHCOM’s roles in supporting Mexican security forces’ counternarcotics efforts include training, equipment, and information sharing, and concentrate on helping Mexican forces improve their tactical and operational proficiency, as well as their air mobility, maritime law enforcement, communications, and reconnaissance capacities. This includes an emphasis on intelligence-driven and interagency operations as well as incorporating principles of respect for human rights. (See question #46).

SOUTHCOM’s efforts against drug trafficking and associated transnational crime span a much greater geographic range, and vary greatly in intensity from country to country. Some countries, such as Colombia and Peru, continue to make admirable efforts to suppress drug production and trafficking, while other countries’ efforts (such as those of Venezuela) have been disappointing in recent years. SOUTHCOM (and its component Joint Interagency Task Force-South) conduct substantial missions to detect and monitor drug trafficking, as well as to support law enforcement interdiction of smuggling. Counterdrug Forward Operating Locations in the Netherlands Antilles and El Salvador provide critical support in these efforts. SOUTHCOM information-sharing programs include the CNIES which shares radar track information among participating countries, and the FAT program, which provides DOD counterdrug intelligence analysts to support U.S. Embassies abroad. SOUTHCOM counternarcotics partner capacity building efforts include training in areas such as special operations, riverine and maritime operations, leadership, maintenance, planning and other areas. SOUTHCOM provides infrastructure and equipment to a variety of countries in the Americas for counternarcotics purposes. Other categories of support to U.S. and foreign counternarcotics efforts in SOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility include airlift, engineering, and communications.

48. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Wechsler, in your testimony, you also state that DOD’s counternarcotics program expects to allocate approximately $51 million in fiscal year 2011 to support Mexico, representing a dramatic increase over previous funding levels, which were closer to $3 million per year prior to 2009. Please elaborate on what this additional funding will be used for.

Mr. WECHSLER. DOD CN support to Mexican security forces includes training, equipment, infrastructure, and information sharing and concentrates on helping Mexican forces improve their tactical and operational proficiency, as well as their air mobility, maritime law enforcement, communications, and reconnaissance capacities. DOD CN support includes an emphasis on intelligence-driven and interagency operations as well as incorporating principles of respect for human rights.

Training examples include: air operations, safety, resources management, maintenance, and mission planning; helicopter pilot training (including at an expanded school in Colombia); transnational/regional security issues; rule of law, human rights, and discipline of military operations; tactics for urban and night operations; counter-improvised explosive device techniques; force protection during operations, as well as at staging and garrison locations; logistics/resources management; maritime, littoral, riverine, and amphibious operations, communications and planning; ship maintenance and repair; search-and-rescue, medical and lifesaving; non-commissioned officer leadership; intelligence and operational planning; and unmanned aerial systems employment.

Equipment provided includes: aircraft avionics, sensor upgrades, maintenance consumables, spare parts; helicopter repair and mission system upgrades; aviation and surface night vision devices; non-intrusive cargo inspection detectors; unattended ground sensor systems; tactical, secure, GPS-equipped hand-held and vehi-
cle-mounted radios; point-to-point communications network consisting of microwave links, towers, encryption equipment, and associated components; and maritime automated information system transponders.

DOD CN operates or supports U.S. intelligence, radar, communications, computer network, transportation, counterdrug detection and monitoring, training, technology development, liaison, headquarters support, and related activities, portions of which may be considered indirect support to Mexico. This includes the work of Joint Task Force-North, which supports U.S. drug law enforcement agencies in the United States.

**SOMALIA**

49. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Reid, some analysts speculate that successfully denying al Qaeda a safe haven in Afghanistan and Pakistan might simply result in a relocation and reorganization of al Qaeda leadership. In your prepared testimony, you note al-Shabaab's increasing affiliation with al Qaeda. Reports indicate that al-Shabaab now controls much of southern and central Somalia. Please elaborate on the nature and scope of this threat and on al Qaeda's influence in the region.

Mr. REID. The relationship between al-Shabaab and al Qaeda is complicated. We see increasing connections between al-Shabaab and al Qaeda's Pakistan-based leadership, but also divisions between al-Shabaab and the remnants of the al Qaeda in East Africa cell. Parts of al-Shabaab are committed to international terrorism while other parts are regionally-aligned, clan-based militias that have been co-opted or coerced into al-Shabaab's ranks. Regardless of the specifics of the organizational relationship between al-Shabaab and al Qaeda, we're very concerned about al-Shabaab's increasing interest in external attacks and desire to leverage Somali diaspora communities.

We also remain concerned that if al-Shabaab were to take over Somalia, al Qaeda could try to use it as a safe haven and staging base in a key strategic area of the world. An al-Shabaab-led Somalia would also pose a regional threat and perpetuate the instability and humanitarian crises that have wracked the region for the past 2 decades.

50. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Reid, what factors make Somalia a particularly attractive place for al Qaeda to operate?

Mr. REID. Somalia's lack of governance and relatively sparse population make it appealing as a safe haven. However, Somalis' historic distrust of outsiders could undermine al Qaeda's ability to hide among the population. Its location along key shipping routes could make Somalia a key staging area for transnational terrorist attacks. But its long coast line could also allow the U.S. and allied nations to conduct sea-based CT operations virtually anywhere in Somalia. We continue to work with our interagency partners to create some governance and security capacity in Somalia, bolster the ability of neighboring countries to counter the threat, and prevent al Qaeda from establishing a strong foothold there.

51. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Reid, in your opinion, if al Qaeda is effectively denied a safe haven in Afghanistan and Pakistan, what is the likelihood that they would relocate their leadership to Somalia?

Mr. REID. There are a number of places where al Qaeda could relocate, including Somalia. However, it would take al Qaeda some time to establish the same operational infrastructure there and to effectively hide among a population that has traditionally been very resistant to outsiders. I defer to my colleagues in the IC for a more thorough assessment of the likelihood of al Qaeda relocating its leadership to Somalia.

**LIBYA**

52. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Reid, Colonel Moammar Qadhafi recently promised to carry out terrorist attacks against civilian ships and airliners. If Qadhafi is allowed to remain in power, do you believe he will make good on these threats?

Mr. REID. In the complex security environment we are in, we cannot afford to discount any leader's threats. Colonel Qaddafi has a history of conducting terrorist attacks against Western states and could do so again.

53. Senator CORNYN. Mr. Reid, al Qaeda and its affiliates have found safe havens around the world in failed or failing states. If the situation in Libya becomes a protracted stalemate between Qadhafi and rebel forces, what is the likelihood that al
Qaeda or a like-minded terrorist organization will establish itself somewhere in Libya?

Mr. Reid. Although we continue to monitor the actions of al Qaeda and affiliated groups in Libya, the generally reformist, pro-democracy orientation of the opposition movement is at odds with the aims of al Qaeda. Further, for all of its shortcomings, the Qaddafi regime has proven effective in countering al Qaeda and affiliated groups. Far more concerning is the possibility that al Qaeda and its affiliates will exploit the current instability to obtain advanced Libyan military weaponry, such as surface-to-air missiles.

AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

54. Senator Corynn. Mr. Reid, the anti-government movement in Yemen to force President Saleh from power has further destabilized that country. At the same time, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) remains a serious threat and has recently demonstrated its intent and its capabilities. What is your assessment of the current anti-government movement in Yemen and its impact on AQAP’s reach, operations, and capabilities?

Mr. Reid. The political instability in Yemen has allowed AQAP to increase its operating space and to make some tactical gains in the tribal areas—in several cases seizing and holding territory now outside of Republic of Yemen Government control. Despite AQAP’s limited gains, it remains distant from, and largely counter to, the current anti-government movement in Yemen. AQAP has not made any significant gains in the urban areas nor has it been able to translate this into a broader strategic success in Yemen or beyond.

55. Senator Corynn. Mr. Reid, although AQAP primarily targeted western interests in Yemen, its attempted Christmas Day bombing of a Detroit-bound airliner in 2009 and the failed October 2010 parcel plot indicates that it has international aspirations. What is your assessment of al Qaeda’s current goals and objectives?

Mr. Reid. AQAP is intensely focused on conducting a near-term attack against the United States, and poses an immediate terrorist threat to U.S. interests and the Homeland. The Christmas Day bombing of the Detroit-bound airliner in 2009 and the failed package bombing attempt in October 2010 are the more recent attempts by al Qaeda to attack the U.S. Homeland. Despite recent setbacks, al Qaeda and its affiliate AQAP are still actively plotting attacks, with the principal aim of successfully striking the U.S. Homeland.

The rise of these affiliate organizations in the Arabian Peninsula and elsewhere is of great concern, and highlights the importance of not only disrupting al Qaeda’s attacks against the United States and our allies and partners, but also countering al Qaeda’s ideology, messaging, and resonance as well. Hence, both are administration priorities.

LASHKAR-E-TAYYIBA

56. Senator Corynn. Mr. Reid, PACOM Commander Admiral Robert Willard testified before this committee that Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) has “spread their influence internationally and are no longer solely focused in South Asia and on India.” He went on to say that LeT has declared jihad on America and has even carried out attacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan. What is your assessment of the threat LeT poses to the United States and our interests?

Mr. Reid. Since its inception in the late 1980s, LeT has focused its efforts primarily on combating India over the contested Jammu and Kashmir regions. Like other militant groups however, there is evidence that LeT has broadened its interests and could represent an emerging threat to the West, particularly in Europe, as well as the broader South Asia region. At this time however, we do not fully understand the extent of the network’s aspirations.

Regarding LeT’s activities against Coalition Forces in Afghanistan, we assess that these activities are likely done to gain both tactical experience and legitimacy, to forge relationships with key insurgent groups there, and to meet the group’s goal of defending Islam from perceived Western aggression. LeT’s presence in Afghanistan has not gone unnoticed. COMISAF is fully aware of the LeT threat and is addressing it proportionately and responsibly. The DOD continues to monitor LeT’s potential for expanded operations that may target the U.S. and our interests. We will continue to address this potential threat as it presents itself and will remain supportive of broader U.S. Government efforts to examine and combat LeT.
Senator CORNYN. Mr. Reid, what is the current relationship between LeT and the Government of Pakistan as a whole, between LeT and Pakistan's military, and between LeT and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence?

Mr. REID. Pakistan continues to view India as its greatest security threat and, given India's military dominance in the region, may view militant groups, like LeT as useful proxies to bridge the military capability gap between it and its eastern neighbor. There are widespread allegations that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence may maintain a limited relationship with elements of LeT to both, provide Pakistan with an asymmetric capability which would offset the aforementioned gaps, and to moderate LeT's activities. However, our insight into the details of the alleged relationship is minimal and often fraught with contradictory information.

NATIONAL GUARD JOINT COUNTER-DRUG TASK FORCES

Senator CORNYN. Mr. Wechsler, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 1989 authorizes the National Guard to provide support to law enforcement counter-drug operations. The Texas National Guard Joint Counter-Drug Task Force (JCDTF) has provided support to local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies for over 21 years, and it does extremely important work along the Texas-Mexico border. Although the Texas-Mexico border is over 1,250 miles long, comprising about 65 percent of the overall U.S.-Mexico land border, the Texas National Guard JCDTF receives only 10 percent of the Federal budget for Counterdrug State Plans. In spite of this, the Texas National Guard JCDTF's operations have resulted in over $54 billion in assisted seizures. In your opinion, how important are the National Guard's JCDTF programs, and what critical capabilities do they bring to the table to help our Nation counter illicit trafficking?

Mr. WECHSLER. Helping protect the U.S. border region with Mexico is my top domestic priority, both with respect to National Guard programs and Title 10 military support to law enforcement agencies, since the border region is the principal theater through which illegal drugs enter our country. We have to recognize, however, that TCOs operate throughout the United States and that the worst violence associated with such crime is generally not concentrated in the border region. In fact, criminals with ties to Mexican TCOs operate in an estimated 235 U.S. cities. In view of these realities, the need to put scarce resources toward the greatest threat, and the need to measure the effects of our efforts, the National Guard Counterdrug Program has developed a Threat Based Resourcing Plan to support law enforcement counter narcotics operations in all States.

I consider each State's JCDTF to be extremely important. In fact, the States can support one another in part through the networkable body of capabilities the National Guard Counterdrug Program provides from DOD's authorized mission list. How each State Governor meets specific capability needs in counter narcotics activities varies considerably, and flexibility as a hallmark of the National Guard Counterdrug Program.

The authorized mission categories for the National Guard Counterdrug Program are:

1. Program management;
2. Technical support (subcategories include: linguist support, investigative case and analyst support, operational/investigative case support, communications support, engineer support, and subsurface diver support);
3. Reconnaissance/observation (ground and aerial); and
4. Illegal drug demand reduction support.

[Whereupon, at 4:14 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]