[Senate Hearing 112-173]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-173
OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 30, 2011
__________
Serial No. J-112-12
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
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71-557 WASHINGTON : 2011
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin CHUCK GRASSLEY, Iowa
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
CHUCK SCHUMER, New York JON KYL, Arizona
DICK DURBIN, Illinois JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota JOHN CORNYN, Texas
AL FRANKEN, Minnesota MICHAEL S. LEE, Utah
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
Bruce A. Cohen, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Kolan Davis, Republican Chief Counsel and Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Page
Grassley, Hon. Chuck, a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa...... 3
Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont. 1
prepared statement........................................... 81
WITNESS
Mueller, Robert S., III, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC...... 5
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Responses of Robert S. Mueller, III to questions submitted by
Senators Klobuchar, Franken, Grassley, Hatch, Kyl and Sessions. 34
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Mueller, Robert S., III, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC,
statement...................................................... 83
OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in
room SD-226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Patrick J.
Leahy, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Leahy, Kohl, Schumer, Durbin, Klobuchar,
Franken, Coons, Blumenthal, Grassley, Sessions, Kyl, and
Graham.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK J. LEAHY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF VERMONT
Chairman Leahy. Today the Judiciary Committee will hear
from Director Robert Mueller.
This fall, the Director will complete his 10-year term
overseeing the FBI. He and I were talking out back earlier, and
I do not know when I have seen 10 years go by so quickly, and I
am sure the Director feels the same way. He took over just days
before the attacks of September 11th. And I told him a
reference from Elizabethan England, which I will not repeat
here, in the hearing room at that time, but it did seem like
everything--it was almost as though they were trying to give
the Director his full 10-year term in about the first 10 days,
with all that went on. He has overseen a major transformation
of the Bureau. While the FBI continues to perform all the
functions of a Federal law enforcement agency, it has greatly
increased its role in ensuring our National security. There
have been growing pains and false starts, but Director Mueller
has managed this transformation of a large and well-established
agency with great professionalism and focus, and he will leave
at the end of his tenure a better Bureau than he had when he
came in.
The Director has aggressively pursued both law enforcement
and national security objectives while maintaining a strong
commitment to the values and freedoms we hold most dear as
Americans. In commemorating the 100th anniversary of the FBI
several years ago--and I remember sitting there listening to
the Director as he said this--he said:
''It is not enough to stop the terrorist--we must stop him
while maintaining his civil liberties. It is not enough to
catch the criminal--we must catch him while respecting his
civil rights. It is not enough to prevent foreign countries
from stealing our secrets--we must prevent that from happening
while still upholding the rule of law. The rule of law, civil
liberties, and civil rights--these are not our burdens. They
are what make us better. And they are what have made us better
for the past 100 years.''
I was in that audience when he said that. I think it is
fair to say the audience went across the political spectrum,
and his statement was greeted with long and sustained applause.
I have tried to advance these same objectives with
carefully calibrated criminal justice legislation like the
Justice For All Act and national security legislation like the
USA PATRIOT Act reauthorization proposal that recently passed
through this Committee. But I am gratified that the Director
shares my commitment to working to keep all Americans safe
while preserving the values of all Americans.
I appreciate that the FBI has shown signs recently of real
progress on issues vital to this Committee and to the country.
National security and counterterrorism are central to the FBI's
mission. But it has been heartening to see this steady stream
of important arrests of those who would do this country harm.
Earlier this month, the FBI arrested Kevin Harpham for
planning to bomb a march in honor of Martin Luther King Day in
Spokane, Washington. Mr. Harpham reportedly had ties to white
supremacist groups, and the plot he is accused of planning came
dangerously close to succeeding. Had it succeeded with the bomb
that he had, the results could have been devastating to a large
crowd of people, and I commend the FBI for making this arrest,
which shows the continuing threat posed by domestic terrorism
and makes very clear that no one ethnic group has a monopoly on
terror.
Now, in the last Congress, we made great strides toward
more effective fraud prevention and enforcement. I worked hard
with Senator Grassley and others to craft and pass the Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act, the most expansive anti-fraud
legislation in more than a decade. It adds resources and
statutory tools for effective prevention, detection, and
enforcement of mortgage fraud and financial fraud. We have
worked hard to ensure that both the health care reform
legislation and Wall Street reform legislation passed last year
had important new tools for cracking down on fraud. Senator
Grassley and I are hard at work now on new legislation to
provide greater support for aggressive enforcement of our fraud
laws.
I am pleased to see that the FBI has been taking advantage
of this heightened support for fraud enforcement. They have
greatly increased the number of agents investigating fraud.
They have led to more fraud arrests, but also--and the
taxpayers should be happy about this--they have led to greater
fraud recoveries. And I am glad that the FBI has maintained its
historic focus on combating corruption. I would hope that they
would continue to crack down on the kinds of fraud that
contributed so greatly to our current financial crisis and on
corruption that undermines Americans' faith in their democracy.
Last, I have been heartened to see that the FBI's
statistics continue to show reductions in violent crime
nationwide despite the painful recession, and I commend the FBI
for their work in combating violent crime. I hope that Congress
will continue to provide the urgently needed assistance to
State and local law enforcement, which has been vital to
keeping crime down throughout the country.
Then, of course, areas of major concern include the FBI's
continuing struggles with modernizing its technology and
information-sharing systems. We will have vigorous oversight,
and I know that today's hearing will shed light on these areas.
I thank Director Mueller for returning to the Committee,
for his responsiveness to our oversight efforts, but especially
for his personal example and impressive leadership over the
past decade in returning the FBI to its best traditions. If you
get to know the Director and his family, you can see he carries
the same values to work, and I commend him for that.
I also would say I commend him for the times when difficult
things were happening, he has called me at home or on the road
or in Vermont, and he actually traveled to Vermont with me to
talk about it. That meant a great deal and means a great deal.
And, of course, I thank the hard-working men and women of the
FBI. And, again, without going into our personal conversations,
earlier the Director and I were talking about how fortunate we
are to have the kind of men and women who have put their lives
on hold to uphold what is needed in our country.
Senator Grassley.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK GRASSLEY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF IOWA
Senator Grassley. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, oversight of the
FBI is probably one of the most important oversight hearings
that you have, and so I thank you.
I would take a moment to publicly thank you, Director
Mueller, for your service to America, and I do that just in
case this might be the last time as Director of the FBI you are
before this Committee. But I will bet you after you are in
private life you will be asked to testify on various things
before Congress in that capacity because of your experience.
While we have had our share of disagreements, Director
Mueller, I have always appreciated your candor and your
willingness to work with us to get answers even if we do not
always agree with what those answers are. For instance, I know
there is a lot of agreement between you and me on the need to
extend the PATRIOT Act provisions that are set to expire in
May. The three expiring provisions of the PATRIOT Act are very
important tools used by law enforcement and the intelligence
community to protect us from threats to our National security.
They are vital to our ability to investigate, identify, track,
and deter terrorists.
It was recently revealed that the FBI successfully utilized
a Section 215 order as part of the investigation that prevented
a terrorist attack planned by a Saudi national in Texas. In
that case it was revealed that the individual in question
purchased bomb-making materials such as 3 gallons of sulfuric
acid, clocks, chemistry sets, and a gas mask from online
retailers Amazon.com and eBay. This case is the latest of many
examples of successes of the PATRIOT Act provisions and your
successful use of that.
Given the numerous threats we face and the fact that the
three expiring provisions have not been found to have been
abused, the Senate should work to reauthorize the expiring
authority without amendment.
Aside from the critical national security authority we need
to reauthorize, I want to today eventually ask Director Mueller
about a recent report that was issued by the Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs Committee released in February
entitled, ``A Ticking Bomb'' that examined the tragic shootings
at Fort Hood that occurred November 2009. That report
highlighted a number of problems at both the Department of
Defense and the FBI and found ``systematic failures in the
Government's handling of the Hasan case.''
I was troubled to hear allegations contained in the report,
including that an analyst on a Joint Terrorism Task Force was
not provided full access to a key FBI data base simply because
he was from a non-FBI agency. I want to hear from the Director
whether he agreed with some of these key findings, what is
being done to correct any deficiencies in the way terrorism
cases are reviewed, and whether information sharing has been
improved.
I will also ask the Director some questions about FBI
employee personnel matters. I have long been concerned about
the plight of whistleblowers within the FBI. Director Mueller
has made it a priority to instruct all employees of the FBI
that retaliation against whistleblowers will not be tolerated,
but, unfortunately, that directive has not always been followed
by agents in the field, and I find one case particularly
troubling.
In 2007, the Department of Justice Inspector General issued
a memorandum finding that a 30-year non-agent employee of the
FBI, Robert Kobus, was retaliated against for protected
whistleblowing. The Inspector General found that, ``The FBI
management in the New York Field Division improperly moved
Kobus from the position of a senior administrative support
manager to several non-supervisory positions.'' One of those
positions included being demoted to OSHA safety officer. The
retaliation was blatant and included moving his office to a
cubicle on a vacant 24th floor of the FBI building. The
Inspector General ultimately concluded that the decision to
move him was in retaliation for disclosing wrongdoing to a
special agent in charge of the field office, in this case an
attendance fraud by FBI agents. This is exactly the type of
retaliation against whistleblowers that should never occur.
So I am working on a request that I shared with Chairman
Leahy--you may not know about it, but I have given it to your
staff--hoping that we can work together on this issue. But I
would also request that the Government Accountability Office
conduct a top-to-bottom review of the Department of Justice's
process for dealing with FBI whistleblowers. Delays like the
one in the Kobus case send a clear signal to potential
whistleblowers that reporting wrongdoing will only end up in an
expensive bureaucratic mess.
Another area of concern that I have relates to the FBI
employee misconduct. In January of this year, the internal FBI
Office of Professional Responsibility documents were leaked to
the press. Those documents contained a number of shocking
allegations about misconduct committed by employees of the FBI.
An example: The document detailed FBI agents who were dismissed
because they were arrested for drunk driving, engaged in
improper relationships with FBI informants, leaked classified
information to reporters, sought reimbursement for expenditures
they never made, and in one instance brought foreign nationals
back into the FBI's space after hours. I want to know more
about these penalties, how they were determined. I think it is
necessary and important to know in light of the fact that the
Inspector General found in the May 2009 report that there is a
perception among FBI employees that there is a double standard
for discipline among higher-ranking and lower-ranking
employees.
Director Mueller, over the past 8 months, I have been
investigating systemic problems at the Philadelphia Public
Housing Authority--outlandish salaries, sexual harassment
settlements, and excessive legal billings, just to name a few
of the problems, and I want to express my appreciation
regarding the FBI's ongoing investigation and recent seizure of
expensive luggage purchased as gifts by the Philadelphia Public
Housing Authority, and I hope the FBI follows through
vigorously on any criminal violations that may have occurred at
the Philadelphia Public Housing Authority.
Finally, I want to ask the Director about the fiscal year
2012 budget request that was submitted to Congress. I continue
to have concerns with the FBI's agency-wide case management
system known as Sentinel. I want to know when this is going to
end, how much more taxpayers' money will be necessary, and how
the FBI plans to maintain the older case management data base
as part of the new system. After a decade of upgrading the
system, not another dime of taxpayers' money should be awarded
until the FBI can prove the system will work and will be done
on time.
That is a lot to cover. I thank you for your patience as I
cover those items.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you very much.
Director Mueller, please go ahead, sir.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Mueller. Thank you and good morning, Chairman Leahy and
Ranking Member Grassley and other members of the Committee who
are here today. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
the Committee.
I will start by saying that the FBI faces today
unprecedented and increasingly complex challenges. We must
identify and stop terrorists before they launch attacks against
our citizens. We must protect our Government, businesses, and
critical infrastructure from espionage and from the potentially
devastating impact of cyber-based attacks. We must root out
public corruption, fight white-collar and organized crime, stop
child predators, and protect civil rights.
We must also ensure we are building a structure that will
carry the FBI into the future by continuing to enhance our
intelligence capabilities, improve our business practices and
training, and develop the next generation of Bureau leaders.
And we must do all of this while respecting the authority given
to us under the Constitution, upholding civil liberties, and
the rule of law.
The challenges of carrying out this mission have never been
greater as the FBI has never faced a more complex threat
environment than it does today. Over the past year, the FBI has
faced an extraordinary range of threats from terrorism,
espionage, cyber attacks, and traditional crime. A few
examples.
Last October, there were the attempted bombings on air
cargo flights bound for the United States from Yemen, directed
by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Last May, there was the
attempted car bombing in Times Square, aided by TTP in
Pakistan. These attempted attacks demonstrate how al Qaeda and
its affiliates still have the intent to strike inside the
United States.
In addition, there were a number of serious terror plots by
lone offenders here in the United States. Their targets ranged
from the Martin Luther King Day march in Spokane, Washington,
as mentioned by the Chairman, to a Christmas tree lighting
ceremony in Portland, Oregon; to subway stations in the
Washington, D.C., Metro system. And while the motives and
methods for these plots were varied, they were among the most
difficult threats to combat.
The espionage threat persisted as well. Last summer, there
were the arrests of ten Russian spies, known as ``illegals,''
who secretly blended into American society in order to
clandestinely gather information for Russia. And we continued
to make significant arrests for economic espionage as foreign
interests seek to steal controlled technologies.
The cyber intrusion at Google last year highlighted the
potential danger from a sophisticated Internet attack. And
along with countless other cyber incidents, these attacks
threaten to undermine the integrity of the Internet and to
victimize the businesses and persons who rely on it.
In our criminal investigations, we continue to uncover
billion-dollar corporate and mortgage frauds that weaken the
financial system and victimize investors, homeowners, and
ultimately taxpayers. We also exposed health care scams
involving false billings and fake treatments that endangered
patients and fleeced Government health care programs.
The extreme violence across our southwest border continued
to impact the United States. As we saw the murders last March
of American consulate workers in Juarez, Mexico, and the
shooting last month of two U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement agents in Mexico. And throughout the year, there
were numerous corruption cases that undermined the public trust
and countless violent gang cases that continued to take
innocent lives and endanger our communities.
As these examples demonstrate, the FBI's mission to protect
the American people has never been broader, and the demands on
the FBI have never been greater. And to carry out these
responsibilities, we do need Congress' continued support more
than ever.
Let me briefly discuss two areas where Congress can help
the FBI with its mission. First, we do encourage Congress to
reauthorize the three FISA tools that are due to expire later
this spring; the roving intercept authority is necessary for
our national security mission and provides us with tools
similar to what we use in criminal cases already and have used
for a number of years.
The business records authority permits us to obtain key
documents and data in our national security cases, including in
our most serious terrorism matters. And the lone-wolf provision
is important to combat the growing threat from lone offenders
and homegrown radicalization. These authorities, all of which
are conducted with full court review and approval, are critical
to our national security.
Second, the FBI and other Government agencies are now
facing a growing gap in our ability to execute court-approved
intercepts of certain modern communications technologies. We
call this the problem of going dark. With the acceleration of
new Internet-based technologies, we are increasingly unable to
collect valuable evidence in cases ranging from child
exploitation and pornography to organized crime and drug
trafficking, as well as to terrorism and espionage.
Let me emphasize at the outset that collecting this
evidence has been approved by a court, but because the laws
have not kept pace with the changes in technology, often we
cannot obtain the information responsive to the court orders
from the communications carrier. And we look forward to working
with this Committee and Congress on the legislative fixes that
may be necessary to close this gap and preserve our ability to
protect all Americans.
Last, let me say a few words about the impact of the
continuing budget resolutions on the FBI and on our workforce.
The support from this Committee and Congress has been an
important part of transforming the FBI into the national
security agency it is today. But for our transformation to be
complete, we must continue to hire, train, and develop our
cadre of agents, analysts, and staff to meet the complex
threats we face now and in the future.
Under the current levels in the continuing resolution, the
FBI will have to absorb over $200 million in cuts, and without
any change, the current CR will leave us with over 1,100 vacant
positions by the end of the year. Put simply, these cuts would
undermine our efforts to continue to transform the Bureau and
undermine our efforts to carry out our mission.
I appreciate the opportunity to review the FBI's work in
responding to the far-reaching threats we face today before you
today. I also want to thank the Committee for your continued
support, the support over the years that I have held this
position, and not only support for me but most particularly for
your support of the men and women of the FBI who do the work of
this great institution.
Thank you and I would be happy to answer any questions, Mr.
Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mueller appears as a
submission for the record.]
Chairman Leahy. Well, thank you, Director, and again, I
reiterate my personal feelings and appreciation for what you
have done and for the openness you have shown when I have had
questions, and others on the Committee. All Senators I think
have found you to be very accessible.
Earlier this month--and I mentioned this in my opening
statement about the FBI arresting Kevin Harpham in connection
with a plot to bomb a parade in honor of Martin Luther King Day
in Spokane, Washington. And what I have read in the press is
that the bomb was very sophisticated. The plot almost
succeeded. With the large number of people around there, at
looking at some of the press photographs, if the bomb had gone
off, the results would have been horrible.
Now, he reportedly had ties to white supremacist groups,
and I mention this only because I do not want us to lose sight
of the fact that domestic terrorism may not be as visible as
international terrorism, but also the threat to us just as
Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma City and others.
What is the threat posed by domestic terrorism? How would
you just generally--not this particular case, but generally,
how do you see the threat of domestic terrorism?
Mr. Mueller. Well, we have not lost sight, even with
September 11th, of the devastation that was wreaked by McVeigh
in Oklahoma City in 1995, and we have, certainly before then
but most particularly since then, had domestic terrorism almost
as important an issue as the international terrorism that we
have seen over the years. Whether it be white supremacists,
militia extremists, sovereign citizen extremists, we continue
to undertake investigations with adequate--where we have the
predication to make certain that these groups do not present
terrorist threats.
I will tell you that most concerning is, yes, the groups
themselves in some ways, but most concerning are the lone
wolves, those persons who may have had some loose affiliation
with one of these groups but may have been rejected by the
group as being too extreme or individually found the group was
not extreme enough and then on their own undertake an attack.
And so I would say the possibility of activity from a lone wolf
is the thing that we are most concerned about----
Chairman Leahy. Those are the people that would be the
hardest to track, I would take it.
Mr. Mueller. That is correct. They do not communicate with
any others. It is really difficult to put into place the
capabilities of alerting us when one of those individuals looks
like they want to go operational.
Chairman Leahy. The Unabomber, people like that.
Mr. Mueller. Exactly.
Chairman Leahy. It is very hard. I agree with you, and I
raise this just because I would hate to have everybody lose
sight of the fact in a Nation of 300 million people and the
size of our country that we do face questions of domestic
terrorism, and we have to, not just at the FBI level but State
and local and others, keep track of that, too.
Last week, the press released an FBI memorandum providing
guidance to the field on the interrogation of terrorist
suspects arrested in the United States. Now, you could have
people playing on all sides of the debate about how to treat
terrorism suspects. As far as I could tell, the memo
essentially reiterates current law. When I first became a
prosecutor, Miranda came down. You had Escobido and then
Miranda. I remember working with the police within my
jurisdiction as to how you adapt to it. You have in your
regular training programs for any new FBI agent how to do it.
This memo reiterates the requirements of the Miranda decision,
and it restates the narrow parameters of the public safety
exception, and there has always been--contrary to some of the
plain rhetoric, there has always been a public safety
exception, and it makes no changes to the requirements
governing presentment of a suspect in court. If the agents
believe the suspect has valuable intelligence, they can
continue the interrogation even beyond the recognized
parameters of the public safety exception and understanding the
possible exclusion in court.
I think you were wise to do it this way and not do it
through trying to make a congressional change, and I will get
into that in a moment. But have these procedures been effective
in the past? You have had this in place now for a while. Have
they been effective? Do you think they will be effective in the
future?
Mr. Mueller. I do think they have been effective and will
continue to be effective in the future. We are in some sense in
uncharted but guided territory in the sense that the Quarles
decision issued by the Supreme Court that establishes the
public safety exception was applicable to a discrete set of
facts relating to a robbery, and what we have to anticipate is
how that public safety exception translates to the area of
terrorism. And our guidance errs on the side of obtaining that
information we need to prevent the next terrorist attack, but
within what we think would be the parameters of the public
safety exception if and when the Supreme Court has an
opportunity to look at how expansive that particular exception
is.
Chairman Leahy. And you have to assume they will. I recall
being in a long meeting with the President, and I believe
Attorney General Holder joined the meeting partway through. We
were talking about whether we would make changes--try to make
changes legislatively to Miranda. I argued that you cannot
really do that. The Dickerson case, the Supreme Court said that
Miranda is a constitutional decision, and a legislative act
could not overrule that. But as a constitutional decision, it
has been your experience, I take it, that the Supreme Court has
carved out certain areas that show practicality in there, for
want of a better word.
Mr. Mueller. Well, I think we have to wait and see what the
Supreme Court does. In the meantime, our principal
responsibility when it comes to counterterrorism is stopping
the next terrorist attack, and consequently, you look at each
case as an opportunity to gather that intelligence and
information that will stop the next terrorist attack. And that
is foremost on our minds, but doing that within the construct
that has been given to us by the Congress and the Supreme
Court.
Chairman Leahy. And this memorandum gives some flexibility
in----
Mr. Mueller. It does.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you. I mentioned your tenure began
just before the September 11th attacks and will wrap up just
before the tenth anniversary of that. We have seen a big
transformation. Now, your successor, whoever he or she may be,
is going to sit down with you, if they are at all wise--
certainly I would recommend it--to talk about what has happened
in the last 10 years and certainly the views of the next 10
years. When you hand that leadership over, what would you say
is the most--what would you tell them is the most effective way
to manage the extraordinary amount of data that is gathered by
the FBI? It is like a tsunami, the data that comes in there.
How do you do that and identify threats and hold our values?
What kind of advice would you give? That will be my last
question.
Mr. Mueller. Well, generally, my advice would be to rely on
the people in the FBI. I started a week before September 11th.
I was new. I did not know really how the FBI operated other
than looking at it from afar as an Assistant United States
Attorney, and the remarkable thing is how that organization
pulled together to undertake the responsibilities of responding
to September 11th. And so regardless of what one does as the
Director, it is the FBI as an organization and an institution
that has the strength to carry us.
With regard to the tsunami of information that you talk
about, one of the lessons we have learned since September 11th
is there has been a profusion of databases, different databases
given different authorities, and what we have needed over a
period of time, and not only us but others in the intelligence
community, are the capabilities for federated searches that
enable you to pull out the pieces of information from disparate
databases and put them together to prevent the next terrorist
attack.
But as much as you can do this digitally, as much as you
can do this with databases, it always is the human element, the
personal element that ultimately is successful. And developing
the persons who are capable of sifting through this data with
the help of algorithms and the like is as important as
developing the digital capability to sort through it. And so
continuing to build the analytical cadre, continuing to build
the type of agents and analysts and professional staff that no
one understands, the technological area, but no one understands
the human element of it is as important as anything else, and
that is what we have tried to do, build up that capability
since September 11th, and I would expect that my successor
would continue on that path.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you very, very much.
Senator Grassley.
Senator Grassley. Director Mueller, I am going to start out
with a question or two that probably you touched on in your
testimony, but I think it is important that we get answers to
specific questions. It is in regard to the PATRIOT Act. And you
know the three provisions that are expiring. Do you agree that
these three provisions should be made permanent?
Mr. Mueller. Yes, sir.
Senator Grassley. Have these three tools been useful to the
FBI to prevent terrorist attacks on our country?
Mr. Mueller. They have. Let me, if I can, briefly mention
the business records provision has been used over 380 times.
You alluded to an instance where it was used recently. It is
absolutely essential that we have the ability to gather these
records through that provision. Whether it be for identifying
intelligence officers from other countries, these records
enable us to get hotel records, travel records and the like,
and without that capability, it would be difficult to develop
the cases and the investigations in that arena as well as the
counterterrorism arena without this provision.
The roving wiretap provision has been used more than 190
times. It is limited in the sense that we have to show that the
individual for whom we wish this authority is trying to avoid
surveillance, and, again, it is reviewed by the court before it
is issued. And as I did mention in my testimony, we have had
this capability on the criminal side of the house for any
number of years. It has been very helpful in national security
and important.
The one we have not yet used is the lone-wolf provision,
but I still believe that that is important. We have come close
to using it in several of our cases. The one thing I would
point out there is that the only time it is to be used is on a
non-U.S. citizen and with court approval. And, consequently,
while we have not used that provision, with the profusion of
lone-wolf cases domestically and, indeed, some internationally,
my expectation is we will be using this in the future, and I
believe that it is important that it be reauthorized.
Senator Grassley. I think that your answer shows that if
these provisions were not reauthorized or if they were
substantially weakened by including new requirements, it would
be detrimental to the agents in the field. Would that be a
correct assumption?
Mr. Mueller. Yes, sir.
Senator Grassley. And kind of from your point of view
whether any of these three provisions have been subject to any
negative reports of finding abuse.
Mr. Mueller. I am not aware of any.
Senator Grassley. OK. Let me go to three other tools which
are not set to expire and are not part of the needed
reauthorization. These are the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act pen register and trap-and-trace orders,
national security letters, and delayed notice search warrants.
The FBI regularly uses pen register/trap-and-trace authority in
both national security and criminal areas. Is that a correct
assumption on my part?
Mr. Mueller. Yes, sir.
Senator Grassley. Under current law these authorities have
the same legal standard, relevance. That is correct, isn't it?
Mr. Mueller. Yes, sir.
Senator Grassley. Do you believe increasing the legal
burden on these investigative tools is necessary?
Mr. Mueller. Speaking generally, I would say no, I believe
we are at a point in time where there has been the appropriate
balance between, on the one hand, the necessity for addressing
the terrorist threat and threat from other criminal elements in
the United States, and yet on the other hand, the protection of
privacy, civil liberties. And I think that balance has been
worked out satisfactorily over the years since September 11th.
Senator Grassley. National security letters are an
essential part of building blocks of national security
investigations. They have never had a sunset in law. Do you
think that they need one now?
Mr. Mueller. I do not.
Senator Grassley. Delayed notice search warrants are
primarily a criminal tool, not a national security tool. Is
that right?
Mr. Mueller. That is correct.
Senator Grassley. Has there been any criticism of their use
that you know of requiring us to change the delay from 30 days
to 7 days?
Mr. Mueller. Not that I am aware of.
Senator Grassley. Is there any advantage to decreasing the
delay period?
Mr. Mueller. Did you say decreasing the delay period?
Senator Grassley. Yes.
Mr. Mueller. I think the suggestion was decreasing it
from----
Senator Grassley. 30 to 7.
Mr. Mueller. That is something we would have to look at the
impact there, but I am not aware of any abuse or any activity
that directs or mandates such a change. Let me put it that way.
Senator Grassley. At least as of now then, I can conclude
that you would not be able to say that you support a change at
this point.
Mr. Mueller. I would have to look at the legislation and,
quite obviously, the last word is the Justice Department terms
and views letter.
Senator Grassley. Okay. I would like to go to the
Electronic Communications Protection Act. There is a coalition
called the Digital Due Process Coalition, business and interest
groups supporting a probable cause standard for obtaining all
electronic communications regardless of its age, the location,
or storage facilities or the providers of access to
information. Do you support raising the legal standard for
obtaining electronic communications to a probable cause
determination?
Mr. Mueller. I do not, and that would be tremendously
problematic in our capability of undertaking and successfully
undertaking investigations to prevent terrorist attacks. We use
the information, not the content of communications but the
existence, in fact, of communications to make the case for
probable cause that would enable us to utilize the more
intrusive investigative powers that have been given to us by
Congress. If that standard was to change, it would severely
inhibit our ability to make those probable cause showings to
the court in order to continue the investigation as is
warranted.
Senator Grassley. Let me ask you specifically along that
line if you think the legal standard to obtain information
through a pen register or trap-and-trace order should be
increased to a probable cause or 2703(d) standard.
Mr. Mueller. No, for the same reasons that I stated before.
Senator Grassley. OK. Do you agree that a change like this
would be unworkable and burdensome? I think you have answered
that, that it would be burdensome.
Mr. Mueller. I would have to look at the particular
provision and look more closely at it to be able to answer that
particular question.
Senator Grassley. I have more questions, but I think my
time is up. I am going to leave for a few minutes and go to
Agriculture, but I will come back.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you. Thank you very much.
I yield to Senator Kohl.
Senator Kohl. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Director Mueller, I remember 10 years ago--it was like
yesterday--when you came on board, and as with all of us, time
goes by very, very quickly. But I want to express my deep, deep
admiration and respect for you as a person and as an individual
with the capabilities that you have and have demonstrated over
the past 10 years. You have been a crucial asset to our
country, and I along with, I think, everybody who has been
connected with you over these past 10 years looks at your
tenure in terms of how much it has done for our country and how
much we owe you by way of appreciation.
Mr. Mueller. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Kohl. I want to speak just a bit about what
happened at Fort Hood. As you know, the Senate Homeland
Security Committee released a report critical of the FBI. They
said that the FBI conducted only a cursory investigation into
evidence that existed that the shooter was frequently involved
in talking with an al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist overseas. The
report also said that the FBI failed to give the Pentagon full
access to an FBI data base that likely would have sparked an
in-depth inquiry that would most likely have avoided what
occurred at Fort Hood.
Going forward, which is really all we need to be concerned
about at this time, what can you tell us about new procedures
that are in place that will head off another Fort Hood in the
future?
Mr. Mueller. I will say at the outset that this is one of--
the pieces of information on the individuals responsible for
Fort Hood were found in one of the thousands of cases we handle
day in and day out. But what we found as a result of Hasan's
incident, his attack on that day, is there were gaps that we
had to fill.
Immediately afterwards, we looked at our procedures. We
found that we could do a much better job at information sharing
with DOD and, consequently, today elements of the Department of
Defense serve on our National Joint Terrorism Task Force. They
are in many of our Joint Terrorism Task Forces around the
country, but most particularly we have a formalized process
where we sit down and go through all the cases, whether a DOD
case or our cases that may touch on DOD, so that we have before
both entities a full review of those cases that may impact DOD.
Second, we have put into place technological improvements
relating to the capabilities of a data base to pull together
past e-mails and future ones as they come in so that it does
not require an individualized search. So putting together a
technological improvement to enhance our capabilities.
Last, we--not last, actually. Two more things. Third, what
we had done is assure that we have not just one office that is
reviewing, say, communications traffic but have a redundancy of
review at headquarters as well to make certain that we do not
miss something.
And, last, you alluded to an analyst's inability to either
access or knowledge of a particular data base, and we underwent
an extensive training initiative for all persons serving on
Joint Terrorism Task Forces in the wake of what happened at
Fort Hood to assure that not only the persons have access to
the databases, but were knowledgeable and knew when and where
to utilize those particular databases.
So I do believe that we have addressed the issues that came
to our attention immediately after the Fort Hood incident.
Senator Kohl. Director Mueller, the ability of American
companies to out-innovate and out-compete the rest of the world
is more important today than ever. In 1996, I worked to pass
the Economic Espionage Act. This is a law that makes it a
Federal crime to steal trade secrets. And yet the FBI estimates
that U.S. companies continue to lose billions of dollars each
year when criminals do steal their trade secrets.
I am currently reviewing the Economic Espionage Act to see
what improvements are needed to better protect American
companies. As a first step in this process, I am introducing
legislation to increase maximum sentences for economic
espionage from 15 to 20 years and the Sentencing Guideline
range.
Do you support these penalty increases? Will you work with
me as we consider additional updates to the law? And do you
have any suggestions as to what we should be doing?
Mr. Mueller. I would have to, quite obviously, consult with
Justice in terms of the response, but it seems to me that I
would think we would look quite favorably on the suggestions of
enhanced penalties in this arena. And, of course, we would work
with you and your staff in terms of looking at what other areas
might be improved through legislation.
Senator Kohl. Maybe you can respond to this. In 1996, we
considered including a Federal civil private right of action as
a tool for companies to combat and deter theft of trade
secrets. At the time we decided to forgo this and rely on State
trade secret laws. Other criminal laws like the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act contain companion Federal civil remedies for
victims.
What are your views as to how prosecutions and
investigations could be improved if a private right of action
was available? Might you support a change of this sort?
Mr. Mueller. I think we--and by ``we,'' I mean ourselves
and the Justice Department--would have to look and see what is
in the statute. I might be leery at the outset of including a
private right of action, maybe because I would be somewhat
concerned about overlap and conflicts in terms of
investigations, and it is something that I would think that we
would have to look at very closely to determine what adverse
impact there might be on our ability as the Government actor to
pursue these cases if there was a private right of action. I am
not saying there should not be. I am just saying that is
something that we ought to look at closely before the Justice
Department gives a position on whatever legislation that is
proposed.
Senator Kohl. Finally, what advice would you give your
successor in avoiding pitfalls that you experienced during your
tenure?
Mr. Mueller. Whew. I would say rely on the great people in
the FBI, just a remarkable organization, remarkable grouping of
people.
I think I would also say, when I have gotten in trouble, it
is because I have not asked the hard questions and I have been
satisfied with answers that were fine on the surface, but there
were areas that I should have delved deeper and found out the
answers myself. I could kick myself in some of those arenas.
One of the other things I would say is that it is important
for us in the organization to understand what is necessary to
protect the American public to grow and adjust to the new
threats that are coming so much faster than they did 10, 15, or
20 years ago and be flexible and agile to address those
threats, and the organization has to do what it needs to do for
the American public as opposed to what we may enjoy or like
doing as prosecutors or as agents. And the Bureau has always
done that, and it is history, and we are going to have to do
it, and do it swifter and faster in the future.
Senator Kohl. Thank you very much.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, sir.
I would like to acknowledge your service for probably one
of the most challenging times in American history. I really
appreciate what you have tried to do for our country in your
whole force.
Mr. Mueller. Thank you, sir.
Senator Graham. You mentioned, I think, in your testimony
about Border Patrol agents being killed. What is your
assessment of the violence in Mexico? Are the border areas more
dangerous? And where do you see this going in Mexico?
Mr. Mueller. I think anybody looking at what has happened
in the last several years along the border but also inside
Mexico in terms of the increasing homicides, the breakdown of,
to the extent that there was any cartel--I do not want to say
``justice,'' but restraint--has long since been lost with the
increase in homicides despite the efforts and intent of the
Calderon administration from the outset to address it.
From our perspective, the concern is the violence coming
north of the border. From our perspective, we have seen and had
several years ago an uptick in kidnappings of individuals who
may live in the United States but have businesses or family be
kidnapped in Mexico and the ransom sought from persons in the
United States. We put together task forces to address that, and
that has been reduced somewhat.
We have a priority of looking at corruption along the
border, and we have a number of agents looking at border
corruption. We have had a number of cases of border corruption
that we have successfully investigated.
We have put together fusion squads or individuals who are
familiar with corruption, familiar with the narcotics
trafficking, white-collar crime, money laundering and the like
in the squads that we are using--``hybrid squads'' we call
them--to address the activities on the border. And, finally, we
have put together an intelligence capability down in El Paso
that brings in the intelligence from each of our offices as
well as from our legal attache in Mexico City and headquarters.
And we integrate that with the other players that are working
on the border.
Senator Graham. Would you said it would be a fair
observation that securing our border is probably more important
than ever, that criminal activity is growing and that terrorism
threats are growing, and that we should really look at securing
the border as a national security imperative?
Mr. Mueller. I think securing the border has always been a
national security imperative, yes, sir.
Senator Graham. But it seems to be even more so from your
testimony.
Now, you mentioned something in your testimony that you
should maybe ask hard questions, and I think that is probably
good advice for us all. When it comes to Miranda warnings, is
it the FBI's view that Miranda warnings are required for
interviews that involve intelligence gathering for national
security purposes?
Mr. Mueller. If there is no intent to utilize the results
of those interviews in a courtroom and the purpose was
gathering intelligence, yes, it would be--and that happens all
the time, particularly overseas.
Senator Graham. Is it fair to say that homegrown terrorism
is on the rise?
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Senator Graham. Is it fair to say that we need to get our
laws in shape to deal with a new threat, which is people
attacking us who may be American citizens themselves who are
here legally?
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Senator Graham. So wouldn't it be fair to say that we
should as a Nation, the Congress and the administration, try to
find a solution that would withstand court scrutiny to deal
with the fact that when we are facing this threat, providing a
lawyer and reading someone their rights when they may involve
an act of terrorism is something that may be counterproductive
at the time?
Mr. Mueller. I am not certain I could go that far. I would
say we are bound by what the Supreme Court has issued in terms
of----
Senator Graham. Well, do you think Congress should be
involved in helping create a solution to this problem?
Mr. Mueller. It would be nice if Congress could, but we
have got the Supreme Court as the ultimate arbiter in terms of
the application of Miranda to the admissibility of statements,
as I am sure----
Senator Graham. I totally understand what you are saying,
but it is my view that Miranda warnings are not required if the
purpose of the interrogation is to gather intelligence about
existing threats or future threats, because when you fight a
war, you do not read people Miranda rights on the battlefield.
Where is the battlefield? Is the United States part of the
battlefield?
Mr. Mueller. One can speculate. I know there are persons
who say everything is a battlefield now. I would stay----
Senator Graham. Well, what do you think?
Mr. Mueller [continuing]. Away from speculating on the
battlefield. I know where you are going, but I will stay away
from the definition of battlefield.
Senator Graham. In all fairness to you, I think it is
pretty important to know where the battlefield is. To me, the
battlefield is here at home. We have caught people who are
trying to blow us up that are connected with people in
Pakistan, allegedly. So, Mr. Director, I think home is the
battlefield, and we need to craft solutions in light of this
growing threat, and I look forward to working--and I would urge
the administration to come to Congress to see if we can work
together.
But under your policy guidance, this memorandum, how long
can you hold someone without reading them their Miranda rights?
If you catch someone here in America, an American citizen whom
you suspect of being involved with al Qaeda or some foreign
entity, a terrorist group, how long can you hold them without
reading them their rights? How many questions can you ask them?
And when do you have to present them to court?
Mr. Mueller. Well, generally, within 24 to 48 hours one has
to make the presentment to court, at which point in time they
will be read their Miranda warnings. It depends on where you
might be. It may be longer if you are not that close to a
magistrate.
Senator Graham. Well, let us continue to ask the hard
questions. So under the policy, under the problem with
presentment to court, you are talking about 24 or 48 hours. Is
that enough time to gather intelligence?
Mr. Mueller. It may well be. In certain cases we have----
Senator Graham. Could it well not be?
Mr. Mueller. It could not be.
Senator Graham. Yes, I mean, you might actually want to
call foreign intelligence services and see what do they know
about this guy. You would certainly want to call the CIA. You
would want to call the DOD, and you would want to make a good
assessment.
I think the honest answer is that presentment and Miranda
warnings need to be looked at anew in light of the domestic--in
light of homegrown terrorism, and that is just my view. And I
want to invite the administration to be a good partner on this,
but I just feel like we are less safe with the current policy
because the questions I have asked about how long you can hold
them, 24 to 48 hours, without a presentment problem is probably
not a good solution to what I think is a growing problem.
The last thing I want to ask you about is your budget. We
are having a real debate up here about, you know, cutting
Government, and God knows it needs to be reduced. But one thing
about Government from my point of view is the first thing you
want to do is protect your citizens. You are telling me that
H.R. 1, if implemented the way it is today, would cost 1,100
job slots?
Mr. Mueller. We would not be able to fill 1,100 slots by
September in order to meet the budget constrictions.
Senator Graham. So when we are deciding what is the right
number to pick--you are losing $200 million. Is that correct?
Mr. Mueller. Yes, we are.
Senator Graham. And the plus-up you are asking in 2012, is
that really----
Mr. Mueller. Depending on what happens in 2011----
Senator Graham. Right.
Mr. Mueller.--will dictate to a certain extent the plus-ups
in 2012. And what we are struggling for is to get what we did
not get in 2011 for 2012.
Senator Graham. Well, you know we are deeply in debt,
right?
Mr. Mueller. Absolutely. Absolutely.
Senator Graham. I thought you might agree with me there.
And you have looked at this budget from a perspective that the
Nation is deeply in debt?
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Senator Graham. And you are telling us, the Congress, that
due to the threats that are multiplying exponentially you need
this force to protect America?
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Senator Graham. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Chairman Leahy. Senator Schumer.
Senator Schumer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
thank you, Director, for your service. You started a week
before 9/11, and it has been quite a decade. But thank you. You
have done an excellent job.
Mr. Mueller. Thank you.
Senator Schumer. I would like to discuss first an issue
that affects a small upstate community, Newburgh, New York. As
you know, 2 years ago Newburgh saw gang activity and a violent
crime spike. There were shootouts in the streets, repeated bank
robberies, numerous homicides. At the time you and Attorney
General Holder assured me the FBI and other Federal partners
would work closely with local law enforcement and significantly
increase Federal resources to counter gangs operating in the
area, and you have done a good job on that. Last spring, this
work led to an FBI investigation, a multi-agency sweep
involving some 500 local, State, and Federal law enforcement
agents and the arrest of 70 gang members in the city of
Newburgh. It is not a large city, so that was very significant.
Early last month there was another sweep, ten more gang
suspects were arrested, and there have been reports now that
the FBI is considering moving its Hudson Valley resident agency
to Newburgh. I want to personally express my strong support of
such a proposal.
When I toured the streets of Newburgh with the local police
department and your field agents, residents thanked the
officers and agents and saw hope. As the community works to
rebuild, I know that housing the FBI within the community will
serve as an important gang deterrent, an important community
resource.
So can you commit to consider Newburgh closely as the
location for the FBI resident agency location?
Mr. Mueller. I think I can make that commitment. I know the
decision is in process and that the activities in or about
Newburgh would be a factor, amongst other factors as well. But
certainly we would consider the activity that you have adverted
to over the last year or two in terms of where that resident
agency should be located.
Senator Schumer. OK. And if you are having any space
problems, we will find it for you. OK? But it is very important
to move there.
Mr. Mueller. I understand.
Senator Schumer. So I hope you will do everything you can
to do that.
Mr. Mueller. Sure.
Senator Schumer. OK. The second question deals with the
background checks pilot. In 2003, Congress passed the Criminal
Background Check Pilot Program as part of the PROTECT Act. The
legislation was introduced by Senator Hatch, cosponsored by a
number of Senators on the Committee. I was one of them. This
pilot program was established to determine the feasibility of a
nationwide fingerprint-based background check system for
volunteers of youth-serving organizations like the Boys and
Girls Club, the National Mentoring Partnership. Thanks to the
great work of the FBI and the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children, which processed background check requests,
some 90,000 records have been requested and used since this
pilot program's inception. Six percent of the records included
criminal histories of concern, including serious offenses,
sexual abuse of minors, assault, child cruelty, even murder.
So, Director Mueller, has the FBI experienced any problems
in running these checks for these youth-serving organizations?
For instance, does the FBI believe the costs associated with
this pilot program to be overly burdensome or the work overly
complex?
Mr. Mueller. My understanding is that there has been no
problems with the processing of these requests through NCMEC.
NCMEC is a tremendous organization. So we have not seen any
problems, and I do believe that the charges that we--what we
charge for is an appropriate charge, and my understanding is
there have been no problems in terms of receiving the monies
for those checks.
Senator Schumer. OK, because as you know, NCMEC recently
announced it would no longer operate the pilot program, leaving
a number of youth service organizations without access. So
given the Bureau's experience with the pilot, do you agree such
a permanent program could be helpful in the continued
protection of our children? Are you willing to work with
whatever organization takes NCMEC's place?
Mr. Mueller. We would take directly from those youth
service organizations the requests for doing the background
checks.
Senator Schumer. Good.
Mr. Mueller. And, consequently, I probably cannot say to
what extent that going back to that practice would be
detrimental to those organizations or others.
Senator Schumer. But you are willing to work and make sure
that this gap is filled again because it is a worthwhile----
Mr. Mueller. If there is indeed a gap, yes, we are willing
to work with NCMEC or youth service organizations in order to
make certain that the processes undertaken----
Senator Schumer. Great. OK. Finally, guns, gun checks. The
President himself has noted information included in our gun
check system, NICS, which is supposed to prevent guns from
being sold to the wrong people, is ``often incomplete and
inadequate.'' The FBI relies on State governments to supply
many of the records about people who are not allowed to possess
guns, and there are lots of examples of this: people who are
involuntarily committed to a mental institution by a State
court, someone on probation for a State crime fails a drug
test. And yet we are finding that many States are not
complying.
So you have any idea why so many States are not doing
anything to help you enforce the Federal law in this regard,
why we are not getting the information that we should to be on
this list? Which, by the way, everyone supports. This is not
about who should own a gun. This is once there is a consensus
that say a felon or somebody who is adjudicated mentally ill
not get a gun, that they be on the list so they will not be
sold a gun.
Mr. Mueller. We do everything we can to encourage the
States to provide us the information that would be present in
NICS that would prevent the sale of those particular guns. I do
not think there is one particular factor that contributes to
the inability or unwillingness of a State to provide that
information. It may well be it costs additional time and money
to ferret out that information and put into place a process to
assure it goes into NICS. All we can do in the Bureau is
encourage that the States provide us that information.
Senator Schumer. Well, you could just send us things we
might be able to do now. As you know, I have been working on
legislation on this for a long time. Representative McCarthy
and I passed legislation about the mentally infirm, adjudicated
mentally infirm, after Virginia Tech. Recently, Jared Loughner,
the Tucson gunman, was rejected by the army due to his admitted
drug use. Under the bill that McCarthy and I have put in, under
Federal law, it seems to me such information could have been
sent to NICS under existing law.
So given that the President has stated that the NICS
Improvement Act has not been properly implemented and
Loughner's ability to purchase a firearm even after admitting
to the Federal Government--this is when he was applying to the
armed forces--about his drug abuse, will you agree to examine
the implementation of this legislation to ensure it is serving
its intended purpose, for instance, having the armed forces
report to NICS in these types of instances like Loughner?
Mr. Mueller. As I say, in every one of these instances we
encourage, but we have no ability to do much more than
encourage the responsiveness.
Senator Schumer. OK. And can you provide me with updated
numbers in the next few days on how many people have been
identified as drug abuses by each Federal agency?
Mr. Mueller. I think we can.
Senator Schumer. Great.
[The information appears as a submission for the record.]
Senator Schumer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has
expired.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you, Senator Schumer.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Mueller, thank you for your service. You came to
this office with unparalleled experience, the proven judgment,
and integrity to lead the agency in an effective way. I believe
you have done that. I salute you for it. The country has been
lucky to have you there. I have worked with the FBI many, many
years and have the greatest respect for the men and women who
serve in that fabulous agency, truly I think it is fair to say
the greatest law enforcement agency in the world. Would you
agree?
Mr. Mueller. I cannot dispute that.
Senator Sessions. I did not think you would, not perfect--
--
Chairman Leahy. We would have some problems if you did,
Director.
[Laughter.]
Senator Sessions. It may not be perfect, and none of us
are, but it is a great institution with fabulous men and women
who serve every day, long hours and doing the things that are
necessary to help protect us from crime and terrorist
activities.
I would like to follow up a little on Senator Graham's
questions about the Miranda warnings and the nature of the
struggle that we are in with terrorism today. I remain totally
baffled by this administration and, frankly, your perception
that those who are dedicated to the destruction of this
country, who enter our country with the design to attack and
kill Americans somehow should be presumptively treated as
criminals and should be provided Miranda warnings and other
legal protections that we provide American citizens, but the
kind of things that have never been provided to enemy
combatants on the battlefield.
First of all, I want to just make clear that I do not think
it is speculative about where the battlefield is. I think the
battlefield is where the enemy is attacking us. And we have
seen that they are attacking us in our homeland.
So I guess my first question is: How do you feel about the
fundamental question of the apprehension of someone directly
connected to al Qaeda in the United States bent on attacking
the United States? Do you believe that should be treated as an
act of war or a crime?
Mr. Mueller. I am going to leave that up to others to
decide. I will tell you that we as an organization, if the
responsibility given to us under the law is to make the arrest
and there is an intent and a decision made by the President,
whichever President it may be, whether it be Bush before or
Obama now, that the person go through the Federal district
courts and the procedures are mandated that we go through in
order to have testimony admissible in a courtroom.
Now, a decision can be made by the executive that they not
go through the Federal criminal process of the United States,
which is a decision to be made by the executive at whatever
point in time, and that----
Senator Sessions. Well, I would agree----
Mr. Mueller.--different procedures kick in. But if we are
given the mandate to do the arrest and take them to trial and
convict them under our courts, then there is a pathway that has
been decided by the executive that we must follow.
Senator Sessions. Have you made a recommendation that that
is the way, the presumptive way----
Mr. Mueller. I have not. No, sir.
Senator Sessions. Have you opposed that?
Mr. Mueller. That is an issue that is left to the
President, and----
Senator Sessions. Decided at a level above you?
Mr. Mueller. Way above me, yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Well, I do not know, you being a long-
time appointment, so you can speak candidly about what is
important to protecting the safety of the United States of
America. And you are not just expected to come here and rubber-
stamp what decision is made in the White House. But according
to the document you put out on custodial interrogations, you
say that the FBI policy, you will continue to adhere to the FBI
policy regarding the use of Miranda warnings for custodial
interrogations of operational terrorists. And you define
operational terrorists as an arrestee who is reasonably
believed to be either a high-level member of an international
terrorist group or an operative. It goes on to describe that.
So let us take the situation that Senator Graham was asking
you about, and I think it is very important. If this is an
enemy combatant, and I believe many of these terrorists are,
associated with al Qaeda or organizations committed to the
destruction of the United States, then they should be seen as a
potential source of intelligence information that could help us
identify who else may be in this organization, who else is
threatening the United States. And isn't it possible that you
can obtain that kind of information through effective
interrogation techniques?
Mr. Mueller. Well, I agree with you, it is absolutely
essential in our first--when we have individuals who are
involved in terrorist attacks, our first objective is to obtain
the intelligence. And what our guidance is to our persons is
that should be your objective----
Senator Sessions. Well, that is----
Mr. Mueller.--give advantage----
Senator Sessions.--your objective, but you indicate that
there is some potential window of public safety exception which
is not clear in any case law that I am aware of, not really
clear what this public safety is. As you indicated, it cannot
exceed 24 or 48 hours when they have to be brought before a
Federal court if you are treating them as a criminal, right?
Mr. Mueller. Well, if they are going to be treated in the
courts of the United States----
Senator Sessions. How many hours----
Mr. Mueller.--the requirement----
Senator Sessions.--has a court ever approved----
Chairman Leahy. Let him finish.
Senator Sessions. Well, my time is about up, Mr. Chairman.
It is an important issue.
Chairman Leahy. He has answered these questions several
times already, but I would like to let him answer----
Senator Sessions. I would like to get a square answer out
of it, too.
Mr. Mueller. And I am happy to answer.
Senator Sessions. Well, first of all----
Mr. Mueller. Let me just say----
Senator Sessions. Let me just say to you----
Mr. Mueller.--it is important to----
Senator Sessions.--this, and I will let you answer further.
I believe that an individual arrested carrying a bomb, about to
board an airplane in the United States directly connected to al
Qaeda should be treated as an enemy combatant, does not need to
be taken to court in 24 or 48 hours and given a lawyer, does
not need to be given Miranda rights, may need to be subjected
to weeks of interrogation utilizing the best information and
techniques we have to find out who else in this country may be
prepared to kill thousands of American citizens. And for you to
say--and not acknowledge that Miranda warnings can be
counterproductive to that is inexplicable to me. So I would be
glad to hear your comments.
Mr. Mueller. Well, I have not exactly said that, Senator.
What I have said is that if a person is arrested--may I finish?
If a person is arrested in the United States under our laws, we
are guided by the statutes and by the Supreme Court in terms of
what we can do. We have expanded and identified what we
anticipate we should get when a terrorist has been arrested in
the United States in terms of intelligence, and that is the
first thing, without Miranda warnings, we do. But ultimately if
that individual is to be prosecuted in the United States, there
may well come a point in time where Miranda warnings are
warranted.
If the decision is made that the person is not going to go
through our courts, that is a decision that is made by the
executive and we quite obviously would follow that. But that
person would not be in our custody or going through what we do
day in and day out under the criminal justice system of the
United States.
Senator Sessions. How long do you wait before you give a
Miranda warning under an exception?
Mr. Mueller. Under the exception? It is indeterminate. And
we have had a number of occasions where we have put off both
the giving of Miranda warnings as well as presentment for a
number of days where we have got the person and the person
agrees that they want to cooperate----
Senator Sessions. Well, they agree----
Mr. Mueller.--and provide intelligence for a period of
time.
Senator Sessions. They agree.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you.
Senator Franken.
Senator Franken. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Mueller, I would like to associate myself with all
the other Senators who have commended you for your service.
Thank you so much.
I would also like to commend you for aggressively
investigating mortgage fraud and predatory lending cases.
Recently I became Chair of a new Subcommittee on Privacy,
Technology, and the Law, and one thing I learned as I have been
preparing for the Subcommittee's work is that at the height of
the subprime lending crisis in the summer of 2007, the No. 1
buyer of Internet advertising across all industries was a
subprime lender. This was a company called Low Rate Source.
Another top-five Internet advertiser in this period may sound
more familiar--Countrywide Financial.
And, Mr. Chairman, without objection, I would like to add
the Nielsen net ratings reports to the record.
Chairman Leahy. Without objection.
[The information referred to appears as a submission for
the record.]
Senator Franken. My point here is that subprime mortgages
did not assign themselves, and one of the key ways that
Countrywide Financial and other subprime lenders identified
their targets was by gathering data about those customers
online to see who might be a good mark and targeting them
online, often without the customers' having any idea that this
was happening. Is this a trend that the FBI has seen during its
investigations of subprime lenders?
Mr. Mueller. I am not familiar myself with that. I would
have to get back to you on it. But we can do that.
Senator Franken. Well, Mr. Director, it seems to me this is
an area in which the FBI would be well served by working with
the Federal Trade Commission. Can you tell me what you are
currently doing to work with the FTC on this issue?
Mr. Mueller. Again, I would have to get back to you on it.
Senator Franken. Thank you.
Mr. Mueller. I know we have a number of task forces and
working groups with them, but I would have to get back to you
with the specifics.
Senator Franken. I appreciate that.
[The information referred to appears as a submission for
the record.]
Senator Franken. A while back, I saw Representative Peter
King, Chairman of the Homeland Security Committee in the House,
say on TV pretty categorically that there was no cooperation
from the Somali community or from community leadership in
Minnesota after a very small number of members of that
community went to Somalia to train with Al-Shabaab. My
experience is that no one is more upset about what happened
than the Twin Cities Somali community itself, and my
understanding from talking to law enforcement is that there has
been real cooperation from the community in Minnesota. Is that
your understanding?
Mr. Mueller. Yes, sir. I think that the Somali community in
Minneapolis was taken aback by the number of young men who had
traveled to Somalia to work with Al-Shabaab, and that that
community, understanding what had happened to that community
and the threat to the young men in that community, became very
cooperative in terms of not wanting that to happen again.
Senator Franken. Yes, that was my understanding. He said
quite categorically the opposite was true, and I take umbrage
on behalf of the Somali community in the Twin Cities whom I
represent.
Now, it seems to me that it would make sense to have a
Somali face on some of our counterterrorism efforts in the
Somali community in Minnesota. Are you actively working to
encourage and recruit members of key communities like the
Somali community to actually become field agents?
Mr. Mueller. Yes, we are. We have not been as successful as
we would like, but we continue to press hard and recruit from
all segments of the community.
Senator Franken. Thank you.
Many incidents have come to light recently of banks and
debt collection agencies fraudulently signing affidavits. This
has likely resulted in wrongful foreclosures and in consumers
paying thousands of dollars in money that they do not owe. In
fact, Lori Swanson, Minnesota's Attorney General, filed a suit
just yesterday against a large debt collection company alleging
that it improperly signed hundreds of affidavits without
verifying information. This has reportedly resulted in
situations like that of a woman from Eagan, Minnesota--a
southern suburb of the Twin Cities--who was pursued for years--
a bill that she had already paid on time. She repeatedly sent
her canceled check as proof of payment to the debt collector,
but it took her a very long time to finally get the case
dismissed by a court, and she has never been able to repair her
credit.
Do you think existing penalties for this type of fraud are
strong enough? What more can we be doing to deter this kind of
activity since it is so hard to make the victims whole after
they have been defrauded?
Mr. Mueller. First, I would have to give some thought as to
what additional legislation is necessary, whether it be
enhanced penalties in a particular area. I can tell you that we
have a number of investigations going into this general area,
and we have found that with the success of these
investigations, we do have indictments and persons do go away
for a substantial period of time. I am not familiar with this
particular case, and so I cannot say whether those activities
in that case are under investigation. I could not anyhow, but I
can assure you we have a number of investigations.
Senator Franken. Do not tell me anything I should not know.
As you know, I have been very interested in how mortgage
fraud has affected Minnesota. After our last oversight hearing,
I submitted a question for the record asking you to explain the
process by which the FBI chooses to prioritize resources for
mortgage fraud cases. You said the FBI addresses the most
prolific schemes that have the greatest impact on the
communities where the fraud has occurred.
I want to follow up on this because Minnesota has not just
been affected by really big fraud cases. We have been hit by
smaller frauds, too, where someone comes in and offers to
refinance someone's home loan, gets all of the homeowner's
information, then just steals the check when it arrives. Do you
have the resources you need to investigate these smaller
schemes and not just the highest-profile ones? And how are you
working with state and local law enforcement to ensure that
these outrageous cases of fraud are being prosecuted?
Mr. Mueller. Well, what we endeavor to do is to work with
State and local law enforcement in the form of either task
forces or working groups, and we have currently 94 of these
task forces and working groups around the country. We have
almost 340 agents doing this. Probably we could use some more,
but we do do a triage across not just the universe of cases in
the Federal arena, but also with State and local law
enforcement to see if we can get resolution of all the cases
across the board. And so we will sit down with a working group
and say, OK, how can this case be best addressed. Some will go
to Federal court. Some will go to State court to be handled by
district attorneys and the like. But our endeavor is to
identify the universe and make certain that we get all cases
that we can addressed in some way, whether it be at the Federal
level, State or local, and that requires the coordination with
State and local law enforcement.
Senator Franken. Thank you. And, again, thank you for your
service. I hope your next job is slightly less pressure, but I
do want you to keep serving our country, and I know you will in
whatever way you choose.
Mr. Mueller. Thank you, sir.
Senator Franken. Thank you.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you very much, Senator Franken.
Senator Kyl.
Senator Kyl. Thank you very much.
Director, I want to add my voice to those who have thanked
you for your service. We appreciate it very much and obviously
do wish you well. I would note, though, as in my case, your job
is not quite done. I asked the Chairman if we might be calling
you up one more time before you left. He said probably not, but
I would not hold your breath yet.
Mr. Mueller. I am with the Chairman.
[Laughter.]
Senator Kyl. Let me first just follow up on a question that
Senator Franken asked. The FBI does rely on the cooperation of
the Muslim community to investigate radicalization particularly
of young Muslims in the community. Is that not correct?
Mr. Mueller. True.
Senator Kyl. And I gather it would not be helpful to your
efforts if members of the Muslim community refused to even talk
to FBI agents without having their lawyer present.
Mr. Mueller. I would state at the outset everybody in the
United States has a right to have a lawyer present, but what we
would like and ask of these communities is that they encourage
their persons to cooperate with us and provide us the
information, the tripwires that will help prevent the next
terrorist attack.
Senator Kyl. So it is not particularly helpful if they are
advised that they do not talk to you unless they have a lawyer
present?
Mr. Mueller. I am familiar with one of the placards that
one entity had there, which across the board urged persons not
to talk to the FBI. And that is not contributions we want from
our citizens to stop crime, stop terrorist attacks.
Senator Kyl. Any citizen, for that matter.
Mr. Mueller. Any.
Senator Kyl. Right. Let me ask you about--could you
describe just for the record in about 20 seconds what your Team
Telecom mission is?
Mr. Mueller. Team Telecom.
Senator Kyl. Well, as I understand it, you have stood up a
mission which assists in the evaluation of cyber activity by
foreign corporations, for example. Maybe I should set the
stage. I was just trying to set the preliminary stage. You are
familiar with the Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE?
Mr. Mueller. Yes, sir.
Senator Kyl. And there are a couple specific things that
your Team Telecom has been advised. Maybe you have a different
name for it.
Mr. Mueller. We call it CFIUS. I understand the process
whereby the Government looks at the purchase of companies by--
--
Senator Kyl. Right, and the FBI has a specific group that
assists in that.
Mr. Mueller. We do. We call it CFIUS. Yes, we do.
Senator Kyl. Okay. One of the things that has been reported
is that our country's sixth largest cellular provider, U.S.
Cellular, is contemplating having Huawei build out its 4g
network. Now, given the fact that we were concerned enough
about Huawei's potential contracting with AT&T and Sprint to
the point that we intervened and both of those companies
separated themselves from Huawei and did not move forward, what
would your concerns be about such a contract with U.S.
Cellular?
Mr. Mueller. Well, this is something I am not certain we
can address in open session. I can tell you the process is
while we do not sit at the table with those who are in the
CFIUS process, our recommendations or advice is often elicited,
and we would do that in a classified setting.
Senator Kyl. And the kinds of advice that the FBI would
give would be based upon just hypothetically what kind of a
concern?
Mr. Mueller. Well, concerns that--speaking generally, not
about one company----
Senator Kyl. Just generally, yes.
Mr. Mueller [continuing]. Or one particular process, but
the concerns that through entities are operating with the
backing of the Government that foreign governments may have
access to classified communications to our intellectual
property through proxies, and so the process, the CFIUS
process, has been set up to assure that that possibility is
examined, looked at, and a determination made as to whether or
not a particular purchase of a company should go through.
Senator Kyl. Right. One of the things that has occurred, at
least we understand, that Huawei has partnered with the company
Hibernia to help build and deploy a cable from New York to the
U.K. that will transmit sensitive data including market
information from the New York Stock Exchange. And I am curious
whether or not your team CFIUS or Team Telecom has reviewed
that partnership with Hibernia and the cable license involved
with this cable landing and whether you could inform us about
any considerations that you would have there.
Mr. Mueller. At the outset, I am not familiar with the
facts of that, but even if I were, I do believe it is the type
of subject that would be addressed in a classified setting.
Senator Kyl. Okay. Just so folks that might not be quite as
aware of this would understand, a little bit of background.
This firm Huawei has a background with the People's Liberation
Army of China, is supported strongly by the Chinese Government,
and at least in the past concerns have been raised about its
involvement in the U.S. network, and that is the reason for the
questions.
Would you have a concern about FBI systems being integrated
or having Huawei, for example, being integrated into FBI
systems?
Mr. Mueller. I cannot speak to a particular company. I can
say that ourselves, the intelligence community, are always
concerned about assuring the security of our systems and the
persons that are working on our systems or providing the
capabilities that support our systems.
Senator Kyl. Would that also include even down to the local
level? In other words, any network that might carry sensitive
information or be connected with one that would carry sensitive
information would potentially fall within the mission of the
FBI taking a look at it. Is that correct?
Mr. Mueller. It may well be that in those circumstances we
would take a look at it. If you are talking about our systems,
we would always be concerned about trap doors or back doors and
ways into our systems. If there is a business purchase at some
point, we may be asked to look at the impact of that purchase?
Senator Kyl. Just generally speaking, is there anything
that you would ask of us at this point? Or could I just ask you
to perhaps think about that and supply for the record any
recommendations or suggestions you would have about assistance
that Congress could provide for you to do your part of this
mission?
Mr. Mueller. Yes, sir. Would be happy to.
Senator Kyl. Great.
[The information appears as a submission for the record.]
Senator Kyl. And then just one last question. One of the
things that has been on going with the FBI and the Department
of Homeland Security has been the matter--I am going back to
the terrorist issue--of lexicon, and there is one theory that
says you do not call people jihadists or Islamists because that
simply gives credibility to their ideological foundation for
their action. The other school of thought says if we are going
to defeat a terrorist enemy, we need to at least be able to
call it by its true name, understanding its etiology, its
motivation of the people, what makes it tick so that we can
effectively deal with it.
Where does the FBI come down in this matter of terminology?
Mr. Mueller. Well, we call it as we see it. I understand
that there is some discussion out there, but nobody has ever
told us how we are supposed to describe terrorists or terrorist
groups, and we try to give the most clear definition, but call
it what it is.
Senator Kyl. Would you agree that one accurate description
of some of these groups like al Qaeda, for example, is
Islamist?
Mr. Mueller. Islamic extremists, absolutely.
Senator Kyl. OK. Thank you very much.
Mr. Mueller. Extremists. ``Extremists'' is an accurate
definition.
Senator Kyl. Just to be crystal clear, nobody is suggesting
that the Muslim faith is responsible for all of this. But in
the name of their view of their faith, a lot of folks--maybe
not a lot, but a number of young people have been radicalized,
and radicalized to extreme actions I guess is the reason for
the extremist. But there is no denying the connection, in their
mind at least, to their Islamist faith, I gather. Would you
agree with that?
Mr. Mueller. Agreed, yes.
Senator Kyl. Thank you very much, Mr. Director.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you, Senator Kyl.
Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director, thank you so much for your testimony today and
for your service to our country and for your diligent
stewardship of the FBI. I have a number of areas I would like
to touch on.
First, in my former role as a county executive, I had
responsibility for a county police department, and hopefully we
will be focusing some latter this summer on the Federal and
local law enforcement interface and collaboration. The FBI is
an enormous source of valuable intelligence, not just in the
national security area, in the anti-terrorism area, but also
just in routine local law enforcement--drug interdiction,
violent crime, and so forth.
Could you just comment on successes and areas of
improvement for FBI intelligence sharing with local law
enforcement and how you feel local law enforcement is doing
nationally at moving toward intelligence-based policing?
Mr. Mueller. Let me start with the information sharing. One
of the great successes, I think, since September 11th is the
growth of the Joint Terrorism Task Forces and that concept, and
to the extent that we have been successful in cases, virtually
all of them have been utilizing the combined resources of the
FBI and other Federal agencies and State and local in the
context of the Joint Terrorism Task Force.
I am a great believer also in task forces across the board,
whether it be mortgage fraud task forces or gang task forces,
violent crime task forces, because it gives you the combined
capabilities of the entities, but also gets everybody on the
same page so those vehicles provide a sharing of intelligence.
Second, I would say we are doing, I believe, a lot better
job of informing generally State and local law enforcement of
what is happening in the terrorism arena. We will all be,
however, beat to the punch occasionally by CNN, and that is
just a factor of life in this day and age. But right now we put
out bulletins almost immediately after something becomes public
with regard to a terrorist attack to all State and local law
enforcement across the country.
Fusion centers that are--I think there are 70-odd around
the country now that also contribute to the sharing. On many of
these, the majority of them, we have FBI personnel even though
they are State entities that are participating. That
contributes to the sharing as well.
There will always be some tension between ourselves and
others, particularly when the information that we are utilizing
is classified because it may come from the CIA or NSA, and
persons who do not get that information are often frustrated.
So there will always be that tension, but I think we have made
substantial progress, and that is one of the pluses, positive
aspects of what has happened since September 11th.
Senator Coons. And how do you address concerns about
classified information access? What is your process or
prioritization when you reach a tipping point and conclude that
it is essential that local law enforcement have access to that
information?
Mr. Mueller. Well, any person who is assigned to a Joint
Terrorism Task Force goes through a background check and gets a
top-secret clearance. And so if you are State and local and you
are on a task force, you have access to that which the agents
sitting to your right and left have. Many police chiefs have
also gotten clearances so that they can have access to--police
chiefs or sheriffs, access to the information.
But it has been our position throughout that if a person is
responsible for the safety of a particular community,
classification should not stand in the way of getting the
information they need to protect their community. If there is a
threat to a particular--to Wilmington, Delaware, and----
Senator Coons. Thinking hypothetically.
Mr. Mueller. Hypothetically. And the chief of police has
not got a clearance but there is a potential threat, you will
get the information on that. We will find a way to get it,
because I firmly believe those persons who have the
responsibility for security have the right to that information
if there is an immediate threat.
Senator Coons. That is very helpful. Thank you.
One other area I have worked on in collaboration with our
Attorney General is DNA testing. We have only one State lab,
our Office of Medical Examiner, which, oddly, comes under our
State Health and Human Services Department, is understaffed,
overworked, has a significant backlog. This is a challenge in
many different States staying on top of the developing
technology. Now that everyone watches it on TV, every defense
lawyer believes they are entitled to, you know, top-level DNA
testing, and there are a significant number of convicted
offender samples--thousands in our case--that have not been
reviewed as well.
One possible solution to this backlog that was suggested to
us was to allow private labs to do some of the backlog testing,
but there is an FBI standard--I believe it is Standard 17--that
requires that there be a full--essentially a public lab double-
check for any work that is being done by a private lab before
the FBI will accept the results. I just would be interested in
whether you are doing anything to ensure that FBI regulations
are not resulting in needless inefficiencies. Our Office of
Medical Examiner identified that standard as one challenge that
essentially made it not worth their time to engage with private
labs to have them, at reduced cost and better speed, help them
with their significant backlog.
Mr. Mueller. Well, there is a quality control process, a
technological review process that you are adverting to that is
required that one go through before it is ingested into the
data base. Over the last year this has been an issue. We know
those who are pressing to avoid this, and it may be in certain
circumstances a bottleneck.
To the extent that it has been, we are trying to reduce
that and put into place more efficient capabilities to assure
that that quality control can be done without slowing the
ingestion of the new samples into the data base. But most
people agree that there needs to be a quality control before
the samples do go in the data base. So what we are trying to do
and will continue to do is make that process more efficient to
remove the time lags and make certain that--and all of us want
to get it in as soon as possible, make certain that is done as
efficiently as possible.
Senator Coons. Well, thank you. I appreciate your testimony
about these questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you very much, Senator Coons.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mueller. Good to see you, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. I want to join in thanking you for your
service over the years where I have had the privilege of
working with you as Attorney General of the State of
Connecticut. And I know that the Attorneys General of the
United States appreciate your working so closely with them and
really in a very close partnership, and I particularly want to
thank you for training and attracting the great men and women
of the FBI who serve us so well day in and day out. And on that
note, I just want to come back to the questions you answered
about your budget.
The inability to fill those 1,100 slots in my view would be
really a disservice to the FBI and severely disadvantage this
great organization, and I hope you agree with me in that.
Mr. Mueller. It would set us back. It is a setback, and we
have been moving forward with the help of Congress and the
Committee and the appropriators, and this would stall the
progress that has been made.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. You know, I want to commend
the FBI for its focus on an area that I think is extremely
important--anabolic steroids. Recently in Danbury there was a
major set of arrests involving breaking a drug ring that was
selling steroids to high school users in the Danbury area,
selling 70 bottles each month of these steroids to so-called
individual users. And I know that very often we focus on street
drugs, and the DEA has a responsibility in this area. But I
want to commend the FBI for its focus on the steroid problem,
which sometimes receives too little attention or awareness. And
I wonder if the FBI is planning additional efforts to combat
the spread and use of steroids, particularly among young users,
high school and college users around the country.
Mr. Mueller. I would say this generally is not an area that
we would, particularly in this time of budget constraints,
spend a lot of effort on, particularly when the primary agency
with the jurisdiction is DEA.
Now, we have become involved in investigations with DEA
when steroids are coming from outside the United States with
the Customs and Border Patrol, and we will contribute and
participate in those investigations when we can provide
something unique to further that investigation.
But beyond that, I would have to go back and see what we
are doing and get back to you on that, but I cannot say that
given the challenges that we have and the threats that we have
that this would be as high a priority as all of us would like.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, I know that you have enormous
challenges, and some of them we have heard today. But I would
be interested in your additional information and also increased
participation and support for other agencies that may have a
primary role in this area, because I do think that the spread
of these steroids, indeed an epidemic of their use, and an
acceptance of their legitimacy is one of the great threats to
our young people today, and I appreciate your willingness to
cooperate in that effort.
Mr. Mueller. Thank you.
Senator Blumenthal. On a subject that others have asked you
about, the mortgage foreclosure issue, I have to confess that I
am unhappy and frustrated with the most recent efforts by the
administration to send a message in this area--the robo-
signers, which are a subject of ongoing investigation by the
State Attorneys General, which I helped to initiate. So far we
have seen virtually no major actions by the task force that the
President has appointed. In the face of blatant fraud on the
court involving the robo-signers, false affidavits, clearly in
my view criminal violations that are a fraud on our justice
system, and I wonder if you could respond, please.
Mr. Mueller. Sure. I share that concern and belief that
there is fraud out there, and I can tell you we have ongoing
investigations.
Senator Blumenthal. And I hope that we will see
prosecutions soon. I do not want to put words in your mouth,
but if you share my frustration, I hope that you also share my
belief that we ought to have action soon.
Mr. Mueller. I do not disagree with that.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
On the issue of missing children--and you have covered it a
little bit--as you may know, the FBI was very constructively
involved in a recent highly publicized search in the New Haven
area for a missing 13-year-old, Isabella Oleschuk, who
fortunately was found after 3 days. She appeared--in fact, left
her own home on her own initiative, so she was not actually
abducted or taken. But as you know, this problem is pervasive
around the country. In Connecticut alone, the National Center
for Missing and Exploited Children, a great organization that
does wonderful work, received 67 reports of missing children in
Connecticut last year, and 19 are still missing. And I know
that the FBI has extraordinarily important other tasks, but I
wonder whether this has taken increased--has come to be seen as
a subject of increased priority in the FBI.
Mr. Mueller. I would say it has always been a priority.
When a child is lost, every special agent in charge wants to
work with State and local law enforcement to find that child,
and we will participate in the investigation so long as there
is a Federal basis. And generally that is the thought being the
person may well have been taken, abducted across State lines.
There are occasions where we have to withdraw from
investigations where the child has been found, and yet there is
some investigative work to be done, but we have lost the
Federal jurisdictional basis for it.
But I can tell you, when a child is lost, we as well as
every other law enforcement entity around bring whatever we can
to make certain that we find that child. We have experts--
actually we have expert teams that are set up specifically to
go to and address that circumstance when a child is lost.
Senator Blumenthal. I welcome that response, and I would
note that it marks a departure from many years ago when missing
children were thought to be exclusively a local or State issue,
and particularly now that many missing children are likely to
be taken across State lines either by parents or others, I
think that is a very commendable approach.
Mr. Mueller. I can tell you that while not all missing
children find their way to my BlackBerry, many of them do and
we monitor that all the way up to the top.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, I thank you very much, and,
again, thank you for your extraordinary service to this Nation,
and I think since I am the last questioner, I may enable you to
leave this hearing unscathed and unwounded.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mueller. Thank you. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you, and my only concern is we have
CALEA, the Communications Assistance Law Enforcement Act, which
I helped draft back in the 1990's. We worked closely with the
Bureau and everybody else because, as I recall, part of it I
drafted in my hideaway office with others around. I hear
concerns that it may go dark, and I just urge you and your
office to work with me and others who do not want that to
happen, to make sure that we can keep this going. May I have
that assurance?
Mr. Mueller. Yes, sir. Absolutely.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you.
Okay. Well, I thank you very much. I appreciate you being
here. I appreciate Attorney General Blumenthal wrapping it up,
and thank you.
Mr. Mueller. Thank you, sir.
[Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
[Submissions for the record follow.]
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