[Senate Hearing 112-80, Part 7]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-80, Pt. 7
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
S. 1253
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 FOR MILITARY
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION,
TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
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PART 7
STRATEGIC FORCES
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MARCH 30; APRIL 6, 13; MAY 11; JUNE 3, 2011
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
David M. Morriss, Minority Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
MARK UDALL, Colorado ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK BEGICH, Alaska ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Strategic Forces Programs of the National Nuclear Security
Administration
march 30, 2011
Page
D'Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration, and Under Secretary for Nuclear
Security, Department of Energy; Accompanied by Hon. Donald L.
Cook, Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, National
Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy; ADM
Kirkland H. Donald, USN, Deputy Administrator for Naval
Reactors, and Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion, National
Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy; Michael
R. Anastasio, Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory; George
H. Miller, Director, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory;
and Paul J. Hommert, Director, Sandia National Laboratories.... 5
Strategic Systems
april 6, 2011
Benedict, RADM Terry J., USN, Director of Strategic Systems
Program, U.S. Navy............................................. 127
Kowalski, Lt. Gen. James M., USAF, Commander, Air Force Global
Strike Command, U.S. Air Force................................. 131
Chambers, Maj. Gen. William A., USAF, Assistant Chief of Staff
for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, U.S. Air
Force.......................................................... 138
Ballistic Missile Defense Programs
april 13, 2011
O'Reilly, LTG Patrick J., USA, Director, Missile Defense Agency.. 175
Roberts, Bradley H., Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy......................... 182
Macy, RADM Archer M., Jr., USN, Director, Joint Integrated Air
and Missile Defense Organization, The Joint Staff.............. 190
Chaplain, Cristina T., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
Management, Government Accountability Office................... 200
(iii)
Military Space Programs
may 11, 2011
Schulte, Hon. Gregory L., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Space Policy............................................... 247
Zangardi, John A. Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Information Operations, and Space.............................. 252
Helms, Lt. Gen. Susan J., USAF, Commander, Joint Functional
Component Command for Space, U.S. Strategic Command............ 256
Formica, LTG Richard P., USA, Commander, U.S. Army Space and
Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command.......... 260
Titley, RADM David W., USN, Oceanographer and Navigator of the
Navy, Director, Maritime Domain Awareness and Space............ 266
Hyten, Maj. Gen. John E., USAF, Director, Space Programs, Office
of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition.... 267
Shelton, Gen. William L., USAF, Commander, Air Force Space
Command........................................................ 270
Chaplain, Cristina T., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
Management, Government Accountability Office................... 278
U.S. Strategic Command
june 3, 2011
Kehler, Gen. C. Robert, USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.. 326
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
STRATEGIC FORCES PROGRAMS OF THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:38 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E.
Benjamin Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Nelson, Shaheen, and
Sessions.
Committee staff members present: Leah C. Brewer,
nominations and hearings clerk; and Jennifer L. Stoker,
security clerk.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; and Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Daniel A. Lerner,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Hannah I. Lloyd and Brian F.
Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: Ann Premer,
assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to
Senator Shaheen; and Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator
Sessions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, CHAIRMAN
Senator Nelson. This is the first of the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee hearings in review of the fiscal year 2012 budget
request.
I'm going to go ahead and start with my opening statement.
I think my ranking member is on his way.
We have hearings now scheduled for April 6, which will
address the strategic systems, bombers, intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBM), and submarine launched ballistic
missiles (SLBM); for April 13, which will address ballistic
missile defense programs; and on May 4, which will address
national security space programs.
Today, we have with us Mr. Tom D'Agostino, the
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA). With Mr. D'Agostino are Dr. Donald Cook, the Deputy
NNSA Administrator for Defense Programs, and Admiral Kirkland
Donald, Deputy NNSA Defense Administrator for Naval Reactors.
We also have the directors of the three NNSA National
Laboratories: Dr. Michael Anastasio, Director of Los Alamos
National Laboratory (LANL); Dr. George Miller, Director of the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL); and Dr. Paul
Hommert, Director of the Sandia National Laboratories.
We welcome you all to the hearing.
I would note that this is the first time that Admiral
Donald and Dr. Cook have testified before the subcommittee.
Sadly, this will be the last time that Dr. Anastasio will
testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee in his
capacity as Director of LANL, having announced his retirement,
later this summer. You have had a long and distinguished
career, and we wish you all the best in your future endeavors
and thank you for all your service.
Last year, the Armed Services Committee, and the Senate as
a whole, devoted considerable time and effort to consideration
of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The Senate
Armed Services Committee alone held 11 hearings and briefings
on the subject. The debate on the floor went on for almost 2
weeks before the New START treaty was ratified. One of the
major issues discussed by the committee and the Senate was the
ability of NNSA to maintain the nuclear weapons stockpile
safely, securely, and reliably into the future.
A part of that debate and discussion was the overall well-
being and funding of the nuclear complex, particularly, the new
facilities that were needed at NNSA Y-12 facility in Oak Ridge,
TN, and at LANL. Parts of this complex were described as
``decrepit'' by the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission. I
would note that each of these new facilities--the Uranium
Processing Facility (UPF) at Y-12, and the new facility to
replace the current Chemical and Metallurgical Resource
Replacement (CMRR) facility, at Los Alamos--are multibillion-
dollar facilities. The Government Accountability Office has put
the NNSA on its high-risk list as a result of the difficulties
that NNSA has had delivering major construction, and other
projects, on scope, schedule, and budget. We look forward to
hearing how NNSA will position itself to successfully deliver
two new multibillion projects, both of which will be under
construction at the same time.
The long-term ability of the NNSA laboratories to provide
the technical support to the stockpile was also a topic of
considerable discussion. Over the 5 years prior to 2010,
funding for nuclear weapons work was substantially reduced. The
labs went through significant layoffs. The result was a system
that was beginning to lose its technical capability to support
the stockpile for the long term.
To sustain the abilities of the nuclear weapons complex,
President Obama laid out a 10-year plan last fall which
included substantial annual increases in funding for fiscal
years 2011, 2012, and beyond.
From the $6.4 billion appropriated for weapons activities
in fiscal year 2010, the fiscal year 2011 funding was to be $7
billion, and the fiscal year 2012 budget request is $7.4
billion. This increase was to continue over the 10-year period.
Some Senators argue that even these substantial increases
weren't enough, and voted against the New START treaty.
With the Continuing Resolution (CR), the long-term funding
for NNSA isn't clear and, based on the proposals coming from
the House of Representatives, could be substantially less than
the funding requested by the President for both 2011 and 2012.
One of the main issues of the hearing today will be the impact
of the current funding uncertainty and the projected funding
levels on the ability of NNSA to maintain the nuclear
stockpile.
The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) determined that it was
essential for the United States to maintain a triad of nuclear
delivery system: bombers, land-based ICBMs, and the submarine-
launched ICBMs. To sustain the triad into the future, the NPR
outlined the need for replacement programs for the current
bomber fleet and a replacement for the Ohio-class ballistic
missile submarines. The Office of Naval Reactors, which Admiral
Donald heads, is a dual-entity of the NNSA and Department of
the Navy, with responsibility for the design, development,
operations, maintenance, and disposal of the nuclear propulsion
plants on naval surface ships and submarines.
One of the primary ongoing missions of the Office of Naval
Reactors is the development of a new reactor for the Ohio-class
replacement ballistic missile submarines. The funding requested
in the fiscal year 2011 and 2012 budgets is critical to keeping
the reactor design process in sync with the overall design of
the submarine.
Admiral Donald, we also look forward to discussing with you
the impacts of the current funding situation on the Ohio-class
replacement, as well as the other work of your offices.
I thank you all.
Now, it's my pleasure to turn this over to my good friend
and ranking member, Senator Sessions.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great
pleasure for me to work with you. You know how much I respect
and admire your leadership. I think, together, we'll do our
best to fulfill our responsibilities to the taxpayers and to
the security of America.
This hearing focuses on the President's fiscal year 2012
request for NNSA. Never has a nuclear weapons complex faced a
turning point as significant, I think, as the one before us
today. As highlighted by the bipartisan Perry-Schlesinger
Strategic Posture Commission, a commission that I helped put
the language in to create, both physical and intellectual
infrastructure are ``in serious need of transformation and
require significant attention and investment. After years of
neglect, the infrastructure has degraded to the point where we
decide to recapitalize or forego the ability to certify and
produce safe, secure, and reliable weapons.'' Today's hearing
provides an opportunity to discuss the 2012 budget, assess its
adequacy, and deliver a credible deterrent that is safe,
secure, and reliable.
So, I welcome the commitment that the President has made
for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex. While we may
disagree on the likelihood that we'll have a nuclear-free world
sometime in the future, the President has clearly recognized
that the world we live in today requires a strong nuclear
deterrent and that efforts toward reducing the size of the
stockpile depend on a modernized weapons complex, a robust
ability to produce, refurbish, and replace legacy weapons with
weapons that are safer, more secure, and reliable.
The 1251 report that's part of the New START Treaty was a
key first step in ensuring the future viability of the complex.
But, it was only a first step. A long-term sustained commitment
that spans future administrations and Congresses alike is
essential. Now, that's not always easy to do, to maintain a
long-term defense project like this.
I am, however, already concerned that some in Congress have
forgotten the national security importance of the weapons
complex, and have neglected to appropriate what seems to be the
necessary amount of funds for 2011. In fact, in the most recent
full-year fiscal year 2011 appropriations bills, the House
appropriators cut the fiscal year 2011 budget by $312 billion,
and the Senate appropriators cut the weapons program by $185
billion. After countless hours of debate to fully fund the
administration's 10-year-plus proposal during this Treaty
debate, this failure to recognize the national security
importance of complex modernization, I think, is disappointing.
Hopefully, I'm wrong, and you can do the job without as much
money as we originally thought. But, I'm worried about it.
Going forward, I intend to advocate for the restoration of
the funds necessary to meet the goals that we set when we
worked on the treaty together. The construction projects at Y-
12 and LANL are the foundations of the modernization effort,
and are the key enabler to a long list of warhead Life
Extension Programs (LEP) over the next 20-plus years. I look
forward to hearing more about these programs, understanding how
NNSA intends to ensure that both facilities are delivered on
time and on cost.
Cost is a big question on these projects, to me. In the
report that accompanied the New START Treaty, and has since
been updated, the current cost estimate for the CMRR is a range
between $3.7 and $5.8 billion. That's a lot of money. Alabama's
general fund budget is $2 billion a year. The cost estimate for
the UPF is between $4.2 and $6.5 billion. Together, these
buildings would cost between $7.9 and $12.3 billion. If
necessary, okay. That's what we have to do. It's critical to
our defense, so we have to do it. But, I don't think it's wrong
for Congress to ask some questions about those high figures.
When it was released last year, the NPR included some
troubling language that threatens to restrict the tools
necessary for our weapons designers to design weapons with the
highest degree of safety, security, and reliability. According
to the NPR, warhead LEPs will ``give strong preference to
options for refurbishment or reuse,'' thus restricting the
ability of the labs to pursue the benefits associated with the
replacement option.
I remain concerned by this guidance, and associate myself
with the concerns raised by 10 distinguished former lab
directors who stated, in a letter to the Secretaries of Defense
and Energy, that the NPR ``will stifle the creative and
imaginative thinking that typified the excellent history of
progress and development at the National Laboratories.'' I
think that's a serious point that we must consider.
I look forward to hearing what steps have been taken to
ensure our weapons designers will not be restricted from
utilizing the tools necessary for developing the most credible,
safe, secure, reliable stockpile possible.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the witnesses.
Senator Nelson. Well, thank you, Senator Sessions. It's
always a pleasure to work with you.
Senator Shaheen, do you have any opening remarks?
Senator Shaheen. No, thank you.
Senator Nelson. Okay. Mr. D'Agostino, I understand that you
will present an oral opening statement on behalf of the panel.
I would note that your prepared statement, as well as the
statements of the three lab directors, will all be included in
the subcommittee hearing record. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, AND UNDER SECRETARY FOR
NUCLEAR SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; ACCOMPANIED BY HON.
DONALD L. COOK, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS,
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY;
ADM KIRKLAND H. DONALD, USN, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR NAVAL
REACTORS, AND DIRECTOR, NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION, NATIONAL
NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; MICHAEL
R. ANASTASIO, DIRECTOR, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY; GEORGE
H. MILLER, DIRECTOR, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY;
AND PAUL J. HOMMERT, DIRECTOR, SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES
Mr. D'Agostino. Thank you, Chairman Nelson, Senator
Sessions, Senator Shaheen. It's a real pleasure to have the
opportunity to address you today on a variety of investments
that the President's proposing in the future for our Nation's
nuclear security enterprise.
I'd like to begin by thanking all of the Senators on the
committee for your continued support of our program, the
Department of Energy (DOE), the NNSA, as well as the 35,000 men
and women who work every day to keep our Nation safe.
We couldn't do our work without strong bipartisan support
and, from my standpoint, the engaged leadership by Congress.
It's absolutely critical, and this is actually what we've seen
over the past number of years, in moving forward.
I'd also like to take a few moments to discuss our role in
providing response to the tragic events in Japan. Mr. Chairman,
the earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan on March 11, 2011,
causing significant damage to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
powerplant. Some of the radioactive materials have been
released as a result of the damage. First and foremost, our
thoughts and prayers are with the people of Japan during this
very difficult time.
To assist in the response, we've deployed over 45 people
and more than 17,000 pounds worth of equipment, including
NNSA's aerial measuring system and consequence management
response teams. Our response teams are on the ground and
they're utilizing their unique skills and expertise and
equipment to help with our partners in Japan.
Since arriving in Japan, NNSA teams have collected and
analyzed data gathered from more than 130 hours of flights
aboard Department of Defense (DOD) aircraft and thousands of
ground-monitoring points to get actual data on the ground and
pass that information back to the Government of Japan.
But, in addition to that, in order to ensure that this
information is available to every single government agency,
we've been moving this information throughout the government,
as well as posted information online at our Web site,
energy.gov, so members of the public can see this information
themselves, evaluate it for themselves, and be informed. We'll
continue to monitor this situation. We continue to provide
detailed technical support for the Japanese; in fact, on a
daily basis. It changes dramatically on a daily basis.
DOE is also monitoring activities throughout--with a
nuclear incident team that we have manned 24/7, with our naval
reactors, as well. We get together and exchange data. We report
our assets at our National Laboratories to provide ongoing
predictive atmospheric monitoring capabilities based on a
variety of different scenarios.
It's important to note that all of the data that we have
seen to this point reaffirms what the President has said from
the beginning, that we do not expect any harmful levels of
radiation from Japan to reach the United States.
Mr. Chairman, I come before you today to discuss the
President's fiscal year 2012 budget request. I do so at a time
when the capabilities NNSA offers the Nation, and indeed the
world, are on display in real time. The resources President
Obama is requesting for fiscal year 2012 make a critical
investment in the future of the nuclear security enterprise
which will allow us to continue to implement his nuclear
security agenda and respond to global crises like the one in
Japan.
Despite the challenging economic times facing our country,
President Obama has requested $11.8 billion for NNSA, up from
$11.2 billion in 2011. As I see it, the budget request can be
broken down into three key themes.
First, we're investing in the future. This budget request
reflects the President's commitment, made last November, to
invest more than $85 billion over the next decade to assure the
safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear stockpile
and to modernize the nuclear security infrastructure and
revitalize the science and technology base that supports the
full range of nuclear security missions that we have. It
provides $7.6 billion for the weapons activities account to
support our efforts to leverage the best science and technology
and research in the world to maintain our deterrent and
modernize the infrastructure that supports the deterrent. This
will enable us to enhance our surveillance of the stockpile,
proceed with key LEPs for the B61 and the W78 weapons systems,
and continue to design the UPF at Y-12 National Security
Complex, and the CMRR facility at LANL. These two facilities
will provide the necessary capabilities that are absolutely
critical to maintaining the Nation's expertise in uranium
processing and plutonium research. Investing in a modern
nuclear security enterprise is critical to our Stockpile
Stewardship Program (SSP), but it also supports the full range
of NNSA's nuclear security missions.
Which brings me to the second theme in this request, which
is implementing the President's nuclear security agenda.
President Obama has made strengthening nuclear security and the
nuclear nonproliferation regime one of his top priorities. As
he said in his speech in Prague in April 2009, the threat of a
terrorist acquiring and using a nuclear weapon is the most
immediate and extreme threat we face. This budget makes the
investments needed to continue to implement the President's
nuclear security agenda.
To power the nuclear Navy, President Obama has requested
$1.1 billion for NNSA's naval reactors program. The NPR
highlighted the need to build a replacement for the Ohio-class
submarine, which will start to be retired from Service in 2027.
Our fiscal year 2012 request continues the design work on the
propulsion unit for that Ohio-class replacement submarine in
order to meet the Navy's required procurement date of 2019.
This budget request also includes critical investments in a
modern and sustainable spent nuclear fuel infrastructure at the
naval reactor site at the Idaho National Laboratory. This will
allow us to move fuel away from wet to dry storage, and
ultimately, to dispose of it, while we maintain the capacity
necessary to receive spent fuel generated during a sustained
intense period of fuel handling at our shipyards.
Finally, the budget request seeks the resources to refuel
the land-based prototype reactor in upstate New York.
These are all critical elements of the President's nuclear
security agenda defined in the national security strategy and
in the NPR.
Mr. Chairman, we recognize that this request for increased
investments in the nuclear security enterprise comes at a time
of acute financial challenges to our Nation. We recognize that
we have the need to be effective stewards of the taxpayers'
money.
This brings me to the third key theme outlined in this
budget, and that is our commitment to improving the way we do
business and manage our resources, including budget resources,
people resources, projects, and our infrastructure. I realize
that you, the ranking member, and all members of this committee
have many competing requirements. While I believe that nothing
is more important than our shared responsibility to ensure our
Nation's security, I also recognize that it's my responsibility
to assure you that we can manage those resources wisely. That's
why we are working with our management and operating partners
to streamline our governance model to devote more resources to
critical mission work and maximize our ability to complete our
missions safely and securely, and do that in a cost-effective
way. We're making sure that we have the right contracting
strategy in place. We are improving our project management by
ensuring we have qualified project managers leading our major
projects, setting costs and schedule baselines on construction
projects when design work is 90 percent complete, subjecting
those estimates to rigorous independent reviews, and placing
renewed focus across our enterprise on project management.
That's why we recently created a new Policy and Oversight
Office for managing major projects that reports directly to me
and my office to make sure that this project management
responsibility gets the high level of management attention it
deserves.
We're continuing to find innovative ways to save money
across our enterprise. Take, for example, our supply-chain
management center. Since 2009, it has used new technologies and
pooled purchasing power to drive efficiencies across our
enterprise. The result has been more than $213 million in
auditable cost savings in the last 3\1/2\ years.
All of this is part of our effort to create one NNSA, a
true partnership between all of our programs and all of our
Management and Operations (M&O) partners across the country to
fulfill our common mission. We must break down our stovepipes,
work collaboratively across our programs and organization, make
sure our headquarters, site offices, and M&O partners are
coordinated, and leverage all of our resources to meet a common
objective, ultimately making the world a safer place.
Taken together, these steps will ensure that we have a
modern 21st-century nuclear security enterprise that is safer,
more secure, more efficient, and organized to succeed, and an
enterprise that can address broader national security needs.
We're already realizing positive benefits as a result of
our work. Last year, our Kansas City plant won the Malcolm
Baldrige Award for quality. Since October, two NNSA projects
have won separate Project Management Institute (PMI) awards,
including our Global Threat Reduction Initiative that became
the first Federal project to ever win PMI's Distinguished
Project Award. That's the vision outlined in this budget
request. It supports our full range of NNSA missions and, more
importantly, invests in the infrastructure, in the people, in
the science and technology and engineering required to fulfill
our missions.
I look forward to working with you and the members of the
committee.
With that, we'd be happy to take any questions that you may
have.
[The prepared statements of Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Anastasio,
Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert follow:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Thomas P. D'Agostino
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify regarding our
nuclear security posture and the President's fiscal year 2012 budget
request for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
I am pleased to be joined at the table by Dr. Don Cook, Deputy
Administrator for Defense Programs and Admiral Kirk Donald, Director
for Naval Nuclear Propulsion. We are also pleased to have the Directors
of the National Laboratories--Dr. Michael Anastasio from Los Alamos
National Lab, Dr. George Miller from Lawrence Livermore National Lab,
and Dr. Paul Hommert from Sandia National Laboratories--join us for
this hearing.
The NNSA has the important mission to enhance global security
through nuclear deterrence, nonproliferation, counterterrorism, naval
nuclear propulsion, and national leadership in science and technology.
Today I am going to focus on how we at NNSA are: (1) investing in the
future of the nuclear security enterprise, (2) implementing the
President's nuclear security agenda, and (3) improving the way we do
business and manage our resources from the standpoint of the status of
the nuclear stockpile and supporting infrastructure. These key mission
areas are interdependent, and the men and women who support them make a
direct contribution to advancing national and international security.
Now more than ever, we must remain vigilant in ensuring that
nuclear security programs and activities are properly managed in this
tough budget climate. The national consensus that has developed
following the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the New START treaty
ratification on the need to modernize our arsenal and promote all
aspects of nuclear security across the spectrum of deterrence,
proliferation prevention, counterterrorism and response further
underpins the need to execute this mission responsibly and effectively.
the nuclear security policy context and nnsa's role
The policy context remains one in which the advancement of global
nuclear security is a priority. When President Obama revealed his
vision for reducing nuclear dangers and moving toward a world without
nuclear weapons, he made clear that ``as long as these weapons exist,
the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to
deter any adversary, and to guarantee that defense to our allies.''
NNSA has been implementing the NPR guidance to ensure a safe,
secure and effective arsenal and promote global nuclear security. With
the entry into force of the New START treaty we are able to project
what the stockpile will look like, to plan an integrated program that
meets established military requirements, and to modernize the stockpile
and infrastructure to support a leaner, modern 21st century Nuclear
Security Enterprise.
The ratification of the New START treaty brought the administration
and Congress together on the need to modernize the Nation's nuclear
arsenal, and to provide greater resources to the science and technology
missions, the aging physical infrastructure, and the people that
support our strategic deterrent. We have agreed with the Russian
Federation and within the United States to decrease the number of
operationally deployed nuclear weapons, but we must not lose sight of
the commitment needed to maintain the current stockpile and ensure it
is safe, secure and effective. The President's budget requests in
fiscal year 2011 and again in fiscal year 2012 reflect this commitment
in the clearest and most comprehensive terms.
21st century nuclear security enterprise
While NNSA's primary mission is to maintain and deliver the
Nation's nuclear deterrent to the Department of Defense, the expertise
and tools used to accomplish that task have resulted in a multitude of
other national security applications. The network of laboratories,
production plants and sites that make up the Nuclear Security
Enterprise evidences not only a shift from the Cold War capacity-based
nuclear weapons complex, but a vision for preserving and enhancing one
of our Nation's greatest national assets.
This shift from a weapons complex into a nuclear security
enterprise is about making adjustments to the program in order to
prevent and respond to current and emerging global threats,
particularly in relation to countering a wide-ranging set of nuclear
threats such as preventing--or minimizing the impact of--the explosion
of an improvised nuclear device or radiological dispersal device. It is
about staying ahead and advancing cutting edge science and technology
to carry out this mission.
budget highlights
The President's fiscal year 2012 budget request provides $11.78
billion to invest in a modern, 21st century nuclear security
enterprise, implement the President's nuclear security agenda, and
improve the way the NNSA does business and manages its resources.
The fiscal year 2012 request represents an increase of 5.1 percent
over the $11.2 billion requested for fiscal year 2011, reflecting a
commitment to investing in a modern enterprise that can support the
full range of nuclear security missions. The request highlights the
vital role NNSA plays in implementing the President's nuclear security
agenda and the broad, bipartisan consensus that has developed regarding
the role NNSA plays in enhancing our Nation's security and the
resources needed to get the job done.
Investing in the Future
Secretary of Energy Chu and I work closely with Secretary of
Defense Gates and other Defense Department (DOD) officials to ensure
that NNSA remains focused on a strong interagency partnership that
meets our national security requirements and promotes NNSA's
sustainability. As a result, the President's request includes $7.6
billion for the Weapons Activities appropriation, an 8.9 percent
increase over the President's fiscal year 2011 request and a 19.5
percent increase over the fiscal year 2010 appropriation to invest in
the future of the nuclear security enterprise. These resources will
support, among other things, the operation and construction of the
modern research facilities needed to do cutting edge science and
attract the next generation of nuclear security experts. It continues
implementation of the President's commitment to invest $85 billion over
the next decade to sustain the nuclear deterrent and to modernize the
infrastructure that supports it, as well as to implement the agenda
outlined in the NPR, the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, and
the updated Section 1251 Report submitted to Congress.
NNSA's budget request also includes associated out-year projections
in the Future-Years Nuclear Security Program that identifies resources
needed to meet the continuing requirements for significant long-term
investments in the deliverables, capabilities, and infrastructure of
the enterprise.
These resources will help us invest in a modern, 21st century
Nuclear Security Enterprise that can sustain the stockpile and support
our full range of nuclear security missions. With these investments,
NNSA will be able to continue to move toward an enterprise that is
safer, smaller, more secure, more efficient, more sustainable, and more
adaptable.
The request includes an increase of 3.1 percent over the fiscal
year 2011 level to protect and advance the scientific capabilities at
the U.S. national security laboratories and a 21 percent increase for
infrastructure improvements, including continuing work on the Uranium
Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 National Security Complex and the
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement facility (CMRR) at Los
Alamos National Laboratory. These capital projects are key elements for
ensuring safe, secure, and reliable uranium and plutonium capabilities
for nuclear security and other important missions.
To power the nuclear navy, the budget request includes $1.2 billion
for the NNSA's Naval Reactors program, an increase of 7.8 percent over
the President's fiscal year 2011 request. The programs in this
appropriation support the U.S. Navy's nuclear fleet. Specifically, the
request supports the administration's decision to recapitalize the sea-
based strategic deterrent. The Ohio-class ballistic submarines, the
most survivable leg of the Nation's strategic deterrent, are reaching
the end of their operational life. The request will enable Naval
Reactors to continue reactor plant design and development efforts begun
in 2010 for procurement of long-lead reactor plant components in 2017,
in support of Navy procurement of the first Ohio Class submarine
replacement in 2019. Providing the Ohio-class replacement a life-of-
the-ship reactor core will require substantial advances in
manufacturing technology to provide new cladding and a new fuel system.
The request also supports the refueling of a land based prototype
reactor, providing a cost effective test platform for these new
technologies.
Increased funding is also requested for the Spent Fuel Handling
Recapitalization Project, which will replace the over 50-year old
Expended Core Facility as the location for naval spent nuclear fuel
receipt, inspection, dissection, packaging, and secure dry storage.
Fiscal year 2012 funding continues the conceptual design for the
facility, equipment, and related systems, as well as continues meeting
the National Environmental Policy Act's requirements and project
oversight (e.g., engineering procurement and construction management).
Detailed project engineering and design work will commence in fiscal
year 2013 and construction will commence in fiscal year 2015.
These vital projects will replace facilities that date back to the
dawn of the Cold War with modern facilities that can support the full
range of nuclear security missions--including maintaining the nuclear
deterrent, preventing proliferation, securing vulnerable nuclear
material, powering the nuclear Navy and providing the Nation with the
best emergency response and counterterrorism capabilities possible.
They will also ensure that NNSA continues to work with the Department
of Defense and other interagency partners to keep the Nation safe.
Implementing the President's Nuclear Security Agenda
The fiscal year 2012 budget request also provides the resources
required to continue to work toward the President's commitment to
secure the most vulnerable nuclear material around the world within 4
years, a key national security goal. The budget request includes $2.5
billion for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation in fiscal year 2012 and
$14.2 billion over the next 5 years to reduce the global nuclear threat
by detecting, securing, safeguarding, disposing, and controlling
nuclear and radiological material worldwide, as well as promoting the
responsible application of nuclear technology and science. Working
together across the nuclear security enterprise, and in collaboration
with our colleagues in a range of U.S. agencies, as well as with
international organizations and partners in over 100 countries, we
carry out these efforts globally on a daily basis.
This request reflects the significant accomplishments of NNSA's
nuclear nonproliferation programs and seeks the resources needed to
complete the President's goals and prepare to respond to new
challenges. This budget request provides the resources required to meet
commitments secured from international partners during the 2010 Nuclear
Security Summit to remove all remaining highly enriched uranium (HEU)
from Belarus, Ukraine, Mexico, and other countries by April 2012,
expand our efforts to prevent nuclear materials trafficking, encourage
global implementation of higher standards for the physical protection
of nuclear material and nuclear facilities and work with the Defense
Department to improve international nuclear security cooperation.
The request of $2.5 billion is a decrease of 5.1 percent from the
President's fiscal year 2011 Request, but an increase of 19.6 percent
over the fiscal year 2010 appropriation. This 5.1 percent or $138
million decline flows logically from the fiscal year 2011 request which
was `front loaded' to accelerate the effort to secure vulnerable
nuclear materials within the President's stated timeframe. Even with
this decrease, the NNSA's budget request remains consistent with our
overall strategy to ensure that programs supporting the President's
commitment to lead an international effort to secure the most
vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in 4 years are fully
funded in the Request. The Global Threat Reduction Initiative efforts
related to radiological material, as well as the International Nuclear
Material Protection and Cooperation program's activities to enhance the
ability of our foreign partners to detect nuclear smuggling at border
crossings and in Megaports have been prioritized to accelerate nuclear
material lockdown efforts. The decrease in the request for Fissile
Materials Disposition reflects the completion of long-lead procurements
for the MOX and Waste Solidification projects, as well as the decision
to defer funding associated with the $400 million U.S. pledge for the
Russian Surplus Fissile Materials Disposition program until agreement
is reached on milestones for the program. Prior Year unobligated
balances of $30 million associated with contingency funds for
construction under the Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium
Production Program are proposed for cancellation, due to the program's
anticipated completion of CD-4 activities in the June 2011 timeframe.
Improving the Way NNSA Does Business
In 2010, the NNSA observed 10 years of major accomplishments since
its inception. We have secured and removed hundreds of nuclear weapons-
worth of nuclear material around the world; we have built the world's
fastest supercomputers and largest laser; we have pushed the frontiers
of science and discovery on a daily basis; and we maintain an aging
stockpile to ensure that it will remain a safe and effective deterrent.
In the next decade, we have major projects to complete: the First
Production Unit of the life extended B61 by 2017; addressing the W78
Life Extension Program and the potential commonality with the W88; and
completing the design and construction of our plutonium and uranium
capability at CMRR and UPF by 2020, with operations by 2023 and 2024
respectively. We also continue to reduce our security footprint by
consolidating nuclear missions and materials. We are on track to
complete removal of Category I/II Special Nuclear Materials from the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory by the end of 2012, which will
enable NNSA to reduce security risks and costs there.
We recognize that the fiscal year 2012 request for increased
investments in the nuclear security enterprise comes at a time of acute
financial challenges for our Nation, and we recognize the need to be
effective stewards of the taxpayer's money. We have made a series of
management decisions and put in place reforms and reorganizations to
better reflect a 21st century mission and prepare us for the next 10
years of the NNSA.
Consistent with the President's commitment to deliver on critical
national nuclear security missions at the best value to the American
taxpayer, the fiscal year 2012 budget request will enable NNSA to
continue to improve the way it does business and manages resources. The
President's budget request for Federal oversight and staff included in
the Office of the Administrator appropriation is $450.1 million, an
increase of 0.4 percent over the fiscal year 2011 request and an
increase of 7 percent over the fiscal year 2010 appropriation.
To maintain congressional support for NNSA's programs, the
enterprise has a responsibility to work together as ``One NNSA,'' a
fully integrated enterprise that operates efficiently, is organized to
succeed, that performs its work seamlessly, and speaks with one voice.
This ``One NNSA'' needs to be a true partnership among Headquarters,
the Site Offices and our Management and Operations (M&O) partners. We
are working from the senior management level to ensure all 35,000
employees develop a culture where we all work in a more integrated and
interdependent fashion.
Changing the way NNSA does business is an important part of the
effort to transform a Cold War nuclear weapons complex into a 21st
Century Nuclear Security Enterprise. NNSA simply cannot expect Congress
to support major investments in its programs and its facilities unless
the enterprise can demonstrate that the Department of Energy is a
responsible steward of the taxpayer's money.
NNSA needs to do better, which is why the Federal sector leadership
is working with its M&O partners to streamline the enterprise
governance model in order to devote more resources to critical mission
work and maximize NNSA's ability to complete its mission safely and
securely.
NNSA is making sure that it has the right contracting strategy in
place. The agency is improving its project management by, for example,
ensuring that NNSA no longer sets cost and schedule performance
baselines on construction projects until design work is 90 percent
complete, ensuring it has the right leadership teams in place, and
performing independent cost reviews. NNSA has also created a new policy
and oversight office for managing major projects, the office of
``Acquisitions and Project/Construction Management.'' The new office
reports directly to the Administrator. This will help ensure that
project management gets the high level focus it requires. In addition,
we are moving to Federalize pilots for our secure transportation
program in order to gain efficiencies and maintain operational control.
Finally, as the Facilities Infrastructure and Recapitalization Program
comes to an end, we will create the Capabilities Based Facilities and
Infrastructure activity to continue to focus on maintaining the
infrastructure we have.
We are already beginning to see results. NNSA is increasingly
recognized for its efforts to be an effective steward of tax dollars.
For example, since 2007, NNSA's Supply Chain Management Center has
saved $213 million by using pooled purchasing power to drive
efficiencies across the enterprise. In the last year NNSA's Kansas City
Plant won the prestigious Malcolm Baldrige Award, America's highest
honor for innovation and performance excellence. Two other NNSA
programs were recognized with Project Management Institute (PMI)
awards. In 2010, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative became the
first Federal project to receive PMI's Distinguished Project Award,
while the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory received PMI's project of the year.
conclusion
Our Nation has carefully evaluated its security needs in an
international landscape that remains challenging and uncertain. NNSA
has charted a path forward that shows our unwavering commitment to the
Nation's security and enhances our formidable capabilities to address
broader security challenges.
The NNSA is a technically based organization with a strong nuclear
heritage that serves as the base for our contribution to a wide range
of national security solutions. NNSA is rooted in the management of our
Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile, the application of nuclear energy
for naval propulsion and its nonproliferation programs. Additionally,
NNSA capabilities support a broad range of U.S. and international
activities that address existing dangers, identify and prepare for
future challenges, and advise the U.S. Government and our international
partners on nuclear security matters.
This 5 year budget request takes the NNSA well into its second
decade and strengthens the capabilities that are integral elements of
our nuclear deterrent. Our challenge is to retain the essential
capabilities and to identify and develop those needed for the future.
appropriations detail
Following are more detailed descriptions of each of the four
specific NNSA appropriations.
______
Prepared Statement Dr. Michael R. Anastasio
introduction
Chairman Nelson and Ranking Member Sessions, I would like to thank
you for your invitation to appear before the subcommittee on the
``challenges and tasks confronting the laboratories in fiscal year 2012
and the out-years.'' I am pleased to appear today along with National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Administrator Tom D'Agostino,
Director for Naval Nuclear Propulsion Admiral Kirk Donald, Deputy
Administrator for Defense Programs Dr. Don Cook, and my fellow
laboratory directors from Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National
Laboratories. I am currently in my 31st year in the weapons program and
in my 9th year as a laboratory director, having served first as
director of Lawrence Livermore and now since 2006 at Los Alamos (LANL).
As you likely know, I will be retiring as director this summer, and I
wanted to take this opportunity to thank this committee for all its
support of the Laboratory and the NNSA mission over the years.
Los Alamos is one of the Nation's two nuclear weapons design
laboratories. Although the Laboratory and its mission evolve over time,
the primary focus of LANL remains to ensure the U.S. nuclear weapons
stockpile is safe, secure, and effective. More broadly, Los Alamos is a
national security science Laboratory. We conduct work in the national
interest in a broad range of areas including nonproliferation, support
to the intelligence community and homeland security, and energy
security and the science that underpins all these mission areas.
Per the request of the subcommittee, I will focus my remarks today
on the health and vitality of the Laboratory as it relates to our
ability to meet the national security requirements of the Nation. Since
I last appeared before the U.S. Senate in July 2010 much has happened
here in Washington which will potentially have profound impacts on the
future of Los Alamos. With the passage of the New START treaty last
December and the preceding debate on the health of the United States'
nuclear weapons complex and strategic stockpile, a baseline strategy
was formed.
The administration announced a nuclear policy in the form of its
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in April 2010 and a budget outline to
support it, through the so-called 1251 Report, which was released in
May 2010 and then updated later that year in November. Along with my
colleagues from Livermore and Sandia, we issued a statement on the NPR
in April, parts of which I include here: ``We believe that the approach
outlined in the NPR, which excludes further nuclear testing and
includes the consideration of the full range of life extension option's
(refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from
different warheads and replacement of nuclear components based on
previously tested designs), provides the necessary technical
flexibility to manage the nuclear stockpile into the future with an
acceptable level of risk.''
I addressed these issues further in my testimony before this
Committee in July 2010, where I stated in general that I was encouraged
by the policy, and I said further that I viewed, ``the NNSA's fiscal
year 2011 budget request as a positive first step . . . '' However, I
added that, `` . . . I have concerns about sustaining the focus and an
appropriate budget over the several decades for which it will be
required.'' As I will discuss further in my testimony today, this
continues to be a concern.
The three laboratory directors were once again asked our opinion of
the updated 1251 Report, when it was released in November 2010. In
response to a December 2010 letter from the Chairman and Ranking Member
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the three of us stated that
``We are very pleased by the update to the 1251 Report, as it would
enable the laboratories to execute our requirements for ensuring a
safe, secure, reliable and effective stockpile under the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Plan.'' We continued further that, ``We
believe that, if enacted, the added funding outline in the Section 1251
Report update--for enhanced surveillance, pensions, facility
construction, and Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF),
among other programs--would establish a working funding level for a
balanced program that sustains the science, technology and engineering
base.''
I recognize, however, that in the interim, the country is now
confronting some very significant financial challenges. My comments
today recognize that situation and are cognizant that all Federal
programs will be facing budget constraints in the months and years
ahead.
health and vitality of the laboratory in support of the national
mission
When I testified before the Senate last July, the focus of my
remarks was on the ability of the Laboratory to execute the new
national strategy based on the funding in the President's fiscal year
2011 budget submission. At the subcommittee's behest, I would like to
outline what I believe are key elements for maintaining a healthy and
vital Los Alamos, one that can support the national needs of the
country. At the fundamental level, the Laboratory needs the best
scientists, engineers, technicians and support staff that can work in
multi-disciplinary teams on national security science challenges facing
the country. In order for us to be able to attract and retain the best
people, I believe that the following elements form a strong foundation
for the Laboratory:
A strong national commitment to compelling national
security missions;
Stable and adequate funding;
Diverse and broad cutting-edge scientific programs,
which attract the best and brightest scientific talent; and
Tools, facilities and infrastructure to accomplish the
above, such as: the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE),
the proposed Matter Radiation Interactions in Extremes (MaRIE)
facility, and exascale computing, among others.
If all the above elements are in place, the Nation will be able to
reap the benefits of a healthy Los Alamos. As director, I am
responsible to ensure that this is as true 15 years in the future as it
is today, even though no one can predict what then will be the
compelling challenges facing the country. I will address the current
status of each of these elements below.
strong national commitment to compelling national security missions
The Obama administration in April 2010 released its NPR that
updated the Nation's nuclear weapons policy. One of the five key
objectives of the NPR was ``sustaining a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear arsenal.'' The NPR discussed that this would be accomplished by
studying ``options for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability
of nuclear warheads on a case-by-case basis, consistent with the
congressionally-mandated Stockpile Management Program. The full range
of LEP [Life Extension Program] approaches will be considered:
refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from
different warheads, and replacement of nuclear components.'' The NPR
provided further detail on the fact that the ``U.S. nuclear stockpile
must be supported by a modern physical infrastructure . . . '' and that
the ``science, technology and engineering base, vital for stockpile
stewardship as well as providing insights for non-proliferation, must
be strengthened.''
The NPR was followed by a program plan and funding profile (the
revised 1251 Report) with an accompanying request for substantial
funding increases in the fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 budget
submissions. These policies and plans commit the NNSA's national
security enterprise to an aggressive body of work for the next 20+
years that includes completion of the current Life Extension Program
(LEP) for the W-76, starting studies to complete LEPs of the B61, W78,
and W88 and the construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement facility (CMRR) at Los Alamos and the Uranium Production
Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 plant.
The workforce at LANL is excited and energized to meet these
challenges which are daunting. Certifying the stockpile in the absence
of the ability to test (the last U.S. nuclear test was in 1992) has
provided one of the greatest technical challenges to ever face the
nuclear weapons complex and led to the creation of the science-based
Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP). At a high level, the SSP is
critical both to the annual assessment of the stockpile, as well as to
maturing the next generation of tools and technologies that will
support certification of future LEPs. It requires powerful experimental
capabilities to probe key questions facing an aging stockpile, as well
as the most capable supercomputers in the world to integrate our new
knowledge from experiments and validate this through comparison with
the data that we have from our underground test history.
I want to stress that we have learned a great deal about the
science and engineering of weapons and the detailed phenomena that have
to occur for a weapon to function properly. Contrary to what some have
argued, we are definitely not ``done'' with science--there are many
significant areas of work that remain to be done. There are critical
open questions that remain to be solved to retain our confidence in the
stockpile, and we cannot fully predict the scientific challenges that
are still ahead as it continues to age and goes through modernization.
As a nuclear weapons enterprise, we need to be fully utilizing the
tools of Stockpile Stewardship that are now online, ranging from the
Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility and LANSCE at
Los Alamos, to the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Livermore.
We also need to continue what will likely be a decade long march to
the next level of supercomputing performance, known as ``exascale
computing.'' One of the largest successes of Stockpile Stewardship has
been our advances in supercomputing capability, and specifically our
ability to model the complex phenomena that occur in a weapon. What we
have discovered is that with each improvement in simulation
performance, we see greater fidelity and develop an improved
understanding, as well as a further awareness of what we still do not
understand. Thus, moving to the next generation of computing is not a
luxury or simply speed for the sake of speed. It is essential to our
understanding of the challenges we face with the stockpile, in
particular as we move further away from our underground test
experience.
If funded according to the profile in the 1251 Report, this program
of work constitutes national commitment to a compelling national
security mission.
stable funding
Stable funding is another sign to the workforce that there is a
national commitment to the mission. In the national security science
area and weapons activities in particular, scientists of necessity
become involved in classified research and development (R&D).
Consequently, they disappear from the traditional forums of publication
and conferences that lead to advancement in their fields and once out
of sight it is very difficult to find opportunities to reenter this
very competitive arena. Before forgoing this career path, scientists
must judge if there is an opportunity for a career over several decades
and the best of them have many other choices available. A national
commitment and stable funding to go with it are essential elements to
enable that personal decision.
For a laboratory like Los Alamos, stable funding allows
institutional workforce planning to ensure that the right mix of skills
with the right mix of experience are available to the programs to
execute work today and into the future. With funding uncertainty and
the associated worries about downsizing coupled with pay freezes,
increased contribution to pension and medical plans, the best of our
workforce is difficult to retain. Currently for Los Alamos, with the
uncertainty in the fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 budgets, I
don't know what actions I should be taking--increasing the size of the
workforce or decreasing the size of the workforce.
broad and diverse science portfolio that can attract the best and
brightest
Over the years, I have engaged the national leadership about my
concern that the scientific capability that underpins the nuclear
weapons program has been squeezed by eroding funding, increasing costs
for facilities and security, and uncertainty over the future of the
program. This squeeze has impacted our ability to advance the science
to address the gaps in our understanding that must be closed for our
continued confidence in the nuclear deterrent. For example, we have had
to forgo some areas of research and have not fully utilized our major
experimental facilities like DARHT, LANSCE, and NIF. Additionally, we
have not consistently provided the most capable diagnostics and
instruments for our research. It is the knowledge developed from this
broad range of experimentation that is essential to validate our
simulation tools that forms the basis for confidence through the
science-based SSP.
In order to mitigate the consequences of these shortfalls in
support for our scientific capabilities, we have consciously found
funding from other sponsors that utilize some of the same science as
that needed by the weapons program, and in that way sustain and enrich
our capabilities that reside in the more than 2,500 Ph.Ds that are the
core of our science base. For instance, our technical staff does work
that is competitively selected for the Department of Energy's (DOE)
Offices of Science and Nuclear Energy, and NNSA's Office of Nuclear
Nonproliferation, that is, of course, very important in its own right.
Our researchers fare well in these competitions as they are recognized
as among the top scientists in the country, by numerous measures,
including the number of peer-reviewed publications. These non-weapons
programs serve to both attract top scientists to the Laboratory, and
they also build up fundamental scientific capability that can then be
further leveraged and applied to our core weapons program work.
In the case of Los Alamos, the intellectual seed corn has to be
attracted and incentivized to join our staff because of our remote
location and the heavy recruitment of U.S. citizens with technical
degrees from large corporations and research universities. As a March
25, 2011, New York Times article highlighted, we have tough competition
from today's Silicon Valley that can provide high salaries, stock
options and free iPads to new recruits. The good news is that typically
once we get the scientific talent to the Laboratory, they tend not to
leave because of the diverse set of scientific opportunities we are
able to offer. This is particularly true when our early-career
scientists develop a better understanding of our national security
missions in nuclear weapons, conventional explosives, materials
research, radiography, intelligence activities, and actinide chemistry
and plutonium science, to name just a few.
One common example of the path that many of our employees take from
newly hired postdoctoral candidate to highly trained weapons engineer
or designer can be found at our linear accelerator LANSCE. LANSCE is a
DOE national user facility, the largest such facility at an NNSA site,
as measured by the number of visits. LANSCE is a perfect microcosm of
the overall Laboratory. The facility is a proton accelerator supported
by NNSA. This single accelerator, however, among other things supports
Office of Science-funded work at our neutron scattering facility (Lujan
Center) and our isotope production facility; Weapons Activities work at
a proton radiography center, as well as at the Weapons Neutron Research
facility; and work for the Office of Nuclear Energy. A new physicist
will be hired to do unclassified science at LANSCE on the fundamentals
of materials, for instance, and then over time they have the
opportunity to start working on elements of our classified national
security activities. The people who remain in the program do so because
they believe in its scientific challenge and importance.
This same underlying science that supports the weapons program is
applied to other real national challenges, whether it is analyzing data
from radiation detectors in Japan to help understand the status of the
reactors and spent fuel rods or responding to the Gulf of Mexico
crisis. For example, our staff experienced in radiography were able to
immediately deploy to the Gulf of Mexico last year and quickly develop
a new capability to x-ray the Deep Horizon blowout preventer. At more
than a mile beneath the surface, we provided imagery using a sealed
source to help national decisionmakers better understand what was
occurring inside that device.
tools, facilities and infrastructure
The Nation has invested billions of dollars over many decades in
the scientific tools, facilities and infrastructure at Los Alamos. The
reality, though, is that much of that infrastructure has aged, and more
than 50 percent of our facilities are more than 40 years old. Los
Alamos has been working closely with NNSA to build strategies that
update the site's aging infrastructure.
A key element of that infrastructure, in terms of the required
national capability, is the replacement facility for the Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research facility that was completed in 1952 and was
discovered years later to reside on a seismic fault. The CMRR will
provide the infrastructure required for the Nation's ongoing plutonium
work, just as the Uranium Production Facility (UPF) at Y-12 will
provide the Nation's ability to work with uranium. The currently
operating plutonium and uranium facilities have both served our country
well over the last 60 years. However, with evolving safety and security
standards, these aging buildings now need to be replaced with more
efficient structures designed to meet modern-day requirements.
It is important to recognize, especially when I look at the overall
health and vitality of the Laboratory, that the infrastructure needs at
Los Alamos are much broader than just CMRR. Clearly, CMRR will be one
of the biggest line-item projects in front of this subcommittee, but
other smaller investments will be required that will help maintain the
science at the Laboratory. One example of this is LANSCE. We have been
working with this subcommittee, as well as with NNSA to ensure a path
forward for the enhanced maintenance of this machine that supports not
only NNSA's Defense Programs, but also our efforts with DOE's Offices
of Science and Nuclear Energy. We have been charting a path with DOE
and NNSA for the future of LANSCE and a follow-on materials science
capability called MaRIE. As I discussed earlier, it is the broader set
of science programs that enable us to attract the next generation of
scientists. Absent these types of tools, we will be hard pressed to
accomplish our recruitment goals.
challenges
We at Los Alamos, like most Americans, appreciate the significant
fiscal constraints we are facing as a nation. However, I am
increasingly concerned about the final outcome of the fiscal year 2011
budget process and whether proposed reductions below the 1251 baseline
will be enacted, and if so, whether that will be a trend into fiscal
year 2012 and beyond. At Los Alamos alone, the differential in funding
shifts that may arise from the current debate in Congress amounts to
the equivalent of 20 percent of our annual budget. Absorbing such a
contraction beyond fiscal year 2011 would undoubtedly result in
workforce actions, not to mention the destabilizing effect that would
take years to correct.
Pressure from mounting pension requirements and on carryover
balances have left very little flexibility remaining should our budget
fall below the 1251 Report guidance. This concern is compounded, if not
amplified, by the proposed funding reductions to the DOE's Science and
Energy programs and NNSA's Nuclear Nonproliferation programs which
would have significant negative impacts on the capabilities supporting
the weapons program at Los Alamos, and the overall health of the
Laboratory. As I discussed above, our research base is very broad, and
we have significant crosscutting activity that provides additional
support apart from the weapons program. A significant loss of funding
in these areas will have impacts on our R&D workforce in the areas that
the weapons program has not been able to fully support. It is the
aggregate expertise and varied capabilities derived from multiple
sources that comprise this great institution's technical strength in
addressing issues of national importance.
In addition, the re-commitment to the nuclear weapons enterprise
embodied in the NPR has, I believe, engendered a sense of stability and
dedication in our workforce over the past year. To reverse course and
curtail our modest hiring efforts at this point will result in losing
that momentum and, I predict, will result in a drain of technical
experts via retirements and the pursuit of careers in institutions that
can offer that stability. I would offer that the people, infrastructure
and science that underlie our nuclear defense represent an expertise
that warrants stability over the long term, independent of short-term
fiscal constraints.
conclusion
With all the turmoil and uncertainty in the world, now more than
ever, the Nation needs a strong national defense. Los Alamos is proud
of the contributions we have made for more than 65 years, providing
innovative and effective science and engineering to confront a broad
range of the country's evolving security challenges. For our nuclear
deterrent, the Nation has a clear policy together with a program of
work and a funding profile for its execution. Regrettably, at the same
time, the Federal budget is under tremendous strain. The uncertainty in
the budget process and its eventual outcome puts that policy and
program, as well as the health of the Laboratory, at risk. The
disconnect between the budget, on the one hand, and the policy and
program on the other, leads to instability and the inability to
ultimately meet the goals.
Los Alamos is prepared, as always, to do its very best to deliver
on our missions with our most creative science and engineering.
However, aligning the budget with a program balanced across near-term
goals and the underlying science will be essential for success. If the
budget cannot support the current program then the policy framework and
program to carry it out must be revisited.
Mr. Chairman, I again want to thank you for the opportunity to come
before the subcommittee and outline my concerns. I would be happy to
answer any questions you might have.
______
Prepared Statement by Hon. George H. Miller
opening remarks
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for your
continuing support for the Nation's Stockpile Stewardship Program. I am
George Miller, Director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
(LLNL). We are one of the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) nuclear design laboratories responsible
for helping sustain the safety, security, and effectiveness of our
strategic deterrent.
The Nation not only depends on the success of our efforts in
stockpile stewardship but also leverages the capabilities of the NNSA
Laboratories to develop innovative solutions to major 21st century
challenges in nuclear security, international and domestic security,
and energy and environmental security.
summary
I believe that the program outlined in the President's
budget request for fiscal year 2012 provides a measured
approach to meeting the mission needs and sustaining the
capabilities and deterrent value of the Nation's nuclear
security enterprise through investments in a skilled,
knowledgeable, and able workforce; advanced scientific
facilities and production facilities; and a safe, secure, and
effective stockpile.
The tools of stockpile stewardship are being
effectively applied to assess and, where necessary, refurbish
and sustain our Nation's nuclear deterrent. Your investment in
``flagship'' capabilities in high-performance computing and the
National Ignition Facility at LLNL are producing excellent
results.
It is important that we continue to move forward with
refurbishing the aging stockpile. The inevitable changes that
we detect through our surveillance and assessment programs
increase risk with every year and must be mitigated. In
particular, it is imperative that we begin the study of options
for refurbishing the W78 warhead to address evolving issues
identified in the annual assessment of this weapon system.
High-performance simulations accomplished using the
tools available today have demonstrated that still unresolved
issues will require exascale-level computing to continue to
stay on top of the stockpile concerns and challenges ahead.
Achieving exascale computing is a technically challenging
endeavor, similar to the effort in the 1990s to develop
terascale computing. This new capability will have other
positive impacts on our country's national security and
competitiveness. I am pleased that a program to initiate this
effort is included in the President's budget request and
strongly urge support for an aggressive research and
development effort to create the technologies necessary to
achieve and apply exascale computing.
The science, technology, and engineering capabilities
that are the foundation of the Stockpile Stewardship Program
and the core capabilities of the NNSA Laboratories have been
successfully leveraged to help solve some of the country's most
important and urgent issues in defense, energy, and
environment.
The national investment in the Stockpile Stewardship
Program has produced impressive science, technology, and
engineering capabilities at the NNSA Laboratories that should
be carefully nurtured and preserved. However, like all
treasures, if these assets are neglected, they and the key
personnel that we rely on will disappear very quickly. I
believe that they deserve your careful consideration as the
country faces both very difficult budget decisions and a
challenging future in a dangerous world.
introduction
I am here to provide my technical assessment of the NNSA weapons
program activities as outlined in the President's fiscal year 2012
budget request and of the ability of our Laboratory to sustain
capabilities and fulfill mission requirements. The request reflects the
need to deal with an aging stockpile and ensure the long-term health of
the Nation's nuclear security enterprise by making substantial
investments in a skilled workforce, facilities, and life-extension
program activities. My testimony will focus on activities at Livermore
and the importance of the budgeted investments to allow our Laboratory
to accomplish the missions assigned to us. Without a healthy nuclear
security enterprise, the Nation puts in jeopardy the safety, security,
and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent over the long run as well as
the ability of the NNSA Laboratories to apply outstanding science,
technology, and engineering to a wide range of important national
security challenges.
The Nation's nuclear security strategy requires a stable and
measured Stockpile Stewardship Program that is supported by the long-
term commitment of successive administrations and Congress with
sufficient funding to meet mission requirements. The President's
proposed budget increase reverses the declining trend of the last
several years and restores funding to a level sufficient to
reinvigorate and sustain the Nation's program. These investments are
urgently needed--in the face of enormous overall budget pressures--in
all three major areas of stockpile stewardship: (1) life extension
programs; (2) modernization of facilities and infrastructure; and (3)
the science, technology, and engineering base. In my view, delays in
providing adequate funding has both immediate, short-term consequences
and raise longer-term sustainment issues.
life extension programs
It is very important that we address the specific issues discovered
in our aging stockpile through the surveillance program and the review
processes supporting our annual assessments before these concerns
worsen. The role of any Life Extension Program (LEP) is to fix issues
that impact--or will soon impact--overall system effectiveness and take
actions that will extend the stockpile life. Failure to address these
issues can have immediate and drastic consequences for the viability of
the deterrent our national security strategy relies on.
Included in the request is funding for the Life Extension Study of
the W78 Air Force Minuteman III ICBM warhead. This effort is vitally
needed. $26 million was requested in fiscal year 2011 to begin a 6.1
Phase study to identify and evaluate the LEP. I am concerned because
the start of the 6.1 Phase study has been delayed. In fiscal year 2012,
the administration requested $51 million to continue W78 LEP
development in the 6.2/6.2A Phase (feasibility, planning, and costing
studies). The official NNSA guidance designates LLNL as the lead
nuclear design laboratory for the W78 LEP.
It is important to begin the study activities on the W78 warhead
because today it constitutes the majority of the ICBM leg of the triad
and it has been deployed on the Minuteman III for more than 31 years.
The warhead is currently beyond its planned service life and it will
take a 10-year effort to study and then refurbish the necessary
systems. We need to address concerns identified in surveillance of W78
units and reported in annual assessments. There are issues with
material aging and compatibility, which can impact components within
the nuclear explosive package. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)
has been monitoring W78 aging characteristics and has assessed that
aging ``has not affected the safety, reliability, or performance of the
W78 to date;'' however, ``the condition is progressive and beyond
current predictive capabilities.'' LLNL has concurred with these
concerns in our peer review role as part of the annual assessment
process. An important function of the study is to evaluate the
different approaches available to refurbish the warhead--as were
outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review--and assess the impacts of
including additional safety and security features.
modernization of facilities and infrastructure
Infrastructure modernization projects account for the largest
portion of the proposed budget increase, and two of the projects are
particularly high in cost and high in priority: the Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility at LANL and a new
Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, TN. I fully
support these modernization projects and urge that as the cost
baselines are further defined, any cost changes that occur be
accommodated without upsetting the overall delicate balance of the
Stockpile Stewardship Program.
science, technology, and engineering base
The fiscal year 2012 President's budget request for science,
technology, and engineering capabilities is, in my view, prudent but
constrained and austere: the level of activity will be less than that
in fiscal year 2007. This level of capability provides the fundamental
stockpile stewardship activities that permit surveillance, assessments,
experiments, and computer simulations to ensure the aging stockpile and
the refurbished weapons are safe, secure, and effective.
Weapons Surveillance
Weapons surveillance activities aim to predict and detect the
effects of aging and other stockpile issues. The programmed increase in
funding is vitally needed to step up the rate of stockpile surveillance
and become more proficient at detecting and predicting potential
problems early enough for our smaller complex to take measured action
within limited resources. This area has suffered over the last few
years and more sophisticated tools are needed to study how aging alters
the physical characteristics of weapon materials and how these changes
affect weapon effectiveness and safety.
Assessments
The Stockpile Stewardship Program includes a comprehensive set of
activities to annually assess each weapon system and to address issues
that arise. It is particularly important for processes to actively
engage both centers of nuclear design expertise--LLNL and LANL--to
provide independent assessments. In all areas of importance, advice
from more than one independent source is crucial to the decisionmaking
process. Our assessments require rigorous scientific and engineering
demonstration and evaluation and are benefiting from the development of
Uncertainty Quantification, a methodology that is increasing the rigor
of weapon certification and the quality of annual assessments.
Experiments and Simulations
Because we do not perform nuclear tests, simulations are a major
tool for providing assessment of the stockpile. These simulations
require experimental validation, which in the absence of nuclear
testing, is provided by very sophisticated non-nuclear experiments.
Through these experiments and simulations, Laboratory scientists and
engineers improve their understanding of nuclear weapon performance and
exercise the necessary base of specialized skills in support of
stockpile stewardship.
There remain several key areas, such as energy balance and boost
physics, where we still lack adequate knowledge. Predictive Capability
Framework campaigns utilize our advanced stockpile stewardship tools to
fill gaps in knowledge about nuclear weapon performance relevant to
existing or expected issues about stockpiled weapons. These activities
integrate the use of state-of-the-art high-performance computers, high-
fidelity simulation models, and data gathered from state-of-the-art
experimental facilities. This cutting-edge research provides both the
basis for stockpile stewardship and the tools by which the Laboratory
experts make judgments about the health, safety, security, and
effectiveness of the stockpile.
Overall, LLNL conducts a wide range of experiments in support of
the Stockpile Stewardship Program. For example, to enhance weapons
surveillance, we developed and applied state-of-the-art radiographic
methods to evaluate the health of the high-explosive system used to
initiate weapon detonation. In fiscal year 2010 we also conducted
important hydrodynamics experiments at the Contained Firing Facility at
LLNL and at the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamics Test Facility at
LANL and many types of experiments to better understand material
properties at extreme conditions. These include experiments at the
National Ignition Facility.
I will focus on high-performance computing and activities at the
National Ignition Facility, which illustrate the outstanding work at
our Laboratory in support of stockpile stewardship and the challenging
science and technology efforts required for the Stockpile Stewardship
Program.
high-performance computing and simulations
Since the Stockpile Stewardship Program began in 1985, the NNSA
weapons laboratories--working closely with industry--have made
remarkable strides in high-performance computing. Our initial goal was
to have a machine that could perform 100 trillion floating point
operations per second (teraflops) available within a decade. Through a
very concerted effort, the community achieved that goal, which provides
the capability projected to be the minimum threshold for initial 3D
simulations of weapons performance. With simulations on the 100-
teraflops IBM Purple, we observed important phenomena that had never
been seen before. We also learned that to accurately simulate these
phenomena we needed supercomputers that perform much better and
modeling techniques that are significantly more powerful and capable.
Computer technology has since advanced by about a factor of 10
(1,000 teraflops or 1 petaflops). Currently China leads the world with
a 2.5-petaflops machine. The expanding international interest in
supercomputing superiority is indicative of the technology's great
value in advancing science and technology on many fronts and
accelerating product development in industry.
Improved high-performance computing capabilities are to better meet
stockpile stewardship challenges. To better understand phenomena in
areas such as boost, improvements in both the physics models and
resolution are required. Model improvements, in turn, necessitate
further advances in computing: 1,000-petaflops technology (1 exaflops)
is required. Exascale computing is also needed to fully implement
Uncertainty Quantification, the formal methodology to increase the
rigor of LEP weapon certification and the quality of annual
assessments. The methodology requires thousands of three-dimensional
weapon simulations to be run to estimate uncertainties. Simulations
with today's capability tell us that we need better resolution, better
physics models, and the running of many more simulations than possible
with today's machines to reach the level of understanding and analysis
required to fulfill mission needs.
Sequoia
Through the NNSA ASC program, Livermore and IBM are poised to make
the next major advance in supercomputing. Delivery of the 20-petaflops
IBM Sequoia is to begin in December 2011. Sequoia's processing speed is
equivalent to every person on Earth completing 3 million calculations
per second. This nearly-factor-of-10 leapfrog advance over current
capabilities is based on third-generation IBM BlueGene technology.
Unclassified science calculations will be performed on Sequoia in 2012,
transitioning after these tests to classified use in 2013.
Since 2009, researchers have been using Dawn, a 500-teraflops
initial delivery system for Sequoia. All three NNSA Laboratories run
cutting-edge weapons science problems on Dawn and use the machine to
prepare codes for use on Sequoia. For example, LANL performed the
largest ever high-resolution turbulence simulations and uncovered new
phenomena related to important open questions. The results are being
used to improve physics models under development within Advanced
Simulation and Computing. Sandia has been testing and improving the
speed at which some of the key algorithms in their large simulation
codes will run on Sequoia's 1.6 million processors.
Among other applications, LLNL scientists are developing new tools
on Dawn to study complex laser-plasma interactions and to predict and
interpret the results of experiments at the National Ignition Facility.
More generally, in preparation for Sequoia's arrival, we are making
significant progress in the development of algorithms that will run
efficiently on the machine's architecture, applications that are
tolerant to the many ``faults'' that can be expected in long runs using
over a million processors, tools to analyze and help balance the
workload among processors, debugging methodology, and a variety of data
visualization and interpretation tools.
Exascale Initiative
I am very pleased to note that the fiscal year 2012 President's
budget request includes $126 million to support start of an exascale
initiative in an effort to sustain U.S. leadership in supercomputing to
support DOE/NNSA missions. This is a joint effort between NNSA and
DOE's Office of Science. The path forward beyond the 20-petaflops IBM
Sequoia toward exascale computing offers exciting opportunities to
address a wide range of vital national needs, but it presents
tremendously difficult technical challenges. We are working with DOE
and NNSA leadership, other laboratories, and industry to size and scope
the technical work program.
the national ignition facility
The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is the world's premier laser
facility. Since the facility's dedication in May 2009, NIF with its 192
laser beams has performed exceptionally well. It is proving to be a
remarkably reliable and precise system. Citing groundbreaking technical
achievement and exemplary project management, the Project Management
Institute (PMI) named NIF as the 2010 Project of the Year. PMI honored
NIF for ``pushing beyond the state-of-the-art'' and lauded the effort
as ``a stellar example of how properly applied project management
excellence can bring together global teams to deliver a project of this
scale and importance efficiently.''
NIF is the focal point for the National Ignition Campaign (NIC).
The purpose of NIC is to determine the feasibility of fusion ignition
and transition NIF from a construction project to routine experimental
operations for weapons and basic science by the end of fiscal year
2012. With respect to fusion, NIC has two major goals: execution of DT
ignition experiments starting in fiscal year 2010 for the purpose of
demonstrating ignition and development of a reliable, repeatable
ignition platform for weapons physics, basic science, and energy
research by the conclusion of NIC at the end of fiscal year 2012. A
national program, NIC includes as partnering institutions the three
NNSA Laboratories, the University of Rochester Laboratory for Laser
Energetics, and General Atomics. The NIC team has established
collaborations with the Atomic Weapons Establishment in United Kingdom,
Commissariat ` l'Energie Atomique in France, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, and many others.
The campaign is guided by the NIC Execution Plan (currently, NIC EP
Revision 4), which describes the scope, schedule, and budget for the
campaign. NIC is an exceedingly complex, frontier science and
engineering project. Adjustments to the optimal path forward are made
based on information learned from experiments. Accordingly, NIC
accomplishments and plans are scrutinized by several external high-
level committees: the NNSA Ignition Review Panel chaired by DOE
Undersecretary for Science Steve Koonin, the NIC Technical Review
Committee chaired by former Oak Ridge National Laboratory Director Al
Trivelpiece, and the LLNL Directorate Review Committee chaired by
former NNSA Administrator General John Gordon, USAF, Ret. The NIC
reviews have been very positive and encouraging.
The Ignition Campaign
There have been a number of important successes at NIF. In the
hohlraum energetics campaign, the NIC team demonstrated that the
interaction between the laser beams and the target could be
satisfactorily controlled and that the conditions necessary to implode
the hydrogen fuel could be achieved. Creation of the proper implosion
conditions was a major concern of the original National Academies of
Science Study that led to the construction of NIF.
We have also demonstrated the integration of all of the subsystems
needed for ignition. Cryogenically cooled ignition targets with a layer
of solid tritium, hydrogen, and deuterium have been successfully
created and imploded. One shot in particular achieved a record-setting
1.3 x 1014 neutrons in a purposely low-yield configuration.
NIC continues to make excellent progress and the results of
implosion experiments are very encouraging. We continue to learn much
from the experiments and see no ``show stoppers.'' We are optimistic
about success in achieving fusion ignition but mindful that NIC is an
extremely challenging undertaking that is at the frontiers of science
and technology. Current plans are to complete the current fusion
ignition and burn campaign in spring or summer of 2012.
Stockpile Stewardship and Science Experiments
In late February-March 2011, we conducted the most recent series of
highly successful campaigns of high-energy-density physics experiments
in support of stockpile stewardship on NIF. One campaign focused on
radiation transport to gather data to validate the capability of our
physics simulation codes to model phenomena very important to weapon
performance. Altogether, 16 experiments were performed in 11 shot days.
These included the first experiments performed that included
diagnostics to provide time-resolved radiographic data. Preliminary
comparisons of data taken are in reasonable agreement with pre-shot
predictions. A second campaign focused on developing and using a
technique for gathering equation-of-state data to characterize the
properties of highly compressed (but unheated) materials--in this case,
tantalum and carbon. Gathered data from such experiments are needed for
scientific advances that underpin both stockpile stewardship and
planetary science. These experiments are important steps on the path
toward transforming NIF to a national and international user facility
in fiscal year 2013.
nuclear nonproliferation and counterterrorism
A key aspect of our nuclear security efforts is applying our
expertise in nuclear weapons science and technology, nuclear sensors
and detection, and arms control verification technologies to programs
in the NNSA Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. For example, to
help secure vulnerable weapons-useable and radiological materials,
Livermore-led teams have been recovering radioisotopic thermonuclear
generators, which contain highly radioactive heat sources, from remote
areas of Russia. Additionally, we are developing advanced technologies
to detect nuclear and radiological materials. Two of the technologies
received R&D100 Awards, the Oscars of invention, in 2010. Complementing
these efforts is a program focused on nuclear counterterrorism.
The Laboratory provides both technical support to ongoing arms
control negotiations and technology development. Livermore's
underground nuclear explosion monitoring program is a longstanding
nonproliferation program that provides the technical underpinning for
both the domestic and international monitoring needed to uncover
clandestine underground nuclear tests. We couple data from global
seismic networks with LLNL's supercomputing capability to interpret the
seismic data and model the earth, thereby improving U.S. capability to
detect possible proliferation. This program also has strong links to
international seismic safety and science engagement activities.
importance of people and program growth to the health of stockpile
stewardship
Long-term success in stockpile stewardship fundamentally depends on
the quality of people in the program. If the Nation is not confident in
the expertise and technical judgments of the stewards, the Nation will
not have confidence in the safety, security, and effectiveness of our
nuclear deterrent. The specialized technical skills and expertise
required for nuclear weapons work take a long time to develop through
hands-on experience and mentoring by our very best. Program stability--
based on sustained bi-partisan support and sufficient funding over the
long term--is critically important to executing a balanced, integrated
Stockpile Stewardship Program. We welcome the support provided by the
administration and Congress on the importance of the NNSA Laboratories'
work in maintaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
Program Leverage
An important benefit of a strong Stockpile Stewardship Program is
that this foundational program enables the NNSA Laboratories to meet
broader national security objectives by applying their unique
capabilities and multidisciplinary approach to problem solving. With a
focus on national security, the NNSA Laboratories are a vital part of
the Nation's science and technology infrastructure. We partner with
non-NNSA components of DOE, the Department of Defense, the Intelligence
Community, the Department of Homeland Security, and many other agencies
such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the
National Institutes of Health. In particular, nuclear weapons expertise
at LLNL is directly applicable to the nuclear security challenges of
proliferation and terrorism. Other areas of national defense, domestic
and international security, and energy and environment security also
benefit from the Laboratory's broad scientific and technical base and
international leadership in areas such as high-performance computing.
These activities also further strengthen our science and technology
workforce, add vitality to the Laboratory, and spin new ideas and
additional capabilities into and out of the weapons program and other
national security programs. Very importantly, they serve as a pipeline
to bring top talent to LLNL so that we continue to provide the Nation
with outstanding stockpile stewards. A broader base of national
security programs at the NNSA Laboratories can never be a substitute
for a strong Stockpile Stewardship Program. Likewise, these programs
are not a distraction from our defining mission and responsibilities to
sustain the Nation's nuclear deterrent.
Continuing to foster partnerships between Livermore and the broader
national security community is a key component of our strategy for
helping solve the country's most important problems and sustaining
science and technology excellence and intellectual vitality at the
Laboratory. I am very concerned about the possibility of drastic
reductions in the investments in science and technology broadly across
Federal departments and agencies in these times of very constrained
budgets. Investments in science, technology, and engineering provide an
important spark of innovation that is a basis for our country's
national security, energy and environmental security, and continuing
economic competitiveness.
Leveraging High-Performance Computing
I emphasize the importance of high-performance computing in my
testimony because it is a cornerstone of the Stockpile Stewardship
Program, a core strength of our laboratory, and critical to many of our
programs for non-weapons-program sponsors. Some of our recent
accomplishments provide a sense of the breadth of our high-performance
computing activities and the many program areas they support:
Support in response to environmental emergencies. The
DOE's National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) at
LLNL is providing timely, state-of-the-art, predictions of
fallout from the damaged nuclear reactors after the recent
earthquake/tsunami in Japan. As the hub of the Department of
Homeland Security's Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric
Assessment Center (IMAAC), NARAC also provided plume
predictions of the fire on the Deepwater Horizon oil platform
and forecast the particulates that might be released from
surface-oil burns.
Persistent surveillance. Laboratory scientists
developed an innovative data-processing ``pipeline'' designed
to help the Department of Defense monitor tens of square
kilometers of terrain from the skies and provide combat support
by detecting in real time potentially important events in
streaming video data.
Third-generation conventional munitions. LLNL is using
state-of-the-art engineering codes, advanced design
capabilities, and expertise in materials to pursue, with the
Department of Defense, development of third-generation
munitions that are more effective against precision targets
while, at the same time, limiting collateral damage. This
effort represents a superb example of the power of high-
performance simulation: a munitions program went from concept
to completion of qualification testing in 10 months, providing
significant advantages to the warfighter.
Nuclear test monitoring. Laboratory seismologists
developed improved 3D models of seismic wave travel time,
greatly increasing the accuracy with which seismic events can
be located and the ability to differentiate earthquakes and
nuclear explosions.
Cyber security and intelligence support. Livermore has
developed advanced methods for gleaning information from
extremely large-scale relational databases (graphs) and
analyzing networks together with fast, accurate tools for
large-scale text analysis.
Microbial detection. Expertise in bioinformatics
enabled Laboratory researchers to develop microbial detection
array with 388,000 probes that fit on a glass slide, able to
detect or identify more than 2,000 viruses and 900 bacteria
within 24 hours.
Aerodynamic drag reduction for semi-trailer trucks.
Simulations with LLNL's fluid dynamics codes identified
critical drag-reduction regions around semi-trailer trucks,
with results verified by full-scale wind tunnel tests. Properly
placed drag reduction devices could increase semi-trailer truck
fuel efficiency by as much as 12 percent.
Award-winning software tools. Livermore researchers
have developed advanced tools--including several R&D100 Award
winners--for solving linear equations, debugging and compiling
programs, and visualizing extremely large data sets that are
made available to and downloaded thousands of times per year by
the user community.
Fusion energy. New developments at LLNL in lasers and
materials technologies could provide a much shorter path to
carbon-free energy.
Directed energy. Laboratory researchers are developing
exciting new capabilities in lasers that could have important
impacts on national security.
Carbon capture. Laboratory scientists are using
supercomputers to design small-molecule catalysts that can be
adapted to capture CO2 from power-plant emissions.
closing remarks
Again, I thank the subcommittee for its continuing support for the
Nation's Stockpile Stewardship Program and the terrific people at the
LLNL. As I have stated, I believe that the program outlined in the
President's budget request for fiscal year 2012 provides a measured
approach to meeting the mission needs and sustaining the long-term
health of the Nation's nuclear security enterprise through investment
in a skilled workforce, facilities, and the stockpile.
The investments will help us move forward refurbishment programs in
response to inevitable changes in aging weapons that require our
attention. In particular, initiating the study of the options for
refurbishing the W78 warhead is urgently needed.
The heart of our successful Stockpile Stewardship Program is our
skilled workforce, who are the current generation of a worthy line of
stewards in the service of our Nation. I have emphasized the importance
of investing in the workforce and the tools that Laboratory scientists
and engineers are effectively applying to assess and refurbish the
nuclear deterrent. Our accomplishments in the areas of NIF experiments
and high-performance computing are particularly noteworthy. In both
areas, future opportunities are very exciting, and in particular, I
urge that the Nation undertake a forceful effort in exascale computing
because of its importance to stockpile stewardship and, more broadly,
the Nation's security and economic future.
With sustained support for the Stockpile Stewardship Program, our
Laboratory can best serve the country as a broad-based national
security laboratory, developing innovative solutions to major 21st
century challenges in nuclear security, international and domestic
security, and energy and environmental security.
______
Prepared Statement by Dr. Paul J. Hommert
introduction
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and distinguished members
of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, thank
you for the opportunity to testify. I am Paul Hommert, President and
Director of Sandia National Laboratories. Sandia is a multiprogram
national security laboratory owned by the U.S. Government and operated
by Sandia Corporation \1\ for the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA).
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\1\ Sandia Corporation is a subsidiary of the Lockheed Martin
Corporation under Department of Energy prime contract no. DE-AC04-
94AL85000.
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Sandia is one of the three NNSA laboratories with responsibility
for stockpile stewardship and annual assessment of the Nation's nuclear
weapons. Within the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, Sandia is uniquely
responsible for the systems engineering and integration of the nuclear
weapons in the stockpile and for the design, development, and
qualification of nonnuclear components of nuclear weapons. While
nuclear weapons remain Sandia's core mission, the science, technology,
and engineering capabilities required to support this mission position
us to support other aspects of national security as well. Indeed, there
is natural, increasingly significant synergy between our core mission
and our broader national security work. This broader role involves
research and development in nonproliferation, counterterrorism, energy
security, defense, and homeland security.
My statement today will provide an update since my testimony of
July 15, 2010, before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Starting
from an overall perspective of the nuclear weapons program and the
challenges facing us since the beginning of the Cold War, I will refer
to the following major issues: (1) the U.S. nuclear stockpile
assessment, (2) the life extension programs (LEPs) with emphasis on the
B61 LEP, and (3) the status of the capability base needed to support
our mission. All these issues will be viewed within the context of the
administration's request to Congress for the fiscal year 2012 budget.
major points of this testimony
1. It is my view that we are now entering a new era for the U.S.
nuclear deterrent. The nuclear weapons enterprise must address for the
first time the following three imperatives: continuing to further the
tools of stewardship, upgrading production infrastructure, and
importantly, modernizing the nuclear stockpile. Such an environment
creates funding demands not seen in recent decades, and it will require
rebalancing the program, along with continued emphasis on strong
program management.
2. The most immediate stockpile challenge is the B61 life
extension. In the context of my responsibilities, it is my judgment
that the full nonnuclear scope of the B61 must be executed on the
proposed schedule. Both the current scope and the schedule are
demanding and can be achieved only by continuing the accelerating
effort called for by the current program.
3. Our nuclear weapons competencies impact our broader national
security work. In turn, to sustain and sharpen those competencies,
Sandia relies on this broader work. The symbiotic relationship between
the nuclear weapons and broader national security missions prevents
insularity and creates a challenging, vigorous scientific and
engineering environment that attracts and retains the new talent that
we need. Such an environment is essential to succeed against the
challenges we now face.
perspective of the nuclear weapons program
It is my view that we are now entering a new era for the U.S.
nuclear deterrent. The nuclear weapons enterprise must address for the
first time the following three imperatives: continuing to further the
tools of stewardship, upgrading production infrastructure, and
importantly, modernizing the nuclear stockpile. Such an environment
creates funding demands not seen in recent decades, and it will require
rebalancing the program, along with continued emphasis on strong
program management. Our nation has been and continues to be fully
committed to the U.S. nuclear deterrent as reflected by the near- and
long-term nuclear weapons policy outlined in the National Posture
Review (April 2010). The contribution of Sandia National Laboratories
is crucial to the success of the next era of the U.S. nuclear
deterrent.
The current nuclear stockpile was largely developed, produced, and
tested in the 1970s and 1980s, during the Cold War. It was the time of
the arms race, as new nuclear systems were frequently being developed
and fielded.
After the 1992 moratorium on underground testing, the nuclear
weapons program went into its next phase, science-based stockpile
stewardship. For the first 15 years of this program, creating the
scientific tools and knowledge required in the absence of underground
nuclear testing was a compelling grand challenge for the U.S. nuclear
weapons program. At Sandia, the primary challenge following the
moratorium was to find best solutions for sustaining, assessing, and
certifying the stockpile against a full range of environments--most
notably, the numerous radiation environments our products must survive.
The advanced tools and deeper scientific understanding we developed
have been applied to our annual assessment of the stockpile, to
stockpile maintenance activities such as replacement of limited-life
components, and to the qualification of the W76-1 life extension
program. Science-based stockpile stewardship has been immensely
successful in generating the required scientific competencies and
resources, but it was not accompanied by a broad-based effort to extend
the lifetime of the nuclear arsenal.
Now, some 20 years since the end of the Cold War, we have a
stockpile that has become significantly smaller and older. Considering
our insights into and the average age of the stockpile, we have clearly
reached a point at which we must conduct full-scale engineering
development and related production activities to extend the service
life of the nuclear arsenal. This work can be accomplished only by
relying on the tools of stewardship and a revitalized, appropriately
sized production capability. Let me restate that, in my view, the
nuclear weapons enterprise has never before faced the combined need to
further stewardship, address production infrastructure, and
importantly, modernize the stockpile.
As we enter the new era of the nuclear deterrent, I am pleased to
see that a clear strategic direction has been outlined for U.S. nuclear
weapons policy in the Nuclear Posture Review and that a collective
guidance for implementation has been provided through the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Plan, the updated section 1251 report, and
the administration's fiscal year 2012 budget request to Congress. The
strategic direction for the nuclear weapons policy is also consistent
with the New START, which was ratified by the U.S. Senate in December
2010 and the Russian Federation Duma in January 2011. In this context,
we are actively positioning Sandia to fulfill its responsibilities in
support of the Nation's nuclear deterrent. We are confident in our
ability to do so.
In their totality, the documents describing the future of the U.S.
nuclear deterrent represent a well-founded, achievable path forward,
which I understand and support. However, we must recognize that a
significant body of work is required to sustain a strong nuclear
deterrent into the next two decades, and we must ensure that the
resources are commensurate with the requirements and expectations.
Specifically, I can be confident that, as an institution, we are
positioned to execute stockpile management and deterrence policy to the
priorities delineated in the policy documents referred above if the
fiscal year 2011 budget is appropriated at the level of the
administration's request. Furthermore, the overall fiscal year 2012
weapons activities budget, if authorized and fully appropriated as
requested by the President, will provide the basis for continuing the
program consistent with national policy. This level of funding reflects
a national commitment to strengthening the security of our country and
allies by sustaining a smaller nuclear stockpile that is safe, secure,
effective, and reliable. Deviation from this funding, however, will
impact the scope and/or schedule of the life extension programs.
the u.s. nuclear stockpile assessment
Mission and Product Space
Sandia is responsible for the systems engineering and integration
of the nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile, and it is the nonnuclear
component design agency for NNSA. The components that we design ensure
that the weapons will perform as intended when authorized through the
U.S. command and control structure, and that they remain safe and
secure otherwise. These critical functions are provided through our
core products of arming, fuzing, and firing systems (AF&Fs), neutron
generators, gas transfer systems, and surety systems. As we prepare to
execute these responsibilities for 21st century strategic deterrence,
we are facing new challenges.
While many critical tools were developed in the stewardship era,
full-scale engineering development was almost entirely absent during
this period. In addition, since we last put a system such as the B61
into the stockpile, the technologies on which nonnuclear components
rely have changed dramatically. Thus we must ensure that a new
generation of component and system engineers is prepared to work to the
exacting standards of nuclear weapons and that we can fully adapt to
and take advantage of new technologies. I am confident that Sandia is
prepared to meet these challenges due in no small measure to the fact
that, over the past 20 years, work we have done in other national
security arenas has allowed us to attract and train the talent that
will bring new technology to high-consequence high-reliability
engineering applications. In the decade since we began design on the
W76-1 LEP, one additional challenge has grown in complexity. Sandia's
products must also be robust against cyber risk. We believe it is vital
to assess cyber risk and develop technologies to manage this risk for
the next generation of life extension programs. All these realities
bear directly and significantly on Sandia's responsibilities as we
embark on the next era of the nuclear deterrent.
Stockpile Surveillance and Assessment
Stockpile surveillance and assessment play a crucial role in
assuring the nuclear deterrent. Through these activities, we develop
knowledge about the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile.
This knowledge provides the technical basis for our annual assessment
findings and is reported to the President through the annual assessment
process. Through this process, we have been, and remain, able to assess
the Nation's stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable. The Department of
Energy fiscal year 2011 Congressional Budget Request places high
priority on stockpile surveillance. I strongly agree with this
emphasis, but there is important further work to be done. Specifically,
the surveillance transformation plan was established to better align
our surveillance program with the challenges of an aging and smaller
stockpile. My fiscal year 2010 stockpile assessment letter to the
secretaries of energy and defense and to the chairman of the Nuclear
Weapons Council noted the need for a strong focus to complete
surveillance transformation, which aims to shift the program from being
reactive to becoming predictive and thus allowing us to better
anticipate stockpile performance degradation and to schedule required
actions.
Today we are surveilling a stockpile for which most of the weapons
were designed at a time when long design life was not typically a high-
priority design requirement. The radar for the first B61 bomb, for
example, was originally designed for a 5-year lifetime; today there are
B61s in the stockpile with components manufactured in the late 1960s.
It is a credit to our stockpile stewardship program that we have the
technical knowledge base to support continued confidence in these
weapon systems as they age. However, our surveillance efforts, coupled
with the fact of the age of the stockpile, indicate that it is
imperative that we begin to execute on replacing the aging components
as the lead time for these activities will be 5 to 10 years on a
system-by-system basis.
the life extension programs
The B61 Life Extension Program
The most immediate stockpile challenge for sustaining the deterrent
is to extend the service life of the B61 bomb under expansive product
requirements and a demanding schedule. The primary driver for the
schedule of the B61 LEP is the fact that critical nonnuclear components
are exhibiting age-related performance degradation. Another driver for
the schedule is the deployment of the F35 Joint Strike Fighter, which
requires a new digital interface for the B61. Specific component
issues, as well as the overall age of the system, lead me to conclude
that we need to approach this LEP with a resolute commitment to address
end of life, degradation, and technology obsolescence to ensure long-
term safety, security, and effectiveness.
Notably, the scale and complexity of this LEP will be much larger
than that of the W76 Trident II SLBM warhead LEP, which is now in
production. To extend the lifetime of the B61 with a first production
unit in 2017, full appropriation of the fiscal year 2011 funding
requested by the administration is critical. We must complete the
design definition in fiscal year 2011 to create a firm understanding of
system requirements and thus fully establish future-year funding needs.
Total cost estimates for the B61 LEP are subject to change until the
design definition and requirements are finalized at the end of fiscal
year 2011.
To overcome technology obsolescence, it is important that we
develop new technologies to insert into the B61. That is why we are
conducting considerable technology maturation work in fiscal year 2011.
Technology maturation is a rigorous approach Sandia applies to
developing new technologies, from the earliest conceptual designs
through full-scale product realization and ultimately to insertion into
the stockpile. We use a construct of technology readiness levels, first
implemented at the Department of Defense and then NASA, and we
implement a series of technical and programmatic reviews to ensure that
the maturity level of new technologies is understood and associated
risks are effectively managed before the new technologies are used in a
life extension baseline design. For the B61 LEP, we have more than 40
product realization teams designing components and subsystems and
maturing technologies. We are aggressively staffing this program to
accomplish our objectives on the current schedule. In July 2010, we had
a core of approximately 80 staff on the B61 project. Staffing levels
are now more than 3 times that number and will continue to increase. We
are planning to have a core of 400 staff on the project by the end of
fiscal year 2011. These staffing levels are enabled by fiscal year 2011
funding provided through the continuing resolutions. However, should
fiscal year 2011 funding deviate significantly from the current levels,
we will not be able to sustain staffing levels, and the scope and/or
schedule of the project will have to be adjusted.
The B61 LEP schedule and scope are also, of course, heavily
dependent on the appropriated funding in fiscal year 2012 and beyond;
multiyear sustained funding is required to bring this program to
successful completion. The success of the B61 LEP also requires the
necessary support for the nuclear explosive package agency (Los Alamos
National Laboratory) and the production complex.
Other Life Extension Programs
The B61 LEP is one in a series of programs with timelines extending
to 2035 that have been documented in the Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Plan. Among them are the W88 ALT, the W78 LEP, and likely a
weapon system associated with long-range stand-off delivery vehicles.
Funding for the W88 ALT has been identified in the updated Section
1251 Report. Sandia is pursuing work on the W88 ALT, which involves
replacing the AF&F system and the neutron generators.
The Nuclear Posture Review recommended ``initiating a study of LEP
options for the W78 ICBM warhead, including the possibility of using
the resulting warhead also on SLBMs to reduce the number of warhead
types'' (p. xiv). Although the Department of Energy fiscal year 2011
Congressional Budget Request includes funding for a W78 LEP with
completion of a first production unit in 2021, work for this program
has not been authorized by the continuing resolution under which we are
operating. Should the W78 LEP be authorized, Sandia is ready to support
the warhead systems engineering and integration effort and to fully
leverage the work done on the recently completed feasibility study for
a common integrated AF&F system. Using an envelope of the requirements
for the W78 and the W88, and even the W87 and the U.K. system, our
study concluded that this approach was technically feasible, including
improvements in safety and security enabled by miniaturization of
electronics. Savings in weight and volume, at a premium in reentry
systems, can be used for those additional safety and security features.
The study results have been briefed to the Nuclear Weapons Council and
are being used to inform decisions regarding the scope, schedule, and
interplay between the W78 and W88 life extensions. Such an approach
offers the potential for significant cost savings for the overall
Department of Defense and Department of Energy nuclear weapons
enterprise.
Our Capability Base Supports the Mission
Over the next 25 years, we will rise to meet the challenges of a
demanding program described in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Plan, but we also must establish the basis for long-term stability. For
Sandia, stability should be viewed in the context of three pillars:
infrastructure, broad national security work, and workforce.
Essential Infrastructure and Capabilities
Sandia's capabilities are essential to its full life cycle
responsibilities for the stockpile: from exploratory concept definition
to design, development, qualification, testing, and ultimately to
ongoing stockpile surveillance and assessment. Let me point out a few
examples.
The NNSA complex transformation plan designated Sandia as the Major
Environmental Test Center of Excellence for the entire nuclear weapons
program. Our facilities and equipment in this area are extensive: (1)
20 test facilities at Sandia-New Mexico; (2) the Tonopah Test Range in
Nevada; and (3) the Weapon Evaluation Test Laboratory in Amarillo, TX.
We use environmental test capabilities to simulate the full range of
mechanical, thermal, electrical, explosive, and radiation environments
that nuclear weapons must withstand, including those associated with
postulated accident scenarios. In addition to these experimental and
test facilities, Sandia's high-performance computing capabilities are
vital tools for our mission responsibilities in stockpile surveillance,
certification, and qualification, and they have proved to be
indispensable in our broader national security work.
I am very pleased that Test Capabilities Revitalization Phase 2
funding has been requested in the fiscal year 2012 weapons activities
budget. This funding will enable us to renovate our suite of mechanical
environment test facilities, many of which were commissioned in the
1950s and 1960s. These facilities are essential to support the design
and qualification of the B61 life extension and subsequent LEPs.
Across the nuclear weapons complex, there is a shortage of funding
for infrastructure, maintenance, and operation upgrades included in the
Readiness in the Technical Base of Facilities program. However,
mentioned in the updated Section 1251 Report is the Tonopah Test Range
in Nevada, one example that I want to highlight not so much as a
funding issue but as an essential mission requirement. Starting in
fiscal year 2013, development flight tests must be conducted at the
Tonopah Test Range for the B61 life extension.
Another capability that Sandia stewards for the nuclear weapons
program and also for the Department of Energy's nonproliferation
payloads is the microelectronics research and fabrication facility,
where we design and fabricate an array of unique microelectronics, as
well as specialty optical components and microelectromechanical system
devices. This capability includes a national ``trusted foundry'' for
radiation-hardened microelectronics. We have been providing
microelectronic components to the nuclear stockpile at the highest
level of trust since 1978 and to the Department of Energy's
nonproliferation payloads since 1982. In 2009, Sandia received Class 1A
Trusted Accreditation (the highest level of accreditation) from the
Department of Defense for Trusted Design and Foundry Services and is
the only government entity with this accreditation for both design and
foundry operations. We must recapitalize the tooling and equipment in
our silicon fabrication facility, much of which dates back about 15
years in an industry where technology changes almost every 2 years.
Recapitalization will ensure production of the radiation-hardened
components required by the B61 LEP and W88 ALT; this facility is the
only source for the key microelectronics required for the life
extension work specified. Recapitalization must begin soon in order to
eliminate the risk of running existing equipment to failure. Sandia is
therefore working with NNSA on a 4-year funding plan to stage the
retooling (starting in fiscal year 2013). We have plans for meeting
programmatic requirements with a staged funding profile.
I mentioned earlier the need to continue strengthening the tools of
stewardship. Let me mention two such areas for Sandia. First, a stable
funding position is essential for the material science that underpins
the broad range of materials for nonnuclear components in order to move
to a more predictive basis for an older, smaller stockpile and prepare
for the life extensions. We continue to work with NNSA to ensure
adequate prioritization for nonnuclear components material science in
fiscal year 2012 and out-year budgets. Second, I am pleased to see
budget stability being brought to the area of radiation hardness. As I
discussed in my July 2010 testimony, I believe this is an essential
element of our strategic nuclear deterrent. We continue to advance the
scientific basis for confidently certifying the stockpile to radiation
hardness requirements in the absence of nuclear testing. We are also
pursuing intrinsically radiation-hardened designs for use in future
life extensions such as the W88 ALT and W78 LEP.
Synergy between Our Nuclear Weapons Mission and Broader National
Security Work
Today's national security challenges are highly diverse. The NNSA
laboratories are contributing solutions to the complex national
security challenges. Indeed, as mentioned in the Stockpile Stewardship
and Management Plan Summary, ``while NNSA nuclear weapons activities
are clearly focused on the strategic deterrence aspects of the NNSA
mission, they also inform and support with critical capabilities other
aspects of national security'' (p. 7). In turn, to sustain and sharpen
these competencies, Sandia relies on its broader national security
work. The symbiotic relationship between the nuclear weapons and
broader national security missions prevents insularity and creates a
challenging, vigorous scientific and engineering environment that
attracts and retains the new talent that we need. Such an environment
is essential to succeed against the challenges we now face. The
following examples highlight the way in which this symbiotic
relationship works.
Sandia developed synthetic aperture radar (SAR) technology, which
was made possible by our extensive design and development work for
radars for nuclear weapon fuzing. This technology has been enhanced and
is currently used by the Department of Defense. The extensive SAR work
has sharpened our radar design competencies and kept Sandia aligned
with advances in radar technology, such as radar frequency integrated
circuits. We are now applying these modern technologies to the design
of the replacement radar for the B61 LEP.
Another example is our work in cyber security. Sandia's
responsibilities for nuclear weapons include weapon system
architectures and components to support the highest standards of
command and control--U.S. nuclear weapons must always work when
authorized by the President, and never work otherwise. Our technical
expertise in this area was the foundation for contributions to broader
national security problems associated with cyber threats. In turn, our
life extension work will take advantage of the modern, state-of-the-art
capabilities developed for broader national security.
A third example demonstrates how these synergies have worked within
the NNSA family of programs. For the past 10 years, Sandia has been
leveraging the unique capabilities of our microelectronics research and
fabrication facility for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. In this
effort, we designed, developed, and deployed the next generation of
satellite-based treaty monitoring technology, called the ``enhanced
optical sensor.'' In turn, we have used the advancements of the Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation satellite project in the nuclear weapons
program.
Finally, I want to acknowledge an important step in
institutionalizing the relationship between the nuclear weapons and
broader national security missions. In July 2010, NNSA, the Department
of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence have signed a governance charter,
which provides a framework for the participating agencies to coordinate
shared, long-term planning for the science, technology, and engineering
capabilities of Department of Energy national laboratories that will
contribute to the Nation's broader national security missions.
Workforce
Our talented people are our most fundamental capability. Given the
scope and nature of our work, it is mandatory to continue attracting,
retaining, and training a highly capable workforce. To do so, we must:
(1) ensure that our work is aligned with the national purpose; (2)
create a climate of innovation and creativity that inspires our
workforce; and (3) create a balanced work environment that is both
responsive to the fiscal realities of our times and attractive to the
talented staff we need in the future.
Today we are facing a number of challenges. Currently, 37 percent
of the experienced technical staff in Sandia's weapon system and
component design organizations are over the age of 55. Their remaining
careers will not span the upcoming life extension programs. This
reality puts a premium going forward on stable commitment to the LEPs.
The life extensions provide opportunities for our new technical staff
to work closely with our experienced designers: from advanced concept
development to component design and qualification, and ultimately to
the production and fielding of nuclear weapon systems. Finally, fiscal
realities have forced us to reduce costs by addressing the funding
liabilities in our pension program, restructuring the healthcare
benefits, and simplifying internal processes. All these actions were
necessary, but in my view, they can go no further without compromising
our ability to attract and retain.
At Sandia, we are focused on creating an environment that reflects
our management's vision for success by coupling the experience acquired
from our past work with new tools and modern technologies. Such an
environment will foster innovation and provide foundational technical
and scientific strength to support the stockpile over the long term.
The multidisciplinary team we are assembling for the B61 LEP reflects
this environment in which the powerful stewardship tools we acquired in
the past are being adapted to meet future needs and the latest
technologies and innovative designs are coupled with the rigor that
comes from experience.
conclusions
As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, ``as long as nuclear
weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear arsenal'' (p. iii). As we enter the new era of the
nuclear deterrent, I am pleased to see that a clear strategic direction
has been outlined for U.S. nuclear weapons policy in the Nuclear
Posture Review and that a collective guidance for implementation has
been provided through the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan,
the updated Section 1251 Report, and the administration's fiscal year
2012 budget request to Congress. The strategic direction for the
nuclear weapons policy is also consistent with the New START, which was
ratified by the U.S. Senate in December 2010 and the Russian Federation
Duma in January 2011. In this context, we are actively positioning
Sandia to fulfill its responsibilities in support of the Nation's
nuclear deterrent. We are confident in our ability to do so.
The documents referenced above represent a well-founded, achievable
path forward, which I understand and support. However, we must
recognize that a significant body of work is required to sustain a
strong nuclear deterrent into the next two decades, and we must ensure
that the resources are commensurate with the requirements and
expectations. Specifically, I can be confident that, as an institution,
we are positioned to execute stockpile management and deterrence policy
to the priorities delineated in the policy documents referred above if
the fiscal year 2011 budget is appropriated at the level of the
administration's request. Furthermore, the overall fiscal year 2012
weapons activities budget, if authorized and fully appropriated as
requested by the President, will provide the basis for continuing the
program consistent with national policy. This level of funding reflects
a national commitment to strengthening the security of our country and
allies by sustaining a smaller nuclear stockpile that is safe, secure,
effective, and reliable. Deviation from this funding, however, will
impact the scope and/or schedule of the life extension programs. The
fact that the three national security laboratory directors were invited
to speak before you today and answer your questions is a clear
indication of the leadership role of Congress in authorizing a path
forward for U.S. nuclear deterrence.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
In the interest of time, we asked you to sort of
consolidate all the statements here, but I would like to take
the opportunity to ask each of you what might be your major
concern or primary issue that you might like to address at this
point, in case we don't raise a question about it.
Why don't we start over on this side. Dr. Hommert?
Dr. Hommert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In my written testimony, I raised three issues. The first
is something that has already been mentioned, that we're at a
very pivotal time with respect to the program and the multiple
demands of maintaining the strength of our science base. The
need to execute the LEPs, and the need to have the
infrastructure commensurate with that, is creating a very
substantial demand on the system. I think we have to look at
that very actively. We have to demand the highest standards of
project management, as Tom has alluded to. But, it is a very
fundamental shift of the state of our weapons program, to take
on that breadth of commitment.
The second thing I'll mention that's most immediate, for us
at Sandia, is the execution of the B61 LEP. The target First-
Production Unit (FPU) date for that is 2017. To be at an FPU in
that timeframe, that's right upon us now. So, the urgency of
the resolution of the fiscal year 2011 budget, where we're
staffing up now to hold to that timeframe, is an immediate
issue for us at our laboratory. As an example, we need to be
flight testing development units in 2013. So, there's very
little time for us to adjust, if we're to hold that schedule.
Very important issue.
The last thing I would just highlight is an issue of
sustaining the people competence, long term, for the
institution and in support of the deterrent, and to highlight--
I think this is true for all of the laboratories--the
importance of the broader national security work that we do and
what I would call the mutual reinforcing value of the work we
do in other national security challenge areas to interplan and
strengthen the basis of our workforce for supporting a nuclear
deterrent, going forward. That's an important issue that I
think now has become almost inseparable from how we would
support the deterrent, going forward.
So, thank you.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Dr. Miller.
Dr. Miller. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for inviting
us today, and for your continuing support of these critically
important national programs.
The main points I'd like to summarize are, first that the
fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 budgets that have been
submitted by the President for your consideration are good
first steps. As many of us have mentioned, I think the critical
issue is sustaining those budgets over successive
administrations and successive Congresses, is critical to the
long-term prospect of putting the nuclear deterrent on a firm
footing.
The tools that you have so wisely invested in, are now
being effectively used to assess the stockpile today. It's
critically important that we move forward and take the
necessary actions that we learn from those assessments. In the
case of an issue that LLNL is concerned about, it's getting on
with a study to look at how we might refurbish the ICBM
warhead, the W78. It is aging. We know there are issues. We
just need to get on with a study to tell us and you, the
decisionmakers, what options are the best ways of refurbishing
this warhead so that it can continue to provide the deterrence
that is so important.
The final area that I would again emphasize is the
importance of the science and technology that is derived from
our NNSA mission, and the way in which that is leveraged to
help the laboratories work on some of the country's most
important problems. These are issues from supporting our
warfighters in Afghanistan and as Administrator D'Agostino
mentioned support of national and international emergencies,
like what happened in the Gulf and what has happened in Japan,
and at the other end of the spectrum, working to help defend
this country against terrorists and cyberthreats.
So, this is a very precious resource, in my view. In these
very difficult budget times, I think it deserves your careful
consideration. In my judgment, it's critical not only for
national security, but also for the economic future of this
country.
Senator Nelson. Admiral Donald?
Admiral Donald. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sessions, and
Senator Shaheen, thank you very much for allowing me to appear
before you today and discuss my program, the Naval Reactors
Program.
I would start off, first and foremost, by just
acknowledging that what I spend the bulk of my time doing--I
wake up every morning and go to bed every evening with my
charter, and that is the safe and effective operation of naval
nuclear propulsion plants. I don't think it should be lost on
anyone that we operate 103 reactor plants. We operate them
around the world, globally. We are welcome in over 150 ports
worldwide. The reason we are able to do that, and including
operating in the vicinity of cities in the United States, is
that people trust us. They trust us because of our record of
success. They trust us to deal with small problems before they
become big problems, and to also be open and transparent with
them, as far as how our program operates, and to ensure that
we're doing good technical work.
The success of the program: We've been around now for over
60 years. We've been operating reactor plants at sea since
1955, when Nautilus went to sea. We've steamed 145 million
miles safely without a reactor accident, without a radiological
incident that effects the environment or people. That record is
attributable to a couple of things; first and foremost,
technical expertise and the devotion to the work that we do.
But, as much as anything, it has been the very strong and
committed support from this subcommittee and from Congress in
general. It allows us the latitude to do the technical work
that we need to do and to work on small problems before they
become big problems, and again, a key to our success.
Mr. D'Agostino has highlighted three key projects that
we're starting right now in support of national security. Those
are certainly challenging projects. We understand that. But,
it's also certainly within our expertise and experience to be
successful in those projects. We've completed ship designs;
most recently, the Virginia is the new class of submarine at
sea, is held up as the hallmark of acquisition programs in the
United States Navy right now. We're completing another design
for the A-1B reactor plant; this is for the CVN-78, the Gerald
R. Ford. So, we know how to do these things, and are ready to
do it.
What's critical right now, though, is, we're in the early
stages of these very complex projects. The funding, early on,
is critically important, because now we're setting design
parameters, we're setting operational concepts for these plants
that will, for the large part, define what the cost, schedule,
and capabilities of these plants will be by the time they
arrive at sea, when the first Ohio replacement goes to sea in
2029. We're doing that right now. Since our equipment tends to
be the first that has to be there for the construction start in
2019, we are really in the very meat of the work to do to
define what this plant is going to look like and what it's
going to cost.
That is where I would ask for your consideration, looking
at our budgets, looking at the request that we've made, to
ensure that we get off to a good start on these projects, that
we have the design maturity that will guarantee success, and
that we will be successful in what it is we go about doing.
Thank you very much for your time.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Dr. Cook.
Dr. Cook. My principal issue, concern, and direction is to
execute the national strategy that was outlined in the NPR, the
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Report, something we call
the section 3113 report, 1251 report, as you mentioned, and now
a ratified New START Treaty.
As the program has changed, we've modified our program
structure and management structure for execution. As you look
at the President's budget, you'll see a 3.1-percent increase in
science and weapons activities, a 4.8-percent increase in
stockpile support, and a 21-percent increase in infrastructure.
The reason for that ties to many of the things that you've
mentioned and problems that we're well aware of across the
complex.
So, to name a few. Although we often talk in terms of
projects, the UPF at Y-12 and the CMRR facility at LANL, in
fact, these are basic capabilities for the Nation. One deals
with uranium components, one deals with plutonium components
and the necessary underpinning of science, technology, and full
manufacturing. For example, when one really looks at UPF, it is
a factory. It's not just a building. It's the basic capability
of the Nation for dealing with uranium components. At LANL,
it's not only a facility we're putting in place for actinide
research and development, but will have the plutonium stores
for the Nation. It will allow us to use other capabilities in a
more effective way.
I mentioned the management structure. In order to enable
effective execution, we've asked the management and operations
contractors, both at Y-12 and at LANL, who have parent
companies who are, in fact, experienced and capable in nuclear
areas, Bechtel and BWXT, to name just a few. That is based on
the fact that we know we have to do these new builds. They are
capability builds, but they're new nuclear builds, and they
have to be done to modern safety and security standards.
This all ties into stockpile deliveries for DOD. While, a
few years ago, we had just one LEP in operation--and we still
do, that's the full build of the life-extended W76 warhead that
goes out to sea--we, today, have, also, the B61 study--the
engineering prestudy and the cost study that we'll complete at
the end of this year. We have requested approval to begin the
study for the W78 warhead, as Dr. Miller mentioned, and look
for adaptable interoperability we could have in two legs of the
deterrent.
That's quite a set of things. There are certainly other
things, such as high explosives pressing at Pantex, which we
have turned on to execute. But, that's what's on our screen.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Dr. Anastasio.
Dr. Anastasio. Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions, Senator
Shaheen.
First, let me thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your kind
remarks in your opening.
I would just like to personally thank this committee for
not only all the support the NNSA missions have received over
many years, but also LANL and myself, personally. I really
appreciate the support of this committee. So, thank you for
that.
When I think about LANL, my number-one thought is about the
general role of the laboratory. We're a national security
science laboratory, and the thing that I worry the most about
is, are we a healthy, vital institution to carry out our
missions and responsibilities? As we've heard, those are clear,
from the NPR that flow down through Stockpile Stewardship and
Management plan and the budget profile the administration has
submitted. The question before this committee and Congress is,
is there funding available, in these difficult times the
country faces, to fund this activity?
For me, as lab director, one of the special
responsibilities we all have is not only, ``Can we carry out
our mission today?'' but will we be able to do that 15 or 20
years from now, as well. Of course, that's all about, not only
``Do we have adequate funding now?'' but also we have a stable
funding profile that we can plan to, so that we can make sure
that the workforce is available that has all the special
diverse and deep capabilities that are necessary to meet these
mission requirements that are so challenging technically?''
Of course, the budget's been under some stress for some
time. We have been working hard to try to mitigate that budget
stress, and you've heard some of the strategies. Not only can
we take the science and engineering that's so important for the
nuclear weapons program, and use it to support other critical
national missions around nonproliferation or countering
terrorist threats, Intelligence Community work, DOD support, et
cetera--not only can we do that, but we've also designed the
efforts that we go after with other sponsors to supplement the
science and technology base of the laboratory that the core
program, and Mr. D'Agostino's program, is not fully able to
support. So, we've tried to mitigate the constraints he has on
his budget by seeking funds from other sponsors to help support
that fundamental capability.
So, when I think about the future, it's not only, ``Do we
have adequate funding?''--the challenge that you face for the
NNSA programs--but, it's even the broader spectrum of national
security programs that this Congress is contemplating that will
really impact the health and vitality of the institution and
our ability to carry out our mission today and well into the
future.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
We'll begin 8-minute rounds for questioning.
My first question relates to weapons funding and gets right
to the heart of it. It goes to, once again, Dr. D'Agostino and
Dr. Cook. Under the CRs, the weapons activities budget request
for fiscal year 2011 for NNSA was provided. This is a
substantial increase, some $625 million above the fiscal year
2010 funding level. On the other hand, there is now talk that a
permanent budget for the balance of fiscal year 2011 may be
$200 to $300 million lower than the fiscal year 2011 budget
request, the level at which the weapons program has been
operating. What impact would a reduction in fiscal year 2011
funding have on the weapons activities programs, given that
we're now half way through the fiscal year?
Mr. D'Agostino. I'll be glad to start, sir. I'd ask Don to
follow up.
Senator Nelson. That would be fine.
Mr. D'Agostino. It would have a significant impact, Mr.
Chairman. Our ability to execute funds effectively depends a
great deal on knowledge of the path forward. We're blessed to
have the President request it and Congress follow, and allow us
to proceed at the President's request in this area. Even with
this uncertainty, Don has been executing, with the
laboratories, to work on the program that we have requested and
that the Senate has allowed us to move forward with.
There is this uncertainty, of course, when we look at the
debates that happen back and forth. It tends to color the
ability to plan and has me thinking about, ``Well, should I
hire up in order to do the B61 work at Sandia?'' For example--
the many tens, and even hundreds, of people that are required
to put this in place. Because, if it doesn't come through, I
might have to fire them. This kind of cycling is very bad for
the workforce. It's very inefficient. At the lower levels
themselves, if we ended up with a lower level, of course--what
would be authorized and appropriated--then, of course, we would
have to start making some very significant cuts, because we've
started the year at this higher rate.
Don, you might be able to provide some more specifics.
Dr. Cook. Yes. My answer, sir, would be that it would be a
substantial change from where we are. With the anomaly in the
CR, we have chosen not to waste time. We have a number of
weapon systems that are operating beyond their original design
lifetime. The infrastructure projects that we must execute
across the board are at very key and sensitive steps in design,
preparing for execution. The hiring has been going on. The
national strategy has been made clear. So, at this point--and
particularly now shortly close to halfway through the fiscal
year--in fact, any reduction would have a very substantial
effect.
Senator Nelson. The effect of halfway through the year is,
of course, doubling the impact, also catching you in the middle
of hiring decisions, no ability to plan until we know what the
number would be. So, we would appreciate you making that clear
for the record.
My colleague has also indicated a concern about that. We're
going to engage in cuts, we need to know exactly what we're
doing, and we have to do it in a responsible way, consistent
with what decisions we've made and expectations we have
following the New START treaty ratification, as well.
Admiral Donald, we're going to talk a little bit about
naval reactors funding. The fiscal year 2012 funding level for
the Office of Naval Reactors is approximately $127 million
below the fiscal year 2011 request and the amount available for
your office under the CR. Can you explain to us what impact
this CR has had on Office of Naval Reactors development work
for the Ohio-class replacement reactor? Are there other areas
where the CR is impacting the naval reactors?
Admiral Donald. Yes, sir. What it has meant, so far, as I
discussed in my earlier statement, is, it's put us behind, as
far as the work that we're doing to do the concept development
and the design work to prepare ourselves to get into
construction of key components and to do the work we need to do
to make sure that design is mature at the time we start
construction in 2019.
Specifically, on the Ohio replacement program, this is the
design for the reactor plant, and I have to be in
synchronization with the Navy as they're designing the rest of
the ship, and as I am designing, from the Navy side, the
remainder of the steamplant that goes with it. So, there's a
very closely coupled relationship here. If I get out of sync
with them, then that will not only potentially delay the ship,
it'll also increase cost.
When we look at where we are right now, if I were held at
the CR level, our estimate is, is that we'd be looking at a 6-
to 9-month delay in the delivery of the ship. Now, that's a
long way out, but if you look at the compression of the
schedule and what we have to do between now and 2019, compared
to what we have done in the past, on Virginia, on the Ford
aircraft carriers, we are pretty comfortable in saying that
will be a delay of somewhere between 6 to 9 months.
Similarly, on the Navy side, if there were reductions in
funding on the Navy side that remained in the CR for the rest
of the year, you looked at the entire ship, you would be
talking to a 1- to 2-year delay, potentially, in the delivery
of the ship.
There are also personnel costs associated with that, and
hiring. We would not be able to hire, our estimate right now
is, somewhere on the order of 100 to 150 people to support the
designers that we'd need to get in place to do that work. You
can't ramp that up overnight, because these are highly
technically sophisticated individuals. They need experience in
what they're doing. We're in the middle of a demographic change
in our business, where we have a lot of senior folks ready to
retire. We want to transfer that knowledge over to the younger
folks and help them become more effective at what they're doing
in the design work.
Then we would be looking at potentially having to lay
people off, both in the shipyards and in our laboratories. Our
estimate, if we stayed at the CR level, would be somewhere on
the order of 50 people. That would just be the beginning of
where we would start.
So, it's a significant impact. Again, very early in the
design work, where there are really two key technical
challenges that we're looking at in this design. The first is,
we want to build a reactor plant--a reactor core that will last
for the life of the ship. This is a 40-plus-year ship. We've
done life-of-the-ship cores for Virginia-class at 33 years.
We've never gone to 40. You would ask, ``Why would you want to
do that?'' If we can do that and eliminate that lengthy
refueling overhaul in midlife, like we do for the Ohios right
now, then the potential exists that we would not have to have
as many Ohio replacements right now as we do Ohios. We have 14.
We would be looking to buy 12 of those ships instead of 14,
because you've bought more operational availability if it's not
sitting in the shipyard. There are technical challenges to
that. We believe we are capable of meeting that challenge.
That's key to this early design work that we're doing.
The second thing we're putting on this ship is an electric
drive. We're changing the propulsion mode from the standard
steam turbine reduction to electric drive. What that brings you
is enhanced quieting. In a submarine, stealth is everything. A
deterrent is not really a deterrent if people can find it. So,
we want to make sure it cannot be found. Given the fact that
this ship will be operating out to 2080, we feel that it's
necessary to make the investment upfront in this stealth
technology to ensure that it is a viable asset well into the
future, long after we're gone from this business.
So, those two key technical challenges, the importance of
the early investment in the design, that's where I'm concerned.
If I can't get that investment now, and get those parameters
and that design work done now, and the right people in place,
puts that at risk.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you very much.
It's difficult to overstate the fiscal crisis this Nation
is in. Admiral Mullen has said it's the greatest threat to our
national security--our debt. This year, we will spend $3.8
trillion and we'll bring in $2.2 trillion. Forty cents of every
dollar is borrowed that we're spending today. People know that
I believe in a strong Defense Department, so the reporters,
first thing they want to ask is, ``Well, is the Defense
Department immune, Senator Sessions? You want to cut everything
else. But, is Defense Department immune?'' DOD is not immune.
I'm just telling you, and neither is DOE. DOE came forward with
a budget request for next year of 9.5-percent increase. They're
not going to get a 9.5-percent increase. We don't have the
money.
What would happen in a private world? Since I'm the ranking
Republican on the Budget Committee and I'm living with these
numbers every day, forgive me; but you have to get in your head
that things have changed. That's all I'm telling you, that
things have changed. The ability to go first-rate on everything
we did and be able to proceed and pay big salaries and bonuses
and build new buildings and all--of course, I guess the weapons
complexes haven't seen a lot of increases in a long time,
there's no doubt about it. That's why we have to go forward.
But, every dollar has to be fought for, Mr. D'Agostino. If you
can build a building for a little less, you have to do it.
So, to follow up a little bit on the Chairman's question,
the House CR version calls for a $312-million reduction; the
Senate's; $185 million. Can you give us any more information
about how much could be sustained and how much can't be
sustained to reach your mission? Because I am of the long-term
view, I think that all of you share, that we have diminished
the weapons complex for a very, very long time, and it's at a
very dangerous stage. We made a national commitment. The
President made a commitment as part of this START Treaty.
What can we do? What can you tell us about how much you
have to have to stay on track without doing damage to the
program and ending up costing more than otherwise would be the
case?
Mr. D'Agostino?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir. I might start, and then, as you
wish, I'll let our colleagues add in, as well.
You had talked specifically about the $312 million and the
$185 million numbers, the differences, maybe, between House and
Senate at various stages of the bills. One is a 50-percent
reduction to our plans on increases and----
Senator Sessions. Fifty-percent reduction of what, now?
Mr. D'Agostino. The $312 million is about 50 percent of the
$624 million that was requested, the difference between----
Senator Sessions. Six---the 624 increase.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. All right.
Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
Senator Sessions. See, the American people are getting a
little confused about all this.
Mr. D'Agostino. Right.
Senator Sessions. You get an increase of 600 and you reduce
that increase to 300, and you say you have a cut. I guess you
have--since we started the year at the higher number, I guess
you can say that. But, the way our budget projections work is
that somebody projects it's going to increase it 3 percent, and
you say we're only going to increase 2 percent; they say that's
a cut. But, to the average American, that's not a cut.
Mr. D'Agostino. I understand, Senator. As you mentioned, we
are digging ourselves out of a hole.
Senator Sessions. But, you only get half as much increase
as you hoped to get.
Mr. D'Agostino. As a result of that, we won't be able to do
the type of program we put forward that we believe is necessary
for the NPR, specifically in three broad areas. We can delve
into the details as we have time to.
The first area is our work on the stockpile itself. At a
50-percent reduction--and, of course, we've been spending at
the higher rate, as authorized in the CR, so it is--it has a
magnifying effect--will result in significant changes to our
B61 life extension work, just to carry that particular problem
forward, this life extension is absolutely critical if we're
going to get the system modernized in place so that it
continues to support the Nation from fiscal year 2017 and
beyond. So, if we don't do this life extension work that we
have planned, it will have a grave impact on our ability to
maintain that particular warhead for our stockpile, which DOD
and the President both believe is necessary to do. That's a
huge upfront impact.
Senator Sessions. So, no money invested in that except for
the new money that you got?
Mr. D'Agostino. Certainly, we have existing money to
maintain the B61, which is what we call surveillance work. It's
like lifting the hood and looking inside the warhead and
maintaining it. But, our ability to move forward with the life
extension in time to meet our 2017 date will be impacted, and
we would have to scale back significantly the type of work, and
do the bare minimum necessary on that particular warhead.
The other significantly large area--that's an example in
directed stockpile work--that would be impacted, I believe, is
our ability to bring on board, for the Nation, a uranium and
plutonium capability. It will be impacted. It'll be pushed out
a few years. These are what have been called projects, but
which Dr. Cook correctly describes as national capabilities. I
believe the committee understands that these aren't just
capabilities to take care of our stockpile. They are, at a
minimum, that. They are a lot more than just taking care of our
stockpile. These are the capabilities that are absolutely
critical in order to work with plutonium and uranium, which is
absolutely necessary for us to do nuclear counterterrorism work
and do the nuclear nonproliferation work which many--including
myself--feel is part of our integrated national security--our
nuclear security mission space. All of this ties together.
We want to get out of buildings and capabilities that were
put in place in 1952. Even if we proceed at the President's
requested level, we'll have been in these facilities for close
to 70 years, as a matter of fact, because the capability won't
come on board for another 10 years or so. So, moving forward is
absolutely essential in order for us to maintain our stockpile
and to maintain the nuclear security work.
I've talked plenty. If you will, sir, I'd like Dr. Cook to
provide some background.
Senator Sessions. All right.
Dr. Cook. I'll add a few words. Let's see, the difficulty
is that, at the same time, we must replace 60-year-old
capabilities in special nuclear materials, uranium and
plutonium. We have weapon systems that are now operating beyond
their original design lifetimes. The President's fiscal year
2012 request is for the 20th year in which we have had a
moratorium on underground testing. So, if I start with one
point, it is, we must effectively put the complex to work, that
waiting further, not investing, is a clear decision to take on
additional risk in all three areas that I mentioned. Those are
fairly severe.
Now, if I can look to hope at all here, it is that we can
reform our management practices, as the Administrator said,
improve the way in which we're doing work. So, we're looking at
the industrial suppliers--I've already mentioned the parent
companies of LANL and Y-12, people who bring to the government
sector the best industrial practices. We're already moving
forward to directives reform, reform of the DOE directives in
which we are seeking to adopt consensus standards--ISO-2000,
ISO-9000, ISO-14000. I'll state an assertion that, in many
areas, not nuclear areas, is a better way to go to improve
speed, efficiency, and the conduct of all work. We can clearly
improve our management disciplines.
But, the core issue I'd start with is, if we don't
effectively put the complex to work, all aspects--research and
development, project development, rebuilding the capabilities,
and mainly manufacturing warheads, but based only on the
previously tested designs, with no new military capabilities or
requirements--that is clear. That's national policy. Waiting
will not make it better. I'm sure you understand that. But, we
could improve some of our business practices.
Senator Sessions. Admiral Donald.
Admiral Donald. I wouldn't want to walk out of here and
leave you with the impression, Senator Sessions, that we don't
understand the significance of the fiscal problem that we face.
But, also, I want to leave you also knowing that we view it as
our obligation to do the best that we can to operate as
efficiently as we possibly can. If you look at our budgets over
the last--really, since I've been in this job now, 6\1/2\
years, we've been relatively flat, essentially adjusted for
inflation. Even within that budget, we took on the project to
put our spent-fuel handling capability in place so that we
could transition from wet fuel storage in Idaho to dry fuel
storage to keep us in compliance with our Idaho agreements that
we entered into in the mid-1990s. We did that within our budget
and didn't come and ask for any additional funding to do that.
That came at a price, though, because the assumption was, if we
were tasked with new projects, we'd have to come to you and ask
you for some additional resources. What you see in our increase
in funding--the $125 million between fiscal year 2002 and
fiscal year 2011, and then the additional into fiscal year
2012--really reflects those three projects that Mr. D'Agostino
had mentioned. We're working against the clock on all three of
those projects. The Ohio replacement, I've already mentioned,
if we make decisions today to delay, it'll have the impact in
2029, when a replacement ship is not there to cover for the one
that went out in 2027. The prototype refueling, I'm working
against physics, because the fuel is being depleted in that
prototype right now. Not only is that where we're going to do
the derisking of the technology to build a core for Ohio
replacement, but that also is going to provide the training
platform for one-third of our nuclear operators that go out
into the fleet. So, I need to go and replace that capability,
as well.
Then finally, the spent fuel handling facility in Idaho--I
have a water pit out there that has 25 metric tons of spent
fuel in it, and some parts of it are over 50 years old. It
needs to be replaced. It's not at current code. It's not
particularly efficient. From our perspective, technically, it's
not a situation we want to live with much longer in the future.
That's the timeline that we're working to and why we've
come to you to ask you for this assistance for these programs.
Senator Sessions. Well, it's $84 billion over 10 years on
total program, and that's a lot of money. We just need you to
be thinking any way possible to keep those numbers at as
reasonable level as possible. But, the United States of America
cannot not have a reliable nuclear arsenal. It is not
acceptable. So, we have to find the money. I hope that you
won't take the view that some government people seem to take
sometimes that, ``I'm not going to affect any efficiencies. You
either give me money or I won't do the new project you want me
to do.'' But, no business operates that way, what businesses
have to wrestle with every day. Families have to make priority
choices, and we're asking you to do that because I want to
protect this program.
I do think $300 million is clearly too much of a reduction,
Mr. Chairman. Hopefully we can figure out a way not to go that
far.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all very much for being here this afternoon.
Mr. Chairman, I know that the Emerging Threats and
Capabilities Subcommittee normally handles the nonproliferation
portfolio, but it's come up a little bit in testimony, and so I
would like to raise the issue here and follow up on some of the
budget questions.
As you pointed out in your testimony, Mr. D'Agostino,
President Obama, in talking about the threat to this country,
pointed out that a nuclear weapon in the hands of terrorists is
probably the biggest threat that we all stay up nights worrying
about. I was really horrified to see that, according to
International Panel on Fissile Materials, the global stockpile
of highly enriched uranium, which is the easiest material for
terrorists to use to make a nuclear weapon, in 2010 was enough
to make more than 60,000 nuclear weapons. So, given the
insecure nature of these materials around the world, clearly
this is a threat that we should all take very seriously.
While I appreciate, and know that you all do, the need to
address efficiencies in our budget, and to deal with the
country's debt and deficit, I am concerned about the proposal
in the House's budget that would have cut $600 million from
nuclear nonproliferation programs. I wonder if you, Mr.
D'Agostino, or any of the other panel members, could speak to
what that would mean, in terms of what would not get done if
that cut is realized.
Mr. D'Agostino. Okay. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Absolutely. There is clearly a connection between these
investments in the weapons activities account of the
subcommittee's jurisdiction and how it impacts other elements
of NNSA. The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program
absolutely counts on Y12, for example, in order to be able to
have a place for this highly enriched uranium that we're
bringing back to be processed, characterized, put in a
situation so it can eventually be used as part of the national
stockpile to support the naval reactors program for propulsion
out into the future, as well as be available for downblending
into low-enriched uranium to turn this into, ultimately,
electricity for peaceful uses here in this country. So, these
investments in the weapons account are directly connected to
the nonproliferation program. I think that's an important
point. I think the subcommittee understands that.
I'm deeply concerned with the reductions in the
nonproliferation program. Again, these are reductions from the
request as Senator Sessions has pointed out--because what we
are in the process of doing is implementing an aggressive but
important program to lock down nuclear materials worldwide in 4
years. We don't do it by ourselves, of course. We do this in
partnership with over 100 countries. But, we do require
expertise from this country. Work that happens at Sandia, LANL,
and LLNL, in fact, provide the core expertise in order to say,
``What's the best security system to design in Russia? Or--and
how do we put it in place? How do we know that it is actually
in place and working as it should be?'' So, these laboratories
provide the foundational element of that. That $600 million
would have a direct impact on our ability to implement the
security--what we call first line of defense--secure the
material in place. It would also have an impact on our ability
to convert research reactors from highly-enriched uranium to
low-enriched uranium, a plan that we have laid out. We've
converted 70 reactors so far, but there are many more research
reactors that we know exist that we have a plan laid out to
convert these research reactors from HEU to LEU. It would
impact the ability for us to put radiation detectors at
seaports, land border crossings, airports, and the like.
Obviously, if we are faced with a reduction, if you will,
from our original plan, we will seek to fund the highest-
priority work, the most important work, first. But, an element
of maintaining nuclear security isn't just doing the security
work in place, it's making sure that other nations who are in
the process of bringing civil nuclear power do so in a way with
the appropriate nuclear safeguards in place. So, we have an
element of our program that is designed in order to help other
nations have the right nuclear safeguards in place.
I believe it would have a significant impact on our 4-year
lockdown effort. I think this is the effort where we have a
very clear direction that everyone feels is an important
direction to go to. That's essentially where we are right now.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Do we have a limit on our time?
Senator Nelson. Eight minutes.
Senator Shaheen. Okay.
Dr. Miller, you talked about your concern that we may lose
some of the best scientists and technicians if we're not able
to ensure future funding and a commitment to the program. I
wonder if you feel like we're currently investing enough in our
future workforce, and what kinds of things we ought to be doing
to ensure that we can attract the best and the brightest people
to the program.
Dr. Miller. Thank you very much, Senator.
Picking off of the recent conversations with Senator
Sessions and yourself at the laboratories--LLNL, in
particular--we have reduced the overall staffing at the
laboratory by about 2,000 people over the last 5 years.
Senator Shaheen. Two thousand out of how many?
Dr. Miller. Out of about 8,000. So, there were 8,000.
Senator Shaheen. Wow.
Dr. Miller. There are about 6,000 now.
Two years ago, I testified that I thought we were in danger
of losing the fundamental science, technology, and engineering
capability that the country relied on. That decline was
stabilized in 2010. We have seen, again in my words, modest
increases. Dr. Cook talked about 3 percent. That's only a
slight--a percent increase or so above the rate of inflation,
but it is positive. We have begun, under the CR and the
President's planned budgets for 2011 and 2012, we have started
growing that back to a level that, in my judgment, would be
sustainable over the long term. The same issue would occur if
there were substantial cuts in the nonproliferation program.
Again, these are substantial investments in fundamental people
that provide the technical capability to build radiation
monitors, and provide advice to the government.
In my view, as I testified 2 years ago, the most important
part of securing the talent at the laboratory is that the
scientists and engineers understand that they have a stable
future. They are very highly trained, very highly technically
qualified, and they want to be assured that they can work on
some of the country's most important problems. If they can, we
don't have difficulty hiring them, nor do we have difficulty
retaining them. But, when there are budget ups and downs and
uncertainties, that's when we have difficulty.
My judgment is, as Dr. Anastasio talked about earlier, one
of my fundamental responsibilities is the long-term health of
the laboratory so it's capabilities are there when the country
needs them to apply to whatever the country's most important
problems are. For me to do that, the most important thing is
stability and national consensus on what we're doing. I think
we have the national consensus in the Congressional Bipartisan
Commission that has been referred to, the NPR, and now the
START treaty. We have that consensus. What we need now is to
fund the programs that support that policy.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. My time is up.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator.
Let's take a second and talk about extending the
replacement facilities, and what that implication is, in terms
of being able to deal with a $100 million shortfall in 2011 and
whatever we might face in 2012. Admiral Donald, in looking at
replacing the facility that you have under your authority, we
have 40.6 million for conceptual design, and that would be a
new spent-fuel building to support the NR program. In fiscal
year 2012, the request for conceptual design is $53.8 million.
The construction wouldn't start until 2013. What would be the
implications, in terms, first, of fiscal impact, and then the
second implication, in terms of what it would do to our
national security if this were to be extended 1 or 2 years into
the future?
Admiral Donald. This is our spent-fuel facility in Idaho.
All of the spent fuel, when we refuel aircraft carriers and
submarines, or defuel them at the end of their lives, this fuel
is shipped by rail to this facility. What we do is, we put it
in a large water pit and it cools down for a period of time. We
also examine it to make sure it's performing the way it was
designed to perform. Then we process it for dry storage, to be
in compliance with the agreements that we have with the State
of Idaho, for all spent fuel to be out of wet storage by 2023.
So, the issue with this facility right now is, as I've
mentioned before, it's aging. Most parts of it are 50 to 40
years old. It is not in compliance with current code. In fact,
it has cracks in it. We know that for a fact. We manage those
cracks, and we deal with it. It does have some seismic
liabilities that we manage. But, from a point of view of just
stewardship, this is a facility that, in fact, needs to be
replaced.
There's another element, as well, in that we are in a very
intense period of fuel handling in our shipyards that's being
driven by the Nimitz-class aircraft carriers. They're all
coming in for their midlife refuelings. They're heel-to-toe.
Right now, the USS Theodore Roosevelt is completing hers. Next
will be USS George Washington. We will be heel-to-toe in these
refuelings now for a very long time, all the way out through
the retirement of the most recent ship, 50 years from now.
There will be one in some sort of a fueling availability. We
have to be able to move that fuel out of the shipyards. To do
that, you have to have an efficient and capable facility. It
has to be configured to take the fuel as it is designed when it
comes out of a ship.
We have had to, because of this heel-to-toe refueling,
redesign how we take the fuel out, reconfigure it into a new
system, and the facility has to be redesigned to accept this
new fuel. Otherwise, I would have aircraft carriers backing up
in the shipyards. They wouldn't be available to do what they're
supposed to do. Or, we could have fuel that we have no place to
put.
So, the target is 2020. That's when I have to have the new
facility in place. The construction starts in 2015. The
construction design starts in 2013.
What we're talking about in a delay is, it's really a day-
for-day, because it's a fairly structured process of design,
design maturing, and then buying the pieces, the heavy
equipment that you need to go do this. So, you're talking about
slipping out beyond 2020. When that happens, we're going to
have to have another place to put that spent fuel from the
aircraft carriers.
The best way we would do that would be with new shipping
containers--more additional shipping containers. Each one of
these shipping containers costs about $22 million. For a
Nimitz-class aircraft carrier, that's nine shipping containers
that you would need. So, that's a $200 million bill that you'd
be talking about if we couldn't get the facility done by 2020,
for each Nimitz-class aircraft carrier that comes for
refueling.
That's the timeline that we're on, the impact that we're
talking about. Then, there's a day-to-day impact of just doing
work in an aging facility. Things break, and you have to go and
fix them. It results in inefficiencies in how we deal with our
business.
So, I think that should capture it for you, the subject of
your questions.
Senator Nelson. Let's talk just a second about the delays
in the naval reactors. The construction project to receive and
handle M-290 spent-fuel shipping containers is about a year
late. Would these be the shipping containers that you're
talking about?
Dr. Cook. Yes, sir, they are.
Senator Nelson. They're a year late. The most recent
schedule indicated that the approval would start construction
CD-3 in the second quarter of fiscal year 2011. That ends
tomorrow--or, it begins--second quarter fiscal starts tomorrow.
No, I guess it ends tomorrow. Can you give us some idea of the
delay? Because, if there's already a shortfall, in terms of
what we're looking at, in terms of money to be able to do, does
this delay just add to that problem?
Admiral Donald. Well, where we are--the CD-0 was--that was
completed in 2009, I believe it was--CD-1, we have--we want to
complete by fiscal year 2012--the end of fiscal year 2012.
Because of the delays in funding we've seen so far, we are, in
fact, behind in the design. We've been able to--at least to
date, because the numbers have been relatively low, we have
been able to continue some of the fundamental work. We're
engaged, right now, in the environmental impact statement and
the concept design work, and continuing that. But, really, this
year and in 2012 is when we have to get the work completed to
make the selection at CD-1 of the type of facility, what it's
really going to look like, where it's going to be located, and
how it's actually going to work--be configured to do the work
that we need it to do. So, this is really a crucial point in
the design, because you do set the basic parameters that define
the cost and schedule for the rest of the program.
Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, I am one who has been very
interested in the efficiencies initiative at DOD. Secretary
Gates has directed all elements of that Department to identify
efficiencies that can be reutilized. I heard earlier
discussion--I think Dr. Cook said--about efficiency and
management programs and what you can do. Could you identify,
maybe, for us some of the efficiencies that perhaps--a project
that has been identified for the next 5 years. Have you gotten
to the point where you can do that?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir. I mentioned one in my oral
statement. We talked about the supply chain management center.
This is something that I started in 2007, when we realized the
way we were operating whereas, more or less--and this isn't
quite a fair statement--I mean, there are no completely
independent sites, but eight sites. We felt there were great
efficiencies to be achieved by operating as an integrated and
interdependent organization, where we would look to drive
efficiencies in not having three capabilities to do the same
thing, but dropping us down to one or two capabilities, when
it's--where we need redundancy for a national capability, then
we would have that. At that time, we felt we could go from 35
million square feet--take 9 million square feet off of our 35-
million-square-feet enterprise of buildings and things like
that. So, we have 9 million square feet of space that we're
moving out of.
Another area of efficiency that we hope to implement, and
have implemented part of the way, is to reduce the amount of
security space that we have to protect in our enterprise, to
consolidate nuclear materials to fewer geographic locations and
to fewer sites within those geographic locations. Because, the
fewer locations that we have to protect, the less expensive it
is to maintain. As a result of those efficiencies, more
recently, we've been able to take our $765 or $770 million
security budget and drop it down to, like, about $22 million or
so.
At Y12, we plan on going from 150 acres of high security
space, ultimately to 15 acres of high security space. That
shift--and this is where this uranium processing capability
that we want to shift into--will allow us to move forward and
save what we believe is a total of $200 million of operating
expenses, both in security costs per year, as well as operating
efficiencies, by getting the whole enterprise right-sized, if
you will, leaving, kind of, the cold-war enterprise behind us,
and shifting to a much smaller, more integrated future
enterprise. Those are the macro pieces that we have before us.
There are a number of other specific initiatives we have,
looking forward. One of them is to look at putting together a
common work breakdown structure. This is something that Dr.
Cook is implementing in the weapons program. We're looking at
linking the formulation of the budget to the execution of the
budget in a real way. We've brought into our organization some
folks that have direct budget formulation and execution
experience from OMB. Phil Calbos is here in the room. He really
understands this work, and he works for Dr. Cook directly in
this particular area.
I'm optimistic. I could talk for a while, but you probably
don't want me to.
Dr. Cook. If I could add--and give you one past one and one
future one.
A past one that we had in this year. We knew that, when we
got the training and the tooling in place at Pantex, that we
would be able to do some of the disassembly work more rapidly
and completely safely. That was proven. So, we had a target of
number of disassemblies, and the Pantex operation, with the
training and the tooling in place, exceeded that target--in
fact, there was another 26 percent--so, 126 percent on 100--and
in a year in which there was a major flood at Pantex; if you
recall, more than 10 inches of rain on a very bad day in the
city of Amarillo, and the ground couldn't absorb that much
rain. In our programs, we're taking account of that effect.
We're using efficiencies to make sure that we can recover from
that.
Now, that's the past. I said there was a future. When you
look at the--it often is called ``common''--we really mean
``adaptable and interoperable'' study for the ICBM warhead, the
W78 and the SLBM warhead, the W88. Provided that we can get
authorization to move ahead on that, we have the potential to
save cost and to have interoperability in the arming and
fusing--arming, fusing, and firing units, that Dr. Hommert
could address, or in the nuclear explosive packages, that Dr.
Miller or Dr. Anastasio could address. What we do know is, if
we don't do that work in a joint way, it's going to cost more,
and so, some of this may be cost avoidance. It doesn't matter.
It's still cost savings in the end.
Mr. D'Agostino. Admiral Donald may have one, as well, if
you have time, sir.
Admiral Donald. Yes, sir. The Ohio replacement has been one
that we've obviously been focused on here for several years
now. But, in the name of efficiencies, one of the issues is, we
work through DOD's acquisition process. We were the first
program through that new process that Dr. Carter headed up.
But, we were challenged to drive the cost of that ship down. As
far as our part was concerned, one of the key decisions that
was made, that helped us in that regard, was the decision to go
from 20 missile tubes to 16 missile tubes. Because, what that
allowed us to do was to downrate the propulsion power that was
needed. So, obviously, it's a smaller reactor that you would
need. But, what it also allowed us to do was to go back--the
size fell into the envelope where we could go back and use
components that we had already designed for the Virginia-class
and bring those into this design--not have to do it over
again--but, several of the mechanical components, to use those
over again. It enabled us to drive the costs of that propulsion
plant down and rely on proven technology that's--pumps and
valves and things like that don't change like electronics do.
So, we're pretty comfortable putting that in a ship that will
be around til 2080. But, we were allowed to do that.
Senator Nelson. Well, in the absence of my colleagues,
perhaps I'll just continue.
Last March, when we held subcommittee hearings, we were
focused on the protective forces that guard the nuclear weapons
and materials at DOE sites. Mr. D'Agostino, are you suggesting
that you've been able to consolidate some of those sites, which
now means that the actual cost of security for those has been
reduced?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir. The security costs have been
reduced. We are also looking, very much so, at other
opportunities to go forward even more. Dr. Miller and Dr.
Anastasio are quite familiar with our joint effort to look at,
instead of the Nation maintaining two separate plutonium
capabilities to deal with large quantities of plutonium
material, one at LLNL and one at LANL, we've decided to
consolidate to one plutonium capability, and it's a national
capability. It doesn't belong to LANL. It belongs to the
Nation. But, both laboratories can work in one particular
facility. That effort to reduce the amount of plutonium--we
have a commitment to get this done by 2012--will allow us to
change the size and the nature of the security forces at LLNL.
Dr. Miller may be able to add to that, if he'd like.
There are other things that we're doing in the security
area. We're pushing towards common uniforms, for example, which
get the security force together in a particular fashion to
essentially show that this is a cohesive unit. Even though
they're managed under different contracts, there are
opportunities to drive some commonality there.
We're using what I would call life extension activities for
the security vehicles that we have in place. We're using
technology to put in long-range detection capabilities and look
out, further out, and rely less on humans, if you will, and
guards--guns and gates--and put technology into the picture.
We're introducing this in our training capability.
All of these things have saved tens of millions of dollars
a year. Brad Peterson, who runs that particular activity,
working with the labs and our production plants, have been able
to do that. That's why they've--we've been able to reduce it. I
keep challenging Brad in this area. I do think that, as we get
to fewer sites with large quantities of nuclear material, there
are some further opportunities.
But, we can't do it in a way that this whole purpose is
just to drive costs down. I mean, in--or, to try to spend less
money. We obviously want to make sure the security--as we're
making these changes, we don't lose that kind of operational
focus that we've had in the past.
Senator Nelson. Now, the goal is, obviously, to create the
best security at the most reasonable cost.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. So, I understand that. It's obvious that
the primary goal here is to protect the materials and the
weapons. So, we'll have to deal with that.
In December, NNSA made a significant change in the way you
manage the aviation program of the source of Office of Secure
Transportation (OST). As part of this change, the DOE aviation
program will have increased oversight responsibilities for the
NNSA program, in lieu of the FAA. Is there a plan that's in
place for DOE Aviation Office to oversee this NNSA program? Dr.
Cook, would that be your area?
Dr. Cook. Yes, it is my area, sir.
If I could address some of the driving factors and where we
are, I'd like to do that.
The focus that we have in the aviation area is looking
forward to the LEP work that we have to the material moves,
whether they're special nuclear materials or not, and to the
limited-life component exchanges that are required across the
country. In order to focus on the efficiency and the
effectiveness, we've taken a look across the board at the OST
and have concluded--and we had a plan to replace our aging
fleet of three DC-9s with 737s that would still be used
airplanes, but would have perhaps only 10 years of life on
them. We're part way through that effort. One of the DC-9s has
been sold. Two 737s have now been acquired. In parallel with
that, we're looking at the equipping contracts, the maintenance
contracts, and the nature of the pilots. We also have taken the
opportunity to sell aircraft that we no longer needed. We've
sold a couple of Twin Otters and one other airplane, and are
focusing now on those things that tend to be inherently Federal
functions. Specifically, the aviation fleet for OST will be
focused on moving the emergency response teams for radiological
or nuclear threats effectively and as rapidly as we have in the
past. As far as maintenance, given that we're going to have
different aircraft, three 737s, rather than three DC-9s--we
intend to competitively place the maintenance contract that is
currently in place. Given the future need, we've taken a look
at the nature of the pilots, although there are a small number
of pilots, 15 or fewer, to operate around-the-clock and have
the emergency response capability. We're looking at whether it
makes sense to Federalize those pilots, or not.
There are different standards that the FAA requires for
different types of aircraft flights and different missions. We
are working hand-in-hand with the FAA. We also work with the
Office of Aviation Management within DOE, but outside NNSA, and
I've given you the base for looking forward with this. The core
objective here is to focus the activity that we have even more
tightly on the mission, while we replace the aircraft, and then
put in place the maintenance contracts for future years and for
pilots to do that.
Senator Nelson. Going back to the question about the
security guards, has--have you addressed the--Mr. D'Agostino--
the need to deal with the retirement issue for the Guards? Are
we having some sort of a program that--perhaps an accelerated
401k program--some system of reduction of that guard force?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, there was a report that had 29
recommendations in it to address, frankly, a whole waterfront,
if you will, of security guard issues that had cropped up over
the previous 5 years. We've worked our way through 14 of those
recommendations, I think smartly, dealing with making sure that
there was a career path and a progression with those guards. In
fact, we didn't do it just with ourselves. We made sure that we
had security guard representation to identify these areas and
work through these.
We're now dealing with, if you will, the second half of
those. We're undertaking a study right now. Some of them have
to do with the question of whether there should be a 20-year
retirement. What are the differences between a security force
that's a static security force around a fixed location, versus
a dynamic security force, such as the OST discussion we were
just having earlier, that's moving about? How equivalent is
that to the U.S. military, which has the 20-year retirement?
These are the more difficult and more challenging questions,
the ones that you've described, and we're looking at how to put
that forward.
But, I think what we have is a path forward, with the
unions' representatives that are there, to kind of address
these 29 recommendations systematically, and work our way
through them. We haven't finished the job. Right now, we're in
the process of comparing the different types of retirement
systems.
Senator Nelson. The retirement systems could be different,
depending upon the requirements for the employment and what's
required for employment. In other words, what kind of
background, what kind of education requirement there might be
as part of the job. So, I would think that would be a good
thing to work on, because of the--it looks to me like you're
going to be seeing a further reduction, at some point along the
way, and having that taken care of upfront is almost always
better than dealing with it after the fact.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I think, with respect to
the security guard force, what we've observed--because we do
have a few different models across our enterprise, and we're
looking to drive--taking the best approaches out of each of
these models. One of the main concerns is, particularly for
those particular guards that are in a very active, what we
call, a fighting position, is, we want to make sure that if
they end up getting hurt--the knee hurts; that they aren't now,
all of a sudden, laid off. We've observed that there's some
value to have the security guards be actually a part of the M&O
contractor workforce. That way, if there's a difficulty in
meeting the physical requirements to continue in this position,
they can be retrained and stay and have a full career, if you
will, and serving our country as an active worker in the M&O
contract.
We're very much in tune to that. The guard force,
particularly, is concerned about making sure they're not in a
position of, ``Well, if you get hurt, then, I'm sorry, you've
lost your job.'' We definitely don't want that.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Anastasio, I don't want you to think
that your trip here was not worthwhile, not having asked very
many questions.
Dr. Anastasio. Every trip here is worthwhile, Senator.
Senator Nelson. Is there anything that we haven't asked
here that we should have asked or would be important for us to
have asked, as you think about the budget issue, trying to cut,
not slash, appropriate reductions, recognizing any cut has some
implication? What we want to do is avoid the unfortunate
implications, or the unfortunate consequences, of something
that was not well thought through.
Dr. Anastasio. Yes sir, I'd have a few comments along those
lines. First, as far as efficiencies we've been talking about,
of course, not only at the administration's level, at the
Federal level, that the laboratories were working on that, too.
As an example, last year, in fiscal year 2010, at LANL, we
increased our purchasing by $209 million, and we did that with
fewer staff. So, we were able to get a lot more work done, and
actually were able to downsize the staff.
The laboratories really made great strides in improving our
efficiency. In the hearing we had last summer, I was worried
about the pension system, and one of the ways we've been
dealing with the pension system is to use some of the savings
that we've accrued. That's available for us to put not back
into science, unfortunately, but at least to cover the pension
costs.
You ask about what would happen with delay of major
facilities. I had a few thoughts on the CMRR facility, what
would happen with the delays there. Senator Shaheen talked
about nonproliferation. Just a reminder that this facility, the
CMRR facility, is where all the inspectors from the IAEA that
go around the world that look at nuclear facilities, we bring
them out to Los Alamos and train them. That's the facility that
that's done in. So, again, it's a multi-use facility, a
national capability, as Mr. D'Agostino said.
With a delay, of course we'll have to continue to operate
in our old facility, which right now is almost 60 years old. It
happens to be literally on top of an earthquake fault--not the
best place for a nuclear facility. We have a reminder of that
with what's going on in Japan.
By delaying it, also we put at risk when we'll be able to
increase the capacity for pit production at the laboratory. The
LEPs that we have planned are going to require some pits to be
made even with the reuse of existing pits, we may run out of
them. So, it's building more of the same pits that we already
have in the stockpile. Of course, the CMRR facility will not
build pits, but all the samples that are taken to qualify a new
pit are used in the existing facility. We don't have the
capacity or the efficiency to get that done in time. So, if we
are delayed with CMRR, then that's going to delay the time
we'll be available.
Of course, the other thing we do is--the facility is
separated from our pit production facility, and then we're
shipping samples of plutonium around on the road. So by doing
that, of course, that's a security risk. By bringing a new
facility online, we'll reduce our security posture.
Then the most important thing, perhaps, is--of course, any
delay in a project ultimately costs you money. So, if we delay
the start and the process of this facility, it means, in the
end, the integrated costs--although in 1 year you might save
money, over the life of the project, it's going to cost you
money.
So, I think those are some of the difficult challenges that
Congress has to face. I think the simple version is, if you
think of this in a project space, saving money this year may
well cause you to spend more money in the long run.
The other pieces we've harped on are--or, not harped on,
but emphasized with you--is the people issue. Right now, our
workforce sees pay freezes, sees increased contributions to
pensions, increased costs of medical care, and now an uncertain
budget. They've been very excited about the new commitment that
the country has made. There's exciting consensus to work on.
But, at the same time, these uncertainties make the younger
ones start to wonder, is there a career here for them? We
understand the challenges that the country faces, but if we can
have a stable-looking budget out into the years, whatever level
it's at, whatever the country can afford--and if it's too
different than the one we've talked about, ultimately I think
we have to go back to the policy and say, ``If the country
can't afford this program, then perhaps we have to go rethink
the policy and come up with a policy framework that the country
can afford.'' I'm not sure I know what that is, but that's the
sort of challenge that you face.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
I'll ask the same question of everyone else. Is there
something that we should have asked, or something you would
like to add, after all the discussion so far?
Dr. Hommert?
Dr. Hommert. I have a few quick comments.
Just to continue a theme that Dr. Anastasio highlighted
about cost efficiencies and our sensitivity to that. At Sandia,
in the last year, we took decisions in our pension and our
medical benefits and in cost efficiencies that have reduced the
cost of our labor base by approximately $1 billion over this
decade. The positive news in that is that our workforce has
gone through that. They remain dedicated. We did not see an
uptick in losses due to that, in part, because of their
excitement about the program that they see the national policy
laying out in front of them. So, again, I echo that, if that
changes, that could have a different impact.
Then, the last thing I'll say is to return to, I think,
really the question that Senator Sessions raised about, Well,
what are our options if we cannot afford? I'll focus it on the
B61 for a moment. It's important to understand that every day--
that the 61 is older than any other bomb system we've ever had.
We're in unchartered territory. It--whatever budget the country
can afford, our commitment is that we will work to minimize
risks of sustaining that weapon and ensuring its safety,
security, and reliability. But, there'll be limits to how much
we can control that risk, either in schedule or in the scope of
what we do. It will require a possible relook at policy. I hope
that won't be the case. We will work diligently to extract
every bit of efficiency for the funds you can authorize to
execute that. But, it is a bit, again I'll emphasize, of
uncharted territory for us on that weapon system.
Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Thank you. That is clearly something we
have to keep in mind. The irony is inescapable, that a year ago
we were making certain that the administration would ask for
enough money. Now we're talking about--it's too much, because
we can't afford it. It's an inescapable irony. I do understand
it. I would imagine that employees and those who are committed
to the project might think that Washington has a bit of a
sleight of hand: now you see it, now you don't.
Thank you all for your candid comments. We appreciate it.
This hearing is now adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
safety of naval nuclear reactors
1. Senator Nelson. Admiral Donald, the Nuclear Navy has had an
exemplary safety record over its almost 60 years of operations.
Nevertheless, the recent events in Japan, a country with as much
expertise in nuclear power as anyone, have taught us that even
redundant redundancies can fail. What actions are you taking to
reassure yourself that appropriate emergency contingencies and plans
are in place and that these contingencies would avert a tragedy?
Admiral Donald. There are no immediate changes planned to how U.S.
naval reactors used onboard submarines and aircraft carriers are
operated as a result of the Fukushima nuclear power plant failures.
However, as we have done in response to other major accidents, nuclear
or otherwise, the U.S. Navy will assess and implement lessons learned
from the event that can be applied to further strengthen the U.S. naval
nuclear propulsion program. I have already initiated an assessment of
the implications of the Fukushima reactor accident to the Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Program.
U.S. nuclear powered warships have safely operated for more than 50
years without experiencing a single reactor accident or release of any
radioactivity sufficient to harm human health or have an adverse effect
on the environment. U.S. naval reactors have an outstanding record of
over 146 million miles safely steamed on nuclear power, and they have
amassed over 6,300 reactor-years of safe operation.
Because of their military-unique missions, naval reactors are
significantly different from commercial nuclear reactors. All nuclear
powered warships are designed to survive wartime attack and allow the
warships to continue to fight while protecting their crews against
hazards. Survivability requires rugged designs, well-developed damage
control capabilities, and redundant systems that also provide enhanced
safety capability in the event of natural disasters.
The earthquake and subsequent tsunami in Japan caused an extended
loss of electrical power which resulted in the inability to properly
cool the reactor cores at the Fukushima Daiichi site. Unlike the
Fukushima nuclear power reactors, U.S. naval reactors have long-term
decay heat removing capability that depends only on the physical
arrangement of the reactor plant and on the nature of water itself
(natural convection driven by density differences), not on electrical
power, to cool the core. This is one example of the means available to
nuclear-powered warships that assure, even in the unlikely event of
multiple failures, naval reactors would not overheat and the fuel would
not be damaged by heat produced in the reactor core.
Further, there are multiple barriers that work to contain
radioactivity on nuclear powered warships. Naval nuclear fuel contains
fission products and prevents their release into the coolant loop
during normal operations. Although commercial power reactors have
similar barriers, barriers in nuclear powered warships are more robust,
resilient, and conservatively designed. For example, U.S. naval nuclear
fuel is solid metal, unlike the ceramic nuclear fuel used in commercial
power reactors. U.S. naval nuclear fuel is designed for battle shock
and can withstand combat shock loads 50 times the force of gravity
without releasing fission products. This is greater than 10 times the
earthquake shock loads used for designing U.S. commercial nuclear
plants.
Notwithstanding the enhanced capability of nuclear powered warships
to survive natural disasters and continue to operate safely, other
factors serve to mitigate the impacts of natural disasters on these
ships. The fact that a moored nuclear powered warship sits in the water
serves as a buffer against the ground forces felt during an earthquake;
the earthquake forces on a moored nuclear powered warship, even those
like the March 11 earthquake, would not be severe.
Commercial nuclear power plants are designed to operate at high
power levels for long periods to produce electricity. Because naval
reactors are designed for warships, they are smaller and have a much
lower power rating than commercial reactors. The rated power levels of
the largest naval reactors are less than one-fifth of a large
commercial reactor plant. Additionally, naval reactors typically
operate at a fraction of their full power levels, since ships usually
operate at speeds less than their maximum. Furthermore, because naval
reactor power level is primarily set by propulsion needs when the ship
is at sea, naval reactors are normally shutdown shortly after mooring
and they are usually started up only shortly before departure. As a
result of these facts, the amount of radioactivity potentially
available for release from a reactor core of a U.S. nuclear powered
warship moored in a port is typically less than about 1 percent of the
levels for a typical commercial reactor. Naval cores also have
significantly less heat buildup from fission product decay to be cooled
when the reactors are shutdown. In addition, the reality that nuclear
powered warships can be moved is a safety option that is not available
to land-based nuclear facilities.
U.S. nuclear powered warship crews are rigorously trained to
respond immediately to any emergency in the ship. Naval operating
practices and emergency procedures are also well-defined and rigorously
enforced. The fact that the crew works in close proximity to the
reactor ensures vigilant monitoring of even the smallest change in
plant status. This is part of what we call ``Defense in Depth'' and is
an element of our overall culture of maintaining high standards for
design, manufacturing and operations--addressing small problems
aggressively before they become larger ones. Because of the rugged
design of the reactor plant, multiple safety systems, and fully trained
and capable crew, the safety of U.S. nuclear powered warships is
extremely high. In order for an accident that affects the operation of
the ship or the crew to happen, the ship must simultaneously experience
numerous unrealistic equipment and operator failures. Even though such
an accident scenario is extremely unlikely, the U.S. nuclear powered
warships and their support facilities are required to simulate such
situations as they conduct meaningful training. In the extremely
unlikely event of a problem involving the reactor of a U.S. nuclear
powered warship, the U.S. Navy would initiate necessary actions to
respond to the situation and could call on other U.S. national response
assets if necessary.
nuclear safety at the laboratories
2. Senator Nelson. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, what
have each of you done to ensure that your emergency contingencies and
plans are adequate, and that they will operate as designed to avert a
nuclear incident at any of the nuclear facilities at your labs?
Dr. Anastasio. Los Alamos is committed to maintaining the highest
safety standards at all of its facilities. All Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL) nuclear facilities are required to have an in-depth
safety analysis in place that reviews postulated accident scenarios and
puts in place appropriate controls to prevent and mitigate such
situations. This includes very severe scenarios which can include a
combination of events, such as a large seismic event coupled with a
facility-wide fire which is the most severe event postulated for the
plutonium facility at LANL. As a result of these analyses, LANL has
initiated a series of safety improvement activities to address
identified issues such as implementing: strict controls over
combustible materials to reduce the chance of a fire; seismic cut-off
switches for electrical power to non-safety systems to eliminate a
seismically-induced electrical fire; repacking nuclear material into
robust containers to survive appropriate impacts and fires; upgrading
the fire suppression, air handling and filtration systems, and storage
infrastructure, and minimizing the nuclear material that is being
processed at any given time. Additionally, in 2007 LANL adopted an
updated site-wide seismic hazard analysis standard which incorporates
new geologic data. Since that time, LANL has been conducting detailed
structural analyses of its nuclear facilities using this updated
hazards to identify potential structural issues that would result from
a large seismic event. LANL is now completing these analyses and has
identified some additional areas that will be reinforced to improve
performance.
For the 3 active nuclear facilities (WETF, CMR, and PF-4) 11 drills
and/or exercises were conducted last year. Each drill/exercise is
evaluated and observations are documented to develop lessons learned to
be shared with response, operations, facilities, and programmatic
science staff. We also include first responders from the community to
participate in these drills. All issues are tracked and corrected per
the site corrective actions process.
With regard to emergency response, each facility or facility
complex at LANL has a written plan that evaluates the response in the
event of an accident and describes the specific actions to be taken for
each potential scenario. Last year LANL performed over 45 drills and
exercises designed to test the responses to a variety of accident
scenarios such as spills, fires (including Wildland fire), criticality
accidents, severe personnel injuries, transportation accidents, and
facility-specific events.
Dr. Miller. Safe and secure operations are a top priority at
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). We have comprehensive
programs to protect the health and safety of our workforce and rigorous
policies governing conduct of operations to ensure the safe operation
of our high explosives and nuclear facilities. These critical
activities are funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration's
(NNSA) Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) program.
Finally, we constantly review ourselves to keep up with best practices
and welcome the oversight provided by the NNSA in this area.
Nuclear safety at the Laboratory is vigorously pursued and
continually reviewed against a wide variety of accident scenarios to
ensure we take a very conservative approach to protecting the
environment, our workers, and the public. Routine nuclear safety
operations include:
Frequent review of operations protocols. LLNL's
continuity of operations program was reviewed and updated in
2010 to consider catastrophic events.
Current safety documents analyze operational hazards,
hazards from external events, and natural phenomena hazards to
determine which safety systems would be required to stay
operational during such events. Comprehensive maintenance and
testing programs ensure continuous operability. Consistent with
Federal regulations, safety documentation is continuously
reviewed by LLNL and U.S. Government oversight organizations to
ensure that, as changes are made or new information received,
hazards are evaluated and appropriate reliable controls are
maintained to avert nuclear incidents.
Critical safety systems (e.g., those safety systems
relied upon to protect the general public) are intentionally
redundant by design for selected active components, and fail-
safe modes are designed with seismic and other credible natural
phenomena hazards in mind. These systems are examined
frequently to ensure their functionality and operability.
Dr. Hommert. Sandia National Laboratories has two nuclear research
reactor facilities: The Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR) and the
Sandia Pulsed Reactor Facility/Critical Experiments (SPRF/CX). The ACRR
is an open-pool research reactor, similar to those used at universities
with capability for Pulse and Steady-State Operation. It is used to
support Sandia National Laboratories' Nuclear Weapons Strategic
Management Unit stockpile stewardship activities and external
customers. SPRF/CX is a laboratory scale research reactor used to
explore the physics of commercial nuclear reactors.
The nuclear facilities were examined pursuant to Department of
Energy (DOE) Safety Bulletin 2011-01, ``Events Beyond Design Safety
Basis Analysis'' issued by Secretary Chu on March 23, 2011. The review
showed that the time-integrated fission power associated with ACRR and
SPR-CX is sufficiently low to preclude the need for electrical power
for post-emergency core cooling or any other safety system action. The
review also found that radionuclide inventories at the facilities are
so low that safety class systems are not required. Public and worker
consequences for the full spectrum of accidents have been extensively
analyzed in previously approved safety documents. Emergency response
plans were also reviewed. Sandia is participating in the DOE-wide
lessons-learned process to identify specific and systemic safety gaps
and mitigate any gaps discovered. To date, Sandia has not identified
any significant gaps in hazard protections or emergency response that
would require immediate actions to ensure the safety of the public,
workers or the environment. Nevertheless, Sandia continues to emphasize
worker and public safety and continuously improve our emergency
preparedness procedures. We are working to guard against complacency.
health of the laboratories
3. Senator Nelson. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, as I
mentioned in my opening statement, there was a lot of discussion on the
amount of weapons funding for the labs during the New START treaty
debate. What was not discussed much is the breadth of the work that the
labs carry out, beyond weapons work, and how this non-weapons work is a
key element in maintaining world-class science and engineering. Could
each of you describe the percentage of your lab's annual budget that is
nuclear weapons activities, and describe the work that comprises the
balance of the budget and why this work is important?
Dr. Anastasio. LANL's core mission is to ensure the continued
safety, security, and effectiveness of the Nation's nuclear deterrent.
Los Alamos is more broadly a national security science laboratory.
Engaging in this broader work is vital to the long-term health of the
Laboratory and to our ability to address future national security
missions. In fiscal year 2011, 56 percent of our operating budget is
NNSA weapons program activities, 7 percent is associated Safeguards and
Security, 9 percent is NNSA nonproliferation funding, 8 percent of our
budget is from DOE environmental management (for cleanup activities), 7
percent is from DOE science and energy programs, and 13 percent is work
for other agencies, the majority of which are other Federal national
security agencies (Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of
Defense (DOD), and the Intelligence Community).
Much of the non-weapons work is still associated with nuclear
security and leverages directly on expertise developed to sustain the
Nation's deterrent. Essentially all of the non-weapons activity is at
Los Alamos because of sponsor selection, i.e. whether Los Alamos is the
sole provider or part of a team with other labs, a sponsor made the
decision to fund this activity rather than others. Those activities
make important, often critical contributions to national interests.
While the core nuclear weapons program provides a majority of the
capabilities (both scientific and personnel), these broader scientific
security missions allow LANL to sustain and develop the science,
technology, and engineering that enable us to respond to unplanned
technical challenges both now and into the future. As an example, last
year our staff experienced in radiography was able to immediately
deploy to the Gulf of Mexico to quickly develop a new capability to x-
ray the Deep Water Horizon blow out preventer. At more than a mile
beneath the ocean surface, we provided imagery using a sealed source to
help national decisionmakers better understand what was occurring
inside that device.
In addition, engagement with this broad range of different
challenges helps extend key science, technology, and engineering at Los
Alamos that is essential to our long-term core mission. Competitive
selection and awards also help demonstrate to allies and potential
adversaries that our technical capabilities remain world-class.
Finally, the open science at Los Alamos supports a strong student and
postdoctoral research program that is essential for our pipeline of the
Nation's top science and engineering talent. Last year, Los Alamos
hosted over 1,300 summer students, as one example.
Dr. Miller. The NNSA laboratories have exceptional staff covering a
broad range of scientific, technical and engineering capabilities-as
well as unique, world-class facilities, which are leveraged to develop
innovative solutions to major 21st century challenges in
nonproliferation, intelligence, defense, homeland security and
counterterrorism, and energy technology and climate science.
Nonproliferation
With globalization and worldwide interest in expanding nuclear
power, proliferation challenges are evolving and covering a wider
geographic area. LLNL has made important contributions to NNSA's
mission in monitoring for signatures of proliferation activity,
addressing problems posed by legacy materials and capabilities in the
Former Soviet Union (FSU), providing technologies and experts to
enhance nuclear safeguards through the International Atomic Energy
Agency, and engaging with the international community to promote U.S.
Government nonproliferation goals and objectives. Nonproliferation
activities have broadened to address new regional challenges beyond the
FSU through international cooperation and engagement and through
enhanced monitoring and detection technologies. This work provides the
technical basis for expanding the benefits of nuclear power without
expanding the nuclear threat.
An example of LLNL contributions to nuclear signatures detection is
nuclear explosion monitoring. For more than a decade, LLNL
seismologists have used available seismic data to develop empirical
corrections to seismic event processing algorithms to adjust for
specific source and monitoring station location. Today, with high-
performance supercomputers, seismologists can capture three-dimensional
earth structure to calculate these corrections with physics-based
models for any source-receiver pair. This will enable more precise
detection, location, and identification of explosions, potentially
anywhere on the globe, and even at the low energy releases that might
occur from a weapon development test. Development of new monitoring
methods with three-dimensional earth models can proceed using current
supercomputer capability, however, exacale computing is required to
make these new techniques operational. Exascale computing will not only
improve our country's ability to monitor nuclear explosions but will
also allow researchers to better define seismically active faults where
small earthquakes may occur.
Intelligence
The NNSA laboratories have a long and distinguished history of
support to the Intelligence Community. The LLNL intelligence program is
strongly focused on the activities of nuclear-capable states,
unsafeguarded and clandestine programs and terrorist groups, cyber
threats and countermeasures, and biological and chemical weapon
development and deployment efforts. LLNL's intelligence support relies
on our diverse, multidisciplinary professional staff, drawing in
experts from across the Laboratory. For example, several insights and
advances in the cyber security program have been informed by experience
gained through LLNL's high-performance computing efforts. The
contributions of the NNSA laboratories cut across the entire spectrum
of the U.S. Government's efforts in prevention, deterrent, defense,
consequence management, and related areas where detailed technical
knowledge provides decision advantage.
The Counterproliferation Analysis and Planning System (CAPS) is an
example of decision support that LLNL has provided military planners
for actual and potential operations against over 37,000 facilities that
support or could support the production of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). CAPS is used by over 1,500 planners and operators on a daily
basis. Chosen in 1998 by then Secretary of Defense Cohen to be the
preferred planning tool for use by U.S. Armed Forces to combat WMD,
CAPS has played a significant role in supporting operations during the
Kosovo conflict, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi
Freedom. CAPS engineers provide in-depth assessments of WMD facilities
to include isolating critical nodes, assessing the potential for
collateral damage from interdiction attempts, and quantifying those
signatures that can reflect real-time operations under way at selected
sites. The engineering staff at CAPS also provides a daily technical
reach-back capability that responds to hundreds of requests for
assistance from troops presently engaged in combat.
Defense
For more than 6 decades, our military has benefitted from the depth
and breadth of integrated, systems-level solutions developed at the
NNSA laboratories. Beyond stewardship of the Nation's nuclear
stockpile, the three NNSA laboratories provide high value to DOD in
munitions, explosives science and engineering, and conventional weapons
design; directed energy systems; cyber and network sciences;
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; operational warfighter
support; countering the nuclear threat; nuclear weapons effects
predictions and analysis; countering the chemical and biological
threat; and space systems. Two examples of defense missions where LLNL
is currently engaged are:
Third Generation Conventional Munitions: The Laboratory was
tasked by DOD to develop a next generation conventional
munition with a more precise lethal radius, thus significantly
mitigating collateral effects concerns in close air support or
peacekeeping operations. We successfully combined and applied
our high explosives expertise with our unique understanding of
case materials and our High Performance Computing (HPC)
capability to model and simulate the new munition, resulting in
a significantly reduced concept to product timeline (10 months
from concept to qualifications testing), providing the
warfighter with a focused lethality weapon.
The Diode Pumped Alkali Laser (DPAL): Sponsored by DOD, DPAL
is a leap-ahead technology that will provide a laser that is up
to 500 times more lethal per kilogram than any other currently
demonstrated or contemplated laser weapon, thus enabling the
deployment of high energy laser capabilities on a broad array
of platforms. These advances take advantage of LLNL's rich
history of laser science and technology development.
Homeland security and counterterrorism
The NNSA laboratories' role in homeland security and
counterterrorism began nearly 30 years ago with the formation of the
Nuclear Emergency Search Teams (NEST) and related nuclear threat
assessment activities. Today, LLNL's efforts cover a wide range of
programs and sponsors, from threat and risk assessments, to detection
of threat materials, to understanding and mitigating the consequences
of attacks, to forensic analysis, to aiding in the attribution of
responsibility for WMD attacks. Our work encompasses chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-explosive threats. Today's
programs take advantage of significant historical investments by the
NNSA in key infrastructure and most importantly in our
multidisciplinary technical staff. Together these capabilities provide
a major component of the Nation's defenses against the catastrophic
threat posed by the malicious use of weapons of mass destruction.
An example of LLNL support for homeland security and disaster
response is the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC).
NARAC has been on call since the Three Mile Island incident of 1979.
NARAC can deliver an initial prediction to Federal, state, and local
responders of the fate and atmospheric transport of hazardous materials
for almost any kind of release in 5 to 15 minutes; it responds to
roughly 25 events in a typical year (and simulates, for the purpose of
exercises, 10,000 more). Right now, NARAC is applying LLNL's computing
capabilities in support the U.S. response to recent events in Japan. As
the hub of the Department of Homeland Security's Interagency Modeling
and Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC), NARAC also provided plume
predictions of the fire on the Deepwater Horizon oil platform and
forecast the particulates that might be released from surface-oil
burns. NARAC and IMAAC are unique capabilities to the Nation that take
advantage of LLNL's expertise, and exceptional computational and
modeling capabilities.
Energy technology and climate science
The NNSA laboratories develop and deploy science, technology, and
operational protocols to increase utilization of our Nation's large and
secure Reserves of conventional and unconventional fossil fuels while
safely reducing carbon dioxide emissions through innovations in carbon
capture and long-term geologic sequestration. In addition, the NNSA
labs have made seminal contributions to climate science, including
participation in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. At
LLNL, scientists are working on programs to expand the use of renewable
energy through innovative technology, improved efficiency, new
resources, systems integration, and reduced costs; deliver climate
simulations at the regional scale to understand the critical processes
that drive climate change; develop advanced nuclear fuels and reactor
systems that are proliferation-resistant and provide for expanded safe,
secure, carbon-free, cost-competitive nuclear power; and provide
science and advanced technology needed to effectively store nuclear
waste for long times or eliminate the nuclear waste altogether.
Specific examples of LLNL efforts in energy and climate are:
Energy, Water, and Carbon Dioxide Flow Diagrams LLNL
specialists produced the first diagrams illustrating U.S.
energy use. Portraying U.S. energy resources and their ultimate
use, these diagrams, called energy flow charts, help
scientists, analysts, and other decisionmakers to visualize the
complex interrelationships involved in powering the Nation.
Today, flow diagram concept has been extended to cover water
use and carbon dioxide emissions, in reports that separately
cover the 50 states and 136 countries.
The Program for Climate Model Diagnosis and Intercomparison
(PCMDI): Established in 1989, LLNL's DOE-sponsored PCMDI is an
internationally recognized research group that focuses on
understanding climate change and analyzing and diagnosing the
performance of climate models. The climate research community
relies on PCMDI to help organize and manage internationally-
coordinated modeling studies. Through a PCMDI-led federated
alliance of major data centers, output from the world's climate
models is made freely accessible to thousands of researchers
who evaluate the models and analyze their projections of future
climate change. This widespread scrutiny of climate models is
accelerating advancement of climate science and provides a
multi-model perspective that has been a basis for reaching
robust conclusions in major assessments of climate science
(e.g., the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change).
FUNDING SUMMARY
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
Fiscal Year 2011 Percent
2010 Percent Funds
Funds In Anticipated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuclear Weapons......................... 64 66
Nonproliferation........................ 6 6
Defense and Intelligence................ 14 13
Homeland and Counter Terrorism.......... 7 7
Energy Technology and Climate Science... 4 4
Other Basic Science..................... 5 4
-------------------------------
100 100
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dr. Hommert. Nuclear Weapons activities are Sandia's core mission,
and in fiscal year 2011, comprise 47 percent of our total budget. We
have other important missions that address a broad spectrum of U.S.
national security needs. These other mission areas include Defense
Systems and Assessments (30 percent); Energy, Climate and
Infrastructure Security (12 percent); and, International, Homeland and
Nuclear Security (11 percent).
Our work in these other mission areas has direct national security
impact for our customers, and is conducted in a way that is mutually
reinforcing of the capabilities and competencies required for our core
nuclear weapons mission. Often a unique Sandia capability is leveraged
to address common or similar interagency needs. For example, in fiscal
year 2011 the $44 million investment by the nuclear weapons program in
our microelectronics/microsystems capabilities enables $119 million in
project work for a number of national security agencies.
4. Senator Nelson. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, if
as set forth in the Continuing Resolution (CR), the funding for the
nonproliferation programs of the NNSA is at or slightly above the
fiscal year 2010 levels, does this also impact the health of the labs?
Dr. Anastasio. NNSA's office of defense nuclear nonproliferation
performs critical science for national security, drawing upon the
entire national R&D enterprise. These programs solve problems
associated with very real threats against the Nation. The capabilities
and expertise that support these programs require substantial long-term
investment. NNSA's nuclear nonproliferation budget has increased from
$2.13 billion in fiscal year 2010 to an estimated $2.27 billion in
fiscal year 2011, after rescissions. The administration's fiscal year
2012 request of $2.54 billion demonstrates a commitment to harness the
power of technology to address real challenges in nonproliferation
research and development. Technological advances such as next
generation nuclear detection capabilities and methods to detect foreign
nuclear materials and weapons production facilities and processes are
among the advances gained by investment in this area. We are working
within the bounds of the current appropriation, but budgetary cuts
would severely limit science and technology momentum against constantly
evolving terrorist threats.
Dr. Miller. As the question points out, the NNSA's Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation total budget under the Continuing Resolution for the
rest of fiscal year 2011 is slightly above the fiscal year 2010
appropriation. Because of uncertainties in some large budget items at
other NNSA sites (the Satellite Program and the National Center for
Nuclear Security), the Nonproliferation R&D budgets for activities at
LLNL and other laboratories currently are significantly less than their
fiscal year 2010 levels. Assuming the successful resolution of those
uncertainties we expect to receive approximately the same amount of
funding in our nonproliferation programs as last year, but we will
likely receive it late in the year. We are planning now to make sure
that these late-arriving funds are obligated against our programmed
deliverables.
Dr. Hommert. The funding for nonproliferation programs under the CR
does not currently impact the health of Sandia. However, if funding is
sustained at these levels in the out years, or if the amount of funding
that Sandia receives from NNSA is decreased from current levels, an
erosion of capability will occur at Sandia, both in the quality of
staff and, more significantly, their experience. This will negatively
impact the Nation's ability to obtain critical technical support for
addressing current treaty obligations and objectives as well as for
accomplishing key policy objectives in future negotiations.
5. Senator Nelson. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, is
the same true for reductions in science funding for DOE as well as
reductions at DHS?
Dr. Anastasio. DOE is the largest funder of physical science in the
United States, and support at Los Alamos in science is essential to the
health of our open, peer-reviewed science and key experimental user
facilities. DHS is also an important sponsor at Los Alamos. This
funding allows Los Alamos to develop prototype technologies that
leverage our innovations to protect the public from threats to the
homeland. These non-weapons programs serve to both attract top
scientists to the laboratory and build up fundamental scientific
capability that can be further leveraged and applied to LANL's core
weapons program work. Depending on the level of cuts in these programs,
the impact on the Laboratory and the Nation could be significant. We
recognize that funding for these and other agencies is constrained and
in each case we work with the sponsoring programs to offer those
agencies excellent technical options to address their mission
priorities within the available budget.
Dr. Miller. Impact on projects funded from the DOE Office of
Science (SC) is not known for certain at this time. However, the
reductions to the SC budget appear to be small. Specific impacts will
depend on how the available budget is allocated throughout the DOE
laboratory complex.
SC program provides funding for the following LLNL R&D activities:
Fusion Energy Sciences - research in experiments,
theory, and modeling in magnetic fusion energy science; high
energy density laboratory plasmas; and fusion technology and
materials.
Advanced Scientific Computing Research - development
of advanced numerical methods for solving complex physics
applications on high performance computers, basic research on
the tools and methods necessary to allow scientists to
effectively use the current and next generation of high
performance computers, and technologies that increase our
insight and understanding into massive scientific data sets.
This research is particularly synergistic with LLNL NNSA
missions and long-term strategic objectives; particularly as
they pertain to the development and use of simulation and
exascale computing environments.
Biological and Environmental Research - includes
analysis of different climate models; the Program for Climate
Model Diagnosis and Intercomparison, which is an
internationally recognized research group at LLNL that focuses
on understanding climate change, developing assessment methods
and maintaining large data bases widely shared by the climate
modeling community, and analyzing and diagnosing the
performance of climate models; research on cloud and aerosol
physics and atmospheric chemistry; microbial systems biology
relevant to both biofuel development terrestrial carbon
sequestration; the biogeochemistry of the subsurface reactive
transport of plutonium; and the development of an artificial
retina. These programs lie at the scientific core of the LLNL's
mission to advance the energy and environmental security of the
Nation.
Basic Energy Sciences - fundamental investigations in
the fields of materials science, chemical sciences,
geosciences, and biomaterials. This includes research efforts
in the areas of materials science at ultrafast timescales,
actinide science, radiation-resistant materials for advanced
energy applications, nanoscale materials science, and materials
characterization for geosciences. This work is aligned with the
Laboratory's long-term strategic objectives in support of
national and energy security mission needs.
High Energy Physics - includes fundamental research in
advanced detector development, dark matter searches, the
properties of neutrinos and the search for the Higgs and
supersymmetry, as well as theoretical investigations of physics
beyond the standard model. The scientists engaged in this
research apply their skills and expertise across the span of
programmatic work at LLNL which include nonproliferation,
stockpile stewardship, homeland security, the National Ignition
Facility (NIF) and the HPC facilities.
Nuclear Physics - fundamental research in a broad
range of topics including theoretical work spanning the range
from quantum chromodynamics, to ab initio nuclear structure and
reaction theory, to fissioning heavy nuclear systems.
Experimental efforts include neutrinoless double-beta-decay
searches, the elucidation of nuclear structure off of
stability, and the study of relativistic heavy ion collisions
at both the Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider and the Large
Hadron Collider. These programs complement the national
security work; the same scientists support homeland security
activities in attribution, stockpile stewardship and the NIF.
Department of Homeland Security
Details on the budgetary impact to LLNL's fiscal year 2011 funding
from the DHS are still unknown at this time. Current funding to LLNL
from DHS S&T is about $48 million, and DHS S&T's budget for research
and development has been reduced by about 20 percent from fiscal year
2010. While DHS S&T has yet to make key decisions on their R&D
priorities for fiscal year 2011, LLNL expects some changes in
priorities from their original plan that might result in reductions to
LLNL's R&D program.
LLNL has ongoing scientific and engineering projects in several
important areas including explosives/aviation security, bio detection
and bio forensics, bio threat awareness, chemical agent science and
chemical forensics, response and recovery, and transit infrastructure
protection.
Examples of LLNL DHS funded research include:
Explosives/Aviation Security: LLNL's scientists and
engineers support a broad range of research and development
programs in explosives and aviation security including:
understanding the properties of homemade explosives, developing
detection technologies for aviation security applications
including both passenger check point and checked baggage
screening, testing of screening technologies in support of
TSA's technology acquisition programs, and modeling and
simulation of aircraft vulnerabilities to a broad range of
homemade explosive threats. These R&D programs are critical to
the development and deployment of effective aviation security
technologies at our Nation's airports.
Biodetection and Bioforensics: LLNL's biosecurity
research and development programs include: development of
biodetection signatures to detect virulence genes in multiple
biological pathogens, development of underlying technologies to
support Gen-3 biowatch, development of integrated bioforensics
database to support bioforensics analysis, and operation of the
DHS BioKnowledge Center, which is focused on providing a deep
understanding of the risks and countermeasures associated with
current and future bio threats.
Chemical Agent Science and Chemical Forensics: LLNL's
chemical security programs include: development of
comprehensive understanding of the fundamental mechanisms of
chemical agents including novel threat agents and development
of an integrated experimental and high-performance computing-
based modeling capability to predict the effects and
degradation of chemical agents. These R&D programs are critical
to mitigating the impact of future chemical weapons-related
terrorist events.
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Restoration
Projects: LLNL brings unique technical capabilities and
operational experience to multiple WMD restoration projects.
These programs support critical partnerships with multiple
Federal, state and local agencies as they work to improve our
Nation's resiliency and facilitate the recovery from a WMD
attack.
DHS, DOE and NNSA have made significant investments in LLNL's
infrastructure dedicated to Homeland Security S&T challenges. Unique
facilities for explosives research, development, test and evaluation
are in place at LLNL to ensure the development and assessment of the
effectiveness of the current and next-generation of explosives
screening technologies designed to counter the emergent threat of home-
made explosives (HMEs). This infrastructure is critical to supporting
TSA's acquisition of screening technologies for aviation security. In
addition, LLNL operates the only select-agent research facility at the
BSL-3 level at the DOE national laboratories. This capability is
fundamental to our understanding of human pathogens and enables
research and development in their detection, characterization and post-
event remediation. LLNL also has the safe and secure infrastructure
needed to synthesize and characterize small quantities of chemical
weapons including novel threat agents. This secure research and
development environment is critical in developing a predictive
capability for mitigating the impacts of novel chemical weapons agents.
Dr. Hommert. Based on the final fiscal year 2011 budget that was
passed by Congress and signed by President Obama, Sandia's budget for
Office of Science activities is expected to be $55 million, a reduction
of $6 million or roughly 10 percent from the fiscal year 2010 level.
This will reduce our ability to pursue research in areas of Basic
Energy Sciences, Advanced Scientific Computing Research, and Fusion
Energy Sciences. Our research in these areas creates the ideas and
future innovations for advanced energy technologies and national
security applications, and supports the overall health of the
laboratories. While we realize that the Nation is in a difficult
budgetary period, a reduction in our science budget makes it difficult
to attract and retain the best and the brightest of the Nation's
scientists and engineers, and this puts at risk our support of critical
national security needs.
The fiscal year 2011 budget of $688 million for the DHS Science and
Technology (S&T) Directorate reflects a reduction of 20 percent
relative to the fiscal year 2010 level of $863 million. Because DHS S&T
has not yet fully distributed these cuts across existing or planned
programs, specific impacts are not yet known. Our current assumption is
that Sandia will receive a proportional negative budget impact of
approximately $5 million.
Looking forward, the new fiscal year 2012 House spending bill
approved by the House Appropriations Homeland Security Subcommittee on
May 13, 2011, includes an additional 40 percent cut to DHS S&T. While
these cuts are not at a scale to impact the overall health of Sandia,
they will have enormous negative implications on the ability of the
United States to reap the operational benefits of innovative new
technologies in the homeland security arena.
uranium processing facility and the plutonium laboratory
6. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, the Uranium Processing Facility
(UPF) in Tennessee, and the new plutonium facility, the Chemical and
Metallurgical Research Replacement (CMRR) facility at the LANL, are
technically complex, new, multi-billion facilities. These are also the
last two large, new facilities slated for the weapons complex,
completing a plan put in place almost 20 years ago to modernize major
production and research facilities. In November of last year, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report on the UPF,
which made several recommendations specific to the UPF, but was also
applicable generally to NNSA management of large construction projects.
One of the issues raised by GAO was the maturity of new technologies.
GAO's view is that prototypes of new technology should be successfully
demonstrated in an operating environment prior to the start of
construction. This level of maturity is a Technical Readiness Level 7
(TRL-7) on a scale of 1 to 10. This scale is widely used by DOD. Will
the new technologies at the UPF and the CMRR be at a TRL-7 as
recommended by GAO at the start of construction of UPF and CMRR? If
not, why not?
Mr. D'Agostino. NNSA continually monitors and evaluates technology
readiness levels for new processes in UPF in alignment with best
practices as identified in the GAO review. The UPF project is being
planned and executed in accordance with the recently updated DOE Order
413.3B, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital
Assets, which requires significant critical technology element
modification subsequent to CD-2. NNSA is encouraging achievement of a
TRL-7 prior to CD-3 as a recognized best practice. However, in
instances where a lower readiness level of development is acceptable,
because of our robust understanding of the technology, we will
recognize the risks of proceeding with demonstrating the technology at
the next lower level and ensure appropriate contingencies are
identified.
DOE agrees that achieving TRL-7--demonstration of a prototype in an
operational environment--is a level of technological maturity that
constitutes low risk for starting a product development program but has
determined that Technical Readiness Assessments coupled with Technology
Maturity Plans are also an acceptable way to manage and mitigate
technology risk when there are very low quantities of each type of
technology. In contrast to DOD's air, sea and sub-surface weapons
platforms, where large production quantities of new critical
technologies must operate in mobile, extreme and very dynamic
environments, UPF technologies exist only in UPF, are stationary and
will operate in a stable, known environment. Further, demonstration
with actual Special Nuclear Material in an operational environment
would require construction of essentially the final system. For these
reasons, a lower technology level (TRL-6, demonstration of prototype
with simulate material in an operational environment) is acceptable in
this instance, given the cost/benefit associated with further
development of each individual new technology. Appropriate rationale
and contingency will be incorporated into the baseline where a project
technology is short of TRL-7.
7. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, you have committed to having the
design for the UPF and the CMRR 90 percent complete before the
construction project baseline for cost and schedule is established.
Under the DOE construction management order, construction projects must
receive senior level approval at certain critical decision (CD)
milestones. These milestones are CD-0, CD-1, etc. CD-2 is the milestone
where the cost and schedule baseline is established. CD-3 is the start
of construction. At which milestone will the cost and schedule
baselines be set for UPF and CMRR?
Mr. D'Agostino. The cost and schedule baselines for UPF and CMRR
will be set at the CD-2 milestone. NNSA has committed to having UPF and
CMRR projects at a minimum 90 percent design completion prior to
seeking CD-2. NNSA will have greater confidence and less risk of
exceeding performance baselines with this advanced level of maturity in
design at CD-2. Both projects are currently planning to request CD-2
approval for the full project scope in fiscal year 2013.
8. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, will NNSA do an Independent Cost
Estimate (ICE) for each project before CD-2?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes. In accordance with DOE 413.3B, an External
Independent Review (EIR) is required as part of CD-2 approval. For
projects such as UPF and CMRR that are greater than $100 million, an
ICE is a required component of the EIR and must validate the proposed
total project costs. The EIR, conducted by the Office of Engineering
and Construction Management (within DOE, but accountable to the
Secretary and completely independent of the NNSA), must validate the
proposed scope, cost and schedule baselines as a condition of CD-2
approval.
9. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, in the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2011, there is a provision,
section 3114, which requires NNSA to report to Congress when the
baseline is established for a major project. From that baseline,
Congress and the NNSA will measure progress. Will CD-2 serve as the
baseline for purposes of section 3114?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, the baseline will be approved at CD-2 for the
purposes of Section 3114 of the NDAA. CD-2 is the milestone where
project scope, cost and schedule baselines are established and approved
by the Acquisition Executive.
10. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, GAO also recommended that once
the baseline cost and schedule is established, the NNSA Administrator
must ensure that the baseline is ``consistent with NNSA's future years
budget and spending plan prior to approval of . . . critical decision
2.'' Will GAO's recommendation be followed for the UPF, CMRR, and the
new Naval Reactors Expended Core Facility (ECF)?
Mr. D'Agostino. NNSA will establish budget requests and spending
plans for UPF, CMRR, and the new Naval Reactors ECF to support the
projects' cost, scope, and schedule as part of baseline approval at
Critical Decision-2. NNSA is seeking as much certainty as possible in
securing a budget profile and spend plan once the projects have been
baselined, and will emphasize the importance of maintaining these
budgets and spend plans until project completion. In the case of UPF
and CMRR, NNSA's current project execution plan aligns with the 10 year
budget profiles outlined in the Section 1251 Report of the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2011.
11. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Anastasio, is there
anything specific in the design of the UPF or the CMRR facilities that
you are reviewing in light of the events in Japan?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes. UPF and CMRR are being designed in accordance
with modern seismic design standards for nuclear facilities.
Nevertheless, NNSA has retained independent seismic experts to study
these projects for risks similar to the Japan event.
Dr. Anastasio. The CMRR Nuclear Facility design is based on a very
significant seismic event determined using geological analysis. The
design was based on the most recent seismic hazard analyses (2007 and
2009 revision). This includes very severe scenarios which include a
combination of events, such as a large seismic event coupled with
laboratory fires, the most severe event postulated for a facility of
this type. In line with recent guidance from the Secretary of Energy,
LANL is conducting a thorough evaluation of the seismic hazards coupled
with other accident scenarios as factors in the CMRR facility design.
As the design for the facility continues to mature the results of
accident evaluations will continue to be incorporated as engineering
inputs to structural, facility systems and equipment design criteria.
replacement of the idaho expended core facility
12. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald, last year
the Office of Naval Reactors (NR) requested $40.6 million for
conceptual design for the replacement building for the new ECF in
Idaho. This new facility would be a new spent fuel building to support
the NR program. In fiscal year 2012 the request for conceptual design
is $53.8 million. The actual construction project would not start until
2013. What is the anticipated total project cost for this new facility?
Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald. The Total Project Cost for the
Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project (SFHP) is estimated to be
$1,249 million, and will recapitalize the over 50-year-old ECF as the
location for naval spent nuclear fuel receipt, packaging, and secure
temporary dry storage. This estimate of the Total Project Cost is based
on scoping studies conducted for a range of alternatives that could
provide the required capabilities. Actual costs to design and fabricate
similar equipment used at the ECF were considered in forming the basis
of the approximate $400 million cost estimate for the required
equipment. The cost estimate also includes approximately $650 million
for the construction of new facilities as well as potential cost saving
measures, such as modification of existing facilities for continued use
with new facilities. Also included is approximately $200 million of
Other Project Costs that include items such as conceptual design,
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) work, analysis, safety
oversight, development of procedures and manuals, training, general
facility engineering startup support, and technical support. This Total
Project Cost estimate has been reviewed by industry experts with
experience in delivering large, complex construction project associated
with nuclear material handling.
Included within the scope of the SFHP:
Evaluation and selection from existing technology and
processes for spent nuclear fuel handling.
Design and delivery of a facility and facility systems
in which the spent nuclear fuel handling will be performed.
Design and delivery of infrastructure specifically
needed to support spent nuclear fuel handling operations (power
distribution substations, rail service to new facilities,
etc.).
Design and delivery of equipment needed for handling
spent nuclear fuel.
Design and delivery of equipment needed for packaging
and disposal of waste generated during spent nuclear fuel
handling operations.
Ability to perform initial cursory external visual
examinations.
Test, operating, and preventive maintenance
procedures, and drawings for the spent fuel handling process
systems, equipment, facilities, and facility systems.
Personnel training and development of training
programs for the facilities, facility systems, and spent
nuclear fuel handling equipment.
Project management.
Support services needed for the project.
Management for subcontracts supporting the design and
construction of the facilities, facility systems, and spent
nuclear fuel handling equipment needed for this project.
Reports and submittals, including those submittals
required for Critical Decisions.
NEPA analyses and actions.
Full funding in the early years of the project remains critically
necessary to ensure that the facility and equipment are sufficiently
defined such that requests for fiscal year 2013 Project Engineering and
Design funds and fiscal year 2015 Construction funds are fully
justified and support the overall project schedule.
A breakdown of the costs for labor and materials and subcontracts
is provided below.
13. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald, would that
amount include the demolition of the old facility?
Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald. The project cost of the SFHP
does not include the demolition of the current ECF. The current ECF
mission includes the unloading, examination, processing and temporary
dry storage of spent nuclear fuel, in addition to the examination of
irradiated material from the Idaho National Laboratory Advanced Test
Reactor. All of these aforementioned operations must continue while the
SFHP is constructed and placed into operation. For example, ship
refuelings will continue to require that spent nuclear fuel is unloaded
from the limited number of spent fuel shipping containers available,
and critical core examinations necessary to validate fuel performance
must continue. Consequently, an inventory of spent nuclear fuel and
irradiated materials will exist in ECF at the time SFHP becomes
operational. It is impractical and cost-prohibitive to move the spent
nuclear fuel present in ECF to SFHP to complete processing operations
for dry storage in the new facility. In addition, there are a number of
important core examinations underway later this decade that must not be
interrupted in support technical decisions for the operating fleet. Due
to these factors, final disposition of ECF will be deferred until after
the completion of the currently identified ECF mission.
14. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald, can NNSA
afford another expensive building?
Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald. The SFHP will recapitalize the
over 50-year-old ECF as the location for naval spent nuclear fuel
receipt, packaging, and secure temporary dry storage. Naval Reactors'
ability to continue work in Idaho is dependent upon a viable, efficient
fuel-handling infrastructure. Although the ECF continues to be
maintained and operated in a safe and environmentally responsible
manner, further deterioration of the infrastructure could profoundly
impact the Naval Reactors mission. Uninterrupted receipt of naval spent
nuclear fuel is vital to the timely, constant throughput of ship
refuelings and return of these warships to full operational status. If
an interruption in ECF operations were to extend over long periods, the
ability to sustain fleet operations would be negatively impacted since
there would be no capacity available to receive naval spent fuel,
thereby tying up shipping containers and halting defueling operations.
Completion of the recapitalization of the spent nuclear fuel
infrastructure is needed by 2020 to support the Navy's tight refueling
and defueling schedule for nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. A delay
to delivery of this new facility will result in costly and time-
consuming workarounds (e.g. procurement of additional spent fuel
shipping containers and associated equipment) or delays to the
defuelings of nuclear powered warships.
In this constrained funding environment, Naval Reactors recognizes
the need for prudent project management to constrain costs. Naval
Reactors will leverage its extensive project management experience to
do exactly that. The Program routinely manages significant projects,
such as the design and construction of the Virginia-class submarine and
the Ford-class aircraft carrier reactor plants. Naval Reactors also
routinely manage large ship projects, including nuclear powered
aircraft carrier and submarine refueling overhauls. These efforts
include the planning and scheduling of the refueling; design and
development of specialized equipment; planning and technical approval
of shipyard facilities and equipment; transportation and handling of
spent fuel, and reviewing and approving detailed procedures for conduct
of refueling operations. Additionally, Naval Reactors has managed the
development, operation, and maintenance of over 25 classes of nuclear
powered submarines and three classes of nuclear powered aircraft
carriers; as well as the design, construction, operation, and
maintenance of eight land-based prototypes. The Naval Reactors
professionals that are assigned to the SFHP have many years of Naval
Reactors project management and oversight experience.
In addition, the SFHP is being managed consistent with DOE Order
413.3B (Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital
Assets) as implemented by Naval Reactors. The Program is also
capitalizing on established requirements and lessons learned from
management of our Navy projects, including the use of formalized
nuclear safety, refueling equipment, and refueling system design
processes. These combined processes, along with the rigorous budgeting
and accountability processes routinely employed by Naval Reactors,
ensures capability of executing a project of this size.
Finally, Naval Reactors has contracted with an experienced
Engineering, Procurement, and Construction Management contractor and is
leveraging relevant experience through our prime contractor, Bechtel
National Inc.
15. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald, will the ECF
have a design that is 90 percent complete by CD-2?
Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald. The SFHP is being managed
consistent with DOE Order 413.3B (Program and Project Management for
Acquisition of Capital Assets). Consistent with that order, the
preliminary design will be 100 percent complete by CD-2. The
preliminary design provides the detail needed to provide a reasonable
assurance that the design will be implementable within the approved
performance baseline. Consistent with DOE Order 413.3B, the fully
completed preliminary design will form the basis of the Performance
Baseline which is approved at CD-2.
16. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald, will the
project baseline for the ECF for the purposes of section 3114 be
established by CD-2?
Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald. Yes. Naval Reactors approval of
the SFHP CD-2, Performance Baseline, will establish the SFHP project
cost and schedule baseline, consistent with the requirements of DOE
Order 413.3B, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of
Capital Assets. CD-2 approval requires that the design be sufficiently
mature to provide a reasonable assurance that the design will be
achievable within the approved performance baseline. The SFHP
Performance Baseline will include the key project performance, scope,
cost, and schedule parameters, and will be provided to the
congressional defense committee in accordance with section 3114 of NDAA
for Fiscal Year 2011.
17. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald, will an ICE
be performed for the ECF?
Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald. Yes, Naval Reactors will perform
ICEs prior to CD-1 and prior to CD-2, consistent with DOE Order 413.3B,
Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets.
The ICEs will help validate that the program estimates are well-
documented, comprehensive, accurate, and credible by ensuring that the
included costs are reasonable and that no costs were omitted, that they
reflect a realistic schedule with technically-reasonable assumptions,
and that risks and uncertainties are appropriately accounted for and
quantified.
18. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald, will all new
technologies be TRL-7 at construction start, as well as CD-3?
Mr. D'Agostino and Admiral Donald. The SFHP will not pursue new
technologies since the fundamental technology to unload, examine,
process, and package naval spent nuclear fuel currently exists. While
Naval Reactors does not use technology readiness levels to manage its
technical efforts, the Program judges that the technologies included in
the SFHP to be equivalent to a level 8 (total system completed, tested,
and fully demonstrated). This assessment is based on the fact that the
design of the spent fuel handling and processing equipment for the SFHP
uses technology that has been demonstrated in existing equipment that
is currently operating in a production environment at the ECF. The SFHP
is being designed to improve the production capacity of the existing
ECF infrastructure and will integrate lessons learned from over 50
years of operating within the current ECF.
delays in naval reactors m-290 idaho facility construction
19. Senator Nelson. Admiral Donald, the construction project at the
NR Idaho facility to receive and handle M-290 spent fuel shipping
containers is about a year late, both in the start of construction and
in the start of operations. The most recent schedule indicated that the
approval to start construction, CD-3, would be in the second quarter of
fiscal year 2011. What was the reason for the delay and has the delay
resulted in increased costs?
Admiral Donald. As part of the fiscal year 2010 budget request,
Naval Reactors requested money for the ECF M-290 Receiving/Discharge
Station. At that time, the project was scoped only to modify (e.g.,
installation of larger capacity crane) the current ECF to allow the
receipt and handling of M-290 shipping containers. Although the
performance baseline for the project was not yet established, Naval
Reactors included in the budget request documentation outlining a
schedule, in which construction was scheduled to begin (CD-3) in the
first quarter of fiscal year 2010. The fiscal year 2010 budget request
also identified the need for a separate Naval Reactors Facility (NRF)
Storage Overpack Complex in fiscal year 2011.
After the fiscal year 2010 budget request was submitted, Naval
Reactors recognized it could not meet its spent fuel handling
requirements under this arrangement. Specifically, the Program would
not be able to concurrently conduct two significant program missions in
ECF:
(1) Return of spent naval fuel from the Idaho Nuclear Technology
and Engineering Center (INTEC)
(2) Aircraft carrier refueling/defuelings using the M-290.
If left unchanged, this would have had a direct negative impact to
both the State of Idaho settlement agreement and operational needs of
the nuclear aircraft carrier fleet.
Accordingly, Naval Reactors modified the construction plan to
ensure the Program could continue to meet its spent fuel handling
requirements. Rather than modify the existing ECF as originally
planned, Naval Reactors determined the mission required a new facility
for the receipt and handling of M-290 shipping containers. That
facility, the ECF M-290 Receiving/Discharge Station project, would also
incorporate the NRF Storage Overpack Complex project identified above.
This single Major Construction Project (MCP) will eliminate workflow
conflicts and will provide the capability for concurrent receipt of
fuel from INTEC and receipt and handling of M-290 shipping containers.
The current or revised scope of the project and schedule was
outlined in the fiscal year 2011 budget request to Congress. That
schedule indicated that CD-2 would be completed in the first quarter of
fiscal year 2010. CD-2, including the new performance baseline for the
project, was approved on 30 November 2009. This approved performance
baseline states that CD-3 will occur in the second quarter of fiscal
year 2011. CD-3 for the project was approved by Naval Reactors on 25
April 2011. In addition, the project is within the cost estimate
included in the performance baseline.
20. Senator Nelson. Admiral Donald, has construction approval been
received? If not, why not?
Admiral Donald. Yes, construction approval (CD-3 (Start of
Construction)) for the M-290 Receiving/Discharge Station (CSRF/OSE2)
rail siding was provided in the first quarter fiscal year 2011. The CD-
3 for the CSRF/OSE2 facility has been approved by Naval Reactors on 25
April 2011.
21. Senator Nelson. Admiral Donald, what is the status of the
design, is it 90 percent complete as is the NNSA requirement?
Admiral Donald. The 100 percent final design for the ECF M-290
Receiving/Discharge Station (CSRF/OSE2) has been submitted by the
contractor. Construction began on the project in fiscal year 2011 with
approval of the CD-3 for the CSRF/OSE2 rail siding. The CD-3 for the
CSRF/OSE2 facility was approved by Naval Reactors on 25 April 2011.
22. Senator Nelson. Admiral Donald, is this considered a new start
and thus construction cannot begin under the CR?
Admiral Donald. The ECF M-290 Receiving/Discharge Station is not
considered a new start and construction may begin under a Continuing
Resolution. Identified as a MCP since fiscal year 2008, this project
received $545,000 in fiscal year 2008, $300,000 in fiscal year 2009,
and $3,236,000 in fiscal year 2010 in project engineering and design
(PED) funding. The project received an additional $6,264,000 in fiscal
year 2010 to support long-lead procurement of a 310 ton crane with a 75
ton auxiliary hook.
The PED funds provided Architect-Engineering services for the ECF
M-290 Receiving/Discharge Station construction project, allowing the
project to proceed from conceptual design into preliminary design and
final design. The design effort assured project feasibility, defined
the scope, provided detailed estimates of construction costs based on
the approved design and working drawings and specifications, and
provided construction schedules, including procurements.
protective forces
23. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, last March, the Strategic
Forces Subcommittee held a hearing on the protective forces that guard
the nuclear weapons and materials at DOE sites. The majority of these
sites are NNSA sites. It was clear from that hearing that NNSA and DOE
needed to look at the career path options for these highly trained
forces, particularly with respect to retirement eligibility. The
rigorous physical requirements of these forces merit the possibility of
a 20-year retirement program along the lines of some law enforcement,
military, and NNSA courier retirement programs. Shortly after that
hearing, DOE was supposed to provide an implementation plan to address
the retirement and other issues. This report was not submitted until
January of this year and it did not include a plan, just a recitation
of the issues and a promise to study the options again. This issue has
been unresolved for over 3 years. The current contracts for the Guard
forces expire in just over a year and it is possible that the forces
will strike if these issues are not resolved. One site did have a
strike over these issues when the last contract expired. The DOE
representative at the March hearing testified that the issue needed to
be resolved promptly. But here we are 1 year later and with the issue
still unresolved. It is important to ensure that the nuclear materials
and weapons continue to be protected. When is NNSA planning to resolve
this retirement issue for the protective forces?
Mr. D'Agostino. NNSA and the Department as a whole continue to
evaluate all measures that seek to enhance career longevity for
contractor protective force employees. In furtherance of its goal to
study retirement benefit options for protective force employees, NNSA
commissioned a study to evaluate costs associated with a variety of
different benefit options for contractor protective force employees.
The study evaluated three benchmark retirement plans as the first step
toward understanding the costs and comparative benefits associated with
each type of plan. The three benchmark design alternatives were: (1)
the Hanford Multi-Employer (Defined Benefit) plan applicable to the
Guards union; (2) a Defined Contribution plan similar to the one
offered to certain contractor employees at Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory; and (3) the Nuclear Materials Couriers Plan, which includes
elements of both Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution plans. A
fourth ``Notional Alternative Plan,'' which mirrors the Couriers' plan
but excludes some of the more costly features, was also included in the
analysis.
To be clear, the protective force members are employees of the
contractors, not NNSA. The contractor protective force employees at all
but one of the NNSA sites are represented by labor unions. Accordingly,
any changes to existing benefits plans would have to be agreed to
during the collective bargaining process between the contractor and the
union representing the protective force employees. Therefore, the study
that was performed provides objective cost estimates for the
liabilities that the government would be responsible for reimbursing
pursuant to its contracts with NNSA contractors if the protective force
employees were to participate in benefit plans that resemble the
benchmark plans.
The study has been completed, and NNSA senior management is
conducting a thorough review of the report. The Department owes its
stakeholders, the taxpayers, and all potentially affected employees
deliberate and careful consideration of these options.
24. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, my understanding is that there
is a way to address this by establishing an accelerated 401K system.
Would you look into this and report to us, before the time we mark up
the National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2012, as to how
we might fix this issue?
Mr. D'Agostino. As part of the Department's protective force career
options initiative, DOE and NNSA have encouraged protective force
contractors and unions to offer ideas and concepts as to how career
longevity and retirement options might be addressed, and we continue to
receive input from these sources. One NNSA contractor and the
protective force union at that site have discussed an ``accelerated
401(k) system'' and this option will be included in the broader
Departmental discussion of this issue as details of this notional plan
emerge. All legal and feasible options that are brought to the
Department's attention will be considered by DOE management. If the
full accelerated 401(k) proposal is presented to the NNSA before the
markup the fiscal year 2012 defense authorization bill, we will report
to you on this recommendation.
aviation
25. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook, in December, NNSA
made a significant change in the way it manages the aviation program of
the Office of Secure Transportation. As part of this change, the DOE
Office of Aviation will have increased oversight responsibilities for
the NNSA program in lieu of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
Is there a plan in place for the DOE Office of Aviation to oversee the
NNSA program?
Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook. There will be no change to the manner
in which the DOE Office of Aviation Management will conduct its
responsibilities. Currently, OST is studying a move to Federalize
pilots. Based on the outcome of this study, the FAA will conduct the
appropriate surveillance of OST's aviation program pursuant to FAA
regulations.
26. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook, the FAA had
previously determined that the NNSA served in both a civil and public
function and thus had to comply with part 119. Has FAA approved the
NNSA plan to move away from FAA regulations under part 119?
Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook. NNSA's Office of Secure Transportation
continues to operate both public and civil flights and will comply with
applicable sections of Part 119 and all other applicable FAA
regulations. As such we will operate under Part 125 as approved by the
FAA. Public flights are conducted to support the agency's governmental
function such as moving Limited Lifetime Components. All other flights
are considered civil unless approved otherwise by the FAA
administrator. An example of a civil flight would be to move passengers
to training. All civil flights must be cost justified and compared to
commercial air transport before utilizing government aircraft for civil
flights. Historically over the last 3 years, approximately 90+ percent
of our flights are public.
27. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook, I would note that
the explanatory statement accompanying the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011
said with respect to the operation of the Secure Transportation Asset
(STA) aircraft:
The Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the NNSA are
directed to consult with the FAA to determine whether the operations of
the STA aircraft are public or civil operations, or a combination, and
the appropriate equivalency standard under which the STA aircraft
should be operated, maintained, and managed. In addition, the Secretary
and the Administrator are directed to submit a report to the
congressional defense committees that sets forth the FAA determination,
the ability of the NNSA to meet the requirements of the DOE orders if
NNSA will operate as a self-regulated entity, and whether the DOE
Office of Aviation is capable of conducting FAA like oversight and
inspections. This report should be completed before 737 operations
begin.
When do you expect 737 operations to begin?
Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook. NNSA's Office of Secure
Transportation's (OST) Aviation Program will comply with the applicable
portions of FAA regulations found at 14 C.F.R. (Aeronautics and Space)
and 41 C.F.R. 102-33 (Management of Government Aircraft). Flight
Operation of the aircraft is expected to begin in August 2011. Mission
support availability expected to begin on 1 December 2011.
28. Senator Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook, when will the
report be submitted to Congress?
Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook. NNSA will comply with the requirements
as set forth by the FAA. The FAA accepted a letter of application from
NNSA that outlines our proposed operating construct to operate under
Part 125 of 14 CFR. NNSA sees no operational, management or legal
constraints that would result in a denial of authorization. At this
point the only limiting factor before final consideration by the FAA is
the hiring of pilots. NNSA owns one aircraft and is currently
finalizing the acquisition of the second. At that point NNSA will have
adequate information and direction from the FAA and can submit a report
shortly thereafter.
computational and experimental capabilities
29. Senator Nelson. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, all
of the experimental tools that were identified when the Stockpile
Stewardship Program (SSP) was established are now operational. Have you
considered what experimental tools might be needed in the future?
Dr. Anastasio. The experimental tools, DARHT, and Los Alamos
Neutron Science Center at Los Alamos, and NIF at Lawrence Livermore
that were first identified when the SSP began some 15 years ago are
just beginning to provide remarkable data that scientist and engineers
are using to better understand and evaluate the safety, security, and
effectiveness of the Nation's nuclear deterrent. Contrary to what some
have suggested, we are definitely not ``done'' with science. There are
many significant areas of work that remains to be done. There are
critical open questions that remain to be solved to retain our
confidence in the stockpile and we cannot fully predict the scientific
challenges that are still ahead as it continues to age and goes through
modernization.
As we seek to sustain the deterrent and improve our understanding
of the Nation's aging stockpile through the SSP, LANL believes that
future mission needs require investment in new and more capable
experimental facilities and computational capabilities. As an example,
we are examining materials in extreme environments, exploiting in situ,
transient measurements to study materials in relevant dynamic and
irradiation extremes. Constructing such a facility would revolutionize
material performance in extremes by conquering ``the micron
frontier''--the domain in which materials microstructure and defects
dominate performance AND our predictive capability for the stockpile is
the weakest--and advancing the transition from observation and
validation of materials performance to prediction and control of
materials functionality.
LANL has engaged the weapons science community including our
colleagues at LLNL and Sandia as well as in the UK, and the broader
scientific community to define such a facility and is currently
performing a pre-conceptual design study for a facility that we call
MaRIE, for Matter-Radiation Interactions in Extremes, including the
identification of scientific and systems requirements, analysis of
alternatives that would meet those requirements, and trade studies that
would assess the cost-risk-benefits of a variety of technical options.
LANL believes that a facility such as MaRIE would provide needed
dynamic observations of microstructure to the SSP, validating
theoretical descriptions and ultimately yielding control of materials
needed to reduce cost and increase confidence in the stockpile. MaRIE
provides not only multiple, simultaneous in situ measurements of multi-
granular materials with sub-granular resolution, but also synthesis
capabilities to predictively design high performing materials for these
environments as well as multiple probes of materials mixing in
extremes, a known consequence of materials damage and failure.
Dr. Miller. From an experimental point of view, the most important
thing right now is to provide the funding to adequately utilize the
tools we have established, such as the Dual Axis Radiographic
Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT), the NIF, and the Joint Actinide
Shock Physics Experimental Research (JASPER) facility; requirements for
additional experimental facilities have not emerged from our research.
An area in which additional capability is need is HPC and simulation.
There remain key areas, such as boost physics, where we still lack
adequate knowledge. Predictive Capability Framework campaigns utilize
our advanced stockpile stewardship tools to fill gaps in knowledge
about nuclear weapon performance relevant to existing or expected
issues about stockpiled weapons. These activities integrate the use of
state-of-the-art high-performance computers, high-fidelity simulation
models validated by data gathered from state-of-the-art experimental
facilities. This cutting-edge research provides both the basis for
stockpile stewardship and the tools by which the Laboratory experts
make judgments about the health, safety, security, and effectiveness of
the stockpile.
In addition to the experimental facilities we rely on, we need to
continue to advance our HPC capabilities to provide the weapons program
with computing platforms for modeling and simulation (M&S) at the
exascale level. To assure that NNSA's future mission critical needs are
met, a decadal, sustained R&D investment is necessary to advance
supercomputing to exascale-class platforms (1 x 10 \18\ or
1,000,000,000,000,000,000 floating point operations per second)-
supercomputers on the order of 1,000 times more powerful than the
fastest in existence. Current petascale supercomputing has manifestly
improved M&S capabilities, but users remain limited by speed or length
of run time in performing calculations, or inability to perform
adequate uncertainty analyses of complex systems. A central R&D
challenge is power consumption. If the current HPC technology were used
and the number of processors simply scaled up, an exascale machine
would take hundreds of Megawatts of power costing tens of millions of
dollars annually to operate--making the machine more expensive to
operate than procure. Therefore, significant technological innovations
are needed to improve efficiency--gains approaching the order of 100--
will be necessary to reach an optimal next-generation exascale
platform.
The NIF is a critical experimental facility required to meet the
Nation's stockpile stockpile stewardship goals and validate our
computational models. It is very important that the NIF be funded at a
level consistent with the current implementation plan to meet required
deliverables and maximally benefit from the investments made in the
facility and its operation. The SSP relies on NIF for ignition and non-
ignition experiments.
NIF has been operational since the facility's dedication in May
2009. NIF with its 192 laser beams has performed exceptionally well. It
is proving to be a remarkably reliable and precise system.
NIF is the focal point for the National Ignition Campaign (NIC).
The purpose of NIC is to determine the feasibility of fusion ignition
and transition NIF from a construction project to routine experimental
operations for weapons and basic science by the end of fiscal year
2012. With respect to fusion, NIC has two major goals: execution of DT
ignition experiments starting in fiscal year 2010 for the purpose of
demonstrating ignition and development of a reliable, repeatable
ignition platform for weapons physics, basic science, and energy
research by the conclusion of NIC at the end of fiscal year 2012.
There have been a number of important successes at NIF. In the
hohlraum energetics campaign, the NIC team demonstrated that the
interaction between the laser beams and the target could be
satisfactorily controlled and the conditions necessary to implode the
hydrogen fuel could be achieved.
We have also demonstrated the integration of all of the subsystems
needed for the ignition. Cryogenically cooled ignition targets with a
layer of solid tritium, hydrogen, and deuterium (THD) have been
successfully created and imploded. One shot in particular achieved a
record-setting 1.3 x 10 \14\ neutrons.
NIC continues to make excellent progress and the results of
implosion experiments are very encouraging. We continue to learn much
from the experiments and see no ``show stoppers.'' We are optimistic
about success in achieving fusion ignition but mindful that NIC is an
extremely challenging undertaking that is at the frontiers of science
and technology. Current plans are to complete the current fusion
ignition and burn campaign in spring or summer of 2012.
NIF also executes ``non-ignition'' experiments in support of the
SSP. In late February-March 2011, we conducted the most recent highly
successful campaigns of high-energy-density physics experiments in
support of stockpile stewardship on NIF. One campaign focused on
radiation transport to gather data to validate the capability of our
physics simulation codes to model phenomena. Altogether, 16 experiments
were performed in 11 shot days. These included the first experiments
performed that included diagnostics to provide time-resolved
radiographic data. Preliminary comparisons of data taken are in
agreement with pre-shot predictions. A second campaign focused on
developing and using a technique for gathering equation-of-state data
to characterize the properties of highly compressed (but unheated)
materials-in this case, tantalum and carbon. Gathered data from such
experiments are needed for scientific advances that underpin both
stockpile stewardship and planetary science.
Dr. Hommert. The challenging work necessary over the next two
decades to extend the lifetimes of key weapon systems in the US nuclear
arsenal will require application of the new experimental facilities and
tools created during the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship era, and
will also require upgrades and recapitalization for a number of legacy
capabilities. Several key investments are required in order for Sandia
to successfully execute our warhead systems engineering and integration
responsibilities and our design and qualification activities for non
nuclear components and subsystems. Some of our major environmental test
facilities were first commissioned in the 1950s, and they must be
upgraded to modern standards to support the design and development
testing for the B61 Life Extension Program (LEP). Facility and
equipment enhancements are needed at the Tonopah Test Range where we
will perform critical development flight testing of the B61 LEP. Sandia
will provide critical radiation hardened microelectronics for upcoming
LEPs and ALTs. Our capabilities are officially accredited with
``trusted'' status for both the design and manufacture of
microelectronics, which is critical in an age of growing cyber threat
concerns about microelectronic supply chain surety. Our silicon fab
facility requires recapitalization because the tooling is 10-15 years
old, and this is an industry where the technology turns over every
couple of years. Of 137 tools in the silicon fab, more than 25 percent
have only 3rd party support, and another 25 percent have no OEM support
or spare parts. The recapitalization must begin soon to address the
ever-increasing risk of running existing equipment to failure.
The unique pulsed power capabilities associated with Sandia's Z
facility are advancing our understanding of the performance of
nonnuclear components in extreme radiation environments, and providing
valuable Equation of State experimental data for the physics labs in
the critical area of dynamic material response. We also apply this
expertise in High Energy Density Physics more broadly to the
diagnostics and experimental design needs of the National Ignition
Campaign and the Predictive Capabilities Framework.
30. Senator Nelson. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert,
underpinning all of the experiments and past nuclear tests are the
world's leading computational and modeling capabilities, which have
been developed by NNSA. The ability to model the performance of nuclear
weapons using the new experimental data and past data from the days of
nuclear testing is essential to maintaining the nuclear weapons
stockpile, safely, securely, and reliably into the future. How
important is this computation capability to your work?
Dr. Anastasio. The computational capability to model and understand
the performance of nuclear weapons is essential to our work, and it
always has been. One of the largest successes of the Stockpile
Stewardship has been our remarkable advances in supercomputing
capability, and specifically our ability to model the complex phenomena
that occur in a weapon. What we have discovered is that with each
improvement in simulation performance. We see greater fidelity and
develop an improved understanding as well as further awareness of what
we still do not understand. Thus moving to the next generation of
computing (exascale) is not a luxury or simply speed for the sake of
speed. It is essential to our understanding of the challenges we face
with the stockpile, in particular as we move further away from our
underground test experience.
Dr. Miller. HPC serves as the integrating element of the SSP and
has been instrumental in the success of the SSP to date. The
significant resources the country has expended over the past few
decades in HPC have proven to be a very worthwhile investment. Nuclear
weapons are highly engineered 3-D systems with complex materials that
change over time. HPC simulations of stockpile performance, security,
and safety help identify problems in the stockpile, assess the impact,
and devise solutions. Without HPC, the SSP would not have been
successful in sustaining confidence in the safety, security, and
effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear stockpile in the absence of nuclear
testing. However, there are still unresolved issues that require
continued growth in our HPC capabilities to exascale computing in order
to stay on top of stockpile concerns and meet future challenges.
Achieving exascale computing is a technically challenging endeavor,
similar in magnitude to the effort expended in the 1990s to develop
terascale computing. This greatly increased capability will have other
positive impacts on our country's national security and
competitiveness. I am pleased that a program to initiate this effort is
included in the President's Budget Request and strongly urge support
for an aggressive research and development effort to create the
technologies necessary to achieve and apply exascale computing.
Dr. Hommert. Computational capabilities, which encompass both
engineering simulation codes and high performance computational
platforms, are essential tools in meeting our stockpile modernization
and stewardship commitments over the coming decades. As our Nation
moves towards a smaller stockpile, confidence in the safety, security,
and effectiveness of the arsenal must be characterized more rigorously
through quantification of margins and uncertainties (QMU) of these
engineered systems. Computational simulation allows us to create age-
aware performance models and thereby predict the future impacts of
fundamental materials aging mechanisms on stockpile performance. This
predictive understanding provides lead time for decisions on required
stockpile actions. HPC capabilities are also important to our coverage
of environmental requirements for the stockpile. While it is not
possible to perform physical tests in all of the environments and
credible scenarios that a weapon could potential encounter during its
lifecycle, computational simulation can simulate these environments and
inform our technical understanding. Computational simulation plays a
significant role in many lifetime extension program activities
including: environments definition, engineering design and integration,
and systems qualification. It is critical that our computational tools
and platforms provide the confidence and credibility required to inform
high-consequence stockpile decisions.
31. Senator Nelson. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, is
the development of the capability keeping pace with stockpile
requirements?
Dr. Anastasio. Since the advent of the SSP, the increase in our
computational capabilities has been impressive. What we have discovered
is that with each improvement in simulation performance we see greater
fidelity and develop an improved understanding as well as further
awareness of what we still do not understand.
With this increased capability, Los Alamos and the other national
nuclear laboratories have been able to deal with stockpile maintenance
for the past 18 years and have been able to introduce additional margin
into the nuclear weapons systems where possible. The national
laboratories have also been able to more accurately quantify the
uncertainties associated with nuclear weapons as they age. However,
after a decade and half of stockpile maintenance we have exhausted many
of the maintenance options certifiable with our current computational
capability.
Throughout this process, we have been able to identify
computational infrastructure and code improvements advancements needed
to accurately understand the physics and chemical changes occurring in
the stockpile as it ages or to further understand options available for
future LEPS. From these examinations, it is clear that higher levels of
computational power are required to assess and certify the current and
future stockpile. This will require greater investments (platforms and
codes) than is projected in the FYNSP. An enhanced computational
capability that allows us to advance the scientific understanding of
our maintenance options in the absence of nuclear testing is required.
This will increase the number of options available to us as we maintain
the stockpile, ensuring that we keep pace with stockpile requirements.
Dr. Miller. In terms of experimental tools, additional tools are
not required at this time. However, providing adequate funding to fully
utilize the existing tools such as the DARHT, the NIF, and the JASPER
facility is essential. In the HPC and simulation area, the additional
capability of exascale computing and simulation platforms is necessary.
The SSP has been extraordinarily successful in maintaining the
nuclear deterrent without needing to resort to underground testing.
Through our success in coupling advanced HPC simulation capabilities
with data gathered from nuclear weapons science experimental facilities
like LLNL's Contained Firing Facility and LANL's DARHT facility and
high energy density physics data from NIF, we have largely resolved the
energy balance anomaly. We now have a key piece of the puzzle to attack
the many resulting science challenges and LEP design issues. We are
also moving forward to complete the second keystone of SSP, developing
a fundamental understanding and predictive capability for boost.
Nuclear weapons are highly engineered 3-D systems with complex
materials that change over time. The accumulation of small changes that
are inherent in component aging, material compatibility issues, and
refurbishment of aging components, take our warheads away from their
original designs whose safety and reliability were certified in the era
when nuclear tests were still being conducted. Recently identified
warhead issues (that were not identified when certain warheads were
first introduced into the stockpile) further complicate assessments.
These factors increase uncertainty in the performance of existing
warheads, but have not undermined weapon certification. Experience has
shown that at least one major new and unanticipated issue is discovered
about every 5 years.
SSP is focused upon an extraordinary challenge: predicting how a
nuclear weapon changes in time with quantified uncertainties. We do not
currently have the computing power needed to simulate weapons
performance in 3-D at the required resolution while incorporating the
needed detailed physics and age-aware material models. Additionally, we
do not have the computing power to conduct the tens of thousands of
high-resolution 3-D simulations needed to quantify the uncertainty in
our predictions. Today's available technology forces us to choose
between simulating weapon performance in 2-D with high resolution and
physics fidelity or simulating in 3-D. While 2-D simulations were
sufficient to establish the physical principles behind aging effects,
applying that understanding to the stockpile requires high-fidelity 3-D
simulations. Therefore, a new architecture enabling exascale computing
is needed.
Dr. Hommert. The challenge we face going forward is the application
of the powerful computational stockpile stewardship tools to the now
urgent life extension needs of the stockpile. Our design and
development work for multiple LEPs over the coming decades will rely
extensively on our engineering simulation capabilities. We must sustain
the investment in computational tools to ensure that capacity keeps
pace with the LEP design workload as we integrate these new tools into
the design process. The scope and complexity of Sandia's
responsibilities for warhead systems engineering and integration, and
non nuclear component design, requires state of the art computational
capabilities. The competency base in computational science that
underpins these capabilities is strengthened by the NW program research
in this area, and effectively applied to broad national security needs
associated with cyber threats. The extensive and growing national
security challenges in this area will drive the need for continued
investments to transition codes and computational platforms to exascale
architectures expected over the next decade.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
nuclear testing
32. Senator Shaheen. Mr. D'Agostino, is there any technical reason
for the United States to resume nuclear explosive testing in the
foreseeable future? Why or why not?
Mr. D'Agostino. Currently, there are no known technical reasons for
the United States to resume nuclear explosive testing in the
foreseeable future. As a result of our successful Stockpile Stewardship
and Management Program, NNSA has been able to maintain and enhance the
safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons
stockpile without resuming nuclear explosive testing. We are now in the
20th year of the underground testing moratorium, and the need for
science-based stockpile stewardship is greater than ever. Our weapons
systems are beyond their original design lifetimes, and while we have
been able to certify them as safe, secure and effective, the stockpile
contains some components that are based on technologies up to 60 years
old and those components must be replaced and re-certified. Our ability
to continue to certify the stockpile over the longer term requires a
sophisticated physics-based understanding of the weapons, science-based
tools that provide new means, other than underground tests, to solve
complex problems, and predictive capabilities to reduce uncertainties.
Furthermore, each of those pieces requires advanced computing
capabilities to support them. We have made significant advancements in
these areas in the past two decades; however, challenging goals remain
such as achieving ignition at the NIF and providing a physics-based
predictive capability for the stockpile. The success of the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Plan--in particular the infrastructure and
human capital investment components--will allow NNSA to continue to
maintain and enhance the safety, security, and effectiveness of the
U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without resuming nuclear explosive
testing.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
chemistry and metallurgy research replacement facility and uranium
processing facility
33. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Cook, Dr. Anastasio, Dr.
Miller, and Dr. Hommert, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, the
construction projects at Y-12 in Tennessee and LANL in New Mexico are
the foundation of the complex-wide modernization plan and are the key
enabler to the many future LEP efforts. Together, cost estimates for
these facilities range between $7.9 and $12.3 billion. What is driving
the cost?
Mr. D'Agostino. UPF and CMRR are modern and highly sophisticated
nuclear facilities where unique and highly complicated operations will
be conducted on sensitive materials. Safety and security standards for
modern nuclear facilities require robust infrastructure, one-of-a-kind
equipment and rigorous validation that all components meet
specifications and operate appropriately under established adverse
conditions. These factors have driven costs above traditional
construction projects.
Dr. Cook. I agree with Mr. D'Agostino and add that, at 50 percent
design, these projects are still in preliminary maturity. As their
designs have matured these projects have acquired better definition of
how the requirements for seismic ground motion, nuclear quality
assurance, and security affect the design. We will not set the
performance baseline for cost and schedule until the engineering design
has reached 90 percent completion. Their scheduled completion is more
than 10 years from now, and cost estimate ranges include appropriate
contingency to address known uncertainties.
Dr. Anastasio. The CMRR facility will support many programs
involving plutonium and other actinides. Those programs include direct
support for the stockpile, nonproliferation and counter-proliferation
programs, counter-terrorism programs, energy programs, and plutonium
science. To meet the mission requirements, these facilities must be
designed to safely and securely handle and control nuclear material not
only for the personnel working in the facility and for the public, even
in major postulated and coupled accidents, such as earthquakes. The
CMRR facility is being designed for personnel to safely handle all
forms of plutonium, including bare metal. We expect these facilities to
serve a broad array of national security programs over many decades. In
addition, we must protect significant quantities of nuclear materials.
These requirements have driven us to a design with multiple, redundant
safety systems and security features.
Dr. Miller. I would respectfully defer to my colleagues at the NNSA
for specific information on the cost estimates for the UPF at Y-12 and
the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) facility at
LANL. However, I would observe that the type of work performed by NNSA
often requires very complex, one-of-a-kind facilities. The nature of
these one-of-a-kind facilities makes out-year budgeting quite
challenging. For these types of facilities, it is very important to
provide flexibility and appropriate contingencies that reflects the
various elements of uncertainty within each project.
Dr. Hommert. I defer to Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Anastasio, and the
institutions accountable for executing these MCPs.
34. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Cook, Dr. Anastasio, Dr.
Miller, and Dr. Hommert, why do these facilities cost so much?
Mr. D'Agostino. UPF and CMRR are modern and highly sophisticated
nuclear facilities where unique and highly complicated operations will
be conducted on sensitive materials. Safety and security standards for
modern nuclear facilities require robust infrastructure, one-of-a-kind
equipment, and rigorous validation that all components meet
specifications and operate appropriately under established adverse
conditions. These factors have driven costs above traditional
construction projects.
Moreover, the nuclear facility construction industry has been
inactive for many years and there are no comparative construction costs
that indicate the UPF and CMRR costs are above market price. NNSA
acknowledges that the UPF and CMRR facilities are costly because they
are unique and modern nuclear facilities that are being designed to
modern nuclear, safety and security standards. As their designs have
matured these projects have acquired better definition of how the
requirements for seismic ground motion, nuclear quality assurance, and
security affect the design. We will not set the performance baseline
for cost and schedule until the engineering design has reached 90
percent completion. Their scheduled completion is more than 10 years
from now, and cost estimate ranges include appropriate contingency to
address known uncertainties.
Dr. Cook. I agree with Mr. D'Agostino.
Dr. Anastasio. The CMRR facility (and likewise, the UPF) must be
able to perform the assigned mission programs for multiple decades in a
safe and secure manner. To meet the mission requirements, these
facilities must be designed to safely and securely handle and control
nuclear material not only for the personnel working in the facility but
also for the public, even in major postulated accidents. The CMRR
facility is being designed for personnel to safely handle all forms of
plutonium, including bare metal. Dealing with special nuclear materials
such as plutonium requires high levels of security and safety,
requiring multiple, redundant safety systems and security features. All
of these requirements tend to increase the facility cost.
Dr. Miller. The NNSA facilities are one-of-kind facilities that
have never been built anywhere in the world before in most cases.
Regardless of the design and engineering challenges these projects
present, I believe they are absolutely critical to our national
security. Without both the stockpile stewardship research and
development centers and production facilities, the country would not be
able to support our nuclear deterrent. I fully recognize that they are
costly, but I would also maintain that they are critical to our
national security.
Dr. Hommert. I defer to Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Anastasio, and the
institutions accountable for executing these MCPs.
35. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Cook, Dr. Anastasio, Dr.
Miller, and Dr. Hommert, when does NNSA plan to have better confidence
in the cost and schedule for these buildings?
Mr. D'Agostino. NNSA will gain more confidence in the cost and
schedule for UPF and CMRR as the designs mature. The design is maturing
at a rate of approximately 1 percent-2 percent per month. Both projects
are on schedule and will be ready to establish project cost and
schedule baseline (CD-2) in fiscal year 2013 after they have achieved
90 percent design completion. I will only approve the baselines once
the project teams have sufficiently demonstrated and DOE support
offices have validated that the projects can be delivered at the CD-2
specified level of cost, schedule, and defined scope.
Dr. Cook. I agree with Mr. D'Agostino and add that a requirement of
CD-2 approval includes an External Independent Review and ICE that
supports, and provides additional confidence in, the proposed cost and
schedules.
Dr. Anastasio. The next major step in the CMRR NF will be when the
performance baseline is set at 90 percent complete, currently planned
for mid-fiscal year 2013.
Dr. Miller. I understand that the NNSA has worked diligently to
address this very question and is moving toward obtaining more frequent
ICEs during the critical decision process, as well as hiring and
training professional large scale project managers. I would
respectfully defer to NNSA for a more detailed answer.
Dr. Hommert. I defer to Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Anastasio, and the
institutions accountable for executing these MCPs.
36. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Cook, Dr. Anastasio, Dr.
Miller, and Dr. Hommert, what steps are being taken to ensure that
taxpayers' dollars will be spent wisely and that the buildings will
come in on time and at cost?
Mr. D'Agostino. The UPF and CMRR project teams are continually
being challenged to identify cost effective opportunities while meeting
all operational, safety, and security requirements. NNSA has supported
numerous internal and external reviews to identify cost savings and
validate that the requirements are current and support mission
deliverables. NNSA will continue to challenge the projects to find more
savings and to ensure that the proposed costs are appropriate for all
elements of the projects' scope.
Dr. Cook. I agree with Mr. D'Agostino. As an example of our
commitment, DOD is currently conducting an independent review of CMRR
and UPF to validate the costs of the project scopes. NNSA has
established that the upper ends of the cost range estimates represent
the maximum Total Project Costs for the projects, and that cost growth
beyond these figures will not be supported. If the costs trend toward
the upper end of the cost estimate ranges, NNSA is prepared to make
scope adjustments as needed to maintain mission capabilities. As
detailed in the DOE/DOD Memorandum of Agreement on DOD's funding for
NNSA, another approach if costs increase is to slip schedules to the
right.
Dr. Anastasio. Los Alamos recognizes that the Nation is confronted
with very serious financial challenges and is committed to spending
taxpayers' dollars wisely. We have assembled a strong team to design
and construct this facility. I personally evaluate the CMRR project and
we have driven the budgeted cost of this facility down over the last
year. In addition, we support a large number of reviews that evaluate
our plan and have learned from lessons from other MCPs.
Dr. Miller. I understand that the NNSA has worked diligently to
address this very question and is moving toward obtaining more frequent
ICEs during the critical decision process, as well as hiring and
training professional large-scale project managers. I would
respectfully defer to NNSA for a more detailed answer.
Dr. Hommert. While, as indicated above, we are not directly
involved in the detailed cost and schedule planning for these
facilities, we strongly support the NNSA decision to apply rigorous
project management tools and approaches to these MCPs. At Sandia, we
are proud of our track record in completing MCPs ahead of schedule and
under budget (for example with our MESA facility in 2007) and if called
upon, we stand ready to support the NNSA with our relevant experience
in this area.
37. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Cook, Dr. Anastasio, Dr.
Miller, and Dr. Hommert, if Congress were to not provide funding for
CMRR and UPF, what are some of the anticipated consequences to the
nuclear stockpile and weapons complex?
Mr. D'Agostino. Delaying UPF and CMRR places our ability to execute
the current LEP schedule at a high risk--that risk will continue to
increase every year. Nuclear component work would need to be performed
in existing facilities like Building 9212 at Y-12 and the Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research (CMR) Facility at Los Alamos. However, the safety,
security, and environmental issues associated with the aging existing
facilities are mounting, as are the costs of addressing them. NNSA
manages the risks associated with the aging facilities and will
continue to do so, but as the facilities and their equipment continue
to age, the ability to maintain them will diminish. NNSA will of course
exhaust all options for keeping these facilities open until a new UPF
and CMRR have been constructed. However, in the event that either of
these facilities had to be shut down due to safety, security, or
environmental concerns, the loss of work force and critical skills
would be considerable, and it would likely be extremely expensive to
restart operations. If there are delays in delivery of the CMRR and
UPF, significantly more maintenance and infrastructure improvement
measures would be needed in the existing facilities, at a significant
cost, to avoid a potential shut down and ensure NNSA can meet delivery
schedules for LEPs.
For the manufacture of plutonium pits, the current CMR facility has
limited analytical capability, and the PF-4 vault is inadequate.
Therefore, NNSA will not be able to achieve the required 80 pits per
year rate until the new CMRR facility is in operation. This capability
is required for the W78 LEP by 2021.
Dr. Cook. I agree with Mr. D'Agostino.
Dr. Anastasio. We cannot continue to operate the current CMR
facility forever because of inherent safety risks of a 60+ year old
facility that will continue to increase into the future. Los Alamos has
already closed three wings of CMR by transferring mission work to TA-55
and curtailing other activities. The CMRR facility will support many
programs involving plutonium and other actinides for decades to come.
Those programs include direct support for the stockpile including
support to the pit production activities in TA-55/PF4, weapons complex,
nonproliferation and counterproliferation programs, counterterrorism,
energy programs, and plutonium science. Impacts can be significant,
including the inability to support these required mission programs.
Dr. Miller. The fiscal year 2011 and 2012 budgets represent a
positive first step toward reversing the recent declining budget trends
and revitalizing the nuclear weapons complex necessary to maintain the
U.S. nuclear deterrent. The requested budget increase for the NNSA
Weapons Activities account balances the funded program of work across
the three primary areas in the SSP: (1) the science and technology that
underpins our understanding of an aging stockpile and supports a
reinvigorated surveillance program; (2) the LEPs that are necessary to
keep the systems safe, secure and effective; and (3) the modernization
of the facilities and infrastructure. Funding shortfalls in any one of
the three primary areas of SSP will likely impact the other elements of
SSP. For instance, if Congress were not to provide funding for the CMRR
facility and the UPF, the LEPs would be impacted. More specifically,
the availability of CMRR could affect the extent to which new safety
and security features are introduced into the stockpile, the
performance margin of the LEP, and the interoperability between systems
like the W78 and W88.
Dr. Hommert. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP)
assumes the availability of these facilities in the early to mid 2020s.
A fundamental change to the SSMP plan for the stockpile would be
required if Congress decided not to provide the required funding. An
alternative approach for ensuring U.S. capabilities for working with
Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) would need to be developed and funded.
38. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Cook, Dr. Anastasio, Dr.
Miller, and Dr. Hommert, given the long list of LEPs over the next 20-
plus years, how could a delay in the construction of CMRR and UPF
impact future LEPs?
Mr. D'Agostino. Delaying UPF and CMRR places our ability to execute
the current LEP schedule at a high risk--that risk will continue to
increase every year. Nuclear component work would need to be performed
in existing facilities like Building 9212 at Y-12 and the CMR Facility
at Los Alamos. However, the safety, security, and environmental issues
associated with the aging existing facilities are mounting, as are the
costs of addressing them. NNSA manages the risks associated with the
aging facilities and will continue to do so, but as the facilities and
their equipment continue to age, the ability to maintain them will
diminish. NNSA will of course exhaust all options for keeping these
facilities open until a new UPF and CMRR have been constructed.
However, in the event that either of these facilities had to be shut
down due to safety, security, or environmental concerns, the loss of
work force and critical skills would be considerable, and it would
likely be extremely expensive to restart operations. If there are
delays in delivery of the CMRR and UPF, significantly more maintenance
and infrastructure improvement measures would be needed in the existing
facilities, at a significant cost, to avoid a potential shut down and
ensure NNSA can meet delivery schedules for LEPs.
For the manufacture of plutonium pits, the current CMR facility has
limited analytical capability, and the PF-4 vault is inadequate.
Therefore, NNSA will not be able to achieve the required 80 pits per
year rate until the new CMRR facility is in operation. This capability
is required for the W78 LEP by 2021.
Dr. Cook. I agree with Mr. D'Agostino.
Dr. Anastasio. Future plans for LEPs will require replacement pits
to be produced in the TA-55/PF4 building. While CMRR will not produce
pits, this facility does provide the science to ensure that TA-55 pits
meet the exacting chemistry and material properties needed to ensure
the pits will function as designed. As such, a delay in CMRR
construction creates significant delays in completion of delaying
future LEPs.
Dr. Miller. A delay in CMRR and/or UPF could impact the range of
options under consideration for the upcoming LEPs. Today, the
production complex is capable of producing components for weapons
refurbishments. However, the facilities that CMRR and UPF will replace
are more than 50 years old, oversized, increasingly obsolete, and
costly to maintain. They are also safety, security, and environmental
concerns. When completed, both CMRR and UPF will be able to operate
more efficiently in support of the nuclear weapons enterprise. While
the B61-12 is independent of CMRR and UPF construction, a delay in CMRR
could have an impact on replacement or reuse design options for the W78
LEP. The availability of CMRR could affect the extent to which new
safety and security features are introduced into the stockpile, the
performance margin of the LEP, and the interoperability between systems
like the W78 and W88.
CMRR's original construction completion date has been pushed out to
the early 2020s according to the current schedule. LANL and LLNL
continue to work with NNSA to ensure that sufficient capability for
plutonium R&D is available to accommodate the workload of the complex
to support the LEPs while CMRR is under construction. These same R&D
capabilities are also required should the country need to characterize
and/or attribute a nuclear terrorism related event. The country has no
other capable facilities outside of the NNSA design laboratories.
Dr. Hommert. The current sequence and timing of the LEPs called for
in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and documented in the SSMP would
not be achievable, and would need to be revised. Delays in the LEPs for
certain systems could impact our confidence in the state of health of
the US nuclear deterrent.
39. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Cook, Dr. Anastasio, Dr.
Miller, and Dr. Hommert, what is being done with respect to conducting
an ICE for each facility?
Mr. D'Agostino. Both UPF and CMRR project teams have ongoing ICEs
being performed. The GAO has performed an independent review of the UPF
project, and the UPF project team retained the US Army Corp of
Engineers (USACE) to conduct an ICE for the project. The USACE results
are being examined and compared to the project team's cost estimate to
reconcile differences. The GAO has initiated a review of the CMRR
project. The cost range estimates for CMRR and UPF are being
independently validated by the DOD's Cost Analysis and Program
Evaluation (CAPE) group.
Furthermore, in accordance with DOE 413.3b, an External Independent
Review (EIR) is required as part of CD-2 approval. For projects such as
UPF and CMRR that are greater than $100 million, an ICE is a required
component of the EIR and must validate the proposed total project
costs. The EIR, conducted by the DOE's Office of Engineering and
Construction Management, must validate the proposed scope, cost and
schedule baselines as a condition of CD-2 approval.
Dr. Cook. In addition, an independent cost reasonableness review
was conducted on both projects in July 2010. The cost reasonableness
review concluded that the process and steps that were being exercised
to establish cost estimates is appropriate. Also, the former Office of
Cost Analysis conducted an ICE on UPF and an initial review of CMRR.
All reviews--the ones cited by the Administrator and myself plus others
to be done as the cost estimates mature--will be considered in the
final budgeting for both projects.
Dr. Anastasio. We continue to support a large number of reviews of
the CMRR, including DOD, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
(DNFSB), GAO, and Independent Cost Evaluations (ICE). We expect to
support comprehensive ICE reviews as the project proceeds to baselining
in 2012 and 2013. In addition, the project will continue to support
reviews throughout the Construction Execution Phase.
Dr. Miller. I would respectfully defer to my colleagues at the NNSA
for specific information on the cost estimates for the UPF at Y-12 and
the CMRR facility at LANL.
Dr. Hommert. I defer to Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Anastasio, and the
institutions accountable for executing these MCPs.
40. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Cook, Dr. Anastasio, Dr.
Miller, and Dr. Hommert, in what way will CMRR and UPF influence U.S.
Strategic Command's (STRATCOM) requirements for the overall size of the
stockpile?
Mr. D'Agostino. As described in the NPR, the non-deployed stockpile
currently includes more warheads than required to hedge against
technical or geopolitical surprise, due to the limited capacity of the
NNSA complex to conduct LEPs for deployed weapons in a timely manner.
Progress in restoring NNSA's production infrastructure will allow these
excess warheads to be retired along with other stockpile reductions
planned over the next decade.
Dr. Cook. I agree with Mr. D'Agostino.
Dr. Anastasio. The CMRR facility will support many programs
involving plutonium and other actinides. Those programs include direct
support for the stockpile, weapons complex, nonproliferation and
counter-proliferation programs, counter-terrorism, energy programs, and
plutonium science. It is important to note that CMRR will not produce
pits but will provide the science to ensure that pits manufactured at
TA-55/PF-4 meet the exacting chemistry and material properties needed
to ensure the pits will function as designed. STRATCOM's current, and
projected stockpile size requirements will be supported, as required
with manufacturing in TA-55/PF-4 building. While the CMRR facilities
size is capability based, a small capacity for the stockpile is
inherent in the capability base.
Dr. Miller. This question is best answered by STRATCOM. I would
note that even though today the production complex is capable of
producing components for warhead refurbishments, the facilities that
the CMRR facility and the UPF will replace are more than 50 years old,
oversized, increasingly obsolete, and costly to maintain. They are also
safety, security, and environmental concerns. Confidence in and
demonstrated performance of the production complex is clearly important
in the sizing of the stockpile with respect to its ability to respond
to future strategic policy uncertainties and the need to protect
against technological failures in the stockpile itself.
Dr. Hommert. These facilities are part of the NNSA plan for a
responsive infrastructure. In principle, a responsive infrastructure
could enable a smaller hedge force which would be consistent with a
smaller overall stockpile.
41. Senator Sessions. Mr. D'Agostino, Dr. Cook, Dr. Anastasio, Dr.
Miller, and Dr. Hommert, without these facilities, would NNSA be able
to meet STRATCOM's current warhead requirements?
Mr. D'Agostino and Dr. Cook. Should NNSA not have access to the
capabilities in the planned new facilities, the ability to produce
uranium components and conduct analysis for pit certification would be
limited to rates existing today, which would erode as the existing
facilities decay. Our ability to support the stockpile and the planned
LEPs would be jeopardized. Without UPF and CMRR, it's not a question of
whether these capabilities would be lost, but only when. Although NNSA
is taking all measures to continue to operate the existing facilities,
their age and single point of failure capability raise the costs of
safe operation each year and will eventually exceed NNSA's ability to
keep them operational.
Furthermore, CMR presently enables the National Laboratories to
conduct surveillance of plutonium components in the stockpile. Should
the facility become unusable, it will negatively impact our ability to
assess and certify the status of the current stockpile.
Dr. Anastasio. Without these facilities, STRATCOM's requirements
for extended life warheads starting with the W78 LEP will be
significantly impacted if the replacement option is selected by the DOD
and funded by Congress.
Dr. Miller. Today, the production complex is capable of producing
the required components for current warhead refurbishments underway.
However, the facilities that the CMRR facility and the UPF will replace
are more than 50 years old, oversized, increasingly obsolete, and
costly to maintain. They are also safety, security, and environmental
concerns. When completed, both CMRR and UPF will be able to provide
components more efficiently. A delay in CMRR and/or UPF could impact
the range of options for the upcoming LEPs and the ability of LEPs to
meet new military requirements.
Dr. Hommert. The current NNSA plan calls for these facilities to
become operational in the 2020s. In the near term, the stockpile can
and will be maintained with existing facilities to meet requirements.
However, these facilities will be needed to meet anticipated future
requirements.
ssbn(x) life of hull reactor
42. Senator Sessions. Admiral Donald, what is the current
technology readiness level for the life of hull reactor anticipated for
the SSBN(X)?
Admiral Donald. Naval nuclear reactor designs are evolutionary
rather than revolutionary. The reactor for Ohio Replacement SSBNs will
incorporate technologies that provide greater energy and a longer
lifetime than any previous submarine core.
Initial development of the materials required to achieve the life-
of-ship core were part of previous research, design and manufacturing
efforts. The knowledge gained from these efforts identified the
additional steps needed to be ready for production. Naval Reactors is
confident in the feasibility of the life-of-ship core and will validate
this through rigorous testing and manufacturing demonstrations. A final
decision on the core material for Ohio Replacement is planned to be
made in February 2012 based on manufacturing demonstrations to date.
While Naval Reactors has not historically used technology readiness
levels to manage its technical efforts, the Program judges that the
life-of-ship core technology would represent a level 5 (component and/
or breadboard validation in a relevant environment). This assessment is
based on the fact that a prototype test cell incorporating the new
material has been inserted in an operating, land-based reactor plant.
Manufacturing development at the ship-production scale needs to be
demonstrated.
43. Senator Sessions. Admiral Donald, how are the requirements for
the life of hull reactor design for SSBN(X) different from those in
current Virginia-class submarines?
Admiral Donald. SSBNs spend more time at sea than SSNs in order to
meet the requirements for strategic patrols. Ohio Replacement will also
be designed for a life of 42 years, vice 33 for Virginia. The Ohio
Replacement core will operate at sea for more than twice as many days
as Virginia's core. In order to achieve this increase in energy and
lifetime demand, Naval Reactors is designing a core with new materials
based on previous research. A more detailed, classified briefing can be
provided.
44. Senator Sessions. Admiral Donald, I understand that the current
milestone and decision point for determining the technical feasibility
of developing a life of hull reactor for SSBN(X) is in February 2012.
If it is determined that a life of hull reactor for the SSBN(X) is not
possible, how will that impact the overall number of boats required to
meet STRATCOM requirements?
Admiral Donald. The resources in our DOE budget are based on
completing the additional development needed to ensure success of
production of a life-of-ship core in Ohio replacement. Without a life-
of-ship core, two additional ships will be required to meet STRATCOM's
requirements, thereby costing taxpayers approximately $10 billion in
ship construction.
45. Senator Sessions. Admiral Donald, would additional boats be
required to compensate for refueling?
Admiral Donald. Yes. Without a life-of-ship core, two additional
ships will be required to meet STRATCOM's requirements, thereby costing
taxpayers approximately $10 billion in ship construction.
46. Senator Sessions. Admiral Donald, in the House-passed version
of H.R. 1, the fiscal year 2011 full year CR, the Energy and Water
Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee cut the President's
fiscal year 2011 NR budget by $103 million. What is the anticipated
impact of that reduction?
Admiral Donald. The $103 million cut proposed in H.R. 1 grew to
$111 million in P.L. 112-10 signed by President Obama on 15 April 10.
The impacts of that $111 million cut are as follows:
a 6- to 9-month delay to the Ohio Replacement Program
and resultant loss of synchronization with the Navy's work on
the ship.
staffing reduction of over 50 contractors at shipyards
and Naval Reactors' laboratories.
deferral in planned hiring of 150 contractors at
shipyards and Naval Reactors' laboratories.
deferral in Ohio Replacement reactor plant component
design subcontract placements.
a reduction in pension contributions.
other impacts to Naval Reactors, including deferral of
previously planned General Plant Projects (GPP).
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
pantex plant
47. Senator Cornyn. Mr. D'Agostino, on July 7, 2010, the Pantex
Plant was impacted by a severe thunderstorm, causing significant
flooding throughout the plant, as well as equipment and facility
damage. Pantex received $8.8 million in fiscal year 2010 for flood
recovery efforts. It is my understanding that Pantex requires an
additional $17.2 million for repair and recovery efforts, as well as
$2.25 million to mitigate the impact of future flood events. The
President's fiscal year 2012 budget request for operating requirements
at Pantex is $649.3 million. Does this figure cover all remaining flood
repair, recovery, and mitigation efforts required at Pantex?
Mr. D'Agostino. The Pantex rain event occurred in July 2010, after
the fiscal year 2011 President's budget had been submitted to Congress.
NNSA committed $8.8 million in fiscal year 2010 for immediate flood
recovery efforts. This funding, along with Pantex internal
efficiencies, addressed the most critical issues faced by the site to
restoring operations. NNSA continues to evaluate the available fiscal
year 2011 funding in the RTBF program, and will work to determine the
best option for addressing the most urgent needs. The President's
fiscal year 2012 budget request includes $164.8 million for Pantex RTBF
Operations of Facilities, which is sufficient to fund any remaining
flood repair, recovery, and mitigation activities.
48. Senator Cornyn. Mr. D'Agostino, the fiscal year 2012 budget
request also covers resumption of work on a new 45,000-square-foot
high-explosives pressing plant at Pantex. Design work for this facility
was completed in 2009 and then put on hold, and it is my understanding
that projected completion of this project is now by 2017. What is the
current timeline for construction, and what is your department doing to
ensure that no further delays are experienced?
Mr. D'Agostino. The project completion date is now September 2016.
An External Independent Review (EIR) has been conducted to validate the
new cost and schedule and the project's baseline revised per the EIR
findings. Costs have increased due to the need to add more contingency
for risk and the added cost escalation due to delay. The United States
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is the Construction Services Manager
and will manage the cost, schedule and technical performance of this
project to ensure no further delays and cost overruns are experienced.
The USACE has received bids for the project on March 1, 2011 and
expects to award the construction contract in third quarter fiscal year
2011. The contract will be a firm-fixed price contract with fixed cost
and completion date.
49. Senator Cornyn. Mr. D'Agostino, according to the 2009 report by
the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United
States, ``excessive regulation originating outside the NNSA but within
a risk-averse DOE was raising cost and hampering production at
Pantex.'' The report found that two broad attitudes are often cited as
contributing to excessive regulation: ``the failure of the NNSA and DOE
to distinguish between what to do (a government function) and how to do
it (a contractor responsibility),'' as well as the government's
``tendency to respond to problems by imposing new rules that will
`guarantee' that the problem does not recur.'' What efforts have the
NNSA and DOE taken to alleviate this excessive regulation, promote
production, and reduce costs at Pantex?
Mr. D'Agostino. In 2009, I established and chaired a Governance
Board consisting of senior leaders from NNSA and its contractors to
develop an approach to transforming the way we govern our contractors
and ourselves. The efforts of the Board resulted in a number of short-
and long-term actions to drive transformation in governance and
oversight programs. The ultimate goal of these actions is to streamline
how NNSA does business and allow resources to be focused and directed
in a way that maximizes mission accomplishment, while ensuring that
safety and security are integral components of that mission.
Upon completion of the governance and oversight transformation
effort, NNSA expects to have the following:
Clearer roles, responsibilities, and accountability
Stronger Contractor Assurance Systems
Better balanced Federal requirements
More focused, integrated, effective and efficient
Federal and contractor oversight systems, and
Improved contractual performance accountability
The effort to better balance Federal requirements directly
addresses the concern regarding the ``two attitudes'' cited from the
2009 report by the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of
the United States. NNSA has implemented a number of changes to its
contract requirements to address duplication and redundancy in
requirements and to eliminate unnecessary prescription. NNSA
established the expectation that a team of senior managers review
proposed new requirements or changes to requirements promulgated by
DOE. As part of its review, the team ensures new or modified
requirements focus on performance outcomes. The team also helps ensure
those requirements are not an inappropriate response to addressing a
performance problem at an individual site. This team of managers has
worked with other DOE organizations responsible for internal
requirements and regulations to effect significant change in those
requirements; many of the changes address the concerns raised in your
question. However, this is a work in progress as the same pressures and
attitudes that led to the concerns raised by the Commission still exist
internal and external to NNSA and DOE.
DOE has also undertaken initiatives to improve its requirements. In
2010, the Deputy Secretary initiated DOE's 2010 Safety and Security
reform effort. This effort is intended to streamline DOE requirements
in the areas of safety and security. NNSA has worked with DOE on this
effort. As part of the security reform initiative, and in partnership
with the DOE's Office of Health, Safety and Security, NNSA has
completed the initial phase of a Zero-Based Security Review that will
improve NNSA's ability to implement its nuclear security mission while
maintaining a robust security posture at all of its sites. These
reforms will demonstrate to Congress and others that the NNSA
effectively accomplishes its safety and security requirements in a
manner that is reasonable, defensible, and consistent across the
Nuclear Security Enterprise.
national laboratories
50. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, was
there an assessment made 4 years ago that the W78 should be replaced
within a decade, meaning that weapon won't begin replacement work until
6 years after you stated it needs to be replaced?
Dr. Anastasio. The W78 warhead entered the stockpile in 1980. LANL
has been monitoring the health of the W78 since then, principally
through the surveillance program, which includes flight testing. In
each of the last 15 years, the Laboratory has issued a W78 annual
assessment report, and the respective Laboratory Directors have issued
an annual assessment letter that included the W78.
LANL has been monitoring one particular W78 aging characteristic
for over a decade. When I became Director in 2006, and annually
thereafter, I received technical briefings on the health of all the
warheads and bombs for which LANL is responsible, including the W78. I
mentioned this aging issue in my first annual assessment letter (2006)
and updated my comments and assessment each year thereafter.
In my 2007 annual assessment letter, I recommended that the W78 be
replaced or enter a comprehensive life extension activity to correct
this specific aging condition, but I did not specify a timeframe for
execution.
Dr. Miller. LANL has been monitoring the W78's aging
characteristics and has assessed that aging ``has not affected the
safety, reliability, or performance of the W78 to date;'' however,
``the condition is progressive and beyond current predictive
capabilities.'' LANL Director Dr. Michael Anastasio first made this
assessment about 4 years ago and at that time stated that a life
extension would be needed within a decade. LLNL has concurred with
these concerns in our peer review role as part of the annual assessment
process. Issues identified include material aging and compatibility
issues, which can impact components within the nuclear explosive
package (NEP).
The W78 warhead constitutes the majority of the ICBM leg of the
triad and has been deployed on the Air Force's Minuteman III for more
than 31 years. It is beyond its planned service life and requires a 10
year effort to study and then refurbish the necessary systems. It is
important to begin the study activities on the W78 LEP in order to
explore options to extend this warhead's life to address concerns
identified in surveillance of W78 warheads and reported in annual
assessments. An important function of the study is to evaluate the
different approaches available to refurbish the warhead--as were
outlined in the NPR--and also to assess the impacts of including
additional safety and security features.
Dr. Hommert. The technical issue driving the need for a life
extension of the W78 warhead is associated with the NEP which is the
design responsibility of LANL. I defer to Dr. Anastasio regarding the
assessment of the W78 issue and the timelines required for the life
extension. Regarding Sandia design responsibilities, we perform tests
and analyses on the non-nuclear components and subsystems each year,
adding data to the technical basis for assessing whether the
requirements for the W78 warhead are met. Our current assessment, based
on 30 years of data collected, is that we see no evidence of
degradation of the non-nuclear components that would require their
urgent replacement. However, the Sandia designed electronics in the W78
warhead are now 30 years old and we believe it would be prudent to
replace them when a LEP is undertaken for the warhead. The insertion of
modern non nuclear technologies will likely be required to enable
surety improvements and flexibility in Nuclear Explosive Package (NEP)
options.
51. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert,
what prompted that statement?
Dr. Anastasio. In my 2007 annual assessment letter, I recommended
that the W78 be replaced or enter a comprehensive life extension
activity to correct a specific aging condition, but I did not specify a
timeframe for execution.
The basis for that statement in 2007 was my assessment of the
surveillance and research that had been accomplished. The specific
aging condition is progressive and must be addressed in the future.
The basis for that statement in 2007 was my assessment of the
surveillance and research that had been accomplished. The specific
aging condition is progressive and must be addressed in the future.
Dr. Miller. LANL has been monitoring the W78's aging
characteristics and has assessed that aging ``has not affected the
safety, reliability, or performance of the W78 to date;'' however,
``the condition is progressive and beyond current predictive
capabilities.'' LLNL has concurred with these concerns in our peer
review role as part of the annual assessment process. Issues identified
include material aging and compatibility issues, which can impact
components within the NEP. The classified LANL Annual Assessment
Letters, starting in fiscal year 2004 through the present (fiscal year
2010), offer the best detailed classified summary overview regarding
the recent history associated with the warhead. The W78 warhead is
already well beyond its planned service and requires a 10-year effort
to complete the life extension options study and physical refurbishment
of the warhead.
Dr. Hommert. Please see my response to QFR #50.
52. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, has
your assessment of the W78 changed in the following years?
Dr. Anastasio. Additional surveillance data and analysis has
improved the Laboratory's understanding of this condition. However, my
assessment that the W78 should be replaced or undergo a comprehensive
life extension activity has not changed.
Dr. Miller. No, LLNL's assessment has not changed. The W78 warhead
is beyond its original design lifetime. Material aging and
compatibility concerns increase as warheads continue to age and
concerns about other possible changes invariably grow as a warhead type
exceeds its original design lifetime. Results from surveillance of W78
units have identified issues associated with material aging and
compatibility, which have the potential to impact components within the
NEP. This has resulted in increased attention on this warhead by LANL.
The classified LANL Annual Assessment Letters, starting in fiscal year
2004 through the present (fiscal year 2010), offer the best detailed
classified summary overview regarding the recent history associated
with the warhead.
Dr. Hommert. Please see my response to QFR #50.
53. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, how
long have you recognized the aging and reliability concerns found in
the W78?
Dr. Anastasio. The specific W78 aging issue was first reported in
an annual assessment letter by then-Director John C. Browne.
LANL assesses that this aging issue has not affected the safety,
reliability or performance of the W78 to date.
Dr. Miller. LANL has been monitoring the W78 aging characteristics
and has assessed that aging ``has not affected the safety, reliability,
or performance of the W78 to date;'' however, ``the condition is
progressive and beyond current predictive capabilities.'' Dr. Anastasio
first made this assessment about 4 years ago and at that time stated
the life extension would be needed with a decade. LLNL has concurred
with these concerns in our peer review role as part of the annual
assessment process. Issues identified include material aging and
compatibility issues, which can impact components within the NEP. The
classified LANL Annual Assessment Letters, starting in fiscal year 2004
through the present (fiscal year 2010), offer the best detailed
classified summary overview regarding the recent history associated
with the warhead.
Dr. Hommert. Please see my response to QFR #50.
54. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert,
what is the consequence of additional delays in the start of the LEP
study, if for example the study does not commence in fiscal year 2011?
Dr. Anastasio. Delaying the start of the W78 LEP study results in
delaying the work that will be required to extend the life of the
system. Within the limited nuclear weapons complex capabilities, delays
in the W78 LEP schedule will delay future LEPs.
We have been delaying the start of the W78 life program for several
years. The specific condition in the W78 is progressive and must be
addressed in the future. The longer we delay the LEP, the greater the
risk is to the W78 and the missions that this weapon supports. As I
mentioned earlier, at the current time, LANL assesses that this aging
issue has not affected the safety, reliability or performance of the
W78.
Dr. Miller. There are a number of potential consequences associated
with delays in starting the LEP study for the W78 warhead, which would,
in turn, delay start of the effort to refurbish this vitally important
weapon system that is already beyond its design life. At the highest
level, delaying the study will increase the risk of meeting the
proposed first-production-unit which is currently slated for fiscal
year 2021. In addition, delays will also put at risk achieving the high
level goals currently being put forward for the warhead attributes
associated with this life extension (for example improving warhead
safety, security, and use control). Delays in initiating the W78 LEP
study would also impact the ongoing joint Navy and Air Force effort to
develop a common Arming, Fusing, and Firing assembly for their
respective reentry vehicles. Delays in the W78 study will also result
in missing the opportunity to work synergistically with the ongoing
B61-12 LEP to develop and mature technologies and processes that could
potentially be used in both warhead life extensions.
Dr. Hommert. Please see my response to QFR #50.
55. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, is
the W78 the most likely candidate for a ``replacement'' LEP?
Dr. Anastasio. The W78 is the first possible candidate for a
``replacement'' LEP, as the W76-1 LEP is currently being built, and the
B61 is not designed as a ``replacement'' LEP. With regards to the W78
LEP, many options have been proposed as possible solutions for the W78
LEP, but until the study is complete it is impossible to decide what
the optimal solution is. LLNL has the responsibility for this LEP. Los
Alamos will provide a critical analysis of any options that LLNL
proposes in this process (red-teaming the design).
Dr. Miller. LLNL looks forward to commencing the study on the W78
LEP. At this time it would be premature to decide which life extension
option (refurbishment, reuse, or replacement) is the best technical
option for the Laboratory to present to leadership in the Departments
of Energy and Defense.
Based on direction from the Secretary of Energy and the NNSA
Administrator, the laboratories will explore all options. With
information at hand on all options, stockpile decisions will be based
on U.S. national security and stockpile requirements, informed by our
best scientific judgment, and consistent with the guidance contained in
the NPR and the plans outlined in the Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Plan. I consider it my critical responsibility as a
Laboratory Director to assure that all options authorized by Congress
and the President are explored when LEPs option are evaluated.
Dr. Hommert. Per the national policy guidance in the NPR, the full
range of options will be considered for the W78 LEP, and a
``replacement'' approach would require Presidential authorization. The
final decision on which LEP approach is best for a given warhead is
based primarily on characteristics of the NEP, and I therefore defer to
Dr. Miller.
56. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, can
you explain why it is important to study the W88 warhead, in terms of
potential commonality with the W78 LEP?
Dr. Anastasio. One of the advantages of having a warhead that is
compatible with both delivery systems (ICBMS and SLBMs) is that it
allows different options to address potential and or unanticipated
failures in the stockpile. The laboratories have examined the
possibility of common adaptable warheads for a variety of applications
over several decades. The key issue in all these evaluations is ``how
common do the warheads need to be?''
The studies indicate that if the goal is to maintain a credible
deterrent with fewer warheads in the stockpile, stockpile diversity is
critical. Ideally, the design of the physics packages for the W78 and
W88 should be different yet able to fit and fly in ``common'' reentry
bodies.
Dr. Miller. A high level goal for all future LEPs is to develop
options that would enable the life-extended warhead to be used in
multiple delivery platforms. We need to explore if this is a viable
approach to reducing the number of different warhead types in the
future stockpile without adversely impacting overall stockpile
reliability, and if this approach offers the potential to reduce the
number of hedge (non-deployed) warheads required. For the W78 LEP, this
goal entails developing options that would enable the resulting warhead
to be interoperable with (able to be used in) the Air Force Mk12 A and
the Navy Mk5 reentry vehicles. (The W88 is currently fielded in the Mk5
Reentry vehicle.) Therefore, this requires the W78 LEP to address the
life cycle/stockpile-to-target requirements for both of these warheads
and both delivery vehicles and missile systems.
Dr. Hommert. The NPR recommends ``initiating a study of LEP options
for the W78 ICBM warhead, including the possibility of using the
resulting warhead also on SLBMs to reduce the number of warhead
types.'' The development of an interoperable warhead that could be
mated to either an ICBM or SLBM delivery platform would support a hedge
strategy that includes ``cross-leg'' hedging which would allow desired
reductions in the size of the overall stockpile. Cross leg hedging
means that a weapon system from one leg of the triad would be used to
cover a shortfall created from a systemic defect or problem in a weapon
system from another leg of the triad.
A feasibility study of a common Arming, Fuzing, and Firing (AF&F)
system for the W78/Mk12A and W88/Mk5 warheads was conducted by Sandia
with excursions that examined extensions of the AF&F for high-surety
warheads and the existing W87/Mk21 system. This 90-day study, which was
completed in February 2010, considered enveloped functional and
environmental requirements that were derived from Air Force, Navy, and
STRATCOM inputs. While it is not possible to make one AF&F that can be
used without modification on multiple delivery platforms or reentry
systems, the study found that significant levels of AF&F commonality
are possible with existing system architectures and enable additional
surety features compatible with the existing NEPs and future high-
surety warhead designs. The results of this Sandia study will be
incorporated into the W78 LEP Phase 6.1 study once it is authorized by
Congress.
57. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, is
there capacity in the enterprise to undertake an LEP on the W80?
Dr. Anastasio. The complex has limited capacity to execute several
LEPs at the same time. In addition, several LEPs are needed in the next
decade. It is critical for the DOD and NNSA to work out the national
priorities in the context of limited resources. If it is a national
priority to do the W80 LEP simultaneously with the other LEPs, there
will be significant cost impacts and likely LEP schedule impacts as the
nuclear weapons enterprise works towards increasing its capacity.
Dr. Miller. The current NNSA LEP Plan includes the W80 undergoing a
life extension in 2030. NNSA continually reviews the scheduling of LEPs
with the aim of best supporting the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
Dr. Hommert. The current Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
sustains the W80 in the U.S. stockpile through the end of the next
decade, with an LEP or another Long-Range Standoff option activity at
that point in time. If this timing holds, there should be capacity in
the enterprise to undertake this work. In the meantime, a strong
surveillance program for the W80 is essential.
58. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert,
what risks is the United States taking in view of the current status of
that warhead?
Dr. Anastasio. On October 1, 2004, the NNSA transferred design
agency responsibility for the W80 warhead from LANL to LLNL. In May
2006 Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) decided to cancel the LEP for the
W80.
Dr. Miller. LLNL has certified the W80 for a planned service life
through 2030, barring any unforeseen issues with the system. Like the
W78, a life extension of the W80 will require a 10-year effort for
study of options and refurbishment. If a critical performance issue
were to be identified, a delay in commencing the life extension could
affect the status of the system.
The risk to the stockpile is best mitigated by a balanced and well-
funded SSP, which increases the nuclear weapons enterprise's agility
and ability to adapt to unforeseen events. The fiscal year 2011 and
fiscal year 2012 budget increases are positive first steps toward
revitalizing the nuclear weapons complex necessary to maintain the U.S.
nuclear deterrent, reversing the recent trend of declining budgets, and
manage risk. The requested budget increase to the NNSA Weapons
Activities account balances the funded program of work across the three
primary areas in the SSP: (1) the science and technology that underpins
our understanding of an aging stockpile and supports a reinvigorated
surveillance program, (2) the LEPs that are necessary to keep the
systems safe, secure and effective; and (3) the modernization of the
facilities and infrastructure.
Dr. Hommert. In Sandia's non nuclear component space, concerns
about technology obsolescence and aging are significant. We have very
limited data associated with components fielded for more than 30 years.
Our current experience with the B61 indicates an increasing likelihood
of degradation and performance impacts as components age.
59. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert,
when will the CMRR and UPF be required for the W78 production?
Dr. Anastasio. Many options have been proposed as possible
solutions for the W78 LEP, but until the study is complete it is
impossible to decide what the optimal solution is. CMRR will be
available to support pit production in TA-55/PF-4 starting no later
than 2023 if the pit replacement option for the W78 is selected by the
NNSA and approved and funded by Congress.
Dr. Miller. The CMRR facility and the UPF are both scheduled to be
operational in the 2021-2022 timeframe to support production
requirements. This is fully consistent with the current W78 LEP's
current production schedule. While it is important that the facilities
follow the current schedule to meet its targeted FPU of the W78 LEP, it
is equally important that potential cost growth in facility
construction does not adversely affect the science and technology that
underpins stockpile assessment. A balanced and well-funded SSP is
required to support the deterrent. The requested budget increase for
the NNSA Weapons Activities account balances the funded program of work
across the three primary areas in the SSP: (1) the science and
technology that underpins our understanding of an aging stockpile and
supports a reinvigorated surveillance program, (2) the LEPs that are
necessary to keep the systems safe, secure and effective; and (3) the
modernization of the facilities and infrastructure.
Dr. Hommert. I defer to Dr. Anastasio and Dr. Miller.
60. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert,
what are the risks to the stockpile if the facilities follow the
current schedule?
Dr. Anastasio. Stockpile risks can be grouped in two areas. First,
ongoing stockpile stewardship activities (surveillance and
manufacturing assessments) that are dependent on the chemistry and
materials capabilities planned for the CMRR nuclear facility and
currently housed in the existing CMR, a facility that is more than 60
years old. Second, planned schedules for new facilities are being
factored into LEP planning such as W78. Given this advanced planning
risks to the stockpile are currently manageable. However, pit
production in TA-55/PF-4 at the necessary rate cannot be supported by
CMRR nuclear facility until 2023.
Dr. Miller. The risk to the stockpile is best mitigated by a
balanced and well-funded SSP, which increases the nuclear weapons
enterprise's agility and ability to adapt to unforeseen events. The
fiscal year 2011 budget increase is a positive first step toward
reversing the recent declining budget trends and revitalizing the
nuclear weapons complex necessary to maintain the U.S. nuclear
deterrent. The requested budget increase for the NNSA Weapons
Activities account balances the funded program of work across the three
primary areas in the SSP: (1) the science and technology that underpins
our understanding of an aging stockpile and supports a reinvigorated
surveillance program; (2) the LEPs that are necessary to keep the
systems safe, secure, and effective; and (3) the modernization of the
facilities and infrastructure. Funding shortfalls in any one of the
three primary areas of SSP will likely impact the other elements of
SSP; hence, affect the deterrent. While it is important that the
facilities follow the current schedule and are available for the FPU of
the W78 LEP, it is equally important that potential cost growth in
facility construction does not adversely affect the science and
technology that underpins stockpile assessment.
Dr. Hommert. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP)
assumes the availability of these facilities in the early to mid 2020s.
If the facilities follow the current schedule, the enterprise will be
able to execute the stockpile LEPs as documented in the SSMP.
61. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert,
what are the risks to the stockpile if the facilities are delayed?
Dr. Anastasio. If the pit replacement option for the W78 is
selected by the NNSA, and approved and funded by Congress, the risk to
delays will be determined by the existing pit build capacity. Without
CMRR's chemistry and analytic capabilities, necessary pit production
rates in TA-55/PF-4 cannot be supported, delaying the W78 LEP and
future LEPs.
Dr. Miller. The risk to the stockpile is best mitigated by a
balanced and well-funded SSP, which increases the nuclear weapons
enterprise's agility and ability to adapt to unforeseen events. The
fiscal year 2011 and the fiscal year 2012 budgets are positive first
steps toward reversing the recent declining budget trends and
revitalizing the nuclear weapons complex necessary to maintain the U.S.
nuclear deterrent. The requested budget increase for the NNSA Weapons
Activities account balances the funded program of work across the three
primary areas in the SSP: (1) the science and technology that underpins
our understanding of an aging stockpile and supports a reinvigorated
surveillance program, (2) the LEPs that are necessary to keep the
systems safe, secure and effective; and (3) the modernization of the
facilities and infrastructure. Funding shortfalls in any one of the
three primary areas of SSP will likely impact the other elements of
SSP; hence, affect the deterrent. While it is important that the
facilities follow the current schedule and are available for FPU of the
W78 LEP, it is equally important that potential cost growth in facility
construction does not adversely affect the science and technology that
underpins stockpile assessment.
A delay in the CMRR facility and/or the UPF could impact the range
of options for the upcoming LEPs. While the B61-12 is independent of
CMRR and UPF construction, a delay in CMRR could have potential impact
on replacement or reuse design options for W78 LEP. For the W78 LEP,
the availability of CMRR could affect the W78 LEP's performance margin
and the potential warhead interoperability between systems like the W78
and W88. Also, the facilities that CMRR and UPF will replace are more
than 50 years old, oversized, increasingly obsolete, and costly to
maintain, and they are safety, security, and environmental concerns.
Dr. Hommert. The current sequence and timing of the LEPs called for
in the NPR and documented in the SSMP would not be achievable, and
would need to be revised. Delays in the LEPs for certain systems could
impact our confidence in the state of health of the US nuclear
deterrent.
62. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, do
you support the acceleration of the construction of these facilities?
Dr. Anastasio. Completing these projects sooner reduces risk to
execution of required life extensions. Continuing to rely on greater
than 60+ year old facilities to support the Nation's nuclear deterrent
cannot be sustained.
Dr. Miller. In the out-years, the uncertainties associated with the
baselines for the planned LEPs and the construction of large facilities
are my primary source of concern. Without detailed designs for the CMRR
facility and the UPF and the corresponding cost analysis, funding
requirements will remain uncertain. The laboratories and plants are
working with the NNSA to develop baselines for these projects, but the
total costs are not yet known. It is critically important to budget for
adequate contingency in large construction projects to ensure
sufficient flexibility to accommodate the detailed design issues that
typically arise in constructing these complex, one-of-a-kind
facilities. It is equally important to ensure that funding for these
construction projects does not erode available funding for the science
and technology activities that underpin the maintenance and assessment
of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
The fiscal year 2011 and the administration's proposed fiscal year
2012 budget increases are positive first steps toward revitalizing the
nuclear weapons complex necessary to maintain the U.S. nuclear
deterrent. The nation's nuclear strategy requires a SSP that is
balanced, integrated, and sustained over time. The level of investment,
consistent with planned nuclear warhead reductions, must grow over time
to capitalize construction of essential new facilities; sustain a
healthy science, technology, and engineering core; manage the aging
stockpile; support an increased level of LEP work; and maintain a
critically skilled workforce. Until the baselines are completed, we
will not have an accurate and reliable estimation of the resources
required. It is clear that sustained effort will be necessary to ensure
the appropriate balance within the program across all of its
requirements.
Dr. Hommert. The current schedule is aligned with the life
extension plans for the stockpile and therefore should be sufficient. I
don't believe the overall budget profile for the NNSA over the next
decade will support both the acceleration of these facilities and the
required work on the stockpile.
63. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, what steps is Los Alamos taking
to accelerate the construction of the CMRR?
Dr. Anastasio. The project will be executed in a cost effective and
phased manner where possible with available funding. For example, we
plan to execute some site preparation activities such as establishing a
concrete batch plant while the facility design is finalized. That way,
construction can begin once the design is approved and the project
receives authorization and the needed appropriations to begin facility
construction.
64. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, what is your understanding of
the timeline for the CMRR to be completed and to be fully operational?
Dr. Anastasio. Formal direction from NNSA requires that CMRR be
completed no later than 2020 with operation no later than 2023.
65. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, why are different completion
dates (2020 and 2023) provided in the Section 1251 report?
Dr. Anastasio. The 2020 date is for completion of construction.
Readiness and startup activities leading to full operation of the
analytical chemistry and material characterization operations is 2023.
66. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, after your retirement, how many
weapon designers at Los Alamos will have direct nuclear test
experience?
Dr. Anastasio. After I retire there will be 8 nuclear weapon
designers at Los Alamos with nuclear test experience. They range in age
from 50 to 70 years old and in experience from a single nuclear test to
being involved in greater than ten nuclear tests. In addition, we have
10 Laboratory-Affiliate weapon designers (retired staff who work on a
part-time basis) with nuclear test experience that helps train the next
generation of designers.
67. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, what are the risks associated
with the eventual condition when no weapon designers will have
designed, tested, and deployed a new weapon?
Dr. Anastasio. I have confidence in our design experts with and
without nuclear weapons testing experience. The upcoming LEPs provide
an essential element in continuing to develop new expertise in our
design staff. I have also worked to develop new tools and methods for
ensuring our confidence in the stockpile in the absence of new nuclear
testing opportunities. In addition, the design labs have, for many
years, instituted a rigorous training program for our incoming
designers in anticipation of the time when our weapons staff with test
experience would no longer be available. Another important element to
ensure the continuing reliability of the stockpile will be in
maintaining two distinct design laboratories, where we have two
separate teams; one at each lab, reviewing the annual data will ensure
good overall confidence in our systems.
68. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, how many weapon designers at
Livermore will have direct nuclear test experience?
Dr. Miller. There are presently 12 active nuclear weapons designers
at LLNL with direct nuclear test experience. These designers continue
to make vital contributions to maintaining the stockpile and assessing
foreign threats. Additionally, there are a handful of LLNL managers
with direct nuclear test experience who continue to share their
expertise with the next generation of designers.
69. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Miller, what are the risks associated with
the eventual condition when no weapon designers will have designed,
tested, and deployed a new weapon?
Dr. Miller. The SSP has been extraordinarily successful in
developing the tool set required to maintain the stockpile in the
absence of testing and using those tools to train the next generation
of stockpile stewards. The program was specifically designed to
maintain the skills necessary in the absence of nuclear testing. The
SSP's above-ground experimental facilities, such as the NIF and DARHT,
not only provide data required for stewardship, but also provide our
weapons designers with opportunities to carry out complex, integrated
physics experiments that stress and hone designer judgment as issues
are investigated or potentially new phenomena are revealed.
Additionally, judgment is developed through computational simulation.
Detailed simulations of weapons system performance continue to give new
insight into weapons physics, often times beyond that available during
the era of underground nuclear testing.
Of equal importance is providing adequate opportunity to exercise
skills in the complete design through production cycle, which is
essential for training laboratory and production plant personnel. For
example, the NNSA's assignment of responsibility for the W78 LEP to
LLNL provides an essential path for maintaining the competency and
capability of its design and engineering cadre through the exercise of
an integrated system design/engineering/manufacturing program. Finally,
involvement in the annual assessment process provides a basis for
developing and exercising the judgment of new nuclear weapons staff in
dealing with difficult issues related to nuclear design and
engineering, in much the same way that the development of nuclear
weapons and underground testing did.
The NNSA and the laboratories have made a concerted effort to
mentor, train and validate the skills of the next generation of the
Nation's stockpile stewards at a time when scientists and engineers,
who were trained during the period of extensive weapon development
programs and nuclear testing, are still available. I am confident in
the capabilities and competencies of LLNL's workforce. Because of this,
and the success of the SSP, I believe that the risks associated with
the eventual condition when there are no weapon designers who have
designed, tested, and deployed a new weapon are minimal.
70. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, the
Strategic Posture Commission led by Secretaries Bill Perry and James
Schlesinger recommended that DOE, NNSA, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, and the DNFSB be realigned, and that NNSA should be a
separate agency from the DOE. Has this occurred?
Dr. Anastasio. No. The Strategic Posture Commission
recommendations, as outlined in Chapter 6, include the realignment of
the DOE/NNSA, Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the DNFSB and the
establishment of NNSA as a separate agency. Implementing these
recommendations requires actions on the part of Congress in cooperation
with the executive branch.
Dr. Miller. Not to my knowledge.
Dr. Hommert. No, this has not occurred.
71. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert,
what efforts, if any, have NNSA and DOE taken to streamline Federal
operations to facilitate laboratory productivity?
Dr. Anastasio. We continue to work with DOE and NNSA to seek
improvements in process efficiency and to reduce and streamline Federal
rules and regulations and their interpretation impacting laboratory
operations and productivity to ensure the long-term vitality of the
Laboratory. As the Strategic Posture Commission warned, NNSA has become
part of the problem, ``adopting the same micromanagement and
unnecessary and obtrusive oversight that it was created to eliminate''
As the Stimson Center recommended in its report (pg 41) Leveraging
Science for Security A Strategy for the Nuclear Weapons Laboratories in
the 21st Century ``NNSA should configure its oversight of the
Laboratories and NTS to ensure performance meets the national security
priorities within the bounds of budget, policy, and law. The DOE should
provide oversight in an audit capacity, not in a compliance capacity,
to minimize unnecessarily intrusive and bureaucratic intervention.''
Dr. Miller. In December 2009, NNSA Administrator Tom D'Agostino
launched an Enterprise Re-engineering Reform Initiative aimed at
dramatically rethinking and redesigning what is widely perceived to be
a compliance and enforcement-driven relationship between Federal and
contractor entities in NNSA. The goal is transform to a more
constructive Federal/contractor partnership using NNSA's effort with
the Kansas City Plant (KCP) as a model.
LLNL submitted in June 2010 an Implementation Plan to the NNSA
Livermore Site Office (LSO) for a governance approach implementing
aspects of the KCP Oversight Model for Non-Nuclear Operations.
Considerations included streamlining DOE orders and directives,
implementation of a Management Assurance System, and changes to the
Performance Evaluation Plan (used by NNSA to assess each site's
performance) to focus it on more strategic issues.
Some progress is being made. The DOE Office of Health, Safety
intends to streamline 107 directives. A LLNL/LSO Change Control Board
has been chartered that will determine implementation of changes to DOE
directives. In addition, our Laboratory has been taking significant
steps to strengthen its Contractor Assurance System and transform it
into a fully-functioning Management Assurance System that would serve
as a means to eliminate Federal-contractor inefficiencies in management
and controls and reduce fixed costs. We are not yet at a stage where
the NNSA LSO has significantly modified oversight processes based on
its use of our Contractor Assurance System.
Dr. Hommert. Since 2009, DOE, NNSA and Sandia have been working at
DOE Secretary Steven Chu's direction to reengineer and transform the
way DOE runs the enterprise and manages its contractors. Reform is
necessary because the cost of doing business has outpaced the budget.
Costs are being driven by management by directive, unclear Federal and
contractor roles and responsibilities, and the government-owned
contractor-operated (GOCO) contracting mechanism that needs updating.
To address the problems of overly prescriptive requirements that
are open to inconsistent interpretation and application, NNSA and the
contractors have focused reform on: (1) thorough reviews of all
requirements by Federal/contractor boards; (2) use of voluntary
consensus standards where they exist and are appropriate; (3) risk-
based tailoring to each work situation; and (4) decisionmaking pushed
to the lowest appropriate levels.
At all steps of this process, we are assuring that the referenced
changes will enable continued improvement in our safety and security
environments.
72. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, do
you have extra layers of administration and expense because of the
current management structure involving NNSA and DOE?
Dr. Anastasio. We have still not fully implemented the approach
where the Federal Government establishes our goals and we find the most
efficient and effective means of delivering those goals.
Dr. Miller. Safe, secure, efficient, and environmentally
responsible work performance is a top priority at LLNL. Our management
structure and our systems reflect that priority and are designed to
ensure that our work is performed safely and securely and meets
environmental quality standards.
Many aspects of the way we operate are driven by DOE orders and
directives-often requiring more manpower than is ideally necessary to
ensure the quality of work performance. We are working with DOE and the
NNSA to streamline applicable DOE orders and directives without
compromising operational quality while implementing a Management
Assurance System that can be used by the NNSA Livermore Site Office to
modify and streamline oversight processes.
Dr. Hommert. We do have to meet administrative and management
requirements at both the DOE and NNSA levels. For the most part, these
requirements are specific to different components of the organization
and are addressed accordingly. However, in my view, there is some level
of redundancy.
73. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, the
Strategic Posture Commission also recommended that laboratories be
recognized for their involvement in the assessment of weapons in ways
not involving an award fee. Has this recommendation been implemented?
If so, how?
Dr. Anastasio. The Strategic Posture Commission recommended that
Congress and the administration create a formal mechanism (not
involving awarding fee) to recognize the importance of the involvement
of the directors of the weapons laboratories in the annual
certification process. I am not aware of any action to bring this
recommendation to fruition.
Dr. Miller. The Commission recommended creation of a formal
mechanism ``to recognize the importance of the involvement of the
directors of the weapons laboratories.'' The Annual Assessment of the
Stockpile is singularly my most important responsibility as director of
LLNL. It is a responsibility that I--and prior directors--have taken on
with full diligence and utmost seriousness.
To my knowledge, no direct action has been taken on the
Commission's recommendation. However, the importance of my weapons
assessment responsibilities is properly recognized within the Federal
Government. I have had access to all necessary audiences on any
occasion where I have felt it necessary to voice a concern or issue
about the stockpile. In addition, it is noteworthy that the fundamental
importance to national security of independent, critical assessments of
the condition of the Nation's nuclear stockpile by trained,
knowledgeable experts at the NNSA laboratories was made clear in the
2010 NPR. This recognition is being supported by proposed necessary
budget increases. Your continued support for the SSP is a highly
valuable form of recognition of the importance of the work of the NNSA
laboratories and their directors.
Dr. Hommert. The majority of Sandia's fee is fixed rather than
award fee. While the award fee is associated with the overall
laboratory performance, and some of the performance measures and
milestones are associated with our stockpile evaluation and assessment
responsibilities, in practice, I do not find any conflict between our
fee structure and the ability to independently conduct the assessment
of the stockpile. Going forward, I believe it is important to maintain
our technical independence and that our technical judgment not be
impacted by fee. Any changes to our fee structure should be carefully
assessed to ensure appropriate incentives are established that do not
compromise this technical independence.
74. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, do
you worry about the management structure of the laboratories?
Dr. Anastasio. I do have concerns that in practice, the DOE/NNSA
structure overseeing management of the Laboratory has room for improved
efficiency and effectiveness, in balancing between enabling our support
of technical work activities for our national security science missions
(and which are aligned with the strategic views of both DOE and NNSA),
and oversight of our operations. Related to this is the challenge of
ensuring adequate investment in science, technology, and engineering
capabilities and facilities that are essential to our mission, but
extend beyond the near-term needs of the weapons program. This concern
has also been identified in several previous external studies and
assessments of the management and oversight structure under which the
Laboratories function. Some studies, such as the report of the
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States,
have suggested profound restructuring. We continue to work with DOE and
NNSA to seek improvements in process efficiency and to work with them
and other agencies to ensure the long-term vitality of the Laboratory.
Dr. Miller. Under the new contract and management structure, the
Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS) partnership has
assembled a prestigious Board of Governors consisting of leaders of the
parent organizations and national experts in science and technology,
mission, business, operations, and security. Oversight of Laboratory
performance is maintained through a number of standing committees of
the Board and regular corporate assessments. The Laboratory Director is
also the President of LLNS and reports to this Board of Governors. The
Federal Government through the LLNS Board of Governors has access to a
broad range of commercial and academic expertise. The Board facilitates
``reach back'' to the parent organizations for augmenting the talent
and expertise at the Laboratory when the need arises. Parent
organizations have organized Assess, Improve, Modernize (AIM) Teams,
and Functional Management Assessment (FMA) reviews are regularly
scheduled throughout the year to help drive continuous improvement.
Over time, this has allowed the Laboratory to more cost effectively
and efficiently fulfill its mission to provide exceptional science and
technology to help solve the Nation's most important problems.
Dr. Hommert. I believe there is an effective management structure
in place today. Within the construct of the GOCO model, further
refinements and modernization are required to optimize our
contributions to the broad set of national security challenges faced by
our full customer set.
75. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, has
there been a change in the emphasis on scientific research and academic
freedom since the conversion to the for-profit model?
Dr. Anastasio. Our emphasis on scientific research and academic
freedom has not changed-it is critical to our mission. Los Alamos'
national security mission, and its role as the premier national
security science laboratory, requires a strong emphasis on scientific
research. We continue to lead the national laboratories in the number
of peer-reviewed scientific publications, we continue to win a
significant number of R&D 100 awards each year, and our staff continues
to be recognized by professional societies for their work. Our annual
external reviews of our technical capabilities also help us validate
our strengths and identify any weaknesses. Our mission requires that we
act first and foremost in the best interests of the Nation, and
represent our best technical judgments with integrity and objectivity.
Our internal policies therefore continue to protect academic freedom to
publish, and to demand intellectual integrity and expect scientific
objectivity even in the face of possibly competing interests. Without
scientific integrity, we would fail both ourselves and the Nation.
Dr. Miller. In my view, the importance of scientific research and
academic freedom has not been impacted by the change in the
organization that manages the Laboratory for the Federal Government.
These remain important cores values of the institution. I highlighted
in my written testimony some of the many outstanding scientific and
technical accomplishment made at LLNL in fiscal year 2010. The Lawrence
Livermore National Security (LLNS) Board of Governors shares my belief
that the Laboratory's continuing success ultimately depends on the
strength of its science, technology, and engineering, which in turn,
depends on the quality of people at the Laboratory and their ability to
pursue scientific research in the national interest.
As I also stressed in my written testimony, the national investment
in the impressive science, technology, and engineering capabilities at
the NNSA laboratories needs to be carefully nurtured and preserved. My
concerns are budgetary. If these assets are neglected, they will
quickly erode and disappear. This issue merits your careful
consideration as the country faces both very difficult budget decisions
and a challenging future in a dangerous world.
Dr. Hommert. Please see my response to QFR #73.
76. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, do
you worry about the independence of the laboratories now and in the
future?
Dr. Anastasio. The Laboratories remain independent today and must
in the future, to continue to properly serve the Nation. As I noted in
my answer to the previous question, our mission requires both a strong
emphasis on science and to provide out best technical judgments with
integrity and objectivity independent of possibly competing interests.
Los Alamos maintains that independence today-from both political and
commercial interests. I have no concern that this is changing, today.
Among other things, the presence of the University of California among
the parent companies in Los Alamos National Security, LLC helps support
that historical--and vital--tradition. However, retaining this
independence requires vigilance. It is important that future Congresses
and administrations recognize the importance to the Nation of the
independence of the Laboratories and help the Laboratory guard it, for
it is certainly possible for future decisions on management and
structure to undermine it.
Dr. Miller. I do worry about the continuing independence of the
NNSA laboratories in the future because it is an essential element and
core strength of the Laboratory--not only for our assessments of the
safety, security, and performance of the nuclear weapons stockpile and
certification of changes made to weapons to extend their lifetime, but
also to ensure the quality of the other vitally important national
security work we perform.
Our continuing independence depends on three key factors. First is
continuing recognition by the executive branch and Congress of the
importance of the laboratories and their independence. Second, funding
for the laboratories over the long term must be sufficient for them to
sustain the scientific skills and technical know-how required to
competently deal with challenging nuclear weapons issues and merit the
confidence of the American people in the judgments of our stockpile
stewards. Finally, the NNSA national laboratories must continue to
attract and retain top-notch talent to address the major scientific and
technical challenges of stockpile stewardship and the many national
security issues facing the U.S. Vigilance is required in each of these
areas to sustain laboratory independence.
Dr. Hommert. It is important that the laboratories live up to the
principles of the FFRDC model by ``operating in the public interest
with objectivity and independence and to be free from organizational
conflicts of interest''. In my view, this model needs to be continually
reinforced and while I believe the national laboratories continue to
render effective independent advice to the government; constant
vigilance is required to retain this independence.
77. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, is
the Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) model
intact at the NNSA laboratories? If not, what has changed?
Dr. Anastasio. Under the Federal Acquisition Regulations, an FFRDC
``meets some special long term research or development need which
cannot be met as effectively by existing in-house or contractor
resources'' and ``is required to operate in the public interest with
objectivity and independence.'' The Laboratories are exemplars for both
attributes. The FFRDC model is excellent. However, I am concerned that
our current contractual environment has led to an overemphasis on
managing the Laboratory as a procurement contract and that this
constrains the implementation of the FFRDC model at the Laboratories,
and limits the efficiency and effectiveness with which we can offer
support to Federal agencies in the way that the FFRDC model intends.
Dr. Miller. LLNL is a FFRDC, operated as a GOCO entity. The
paradigm for GOCO model is that the Government tells the contractor
``what to do,'' and the contractor determines ``how to do it.''
The GOCO model needs attention. The DOE Secretary, the Deputy
Secretary and the Under Secretaries have made it a high priority to
improve the efficiency of the Departmental processes and mechanisms for
governance. In December 2009, NNSA launched an Enterprise Re-
engineering Reform Initiative aimed at dramatically rethinking and
redesigning what is widely perceived to be a compliance and
enforcement-driven relationship between Federal and contractor entities
in NNSA. We are working with NNSA to identify governance/oversight
issues and address them with the goal of transforming to a more
constructive Federal/contractor partnership.
Dr. Hommert. For the most part, the FFRDC model is intact at the
NNSA laboratories. However, these laboratories are much more diverse in
their national security roles than when the FFRDC model was first
created. There is an interplay between the GOCO and FFRDC models that
can impact the ability of the laboratories to fulfill their FFRDC
roles. For these reasons, I believe a re-examination of the model is
appropriate.
78. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert,
what is the role of the national laboratories in doing deterrence
analysis, targeting analysis, model development, analysis validation,
etc.?
Dr. Anastasio. The nuclear weapons laboratories bring critical
technical capabilities to bear on numerous national security problems.
While the core mission of Los Alamos is assuring the safety, security,
and effectiveness of the U.S. stockpile, the skills and personnel
required for this mission also contribute to addressing other national
challenges. The Laboratory was heavily involved in Cold War deterrence
modeling and analysis, as well as in assessing weapon effects. Today,
we are working on deterrence, stability and other related national
security issues. Los Alamos is also involved in providing detailed
analysis on nuclear nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, foreign
weapon intelligence, and event response capabilities. Much of this work
performed at Los Alamos involves and/or benefits from the development
of applicable models to help inform decisions. Wherever possible,
validation tools are also used to increase confidence in the robustness
of such analyses.
Dr. Miller. LLNL personnel have supported decisionmaking at the
highest levels of government since the establishment of the Laboratory.
LLNL has played a significant support role by providing in-depth
technical analysis across the full spectrum of the Nation's `Strategic
Assessment' efforts.
Generally, a strategic assessment capability consists of three
broad areas of capabilities:
(1) Deterrence Theory. This includes its translation into nuclear
policy and doctrine. This effort draws on the intellects of our most
experienced academics, former and current senior policy advisors, and
former and current senior military officers. Over the years, the
national effort has been informed by studies conducted at LLNL on the
impact of systems and technologies that might be deployed in the
future.
(2) Decisionmaking. Background and context support of the
necessary government decisions is required to turn nuclear policy
guidance into practical implementation plans. This is the area where
LLNL's history of integrating science, technology and engineering has
fundamentally contributed to the assessment of U.S. and foreign nuclear
weapons systems and capabilities-as well as the impact of potential and
proposed arms control agreements. Three examples are ICBM basing
analysis, studies of strategic stability with the deployment of
ballistic missile defenses, and the analysis of modernization of
tactical nuclear forces in Europe.
(3) Development of execution plans for our nuclear forces. This is
comprised of direct support to the Nation's nuclear warfighting
apparatus and involves a myriad of technical analyses. We serve in
technical advisory roles for such systems as the STRATCOM's S&T
Advisory group, Red on Blue type exchange studies, and technical issue
reviews associated with targeting studies such as ``hard and deeply
buried targets.''
Dr. Hommert. The 1953 Agreement between the AEC and DOD directs the
laboratories to perform analyses of weapons effects, target
interactions, and weapon options. The nuclear weapons laboratories have
a long history of performing these analyses, often in partnership with
the DOD. DOD has the lead in weapons effects/target interaction
analysis methodology while the national laboratories are primarily
responsible for weapons performance and output modeling.
79. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert,
what is the status of these capabilities at the laboratories?
Dr. Anastasio. Los Alamos prides itself on being a national
resource, where as a trusted advisor for the government, we provide
technical input and support on a variety of key national security
issues. As a result of our broad mission space, our national security
scientific capabilities have grown and strengthened over the past
several years to new levels (e.g., nonproliferation and
counterterrorism). Unfortunately, other critical areas have experienced
significant atrophy, resulting in areas where we are manpower and/or
resource limited (e.g., radiochemical analysis and assessment, and
weapon targeting and effects analyses). For now, I remain confident
that we are able to deliver on the missions we are asked to address
today, but I am concerned about the future for some of these critical
programs.
Dr. Miller. Today, the strategic assessment capability that exists
at the Laboratory is significantly less than the capabilities we had at
the height of the Cold War and what continued to exist up through the
early 2000s. Some of this reduction had begun, understandingly, with
the demise of the Soviet Union and the halt in the development of new
nuclear weapons systems. The remaining reductions were a direct result
of a combination of circumstances: (1) budgetary pressures on the
nuclear enterprise such that the Laboratory could no longer continue
this mission-supportive effort as a funded priority; (2) the lack of a
government agency willing to sponsor and sustain the special skill base
required for these types of analyses; and (3) the attrition of the high
caliber, experienced individuals able to lead these types of
specialized assessments without any replacement planning.
While LLNL has a number of very talented individuals who can do
technical analyses, we will have to ``grow'' the necessary skill sets
of these individuals. They would provide leadership in LLNL's efforts
to rebuild the Nation's efforts in this critical area. Essentially, if
we are to develop such a sustainable, focused capability in a short
amount of time, we would need to ``mentor'' a few handpicked
individuals drawing on those experienced strategic systems analysts at
LLNL who have led previous efforts and are either semi-retired but
still available or about to retire in the next few years. This would
require a concerted effort that must be planned and executed before the
opportunity vanishes.
It is important to note that this is a widely prevalent situation
for the Nation's Strategic Assessment Capability, and that high-quality
analyses require an interconnected network of skill sets. The nation
would need a multi-year commitment from DOD and the NNSA to restore a
sustainable Strategic Assessment Capability and a coordinated,
interagency plan on what to specifically refresh, restore, and/or
refocus.
Dr. Hommert. At Sandia, these capabilities are strong. We have
maintained a core group of systems analysts who have the appropriate
clearances, access to data, and the broad understanding of nuclear
weapons, weapons effects, target response, and military operations
required for such assessments. The weapons modeling activity is a core
activity for the laboratories and has been strongly supported. Sandia's
recent focus in these efforts has been on supporting both DOD and NNSA
decisions regarding LEPs, and on maintaining nuclear deterrence with
the smallest possible number of weapons.
80. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, how
have those capabilities been enhanced or decreased over the last 20
years?
Dr. Anastasio. As I mentioned in my previous answer, Los Alamos has
had some capabilities increase over the past 20 years, while others
have atrophied. Some of our enhanced capabilities include the
advancement of simulation, modeling, and computational capabilities,
improved validation supporting not only the weapons program, but also
nuclear nonproliferation, counter-proliferation, foreign weapon
intelligence and event response capabilities. One area where skills
have atrophied includes the tri-laboratory (LANL, LLNL, SNL) efforts on
targeting analysis and weapon effects modeling. The current expertise
in these areas resides mainly in increasingly senior staff, whose
skills are not exercised regularly and whose capabilities must be
transferred to create the next generation of experts.
Dr. Miller. Despite the need to deal with a number of new
technologies and innovations in the strategic area that have strong
implications for our national security, there has been little
government agency interest in conducting the type of rigorous
analytical assessments that have supported decisionmaking in the past.
This atrophy in capability began with the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the subsequent peace dividend and was followed by a shift of the
Nation's focus to conventional wars and countering terrorism. In terms
of our remaining capabilities, it would be fair to say that current
capability is largely aimed at support for the warfighter and the
development of nuclear force execution plans.
A major concern I have--in addition to the erosion and potential
loss of our Strategic Assessment Capability--is the fact that we are
not developing and applying necessary assessment capabilities to
address the new realities we are beginning to face today from technical
innovations and potential threats that are lurking just over the
horizon. For example, we have limited ability to do assessments that
incorporate advanced conventional capabilities, cyber, space warfare,
hypersonic and boost glide delivery technologies, and advances in
stealth and directed energy weapons.
Dr. Hommert. In the area of weapons modeling, Sandia's capabilities
have been substantially enhanced over the past 20 years. The Science-
Based SSP strengthened our ability to predict weapon system behavior in
a variety of environments. This has increased our confidence in
assessments of the reliability of the stockpile. In the deterrence and
targeting analysis areas, Sandia's capabilities are longstanding and
have been enhanced in the last 20 years by the close interaction and
relationships established with the organizations responsible for
building the Nation's war plans (e.g., STRATCOM, JFCC Global Strike,
OSD, DIA, and the military services).
81. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, is
there appropriate expertise to assess a potential major shift in U.S.
nuclear weapon policy?
Dr. Anastasio. There is a small core group of dedicated individuals
at Los Alamos with a broad range of experience involving issues related
to nuclear weapons policy. In 2009 and 2010, this core group provided
technical guidance on, and input into, the development of the
government's policy positions for the 2010 NPR, the NPT Review
Conference, the Nuclear Security Summit, and the New START treaty.
Often on short timelines, this team helped engage the broader
scientific capabilities of the laboratory to provide direct assistance
to the administration on the technical issues involved in these
important events and documents, helping to enable informed decisions
that affect the future of U.S. nuclear weapons, nonproliferation and
arms control policies.
Dr. Miller. Assessing a major shift in U.S. nuclear weapons policy
is a very complex undertaking requiring an integrated set of analytical
skills that includes policy, sociological, and technical expertise.
LLNL has participated in studies of this character in the past, but
recent experiences and current capabilities are limited. The strategic
assessment capability that exists at LLNL is significantly less than
the capabilities we had at the height of the Cold War and what
continued to exist up through the early 2000s.
LLNL has a number of very talented individuals who can do technical
analyses, but we will have to ``grow'' the necessary skill sets of the
individuals at the Laboratory that would provide leadership in our
efforts to support the Nation's efforts to carry out such an
assessment. Most importantly, an integrated set of analysis
capabilities--here at the Laboratory or elsewhere--largely does not
currently exist and would have to be rebuilt. However, key pieces exist
at LLNL. We can build on technical expertise and capabilities in areas
such as weapons reliability and effectiveness, weapons enterprise
production capabilities, issues related to monitoring nuclear weapons
and their production, technologies and challenges related to
verification, emerging strategic technologies and threats, and the
capabilities of other nation states.
Dr. Hommert. The appropriate expertise does exist to both assess
the pros and cons of various policy options, as well as assess the
detailed implications of any given policy. Close interaction and
coordination among the major stakeholders mentioned previously is
required. Sandia's contributions stem primarily from our broad
understanding of nuclear weapons and possible future stockpile
scenarios, including implications for deterrence policy and the
nonproliferation and arms control regime.
82. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert,
what additional measures are needed?
Dr. Anastasio. As the Nation continues to rely on a safe, secure,
and effective nuclear deterrent for its security and that of its
allies, the national nuclear laboratories play a critical role.
Included in this role is providing technical support to policy
makers. One of the concerns at the national laboratories is that the
set of individuals, which hold both in-depth technical and policy
capabilities in nuclear weapon policy, is small in number and getting
older. One of our goals in the coming years will be to engage more
young laboratory staff in technical/policy issues involved in
sustaining an effective deterrent, while also addressing broader
national security issues including nonproliferation and arms control--
and to help these staff develop the experience needed to support future
policy discussions and decisionmaking. Their informed technical input
will be critical for the future, especially as it relates to the U.S.
nuclear weapons stockpile and enterprise, and to the development and
effective implementation of nonproliferation, nuclear security,
counterterrorism and arms control monitoring and verification
capabilities.
Dr. Miller. The experienced, skilled analysts and integrated set of
analysis capabilities needed to carry out a thorough assessment of a
major shift in U.S. nuclear weapons policy largely does not exist--at
LLNL or elsewhere--and would have to be rebuilt. The nation would need
a multi-year commitment from DOD and the NNSA to restore a sustainable
Strategic Assessment Capability and a coordinated, interagency plan on
what to specifically refresh, restore, or refocus.
Rebuilding a Strategic Assessment Capability is also important for
addressing the new realities we are beginning to face today from
technical innovations and potential threats that are lurking just over
the horizon. For example, the Nation currently has limited ability to
do assessments that incorporate advanced conventional capabilities,
cyber, space warfare, hypersonic and boost glide delivery technologies,
and advances in stealth and directed energy weapons.
Dr. Hommert. It will be important for the United States to develop
a better understanding of future adversaries to maintain deterrence at
lower stockpile numbers while simultaneously strengthening global non-
proliferation construct. This can be accomplished by more regular and
robust interagency collaborations that seek to cost-effectively enhance
analytic capabilities. In addition, we need a stronger emphasis on
assessments of aging and technology obsolescence as we move forward
with the modernization of the stockpile.
83. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, how
would you rate expertise in nuclear weapons effects analysis?
Dr. Anastasio. Los Alamos has expert-level capability in certain
areas, and a lesser level of expertise in other areas. While the number
of staff with these skills are limited, expert-level capabilities exist
in definition of the weapons-effect source term (all radiation outputs
emanating from a nuclear explosion); in the transport of radiation
(e.g., neutrons, gamma-rays, x-rays) and the radioactivity levels they
induce; in nuclear forensics; in electromagnetic pulse assessment; in
air-shock and ground-shock environments; in certain nuclear-explosion
space environments; and in assessment of nuclear weapon effects on U.S.
warheads. Los Alamos has some expertise on modeling radiation plume
dispersal; thermal-pulse environments; and structural damage.
Dr. Miller. I believe that the integrated set of capabilities to
perform weapons effects analysis has degraded significantly. Today, the
skill to perform weapons effects analysis resides in a mere handful of
people. At LLNL, we continue to be mindful of the importance of
maintaining the expertise in this essential analysis area within the
context of limited resources.
However, it is important to note that with the tools developed by
the SSP, the ability of the community to significantly advance our
understanding of nuclear weapons effects has greatly increased. HPC
advances make it possible to develop and apply far more detailed
simulations of weapons effects than were possible even a decade ago.
Tools like the NIF have enormous potential to conduct weapons effects
tests and to gather detailed data that can be used to validate
simulation models. In fact, the first campaign of weapons effects
experiments was performed in 2010. A cadre of critically skilled
weapons scientists and engineers is available to execute the task
rebuilding weapons effects analysis capabilities.
Dr. Hommert. Our nuclear deterrence depends on the capability of
our stockpile to hold an adversary's assets at risk. To guarantee this,
nuclear weapons must be designed and built to withstand extreme levels
of radiation and still function as intended. The laboratories must have
a deep scientific understanding of how radiation can damage systems and
be able to model the effects of radiation on our stockpile. We can no
longer do the testing that was done at the Nevada Test Site or at other
facilities that are no longer operating, such as the Sandia Pulsed
Reactor. We are more dependent than ever on our remaining experimental
facilities and our ability to model effects.
Our expertise in modeling weapons effects is extensive but fragile.
This capability depends on scientific expertise in a wide range of
esoteric subjects, such as electromagnetic effects, shock and
mechanical response, equation of state of exotic materials, radiation
transport, radiation damage in semiconductors, high-voltage breakdown,
nuclear and plasma diagnostics, pulsed-power and reactor technologies,
density functional theory, and molecular dynamics. In some areas our
expertise is very robust, but in other areas it depends on just one or
two people. In a couple of cases we have lost important capability, and
we are trying to rebuild it. Many of our best scientists are nearing
retirement, and we are aggressively recruiting people to work on the
upcoming stockpile refurbishments. It takes some time for newly hired
staff to become fully effective in working on our unique technologies.
We face significant technical challenges in understanding the
performance of aging weapons and in refurbishing the stockpile. Our
research programs in these areas are essential to supporting the
stockpile and to training the staff of the future.
84. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, in
terms of the connection between stockpile stewardship and assessing the
targeting value of a weapon, what are the consequences of warhead aging
and reliability for STRATCOM on targeting, especially at reduced
stockpile numbers?
Dr. Anastasio. Intended weapon targeting is factored into the
Military Characteristics and Stockpile-to-Target sequence requirements
associated with each type of U.S. weapon system. Weapons must sustain
the rigors of warhead launch and delivery, and may be intended to fly
through and survive defended target space (so-called hostile
encounters). In general, nuclear weapons were designed with margins to
sustain the rigors of warhead delivery, including hostile encounters.
Weapon aging can lead to internal weapon changes that reduce those
margins, which, in principle, can impact STRATCOM targeting options.
Los Alamos has the capability to assess the impact of weapon aging, as
well as the rigors of warhead delivery and hostile encounters, in
evaluating reduced weapon margins. Accordingly, inputs are made
available to STRATCOM to help inform their decisions on targeting.
These inputs become more important at reduced stockpile numbers and as
the stockpile continues to age.
Dr. Miller. As the number of weapons decrease, the importance of
optimal selection of targets and reliable weapon performance greatly
increases. At some point, a fundamental shift in approach will be
necessary. During the Cold War, with large numbers of weapons and
targets, consideration of a statistical average of expected weapon
reliability was sufficient and if a target were especially important,
more than one weapon could be designated. At much smaller numbers,
knowledge of the health of each individual warhead becomes increasingly
important. Such information will require a fundamental change in the
nature of the surveillance stockpile program and use of technical
options such as imbedded sensors that would allow assessment on a
weapon-by-weapon basis rather than reliance on statistical ``average''
behavior.
Dr. Hommert. Today, the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile is assessed
to be safe, secure, and reliable. We strive to continuously strengthen
the scientific underpinnings of our assessments, and thereby improve
our understanding of the state of health of the stockpile. For the
future, concerns we have about aging and technology obsolescence
associated with our non-nuclear components must be addressed through
the LEPs.
85. Senator Cornyn. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert,
should there be consideration given to increased reliability/
survivability requirements as the stockpile is reduced?
Dr. Anastasio. Consideration for stockpile reliability and
survivability requirements is extremely high today, and would remain so
as the stockpile is reduced.
Dr. Miller. It is important to ensure the reliability of stockpile
remains high as the stockpile is reduced. It is equally important that
the Nation have high confidence in the quality of the weapon
performance and reliability assessments of the stockpile stewards. A
balanced and well-funded SSP is key to ensuring the stockpile is safe,
secure, reliable, and effectively meets evolving military requirements
and assuring decisionmakers that the weapons scientists and engineers
making those assessments have the necessary training, skills, and
ability.
The fiscal year 2011 budget increase is a positive first step
toward reversing the recent declining budget trends and revitalizing
the nuclear weapons complex necessary to maintain the U.S. nuclear
deterrent. The necessary program of work to create a balanced SSP
includes: (1) the science and technology that underpins our
understanding of an aging stockpile and supports a reinvigorated
surveillance program; (2) the LEPs that are necessary to keep the
systems safe, secure and effective; and (3) the modernization of the
facilities and infrastructure. Funding shortfalls in any one of the
three primary areas of SSP will affect the deterrent, particularly as
the stockpile is reduced.
Dr. Hommert. The requirements for stockpile reliability and
survivability are high today, and should be maintained as the size of
the stockpile is reduced. As we go forward to reduced numbers, we must
address aging and technology obsolescence associated with non nuclear
components to ensure that our stockpile continues to meet these
requirements.
[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
STRATEGIC SYSTEMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E.
Benjamin Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Nelson and Sessions.
Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel.
Minority staff member present: Daniel A. Lerner,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Christine G. Lang, Hannah I.
Lloyd, and Brian F. Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: Ann Premer,
assistant to Senator Nelson; and Lenwood Landrum, assistant to
Senator Sessions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, CHAIRMAN
Senator Nelson. Good afternoon. The Strategic Forces
Subcommittee convenes today to discuss the strategic systems of
the Military Services, the bombers, the submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBM), and the land-based ballistic
missiles. They'll all be in the inventory of U.S. strategic
systems for many years, but in smaller numbers. At the same
time that we're reducing the overall numbers of strategic
systems, we must also be modernizing them. Most of these
systems will support U.S. deterrence through 2030.
To discuss these systems today, we have with us: Lieutenant
General James M. Kowalski, Commander, Air Force Global Strike
Command; Rear Admiral Terry J. Benedict, Director, Navy
Strategic Systems Programs (SSP); Major General David J. Scott,
Director, Air Force Operational Capability Requirements, Deputy
Chief of Staff, Force Operations, Plans and Requirements; Major
General William A. Chambers, Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff
for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration; and Brigadier
General Garrett Harencak, Commander, Air Force Nuclear Weapons
Center.
Welcome to all of you here today. We appreciate your being
here.
At approximately 3:30 p.m., we'll adjourn here and
reconvene in a closed session in room 217 of the Senate
Visitors Center. Lieutenant General Mark D. Shackelford,
Military Deputy, Office of the assistant Secretary of the Air
Force for Acquisition, will brief the members of the committee
on the Air Force plans for the new bomber program.
Last year the administration completed the congressionally-
directed Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which set forth the
nuclear force structure for the next decade. This force
structure is reflected in the New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START) which entered into force in February. Under the
terms of the treaty, the United States will maintain no more
than 700 deployed strategic missiles and nuclear-capable
bombers and no more than 800 non-deployed strategic missile
launchers and nuclear-capable bombers. While the United States
has 7 years to come into compliance with the treaty, planning
is already underway.
We look forward to hearing from each of our witnesses this
afternoon about the plans for implementing the New START
treaty. While reducing the number of delivery systems, they
must also be sustained, modernized, and eventually replaced.
Each of the systems today is highly capable, but maintaining
that capability well into the next decade will take significant
focus and funding.
All three of the bombers will need significant
modernization until the new bomber can replace them. The B-52,
the oldest of the bomber fleet, will be almost 70 years old
when it's replaced. While old, the bombers remain formidable,
as evidenced by recent events in Libya and the ongoing
deployments in support of the war in Afghanistan.
The Trident D5 SLBM will continue in production, with
targeted upgrades, as it transitions from the current ballistic
missile to the Ohio-class replacement submarine. Planning and
design for that new submarine is already underway.
The Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
has recently been upgraded to last through 2020. To continue to
be a viable system through 2030, updates will be needed.
While most of the attention is focused on the delivery
systems, the infrastructure that sustains these systems is
fragile and must also be maintained and modernized. The
support, test, and training equipment, the command and control
systems, and even the helicopters that provide access to the
missile fields must all be updated or replaced.
Since the events of August 2007, when the Air Force
unknowingly flew nuclear weapons on the wings of a B-52 bomber
from Minot Air Force Base to Barksdale Air Force Base, the Air
Force has undertaken significant changes in its management,
organization, and support of the nuclear enterprise. The
positions that Lieutenant General Kowalski, Major General
Chambers, and Brigadier General Harencak now hold were all
established as the result of that mistake. The Air Force has
made considerable progress in an effort to ensure that its
nuclear enterprise is sound.
We look forward to hearing from each of you about the
changes that have been made, the progress that has been
achieved, and the plans to ensure that the progress is
sustained.
Now it's my pleasure to turn to the attention of Senator
Sessions, my good friend and ranking member, for any opening
comments you may have.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just so much
enjoy working with you and respect you and your knowledge of
these issues and commitment to America, to the defense of our
country. I know you deeply share those views.
I thank the distinguished panel for being with us and your
service to your country. Given that appropriate policy
officials couldn't be here today, I appreciate, Mr. Chairman,
your commitment to hold another committee hearing next month to
address critical issues regarding the modernization and future
plans for further potential reductions, and I'm afraid unwise,
reductions in the size of our nuclear stockpile with the U.S.
Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and Department of Defense (DOD)
policy officials.
Last week's hearing focused on the cost for modernizing the
nuclear weapons complex. The effort is a critical
recapitalization program which the administration estimates
will cost at least $84 billion over 10 years.
I came up, Mr. Chairman, and I asked about those two
buildings. They would cost a lot of money. We just had the
biggest industrial, I think, announcement in America in
Alabama, Thyssenkrupp steel mill, $5 billion, 3,700 acres, 7
million square feet under roof, 160 acres under roof, 11
million cubic yards of Earth moved, twice that for Hoover Dam;
75,000 pilings laid end to end would stretch from Mobile, AL to
Houston, TX; 1 million cubic yards of concrete, and much more.
That was including their equipment, a $5 billion project.
I think our two buildings that they're talking about were
$4 or $5 billion each, and I think we need to ask about the
cost of those buildings as we go forward. We need them, though.
I really do believe that there's no alternative to modernizing
our infrastructure at our labs.
Today's hearing focuses on the triad of nuclear delivery
vehicles and its modernization, which is estimated to cost more
than $120 billion over that same period. In sum, for the
foreseeable future our country must commit itself to
approximately $20 billion a year to sustain and modernize our
strategic deterrent. This, I think, is necessary investment. If
we can make it successful for less, we need to try to do that.
But we just have to assume this, because we neglected real
investments in this area for many years.
I fully agree with the bipartisan Perry-Schlesinger
Strategic Posture Commission finding that: ``The triad of
strategic nuclear delivery systems should be maintained for the
immediate future and this will require some difficult
investment choices.'' I think that bipartisan commission is
correct. Characterizing the choices before us as ``difficult''
might be an understatement, but one thing that is absolutely
clear is that the recapitalization of our deterrent will
require a sustained, smart, and long-term commitment spanning
future Congresses and administrations.
I look forward to discussing the overall importance and
crucial need for this modernization effort. I also look forward
to discussing the timeline during which these modernization
efforts must be accomplished, our ability to sustain what we
currently have, and the steps being taken early on in
emphasizing the affordability of the systems.
DOD unfortunately is not immune to the current fiscal
situation that we find ourselves in. This year we'll spend $3.7
trillion and we take in $2.2 trillion. Admiral Mullen, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has told us that our
biggest national security threat is our debt.
Everybody will be challenged, but there are certain things
we have to have. We have to have a triad. We have to have
nuclear deterrence and it needs to be safe and reliable. A
robust triad of nuclear delivery vehicles is essential and the
recapitalization is critical to national security.
One of the biggest unanswered questions in the future is
the ICBM force. According to section 1251 of the report's
November 2010 update, the administration intends to begin to
study what a follow-on ICBM might look like, but it is doing so
with the concerning caveat, we note. That is, in a way that
``supports continued reductions in the U.S. nuclear weapons.''
Recent statements by the President's National Security
Adviser have shed new light on the administration's intention.
In his speech before the Carnegie Endowment, Mr. Donilon stated
``The administration is currently making preparations for the
next round of reductions''--we've hardly gotten through this
one, or approved this one, and that DOD will ``review our
strategic requirements and develop our options for further
reductions in our current nuclear stockpile.'' He continued to
mention in that speech the, as he said, the President's
declared vision for ``achieving peace and security in a world
without nuclear weapons.'' I'm confident that I won't live to
see that, unless we do have a second coming.
Mr. Donilan continued by stating that in meeting these
objectives the White House will direct DOD to consider
``potential changes in targeting requirements and alert
postures.''
Last month, along with 40 of my colleagues, I sent a letter
to the President regarding our desire to be consulted on any
further reduction plans to the nuclear stockpile. The New START
treaty was only signed a few weeks ago. Yet the administration
is moving forward in my opinion in a pace that justifies the
phrase ``reckless,'' pursuing more reductions at an expedited
and potentially destabilizing pace.
I am very concerned and I look forward to discussing with
our witnesses today what guidance and assumptions they have
been given or told to follow in the design, development, and
posture for modernizing the triad, and we'll have the policy
people to discuss at a later date.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing and for
the excellent team of witnesses we have before us.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator Sessions. I appreciate
very much your opening comments and look forward to the
opportunity for questioning.
We have a large panel this afternoon and limited time. All
of the prepared statements will be included for the record.
It's my understanding that Lieutenant General Kowalski, Rear
Admiral Benedict, and Major General Chambers will be making the
opening statements. I guess we should start with you, Admiral.
STATEMENT OF RADM TERRY J. BENEDICT, USN, DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC
SYSTEMS PROGRAM, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Benedict. Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions,
distinguished members of the subcommittee: It is an honor to
testify before you today representing SSP. SSP's mission is to
design, develop, produce, support, and protect our Nation's
sea-based strategic deterrent, the Trident II D5 strategic
weapon system.
The recently ratified New START treaty increases the
dependence on the submarine leg of the triad. The reductions in
warheads and launchers will result in ballistic missile
submarines carrying approximately 70 percent of the Nation's
strategic commitment.
I have focused on four priorities since returning to SSP:
nuclear weapons security, the D5 life extension program (LEP),
the Ohio replacement program, and the solid rocket motor
industrial base. The first priority I would like to address and
arguably the most important priority is the safety and the
security of the Navy's nuclear weapons. Our Marines and Navy
Master-at-Arms provide an effective and integrated elite
security force at our two Strategic Weapons Facilities, in
King's Bay, GA, and Bangor, WA. U.S. Coast Guard units have
been commissioned at both facilities to protect our Ohio-class
submarines as they transit to and from their dive points.
The second priority I would like to discuss is SSP's life
extension efforts to ensure an effective and reliable sea-based
deterrent. The D5 weapon system continues to demonstrate itself
as a credible deterrent and exceeds the operational
requirements established for the system almost 30 years ago.
Last month the USS Nevada conducted the 135th consecutive
successful flight of the D5 system.
SSP is extending the life of the D5 weapon system through
an update to all the subsystems: launcher, navigation, fire
control, guidance, missile, and reentry. These life extension
efforts will provide the Navy with the system we need to meet
the operational requirements.
My next priority and one of the highest Navy priorities is
the Ohio Replacement Program. To lower development costs and
leverage the proven reliability of the Trident II D5, the Ohio
replacement SSBN will enter service with the D5 strategic
weapon system beginning in 2029.
Finally, I would like to discuss the importance of the
solid rocket motor industrial base. The Navy is maintaining a
continuous production of rocket motors. However, we have faced
significant cost challenges as both the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) and the Air Force demands have
declined. We are working with our industry partners, DOD, and
Congress to sustain the solid rocket motor industrial base and
find ways to maintain successful partnerships.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and at the
end of the other two opening statements I would be pleased to
take your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Benedict follows:]
Prepared Statement by RADM Terry Benedict, USN
introduction
Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss Navy's
strategic programs. It is an honor to testify before you this morning
representing the Navy's Strategic Systems Programs (SSP).
SSP's mission is to design, develop, produce, support and protect
our Navy's sea-based strategic deterrent, the Trident II (D5) Strategic
Weapon System (SWS). The Trident II (D5) Submarine Launched Ballistic
Missile (SLBM) represents the Nation's most survivable strategic
deterrent capability. The men and women of SSP and our industry
partners remain dedicated to supporting the mission of our Sailors on
strategic deterrent patrol and our Marines and Sailors who are standing
the watch ensuring the security of the weapons we are entrusted with by
this nation.
It has been 11 months since I assumed command as the 13th Director
of SSP. This is a relatively small number of incumbents since the
inception of the program 55 years ago. Since returning to SSP, I have
focused on four priorities: Nuclear Weapons Security; the Trident II
(D5) SWS Life Extension Program; the Ohio Replacement Program; and the
Solid Rocket Motor Industrial Base. Today, I would like to discuss my
four priorities and why these priorities are keys to the sustainment of
the Navy's sea-based strategic deterrent and its future viability. I
will also provide an update on our SSBN force and our flight test
program.
nuclear weapons security
The first priority I would like to address, and arguably the most
important priority, is the safety and security of the Navy's nuclear
weapons. Navy leadership has clearly delegated and defined SSP's role
as the program manager and technical authority for the Navy's nuclear
weapons and nuclear weapons security in Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV)
Instruction 8120.1.
At its most basic level, this priority is the physical security of
one of our Nation's most valuable assets. Our Marines and Navy Masters
at Arms provide an effective and integrated elite security force at our
two Strategic Weapons Facilities in Kings Bay, GA, and Bangor, WA. U.S.
Coast Guard Maritime Force Protection Units have been commissioned at
both facilities to protect our submarines as they transit to and from
their dive points. These coast guardsmen and the Navy vessels they man
provide a security umbrella for our Ohio-class submarines. Together,
the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard team form the foundation of our
Nuclear Weapons Security Program.
SSP's efforts to sustain the safety and improve the security of
these national assets continue at all levels of the organization. On
October 1, I stood up a new division within SSP responsible for
overseeing all nuclear safety and security operations, as well as
managing the future acquisition planning for this mission. SSP
continues to maintain a safe, reliable, and secure environment for our
strategic assets as well as focus on the custody and accountability of
the nuclear assets that have been entrusted to the Navy.
d5 life extension program
The next priority I would like to discuss is SSP's life extension
efforts to ensure an effective and reliable sea-based deterrent. We are
executing the Trident II (D5) Life Extension Program in cooperation
with the United Kingdom (U.K.), under the auspices of the Polaris Sales
Agreement. I am pleased to report that our longstanding partnership
with the U.K. remains strong.
The Trident II (D5) SWS continues to demonstrate itself as a
credible deterrent and meets the operational requirements established
for the system almost 30 years ago. We have successfully conducted 135
consecutive flight tests of the D5 missile and continue to exceed our
required performance. This record of success demonstrates our Navy's
ability to respond if called upon. Our allies and any potential rivals
are assured the U.S. strategic deterrent is ready, credible, and
effective.
However, we cannot simply rest on our successes. The Trident II
(D5) SWS has been deployed on our Ohio-class ballistic missile
submarines for over 20 years, and is planned for operational deployment
for at least another 30 years, making it operational longer than any
other missile system SSP has deployed. We must remain vigilant of age-
related issues to ensure a continued high level of reliability.
The Navy is proactively taking steps to address aging and
technology obsolescence. SSP is extending the life of the D5 Strategic
Weapon System to match the Ohio-class submarine service life and to
serve as the initial baseline mission payload for the Ohio replacement
submarine platform. This is being accomplished through an update to all
the Trident II (D5) SWS subsystems: launcher, navigation, fire control,
guidance, missile and reentry. Our flight hardware--missile and
guidance--life extension efforts are designed to meet the same form,
fit, and function of the original system, in order to keep the deployed
system as one homogeneous population and to control costs. We will also
remain in continuous production of energetic components such as solid
rocket motors. These efforts will provide the Navy with the missiles
and guidance systems we need to meet operational requirements.
SSP previously restructured the D5 Life Extension Program to ensure
sufficient time for additional missile electronics design evolutions. I
am pleased to report that our restructured program is on track. SSP
successfully conducted a system Critical Design Review of the missile
electronics in January 2011. Our life extended guidance system also
completed its Critical Design Review and is scheduled for its first
flight test in fiscal year 2012. Our first flight test of a D5 life
extended missile is scheduled in fiscal year 2013. The Initial
Operating Capability of the combined missile and guidance systems is
scheduled in fiscal year 2017.
Another major step to ensure the continued sustainment of our SWS
is our SSP Shipboard Integration (SSI) efforts, which utilizes open
architecture and commercial off-the-shelf hardware. The first increment
of this update is now being installed throughout the fleet and training
facilities. To date, installation is complete on four U.S. SSBNs and
two U.K. SSBNs. This effort is a technical obsolescence refresh of
shipboard electronics hardware and software upgrades, which will
provide greater maintainability of the SWS and ensure we continue to
provide the highest nuclear weapons safety and security for our
deployed SSBNs. The first end-to-end operational test of the SSI
Increment 1 was successfully conducted in March 2011 on the USS Nevada
(SSBN 733).
To sustain the SWS, SSP is extending the life of the W76 reentry
system through a refurbishment program known as the W76-1. This program
is being executed in partnership with the Department of Energy,
National Nuclear Security Administration. The W76-1 is now in full
production and has achieved Initial Operating Capability. The W76-1
refurbishment maintains the military capability of the original W76 for
approximately an additional 30 years. This program successfully
incorporated commercial off-the-shelf hardware and other economies to
achieve Navy component production costs 75 percent less than previous
nuclear arming, fuzing, and firing systems.
In addition to the W76-1, the Navy is in the initial stages of
refurbishing the W88 reentry system. The Navy is collaborating with the
Air Force to reduce costs through shared technology. This refurbishment
will reach Initial Operation Capability in the SLBM Fleet in 2018.
These programs will provide the Navy with the weapons we need to meet
operational requirements throughout the Ohio service life and the
planned follow-on platform.
ohio replacement program
My third priority and one of the highest Navy priorities is the
Ohio Replacement Program. The continued assurance of our sea-based
strategic deterrent requires a credible SWS as well as the development
of the next class of ballistic missile submarines. The Navy team is
taking aggressive steps to ensure the Ohio Replacement Program is
designed, built and delivered on time with the right capabilities at an
affordable cost. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Defense
Acquisition Board approved the Ohio Replacement Program Milestone A in
January 2011 and authorized entry into the Technology Development
Phase.
The Navy team has the benefit of leveraging the success of the
Virginia class build program and the opportunity to implement many of
those lessons-learned to help ensure we design the Ohio replacement for
affordability both in terms of the acquisition and life cycle
maintenance. Maintaining this capability is critical to the continued
success of our sea-based strategic deterrent now and into the future.
The Ohio Replacement Program will replace the existing 14 Ohio-
class submarines. To lower development costs and leverage the proven
reliability of the Trident II (D5) SWS, the Ohio replacement will enter
service with the Trident II (D5) SWS and D5 life-extended missiles
onboard beginning in 2029. These D5 life extended missiles will be
shared with the existing Ohio class submarine for approximately 13
years until the Ohio-class retires. Maintaining one SWS during the
transition to the Ohio-class replacement is beneficial from a cost,
performance, and risk reduction standpoint.
A critical component of the Ohio Replacement Program is the
development of a Common Missile Compartment that will support Trident
II (D5) deployment on both the Ohio class replacement and the successor
to the U.K. Vanguard Class. The United States and the United Kingdom
have maintained a shared commitment to nuclear deterrence through the
Polaris Sales Agreement since April 1963. The United States will
continue to maintain its strong strategic relationship with the U.K.
for our respective follow-on platforms, based upon the Polaris Sales
Agreement. As Director, SSP I am the U.S. executor of this agreement.
Our programs are tightly coupled both programmatically and technically
to ensure we are providing the most cost effective, technically capable
nuclear strategic deterrent for both nations.
The New START Treaty, which entered into force on February 5, and
the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reinforce the importance of strategic
submarines and the SLBMs they carry, as the most survivable leg of the
Triad. The reductions in warheads and launchers will result in
ballistic missile submarines carrying the majority of the Nation's
strategic force. Our continued stewardship of the Trident II (D5) SWS
is necessary to ensure a credible and reliable SWS is deployed today on
our Ohio class submarines, as well as, in the future on the Ohio
replacement.
The Ohio replacement will be a strategic, national asset whose
endurance and stealth will enable the Navy to provide continuous,
uninterrupted strategic deterrence into the 2080s. The development of
this follow-on capability requires the cooperation of the executive
branch and Congress to deliver an effective sea-based deterrent on time
with the right capabilities to sustain the most survivable leg of our
Triad at the right cost for many decades to come.
solid rocket motor industrial base
The fourth priority I would like to discuss is the importance of
the defense and aerospace industrial base. In particular, the decline
of the Solid Rocket Motor industry has placed a heavy burden on Navy
resources. The Navy is maintaining a continuous production capability
at a minimum sustaining rate of 12 rocket motor sets per year through
the Future Years Defense Plan. However, we have faced significant cost
challenges as both the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) and Air Force demands have declined. We will continue to
experience those cost increases if demand shrinks further in coming
years.
Reduced industrial demand has resulted in overhead costs spread
over a smaller customer base. The Navy's growing percentage of the
Solid Rocket Motor business base has already resulted in increased unit
costs. In addition, Trident II (D5) is the only program in production
of Class 1.1 type propellant. This type of propellant is highly
energetic and necessary for use in submarines due to volume
constraints.
Navy added funding to the budget to address the unit cost increase.
While these additional funds are essential for the continued production
of D5 rocket motors, the long-term sustainment of this vital national
capability must also be addressed.
We are working with our industry partners, the Department of
Defense and Congress, to sustain the Solid Rocket Motor industrial base
and find ways to maintain successful partnerships. The OSD (Industrial
Policy)-led Interagency Task Force, with membership from Navy, the Air
Force, OSD along with the Missile Defense Agency and NASA, is
developing a Solid Rocket Industrial Base Sustainment Plan. SSP is an
integral part of this process. We look forward to continuing this
collaborative process to find an interagency solution to maintain this
crucial national capability.
today's force
The final topic I would like to address is our SSBN force. Our 14
U.S. Navy SSBNs, 8 of which are homeported in the Pacific and 6 in the
Atlantic Fleet, continue to provide a credible, survivable and reliable
sea-based strategic deterrent for our national leadership.
Last month, the USS Nevada (SSBN 733) successfully conducted her
Demonstration and Shakedown Operation involving the launch and flight
test of a Trident II (D5) missile and is now ready to return to
strategic service. The completion of this test marks the 135th
consecutive successful flight test of a D5 missile. Therefore, I am
pleased to report to you the Trident SWS continues to demonstrate
itself as a credible deterrent and meet the operational requirements
established for the system almost 30 years ago.
USS Tennessee (SSBN 734) will soon complete her Engineering
Refueling Overhaul, enter post availability testing, prepare for her
Demonstration and Shakedown Operation, and return to the operational
force in the spring of 2012. Two more of our SSBN submarines are
undergoing Engineering Refueling Overhauls, which will maintain the
viability of these platforms through the service life of the Ohio
class.
We must continue to be vigilant of age-related issues to ensure the
high reliability needed for our SWS. With the Trident II (D5) missile
planned for operational deployment through the service life of the Ohio
class and as the initial payload on the Ohio replacement, D5 hardware
will age beyond our previous experience base and will be operational
almost twice as long as any previous sea-based strategic deterrent.
Therefore, SSP has adjusted our flight testing philosophy to focus on
older flight hardware in order to best predict aging characteristics.
We tested our oldest missile to date from the USS Nevada last month.
The first and second stage rocket motors were nearly 22 years old.
conclusion
This is an exciting time to be the Director at SSP. The New START
Treaty reduces both deployed and nondeployed nuclear weapons, which
will require the United States to continue to rely heavily on the
survivable capability provided by ballistic missile submarines. The
ballistic missile submarine is only one leg of the nuclear Triad. Land-
based ICBMs, nuclear capable heavy bombers, and the SSBN force work
together to provide the total U.S. nuclear deterrent. Each leg of the
deterrent provides unique capabilities.
The 2010 NPR also committed to strengthen conventional capabilities
and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear
attacks, with the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on
the United States or our allies and partners the sole purpose of U.S.
nuclear weapons. SSP stands ready to support and participate in future
Conventional Prompt Global Strike efforts should leadership authorize
our participation. However, the NPR makes clear that as long as nuclear
weapons exist, the United States will sustain a safe, secure and
effective nuclear deterrent. This includes modernizing nuclear weapons
infrastructure; sustaining the science, technology and engineering
base; investing in human capital; and ensuring that these goals remain
a senior leadership focus. As the Navy's primary stakeholder, SSP is
accountable for the technical oversight, safety, and security of Navy
nuclear weapons and we understand the vast responsibility entrusted to
us.
Our Nation's sea-based deterrent has been a critical component of
our national security since the 1950s and will continue to assure our
allies and deter our enemies well into the future. I am privileged to
represent this unique organization as we work to serve the best
interests of our great Nation.
Senator Nelson. General Kowalski.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAMES M. KOWALSKI, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR
FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND, U.S. AIR FORCE
General Kowalski. Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions,
I'm honored to appear before you today for the first time as
commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, representing
nearly 24,000 airmen and civilians. With strong support from
Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, we have pursued three
parallel efforts: the standup of a new major command, execution
of current operations in support of our combatant commanders,
and establishing a culture that embraces the special trust and
responsibility nuclear weapons require.
We're now fully engaged on our core organize, train, and
equip tasks. Our new headquarters is about 81 percent of our
authorized strength and we've established the organizational
structure and processes necessary to execute the mission. Our
work in revitalizing the nuclear enterprise is ongoing, as we
build upon relationships between all the stakeholders
representing the Services, the combatant commands, and other
Federal agencies.
We established a number of new training programs tailored
to the nuclear and global strike missions. These programs
develop expertise throughout the nuclear enterprise, to include
operations, maintenance, intelligence, and security forces. As
we worked to equip our forces, we assumed lead major command
responsibilities for the Minuteman III, UH-1N helicopter, B-2
and B-52 bombers, air-launched cruise missiles, gravity nuclear
weapons, and Air Force nuclear command and control.
As we go forward, I see three major challenges for the
command. First, we must consolidate the gains of the last few
years across the nuclear enterprise. We will continue to mature
our headquarters and be rigorous in the examination of our
processes. Second, we have to achieve enduring cultural change
in our nuclear enterprise, while also aggressively supporting
the current conventional fight. Our bomber forces are more than
just dual-capable; they are full spectrum. Recent B-2 and B-1
missions into Libya from bases in the United States show how
quickly a crisis can develop and how long-range bombers can
rapidly bring flexible combat power to a joint commander.
Finally, we must sustain and enhance our current force
while preparing to meet the challenges of the future. At Air
Force Global Strike Command we recognize our responsibility to
be efficient and effective stewards of resources. Our goal is
to instill a culture that consistently encourages innovation
and fosters productivity.
Our central mission remains unchanged: to develop and
provide combat-ready forces for nuclear deterrence and global
strike operations in support of the President and the combatant
commanders.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the members of the
committee again for the opportunity to discuss the status and
future of Air Force Global Strike Command, and I look forward
to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Kowalski follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. James M. Kowalski, USAF
introduction
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and distinguished members
of the subcommittee; I am honored to appear before you today for the
first time as the Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command,
representing nearly 24,000 dedicated airmen and civilians.
I would like to update you on the current status of the command,
some of our progress since my predecessor, Lieutenant General Klotz,
last testified in March 2010, and what I see as our central challenges.
current status
On 30 September 2010, Air Force Global Strike Command declared full
operational capability. As we built this command, the first completely
new Air Force major command (MAJCOM) in 27 years, the rest of the world
did not pause. Some of the events that have shaped our development over
the last year include the Nuclear Posture Review, the New START, and as
a reminder of our conventional responsibilities, ongoing operations in
support of U.S. Africa Command.
Our efforts during the last year to strengthen the nuclear
enterprise involved three parallel efforts: the methodical stand-up of
a new major command and headquarters, the disciplined execution of
current operations in support of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and
the geographic combatant commanders, and the enduring effort to
establish a culture that embraces the special trust and responsibility
of nuclear weapons.
As we approach our planned manpower levels and have the initial
tasks associated with standing up the Headquarters behind us, we must
now focus on building the relationships and processes both internal and
external to the command. We are pleased by the progress the
headquarters has made in assuming responsibilities for guidance and
oversight of our forces. We continue to mature our processes in
developing fiscal guidance and plans within the Air Force corporate
structure. The connective tissue between organizations within the
command is getting stronger as the units align to our priorities,
metrics, and battle rhythm. In declaring full operational capability,
we closed out 696 specific action items under Programming Plan 09-01
that ranged from the broad task of establishing the initial Air Force
Global Strike Command structure to specific tasks such as the
identification of formal training quotas.
On any given day we have 1,100 airmen deployed or on standby to
support STRATCOM in the missile complexes and about another 1,100
deployed in support of our regional combatant commanders. In addition,
we stand ready to deploy up to 16 B-2s and 44 B-52s along with a range
of combat support capabilities to support national taskings.
air force global strike command progress
With the completion of initial stand-up activities, we were able to
fully focus on our strategic master plan and make headway on our goals,
objectives, and tasks. Although much work remains, I would like to
share some of the progress we have made in our core areas of organize,
train, and equip.
air force global strike command--organize
Our ongoing efforts to organize the Air Force's newest MAJCOM have
included standing up the Headquarters, defining our role within the
nuclear command, control, and communications system (NC3), establishing
the 69th Bomb Squadron at Minot Air Force Base, the stand-up of General
Officer Steering Groups in support of each of our weapons systems,
providing Air Force Office of Special Investigations support to our
missile convoys, and re-establishing the presence of Intelligence
Officers in our Missile Wings.
Standing up the headquarters presented a unique challenge the Air
Force had not faced in 27 years. We are now operating at 81 percent of
our authorized strength and we have established the Headquarters
organizational structure, battle rhythms, metrics, and reviews
necessary to execute the mission.
``Air Force Global Strike Command serves as the lead MAJCOM for 14
major NC3 systems. In that capacity we provide a clear and strong voice
for NC3 sustainment and modernization. Additionally, our staff has
successfully integrated 14 previously dispersed NC3 programs into a
unified and cohesive Global Strike Command NC3 portfolio. This
translates into greater command situational awareness and management of
these vital programs.''
On 30 June of this year, the 69th Bomb Squadron will declare Full
Operational Capability under the 5th Bomb Wing at Minot Air Force Base.
The Air Force activated the 69th in September 2009 to better balance
operational taskings with the addition of a fourth B-52 squadron, with
two at Minot and two at Barksdale.
We have also organized new General Officer Steering Groups (GOSGs)
dedicated to sustaining each of our assigned weapon systems. These
GOSGs focus on warfighter concerns, prioritize sustainment initiatives,
and remove obstacles in order to keep Air Force Global Strike Command's
assigned weapons systems capable and available. GOSG participation
includes members of the Headquarters staff, senior representatives from
Air Force Material Command and the Defense Logistics Agency, leadership
from each of Air Force Global Strike Command's wings, and the National
Nuclear Security Administration. Through this steering group process,
funds and focus have been reprioritized to address issues with aging
support equipment, diminishing manufacturing resources, supply parts
support, and parts availability.
We are now organized to provide the sole Response Task Force for
any Air Force nuclear incident in the continental United States and
stand ready to assist the Department of Energy and U.S. Air Forces in
Europe (USAFE). An aggressive training schedule will culminate with
participation in our first full scale national response exercise in May
2012.
Another organizational initiative is the revitalization of the
Nuclear Weapons Stakeholder Partnership Meeting. This semi-annual
meeting is the framework for discussion on specific nuclear weapon
issues and is a forum for building relationships and trust between
organizations from the Air Force, Navy, STRATCOM, USAFE, Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, Department of Energy, and the National Labs. We look
forward to our next meeting at Barksdale Air Force Base later this
month.
Over the course of the past year Air Force Global Strike Command
and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI) has teamed up
to close a 4-year gap in Federal law enforcement support to off-base
nuclear convoys. Air Force OSI agents have joined our Security Forces
in the convoy, and provide an important link to local, state, and
Federal law enforcement.
Conducting inspections is a critical MAJCOM function, and we have
made significant progress in this area as well. Over the course of the
last year, our Inspector General, starting from scratch, built an 86-
person inspection team fully capable of inspecting our bomber and
missile wings. This team has been able to combine the inspection
philosophies and instructions from Air Combat Command and Air Force
Space Command to produce specific Air Force Global Strike Command
direction for inspections throughout the nuclear enterprise.
Finally, I am pleased to report that for the first time in nearly a
decade, we have taken the steps necessary to send Intelligence Officers
back into Missile Wings. Improving intelligence support to our nuclear
forces was a key recommendation of the Schlesinger report and will
enhance missile crew situational awareness, their understanding of
strategic threats, and the vital role they play in the defense of our
Nation.
air force global strike command--train
In December 2008, the Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force
on Department of Defense (DOD) Nuclear Weapons Management identified
the need for more nuclear-qualified and experienced personnel. Filling
positions designated for personnel with nuclear experience is a command
priority, and tailored training plays a major role in consolidating the
gains we have made across the nuclear enterprise. Therefore, we
established a number of programs to build upon the excellent basic
military training and initial skills training that other Air Force
organizations provide.
On 30 March 2009, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force approved the
creation of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Weapons Instructor
Course (WIC) at the U.S. Air Force Weapons School (USAFWS), Nellis Air
Force Base, NV. The mission of the ICBM WIC is to produce weapons
officers to lead weapons and tactics development and provide in-depth
expertise throughout the ICBM community and the nuclear enterprise. On
19 December 2010, the USAFWS graduated the first four students from the
ICBM WIC. Three of these graduates have returned to our ICBM units to
stand up the first weapons and tactics flights. These weapons officers,
well versed in the nuclear enterprise, can serve as the lead integrator
on issues related to operations, maintenance, and security forces at
the missile units. The ICBM WIC is on track to produce eight graduates
per year.
One of our newest programs is an Intelligence Formal Training Unit
designed to help our unit intelligence teams support the nuclear and
global strike mission. We will host 5 courses in fiscal year 2011 and
will train approximately 100 nuclear intelligence professionals to
fully understand the daily deterrence mission.
For our security forces, helicopter crews, and convoy drivers, we
conduct graduate level training at Camp Guernsey in Wyoming and expect
to expand our investment there over the next few years. We have
significantly increased our nuclear security training program with
emphasis on tactical expertise, marksmanship, and small unit
leadership. This training allows integration of security forces,
helicopter crews, and maintenance personnel into a cohesive and
effective security team. Training together as a team, these warfighters
maximize the capabilities necessary to protect our Nation's most vital
resources and most powerful weapons. Additionally, we expanded our
training capacity to include 8th Air Force's nuclear bomber security
forces alongside the 20th Air Force intercontinental ballistic missile
security forces in our tactical security training classes.
air force global strike command--equip
Air Force Global Strike Command assumed lead command
responsibilities for the Minuteman III and UH-1N helicopter weapon
systems from Air Force Space Command on 1 December 2009, and for the B-
2 and B-52 dual capable bombers from Air Combat Command on 1 February
2010. Our four major weapons systems are on average, over 40 years old,
and this includes our ``new'' 22-year-old B-2 bombers.
equip: b-52s
We have been successful in investing in multiple B-52 platform
improvements to address both modernization and sustainment. The Combat
Network Communications Technology (CONECT) program is the most
significant B-52 modernization program since 1980 and will add 21st
century capability to the aircraft. CONECT ground testing is ongoing at
Edwards Air Force Base. We have also recently tested a bomber flight
control software block upgrade that will significantly improve Advanced
Targeting Pod capabilities and provide the interface to employ
Miniature Air-Launched Decoys, and have started the Military Standard-
1760 Internal Weapons upgrade program which will enable the carriage of
8 modernized smart weapons in the bomb bay, such as the Global
Positioning System-guided Joint Direct Attack Munition, increasing the
total aircraft load-out from 12 to 20 Precision Guided Munitions.
In the near-term, the B-52 needs upgrades to its anti-skid system,
it needs airspace access upgrades such as the Mode S/5 transponder for
real-time aircraft identification, data, and position, and it needs a
new radar as the current radar is based on 1950s technology and may be
unsupportable by 2016. We also need to resolve a safety of flight issue
with the installation of the MultiMode Receiver 2020 Instrument Landing
System Receiver that brings the aircraft in compliance for frequency
modulation immunity, a requirement that previously restricted B-52
aircraft transiting European airspace and using European airfields.
equip: b-2s
We made significant progress with the B-2 Radar Modernization
Program during the past year, completing 4 aircraft and bringing the
fleet total to 12 upgraded aircraft. Air Force Global Strike Command
increased maintainability of the upgraded radar system by accelerating
technical data deliveries and by maximizing antenna diagnostic and
prognostic capabilities through software enhancements. We have also
completed integration of the Massive Ordnance Penetrator with the B-2
aircraft, giving the warfighter increased capability against hardened
and deeply buried targets.
We made progress in addressing B-2 aircraft parts obsolescence
issues through weekly teleconferences across the B-2 enterprise to
track current problem parts and project future parts issues. Improved
communication, proactive planning, and procurement, as well as new
logistics models for small fleet management, have decreased the B-2
monthly non-mission capable supply rate by one third since February
2010.
For the B-2, we also must meet national requirements for nuclear
command and control--the program of record is the extremely high
frequency satellite communications. This upgrade not only meets nuclear
requirements, it provides wideband ``net-ready'' beyond-line-of-site
connectivity for full spectrum operations.
equip: uh-1ns and cvlsp
Bombers are not the only aviation weapons systems vital to our
mission in Air Force Global Strike Command. The UH-1N (Huey) Helicopter
has served the Air Force well since 1970, primarily in providing
missile field support, convoy security, and ferrying missile crews and
maintenance teams to and from the missile complexes and providing
aerial security surveillance of remote ICBM facilities. However,
mission requirements changed in the late 1990s, and again after the
terrorist attacks on September 11.
The Air Force currently operates 62 UH-1N aircraft which do not
meet all of the vertical lift requirements in our missile fields, nor
in the AF District of Washington. Post-September 11, DOD determined an
urgent need for vertical lift improvements over the current UH-1N. For
AF Global Strike Command, the Huey's primary role is to provide a
robust and agile missile field security capability. Presently, the UH-
1N fleet does not meet missile complex security requirements for
endurance, speed, and payload. In addition to the UH-1N's clearly
defined capability gaps, there are not enough UH-1N aircraft to meet
the security needs for our nuclear enterprise and the missions in the
Military District of Washington. Finally, the UH-1N's advanced age is
manifesting itself in the form of airframe cracks. Cracks in the UH-
1N's lift beam area and tail boom assembly present the challenge of
keeping a 40-year-old aircraft combat mission ready while working
through the issue of parts availability and obsolescence.
The risk we assume with the current helicopter is unacceptable and
the need for a replacement helicopter is both urgent and compelling. As
lead MAJCOM, we will continue to advocate for the Common Vertical Lift
Support Platform (CVLSP) to ensure the safety and security of missile
field operations and to meet the requirement posed by Air Force
District of Washington continuity of operations and government missions
for the National Capital Region.
equip: icbms
Turning now to ICBMs, the Minuteman III is congressionally mandated
to be in service until 2030. We're in a modernization program to reach
2020, and Air Force Materiel Command is exploring what will be required
to reach 2030. Since 1962, the Minuteman ``family'' has been updated
from the MMI, to the MMII, to the MMIII, and there have been upgrades
and modifications to each of those respective models. We made
significant strides in the past year toward completing the Propulsion
Replacement Program, which marks the full deployment of new solid fuel
stage motors and refurbished flight controls across the entire force to
extend booster service life through the end of this decade. We will
reach completion on this major effort when the last two boosters are in
place this month.
While the Minuteman missiles have been upgraded and modified, the
infrastructure supporting these missiles is still early 1960s era
equipment and we will ensure our reviews include this element of the
weapon system. Along those lines, we began, with the support of Air
Force Materiel Command, a depot overhaul program for the fleet of 23-
year-old Transporter Erector Vehicles and silo emplacement vehicles. We
have established requirements for a Transporter Erector Vehicle
replacement and have begun development of the new Payload Transporter
vehicle. The new ICBM Payload Transporter will introduce physical
security technologies into the reentry system transport vehicle, to
include advanced security delay features with stand-off command and
control activation capability. I want to thank Congress for funding
this program at $117.8 million across the Future Years Defense Program,
and we should see the first Payload Transporter deliveries in fiscal
year 2015.
These handling equipment sustainment efforts will significantly
enhance the safety and security of daily operations across our three
ICBM bases and supports modernization and upgrade necessary to extend
Minuteman III through 2030. Additionally, these efforts will enable the
Air Force to execute activities required for implementation of New
START.
equip: icbm security improvements
We have taken a number of steps to provide our security forces with
the equipment and technology they need to protect and defend our
Nation's nuclear deterrent.
Air Force Global Strike Command has purchased 152 armored vehicles
to better protect our security forces and meet DOD requirements. Some
of these new armored vehicles have been delivered to our wings, and
delivery will be complete no later than calendar year 2013.
We are in the process of fully deploying new Remote Visual
Assessment (RVA) equipment to assist security forces monitoring of the
ICBM missile complexes. RVA enhances situational awareness, and helps
security forces tailor the responding forces in accordance with the
assessed threat. We are transitioning from a satellite dependent RVA
system to a terrestrial system that increases both performance and
responsiveness at a lower long term operating cost. In addition, we are
modernizing our security sensor systems used to protect our above-
ground weapons storage areas, with completion of the upgrade at Minot
Air Force Base, ND, this year.
equip: long-range strike family of systems
We are strong advocates and partners in the development of a long-
range strike (LRS) family of systems that will provide a visible
deterrent and global strike capability well into the future. The Air
Force LRS strategy uses a family-of-systems construct consisting of
three precision-strike pillars: a long-range strike platform, a long-
range standoff missile, and a conventional prompt global strike
capability. Both Secretary Gates and Secretary Donley have made a
commitment to a new nuclear capable, long-range penetrating bomber.
challenges
Air Force Global Strike Command faces three central challenges.
First, we must consolidate the gains we have made across the nuclear
enterprise. Second, we must achieve enduring cultural change in our
nuclear enterprise while also aggressively supporting the current
conventional fight. Finally, we must sustain and enhance our current
force while preparing to meet the challenges of the future with
innovative solutions. I am proud of the progress our airmen have made,
and as I address these challenges through this testimony, I will share
my perspective on Air Force Global Strike Command's significant
accomplishments.
consolidating our gains
Now that we have established the Command and declared full
operational capability, we must consolidate our gains, sustain
momentum, and provide stability to the enterprise while continuing to
pursue improvements. One example is our recent initiative to capture
and categorize recommendations or findings relating to our nuclear
alert forces. In partnership with the Air Force Materiel Command, we
are reviewing studies, assessments, reports, and other documents dating
back to 1990 to audit the recommendations and follow through with the
findings that have not been executed, funded, and/or mitigated. Any
open recommendations will be worked to resolution or prioritized and
tracked for later action according to fiscal constraints and level of
risk.
sustain conventional capabilities
Our second challenge is to achieve enduring cultural change in our
nuclear enterprise while also aggressively supporting the current
conventional fight. Our bomber forces are more than just dual-capable--
they are full-spectrum. Having both a nuclear and conventional mission
is not something new for our bomber units. Nuclear capable bombers
participated in numerous conventional operations from Korea through
Operation Desert Storm. During the Cold War, the conventional
employment of bombers was seen as a distraction from the core mission
of nuclear deterrence. However, since the end of the Cold War,
providing support to conventional operations has been a core mission
enhanced by developments in stealth; precision; intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance; and joint connectivity. Our nuclear
capable bombers, with enhanced conventional capabilities and training,
have excelled in Operations Southern Watch, Allied Force, Enduring
Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and Odyssey Dawn.
To help our commanders strike this balance, we executed a year-long
review of our Designed Operational Capability statements for every unit
in the command. We ensured that the units' missions, resources, and
readiness metrics are clearly linked to the combat power or the combat
support required by the joint warfighter.
Today, our B-52s and B-2s rotate to Guam to provide continuous
long-range strike presence and proven combat capability to the
commander of U.S. Pacific Command. Furthermore, our recent B-2 missions
into Libya show how quickly a crisis can develop, and how long-range
bombers can rapidly bring flexible combat power to a joint commander.
As a command, we must continue to evolve long-range strike as a core
competency to ensure no adversary has complete freedom of action.
preparing for the future challenges
Finally, we must sustain and enhance our current force while
preparing to meet the challenges of the future. Sustaining our aging
platforms and meeting current commitments competes for the resources we
need to modernize our forces in advance of future threats.
Secretary Gates has directed a thorough and vigorous scrub of
military bureaucratic structures, business practices, modernization
programs, civilian and military personnel levels, and associated
overhead costs. At Air Force Global Strike Command we recognize our
responsibility to be efficient and effective stewards of resources. To
achieve both efficiency and effectiveness requires a commitment to
creating a climate where productivity improvements--faster, better,
cheaper--thrive. As Secretary of Defense Gates has said, ``We have not
seen the productivity growth in the defense economy that we have seen
and expect from the rest of the economy.''
This is an opportunity to achieve not just efficiency targets for
the next few budget cycles, but to institutionalize the processes,
education, and mindset to encourage, reward, and implement operational
innovation. Our goal is to instill a culture that consistently
encourages innovation and to foster airmen for whom productivity
improvements are second nature. We will ensure they have a command
structure that allows their ideas to be raised, vetted, and
implemented. We must be more productive in ways we have not been in the
past while remaining focused on the daily execution of our missions.
summary of challenges, special trust, and responsibility
In conclusion, we have made great strides in the last year, and
Americans can be proud of what the Airmen assigned to Air Force Global
Strike Command accomplished since we last testified before your
committee in 2010. We must now consolidate those gains and continue to
forge a culture that recognizes the special trust and responsibilities
of the most powerful weapons in our Nation's arsenal; we must do this
while aggressively supporting the current fight; and we must sustain
and enhance our force while preparing for future challenges.
The existence of Air Force Global Strike command reflects the
commitment of the Air Force to ensure the United States maintains a
safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, and the importance of
the global strike mission.
Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, General.
General Chambers.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM A. CHAMBERS, USAF, ASSISTANT
CHIEF OF STAFF FOR STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR
INTEGRATION, U.S. AIR FORCE
General Chambers. Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss your Air Force's
strategic deterrent forces. Your Air Force nuclear enterprise
consists of 450 ICBMs, 96 bombers, squadrons of F-16C and F-15E
dual-capable fighters, and the thousands of dual-capable airmen
who operate and sustain them. These weapons systems and
dedicated airmen maintain the credibility of a strategic
deterrent that requires a long-term visible commitment.
Continuing to strengthen our nuclear enterprise remains the
number one Air Force priority. Our Secretary and Chief of Staff
have ingrained the Air Force's commitment to and are sustaining
the focus on the nuclear enterprise. My written statement lays
out their specific strategic guidance and I respectfully
request that statement be entered into the record. Today I
simply highlight the following areas: human capital,
modernizing and recapitalizing, the NPR and New START.
When the Air Force established reinvigoration of the
nuclear enterprise as our top priority, we included our most
precious resource, our airmen, as an integral part of that
effort. In response, the nuclear and personnel communities
jointly created an analytical process resulting in a
comprehensive nuclear enterprise human capital effort which
lays out the active management steps required to deliberately
develop airmen and their nuclear expertise.
From investing in our people to investing in our systems,
every weapons system in the Air Force's nuclear enterprise is
undergoing some form of modernizing or recapitalizing.
Successful deterrence over the next 2 decades requires
sustaining and modernizing our force structure in a consistent,
year-by-year deliberate manner.
During the next 7 years, implementation of the NPR and New
START will bring a reduction in the role and numbers of nuclear
weapons in our national security strategy. Our final force
structure will meet the combatant commander's requirements and
maintain overall effectiveness of the deterrent force.
The President's fiscal year 2012 budget request reflects
the positive steps we are taking to improve this Air Force core
function. Across the FYDP, Air Force investment in nuclear
deterrence operations totals $28 billion. The Air Force is
committed to ensuring this investment results in systems and
capabilities that best operationalize strategic deterrence for
our Nation.
The national military strategy acknowledges our Nation's
security and its prosperity are inseparable and preventing wars
is as important as winning them and far less costly. In this
time of constrained resources, the efficacy of nuclear
deterrence operations is evident in the fact that for
approximately 3 percent of the Air Force total obligation
authority your Air Force continues to deliver the bedrock of
global strategic stability, providing the ICBM and bomber legs
of the triad, as well as dual-capable fighter capability 24
hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year.
Thank you for this subcommittee's continued support of
America's Air Force and particularly its support to our airmen
and the strategic deterrence they provide.
[The prepared statements of General Chambers, General
Scott, and General Harencak follows:]
Prepared Statement by Maj. Gen. William A. Chambers, USAF
introduction
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, distinguished members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss your Air
Force's strategic deterrent forces.
In pursuit of the President's vision as outlined in the Nuclear
Posture Review to ``reduce U.S. nuclear weapons and their role in U.S.
national security strategy,'' the Air Force takes to heart its
responsibility to uphold the entirety of his vision and pledge, `` . .
. [that] as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will
maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal, both to deter potential
adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that
they can count on America's security commitments.'' We employ that
arsenal to produce strategic deterrence that remains vital at a time
when our National Military Strategy notes, `` . . . ongoing shifts in
relative power and increasing interconnectedness in the international
order indicate a strategic inflection point.'' Maintaining credibility
of our strategic deterrent requires a long-term, visible commitment to
our nuclear capabilities.
continue to strengthen--the air force's #1 priority
Continuing to strengthen our nuclear enterprise remains the number
one Air Force priority. A year ago, testimony before this committee
recounted Air Force efforts to reinvigorate our nuclear enterprise.
That focus significantly advanced our structure, processes, and
culture. Our focus now is on making sure those advances endure.
Since last year's testimony, Air Force Global Strike Command
(AFGSC), as the first major command stood up in 27 years, is the most
visible structural change taken to ensure focused operational oversight
and proper support to U.S. Strategic Command. AFGSC now has full
operational command of our Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
and nuclear-capable bomber forces and is continually focused on the
airmen and their weapon systems that produce strategic deterrence every
day. Additionally, the Air Force designated Nuclear Deterrence
Operations as 1 of 12 Service Core Functions to ensure alignment of
policy and resources. These are just two of the many changes to
structure, process and culture that reflect a concerted effort to
institutionalize our reinvigoration initiatives and maintain safe,
secure, and effective nuclear capabilities.
The Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force
articulated strategic guidance to ingrain the Air Forces' commitment to
sustained focus on the nuclear enterprise.
Strengthen Positive Inventory Control of Nuclear
Weapons Related Materiel
Refine Inspection Processes
Fulfill Human Capital Plan to Ensure Appropriate
Expertise at All Levels
Modernize and Recapitalize Nuclear Deterrent
Capability
Implement New START
Craft a Comprehensive Deterrence and Crisis Stability
Vision that Builds on the Nuclear Posture Review
The initiatives in the President's budget request will build on
successes achieved since 2008 and enable the Air Force to Continue to
Strengthen along these Strategic Steps to maintain safe, secure, and
effective nuclear capabilities.
strengthen positive inventory control of nuclear weapons related
materiel
Efforts continue to tighten, assess, and automate accountability
for Nuclear Weapons Related Materiel through a completely revamped
Positive Inventory Control process. To improve accountability,
sustainment activities such as these have been consolidated under a
vastly revitalized Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center. The Air Force now
has improved visibility of our worldwide inventories and accountability
continues to improve.
refine inspection processes
We have seen positive results from the current inspection regime
across the board. We have reinforced our long-held nuclear standards
and we will continue to examine the size and scope of the inspections
required to ``sustain'' excellence, focusing on effectiveness. We will
continue critical self-inspection, Nuclear Surety Staff Assistance
Visits, and Nuclear Surety Inspections. The goal is to bolster resolute
attitudes of exacting compliance and strict adherence to prescribed
standards with continual self-assessment. We now perform Root Cause
Analysis on all major write-ups, track them and brief progress of
corrective actions to Air Force leadership. Senior Air Force leaders
continue to review inspection results and other key indicators on a
frequent and recurring basis.
fulfill human capital plan to ensure appropriate expertise at all
levels
When the Air Force established reinvigoration of the Nuclear
Enterprise as our top priority, we included our most precious resource
. . . our airmen . . . as an integral part of the effort.
In response, the nuclear and personnel communities jointly created
an analytical process resulting in a comprehensive Nuclear Enterprise
Human Capital Execution Plan. This action plan focuses on synchronizing
the Air Force's Continue to Strengthen objectives that relate to
development of airmen and their nuclear expertise.
As a result of collaborative efforts across all nuclear
specialties, we have instituted changes to improve the long-term
professional fitness of our people. Over the past year, we have
scrutinized our small, critical nuclear career fields, and recognized
that in this era of small total force numbers and dual capability
requirements, we must take innovative steps to optimally manage, grow,
and retain this specialized expertise. As a result, several initiatives
are now underway that will improve operational effectiveness in these
critical areas. In addition, the Air Force is testing a new Enlisted
Developmental Team process starting with the nuclear enterprise, to
ensure deliberate development of our senior noncommissioned officers to
create a sustainable leadership bench. We have also moved out
aggressively to retain nuclear talent, ramping up programs to target
expertise and critical skills through retention incentives.
Recently, my organization was designated the Functional Authority
for the Human Capital performing the Nuclear Deterrent Operations. As
such, we are responsible for injecting strategic perspective in the
array of nuclear-related human capital programs. This broadens the
perspective of the human capital policy arm to the needs of the nuclear
enterprise career fields, brings attention to some unintended
consequences of broader policies, and allows for refinements in
leveraging our skilled dual-capable nuclear airmen.
These changes allow us to deliberately develop and manage our
nuclear-capable personnel. Air Force senior leaders have energized
these efforts through advocacy, continuous, focused attention and
regular review of nuclear initiatives.
modernize and recapitalize nuclear deterrent capability
From investing in our people to investing in our systems, every
weapon system in the nuclear enterprise is undergoing some form of
modernization or recapitalization. Successful deterrence requires
sustaining and modernizing our force structure in a consistent and
deliberate manner. This is a vital contribution to the long-term
credibility of our deterrent.
Air Force funding efforts maintain ongoing investment for the
Minuteman III and support equipment programs to extend life expectancy
through 2030, as directed by the 2010 National Defense Authorization
Act. Ensuring consistent, adequate sustainment of MM III requires an
investment strategy addressing cryptographic upgrades, ICBM fuze
refurbishment, and modernizing data transfer technology. Additionally,
the Air Force and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
plan to start a life extension program for the W78.
Although a decision on a follow-on ICBM is not needed for several
years, the Nuclear Posture Review recognized the need for studies to
inform a decision on Ground-Based Strategic Deterrence beyond 2030. In
January 2011, AFGSC initiated study efforts appropriate to the early
stages of the ICBM follow-on. Once these are complete, the study will
move into a Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA) phase, which will include
an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). We plan to complete the MSA phase in
fiscal year 2014.
Air Force modernization plans for our current B-52s and B-2 bomber
fleet continue an effort to maintain a viable force. The B-2 is the
only aircraft capable of long-range delivery of direct attack munitions
in an anti-access environment. To ensure the B-2 can continue to
operate in high threat environments, we have programs to modernize
communication, offensive, and defensive systems. For the B-52, we have
programs to modernize and sustain the communication, radar, and weapon
delivery systems.
Beyond modernization of existing platforms, we recognize the
changing threat environment of the future requires improved
capabilities. To meet that need, the Air Force is programming for a
long range, nuclear capable, penetrating bomber. This program will
leverage mature technologies and follow streamlined acquisition
processes and focus on affordability with unit cost targets informing
design trades and ensuring sufficient inventory. The program will begin
in fiscal year 2012 delivering an initial capability in the mid-2020s
with a planned production of 80-100 bombers.
The Air Force will sustain the current Air Launched Cruise Missile
(ALCM) until a follow-on advanced penetrating long-range stand off
(LRSO) missile capability is fielded. We have multiple service life
extension programs to ensure viability of the propulsion systems,
guidance and flight control systems, and warhead arming components.
Preparation activity began in November 2010. The AoA final report is
due in May 2012. The Air Force has programmed for research,
development, test and evaluation over the next 5 years for the
development of LRSO.
The Air Force continues to program for a nuclear-capable F-35 to
modernize the Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA) fleet. The investment over
the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP) for F-35 DCA ensures effective
transition of this capability from our legacy fleet.
The B61 Life Extension Program continues to be a top priority. The
Air Force is committed, with the NNSA, to improve the safety and
security of the B61 and ensure the Tail Kit Assembly acquisition
schedule remains on track for a fiscal year 2017 First Production Unit
delivery. The B61 will remain compatible with current nuclear capable
platforms to maintain effectiveness against projected target sets for
years to come. This will also ensure the United States retains the
capability to forward-deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons in support
of Alliance commitments.
The Air Force started the Common Vertical Lift Support Platform
(CVLSP) program to address capability gap shortfalls in helicopter
nuclear security support, and Continuity of Government/Continuity of
Operations missions. The CVLSP program seeks to replace existing UH-1N
fleet with an off-the-shelf, nondevelopmental aircraft. We are
currently evaluating acquisition strategies to best meet warfighter
requirements with a goal of an fiscal year 2015 Initial Operational
Capability.
There are many other initiatives required to maintain a safe,
secure, and effective arsenal. The Air Force will spend approximately
$1 billion over the FYDP in critical areas, such as Transporter Erector
Hoists, Weapons Load Trailers, Electronic Systems Test Sets, Weapons
Storage and Security System (WS3), and Reentry System Test Set cables.
The Air Force also continues its commitment to maintaining its history
of safe and secure resource transportation. To this end, AFGSC is
actively programming to rapidly replace the current Payload-Transporter
vehicle with a model with improved safety and security features.
implement the nuclear posture review & new strategic arms reduction
treaty
During the next 7 years, implementation of the 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR) and New START Treaty (NST) will bring a reduction in the
role and numbers of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.
Under the NPR, the Air Force will remove multiple warheads from its
ICBMs. Under NST, which entered into force on February 5, 2011, the
United States and Russia will reduce the number of accountable
strategic warheads from the current Moscow Treaty warhead limit of
2,200 to 1,550. Within the treaty's central limits on Strategic
Delivery Vehicles, the Air Force will reduce the numbers of deployed
ICBMs and convert some nuclear-capable B-52s to conventional-only
capability. Final force structure will be based on meeting the
combatant commander's requirements and maintaining overall
effectiveness of the deterrent force. We are currently developing
options to reach the force levels specified in the treaty and have
initiated the appropriate planning, programming, logistics, engineering
and environmental studies to support these decisions, inform Congress,
and meet treaty obligations.
For its part, the Air Force began formal data exchanges with Russia
in March. Inspections and exhibitions of bombers and missiles will
start this month. The Air Force will also begin actions necessary to
reduce deployed bombers and missiles, convert some nuclear-capable B-52
bombers to conventional-only capability, and eliminate other assets
such as, Peacekeeper silos, 564th Missile Squadron silos, and B-52s to
comply with central treaty limits. These actions must be completed by
February 2018.
Global Strike Command will lead the Air Force portion of this
effort. Lieutenant General Kowalski and his team of dedicated
professionals are finalizing implementation and compliance plans to
ensure the safety and security of our nuclear force as we draw down to
NST mandated levels, all the while preserving the ability to deter
adversaries, and assure allies and partners.
In preparing for the new verification regime, the Air Force is also
working closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and U.S.
Strategic Command.
craft a comprehensive deterrence and crisis stability vision that
builds on the nuclear posture review
As we think about providing deterrence in the 21st century, it's
important to remember that not only is the Cold War over, the post-Cold
War is over. Airmen who started active duty service after the fall of
the Soviet Union are now retirement eligible. A generation has passed.
That does not mean that strategic deterrence and nuclear forces are
anachronisms. What it does mean is that we need to hit fast-forward on
how we think about Nuclear Deterrence Operations in the complex
security environment of today and tomorrow. The 2010 Joint Operational
Environment declared: ``For the past 20 years, Americans have largely
ignored issues of deterrence and nuclear warfare. We no longer have
that luxury.'' Successful strategic deterrence in the 21st century
requires stability-based analysis that goes beyond traditional numbers-
based assessments to determine optimal deterrence force structure and
posture. The Air Force is revitalizing deterrence thinking to meet the
challenges of our complex ``multi-nodal'' security environment.
conclusion
Our ability to enable other nations to achieve their security
goals, serve as a convener to cooperatively address common security
challenges, or lastly, act as a security guarantor, preferably with
partners and allies, but alone if necessary, rests on a foundation of
U.S. nuclear capabilities and the strategic deterrence they provide.
Your Air Force is continuing to strengthen our strategic deterrent
force. This will be a long-term, systematic effort to refine and
solidify earlier ``reinvigoration'' initiatives and to codify
institutional changes ensuring safe, secure, and effective nuclear
capabilities for the Nation.
The President's budget request reflects the positive steps we are
taking to improve this Air Force core function. Across the FYDP, Air
Force investment in Nuclear Deterrence Operations totals $28 billion.
The Air Force is committed to ensuring this investment results in
systems and capabilities that best operationalize strategic deterrence
for our Nation in the multi-nodal security environment we face.
The National Military Strategy acknowledges, ``Our Nation's
security and prosperity are inseparable'' and ``Preventing wars is as
important as winning them, and far less costly.'' In this time of
limited resources, the efficiency of Nuclear Deterrence Operations is
evident in the fact that for approximately 3 percent of the Air Force
Total Obligation Authority, your Air Force continues to deliver the
bedrock of global strategic stability providing the ICBM and Bomber
legs of the Triad as well as dual-capable fighter capability 24 hours a
day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year.
Thank you for the committee's continued support of America's Air
Force and particularly to its airmen and their contributions to
strategic deterrence.
______
Prepared Statement by Maj. Gen. David J. Scott, USAF
Today, the Air Force flies, fights, and wins in air, space, and
cyberspace--globally and reliably--as a valued member of our Joint and
coalition teams. Last year the Air Force conducted more than 45,000
sorties supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn and almost 101,000
sorties supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. Just recently, the Air
Foprce led the way in executing and supporting Operation Odyssey Dawn
in Libya, flying hundreds of sorties to date. As we continue to
accomplish our current mission sets and plan for future threats, we
must remain mindful of the increasing age and costs of operating our
aging air fleet which is 33.7 years old, on average. Our Air Force
leadership is scrutinizing programs and budgets to find acceptable
solutions to meet growing demands that are competing for limited funds.
Our fleet of 156 bombers remains engaged in today's fight while
retaining an ability to meet future challenges. Air Force bombers have
maintained a continuous presence in Southwest Asia since shortly after
September 11. Bombers have also provided the U.S. Pacific Commander
with a continuous presence throughout the area of responsibility (AOR)
since 2004. The Air Force continues its commitment to future long-range
strike capabilities as part of a comprehensive, phased plan, valued at
$5.5 billion over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), to modernize
and sustain our bomber force.
b-1
The B-1 currently provides long-range persistent airpower in direct
support of NATO/ISAF, U.S. and Afghan troops in three major operations.
The B-1 also provides real-time intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance with full-motion video, enhanced situational awareness
and a demonstrable overwatch presence. The Air Force added the SNIPER
Advanced Targeting Pod capability to B-1 aircraft in summer 2009 to
provide aircrews with positive identification capability and the
ability to share video with ground forces. The B-1 has proven to be the
workhorse of current combat operations, flying the majority of the
bomber combat sorties in the Central Command AOR. Most recently, two B-
1s launched from Ellsworth AFB, and dropped munitions in Libya in
support of Operation Odyssey Dawn. With less than 2 days from first
notice to takeoff, Ellsworth airmen prepared several aircraft and
hundreds of weapons to provide the combat configuration needed halfway
across the globe. This is the the first time the B-1 fleet has launched
combat sorties from the continental United States to strike targets
overseas. The B-1 is beginning to show its age and requires multiple
upgrades to maintain critical combat capability. B-1 modernization and
sustainment programs include the Integated Battle Station program,
combining Fully Integrated Data Link (FIDL), Vertical Situational
Display Upgrade (VSDU), and Central Integrated Test System (CITS)
programs under one installation contract. Four B-1 upgrades are
required to prevent grounding of the B-1 fleet. The four grounding
modifications are: VSDU, CITS, Radar Maintainability and Improvement
Program (RMIP), and the Inertial Navigation System (INS).
B-1 upgrades are a must, but funding has proved challenging. The
Air Force has decided that force structure adjustments can provide the
necessary cost savings that will allow us to keep the B-1 fleet viable.
As such the Air Force is retiring 6, from an overall force of 66, B-1s
to fund the 4 grounding modifications plus Fully Integrated Data Link
through the remainder of the B-1 fleet. This is strictly a programming
action, taking acceptable (moderate) risk to the overall bomber
capability requirement. This retirement will not impact current
operations because real-world taskings will always take priority over
home-station training missions.
B-1 aircraft availability rates remained relatively level for
fiscal year 2002-2007 with a drop in fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year
2009 primarily driven by modernization efforts. To mitigate manpower
shortages and reduced maintenance experience levels, B-1 bases have
been augmented by contract field teams which will continue through
April 2011. Manning authorizations have been approved but B-1 aircraft
availability will be affected into the distant future while personnel
are trained and gain experience. The Air Force places great emphasis on
sustaining and maintaining the B-1 fleet, ensuring that this key
capability and keeping it available to support our warfighters.
b-2
The B-2 has participated in every combat action, including Odyssey
Dawn, since Operation Allied Force and is pivotal to U.S. Strategic
Command's plans as well as to U.S. Pacific Command's (PACOM) Continuous
Bomber Presence to assure allies and support U.S. interests in the
Pacific. The B-2 Spirit provides a lethal combination of range,
payload, and stealth. It remains the world's sole long-range, low
observable dual-role bomber. It is the only platform capable of
delivering 80 independently targeted 500-lb Joint Direct Attack
Munitions (GBU-38). It is the only platform capable of carrying the
developing Massive Ordnance Penetrator; a weapon crucial to our
capabilities against hardened, deeply buried targets. While B-2
availability has steadily increased over the past 5 years, in part due
to enhancements in low observable maintenance such as the highly
successful Alternate High Frequency Material program, it faces
increasing need for upgrades to avionics originally designed over 20
years ago.
The Extremely High Frequency Satellite Communications and Computer
Upgrade Program (EHF SATCOM and Computer Upgrade) has three increments.
Increment 1 upgrades the B-2`s flight management computers and main
data bus as an enabler for future avionics efforts. Increment 2
integrates the Family of Beyond-line-of-sight Terminals (FAB-T) along
with a low observable antenna to provide secure, survivable strategic
communication, and Increment 3 connects the B-2 into the Global
Information Grid. Increment 1 of EHF SATCOM and Computer Upgrade is
beginning procurement this year for fleet installations beginning at
the end of fiscal year 2013.
We will finish replacing the B-2's original radar antenna, upgrade
selected radar avionics and change the radar operating frequency as
part of the Radar Modernization Program (RMP). Thanks in large part to
Congressional support, the RMP acquisition strategy was modified to
include life-of-type component buys to avoid diminishing manufacturing
source issues during the production run.
The Department is also investing in B-2 Defensive Management System
(DMS) modernization to ensure continued survivability. This will allow
the B-2 to continue operations in more advanced threat environments
while decreasing the maintenance required to operate the system. The
DMS faces obsolescence in light of threat system advances and
diminishing manufacturing sources for critical components. $41 million
is being invested in fiscal year 2012 with $560 million across the FYDP
to maintain B-2 penetration capability. We just completed an Analysis
of Alternatives and are preparing to move towards the technology
development phase.
b-52
The B-52 Stratofortress is our Nation's oldest frontline long-range
strategic bomber with the last airframe entering service in 1962. It
amplifies the consistent message of long-range U.S. airpower in a
theater like PACOM where distances drive decisions. Equipped with an
advanced targeting pod, the B-52 can also provide real-time
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance with full-motion video,
enhanced situational awareness, a demonstrable overwatch presence and
precision joint fires in support of PACOM`s objectives. The Air Force
has invested in modernization programs to keep the B-52 platform viable
and operationally relevant. Major B-52 modernizations include the
Combat Network Communications Technology (CONECT), EHF SATCOM,
Strategic Radar Replacement (SR2), and the 1760 Internal Weapons Bay
Upgrade programs. CONECT provides an integrated communication and
mission management system with machine to machine data link interfaces
for weapons delivery. The digital infrastructure provided in CONECT is
the backbone for EHF SATCOM. The EHF SATCOM program integrates the FAB-
T providing assured, survivable two-way strategic command and control
communications. The SR2 program, starting in fiscal year 2010,
integrates a modern nondevelopmental radar to address systemic
sustainment issues, replacing the legacy APN-166 radar. Finally, the
1760 Internal Weapons Bay Upgrade provides internal J-series weapons
capability through modification of Common Strategic Rotary Launcher and
an upgrade of stores management and offensive avionics software.
Updated with modern technology the B-52 will be capable of delivering
the full complement of jointly developed weapons and will continue into
the 21st century as an important element of our Nation`s defenses.
long range strike (lrs)
Our existing bomber force has performed exceptionally well and has
provided our Nation an unmatched global strike capability. However,
these systems will eventually reach the end of their service lives. Our
bomber fleet also faces challenges in the face of advancing threat
capabilities and emerging Anti Access/Area Denied (A2/AD) environments.
The Air Force must look ahead to the next generation of long range
strike capability in order to provide future presidents the ability to
hold any target at risk, anywhere on the globe.
On January 6, 2011 the Secretary of Defense announced that the Air
Force would initiate a new bomber program as the cornerstone of the
future of our Long Range Strike portfolio for the United States Air
Force. Our intent is to field a new long-range penetrating bomber to
join the joint portfolio of deep-strike capabilities. He directed this
new penetrating bomber would be nuclear capable, and envisioned to
accommodate both unmanned and manned operations. The SecDef also
directed the Air Force to procure 80-100 of these new highly survivable
bombers, which should begin delivery in the mid-2020s. The fiscal year
2012 President's budget provides funding for the long range penetrating
bomber program, following an extensive 18 month, OSD-led review of long
range strike requirements. By leveraging proven technologies and
streamlining program management during development, the Air Force will
ensure the new bomber can be delivered before our current fleet goes
out of service. Though details of the program, including specific
system performance attributes such as range, payload and speed are
classified, the total annual budget will be executed by regular
appropriation of funds, with the Air Force making capability tradeoffs
as necessary to hold procurement costs down to ensure affordability for
the full purchase of the program of record. The President's budget
requests $197 million in fiscal year 2012 and $3.7 billion over the
FYDP for the new penetrating bomber.
In the mid-term (2017-2030), we plan to field the new penetrating
bomber while continuing to develop its capability as the threat and the
technology mature. Long-term (2031-2050) plans aim to complete fielding
of the fleet while continuing to evolve the weapon system as the threat
environment and technology mature. The Air Force LRS strategy provides
present and future leaders continued and affordable global strike
options within emerging anti-access area denial environments.
closing
The Air Force stands ready to win today's joint fight and plan for
tomorrow's challenges. We are committed to working together to
determine the right procurement, sustainment and retirement strategy to
remain prepared for the current fight as well as posturing for future
demands. Dominance of air, space, and cyberspace continues to be
requisite to the defense of the United States. We appreciate your
continued support and look forward to working in concert to ensure our
decisions enable us to strengthen our Air Force to meet future
requirements.
______
Prepared Statement by Brig. Gen. Garrett Harencak, USAF
Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, and distinguished members of the
Strategic Forces Subcommittee thank you for this opportunity to discuss
our continuing improvements to the Air Force's nuclear sustainment
efforts. As a result of the dedication of our talented team of military
personnel, civilians and industry professionals, I can attest that the
Air Force nuclear enterprise is considerably stronger today than at any
point prior to the Nuclear Weapon Center's establishment in 2006. The
vitality that we see today represents a reversal in a decades-long de-
emphasis of America's strategic forces that was first documented in
studies ranging back to 1998. In the years that followed, a series of
reports called for a single manager for nuclear weapons sustainment, a
consolidation of management sustainment activity and a unified funding
strategy. In response to these reports, Air Force Materiel Command
(AFMC) developed a two-phase strategy to establish a new center
responsible for nuclear sustainment activities. The first phase was
completed in March 2006 when the Nuclear Weapons Center was activated.
AFMC and the Center then began the lengthy task of pulling together the
fragmented pieces of the Air Force nuclear enterprise. Phase II was
accomplished in April and May 2008 with the assignment of the first
flag-level officer as Center commander and the assignment of the
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Systems Program Office to the
Center. Phase III began in February 2009 with the signing of Program
Action Directive (PAD) 08-05 which directed further integration of the
enterprise.
I am pleased to tell you that on January 20, 2011, General Hoffman,
the AFMC Commander declared that the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center
had achieved Full Operational Capability (FOC). This is a measure of
General Hoffman's confidence that AFNWC has successfully created and
codified staff best practices and standards, that we are sufficiently
capable of advocating for the resources necessary to execute our plans,
that our staff is sufficiently manned and capable and that we have put
in places processes and procedures that are measurable, repeatable and
auditable, all contributing to our primary mission: support for the
warfighter.
Most assuredly, this does not represent any sort of watershed
moment in the strengthening of the nuclear enterprise . . . the pursuit
of the nuclear zero defect culture requires continuous improvement and
oversight and we still have a long way to go to get to where we want to
be. The declaration of FOC does, rather, show how far we have come in
applying common-sense leadership and organizational principles to a
difficult problem. There can be no letting up, however, on tracking
down and eliminating remaining problems that confront the enterprise.
We will continue to perform self-assessments, independent inspections
and progress reviews to ensure that focus is maintained on critical
factors that define the health of our strategic deterrent. The Nation
will not tolerate any less of the stewards of the Air Force's most
potent weapons.
In addition to the completion of Phase III of AFNWC's standup and
declaration of FOC, AFMC and the Air Force as a whole have made
significant strides in reorganization that have reinvigorated and
strengthened the nuclear sustainment enterprise. The Air Force vested
the AFMC Commander as the single four-star officer responsible for
nuclear sustainment. It is important to note that since the
inactivation of Strategic Air Command in 1992, no single four-star
officer had been charged with understanding and articulating the needs
of the Air Force with regard to nuclear sustainment below the Chief of
Staff. In contrast, today the Air Force has a one-star officer
overseeing the day-to-day sustainment issues of the enterprise, while a
four-star officer keeps the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of
Staff, and the Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command informed
and engaged in issues involving the sustainment of nuclear weapons and
the health of the various delivery vehicles and pieces of support
equipment which comprise the Air Force strategic deterrent. A series of
recurring reviews, culminating in the Nuclear Oversight Board, chaired
by the Secretary and Chief of Staff and comprising all Major Command
(MAJCOM) commanders ensure high-level oversight of trends, developments
and attention to emergent issues. Additionally, AFMC created a new
directorate specifically focused on nuclear matters and tasked with
representing the Command to other MAJCOMs, the Air Staff and the Joint
warfighter.
As members of the subcommittee are well aware, a number of studies
were conducted in the wake of the 2007 and 2008 incidents that brought
the shortcomings of the Air Force nuclear enterprise into the public
eye. While the studies revealed a large number of discrete process
failings, organizational issues, and leadership problems, in the macro
sense, they all bore out the same root cause: that the focus on
standards had atrophied over the years and that this root cause ended
up manifesting itself in three serious ``seams'' that had to be
addressed immediately. These seams are: (1) a lack of nuclear
expertise; (2) a lack of nuclear focus; and (3) a lack of authority.
These seams ``opened'' under the weight of competing priorities and the
stress of continuous combat operations since 1991. AFNWC has been
working with its numerous mission partners to close these seams by
making thoughtful and deliberate changes to the way in which things get
done in the nuclear enterprise.
There are three overarching ways in which we as a center are
working these problems. The first is by enabling collaborative
partnerships. We realized from the very beginning that, given the large
number of players in the nuclear arena, we simply cannot have a
stovepiped view of the enterprise. From other Air Force agencies, such
as the Air Staff's nuclear directorate, AFMC's nuclear directorate, Air
Force Global Strike Command, other centers and commands, and the joint
warfighter, to other government organizations such as the National
Nuclear Security Administration and beyond to colleges, universities,
and national laboratories, AFNWC has been working hard cultivating
contacts and associates. By doing this, we're ensuring that we can meet
requirements more rapidly, find answers and recruit the right people to
get the job done for the warfighter and the Nation. One of our most
vital collaborations is with the newly created office of the Program
Executive Officer (PEO) for Strategic Systems. The PEO position was
created in response to specific recommendations made by the Schlesinger
Report, and has assumed responsibility for the development and
acquisition of future systems and for modernization efforts while AFNWC
focuses on day-to-day operations and sustainment. The PEO, Brigadier
General John Thompson, who reports to the Air Force Service Acquisition
Executive, Mr. David Van Buren, is colocated with AFNWC at Kirtland Air
Force Base, NM.
The second way we're sealing the seams is by improving our ability
to spot problems and come up with solutions before they become crises.
As our nuclear stockpile ages, it is becoming apparent that any number
of serious problems may be waiting around the corner. By using sound
engineering principles, we are becoming increasingly able to spot
trends with weapons, delivery systems and their associated support
equipment and determine practical, effective and timely solutions
before the problem reaches a critical stage, at which point they become
difficult and expensive to address. Like other complex systems, our
nuclear arsenal is dependent upon a vast number of components and
processes, the failure of any one of which can be very serious for a
given weapon system. Many of these components have not been updated in
decades and, while expertly maintained, are not immune to
deterioration. As former U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Commander,
General Kevin Chilton stated in 2008, nuclear weapons, even when
sitting on the shelf, are chemistry experiments. They are constantly
changing from chemical reactions inside of them. This extends as well
to other equipment as well, some of which is affected by wear and tear
on top of everything else. Metal fatigue, corrosion and chemical
changes all take their toll. If a weapon, delivery system or a piece of
support equipment only had to last to the end of its 10-year design
life before replacement, like much of our equipment was intended to
have, it wouldn't be as crucial that all these very long term issues be
taken into account. However, if we extend this to the 30, 40, or 50
year lives we now expect from our current weapons, it becomes vitally
important that we understand the relationship between the various
components and use sound engineering practices to determine the correct
course of action to maintain reliability and availability for the
warfighter.
The third way we're closing the seams is by deliberately
maintaining a forward-looking view, both in order to be proactive to
possible problems on the horizon and to ensure that nuclear sustainment
equities are thoroughly considered in the planning and development of
future systems. AFNWC is heavily involved in the Long-Range Standoff
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) process and is helping lay the
groundwork for the forthcoming Ground Based Strategic Deterrence AoA.
We are also working with the PEO for Strategic Systems on acquisition
and modernization programs for the various systems which make up our
strategic deterrence force. We are looking to the future in other ways
as well, reaching out to universities and national laboratories to
recruit new talent, helping to rebuild the nuclear expertise that has
been lost in the years of atrophy. Finally, AFNWC is involved in
ensuring that adequate qualified military personnel are available to
perform the difficult task of maintaining the arsenal and that they
have available the necessary equipment and tools to do their job.
I am a strong advocate of keeping a big picture, strategic view.
With so many discrete tasks requiring attention, this is sometimes
difficult. However, it is vital that our perspective be kept broad and
that we always question what effect changes will have on the health of
the force. As we have found in the past, there are often second- and
third-order effects that can result from decisions we make now.
Decisions such as how reductions for the New START treaty are executed,
for instance, will have long-term repercussions, for good or ill that
will continue for decades. We are committed to providing thoughtful
solutions and advice based on sound engineering and logistical
principles and always moving no faster what we have termed ``the speed
of nuclear surety.''
AFNWC's most important mission is to provide direct support for the
warfighter, in this case, STRATCOM. To that end, as part of Phase III
of AFNWC's stand-up, we assumed command of the Air Force's remaining
five CONUS Weapons Storage Areas (WSAs)--which had previously been
split between three commands--AFMC, AFSPC, and Air Combat Command
(ACC). This was done with the goal of standardizing publications,
procedures and leadership in mind. In addition to this, we created a
Directorate of Nuclear Surety within AFNWC to work with the WSAs as a
coherent and integral weapon system. This Directorate recently
published a detailed study of the Air Force WSAs, further pointing out
their need for standardization across civil engineering,
communications, security and safety disciplines. The Nuclear Surety
Directorate has also brought together WSA stakeholders from across the
Air Force and Navy in recurring council sessions to deliberately work
through requirements and to better advocate for needed modernization
and upgrades.
In addition to WSAs at CONUS bases, the Air Force Nuclear Weapon
Center responsibilities include direct support to force providers in
Europe--the U.S. Air Forces, Europe (USAFE). We manage programs for
support equipment sustainment in the European Theater, including
weapons storage vaults and the weapons maintenance truck, both of which
are vital to the safety, security, and sustainment of the B61.
Additionally, we are working closely with the AFPEO for Strategic
Systems on life extension modifications to the B61 to ensure that it
continues to meet the requirements of USAFE and our NATO allies.
Furthermore, to ensure that the Air Force's ICBM force remains
robust and capable through 2030, as required in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, we are currently undertaking a
number of critical actions to sustain today's aging forces. First among
these is a two-pronged approach to providing sufficient Mk21 fuzes to
support the warfighter. We have instituted an aggressive screening
program to identify fuzes requiring few or no repairs. Those which pass
the screening are returned to the field for installation into the
Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle modified Minuteman III ICBMs. Those
failing the screening tests become candidates for refurbishment.
Initial attempts in 2008 to refurbish Mk21 fuzes were unsuccessful, in
large part due to their level of sophistication and complexity. Our
two-pronged approach to refurbishment has enlisted the assistance of
the original manufacturer, which has been successful in demonstrating
its ability to refurbish the fuze. Additionally, an organic production
line at Hill Air Force Base is in the process of performing its proof-
of-concept trials and will begin fielding refurbished fuzes in fiscal
year 2012. Along with the screening process, these two production
lines, operating simultaneously, will be able to provide enough
operational Mk21 fuzes to meet initial warfighter requirements in the
mid-term. We are also working closely with our mission partners at
Ogden Air Logistics Center which is currently completing their first
refurbishment cycle for the Mk12A fuze. This refurbishment effort is on
schedule and meeting production goals. AFNWC is also working with AFGSC
and the NNSA to ensure that they have our full support in the field of
testing. By bringing on board a dedicated Center Test Authority (CTA),
we are not only ensuring that there will be no surprises related to
ICBM test supportability, but we are also looking to the future to
ensure that testing requirements are included in AoAs and studies for
follow-on systems. The value of the CTA had been validated by recent
cooperative work between the ICBM Systems Division, AFGSC and the ICBM
Prime Contractor on emergent issues with the Minuteman III Command
Destruct system. Finally, we are working closely with the PEO/SS on
requirements and considerations for a joint fuze, which is envisioned
as a replacement for both the Navy Mk5 fuze and the Air Force Mk12A
fuze, with the goal of realizing benefits in standardization,
functionality and cost.
As I mentioned previously, possibly our greatest challenge is with
our most important asset--our people. From where we are right now, we
can see that we are far from healthy with regard to our pool of
available talent. Years of atrophy have reduced the overall number of
nuclear-experienced personnel available, and the recent reinvigoration
of the nuclear enterprise has made competition for the scarce talent
severe. Additionally, the available personnel are tending to be toward
the top and bottom of the demographics. We have a number of experienced
senior level personnel and the Air Force is doing a good job bringing
in inexperienced but enthusiastic junior people, but we currently lack
the strong mid-career professionals, both military and civilian, who
are the backbone of a successful organization. While time and
experience will resolve this problem eventually, the Air Force has
embarked on an aggressive program to identify its nuclear experienced
personnel and to ensure that they are tracked and placed appropriately
to make the best use of their experience. Furthermore, AFNWC has
created the Air Force Nuclear Fundamentals Course, which encompasses
nuclear weapons fundamentals, force structure, nuclear stockpile
guidance and planning, nuclear surety and the nuclear enterprise. We
are also working with the Air Staff and Air Force Personnel Center to
rebuild a strong, well-managed nuclear science and engineering
workforce. We're trying to ensure that our people receive everything
they need in order to thrive in the difficult nuclear environment,
including a solid organization with strong, repeatable processes,
training, education and meaningful experience as well as the necessary
support equipment and processes to do the job.
In closing, I would like to emphasize the hard work and dedication
of AFNWC's professionals and their efforts to address the most pressing
concerns in the nuclear enterprise. The American public rightly holds
its nuclear stewards to the very highest standards, and we will not let
them down. I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity to
address these issues and look forward to your questions.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, General. Thank you all. We'll
commence a 6-minute round of questions.
General Kowalski and General Scott, the B-1 and B-2 bombers
each flew in Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya. What is your
assessment of the mission success of each of these bombers and
did either have any equipment or other problems?
General Kowalski. Chairman Nelson, the bombers and their
weapons performed exactly as we expected them to. The crew
members' performance was superb, and the command and control of
the operation also was executed very well from organizations
within the U.S.
Senator Nelson. General Scott, anything to add?
General Scott. Sir, I would just add that if you looked at
the B-1, for the first time in history they flew from the
States to a target in another nation and then returned, not
back to the States, but to a point in space. So they flew a 24-
hour sortie. If you remember that particular day where they
were launching those aircraft 42 hours after they got notified,
it was in the snow and ice. Those were some pretty tough
conditions for our young men and women loading those aircraft
up and getting them airborne to do the mission that they did.
Sir, it was absolutely flawless.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Also, to the two of you, the last time the longevity of the
current fleet was reviewed, all the bombers would begin to
start retirement around 2035 to 2037. Can you tell us now, what
is the expected retirement date for the B-52, the B-1, and B-2
based on current expectations and current projections?
General Kowalski. All of those bombers, based on longevity
in terms of the aging and surveillance information that we get
on the airframes as they go through depot and other studies,
have them all going out past 2040. The limiting factor on the
B-2s is the rudder attachment point right now. The limiting
factor on the B-52s is the upper skin of the wing, and on the
B-1s it's the lower skin on the wing.
General Scott. That's absolutely right. In the B-1 fleet,
we have it from right now structurally out to 19,900 hours.
That takes it out to the '40s. If we also look at it, by 2018
we will be doing a fleet viability board and a structural test
on it to see where we need to go further with that aircraft.
Senator Nelson. Now, continuing with this, all of the
current bomber aircraft have modernization programs of varying
types to try to reach that 2040 point in time. Do we have a
comprehensive plan developed for each bomber aircraft that
would help us understand what it's going to take to sustain and
modernize each bomber so that we can be certain that each
platform remains capable through that period of time? Is there
an overall program for each one of the birds?
General Kowalski. Senator, for both the B-2 and the B-52
there are existing roadmaps. With the standup of Air Force
Global Strike Command, we have put into place a larger
strategic master plan to sort of guide our efforts from our
mission and vision all the way down to specific tasks to be
done during any current year. We're in the process right now of
integrating the roadmaps for the B-2 and the B-52 into that
strategic master plan so we can track it and work tasks on a
regular basis.
Senator Nelson. General Scott, several of the upgrade
programs are needed to prevent the bombers from being grounded.
For example, the B-1 had three programs that had to be in place
this year to prevent grounding. These three programs are the
central integrated test system, the vertical situation display,
and the radar modernization improvement program. Are all the
programs that I've just outlined on track to complete by the
end of the year to avoid having any grounding?
General Scott. Sir, they are on track. The end of the year
is not the timeline. The actual timelines are for these
specifically, are in 2012 and 2013. But the funding is in place
for the B-1 to do this. As we look at this, we look at it in
four different ways: the sustainability, lethality,
responsiveness, and the survivability. That's how we tie the
things that the Air Combat Command (ACC) is working on to
maintain this modernization of this fleet.
They are on track, but the timelines are in second quarter
of 2012 and 2013.
Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, the Global Strike Command
is now fully operational. Are there any plans to move the B-1
to Global Strike?
General Kowalski. Senator, I'm not aware of any plans at
this time.
Senator Nelson. Is anybody else aware of any plans to do
that?
General Chambers. No, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. General Scott, in the fiscal year 2012
budget request the Air Force has proposed to retire six B-1
bombers. Could you explain why these bombers are being retired
and what are the cost savings associated with the retirements?
General Scott. Mr. Chairman, as we look at our fleet and as
we look at the entire bomber fleet, we look at how we can
balance and manage capability and capacity. As we look at the
modernization pieces that we're doing with the B-1 and as we
look at these specific aircraft, the six that we're reducing,
we're not retiring the fleet; we're reducing the number that we
are. It's to enable us to be able to take those 60 aircraft,
continue that modernization on time to maintain that combat
capability that we give to the COCOM commanders.
Senator Nelson. Do you think that the 60 will be sufficient
for that by reducing it by 6, or will we be shorting ourselves
of our capabilities for cost savings?
General Scott. Sir, the analysis that we have done looking
at all of the force planning structure and the analytical
agendas that we have been given show that the 60 will be--with,
again, as you look across the fleet of the bombers and the
combat air forces, working with Global Strike Command and ACC--
yes, sir, the total number of bombers is still well within the
capability of the risks that we accept.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
General Scott. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
I'll submit some questions to each of you concerning the
modernization of our strategic deterrent and the cost. I know
you're wrestling with that and I'd like to have as much
information as we can as we wrestle with it. I happen to be the
ranking member on the Budget Committee, which makes all this no
fun to talk about.
Let me ask, Admiral Benedict, about the solid rocket motor
industrial base. Or maybe General Kowalski mentioned that
earlier. The fiscal year 2012 budget shows an almost 85 percent
per unit increase, Mr. Chairman, $8.5 million more than the
cost for the same motors in 2011, for the purchase of the D5
solid rocket motors. How much of that price is related to the
cancellation of the Constellation and lack of NASA's decision
to have a clear path for heavy lift, and what can be done about
that if that's the problem?
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. We have seen the unit cost
increase from approximately $10.7 million to approximately
$19.2 million. Of that, part of it is due to overhead
increases. We calculate motor costs to be about 60 percent of
that increase. The other 40 percent is due to requalification,
material increases, and the retooling in order to continue
production of the original D5 design.
We have worked very closely with Lockheed Martin and
Alliant Techsystems Inc. (ATK), our industry partners, to try
and mitigate the cost of the uncertainty and the cancellation
in the NASA programs. We have seen ATK reduce their indirect
overhead by approximately 24 percent. We have seen ATK reduce
their current work force by approximately 42 percent.
In parallel with that, we have taken significant process
and quality improvements. We estimate savings of about 17,000
man-hours or about $10 million a year cost avoidance.
So as we look at this issue today, we have a requirement to
STRATCOM to continue to provide the survivable strategic
deterrent. We are the only program today in current production.
So we are working very closely with the industry partners as
they try to develop not only a business plan, but understand
the larger plan for this national capability solid rocket motor
industry.
Senator Sessions. Do I understand that the decline in
numbers of purchases driven by NASA's situation has increased
the cost? What part of the cost increase do you attribute to
that?
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. If you look at it in just terms
of pure volume, NASA is about 70-plus percent of the solid
rocket motor industry. We're about 20 percent. Another baseline
point is it would take 10 Trident motors--first, second, and
third stages--in order to make one solid rocket motor booster
for the Shuttle. So in pure volume, the NASA decision is one
that causes the overhead to be spread amongst the remaining
programs.
We have worked closely with the Air Force. Their Minuteman
program is in a smart shutdown. The NASA program is
significantly ramped down. We are the only strategic program of
solid rocket motors that are currently in production, so we are
currently bearing that overhead shift.
Senator Sessions. Well, we've tried to work on that because
I think NASA needs to maintain its role, and through our budget
and other reasons we haven't been able to do that. It's had the
perverse result of driving up DOD's costs.
General Kowalski and General Chambers, as I mentioned in my
opening remarks, the 1251 report that accompanied the New START
treaty stated that the administration intends to begin to study
a follow-on ICBM in a way that ``supports continued reductions
in U.S. nuclear weapons.'' Can you elaborate and provide some
context for that statement? Do you know precisely what was
being referred to there?
General Kowalski. Senator, I'm not sure what's being
referred to there. In terms of the ground-based strategic
deterrent, our command is working with headquarters Air Force
on a capabilities-based assessment and we plan to move to pre-
ICD activities next year.
Senator Sessions. ``ICD'' is?
General Kowalski. Initial capabilities document, and
analysis of alternatives by fiscal year 2013.
Senator Sessions. Well, could this guidance that you
conduct this review for the follow-on ICBM in a way that
supports continued reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons--is it
possible that such a statement could influence the results that
you produce, the nature of the study? Have you been directed to
consider that as you make your study?
General Kowalski. Senator, the guidance we have right now
is in the nuclear posture report and that's the guidance that
we're using for the capability-based assessment.
Senator Sessions. General Chambers?
General Chambers. Yes, sir. The exact context of that
wording is unclear. However, the section 1251 report does
indicate, of course, that the ground-based leg of the triad the
Air Force will retain up to 420 ICBMs from a current force of
450. So the ``up to 420'' is the baseline for the New START
level of ICBMs, and so the follow-on ICBM uses that as the
starting point.
Now, if further policy looks are made at further
reductions, we are not yet tasked to go any further than that.
So the ``up to 420'' is our guiding baseline right now.
Senator Sessions. The problem I want to know is that, here
we have the report suggesting that anything you say, anything
you conclude, should support continued reductions. Are you
prepared to issue a report if you so decide that does not
recommend reductions? It seems like to me otherwise you're
having a political interference or a political override of
military best judgment.
General Kowalski. The efforts that we're pursuing right now
in ground-based strategic deterrence won't address the
policies. It will simply address what we see as the capability
requirements based on the 2010 nuke posture review.
Senator Sessions. General Chambers?
General Chambers. Yes, sir. As General Kowalski indicated,
the entire material solution analysis phase for this new--for
this potential Minuteman follow-on, will continue into fiscal
year 2014. Between now and fiscal year 2014, if there are
national policy decisions made with regard to force structure,
I know I'm very confident that my chief of staff will be
involved in providing military advice to those discussions. But
they will certainly inform the final force structure number.
But right now we're starting this study effort with a baseline
of up to 420.
Senator Sessions. Well, ultimately the political leaders
make final decisions on the matter, there's no doubt about it.
But I would trust that all of you--and I guess I'll ask you to
state for the record: Do all of you understand it would be your
duty, if asked in hearings or within DOD, that your duty would
be to give your best military judgment as to how to best defend
America, even if it's not in accord with us politicians?
General Scott?
General Scott. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Admiral Benedict?
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. General Kowalski?
General Kowalski. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. General Chambers?
General Chambers. Most definitely, sir.
Senator Sessions. Well, I just wanted to raise that,
because sometimes, even in the military, cultures and climates
get established and people feel like they should try to make
their judgment comply with what higher officials would like to
see. But this is so important and so critical, and I appreciate
your willingness to speak the truth as you see it.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
To comply with the New START treaty, the Air Force will
draw down the number of nuclear-capable bombers, as has been
discussed, the number of deployed Minuteman III ICBMs, and the
Navy will reduce the number of deployed D5 SLBMs. Let's start
with the bombers. General Scott, the B-1 became a conventional-
only bomber over a decade ago. Nevertheless, they were counted
under the old START Treaty. Do we know when the efforts will
begin to modify all the B-1 aircraft so that they're not
nuclear-capable any more under the new treaty?
General Scott. Mr. Chairman, I'll start with the answer but
then I'll pass it to General Chambers as the guy that works the
treaty.
Under the old START treaty, all of the B-1s, I think as of
about a week ago, General Chambers will say, have been
retrofitted non-nuclear. So under old START they are non-
nuclear. Now, there are some timelines on when we notify the
Russians, and again I'll let General Chambers follow on with
that, for the New START inspection process. But currently today
the B-1s are conventional platforms.
Senator Nelson. Great.
General Chambers?
General Chambers. Mr. Chairman, one of the first provisions
of the new treaty was to provide the Russian Federation an
exhibition of a B-1. That has now been completed in compliance
with the treaty, and that was the last hurdle to converting the
last B-1. So the entire B-1 fleet has now either been converted
or eliminated, and thus the Russian Federation now has 60 days
to confirm that using inspection means. Then some time late
this summer, early fall, the database for New START will no
longer reflect B-1s as an accountable nuclear delivery
platform.
Senator Nelson. It's my understanding, General Kowalski,
that all the B-2 aircraft will remain nuclear-capable. Is that
accurate?
General Kowalski. Mr. Chairman, yes, that's accurate.
Senator Nelson. Has there been any decision as to how many
B-52s will be modified to no longer be nuclear-capable?
General Kowalski. Mr. Chairman, that conversation is
ongoing. We expect a decision will be made soon on the force
structure options.
Senator Nelson. Has there been a decision as to the actual
modification that will be needed to remove the B-52 from being
counted as a nuclear-capable bomber under that New START
treaty?
General Kowalski. No, that decision has not been made yet.
Senator Nelson. Do we have some idea when it may be made?
General Kowalski. I'd turn that over to General Chambers.
General Chambers. Mr. Chairman, the conversion method for
the bomber, for the B-52, has to be reviewed by a body called
the Compliance Review Group. It's a bilateral group of Russians
and American specialists. That Compliance Review Group will
meet later this spring, I believe in the month of May, but we
can check that for sure.
The command has given their method of converting and that
method will be reviewed, and we hope to get a good answer soon.
Senator Nelson. Okay. If you would, for the record respond
to us with that information when it's available.
[The information referred to follows:]
When is the next CRG to discuss bomber conversion method? How long
will it take for a decision? What's the CRG membership?
(1) Date of the next Compliance Review Group (CRG): CRGs do not
meet regularly; rather they convene in reaction to Services (or DOD
Agencies) bringing forward proposed activities that raise issues of
compliance with arms control treaties. For B-52 conversion, the Air
Force's aim is to meet the Treaty's requirement to render the converted
bombers incapable of employing nuclear armaments while simultaneously
preserving full conventional functionality. We have found that the more
due diligence we conduct before approaching the CRG, the more rapidly
they can reach compliance decisions. With this in mind, the Air Force
is currently fleshing out a proposal for converting some number of
operational B-52Hs to a non-nuclear role. We currently envision
approaching the CRG with a thoroughly developed package within the next
couple of months.
(2) How long will it take: Engaging the Compliance Review Group
marks the beginning of the process leading to a compliance decision.
Experience reveals that the decision process can sometimes be an
iterative one. We have seen some issues settled in a matter of weeks to
months while in some rare cases others have taken years. As a result,
it can be difficult to predict the point where a decision will be made.
(3) CRG membership: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
Technology and Logistics is the DOD official responsible for ensuring
that DOD activities are conducted in compliance with treaties. The
Under Secretary is supported by Compliance Review Groups--one for each
treaty. The individual membership may change from treaty to treaty.
However, the organizational composition remains the same--senior-level
experts from OSD (Policy), OSD (General Counsel), the Joint Staff, and
is chaired by OSD(AT&L).
Senator Nelson. Admiral Benedict, my understanding is that
the Navy will retain the current number of Ohio-class ballistic
missile submarines under the New START treaty, and that's 14,
but will remove missiles from the missile compartment of the
deployed submarines. Each submarine can carry 24 missiles. How
many D5 missiles will be removed from each deployed submarine,
and will this process start soon and how long might it take?
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. The Navy's current planning is
to remove four missiles per deployed submarine, so we would go
from 24 to 20. We are currently programmed to do that beginning
in fiscal year 2015, and we expect that to be accomplished
within a 2-year timeframe.
Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, the Air Force plan is to
reduce to approximately 400 deployed Minuteman III ICBMs from
the current 450, and my understanding is that each squadron of
50 missiles is interdependent, but the Air Force is exploring
options as to how to reduce the number of ICBMs. In other
words, will a whole squadron be deactivated or will the Air
Force pick and choose among missiles and among the squadrons?
General Kowalski. Mr. Chairman, the force structure options
will be determined soon in terms of the Chief and the Secretary
looking, reviewing them, and then making their recommendations
back to the Secretary of Defense.
Senator Nelson. Because there's some sort interdependence,
is it going to be possible to take out of the various different
locations maybe one or two, or do you have to remove an entire
set at once?
General Kowalski. The options that we're looking at--as we
put forward the 1251 report, if you do the math on that you see
that we end up with about 720. So there's about 20 strategic
delivery vehicles that we're trying to get--trying to get our
arms around in terms of how we get from 720 to 700. So whether
that 20 is bombers or whether that 20 is missiles to go from
420 down to 400 is what we're wrestling with right now.
Once we determine what is the best way to get there, then
there's a follow-on discussion of that. For example, if we do
decide that it is to go to 400 on the ICBMs, then the decision
then is do you spread that out among the force? We have 45
flights of 10 missiles out there in the field right now, so if
you took one from each that would get you to about 45. Or
whether you pursue an entire squadron. There are pros and cons
to both, and that will inform the decision as we go forward
here in the next few weeks.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. With regard to the solid rocket motors,
has there been a consideration, Admiral Benedict, of working
with NASA to try to achieve a reduction in cost per unit as a
result of more numbers?
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. I met with the director of
NASA's Huntsville location just last Friday. We have been very
collaborative with NASA, MDA, and other Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) groups. OSD industrial policy led the review
in response to the congressional direction for a report on the
future of the solid rocket motor industry.
My understanding as of this morning, that report has been
approved by Dr. Carter and will be released. We provided an
interim report last summer on what we believed within the
Department was the proper path forward for the solid rocket
motor. The final was just signed this morning, sir. So we have
been working very collaboratively with all the other solid
rocket motor users.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
General Chambers, can you tell us about the current status
of the dual-capable, nuclear-capable variant of the F-35? Is it
scheduled for the 2017 delivery date still?
General Chambers. Senator Sessions, the F-35 as a platform,
of course, is part of the larger F-35 program both for the
United States and the allies. That program overall is now
undergoing a technical baseline review. That technical baseline
review will later this summer and fall probably give us a new
timeline. The timeline for production and delivery of the F-35
is going to slip to the right. The amount of time is unknown,
but that will impact the delivery of that capability with the
new B61 life extended--B61 Mod 12, to the alliance in Europe.
Thoroughgoing planning is under way to cover any potential
gap that this slip may require. Sir, the current mission is
being fulfilled by F-16s and F-15Es stationed in Europe. Those
units that conduct that mission continue to conduct it,
continue fully certified to conduct it. Some portion of those
airplanes will continue to perform the mission until the F-35
is ready and fully integrated and deployed to Europe.
Senator Sessions. Are you not prepared to give us a date of
the F-35?
General Chambers. Yes, sir. The F-35 Joint Program Office,
of course, is working this very hard, and we just know that,
writ large, the F-35 program is approximating a 2-year slip.
That doesn't mean that every piece of F-35 capability is going
to slip to the right 2 years. So we are also very confident
that the piece of that F-35 development program which calls for
it to carry a nuclear weapon is still the first block of
software after the development phase, which is a good thing.
But the exact date I can't name yet.
Senator Sessions. Admiral Benedict, according to recent
press reports the Navy rejected the recommendations of STRATCOM
to design the next generation of ballistic missile submarines
with 20 missile tubes instead of opting for only 16 per boat.
What is the basis for the Navy's decision of 16? I'm sure cost
is a factor. In what ways will that decision impact overall
nuclear force structure associated with the command?
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. SSP supported the Navy
analysis, STRATCOM's analysis, as well as the OSD analysis as
we proceeded forward and towards the Milestone A decision that
Dr. Carter conducted based on our input, which was the
technical input, as the Director of SSP. Other factors were
considered. As you stated, cost was one of them.
But as the Secretary, as the CNO, and I think as General
Kehler submitted in their testimony, given the threats that we
see today, given the mission that we see today, given the
upload capability of the D5, and given the environment as they
saw today, all three of those leaders were comfortable with the
decision to proceed forward with 16 tubes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Does that represent your judgment? To
what extent were you involved in that?
Admiral Benedict. Sir, we were involved from a technical
aspect in terms of the capability of the missile itself, what
we can throw, our range, our capability. Based on what we
understand the capability of the D5 today, which will be the
baseline missile for the Ohio Replacement Program, as the
Director of SSP I'm comfortable with that decision.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. General Harencak, you have recently assumed
command of the Nuclear Weapons Center, another organization
established to address the problems with the nuclear
enterprise, particularly the incident where a missile nose cone
was mistakenly shipped to Taiwan mismarked as a battery. I have
two or three questions that I'd like to ask.
Do you think you have positive control over all nuclear-
related parts?
General Harencak. Absolutely, sir. We've made significant
progress over the years in developing positive inventory
control (PIC) and merging of databases, and we are absolutely
positive that we have fixed that problem.
Senator Nelson. Could you describe what kind of a database
you've put together to make sure that all the parts are
accounted for, incoming, outgoing, and in supply?
General Harencak. What we've developed is what we call PIC
fusion. What it does is, it merges all of the databases into
one. We take in-transit databases. We take databases that are
in base supply, any type of database that may be even
indirectly under our control or not. For example, we're right
now beginning to merge the nuclear weapons-related material
(NWRM), that is ours, that the Department of Energy currently
holds for us at Pantex and the Kansas City plant, for example.
So we've merged this. It's been under development. It's a
constantly evolving system that gives us very, very solid
visibility on where all this is.
I might also add that when it comes to actually the nuclear
weapons themselves, there is one general in the Air Force that
knows at all times where every weapon is, whether it be in
storage or in transit, and that is me. We do that through our
Sustainment and Integration Center (SIC), which is
headquartered at my headquarters in Albuquerque. It has
complete control and focus on where everything is.
Senator Nelson. Much of the maintenance and test equipment
supporting the missiles and the nuclear weapons is old and
needs to be replaced. Now that we have knowledge of where
everything is, do you have any plans to begin replacing the old
equipment?
General Harencak. Absolutely, sir. We have spent and plan
on spending almost $1 billion from 2009 to 2016 on specifically
ensuring the capabilities are retained through refurbishment
and repair and getting ahead of the systems. For example, the
reentry system test tabs, which are cables that have to be
repaired. We're getting out ahead of them. While we're
refurbishing, while we're fixing these and getting them out to
the field as quick as possible, we're also fast-tracking the
designing and building of replacements.
So we are very focused on keeping a whole weapons system,
specifically the Minuteman III, viable through a focused
sustainment life cycle cradle-to-grave approach.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
General Kowalski, much of the support equipment for the
missiles, it's very old. What are your plans to address the
issue of aging equipment, including, for example, the need to
replace the Vietnam-era helicopters that support the missile
fields? Are there new helicopters needed, and if so why, and
can the Air Force replace these helicopters with very little,
minimal, or no development costs?
General Kowalski. Mr. Chairman, we're working with the
system program offices and with the Nuke Weapons Center on a
lot of the test equipment issues for the ICBM. We also have a
missile engineering squadron that's currently based at Peterson
Air Force Base, that does a lot of the facility kinds of
sustainment for it.
On the requirements for the helicopters, when the UH-1 was
introduced it was introduced primarily as a lift platform for
support. It really wasn't identified as part of the security.
When we did a series of stressing reviews of the security
requirements of the missile fields, what was identified was a
need for a helicopter that could carry more security forces
members, could get them to launch facilities or convoys faster,
and which had greater range, and that's what we have been
working on since the mid- to late-1990s.
Senator Nelson. From your testimony, it appears that the
mission for the new helicopters will be missile field support,
as you've just indicated, and to meet the continuity of
government needs for the military district of Washington. Is it
clear that the new common vertical lift support platform will
support only those two missions and won't serve as a combat
search and rescue function?
General Kowalski. I think the acquisition decision has yet
to be made in terms of the final elements and the strategy to
go forward. Right now, in the capability document that we had
put together it is a lift support platform for the missile
field security, for continuity of ops, continuity of government
here in Washington, DC, and there is also some platforms that
are used out in the Pacific.
Senator Nelson. How many helicopters do you expect might be
needed to achieve each mission? Do you have a number in mind?
General Kowalski. Senator, I would probably have to give
you for the record a precise number. That number is probably
somewhere between 80 and 100.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Air Force needs 42 Common Vertical Lift Support Platform
helicopters for missile field security and 27 to meet the continuity-
of-government requirements for the Air Force Military District of
Washington. There are 24 additional helicopters required for Pacific
Air Forces, Air Force Materiel Command, Air Force Special Operations
Command, and AETC training and transport needs.
Senator Nelson. I guess that's everything that I have.
There's a personnel concern. We should try to address this and
then I think we can go to the secure location. When you work in
the nuclear fields, obviously that can be difficult for
personnel. Do either of you have any challenges bringing young
airmen and sailors into the nuclear enterprise, and are these
sought-after assignments or do they just sort of happen? Are
they actually sought after by young men and women coming into
the Service?
General Kowalski. Mr. Chairman, we don't really have any
issues with getting airmen to join the Air Force and then being
assigned tasks out in the missile fields. Probably the larger
challenge that we face is getting our younger airmen, once
they've reached that decision point, if they have been
stationed in one of our northern bases where the environment's
a little bit tougher, the smaller communities around them, they
tend to leave the Service.
So we have been very concerned about that. We've been
watching it very closely in cooperation with headquarters Air
Force in terms of how do we improve quality of life and things
up there for them.
But at the end of the day our airmen really want two things
from us: they want to know what it is that they have to do and
they want to know that what they do is important. The Secretary
and the Chief have established Air Force Global Strike Command.
I have been to each base at least three times. I've talked to
these airmen. The functional directors on my staff have been
out talking to the airmen.
They get the clear message that what they do is important
and they also have the clear message about what it is that we
need them to do. So I think we're making real headway, and we
see it right now in our younger officers when they get to the
decision point. Because of the numbers of ICBM missileers that
we take in, the crew members, we don't need them at about the
5-year point. A lot of them are allowed to do other things in
the Air Force. Right now we have more volunteers to stay in the
ICBM community in the nuclear enterprise than we have spots
for. So right now that's a good sign on how the enterprise has
turned around in the last few years.
Senator Nelson. Thank you for that update. Thank you all
for your testimony today. We appreciate your being here and
your service.
Senator Sessions. Just one question.
Senator Nelson. Sure.
Senator Sessions. General Kowalski, or maybe Chambers or
whoever, the 1251 report stipulated a force structure of up to
420 ICBMs. That's a reduction of 30. When will the decision be
made as to what that number will be? Have you decided that?
General Kowalski. Senator, I expect that decision to be
made here shortly, within the next 3 months.
Senator Sessions. Will that allow you appropriate time to
analyze all the factors necessary?
General Kowalski. Senator, yes. We have been looking at
this for about 7 to 9 months already in terms of analyzing the
costs and working down this path. Then as the Secretary of
Defense has stated, the entry into force will be toward the end
of the treaty. What we see right now as we look at the
different options that we have is that, frankly, the critical
path to make sure we're in compliance with the treaty is
eliminating a lot of the phantom silos out there. So there's a
lot of work to be done out in eliminating the silos.
But in terms of the force structure decisions, that's not a
particularly driving force right now.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Again, thank you all.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
bombers--upgrades and future capabilities
1. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski and General Scott, the last
time the longevity of the current fleet was reviewed, all of the
bombers would begin to start retirements around 2035 to 2037. What is
the expected retirement date for the B-52, the B-1, and B-2, based on
current projections?
General Kowalski and General Scott. The Air Force expects to begin
retiring legacy bomber platforms once the Long-Range Penetrating Bomber
(LRPB) achieves Initial Operational Capability (IOC). Until that time,
the Air Force will continuously assess the overall capacity and
capability of our combat forces, including bombers, to ensure that the
overall force is appropriately sized to provide for the Nation's
defense. Potential legacy bomber retirements as a result of LRPB IOC
will likely be a mix of B-1s and/or B-52s (numbers and dates to be
determined). Legacy bomber retirement decisions will be based on
operational requirements, operating costs, economic service life, and
treaty compliance mandates. The Air Force plans to maintain the B-2
fleet to beyond 2040.
2. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski and General Scott, what are the
serious life-limiting factors for each aircraft?
General Kowalski and General Scott. The Structural Service Life for
each bomber is based on when a key component within the aircraft
structure reaches the point where further repair is not economically
viable. Key components are tracked and service life is updated through
the Aircraft Structural Integrity Program. The current limiting factor
for the B-52 is the wing upper surface. For the B-1 it is the wing
lower surface. For the B-2 it is the rudder attach points. All three
bomber types are currently projected to reach their Structural Service
life beyond 2040.
3. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski and General Scott, all of the
current bomber aircraft have modernization programs of varying types
underway. Has a comprehensive plan been developed for each bomber
aircraft to sustain and modernize each bomber to assure that each
platform remains capable through the projected future life for each
bomber and to meet the retirement date outlined above?
General Kowalski and General Scott. Air Force Global Strike Command
(AFGSC) possesses the B-2 and B-52 dual-capable bombers. These aircraft
each have plans detailing current and future sustainment and
modernization requirements. The most recent B-2 Long Range Capability
Flight Plan is dated November 2009 and addresses sustainment and
modernization requirements to ensure the platform remains capable
through 2058. The most recent B-52 Road Map is dated December 2007 and
outlines sustainment and modernization requirements to ensure the
platform remains capable through 2040. AFGSC is currently writing
Bomber Master Plans for both of these platforms. The Master Plans will
build on these previous plans and provide updated sustainment and
modification requirements designed to keep the platforms capable
through their life expectancies. AFGSC will publish these plans later
this year and look to publish future plans until the new bomber attains
IOC.
Air Combat Command (ACC) possesses the B-1 conventional bomber. The
B-1 Roadmap dated October 2007 addresses sustainment and modernization
requirements to ensure it remains capable through 2025. The Bomber
Force Structure Study from February 2008 estimates the structural life
of the platform out to 2040. ACC and the B-1 Systems Program Office
(SPO) at Tinker Air Force Base are currently producing a Strategic
Action and Investment Plan (SAIP) that will update and validate the
sustainment and modernization efforts for the B-1 to ensure that it
remains viable through its expected service life of 2040. The SAIP will
be published later this year.
4. Senator Nelson. General Scott, several of the upgrade programs
are needed to prevent the bombers from being grounded. The B-1, for
example, had three programs that had to be in place this year to
prevent grounding. These three programs are the Central Integrated Test
System (CITS), the Vertical Situation Display, and the Radar
Modernization and Improvement Program (RMIP). Are all these programs on
track to be completed by the end of the year to prevent grounding?
General Scott. All three modification programs are on track to
begin installations early enough in 2012 to prevent grounding. The RMIP
production contract was awarded on 30 September 2010. First kit
deliveries begin in the spring of 2012 with the first aircraft
modification scheduled for June 2012. The CITS program has completed
development, and the production contract award is projected for June
2011. The Vertical Situation Display Upgrade (VSDU) program is
scheduled to begin flight test this summer. Early procurement of
critical kit parts has been authorized, and the contract award is
projected for June 2011. Kit deliveries for both CITS and VSDU are
scheduled to begin in September 2012 with first aircraft installation
starting in November 12.
5. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski and General Scott, the Global
Strike Command is now fully operational. Are there any plans to move
the B-1 to Global Strike? If not, why not?
General Kowalski and General Scott. Currently there is no plan to
move the B-1 from ACC to AFGSC. The decision to transfer only the
nuclear capable bombers to AFGSC was focused and deliberate, given
their primary mission of safe, secure, and effective nuclear
deterrence. Maintaining the B-1 within the ACC portfolio supports ACC's
tasked role as the lead integrator for the Combat Air Force.
b-1 retirements
6. Senator Nelson. General Scott, in the fiscal year 2012 budget
request the Air Force has proposed to retire six B-1 bombers. What are
the cost savings associated with these retirements?
General Scott. The retirement of six B-1s will provide a total
fiscal year 2012 savings of $62M in procurement and sustainment
funding.
7. Senator Nelson. General Scott, how much of the savings will go
to each of the B-1, other bombers, and Air Force higher priorities?
General Scott. The Air Force is reinvesting $33 million in fiscal
year 2012 into critical B-1 sustainment and modernization programs to
ensure the health of the remaining fleet. These programs include
procurement and installation of VSDU and CITS sustainment efforts,
Fully Integrated Data Link capability upgrade, and procurement of
critical initial spares for these modifications. The Department applied
the remainder of the savings from the B-1 reduction to other Air Force
and Department of Defense (DOD) priorities to include continuing to
strengthen the nuclear enterprise and investing in Building
Partnerships.
8. Senator Nelson. General Scott, will the retirement have any
impact on the Air Force ability to meet any operational plan or other
requirements?
General Scott. The retirement of six B-1 bombers will free up
funding to modify the remaining B-1 aircraft. The modifications to the
remaining aircraft will improve their ability to respond to Combatant
Commander operational taskings and ensure their viability in the
future.
Tactical and campaign level analysis conducted by Air Force Studies
and Analysis has indicated a reduction of six B-1 primary aircraft
authorizations (three combat coded and three training coded) can be
taken with limited risk against currently approved Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) Analytic Agenda scenarios. Cost per flying
hour and mission capable rate analyses further supported a modest B-1
reduction as a wise reinvestment strategy geared toward increasing the
pool of equipment spares and freeing funds to source critical
sustainment and capability modifications. The Air Force expects to
achieve an increase in aircraft availability in the near-term as a
result of these retirements and monies reinvested, in part, to fund
fleet modernization programs. Funded programs include fully integrated
data link, vertical situation display, and CITS upgrades, providing a
capabilities-based bridge to the future Long Range Strike platform.
start reductions
9. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, Admiral Benedict, and General
Chambers, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) allows 800
nondeployed missile launchers and nuclear capable bombers. Has there
been a decision as to how the 800 nondeployed systems will be
allocated?
General Kowalski and General Chambers. The fiscal year 2012 Annual
Update to the Report Specified in Section 1251 of the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 (Section 1251 Report)
allocates the 800 total deployed and nondeployed launchers as follows:
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM)--280; intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBM)--up to 454; and nuclear capable bombers--up
to 66. Within the bomber force we will maintain all 20 B-2s as dual
capable bombers. Up to 700 of these systems may be deployed (as defined
by the treaty). We are assessing how the nondeployed systems might be
allocated during the treaty period.
Admiral Benedict. One of the New START treaty central limits is a
limit of 800 deployed plus nondeployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and
deployed plus nondeployed heavy bombers, to be achieved by 7 years
after entry into force of the treaty. In order to meet this limit,
current U.S. plans call for a total of 280 deployed plus nondeployed
SLBM launchers. Of this total, 240 will be deployed launchers (20
launchers on each of 12 strategically-loaded SSBNs) and 40 will be
nondeployed launchers (20 launchers on each of 2 SSBNs in extended
overhaul).
10. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, Admiral Benedict, and General
Chambers, has there been a decision on what constitutes a nondeployed
missile launcher?
General Kowalski and General Chambers. Under the New START treaty,
a silo launcher at an operational ICBM base that does not contain an
ICBM is considered a nondeployed launcher. In addition, those silo
launchers at ICBM test ranges and space launch facilities are
accountable as nondeployed launchers. Plus, all ICBM silo training
launchers are accountable as nondeployed launchers, of which the Air
force currently has no launchers that fit this definition. Finally, non
silo-based fixed launchers of ICBMs and space launch vehicles (i.e.,
``soft-site'' launchers) at any of these facilities are not accountable
as nondeployed or deployed launchers.
Admiral Benedict. As defined in the treaty:
The term ``nondeployed launcher of SLBMs'' means an SLBM
launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, that is intended for
testing or training, or an SLBM launcher that does not contain
a deployed SLBM.
In simpler terms, a nondeployed SLBM launcher is an accountable
missile tube that is empty; thus, if the Navy were to remove an SLBM
from its launcher, the status of that launcher (and the status of the
SLBM) would change from deployed to nondeployed. A nondeployed SLBM
launcher is accountable under the New START treaty towards the central
limit of 800 deployed plus nondeployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers,
and heavy bombers.
solid rocket motor industrial base
11. Senator Nelson. General Chambers, the cost of solid rocket
motors (SRM) continues to grow. The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration's decisions to halt the Constellation/Aries programs
have, as we discussed last year, increased the portion of overhead
costs borne by DOD. Now that the Air Force has completed Minuteman III
upgrades and it will be several years before a new engineering effort
is needed to sustain the Minuteman III through 2030, the Air Force is
apparently not planning to invest in the SRM infrastructure. What are
your thoughts on how to ensure the industry has the ability to support
an additional life extension for Minuteman III and a replacement ICBM
in the future?
General Chambers. The Air Force is committed to support the
industrial base for current and future strategic SRMs needs. The Air
Force is developing a Minuteman III SRM Modernization concept which
proposes a modernization program to leverage latest SRM technology
development into replacement SRMs for MM III (expected need date post-
2020). The proposal would operationally qualify modernized motor
designs; replace current MM III motors with new SRM technology; utilize
modern industrial practices; and posture DOD for future SRM
requirements with transferable technologies. Many of these technologies
are currently being matured in the ICBM Demonstration and Validation
Program specifically designed to support industrial base by exercising
the critical SRM systems engineering and design skills. We believe that
this Modernization program will be able to provide the needed SRM
development to sustain the Industry until the time comes for a
replacement for the current MM III ICBM.
long-range nuclear cruise missile
12. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, in your prepared testimony
you talk about the process for fielding a new long range nuclear cruise
missile, starting with an analysis of alternatives (AoA) that will be
completed in 2010. What is the assumption on the life of the existing
nuclear cruise missile?
General Kowalski. The Air Force has two service life extension
programs (LEP): one to sustain the air launched cruise missile (ALCM)
through 2020, which is fully funded; and another to sustain the ALCM
through 2030, currently being programmed for in the fiscal year 2013
Program Objective Memorandum (POM).
13. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, when does the replacement
need to be in place?
General Kowalski. Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) must be in place by
2030, which aligns with the projected end date for the ALCM service
LEP.
14. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, has there been any discussion
about the warhead that will be used in the new cruise missile?
General Kowalski. Recommendations on the specific warhead for use
in the new cruise missile are being developed by a cross-organizational
Warhead Working Group with participation from Department of Energy
(DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), U.S. Strategic
Command (STRATCOM), AFGSC, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC),
and Air Armament Center. There are several warhead candidates being
considered, including the W80. Data from the LRSO AoAs will be used to
help finalize the warhead recommendation. Final recommendations for
warhead selection will be completed prior to Milestone A, which is
currently scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2013.
global strike command--helicopters
15. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, much of the support equipment
for the missiles is very old. What are your plans to address the issue
of aging equipment, including the need to replace the Vietnam-era
helicopters that support the missile fields?
General Kowalski. Support equipment is a critical component of the
ICBM Master Plan, our overarching planning document for sustaining the
Minuteman III through 2030. All ICBM support equipment needs are
prioritized within the Master Plan to support our planning and
programming process for building the POM submission. Two specific
examples of support equipment needs highlighted in the Master Plan and
included in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) are replacements
for the ICBM Payload Transporters and Transporter Erectors. The 17-
year-old Payload Transporter fleet is currently funded in fiscal year
2011 for replacement with first deliveries projected to begin in fiscal
year 2015. A program to replace the 21-year old Transporter Erector
fleet is being considered as part of the fiscal year 2013 POM.
We intend to replace the UH-1N with the Common Vertical Lift
Support Platform (CVLSP) with an initial operating capability in fiscal
year 2015.
16. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, why are new helicopters
needed?
General Kowalski. The UH-1N does not have the four critical/
fundamental key performance parameters (KPP) of speed, range,
endurance, or payload capacity for the nuclear security mission or meet
the continuity of government requirements for the Military District of
Washington.
17. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, when are new helicopters
needed?
General Kowalski. Our continued reliance on the UH-1N platform for
the missile field security results directly in 11 nuclear security
deviations now. Those deviations will not be resolved until the CVLSP
is fully fielded in our Missile Wings. Given this compelling need,
AFGSC is pressing for an initial operating capability of fiscal year
2015 and an full operational capability (FOC) by fiscal year 2019, with
FOC for the remainder of the Air Force fleet by fiscal year 2022.
18. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, can the Air Force replace
these helicopters with minimal or no development costs?
General Kowalski. Yes. The CVLSP program intends to procure a non-
development, off-the-shelf, in-production helicopter that will require
minimal or no development effort. The CVLSP program currently has $21.7
million budgeted for RDT&E from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year
2014.
19. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, from your testimony it
appears that the mission for the new helicopters will be missile field
support and to meet the continuity of government requirements for the
Military District of Washington. Is it clear that the new CVLSP will
support only those two missions and will not serve a combat search and
rescue function?
General Kowalski. The CVLSP program will replace the UH-1N fleet
that is supporting AFGSC nuclear security support, AFDW continuity of
government missions, and a variety of other secondary missions, not
including Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). CSAR missions are currently
performed with HH-60 helicopters. There is a separate acquisition
program to address recapitalization of the HH-60 CSAR fleet.
20. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, how many helicopters will be
needed for each mission?
General Kowalski. The Air Force needs 42 CVLSP helicopters for
missile field security and 27 to meet the continuity of government
requirements for the Military District of Washington. There are 24
additional helicopters required for PACAF, AFMC, AFSOC and AETC
training and transport needs.
21. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, what is the total number that
will be purchased?
General Kowalski. The CVLSP program plans to procure 93 helicopters
for the various CVLSP missions. This will include 42 helicopters for
AFGSC nuclear security support, 27 helicopters for the Air Force
District of Washington continuity of government mission, and 24
helicopters for training and other CVLSP missions at four other
MAJCOMs.
22. Senator Nelson. General Kowalski, when will there be a decision
on the acquisition strategy for the helicopters?
General Kowalski. On 12 April 2011, the Secretary of the Air Force
(SECAF) and Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) approved a full and
open acquisition strategy for the CVLSP program. The funding in the
fiscal year 2011 Appropriation and fiscal year 2012 President's budget
will support the planned acquisition strategy that seeks to provide an
IOC in fiscal year 2015.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
further reductions
23. Senator Sessions. General Kowalski, General Shackelford,
Admiral Benedict, General Scott, General Chambers, and General
Harencak, the President's National Security Advisor recently made
comments at the Carnegie Endowment that the administration is currently
``making preparations for the next round of nuclear reductions'' and
that DOD will ``review our strategic requirements and develop options
for further reductions in our current nuclear stockpile.'' He continued
by stating that in meeting these objectives, the White House will
direct DOD to consider ``potential changes in targeting requirements
and alert postures.'' What guidance and assumptions have you been given
or told to follow in the design, development, and posture for
modernizing the nuclear triad?
General Kowalski, General Shackelford, General Scott, General
Chambers, and General Harencak. We have not received further guidance
or assumptions from DOD. As stated in the fiscal year 2012 Annual
Update to the Report Specified in Section 1251 of the National Defense
Authorization Act, ``DOD will invest in its nuclear delivery systems to
ensure that existing capabilities are adequately sustained with
essential upgrades and modifications. Additionally, DOD will seek to
modernize systems to ensure continuing capability in the face of
evolving challenges and technological developments.''
Admiral Benedict. Strategic Systems Programs has been tasked to
extend the life of the Trident II (D5) Strategic Weapon System to match
the hull life of the Ohio-class submarine and to serve as the initial
payload of the Ohio Replacement. SSP is extending the life of the W76
reentry system through a refurbishment program known as the W76-1. This
program is being executed in partnership with DOE, NNSA. In addition to
the W76-1, the Navy is in the initial stages of refurbishing the W88
reentry system. The Navy is collaborating with the Air Force to reduce
costs through shared technology.
24. Senator Sessions. General Kowalski, General Shackelford,
Admiral Benedict, General Scott, General Chambers, and General
Harencak, in your best military judgment, how prudent is it to begin
consideration of reductions past the New START levels?
General Kowalski, General Shackelford, General Scott, General
Chambers, and General Harencak. It is prudent to begin consideration of
reductions past the New START levels only to the degree that such
consideration is based on national strategy. That strategy continues to
affirm the central role of Deterrence. Deterrence applied to the
complexities of the 21st century strategic and operational reality
requires deliberate analysis and planning. Such analysis of 21st
century requirements for strengthening strategic Deterrence must also
deliberately include Extended Deterrence and Assurance as a requisite,
as our reliance on Allies and partners is fundamental.
National strategy also continues to affirm the efficacy of the
Triad. Any strategy-based look at further reductions needs to carefully
assess the effects on the complementary capabilities inherent in the
three legs of the Triad. Such an assessment will show that
consideration of further reductions is not accomplished by application
of mathematical formulae alone, but via thorough analysis of the
attributes of each leg at lower levels; indeed, fewer warheads and
fewer platforms can fundamentally alter overall deterrent attributes.
So, then, the prudence of beginning consideration of reductions
past New START levels is based on the comprehensive analysis a
strategy-to-task methodology requires. Such analysis may soon be
underway, and the Air Force is prepared to fully engage with OSD and
the combatant commands in providing analytical support and military
advice.
Admiral Benedict. Issues involving reductions of nuclear systems
past the levels specified in the New START treaty is a consideration
for the executive branch, in consultation with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff and the responsible combatant
commander, STRATCOM.
balance between affordability and capability
25. Senator Sessions. General Kowalski, General Shackelford,
Admiral Benedict, General Scott, General Chambers, and General
Harencak, as I mentioned earlier, the modernization and sustainability
of strategic deterrent is an immense yet critical investment that will
cost around $20 billion per year for the foreseeable future. Within
each of your portfolios what steps are being taken to address
affordability?
General Kowalski, General Shackelford, General Scott, and General
Chambers. Our ability to sustain the current systems we have is viable.
DOD will invest in its nuclear delivery systems to ensure that existing
capabilities are adequately sustained with essential upgrades and
modifications. Additionally, DOD will seek to modernize systems to
ensure continuing deterrent capability in the face of evolving
challenges and technological developments.
The Minuteman III will be sustained through 2030. Weapon system
requirements are continuously reviewed and if sustainment programs not
previously programmed become necessary they will be implemented
to ensure we meet the requirement `` . . . to maintain a
sufficient supply of launch test assets and spares to sustain the
deployed force of such missiles through 2030.'' (ref: H.R. 5122 Section
139)
The Air Force plans to maintain heavy bombers for the indefinite
future to provide long-range conventional and nuclear attack.
DOD will sustain the current ALCM until a classified follow-on
capability is fielded.
Dual-Capable aircraft will continue to carry the B61 gravity bomb.
The B61 will be sustained through LEPs and the Air Force will provide a
new tail kit during the LEP. Additionally, the F-35 will be equipped to
carry the B61.
Admiral Benedict. A low-rate production continuity procurement
strategy was extensively reviewed and approved by DOD and Congress. We
have been in execution for nearly 15 years. This procurement strategy
has proven successful, based on the demonstrated superb performance of
the Trident II (D5) weapon system. The Navy submitted a report to
Congress in December 2002 that detailed the impact of alternative full-
funded procurement strategies and recommended continuation of the
current production continuity procurement strategy. Continued
production of critical components represents the best balance of cost
and risk to extend the life of the D5 missile.
In addition, examples of other affordability initiatives SSP has
implemented are:
(1) Integrated Support Facility consolidation for missile guidance
increased efficiency and improved supportability by consolidating the
missile guidance infrastructure to support the MK6 and deploy MK6LE.
(2) Shipboard Electronics Repair Facility established to repair
and recertify shipboard Strategic Weapons Systems and Attack Weapon
Systems electronic equipment. A common repair facility has yielded both
cost avoidance and savings for SSP in the out-years by eliminating
duplicate repair capabilities across four locations.
(3) Moving Navigation efforts to Heath, Ohio, which provides co-
location with the Air Force efforts and also is a lower cost-of-living
area.
General Harencak. There can be no doubt that nuclear weapons are
expensive. Everything about them and their delivery vehicles is
meticulously designed, over-engineered, and has multiple, redundant
failsafes. Add to this the fact that many of the weapons and delivery
vehicles are being sustained well beyond their design lives, and costs
will inevitably be high. However, one of the Nuclear Weapons Center's 5
Priorities, as defined in its strategic plan, is entitled ``Ensure
Resource Stewardship,'' and that is something we take very seriously.
By using smart engineering and logistics processes, we're
constantly improving our ability to determine what hardware can be
refurbished and what must be replaced. As a result, we're planning
integrated roadmaps and schedules to avoid bottlenecks in production
that result in higher costs. As we continue to streamline our
sustainment processes, we're beginning to get a better understanding
for the effects of advancing or deferring certain sustainment actions,
which will allow us to plan more efficiently with an eye to reducing
costs and to ensure that the needs of the warfighter are met.
In partnership with the AF Program Executive Officer for Strategic
Systems (AFPEO/SS), we're also looking at innovative teaming
opportunities to produce needed technology. For example, in the past,
if an Air Force warhead required a new fuzing assembly, the Air Force
would foot the entire bill. Now, we're looking at combining efforts
with Navy SSP in the Integrated ICBM Fuze Program. Since the
requirements for these fuzes are similar--though not identical--we plan
to develop a common family of components for the Air Force Mk12A and
Mk21 reentry vehicles as well as the Navy's MK 5 reentry body. These
building block components should be adaptable into fuzes for all three
systems. The savings vice three separate programs should be very
significant.
The bottom line is that the Center will do nothing that will
compromise nuclear safety or security. However, as conscientious
stewards of the Air Force nuclear arsenal, we are acutely aware of the
fiscal environment and will continue to seek innovative ways to serve
the vital goals of meeting warfighter needs, preserving nuclear surety
and ensuring fiscal responsibility.
26. Senator Sessions. General Kowalski, General Shackelford,
Admiral Benedict, General Scott, General Chambers, and General
Harencak, within each of your portfolios, what is the timeline these
modernization efforts must be accomplished?
General Kowalski, General Shackelford, General Scott, General
Chambers, and General Harencak. The timeline for the below key
modernization efforts is an estimate and will change as required.
Current projected delivery dates are:
1. B-52 1760 IWB: 2013
2. CVLSP: 2014
3. B61 LEP: 2017
4. Joint Fuze: 2019 (Mk21); 2020 (Mk12A)
5. B-2 DMS: 2018
6. LRSO: 2023
Acronyms:
CVLSP: Common Vertical Lift Support Platform
DMS: Defensive Management System
IWB: Internal Weapons Bay
LEP: Life Extension Program
LRSO: Long-Range Standoff
Admiral Benedict. Modernization efforts are occurring now for the
Trident II (D5) weapon system. The Navy and OSD agreed to extend the
life of the D5 missile to match the Ohio class submarine service life
and to serve as the initial payload on the Ohio Replacement based on
programmatic advantages and the ability to meet effectiveness
requirements that are derived from the national deterrence strategy.
The life extension is being accomplished through an update to all the
Trident II (D5) Strategic Weapons System (SWS) subsystems: launcher,
navigation, fire control, guidance, missile, and reentry. Our flight
hardware--missile and guidance--life extension efforts are designed to
meet the same form, fit and function of the original system, in order
to keep the deployed system as one homogeneous population and to
control costs. The Initial Operating Capability of the D5 Flight
Hardware Life Extension efforts is scheduled in fiscal year 2017. The
Shipboard Systems efforts are ongoing and will support the baseline
configuration for the Ohio Replacement Program Strategic Weapon System.
27. Senator Sessions. General Kowalski, General Shackelford,
Admiral Benedict, General Scott, General Chambers, and General
Harencak, within each of your portfolios, what is our ability to
sustain the systems we currently have?
General Kowalski, General Shackelford, General Scott, and General
Chambers. In support of the Secretary of Defense's efficiency
initiatives, program managers are required to treat affordability as a
requirement. Specifically, at Milestone A, the Acquisition Decision
Memorandum (ADM) will contain an affordability target to be treated by
the program manager as a KPP. At Milestone B, program managers will
present a systems engineering tradeoff analysis showing how cost and
risk varies as major design parameters and time to complete are varied.
Furthermore, new ``Will Cost/Should Cost'' direction will
incentivize both industry and the program office to aggressively
scrutinize every element of program cost as they pursue affordability
solutions to our nuclear deterrence capability requirements.
Admiral Benedict. The fiscal year 2012 President's budget is
sufficient to sustain the safety and reliability of the Trident II (D5)
SWS. However, D5 SWS has just completed 20 years of deployed service
and is fast approaching its 25-year design life goal. To address aging
concerns, the Strategic Systems Programs has been tasked to extend the
life of the Trident II (D5) SWS to match the hull life of the Ohio
class submarine and to serve as the initial payload of the Ohio
Replacement. Life extension efforts are being accomplished through an
update to all the Trident II (D5) SWS subsystems: launcher, navigation,
fire control, guidance, missile and reentry. These efforts will provide
the Navy with the SWS needed to meet operational requirements
throughout the Ohio service life and will serve as the initial SWS on
the planned follow-on platform.
General Harencak. Within the AFNWC portfolio, we have the LGM-30G
Minuteman III ICBM, the AGM-86 ALCM, and support equipment for these
systems. AFNWC also sustains the support equipment and handling gear
for gravity bombs and weapons storage areas.
AFNWC's ability to sustain the Minuteman III ICBM is good. As an
aging system now 50 years old (the original Minuteman infrastructure
was emplaced starting in 1961, most of the flight equipment dates from
the 1970s), there are issues with aging components and infrastructure,
parts obsolescence, diminishing manufacturing, loss of industrial base,
and other concerns. However, 50 years of experience has taught us how
to be good stewards of this system, and we have conducted dozens of
LEPs over that period. We have developed comprehensive roadmaps that
show the way for us to sustain this weapon system through 2030 and
minimize risks. Additionally, the Air Force participates in a robust
Force Development Evaluation (FDE) program, which includes flight,
ground and C2 testing to ensure that any weaknesses with a force-wide
impact are detected as early as possible so that a fix can be planned
and executed as quickly as possible. We also monitor facility hardness
to ensure that ICBM infrastructure remains survivable in the event of
attack. Support equipment is another area that requires constant
monitoring. Equipment that has worked and been well maintained for
decades eventually wears out and requires refurbishment or replacement.
AFNWC is currently working on refurbishing and replacing a number of
pieces of support equipment that are well past their designed
lifespans. In many cases, it is becoming increasingly difficult to find
manufacturers who can build systems and components that can still
integrate effectively with the Minuteman system. As we continue to look
at a successor to the Minuteman ICBM, we remain mindful that this
system has served with unsurpassed reliability for a half-century and
can continue for some time into the future, though the cost of
sustaining such an old system will eventually start to increase more
and more rapidly if modernization of infrastructure, ground equipment
and flight equipment do not continue.
Sustainability prospects for the ALCM are also good. As this system
is significantly newer than the Minuteman ICBM, it has fewer problems
with disappearing suppliers, industrial infrastructure and obsolete
technology. We continue to conduct a robust FDE program on ALCM as
well, and have discovered some issues with aging and/or problematic
components, which we are in the process of addressing. Additionally, we
are refurbishing and upgrading some ALCM ground equipment, such as the
Electronic System Test Set to improve reliability through funding of
the long term modernization plan, as this test set is crucial to
sustaining the ALCM through 2030. Though AFNWC is involved in the LRSO
AoAs to determine the requirements for the successor to the ALCM, we
fully realize that this system is amply capable of serving through
2030.
In addition to the Minuteman and ALCM, AFNWC sustains the loading
and support equipment for gravity bombs, both in CONUS and overseas.
We've recently been executing a Service LEP for the Weapons Maintenance
Truck (WMT) used to sustain gravity bombs in Europe. Prior to AFNWC
intervention, the WMT was in very poor repair and frequently
necessitated sharing a single working vehicle between multiple air
bases, hundreds of miles apart. At this time, each base has its own
working WMT. Additionally, the Air Force Program Executive Officer for
Strategic Systems (AFPEO/SS) is working to replace the WMT system
entirely with a much newer and more capable system (the Secure
Transportable Maintenance System).
The bottom line is that AFNWC and its allies in the nuclear
sustainment business understand what it will take to keep the systems
in our portfolio going and we will take the necessary steps to preserve
their surety and effectiveness. This task becomes harder and more
expensive as the systems continue to age, but there is no point in the
future we can identify beyond which the systems become unsustainable
icbm sustainment and modernization
28. Senator Sessions. General Kowalski and General Chambers, a
recent article in the Air Force Times cited a failure review board's
conclusion that an equipment failure was responsible for the hour-long
communication outage at F.E. Warren Air Force Base that affected 50
nuclear missiles last fall. Given the age of the current ICBM
infrastructure, some have speculated that the incident may be
indicative of the aging ICBM infrastructure. Do you believe the
incident is indicative of the aging ICBM infrastructure?
General Kowalski and General Chambers. No, the Minuteman III Weapon
System continues to perform as a safe, secure, and effective deterrent.
Our newest Major Command, AFGSC, conducted an extensive review of last
fall's event and determined this was an isolated incident and is not
indicative of age-related systemic problems within the ICBM force. The
Minuteman III ICBM weapon system alert rate exceeds 99 percent.
In addition, consistent with the NDAA Section 1251 Report, the Air
Force, through the leadership of AFGSC, has developed sustainment and
modernization plans, specified in the ICBM Master Plan, to ensure the
infrastructure necessary to support and operate our ICBM fleet. We feel
these plans will meet the challenges required to sustain the MMIII to
2030.
29. General Kowalski and General Chambers, do you believe it was an
isolated incident?
General Kowalski and General Chambers. Yes, the Minuteman III
Weapon System continues to perform as a safe, secure, and effective
deterrent. Our newest Major Command, AFGSC, conducted an extensive
review of last fall's event and determined this was an isolated
incident and is not indicative of age-related systemic problems within
the ICBM force. The Minuteman III ICBM weapon system alert rate exceeds
99 percent.
Consistent with the NDAA Section 1251 Report, the Air Force,
through the leadership of AFGSC, has developed sustainment and
modernization plans, specified in the ICBM Master Plan, to ensure the
infrastructure necessary to support and operate our ICBM fleet. We feel
these plans
30. Senator Sessions. General Kowalski and General Chambers, how
confident are you that the Air Force will be able to sustain the
current ICBM force through 2030?
General Kowalski and General Chambers. Very confident. The AF is
committed to sustaining and modernizing the existing Minuteman III ICBM
system through 2030. The fiscal year 2012 PB request includes
approximately $1.9 billion of investment funding over the FYDP (fiscal
year 2012-2016) to extend the existing MM III ICBM weapon system
through 2030. All aspects of the ICBM Federal and contractor community
are being exercised and funded to sustain and/or modernize (through
refurbishment or replacement due to obsolescence and/or diminishing
vendor base) the MM III ICBM force and associated infrastructure.
31. General Kowalski and General Chambers, when should a decision
be made for pursuing the development of a follow-on ICBM?
General Kowalski and General Chambers. The 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review stated that studies are needed now to inform a decision on a
follow-on ICBM. To meet this need, pre-AoA efforts have already begun.
AFGSC has already initiated a Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent
Capability Based Assessment (CBA). The CBA supports development of the
Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) which establishes baseline
requirements for any future Minuteman III replacement program. The next
step is the actual AoA which will be accomplished in fiscal year 2013-
2014.
Once the AoA is completed it will be used to recommend the best
ICBM follow-on options from a broad range of alternatives. A final
decision is needed sometime in the fiscal year 2015 timeframe.
air launched cruise missile
32. Senator Sessions. General Chambers, are there any challenges
associated with sustaining the ALCM until 2030?
General Chambers. Yes. ALCM faces the common, yet manageable
challenges you might expect any weapon system to face that is having
its service life extended. Any system that has been in the inventory
for more than two decades must manage diminishing manufacturing source
issues, weapon system reliability concerns and service life extension
priorities. The Air Force has a robust FDE (flight test), functional
ground test, analytical condition inspection and aging and surveillance
program to assist with managing these challenges.
33. Senator Sessions. General Chambers, the fiscal year 2012 budget
includes $884 million over the next 5 years for the development of a
new ALCM. Has the Air Force decided if this new ALCM will be nuclear
capable at the outset?
General Chambers. Yes, the Air Force has decided that the new ALCM
will be nuclear capable at the outset.
34. Senator Sessions. General Chambers, if nuclear, does the Air
Force intend to use the W-80, and if so, when would the LEP on the W-80
have to begin so that it will be available for the new cruise missile?
General Chambers. The Air Force has decided that the new ALCM will
be nuclear capable at the outset. Recommendations on the specific
warhead for use in the new cruise missile, and requisite LEP start date
are being developed by a cross-organizational Warhead Working Group
with participation from NNSA, STRATCOM, AFGSC, AFNWC, and AAC. There
are several warhead candidates being considered, including the W80. The
Warhead Working Group is also supporting the development of an
integrated master schedule that will include a required LEP start date.
Data from the LRSO AoAs will be used to help finalize the warhead
recommendation. Final recommendations for warhead selection and LEP
start date will be completed prior to Milestone A, which is currently
scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2013.
b-61
35. Senator Sessions. General Chambers, what is the current status
of the Air Force's efforts on the B-61's tail subassembly development
and overall integration efforts?
General Chambers. The Air Force is currently preparing for a
combined Material Development Decision (MDD)/Milestone A Defense
Acquisition Board, scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year
2011. Preparations include developing and finalizing technology
development and acquisition strategies, contracting strategies,
requirements, and cost estimates. The Air Force is also drafting
statutory and regulatory documents required for MDD and Milestone A. In
addition, the Air Force is gathering data from three ongoing concept
development contracts and has established integration working groups
that include participation from platform program offices and the DOE/
NNSA.
36. Senator Sessions. General Chambers, do any challenges currently
exist in meeting the fiscal year 2017 deadline for the first production
unit (FPU)?
General Chambers. Yes, challenges do exist, but both the DOD (Air
Force) and DOE (NNSA) efforts are on track to meet an fiscal year 2017
FPU. At this stage of the acquisition program, the primary challenge we
have identified is synchronizing the DOE and DOD acquisition efforts,
and emphasis has been placed on communication at all levels. One
specific forum we have established to ensure communication between the
Air Force and NNSA is a flag officer level Senior Management Team
(SMT). The SMT meets monthly to review progress and provide guidance to
the Air Force and NNSA program management teams.
air force replacement helicopters
37. Senator Sessions. General Kowalski and General Chambers, what
is the current acquisition strategy for the Air Force procurement of
the CVLSP, the helicopter replacement program for the current fleet of
UH-1s?
General Kowalski and General Chambers. The SECAF and CSAF approved
a full and open competition acquisition strategy for the CVLSP program
on 12 Apr 2011. Schedule milestones include request for proposals in
late fiscal year 2011, contract award in later part of fiscal year
2012, leading to an IOC in fiscal year 2015. The funding in the fiscal
year 2011 Appropriation and fiscal year 2012 President's budget request
is considered adequate to support this acquisition strategy.
38. Senator Sessions. General Kowalski and General Chambers, will
this be a new development program or do any current DOD airframes exist
that could meet requirements at a lower cost?
General Kowalski and General Chambers. The CVLSP program intends to
procure a non-development, off-the-shelf, in-production helicopter that
will require minimal or no development effort. There are helicopters
currently in production including DOD airframes that could potentially
satisfy CVLSP requirements.
start treaty implementation
39. Senator Sessions. General Kowalski and General Chambers, what
is the anticipated cost for Air Force implementation of the New START
treaty?
General Kowalski and General Chambers. The Air Force continues to
evaluate projected cost for implementation of the New START treaty.
However, until a final decision is made on deployed Air Force strategic
delivery vehicles, as well as elimination methods for the ICBM silos
and conversion method for the B-52, an accurate cost is not feasible at
this time.
40. Senator Sessions. General Kowalski and General Chambers, what
is the Air Force plan for meeting New START levels for deployed ICBM
launchers?
General Kowalski and General Chambers. Our ICBM planning efforts
are focused on complying with the limit as dictated in the NDAA Section
1251 Report of up to 420 deployed ICBM launchers. While a final force
structure decision has not been made, the Air Force continues to
analyze several options to meet the New START limits.
41. Senator Sessions. General Kowalski and General Chambers, the
1251 report that accompanied the New START treaty stipulated an ICBM
force structure of up to 420 (a reduction of 30). When will a decision
on the actual number be made?
General Kowalski and General Chambers. The Air Force is currently
working with the Joint Staff to evaluate force structure options and to
make a final decision on the number of deployed ICBMs and nuclear-
capable bombers. When the actual decision will be made is still to be
determined.
42. Senator Sessions. General Kowalski and General Chambers, does
the Air Force intend to spread reductions across multiple ICBM wings or
would it be more economical to eliminate a block of silos at an
individual base? If so, why? If not, why?
General Kowalski and General Chambers. The Air Force has not made a
final decision on how reductions in deployed ICBMs would be made across
the force. Some of the considerations involved in this decision are the
method of reduction (elimination vs. nondeployed status), ongoing
modification programs, technical characteristics of the Minuteman III
weapon system, the conditions of specific launchers and the actual
number of reductions that have to be made. The Air Force continues to
evaluate options.
[Whereupon, at 3:34 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 13, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, DC.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E.
Benjamin Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Nelson, Levin, Udall,
Shaheen, and Sessions.
Committee staff member present: Mary J. Kyle, legislative
clerk.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and
Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant.
Minority staff member present: Daniel A. Lerner,
Professional Staff Member.
Staff assistants present: Hannah I. Lloyd and Breon N.
Wells.
Committee members' assistants present: Ann Premer,
assistant to Senator Nelson; Casey Howard, assistant to Senator
Udall; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; and
Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, CHAIRMAN
Senator Nelson. The subcommittee today meets to consider
the ballistic missile defense (BMD) policies and programs of
the Department of Defense (DOD) supported in the fiscal year
2012 budget request. We're pleased to have four distinguished
public servants as witnesses today and we all appreciate your
service to our country.
Dr. Brad Roberts is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy. He's been
deeply involved in developing missile defense policy and
strategy, including last year's comprehensive Ballistic Missile
Defense Review (BMDR). He continues to develop our strategy and
is also working to ensure the implementation of those policies
and strategies.
Lieutenant General Patrick O'Reilly is the Director of the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA), which is responsible for
conceiving, developing, testing, building, and delivering an
integrated and operationally effective ballistic missile
defense system (BMDS), including its component elements, to the
Services and combatant commanders.
Rear Admiral Arch Macy is the Director of the Joint
Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO) at the
Joint Staff. He has been leading the joint warfighter
assessment of our missile defense needs and has just completed
an important study called ``The Joint Capabilities Mix III
(JCM-III),'' which will help guide our future missile defense
program and budget decisions. I would note that Admiral Macy is
planning to retire at the end of this month, so this is likely
his last hearing with the committee, but at his suggestion, not
ours. We thank you for your many years of service to the
Nation, Admiral Macy, and we wish you and your family the very
best in your future.
Cristina Chaplain is the Director of Acquisition and
Sourcing Management for the Government Accountability Office
(GAO). She and her team have recently completed their annual
assessment of MDA's progress on the development and acquisition
of the BMDS, focusing particularly on issues of transparency
and accountability.
As the BMDR emphasized last year, BMD is an essential
national priority to protect the Homeland from the possibility
of a missile attack from countries such as North Korea and Iran
and to protect our forward-deployed forces, our allies, and
partners overseas against the large and growing threat of
regional missiles. As Admiral Winnefeld indicated last week,
with our Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system we're
ahead of the Homeland threat from North Korea and Iran, and we
want to keep it that way. Our regional missile defenses, using
the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA), are designed to meet the
existing threat and adapt to future threats.
Developing effective BMDS is an extremely complex technical
endeavor. Consequently, it often takes longer than we would
like. However, it's essential that we develop the systems
carefully, test them adequately and realistically, and
demonstrate that they work effectively before we produce and
deploy them. Lives depend on it.
BMD is also expensive. This is particularly notable under
the current constrained budget environment. The fiscal year
budget request for missile defense is $10.7 billion and the
planned budget for MDA for fiscal years 2011 through 2016 is
roughly $52 billion. As GAO notes, the BMDS is the largest
single acquisition program within DOD. So it's important that
the administration has a policy that missile defenses must be
fiscally sustainable and affordable and that we have
appropriate accountability and transparency for the program.
Within this context, there are a number of issues we hope
to discuss today. For example, concerning Homeland defense,
we're interested to hear about proposed fixes, enhancements,
and hedging options for the GMD system. We're interested to
know what the implementation of the European Phased Adaptive
Approach (EPAA) to missile defense is, to know more about that.
This includes the development, testing, production, and
deployment of the planned elements for the EPAA, such as the
Standard Missile 3 interceptor variants to be deployed with
each successive phase. We'd also like to learn more about our
efforts to expand other international cooperation, including
efforts to cooperate with Russia on missile defense.
We thank all of you for your contributions to improving
missile defense and to our security and we look forward to your
testimony.
Now it's my pleasure to turn to my ranking member and good
friend, Senator Sessions, for any opening comments he may have.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is an
important hearing and an important subcommittee. Thank you for
your leadership. I've enjoyed working with you and respect you
and your judgment on these issues very highly.
Today's hearing focuses on the President's 2012 budget for
the MDA. I'm pleased that the top line of $8.6 billion includes
a modest increase over last year, but I'm concerned that the
overall 5-year budget represents a more than $2.2 billion
reduction below last year's planned future defense budget. So I
have concerns whether we have the ability to support the full
cost and on-time delivery of the weapons systems we've invested
so much in.
I've long urged that we focus more on the GMD system, the
only system solely responsible for protecting the Homeland at
this time. Unfortunately, the budget request continues to
deprive GMD, I'm afraid, of the resources necessary to provide
and refine the system.
General O'Reilly, you tout the improvements of GMD such as
the emplacement of 30 interceptors and upgrades to the missile
to Fort Greely area. Those accomplishments are welcome and
appreciated, but without additional resources, the GMD program
may not succeed, and the two recent test failures should serve
as key reminders that more must be done to ensure the
capability we have works and that it will improve over time.
I'm confident that the difficulties we are having will and can
be solved, but we have to spend some time and effort on that.
I look forward to understanding why you believe you can
achieve and sustain success in a program that needs more
attention with a budget that's $1.4 billion below what you said
you needed in the Fiscal Year 2011 Future Years Defense Plan
(FYDP). After all the money we've spent on developing this
program, it's really not the time to take our eye off the ball.
It really needs to be completed. I think it would just be a
tragedy if we didn't follow through here after all the decades
of work.
The GAO questions the plan for the sustainment and
modernization of GMD. Last year, GAO reported that DOD ``still
lacks full knowledge of GMD's capability and limitations'' and
that, although there is a need to continue development until
2020, the ``acquisition of major GMD assets is nearly
complete,'' and that DOD has shifted its focus to ``improving
its knowledge of GMD's capabilities and improving
integration.''
Given the two recent failures, I look forward to discussing
whether or not we need to look back a bit here and make sure
we're not ahead of ourselves.
The Aegis weapon system remains one of our most promising
capabilities and its legacy of incremental development,
refinement, and proven design is a cornerstone of its success.
Last week, MDA awarded its first contracts for the new Aegis
evolution, the SM-3 Block IIB, and I look forward to hearing
more about the development plan for the IIB.
Nonetheless, I remain concerned that the schedule is overly
optimistic. Development of the SM-3 Block I was an 8-year
effort for an incremental upgrade of the proven SM-2 Block IV.
The SM-3 Block IIB concept appears to be a far more significant
upgrade and, according to some initial descriptions, could
represent a significant departure from Standard Missile
variants.
Furthermore, I question the decision not to include the
Aegis program office in the early stage development, ignoring
in my opinion the design philosophy that has epitomized
success.
The PAA to missile defense establishes a global framework
for regional uncertainties. If executed correctly and on time,
it will represent a good approach that is both relocatable and
scalable. According to the BMD review, the fourth phase of the
PAA and SM-3 Block IIB will improve the defense of the
Homeland. As we are all aware, this layered protection could
have come earlier with the prior plan that we had from the
prior administration. However, I agree that defending both
Europe and the U.S. from Iran with only 10 interceptors was not
sufficient--it was not going to provide the inventory necessary
to deter Iranian aggression.
So I look forward to learning more on the anticipated
Homeland defense capabilities of SM-3 Block IIB, how they
compare to the previously planned two-stage GBIs, while the
two-stage GBI has been designated as a contingency if the
recent development of IIB takes longer than anticipated.
The JCM-III study to provide warfighter input on necessary
global force requirements for sensors, interceptors, and
launchers has just been finalized. I look forward to hearing
more about this study.
Let me close by offering a special thanks to Admiral Macy
for being here today. I understand you plan to retire this
month and we congratulate you on your service and thank you for
your commitment to your country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Udall, do you have any opening comments that you
might like to make?
Senator Udall. I'm eager to hear from the witnesses.
Senator Nelson. Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. No.
Senator Nelson. If it's okay with everybody, let's have a
7-minute round. Is that satisfactory? [No response.]
General O'Reilly, you know we're more than halfway through
fiscal year 2011 and DOD is still--oh, excuse me, yes. I guess
you get a chance to talk first. That doesn't happen often
enough. But thank you, Richard. Thank you.
You may even answer the question before I ask it, now that
I've tipped you off. Will you start first, General O'Reilly?
STATEMENT OF LTG PATRICK J. O'REILLY, USA, DIRECTOR, MISSILE
DEFENSE AGENCY
General O'Reilly. Good afternoon, Chairman Nelson, Ranking
Member Sessions, other distinguished members of the
subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to testify before
you today on the MDA's $8.6 billion fiscal year 2012 budget
request to develop protection of our Nation, our Armed Forces,
allies, and friends against the continually growing threat, the
proliferation of increasingly capable ballistic missiles.
In fiscal year 2012 we propose to continue our enhancement
and integration of sensor, fire control, battle management, and
interceptors in the BMDS, to improve the reliability and
performance of our Homeland defense, and to defeat large raid
sizes of a growing variety of regional ballistic missiles. By
the end of fiscal year 2012 we will complete the initial
fielding of a GMD system for Homeland defense against first
generation intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM)
potentially being developed by current regional threats. We
will also continue our initial fielding of regional defenses
against today's short-, medium-, and intermediate-range
ballistic missiles that are in direct support of our combatant
commanders.
I should note that our fiscal year 2012 budget request was
predicated on receiving the fiscal year 2011 requested budget.
Therefore, we will adjust our program accordingly once the
final fiscal year 2011 budget is approved.
We have had significant accomplishments over the past year,
including the conduct of 8 out of 8 planned flight tests using
13 successful targets, the first flight of a two-stage Ground-
Based Interceptor (GBI), the third successful missile intercept
by the Japanese Aegis program, a successful low-altitude
intercept by the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System
(THAAD). We destroyed two boosting ballistic missiles with our
Airborne Laser Testbed; and we proved sufficiently accurate
missile tracks from two Space Tracking and Surveillance System
satellites to enable a missile defense intercept without using
ground radars.
Additionally, we supported Israel's successful intercept of
a threat missile earlier last month. We also delivered 25 SM-3
IA interceptors, began the THAAD interceptor production,
emplaced the 30th GBI, and completed the upgrade of the early
warning radar in Thule, Greenland.
Today, MDA's top priority is to confirm the root cause of
the most recent GBI flight test failure, then verify the
resolution of the problem and successfully repeat the previous
flight test. While the failure review board has only produced
preliminary results, it is clear more ground testing and an
additional non-intercept flight test of an upgraded GBI
exoatmospheric kill vehicle will be required before the next
intercept.
For the GMD, in fiscal year 2012 we are requesting funding
for procuring five new GBIs, completing the construction of the
GMD Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely, AK, the construction of a
missile communications system on the east coast of the United
States, placing Missile Field 1 in a storage mode for possible
upgrade and operations in the future, and upgrading the early
warning radar in Clear, AK.
Today 30 operational GBIs protect the United States against
a limited ICBM attack launched from current regional threats.
We closely monitor intelligence assessments with the
intelligence community and if this capability is determined to
be insufficient we are developing options to increase the
number of operational GBIs and accelerate the delivery of new
sensor and interceptor capabilities.
DOD is committed to brief Congress soon on our strategy to
hedge against uncertainties in threat estimates. Additionally,
I've answered questions in other hearings that I've testified
to that it is my personal judgment that, in light of the two
GBI test failures, the need for an additional non-intercept
test, and the need to repeat the failed test, we will need to
reassess the total number of GBIs we are procuring and reflect
that assessment in the President's budget request for fiscal
year 2013.
Our execution of the EPAA is on track for meeting the
timelines outlined by the President in September 2009. For
phase 1, or our initial capability in Europe, our first Aegis
ballistic missile ship deployment, the U.S.S. Monterey, is on
station. The latest command and control system upgrades are
being installed at the U.S. European Command, and the Army
Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY-2) forward-based
radar will be available in August for deployment in southern
Europe by the end of this year.
Finally, in a few days we will conduct a major test in the
Pacific to verify the readiness of the phase 1 architecture
against an intermediate-range ballistic target.
For phase 2, or our enhanced capability against medium-
range ballistic missiles by 2015, we will conduct the first
flight test of the next generation Aegis missile interceptor,
the SM-3 Block IB, this summer and certify the associated
upgrade of the Aegis fire control system in 2012. The design of
the adaptation of the Aegis system for land basing, called
Aegis Ashore, began last summer and the test site will be
installed in Hawaii in 2013 and flight tested in 2014. The
installation of the Aegis Ashore in Romania will also occur in
2014 and be fully operational by 2015.
For phase 3, or an enhanced capability against
intermediate-range ballistic missiles by 2018, the SM-3 Block
IIA interceptor is completing its preliminary design this year
in support of flight testing in 2015 and deployment in 2018. We
are preparing the Airborne Infrared sensor for early missile
tracking using the Air Force's next generation sensor in fiscal
year 2012, and we will begin the design process of the
Precision Tracking Space System.
For phase 4, or medium and intermediate-range and ICBM
early intercept capability in Europe by 2020, we competitively
awarded concept design contracts for the SM-3 IIB interceptor
to three industry teams last week. The SM-3 IIB development
timeline is consistent with the average development timeline of
other missile interceptors of its class to ensure a low
development risk approach.
While not necessary for the defense of the United States
against limited attacks by early generation ICBMs, the SM-3 IIB
will complement the GMD, Aegis, and THAAD systems to greatly
increase the cost-effectiveness of our missile defenses.
Beyond PAA phase 4, we are pursuing advanced technologies
for more effective missile defenses in the future, to develop
high-energy, compact, lightweight laser technologies.
Finally, the MDA continues to engage in international
missile defense projects, studies, and analyses with over 20
countries and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
In conclusion, our fiscal year 2012 budget request funds
the development of BMD capabilities that are flexible,
survivable, cost-effective, and tolerant of uncertainties of
intelligence estimates of both nation state and extremist
ballistic missile threats.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to answering
your subcommittee's questions.
[The prepared statement of General O'Reilly follows:]
Prepared Statement by LTG Patrick J. O'Reilly, USA
Good afternoon, Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, other
distinguished members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity
to testify before you today on the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) $8.6
billion fiscal year 2012 budget request to develop protection for our
Nation, our Armed Forces, allies, and friends against a growing
threat--the proliferation of increasingly capable ballistic missiles.
We continue to enhance and integrate sensor, fire control, battle
management, and interceptor systems into the Ballistic Missile Defense
System (BMDS) to improve the reliability and performance of our
homeland defense and defeat large raids of a growing variety of
regional ballistic missiles over the next decade. By the end of fiscal
year 2012, we will complete the initial fielding of the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense (GMD) system for homeland defense against first
generation Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) potentially
being developed by current regional threats. We will also continue our
initial fielding of regional defenses against today's short-range
(1,000 km or less), medium-range (1,000 to 3,000 km), and intermediate-
range ballistic missiles (3,000 to 5,500 km), or short-range ballistic
missiles (SRBMs), medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM), and
intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), respectively.
fiscal year 2010 accomplishment highlights
During this past year, we have improved our homeland defense by
emplacing the 30th Ground Based Interceptor (GBI), upgrading two
additional GBIs, installing a training node at Fort Greely, AK (FGA),
and completing a significant upgrade of the Early Warning Radar in
Thule, Greenland. Additionally, we had a successful two-stage Ground-
Based Interceptor (GBI) booster test and conducted a three-stage GBI
intercept test where we did not achieve our primary objective, but we
did demonstrate integrated sensors and command, control, battle
management, and communication (C2BMC) during the longest range flight
test to date. During the past year, we also improved our regional
defenses by converting 2 Aegis BMD ships, delivering 25 SM-3 IA
interceptors, and increasing the Aegis BMD fleet to 20 operationally
configured BMD ships. Aegis BMD ships carrying SM-3 IA interceptors are
currently deployed and on-station in forward operating areas, including
the USS Monterey as part of the first phase of the European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA). We also commenced production of Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Batteries 3 and 4 and the associated
interceptors. We accelerated the refurbishment of an AN/TPY-2 radar for
phase 1 of the EPAA and installed a C2BMC system and prepared a second
AN/TPY-2 for deployment to U.S. Central Command. Moreover, we
successfully flew 14 target missions, including a successful intercept
of a separating MRBM with our Japanese allies using an SM-3 IA
interceptor (thus completing the first BMD Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
case), and conducted a successful intercept of a unitary SRBM with
THAAD. For future capabilities, we demonstrated the ability of the two
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) satellites to provide
stereo, high-fidelity tracking capabilities and transfer tracks into
C\2\BMC. Our Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB) successfully destroyed two
boosting ballistic missiles. We achieved our goal of demonstrating NATO
Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense interoperability with
the U.S. C2BMC in Joint Project Optic Windmill. Finally, we completed
U.S. and Israeli Government project agreements on the Arrow 3 Upper
Tier Interceptor, the David's Sling Weapon System, and an Israeli Test
Bed. Recently, we supported Israel's successful intercept mission of a
separating threat missile off the coast of California.
enhancing homeland defense
MDA's top priority is to confirm the root cause of the most recent
GBI flight test failure, verify the resolution of the problem, and
successfully repeat the previous flight test. While the Failure Review
Board has only produced preliminary results, it is clear more ground
testing and an additional non-intercept flight test of an upgraded GBI
Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) will be required before the next
intercept.
We are requesting $1.16 billion in fiscal year 2012 in Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding for the GMD program
(including completing the construction of Missile Field 2 at FGA),
which will complete the initial fielding of the defense of our homeland
against limited ICBM attacks. In fiscal year 2012, we also will
continue to upgrade existing GBIs and acquire new GBIs to meet our
minimum requirement of 26 operational GBIs at FGA, 4 at Vandenberg Air
Force Base (VAFB), CA, and 22 GBIs for testing, stockpile reliability
testing, and spares. Key to an effective GBI sustainment program is
examining the results of flight tests (including the loss of two GBIs
during recent flight testing) and reliability testing. In parallel, we
continue GBI component vendor requalifications for the future GBI
avionics upgrade and obsolescence program. Given the two flight test
failures and the need for a new non-intercept flight and a repeat of
the last flight test, we need to assess the procurement quantity of
additional GBIs as part of the fiscal year 2013 President's budget
request. The new missile field (Missile Field 2) will replace the
prototype Missile Field 1, which will be placed in a storage mode for
possible upgrade for operational use in the future. We will complete
the construction of a second fire control node at FGA to allow testing
or exercises to be conducted while simultaneously controlling the
operational system. In addition to completing the upgrade of our new
hardened backup power plant at FGA in fiscal year 2011, we will also
complete the upgrade of the communications system at FGA in fiscal year
2012. Additionally, we will begin the planning, design and environment
work for a GBI In-Flight Interceptor Communication System (IFCS) Data
Terminal (IDT) on the east coast of the United States by 2015. This
East Coast IDT will enable communication with GBIs launched from FGA
and VAFB on longer flights, thus improving the defense of the eastern
United States against potential ICBM threats from the Middle East. We
also are requesting $177.1 million in RDT&E funding for the Sea-Based
X-band radar in fiscal year 2012 for software upgrades to improve its
discrimination capability.
In addition to GMD upgrades, we are requesting $222.4 million in
fiscal year 2012 for BMDS Sensors for homeland defense, including
support of the Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWRs) and AN/TPY-2
radars. Integration of the Thule, Greenland radar in fiscal year 2012
will make it a fully operational UEWR in the BMDS. We continue to
upgrade the Clear Early Warning Radar in Alaska for full missile
defense capability by 2016. In addition, a forward-based AN/TPY-2 X-
band radar will be deployed to southern Europe to provide early
tracking for both enhanced homeland and regional defense. We will
continue to upgrade system software to address new and evolving
threats, including enhancing Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle
discrimination algorithms by 2015, improving GBI avionics, and
increasing GBI interoperability with the Command and Control, Battle
Management and Communications (C2BMC) system.
After last year's successful initial flight of a two-stage GBI, we
plan to conduct an intercept flight test with a two-stage GBI as a
potential hedge to allow for a longer intercept window of time if ICBMs
were launched against the United States from Northeast Asia or the
Middle East. However, as a consequence of the need to repeat the failed
three-stage GBI flight tests, we plan to delay the first intercept test
of the two-stage GBI from fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2014.
Finally, we will continue development of the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3)
IIB to protect our homeland in the future by having the capability to
intercept first generation ICBMs within the regions from which they
were launched.
hedge for protection of the united states
Today, 30 operational GBIs protect the United States against a
medium ICBM raid size launched from current regional threats. If this
capability is determined to be insufficient for protection of the U.S.
Homeland based on intelligence estimations of future threats, we have
options to increase the number of operational GBIs and accelerate the
delivery of new sensor and interceptor capabilities. The Department is
committed to brief Congress soon on the results of our ongoing BMD
analysis and our recommended hedge strategy.
enhancing regional defense
We are also currently deploying our initial missile defense
capability against SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs. Over the next decade we are
enhancing this initial capability by developing increasingly capable
missile defenses that can be adapted to the unique circumstances of
each combatant command region. In regions where ballistic missile
threats are a concern, the United States will tailor Missile Defense
Phased Adaptive Approaches (PAAs) (like the European PAA (EPAA)) to
plan the establishment of command and control, sensor, fire control,
and interceptor infrastructures to provide fundamental defenses and
facilitate the effective surge of transportable missile defense assets
to their regions when needed.
The EPAA focuses on addressing missile defense interoperability
with NATO and our allies and partners as the threat from the Middle
East is anticipated to increase over the next decade. In November 2010,
NATO Heads of State and Government agreed to develop an Alliance
territorial missile defense capability to ``provide full coverage and
protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces
against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic
missiles.'' The United States has committed to provide the EPAA as a
national contribution to this capability, built on the Active Layered
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense command and control system, and we
are encouraging our allies to field and provide national capabilities
as well.
Phase 1: Initial SRBM, MRBM, and IRBM Defense in Europe--to be
completed by the end of 2011. In this phase, our goal is to achieve an
initial missile defense capability in Europe using the Aegis BMD 3.6.1
weapon system with SM-3 IA interceptors, forward-based AN/TPY-2 and
SPY-1 radars, and the C2BMC system at Ramstein Air Force Base, Germany,
which will improve connections to NATO command and control structures.
The USS Monterey is at sea today and, when paired with the AN/TPY-2
radar, will provide initial BMD protection of southern Europe from
existing SRBM, MRBM, and IRBM threats. While no decision on the
location of the radar has been made, we expect to meet our 2011
deployment timeline. Additionally, THAAD batteries will be available
for deployment in this and subsequent phases. The Army activated a
second THAAD battery in October 2009, which is scheduled to complete
training by the end of calendar year 2011. We are requesting $290.5
million in RDT&E funding to enhance communications and enable THAAD's
launch-on-sensor network capability, which will allow THAAD to
intercept threat missiles tracked by many different missile defense
sensors. We also request $833.2 million for the production of 68 THAAD
interceptors, 6 launchers, and 1 Tactical Station Group to be delivered
by fiscal year 2014, and $380.2 million for the production of 2 AN/TPY-
2 radars.
Phase 2: Enhanced MRBM Defense in Europe by 2015. Our goal in this
phase is to provide a robust capability against SRBMs and MRBMs by
launching several different interceptors to engage each threat missile
multiple times in its flight. This architecture includes the deployment
of the Aegis BMD 4.0.1/5.0 weapon fire control systems with SM-3 IB
interceptors at sea and at an Aegis Ashore site in Romania. When
compared to the current SM-3 IA, the IB will have an improved two-color
seeker for greater ability to discriminate threat Reentry Vehicles from
other objects, and it will have improvements to enhance reliability and
producibility of the SM-3 IB's divert and attitude control system.
These improvements also provide greater capability against larger sized
raids. We are requesting $565.4 million for the production of 46 SM-3
Block IB interceptors to be delivered by fiscal year 2014 and $960
million for Aegis BMD to fund continued development and testing of the
SM-3 IB as well as upgrades to Aegis 5.0 fire control software to
support the operation of the SM-3 IB and IIA interceptors and
associated flight tests. In fiscal year 2012, we are requesting $306.6
million to begin acquiring Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Systems (land-
based SM-3) batteries--one for testing at the Pacific Missile Range
Facility, and one for deployment in Romania by fiscal year 2015. We
request $364.1 million for the C2BMC program for continued development
of software and engineering to incorporate enhanced C2BMC capability
into the C2BMC battle management architecture and enable
interoperability among the BMDS elements, incorporate boost phase
tracking, and improve system-level correlation and tracking.
Phase 3: Enhanced IRBM Defenses in Europe by 2018. The SM-3 Block
IIA interceptor, being co-developed with the Japanese Government, is on
schedule to be deployed at the Aegis Ashore site in Romania and at an
additional Aegis Ashore site in Poland, and at sea, in 2018 to provide
enhanced protection for European NATO countries from all ballistic
missile threats from the Middle East. The fiscal year 2012 request for
SM-3 Block IIA co-development is $424.5 million. Additional BMDS
improvements during this phase include expanded coordination of missile
defense fire control systems and improvements to radar discrimination.
Likewise, beginning with their first launch in 2017, the Precision
Tracking Space System (PTSS) satellites will detect and track hostile
ballistic missiles over their entire flight and enable earlier
engagements to improve homeland and regional defense. Furthermore, the
deployment of the Airborne Infrared (ABIR) sensor will provide the
capability to provide early track of large ballistic missile raids from
forward locations, decreasing the time between the enemy's launch of
the first ballistic missile and the first launch of a ballistic missile
defense interceptor.
Phase 4: Early Intercept Defense in Europe by 2020. The SM-3 IIB
will provide an early intercept (pre-apogee) capability against MRBMs
and IRBMs and provide an additional layer for a more enhanced homeland
defense against ICBMs launched from today's regional threats. In fiscal
year 2012, we are requesting $123.5 million to fund three industry
teams to begin concept development of the SM-3 IIB design while MDA
develops advanced propulsion and lightweight material technologies
relevant to the SM-3 IIB interceptor. Advanced discrimination
technologies also will be deployed during EPAA Phase 4 including GMD's
use of fused data from the entire network of BMDS sensors (including
enhancements from PTSS and ABIR sensor capabilities) to improve
homeland defense.
proving missile defense works through enhanced testing
In fiscal year 2012, we are requesting nearly $1 billion of RDT&E
funding for Testing and Targets. In collaboration with the Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation and the Operational Test Agencies
(OTAs), MDA updated its Integrated Master Test Plan. The updated test
plan (version 11.1), consisting of 53 flight tests and 74 ground tests
from fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2016, promotes cost-
effectiveness by conducting fewer, but more complex, flight tests to
achieve more objectives and enhance the realism of each test.
It is the Agency's plan to conduct later this month an Aegis BMD
flight test using an SM-3 IA interceptor using data from the AN/TPY-2
radar passed through the C2BMC system to intercept an IRBM target.
Later this summer we will also demonstrate Aegis BMD 4.0.1 fire control
and the first flight test of the SM-3 IB interceptor. Additionally, we
will conduct two critical ground tests this year to demonstrate the
EPAA Phase 1 capability for defending European allies and deployed
forces from multiple and simultaneous SRBM and MRBM threats.
We will hold a series of system-level operational flight and ground
tests to demonstrate the initial capability against SRBMs and MRBMs for
theater/regional defense as well as planning in fiscal year 2012 the
first entirely operational test of the defense of the homeland by 2015.
Each operational test will be conducted as realistically as possible
and involve multiple targets of different ranges. This is where the
Agency will test how well these layered defenses work. These tests are
being planned and will be executed in concert with the BMDS Operational
Test Agencies and under the oversight of the Department of Defense
Director for Operational Test & Evaluation.. The BMD system under test
will be operated by the soldiers, sailors, and airmen assigned to their
respective missile defense equipment and placed under realistic wartime
conditions to truly document the capabilities and limitations of the
system. Finally, in fiscal year 2011, THAAD will execute a near-
simultaneous engagement of an MRBM and SRBM.
developing new capabilities
In fiscal year 2012, we plan to develop BMDS capabilities and
technologies that can adapt as threats change and are fiscally
sustainable. Early intercept capabilities enabled by satellites,
forward based sensors and the SM-3 IIB interceptor will provide
additional opportunities to kill threat missiles, enlarge protection
areas, and improve the overall performance of the BMDS.
After completing all of their original on-orbit testing in 2010, we
continue to operate the two STSS demonstration satellites to conduct
cooperative tests with other BMDS elements and demonstrate the
capability of STSS satellites against targets of opportunity. These
tests demonstrate the ability of space sensors to provide high
precision, real-time, tracking of missiles and midcourse objects that
enable the fire control solutions BMDS interceptors. We are requesting
$96.4 million for the STSS system in fiscal year 2012. Lessons learned
from the two STSS demonstration satellites inform PTSS development
decisions. We are requesting $160.8 million for PTSS in fiscal year
2012. The PTSS, a new program start in cooperation with Johns Hopkins
University Applied Physics Laboratory, Navy Research Laboratory, Air
Force SPACECOM, and industry will use simple designs and mature
technologies to provide persistent classification and tracking
capability of enemy ballistic missiles for areas of the globe that have
ballistic missile activity. PTSS project scope includes the delivery of
PTSS ground segments and the launch of the first two PTSS spacecraft in
fiscal year 2017.
In fiscal year 2012, we are requesting $46.9 million for the ABIR
program. The ABIR program will provide a capability to track large
ballistic missile raids with an airborne forward-based sensor,
decreasing the time between the enemy's launch of the first ballistic
missile and the first launch of a ballistic missile interceptor.
Initially, we will integrate a sensor from the Multi-spectral Targeting
System family of infrared sensors onto an MQ-9 Reaper Remotely Piloted
Vehicle to prove that we can enable Aegis fire control solutions with
forward-based airborne assets. In fiscal year 2012, using platforms and
operators supplied by the Air Force, and working closely with the Navy,
we propose to demonstrate the ability to provide external cueing,
sensor performance, and timely and accurate ballistic missile tracking.
Our objective is to integrate the ABIR sensor into a pod that can be
attached universally to the wing of a variety of aircraft.
Additionally, in fiscal year 2012 we are enhancing our command and
control capability to handle larger threat missile raid sizes and
leverage airborne and space sensor missile tracking data networks. We
will continue our development and testing of a multi-sensor application
(ABIR and space sensors) tasking and signal processing capability that
will provide data with sufficient quality to enable Aegis, THAAD, and
GMD fire control solutions for launching interceptors.
In fiscal year 2012, we are requesting $96.3 million for Directed
Energy Research ($92.6 million for ALTB). Following the successful
shoot downs of liquid-fueled and solid-fueled boosting ballistic
missile targets with an airborne laser in fiscal year 2010, the
Assistant Secretary for Defense Research and Engineering designated the
ALTB as a science and technology test bed for high power laser research
and development. In fiscal year 2012, we are teaming with the Air
Force's Research Laboratory to use the ALTB for testing advanced
directed energy technologies and conducting beam propagation and
lethality testing. A primary objective of our directed energy program
is to continue our partnership with Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory to develop Diode Pumped Alkaline-gas Laser System
technology, which offers great potential for high efficiency,
electrically-driven, compact, and light-weight high energy lasers for a
wide variety of missions of interest to MDA and the Department of
Defense.
international cooperation
As stated in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, developing
international missile defense capacity is a key aspect of our strategy
to counter ballistic missile proliferation. In Europe, we remain
committed to working with our NATO allies to make NATO lower layer
missile defense assets interoperable with U.S. upper-tier missile
defense assets deployed under the EPAA through NATO's territorial
missile defense capability. In East Asia, we are improving missile
defenses through bilateral relationships. In the Middle East, we
continue to work with long-term partners and pursue strengthened
cooperation with other countries that have expressed interest in
missile defense. MDA is currently engaged in missile defense projects,
studies and analyses with over 20 countries, including Australia, the
Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, NATO,
Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, the United Arab Emirates,
and the United Kingdom.
MDA continues its close partnership with Japan on the SM-3 IIA
interceptor (Japan is leading the development efforts on the SM-3 IIA
second and third stage rocket motors and the nosecone), studying future
architectures, and supporting that nation's SM-3 IA flight test
program. We also continue collaboration with Israel on the development
and employment of several missile defense capabilities that are
interoperable with the U.S. BMDS. Last month, at a U.S. test range off
the coast of California, the Arrow Weapon System successfully
intercepted a target representative of potential ballistic missile
threats facing Israel today. We are requesting $106.1 million for
Israeli Cooperative Programs (including Arrow System Improvement and
the David's Sling Weapon System) in fiscal year 2012. We are working
with our partners from the United Arab Emirates on the development of a
FMS case for the THAAD system that would represent the first sale of
this capability.
Additionally, MDA is actively engaged with the Russian Federation
through three missile defense working groups led by the State
Department, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff. We
are optimistic from the outcomes of both the NATO Russia Council
meeting at Lisbon and the U.S. bilateral working groups that we will
make meaningful progress this year in cooperating with the Russian
Federation on missile defense, including considering leveraging the
combined early warning and surveillance radars of both countries.
conclusion
Our fiscal year 2012 budget funds completing the initial deployment
of SRBM, MRBM, IRBM, and ICBM defenses while meeting the warfighters'
near-term missile defense development priorities. Subsequently, we will
build on that initial capability with the long-term goal of creating an
international and enhanced network of integrated BMD capabilities that
is flexible, survivable, affordable, and tolerant of uncertainties of
estimates of both nation-state and extremist ballistic missile threats.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering the
committee's questions.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, General, and I want to make it
clear that we'll insert all your prepared statements in the
record, so if you are able to summarize, as General O'Reilly
did, that would be good. Thank you.
Dr. Roberts.
STATEMENT OF BRADLEY H. ROBERTS, Ph.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY
Dr. Roberts. Thank you, Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member
Sessions, members of the subcommittee. I'm grateful for the
opportunity to be here today and look forward to your
questions. I just have a brief oral statement. The written
statement begins with a review of the scope and conclusions of
the BMDR, with the hope that that might be of general interest
to this subcommittee. But my focus here today is on the key
issues that have emerged in our dialogue as we have shifted
from the phase that was policy development to policy
implementation.
From my perspective, there have been four main issues in
discussion between us of a policy kind. The first relates to
developments in the threat. In the missile defense review we
made a commitment to closely monitor developments in the threat
and to assess our defense investment priorities in light of new
information about the threat. Of course, in the last year we've
had a lot of new information that simply reconfirms the fact
that we have an accelerating development of threat, both
quantitatively and qualitatively, and this new information has
simply reinforced the commitment, our commitment as reflected
in the missile defense review, to a balanced approach that
ensures that we continue to improve protection of the Homeland
while at the same time accelerating regional protection.
The second main issue that's been of continuing discussion
among us relates to Homeland defense. In the missile defense
review we made the commitment to firstly continue to improve
our GMD of the Homeland in order to, in your words, stay ahead
of the threat as it develops, and to keep ahead over the long
term. But we made a related commitment to be well-hedged, and
we've had some continuing discussion about what that means.
I would emphasize that we made a series of commitments in
the last budget and some new commitments in the current budget
to take steps to continue to improve the performance of the GMD
system. Enhanced performance of the system can add future
capability in meeting quantitative and qualitative threat
developments clearly.
But the focus of discussion has been about the hedge. What
is it, first of all, we seek to hedge against? In shorthand,
it's the appearance of a second generation threat before we're
ready for it. Now, what does that mean? The posture we have
today is one that has us well-protected against the initial
ICBMs that might be deployed by states like North Korea and
Iran, that are few in number, relatively slow, and lack
sophisticated countermeasures. Against this threat we have the
current posture of 30 GBIs and the expected enhancements to
come in the defense of the Homeland with the future deployment
in the 2020 timeframe of SM-3 IIB.
The hedge problem is what happens if we have a number of
ICBMs deployed by states like North Korea, Iran, or
sophisticated ICBMs with sophisticated countermeasures before
the availability of the SM-3 IIB to enhance the protection of
the Homeland? For that problem, we have already taken steps to
hedge, as reflected in the BMDR, principally providing
additional silos into which we could place additional GBIs if
required to do so. This year we took the additional step of
mothballing rather than decommissioning some additional number
of silos so that when that's implemented we would have the
ability to increase from 30 to 44, roughly 50 percent, the
number of GBIs as a part of the hedge posture. We've also
committed to maintaining development of the two-stage GBI as a
part of this hedge.
The question that we've been engaged with now internally in
DOD for a few months is what more do we need to do to ensure
that the hedge posture is sufficient to deal with the possible
threat developments in the timeframe before 2020? As we've
stated in various venues, we're committed to bring that work
forward to you as soon as our Secretary is satisfied that it's
complete, and we expect to do so soon.
The third topic of continuing discussion between us has
been on implementing the PAA. Our attention has naturally been
attracted to Europe because this is the approach that attracted
the most political discussion and required the biggest push
over the last year politically. But this is a global approach
to the regions and one that has to be tailored to each of the
regions.
In a general summary, General O'Reilly has already given
you good detail on the technical aspects of this. But our first
priority in implementing PAA is to ensure that we are growing
the capabilities that are available that are relocatable and
flexible and adaptive to the different security environments.
So we've been ramping up procurement in order to meet the
rising demands of the combatant commands (COCOMs), and
politically we've been working within the multilateral
framework at NATO, bilaterally with our allies in East Asia and
elsewhere, to define needed next steps.
Lastly, the fourth issue I'd like to touch on relates to
expanding international cooperation. This is again a global
agenda from our perspective, but our focus here today, I think,
is on Russia. You've posed some specific questions there. We
believe, as I think you do, in the potential benefits of
cooperation with Russia. We believe also in the potential
risks.
We see the benefits as potentially significant for the
United States, for the European security environment, and for
NATO, but also for Russia. We're mindful of the challenges. We
reject cooperation that would in any way limit our missile
defenses. You know the shorthand: NATO will defend NATO, but
Russia will defend Russia, and we will seek to reinforce each
other's defense where there's mutual benefit in doing so.
We will not compromise essential technologies. There's no
discussion of sharing hit-to-kill with Russia. We have made
clear that cooperation will require successful conclusion of
the defense technology cooperation agreement. This has been
under discussion with Russia since it was proposed by the Bush
administration in 2004. We've also made it clear that any
classified information that's required for discussion with the
Russians on this topic would only be discussed after thorough
review under our national disclosure policy.
So we hope that we're being mindful of the risks while
being clear about the opportunities. We're working two parallel
paths: the NATO-Russia Council pathway with Russia, where we
are exploring the possibility of cooperative systems in defense
of common spaces, where we've resumed the theater missile
defense cooperation that was being pursued under the Bush
administration and where we're developing a joint analysis for
a future framework of cooperative activities.
Bilaterally, we're also working to pursue parallel work on
a joint analysis in order to better understand the capabilities
we would each contribute and on the defense technology
cooperation agreement.
With that, let me close my opening remarks and look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Roberts follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Brad Roberts
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the
Department's ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs. BMD is a key
strategic issue for the United States and I look forward to testifying
and answering your questions about our policies and plans.
the 2010 ballistic missile defense review
A year has passed since the Obama administration released its
review of BMD policy. It is important to recall that this was the first
ever comprehensive review of BMD policy and that it was undertaken with
congressional direction in order to inform our national debate about
policies, strategies, plans, and programs. As we continue to work
within the framework set out in that report, it is useful here to
recall its main elements.
The review began with an assessment of the ballistic missile
threat. Among its key findings were the following:
The threat is increasing both quantitatively and
qualitatively and is likely to continue to do so over the
coming decade.
Several States are developing nuclear, chemical, and/
or biological warheads for their missiles and may attempt to
use the resulting capabilities for military advantage in
conflict but also to coerce States near and far.
Regional actors such as North Korea and Iran continue
to develop long-range missiles that will be threatening to the
United States. There is some uncertainty about when and how
this type of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threat
to the U.S. Homeland will mature.
But there is no uncertainty about the existence of
regional missile threats. They are clear and present and
increasing at a particularly rapid pace.
Although confident predictions about the future of the
threat are difficult to make, there are some clear trends.
These include the progress from short- to longer-range missiles
and an increasingly open market in technologies, materials, and
expertise. There is also the troubling possibility that non-
state actors might acquire weapons of mass destruction and the
means to deliver them.
We drew two key conclusions from this threat analysis. First, U.S.
defense investments must be balanced in a way that enables the
effective defense of the U.S. homeland and of U.S. forces, allies, and
partners overseas in both the near and long term. Second, our defensive
capabilities must be adaptable to unexpected threat developments.
Threats may mature more rapidly or more slowly than predicted, may
appear in unexpected locations, or may involve novel technologies or
concepts of operations. It is essential that the United States be well
hedged and has a strong posture against unpredicted threat
developments.
The Review identified the administration's main policy priorities.
1. The United States will continue to defend the homeland from
limited ballistic missile attack. These efforts are focused on
protecting the homeland from a ballistic missile attack by a regional
actor such as North Korea or Iran. The U.S. Homeland is currently
protected against limited threats and possesses a capacity to counter
the projected threats from these States. But the United States must
maintain this advantageous position as the threat matures. Through our
continued commitment to maintain and develop the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense (GMD) system, the United States seeks to dissuade such States
from developing an ICBM, deter them from using an ICBM if they develop
or acquire such a capability, and defeat an ICBM attack by States if
deterrence fails.
2. The United States will defend against regional missile threats
to U.S. forces, while protecting allies and partners--and enabling them
to defend themselves. Regional approaches must be tailored to the
unique deterrence and defense requirements of each region, which vary
considerably in their geography, in the history and character of the
threat, and in the military-to-military relationships on which to build
cooperative missile defenses. The review reflected our commitment to
strengthen regional deterrence architectures with missile defense. It
also set out the phased adaptive approach to regional missile defense.
It is phased in that it will incorporate improving U.S. capabilities as
they become available. It is adaptive in that it is tailored to unique
regional requirements and opportunities. Because the demand for missile
defense assets within each region over the next decade will exceed
supply, we must focus on developing capabilities that are mobile and
relocatable.
3. Before new capabilities are deployed, they must undergo testing
that enables assessment under realistic operational conditions. This
commitment reflected our assessment that it is no longer necessary to
pursue a high-risk acquisition strategy that simultaneously develops
and deploys new systems. The Integrated Master Test Plan announced in
June 2009, and updated every 6 months since, reflects the Missile
Defense Agency's new approach.
4. New capabilities must be fiscally sustainable over the long
term. This commitment reflects our leadership's assessment that tough
decisions must be made to ensure the long-term viability of the
investment program. As such, we are pursuing lower-cost interceptors
and enabling early intercepts to minimize the inventory required to
negate a missile launch. The more constrained fiscal environment has
only reinforced our sense of resolve on this matter.
5. BMD capabilities must be flexible enough to adapt as threats
change. This conclusion derives from the threat assessment described
above.
6. The United States will seek to lead expanded international
efforts for missile defense. This is essential to the implementation of
the phased, adaptive approach to regional missile defense. More
broadly, it supports the objective of creating an environment in which
the development, acquisition, deployment, and use of ballistic missiles
by regional adversaries can be deterred.
ballistic missile defense review implementation
Over the last year, our focus has shifted from policy formulation
to policy implementation. In the continuing executive-legislative
discussion of implementation, four key issues have emerged, and I will
address each in turn.
1. Monitoring the threat: the Ballistic Missile Defense Review
(BMDR) expressed a commitment to maintain a strong focus on threat
developments and to rigorously assess defense planning in light of new
information. What have we learned?
2. Protecting the Homeland: the BMDR expressed a commitment to
continue to improve the GMD system in order to maintain the currently
advantageous offense-defense balance against limited strikes, and to be
well hedged against threat developments. What additional steps are
needed at this time?
3. Pursuing phased adaptive regional missile defense: the BMDR
expressed a commitment to deploy the phased adaptive approach in Europe
and apply the approach in East Asia and the Middle East. How much
progress has been made?
4. Seeking expanded international cooperation: the BMDR expressed
a commitment to lead expanded international efforts for missile
defense. This includes a commitment to work to establish a cooperative
BMD relationship with Russia. What opportunities and challenges have
emerged?
monitoring the threat
The last year has brought abundant confirmation that the threat is
continuing to grow quantitatively and qualitatively. A central focus
remains on Iran and North Korea as sources of potential threat to the
United States and to our allies. In addition, a number of States are
developing or acquiring Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities such as
anti-ship cruise missiles or anti-ship ballistic missiles. These
capabilities are intended to deny our forces access to key regions, and
to blunt the operations of forces that do deploy forward.
Iran already possesses the largest inventory of ballistic missiles
in the Middle East, and is developing more of them. In addition to its
growing missile and rocket inventories, Iran is boosting the lethality
and effectiveness of those stockpiles, through accuracy improvements,
new submunitions, and salvo launch capabilities. Furthermore, Iran's
Simorgh space-launch vehicle shows that Iran is making the
technological progress needed for the development of an ICBM.
Iran also shows continued interest in pursuing its nuclear-related
programs, though the Obama administration's economic sanctions program
has clearly begun to bite more deeply than the present regime might
have expected. Although we do not know if Iran will eventually decide
to build nuclear weapons, the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran is
deeply concerning to the United States and the global community, and
there is a risk that Iran's continued efforts along these lines may
prompt neighboring States to pursue national nuclear programs.
North Korea is modernizing every aspect of its deployed missile
forces--including short-, medium-, and intermediate-range systems. It
has reinforced its long-range artillery forces near the DMZ with a
substantial number of mobile ballistic missiles that could strike
targets in South Korea, Japan, and U.S. bases in the Pacific. North
Korea has not successfully tested an ICBM, but we expect it to continue
to test-launch missiles, including the Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2). With
further TD-2 tests, North Korea may develop an ICBM capable of reaching
the United States. In addition, Pyongyang has a long history of
ballistic-missile proliferation, and likely will continue to market and
potentially export missile technologies to a number of countries--
including Iran and Syria.
North Korea's nuclear-weapons program only increases our concerns
about that nation's missile capability. According to the Director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency, ``The North may now have several
plutonium-based nuclear warheads that it can deliver by ballistic
missiles and aircraft as well as by unconventional means.''
The ballistic-missile threat from North Korea is especially
relevant in light of recent provocative behavior by the regime. A
multinational Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Team concluded that
a North Korean midget submarine sank South Korea's naval corvette
Cheonan on March 26, 2010 near the contentious Northern Limit Line in
the West Sea, causing the loss of 46 South Korean sailors. Then, in the
first attack against a civilian-inhabited area since the Korean War,
North Korea shelled Yonpyong Island on November 23, killing two South
Korean marines and two civilians.
These assessments reinforce the administration's commitment to a
balanced approach that continues to improve the defense of the homeland
while also accelerating protection against regional threats.
defending the homeland
As noted above, the BMDR expressed a commitment to continue to
improve the GMD system in order to maintain the currently advantageous
offense-defense balance against limited strikes, and to be well hedged
against threat developments. What additional steps are needed at this
time?
The assessment that the United States is currently protected
against limited strikes derives from the strength of the current
posture against the current threat to the homeland. Today, the United
States is protected against limited ICBM attacks as a result of
investments made over the past decade in the GMD system. Thirty Ground-
Based Interceptors (GBIs) are now deployed to defend the homeland. To
enable successful intercepts by these missiles, radars are now in place
in Alaska, California, Greenland, and the United Kingdom. They are also
deployed at sea aboard Aegis destroyers and cruisers, at Shariki,
Japan, and in the form of the Sea-based X-band radar. These
capabilities are enabled by a sophisticated command and control
infrastructure. Looking to the future, this posture will provide
continued protection against initial ICBM deployments.
The commitment to continue to improve the GMD system is reflected
in a number of ongoing activities and in the associated fiscal year
2012 budget. We continue to:
Test and upgrade the system to increase reliability
and survivability
Develop and upgrade Ballistic Missile Defense System
sensors
Procure GBIs (in fiscal year 2012, we will procure
five more)
Implement GBI refurbishment and reliability
sustainment programs (in order to sustain the fleet for another
two decades)
Upgrade GMD Fire Control ground system software
Enhance the Command, Control, Battle Management and
Communications system to handle larger raid sizes
Develop and deploy new sensors in a variety of
settings--including forward bases in Europe, unmanned vehicles
in the skies, and platforms in space
Develop early-intercept concepts to help defeat
countermeasures and reduce the inventory required to negate
missile launches
Additionally, we are developing the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block
IIB for deployment against future IRBM and ICBM threats in the regional
defense architectures (as discussed further below), which is an
important part of the long-term defense against future ICBM threats to
the homeland.
The performance of the GMD system will also be strengthened with
new investments that will result in better sensor information reaching
the GBI during its flight. The fiscal year 2012 budget includes new
funding for an In Flight Interceptor Communications System Data
Terminal on the East Coast and for upgrades to the Early Warning Radars
at Clear, AK, and Cape Cod, MA. Looking to the longer term, the
administration is also investing to develop next generation missile
defense capabilities. This includes continued work to research the
potential of directed energy systems for missile defense.
We are sustaining these commitments even as the Department has
identified efficiencies and cuts as a result of government-wide budget
limitations.
These capability enhancements will contribute significantly to
preservation of the currently advantageous posture of the United States
against limited strikes if or as ICBM threats develop from Iran and
North Korea, or other regional threats. But they may not be enough. The
United States must also be well hedged against the possibility that
threats might evolve more rapidly than planned capability enhancements.
It must also be well hedged against the possibility that those
capability enhancements may be delayed for technical reasons. After
all, development programs involve inherent technical risk.
To strengthen the U.S. hedge posture, the administration has taken
the following steps:
Construction of Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely, AK, is
being completed in a 14-silo configuration to accommodate a
contingency deployment of eight additional GBIs if needed.
Six GBI silos at Missile Field 1 at Fort Greely are
being mothballed instead of decommissioned, allowing their
return to service within 2 years if necessary; and
Testing and assessment of a two-stage Ground-Based
Interceptor is continuing in order to preserve future
deployment options.
The administration is considering additional steps to strengthen
the U.S. hedge posture. We have been studying threat developments,
future capabilities, and deployment options for a range of scenarios.
We have been evaluating the deployment timelines associated with
fielding additional capabilities with an eye to enabling rapid
responses to triggering events. Our objective is to enable aggregate
improvements that increase probability of kill, raid capacity, and
battle space. This work involves a significant amount of classified
information from both the intelligence community and the system
developers. We have committed to brief this subcommittee on the results
in a classified setting in the next several weeks.
A key issue of continuing congressional interest is the role of the
two-stage GBI in the hedge strategy. The BMDR explicitly recognized
this role. The classified analysis addresses this matter directly, as
well as the continued role of GBIs more generally. DOD will ensure that
it preserves the capacity to provide additional GBIs to missile field
two and possibly missile field one should such decisions be taken in
the future. As General O'Reilly said in his testimony before the House
Armed Services Committee on March 31, several of the assumptions we
used to arrive at a total purchase of 52 GBIs are no longer valid,
primarily due to test failures and the need for additional testing.
Some increased number of GBIs that will be necessary, but we must
conclude the investigation of the most recent test failure before we
can make a determination about the number of additional GBIs that will
be required. The decision to procure five additional GBIs, together
with the ongoing refurbishment program, will keep GBI production lines
warm for several years. This in effect provides us with additional
decision time to procure additional GBIs without letting the production
lines go cold.
pursuing phased adaptive regional missile defense
The BMDR expressed a commitment to deploy the phased adaptive
approach (PAA) in Europe and apply the approach in East Asia and the
Middle East. How much progress has been made? In brief, the progress
has been significant.
Required Capabilities
To support PAA implementation, we are procuring a pool of missile
defense assets that will allow us to address current regional threats
and surge missile defenses into troubled regions in a time of
political-military crisis. To date, MDA has delivered two THAAD
batteries and seven AN/TPY-2 radars. By the end of fiscal year 2012, a
total of 29 Aegis ships will have BMD capability and there will be a
total of 15 U.S. PAC-3 battalions. The fiscal year 2012 budget
continues the procurement of additional THAAD batteries, forward-based
radars, as well as the conversion of additional Aegis ships, and SM-3
interceptors. This commitment to additional regional capabilities will
allow for increasingly robust regional architectures over the decade.
Europe
The BMDR set out the main elements of the application of the phased
adaptive approach in Europe. The European Phased Adaptive Approach
(EPAA) is phased to incorporate improving U.S. capabilities and
adaptive to the particular geopolitical landscape of Europe. The Obama
administration is committed to the deployment of all four phases.
Toward that end, it has begun to deploy initial capabilities. It has
also developed a diplomatic strategy with allies and partners in
Europe.
The first deployment of EPAA capabilities came on March 7 when the
guided missile cruiser USS Monterey, carrying SM-3 Block IA
interceptors, deployed to Europe. This deployment is supported by other
decisions within a comprehensive force management process, led by the
Joint Staff, that adjudicates competing requirements from the combatant
commands.
We are currently in discussions with potential host nations for the
deployment of an AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar to southeastern Europe.
While no decision has been made, we expect to meet our 2011 deployment
timeline. Looking ahead to Phase 2 in 2015 and the deployment of land-
based SM-3 interceptors in southeastern Europe, Romania has agreed to
host the site. Looking further ahead to Phase 3 in 2018, Poland has
agreed to host the second land-based SM-3 site.
Within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), considerable
progress has also been achieved. This past November at the Lisbon
Summit, NATO's leaders took the unprecedented step of deciding to
pursue full coverage and protection for the Alliance's populations,
territories, and forces in Europe against ballistic missile attacks.
NATO also decided at Lisbon to expand its existing missile defense
command and control backbone--the Active Layered Theater Ballistic
Missile Defense--to encompass territorial missile defense, which will
make current and future Alliance missile-defense assets interoperable.
These decisions send a strong signal that NATO will not allow itself to
be defenseless against ballistic missile coercion or attack.
Other Regions
The same basic approach is being pursued in East Asia and the
Middle East, but in a way that is tailored to the existing foundations
of cooperation and unique regional requirements. Capabilities will be
phased in as they become available for deployment, but in a manner
adapted to specific regional circumstances.
In East Asia, a strong foundation of missile defense capabilities
and cooperation already exists. The U.S. deploys Aegis BMD-capable
ships in the region. Japan has a layered missile defense system that
includes Aegis BMD ships with SM-3 interceptors, PAC-3 fire units,
early-warning radars, and a command-and-control system. Japan also
hosts an AN/TPY-2 radar. U.S. and Japanese forces regularly train
together and have successfully executed simulated cooperative BMD
operations. We are also engaged in cooperative development of the next
generation SM-3 Block IIA interceptor, which is projected to enter
service in 2018.
Australia participates in our Trilateral Missile Defense Forum with
Japan, and takes part in the Nimble Titan missile-defense exercise
series hosted by U.S. Strategic Command. Australia is also acquiring
ships that would be compatible with U.S. Aegis BMD systems, should they
choose to pursue that capability.
With South Korea, we have engaged in bilateral missile-defense
cooperation discussions and have recently signed a Terms of Reference
and an agreement that will enable our two nations to carry out a
requirements analysis so that South Korea can make informed decisions
about the utility of any future BMD program.
One of the key differences between East Asia and Europe is the
absence of a multilateral alliance framework based on collective
defense. Thus our plans to strengthen the regional missile defense
architecture have had to be built on the foundations of bilateral
cooperation and a variety of security interests and perceptions.
The administration has also sought dialogue with China on BMD, with
little success. We have sought to explain U.S. intentions and
capabilities and also to better understand China's concerns that such
defenses might negate China's strategic deterrent. We have also sought
to convey longstanding U.S. concerns about the pace and scope of
China's current military modernization efforts, which encompass a wide
range of advanced air, air-defense, naval, missile, space and
cyberspace capabilities. We believe that such a dialogue could help to
reduce mistrust, enhance mutual understanding, and broaden cooperation.
China deploys a limited but growing number of conventionally armed,
medium-range ballistic missiles, and it likely is nearing deployment of
a medium-range anti-ship ballistic missile. It has more than 1,000
conventional short-range ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan for a
variety of precision-strike missions. China is also forming more
missile units, upgrading some older missile systems, and developing
methods to penetrate missile defenses.
In the Middle East as in East Asia, the absence of a multilateral
security framework means that the regional approach must be built on
the foundation of bilateral relationships.
In the Persian Gulf, the United States maintains a robust mix of
missile-defense assets to protect our troops and facilities in the
region. We have built a series of bilateral missile defense agreements
with the Nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to address the
regional ballistic missile threat from Iran. U.S. Central Command
continues to work on establishing air defense and missile defense
architectures for the GCC nations. In addition, the United States has
approved the sale of Patriot and THAAD systems to the United Arab
Emirates. We are also working with Saudi Arabia to refurbish its
Patriot systems and recertify the interceptors for those systems.
We have also taken steps to ensure that Israel will remain capable
of countering the full range of Iranian ballistic missile threats that
may emerge. In doing so, we have built on a longstanding relationship
with Israel on BMD. In addition to conducting major missile-defense
exercises over the last several years, the United States and Israel
meet regularly and coordinate extensively on a range of missile-defense
programs, including the Arrow weapon system and a new program for
defeating short-range ballistic missiles, known as David's Sling, as
well as various other shared plans and operations.
In both East Asia and the Middle East, new capabilities will be
phased in as appropriate to address regional threats, and as they
become available through the comprehensive joint force management
process identified above. This will help to ensure that the
requirements of the different combatant commands are met in a
responsible manner as additional asserts become available.
Seeking Expanded International Cooperation
The BMDR expressed a commitment to lead expanded international
efforts for missile defense. The intent here is global--to work with
allies and partners generally to strengthen cooperation. A key priority
is to establish a cooperative BMD relationship with Russia. Significant
opportunities have emerged, along with some challenges.
Our pursuit of missile defense cooperation with Russia occurs
against the backdrop of broader changes in U.S.-Russian relations. Over
the past year, there has been important progress in these relations
such as ratification and entry into force of the New START Treaty, the
joint pressure applied to Iran's nuclear program, and new steps to
strengthen the NATO-Russia Council. Russia's leaders have accepted
proposals from the United States and NATO to pursue cooperation on
missile defense to enhance our common security against common threats
and as part of the broader re-set of U.S.-Russia relations.
Cooperation with Russia on missile defense would be significant for
a number of reasons. Cooperation could offer tangible security benefits
to Europe, Russia, and the United States in the form of stronger
protection against missile threats than would be possible if pursued
separately. Most significantly, by beginning missile defense
cooperation now, Russia, the United States and NATO will gain
information, experience, and confidence that will strengthen strategic
stability and help to shape and bring closer together our security
strategies.
Officials from the Department of Defense and Russian Ministry of
Defense have been working to initiate a joint analysis of opportunities
for enhanced missile defense cooperation. In addition to our bilateral
efforts, NATO and Russia agreed to resume missile defense cooperation,
and to study ways in which we might cooperate on territorial missile
defense in Europe.
As President Obama has stated, we are pursuing BMD cooperation
``even as we have made clear that the system we intend to pursue with
Russia will not be a joint system, and it will not in any way limit
United States' or NATO's missile defense capabilities.'' NATO alone
will be responsible for defense of NATO territory, just as Russia
should be responsible for defense of Russian territory. We would
operate our respective systems independently but cooperatively, in a
way that reinforces their performance without putting them at risk.
A requirement for the safeguarding of sensitive information in
support of cooperation is a Defense Technology Cooperation (DTC)
Agreement, which will provide the legal framework for undertaking
cooperative efforts. The proposed DTC Agreement (which we began to
negotiate in 2004) contains an annex that addresses the sharing of
classified information. But this on its own will not constitute
authorization to provide classified information to Russia. Exchange of
classified information with Russia would still be subject to U.S.
National Disclosure Policy and the associated careful review, just as
it is with other partners.
Expectations for cooperation with Russia are running high, but it
is important to be realistic about both the opportunities and
challenges ahead. That said, I do believe we have an opportunity for
meaningful cooperation that will enhance the security of the United
States, our NATO allies, and Russia.
conclusion
A year after release of the BMDR, implementation is well launched.
Capabilities are in place to protect the homeland from limited attack,
and steps are being taken to continue to improve those capabilities.
Capabilities are also in place to protect U.S. forces, their families,
and our allies from regional attacks, and the first steps have been
taken to implement the phased adaptive approach. We have put in place
investment programs aligned with our policy priorities.
We have also tried to put in place the political foundations for a
long-term commitment by the United States in this area, building on the
important work of our predecessors. Missile defense is a long-term
challenge that requires sustained support from a succession of
administrations and Congresses. As Secretary Gates has argued, ``The
protection of the United States from the threat of ballistic missile
attack is a critical national security priority. The threat to our
deployed military forces and to our allies and partners is growing
rapidly. This threat has significant implications for our ability to
project power abroad, to prevent future conflicts, and to prevail
should deterrence fail.''
I am grateful for the opportunity to be here today to make our case
for your support and I look forward to your questions.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Admiral Macy.
STATEMENT OF RADM ARCHER M. MACY, JR., USN, DIRECTOR, JOINT
INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION, THE JOINT
STAFF
Admiral Macy. Thank you, sir. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman,
ranking member, and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate
the opportunity to testify on the JIAMDO and our contribution
to BMD. Let me also take a moment here to thank you both for
your comments on my behalf, and I very much appreciate your
attention and the opportunity to work with this subcommittee
over the last 2 years. It's been truly a pleasure.
JIAMDO supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Joint Staff, and the combatant commanders. Our mission is
to identify and coordinate joint requirements for air defense,
cruise missile defense, and BMD to support the development of
solutions, to deliver capabilities for the warfighter. We
provide expertise, analysis, planning, and coordination across
the combatant commanders and the Services in a number of vital
efforts relative to both air threat and BMD. These include
advocating for the warfighters' desired air and missile defense
capabilities, where we facilitate COCOMs and Services'
collaborative efforts to identify and develop operational
concepts, joint requirements, system interoperability, and
operational architectures for integrated air and missile
defense.
We provide support to the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM), in his role as the air and missile defense
integrating authority. We provide support for, and interaction
with, other elements of the Joint Staff for global force
management of the high-demand, low-density BMD assets and
systems.
We represent the United States to NATO for matters of air
and missile defense policy and planning, and we conduct
assessment, analysis, and validation of integrated air and
missile defense capabilities to inform both warfighter planning
and system development and acquisition.
The Chairman has directed JIAMDO to be at the intersection
of the requirements processes for air defense and BMD and to
act as an integration mechanism for harmonizing both common and
differing needs across multiple services, platforms, and
systems. Several recent JIAMDO key activities in BMD capability
development highlight this integration responsibility. These
include follow-on efforts from the BMDR, initial steps in
fielding the EPAA, and conducting the JCM-III study that the
chairman referred to earlier.
During the BMDR, completed approximately a year ago, I was
one of the three co-directors of the review, which holistically
assessed U.S. BMD policy and strategy. Since that time, JIAMDO
serves as a nexus within the Joint Staff for tracking and
enabling implementation of the recommendations and
characteristics of the BMDR report and, critically, providing
support to the COCOMs and the interagency in fulfilling the
goals of that review.
These efforts have included examining how BMD capability
needs fit into DOD's global force management processes to
apportion, allocate, and assign BMD elements in a process to
adjudicate competing COCOM requirements.
As the Director of JIAMDO, I am the U.S. representative to
the NATO Air Defense Committee, responsible for addressing air
and missile defense-related issues in NATO and for drafting and
coordinating U.S. positions. In this role, I have the privilege
of working with the NATO staff and member countries to discuss
the application and implementation of the PAA in Europe and the
potential for regional missile defense capability in a NATO
context.
As was mentioned already, the first BMDS element deployment
in support of phase 1 EPAA capability occurred on March 7 of
this year when the cruiser USS Monterey deployed to Europe. Two
weeks ago, the permanent representatives to the North Atlantic
Council, the NATO Military Committee, the NATO Air Defense
Committee, and other NATO senior policy and technical
committees and international staff received tours and
demonstrations aboard the ship during a port call on Antwerp.
For the rest of this year, Monterey will spend the spring and
summer helping to develop, test, and verify the command and
control processes, the data pathways, tactics, techniques, and
procedures necessary for the phase 1 capability to become
operational later this year.
In the course of this, two areas have become clear in my
dealings with the allied nations. First is the criticality of
being able to integrate partner nations into the missile
defense architecture and structure through networking. This
builds coalition unity and provides other nations the
opportunity to actively participate in both their own defense
and a larger collaborative defense, and results in shared
responsibility and costs.
Second is the value of satellite systems, such as the STSS,
to provide a means to rapidly increase the level of protection
in designated areas or extend protection to an undefended area.
This is an unprecedented level of flexibility and
responsiveness for combatant commanders to offer their allied
partners should the need arise.
Finally, as was mentioned, JIAMDO recently completed the
base case in the third of a series of air and missile defense
inventory sufficiency analyses called the JCM-III study, to
examine the implications and opportunities for the PAA to our
overall capability for BMD. This study has been reviewed by
DOD. We're in the process of briefing the base case results to
appropriate parties, including this committee, and we are
continuing the analytic efforts of JCM-III to examine a number
of excursions and alternatives that we have developed.
The JCM-III study assesses warfighters' requirements for
BMD elements for the Homeland and for each of the European,
Central, and Pacific Commands' areas of responsibility (AOR) as
the commanders anticipate using BMD capabilities within their
overall operational planning. Working with the COCOMs, the
Services, and the MDA, we looked to understand how many
interceptors, launchers, and sensors were needed to counter
various future scenarios and, most critically, the effect those
numbers had on warfighting capability. We took into account how
the COCOMs intend to employ the BMD elements, their desire for
a layered defense, what the threats are, and generally how the
threat will be expected to be employed.
The significant level of warfighter and developer
involvement in the process gives us a high level of confidence
in the results. It also shows that the development programs are
correctly focused on warfighters' desires for forward-based
airborne and satellite systems that enable earlier intercepts,
larger engagement areas, more shot opportunities, and increased
effectiveness against countermeasures.
You may remember that we previously conducted JCM-I in 2005
and 2006 and JCM-II in 2007 and 2008. These focused on the
number of interceptors that might be required under different
scenarios against specific threats. There are three main
differences between these earlier studies and JCM-III.
First, JCM-III examines all the elements of the regional
BMDS, including sensor systems, launcher systems, and
interceptors, whereas the previous studies looked only at
interceptors.
Second, JCM-III examines performance against threat
ballistic missiles that employ a range of countermeasures. We
had not done this previously.
Third, as I have previously noted, JCM-III is a study of
warfighting sufficiency rather than inventory acquisition
objectives. We examine the ability of the application of PAA
architectures in the different AORs of the COCOMs and for the
defense of the Homeland to determine how BMDS contributes to
their overall plan to deter aggressors and, if necessary, to
end enemy ballistic missile attacks should they occur. We do
not attempt to simply answer how much to buy. We give
alternatives to the warfighter on how to achieve his overall
warfighting goals.
The specific study results cannot be discussed in this open
forum, but I'm prepared to discuss the classified results in a
closed session following our time this afternoon or at another
time at the subcommittee's convenience or that of the
individual Members.
Overall, JIAMDO continues to provide the Joint Staff and
the combatant commanders a linchpin resource for the
development, refinement, planning, and fielding of, among other
things, BMD for our Homeland, our deployed forces, citizens,
partners, and friends overseas.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member for the
opportunity to testify. I look forward to answering your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Macy follows:]
Prepared Statement by RADM Archer M. Macy, USN
Thank you, Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, and distinguished
members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify.
It is an honor and pleasure to join Dr. Roberts, LTG O'Reilly, and Ms.
Chaplain to discuss ballistic missile defense (BMD) and inform you how
the Joint Staff and the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense
Organization (JIAMDO) contributes to this important mission area.
joint integrated air and missile defense organization as a part of the
joint staff
As a reminder, JIAMDO supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Joint Staff, and the combatant commanders. Our mission is to
identify and coordinate joint requirements to support efforts
developing air defense, cruise missile defense, and BMD solutions for
the warfighter.
We are a Chairman's Controlled Activity tailored to provide current
operational expertise in air and missile defense and our members are
drawn from across the Services. The background and experience of these
military experts allows them to relate at an operational level with the
warfighter and enables them to translate operational needs into
requirements documents, analysis and study activities, and
demonstrations.
joint integrated air and missile defense organization's key
contributions to ballistic missile defense
In support of the Chairman and the Joint Staff, JIAMDO provides
expertise, analysis, planning, and coordination across the combatant
commanders and the Services in a number of vital efforts relative to
BMD. These include participating in, and following up on the results
of, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) that concluded last
year; support for BMD weapon system fielding processes; support to U.S.
Strategic Command (STRATCOM) as the Air and Missile Defense Integrating
Authority; support for and interaction with other elements of the Joint
Staff for Global Force Management of High Demand/Low Density BMD assets
and systems; representing the United States to North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) for matters of air and missile defense policy and
planning; and Integrated Air and Missile Defense Assessments and
Analysis. I'll address each of these briefly, but first I'd like to
discuss JIAMDO and the Combatant Commands (COCOMs).
A key part of our contribution is advocacy for the COCOMs. JIAMDO
is focused on ensuring the Department is delivering capabilities that
support COCOM operational plans and address their air and missile
defense gaps. We assist the COCOMs in the Department's annual
Capability Gap Assessment process that addresses their critical
warfighting capability gaps in their Integrated Priority Lists that
identify risk in accomplishing their specific Unified Command Plan
missions. In addition to JIAMDO's role in the Joint Staff capabilities
processes, we have liaison personnel at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM),
U.S. European Command (EUCOM), STRATCOM, Joint Forces Command, U.S.
Pacific Command (PACOM), U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), U.S. North
American Aerospace Defense Command, and U.S. Forces, Japan. The liaison
provides a direct link between JIAMDO and the COCOMs as they work air
and missile defense issues day-to-day for both the hosting command and
JIAMDO.
Ballistic Missile Defense Review
JIAMDO had four key roles in the BMDR. As the Director of JIAMDO, I
was one of the three directors of the review; other JIAMDO personnel
served as co-chair of the Programmatic Process and Execution Working
Group; led the Requirements Issue Team; and served in the Directorate
of Activities. In short, JIAMDO played a central role in the
development of the BMDR. Subsequent to the completion of the Review, we
have continued to work with the offices of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the Joint
Staff, and members of the Interagency as we develop and advance the
principles and policies for BMD, such as the Phased Adaptive Approach
(PAA), that were enumerated in the BMDR report.
Ballistic Missile Defense Elements System Fielding
The fielding plan for new missile defense systems developed by MDA
identified a need for the department to develop a process to transition
and transfer those systems from MDA to the Services. JIAMDO worked
closely with Service staffs and MDA to develop business rules and
processes to handle this, and was the lead to take the new process to
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) for approval.
Support to the Air and Missile Defense Integrating Authority
STRATCOM is designated the Air and Missile Defense Integrating
Authority (AMD IA) and serves as the COCOMs' representative for air and
missile defense. JIAMDO is formally tasked to provide operational
expertise and analytic support to the AMD IA as it documents BMD
requirements to MDA. Currently, we are assisting in developing the
expanded Prioritized Capability List that will provide transparency and
insight for Service developers and MDA for missile defense, and a
common requirements view for senior decisionmakers.
JIAMDO and Global Force Management
JIAMDO is also assisting the Joint Staff J-3 to formalize the
inclusion of Missile Defense in the Global Force Management Process to
address the force sourcing and mitigation options for BMD assets. This
would assure that, like other high demand/low density assets, missile
defense is included in the assignment, allocation, and apportionment
process to adjudicate competing COCOM requirements.
JIAMDO and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Closely associated with COCOM relationships are the NATO
responsibilities of JIAMDO. The Director, JIAMDO is the U.S.
Representative to the NATO Air Defense Committee (NADC), responsible
for addressing air and missile defense related issues in NATO. The
Director's unique position allows insight into policy and military
issues from both a U.S. and Alliance point of view, and enables the
United States to understand and address tactical level integration of
allies and partners in analysis and studies, and during the development
of employment concepts. In this regard I have had the privilege of
working with the NATO staff and appearing before the North Atlantic
Council to discuss the application of the PAA in Europe and the
potential for regional missile defense capability in a NATO context.
Most recently, the NADC led the senior policy and technical committees
from NATO Headquarters on tours and demonstrations on the Aegis BMD
ship USS Monterey (CG 61).
Integrated Air and Missile Defense Assessments and Analysis
A concurrent responsibility for JIAMDO is assessing and validating
operational concepts and architectures, and helping COCOMs and Services
define and refine air and missile defense requirements. This is
performed primarily through studies and analyses, modeling and
simulation, and the conduct of wargames. Study activities vary from
inventory analysis to examinations of surveillance coverage and options
for various mixes of surveillance sensors. JIAMDO recently completed
the third of a series of quantitative performance analyses, the Joint
Capability Mix III (JCM III) Study, to determine the warfighter
requirements for elements of the BMD System required for BMD; I will
discuss this in some more detail later in my testimony.
A centerpiece of JIAMDO's analysis is the Nimble Fire modeling and
simulation activity. Nimble Fire is a classified operator-in-the-loop
simulation where Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Army operational
personnel come together to simulate the execution of joint air and
missile defense missions. The events are structured to allow
operational personnel to employ their systems and forces as they deem
appropriate and the data we obtain is used to define and refine
capability gaps, requirements, concepts, and in some instances
employment techniques. It is a fully functional joint architecture
capable of executing current and future concepts with operationally
representative positions for Aegis, Patriot, Airborne Warning and
Control System, E-2, F/A-18, F-15, F-22, and JLENS among others. The
simulation can conduct distributed operations to U.S. and overseas
military locations and annually executes a combined air, cruise
missile, and BMD event in conjunction with MDA's Missile Defense
Integrated Operations Center simulation at Colorado Springs. Analysis
events are based on COCOM war plans and routinely have participants
from the commands in the operational positions. Results are out-briefed
to the COCOMs as well as the Services and agencies. Nimble Fire is a
one-of-a-kind capability that has proven to be invaluable in analyzing
concepts and requirements.
JIAMDO also provides analytical support and coordinates COCOM
participation and input into two of the premier BMD wargames, Nimble
Titan and the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Wargame. Nimble
Titan is sponsored by STRATCOM and led by the Joint Force Component
Command, Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD). It is a policy and
military wargame designed to assess and evaluate coalition and allied
participation in missile defense. U.S. and international missile
defense experts from both ministries of foreign affairs and ministries
of defense take part in the events. Eight nations currently
participate, with more countries to be added in 2012. Insights from
these wargames allow the U.S. and its partners to identify potential
policy and military issues such as command and control, information
sharing, and coalition decisionmaking. The BMDS Wargame, sponsored by
MDA, is a U.S.-only classified tactical level simulation that brings
together warfighters and developers to collaboratively examine the
optimal employment of the future BMDS. This wargame explores areas such
as shot doctrine, sensor control, interceptor inventory management, and
force employment. JIAMDO leverages findings from these events to
support other analyses, and used the shot doctrine developed during the
BMDS wargame in the models for the JCM studies.
The Department has recognized that air and missile defense is a
complex mission area and has committed to joint warfighting. JIAMDO is
part of that commitment and we are working hard to ensure that
warfighter needs are met. I would next like to discuss the PAA for BMD
as mentioned earlier.
the phased adaptive approach concept
The concept of a PAA to missile defense was an outgrowth of the
BMDR, which took a holistic look at the different aspects of our
missile defense strategy and its programs. These ranged from trends in
threat development, U.S. missile defense technology development,
operational fielding needs and opportunities, and capability
requirements from COCOM war plans. The particular focus of PAA is the
regional missile threat coming from short-, medium-, and intermediate-
range ballistic missiles and is responsive to both congressional
direction, and the warfighters' needs, to place more emphasis on these
types of threats. In short, it is a more effective and efficient
approach to missile defense. I think it is important to emphasize here
that the PAA is not an acquisition program, or a single plan to be
applied unchanged across all areas of the globe. It is a conceptual
approach to providing BMD capability for our deployed forces, allies
and partners, and additional capability for homeland defense, in
different regions, circumstances and times.
The recently completed NATO Summit of Heads of State and
Governments at Lisbon adopted the new Strategic Concept for NATO, which
explicitly affirms that, in the face of `` . . . the proliferation of
ballistic missiles, which pose a real and growing threat to the Euro-
Atlantic area,'' the Alliance will ``develop the capability to defend
our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a
core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the
indivisible security of the Alliance.'' We view this as a ringing
affirmation of the priority to develop missile defense for our European
NATO allies and our deployed forces.
I would like to point out that although there has been significant
focus and discussion on Europe, the PAA is much more than just the
defense of Europe. The PAA concept provides the United States with an
enhanced capability to respond to regional threats worldwide, no matter
where they emerge, and to strengthen defense of the Homeland. It also
provides us with the flexibility to tailor the type and size of that
response by being able to adapt to the threats, partners' capabilities,
and geography of each region. The PAA is ``phased'' to advances in our
own technical and operational capabilities for BMD, and it is
``adaptive'' to trends and advances in potential adversary threats. The
European version of the PAA has four phases based upon projected
advances of our technical capabilities; however, in other COCOM's areas
of responsibility (AOR) the number and timing of individual phases will
vary based upon their unique circumstances. The geographic COCOMs are
developing plans for phases for each AOR, with the European PAA
currently being the most advanced.
The PAA has not resulted in a wholesale change in what the
Department had previously planned to develop, but it does adjust the
timing and quantity of some of the systems. A key enabler for this
flexibility is the structured and disciplined approach to development
and fielding of the BMDS. MDA is providing the Department with an
impressive array of very capable systems that give us the freedom to
maneuver and adapt to different and changing environments and threats.
To fully capitalize on this range of capabilities, the Joint Capability
Mix studies help guide decisions on maximizing COCOM capabilities and
provide senior leaders with a risk-relevant assessment based on
operational plans. This is a critical effort, particularly in light of
the need to maximize every dollar spent. I would now like to address
the operational benefits of the PAA.
operational benefits of phased adaptive approach
As has been noted before, Congress and our warfighters have said
the most pressing threat for our deployed forces today is the
increasing number of Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) and Medium
Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs). Without going into classified
details, suffice it to say that the sheer number and types of these
threats grows daily and the Nation needs to find a way to deal with
them. The PAA addresses these issues head on. The United States cannot
afford to build the number of launchers, interceptors, and sensors it
would take for each COCOM to have his own dedicated BMDS capability
that can address all the potential strikes that could be launched. What
the PAA provides instead, is a balanced investment that has the
capacity to engage the range of threats; can be tailored to the
geography, political circumstances, capabilities of regional partners;
and has the flexibility to rapidly deploy more assets where and when
they are needed.
european paa phase i (2011) initial short-range ballistic missiles and
medium-range ballistic missiles capability in europe
European PAA Phase I is focused on the near-term essentials to go
against the SRBM and MRBM threats. We are already giving the overseas
combatant commanders more of what we already have by increasing the
number of Patriot interceptors to complement the existing inventory of
Patriot and Aegis with Standard Missile-3 (SM-3). The European PAA
Phase I will also add SM-3 Block IA. This is a simple and direct
operational counter. As the threat grows, we increase the number of our
defensive interceptors. While this is workable to a point, it rapidly
becomes unaffordable as the threats continue to grow in numbers over
time.
To break out of the spiral of trying to match the threat missile-
for-missile, the European PAA Phase I also begins the introduction of
operational leverage by placing a forward-based AN/TPY-2 radar in
Southern Europe. The addition of this AN/TPY-2 radar will allow the
combatant commander to use Aegis to launch interceptors against
ballistic missiles tracked by either the ship itself or the AN/TPY-2
radar. This significantly increases the size of the area that can be
defended, and we will examine this architecture in a live intercept
test mission in the near future. Phase I also includes the Command,
Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) upgrade to the
air operations center at Ramstein Air Base, Germany. C2BMC controls the
AN/TPY-2 and also ties it and any Aegis ships into our command and
control structure in Europe. C2BMC is a major operational leverage
point for PAA because it provides the pathway for data exchange
throughout a theater and from a theater to the Homeland.
The first BMDS element deployment in support of Phase I European
Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) capability occurred on March 7, of this
year when the USS Monterey (CG 61) deployed to Europe. Monterey will
spend this spring and summer helping to develop, test, and verify the
command and control processes, data pathways, tactics, techniques, and
procedures necessary for the Phase I capability to become operational
later this year.
This phase is also concurrent with efforts to enhance our
capability for Homeland defense with early warning radar upgrades,
adding more Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) in Alaska, and developing
improved GBIs. In the instance of the European PAA the radar tracks
from the AN/TPY-2 in Southern Europe will be provided to NATO for
defense of the territory and populations of the European members of the
Alliance, and will be used by the United States to provide early
tracking information to enhance our Homeland defense assets. This
linkage enables very efficient management of radar data and missile
engagements. C2BMC will ensure threats are detected, tracked, and
efficiently engaged. It will both prevent inadvertent
``overengagement'' where too many shots are taken at an incoming
threat; and the worse alternative, ``underengagement'' where no shots
are taken, because each shooter is operating independently. The
operational bottom line on Phase I is that it gets us greater ability
to engage the SRBM and MRBM threats, and just as important, it begins
fielding a netted sensor and weapons infrastructure.
european paa phase ii ( 2015) enhanced mrbm defense in europe
Phase II of the European PAA further embodies operational
innovation. From a developmental point of view, the introduction of
Aegis with SM-3 IB interceptors and AN/TPY-2 radars gives us expanded
capability against MRBMs. We also significantly increase the size of
area that can be defended. The true operational innovation in this
phase comes from the increasing use of integrated and networked systems
and the concept of placing SM-3 on land in Romania as a part of Aegis
Ashore.
Aegis Ashore is a shift away from forward based GBIs in fixed
launch sites, to a relocatable land-based Aegis radar with land-based
SM-3 IB interceptors. This approach provides all the engagement range
and capability of an Aegis ship but without the requirement to keep a
ship in a fixed location for extended periods of time, nor the cost of
maintaining the rest of the multi-mission capability of an Aegis
warship. Operationally this allows a combatant commander to provide
long-term coverage for his assets or allies, establish a presence, and
have a visible deterrent in theater. Similarly, a land-based SM-3
system can be augmented with Aegis warships and other BMDS assets to
provide a very robust defense if the situation warrants. This is a very
operationally responsive concept for the combatant commanders.
A more significant development beyond deployment of a new weapon
system is the operational leverage gained from the improvements in the
SM-3 Block IB interceptor. The SM-3 IB seeker's discrimination
capability improves its performance during intercepts. The SM-3 IB will
be deployed with Aegis Ashore and Aegis ships at sea. Because the
missile seeker has been improved, both Aegis at sea and on land will be
able to launch on remote sensor data (for example, using data from one
of the land based radars). The operational impact of this concept is
not obvious until you understand that the SM-3 missile has a fly-out
range that goes well beyond where the Aegis radar can detect. The
establishment of networks combined with the ability to use remote
sensor data enables a combatant commander to take full advantage of the
SM-3 range and reach out to extremely long ranges to engage targets.
Operationally, this equates to a much larger defended area and a
greater number of defended assets with the same force structure. The
ability to use multiple weapons systems, and particularly systems that
are not in the immediate area, does several things. First, it prevents
an enemy from being able to tell which assets are being defended.
Second, it makes it impossible to determine ahead of time which
defensive systems have a shot at an incoming missile. Lastly, it
prevents an adversary from being able to take down our defenses by
targeting a single node. I would summarize Phase II as the transition
phase where we move from classic concepts of single asset employment to
a modern networked concept.
european paa phase iii ( 2018) enhanced irbm defense in europe and
phase iv ( 2020) early intercept defense in europe
European PAA Phases III and IV add significant operational
capability and continue to leverage and build on the netted
infrastructure of the earlier phases. The key capability in Phase III
is the addition of the SM-3 IIA, to be deployed in Poland, which will
expand the defended area against MRBMs and Intermediate Range Ballistic
Missiles (IRBMs). SM-3 IIA will be fielded with both Aegis ships and
land-based SM-3 systems. Phase IV adds SM-3 IIB to our Aegis Ashore
sites which will be capable of engaging potential future ICBMs from
today's regional ballistic missile threats. This is the first
capability beyond GBIs to defend against ICBMs, and provides enhanced
defense of the Homeland. The SM-3 IIB also adds the ability to
intercept MRBMs and IRBMs earlier in their flights which allows the
warfighter to thin out large raid sizes, and suppress the use of
countermeasures by engaging a missile before they are deployed. Phases
III and IV will both continue the use of netted employment and its
inherent advantages.
At the completion of Phase IV, Commander EUCOM will have multiple
defensive capabilities across the entire ballistic missile threat
regime from SRBMs to ICBMs. It's worthwhile at this point to contrast
the European PAA with the previous approach for defense of Europe to
further illustrate the operational impact. Under the previous GBI
approach we could defend portions of Europe, but the primary benefit
was defense of the U.S. Homeland. Under EPAA we defend increasing areas
of Europe, enhance defense of the Homeland, and develop capabilities
that can be deployed worldwide. So operationally, PAA does much more
than support a specific combatant commander, it provides capabilities
that can be employed by every combatant commander. This is major step
forward in protection for the United States and its allies and
partners.
Before I leave the operational discussion of the EPAA Phases, I
wanted to reinforce the point that BMD, such as we embody in the EPAA,
is not an isolated mission but part of a larger campaign against an
adversary. Fundamentally, the BMDS is not, and cannot be, the sole
method by which we defend ourselves against the threat or use of
aggressor ballistic missiles. Many potential aggressors already have
larger threat missile inventories than we have, or expect to have,
numbers of interceptor missiles. BMDs can prevent an adversary from
winning the fight with the first wave of the attack, limit damage to
friendly forces and civilians, and provide time for our other elements
of national and military power to be brought to bear to end the
conflict. Further, the possession of a capable BMD such as provided by
the EPAA, assists in deterring potential aggressors from the use of
ballistic missiles, as they have to contemplate that they will not be
successful in achieving their aims from the use of these weapons.
analysis supporting paa development
The analytic efforts that JIAMDO leads are used to support
operational planning by the warfighters, and support the resources and
acquisition communities in research and development, production,
budget, and programming decisions on missile defense. We have recently
completed the base case of the JCM III to examine the implications and
opportunities of the PAA as an element of our overall capability for
BMD. The study has been reviewed by the Department; we are in the
process of briefing the results to appropriate parties including this
committee; and, we are continuing the analytic efforts of JCM III to
examine a number of excursions and alternatives that we have developed.
The study results cannot be discussed in this open forum, but I will
discuss the process used at this point. I am prepared to discuss the
classified results in a closed session following our time this
afternoon, or at another time at the committee's convenience or that of
some of the members.
Building a BMD capability is a blend of determining what the right
technology is, how many of each system is acquired, and how are the
elements to be applied in different contexts of threat, geography, and
international political and military environments of allies and
partners. In operational terms this gets shortened to ``how much PAA do
we need, and where?'' A simple phrase, but a very complex problem.
We previously conducted JCM I in 2005-2006 and JCM II in 2007-2008.
These focused on the number of interceptors that might be required
under different scenarios against specific threats.
There are three main differences between these earlier studies and
JCM III:
First, JCM III examined all the elements of the regional BMD
system, including sensors systems, launcher systems, and interceptors,
whereas the previous studies only looked at interceptors.
Second, JCM III examined performance against threat ballistic
missiles that employed a range of countermeasures; we had not done this
previously.
Third, JCM III has been a study of warfighting sufficiency rather
than inventory acquisition objectives. We examined the ability of the
application of PAA architectures in different AOR of the combatant
commanders to determine how BMDS contributed to their overall plan to
deter aggressors and, if necessary to end enemy ballistic missile
attacks should they occur. We do not attempt to simply answer how much
to buy; we give alternatives to the warfighter to best achieve his
overall goals.
I would also like to spend a couple of minutes discussing the study
methodology. In order to determine force needs at this level of
granularity, we had to take into account how the COCOMs intend to
employ them, what the threats are, and generally how the threat will be
expected to be employed. COCOMs provided operational employment
information, to include asset laydowns and shot doctrine. For system
performance, we went to the experts at MDA. The analysis was executed
by JIAMDO in conjunction with representatives from CENTCOM, EUCOM,
PACOM, STRATCOM, NORTHCOM, MDA, the Services, and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation. The
significant level of warfighter and developer involvement in the
process is why we have such a high level of confidence in the results.
The results have been briefed to the JROC, the Missile Defense
Executive Board, and finally to the Deputy Secretary of Defense's
Advisory Working Group. I have included a graphic on the Senior Review
Group of the study to illustrate the inclusive approach we use for our
analysis.
european phased adaptive approach and north atlantic treaty
organization
As I mentioned earlier, NATO has just taken the decision that BMD
is `` . . . a core element of our collective defence.'' In both my role
as the Director of JIAMDO, and as the U.S. head of delegation to the
NADC, I have spent a significant amount of time discussing the EPAA
with various allies and friends throughout Europe. The United States is
not building a missile defense system in isolation. Our allies are
appreciative of our efforts to include them in our discussions and
explain our missile defense concepts and approaches. The EPAA concept
and implementation provides the opportunity for allies and partners
across the globe to participate with and alongside U.S. systems. Not
only is this the right thing to do, it is a very effective and
efficient approach to missile defense that allows all participants to
leverage the investment the other nations are making. The recent MDA
demonstration of C2BMC with NATO's Active Layered Theatre Ballistic
Missile Defence is a premier example of the right approach to follow.
Now that NATO has made the decision, the U.S. BMDS capabilities of
the European PAA will constitute our national contribution to this
mission. We will work closely within the Alliance to craft the
appropriate command and control structure to provide for the effective
defense of ourselves and our partners from ballistic missile threats in
the region.
summary
The Department is investing a significant portion of its budget in
missile defense and the PAA is providing the necessary framework to
ensure it is invested effectively and wisely. The PAA is shaping the
integration and networking of our systems across the COCOMs, Services,
and allies which is the correct path to successful and effective
missile defense. We have established a solid process and analytic
approach to monitor and guide the implementation of the PAA and expect
to develop and field the phases in the most operationally effective and
cost efficient manner possible.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to
answering your questions.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Admiral.
Ms. Chaplain.
STATEMENT OF CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND
SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Chaplain. Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and
members of the subcommittee: Thank you for inviting me to
discuss accountability and transparency for the BMDS. As you
noted earlier, the BMDS is DOD's largest single acquisition
program. It is also likely the most challenging, not only
because of the inherent technical challenges involved with the
missile defense mission, but because of the wide range of
assets involved, the global nature of the system, and the need
for a high degree of integration and jointness.
While the inherent risks are substantial, intense early
schedule pressures driven by presidential directive exacerbated
acquisition risks, as they required MDA to take on a high
degree of concurrency in development. That concurrency
continues. More recently, budgetary pressures have further
challenged MDA. A faster pace of acquisition and development
activity often comes with a higher price tag. Yet, fiscal
conditions require DOD to reexamine all of its programs with an
eye toward achieving greater cost efficiencies and savings.
Taken together, these conditions create a high risk
environment for the MDA and thus call attention to the need for
strong oversight, accountability, and transparency. Yet, the
flexibilities given to MDA in order to field initial capability
quickly have made accountability and transparency elusive. Our
testimony and report detail the differences between the BMDS
and DOD's largest acquisition programs. I would just like to
highlight a few.
First, while other large programs have been required to
create baselines and report variances once they enter into the
engineering and manufacturing development cycle, until recently
MDA has not been required to do so for pieces of the missile
defense system.
Second, while other programs must obtain approval of a
higher level acquisition executive before making changes to
their baselines, MDA does not. In fact, the Director of MDA
serves as both approving acquisition executive and as the
program manager.
Third, while other programs must obtain independent life
cycle cost estimates, MDA does not.
Fourth, while other programs must complete initial
operational test and evaluation before proceeding beyond low
rate initial production, MDA does not.
This broad flexibility enabled MDA to make decisions faster
than other acquisition programs and to be more agile. But from
an oversight and decisionmaking perspective, there were
considerable disadvantages. The lack of baselines for BMDS
along with high levels of uncertainty about requirements and
program cost estimates effectively set the missile defense
program on a path to an undefined destination at an unknown
cost.
I'm pleased to report, however, that the MDA has recently
made significant strides in increasing transparency and
accountability. Specifically, in the last year MDA established
resource, schedule, test, operational capacity, technical, and
contract baselines for several BMDS components. MDA also
identified three phases where baselines are approved to help
ensure the appropriate level of knowledge is obtained before
acquisitions move from one phase to the next.
In addition, MDA implemented a process under which product
development and initial production baselines can be jointly
reviewed by MDA and the military Service senior leaders, as a
number of missile defense systems are expected to eventually
transition to the Services for operation. These improvements
were made subsequent to recent improvements to test planning to
better link testing to models and simulations needed to assess
performance and to extend test planning into the future.
Given the breadth, scope, and complexity of the systems
involved in the missile defense mission and the wide range of
stakeholders and gaps in past data, these improvements were not
easy achievements. Significant progress has been made.
Nevertheless, there is still much work ahead to ensure
oversight and management data is clear, complete, accurate, and
reliable. My statement and our report detail improvements that
are needed, particularly in the areas of cost reporting and
testing.
Moreover, improvements to oversight reporting should be
complemented by other actions, including stabilizing the
approach to acquisition efforts, improving transparency and
accountability for the EPAA, and lastly embracing knowledge-
based acquisition practices that ensure programs complete
developmental activities before proceeding in production, that
test plans are stabilized and adequately reported, and that
targets used for testing are reliable, available, and
affordable.
This concludes my statement and I'm happy to answer any
questions you have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Cristina Chaplain
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the transparency
and accountability progress made by the Department of Defense's (DOD)
Missile Defense Agency (MDA). MDA has been charged with developing and
fielding the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), a system expected
to be capable of defending the United States, deployed troops, friends,
and allies against ballistic missiles of all ranges in all phases of
flight. The BMDS is DOD's single largest acquisition program--spending
between approximately $7 billion to $9.5 billion per year--to develop
and field nine elements and supporting efforts. The system's
architecture includes space-based and airborne sensors as well as
ground- and sea-based radars; ground- and sea-based interceptor
missiles; and a command and control, battle management, and
communications system to provide the warfighter with the necessary
communication links to the sensors and interceptor missiles.
In fulfilling this charge, MDA began delivering an initial
defensive capability in 2004. In meeting this challenge, MDA was
afforded much more flexibility than DOD's other major weapons programs.
However, this flexibility also introduced transparency and
accountability challenges that persisted after the 2004 date for
initial capability. Today, I will highlight significant progress that
MDA has recently made to strengthen accountability and transparency and
also the shortfalls that still need to be addressed in order to further
strengthen MDA's oversight posture and ensure new capabilities are
fiscally sustainable for the long term.
Since 2002, the National Defense Authorization Acts have mandated
that we prepare annual assessments of MDA's ongoing cost, schedule,
testing, and performance progress.\1\ In March 2011, we issued our
report covering MDA's progress toward achieving its goals during fiscal
year 2010 as well as its efforts to improve transparency,
accountability, and oversight.\2\ My statement today will focus on the
issues covered in that report. We conducted this performance audit from
March 2010 to March 2011 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our fmdings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Additional information on our scope and methodology is available in the
issued report.
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\1\ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-107, Sec. 232(g) (2001); Ronald W. Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, Sec. 233
(2004); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub.
L. No. 109-163, Sec. 232; John Warner National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, Sec. 224 (2006); and
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-181, Sec. 225.
\2\ GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency
and Accountability, GA0-11-372 (Washington, DC: March 24, 2011).
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acquisition flexibility given to mda has downsides for oversight and
accountability
MDA is a unique agency with extraordinary acquisition flexibility
and a challenging mission, however while that flexibility has helped it
to rapidly field systems, it has also hampered oversight and
accountability.
Over the years, Congress has created a framework of laws that makes
major defense acquisition programs accountable for their planned
outcomes and cost, gives decisionmakers a means to conduct oversight,
and ensures some level of independent program review. Application of
many of these laws is triggered by the phases of the Department of
Defense's acquisition cycle, such as entry into engineering and
manufacturing development. Specifically, major defense acquisition
programs are generally required by law and policy to do the following:
Document program parameters in an acquisition program
baseline that, as implemented by DOD, has been approved by the
Milestone Decision Authority, a higher-level DOD official prior
to the program's entry into the engineering and manufacturing
development phase.\3\ The baseline provides decisionmakers with
the program's best estimate of the program's total cost for an
increment of work, average unit costs for assets to be
delivered, the date that an operational capability will be
fielded, and the weapon's intended performance parameters.
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\3\ 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2435 requires an approved program baseline
description for major defense acquisition programs before the program
enters system development and demonstration, production and deployment,
and full rate production. The system development phase of the DOD
acquisition cycle is now known as the engineering and manufacturing
development phase.
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Once approved, measure the program against the
baseline, which is the program's initial business case, or
obtain the approval of a higher-level acquisition executive
before making changes.
Obtain an independent life-cycle cost estimate prior
to beginning engineering and manufacturing development, and/or
production and deployment.\4\ Independent life-cycle cost
estimates provide confidence that a program is executable
within estimated cost.
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\4\ 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2434.
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Regularly provide detailed program status information
to Congress, including information on cost, in Selected
Acquisition Reports.\5\
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\5\ 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2432.
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Report certain increases in unit cost measured from
the original or current program baseline.\6\
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\6\ 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2433, also known as ``Nunn-McCurdy''.
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Covered major defense acquisition programs and
subprograms are required to complete initial operation test and
evaluation before proceeding beyond low-rate initial
production.\7\ After testing is completed, the Director for
Operational Test and Evaluation assesses whether the results of
the test confirm that the system or components are effective
and suitable for combat.
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\7\ 10 U.S.C Sec. 2399 requires completion of initial operational
test and evaluation of a weapon system before a program can proceed
beyond low-rate initial production. According to DOD policy, low-rate
initial production is intended to result in completion of manufacturing
development in order to ensure adequate and efficient manufacturing
capability and to produce the minimum quantity necessary to provide
production or 1production-representative articles for initial
operational test and evaluation, establish an initial production base
for the system; and permit an orderly increase in the production rate
for the system, sufficient to lead to full-rate production upon
successful completion of operational (and live-fire, where applicable)
testing.
When MDA was established in 2002, it was granted exceptional
flexibility in setting requirements and managing the acquisition, in
order that its BMDS be developed as a single program, using a
capabilities-based, spiral upgrade approach to quickly deliver a set of
integrated defensive capabilities. This decision deferred application
of DOD acquisition policy to BMDS until a mature capability is ready to
be handed over to a military service for production and operation.
Because the BMDS program has not formally entered the DOD acquisition
cycle, application of laws that are designed to facilitate oversight
and accountability of DOD acquisition programs and that are triggered
by phases of this cycle, such as the engineering and manufacturing
development phase, has also effectively been deferred. This gives MDA
unique latitude to manage the BMDS and it enabled MDA to begin
delivering an initial defensive capability in 2004. However, the
flexibility also came at the expense of transparency and
accountability.
Specifically, a BMDS cost, schedule, and performance baseline does
not have to be established or approved by anyone outside MDA. Recent
laws have created some baseline-related requirements for parts of the
BMDS.\8\ In addition, while most major defense acquisition programs are
required by statute to obtain an independent verification of cost
estimates, MDA has only recently developed cost estimates for selected
assets and plans to work with the DOD Office of the Director for Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation to develop independent cost estimates
for more MDA elements. Further, assessments of a system's suitability
and effectiveness in combat have only been accomplished, with
limitations, for the currently deployed Aegis BMD weapon system. The
limited amount of testing completed, which has been primarily
developmental in nature, and the lack of verified, validated, and
accredited models and simulations prevent the Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation from fully assessing the effectiveness,
suitability, and survivability of the BMDS in annual assessments. MDA
has agreed to conduct an operational flight test in 2012.
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\8\ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-181, Sec. 223(g); Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, Sec. 225.
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As we concluded in a prior report, having less transparency and
accountability than is normally present in a major weapon program has
had consequences.\9\ The lack of baselines for the BMDS along with high
levels of uncertainty about requirements and program cost estimates
effectively set the missile defense program on a path to an undefined
destination at an unknown cost. Across the agency, these practices left
programs with limited knowledge and few opportunities for crucial
management oversight and decisionmaking concerning the agency's
investment and the warfighter's continuing needs. At the program level,
these practices contributed to quality problems affecting targets
acquisitions, which in turn, hampered MDA's ability to conduct tests as
planned.
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\9\ GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Transition Provides
Opportunity to Strengthen Acquisition Approach, GA0-10-311 (Washington,
DC. Feb. 25, 2010).
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numerous strategy changes have exacerbated transparency and
accountability challenges
MDA has employed at least three strategies to acquire and deploy
missile defense systems, which has exacerbated transparency and
accountability challenges. From its inception in 2002 through 2007, MDA
developed missile defense capability in 2-year increments, known as
blocks, each built on preceding blocks intended to enhance the
development and capability of the BMDS. However, there was little
visibility into baseline costs and schedules associated with the
systems that comprised the blocks or how the blocks addressed
particular threats.
In response to our recommendations, in December 2007, MDA announced
a new capabilities-based block structure intended to improve the
program's transparency, accountability, and oversight. Instead of being
based on 2-year time periods, the new blocks focused on fielding
capabilities that addressed particular threats. Because the new block
structure was not aligned to regular time periods, multiple blocks were
under way concurrently. This approach included several positive
changes, including a DOD commitment to establish total acquisition
costs and unit costs for selected block assets, including only those
elements or components of elements in a block that would be fielded
during the block and abandoning deferrals of work from one block to
another.
MDA was still transitioning to this new capabilities-based block
approach when the Director, MDA terminated it in June 2009. According
to MDA, this was done in order to address congressional concerns
regarding how to structure MDA's budget justification materials. This
termination marked the third acquisition management strategy for the
BMDS in the prior 3 years and effectively reduceo transparency and
accountability for the agency. The agency then began to manage BMDS as
a single integrated program but planned to report on cost, schedule,
and performance issues by each element within the program.
Changing the acquisition strategy is problematic because each time
it is changed, the connection is obscured between the old strategies'
scope and resources and the new strategy's rearranged scope and
resources. This makes it difficult for decisionmakers to hold MDA
accountable for expected outcomes and clouds transparency of the
agency's efforts.
We also reported in December 2010 that the adoption of the European
Phase Adaptive Approach (PAA) for deploying missile defense assets has
limitations in transparency and accountability.\10\ Specifically, we
reported that DOD made progress in acquisition planning for technology
development and systems engineering and testing and partial progress in
defming requirements and identifying stakeholders but had not yet
developed a European PAA acquisition decision schedule or an overall
European PAA investment cost. We found that the limited visibility into
the costs and schedule for the European PAA and the lack of some key
acquisition management processes reflect the oversight challenges with
the acquisition of missile defense capabilities that we have previously
reported. We concluded that for the European PAA, the flexibility
desired by DOD is not incompatible with appropriate visibility into key
aspects of acquisition management. Moreover, as DOD proceeds with the
European PAA acquisition activities, it is important for Congress and
the President to have assurance that the European PAA policy is working
as intended and that acquisition activities are cost-effective. We made
recommendations also in January 2011 regarding the development of life-
cycle cost estimates and an integrated schedule for the acquisition,
infrastructure, and personnel activities to help identify European PAA
implementation risks.\11\ DOD partially concurred with the first
recommendation and fully concurred with the second.
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\10\ GAO, Missile Defense: European Phased Adaptive Approach
Acquisitions Face Synchronization, Transparency, and Accountability
Challenges, GAO-11-179R (Washington, DC: Dec. 21, 2010).
\11\ GAO, Ballistic Missile Defense: DOD Needs to Address Planning
and Implementation Challenges for Future Capabilities in Europe, GA0-
11-220 (Washington, DC: Jan. 26, 2011).
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prior gao recommendations and congressional actions to improve
transparency and accountability
Congress has taken action to address concerns regarding the
acquisition management strategy, accountability, and oversight of MDA.
For example, in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008, Congress required MDA to establish acquisition cost, schedule,
and performance baselines for each system element that has entered the
equivalent of the engineering and manufacturing development phase of
acquisition or is being produced or acquired for operational
fielding.\12\ Most recently, the Ike Skelton National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 requires the Secretary of
Defense to ensure that MDA establishes and maintains an acquisition
baseline for each program element of the BMDS.\13\
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\12\ Pub. L. No. 110-181, Sec. 223(g).
\13\ Pub. L. No. 111-383, Sec. 225.
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Since our first MDA report in 2004, we have made a series of
recommendations to improve transparency and accountability, many of
which are designed to adapt the key transparency and accountability
features already embedded in the DOD acquisition regulation and apply
them to MDA. Some of our key recommendations include:
Establishing and reporting to Congress costs and unit
costs, including development costs in unit costs, including
sunk costs in cost estimates, reporting top-level test goals,
obtaining independent cost estimates and taking steps to ensure
the underlying cost estimates are high quality, reliable, and
documented reporting variances.
Improving transparency by requesting and using
procurement funds instead of research, development, testing and
evaluation funds to acquire fielded assets.
Strengthening the test program by establishing
baselines for each new class of target in development,
including sufficient schedule and resource margin, including
spare test assets and targets, and strengthening the role of
the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation in assessing
missile defense progress.
Implementing a knowledge-based acquisition strategy
\14\ consistent with DOD acquisition regulations, and ensure
that items are not manufactured for fielding before their
performance has been validated through testing.
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\14\ A knowledge-based acquisition approach is a cumulative process
in which certain knowledge is acquired by key decision points before
proceeding.
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mda has recently made significant progress in increasing transparency
and accountability
DOD has committed to take action on many of these recommendations.
While agreeing with our recommendations to enhance baseline reporting,
there are differences in MDA's perspectives on such issues as sunk
costs and changes in unit cost.
In 2010, MDA made significant progress in implementing some of
these recommendations by fmalizing a new baseline phase review process
in which the agency set detailed baselines for several BMDS elements,
or portions of elements, for the first time. Specifically, MDA
established resource, schedule, test, operational capacity, technical,
and contract baselines for several BMDS components. It reported these
to Congress in its June 2010 BMDS Accountability Report.
MDA also identified three phases of development where baselines are
approved-technology development, product development, and initial
production phases-and specified the key knowledge that is needed at
each phase. MDA officials stated that they expect that aligning the
development efforts with the phases will help to ensure that the
appropriate level of knowledge is obtained before the acquisitions move
from one phase to the next.
In another key step, approval of the product development and
initial production baselines will be jointly reviewed by the Director
of MDA and the respective service acquisition executive, as a number of
missile defense systems are expected to eventually transition to the
military services for operation. In addition, in regard to these new
phases, the agency established a process for approving baselines. As a
result of MDA's new baseline phase review process, its 2010 BMDS
Accountability Report is more comprehensive than its 2009 report.
MDA also undertook a new approach to testing in recent years to
address our prior findings. In March 2009, we reported that MDA's
Integrated Master Test Plan--its test baseline--was not effective for
management and oversight because it was revised frequently, only
extended through the following fiscal year and was not well integrated
with other key aspects of testing such as target acquisitions.\15\ In
addition, the BMDS Operational Test Agency identified several
limitations in the previous BMDS test program, including unaccredited
models and simulations, flight test artificialities, and inadequate
modeling of some environmental conditions.. Congress also expressed
concern with MDA's test approach. For example, in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 conference report, conferees
noted that MDA failed to ensure an adequate testing program and that
its test and targets program needed to be managed in a way that fully
supported high-priority near-term programs.
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\15\ GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile
Defense Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than
Planned, GA0-09-338 (Washington, DC: March 13, 2009).
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We reported last year that MDA extensively revised the test plan to
address these concerns.\16\ MDA's new approach now bases test scenarios
on modeling and simulation needs and extends the test baseline to cover
the Future Years Defense Program which allows for better estimation of
target needs, range requirements, and test assets. Also, as part of its
new test plan, MDA scheduled dedicated periods of developmental and
operational testing, during which the system configuration will remain
fixed to allow the warfighter to carry out training, tactics,
techniques, and procedures for developmental and operational
evaluation. Additionally, the new test plan is expected to provide
sufficient time after test events to conduct a full post-test analysis.
As we reported last year, these improvements are important because BMDS
performance cannot be fully assessed until models and simulations are
accredited and validated and the test program cannot be executed
without meeting its target needs.
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\16\ GA0-10-311.
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These steps represent significant progress in providing a better
foundation for managing and overseeing the missile defense system.
Given the breadth, scope, and complexities of systems involved in the
missile defense mission and the wide range of stakeholders and gaps in
past data, these were not easy achievements. Nevertheless, there is a
significant amount of work ahead to ensure oversight and management
data is clear, complete, accurate, and reliable. Specifically:
We found that the cost baselines that have been
established are not clear, consistent and complete nor are they
based on high quality estimates and therefore we remain unable
to assess cost progress for the 8th year until MDA develops
high-quality, reliable cost estimates. For example, we found
that the unit cost baselines and the baselines for portions of
and sometimes all the life cycle costs reported to Congress did
not provide clear, consistent, and complete information. We
also assessed the 12 life cycle cost estimates that were the
basis for these baselines and found that half did not support
the baselines and the other half were insufficient to be
considered high-quality, reliable cost estimates.
Our assessment of the schedule baselines determined
that we could not compare the asset delivery schedule to the
prior year's baseline because MDA has stopped reporting a
comprehensive list of planned asset deliveries.
Finally, we found the test baseline to be well
documented. However, because it is success oriented, any
problems encountered in executing the plan can cause ripple
effects throughout remaining test events. The frequent changes
that continue to occur undermine the value of the test baseline
as an oversight tool.
rapid pace of fielding assets makes transparency and accountability
even more important
Over the past 10 years, we have conducted extensive research on
successful programs and have found that successful defense programs
ensure that their acquisitions begin with realistic plans and baselines
prior to the start of development. We have previously reported that the
key cause of poor weapon system outcomes, at the program level, is the
consistent lack of disciplined analysis that would provide an
understanding of what it would take to field a weapon system before
system development begins. We have reported that there is a clear set
of prerequisites that must be met by each program's acquisition
strategy to realize successful outcomes. These prerequisites include
establishing a clear, knowledge-based, executable business case for the
product. An executable business case is one that provides demonstrated
evidence that: (1) the identified needs are real and necessary and can
best be met with the chosen concept; and (2) the chosen concept can be
developed and produced within existing resources--including
technologies, funding, time, and management capacity. Knowledge-based
acquisition principles and business cases combined are necessary to
establish realistic cost, schedule and performance baselines. Without
documented realistic baselines there is no foundation to accurately
measure program progress. Our work has shown that when agencies do not
follow a knowledge-based approach to acquisition, high levels of
uncertainty about requirements, technologies, and design often exist at
the start of development programs. As a result, cost estimates and
related funding needs are often understated.
MDA has begun to institute some key aspects of a knowledge-based
approach to acquisition as we noted. Moreover, in its Ballistic Missile
Defense Review, DOD emphasized that it is no longer necessary to pursue
a high-risk acquisition strategy that simultaneously develops and
deploys new systems. However, we continue to identify and report on
areas of high levels of acquisition risk associated with the rapid pace
of fielding assets. We see this effect most pronounced in three key
areas--testing, the Aegis Ashore program and the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense (GMD) program.
Testing and Targets: As in previous years, failures
and delays in testing have continued to delay the validation of
models and simulations used to assess BMDS performance. Target
availability was a significant, though not the only, driver to
the test plan delays. Since 2006, we have reported that target
availability has delayed and prompted modifications to planned
test objectives. This trend continued in 2010. We reported this
year that five tests scheduled for fiscal year 2010 were
canceled because of a moratorium on air launches of targets.
The moratorium was imposed following the failure of an air
launched target participating in MDA's December 2009 Theater
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) flight test. A failure
review board investigation identified the rigging of cables to
the missile in the aircraft as the immediate cause of the
failure and shortcomings in internal processes at the
contractor as the underlying cause. Additionally, target
shortfalls contributed to delays in flight tests, reduced the
number of flight tests, and altered flight test objectives.
Another area of risk related to targets identified in this
year's report is MDA's extended use of an undefmitized contract
action to acquire targets from its incumbent prime targets
contractor.\17\ This action, signed in April 2010, asked the
prime contractor to build a new type of medium-range air-
launched target. The contract action initially included three
targets; the quantity was then increased to five targets in
September 2010. The current ``not-to-exceed'' level for the
contract action is $496 million. MDA has allowed this
undefinitized contract action to continue for an extended
period. According to MDA officials, the delay in defmitization
is due to changes in its requirements for the targets, and they
anticipate definitization in July 2011, by which time the
contract action will have remained undefinitized for about 450
days. MDA officials stated that this new acquisition was to
obtain a second procurement source for air-launched targets
following the December 2009 THAAD flight test failure. The
extended use of undefinitized contract actions has previously
been identified by GAO and others as risky to the government.
Because contracting officers normally reimburse contractors for
all allowable costs they incur before definitization,
contractors bear less risk and have little incentive to control
costs during this period. The government also risks incurring
unnecessary costs as requirements may change before the
contract is definitized.
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\17\ To meet urgent needs, DOD can issue undefinitized contract
actions, which authorize contractors to begin work before reaching a
final agreement on contract terms. Undefinitized contract action means
any contract action for which the contract terms, specifications, or
price are not agreed upon before performance is begun under the action.
Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
217.7401(d).
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Aegis Ashore: Aegis Ashore is MDA's future land-based
variant of the ship-based Aegis BMD. It is expected to track
and intercept ballistic missiles in their midcourse phase of
flight using Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptor variants as
they become available. However, while Aegis BMD has
demonstrated performance at sea, these demonstrations used the
currently fielded 3.6.1 version of Aegis BMD with the SM-3 IA
interceptor, not the newer variant of the Aegis operating
system and new interceptor that Aegis Ashore will use. Aegis
Ashore is dependent on next-generation versions of Aegis
systems--Aegis 4.0.1 and Aegis 5.0--as well as the new SM-3 IB
interceptor, all of which are currently under development.
Moreover, a series of changes are required to further modify
these new variants of Aegis BMD for use on land with Aegis
Ashore. These modifications include changes to the Vertical
Launching System; suppression or disabling of certain features
used at sea; design, integration, and fabrication of a new
deckhouse enclosure for the radar, and potential changes to the
SM-3 IB interceptor. Changes to those existing Aegis BMD
components that will be reused for Aegis Ashore may reduce
their maturity in the context of the new Aegis Ashore program,
and new features will require testing and assessment to
demonstrate their performance. MDA plans to make production
decisions for the first operational Aegis Ashore before
conducting both ground and flight tests. We concluded in this
year's report that it is a highly concurrent effort, with
significant cost, schedule, and performance risk.
Ground-based Midcourse Defense: GMD is a ground-based
defense system designed to provide combatant commanders the
capability to defend the homeland against a limited attack from
intermediate, and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles
during the midcourse phase of flight. The GMD consists of a
ground-based interceptor--a booster with an Exoatmospheric Kill
Vehicle on top--and a fire control system that receives target
information from sensors in order to formulate a battle plan.
GMD continues to deliver assets before testing has fully
determined their capabilities and limitations. The Director,
MDA testified on March 31, 2011 that he considers the GMD
interceptors essentially prototypes. In the urgency to deploy
assets to meet the Presidential directive to field an initial
capability by 2004, assets were built and deployed before
developmental testing was completed. During the ongoing
developmental testing, issues were found that led to a need for
retrofits. GMD intercept tests conducted to date have already
led to major hardware or software changes to the interceptors--
not all of which have been verified through flight testing. In
addition, manufacturing of a new variant called the Capability
Enhancement II is well underway and more than half of those
variants have already been delivered although their capability
has not been validated through developmental flight tests. To
date, the two flight tests utilizing this variant have both
failed to intercept the target. According to MDA, as a result
of the most recent failure in December 2010, deliveries of this
variant have been halted. Again, because of the urgency to
deploy some capability, limited work was undertaken on long-
term sustainment for the system which is critical to ensure the
system remains effective through 2032. In September 2010, MDA
finalized the GMD Stockpile Reliability Program Plan, a key
step in developing the knowledge needed to determine the
sustainment needs of the GMD system.
concluding observations
This year MDA has made significant strides in providing a better
foundation for Congress and others to assess progress and hold senior
leadership accountable for outcomes. Undoubtable progress has been made
in terms of implementing new acquisition reviews and reporting detailed
baselines, but critical gaps remain in the material reported,
particularly the quality of the underlying cost estimates needed to
establish baselines. We look forward to continuing to work with DOD and
MDA in addressing these gaps and further strengthening the
underpinnings for sound oversight. Moreover, as we have recommended
previously, improvements to oversight reporting should be complemented
by knowledge-based acquisition approaches that ensure programs complete
developmental activities before proceeding into production; that test
plans are stabilized and adequately resourced; and that targets used
for testing are reliable, available, and affordable. Given the breadth
and scope of the European Phased Adaptive Approach it is also important
that Congress have assurance that this policy is working as intended
and is cost-effective.
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you may have at this time.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
I guess now I get to ask a question. General O'Reilly, as I
was starting to say, and I think you began to address it, being
more than halfway through fiscal year 2011 and DOD still
operating under a continuing resolution at fiscal year 2010
funding levels, can you tell us what the impacts on your
missile defense program has been on operating under the
continuing resolution (CR), and will you be able to mitigate
some of those impacts if Congress passes a year-long funding
resolution with most of the fiscal year 2011 defense
appropriation levels soon?
General O'Reilly. Thank you, sir. The impact of the CR,
series of CRs, for 2011 on the MDA's program has been
significant. One area, for example, is the GMD system, which
the President had requested a $324 million increase in fiscal
year 2011 over fiscal year 2010, so we're still operating at
the fiscal year 2010 position. That is significant when it
comes to construction, for example, of the GMD system in
Alaska. We're approaching the construction season, where most
of the work is done, and if we were not able to get a budget
this week I would be in a significantly diminished position in
order to hire the construction crews on time and we could
perhaps lose most of the year's construction.
The mitigation to that is, if it does look like and if we
do receive a budget for fiscal year 2011 I will be able to
accomplish about 80 percent of the construction I was
intending. But I must tell you that across our programs the CRs
have prevented us from starting new starts for fiscal year
2011, such as our satellite programs that were to support EPAA,
and they have caused a tremendous inefficiency in allowing
contracts to only move forward, very large contracts, for
several weeks at a time.
So the combined impact is a significant inefficiency and a
reduction in, now with this budget, how much I can accomplish
over the remaining months of this fiscal year. I do believe I'm
going to have to readjust what I intended to accomplish in
fiscal year 2012 because the budget was received in April and
before all of the funding will be received will be many weeks
later than that.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
I see we're joined by the chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, Senator Levin. Senator Levin, would you
have any comments you'd like to make?
Chairman Levin. I would have questions later on, but
Senator Shaheen was here first, so please go in the regular
order. Thank you, though.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You all have alluded to the current budget situation that
we're facing and clearly it's going to affect everyone across
the board. As you look at the budget situation, can you talk
about how you expect to be able to keep programs on track?
Specifically--I guess this goes to you, General O'Reilly, and
perhaps Dr. Roberts--can you talk about the balance between
development and testing versus deployment and what potential
risks there are if you misjudge on one side or the other?
General O'Reilly. Senator, I will start first. As far as
the budget impacts are, as I said, they're very significant
across the board. In some cases where we've just lost at least
half a year's worth of program and we will not--for example,
the start of my satellite surveillance program, our new
program--we will now be allowed our new start at the end of
this week if we receive a budget, which is more than half a
year. I don't believe we're going to be able to catch up on
that time.
So in some cases we can't. In other cases, with production
lines and so forth, we will try to acquire larger lots of
supplies and accelerate the production line on some of our
interceptors. But again, I don't believe we're going to be able
to mitigate the total impact of the CRs this year. So what we
set out to accomplish in 2011, some of it's going to have to
occur in 2012.
As far as the balance between testing and development, we
have taken a look several years ago at all of the data that was
required for testing in order to do two things: one, to confirm
for the operational test agencies, independently confirm, that
missile defense systems are suitable and operationally
deployable and effective. The second reason is to support the
accreditation of our models and simulations. Our testing is so
expensive--a typical GMD test can cost $300 million. So to
fully test its full operational capability, especially against
large raid sizes of missiles, it's critical that we have
independent verification of our models and simulations which
our combatant commanders will use.
So we have set out and restructured our programs to ensure
that every new deliverable product has gone through a testing
regime sufficient for the operational test agencies to make an
independent assessment, are they ready.
The penalties we can see in the approach for GMD, for
example: I can understand why we fielded GMD as quickly as we
did, but we will still be testing some of the original
fundamental operations of the system for many years. As we
discover that we need to upgrade the system because of
something we found in flight testing, we will go back and
refurbish the missiles we have. So that's why we've started a
stockpiling of missiles to do that. But that is much more
expensive than to completely qualify, what we call, for
production all of our systems on the ground before we go into
flight testing.
But I understand why we did it in GMD. We have a strategy
to increase over time the reliability of the system through
testing. But we will not approach that, nor have we, as a
result of the BMDR for the rest of our systems.
Senator Shaheen. So when you do those independent
verifications of your models, since we're not actually testing
in real time, do you have any evidence that there's ever a
problem?
General O'Reilly. Senator, there are two levels where we
find problems, actually three. The first is in the component
testing on the ground. To the greatest extent possible, we
replicate the performance of the missile components on the
ground as if they were flying. We do that hundreds of times. It
occurs in very severe environments. That's our first confidence
level that these components work right.
In our latest GMD test, we did find we had a failure mode
that could not be replicated on the Earth and that's why I am
going to request an additional test to verify we fixed it. The
Earth's gravitation is one problem with testing it on the
ground, and literally the rotation of the Earth. These are very
sensitive items and you must be in flight testing, and the
frequencies and shocks that we can replicate on the ground are
limited, even with our best capabilities, our best facilities.
So one of the problems is until you're into flight testing
you can't totally replicate on the ground. But you can do a
lot.
Second is to integrate the system in extensive ground
testing. We do it in laboratories and then we repeat it
actually in the field with the soldiers, sailors, and airmen
operating the system, and we simulate threats on the system and
we run those hundreds of times in order to gain a confidence
level. But the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation--and
each Service has its own independent operational test agency--
makes the final assessment on my products, not the MDA, so that
there's some independence.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
In competing for some of the scientists and engineers that
we're going to need for the future to continue the work of the
MDA and also for DOD, are you comfortable that the current
budget actually supports our ability to recruit and train the
scientists and engineers and mathematicians that we're going to
need? I have an ulterior motive in asking this question because
I think we're not doing enough to train the folks in the
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics subjects that
we're going to need for the future to continue to lead this
country, and obviously in your agency there's a critical need
for people with those degrees and training.
General O'Reilly. Ma'am, I couldn't agree more. Senator,
our issue with qualified young engineers and scientists has
been increased or exacerbated by the 2005 Base Realignment and
Closure Act. We moved our technical workforce from Washington,
where I had over 3,000 engineers. I will now have 300 people
here by the end of September. We moved those to Huntsville, AL,
and Colorado Springs and Dahlgren, VA.
The problem was the average age of my workforce was 49, so
most of them were not willing to move. So I needed to hire over
1,000 engineers. We went to the universities and there were two
aspects that we observed. One, I think it takes personal
engagement. I have personally engaged with universities, as
well with the chairman, out on trips. We've gotten a tremendous
response from that.
Two is, unfortunately, the economy. For every engineering
position I have had as we hire the college graduates, we have
had between 18 to 26 highly qualified applicants for every
position. So the MDA as a consequence, unintended, of the
economy, we've received tremendously qualified applicants. The
average person we receive has over a 3.8 average. 40 percent
are master's degrees or Ph.Ds.
But I do spend a lot of time in the universities, also with
research. Key to this is investing in research with the faculty
members so they in fact can talk to the students and the
postdocs and they can see opportunities in government such as
this.
Finally, I have outreach to historically black colleges and
universities because our agency had 12 percent minorities, but
in the engineering field 2 years ago, .3 percent of our
engineers were minorities. Today it's 4 percent. So it may not
seem like a lot, but it took a significant amount of effort to
reach that.
So in all of those areas, Senator, I couldn't agree more.
The young folks really respond to personal energy and personal
appearances and that's what I have been pursuing.
Senator Shaheen. I'm out of time, but how many women?
General O'Reilly. In some universities over 70 percent of
the engineering students are women, and that's reflected today.
In the group that we have hired since I first mentioned, over
40, I believe it's 42 or 44 percent are women engineers. So we
previously had less than 10 percent--significant growth in that
area, too.
Senator Shaheen. So what's the final number? Where are you
at today?
General O'Reilly. We have hired 380 new college graduates
in the last 2 years. What I'm trying to do is prevent a
demographic bump again in my organization. So we hire 100 at
the end of every semester, to smooth out the demographics.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me go over.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
General O'Reilly, as I mentioned in the opening statement,
after two recent test failures it's clear that GMD is in need
of some additional resources. More I think is needed to ensure
the capability that we have works to the advanced degree that
you'd like it to operate at.
I would first note--see if I'm correct--that the initial
guidance system's kill vehicles have performed ably and I
believe 20 of those are in the ground today and you believe are
capable of defeating the kind of incoming missiles likely to be
received from an Iran or North Korea; is that correct at this
point in time?
General O'Reilly. I can't get into the actual number of
that configuration, but our original configuration, yes, sir,
we have had five flight tests and three intercepts out of three
attempts and have found no indication of the type of problem we
found in the newest version, where we have failed twice.
Senator Sessions. The new version was designed to be even
more sophisticated to deal with more sophisticated threats; is
that correct?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. It had more accurate guidance
instrumentation on board.
Senator Sessions. So it's going to take some effort to get
that under control. I think you've indicated you need more
interceptors to facilitate the kind of realistic testing that
you believe is necessary. Is that correct?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. Before the first generation of
GBI, we flew a test where we did not have an intercept, and I'm
asking for another test in order to verify that we've resolved
the problems on this latest interceptor version.
Senator Sessions. Could you give an estimate of what that
test might cost, say one test?
General O'Reilly. Sir, since it does not involve a target,
the cost would be primarily of the interceptor, which would be
around $70 million, and then an additional $30 to $40 million
of support for that test. So it's approximately $100 million
for that test.
I have also, sir, determined that we're going to need
significant ground testing of at least $50 to $100 million more
on the ground, again to verify that we have absolutely resolved
this problem.
Senator Sessions. We've had such a long and basically
successful effort to establish the capability to defend the
United States against a missile attack, we don't need to stop,
allow our adversaries to develop more sophisticated missiles,
and then all of our efforts have been not productive.
So you would say that it does make sense that we continue
to develop the more sophisticated capabilities that the threats
may pose to us in the years to come?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. I would agree with, for example
as Admiral Winnefeld said, to stay ahead of the threat.
Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts indicated that the threat is
qualitatively and quantitatively advancing, I believe.
Now, with regard to this money that's going to be needed,
maybe $250 million you just referred to, where do you plan to
get that and how can you obtain that?
General O'Reilly. Sir, for this year I've had to stop the
production of seven GBIs in production because we don't want to
go forward until we've absolutely assured we've identified and
resolved this design issue that's caused the most recent
failure. So I am proposing to divert the funding that we would
have had to build those seven interceptors and to do more
refurbishments and to support this ground testing, than we had
originally planned.
Senator Sessions. So that looks to me like you're robbing
Peter to pay Paul, and it raises the fundamental question, of
does this budget give you enough money to keep the program on
track and actually fix the failures. I know that you have
difficulties. All of us in Congress, the White House, and the
Secretary of Defense are saying watch spending, try to contain
spending, and we all believe in that, trust me.
However, when we've done this much work and we're down to
maybe $40 billion more has been spent on this project and we've
hit a difficulty, we need to be able to go forward with it and
we don't need to stop short of the number of interceptors we
need in the ground and prepared.
So I guess my question is, in your personal professional
opinion--and we ask you for that--do you have enough money to
keep this program on track and to fix the challenges from the
GMD system?
General O'Reilly. Sir, for fiscal year 2011 and for fiscal
year 2012, because I have had to stop the production of the
current GBIs and I am diverting that funding to fixing this
problem and I'm using funding that was reserved for a flight
test next year of the two-stage interceptor, which will have to
move another year----
Senator Sessions. That will push the two-stage interceptor
back.
General O'Reilly. Sir, without additional funding in fiscal
year 2013 and beyond, there will need to be a delay of about a
year of our overall flight test program that we were trying to
complete by 2017. So that's one way to do it.
Right now, sir, I have the funding I need to address this
problem because I've stopped my production line.
Senator Sessions. That has costs and ramifications also.
So I guess what I would say, Mr. Chairman, is that the DOD
budget is tight. Just looking at the basic numbers on the MDA
budget, DOD gets an increase as requested by the President, I
think, in the House. But you have a reduction of, I estimate,
about 5 percent in MDA's budget request; is that correct?
General O'Reilly. Sir, for fiscal year 2012 it's $48
million higher than fiscal year 2011, and fiscal year 2011 was
$324 million higher than fiscal year 2012. So for this budget
it's actually higher than last year.
Chairman Levin. You mean fiscal year 2010?
General O'Reilly. I'm sorry. I meant 2010. Fiscal year 2010
to fiscal year 2011 was $324 million higher than fiscal year
2010.
Senator Sessions. I think we should take a note here how
alert the chairman is over here.
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. I apologize.
Senator Sessions. Somebody is watching the store. You get
an A, Mr. Chairman. I'm asking the questions. I wasn't
following that--I wasn't that quick.
Chairman Levin. I didn't mean to interrupt.
Senator Sessions. No, you do a fabulous job of keeping up
with things.
General O'Reilly. Sir, I do believe in the near term, for
fiscal year 2011 and 2012, however, as I've said before----
Senator Sessions. Next year you begin to bite. 2013, the
budget is less than originally projected, is it not, the 5-
year?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. Across the following 5 years,
two things. First, we're finishing the heavy construction over
fiscal year 2012. So the remainder of the work is focused on
interceptors, flight testing, and upgrades. So that accounts
for about half of it.
The other half is the efficiencies we're approving, sir. We
have not reduced what we intended to accomplish, even though
there's $2.4 billion less in the MDA budget. We have identified
all of the steps we're taking so they can be accounted for and
it will be evident we're either achieving it or we're not,
these efficiencies, for the same amount.
Senator Sessions. Excuse me. You just noted, though, that
you're delaying the two-stage testing and you're stopping the
production of your interceptors. Both of those will add costs
to the future.
We can talk more about where we are financially. I applaud
you for the efficiencies that you've found, but I think there's
no doubt, with the unfortunate failures of these tests, that
it's going to hit our budget more than we expected, and we
really need to see what we can do to keep your already-reduced
plans from putting us in a situation we don't want to be in.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Chairman Levin.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You say you stopped the production of the interceptors. I
thought it was the kill vehicles which you've stopped
production on.
General O'Reilly. Sir, it is the kill vehicles. I can't
deliver the interceptor without the kill vehicles.
Chairman Levin. No, that's fine. But you said the
production of the interceptors and I think you meant kill
vehicles; is that correct?
General O'Reilly. That part of the interceptor, yes, sir,
the kill vehicles.
Chairman Levin. On the funding issue, you're stopping
production not to save money, but because you want to do
testing first to make sure that what you produce will work; is
that fair?
General O'Reilly. That's absolutely the case, sir. We did
not anticipate this failure, and especially when it happened
when the budget was already developed. So that was not to save
any money. It is solely driven by we need to confirm the design
works before we go back into production.
Chairman Levin. I totally agree with that philosophy,
because I think you should know whether something works before
it's produced and deployed, and there's been too many times
where we've deviated from that course in the past, particularly
in missile defense, for my comfort level.
But you're satisfied. Let me ask the other witnesses too.
Do you all agree that it makes sense to not produce further
kill vehicles until we have corrected the problem, so that when
we do produce them we know that they're going to properly
behave? Admiral, would you agree with that?
Admiral Macy. Absolutely, sir. It was one of the basic
results of the BMDR that we would, if you will, fly before we
buy. We would ensure that to the best of our ability within
costs of testing and modeling and simulation that we would
understand the performance of the systems. So when they are
fielded, from my perspective representing the warfighter, I
have confidence in their level of performance. So that I can
build my operational plans to meet the need.
Chairman Levin. Dr. Roberts, do you have any difference
with that?
Dr. Roberts. Ditto.
Chairman Levin. Now, General, last year I believe you
displayed some frustration with the quality of some
contractors' work, and you and I discussed the need to improve
the MDA contracts to try to get more protection for the
government against defects, which would require some defects
clauses in the contracts.
Have you made any progress towards including defects
clauses in the contracts?
General O'Reilly. Sir, we've worked with industry to get
their feedback. I've worked with the leaders, the chief
executive officers, of the major aerospace corporations and
asked them for their ideas and help on this, so that it is most
effective, these clauses.
The clause that we're looking at is not to indemnify
industry from trying to achieve an unprecedented technical
goal. That is the reason why we have cost-plus contracts.
Unfortunately, when we find a failure mode that was caused by a
quality, what we refer to as a quality escape--they didn't
follow their own processes, their supervisors didn't catch it,
and ultimately it caused a defective product--that's also today
under our contracts protected by a cost-plus contract. It's the
cost just went up.
An example is the first of the two GMD failures was caused
because of a quality problem, and no matter how much additional
money we added that wouldn't have resolved the root cause of
that problem.
So where I am today is looking at the fee and looking at
the profit that we're providing contractors and having the
ability to go beyond the limited scope that we currently have
in our award fees for quality control and extending it to a
much greater pool of award fee money, even past-awarded money,
so that the government can be compensated for egregious errors
in quality control.
Chairman Levin. I hope you'll pursue that. As I understand
it from our conversations, that first flight failure was due to
a lock wire, if I have the right word, not being in place; is
that accurate?
General O'Reilly. That is accurate, sir.
Chairman Levin. It was not where it was supposed to be?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Now, that is not something that the
government should be losing money over as far as I'm concerned.
I agree with you that you want the industry to be creative and
if things fail because there's design problems and because
we're taking risks, that's fine. That's what research is all
about. But if you have a plan that says the lock wire, whatever
that is, has to be here and instead it was put over here and we
have a missile test failure because of that, that's a totally
different deal as far as I'm concerned.
There is a role for cost-plus. We use it much too much, and
I commend, by the way, Senator McCain and others on this
committee for really joining in an effort to go after cost-plus
contracts where they shouldn't be cost-plus. But I'm very much
troubled by this. When you have a missile failure, a test
failure, and it costs hundreds of millions of dollars and it's
because something was not put in the right place according to
the plan, then I think that the taxpayers should not be paying
for that, and I hope you'll pursue that approach that you're
using vigorously.
Do I have time? I don't know.
Senator Nelson. Go ahead.
Chairman Levin. I'd like to talk to you, Admiral, about the
PAA to missile defense in Europe. As I understand it, you are
responsible for assessing missile defense capability
requirements of the combatant commanders. I believe that, after
input from the combatant commanders, the Joint Chiefs
unanimously recommended the PAA to missile defense in Europe.
If that's true so far, can you tell us why from a warfighter
perspective the military benefits of the EPAA to missile
defense make sense?
Admiral Macy. Thank you, Senator. Yes, it makes sense
because it provides us two opportunities. The first is an
opportunity in time and the second is an opportunity in
planning.
In the role of time, the PAA allows us to address the
closer threat to Europe, the threat of medium-range, and
intermediate-range missiles coming from the Middle East,
whereas previously we did not have a method to do so prior to
2017 at the earliest with the so-called third site plan, which
because of physics also would have had some limitations in
defending some of the parts of Europe, those more to the south.
The PAA, being phased to our own technologies and adapted
to the threat, gave us a way in which to organize our thoughts
and our plans to take advantage of the near-term capabilities
that are present in Aegis and in THAAD, developed by MDA, to
address those near-term threats to Europe. So that's a time
issue. Basically, we can address the threats to Europe much
sooner than we would have been able to.
The second is in the flexibility and the capability of the
system. It allows us to adapt to changes that may appear in
enemy intent and the emergence of threats from another area. We
have done most of our planning for threats coming from one
particular country or set of countries and part of the region.
If another were to develop this capability, it would allow us
to adjust faster.
It would allow us to increase or decrease the capability
based on the amount of threat. It allows us opportunities for
partners to take part in the missile defense of Europe by
having more opportunities for ways in which they can connect
with our system and come up with an allied approach. Whereas
previously it was a unitary system linked to the homeland
defense BMD capability and there was not a real practical way
to have the partners involved.
So we have flexibility in capability, we have flexibility
in the alliance, and we have the opportunity to address threats
on a more timely basis.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Chairman Levin.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome to all of you. Thank you for being here today.
Let me start with this. As we develop active defense
networks to counter advanced ballistic missiles, deployed
American forces and some of our allies, as we know all too
well, are faced with the threat of low-tech rockets and
missiles. Some of these weapons don't require a lot of
technical knowledge for the user. They can be launched from the
backs of pickup trucks and they're easily hidden.
How do we strike a balance between countering complex
systems and those that are basically flying improvised
explosive devices (IED)?
Admiral Macy. Senator, that falls into the, if you will,
larger realm of which I am responsible, which is integrated air
and missile defense (IAMD), where we look at the defense of the
Homeland, of own forces and partner forces from all threat
objects arriving in the atmosphere, regardless of source. So we
look at the IAMD architecture, the IAMD capability, across the
board to address that.
We have an IAMD operational architecture, a formal way of
looking at what decisions and information are there made at
each stage in that process, who has to make them, and who they
have to provide it to. This has been done in a very rigorous
and organized fashion, in accordance with the operational
architectural framework.
We coordinate with program providers across the spectrum of
air and missile defense at the program level, how they fit into
that operational architecture, and how they address these
issues. Recently we've had a number of discussions with the
Army in particular on countering rockets, artillery, and mortar
issues, and what needs to be done, what are the requirements,
what are the current capabilities, and what are the shortfalls.
We serve, as I said earlier, at the nexus of how this is
done within DOD. We participate with the Services in their
development of classic air defense systems through the joint
capabilities process, and we participate with STRATCOM, who has
the responsibility as the air and missile defense integrating
authority to look at those requirements across the spectrum of
threat.
In the BMD world, we look at the prioritized capabilities
list, the achievable capabilities list, that's generated by
STRATCOM with the combatant commanders, and the dialogue that
goes on with MDA over the programs that General O'Reilly is
asked to provide.
So we are the nexus across that span of questions from
rockets, artillery, mortars, long-range rockets, short-range
ballistic missiles, manned bombers, fighter aircraft, et
cetera. I don't know if that answers your question, but that's
how we try to put it together, then integrate both solely
service programs--Army air defense, Navy air defense, Air Force
air defense capabilities--with joint programs, how they work
together.
We conduct a number of studies on that, one of the most
significant being a series of exercises known as Nimble Fire,
where in a classified environment we can bring together the air
defense capabilities of all of the Services and see how they
interact. We've been involved in all of these discussions that
we've had here today.
Senator Udall. I may want to follow up with some additional
questions for the record.
General, did you have anything to add, or Dr. Roberts?
General O'Reilly. Sir, in my charter it does not cover the
very short-range rockets you referred to. So I develop
typically a Scud threat and beyond. I have been asked by
Congress and we do co-manage some Israeli programs that are
short-range, such as the David's Sling. But even what you're
referring to is more in the realm of the Iron Dome system,
which was not part of our development, but I have been watching
that and I have seen it's been successful in its recent
deployment against very short-range rockets.
Admiral Macy. Senator, I'd like to add, if I may, sir, that
I'm frankly very proud of the very close liaison between my
staff and that of MDA, where we look at these intersections
very closely to understand where there are opportunities for
exchange of information, exchange of data and capabilities.
So it's not that one part of JIAMDO is doing air defense
and another part is doing ballistic missiles. We are very
closely integrated with MDA as well as with the service
engineers. We understand this is a spectrum of capability.
Senator Udall. It's hard to see it being a threat in a
broad-based way to our forces, but General O'Reilly mentioned
the situation in Israel and I think that that has political
elements as well as military elements, and the political
elements can affect the military situation and the stability in
the region. The more we develop the capacity to counter flying
IEDs, in some ways the better.
I'll follow up with some additional questions on cost and
so on. I want to use the second half of my time, if I have some
left, to turn to GAO. Ms. Chaplain, you're here, and thank you
for your good work. You talked about some aspects of MDA's
flexible acquisitions process that create what the report
describes as ``down sides'' for oversight and accountability. I
know that DOD concurred with some of the GAO recommendations
and that MDA has made some significant progress. But there are
some recommendations that DOD still disagrees with, and I'd
like you just to discuss those, if you would, and then give
General O'Reilly a chance to respond.
Ms. Chaplain. Yes, there were some disagreements. Our
recommendations focused on where we thought MDA could further
improve the reporting that it had started. One issue, for
example, was with regard to sunk costs for targets, and we
believe those sunk costs should be reported and pretty clear,
and MDA only partially agreed with that. They didn't feel like
that would fit the way they want to report targets and that
it's difficult to report some of the heritage costs in targets.
But our concern was even MDA sunk costs weren't reported
and we felt that they need to be, and to the extent the other
costs can be or cannot be found that needs to be disclosed.
We also had some partial disagreements on the way testing
is planned. We encouraged MDA to make test plans more
realistic. There are often failures in testing and a lot of
rework going on. We thought maybe some additional time and
resources should be built into the plan, and they only
partially agreed with that recommendation. I think it's just
part of the issues involved with testing. As General O'Reilly
said, they're very expensive tests to conduct and it might
require more resources upfront.
But our goal is to avoid a lot of the rework that goes
along with a test plan that's not fully stabilized yet.
Senator Udall. Thank you.
I think my time has expired, so, General O'Reilly, I'll
have you respond for the record, if I might, so that Senator
Shaheen can ask some questions.
I would just add that when I was a businessman I on the one
hand loved seeing my auditors and on the other hand I wasn't
all that happy to see my auditors. So thank you for what you
do. I know General O'Reilly and I have had some conversations
and he takes seriously your insights and has made some real
improvements and is notably and understandably proud. I look
forward to your responses for the record. I did want to yield
so Senator Shaheen can ask her questions.
Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator.
[The information referred to follows:]
Ms. Chaplain raised two issues, one regarding reporting sunk costs
of targets and one on adding additional time and resources to execute
our test programs. I will respond to both.
Target sunk costs are not reported in MDA program baselines.
Targets are developed in support of separate and distinct Ballistic
Missile Defense System (BMDS) test events and do not follow a
traditional DOD weapon system procurement process. As the test program
adjusts, the quantity of targets in the baseline adjusts as well.
Additionally, each target is inherently a test article and no two are
truly identical. As such, there is not a clear quantity of targets to
be procured over the lifecycle in order to amortize the non-recurring
engineering costs.
MDA strives to reuse previously developed and procured strategic
missile components in our targets program, so including all sunk costs
would not accurately reflect program costs. Accordingly, MDA uses the
costs incurred or planned during the Future Years Defense Program to
calculate unit costs.
The Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) is defined well enough over
a 6-year period to provide a reasonable baseline from which target
needs can be defined and targets can be procured.
With respect to the second issue raised by Ms. Chaplain, MDA builds
available schedule and resource margin into the test baseline in order
to stabilize, to the extent possible, the test program and minimize
rework in test planning and execution.
MDA continuously evaluates the availability and allocation of test
resources to ensure all components of the test program (e.g., range
availability, target availability, range safety systems, data
collection assets, et cetera) are synchronized. MDA thoroughly analyzes
all test results (successes and failures) to ensure test objectives
were met. When analysis determines an objective was not fully met, it
is assessed for inclusion in a future test event. This continuous
evaluation allows MDA to re-allocate resources based upon test results,
priorities, and warfighter requested capabilities. The IMTP has defined
flight and ground test plans, at both the system and element levels,
that can be adjusted based upon emerging test results or changing
warfighter requirements. Test delays, accelerations, cancellations, and
additions are analyzed using established MDA processes to update the
IMTP and maximize the use of planned test events for additional data
collection.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Roberts, you in your testimony referred
to the hedge options. It's my understanding that DOD has been
planning to implement a number of these hedge capabilities and
I understand that DOD is currently conducting an analysis. Do
you have some idea of when this analysis of the hedge options
would be finished, and is it possible that you would brief us
at the time that you have those options analyzed and under
consideration?
Dr. Roberts. Yes, we're committed to brief you as soon as
we have the Secretary's review and decisions in this area.
Frankly, we expected that to be by now. We thought we'd have
more to say in this hearing about the hedge. But of course,
other events have intervened and we expect within a matter of a
few short weeks.
Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, are you confident that
the MDA will be able to deploy additional GBIs at the eight
extra silos at Fort Greely in a timely manner if DOD chooses to
do so?
General O'Reilly. Sir, we're going to need to complete the
additional missiles that are currently stopped in production in
order to do that. As soon as we have those completed, we will
have at that point, I believe, over 10 missiles additional for
those 8 silos, sir. So I will get back to you on the record the
exact delivery dates for those remaining missiles.
[The information referred to follows:]
Pending the outcome of the Failure Review Board, once the
corrections to the missiles are made, MDA will prioritize repair of
both emplaced missiles and Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) in
production. While no decision has been made to fill additional silos in
Missile Field 2, if directed to do so, eight additional GBIs will be
available for emplacement by the end of fiscal year 2015.
Senator Nelson. Okay, thank you.
Admiral Macy, can you explain how DOD assesses how many
missile defense interceptors are required to meet the needs of
the combatant commanders? I presume it's not as simple as
planning to have at least two interceptors for each adversary
ballistic missile so we can shoot at every missile. But if you
could help us understand how the COCOMs and the military view
the actual role of missile defense and the force structure that
they need.
In other words, how does missile defense fit into the
larger picture of a COCOM's missions and capabilities?
Admiral Macy. Yes, sir. I'm looking forward to addressing
that. To begin with, it's important to note that BMD capability
as we have been talking about it today is not an isolated
mission. As you pointed out, it's on the warfighters' planning.
It's part of a larger campaign against an adversary.
I shorthand it sometimes that BMD does not defend you
against ballistic missiles. Ballistic missiles are an action
taken by an adversary for a political result. BMD provides part
of the national capability to deal with that potential threat
or to deal with the event should it occur.
So what BMD allows us to do is to prevent the adversary
from winning the fight with the first wave. What it does is to
provide the requisite level of protection for critical forces
and nodes and capabilities sufficient for the combatant
commander to bring all the other elements of national power to
bear to get the enemy to change his behavior, because in the
end that's what you're trying to do, is to change the enemy's
behavior.
The goal is not to just simply sit there and keep taking
incomings. As you pointed out, it's not practical. The number
of threat missiles in the world already exceeds our inventory
and will continue to do so. So buying missiles equal to twice
the number is just not practical.
So what we look for and what we have done in the JCM-III
study is to look at that from a warfighting perspective: How
long can BMD capability provide the requisite level of
protection to those critical assets that the combatant
commander has identified so that he can take other steps
necessary to change the enemy's behavior, to stop the enemy's
use of ballistic missiles?
That's from an operational perspective. From a planning
perspective, demonstrating that having sufficient capability
may assist in deterring the enemy from contemplating the use of
ballistic missiles, knowing that he will not be successful in
his initial attacks, and he can remain confident that the
reaction of the United States is going to be significantly more
than simply defending against the incoming.
Senator Nelson. How does the Joint Staff allocate the
number of missile defense systems to the various combatant
commanders, who I'm sure are competing to one degree or another
for those assets?
Admiral Macy. Yes, sir. It's a safe bet that each of them
has a list which is a little bit longer than the one I have.
It is part of our global force management process, which is
our formal process to assess the operational plans and
requirements of each combatant commander, to understand the
risks and the rewards of allocating them different
capabilities. This is true across the board, whether it's BMD
ships, whether it's long-range bombers, whether it's infantry
brigades, for their different needs.
We have an ongoing process through the Global Force
Management Board to understand their needs and their
requirements, to balance across the forces what we have
available, and to use that information to essentially do two
things. One is to feed back through the Secretary to the
development community and the budget community what we need to
increase because we assess the overall risk as being too high
and, until we have those, to give to the Secretary that
information he needs to make the decision on what risks he's
going to take and where he's going to take them.
Last year we looked very carefully at the issue of BMD
forces with the Global Force Management community. We are
folding that into the community. STRATCOM is currently leading
an effort among the three COCOMs plus U.S. Northern Command to
understand how all of their different plans fit together and to
understand how we would apportion and allocate forces in the
near term and over time as we get more capability to each one
of those.
Senator Nelson. So at the end of the process, is it the
Secretary who makes the decision or is it brought to the
Secretary's attention and the Secretary either assents or
dissents to it?
Admiral Macy. Every deployment order is a decision by the
Secretary in his role on behalf of the President as the command
authority, whether it's for a ship or for a brigade. We have a
process that goes on every week. It's called the Dep Ord Book.
It's the Deployment Order Book, where the movement of forces,
the reassignment of forces, goes through a review process among
the COCOMs, goes through the Joint Staff, is reviewed by the
Chairman in his role of providing military advice, and then is
presented to the Secretary, and he literally signs off each
page. His initials go on: ``yes'', ``no'', or ``come see me''.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just have a final question. I was interested in the back
and forth around Israel's Iron Dome and David's Sling program
and the Arrow program, because I had the opportunity to visit
Israel last summer and be briefed by their director of the
missile defense program on those systems. I actually think we
should take a lesson in terms of naming our systems. I think
theirs are quite descriptive.
But what I was interested in is, you mentioned that the
Iron Dome technology was Israeli and I know that we contribute
to the work that's being done there, so I wonder if you could
talk about what we have learned from the technology that's been
developed and how much of that is shared and whether we are
actually incorporating any of that into what we're doing here.
General O'Reilly. Senator, actually the Iron Dome is one of
the few Israeli programs that's totally developed by them. So
we do not have a sharing agreement with them. David's Sling, we
provide 50 percent of the funding and they provide 50 percent
of the resources. Our companies, such as Raytheon, work with
that development so that they have the proprietary rights and
the information rights to develop that type of capability
should we want David's Sling. The same with Boeing on Arrow 3.
Those two programs, in which we are investing approximately
half of the resources, we do not--first of all, our industry
team is working on those programs, so they see the details of
the technology, and we have the rights to that technology.
There are certain limitations, but all that is pre-agreed to
prior to the start.
But in the Iron Dome, that is not a MDA program. I have
been asked to provide funding out of my budget for the
procurement of Iron Dome. So we're ready to follow the guidance
of Congress in that regard. But I don't participate in the
actual management or the development of that capability. But
I've reviewed it.
Senator Shaheen. Where are we in terms of the procurement?
There has been a request from Congress, but have we done
anything on that?
General O'Reilly. Senator, I need this year's budget,
fiscal year 2011. It's in the fiscal year 2011 budget, $205
million for the MDA for the procurement of that for Israel.
Senator Shaheen. If we do contribute to that, what would we
learn from that and will we be able to take advantage of any of
the procurement efforts?
General O'Reilly. Once we have the budget, I will begin
that process. But we have not begun that, those agreements with
the--and the office in Israel that you were referring to, they
also were not responsible for the development of Iron Dome.
That office, we work together closely every day. So this is
something we're going to have to determine ahead of time of the
agreements. That hasn't occurred yet.
Senator Shaheen. So who developed the Iron Dome technology?
General O'Reilly. I know the company is Rafael and I've
been out there. I've seen their testing. It's very impressive
for what it can do.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator.
Ms. Chaplain, when GAO makes recommendations for MDA to
improve its program management, DOD formally indicates its view
of those recommendations. I believe in response to
recommendations in your report in March, DOD either agreed or
partially agreed with all your recommendations. Your report and
your testimony indicate that MDA has made significant progress
in improving the accountability and transparency of its
programs.
If MDA implements the recommendations in your report, how
far will it have come toward what you would consider an
acceptable level of transparency and accountability?
Ms. Chaplain. If they implemented all the recommendations,
they will have come a very long way in getting the things that
we want to see for accountability and transparency. There are
some actions that need to be taken that shouldn't be taken
lightly. One thing we're looking for, for example, are
independent cost estimates (ICE) and MDA has just started that
process. So that's going to take some time.
Another thing we're looking for is backing cost estimates
with all the data and documentation you need to trace and
verify them and to really understand them in an easy way. That
wasn't present this round. I think they'll be more present the
next round.
Along with the transparency and accountability of just what
they report to Congress, we would like to see a few other
things happen. One is just stabilizing the acquisition
approach. We've had three different ways of reporting on
progress for the missile defense system and each time we change
those ways it becomes very difficult for us to go backwards and
track costs back in time and schedule and progress.
We'd also like to see some of the things we recommend
extend to the efforts like EPAA, where we can learn more about
costs and schedule within that effort. Then we'd also like to
see the structure and the clarity of MDA's budget request
improve as well.
So there's more beyond just what you see on paper, but I
think if everything that we're asking for in this round is
implemented it will be just a huge amount of progress that's
been made.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
General O'Reilly, have you determined what or how many of
the recommendations you may be seeking to implement?
General O'Reilly. Senator, we believe GAO has accurately
captured the challenges which missile defense has to operate
in, but at the same time--the management challenges. At the
same time, we are on a path to accomplish the ICE. As she has
said, there's been recent changes. I've made most of those
changes, to enhance the baseline reporting.
This was the second year we've done it in a row. This
year's report that we submitted to Congress wasn't taken into
account. The delivery was after this GAO audit was done. We
believe that has each year more enhanced accuracy and the level
of detail they're looking at.
The one area in which we disagree with the GAO's
recommendation--Ms. Chaplain just referred to it before--is in
the area of our targets. We feel that we reuse--because we have
to find intermediate-range and ICBM-type targets, instead of
buying brand-new targets. We go out and work with the Air Force
and the Navy and we identify retired missiles, and then we
modify those missiles and make them into a target.
Now, the cost of the original missile we don't believe
accurately reflects the cost to MDA of achieving that target. I
know GAO looks at it as the cost to the government, but those
missiles were bought for a particular reason, they were
retired, and we've taken them out of retirement. We do agree
with GAO we should capture all of the costs of modifying those
missiles, but there's a difference there that we're still in
discussions with the GAO on.
Senator Nelson. In that regard, I know that you've changed
some of your acquisition requirements and contracting
requirements now where you get competitive bidding for
contracts. Could you tell us a little bit about what you've
been doing there and maybe some of the cost savings that the
agency has achieved?
General O'Reilly. Sir, of our $2.4 billion that was
identified in efficiencies by MDA this year, almost a half a
billion was due to the way in which we acquire contractor
support for government agencies or government staff. In the
past, we used to hire--we determined and told our contractors
how many engineers we needed and of what seniority and what
were the particulars of the resources we wanted these companies
to provide us to augment our staffs. Instead, we're taking a
different approach. We define the task that we want these
companies to provide for us and we leave it up to the companies
to determine the seniority and number of engineers.
We do this in a competitive fashion, so they know they're
competing for cost, schedule, and performance of their
competitors, against their competitors. This year we've
identified so far over $100 million in savings because of the
way that contractors have proposed. It may be an equal amount
of personnel or it may be even more, but it might be fewer
senior engineers that cost more, more mid-level, and then some
junior engineers, which industry has told me in the past the
way we were contracting was preventing them from literally
hiring and developing a new generation of engineers.
So this has worked quite effectively for us, sir. We do
have about $30 billion more of contracts over the next 5 years
which we are looking to compete.
Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, given the two failed GMD
flight tests, you're planning to conduct two more flight tests
to verify the solution for the problem encountered in the test,
and you've indicated that you will need some additional GBIs
for the GMD test program, but that number hasn't yet been
determined. I understand that you plan to assess the need for
additional GBIs after the flight tests verify and demonstrate
the solution to the GBI problem we've been discussing.
Is that correct? Since the GBI production line will remain
open for several years and the refurbishment and target
programs will also keep that production line busy, we'll have
several years in which to decide how many additional GBIs are
needed. In other words, we don't need to decide that this year;
is that assumption accurate?
General O'Reilly. Yes, sir. We believe that through this
failure review board process one of the outcomes will be what
is the right number and the strategy for testing GBI
reliability in the future. We already have a program that we
plan over the next 10 years to test over 900 components off the
missiles that are currently in the missile fields as we
refurbish, as you say. But we will reassess what additional
testing is needed beyond that.
Senator Nelson. This is to both General O'Reilly and Dr.
Roberts. Your prepared statements discuss a number of planned
enhancements to the existing GMD system to increase the
capability to defend the Homeland over the coming decade.
General O'Reilly, can you summarize the enhancements briefly
and describe the degree to which they are expected to improve
our defenses and over what period of time are we looking?
General O'Reilly. Sir, there are several studies that are
being done independently and they all indicate that--one of
them, including Admiral Macy's study that he just finished--one
of the key indicators to the effectiveness of missile defense
is not actually the number of interceptors--you do need a
certain amount--but it is the sensor system and our ability to
discriminate objects and determine which is the reentry vehicle
(RV) with enough certainty in order to affect your firing
doctrine, how many missiles are you going to shoot at that
cluster of objects?
All missiles when they're launched have associated objects
that come with them--upper stages, shrouds, other components
that come off the missile during powered flight. So we have to
have the ability to determine where is the RV to hit it. Those
types of upgrades to the sensor systems, as I've mentioned,
Clear, AK, those algorithms will have a significant impact on
our capability.
Also, the East Coast communications system will, in fact,
significantly enhance the protection of the United States
because we can communicate with the GBI late in flight before
it has to intercept any threat that's coming from the Middle
East.
Those are, the ability to discriminate, the ability to use
our new sensors like our satellite systems and even our
forward-based airborne platforms and forward-based radars,
those totally combined give us a very early track, and with the
SM-3 IIB we would be able to intercept. Our cost estimate of
that interceptor is about $15 million, so it's very cost-
effective for the first layer of defense for Homeland defense.
It doesn't replace the GMD system, though, that still is
necessary.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Roberts, how do you see these GMD
enhancements fitting into our overall missile defense strategy?
Dr. Roberts. To go back to your opening formulation, we're
ahead of the threat of limited strikes from states like North
Korea and Iran, and we want to make sure that we stay ahead. A
part of that is on the quantitative side. We want to be sure
that we have the ability to provide sufficient interceptors, a
sufficient number to match the requirement.
But we often forget the qualitative side, and we can
significantly enhance the performance of the current system and
prepare it for substantially enhanced performance when the SM-3
IIB becomes available to us. So we see these capabilities
enhancements as essential. They are separate from the hedge,
meaning these are things we're going to do in any case because
they're important to staying ahead, and the hedge involves a
set of things that we might want to do that are in addition, in
the case of a more early emergence of capabilities that would
overwhelm the GMD system.
Senator Nelson. In that regard, my colleague, Senator
Sessions, was raising questions about the budget for what I
would call the out years, from 2013 on, and raised a question
about whether or not that was sufficient funding for that
period of time. Dr. Roberts, do you have any thoughts about how
you might respond to that?
Dr. Roberts. You had two good answers from the same
military advisers that we listen to in Policy on this topic. We
are satisfied that the budgets as projected are sufficient to
our purpose. We don't see any opportunity for additional
savings.
We have a clearly emerging threat in the regions. We have
the challenge of staying ahead in the defense of the Homeland.
We have future technologies that we'd like to be invested in to
ensure that we remain competitive over the very long term. We
have a testing program that we've all accepted needs to be
robust and sustained over the long term. There's no significant
opportunity there for additional savings.
So Policy clearly has the view that there are not
significant new savings to be realized in the BMD budget if
we're committed to the policy principles articulated in the
BMDR.
Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, do you have any thoughts
you'd like to share?
General O'Reilly. Senator, as Dr. Roberts laid out, our
current budget, the question that Senator Sessions was
referring to, it was aimed at efficiencies. We're still
intending to accomplish the same scope, and we've done this in
a way that's auditable to determine are we more efficiently
buying this capability. It was not determined nor is it our
intent to reduce the amount of work that we plan to do in
fiscal year 2011.
As Dr. Roberts was saying, the hedge strategy would be
additional, if we executed those hedges, would be beyond what
was in our current budget.
Senator Nelson. So we would have to increase the budget at
some point down the road to take into account these additional
efforts at defense?
General O'Reilly. If those efforts are turned on, yes, it
would require additional funding.
Senator Nelson. My final question is, is there anything we
should have asked that we didn't ask?
General O'Reilly. No, sir.
Senator Nelson. Very politic.
Thank you very much, all of you, and thank you for your
service to our country. We appreciate it.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
phased adaptive approach
1. Senator Levin. Dr. Roberts, General O'Reilly, and Admiral Macy,
in September 2009, the President announced his decision to accept the
unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to pursue the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to missile
defense in Europe. He described each of the four phases of the PAA,
including the planned deployment timeframe for each phase. As explained
in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), it is U.S. policy that
``before new capabilities are deployed they must undergo testing that
enables an assessment under realistic operational conditions against
threat-representative targets to demonstrate that they can reliably and
effectively help U.S. forces accomplish their mission.'' Do you each
agree that this central fly-before-you-buy policy criterion should be
applied to each phase of the European PAA (EPAA), so that we have
confidence that the systems will work before we deploy them, and so
that we only deploy systems that have demonstrated that they will work?
Dr. Roberts and Admiral Macy. The fly-before-you-buy policy as
outlined in the BMDR should and will be applied to each phase of the
EPAA. The EPAA was specifically designed to take advantage of
capability developments as they became operationally available, which
includes realistic testing of the systems as they are fielded.
General O'Reilly. A key tenet of the BMDR is to sufficiently test
the capabilities and limitations of a missile defense system before we
begin procurement, or fly-before-we-buy.
future contract improvement opportunities
2. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, you have indicated that future
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) contracts will provide opportunities for
increasing value and protection to the taxpayer, including through
increased competition and enhanced contract terms to protect against
defects or other unsatisfactory contractor performance. What are your
plans and objectives for improving these future MDA contracts, and what
enhancements do you expect to achieve, in terms of savings or other
enhancements?
General O'Reilly. MDA awards contracts for hardware and services
using both competitive and noncompetitive procedures. We continually
look at our existing contracts and all new requirements for future
competition opportunities. By conducting market research, we are able
to define the extent to which system components or services can be
competed in the future. Where necessary, we plan to obtain technical
data under existing contracts to facilitate future competition.
Additionally, MDA has implemented a competitive procurement strategy
for the acquisition of our advisory and assistance service support
requirements. This support is obtained using competitively awarded task
orders under multiple award contracts. We are committed to ensuring
maximum competition is planned for and considered in all acquisitions.
To address recent unsatisfactory contractor performance, MDA has
developed a draft contract provision, titled ``Contractor
Accountability for Quality.'' This provision will allow MDA to reduce
or even eliminate the amount of performance incentive fee awarded when
our prime and subcontractors fail to follow their own best practices,
internal processes, or accepted industry standards which then result in
quality problems. We intend to include this provision for the first
time in the Ground-based Midcourse Defense Development and Sustainment
Contract. We plan to incorporate a contract provision holding
contractors accountable for quality in all applicable MDA contracts.
counterfeit electronic parts
3. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, the committee has initiated an
investigation into the presence of counterfeit electronic parts in the
defense supply chain. MDA has taken steps to mitigate the risk of
counterfeit electronic parts finding their way into our missile defense
systems. From MDA's perspective, how serious is the problem of
counterfeit electronics?
General O'Reilly. MDA recognizes the seriousness of counterfeit
electronic parts in the defense supply chain and has developed an
effective process to identify and remove them. Specifically, to date
MDA has experienced six instances of counterfeit parts within our
supply chain which is made up of thousands of unique parts and
materials provided by hundreds of suppliers providing hundreds of
assemblies. One of the counterfeit part incidents required a recall of
49 mission computer assemblies which necessitated the removal of
approximately 800 parts from inventory. Counterfeit electronic parts in
the defense supply chain can affect overall system quality and
reliability if not properly addressed.
4. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, what national security risks
result from the presence of counterfeit electronic parts in the
Department of Defense's (DOD) supply chain?
General O'Reilly. The predominant risk is reduced reliability and
availability of weapon systems due to the failures related to
counterfeit parts and materials. A counterfeit part may pass all
production testing. However, it is possible that the part was damaged
during unauthorized processing (e.g., removing the part from a previous
assembly, or sanding the surface in order to place a new part number)
causing the deployed system to fail. Similarly, reliability may be
affected because a counterfeit part may be near the end of its useful
life when it is installed. Should any mission critical component fail,
that system fails and national security is impacted.
A more insidious risk is the potential for access or the ability to
disable a weapon system or communication network through malicious
circuits embedded in counterfeit devices. Testing for this type of
defect is extremely difficult.
5. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, many of our defense systems
rely on parts that are no longer in production, forcing agencies to
purchase them from places other than the original manufacturer. What
steps has MDA taken to ensure that their sources of supply for obsolete
parts are trustworthy?
General O'Reilly. Understanding and controlling the source of parts
and materials is critical in reducing the counterfeit part risk. Our
MDA Parts, Materials, and Processes Mission Assurance Plan (PMAP)
requires parts and materials for new or modified mission and safety
critical hardware to be purchased only from the original manufacturer
or an authorized distributor. MDA realizes that there are cases when
obsolete parts are no longer available from the original manufacturer
or an authorized distributor. In these cases, MDA PMAP requires that
the contractor justify the reason why an authorized source was not
available and provide a plan for verifying authenticity of the part.
MDA Policy Memo #50, released in June 2009, extended these requirements
to also include heritage mission and safety critical hardware.
6. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, has MDA adopted any policies or
procedures to mitigate the risk of counterfeit electronic parts that
DOD should consider adopting?
General O'Reilly. MDA established requirements for mitigating
counterfeit parts dating back to October 2006. At this point, MDA's
requirements sufficiently mitigate the risk of counterfeit parts. There
are other standards that are being developed. For instance, SAE is
currently developing a comprehensive standard. MDA is participating in
its development. DOD may want to look at all the standards and
determine how such requirements should be imposed.
missile defense cooperation with russia
7. Senator Levin. Dr. Roberts, your prepared testimony states that,
``a key priority is to establish a cooperative [ballistic missile
defense] relationship with Russia. Significant opportunities have
emerged, along with some challenges.'' You also state that you believe
``we have an opportunity for meaningful cooperation'' that will enhance
security. Why do you believe such missile defense cooperation would be
in our security interests, and do you believe it could send an
important signal to Iran that the United States and Russia are both
opposed to its developing nuclear weapons and long-range missiles?
Dr. Roberts. Cooperation with Russia in our missile defense efforts
would send an important signal to Iran that Russia and the United
States are working together to counter the acquisition, deployment, and
use of ballistic missiles. Effective Ballistic Missile Defenses (BMD),
including a potential U.S.-Russia cooperative architecture, can also
devalue Iran's ballistic missile arsenal by reducing its confidence
that an attack would be successful. This would help undergird a broader
strategic objective: to strengthen deterrence in key regions through
the integrated and innovative use of military and nonmilitary means
that adapt regional deterrence architectures to 21st century
requirements.
8. Senator Levin. General O'Reilly, your prepared testimony states
that you are, ``optimistic . . . that we will make significant progress
this year in cooperating with the Russian Federation on missile
defense.'' Why are you optimistic, and what sort of cooperation do you
anticipate?
General O'Reilly. We continue to support expert dialogue on
cooperative efforts with the Russian Federation whose surveillance
radars would enhance our ability to monitor ballistic missile
development and flight testing in Southwest Asia. There are
opportunities for us to cooperate in sharing our sensor data, our
future research and development, and our command and control activities
and exercises in order to build confidence between both sides that
we're not threatening each other, but we are building ourselves a
defense against the proliferation of these missiles.
defense technology cooperation agreement with russia
9. Senator Levin. Dr. Roberts, your prepared testimony describes
the administration's effort to conclude a Defense Technology
Cooperation Agreement (DTCA) with Russia as a ``requirement for the
safeguarding of sensitive information in support of cooperation'' on
missile defense. Please describe the role and purpose of such a DTCA,
and why you believe such an agreement would be necessary to permit
missile defense cooperation with Russia.
Dr. Roberts. To facilitate greater cooperation with Russia, we need
to conclude a DTCA, which will be beneficial not only for missile
defense cooperation, but for cooperation in other areas, such as
counterterrorism.
We have made clear to Russia that we must complete a DTCA in order
to undertake more extensive BMD cooperation. The DTCA will contain an
annex that addresses the exchange of classified information. Even with
a DTCA in place, a National Disclosure Policy review will still be
required to provide classified information to Russia.
national disclosure policy
10. Senator Levin. Dr. Roberts, you indicated that, in the context
of possible missile defense cooperation, the United States would not
share classified information with Russia unless and until we have
conducted a National Disclosure Policy review. Please describe what
such a review entails and how it would protect our information.
Dr. Roberts. The DTCA will provide a legal framework to support
defense technology cooperation between DOD and the Russian Federation
Ministry of Defense for projects (classified or unclassified) to
include missile defense and counter-improvised explosive device
projects.
All projects involving classified information that will be
undertaken with the Russian Federation under the DTCA will require
review and approval by the interagency National Disclosure Policy
Committee (NDPC). An exception to the National Disclosure Policy must
be authorized prior to the release of any information on a program
involving classified information. Exceptions to the National Disclosure
Policy may be authorized personally by the Secretary of Defense or his
Deputy or the NDPC.
NDPC reviews result in well-coordinated and informed interagency
decisions regarding the types and level of classification of military
information and projects authorized for disclosure, as well as specific
conditions and limitations to be applied when sharing classified
information and technology with a foreign government.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
flight test failures
11. Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense (GMD) system currently has 30 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI)
deployed to provide defense of the Homeland against limited missile
attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran. However, the last
two flight tests of the system failed to intercept the target. Can you
explain what happened, what you are doing to fix this problem, and
whether these test failures affect the deployed interceptors?
General O'Reilly. For FTG-06 in January 2010, the Exoatmospheric
Kill Vehicle (EKV) lost attitude control during the acquisition phase
and failed to intercept the target. The failure was traced to an EKV
quality control problem, a missing lockwire on an attitude control
system thruster. Corrective action, manufacturing, and inspection
procedures have been modified and there was not a recurrence of this
problem in the two subsequent flight tests: BVT-01 in June 2010 and
FTG-06a in December 2010. This issue impacts both CE-I and CE-II
interceptors; however, records and photographic evidence have been
reviewed for every delivered GBI to support a comprehensive risk
assessment and no other instances were identified.
During FTG-06a in December 2010, the EKV lost track of the target
during the discrimination phase and failed to intercept the target. The
failure investigation is ongoing and final determination of root cause/
corrective action has not been made. However, GMD is developing/testing
multiple potential corrective actions and plans to validate the
correction during the next flight test (non-intercept test FTN-01) in
fiscal year 2012. Preliminary indications are that the failure is
unique to the CE-II GBIs. Testing and analysis that the original
deployed interceptors are not affected by the failure mode seen in FTG-
06a is underway.
12. Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, will you brief this committee
when the Failure Review Board has completed its review and you have
decided on a plan for how to fix the problem?
General O'Reilly. Yes.
phased adaptive approach
13. Senator Nelson. Admiral Macy, it appears that some view the PAA
as a specific system or architecture, with a fixed number of assets and
capabilities. However, as explained in the BMDR, it appears more like a
strategy or an approach than a system or architecture. Can you provide
your view of whether the PAA is an approach to missile defense or a
specific system architecture?
Admiral Macy. The PAA is not a specific system architecture or
acquisition program. It is a conceptual approach that provides BMD
capability for our deployed forces, allies, and partners, and
additional capability for Homeland defense, in different regions,
circumstances, and times. The PAA provides a balanced investment with
the capacity to engage the range of threats that can be tailored to the
geography, political circumstances, and capabilities of regional
partners. It also has the flexibility to rapidly deploy more assets
where and when they are needed.
14. Senator Nelson. Dr. Roberts, you helped develop the policy and
strategy for the PAA. What is your view?
Dr. Roberts. I agree with Admiral Macy that the PAA is not a
specific system architecture or acquisition program. It is a conceptual
approach that provides BMD capability for our deployed forces, allies,
and partners, and additional capability for Homeland defense, in
different regions, circumstances, and times. The PAA provides a
balanced investment with the capacity to engage the range of threats
that can be tailored to the geography, political circumstances, and
capabilities of regional partners. It also has the flexibility to
rapidly deploy more assets where and when they are needed.
15. Senator Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, as explained in the BMDR, DOD
developed the EPAA as a regional policy approach for missile defense of
Europe, not as a specific acquisition program. Can you explain why the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) seems to be evaluating this
policy approach as if it were a new major defense acquisition program?
Ms. Chaplain. At the request of the House Armed Services Committee,
GAO conducted a broad assessment of DOD's planning for implementation
of the EPAA policy. Although we understand that the EPAA is a policy
approach, not an acquisition program, it is an investment in a subset
of MDA's systems requiring coordination and technical integration to be
deployable in the European region, and to meet the timelines set out in
the policy. In our view this represents a significant acquisition
challenge. The criteria we applied in our assessment, however,
represent sound management principles for guiding complex, highly
integrated efforts. They reflect DOD's acquisition guidance as well as
the Office of Management and Budget's guidance for capital programming
across Federal agencies, particularly as it relates to bringing
together and synchronizing multiple development efforts. We continue to
believe these acquisition management principles serve as a useful,
appropriate, and beneficial standard to assess DOD's EPAA acquisition
activities. Importantly, these six principles are not just acquisition
principles, they reflect general management principles for any major
initiative: Identify what you need; identify the players and their
roles; put together a plan with timeframes; ensure the pieces of the
initiative are organized for success; test your assumptions; and
determine how much it's going to cost to see the initiative to
completion.
decision timeframe for more ground-based interceptors
16. Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, you have indicated that you
believe there will be a need for additional GBIs because of the two
failed GBI flight tests last year. You stated that you plan to complete
two additional flight tests to confirm and demonstrate that MDA has
properly diagnosed and corrected the problem encountered in the most
recent flight test failure. The second verification flight test,
designated FTG-06b, is not expected to take place until late 2012,
which means during fiscal year 2013. You have also stated that after
you have studied the results of that second verification flight test,
then you will assess the need for any additional number of GBIs, and
any additional elements for the test and sustainment plan for the GMD
system. During the hearing, you acknowledged that--because the GBI
production line will remain open for several years--we have several
years to decide how many additional GBIs we might need. Given this
plan, is it correct to understand that your assessment and
recommendations about additional GBIs would not be completed until
sometime during fiscal year 2013, and could be ready for inclusion in
the budget request for fiscal year 2014?
General O'Reilly. Successful ground testing of the EKV
modifications to resolve the previous flight test issues could be
successfully concluded this fall. Based on those results, the PB13
request will reflect whether we propose additional procurement of GBIs
at that time. The non-intercept flight test in the winter of 2012 and
intercept in summer of 2013 will inform congressional budget
deliberations. If these tests are delayed or unsuccessful, Congress
will be in an informed position to delay the request for additional
GBIs beyond the fiscal year 2013 budget request.
17. Senator Nelson. Dr. Roberts, does this notional schedule fit
within our GMD enhancement strategy and plans?
Dr. Roberts. Several of the assumptions we used to arrive at a
total purchase of 52 GBIs are no longer valid, primarily due to test
failures and the need for additional testing. Some increased number of
GBIs will be necessary, but we must conclude the investigation of the
most recent test failure before we can make a determination about the
number of additional GBIs that will be required. Based on the outcome
of the investigation, the PB13 request will reflect whether we propose
additional procurement of GBIs at that time.
significance of nato decision on missile defense
18. Senator Nelson. Dr. Roberts, last November at the Lisbon
Summit, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decided to adopt
missile defense of NATO Europe as a core mission. As part of this
decision, NATO decided to expand its missile defense command and
control system, endorsed the U.S. plan for the EPAA to missile defense,
and invited Russia to cooperate with NATO on missile defense. Can you
tell me your view of the significance of NATO's decision, and how it
could benefit security in Europe?
Dr. Roberts. I believe the Lisbon decision reflects NATO's
determination to remain the world's premier defense alliance by
adapting to new challenges. Allies recognized that a new threat to our
homelands comes primarily from non-traditional sources such as
ballistic missile and WMD proliferation. Therefore, NATO's decision to
pursue a territorial missile defense capability is a key step that
sends a clear message--NATO is serious about responding to new threats,
and is willing and able to pursue critical capabilities to counter
those threats.
19. Senator Nelson. Admiral Macy, you are the U.S. military
representative to the NATO Air Defense Committee and you have worked
closely with NATO on the new missile defense plan. What steps is NATO
taking to implement the new plan?
Admiral Macy. NATO is fully engaged in incorporating territorial
missile defense of Europe. Per the decisions from the Lisbon Summit,
November 2010, NATO has made the decision that missile defense is ``its
core task of collective defence'' and our allies are appreciative of
our efforts to include them in our discussions regarding our missile
defense concepts and approaches. Now that NATO has made the decision,
the BMDS capabilities resident within the EPAA will constitute our
national contribution to the mission of collective defense.
Implementing the EPAA provides the opportunity for NATO to contribute
national systems and participate alongside the United States, and it is
a very effective and efficient approach to NATO missile defense that
allows all participants to leverage the investment other nations are
making. The recent MDA demonstration of the Command, Control, Battle
Management, and Communications (C\2\BMC) system interfacing with NATO's
Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program is a
premier example of this implementation. In addition, NATO has committed
to expand the ALTBMD program from beyond the protection of NATO
deployed forces to also protect NATO European populations, territory,
and forces. Finally, the alliance is increasing its participation in
missile defense exercises progressing from simply observing to active
participation in the Nimble Titan 2012 exercise. We will work closely
within the alliance to craft the appropriate command and control
structure to provide for the effective defense of our forward deployed
forces, allies, and our partners from missile threats in the region.
standard missile-3 block iib schedule risk
20. Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, DOD plans to deploy a new
variant of the Standard Missile-3, the Block IIB, on land in 2020 for
Phase 4 of the EPAA to missile defense. This interceptor is intended to
defend Europe against medium-, intermediate-, and long-range missiles,
and to supplement the GMD system for additional defense of the Homeland
against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) from North Korea or
Iran. Your agency awarded contracts in early April to three companies
to help define the concept and development plan for the new missile,
through the end of 2013. Consequently, there is not even a design yet
for this interceptor. In addition, MDA is just starting to develop new
technology needed for the missile, and the Aegis BMD program office is
not expected to manage the program until 2013. Given these
considerations, how confident are you that this new missile will be
ready to deploy in 2020, and how will you manage schedule risk?
General O'Reilly. I am confident that we will deploy the SM-3 Block
IIB interceptor in the 2020 timeframe to support Phase 4 of EPAA. The
SM-3 Block IIB schedule is based on recent government experience
developing similar successful missile defense interceptor programs.
Product development for SM-3 Block IIB spans 7 years, beginning in
third quarter fiscal year 2013 and continuing through initial
operational capability (IOC) in 2020. The time between product
development and a production decision for this program is 5\1/2\ years.
This development to production decision timeline is consistent with the
average of BMD interceptors including Patriot, THAAD, SM-6, and SM-3
Block IB as reported by GAO (see attached).
Concept Definition and Program Planning contracts we recently
awarded to three potential SM-3 Block IIB development prime contractors
add a broad industry analysis to further inform our schedule
projections. Each contractor is conducting missile trade studies to
define SM-3 Block IIB concepts, challenges, and program plans for
Product Development. For the next 2 years we are executing technology
risk reduction efforts to mature key interceptor components that
increase performance and potentially reduce cost. Specifically, we are
investing now with multiple vendors in kill vehicle divert and attitude
control systems, upper stage propulsion, focal plane arrays, and
lighter weight structures and materials to reduce inert mass. These
investments reduce risk in key technology areas to further minimize our
Product Development schedule risk.
gao view of aegis ashore risk
21. Senator Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, the Aegis Ashore program planned
for deployment in Europe is based on the existing Aegis BMD program. As
your prepared statement notes, and as the Director of Operational Test
and Evaluation has also stated, the Aegis BMD program is the most
mature in terms of development and operational suitability. If the
Aegis Ashore program is based on the most mature existing Aegis BMD
system, can you explain why GAO believes the Aegis Ashore program still
has a degree of developmental risk?
Ms. Chaplain. While Aegis Ashore is being developed out of the
Aegis BMD program, it is not based on the configuration that has been
tested and is deployed today, which is the 3.6.1 Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense System (BMDS) with the Standard Missile 3 Block 1A. The
high levels of risk we see are based on the commitment to produce the
weapon system before the design is proven through ground and flight
testing. This commitment increases the chances for discovering issues
with the hardware and software that could lead to costly redesign,
rework, and doubts about the performance of the system.
The Aegis Ashore will use the new 4.0.1 and 5.0 systems currently
in development, and the new version of the interceptor also in
development. Yet MDA has decided to commit to procure the system
starting in 2012, well before results of ground and flight testing are
available. We have repeatedly found in our reviews of major
acquisitions that basing commitments, such as the decision to
manufacture systems for operational use, should be based on
demonstrated knowledge. One key step before that commitment is
demonstrating a production representative system in a realistic
environment. That will not occur until 2014 when the test version
demonstrates the ability to successfully launch and engage a target.
However, in order to meet the schedule that requires the Aegis Ashore
to be operational by 2015, manufacture must begin in 2012.
We discuss additional acquisition risks related to Aegis Ashore in
Appendix IV of our March 26, 2011 report (GAO-11-372).
impact of epaa radar on gmd capability
22. Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, there has been discussion of
the importance of a forward-deployed AN/TPY-2 radar in Phase 1 of the
EPAA for the defense of Europe. However, that radar would also improve
the performance of the GMD system to defend the United States. Can you
tell me how that radar would enhance the GMD system, and how
significant that improvement would be?
General O'Reilly. [Deleted.]
23. Senator Nelson. Dr. Roberts, would you consider this radar
deployment to be an enhancement of the GMD system, even though it is
placed in a regional missile defense context?
Dr. Roberts. Yes, the deployment of a forward-based radar in
southern Europe improves the missile defense protection of both Europe
and of the United States.
u.s.-israeli cooperative programs
24. Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, for the cooperative missile
defense programs we are developing jointly with Israel, you have
established a joint program management structure including
representatives from both nations. Has this joint program management
structure worked as you had hoped it would?
General O'Reilly. The joint management structure implemented in the
two most recent U.S.-Israeli cooperative Project Agreements (Upper Tier
and David's Sling) is working as expected. Older agreements for
programs such as the Arrow System Improvement Program did not specify
joint management practices. This created a potential problem where MDA
was informed of progress and actions after the fact, and without
performance metrics. In the newer agreements, visibility and
accountability have increased through the establishment of program
baselines, configuration control boards, jointly-defined and approved
Knowledge Points, and joint decision authority for major program
decisions (e.g., contract issuance, concurrence to proceed with test
events, and design review entrance and exit criteria). These practices
have all contributed to better U.S. understanding of progress,
challenges, and risk to both schedule and resource planning for these
programs.
25. Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, in the past, you expressed
concern that the Arrow-3 interceptor being developed jointly by the
United States and Israel had high technical and schedule risk. What is
your current assessment of the level of technical and schedule risk in
the Arrow-3 program, and has the program met its required knowledge
points?
General O'Reilly. While significant progress has been achieved in
the Arrow-3 development program, I believe that my original assessment
of high technical and schedule risk is still valid. Of the 20 Knowledge
Points, 6 of 7 planned have been successfully accomplished thus far.
One Knowledge Point related to the booster motor was not met due to a
static test failure, and the re-design and re-test is in progress. As
we have proceeded into more complex component ground tests leading up
to the first flight test, additional technical issues have surfaced.
These technical issues are driving slight schedule delays (first
quarter so far) for the first flight test, but there is very little
schedule margin to be able to accommodate any additional issues. The
remainder of the schedule through IOC declaration is also success-
oriented with no room for error. Execution of the first flight test at
the end of this year will be a major program milestone from which
additional technical and schedule assessments will be made.
development of sensor systems
26. Senator Nelson. General O'Reilly, MDA is developing two sensor
systems to improve tracking and interception of large numbers of
regional missiles. These systems are the Airborne Infrared (ABIR) and
the Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS). The ABIR would be an
unmanned aerial vehicle, and the PTSS is a satellite system. Can you
explain the role of these two systems, and whether you believe they
would both be necessary--or if one of them would be sufficient?
General O'Reilly. While the PTSS provides the most cost-effective
and assured comprehensive coverage of the Northern Hemisphere, I
believe both systems, ABIR and PTSS, are necessary for the success of
the BMDS.
PTSS is planned because it offers the advantages of assured access
to the greatest regions of threat launch activity and provides
persistent tracking coverage of ballistic missiles over their entire
flight. Because of Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS)
demonstrations and our work with the SBIRS community, we believe that
the technological basis for satellite-to-shooter engagements is
available today. PTSS post-boost and midcourse tracking accuracies are
suitable for any of our BMDS interceptors to achieve a high probability
engagement over the widest possible geometries. The estimated annual
O&M costs of a globally deployed PTSS constellation is $75 million/
year.
ABIR is being demonstrated now because of the flexibility that UAV-
based systems have to rapidly extend sensor coverage and battle space
beyond fixed radar sites outside the PTSS coverage of the Northern
Hemisphere, provide early ascent phase tracking, and integrate readily
with the existing Service infrastructures and BMDS network. Further,
while today's sensors are useful and complementary to the BMDS radars,
advanced ABIR sensors will significantly improve tracking accuracies,
threat identification, and timeliness of reporting to the regional
shooter. The estimated annual O&M cost of an ABIR Combat Air Patrol
(CAP) of 3 aircraft is greater than $56 million per CAP. Of note, ABIR
will require overflight permission from countries required for viewing
access.
Both of these systems promise improvements to the warfighter in
earlier and higher confidence threat awareness and ability to address
the highest priority ballistic missile threats. Given the actual annual
O&M costs to operate an AN/TPY-2 radar of more than $50 million per
year per radar and the requirement for Host Nation basing agreements to
locate a radar in a region of interest, the PTSS is a critical system
for affordable, unrestricted, and responsive missile defense in the
future. The PTSS provides persistent broad earth coverage and ABIR
provides flexible regional surge capability.
27. Senator Nelson. Admiral Macy, can you give me a military
perspective on the importance of these two systems to our future
missile defense capability?
Admiral Macy. The ABIR sensor and the PTSS are vital to the future
BMDS. Both systems will enhance the combatant commanders' ability to
defend against ballistic missiles by increasing their capability and
capacity to counter these threats. Any further discussions of the
importance of these systems and the contribution that they make must be
conducted in a classified setting.
28. Senator Nelson. Admiral Macy, do you view them as both being
necessary to the capabilities that the combatant commanders will need?
Admiral Macy. The capabilities of the ABIR system and PTSS will be
vital to the combatant commanders' future ability to defend against
ballistic missiles. Any further discussions of the importance of these
systems and the contribution that they make must be conducted in a
classified setting.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
an/tpy-2 program
29. Senator Shaheen. General O'Reilly, the forward deployment of
AN/TPY-2 radars will be fundamental to the success of the EPAA and will
be important in meeting the combatant commands' (COCOM) needs for
regional missile defense around the globe. In your written testimony,
you note several accomplishments with respect to the AN/TPY-2 program,
including the refurbishment of an AN/TPY-2 radar for phase 1 of the
EPAA as well as the preparation of a second radar for deployment to
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). You also note that the fiscal year 2012
budget request includes support for additional AN/TPY-2 radars. Is DOD
currently planning for the possibility of a multi-year procurement of
the AN/TPY-2 radar and what would be the reasoning behind such a
decision?
General O'Reilly. MDA is evaluating the merits of a multi-year
production procurement for AN/TPY-2 radars. This strategy reflects
DOD's initiative to identify efficiencies that reduce costs of
delivering warfighting capability. No decisions have been made at this
time due to considerations of obsolescence changes and the need for
subsequent testing prior to proposing a multi-year procurement.
30. Senator Shaheen. General O'Reilly, would you anticipate cost
savings to accrue from a multi-year procurement of the AN/TPY-2 radar?
General O'Reilly. MDA anticipates there would be cost saving from a
multi-year procurement. We are evaluating the merits of a multi-year
production for AN/TPY-2 radars. This strategy reflects DOD's initiative
to identify efficiencies that reduce costs of delivering warfighting
capability. No decisions have been made at this time due to
considerations of obsolescence changes and the need for subsequent
testing prior to proposing a multi-year procurement.
31. Senator Shaheen. General O'Reilly, are you confident that the
current AN/TPY-2 development plans are adequate to match our COCOM
near-term requirements as well as the requirements of the EPAA?
General O'Reilly. MDA remains confident that current AN/TPY-2
capability, increased quantities, and delivery timelines included in
the budget will provide the warfighter the capability to address near
term emerging threats and the EPAA.
32. Senator Shaheen. General O'Reilly, do you anticipate that any
of the emerging challenges faced by our COCOMs will require additional
development in the near-term?
General O'Reilly. Depending on how and when the challenges emerge,
MDA has options for additional near-term development of the AN/TPY-2.
We conducted a 2010 summer study to evaluate investment options in
response to challenging scenarios. The study concluded that while
additional development to the AN/TPY-2 was not expected to be
necessary, several investment options could add operational margin to
help improve defense against an uncertain threat including dynamic
resource management and debris mitigation.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
east coast missile defense data terminal
33. Senator Gillibrand. General O'Reilly, I appreciated your
testimony that an east coast interceptor communication terminal for the
GMD system will significantly enhance the security of the United States
by improving defense of the east coast against a potential future
missile threat from North Korea or Iran. I understand that Fort Drum in
New York is under consideration as the site for such a terminal. Can
you explain why you are pursuing this new capability and why Fort Drum
would be a good site for the data terminal?
General O'Reilly. An east coast interceptor communications terminal
improves the ability of the GMD system to defend the east coast of the
United States by providing data updates to Ground-Based Interceptors
(GBI) launched from Fort Greely, AK, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA,
later in flight, thus increasing its probability of engagement success.
The performance region was determined based upon current projections of
the threat capability by 2015 and on the planned BMDS architecture in
the same timeframe. Fort Drum, NY, was selected because it is within
the required performance region and previous site surveys,
environmental assessments, and use permits are already in place.
34. Senator Gillibrand. Dr. Roberts, how does this planned east
coast missile defense data terminal fit into the planned enhancements
you mentioned for the GMD system?
Dr. Roberts. An east coast interceptor communications terminal
improves the ability of the GMD system to defend the east coast of the
United States by providing data updates to GBIs launched from Fort
Greely, AK, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA, later in flight, thus
increasing its probability of engagement success.
35. Senator Gillibrand. Admiral Macy, from a military perspective,
would this east coast data terminal provide a useful improvement to our
Homeland missile defense capability?
Admiral Macy. A data terminal on the east coast would improve our
overall defense capability by providing better information to the GBIs
in flight. This data terminal will enable communication with GBIs
launched from Alaska and California on longer flights that will improve
the defense of the eastern United States against potential ICBM
threats.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
future budget affordability
36. Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, it seems quite clear that there
will not be enough money in future budgets to cover the costs of the
weapon system programs currently underway. In your opinion, is MDA's
current portfolio of acquisition programs affordable at the funding
level set forth in the President's fiscal year 2012 and Future Years
Defense budgets?
Ms. Chaplain. Judgments about affordability need to be made in the
context of the overall DOD budget, the Nation's priorities, and
reliable cost data. I can only comment on the last point. We have
reported that MDA's cost estimates are not yet reliable or credible nor
do they meet our criteria for high quality estimates. Our March 2011
report details where cost estimates need to improve and how.
phase 1 of phased adaptive approach
37. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts, General O'Reilly, and Admiral
Macy, what is the current status for deployment of Phase 1 of the PAA
to missile defense in Europe?
Dr. Roberts and Admiral Macy. The first BMDS element deployment in
support of Phase 1 of the EPAA capability occurred on March 7 of this
year when the USS Monterey (CG 61) deployed to Europe. Monterey will
spend this spring and summer helping to develop, test, and verify the
necessary command and control processes, data pathways, tactics,
techniques, and procedures. In addition, the C\2\BMC upgrade to the air
operations center at Ramstein Air Base, Germany has been installed to
control the AN/TPY-2 forward based radar and connect it and any Aegis
ships into our command and control structure in Europe. Finally,
negotiations are continuing to finalize plans to locate and operate the
AN/TPY-2 radar in support of the EPAA.
General O'Reilly. USS Monterey CG 61, Aegis BMD 3.61 with SM-3
Block 1A missiles is currently deployed in theater. AN/TPY-2 radar is
currently undergoing refurbishment and is on schedule to be available
to MDA on August 31, 2011, with a proposed movement date of September
20, 2011. C\2\BMC systems are available and scheduled to deploy on
August 31, 2011. Current schedule meets test program timelines. A
critical EPAA phase 1 milestone was achieved in March 2011 when an
IRBM-range target was intercepted in the Pacific by a SM-3 IA
interceptor using the current Aegis fire control system and the EPAA
forward based AN/TPY-2 and command and control architecture. Finally,
negotiations are continuing to finalize plans to locate and operate the
AN/TYP-2 radar in support of the EPAA.
38. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts, General O'Reilly, and Admiral
Macy, do you foresee any obstacles for meeting full deployment of Phase
1 by the end of the year?
Dr. Roberts. We have already deployed the USS Monterey as part of
the sea-based missile defenses that are part of Phase 1 of the EPAA.
While I do not see any insurmountable obstacles, there may be
challenges to reaching a host-nation agreement and deploying the AN/
TPY-2 radar by the end of the year. However we still intend to deploy
the radar as part of Phase 1 of the EPAA.
General O'Reilly. We are awaiting host nation agreement to field
the AN/TPY-2 in support of Phase 1.
Admiral Macy. In order to achieve full deployment of Phase 1 by the
end of the year, a host nation agreement must be achieved to support
deployment of the AN/TPY-2 radar. Once this host nation agreement is
obtained and deployment preparations begin, we will have better
fidelity on when full deployment will actually occur. At this time,
there are no obstacles that cannot be overcome, however, full
deployment of Phase 1 may be delayed.
39. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts, General O'Reilly, and Admiral
Macy, what is the current status of basing negotiations for the
forward-based radar in southern Europe?
Dr. Roberts. We are currently in discussions with potential host
nations for the deployment of an AN/TPY-2 forward-based radar to
southern Europe. No final host-nation decision has been made.
General O'Reilly. MDA provides programmatic and technical support
for basing negotiations. Current status of basing negotiations is more
authoritatively addressed by OSD(P) and the Department of State.
Admiral Macy. The current status of basing negotiations is best
addressed by OSD(P) and the Department of State.
40. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts, General O'Reilly, and Admiral
Macy, in order to consider Phase 1 fully deployed by the end of 2011,
when must a basing decision be made for the radar in southern Europe?
Dr. Roberts and General O'Reilly. We expect that the deployment of
the radar will take several months from the time that a basing decision
is made. The actual timeline may vary due to the specific basing
agreements and legal arrangements associated with the deployment.
Admiral Macy. While we are already inside the window of the optimal
deployment timeline, it is still technically possible to achieve a 2011
deployment given a favorable host nation decision, rapid approval of
the necessary legal framework, strong and active host nation support,
and selection of a prepared site that requires little to no additional
development to accommodate the radar.
european phased adaptive approach transparency and accountability
41. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts, General O'Reilly, Admiral Macy,
and Ms. Chaplain, according to a recent GAO report, ``DOD has not fully
implemented a management process that synchronizes European Missile
Defense acquisition activities and ensures transparency and
accountability.'' Without these key metrics, the ability to conduct
effective oversight is greatly impeded. Given that each of the four
phases of the PAA are closely tied to concrete timeframes, what tools
will be used to ensure that planned capabilities are delivered on time?
Dr. Roberts and General O'Reilly. The tools the MDA uses to ensure
on time delivery of the PAA planned capabilities include an Integrated
Master Schedule (IMS), the BMDS Specification, the Integrated Master
Test Plan (IMTP), the MDA budget, and the program baselines from the
contributing BMDS component programs.
BMDS component programs use six baselines for each system element
being developed. These include a Technical Baseline, Operational
Capacity Baseline, Test Baseline, Schedule Baseline, Resource Baseline,
and Contracts Baseline. Critical milestones are captured in each, and
specifically in the schedule and technical baselines including key
events such as planned capability delivery in support of the EPAA.
The MDA Baseline Execution Review (BER), Technology Baseline Review
(TBR), and Development Baseline Review (DBR) are the tools used to
ensure that planned capabilities are being developed and delivered on
time. These baselines are reviewed monthly to monitor program
performance and ensure alignment with the schedule for delivering the
PAA. The MDA Director conducts quarterly BERs. MDA annually provides
the BMDS Accountability Report (BAR) to Congress which contains
detailed information on all of the baselines for each MDA program.
Admiral Macy. As the programmatic and technical lead for
acquisition and development in support of the EPAA, the tools necessary
to deliver these planned capabilities on time is more authoritatively
addressed by MDA.
Ms. Chaplain. Given the extent of acquisition activity associated
with implementing the EPAA, GAO believes that the following basic
acquisition management tools and principles should be used to ensure
that the EPAA effort can be successfully implemented. We found MDA had
partially adopted these principles as described below.
Well-defined requirements - DOD and MDA continue to
define architectures, systems, and quantities needed to
accomplish the missile defense mission set across the four
phases. We have reported over the years that stable
requirements are necessary to fully understand and plan for
successive steps in the acquisition process, such as
development and testing. As the series of acquisitions
supporting the EPAA proceeds, we believe a clear business case
is important to inform tradeoffs leadership may have to accept
among cost, schedule, and performance to deliver capability
within desired EPAA phase timeframes.
Stakeholders and decisionmakers identified and roles
defined - DOD and MDA's acquisition management and oversight
process is structured around reviewing and approving activities
of individual missile defense elements through a phased
decision process. It remains unclear whether, how, and which
various bodies reviewing MDA acquisitions are specifically
reviewing the overall progress in acquiring integrated
capability for EPAA phases within the timeframes called for by
that approach. We continue to believe top level reviews of EPAA
acquisitions would be useful.
Integrated schedule and decision reviews - DOD and MDA
manage and oversee MDA acquisitions through several mechanisms
including the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) and its
associated subcommittees. It remains unclear whether the MDEB
has a management or oversight role in acquisition
decisionmaking related to EPAA specifically.
Integrated planning for technology development and
system engineering - MDA's planning efforts for development and
system engineering reflect the interdependencies of the BMDS
elements and the integrated performance expected under the
EPAA. Executing these development plans remains challenging
under the EPAA deployment schedule.
Integrated testing - MDA's test plan is structured
around the PAA, and includes plans to test key capabilities
expected as part of EPAA. The twice-yearly process of updating
the test plan facilitates the participation of a wide variety
of stakeholders in MDA's testing approach; however while the
test plan itself is sound, we continue to have concerns about
the plan's executability. MDA's practice of eliminating or
deferring important developmental and operational tests limits
knowledge available for management decisions.
Integrated view of financial commitment - We continue
to believe that a life cycle cost estimate for the subset of
capabilities to be deployed as part of EPAA would help to
ensure that DOD's investment decisions are fully informed.
42. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts, General O'Reilly, Admiral Macy,
and Ms. Chaplain, has MDA developed a life-cycle cost estimate for the
EPAA?
Dr. Roberts. The EPAA is a capability deployment approach and not
an acquisition program, and therefore it does not have a life cycle
cost estimate. EPAA is the phased deployment of individual BMDS
capabilities as those capabilities are developed, tested, produced, and
deployed within the BMDS architecture. MDA produces life cycle cost
estimates for the individual BMDS acquisition programs that comprise
the EPAA and other deployments globally. MDA can provide the cumulative
deployment costs of the EPAA and the lifecycle costs of the individual
elements that comprise the Joint Staff deployment plans of each COCOM.
Due to its adaptive nature, no fixed inventory can be established for
EPAA due to the possibility that differing regional security
environments may require the surging of missile defense capabilities
into other regions.
General O'Reilly. EPAA itself is a capability deployment approach
and not an acquisition program, and therefore it does not have a life
cycle cost estimate. EPAA is the phased deployment of individual BMDS
capabilities as those capabilities are developed, tested, produced and
deployed within the BMDS architecture. MDA produces life cycle cost
estimates for the individual BMDS acquisition programs that comprise
the EPAA and other deployments globally. We can provide the cumulative
deployment costs of the EPAA and the lifecycle costs of the individual
elements that comprise the Joint Staff deployment plans of each COCOM.
Due to its adaptive nature, no fixed inventory is established for EPAA
vice the simultaneous deployment needs of other COCOMs.
Admiral Macy. The EPAA is not a system for which a single life-
cycle cost estimate can be developed. Rather, the EPAA is a framework
that provides an adaptable strategy for missile defense in Europe.
While some components within this framework possess life-cycle costs
that can be readily attributable to EPAA (e.g., Aegis Ashore), many of
the components that have dual or multi-use purposes (e.g., Aegis ships)
cannot.
Ms. Chaplain. MDA has not developed a life-cycle cost estimate for
the EPAA. While MDA did produce an informal estimate in the fall of
2009, it does not reflect the current EPAA architecture. As we reported
in January 2011, DOD has not developed and does not plan on developing
EPAA life-cycle cost estimates because it considers EPAA an adaptive
approach that will change over time. However, best practices for cost
estimating include methods for developing valid cost estimates even
with such uncertainties. These estimates could serve as a basis for DOD
and Congress to assess the goal of fielding affordable and cost-
effective BMDs as well as determine if corrective actions are needed.
We therefore recommended in January 2011 that DOD develop a life-cycle
cost estimate for EPAA.
43. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts, General O'Reilly, Admiral Macy,
and Ms. Chaplain, now that the Joint Staff has completed its Joint
Capabilities Mix III (JCM III) study, shouldn't MDA have a better
understanding of the total costs associated with the deployment of the
architecture envisioned for Europe?
Dr. Roberts. The JCM III results are a useful component for
developing the total costs associated with the deployment of the
architecture envisioned for Europe. However, the study did not include
deployment costs in its assessments.
While the results of the JCM III are not sufficient for MDA to
establish the total cost of the architecture envisioned for Europe, its
findings will be helpful as we determine future missile defense needs.
General O'Reilly. MDA considers the JCM III results as a useful
component of our developing the total costs associated with the
deployment of the architecture envisioned for Europe. However, the
study did not include deployment costs in its assessments. Furthermore,
the radar location in Europe that JCM III assumes may still change due
to political considerations. Any changes in radar basing would impact
the number and deployment costs of interceptors as well as the
deployment costs of the radars themselves.
The JCM III study shows the capability of the currently funded PAA
against intel-based threats, and analyzes improvements that could be
achieved with increased resources. The study made a number of
assumptions about system track correlation and weapons system
deconfliction, hit assessment, and C\2\BMC capability that are still
under development. In addition, the study did not factor in the
platform costs of fielding the number of ABIR systems employed in their
analysis.
While the results of the JCM III are not sufficient for MDA to
establish the total cost of the architecture envisioned for Europe, we
will support the study as it moves to the next phase and incorporate
its findings into our cost estimation.
Admiral Macy. The JCM III study was a qualitative performance
analysis to determine the warfighters' requirements for elements of the
BMD System required for BMD. This study focused on warfighting
sufficiency rather than inventory acquisition objectives by examining
the application of architectures to deter aggressors and end enemy
ballistic missile attacks should they occur. JCM III did not attempt to
simply answer how much to buy, but rather give alternatives to the
warfighter to best achieve their overall goals. As such, JCM III
provides utility to senior leaders on resourcing and allocation
decisions, not total costs.
Ms. Chaplain. DOD should have a better understanding of the total
costs associated of EPAA after completion of JCM III. DOD has not
briefed GAO on the study. Given that DOD, led by the Joint Staff, has
used the JCM III study to examine all elements of the regional BMDS, to
examine the performance against threat ballistic missiles that employed
a range of countermeasures, and to identify alternatives that the
warfighter can employ to best achieve his overall goals, the results of
the study should yield additional information needed to better
understand costs associated with each phase of the EPAA. As we reported
in January 2011, the Joint Staff-led JCM III along with a U.S.
Strategic Command study should help to better define force allocation
and quantity needs for PAA in Europe and other regions. It is clear,
however, that DOD faces a management and operational challenge since
there is greater demand for missile defense assets than there will be a
supply of those assets.
Best practices for cost estimating include methods for developing
valid cost estimates even with the uncertainties associated with EPAA
architectures. These estimates could serve as a basis for DOD and
Congress to assess the goal of fielding affordable and cost-effective
BMDs as well as determine if corrective actions are needed. However, we
reported in January 2011 that DOD needs to determine whether the EPAA
schedule is realistic and achievable, to identify potential problems,
and to analyze how changes will affect the execution of this effort.
sm-3 block iib
44. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, as I mentioned in my
opening statement, I am concerned that the schedule for development and
deployment of the SM-3 IIB is overly optimistic. How confident are you
that the SM-3 IIB will be delivered by 2020 for Phase 4 of the PAA?
General O'Reilly. I am confident that we will deploy the SM-3 Block
IIB interceptor in the 2020 timeframe to support Phase 4 of EPAA. The
SM-3 Block IIB schedule is based on recent government experience
developing similar successful missile defense interceptor programs.
Product development for SM-3 Block IIB spans 7 years, beginning in
third quarter fiscal year 2013 and continuing through IOC in 2020.
Within that interval, 5\1/2\ years is projected between the product
development and production decisions. This time allocation is
consistent with the average of typical BMD interceptors including
Patriot, THAAD, SM-6, and SM-3 Block IB as reported by the GAO.
Concept Definition and Program Planning contracts we recently
awarded to three potential SM-3 Block IIB development prime contractors
add a broad industry analysis to further inform our schedule
projections. Each contractor is conducting missile trade studies to
define SM-3 Block IIB concepts, challenges, and program plans for
Product Development. For the next 2 years we are executing technology
risk reduction efforts to mature key interceptor components that
increase performance and potentially reduce cost. Specifically, we are
investing now with multiple vendors in kill vehicle divert and attitude
control systems, upper stage propulsion, focal plane arrays, and
lighter weight structures and materials to reduce inert mass. These
investments reduce risk in key technology areas to further minimize our
product development schedule risk.
45. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, what is the anticipated SM-
3 IIB capability against ICBMs from Iran?
General O'Reilly. [Deleted.]
46. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, do you agree with the Aegis
weapons system development philosophy of incremental development,
refinement, and proven design? If so, why did you decide to not involve
the Aegis program office in early SM-3 IIB development efforts?
General O'Reilly. The MDA fully supports a development philosophy
of incremental development, refinement, and proven design. The Aegis
program office has been involved with the SM-3 Block IIB program. The
SM-3 Block IIB program office employs 12 full-time Aegis BMD personnel
to support Aegis Weapon System integration and program planning
activities. Following the proven technology approach of the current
family of SM-3 interceptors, the program currently falls under the
leadership of the MDA Program Executive for Advanced Technology because
the Block IIB is currently in the Technology Development Phase. As in
our Navy/BMDO Terrier Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile (LEAP)
technology demonstration program which developed the technical concepts
used in today's SM-3 family of interceptors under the management of our
Technology Directorate, we will prove the fundamental kill vehicle and
booster technology was ready for product development. As with the
original LEAP program, the SM-3 IIB program takes advantage of MDA's
advanced technology efforts to develop new concepts in propulsion,
lightweight materials, and sensors to reduce the risk associated with
achieving the velocity and divert capabilities necessary for the SM-3
Block IIB. After these concepts and technology mature over the next 2
years, the program will then shift to product development and will
transition under full Aegis BMD Program Office management in fiscal
year 2013.
mda oversight by congress
47. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, responses to requests for
information from MDA have never been slower. Countless requests from
both personal offices and committee staff take weeks and in many
instances months for responses. Are you aware of this? If so, how do
you intend to ensure that requests from Congress are responded to in a
timely manner?
General O'Reilly. My Deputy Director and I personally review all
responses to congressional questions. To respond effectively to
congressional inquiries, MDA coordinates closely with the Services, the
combatant commanders, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (AT&L,
Policy, and the Comptroller) to ensure our answers are accurate,
consistent with DOD objectives, and our programs are executable. This
past year has been more challenging due to uncertainty of fiscal year
2011 funding.
However, I fully concur that MDA should respond more rapidly to
congressional inquiries. I recently completed a congressional response
process review with my senior executive staff. As a result, we have
improved our internal processes for responding to congressional
inquiries by elevating questions to the attention of our senior
executive leaders and increasing visibility of the staffing process
within our command group.
48. Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, I understand that GAO has had
issues with MDA transparency and timely responses to requests for
information. Is this true? If so, have you requested that MDA improve
access to information necessary for conducting effective oversight?
Ms. Chaplain. GAO has experienced issues with MDA's timely
responses to our requests for information. We reported in 2010 that we
experienced significant delays in obtaining information from MDA.
During that audit, MDA did not always provide GAO staff with
expeditious access to requested documents and articles of information,
which delayed some audit analysis and contributed to extra staff hours.
We reported in 2011 that we again experienced significant delays in
obtaining information from MDA. In early 2011, MDA's Director agreed to
meet with GAO in an effort to improve our access to data and our
working relationship. These efforts have produced new guidance on
access which has been signed by both MDA and GAO and we are currently
beginning to implement the guidance as we begin our new missile
defense-related engagements. We see the guidance as a positive step
forward, although it is too soon yet to see significant outcomes from
its implementation. Improved access to information will be vital to
ensuring we are in a position to assist Congress as it oversees MDA's
missile defense efforts.
precision tracking space system
49. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, this committee is painfully
aware of the troubles associated with space system acquisition. What is
your acquisition strategy for the PTSS and why do you feel you are
better suited than Air Force Space Command to execute this strategy?
General O'Reilly. PTSS is to be developed as an integrated part of
the BMDS. This will require extensive participation of all BMDS
elements as the preliminary design is developed. While the Air Force
Space Command is a critical partner in the PTSS development, the PTSS
development phase must also have involvement of Federally Funded
Research Laboratories (Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, MIT
Lincoln Laboratory, Naval Research Laboratory, Space Dynamics
Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratory); dedicated Service Cells of
the Air Force and Navy; and an industry-partnered Integrated System
Engineering Team (Ball Aerospace, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop
Grumman, Orbital Sciences, and Raytheon). These PTSS stakeholders will
develop non-proprietary, government-owned intellectual property to
enable full and open competition for industry to produce the PTSS.
FFRCs are well-suited to perform this technical management role for MDA
and Air Force Space Command.
MDA's charter is to develop and test all missile defense
capabilities, including but not limited to missiles and radars. The
development of space-based remote sensing, and the integration of the
data into BMD fire-control loops, are integral to the MDA's development
of early intercept capability. MDA is better able to lead the systems
engineering and testing between the BMDS elements, including PTSS,
prior to making production decisions. To support this strategy, the MDA
and the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center agree to assign Air
Force personnel to the MDA's programs (included the PTSS program).
50. Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, DOD space programs are a part
of your GAO portfolio. Do you have any concerns with MDA's acquisition
of space systems?
Ms. Chaplain. Our concerns about space acquisitions extend across
DOD. As I recently testified before this subcommittee, despite the
significant investment in space, the majority of large-scale
acquisition programs in DOD's space portfolio have experienced problems
during the past two decades that have driven up costs by hundreds of
millions and even billions of dollars, stretched schedules by years,
and increased technical risks. To address the cost increases, DOD
altered its acquisitions by reducing the number of satellites it
intended to buy, reducing the capabilities of the satellites, or
terminating major space system acquisitions. Moreover, along with the
cost increases, many space acquisitions have experienced significant
schedule delays--of as much as 9 years--resulting in potential
capability gaps in areas such as missile warning, military
communications, and weather monitoring. These problems have been
evident in Air Force, Navy, and MDA space programs. However, as I
testified, the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
have taken a wide range of actions to prevent them from occurring in
new programs.
We have not performed an in-depth review of the PTSS in particular
nor of MDA's broader capability to acquire space systems. An assessment
of MDA's capability to acquire space systems may be worthwhile given
the broader concerns we have identified of a shortage of space
acquisition expertise within DOD.
Further, an in-depth review of PTSS may also be worthwhile given
issues we highlighted in our March 2011 report. As we reported in
March, we have concerns regarding the PTSS program's optimistic
schedule. MDA has developed an optimistic PTSS acquisition approach to
field an operational constellation by fiscal year 2018. The agency
plans to conduct prototyping efforts beginning in fiscal year 2011 and
launch two prototype satellites in fiscal year 2015. MDA also plans to
launch a minimum of seven additional satellites by fiscal year 2018. We
are concerned about this compressed schedule because it took MDA about
8 years to refurbish and develop its predecessor--the two demonstration
STSS satellites--which launched in 2009 and took almost 15 months after
launch to reach full operational capability. PTSS intends to develop
and launch two prototype satellites in approximately 5 years and
subsequently launch seven operational satellites in approximately 3
years.
We also reported that delays in fielding a PTSS constellation in
fiscal year 2018 would significantly affect the implementation of the
PAA to defend Europe and the United States against regional ballistic
missile attacks. MDA discovered that there were sensor coverage gaps in
its ability to acquire and track large ballistic missile raid sizes,
intercept ballistic missiles earlier in their trajectories, assess
intercept attempts in real time, and launch additional interceptors, if
necessary. Currently, the sensor systems of the BMDS consist of radar
sensors, such as SBX and AN/TPY-2. According to MDA, infrared
satellites such as PTSS would have advantages over terrestrial radars
because they can limit the affect of weather conditions, eliminate the
need for host nation agreements, and observe ballistic missile launches
occurring in remote locations. In addition PTSS is being designed to
track large missile raid sizes soon after launch to enable earlier
intercepts. Such capabilities would alleviate sensor coverage gaps and
reduce the need for terrestrial sensors.
acquisition reforms
51. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, 1 of the 23 principal
actions outlined in Dr. Carter's September 2010 Better Buying Power
memo was mandating affordability as a requirement for new weapon
programs. How is MDA determining what is affordable?
General O'Reilly. The MDA performs government cost estimates on all
BMDS component programs to create a basis for affordability reviews.
BMDS component programs that require an Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) production decision typically
have an Office of the Secretary of Defense (Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation) Independent Cost Estimate conducted to support the
decision. All BMDS component programs are reviewed by a MDA Director-
level program change board to prioritize activities within the BMDS and
within individual BMDS component programs. Affordability initiatives
from the program manager, program executive staff, and functional staff
are applied at this time. These reviews form the basis for the
overarching MDA budget request and ultimately determine what each of
the BMDS component programs are provided to execute their programs.
52. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, how will programs be held
accountable for meeting affordability targets?
General O'Reilly. BMDS component programs are reviewed quarterly at
the MDA Director-chaired BERs. BERs review all six baselines to include
the Resources Baseline (the Resource Baseline includes cost and
affordability). Any changes to baselines must be approved by the
program manager, program executive, and functional manager responsible
for the baseline to ensure integration with other BMDS component
programs and other baselines. The program manager must account for any
variations from the baselines, and significant variations are reported
to Congress in the annual BAR.
53. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, will affordability targets
be reported to Congress in the BAR?
General O'Reilly. Yes.
israeli programs
54. Senator Sessions. General O'Reilly, the fiscal year 2012 budget
included a $5 million efficiencies-related reduction for Israeli
missile defense cooperative programs. I understand that this reduction
is below the funding level agreed to by the United States and Israel.
Is that correct?
General O'Reilly. The agreement allows for each partner to execute
in accordance with its own national laws and regulations, and those
obligations are subject to availability of funds. Thus, the agreement
allowed for U.S. efficiency directives to be implemented on our Israeli
cooperative programs. $5.0 million in savings was identified in U.S.-
Israel Cooperative Programs in fiscal year 2012 through a refined test
approach. For example, the completion of U.S.-based flight testing in
2011 (Caravan-2), and the decision to move additional planned flight
testing (Caravan-3) to Israel, reduced U.S. test planning and personnel
requirements in fiscal year 2012. Thus, the original objectives and
scope of U.S. contribution to these Israeli programs will be met.
two-stage ground-based interceptor
55. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts and General O'Reilly, while the
two-stage GBI has been designated as a contingency in the event
development of the IIB takes longer than anticipated, I remain
concerned that DOD has yet to identify a serious hedging strategy for
testing and potential deployment. If it is determined that the SM-3 IIB
will not be technologically feasible in time for a 2020 deployment, how
much time would be needed to deploy the two-stage GBIs in its place?
Dr. Roberts. The hedge strategy is in the process of being
developed and refined. We have committed to brief this committee on the
results once it has been approved by the Secretary of Defense. The
hedge strategy will include a discussion of hedge options to mitigate
the effect of a delay to the SM-3 IIB interceptor.
General O'Reilly. The hedge strategy is under development and will
be briefed to Congress by the Office of the Secretary of Defense once
it has been approved by the Secretary of Defense. Hedge strategy
decision timeline triggers include both the threat assessment and SM-3
IIB developmental progress. The hedge strategy will include timelines
for deployment.
56. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts and General O'Reilly, has the
administration outlined a plan that ties two-stage GBI procurement and
basing agreements with the schedule and technological milestones for
the SM-3 IIB?
Dr. Roberts. DOD is reviewing its hedge strategy, including
ensuring a sufficient hedge to a potential delay to the SM-3 IIB
interceptor. DOD is committed to briefing Congress as soon as the
Secretary has approved the hedging strategy.
General O'Reilly. As Dr. Roberts stated in his testimony, DOD is
reviewing what more needs to be done to ensure the hedge posture is
sufficient to address the possible threat developments in the timeframe
before 2020. DOD is committed to briefing Congress as soon as the
Secretary has approved the hedging strategy.
57. Senator Sessions. Dr. Roberts and General O'Reilly, how will
delaying the test for the two-stage GBI next year to pay for corrective
measures related to the two recent three-stage GBI test failures impact
the availability of the two-stage as a hedge to the SM-3 IIA and IIB?
Dr. Roberts and General O'Reilly. The repeat of FTG-06a will
consume a majority of the resources previously estimated for funding
FTG-08 (the first intercept test of a two stage GBI). There are two
remaining two-stage flight tests necessary prior to a two-stage GBI
deployment decision, FTG-08 and FTG-17. FTG-08 has been delayed by 2
years from the second quarter of fiscal year 2012 until the fourth
quarter of fiscal year 2014. FTG-17, with upgraded avionics, is delayed
from the third quarter of fiscal year 2016 to the fourth quarter of
fiscal year 2019. However, we could accelerate flight testing if it is
deemed necessary.
The repeat of FTG-06a will consume a majority of the resources
previously estimated for funding FTG-08 (the first intercept test of a
two stage GBI). There are two remaining two-stage flight tests
necessary prior to a two-stage GBI deployment decision, FTG-08 and FTG-
17. FTG-08 has been delayed by 2 years from the second quarter of
fiscal year 2012 until the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2014. FTG-17,
with upgraded avionics, is delayed from the third quarter of fiscal
year 2016 to the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2019. If a threat change
was to dictate an earlier need, we could accelerate flight testing to
accommodate.
[Whereupon, at 4:23 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 11, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m. in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator E.
Benjamin Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Nelson and Sessions.
Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations
and hearings clerk.
Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Daniel A. Lerner,
professional staff member; and Michael J. Sistak, research
assistant.
Staff assistants present: Christine G. Lang, Hannah I.
Lloyd, and Brian F. Sebold.
Committee members' assistant present: Ann Premer, assistant
to Senator Ben Nelson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, CHAIRMAN
Senator Nelson. I call this hearing to order. My good
friend, Ranking Member Senator Sessions, is on his way, but
they've suggested we go ahead and start, given the fact that
we're interrupted by a vote and the White House.
I'd like to welcome all of you this afternoon and our many
witnesses. Today we meet to discuss military space programs.
Often there is little appreciation or understanding either in
the Senate or in the general public of the advantages that
space systems provide the U.S. military, the Intelligence
Community (IC), and our economy in general. Somehow a satellite
flying over a football game just isn't the same as a flyover by
a B-2. It just hasn't gotten there yet.
We as a Nation would be greatly diminished without our
space assets. Thank you for your commitment and dedication to
space and I look forward to a good discussion today.
Our witnesses this afternoon are: Ambassador Gregory L.
Schulte--we welcome you to your new position, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Space Policy; Dr. John A. Zangardi,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Information
Operations, and Space. Is there anything left? [Laughter.]
Dr. Zangardi. No, sir, there is not. [Laughter.]
Senator Nelson. All right.
General William L. Shelton, USAF, Commander, Air Force
Space Command (AFSPC), we welcome you. Lieutenant General Susan
J. Helms, USAF, Commander, AFSPC, Strategic Command, Joint
Functional Component Commander for Space (JFCC Space);
Lieutenant General Richard P. Formica, USA, Commander, U.S.
Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic
Command (ASMDC/ARSTRAT); Rear Admiral David W. Titley, USN,
Oceanographer and Navigator of the Navy and Director, Maritime
Domain Awareness and Space; Major General John E. Hyten, USAF,
Director, Space Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force for Acquisition; and Ms. Cristina T. Chaplain,
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Government
Accountability Office (GAO).
First, congratulations, as I said, are in order for the
successful launch of the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
GEO-1 last Saturday. This satellite is years behind schedule
and substantially over budget, but it's finally in orbit.
General Shelton, this is your first opportunity to testify
before the subcommittee since your confirmation as the new
Commander of AFSPC. Welcome.
I'd also like to note that we have included Lieutenant
General Formica in our hearing today representing the Army's
small but growing interest in space. General Formica may not
think it's small, but by comparison some others do. We've not
had the Army testify on space issues in many years and we look
forward to hearing from you today.
Finally, Lieutenant General Helms, congratulations on your
induction last week to the Astronaut Hall of Fame.
This past year has been a very active one in the space
community. The first Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
satellite was launched in August, although as a result of a
failure in the satellite propulsion system it is not yet in its
proper orbit. We would appreciate any update on the satellite's
progress. As I understand it, AEHF-1 is supposed to be in the
right orbit by later this summer.
The first Global Positioning System (GPS)-3F satellite
launched just after our hearing last year and the second one
should launch later this year, this summer even. The first
Space-Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) satellite launched in
September. Operational Response Satellite 1 (ORS-1) should
launch in June and TacSat-4 will also launch later this summer.
Both of these satellites are awaiting resolution of a launch
vehicle issue. Of course, the SBIRS launched last week. Quite a
year of firsts.
As we all know so well, the Air Force and Navy have
struggled for many years with their satellite programs and,
while it appears that the many design, development, and
manufacturing issues are mostly resolved, it's been a long and
expensive process. The question we have is, what are the
lessons learned that can be applied to future programs?
One satellite program is not out of the woods, however, and
that is the Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS), the
successor to National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System (NPOESS). Even though the NPOESS program was
cancelled a year ago, the acquisition plan for the much-needed
DWSS is not finished. We'd like to know the schedule for this
program and when there will be an acquisition decision.
While the Navy appears to have solved the technical
problems with the antenna on the Mobile User Objective
Satellite (MUOS), a communications satellite which just last
year was about 11 months late, with a launch date of September
of this year. I now understand that MUOS is approximately 21
months late and will not even be delivered until mid-next year.
In the mean time, the Navy just put the fifth satellite on
contract. We'll be anxious to hear, learn, and discuss more
about this delay as well.
The Air Force has two proposals on the table this year. One
is to look at block buys of satellites starting with AEHF
satellites 5 and 6. The second proposal is to look into a
commitment to buy at least eight booster cores per year for the
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV). This would entail a
much-needed restructuring of the EELV contract and a better
understanding of the actual launch costs. We look forward to a
thorough discussion of the very successful, but expensive,
EELVs.
The final issue is the space industrial base. From rocket
motors and engines to the smallest satellite parts, the supply
base is getting smaller. We'd like to hear your thoughts on how
to strengthen this industrial base.
We have a large panel today, so I will conclude and ask
Senator Sessions for his comments. What I'm hopeful is that our
panelists know that we have to leave at 3:20 p.m., we have a
vote at 3 p.m., and for a late-breaking meeting to the White
House. You've submitted prepared statements, they will be
included in the record. If we could maximize the time and, very
briefly, identify your highest priority in about 2 minutes.
Ambassador Schulte, we'll begin with you. Then Zangardi,
Shelton, Helms, Formica, Titley, Hyten, and Chaplain. Thank
you. Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF HON. GREGORY L. SCHULTE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY
Ambassador Schulte. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the
opportunity to testify this afternoon. In February, Secretary
Gates and Director of National Intelligence Clapper submitted
to Congress a first-ever National Security Space Strategy
(NSSS). This new strategy starts with dramatic changes in
space, a domain that remains vital to our national security,
but that is increasingly congested, contested, and competitive.
In the face of these challenges, this new strategy seeks to
protect the strategic advantages that we derive from space
while also protecting the domain itself and the industrial base
that is so important to our capabilities there. My prepared
statement summarizes the strategy. I would like to focus
briefly on three important aspects: first, promoting
responsible use of space; second, partnering with other
countries; and third, deterring attacks on our space systems.
Promoting the responsible use of space is one of the new
strategy's key approaches. A more cooperative, predictable
environment enhances our national security and discourages
destabilizing behavior. The United States is leading by
example. We are preparing to begin providing pre-launch
notifications of our space launches, just as we have notified
ballistic missile launches in the past.
U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) has signed agreements
with some 23 satellite operators across the world to share data
and warnings of possible collisions. The United States is also
looking to promote international transparency and confidence-
building measures for space. With that in mind, we are
currently evaluating the European Union's (EU) proposed
International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. Our
preliminary review suggests that such a code could provide a
positive approach to promoting responsible space--responsible
behavior, but the administration has not yet made a final
determination on the code or changes that would be necessary
for us to accept it, and the Department of Defense (DOD) is
assessing its operational impact.
Partnering with other countries is another key approach of
the new strategy. Partnerships allow us to benefit from the
growing space capabilities of allies and other countries, to
make our space systems more diverse and resilient, and to
improve our ability to operate in coalition. As an important
step in that process, we are looking at transitioning
STRATCOM's Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) into a
combined space operations center with allies.
Another good example of partnership is the Wide-Band Global
satellite communications (SATCOM). Australia has bought into
the constellation and the Air Force is negotiating with other
allies to also buy in. This expands the number of satellites,
adds coverage and resiliency, and shares the cost, a welcome
benefit at a time of budget constraints.
The new strategy also reflects a new multi-layered approach
to deterring attacks on our space systems, which is important
as space becomes increasingly contested. The first layer of
deterrence is the establishment of norms of responsible
behavior, as I discussed. The second layer of deterrence is the
establishment of international coalitions so that an attack on
the capability of one becomes the attack on the capability of
many.
The third layer of deterrence is increasing our resilience
and capacity to operate in a degraded environment. The fourth
layer of deterrence is a readiness and capability to respond in
self-defense and not necessarily in space.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, DOD has adopted a new space
strategy to protect the national security advantages that we
derive from a domain that is increasingly congested, contested,
and competitive, and we look forward to working with you and
Congress in implementing this strategy.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Schulte follows:]
Prepared Statement by Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on Department of
Defense (DOD) space policy. I am honored to join my distinguished
colleagues from the Army, Navy, Air Force and the Government
Accountability Office (GAO). Today, I am pleased to discuss the
recently released National Security Space Strategy (NSSS).
Maintaining the benefits afforded to the United States by space is
central to our national security. Space systems allow our warfighters
to see with clarity, communicate with certainty, navigate with
accuracy, and operate with assurance. However, an evolving strategic
environment increasingly challenges U.S. space advantages. The current
and future strategic environment is driven by three trends--space is
increasingly congested, contested, and competitive.
Space is increasingly congested. Growing global space activity and
testing of China's destructive anti-satellite system have increased
congestion in important areas in space. DOD tracks approximately 22,000
manmade objects in orbit, of which 1,100 are active satellites. Another
area of increasing congestion is the radiofrequency spectrum. As many
as 9,000 satellite communications transponders are expected to be in
orbit by 2015. As more transponders are placed in service, the greater
the probability of radiofrequency interference. This congestion is
complicating space operations for all those that seek to benefit from
space.
Space is increasingly contested in all orbits. Potential
adversaries are seeking to exploit perceived space vulnerabilities
through a range of counterspace threats that may deny, degrade,
deceive, disrupt, or destroy space assets and supporting infrastructure
from widely available jamming technology to highly-sophisticated,
kinetic anti-satellite weapons. As more nations and non-state actors
develop counterspace capabilities over the next decade, threats to U.S.
space systems and challenges to the stability and security of the space
environment will increase. Irresponsible acts against space systems
could have implications beyond the space domain, disrupting worldwide
services upon which the civil and commercial sectors depend.
Space is increasingly competitive. More than 60 nations and
government consortia currently operate satellites. Although the United
States maintains an overall edge in space capabilities, the U.S.
competitive advantage has decreased as market-entry barriers have
lowered. Some U.S. suppliers are at risk due to inconsistent
acquisition and production rates, long development cycles, and a more
competitive foreign market. A decrease in specialized suppliers further
challenges U.S. abilities to maintain assured access to critical
technologies, avoid critical dependencies, inspire innovation, and
maintain leadership advantages. All of these issues are compounded by
challenges in recruiting, developing, and retaining a technical
workforce.
However, the challenges of a congested, contested, competitive
environment also present the United States with opportunities for
leadership and partnership. The recently released joint DOD and
Intelligence Community NSSS charts a path for the next decade to
respond to the current and projected space strategic environment.
The NSSS seeks to maintain and enhance the national security
benefits the United States derives from its activities and capabilities
in space while addressing and shaping the strategic environment and
strengthening the foundations of our space enterprise. The strategy
identifies three U.S. national security space objectives: strengthen
safety, stability, and security in space; maintain and enhance the
strategic national security advantages afforded to the United States by
space; and energize the space industrial base that supports U.S.
national security. Achieving these objectives will ensure our military
continued access to space-based assets national security purposes.
The United States will retain leadership in space by strengthening
our space capabilities and improving our collaboration with others
worldwide. Leadership cannot be predicated on declaratory policy alone.
It must build upon a willingness to maintain strategic advantages while
working with the international community to develop collective norms,
share information, and collaborate on capabilities. Thus the United
States will pursue a set of five interrelated strategic approaches to
meet our national security space objectives and enhance U.S. leadership
in space, as outlined in the NSSS.
promote responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space
The United States will promote the responsible, peaceful, and safe
use of space as the foundational step to addressing the congested and
contested space domain. A more cooperative, predictable environment
enhances U.S. national security and discourages destabilizing crisis
behavior. The United States will encourage responsible behavior in
space and will support development of data standards, best practices,
transparency and confidence-building measures, and norms of behavior
for responsible space operations. The United States will consider
proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are equitable,
effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United
States.
With increasing congestion in the space domain, efforts to develop
and share situational awareness can help bring order to the congestion
and prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust. DOD will continue to
improve the quantity and quality of the space situational awareness
(SSA) information it obtains and, in coordination with other government
agencies, will seek to establish agreements with other nations and
commercial firms to enhance spaceflight safety for all parties. DOD is
also pursuing opportunities to expand sharing of space situational
awareness data to increase transparency and cooperation in the domain.
U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) has entered into agreements with 23
companies, including both launch providers and satellite owners and
operators, to improve spaceflight safety.
The United States is pursuing a number of initiatives to promote
the responsible use of space. In keeping with the new strategy and the
President's National Space Policy, we are currently evaluating the
European Union's (EU) proposed international Code of Conduct for Outer
Space Activities as a pragmatic first set of guidelines for safe
activity in space. We are also discussing the Code with other space-
faring countries, including our key allies, as well as Russia, China,
and India. The administration has not made a final determination on the
EU proposal, and DOD is assessing its operational impact. However, our
preliminary assessment finds it a positive approach to promoting
responsible behavior in space, enhancing our national security in the
process.
Promoting transparency for responsible space operations will
enhance the security of the United States by singling out those actors
who seek to disrupt peaceful uses of outer space. As a concrete step
towards transparency, DOD recently revised its pre-launch notification
policy to include space launch vehicles in addition to ballistic
missile launches. DOD will continue to work with the Department of
State and other departments to promote responsible behavior worldwide
that will help ensure the long-term sustainability of the space
environment.
provide improved u.s. space capabilities
Ensuring U.S. capabilities are developed and fielded in a timely,
reliable, and responsive manner is critical for military forces to plan
and execute effective operations. Improving our acquisition processes,
energizing the U.S. space industrial base, enhancing technological
innovation, and deliberately developing space professionals are
critical enablers to maintaining U.S. space leadership.
The United States seeks to foster a space industrial base that is
robust, competitive, flexible, healthy, and delivers reliable space
capabilities on time and on budget. International advances in space
technology have put increased importance on reforming U.S. export
controls to ensure the competitiveness of the U.S. space industrial
base while addressing technology security. Secretary Gates has actively
called for an overhaul of our export control system. Reforming export
controls will facilitate U.S. firms' ability to compete in the
international marketplace for capabilities that are, or will soon
become, widely available globally, while strengthening our ability to
protect the most significant U.S. technology advantages. The NSSS
reaffirms the necessity of these reforms and echoes the National Space
Policy's call for giving favorable consideration for export of those
items and technologies that are generally available on the global
market, consistent with U.S. national security interests.
We are exploring innovative acquisition strategies for buying
spacecraft, with a focus on block buys. As part of the Secretary of
Defense's broader efficiency initiatives, our goals are to: (1) reduce
unit cost for ``production ready'' satellites; (2) enable the
Department to acquire these systems more efficiently and affordably;
and (3) stabilize production including the industrial base. Our
innovative acquisition strategy will include full-funding of two
satellite classes--Advanced Extremely High Frequency (in fiscal year
2012) and Space Based Infrared System (in fiscal year 2013)--through
the use of advance appropriations. We ask for your support of this
approach.
partner with responsible nations, international organizations, and
commercial firms
The United States will pursue additional opportunities to partner
with responsible nations, international organizations, and commercial
firms to augment the U.S. National Security Space Posture. Decisions on
partnering will be consistent with U.S. policy and international
commitments and will consider cost, protection of sources and methods,
and effects on the U.S. industrial base. U.S. military personnel will
ensure the appropriate review and release of classified information to
enhance partner access to space information.
With our allies, we will explore the development of combined space
doctrine that endorse and enable the collaborative sharing of space
capabilities in crisis and conflict. DOD is already exploring
transforming STRATCOM's Joint Space Operations Center into a Combined
Space Operations Center operated with international partners. A
Combined Space Operations Center will allow our allies to work side-by-
side with U.S. commanders, integrating a coalition approach to space
into our day-to-day operations. DOD, in conjunction with the State
Department and other appropriate U.S. Government agencies, will work to
expand mutually beneficial agreements with key partners to utilize
existing and planned capabilities that can augment U.S. national
security space capabilities. Wideband Global Satellite Communication is
a good example--Australia has joined the constellation and other allies
are looking at doing the same. A larger, more international
constellation adds resilience and augments our space-based capabilities
and forces a potential aggressor to contemplate attacking space systems
used by a coalition of countries instead of one country.
We will explore sharing space-derived information as ``global
utilities'' with partnered nations. We will continue to share SSA
information to promote responsible and safe space operations and will
pursue enhanced sharing of other space services such as missile warning
and maritime domain awareness. We will explore the establishment of a
collaborative missile warning network to detect attacks against our
interests and those of our allies and partners.
Strategic partnerships with commercial firms will be pursued in
areas that stabilize costs and improve the resilience of space
architectures upon which we rely. Such partnerships enhance national
security capabilities by providing opportunities to host national
security payloads on commercial spacecraft or by offering innovative
opportunities to buy or lease capabilities on-orbit. In an era of
limited resources, the DOD will develop space systems only when there
is no suitable, cost-effective commercial alternatives or when national
security needs dictate. We will also actively promote the sale of
capabilities developed by U.S. companies to partner nations. Such
capabilities could then be integrated into existing U.S. architectures
and networks through arrangements that enhance and diversify U.S.
capabilities.
prevent and deter aggression against space infrastructure that supports
u.s. national security
The United States is pursuing a multilayered approach to prevent
and deter aggression against U.S. and allied space systems that support
our national security. The Department seeks to enhance its capability
to dissuade and deter the development, testing, and employment of
counterspace systems and prevent and deter aggression against space
systems and supporting infrastructure that support U.S. national
security.
Many elements of this strategy contribute to this approach. DOD
will: support diplomatic efforts to promote norms of responsible
behavior in space which may dissuade and impose international costs on
irresponsible behavior; pursue international partnerships that
encourage potential adversary restraint; improve our ability to
attribute attacks; strengthen the resilience of our architectures to
deny the benefits of an attack; and retain the right to respond, should
deterrence fail.
SSA will continue to be a top priority, as it decreases the risk
that an adversary's action could occur without warning or attribution.
We are working with the Director of National Intelligence to improve
our intelligence posture--predictive awareness, characterization,
warning, and attribution, to improve our understanding of activities in
the space domain. When combined with efforts to promote responsible
behavior, such transparency will facilitate the quick identification of
actions that threaten U.S. interests.
Furthermore, the United States will deny adversaries meaningful
benefits of attack by improving protection and strengthening the
resilience of our architectures. Partnerships as well as alternative
U.S. Government approaches such as cross-domain solutions, hosted
payloads, responsive options, and other innovative solutions, can
deliver capability, should our space systems be attacked. This also
will enable our ability to operate in a degraded space environment.
Finally, the United States is developing a range of options to
deter, and if necessary, defeat efforts to interfere with U.S. or
allied space systems consistent with the inherent right of self-defense
and other longstanding principles on international law. Such options
could include necessary and proportional responses outside of the space
domain.
prepare to defeat attacks and to operate in a degraded environment
Notwithstanding our efforts to deter, some actors may still pursue
counterspace actions as a means of achieving military or political
advantage. Our military capabilities must be prepared to operate
through a degraded environment and attacks targeted at our space
systems and supporting infrastructure. We must deny and defeat an
adversary's ability to achieve its objectives.
As DOD invests in space capabilities, it will include resilience as
a key criterion in evaluating alternative architectures. Resilience can
be achieved in a variety of ways, to include cost-effective space
system protection, cross-domain solutions, hosting payloads on a mix of
platforms in various orbits, drawing on distributed international and
commercial partner capabilities, and developing and maturing responsive
space capabilities.
To enhance resilience, DOD will continue to develop mission-
effective alternatives, including land, sea, air, and space-based
alternatives for critical capabilities currently delivered primarily
through space-based platforms. In addition, DOD will seek to establish
relationships and agreements whereby we can access partner capabilities
if U.S. systems are degraded or unavailable. We will be prepared to use
these capabilities to ensure the timely continuity of services in a
degraded space environment.
Preparing for attacks must extend to the people and processes
relying on space information, operating our space systems, and
analyzing space-derived information. Ensuring that our servicemen can
operate effectively during an attack on our space assets reduces the
benefit of attack. DOD is also developing exercises and training to
ensure our ability to access the requisite capabilities and
information, from space or through cross-domain solutions, in the event
of interference with space capabilities.
conclusion
Our strategy requires active U.S. leadership enabled by an approach
that updates, balances, and integrates all of the tools of U.S. power.
DOD, in coordination with other departments and agencies, will
implement this strategy by updating guidance, plans, doctrine,
programs, and operations to reflect the new strategic approach.
DOD included initial steps towards implementing the strategy in its
fiscal year 2012 budget and will use the coming year to lay the
foundation for changes in fiscal year 2013 and beyond. DOD looks
forward to working closely with Congress, industry, and allies to
implement this new strategy for space.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Dr. Zangardi.
STATEMENT OF JOHN A. ZANGARDI, Ph.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS,
COMPUTERS, INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION OPERATIONS, AND SPACE
Dr. Zangardi. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very
much for giving me the opportunity to testify this afternoon on
issues of space.
The Navy continues to provide narrow-band SATCOM for U.S.
forces worldwide through the legacy Ultra-High Frequency (UHF)
Follow-On (UFO) constellation. We will continue to lease
commercial UHF services to supplement existing capacity as
required in support of the warfighter. The Navy looks forward
to the first on-orbit capability of Satellite No. 1 of the MUOS
in 2012. As subsequent MUOS satellites are delivered to replace
the fragile UFO constellation, it is critical that the Navy
remain postured to provide uninterrupted UHF SATCOM services
for the warfighter, including preserving the ability to launch
MUOS satellites as they are delivered, in order to mitigate a
loss of UFO satellite on-orbit.
Sir, that completes my statement. Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Titley and Dr.
Zangardi follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by RADM David W. Titley and Dr. John A
Zangardi
introduction
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, we are
honored to appear before you today to address the Navy's space
activities. Successful Naval operations in the 21st century demand
increased global situational awareness and proficiency in the areas of
intelligence, cyber defense, ballistic missile defense, information
management, and space. To achieve this primacy, the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) directed the realignment of his staff a year ago to
bring all Navy information-related capabilities and systems under a
single resource sponsor--the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Information Dominance. In the area of space, the OPNAV N2/N6
Information Dominance Directorate has established a single focal point
to oversee Navy's space related policies, programs, requirements,
investments, and resourcing. Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. Tenth Fleet,
established over a year ago to be the Navy's operational lead for
information and cyberspace, continues to execute Navy's space
operations today.
Our maritime strategy demands a flexible, interoperable and secure
global communications capability to support the command and control
requirements of highly mobile, geographically dispersed U.S., joint,
and coalition forces. Our satellite systems provide a decisive
advantage to our deployed forces across the broad spectrum of military
operations, from peacetime engagements to humanitarian relief efforts
to major combat operations. The Navy relies upon space-based
capabilities to achieve information dominance over potential
adversaries and enable commanders to exercise effective command and
control at all warfare levels and across multiple information enclaves
in all domains.
navy space requirements
The Navy's interests in space include communications, intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, positioning, navigation, timing, missile
warning, meteorology, and oceanography capabilities. The Navy continues
to engage with the other Services and our interagency partners to
ensure that all of our space equities, interests, and requirements are
well understood so that the combatant commanders and Navy's operating
forces have the space capabilities they need to succeed in their
missions.
The Navy remains critically dependent on space to conduct not only
its wartime mission, but also its core capabilities of forward
presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security,
humanitarian assistance, and disaster response. Space capabilities are
vital to our Nation's maritime operations and are foundational to our
ability to operate in a networked and dispersed manner. As the recently
signed Navy Space Strategy states, space provides the ultimate crow's
nest for maritime operations.
The Navy's mission of ensuring the security of our citizens at home
and abroad requires a global reach and persistent presence. Our ability
to conduct missions of mercy or rapidly deploy decisive combat power,
in concert with the other Services and our coalition partners, depends
on assured space capabilities with inherent flexibility and
responsiveness to support our worldwide responsibilities. In accordance
with the National Space Policy and National Security Space Strategy
(NSSS), commercial and foreign partner capabilities have become
increasingly useful in bridging the gap between requirements and
capabilities. The Navy will continue to work with the commercial sector
and foreign partners to explore options that address multiple maritime
mission requirements. Decisions to exploit these partnerships, though,
must include consideration of the information assurance risks inherent
in the capabilities being employed. Further, these decisions must be
based on feasibility and affordability assessments and cost, benefit,
and risk analysis.
Due to the long lead times involved in fielding complex space
programs, it is essential that Navy requirements and maritime missions
are factored into the pre-launch design and planned on-orbit operation
of future satellite acquisitions. The Navy is actively engaged with key
national and joint space-related organizations to ensure current and
future Navy needs in space are identified and incorporated. Further, we
welcome the opportunity to participate in the recently chartered
Defense Space Council as a senior-level forum to discuss Navy space
equities with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Intelligence
Community, and the Services who are represented at the Secretary and
Under Secretary level.
navy space investments
Nearly 50 percent of Navy's current fiscal contributions to space
remains dedicated to the acquisition, development and management of the
Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Follow-On (UFO) and Mobile User Objective
System (MUOS) communications satellite systems. The remainder is
predominantly apportioned to acquisition of the various satellite
receiver terminals and equipment for Navy units, and space-based
navigation, oceanography, and meteorology.
Additionally, the Navy invests in space-related Science and
Technology/Research and Development efforts that address maritime-
related capability gaps critical to the successful execution of our
Nation's maritime strategy. In this fiscally-constrained environment,
investments have been modest.
The Navy depends on space capabilities now, and expects the demand
for space capabilities to grow in the future, especially in the area of
satellite communications (SATCOM). The Navy's major space segment
responsibility to the joint community is the UHF narrowband SATCOM
constellation. Today this constellation consists of eight UFO
satellites, two residual Fleet Satellites (FLTSAT), one Leased
Satellite (LEASAT-5), and leased capacity on SKYNET-5C. MUOS will begin
to replace these systems in May 2012. Based on evolving warfighting
concepts, UHF SATCOM requirements are expected to grow, and MUOS, as
designed, will support those requirements.
mobile user objective system
The increasing joint demand for SATCOM access at ever-higher data
rates requires moving beyond current legacy UHF satellite capabilities.
MUOS will help satisfy those demands when initial operational
capability is reached in fiscal year 2012. The first satellite in the
planned constellation of four operational satellites, with one on-orbit
spare, is now scheduled for on-orbit capability in May 2012.
Previously, Navy planned for the first MUOS satellite to achieve on-
orbit capability in December 2011; however, the launches of several
higher priority spacecraft have dictated a primary launch date in
February 2012. Over the past year, the MUOS program made significant
progress completing electromagnetic interference testing of spacecraft
#1, propulsion and satellite bus mating of spacecraft #2, and
development of the ground infrastructure required to support MUOS
launch. MUOS program performance continues to support a Fall 2011
launch should a date become available. Navy's fiscal year 2012 budget
submission continues our investment in MUOS to replace the aging UFO
constellation.
MUOS will support Unified Commands and Joint Task Force Components,
Department of Defense (DOD) and non-DOD agencies, and our coalition
partners by providing worldwide tactical narrowband netted, point-to-
point, and broadcast voice and data services in challenging
environments, including double-canopy foliage, urban environments, high
sea states, and all weather conditions. MUOS will carry two distinct
payloads. The legacy UHF payload will provide the capability of a UFO
satellite, while a new UHF waveform payload will significantly increase
the number of accesses while also increasing available throughput to
the warfighter.
MUOS will be the common denominator for future command and control,
enhancing the capability to communicate from the tactical edge to
theater headquarters. MUOS will allow more comprehensive and
coordinated support to regional engagement efforts, providing the
capability to synchronize actions with other Services and agencies.
This capability will be realized through the fielding of MUOS capable
Joint Tactical Radio System terminals and by upgrading existing legacy
UHF software programmable terminals.
delivering muos
The timely delivery of MUOS is a high priority for Navy, and we
recognize both our responsibility and commitment to providing this
vital warfighting capability to all our DOD, Intelligence Community and
Interagency partners. The delay in delivery of the MUOS system, coupled
with the age and fragility of the current UHF satellite constellation,
has our full attention and focus.
Navy has taken several proactive steps to minimize the operational
impact if a gap in UHF satellite availability occurs. We have completed
a payload reconfiguration on UFO satellite Flight 11 that significantly
increased the number of available channels. We completed this action at
no cost and with very low risk to the spacecraft. A recent modification
to the frequency plan on FLTSAT 8 allowed us to optimize the UFO
satellite Flight 7 and provide two additional channels at no cost.
Additionally, the Navy continues to lease supplemental UHF resources
from two commercial satellite systems, LEASAT and SKYNET. Our total
mitigation efforts to date are providing the equivalent capacity of an
additional UFO satellite. Navy has also explored options using
commercially hosted payloads, but all possible material solutions would
not address potential near term gaps. We will keep these options in
reserve if their use becomes necessary.
We are also continuing efforts to make more efficient use of our
currently available satellite resources. The Integrated Waveform (IW),
a software upgrade to UHF SATCOM tactical terminals and control system,
completed operational testing and is currently being deployed. IW will
optimize our use of UHF satellite channels by doubling the number of
accesses that can be supported by a single 25 kHz channel. DOD has also
signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Australian Ministry of
Defense (MOD) for use of channels on an Australian-hosted payload
covering the Indian Ocean region. In exchange, the United States will
provide the Australian MOD use of equivalent UHF SATCOM accesses in the
Pacific Ocean region commencing in 2018. Finally, we are exploring the
use of TACSAT-4, an Office of Naval Research and Naval Research
Laboratory co-led development that supports Operationally Responsive
Space Office efforts. TACSAT-4 may provide a very limited operational
capability when it reaches on-orbit capability later this summer.
environmental remote sensing
The Navy provides DOD with global atmospheric modeling, and global
and regional ocean modeling. We rely on partnerships with the Air
Force, and civil and international agencies to meet our space-based
environmental sensing requirements. Meeting these requirements is
critical to the execution of missions that enhance safe, effective
military operations. For our future, the Navy is engaged in defining
the requirements for the DOD Defense Weather Satellite System and the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Joint Polar Satellite
System, which will together satisfy a large portion of the Navy's
environmental sensing requirements over the next 15 years.
In support of the new National Space Policy, the Navy is adopting a
new strategy to meet its unique space-based ocean altimetry
requirements. We have deferred procurement of the Navy Altimeter
satellite (GEOSAT follow-on) until fiscal year 2016 with full
operational capability achieved in fiscal year 2021. In the interim,
the Navy is seeking to enter partnerships with civil and international
agencies to satisfy our altimetry requirements.
positioning, navigation, and timing
The Navy continues to rely upon the Air Force's Global Positioning
System (GPS) to meet the vast majority of our positioning, navigation,
and timing (PNT) requirements. The Navy intends to award a contract
this year for the GPS-based PNT service which will modernize our aging
shipboard PNT systems and provide enhanced PNT assurance by
implementing jam-resistant antennas, a Selective Availability Anti-
Spoofing Module, and a foundation for future M-code implementation. The
Navy is also investigating the impact of a GPS-challenged environment
on maintaining synchronized timing across our full suite of combat and
communications systems.
The Navy is continuing the technology development phase of the
Joint Milli-Arcsecond Pathfinder Survey satellite, transitioning from
Science and Technology to a major acquisition category program, which
will update the DOD star catalog to meet positioning and orientation
accuracy requirements for the next several decades.
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
A robust architecture of signals and geospatial intelligence
systems to meet current and emerging requirements remains crucial to
successful maritime operations. It is imperative that Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities be funded and fielded in
sufficient quantity and capacity to sustain continuity of essential
space-based intelligence data throughout the maritime domain.
Accordingly, we fully support Office of the Director of National
Intelligence collaboration with combatant commands and Services to
ensure emerging requirements are adequately supported by future
Intelligence Community collection systems.
These intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities
are indispensable contributors to maritime domain awareness. As the
Nation continues to develop and field these and future capabilities,
persistent coverage in the maritime domain remains a key requirement. A
constrained fiscal environment will no doubt make this challenging,
but, in accordance with the National Space Policy and NSSS, emerging
capabilities are being explored with our coalition and commercial
partners in an effort to reduce costs while increasing capability.
commercial space systems
Commercially provided systems provide the ability to augment, but
not replace, existing national and military systems. These commercial
capabilities have become increasingly useful in bridging the gap
between requirements and capabilities. The Navy has used commercial
communications satellites since the early 1990s to augment bandwidth
requirements not fully satisfied by military communications satellites.
Technical advances in the commercial sector provide opportunities for
rapid capability implementation not only for communications, but in
other mission areas as well, such as safety of navigation and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Navy continues to
work with the commercial sector to explore options to address multiple
maritime mission requirements, and we continue to field systems, such
as Commercial Broadband Satellite Program terminals, to fully leverage
available commercial capability. Potential cost savings and capability
supplementation should continue to be evaluated for all commercially-
provided space-based capabilities at every opportunity.
space cadre
Our Navy equities, requirements, operations, and management of
space resources are the responsibility of a small but agile corps of
space professionals that make the Navy's use of space possible. The
Navy's Space Cadre is comprised of approximately 1,350 Reserve, civil,
and active duty service personnel from all warfighter designators and
communities, and is a key component of the DOD's 15,000 military and
civilian space professionals. Part of our Total Workforce strategy is
to ensure that fully qualified Navy Space Cadre personnel are
consistently assigned to our most critical and influential space
billets. This strategy requires the Navy to continue to recruit and
retain a talented and highly skilled workforce to fill vital space
leadership positions now and into the future. We continue to assign
personnel with a proven capacity to represent unique Navy requirements
for space systems in the joint acquisition processes at the National
Reconnaissance Office. To enable us to do this more efficiently, we are
developing specific career progression plans to actively manage space
experts' individual career paths to ensure that Navy and joint space-
related assignments complement and enhance career progression and
promotion opportunities while infusing naval operational expertise back
into the space community.
conclusion
In closing, we would like to reiterate that space capabilities will
continue to be critical to our Nation's success in the maritime domain.
We operate in an increasingly dynamic and challenging global
environment, demanding additional capability and more capacity to
operate in a networked but geographically dispersed fashion. A robust
space layer is essential to providing the Nation's soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines with the situational awareness and force capacity
to operate, fight, and succeed in a myriad of missions.
Navy is leaning forward in the use, advocacy, and development of
space capabilities. We are building and fielding the necessary space-
based systems across multiple mission areas and the plan we have
submitted will deliver the future space-based capabilities within the
fiscal constraints of the budget.
Thank you for the opportunity to share our efforts with you today.
Continued support from this subcommittee and Congress is deeply
appreciated.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
General Helms.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. SUSAN J. HELMS, USAF, COMMANDER, JOINT
FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR SPACE, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Helms. Good afternoon, Chairman Nelson. I am
honored to appear before you as STRATCOM's Commander for JFCC
Space. This is my first opportunity to come before you as the
Commander and I look forward to working with you and the other
subcommittee members to enhance the United States' standing as
a global leader in space.
It's an honor to represent the more than 3,000 soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines of JFCC Space, as well as our
exchange officers from Australia, Canada, and the United
Kingdom. These men and women form a tireless and innovative
Joint Force supporting our warfighters 24 hours a day, 365 days
a year.
Operating within an increasingly congested, contested, and
competitive space environment requires strategically
reexamining our processes, planning flexibility, improving
awareness of the space environment, and expanding collaboration
efforts with all spacefaring nations and corporations.
Correctly adapting our operations will allow JFCC Space to
continue to provide the following capabilities to the Joint
Force: Unmatched position, navigation, and timing information;
missile warning and missile defense; communications,
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) support; and
technical intelligence and characterization of the operational
environment.
In today's strategic world, JFCC Space is at the forefront
of defending our ability to operate freely within space. We
continue to search out better ways to support those in harm's
way. We will continue to develop and employ systems to enhance
our comprehensive space situational awareness. We will strive
to strengthen our relationships with allied and industry space
partners, ensuring our global capabilities remain available for
those requiring them.
You can be proud of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines of JFCC Space. I thank the subcommittee for your
continued support as we work to preserve and enhance our space
capabilities for our Nation.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Helms follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Susan J. Helms, USAF
Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, and members of the subcommittee,
I am honored to appear before you as U.S. Strategic Command's
(STRATCOM) Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for
Space (JFCC Space). This is my first opportunity to come before you as
the Commander for JFCC Space and I look forward to working with you to
enhance the United States standing as a global leader in space.
It's an honor to represent the more than 3,000 soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines of JFCC Space. In addition to our active duty
military members, JFCC Space has more than 1,000 National Guard,
Reserve unit members and Individual Mobilization Augmentees, as well
as, exchange officers from Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom.
These men and women form a tireless and innovative Joint Force, working
hard to provide position, navigation, and timing information; missile
warning and missile defense; communications; intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance support; and technical intelligence
and personnel recovery to our warfighters 24 hours a day, 365 days a
year.
The space environment has become increasingly congested, contested
and competitive. Operating within space is correspondingly more
uncertain than ever in our past. Addressing the changes in the
environment requires strategically rethinking our processes,
integrating extra flexibility in our planning, improving our awareness
of the space environment and expanding our collaboration with all space
faring nations and corporations. Correctly adapting our operations
within the space environment before we are required to respond to an
unforeseen circumstance will allow JFCC Space to continue to provide
space capabilities to our Joint Force throughout these uncertain times.
One of our premier responsibilities is to deliver space effects to
the Joint Force. As the most prevalent space effect delivered by my
operators, we have continued to operate and improve the most widely
used space capability on the planet, the global positioning system
(GPS) constellation. In January we completed the first phase of our
``Expandable 24'' operation, the largest satellite repositioning effort
in GPS program history. This two phase operation repositioned three
satellites to optimize GPS coverage for terrain-challenged
environments, such as cities and the mountains and valleys of
Afghanistan. We also began operations of the newest GPS variant, the
GPS IIF, which will add a second civilian safety-of-life signal and
provide more robust signal availability for military users.
Our Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) capabilities in space are
the stalwart to providing critical ballistic missile warning to field
commanders and national leaders. At least 20 nations currently have
nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, and the technology to deliver
them over long distances. According to intelligence estimates, during
the next 10 years, additional countries will develop the technology and
capability to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles at the United
States. Our detection systems provide both strategic warning for
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and space launches as well as
tactical warning for shorter-range ballistic missile launches. Space
based missile warning satellites are able to provide continuous global
coverage. These systems are capable of providing missile warning to the
Joint Force and coalition partners in the event of a short-range
ballistic missile attack. In addition, deployed units throughout the
world provide Geographic Combatant Commanders the means of receiving
missile warning data direct from the Defense Support Program (DSP)
constellation for their area of responsibility. Space OPIR continues to
ensure missile threats are detected and reported in a timely fashion
but the technology continues to advance and we are constantly finding
new ways to provide better battlespace awareness and technical
intelligence to the ground commanders beyond our foundational ballistic
missile warning mission. The Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) in its
highly elliptical orbit (HEO) gives significant coverage over the
northern hemisphere for infrared detection and technical intelligence
gathering. We can now detect and report, in near real-time, natural and
man-made infrared events. The quality of data provided by SBIRS HEO is
a key part in our ability to characterize launches and predict threats
within minutes. Following its operational acceptance, the first SBIRS
in its geosynchronous orbit will give us the ability to paint a picture
for national leadership of new foreign technology development and
proliferation information. This capability is so significant that the
SBIRS community is developing a pre-certified use plan to get valuable
information to the Joint Force as soon as practical.
These space based sensors are only one portion of our missile
warning capability. Ground-based radars provide warning by detecting,
tracking and counting individual objects in a missile attack early in
their trajectory. Several of the ground based radars are integrated
into the Ballistic Missile Defense System used by the Missile Defense
Agency to improve midcourse sensor coverage by providing critical early
warning, tracking, object classification and cueing data.
Information technologies have truly revolutionized our capability
to operate globally. From combat operations to humanitarian assistance,
we use military satellite communications every day. In addition to GPS
and OPIR capabilities, JFCC Space provides to the Joint Force
protected, wideband and narrowband satellite communication
capabilities.
Protected communications make possible the ability to command and
control forces and support national decisionmakers in a contested
communications environment, including the high end nuclear environment.
Wideband satellite communication provides automatic Digital
Network/automatic Secure Voice Communications, Secret Internet Protocol
Router Network and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System
access from space. Additionally wideband communications include relays
for Defense Message System, Defense Switched Network, Diplomatic
Telecommunication Service Communications and real-time Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle video for ground mobile forces.
In the category of narrowband communications, our ultra-high
frequency follow-on (UHF) satellite system, is the space-based portion
of the Department of Defense (DOD) communication system that enables
reliable communications among aircraft, ships, submarines, ground
stations and the presidential command network as well as a multitude of
joint and allied users. UHF satellite communications is a primary
enabler for distributed command and control, critical for dispersed
maritime operations, and provides critical communications for
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts such as the Haitian
and Japanese earthquake. DOD provided more than 20 UHF satellite
communications channels dedicated for supporting tsunami relief efforts
in Japan.
JFCC Space is forging ahead in our efforts to provide new,
operationally responsive space effects to the Joint Force. We are
actively engaged with Air Force Space Command and STRATCOM in
developing the concepts and command relationships that may allow us to
quickly transition rapid development capabilities to operational use.
For example, the TACSAT-3 satellite has an experimental, hyper-spectral
imagery payload that has shown great promise in support for ground
troops as well as in disaster relief and recovery operations. We are
also working with Service partners to deploy the Operational Responsive
Space (ORS)-1, a small spacecraft that will supply urgently-needed
imagery to Central Command.
Day to day, JFCC Space tasks our space based assets to provide
standard space support to the Joint Force. We maintain a close and
dedicated relationship with each theater's Space Coordinating Authority
(SCA). Through the SCA relationship JFCC Space is proactively postured
to rapidly adapt to changing mission requirements based on combatant
commander's changing needs. JFCC Space, through the Joint Space
Operations Center (JSpOC), coordinated specific support to the U.S.
response to the March 11 earthquake and tsunami in Japan and ongoing
coalition military operations over Libya. These efforts include using
data from the hyperspectral sensor on TACSAT-3 to help contain the
damage at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. In support of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Operation Unified Protector, JFCC
Space tailors theater missile warning coverage, strike assessment and
technical intelligence support for coalition forces protecting Libyan
civilians and civilian-populated areas.
Space situational awareness (SSA) is the cornerstone of JFCC Space
operations and the space surveillance network (SSN) is the workhorse of
our SSA. The data provided by the space surveillance network are
analyzed at the JSpOC by a collection of military and civilian
analysts. These analysts keep track of what satellites are active,
predict when pieces of debris or satellites will re-enter the
atmosphere or collide, and provide vital information to decisionmakers
about when a payload can be safely launched. Over the past 2 years, we
have increased daily conjunction screening at the JSpOC from 110
primary satellites to all active satellites (over 1,100). Due to this
increase in number of satellites screened, we have seen conjunction
warning notifications increase from 5 to up to 25 per day, up 46
percent from 2009 and we have had a corresponding increase in our
interaction with commercial and foreign government space operators.
Information sharing with commercial and foreign entities is now a
routine occurrence executed via a formalized process within JFCC Space.
We currently have data sharing agreements with 23 commercial and
foreign partners.
However, we still suffer from an aged and limited sensor network to
gather our most important SSA resource: orbital observations. Many of
our SSN sensors operate on a one-object-at-a-time system and a majority
of the SSN sensors are not networked with one another. The Continental
United States (CONUS)-based space fence and our Eglin SSN sensor are
currently the only machine-to-machine network between SSN radars. These
networked sensors are resulting in 30,000 observations per year that
would otherwise go undetected due to sensor limitations with Eglin's
space surveillance fence. We could see a huge benefit to our SSA
through greater machine-to-machine networking between our SSN sensors.
The CONUS-based space fence can detect and observe multiple objects at
one time and contributes more observations to our network than any
other sensor. Additionally, we have considerable gaps in coverage in
the southern hemisphere. Placement of a space fence in the southern
hemisphere will improve our coverage considerably. Another sensor that
will improve our capability is the Space-Based Space Surveillance
(SBSS) satellite launched in September. This sensor operates from
space, free of boundaries, borders, or atmospheric effects to distort
or obscure viewing. With a potential capability to track objects much
smaller in size than what our older sensors can track, SBSS will detect
significantly more objects in orbit and produce a corresponding
increase in the volume of SSA data. Current analytic and processing
capacity in the JSpOC is not sufficient to exploit the full capacity of
this or other future sensors. This shortfall is driving an urgent need
to upgrade JSpOC systems. The JSpOC Mission System (JMS) is the Air
Force's program of record for solving this problem and ensuring the
JSpOC is properly equipped to handle the mission is part of my service
function as commander of 14th Air Force.
The JMS is planned to replace our legacy command and control
systems designed in the 1980s and fielded in the 1990s. We are working
closely with the acquisition team to prioritize our mission
requirements. In the months ahead we intend to employ an early JMS
release that will significantly enhance our ability to understand the
space situation with an integrated operating picture, as well as the
ability to respond to a dynamic space environment. We will continue to
build upon this initial capability to ensure our operators on the JSpOC
floor have the tools, and the infrastructure, they need to accomplish
the mission.
We cannot properly equip the JSpOC without addressing our current
facilities and the need for modern infrastructure to house the state of
the art command and control system and the JSpOC personnel. Today the
JSpOC performs its operational mission from a converted missile
assembly building. Over 50 years old and designed for an entirely
different purpose, the building presents significant challenges towards
meeting our integrated space operations mission. Successful integration
with U.S. and coalition forces, as well as commercial partners will
depend upon a future military construction project for new facilities
designed specifically for space command and control.
SSA is not only an understanding of the physical objects within
space but also includes characterizing disruptions to services provided
by satellite signals transmitted through space. JFCC Space provides the
capability to monitor the service quality of U.S. and coalition
satellite communications systems in order to detect interference which
may ultimately be determined to be either unintentional incidents or
purposeful acts. When an interference event is detected, JFCC Space
receives support from other elements of STRATCOM to geolocate the
source of interference. In these efforts, we continue to build on the
early successes of current programs leading to the development of new
systems to be deployed later this year in order to conduct
electromagnetic interference detection in different frequencies and
different locations throughout the world. These efforts support broader
U.S. Government efforts--in cooperation with civil, commercial, and
foreign partners--to identify, locate, and attribute sources of radio
frequency interference, and take necessary measures to sustain the
radiofrequency environment in which critical U.S. space systems
operate.
Consistent with the President's National Space Policy and the
National Security Space Strategy, we are working with the Department of
State to expand our current partnerships and develop new partnerships
through transparency and cooperation with partners and allies,
including industry partners. The United States will continue to promote
safe and responsible space operations both for ourselves and with other
space faring nations and industry partners. Our leadership in the
development of best practices and bilateral and multilateral
transparency and confidence building measures to encourage responsible
actions in, and the peaceful use of, space, is of critical importance.
As the National Space Policy states, it is the shared interest of all
nations to act responsibly in space to help prevent mishaps,
misperceptions, and mistrust.
A Combined Space Operations concept is a starting place and we will
work with our closest allies to flesh out and mature the concept toward
mutually supportive goals. The concept must be expandable and
tailorable to allow the flexibility to incorporate partners beyond our
own U.S. Government agencies and closest allies.
As resources permit, we plan to continue expanding the SSA
information and services we offer. In coordination with the Department
of State and civilian departments and agencies, we intend to enter into
SSA Sharing agreements with foreign governments and international
organizations, and build upon our bilateral space cooperation dialogues
with key allies and partners. These dialogues have already resulted in
agreements in principle for SSA cooperation between DOD and its
counterparts in Australia, Canada, and France. SSA Sharing agreements--
combined with ongoing discussions on SSA cooperation with other allies
as well as the European
Space Agency and European Union--will put us on a path to improve
collective awareness of the space domain and work to preserve its
advantages for all.
Space operations continue to evolve rapidly and JFCC Space is at
the forefront of defending our ability to operate within space. We
continue to search out better ways to support Joint Forces around the
globe, especially those in harm's way. We will continue to develop and
employ systems to enhance our comprehensive SSA. We will strive to
strengthen our relationships with allied and industry space partners,
ensuring our global capabilities remain available for those requiring
them. You can be proud of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines of
JFCC Space. I thank the committee for your continued support as we work
to preserve and enhance the critical space capabilities of our Nation.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
General Formica.
STATEMENT OF LTG RICHARD P. FORMICA, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY
SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND/ARMY FORCES STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Formica. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and again
thank you for your ongoing support of our soldiers, civilians,
and families. I appear today as the Commander of the Army's
Space and Missile Defense Command and Army Forces Strategic
Command. I'm honored to testify before this committee. You've
been a strong supporter of the Army and the key capabilities
that space affords our warfighters and we value your continued
support.
My purpose today is to inform the committee about the Army
as a user of space capabilities, to summarize the Army's space
strategy and policy, and to discuss the space capabilities
provided by the Army. These are provided in more detail in my
written statement which was prepared and provided for the
record. I'll briefly summarize those three, sir.
As a user of space capabilities, the Army depends on
position, navigation, timing, communications, ISR, assured
missile warning, and weather. The space-based services are
critical enablers to our forces and assured access to space-
based capabilities is a critical element in the Army's ability
to shoot, move, and communicate. While we may face localized
tactical disruptions, our Army does not want to face a day
without space-based capabilities.
The Army's space policy and strategic plan provide our
priorities and equities for space capabilities and forces. Our
focus is on leveraging DOD and national space assets in
partnership with the joint community to provide assured access
of space-based capabilities in support of full-spectrum
operations.
The Army provides critical space capabilities for the
combatant commanders and to the warfighter. In our space role,
we have three core tasks: providing trained and ready space
forces and capabilities to combatant commanders and to the
warfighter; building future space forces; and researching,
developing, testing, and integrating future space capabilities.
Our command is uniquely organized in the Army to perform
these three tasks, with operations, capability development, and
materiel development functions. We are also geographically
well-positioned in Huntsville, AL, and Colorado Springs, CO, to
capitalize on the tech bases there. Our space capabilities are
positioned in 14 other locations around the globe to accomplish
these 3 core tasks.
In conclusion, the Army is critically dependent upon the
capabilities that space brings to the battlefield and seeks
assured access to those capabilities. I appreciate the
opportunity to speak on these important matters and I look
forward to your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Formica follows:]
Prepared Statement by LTG Richard P. Formica, USA
introduction
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sessions, and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, thank you for your ongoing support of our soldiers,
civilians, and families, as well as the opportunity to testify before
this panel. This marks my first appearance before the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, a body that has
been a strong supporter of the Army and the key capabilities that space
affords our warfighters. Your continued support is important as we
pursue our joint efforts to provide critical space capabilities in
support of our Nation, our fighting forces, and our allies.
In my current assignment, I wear three hats: first, as the
commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, I have
Title 10 responsibilities to train, maintain, and equip space and
missile defense forces for the Army. Second, as the Army Forces
Strategic Command, I am the Army Service Component Commander (ASCC) to
the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) charged with the responsibility
for planning, integrating, and coordinating Army forces and
capabilities in support of strategic missions. Third, I serve as
STRATCOM's Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for
Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD) in order to leverage the
capabilities and skill sets of U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense
Command/Army Forces Strategic Command (ASMDC/ARSTRAT).
In my role here today as the Commander of ASMDC/ARSTRAT and the
ASCC to STRATCOM, I am honored to testify before you with these
distinguished witnesses--all providers of critical space capabilities
to the warfighter and as essential contributors to the joint space
planning process and our Nation's continued advances to effectively
operate in space. Within the Army, space operations and space-related
activities are pursued as an enterprise and are not the exclusive
domain of the ASMDC/ARSTRAT or any other single branch or functional
proponent.
My purpose today is to outline the Army as a user of space
capabilities; to articulate the Army's space strategy and policy; and
to inform the committee about the Army as a provider of space
capabilities.
the army as a user of space capabilities
As America's principal land force, our Army must be organized,
trained, and equipped to provide responsive and sustained combat
operations in order to fight as a joint team and to respond, as
directed, to crises at home and abroad. Geopolitical uncertainties and
nearly a decade of continuous combat have necessitated a high degree of
operational adaptability. The Army's Operating Concept identifies six
warfighting functional concepts that contribute to operational
adaptability: mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence,
protection, fires, and sustainment. Space-based capabilities leveraged
and employed across the Army Space enterprise enable each of these
warfighting functions. Simply put, space-based capabilities are
critical elements to the Army's ability to shoot, move, and
communicate.
The Army is reliant on space-based systems, such as global
positioning satellites, communication satellites, weather satellites,
and intelligence collection platforms. They are critical enablers to
our ability to plan, communicate, navigate, and maintain battlefield
situational awareness, engage the enemy, provide missile warning, and
protect and sustain our forces. For example, the Army is dependent on
the DOD's Defense Weather Satellite System capabilities to meet its
military weather forecasting requirements. The Army continuously works
with the Air Force to define our requirements in order to ensure future
warfighters have access to essential weather data. Most of these
services are so well integrated into weapon systems and support
processes that Soldiers are unaware of the space connection. This
seamless integration is due in large part to the coordination and
cooperation of space professionals at the Air Force Space Command,
STRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command for Space, the Navy, the
Army, and other Department of Defense (DOD) and joint agencies.
The Army's unrelenting dependency on space-based capabilities
requires active participation in defining space-related capability
needs. The identified needs serve to ensure necessary joint force
structure, systems, and concept of operations are developed and
acquired, thereby enabling the land force to conduct the full range of
military operations now and in the future.
Ensuring tactical and assured access to space is our focus--
reassuring the requisite capabilities and effects are delivered to the
tactical warfighter on time, every time demands that our space
capabilities and architectures become more resilient against attacks
and disruption. We must ensure that our Army does not face a day
without space and space-related capabilities.
the army's space policy and strategic plan
The Army Space Policy, most recently updated in 2009, focuses on
the operational and tactical needs of land forces and assigns space
related Army organizational responsibilities. It follows implemented
DOD space policies and procedures, reestablishes objectives for Army
space, and continues the Army Space Council. The Army's Space Policy
outlines four broad space related objectives:
To maximize the effectiveness of current space
capabilities in support of operational and tactical land
warfighting needs.
To influence the design, development, acquisition, and
concepts of operation of future space systems that enable and
enhance current and future land forces.
To advance the development and effective use of
responsive, timely, and assured joint interoperable space
capabilities.
To seamlessly integrate relevant space capabilities
into the operating force.
The Army recently drafted its Army Space Strategic Plan, which is
in final coordination with the Chief of Staff of the Army. This
document is shaped by national level guidance, such as the National
Space Policy and the National Security Space Strategy. The draft plan,
coupled with the Army's Space Policy, outlines the Army's space
enterprise path for strategic planning, programming, and resourcing.
The essence of our space strategy and the guiding vision of the
Army space enterprise are to assure access to resilient and relevant
space-enabled capabilities to ensure Army forces can conduct full
spectrum operations. To achieve this, our draft space strategy rests on
three tenets that link Army strategic planning and programming for
space to the guidance in national and DOD space policy and strategy.
The three essential tenets are:
To enable the Army's enduring mission by providing
requisite space-enabled capabilities to support current
operations, as well as future transformation efforts.
To leverage existing DOD, national, commercial, and
international space-based capabilities.
To pursue cross-domain solutions to create a resilient
architecture to mitigate threats, vulnerabilities, and assure
access to critical capabilities needed to sustain land force
operations.
the army--a provider of space capabilities
The Army is a provider of space capabilities. Historically, our
greatest investment in space capabilities has been in the ground
segment--the integration of space capabilities into operational forces
through command and control systems, communication terminals, and
intelligence feeds. However, due to the critical importance of space
capabilities, the Army has strengthened and broadened its investment to
include exploitation of national and strategic space capabilities,
defensive counterspace, leveraging the capabilities of space to enhance
missile defense systems, and training and development of space
professionals and space enablers.
In 2012, the Army plans to invest approximately $500 million in
pursuing space and space-related activities, evolving from a position
of simply exploiting strategic space-based capabilities to a position
where the Army is fully integrated into the planning, development, and
use of theater-focused operational and tactical space applications.
ASMDC/ARSTRAT is the Army's space proponent, and coordinates with
the Army Intelligence and Signal communities, STRATCOM, and other
members of the joint community to bring space-based capabilities to the
warfighter. ASMDC/ARSTRAT is at the forefront--providing trained and
ready space forces and capabilities to the combatant commanders and the
warfighter and building future space forces. Aside from delivering and
integrating space products and trained professionals to joint
warfighter operations, ASMDC/ARSTRAT also conducts space mission
related research and development activities. I would like to highlight
our space provider role within three core tasks: providing trained and
ready space forces and capabilities to the combatant commanders and the
warfighter; building future space forces; and researching, developing,
testing, and integrating future space capabilities.
Providing Trained and Ready Space Forces and Capabilities
Over 1,100 soldiers and civilians serving with ASMDC/ARSTRAT's 1st
Space Brigade provide access to products and services that are
essential in all phases of combat operations. The brigade's three
battalions, comprised of Active, National Guard, and Reserve soldiers,
support combatant commanders by providing satellite communications,
space operations, missile warning, and forward deployed space support
teams. These Space Operations Officers, along with members of the
Army's Space Cadre, directly influence the execution of strategic
operations in support of tactical level ground maneuver forces. Their
principal duties include planning, developing, resourcing, acquiring,
integrating, and operating space forces, systems, concepts,
applications, or capabilities in any element of the DOD space mission
areas.
During the 1990s, realizing the essential need of space
professionals, the Army created Functional Area (FA) 40--Space
Operations Officers--within our commissioned officer corps. ASMDC/
ARSTRAT is the Army's personnel developer for FA 40 officers. The
approximately 300 FA 40s serve in Army, joint, and DOD commands and
organizations across all echelons--tactical, operational, and
strategic. The Army's Space Cadre, initiated in 2007, is comprised of
both military and civilian personnel who represent the Army's interests
in space operations, policy, science and technology, and acquisition.
The Cadre consists of soldiers and civilians from a wide variety of
branches, career fields, disciplines, and functional areas.
As part of the DOD overarching effort, the Army has integrated
Space Operations Officers into the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
the Joint Staff, the Air Staff, the North American Aerospace Defense
Command, the Air Force Space Command, and other space focused
organizations and academic institutions. In each of these
organizations, personnel not only provide the Army perspective of space
related capabilities, they articulate requirements from an operational
standpoint in the joint and combined environments. A summary of the
critical space capabilities provided by Army's space professionals is
highlighted below.
Army Space Support Teams: During operations, including
those in Afghanistan and Iraq, the ASMDC/ARSTRAT's Army Space
Support Teams continuously provide space-based products and
services to combatant commanders and other international
government agencies. The teams are on-the-ground space experts,
pulling key commercial imagery, forecasting the impact of space
weather, and providing responsive space support to their units.
Just last month, 3 new teams deployed to theater to provide
their capabilities for the next 9 months--60 teams have now
provided invaluable on-the-ground responsive expertise to
combatant commanders and the warfighter in Afghanistan and
Iraq.
Satellite Communication Support Centers: ASMDC/ARSTRAT
provides and operates the DOD's Regional Satellite
Communications Support Centers and Wideband Satellite
Communications Operations Centers, located both in the United
States and overseas. These centers are the regional management
hubs for a majority of the DOD's satellite communications
capabilities, providing reliable and responsive support. In
close partnership with our Air Force and Navy partners, we
ensure essential communications lifelines are available to our
ground, air, and sea forces, as well as the diplomatic corps
around the world.
Friendly Force Tracking: Situational awareness is
particularly vital given the challenges of conducting
operations in urban areas. As the Army has the greatest number
of warfighters and systems to track on the battlefield, our
Friendly Force Tracking assets help deliver timely situational
awareness and identify friendly forces during combat. In
support of Operation Tomodachi, we provided the friendly force
tracking architecture that enabled the U.S. Forces Japan and
the U.S. Pacific Command to see its ground support elements via
a common operational picture.
Ballistic Missile Early Warning: Critical to the Joint
Force Commander's theater force protection, the Army provides
ballistic missile early warning and missile defense support
from within the theater or region. The 1st Space Brigade's
Joint Tactical Ground Stations (JTAGS) Detachments, operated by
Army personnel, monitor enemy missile launch activity and other
infrared events of interest and share the information with
members of the air and missile defense and operational
communities. Presently, our JTAGS Detachments are forward-
stationed across the globe, providing assured missile warning
to theater commanders and joint warfighters.
Geospatial Intelligence Support: The Army, as an
operational element of the National System for Geospatial-
Intelligence, provides geospatial intelligence production in
direct support of the combatant commands. The Army's space and
intelligence experts perform exploitation of a variety of
commercial, civil, and DOD imagery data derived from space and
airborne sources. Current support includes providing imagery to
U.S. Africa Command in support of contingency operations in
Libya, as well as imagery and exploitation products to U.S.
Pacific Command regarding the extent of damage to the Fukushima
nuclear power site in Japan. Additionally, they aid in the
exploration of emerging spectral system technologies and in
transitioning new capabilities to the warfighter.
Operations Reach-back Support and Services: The ASMDC/
ARSTRAT Operations Center, located at Peterson Air Force Base
in Colorado Springs, CO, provides reach-back support for our
space experts deployed throughout the operational force and
allows us to reduce our forward-deployed footprint. This center
maintains constant situational awareness of deployed elements,
continuously responds to requests for information, and provides
the essential reach-back system of connectivity with technical
subject matter experts.
Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities: The
Army Special Program Office is the Army focal point for the
exploitation of national intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance assets and products through the Tactical
Exploitation of National Capabilities program. The Army is
fully integrated into the National Reconnaissance Office and
the Intelligence Community and has numerous deployed units
providing support throughout the intelligence battalions and
brigades.
Strategic Space Surveillance: The Army also operates
facilities and assets that are of upmost importance to
advancing the Nation's use of space. The U.S. Army Kwajalein
Atoll/Reagan Test Site (RTS), located in the Marshall Islands,
is a national asset that provides unique capabilities to
monitor objects in deep space. The RTS maintains a vigilant
watch, providing critical space situational awareness and
contributing to a variety of missions.
Building Future Space Forces
The Army uses established and emerging processes to document its
space-based needs and pursue Army and joint validation of its
requirements. This disciplined approach helps ensure limited resources
are applied where warfighter operational utility can be most
effectively served. We continue to pursue and develop the necessary
adaptability across the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel,
Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) to
mitigate threats and vulnerabilities while sustaining land force
operations. Within the DOTMLPF combat development arena, the Army has
focused tremendous efforts on the development of our space
professionals. For example, the Army Space Personnel Development Office
develops policies, procedures, and metrics for the Army Space Cadre and
executes the life-cycle management functions of FA 40 Space Operations
Officers ensuring the Army has trained personnel to meet national
security space needs. Without well-trained and motivated Army soldiers
and civilians, we cannot maintain our advantage on the battlefield that
our Nation's space superiority affords us.
To properly train space professionals, the Army developed the Space
Operations Officer Qualification Course and the Army Space Cadre Basic
Course. These two courses provide the necessary foundation for the
Space Cadre. The Army also leverages the high-quality space training
developed and administrated by the Air Force. Finally, numerous space
officers complete additional post-graduate studies at the Naval
Postgraduate School, accredited civilian institutions, and training
with industry. The Army is committed to growing, training, developing,
tutoring, and advancing space professionals.
Researching, Developing, Testing, and Integrating Future Space
Capabilities
The Army is an instrumental joint partner in addressing tomorrow's
space requirements to ensure land warfare dominance. Each year, the
Army plans and programs funding for space related technology research
and development. Despite the current and projected resource constrained
environment, the Army recognizes the need to prioritize, leverage, and
invest in promising space research and development technologies. I
would like to briefly highlight three technology endeavors that have
potential to provide space support to the ground warfighter.
Space and Missile Defense Command--Operational
Nanosatellite Effect: To achieve enhanced capabilities for the
warfighter from space, an approach that holds great promise is
the deployment of constellations of very small satellites into
low earth orbit. The Space and Missile Defense Command-
Operational Nanosatellite Effect is an initiative to meet
specific Army space related operational needs via the use of
nanosatellites. The Army recently built eight, nine-pound
satellites for use in a technology demonstration. The first of
these nanosatellites was placed into low earth orbit last
December. This marked the first launch of an Army designed and
manufactured satellite in more than 50 years. The primary
objective was to receive data from a ground transmitter and
relay that data to a ground station. The demonstration was
successful and offers evidence that the means may be available
to provide the Army--the largest user of space data--with an
ability to economically provide non-line of sight sensor data
from non-permissive environments to remote located soldiers.
Kestrel Eye: Kestrel Eye is an Army endeavor to
manufacture a small imaging satellite that will provide near
real-time, medium resolution imagery to the tactical
warfighter. Since its manufacturing costs will be relatively
inexpensive, Kestrel Eye may have the ability to be robustly
deployed into orbit, providing a potential solution to present
existing imagery needs to tactical forces. The satellite is
designed for operational theater command capabilities,
providing dedicated space-based support to the tactical
commander. Kestrel Eye is scheduled for its initial launch in
2012.
Vertical/Horizontal Integration of Space Technologies
and Applications: We are successfully progressing in a
technology demonstration to integrate space-based data into our
ground forces at the tactical level. The Vertical/Horizontal
Integration of Space Technologies and Applications (VISTA)
provides the capability to seamlessly distribute relevant space
developed products and services to all levels of Army battle
command--from corps and theater needs to the specific needs of
individual warfighters. The capability to identify what
specific pieces of space-developed information are relevant to
individual warfighters is a key component of VISTA's support
capability.
conclusion
The Army is dependent upon the capabilities that space brings to
the battlefield--space is the ultimate high ground. Space capabilities
continue to be inextricably linked to warfighting. In present and
future conflicts, we rely on and advocate for space products and
services provided by the DOD, other government agencies, our allies and
coalition partners, and commercial entities to shoot, move, and
communicate. The Army will continue to provide trained and ready space
forces and capabilities to the combatant commanders and the warfighter,
build future space forces, and research, develop, test, and integrate
future space capabilities. Fully integrated capabilities will provide
depth, persistence, and reach capabilities for commanders at the
strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Assured space systems and
well-trained and experienced space professionals significantly reduce
the fog, friction, and uncertainty of warfare. The Army depends on
space for everything we do in our military operations. This committee's
continued support is essential in enabling us to maintain and further
improve our space capabilities and provide the best-trained space
professionals to combatant commanders. The courageous warfighters that
serve to protect the safety and welfare of our Nation deserve nothing
less.
I appreciate having the opportunity to speak on these important
matters and look forward to addressing any questions you or the other
committee members may have. Secure the High Ground and Army Strong!
Senator Nelson. Senator Sessions, what we've done is we've
started the 2-minute comments summarizing their testimonies. We
have three more, so then we're open for your opening comments.
Admiral Titley.
STATEMENT OF RADM DAVID W. TITLEY, USN, OCEANOGRAPHER AND
NAVIGATOR OF THE NAVY, DIRECTOR, MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS AND
SPACE
Admiral Titley. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Sessions. I'm honored to appear before you today on behalf of
our Nation's sailors to address your Navy's space activities.
The Navy is critically dependent on space to meet our maritime
strategy's demands for a flexible, interoperable, and secure
global communications capability to support the command and
control requirements of highly mobile, geographically
dispersed, U.S., joint, and coalition forces.
Our Navy's interests in space include communications, ISR,
positioning, navigation, timing, missile warning, and
meteorology and oceanography capabilities.
The Navy expects the demand for space capabilities to grow
in the future, especially in the area of space communications.
Our major space contribution to the joint community is the UHF
narrowband SATCOM constellation. Beginning in 2012, the new
system, MUOS, will begin to replace those legacy UHF systems.
Timely delivery of MUOS is a high priority for the Navy and
our fiscal year 2012 budget submission continues our investment
in this vital warfighting capability.
In closing, sir, I would like to reiterate that space
capabilities will continue to be critical to our Nation's
success in the maritime domain. As the recently-signed Navy
space strategy states: ``Space provides the ultimate crow's
nest for maritime operations.''
Thank you, sir, and I look forward to answering any
questions you or Senator Sessions may have.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
General Hyten and then General Shelton.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. JOHN E. HYTEN, USAF, DIRECTOR, SPACE
PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
FOR ACQUISITION
General Hyten. Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, it's an
honor for me to be here today representing the thousands of men
and women involved in the Air Force space acquisition business.
It is undeniable that the Air Force has experienced significant
challenges controlling cost, schedule, and performance in our
space acquisition programs over the last decade. We acknowledge
this and we understand that we must improve our acquisition
practices to both continue to deliver the critical capabilities
our warfighters need while at the same time achieving better
value for the taxpayers. Mission assurance remains fundamental
to what we do, but not at any cost.
We believe we've taken important steps to recapture space
acquisition excellence. We are finally finishing the
development phase of many of our programs, delivering new
capabilities, and moving into more stable production. We are
placing new and additional emphasis on efficient space
procurement that includes new acquisition strategies for
acquiring space and launch vehicles included in our fiscal year
2012 budget submission.
We are working to stabilize funding requirements and
personnel to ensure programs are more affordable, executable,
and delivered as planned. This is hard work and it's going to
take time for these changes to have measurable impact on
performance. Nonetheless, we're confident that the space
acquisition community is moving in the right direction and
creating a fundamentally different space acquisition culture.
Again, let me express my thanks and appreciation to the
members and staff of this subcommittee for your continued and
dedicated support of our space capabilities. More importantly,
thanks to our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. I also
look forward to answering your questions, sir. Thank you very
much.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, General.
[The prepared statement of General Hyten follows:]
Prepared Statement by Maj. Gen. John E. Hyten, USAF
i. introduction
Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, distinguished members of the
subcommittee; I'm honored to be in front of you to discuss a
challenging but exciting topic: space acquisition. I'm also honored to
be with these leaders of the National Security Space Enterprise
including members of other Services, displaying the inherent joint
nature of space. This subcommittee oversees some of the most important
aspects of our national security--nuclear weapons, ballistic missile
defense, and our space programs. I want to thank you for everything
that you do for our airmen and, specifically, our space cadre.
ii. challenges in space acquisition
It is well documented that the Air Force has experienced
significant challenges controlling cost, schedule, and performance of
space acquisition programs over the last decade. We were often
criticized for ``over reaching'' on space programs. The developmental
systems promised giant single-step leaps in technology, but often over
ran program budgets and failed to meet requirements in a timely manner.
I acknowledge these challenges as areas where the Air Force needs to
improve our acquisition practices to deliver better capabilities to the
warfighter while achieving better value for the taxpayer. We have not
ignored these challenges; rather, we have taken important steps to
recapture space acquisition excellence.
Over the last year, the Air Force made both structural and
strategic changes improving space acquisition. Structurally, my Space
Directorate was recently moved back under the Air Force Assistant
Secretary for Acquisition better aligning space acquisition policies
and programs with those of the greater Air Force. This move
consolidates all Air Force programs under one Service Acquisition
Executive providing better oversight of the full Air Force acquisition
portfolio. The new organization also optimizes total obligation
authority and allows greater funding flexibility to manage all Air
Force systems. Air Force acquisition can now provide an integrated,
balanced Service position toward our investments in weapon systems
acquisitions.
In addition, we are placing new and additional emphasis on
Efficient Space Procurement that includes new acquisition strategies
for acquiring space and launch vehicles in the fiscal year 2012 PB. One
element, the Evolutionary Acquisition for Space Efficiency (EASE)
approach for procuring satellites employs the following key tenets:
block buys of satellites, fixed-price contracting, stable research and
development investment, and a modified full funding approach. Block
buys and fixed-price contracts are key tenets to bring satellite unit
costs down and reinvest realized savings in research and development
for next generation capabilities. The modified funding approach enables
affordability of the block buys by funding the satellite procurement
over multiple years--specifically, under EASE, we plan to fully fund
our satellite procurements by using advance appropriations. The Air
Force envisions implementing the EASE approach to drive down costs,
improve stability in the fragile space industrial base, and invest in
advanced technology development and critical capabilities to lower risk
for future programs. We appreciate the dialogue we've already had with
your staff on EASE and look forward to working with the committee
further, as needed.
The National Security Space enterprise couldn't reach space without
our reliable launch capability. The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
(EELV) launch systems have a record of unparalleled success since the
first launch in 2002. The Air Force recently completed the 40th
consecutive successful launch of EELV, demonstrating our continuing
commitment to assured access to space. In a separate and distinct
acquisition strategy, the Air Force is proposing a block buy approach
for the EELV program. If approved, the National Security Space
enterprise would commit to block buys of at least eight launch vehicle
cores per year to stabilize launch industrial base production rates and
control launch cost. We will also support competition from vendors with
proven capabilities. Our revised EELV acquisition strategy will include
a new entrant approach that we are coordinating with the National
Reconnaissance Office and National Aeronautics and Space
Administration. Future competition could further drive cost savings and
enhance the domestic industrial base and our operational flexibility.
However, we must still closely scrutinize mission assurance practices
to ensure we are safely and reliably getting our valuable space assets
to orbit.
In both strategies, the Air Force is working to stabilize funding,
requirements, and personnel to ensure programs are more affordable,
executable, and delivered as planned. Again, we want to attain better
capabilities for the warfighter while achieving better value for the
taxpayer.
iii. completed development and launch of space systems
Despite the challenges encountered in space program development,
our resilient workforce has persevered ensuring the warfighter receives
greater capability in key mission areas. Over the past year, we have
completed development of essential, first-of-their-generation systems.
Just last week, we achieved the launch of the first Space Based
Infrared System (SBIRS) Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) satellite to
enhance our Overhead Persistent Infrared capability. The SBIRS GEO
system will provide improved infrared capabilities with a faster
revisit scanning rate and greater sensitivity than the legacy Defense
Support Program system. Moreover, with a taskable staring capability,
it will provide higher fidelity and persistent coverage for areas of
interest.
Last September, we launched the Space-Based Space Surveillance
(SBSS) Block 10 system to enhance awareness of deep space objects of
interest for safety of flight, threat detection, and warning. SBSS
Block 10 significantly improves the timeliness of data on space objects
in transit to deep space orbits. This satellite is currently in
operation and is exceeding performance expectations, demonstrating
excellent focus, high stability, and superb photometric sensitivity.
This past August, the Air Force launched the first Advanced
Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite. While we encountered initial
issues with the propulsion system, the team revised the orbit-raising
plan and has been successful in executing this plan to achieve the
required on-orbit design life. The AEHF team's dedication and resolve
is a testament to government and industry space team cooperation. AEHF
satellites accommodate ten times the throughput and greater than five
times the data rate of the current Military Strategic and Tactical
Relay II Satellite Communication System.
Finally, in May 2010, we launched the first of 12 Global
Positioning Satellite (GPS) IIF satellites that will broadcast a third
civil signal, in addition to legacy signals provided. These satellites
will sustain a healthy, but aging, GPS constellation providing
ubiquitous position, navigation, and timing capabilities for military
and civil users.
iv. modernizing our mission areas
While the Air Force provides new space capability for the joint
warfighter today, we are keeping an eye on the needs of the future and
developing the next generation systems to meet those requirements. For
example, the GPS III program is progressing on schedule to deliver the
first IIIA satellite in 2014. The next generation of GPS will deliver
significant enhancements including better anti-jam capabilities, a
Galileo-compatible L1C civil signal, and improved accuracy,
availability and integrity. The GPS IIIA program received its Milestone
C approval in January 2011, following a very successful Critical Design
Review--2 months ahead of schedule. The program office is also
advancing the Next Generation Control Segment and Military GPS User
Equipment programs.
Regarding defense space weather, the DOD approved a plan to modify
the existing National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System contract to procure two Defense Weather Satellite
System spacecraft for the early-morning orbit, with the first launch
planned for 2018. This system will replace the Defense Meteorological
Satellite Program in the early-morning orbit, ensuring continuity of
detailed overhead weather imagery and sensing information.
In the space situational awareness mission area, the Air Force
awarded two Space Fence contracts early in 2011 for Phase A development
leading to a Preliminary Design Review in early 2012. Ultimately, the
Space Fence will replace the Air Force Space Surveillance System, which
is rapidly becoming unsustainable. The two ground-based radar sites
comprising the Space Fence will provide timely information on launch
detection, maneuvers and breakups to support protection of space
assets. We are also seeking international cooperation on the Space
Fence program through establishment of a space situational awareness
(SSA) partnership with Australia to jointly employ and operate a site
in Australia. This partnership will establish a foundation for
continuing nation-to-nation cooperation.
Similar to efforts on the Space Fence program, the Air Force is
taking steps on international partnerships in our Wideband Global
SATCOM (WGS). In addition to providing critical communications
capabilities, WGS has also become the keystone for international
cooperation measures in space, with our Australian allies funding WGS-6
in return for a portion of the overall bandwidth. In accordance with
the National Security Space Strategy, the Air Force is pursuing other
international agreements to further expand space-based communication
capability through the procurement of a ninth WGS satellite.
Finally, as discussed earlier, we are proposing the EASE strategy
for procurement of AEHF satellites five and six in fiscal year 2012 and
SBIRS GEO satellites five and six in fiscal year 2013. These
procurements will enhance our protected communications and overhead
persistent infrared mission areas, respectively.
v. fundamentally changing the way we do business
To effectively modernize our space systems, the Air Force must
fundamentally change the way we do business in space acquisition and
incorporate these changes into our strategies going forward. We have
already made adjustments by adopting a ``Back to Basics'' approach to
space system procurement, which ensures more rigorous systems
engineering and program management enacted early in development and
maintained throughout its lifecycle. ``Back to Basics'' focuses on:
mission success through clear and achievable requirements; disciplined
systems engineering; proven technology; and appropriate resourcing. The
Air Force has also implemented the Acquisition Improvement Plan to
establish an experienced, skilled, empowered, and accountable
workforce, and ensure proper requirements and adequate and stable
funding. Improvement of acquisition processes and training of our
personnel is essential to the success of space system development.
As we incorporate these changes, it is critical that space
acquisition professionals gain a better understanding of the business
principles behind system development and procurement. Mission assurance
is fundamental, but not at any cost. Not only do we have a
responsibility to the warfighter in achieving better capability, we
also have an equal responsibility to the taxpayer in achieving better
value. Striking that balance is essential to acquiring affordable
systems for the future. These fundamental shifts in acquisition
perspective require a considerable culture change in our space
acquisition workforce. It will take time for these changes to have
measured impact on performance, but I'm confident the space acquisition
community is moving in the right direction.
vi. conclusion
The Air Force has been, and continues to be, committed to achieving
excellence in space acquisitions. Our effort in refining acquisition
practices and proposing efficiency initiatives coupled with our work to
modernize and recapitalize the space inventory exemplifies our
dedication to supporting the Nation's national security space
objectives. The Air Force fiscal year 2012 budget reflects that
commitment as we seek to maintain critical space capabilities for our
Nation and our warfighters.
I am grateful for the continued and dedicated support of the space
capabilities we provide for this Nation and the service of each member
of this committee. I look forward to answering your questions.
STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM L. SHELTON, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR
FORCE SPACE COMMAND
General Shelton. Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions, it's a
true honor for me to appear before you today as the Commander
of AFSPC. I'm also honored to appear with these distinguished
witnesses, and I'd like to also publicly congratulate Susan
Helms on her induction into the Astronaut Hall of Fame. Her
people launched SBIRS last Saturday and then shortly after that
she was inducted into the Hall of Fame, so all around not a bad
Saturday for the Helms household. I'm fortunate to have this
talented officer and role model in my command.
In AFSPC, I am privileged to lead over 46,000 Active Duty,
Guard, and Reserve airmen, government civilians, and
contractors who deliver space and cyberspace capabilities
around the world for our Nation. AFSPC space and cyberspace
capabilities are integral to the joint fight. Our professionals
work extremely hard to continually ensure excellence and
mission success in global combat as well as humanitarian
operations, ranging from Afghanistan and Libya to Japan.
I thank the committee for your continued and steadfast
support of AFSPC and the capabilities we provide for this
Nation. I look forward to your questions. Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Shelton follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. William L. Shelton, USAF
introduction
Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, it is my honor to appear before you today as the
Commander of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC).
I am privileged to lead over 46,000 Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve
airmen; government civilians; and contractors delivering space and
cyberspace capabilities around the world for our Nation. The men and
women of AFSPC accomplish our mission at 84 worldwide locations, yet we
operate in domains where borders are often indiscernible. AFSPC space
and cyberspace capabilities are integral to the Joint fight and our
professionals continually ensure excellence and mission success.
Based on the unique responsibilities of the Command, I have
established three priorities. First, AFSPC must support the Joint
fight. We are focused on supporting our deployed compatriots with our
best efforts, and we will not fail them. Second, we must address space
system costs and deliver capabilities on time and on budget. In a very
constrained budget environment, it is essential that we drive down
costs to maximize our buying power. Finally, for the purposes of
organizing, training and equipping, we must operationalize and
normalize cyberspace to conduct Air Force operations. Cyberspace cuts
across the spectrum of military operations; therefore, it is imperative
that Airmen understand the special requirements and operational
considerations of cyberspace. As the lead Air Force Major Command for
cyberspace, we will continue to work with other Major Commands to
ensure we have the same level of rigor which has served the Air Force
well in air and space.
I look forward to a strong and mutually supportive working
relationship with the subcommittee as we seek to deliver critical space
and cyberspace capability to our forces. Likewise, I am committed to
working with our space and cyberspace partners, including U.S.
Strategic Command (STRATCOM), U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA), to advance our collective interests.
moral obligation to support the joint fight
I strongly believe we have a moral obligation to do everything in
our power to provide outstanding support to our brothers and sisters in
arms who are in harm's way. Whatever we can do operationally, whatever
we can procure that would make their task easier and bring them home
safely, we will pursue. In that vein, AFSPC has many capabilities which
are central to today's fight, and we are posturing these systems to be
even more capable in the future. The President's fiscal year 2012
budget requests $12.1 billion for AFSPC to field and operate vital
space systems and critical cyberspace capabilities.
Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT)
As stewards of the world's ``gold standard'' for PNT information,
AFSPC is significantly improving the Global Positioning System (GPS)
for military and civilian users alike. This past January, we completed
the first of a two-phased operation called ``Expandable 24,'' the
largest satellite repositioning effort in GPS program history. This
operation was planned and executed under the outstanding leadership of
Lieutenant Colonel Mike Manor, Captain Dan Highlander, and Captain
Blake Hajovsky of the second Space Operations Squadron (SOPS) at
Schriever Air Force Base (AFB), CO. Each phase repositions three
satellites to optimize terrestrial coverage of the constellation for
terrain-challenged environments, such as cities and the mountains and
valleys of Afghanistan.
The second and final phase of this operation is already underway
and it is scheduled for completion this summer.
The fiscal year 2012 budget request of $1.7 billion (Operations and
Maintenance [O&M]; Research, Development, Test and Engineering [RDT&E];
Procurement; and Military Personnel [MILPERS]) also will advance PNT
capability by procuring and launching upgraded satellites (GPS IIF and
GPS III), funding a significant upgrade to the operational control
segment (OCX) and building new Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE). GPS
III, OCX and MGUE will improve user collaboration, incorporate an
effects-based approach to operations and establish a net-centric ground
architecture, thereby accelerating the mission application of
positioning and timing information.
Last May, AFSPC launched the first of 12 GPS IIF satellites, which
provides improved timing technology, a more jam-resistant military
signal and a higher-powered civilian signal. Captains Vivian Elmo and
Linda Gostomski, both from our GPS Reserve Associate Unit, 19 SOPS,
Schriever AFB, CO, led the way as integrators of contractor, booster,
satellite vehicle and ground network teams to ensure a successful
launch and on-orbit checkout of this new capability.
Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM)
The demand for satellite communications continues to grow as
warfighters increasingly depend on information relayed from space,
especially for today's distributed operations in this era of
information-enabled warfare. This past June, the first block of
Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) satellites became fully operational with
the acceptance of WGS-3. Launches of the next block of WGS satellites
(4-6) are planned for 2011-2013, with funding for WGS-6 coming from
Australia. This partnership is an example of the international
cooperation envisioned in the National Space Policy and National
Security Space Strategy. The fiscal year 2012 request includes $481.5
million (RDT&E and Procurement) for WGS to meet combatant commander
requirements to deliver voice, data, and imagery, as well as full
motion video from Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA).
The first satellite in the next generation of protected and
survivable MILSATCOM, our Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
satellite, was launched last August. Compared to its predecessor,
Milstar, AEHF will soon provide a 10-fold throughput increase in
secure, jam-resistant communications for national leaders and combatant
commanders, as well as support for our international partners including
Canada, the Netherlands, and United Kingdom.
While the launch was perfect, a spacecraft propulsion system
anomaly left AEHF-1 well short of its intended geosynchronous (GEO)
orbit. A team of experts from the Space and Missile Systems Center
(SMC), led by Lieutenant General Tom Sheridan and Mr. Dave Madden,
developed a plan to innovatively use the remaining much smaller
thrusters to save this vital asset. The team worked around the clock
addressing the immediate need to conserve fuel, developing the recovery
plan and demonstrating the recovery could be done safely and
effectively. Thanks to the outstanding engineering and hard work of
these space professionals, the AEHF-1 orbit is progressing toward
geosynchronous altitude and we expect to begin initial testing later
this year. The budget includes $974.5 million (RDT&E and Procurement)
in fiscal year 2012 to fund AEHF.
Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR)
Data from the legacy Defense Support Program (DSP), as well as the
highly elliptical orbit (HEO)-based Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
sensors, provides real-time missile warning and missile defense
information to national decisionmakers and commanders. Last year, we
provided the U.S., coalition members and our allies assured warning for
over 200 missile launches and 4,500 special infrared (IR) events, a 150
percent increase over 2009. This is due, in part, to the vastly
improved battlespace awareness capability of the latest HEO payloads.
To further assist Geographic Combatant Commanders, and in cooperation
with STRATCOM, we substantially improved our missile warning reporting
criteria, thanks to the herculean efforts of Captain Christopher
Castle, First Lieutenant Michael Mariner and Technical Sergeant Michael
Johns of the 2d Space Warning Squadron, Buckley AFB, CO. This new
criteria will provide more timely and accurate warning information to
our entire force.
The 40th anniversary of the DSP was celebrated in 2010. This
constellation provides outstanding service to the Nation and Captains
Barry Croker and Zach Lehmann are creatively finding ways to extend the
lives of these satellites. They led a team of professionals who have
developed a series of new system procedures to wring every last drop of
capability from these assets. The team's actions already are credited
with forestalling disposal of one of these valuable satellites.
While DSP has a long history of proven strategic, operational and
tactical value, we are entering the era of SBIRS GEO, the replacement
for DSP. Each SBIRS GEO has a staring infrared sensor to allow
detection of dimmer, faster burning missiles and more accurate missile
launch and impact point predictions, as well as a scanning sensor that
covers an entire hemisphere in its field of view. The fiscal year 2012
budget request includes $1.22 billion (O&M, RDT&E, Procurement and
MILPERS) to continue the development of additional OPIR capability.
Operationally Responsive Space
The Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) philosophy seeks to
rapidly deliver warfighter-demanded capability at reduced cost through
innovative acquisition approaches with shorter timelines. Last June,
TacSat-3, a hyperspectral imaging satellite, transitioned from an Air
Force Research Lab experiment to a warfighter-taskable, Department of
Defense (DOD)-operated, system in support of Combatant Commands
(COCOMs) worldwide. TacSat-3 support of the Haitian earthquake recovery
efforts and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill demonstrated the value of
hyperspectral imagery, and it is now being used by COCOMs to support
daily operations. Leading these efforts is Lieutenant Colonel Darren
Johnson, from the Headquarters AFSPC ORS Division, who deployed to
Afghanistan as Chief, International Security Assistance Force Space
Operations. His experience with TacSat-3 expedited theater usage of
this unique space-based imager for improved location and targeting of
threats to coalition forces in harm's way.
The next ORS satellite on the horizon, currently scheduled to
launch later this spring, is ORS-1 which will support U.S. Central
Command's (CENTCOM) multispectral imagery needs. The fiscal year 2012
budget request includes $86.5 million (RDT&E) to develop these ORS
systems.
Weather
As part of the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System (NPOESS) restructure, AFSPC will support Joint forces
by developing the Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS), a fiscal
year 2012 request of $444.9 million (RDT&E). The acquisition of DWSS
will maximize NPOESS-developed capabilities to best preserve program
schedules and reduce costs. DWSS will replace the military's weather
workhorse, the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), now in
its sixth decade. We will continue to leverage longstanding
partnerships with the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and NASA as we develop the morning
orbit satellite to accompany their Joint Polar Satellite System's
afternoon orbit satellite, on which both defense and civil users rely.
Currently, DMSP is operated at the NOAA Satellite Operations
Facility in Maryland with a backup control station operated by 6 SOPS,
a Reserve unit at Schriever AFB, CO. This blended partnership works
well for all parties. As an example, in January, an emergency situation
at NOAA required activation of the backup unit. Within an hour, Major
Jeremy Edwards and his crew--on hot standby--mobilized and assumed full
command of all DMSP satellites, continuing delivery of critical
environmental intelligence information to worldwide forces.
Space--Contested, Congested, and Competitive.
Space Situational Awareness (SSA)
As the National Security Space Strategy states, ``space is becoming
increasingly contested, congested and competitive.'' In light of these
challenges to the space domain, we must maintain adequate resiliency of
space capabilities to ensure space-based information delivery and
access for Joint forces and allies. Foundational to our ability to
``operate through'' the growing threats is SSA, which is enabled by the
fusion of Space Surveillance Network (SSN) sensor information at the
Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC). Behind the scenes providing this
capability daily are Space Event Duty Technicians, like Staff Sergeant
Adrian Cervantes, ensuring the accuracy of the SSA data by working
closely with fellow space, cyber and intelligence operators. In 2010,
the JSpOC routinely tracked over 22,000 space objects, an approximately
10 percent increase in objects from the previous year. Each week JSpOC
conducts over 7,000 space object conjunction (collision potential)
screenings which are critically important to the 23 commercial and
agency partners in the SSA Sharing Program. Last year, there were 126
collision avoidance maneuvers, a 180 percent increase over 2009, the
year of the very unfortunate Cosmos and Iridium satellite collision.
Our ability to maintain leadership in SSA depends on SSN
modernization and adding increased SSA capability to track smaller
objects, increase timeliness of revisit rates and mitigate coverage
gaps. Replacing the Air Force Space Surveillance System, which employs
a 1960's era Very High Frequency radar, is important to this overall
objective. The Space Fence and its S-band radar capability will
significantly aid the detection of smaller objects and provide uncued
tracking of space objects.
Last September, the first operational launch of a Minotaur IV
delivered the Space Based Surveillance System to orbit, the first
dedicated on-orbit SSA satellite, which provides us the capability to
track an object, day or night, without weather interference. The
satellite's first image was taken in October by a team of SMC, one SOPS
and seven SOPS (Reserve Associate Unit) personnel as part of planned
calibration and characterization activities, and the initial data is
superb. Another new potential SSN contributor is the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency's (DARPA) Space Surveillance Telescope (SST),
based in New Mexico, which is currently undergoing extensive testing.
SST has the potential to provide AFSPC with new capability to detect
and track faint space objects at geosynchronous distance.
Foundational to all the space surveillance architecture
improvements is ensuring that we have the processing and data fusion
capabilities to conduct SSA. The JSpOC Mission System, with a fiscal
year 2012 budget request of $122.1 million (O&M, RDT&E, and
Procurement) will replace legacy technology with improved data
processing, integration, visualization and exploitation capabilities.
Without the capability to receive, process, fuse, and exploit the data
we receive from SSA sources, we will not meet the challenges of an
increasingly congested and contested space environment.
Space Protection Program (SPP)
SPP continues to inform the national space community by raising
awareness of space threats and system vulnerabilities, as well as
identifying material and non-material solutions to mitigate those
threats. The Air Force's fiscal year 2012 budget request is for $9.8
million (RDT&E) to continue this work to gain architectural insights
for the future. Through several analytical studies, SPP provided AFSPC
and NRO leadership significant recommendations and mitigation options
to protect space assets. For instance, Lieutenant Colonel Gary Samson
led an analysis and software demonstration activity which illustrated
how some immediate operational changes could reduce the effects of
known threats and regain reconnaissance mission capability. Another
study, led by Lieutenant Colonel Dan Bates, provided several
recommendations to sustain PNT capabilities in a contested environment.
SPP's analytical work also supports real world events, exercises and
wargames. Finally, SPP supports national efforts to develop policy,
strategy and architecture options across the national security space
community.
Schriever Wargame 2010
The Schriever Wargame series generates leadership insights in
contested space and cyberspace environments. The most recent iteration,
Schriever Wargame 2010, brought together military and civilian experts
from more than 30 government agencies. Under the leadership of
Lieutenant Colonel Joe Wurmstein, Headquarters AFSPC Wargaming Branch
Chief, and Major Jim Pedersen, the Game Director, this version focused
on space and cyber deterrence, escalation control, response options,
policy, planning, and national command relationships and authorities.
The wargame featured expanded international and industry participation,
including Australia, Canada, Great Britain, a North Atlantic Treaty
Organization observer cell and cyber industry representation. As AFSPC
prepares for the next iteration in 2012, we will use a comprehensive
approach to gain additional insights, integrating instruments of
national power to deter, prevent, and contain conflict.
Space Innovation and Development Center
The SIDC, as the name implies, is our center for space and cyber
innovation. Among other responsibilities, it is home to the Air Force
Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities, which works to deliver
game-changing increases in capability for the joint fight. Other Space
Innovation and Development Center (SIDC) projects include on-demand
commercial Synthetic Aperture Radar distribution to warfighters,
distribution of fifth generation aircraft data into legacy fighter
aircraft and C2 platforms, and a prototype Data Integration and Fusion
Center (DIFC) capable of providing a robust common operating picture to
COCOM decision-makers by fusing multiple sources of non-traditional and
national level information.
X-37B
Several AFSPC organizations supported DOD's first-ever operational
space plane mission, the X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle (OTV). Through
lessons learned from the first flight, the SIDC's 3rd Space
Experimentation Squadron has identified concepts of employment,
training, education and technical skill sets required for future X-37B
operations. Also crucial to this success was First Lieutenant Gordon
Barnhill of the 45th Launch Support Squadron at Patrick AFB, FL, who
was the launch site's lead engineer and developer of ground-breaking
procedures for the launch and landing of this unique space plane.
Additionally, the Western Range Team at Vandenberg AFB, CA, developed
and tested new procedures for X-37B pre-recovery operations. Mr. Dennis
Pakulski, the Chief Mission Engineer, applied both ingenuity and
experience to replace 658 steel runway plates that posed a danger to
the X-37's landing gear. Captain Dariusz Wudarzewski, the Range
Operations Commander, led more than 250 landing team members and
provided the complex final recommendation for ``clear to land'' for the
safe return of the OTV after nearly 8 months of successful on-orbit
operations. The second launch of the X-37B took place March 5.
Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN)
The AFSCN is our capability to receive mission data and control
many of our Nation's satellites. In fiscal year 2010, the AFSCN
conducted over 150,000 satellite contacts, supported 21 launches and 39
vehicle emergencies. The fiscal year 2012 budget requests $328 million
(O&M, RDT&E and Procurement) for AFSCN. The AFSCN recently underwent a
major upgrade, replacing decades-old communication and switching
equipment, and upgrading communication circuits to handle Internet
Protocol traffic. Considerable downtime over a 4-day period was
required to make these changes. First Lieutenant David Rothzeid of
SMC's Satellite Control and Network Systems Division orchestrated the
outages site-by-site, working with multiple organizations and
contractors to ensure the network could maintain its average 450 per
day satellite contact rate during the transition.
Electromagnetic Spectrum Management
In 2010, the Air Force Frequency Management Agency, Alexandria, VA,
was redesignated the Air Force Spectrum Management Office (AFSMO) to
better reflect the broader responsibilities of that organization.
Colonel Brian Jordan, the AFSMO Commander, is the strategic thinker and
visionary dealing with the difficult challenges that accompany
preserving access for essential Air Force capabilities. The backbone of
information flow is the electromagnetic spectrum which is the common
link among networks, sensors, weapon systems, commanders and combat
forces. In the Presidential Memorandum, Unleashing the Wireless
Broadband Revolution, issued on June 28, 2010, Federal agencies were
directed to cooperate in the effort to locate 500 megahertz of Federal
and non-Federal spectrum suitable for wireless broadband use. As a
result of the memorandum and at the direction of the Department of
Commerce's National Telecommunications and Information Administration,
AFSMO will lead the Air Force's evaluation of the 1755-1850 megahertz
spectrum sought by wireless companies to determine if it can be made
available without harming critical capabilities.
This spectrum is used by a wide array of critical Air Force
systems, including precision guided munitions, airborne telemetry
systems, RPAs and the C2 of numerous satellite systems, including GPS.
As the Air Force designs, tests and deploys new or modified systems,
spectrum management is of paramount importance to supporting the joint
fight.
Silent Sentry
Since 2005, Operation Silent Sentry, a capability initially
designed for a 120-day demonstration, has provided CENTCOM with
spectrum monitoring for electromagnetic interference (EMI) of satellite
communications in the AOR. Spearheaded by personnel from the 16th Space
Control Squadron (SPCS), Peterson AFB, CO, and its collocated Reserve
Associate 380 SPCS, this nine-person team is instrumental in detecting
and geo-locating sources of EMI events--both intentional and
unintentional--including monitoring of RPA satellite links used for C2
and mission data. The current deployment team is led by Lieutenant
Colonel Blake Jeffries (16 SPCS) and Master Sergeant Scott Westfall
(380 SPCS).
In-Theater Space Professionals
Many of our space professionals have deployed to critical positions
in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) to ensure timely space
support is available to the warfighter. Included in this group is the
Director of Space Forces (DIRSPACEFOR). The DIRSPACEFOR, currently
Colonel Dave Buck, brings senior-level space perspective and harnesses
the expertise of our mid-level space professionals who are integrated
in theater units, directly supporting Joint and coalition forces.
Additionally, the DIRSPACEFOR reaches back to the Joint Functional
Component Command for Space and the JSpOC at Vandenberg AFB, CA, for
access to all DOD space forces.
Captains Aaron Cochran and Peter Norsky are just two examples of
these mid-level theater space professionals, in this case assigned to
the 504th Expeditionary Air Support Operations Group. They provide
critical forward-based space expertise enabling integration of space
capabilities into air and ground operations in Kandahar and Mazar-e-
Sharif, Afghanistan. Their presence allows expert knowledge transfer to
tactical users, including Army brigades and battalions, Joint Terminal
Attack Controllers and other battlespace owners.
Space and Cyberspace Capabilities at Red Flag
Another milestone for AFSPC is tactical level integration of space
and cyber capabilities with traditional air capabilities at the Air
Force's premier training exercise, Red Flag, held at Nellis AFB, NV.
Recently, a space officer was designated the overall mission commander
during one of the exercise days--a Red Flag first. Captain Warren
Riner, 76th SPCS, Peterson AFB, CO, led a multi-faceted air, space and
cyberspace force, which highlighted the diverse, yet synergistic,
mission capabilities of the Air Force. Captain Riner's team was also
responsible for all air, space and cyberspace nonkinetic capability
integration during all exercise missions. I believe this is the future
of our force: seamless integration of multiple capabilities, where the
result is greater than the sum of the parts.
control space system costs
AFSPC is implementing significant changes as part of the Air
Force's ``Recapture Acquisition Excellence'' priority. From
requirements definition to contracting to hard-nosed program
management, we must work to reduce our space system acquisition costs.
In cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Air
Force is redefining acquisition strategies for buying military
satellites. Anticipated savings will allow for research and development
investment for future performance improvements and to lower cost of
follow-on systems. We will closely collaborate with the Headquarters
Air Force acquisition staff to implement this new strategy for the next
blocks of AEHF and SBIRS satellites. We look forward to working with
Congress to obtain the necessary legislative authorities to execute
this strategy and achieve our vision.
The record of successful national security launches since 1999 is
truly remarkable. Nevertheless, we treat each launch as if it were our
first, applying sound mission assurance principles to ensure success.
Unfortunately, the space launch industrial base is very fragile,
resulting in significantly increased costs of the Evolved Expendable
Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. To arrest this cost growth, we are
implementing a new launch vehicle purchasing strategy. Our plan is to
commit to an annual production rate of launch vehicles, alongside the
NRO, with block buy procurement. We believe this will provide
predictability, economic order quantity opportunities and a more stable
industrial base, thereby lowering overall costs. A team of acquisition
and launch experts, including NRO, NASA, and industry partners, is
developing an improved approach to maintaining EELV's outstanding
mission success record while controlling costs and providing more
operational flexibility. The Air Force request for EELV is $1.76
billion (RDT&E and Procurement) in fiscal year 2012.
A Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Understanding signed by the
Air Force, NASA and the NRO commits the organizations to closer
coordination in the acquisition of launch vehicles, liquid-fueled
engines for boosters and upper stages, and the development of launch
bases and ranges. This is recognition of the continued need for
collaboration to help assure the Nation's access to space, especially
in a challenging fiscal environment for all the agencies involved.
operationalize and normalize cyberspace for air force operations
As the Air Force's lead Major Command for cyberspace, AFSPC is
making significant strides in leveraging existing resources, applying
appropriate lessons learned and new processes, and working toward
increasing our effectiveness within cyberspace for 21st century
military operations. Using this approach, we have rapidly developed the
organizational structure, C2, career field management, education and
training, and technical capabilities in cyberspace. Last October,
Twenty-Fourth Air Force (24 AF) achieved Full Operational Capability
status and in December was designated Air Forces Cyber to signify its
role as the Air Force's operational component to CYBERCOM.
We are applying lessons learned from the Space Professional
Development Program to build a counterpart cyberspace program. The
focus of the Cyberspace Professional Development Program is to build
21st century cyberspace warriors with a mindset and skill set tailored
to operational roles. Last year, we produced our first graduates from
Undergraduate Cyberspace Training, Cyber 200 and Cyber 300 classes,
forming the beginnings of a highly trained cyber force.
Cyberspace integration into the Joint fight is beginning to take
shape. A recent milestone was the integration of RPA mission assurance
efforts, also called ``cyber escort missions,'' into the operations
section of the CENTCOM Air Tasking Order. This signifies the first
major, sustained employment of cyber capability into day-to-day air
operations. Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Ramsey, who is assigned to the
624th Operations Center, Lackland AFB, TX, currently leads one of the
first deployments of the Cyberspace Operations Liaison Element (COLE)
to the CENTCOM AOR. The COLE ensures cyber effects are fully integrated
into contingency planning efforts from initial planning through
execution. The COLE also provides mission assurance, exercise planning
and development, and cyber intelligence support to joint operations.
Our 689th Combat Communications Wing (689 CCW) already is fully
integrated in warfighter support. Last year, the 689 CCW deployed 700
Airmen to 54 locations, highlighted by establishing initial
communications capability on four bare bases in hostile areas.
Additionally, they provided support to homeland defense and disaster
relief efforts, including Secret Service support and crucial
involvement in humanitarian and disaster relief operations in Haiti and
Chile. Staff Sergeant Alexander Yessayan, a combat communication
specialist, received the Air Force Combat Action Medal and Army Combat
Action Badge for his heroic actions in defending his Provincial
Reconstruction Team against a Taliban ambush while in Afghanistan.
Major Noland Greene, Commander of the 34th Combat Communications
Squadron, led a 47-member team of cyber warriors to Shindand Air Base,
Afghanistan, where they built and operated a network that provided all
required communication services for the Army at this forward operating
base.
While AFSPC and 24 AF have swiftly reached significant cyberspace
milestones, much work remains. Our top priority is to consolidate into
a single Air Force network. This single network will be a major step
toward achieving real-time situational awareness, allowing better
defense of the network, and facilitating efficient enterprise solutions
for the Air Force. This will standardize and simplify delivery of
services to our force, thereby reducing operations and maintenance
costs.
In addition to terrestrial network consolidation, the Air Force
Network Integration Center leads the Single Integrated Network
Environment (SINE) initiative. Under the leadership of Lieutenant
Colonel Patrick Dunnells, SINE is an overarching framework for how the
Air Force will provide seamless information flow across terrestrial,
air and space domains. Information flow among domains is critical for
efficient and effective mission accomplishment and SINE is a path
forward to provide resilient, risk-mitigated infrastructure for
increased operational reliability, availability, C2 and situational
awareness.
AFSPC's cyberspace portfolio request is for $1.9 billion in fiscal
year 2012. Approximately $1.2 billion of this request is for operations
and maintenance and over $700 million is allocated for developing
additional capability. Operationalizing and normalizing the cyberspace
mission for the Air Force is in its nascent stages, but beginning to
take root as we build a strong foundation
with deliberate speed and thought. These efforts will enhance the
asymmetric advantages of our Joint forces and provide the vehicle for
synergistic benefits through integration of air, space and cyberspace.
afspc professionals
The talented men and women of AFSPC and the families who support
them are essential to achieving the Command's three priorities. We have
trained and ready Airmen who deliver for the joint fight every single
day in technically demanding domains. I strongly believe the continued
development of our space and cyberspace professionals is key to our
future. Last year we broke ground on the new $14.4 million Space
Education and Training Center, which will give a permanent, on-base
residence for the National Security Space Institute (NSSI) and Advanced
Space Operations School (ASOpS). Each year, ASOpS provides advanced
training to more than 1,600 DOD space professionals, while NSSI, the
Air Force's space professional development school, provides unique
education to approximately 800 space professionals from all Services.
Again in compliance with the new National Space Policy, this year the
NSSI will provide its first course offerings to our Australian, British
and Canadian international partners.
In addition to the training we provide for our people, a
professional, non-discriminatory environment creates the opportunity
for all to achieve their full potential. We steadfastly support the Air
Force's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response program and its role in
fostering a healthy unit environment. AFSPC is proud of our bystander
intervention video, shared AF wide, which captures the experience of
Airman First Class Edward Todd of the 21st Dental Squadron, Peterson
AFB, CO. The video recreates how he applied his training to assist a
young woman in a dangerous situation, averting a potential assault.
Further, I believe a focus on the resiliency of our people is
foundational to developing a wellness culture that combats not only
suicides, but alcohol and substance abuse, and other self-destructive
behaviors. We are working hard to provide education and training to
raise the resiliency of our entire command, thereby providing better
tools to our people as they deal with the stressors of daily life.
Total Force Enterprise
The contributions of our Reserve and Guard forces to the Joint
fight simply cannot be overstated. In AFSPC, the Air Reserve Component
(ARC) comprises approximately 40 percent of our Airmen. Space and
cyberspace operations require high-caliber individuals with in-depth
technical skills. As many AFSPC missions are 24x7 and deployed-in-
place, the ARC can augment active duty units as part-time force
multipliers providing needed technical expertise, especially in cyber
where industry is currently leading innovation. The ARC enables a
superb intersection of military and civilian experience, which is
mutually beneficial to both active duty and ARC Airmen in our Command.
conclusion
Significant technological advances in space and cyberspace have
transformed the way we conduct military operations--and even the way we
live our daily lives. Recognizing the mandate to keep pace with this
high rate of change, AFSPC will proceed with a sense of urgency as we
deliver global capabilities, which are so crucial in this age of
information-enabled warfare. We will focus on our three priorities:
support the joint fight, get control of the costs of space programs,
and operationalize and normalize cyberspace for Air Force operations.
Above all, our workforce of highly trained and motivated professionals
will continue to produce excellence, global and beyond.
I consider it a deep personal honor to command AFSPC, and again, I
appreciate the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee to
represent my Command.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, General.
Ms. Chaplain.
STATEMENT OF CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND
SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Chaplain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our focus at GAO is
on acquisition oversight. If I have to sum up my remarks very
quickly, I would just say that space acquisition has been
broken, it is being fixed, but more needs to be done. I just
want to spend a few minutes telling you what's on our watch
list in terms of what needs to be done. I want to say that a
lot of credit should go to both the Air Force and DOD for the
actions they have been taking, and they are all detailed in our
statement.
First, there are some major programs that face considerable
schedule pressures and schedule risks. Although they are
attempting to incorporate best practices, it's still unknown at
this time the extent that these practices can shorten the
schedules by years.
Second, many of the systems on the ground that support
space activities and that enable satellite capabilities to be
used, are still facing a high degree of acquisition risk. These
include ground systems like the operational control segment
(OCX) program for GPS, user terminals for the AEHF system, some
of the sensors involved with space situational awareness, and
the control system for space situational awareness, known as
the JSpOC mission system (JMS), which is the linchpin in that
mission and it's very critical that it be done successfully.
Third, while there's been a number of organizational
changes made over the past year, it's just unclear at this
point how they'll shake out and whether they'll really
streamline oversight and strengthen it for space acquisitions.
Fourth, there's more organizations involved in space now.
You have the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) taking on a new major
program, the Army is taking on some space efforts, and you need
to balance this with the dwindling workforce. There's key areas
of space expertise that have been decreasing in recent years.
There's a question as to how we have that capability, is it
being stretched too far across DOD.
Lastly, there's just budget pressures that we all know are
out there. At the same time, space is very costly. The question
going forward is: can we still start new major efforts or is
that going to be unaffordable? When we do start them, are we
going to be pressured to take shortcuts, including testing and
important mission assurance activities?
That's just what's on our list for this year. I thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain follows:]
Prepared Statement by Cristina T. Chaplain
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of
Defense's (DOD) space acquisitions. Each year, DOD spends billions of
dollars to acquire space-based capabilities to support current military
and other government operations, as well as to enable DOD to transform
the way it collects and disseminates information. Despite the
significant investment in space, the majority of large-scale
acquisition programs in DOD's space portfolio have experienced problems
during the past two decades that have driven up costs by hundreds of
millions and even billions of dollars, stretched schedules by years,
and increased technical risks. To address the cost increases, DOD
altered its acquisitions by reducing the number of satellites it
intended to buy, reducing the capabilities of the satellites, or
terminating major space system acquisitions. Moreover, along with the
cost increases, many space acquisitions have experienced significant
schedule delays--of as much as 9 years--resulting in potential
capability gaps in areas such as missile warning, military
communications, and weather monitoring. These problems persist;
however, the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense have
taken a wide range of actions to prevent them from occurring in new
programs.
My testimony today will focus on: (1) the status of space system
acquisitions, (2) results of our space-related reviews over the past
year and the challenges they signify, (3) the efforts DOD has taken to
address causes of problems and increase credibility and success in its
space system acquisitions as well as efforts currently underway, and
(4) what remains to be done. Notably, DOD has acknowledged the
acquisition problems of the past and recognizes the need for better
management of the acquisition process and oversight of its contractors.
More important, several high-risk space programs appear to have finally
resolved technical and other obstacles and have started to or are close
to beginning to deliver capability. However, other space acquisition
programs--including the Global Positioning System (GPS) IIIA and Mobile
User Objective System (MUOS)--continue to face challenges in meeting
their cost and schedule targets and aligning the delivery of space
assets with the ground and user systems needed to support and take
advantage of new capability. Moreover, it may take years for
acquisition improvements to take root and produce benefits that will
enable DOD to realize a better return on its investment in space.
Importantly, DOD has taken steps to decide how to best organize, lead,
and support space activities. But more may be needed in light of the
wide range of stakeholders and past issues with diffuse leadership.
The work that supports this statement was performed in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives. Additional details on our scope and
methodology are provided in appendix II.
status of space acquisitions: challenges persist
A longstanding problem in DOD space acquisitions is that program
and unit costs tend to go up significantly from initial cost estimates,
while in some cases the capability that was to be delivered goes down.
Figure 1 compares original cost estimates and current cost estimates
for the broader portfolio of major space acquisitions for fiscal years
2010 through 2015. The wider the gap between original and current
estimates, the fewer dollars DOD has available to invest in new
programs. As shown in the figure, cumulative estimated costs for the
major space acquisition programs have increased by about $13.9 billion
from initial estimates for fiscal years 2010 through 2015, almost a 286
percent increase. The declining investment in the later years is the
result of mature programs that have planned lower out-year funding,
cancellation of several development efforts, and the exclusion of space
acquisition efforts for which total cost data were unavailable (such as
new investments).
When space system investments other than established acquisition
programs of record--such as the Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS)
and Space Fence programs--are also considered, DOD's space acquisition
investments remain significant through fiscal year 2016, as shown in
figure 2. Although estimated costs for selected space acquisition
programs decrease 21 percent between fiscal years 2010 and 2015, they
start to increase in fiscal year 2016. According to current DOD
estimates, costs for two programs--Advanced Extremely High Frequency
(AEHF) and Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High--are expected to
significantly increase in fiscal years 2017 and 2018. The costs are
associated with the procurement of additional blocks of satellites and
are not included in the figure because they have not yet been reported
or quantified.
Figures 3 and 4 reflect differences in total program and unit costs
for satellites from the time the programs officially began to their
most recent cost estimates. As figure 4 shows, in several cases, DOD
has increased the number of satellites. The figures reflect total
program cost estimates developed in fiscal year 2010.
Several space acquisition programs are years behind schedule.
Figure 5 highlights the additional estimated months needed for programs
to launch their first satellites. These additional months represent
time not anticipated at the programs' start dates. Generally, the
further schedules slip, the more DOD is at risk of not sustaining
current capabilities. For example, delays in launching the first MUOS
satellite have placed DOD's ultra high frequency communications
capabilities at risk of falling below the required availability level.
Some Acquisition Programs Appear to Have Overcome Problems, but Other
Programs Still Susceptible to Cost and Schedule Overruns
DOD had longstanding difficulties on nearly every space acquisition
program, struggling for years with cost and schedule growth, technical
or design problems, as well as oversight and management weaknesses.
However, to its credit, it continues to make progress on several of its
high-risk space programs, and is expecting to deliver significant
advances in capability as a result. The Missile Defense Agency's (MDA)
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) demonstration satellites
were launched in September 2009. Additionally, DOD launched its first
GPS IIF satellite in May 2010 and plans to launch the second IIF
satellite in June 2011--later than planned, partially because of
system-level problems identified during testing. It also launched the
first AEHF satellite in August 2010--although it has not yet reached
its final planned orbit because of an anomaly with the satellite's
propulsion system--and launched the Space Based Space Surveillance
(SBSS) Block 10 satellite in September 2010. DOD is scheduled to launch
a fourth Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) satellite broadening
communications capability available to warfighters--in late 2011, and a
fifth WGS satellite in early 2012. The Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle (EELV) program had its 41st consecutive successful operational
launch in May of this year.
One program that appears to have recently overcome remaining
technical problems is the SBIRS High satellite program. The first of
six geosynchronous earth-orbiting (GEO) satellites (two highly
elliptical orbit sensors have already been launched) was launched in
May 2011 and is expected to continue the missile warning mission with
sensors that are more capable than the satellites currently on orbit.
Total cost for the SBIRS High program is currently estimated at over
$18 billion for six GEO satellites,\1\ representing a program unit cost
of over $3 billion, about 233 percent more than the original unit cost
estimate. Additionally, the launch of the first GEO satellite
represents a delay of approximately 9 years. The reasons for the delay
include poor government oversight of the contractor, unanticipated
technical complexities, and rework. The program office is working to
rebaseline the SBIRS High contract cost and schedule estimates for the
sixth time. Because of the problems on SBIRS High, in 2007, DOD began a
follow-on system effort, which was known as Third Generation Infrared
Surveillance (3GIRS), to run in parallel with the SBIRS High program.
DOD canceled the 3GIRS effort in fiscal year 2011, but plans to
continue providing funds under the SBIRS High program for one of the
3GIRS infrared demonstrations.
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\1\ The $18 billion does not include the cost of two replenishment
sensors, which the Air Force does not include as part of the SBIRS High
baseline.
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While DOD is having success in readying some satellites for launch,
other space acquisition programs face challenges that could further
increase cost and delay delivery targets. The programs that may be
susceptible to cost and schedule challenges include MUOS and the GPS
IIIA program. Delays in the MUOS program have resulted in critical
potential capability gaps for military and other government users. The
GPS IIIA program was planned with an eye toward avoiding problems that
plagued the GPS IIF program and it incorporated many of the best
practices recommended by GAO, but the schedule leaves little room for
potential problems and there is a risk that the ground system needed to
operate the satellites will not be ready when the first satellite is
launched. Additionally, the National Polar-orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) was restructured as a result of
poor program performance and cost overruns, which caused schedule
delays. These delays have resulted in a potential capability gap for
weather and environmental monitoring. Furthermore, new space system
acquisition efforts getting underway--including the Air Force's Joint
Space Operations Center Mission System (JMS) and Space Fence, and MDA's
Precision Tracking and Surveillance System (PTSS)--face potential
development challenges and risks, but it is too early to tell how
significant they may be to meeting cost, schedule, and performance
goals.
Table 1 describes the status of these efforts in more detail.
results of gao space-related reviews over the past year
Over the past year, we have completed reviews of sustaining and
upgrading GPS capabilities and commercializing space technologies under
the Small Business Innovation Research program (SBIR),\2\ and we have
ongoing reviews of: (1) DOD space situational awareness (SSA)
acquisition efforts, (2) parts quality for DOD, MDA, and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and (3) a new acquisition
strategy being developed for the EELV program. These reviews, discussed
further below, underscore the varied challenges that still face the DOD
space community as it seeks to complete problematic legacy efforts and
deliver modernized capabilities. Our reviews of GPS and space
situational awareness, for instance, have highlighted the need for more
focused coordination and leadership for space activities that touch a
wide range of government, international, and industry stakeholders;
while our review of the SBIR program highlighted the substantial
barriers and challenges small business must overcome to gain entry into
the government space arena.
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\2\ GAO, Global Positioning System: Challenges in Sustaining and
Upgrading Capabilities Persist, GAO-10-636 (Washington, DC, Sept. 15,
2010) and Space Acquisitions: Challenges in Commercializing
Technologies Developed under the Small Business Innovation Research
Program, GAO-11-21 (Washington, DC: Nov. 10, 2010).
GPS. We found that the GPS IIIA schedule remains
ambitious and could be affected by risks such as the program's
dependence on a ground system that will not be completed until
after the first IIIA launch. We found that the GPS
constellation availability had improved, but in the longer
term, a delay in the launch of the GPS IIIA satellites could
still reduce the size of the constellation to fewer than 24
operational satellites--the number that the U.S. Government
commits to--which might not meet the needs of some GPS users.
We also found that the multiyear delays in the development of
GPS ground control systems were extensive. Although the Air
Force had taken steps to enable quicker procurement of military
GPS user equipment, there were significant challenges to its
implementation. This has had a significant impact on DOD as all
three GPS segments--space, ground control, and user equipment--
must be in place to take advantage of new capabilities.
Additionally, we found that DOD had taken some steps to better
coordinate all GPS segments, including laying out criteria and
establishing visibility over a spectrum of procurement efforts,
but it did not go as far as we recommended in 2009 in terms of
establishing a single authority responsible for ensuring that
all GPS segments are synchronized to the maximum extent
practicable.\3\ Such an authority is warranted given the extent
of delays, problems with synchronizing all GPS segments, and
importance of new capabilities to military operations. As a
result, we reiterated the need to implement our prior
recommendation.
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\3\ GAO, Global Positioning System: Significant Challenges in
Sustaining and Upgrading Widely Used Capabilities, GAO-09-325
(Washington, DC: Apr. 30, 2009).
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Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR). In response
to a request from this subcommittee, we found that while DOD is
working to commercialize space-related technologies under its
SBIR program by transitioning these technologies into
acquisition programs or the commercial sector, it has limited
insight into the program's effectiveness.\4\ Specifically, DOD
has invested about 11 percent of its fiscal years 2005-2009
research and development funds through its SBIR program to
address space-related technology needs. Additionally, DOD is
soliciting more space-related research proposals from small
businesses. Further, DOD has implemented a variety of programs
and initiatives to increase the commercialization of SBIR
technologies and has identified instances where it has
transitioned space-related technologies into acquisition
programs or the commercial sector. However, DOD lacks complete
commercialization data to determine the effectiveness of the
program in transitioning space-related technologies into
acquisition programs or the commercial sector. Of the nearly
500 space-related contracts awarded in fiscal years 2005
through 2009, DOD officials could not, for various reasons,
identify the total number of technologies that transitioned
into acquisition programs or the commercial sector. Further,
there are challenges to executing the SBIR program that DOD
officials acknowledge and are planning to address, such as the
lack of overarching guidance for managing the DOD SBIR program.
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\4\ The Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-219, established the SBIR program to stimulate technological
innovation, use small businesses to meet Federal research and
development needs, foster and encourage participation by minority and
disadvantaged persons in technological innovation, and increase
private-sector commercialization of innovations derived from Federal
research and development.
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Under this review, most stakeholders we spoke with--DOD, prime
contractors, and small business officials--generally agreed
that small businesses participating in the DOD SBIR program
face difficulties transitioning their space-related
technologies into acquisition programs or the commercial
sector. Although we did not assess the validity of the concerns
cited, stakeholders we spoke with identified challenges
inherent to developing space technologies; challenges because
of the SBIR program's administration, timing, and funding
issues; and other challenges related to participating in the
DOD space system acquisitions environment. For example, some
small-business officials said that working in the space
community is challenging because the technologies often require
more expensive materials and testing than other technologies.
They also mentioned that delayed contract awards and slow
contract disbursements have caused financial hardships.
Additionally, several small businesses cited concerns with
safeguarding their intellectual property.
Space Situational Awareness (SSA). We have found that
while DOD has significantly increased its investment and
planned investment in SSA acquisition efforts in recent years
to address growing SSA capability shortfalls, most efforts
designed to meet these shortfalls have struggled with cost,
schedule, and performance challenges and are rooted in systemic
problems that most space system acquisition programs have
encountered over the past decade. Consequently, in the past 5
fiscal years, DOD has not delivered significant new SSA
capabilities as originally expected. Capabilities that were
delivered served to sustain or modernize existing systems
versus closing capability gaps. To its credit, last fall the
Air Force launched a space-based sensor that is expected to
appreciably enhance SSA. However, two critical acquisition
efforts that are scheduled to begin development within the next
2 years--Space Fence and JMS--face development challenges and
risks, such as the use of immature technologies and planning to
deliver all capabilities in a single, large increment versus
smaller and more manageable increments. It is essential that
these acquisitions are placed on a solid footing at the start
of development to help ensure that their capabilities are
delivered to the warfighter as and when promised. DOD plans to
begin delivering other new capabilities in the coming 5 years,
but it is too early to determine the extent to which these
additions will address capability shortfalls.
We have also found that there are significant inherent
challenges to executing and overseeing the SSA mission, largely
because of the sheer number of governmentwide organizations and
assets involved in the mission. This finding is similar to what
we have reported from other space system acquisition reviews
over the years. Additionally, while the recently issued
National Space Policy assigns SSA responsibility to the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary does not necessarily have
the corresponding authority to execute this responsibility.
However, actions, such as development of a national SSA
architecture, are being taken that could help facilitate
management and oversight governmentwide. The National Space
Policy, which recognizes the importance of SSA, directs other
positive steps, such as the determination of roles, missions,
and responsibilities to manage national security space
capabilities and the development of options for new measures
for improving SSA capabilities. Furthermore, the recently
issued National Security Space Strategy could help guide the
implementation of the new space policy. We expect our report
based on this review to be issued in June 2011.
Parts quality for DOD, MDA, and NASA. Quality is
paramount to the success of DOD space systems because of their
complexity, the environment they operate in, and the high
degree of accuracy and precision needed for their operations.
Yet in recent years, many programs have encountered
difficulties with quality workmanship and parts. For example,
DOD's AEHF protected communications satellite has yet to reach
its intended orbit because of a blockage in a propellant line.
Also, MDA's STSS program experienced a 15-month delay in the
launch of demonstration satellites because of a faulty
manufacturing process of a ground-to-spacecraft communication
system part. Furthermore, NASA's Mars Science Laboratory
program experienced a 1-year delay in the development of the
descent and cruise stage propulsion systems because of a
welding process error. We plan to issue a report on the results
of a review that focuses specifically on parts quality issues
in June 2011. We are examining the extent to which parts
quality problems are affecting DOD, MDA, and NASA space and
missile defense programs; the causes of these problems; and
initiatives to detect and prevent parts quality problems.
EELV acquisition strategy. DOD spends billions of
dollars on launch services and infrastructure through two
families of commercially owned and operated vehicles under the
EELV program. This investment allows the Nation to launch its
national security satellites that provide the military and
intelligence community with advanced space-based capabilities.
DOD is preparing to embark on a new acquisition strategy for
the EELV program. Given the costs and importance of space
launch activities, it is vital that this strategy maximize cost
efficiencies while still maintaining a high degree of mission
assurance and a healthy industrial base. We are currently
reviewing activities leading up to the strategy and plan to
issue a report on the results of this review in June 2011. In
particular, we are examining whether DOD has the knowledge it
needs to develop a new EELV acquisition strategy and the extent
to which there are important factors that could affect launch
acquisitions.
dod has taken and is taking actions to address space and weapon
acquisition problems
DOD continues to work to ensure that its space programs are more
executable and produce a better return on investment. Many of the
actions it has been taking address root causes of problems, though it
will take time to determine whether these actions are successful and
they need to be complemented by decisions on how best to lead,
organize, and support space activities.
Causes of Acquisition Problems and Best Practices for Avoiding Them
Our past work has identified a number of causes of the cost growth
and related problems, but several consistently stand out. First, on a
broad scale, DOD has tended to start more weapon programs than it can
afford, creating a competition for funding that encourages low cost
estimating, optimistic scheduling, overpromising, suppressing bad news,
and for space programs, forsaking the opportunity to identify and
assess potentially more executable alternatives. Programs focus on
advocacy at the expense of realism and sound management. Invariably,
with too many programs in its portfolio, DOD is forced to continually
shift funds to and from programs--particularly as programs experience
problems that require additional time and money to address. Such
shifts, in turn, have had costly, reverberating effects.
Second, DOD has tended to start its space programs too early, that
is, before it has the assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing
can be achieved within available resources and time constraints. This
tendency is caused largely by the funding process, since acquisition
programs attract more dollars than efforts concentrating solely on
proving technologies. Nevertheless, when DOD chooses to extend
technology invention into acquisition, programs experience technical
problems that require large amounts of time and money to fix. Moreover,
when this approach is followed, cost estimators are not well positioned
to develop accurate cost estimates because there are too many unknowns.
Put more simply, there is no way to accurately estimate how long it
would take to design, develop, and build a satellite system when
critical technologies planned for that system are still in relatively
early stages of discovery and invention.
Third, programs have historically attempted to satisfy all
requirements in a single step, regardless of the design challenges or
the maturity of the technologies necessary to achieve the full
capability. DOD has preferred to make fewer but heavier, larger, and
more complex satellites that perform a multitude of missions rather
than larger constellations of smaller, less complex satellites that
gradually increase in sophistication. This has stretched technology
challenges beyond current capabilities in some cases and vastly
increased the complexities related to software. Programs also seek to
maximize capability on individual satellites because it is expensive to
launch them. Figure 6 illustrates the various factors that can break
acquisitions.
Many of these underlying issues affect the broader weapons
portfolio as well, though we have reported that space programs are
particularly affected by the wide disparity of users, including DOD,
the intelligence community, other Federal agencies, and in some cases,
other countries, U.S. businesses, and citizens. Moreover, problematic
implementation of an acquisition strategy in the 1990s, known as Total
System Performance Responsibility, for space systems resulted in
problems on a number of programs because it was implemented in a manner
that enabled requirements creep and poor contractor performance--the
effects of which space programs are finally overcoming. We have also
reported on shortfalls in resources for testing new technologies,
which, coupled with less expertise and fewer contractors available to
lead development efforts, have magnified the challenge of developing
complex and intricate space systems.
Our work--which is largely based on best practices in the
commercial sector--has recommended numerous actions that can be taken
to address the problems we identified. Generally, we have recommended
that DOD separate technology discovery from acquisition, follow an
incremental path toward meeting user needs, match resources and
requirements at program start, and use quantifiable data and
demonstrable knowledge to make decisions to move to next phases. We
have also identified practices related to cost estimating, program
manager tenure, quality assurance, technology transition, and an array
of other aspects of acquisition program management that could benefit
space programs. These practices are highlighted in appendix I.
Actions to Improve Space and Weapon System Acquisitions
Over the past several years, DOD has implemented or has been
implementing a number of actions to reform how space and weapon systems
are acquired, both through its own initiatives as well as those
required by statute. Additionally, DOD is evaluating and proposing new
actions to increase space system acquisition efficiency and
effectiveness. Because many of these actions are relatively new, or not
yet fully implemented, it is too early to tell whether they will be
effective or effectively implemented.
For space in particular, DOD is working to ensure that critical
technologies are matured before large-scale acquisition programs begin,
requirements are defined early in the process and are stable
throughout, and system design remains stable. DOD also intends to
follow incremental or evolutionary acquisition processes versus
pursuing significant leaps in capabilities involving technology risk
and has done so with the only new major satellite program undertaken by
the Air Force in recent years--GPS IIIA. DOD is also providing more
program and contractor oversight and putting in place military
standards and specifications in its acquisitions. Additionally, DOD and
the Air Force are working to streamline management and oversight of the
national security space enterprise. For example, all Air Force space
system acquisition responsibility has been aligned to the office that
has been responsible for all other Air Force acquisition efforts, and
the Defense Space Council--created last year--is reviewing, as one of
its first agenda items, options for streamlining the many committees,
boards, and councils involved in space issues. These and other actions
that have been taken or are being taken that could improve space system
acquisition outcomes are described in table 2.
At the DOD-wide level, and as we reported last year, Congress and
DOD have recently taken major steps toward reforming the defense
acquisition system in ways that may increase the likelihood that weapon
programs will succeed in meeting planned cost and schedule
objectives.\5\ In particular, new DOD policy and legislative provisions
place greater emphasis on front-end planning and establishing sound
business cases for starting programs.\6\ For example, the provisions
require programs to invest more time and resources to refine concepts
through practices such as early systems engineering, strengthen cost
estimating, develop technologies, build prototypes, hold early
milestone reviews, and develop preliminary designs before starting
system development. These provisions are intended to enable programs to
refine a weapon system concept and make cost, schedule, and performance
trade-offs before significant commitments are made. In addition, DOD
policy requires establishment of configuration steering boards that
meet annually to review program requirements changes as well as to make
recommendations on proposed descoping options that could reduce program
costs or moderate requirements. Fundamentally, these provisions should
help (1) programs replace risk with knowledge and (2) set up more
executable programs. Key DOD and legislative provisions compared with
factors we identified in programs that have been successful in meeting
cost and schedule baselines are summarized in table 3.
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\5\ GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Strong Leadership Is Key to Planning
and Executing Stable Weapon Programs, GAO-10-522 (Washington, DC: May
6, 2010).
\6\ In December 2008, DOD revised its acquisition instruction--
Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense
Acquisition System. The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-23, was enacted May 22, 2009.
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Furthermore, the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2011, signed into law on January 7, 2011, contains further
direction aimed at improving acquisition outcomes, including, among
other things, a requirement for the Secretary of Defense to issue
guidance on the use of manufacturing readiness levels (including
specific levels that should be achieved at key milestones and decision
points), elevating the role of combatant commanders in DOD's
requirements-setting process, and provisions for improving the
acquisition workforce.\7\
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\7\ Pub. L. No. 111-383.
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While it is too soon to determine if Congress's and DOD's reform
efforts will improve weapon program outcomes, DOD has taken steps to
implement the provisions. For example, in December 2009, the department
issued a new implementation policy, which identifies roles and
responsibilities and institutionalizes many of the requirements of the
Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. DOD has also filled
several key leadership positions created by the legislation, including
the Directors for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, Developmental
Test and Evaluation, Systems Engineering, and Performance Assessments
and Root Cause Analyses. To increase oversight, the department embarked
on a 5-year effort to increase the size of the acquisition workforce by
up to 20,000 personnel by 2015. Furthermore, the department began
applying the acquisition reform provisions to some new programs
currently in the planning pipeline. For example, many of the pre-
Milestone B programs we reviewed this year as part of our annual
assessment of selected weapon programs planned to conduct preliminary
design reviews before going to Milestone B, although fewer are taking
other actions, such as developing prototypes, that could improve their
chances of success. With respect to space system acquisitions,
particularly GPS III--DOD's newest major space system acquisition--has
embraced the knowledge-based concepts behind our previous
recommendations as a means of preventing large cost overruns and
schedule delays.
Additionally, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air
Force are proposing new acquisition strategies for satellites and
launch vehicles:
In June of last year, and as part of the Secretary of
Defense's Efficiencies Initiative,\8\ the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics began an
effort to restore affordability and productivity in defense
spending. Major thrusts of this effort include targeting
affordability and controlling cost growth, incentivizing
productivity and innovation in industry, promoting real
competition, improving tradecraft in services acquisition, and
reducing nonproductive processes and bureaucracy. As part of
this effort, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air
Force are proposing a new acquisition strategy for procuring
satellites, called the Evolutionary Acquisition for Space
Efficiency (EASE), to be implemented starting in fiscal year
2012. Primary elements of this strategy include block buys of
two or more satellites (economic order quantities) using a
multiyear procurement construct, use of fixed-price
contracting, stable research and development investment,
evolutionary development, and stable requirements. According to
DOD, EASE is intended to help stabilize funding, staffing, and
subtier suppliers; help ensure mission continuity; reduce the
impacts associated with obsolescence and production breaks; and
increase long-term affordability with cost savings of over 10
percent. DOD anticipates first applying the EASE strategy to
procuring two AEHF satellites beginning in fiscal year 2012,
followed by procurement of two SBIRS High satellites beginning
in fiscal year 2013. According to the Air Force, it will
consider applying the EASE strategy--once it is proven--to
other space programs, such as GPS III. We have not yet
conducted a review of the EASE strategy to assess the potential
benefits, challenges, and risks of its implementation.
Questions about this approach would include the following:
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\8\ In May 2010, the Secretary of Defense announced the Defense
Efficiencies Initiative to increase efficiencies, reduce overhead
costs, and eliminate redundant functions in order to improve the
effectiveness of the DOD enterprise. The goal is to apply savings from
this initiative to force structure and modernization.
What are the major risks incurred by the
government in utilizing the EASE acquisition strategy?
What level of risks (known unknowns and
unknown unknowns) is being assumed in the estimates of
savings to be accrued from the EASE strategy?
How are evolutionary upgrades to capabilities
to be pursued under EASE?
How does the EASE acquisition strategy
reconcile with the current Federal and DOD acquisition
policy, acquisition and financial management
regulations, and law?
The Air Force is developing a new acquisition strategy
for its EELV program. Primarily, under the new strategy, the
Air Force and National Reconnaissance Office are expected to
initiate block buys of eight first stage booster cores--four
for each EELV family, Atlas V and Delta IV--per year over 5
years to help stabilize the industrial base, maintain mission
assurance, and avoid cost increases. As mentioned earlier, we
have initiated a review of the development of the new strategy
and plan to issue a report on our findings in June 2011. Given
concerns raised through recent studies about visibility into
costs and the industrial base supporting EELV, it is important
that this strategy be supported with reliable and accurate
data.
additional actions leadership, organization, and support may still be
needed
The actions that the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Air
Force have been taking to address acquisition problems listed in tables
2 and 3 are good steps. However, more changes to processes, policies,
and support may be needed--along with sustained leadership and
attention--to help ensure that these reforms can take hold, including
addressing the diffuse leadership for space programs. Diffuse
leadership has had a direct impact on the space system acquisition
process, primarily because it has made it difficult to hold any one
person or organization accountable for balancing needs against wants,
for resolving conflicts among the many organizations involved with
space, and for ensuring that resources are dedicated where they need to
be dedicated. This has hampered DOD's ability to synchronize delivery
of space, ground, and user assets for space programs. For instance,
many of the cost and schedule problems we identified on the GPS program
were tied in part to diffuse leadership and organizational stovepipes
throughout DOD, particularly with respect to DOD's ability coordinate
delivery of space, ground, and user assets. Additionally, we have
recently reported that DOD faces a situation where satellites with
advances in capability will be residing for years in space without
users being able to take full advantage of them because investments and
planning for ground, user, and space components were not well
coordinated.\9\ Specifically, we found that the primary cause for user
terminals not being well synchronized with their associated space
systems is that user terminal development programs are typically
managed by different military acquisition organizations than those
managing the satellites and ground control systems.
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\9\ GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Challenges in Aligning Space System
Components, GAO-10-55 (Washington, DC: Oct. 29, 2009).
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Recent studies and reviews examining the leadership, organization,
and management of national security space have found that there is no
single authority responsible below the President and that authorities
and responsibilities are spread across the department.\10\ In fact, the
national security space enterprise comprises a wide range of government
and nongovernment organizations responsible for providing and operating
space-based capabilities serving both military and intelligence needs.
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\10\ Institute for Defense Analyses, Leadership, Management, and
Organization for National Security Space: Report to Congress of the
Independent Assessment Panel on the Organization and Management of
National Security Space (Alexandria, VA, July 2008), and House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on Challenges and
Recommendations for United States Overhead Architecture (Washington,
DC, Oct. 2008).
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While some changes to the leadership structure have recently been
made--including revalidating the role of the Secretary of the Air Force
as the DOD Executive Agent for Space, disestablishing the Office of the
assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration
and the National Security Space Office, and aligning Air Force space
system acquisition responsibility into a single Air Force acquisition
office--and others are being studied, it is too early to tell how
effective these changes will be in streamlining management and
oversight of space system acquisitions. Additionally, while the
recently issued National Space Policy assigns responsibilities for
governmentwide space capabilities, such as those for SSA, it does not
necessarily assign the corresponding authority to execute the
responsibilities.
Finally, adequate workforce capacity is essential for the front-end
planning activities now required by acquisition reform initiatives for
new weapon programs to be successful. However, studies have identified
insufficient numbers of experienced space system acquisition personnel
and inadequate continuity of personnel in project management positions
as problems needing to be addressed in the space community. For
example, a recent Secretary of the Air Force-directed Broad Area Review
of space launch noted that while the Air Force Space and Missile
Systems Center workforce had decreased by about 25 percent in the
period from 1992 to 2010, the number of acquisition programs had
increased by about 41 percent in the same time period.\11\
Additionally, our own studies have identified gaps in key technical
positions, which we believed increased acquisition risks. For instance,
in a 2008 review of the EELV program, we found that personnel shortages
in the EELV program office occurred particularly in highly specialized
areas.\12\ According to the EELV program office and Broad Area Review,
this challenge persists.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Institute for Defense Analyses, Launch Broad Area Review 2010
(BAR-X) (Alexandria, VA, June 2010).
\12\ GAO, Space Acquisitions: Uncertainties in the Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle Program Pose Management and Oversight
Challenges, GAO-08-1039 (Washington, DC: Sept. 26, 2008).
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concluding remarks
DOD is working to position itself to improve its space system
acquisitions. After more than a decade of acquisition difficulties--
which have created potential gaps in capability, diminished DOD's
ability to invest in new space systems, and lessened DOD's credibility
to deliver high-performing systems within budget and on time--DOD is
starting to launch new generations of satellites that promise vast
enhancements in capability. In 1 year, DOD has or expects to have
launched newer generations of navigation, communications, SSA, and
missile warning satellites. Moreover, given the Nation's fiscal
challenges, DOD's focus on fixing problems and implementing reforms
rather than taking on new, complex, and potentially higher-risk efforts
is promising. However, challenges to keeping space system acquisitions
on track remain, including pursuing evolutionary acquisitions over
revolutionary ones, managing requirements, providing effective
coordination across the diverse organizations interested in space-based
capabilities, and ensuring that technical and programmatic expertise
are in place to support acquisitions. DOD's newest major space system
acquisition efforts, such as GPS IIIA, DWSS, JMS, Space Fence, and the
follow-on to the SBSS will be key tests of how well DOD's reforms and
reorganizations have positioned it to manage these challenges. We look
forward to working with DOD to help ensure that these and other
challenges are addressed.
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, this completes my
prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you or
other members of the subcommittee may have at this time.
contacts and acknowledgments
For further information about this statement, please contact
Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected]. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Pubic Affairs may
be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key
contributions to this statement include Art Gallegos, assistant
Director; Kristine Hassinger; Arturo Holguin; Rich Horiuchi; Roxanna
Sun; and Bob Swierczek.
appendix i: actions needed to address space and weapon acquisition
problems
Before undertaking new programs
Prioritize investments so that projects can be fully funded and it
is clear where projects stand in relation to the overall portfolio.
Follow an evolutionary path toward meeting mission needs rather
than attempting to satisfy all needs in a single step.
Match requirements to resources--that is, time, money, technology,
and people--before undertaking a new development effort.
Research and define requirements before programs are started and
limit changes after they are started.
Ensure that cost estimates are complete, accurate, and updated
regularly.
Commit to fully fund projects before they begin.
Ensure that critical technologies are proven to work as intended
before programs are started.
Assign more ambitious technology development efforts to research
departments until they are ready to be added to future generations
(increments) of a product.
Use systems engineering to close gaps between resources and
requirements before launching the development process.
During program development
Use quantifiable data and demonstrable knowledge to make go/no-go
decisions, covering critical facets of the program such as cost,
schedule, technology readiness, design readiness, production readiness,
and relationships with suppliers.
Do not allow development to proceed until certain thresholds are
met--for example, a high proportion of engineering drawings completed
or production processes under statistical control.
Empower program managers to make decisions on the direction of the
program and to resolve problems and implement solutions.
Hold program managers accountable for their choices.
Require program managers to stay with a project to its end.
Hold suppliers accountable to deliver high-quality parts for their
products through such activities as regular supplier audits and
performance evaluations of quality and delivery, among other things.
Encourage program managers to share bad news, and encourage
collaboration and communication.
appendix ii: scope and methodology
In preparing this testimony, we relied on our body of work in space
programs, including previously issued GAO reports on assessments of
individual space programs, common problems affecting space system
acquisitions, and DOD's acquisition policies. We relied on our best
practices studies, which comment on the persistent problems affecting
space system acquisitions, the actions DOD has been taking to address
these problems, and what remains to be done, as well as Office of the
Secretary of Defense and Air Force documents addressing these problems
and actions. We also relied on work performed in support of our annual
weapons system assessments, and analyzed DOD funding estimates to
assess cost increases and investment trends for selected major space
system acquisition programs. The GAO work used in preparing this
statement was conducted in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I sincerely apologize for not being able to be here when
the hearing started. I want to thank all of our witnesses for
being here.
Let me start by congratulating the Air Force for the
successful launch of the first SBIRS. The long-anticipated
launch of this first of a kind, state-of-the-art satellite is a
significant accomplishment and I congratulate the Air Force
upon this major milestone.
I don't need to remind our witnesses of the many challenges
that led to the 9-year delay or the estimated $11.5 billion
increase in total program cost. We just have to insist that DOD
reverse that trend, as we go forward, that's been taking place
over 2 decades. Maybe GAO can help. We must ensure that the
taxpayers' money is spent wisely and that capabilities are
delivered without delay or extra expense.
As DOD, and in particular the Air Force, enters a new era
of space acquisition driven by decreasing budgets, and we will
have some of that, we'll try to protect the military as much as
we can. We know space assets cannot be eliminated from our
future budgets. Some might think so, but they cannot. Our whole
infrastructure, as the chairman knows, and communications
systems are space-based that are so critical to DOD, we can't
allow that to be eroded.
Being on the Senate Budget Committee, I have to tell you a
lot of people are in denial about how serious our financial
condition is. We're borrowing 40 cents of every dollar we
spend, that cannot and will not continue. I would just share
that with you. All of you are committed to the kind of
procurement programs and expense reductions that help us
strengthen our capabilities.
I'm pleased that GAO has joined us and look forward to
hearing their latest assessment of space acquisition efforts.
In the past GAO has expressed a number of valid concerns over
cost overruns, schedule slips, and capability gaps. In the
fiscal year 2012 budget, the Air Force announced its intent to
change the way it procures our multi-billion dollar space
capabilities, and I look forward to GAO's comments on that.
The fiscal year 2012 budget marks a fundamental shift for
defense space. I appreciate that the Air Force has been working
to ensure that its space programs are more executable and
produce a better return on investment. However, I am concerned
that some of this refocusing has come at the expense of needed
investments in future technologies. The lack of sufficient
technology risk reduction is a key reason we often experience
cost overruns. Without that appropriate level of investment, we
risk exacerbating the cycle of schedule slips, cost overruns,
and credibility gaps.
With the release of the NSSS, DOD and the IC have proposed
a framework for responding to the current and projected
strategic space environment. The NSSS aptly characterizes the
congested, contested, and competitive nature of the space
domain.
However, I have significant concerns regarding the
administration's stated intention of pursuing proposals and
concepts for arms control measures. Since the release of the
NSSS in February, it appears the administration is planning to
go forward and maybe sign the EU Code of Conduct for Outer
Space Activities.
According to recent comments by Ambassador Schulte, the
Deputy Assistant Secretary, who I thank you for joining us
today, DOD has tentatively concluded that the EU Code of
Conduct should be adopted and is consistent with the Obama
administration's policy interests. I'm uncomfortable with these
comments and have a number of questions.
Any pursuit of a multilateral arms control agreement on
space capabilities could have a number of highly damaging
implications for our national security interests. To date, the
administration has not consulted with the Senate on its intent,
nor shared any specific provisions. Furthermore, it remains
unclear if the administration has the authority to enter into
such agreement without advice and consent.
Mr. Chairman, this is an excellent panel. Thank you for
convening it and thank you for your leadership and commitment
to the defense of America. It's an honor for me to work with
you.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator Sessions. I feel
likewise. We've worked on so many different things for so long;
it's a pleasure to continue to do so.
I thought what we might do is have 6-minute rounds.
General Shelton, you assumed command of the AFSPC in
January. On a broad basis, what do you see as your greatest
challenges? What did you see when you took your
responsibilities? What was the greatest challenges that you
could see out there?
General Shelton. Senator, there's probably three things
that I have established as top priorities. First, is to
continue to support the joint fight and continue to support our
brothers and sisters in harm's way. Second, is to get control
of the cost of space programs, and you both have talked some
about that, and we are at that work mightily. Third, is to
operationalize and normalize the cyberspace domain within the
Air Force. Those are the three things that we've been focused
on at the top level.
Senator Nelson. What plans do you have, on item number 2,
to get control over the costs, which is one of the things that
is foremost in our minds as we deal with budgetary issues?
General Shelton. Yes, sir. A couple of things. First, is to
do a better job of writing the requirements, such that we are
not pushing the state-of-the-art of the technology, but rather
that we accept very mature technologies. SBIRS is a very good
case in point, we pushed pretty hard on the state-of-the-art
and we ended up with long development timelines, over cost, and
certainly over schedule.
Second, I would tell you, is to manage the kinds of
contracts that we write. We have in the past gone with much
more of a development approach, as opposed to acquiring with a
fixed-price approach. Where government has shared the cost with
the contractor, now we want the contractor to identify the cost
upfront such that we can be much more deterministic in how we
develop our cost estimates.
Senator Nelson. General Shelton, in some recent remarks at
the National Space Symposium, you discussed the growing problem
of space debris. You mentioned that the Air Force tracks
approximately 20,000 objects, most of which is debris, and
there are probably 10 times more objects that are too small to
track at the same time, any one of which could be lethal to a
satellite.
I'd note that when China tested its anti-satellite weapon
in 2007, space debris increased by as much as 25 percent. The
collision of two satellites in 2009 added even more debris.
Is there any possibility to remove some of that debris? For
instance, we've heard of proposals to use a laser to remove
that debris. Is there any other concept that's technologically
possible that you might think of or that we might be able to
develop? If it were feasible to have it, who would pay for it?
Not just the United States, I would hope, but others who have
contributed.
If it can't be removed and we're faced with it, what indeed
are the options? One of the concerns, of course, is that more
debris increases the chances of a collision that, oddly enough,
creates more debris. Perhaps you can share your thoughts on
that?
General Shelton. Senator, you're exactly right. Debris
begets debris, just from a probabilistic point of view. We have
not found a way that is either technically nor economically
viable to eliminate debris. What we have done, both nationally
and internationally, is encouraged the conduct of space
operations in a way that it minimizes debris. As we launch new
satellites, as we reach end of life on satellites, we think
about disposal of those satellites. We think about mitigation
and minimization of debris. We're encouraging others across the
world to do the same.
Senator Nelson. General Helms, to protect satellites you
have to know what you're protecting them from. Improving space
situational awareness, including the ability to detect and
determine interference, is one of your major responsibilities.
Obviously, there are many sensors that provide or could provide
space situational awareness data. One of the problems, however,
is the computer system that the JMS that utilizes this data to
provide meaningful information, is old and no longer is able to
handle the available data.
Upgrading this system has proven to be an acquisition
challenge. Do you have, and if you do, what's your vision for
how this system should work in the future?
General Helms. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, we do have a
vision, and you're exactly right. The Space Defense Operations
Center system is currently the capability that we use in order
to track objects in space, including our satellite operations
and pieces of debris. We have a sensor suite that's all over
the world, that contributes to a catalogue and allows us to
have knowledge of what is going on in space.
The system on which that catalogue resides is aging
rapidly. It's pretty much past its design life. It will become
unsustainable due to the nature of the computer system that it
rides on. This JMS capability is, in effect, a critical
capability that we need to get in order to continue to do the
mission that I'm responsible for, which is to have space
situational awareness of all objects in space.
The vision is that, first, we get that replacement in a
timely manner so that we don't have a gap, which I would call
an absolutely critical gap, between what we have today and
being able to sustain what we have today, and then bring
something on board that replaces it.
Second, we need to have a vision of an open architecture.
What I mean by that is there are sensors that we have in JFCC
Space, but there are also other sensors that are available,
potentially through the MDA, for example. If we set this up
right, we'd have an open architecture that will, in effect,
allow us to leverage the exposure of sensor data from all over
the world, not just from my own sensors, but from others' as
well.
If we build a system with an open architecture such as
that, then what we will have is a multiplying capability that
will allow us to bring more capability to bear, to fuse data,
and to watch the space environment.
Third, the JMS capability would bring interface to the
space professionals. Right now, they're faced with lines of
text. I've seen the products myself. It's very cumbersome to
work with. It slows them down. They have to use sneakernet, as
we call it, in order to manage the knowledge that's necessary
to understand what's happening in the space environment.
If we were to be able to put some user interfaces in front
of them that were more pictorial and much more comprehensive
than what we're working with today, as is envisioned with the
JMS capability, my young space professionals will take off.
They will become much more sophisticated. They are really
sharp. What they need is to have their creativity unleashed.
The way that the JMS capability is envisioned will allow
that to happen. We will have some pretty amazing forces at work
here to try to understand what's happening in the domain as we
acknowledge it as congested, competitive, and contested.
Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, General.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Ambassador Schulte, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, I
am concerned about the EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space
Activities. Can you tell us whether the administration intends
to inform Congress prior to signing any multilateral
commitments in space activities?
Ambassador Schulte. The headline that came out of my speech
in Colorado Springs was: ``Pentagon tentatively okays EU
code.'' That headline was wrong. I trust that never happens
here.
Let me step back and explain what we're trying to achieve,
where we are, and try to address some of the concerns that you,
Senator, and at least 36 other Senators have raised, too. The
national space policy from the President says, as you
mentioned, we will consider arm control in space. It sets out
three criteria: It has to be effectively verifiable, it has to
be equitable, and it has to serve our national security
interest.
So far we haven't found an arms control agreement that does
that. There's one on the table. It's been proposed by Russia
and China. We have declared it, not very politely, but we've
said it's fundamentally flawed because it's not verifiable and
it's not clear it would even capture a lot of the Chinese
counter-space systems that worry us.
Instead of pursuing arms control at this point, we're open
to it, we're looking at what we call transparency and
confidence-building measures, voluntary measures to encourage
responsible use of space.
The one such set of measures that we are currently
evaluating is the proposal from the EU, its proposed Code of
Conduct for Outer Space Activities.
Senator Sessions. Let me tell you my concern, and I've seen
this for a number of years since I've been in the Senate. We
have, in space, the most capable program in the world by far.
We've advanced further technologically, in development, and
actual deployment of systems than anyone else. Agreements,
codes of conduct, tend to constrain our military. Our military
is fundamentally configured so it depends on space capability.
I would be a bit nervous, am a bit nervous, and want to
examine carefully whether or not through some agreement we've
constricted our ability to effectively defend our interests.
Let me ask you a few questions and see if you can answer
them briefly, and if you can I'd appreciate it. Has the AFSPC
or STRATCOM reviewed and provided an assessment at this date to
the draft code of conduct?
Ambassador Schulte. Senator, in DOD, we are currently
conducting an operations assessment of the EU code to see what
the impact would be. Our goal isn't to constrain ourselves. We
think we act pretty responsibly in space. The goal is to try to
constrain new emergent space powers, to ensure they adopt
procedures that would, for example, mitigate the creation of
debris and avoid mishaps and instability in space.
The goal of the IC and DOD is to protect our national
security equities. We also, as the strategy says, have a stake
in a domain in which others are operating that's a bit more
predictable. We want to encourage other countries to apply the
same type of standards that we do in space.
Senator Sessions. Would there be any impact such as this in
such an agreement, would there be anything that would impact a
U.S. decision to deploy missile defense interceptors of any
sort in space?
Ambassador Schulte. Sir, the EU code is about behavior in
space, it's not about capabilities in space. It would not, for
example, prohibit the deployment of space-based interceptors.
Now, if somebody wanted to do that and they're going to create
a lot of debris by doing so, we might say that's a bad
approach. But it doesn't prohibit deployment of space-based
interceptors.
Senator Sessions. As a practical matter, would it or could
it impede our ability to do that?
Ambassador Schulte. No, sir, not as we understand it.
Senator Sessions. Is there anything in it that would impact
the development, test, or deployment of an anti-satellite
weapon such as the one successfully used in the 2008 Operation
Burnt Frost?
Ambassador Schulte. Sir, it would not do that. It doesn't
constrain capabilities; it constrains behavior. In fact,
Operation Burnt Frost, and I was in Vienna at the time and we
did very well there, not just from a technical standpoint, but
from a diplomatic standpoint, we showed how we were acting
responsibly to minimize debris. In fact, the draft EU code as
it now stands would allow such operations in the future.
Senator Sessions. Would it impact, in any way, the
research, development, testing, or deployment of a kinetic
defensive system in outer space, one that could take out a
satellite and let's say we're in an area of hostilities.
There's a satellite that's providing intelligence information
that places our military personnel at risk. Is there anything
that would in any way impact our research, development, and
testing of such a kinetic defense system in outer space?
Ambassador Schulte. No, sir. It would discourage any
activities that, again, would create a lot of debris.
Senator Sessions. But it would be hard under our current
technology to destroy a satellite that's spying on our
military. Would this agreement keep us from doing that?
Ambassador Schulte. Senator, actually there are many ways,
that we can't discuss entirely here, to neutralize another
satellite, and you can certainly do it without creating a lot
of debris.
The other thing I should mention, sir, if I could, is
that----
Senator Sessions. I'm not sure that I'm totally sold on
that, that you can necessarily impact all satellites without
creating debris. Are you sure that's accurate?
Ambassador Schulte. Sir, we could go into another session
for that, certainly the Chinese, for example, are looking at
ways of neutralizing satellites that don't create a lot of
debris.
The other thing that----
Senator Sessions. Looking at it and doing it are two
different things. Excuse me; go ahead.
Ambassador Schulte. Sir, I just wanted to mention, the code
is voluntary, it can be put aside if you have to. It's not a
treaty. It's not legally binding. It also is full of references
to the inherent right of self defense, and you can imagine at
DOD we appreciate that. It allows actions to be taken for self
defense.
As General Kehler told another panel recently, we see it as
largely consistent with our operations plans, with our current
practice, but we are doing a detailed assessment.
Senator Sessions. What are your plans about advising and
briefing Congress on this before anything is signed?
Ambassador Schulte. Sir, I would actually defer to the
Department of State (DOS) about how to handle that with
Congress. Having said that, though, in response to the letter
that you and many of your colleagues signed, there was a
response. We offered briefings to your staff. I'm happy to come
meet with you separately on this. We understand that many have
concerns about this and we're prepared to come and talk to you
about them.
Senator Sessions. Are Russia and China involved in these
discussions?
Ambassador Schulte. Russia and China are interesting. The
two countries that are most nervous about the EU code are
Russia and China. Part of that is because they see the code as
a competitor to the arms control agreement that they've
proposed, which we've found as fundamentally flawed. They've
been a little bit reluctant to look at the code.
As they see more and more countries looking at the code
they're thinking, gee, maybe we should look at this, too. We
have encouraged them to consider it, making clear we haven't
made a final decision. Again, we see this as a possible way to
get the Russians and the Chinese to act more responsibly.
Only if we sign the code along with the EU, otherwise it's
meaningless. We want to get the Russians and the Chinese into
this type of framework. We want to get the Indians in there and
we want to get Brazil. Again, the goal is in many ways to
export the best practices that we use, to other parts of the
world, to create a more predictable space environment, while
still protecting our defense equities.
Senator Sessions. We've spent billions of dollars to
produce a fabulous SATCOM network that is a critical part of
our defense structure. I would hate to see us take any action
that would neutralize any part of that capability we've
invested so much to achieve.
Thank you.
Ambassador Schulte. Thank you, sir.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator.
General Formica, the Army is heavily dependent on space
systems for much of what you do, particularly in theater. This
subcommittee is worried about disconnects between the equipment
that enables the warfighter to utilize space systems,
particularly GPS and communications, and the satellites
themselves. Improved capability is on orbit, but the equipment
is not fielded. Do you see this as an issue for the Army? What
are your thoughts?
General Formica. Senator, thank you. As you said, the Army
is invested in space capabilities and requires them in order to
function our operating forces in theater and around the world.
We are dependent on GPS SATCOMs, among others. Having reliable
ground systems and being able to push those down to the lowest
level is important to us and it is a capability that is
something that needs to be developed and that we count on.
Senator Nelson. In your statement, you mention the Army
space support teams. Apparently these teams play a vital
function in providing space support to commanders in the field.
In your view, do these teams have all the support they need or
do they need additional support or access to information?
General Formica. Senator, again, thank you for the
question. The Army space support teams and the space support
elements which go at the various levels of Army commands and
our operational forces are an essential part of our space
cadre. We manage over 300 space professionals as part of the
space cadre and they are well-trained. They train in a joint
environment. They train not only at schools that we've
developed at Space and Missile Defense Command, but we rely on
the Air Force National Strategic Space Institute for some of
the advanced training that these space professionals get. They
go to the Navy Postgraduate School and other advanced civil
schooling. They're very well-trained.
We've deployed now our 60th Army space support team
rotation in support of forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. They
provide reachback capability to those forces to access the
space capabilities that our joint forces provide. They are a
very essential part of what it is we do. We maintain the
capability to continue that rotation. They get the support that
they need, and they're clearly a capability that operational
commanders seek when they get ready to deploy.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Dr. Zangardi and Admiral Titley, as I mentioned in my
opening statement, last year the first MUOS satellite was
expected to launch in September of this year. Now it looks like
the first satellite will not launch until mid-2012. In your
prepared statement you indicate that there's an issue with
scheduling the launch. Is that the only reason for the delay,
and what is the cost of the delay, both in terms of dollars and
operational capacity?
Dr. Zangardi. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question, sir. We
project that the launch will occur in February 2012. We've been
provided with a launch slot and that was firmed up a few months
ago. The on-orbit capability for the first space vehicle of
MUOS will be available in May 2012.
As far as the cost for that delay, we'll have to take that
as a question for the record. I'm not prepared to answer that
today.
[The information referred to follows:]
In March 2011 the assignment of Mobile User Objective Satellite
(MUOS) 1 to a February 2012 launch slot was finalized by the Air Force
as the earliest slot available since higher-priority National
Aeronautics and Space Administration missions had been assigned to
August 2011 and November 2011 launch slots. Current Ultra-High
Frequency (UHF) Follow-On (UFO) availability models project that the
UFO constellation will meet its availability requirement beyond MUOS 1
On-Orbit Capability in May 2012, so no impact to operational capacity
is expected. The program incurred an additional cost of approximately
$3.7 million due to the extension of contractor program management and
system engineering effort for 4.5 months.
Senator Nelson. Okay. Is there any danger that that program
might experience a Nunn-McCurdy breach?
Dr. Zangardi. Sir, in my view, and having talked with the
program manager extensively before coming here, our view is
that it will not at this point in time.
Senator Nelson. Is there anything that could cause that to
happen that you're aware of?
Dr. Zangardi. Sir, at this time there's nothing that I'm
aware of that could cause that. That does not preclude the
possibility that something can occur, because, as we know,
space is very complicated.
Senator Nelson. Admiral Titley, how do you approach this
from your perspective?
Admiral Titley. Yes, sir, Senator. Thank you for the
question. As we look at the amount of UHF capability that is in
orbit today and how between a combination of some legacy Fleet
Satellite Communication Systems, some leased satellites, and
some Skynet as well as our UFO constellation, we believe that
we will have in excess of 70 percent of that constellation
still available by the time that the first MUOS bird achieves
on-orbit capability in May 2012.
There's a number of reasons for that. STRATCOM has worked
very hard along with the UFO program office. We have been able
to squeeze more capability out of the existing constellation.
We're careful on how we reprioritize. We've been careful with
how we've used the leases. That has us to the point where we
believe we will have again in excess of 70 percent of our
capacity, which is the benchmark, by the time MUOS No. 1
achieves on-orbit capability.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Nelson. What are your thoughts about a potential
Nunn-McCurdy breach?
Admiral Titley. I would just echo Dr. Zangardi's comments
there, sir. From my perspective, I have not seen anything from
the program briefs that at this point in time trigger that
concern. As Dr. Zangardi said, this is something you always
have to keep watching for.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. General Shelton, Ambassador Schulte, and
Ms. Chaplain, over the 5-year Future Years Defense Program
budget for 2012, the cost for space launch vehicles has risen.
Last year the budget called for 26 launch vehicles from fiscal
year 2012 to fiscal year 2016 at a cost of $6.4 billion. This
year's budget for the same time period reduces the number of
launch vehicles by three, but the cost appears to have risen
from $6.4 billion to $9.8 billion. That's three less rockets,
but a $3.4 billion increase in cost.
How much of this price increase is related to the
cancellation of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration's (NASA) Constellation program, which I know is
some of it, and a lack of a clear NASA pathway for heavy lift?
Would you comment on that?
Ambassador Schulte. Senator, I'd be glad to. First, we need
to start with an economic order quantity buy of piece parts for
the rockets that started with the beginning of the EELV
program. When we first started that program, we thought we were
going to have a very robust commercial launch market. The
vendors went out, bought a lot of parts, and got good deals on
the buys of those parts. We are entering the end of those parts
and it's time to buy new.
We're buying smaller quantities. A lot of the vendors that
we used before are no longer in business. In terms of the cost
of upper stages, individual components that go on larger
components, those prices have increased, as well as the engines
for the rockets themselves.
As we go through with this new strategy to buy eight
rockets per year, five for DOD, three for the National
Reconnaissance Office, we will try to bring those costs down by
going at it with a much more fixed-price mindset and again get
back to an economic order quantity capability for the United
Launch Alliance, our launch provider, and get down to lower
costs as much as we can.
This is just a relatively small market that we're in here
and it's just very difficult to contain the costs, but we're
working hard at it.
Senator Sessions. The Air Force is dependent and required
to provide the entire support now that NASA has reduced its
play, participation, and consumption, NASA used to consume 70
percent of this capability. Has that impacted the price for the
Air Force?
Ambassador Schulte. Senator, you're talking about the solid
rocket capability?
Senator Sessions. Right.
Ambassador Schulte. We're not a big player in the big solid
rocket business. That's the business of the strategic programs
of the Air Force and the Navy, the strategic missile programs.
In the space launch business we use liquid propulsion.
Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, would you like to comment
on that, please?
Ms. Chaplain. Yes. Specifically about the engines, their
effect on price, and what's going on in the NASA Constellation
program. I do believe the engine prices are supposed to be
increasing because there is a lot of uncertainty of what NASA's
going to do in terms of the Constellation program and that
could be factoring into the prices considerably.
When will we know what NASA's going to be doing? It should
be this year, but there's still a lot of unknowns about how
NASA's going to answer its own authorization requirements. The
Senate Commerce Committee laid out an architecture that it
desires to see and NASA has not come back yet and answered how
they're going to answer that architecture.
We still have uncertainty and until that certainty comes
it's likely that those engine prices are going to be higher.
Senator Sessions. I agree. I talked to one of the Chief
Executive Officers involved in this said the number one thing
going on in our supply base right now is uncertainty, and
really it's uncertainty on what NASA is going to do. So we're
trying to work on that problem.
Let me ask this. In their mark of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, the House Armed
Services Committee chose not to fund MDA's request for $160.8
million for the Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS). I
talked to General O'Reilly about that and he is concerned that
this is a decision that could increase costs.
Ms. Chaplain, the MDA programs are part of your GAO
portfolio. Do you have any concerns with the MDA's strategy for
PTSS or MDA leading the acquisition of a major space system?
Ms. Chaplain. A couple months ago in our MDA report we
reported on the PTSS program along with all the other MDA
systems, and it's still fairly early in the program. We did
note that the program is adopting some practices that we like
to see in space programs, one being that they want to build
prototypes before operational satellites.
Senator Sessions. In other words, DOD would basically build
the prototypes and own the proprietary data, the patents or the
rights to procure?
Ms. Chaplain. Yes. They would be working with the U.S.
Naval Research Laboratory and the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics
Lab up the road, the two labs, to build prototype satellites.
It's unclear whether the prototypes are going to be what the
operational satellites are going to end up being. It's also
something else we're trying to pursue as to the extent to which
the schedules for developing the prototypes overlap the
operational satellite schedules; are we giving enough time
there to actually learn from the prototypes and feed that into
the subsequent effort by contractors?
The other thing MDA has been trying to do that we thought
was good, is keep requirements simple for PTSS. There are
pressures and ideas for other things that PTSS could do.
We do have a concern about capability in terms of managing
the large space program at MDA in terms of broader workforce
issues across DOD and are we stretching the space workforce and
the acquisition capability for space a little too thin. We
haven't reported on that issue and we haven't done enough
exploration about what MDA has versus what the Air Force has to
be able to make reasonable comparisons.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Chairman, I would just say that it's
possible the House didn't have all the information that's
necessary on this system. General O'Reilly suggests that it
could actually save a lot of money and get more capability.
General Shelton, do you have any thoughts about that,
briefly?
General Shelton. Senator, I talked to General O'Reilly just
before coming over here and by what he has shown me it looks
like a very capable system. Certainly not my area, but in terms
of the way he described the capability and what it brings to
missile defense and potentially to space situational awareness
as well, it looks like a very valuable capability.
Senator Sessions. Thank you. It may be that we can work
together to determine what would be the best thing to do,
because a satellite could do more than other systems at less
cost.
General Formica. Senator Sessions, would it be appropriate
for me to comment?
Senator Sessions. Please.
General Formica. I actually speak from my operational
perspective as STRATCOM's JFCC for Integrated Missile Defense.
I can't speak to the programmatics of the PTSS. I will leave
that to General O'Reilly. But the operational implications of
having PTSS or a capability like that is the ability to defend
against larger raid sizes. It has increased capability. It
would reduce our reliance on terrestrial-based radar systems
which require host nation basing agreements, or even airborne
platforms that require air space. It's a persistent satellite-
based contributor to the missile defense and would provide
quality control tracking data that we would need.
It is a viable capability and there are operational
implications to not having it. Again, I'll defer the
programmatic discussions to General O'Reilly.
Senator Sessions. Briefly, he indicated that it has
exceeded your expectations when you started with that program
technologically?
General Formica. We know that the Space Tracking and
Surveillance System, which is its predecessor capability, was
recently successful in being able to transmit data during the
flight test mission-15 a couple weeks ago.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator Sessions. I have to go
to the White House following the vote, but I'll be glad to
leave this open and it will be in your very capable hands.
Senator Sessions. Thank you. I appreciate this panel. I
might have a question or two and then we'll wrap it up.
Senator Nelson. That sounds fine.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, and make sure you figure a way
to balance that budget, and not on the backs of the military.
Senator Nelson. I'll do my best.
Senator Sessions [presiding]. Thank you.
General Shelton, in January the Deputy Secretary of Defense
voiced significant concerns to the Chairman of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) regarding the FCC's provisional
authorization of LightSquared's new wireless broadband proposal
and the potential for interference with GPS signals, which our
DOD relies on in a lot of different ways.
Secretary Lynn states that there's a ``strong potential for
interference to these critical national security systems,'' and
that ``DOD strongly recommends the FCC defer final action until
proper interference analysis and mitigation studies can be
conducted.''
Do you agree with the concerns expressed by Secretary Lynn
and what are the national security implications if we have
interference problems?
General Shelton. Senator, at the time he signed that letter
and a subsequent letter in March, we had analytical data from
an equipment manufacturer and some of the information that our
program office in Los Angeles had been able to gather. We have
since conducted actual testing using LightSquared's equipment,
civil, commercial, and military GPS receivers at Kirtland Air
Force Base. Although the data is still being analyzed, I would
tell you that the empirical data appears to be consistent with
the analytical data.
Yes, sir, we have concerns for commercial, civil, and
military applications.
Senator Sessions. People with a GPS in their car could have
problems also?
General Shelton. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. We have to look at these things as we go
forward and I think it's very appropriate to ask FCC to look at
it hard.
I realize the vote time is winding down. I thank all of you
for your service. We believe in what you do. People do not
appreciate the extent to which our space capabilities help sea,
air, and land teams, unmanned aerial vehicles, Army squad
leaders all over the world, and Navy ships and capabilities.
It's an extraordinary thing that this Nation has accomplished.
No nation in the world has ever achieved so much in this
regard. It costs a good deal, but it saves a lot of money too
in a lot of different ways in making our military more capable
and requiring less support.
Thank you for your attendance. We will be submitting some
written questions and I hope that you'll be able to answer
those within the time required. Thank you.
We are adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
protecting space assets
1. Senator Nelson. General Helms, to protect satellites, you have
to know what you are protecting them from. Improving space situational
awareness (SSA), including the ability to detect and determine
interference, is one of your major responsibilities. There are many
sensors that provide or could provide SSA data. One of the problems,
however, is the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) Mission System
(JMS), that utilizes this data to provide meaningful information is old
and no longer able to handle the available data. Upgrading this system
has proven to be an acquisition challenge. What is your vision for how
this system should work?
General Helms. My vision for the JMS is that information technology
be a modern, scalable, service-oriented architecture that is capable of
collecting, processing, displaying, and disseminating data across
multiple security levels. Information technology should be able to
receive and transmit data to and from current and future military,
commercial, and allied sources to enable rapid, proactive
decisionmaking and effective operations.
To do this effectively JMS should be designed on an open
architecture with an efficient, user-definable interface. Information
technology should be easily expandable in terms of capacity,
throughput, and storage. Its interfaces with all space systems and
current and future SSA sensors should be efficient and effective.
Finally, JMS must be net-centric to enable distributed operations,
rapid dissemination of information, and continuity of operations.
To achieve this, the acquisition process must allow for rapid
identification, development, testing, integration, and operation of new
capabilities to address emerging threats and to support current,
future, and unanticipated future missions. Close collaboration with the
user is key. The legacy systems have been primarily focused on
integrating space surveillance metric track data. JMS, as a modern,
flexible, and extensible platform, should be able to incorporate
additional intelligence and non-Space Surveillance Network data to
enhance the JSpOC's ability to collaborate with mission partners to
identify and characterize threats interfering with U.S. space assets.
2. Senator Nelson. General Shelton, you recently made a decision to
take a pause in developing a new JMS, and move the acquisition
responsibility to the Space and Missile Systems Center. What was your
reasoning behind that decision and what impact does this have on new
operating capability?
General Shelton. The combination of the JMS program cost estimate
growth to $1 billion or more and the required sustainment of legacy
systems until 2019 levied an unacceptable risk to space operations and
the Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) budget. In January 2011, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
(OSD AT&L) directed an Independent Program Assessment (IPA) of the
program. Although the IPA found the operational needs and system
requirements compelling, information technology found the current
acquisition strategy and approach inadequate. The IPA made several
recommendations including a revised acquisition strategy and the
extension of the prototyping phase to provide critical capabilities and
reduce the risk for an agile information technology strategy.
The IPA results provided an opportunity for a strategic pause, and
the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
evaluated potential courses of action that would incorporate the IPA
recommendations. The result is an approach that fully leverages
multiple prototype development efforts while capitalizing on the
initial JMS service-oriented architecture and user-defined operational
picture. This approach will provide early-use capability, allow JMS to
provide more timely space effects, and utilize new data sources
quicker. Information technology allows decommissioning of the legacy
SSA systems soonest, avoiding an extended legacy sustainment bill.
Finally, information technology establishes rigorous systems
engineering and test and training processes early, enabling successful
rapid integration.
In evaluating the JMS course of action, information technology was
also determined the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) was best
suited to conduct this acquisition. Among SMC's core competencies is
SSA which is the foundation of the capabilities we must deliver in JMS.
The impact is key mission capability delivered to the warfighter
sooner.
3. Senator Nelson. General Hyten, in your view is the acquisition
system simply not structured to buy a new JMS, and if not, what has to
change?
General Hyten. Air Force leadership agrees with the 2009 Defense
Science Board (DSB) Task Force report on the Acquisition of Information
Technologies that there are challenges associated with acquiring agile
information technology under the current Department of Defense (DOD)
5000.02 acquisition policy. The DSB concluded that, ``The conventional
DOD acquisition process is too long and too cumbersome to fit the needs
of the many systems that require continuous changes and upgrades--a
reality driven by the short half-life of commercial information
technology, supportability of hardware (which is often a commodity),
software applications, and operational requirements.''
DOD is progressing toward developing a new acquisition process for
information capabilities (as initially described in the November 2010
report to Congress titled, ``A New Approach for Delivering Information
Technology Capabilities in the Department of Defense''), that embraces
the tenets of section 804, paragraph (b) of the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010, to include: (1) early
and continual involvement of the user; (2) multiple, rapidly executed
increments or releases of capability; (3) early, successive prototyping
to support an evolutionary approach; and (4) a modular, open-systems
approach. A new policy designed with these tenets in mind will provide
DOD and the Air Force the flexibility to develop agile information
technology while providing the foundation and structure to ensure
programmatic success and fiscal responsibility.
In January 2011, OSD AT&L directed an IPA of the JMS program.
Although the IPA found the operational needs and system requirements
compelling, information technology found that the JMS acquisition has
not incorporated agile information technology acquisition practices.
JMS is being restructured to better implement these concepts and
has been reassigned to Program Executive Office (PEO) Space at SMC. SMC
is synergistically aligned with AFSPC and 14th Air Force and has the
requisite space domain expertise. They will be better poised to
successfully develop this critical space capability in the timeframe
necessary to migrate off the increasingly unsustainable legacy systems.
4. Senator Nelson. General Helms, as the Joint Functional Component
Commander for the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), you work with
commercial space companies and other countries to share SSA data. You
mentioned in your statement that there are now 23 data sharing
agreements in place. How is the data sharing working in practice, is
information technology valuable, is the data reliable, are you seeking
additional agreements, and are there any implementation problems?
General Helms. As of 1 June 2011, we have 24 signed SSA Sharing
Agreements. The program is working very well. Companies with agreements
submit data requests directly to Joint Functional Component Command for
Space (JFCC Space), and if the request is consistent with national
security interests and we have the resources available, we provide the
information to the company. Additionally, as an emergency service, we
provide all global operators with alerts when there will be a close
approach between their satellites and other objects. Data sharing is
invaluable to our space operations. It has improved our SSA, increased
our capabilities, and resulted in greater cooperation between allied,
coalition, and commercial partners. Our partnerships have allowed us to
better understand domestic and international commercial space
operations and processes to include satellite status, orbit maneuver
plans, and launch windows and parameters; information that would have
been almost impossible to get without these agreements in place. These
agreements will be even more important as space becomes more congested,
competitive, and contested. For example, companies notify us of planned
maneuvers and launches which enables us to proactively posture sensors
for tracking and understand a change in status before it occurs, rather
than reacting to events. This program is extremely valuable as an
example of U.S. leadership and international confidence-building.
Data reliability is good and getting better. We receive operator
information, compare it to our own, and incorporate the useful
information. Demand for SSA sharing services is growing. We are
currently talking with two additional interested companies and we will
begin entering agreements with international governments once we
receive Department of State (DOS) and DOD approval.
5. Senator Nelson. General Helms, there are many other sensors that
could provide SSA data that are not currently incorporated to the
JSpOC. AFSPC is providing a small amount of operational support to an
array of radio receivers to determine if these privately owned
receivers could provide additional SSA. Could you look into these and
provide your thoughts?
General Helms. The Allen Telescope Array (ATA) is capable of
providing SSA data that could supplement current sensors, track
transmitting satellites without disruption from the sun or most
weather, and provide a ``special event'' RF observation capability. Air
Force Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities has successfully
demonstrated that the ATA can provide position data on transmitting
satellites and conduct secure direct-to-disk observations. We are
always interested in ways to improve our SSA capabilities and the
surveillance network. We support AFSPC desire to further assess ATA
through a military utility assessment to determine the benefit it could
provide to SSA and whether such a capability could be provided in a
cost effective manner.
mobile user objective system satellite
6. Senator Nelson. General Helms, as I mentioned in my opening
statement, last year the first Mobile User Objective System (MUOS)
satellite was expected to launch in September of this year, now
information technology looks as if the first satellite will not launch
until mid-2012. If the launch of the first MUOS is late solely as a
result of congestion in the launch schedule, what is the plan to manage
the schedule?
General Helms. Satellite vehicles are assigned launch slots as
early as 24 months in advance. If they fail to meet these slot dates, a
backup will be scheduled in its place and the satellite vehicle will
have to compete for subsequent launch slots based on booster
availability and national priorities.
The MUOS-1 launch was delayed when the satellite vehicle did not
complete thermal vacuum testing on time, a major processing milestone.
Launch slot priority was given to a mission more likely to meet the
launch slot date. Unfortunately, the next two launch slots support
National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) two inter-
planetary missions scheduled to launch from Cape Canaveral Air Force
Station with fixed launch windows and no launch opportunity between the
two missions. The length of MUOS-1 delay is based on booster
availability and national priorities rather than congestion.
MUOS-1 is currently scheduled for the February 12, 2012, Atlas V
launch slot.
7. Senator Nelson. General Helms, how are launch priorities
determined?
General Helms. The quarterly Current Launch Schedule Review Board
integrates a wide range of inputs to determine the Current Launch
Schedule (2 year schedule). Inputs are received from AFSPC, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), NASA, National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO), STRATCOM, Constellation Sustainment Assessment Teams (CSAT) and
other organizations who have spacecraft preparing to launch. Launch
priority is then based on all inputs, national priorities, and
satellite/launch vehicle readiness to meet assigned launch dates.
acquisition lessons learned
8. Senator Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, you and your colleagues at the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) have spent many years following
space acquisition programs. As most of these challenging programs are
on the cusp of operations, what are the lessons learned from years of
late and over budget programs?
Ms. Chaplain. Key lessons on acquiring space systems have been
learned the hard way over the past decade. These lessons mirror many of
the best practices identified in our prior reports. Principally,
information technology is vital that programs start with as much
critical knowledge on requirements, technology, schedule, and cost as
possible, and that they not be allowed to move into more complex phases
of development without demonstrating that defined levels of knowledge
have been attained. Most of the programs that have experienced
significant delays and overruns lacked critical knowledge at the start
and throughout. Another key lesson is that programs be set up in
achievable increments versus revolutionary advances. In other words,
not every military satellite initially needs to serve all the needs of
multiple communities. Lastly, while acquisition ``reform'' and adopting
``commercial'' practices intuitively seem like the right things to do,
DOD has learned that information technology needs to stay knowledgeable
and involved in its acquisition efforts and provide adequate oversight.
Many of the problems we have identified in the past decade can be
linked back to reform initiatives that loosened oversight, quality
standards, and government involvement. Table 1 highlights practices we
have recommended that could benefit space programs.
Table 1: Actions Needed to Address Space and Weapon Acquisition
Problems
Before undertaking new programs:
Prioritize investments so that projects can be fully
funded and information technology is clear where projects stand
in relation to the overall portfolio.
Follow an evolutionary path toward meeting mission
needs rather than attempting to satisfy all needs in a single
step.
Match requirements to resources--that is, time, money,
technology, and people--before undertaking a new development
effort.
Research and define requirements before programs are
started and limit changes after they are started.
Ensure that cost estimates are complete, accurate, and
updated regularly.
Commit to fully fund projects before they begin.
Ensure that critical technologies are proven to work
as intended before programs are started.
Assign more ambitious technology development efforts
to research departments until they are ready to be added to
future generations (increments) of a product.
Use systems engineering to close gaps between
resources and requirements before launching the development
process.
During program development:
Use quantifiable data and demonstrable knowledge to
make go/no-go decisions, covering critical facets of the
program such as cost, schedule, technology readiness, design
readiness, production readiness, and relationships with
suppliers.
Do not allow development to proceed until certain
thresholds are met--for example, a high proportion of
engineering drawings completed or production processes under
statistical control.
Empower program managers to make decisions on the
direction of the program and to resolve problems and implement
solutions.
Hold program managers accountable for their choices.
Require program managers to stay with a project to its
end.
Hold suppliers accountable to deliver high-quality
parts for their products through such activities as regular
supplier audits and performance evaluations of quality and
delivery, among other things.
Encourage program managers to share bad news, and
encourage collaboration and communication.
Source: GAO.
9. Senator Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, do you see these lessons being
applied to new programs, such as the Defense Weather Satellite System
(DWSS)?
Ms. Chaplain. In general, DOD is working to ensure that critical
technologies are matured before large-scale acquisition programs begin,
requirements are defined early in the process and are stable
throughout, and system design remains stable. DOD also intends to
follow incremental or evolutionary acquisition processes versus
pursuing significant leaps in capabilities involving technology risk
and has done so with the only new major satellite acquisition program
undertaken by the Air Force in recent years--GPS IIIA. DOD is also
providing more program and contractor oversight and putting in place
military standards and specifications in its acquisitions.
Additionally, DOD and the Air Force are working to streamline
management and oversight of the National Security Space Enterprise.
Regarding DWSS, we have not conducted a detailed review of the
development effort to determine the extent to which lessons learned are
being applied.
future for operationally responsive space
10. Senator Nelson. Ambassador Schulte and General Shelton, the
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Office has had several successful
space efforts, including TACSAT-3, demonstrating the military utility
of small satellites to the warfighter. Two more small satellites,
TACSAT-4 and ORS-1, should be launching shortly. What are your views on
the future utility of small satellites from an operational and a policy
perspective?
Ambassador Schulte. Small satellites can play a role in making our
space architectures more resilient and in providing tailored
capabilities to the warfighter, goals that help fulfill several
strategic approaches in the National Security Space Strategy (NSSS).
Resilient architectures contribute to deterring aggression against
space infrastructure that supports U.S. national security, and provide
a means to operate in a degraded environment should deterrence fail.
One approach to improve resilience is to disaggregate specific missions
or payloads, and satisfy requirements by flying multiple smaller
satellites. Smaller, more responsive space capabilities also improve
our ability to operate in a degraded environment by enabling the DOD to
respond quickly to urgent needs or reconstitute a capability after it
is lost. Small satellites can also help address the challenges of our
space industrial base, providing a steady requirement for many smaller
satellites spread over many years and offering opportunities to
incorporate new technologies and innovations rapidly.
General Shelton. As you mentioned, the TACSAT-3 spacecraft built by
the Air Force Research Laboratory has demonstrated the military utility
of a hyper-spectral imaging sensor. We believe that both the Naval
Research Laboratory TACSAT-4 and ORS Office/AFSPC ORS-1 spacecraft will
provide unique capabilities to the warfighter and useful data regarding
small spacecraft performance.
The National Space Policy (NSP) directs DOD to develop and exercise
capabilities and plans for operating in and through a degraded,
disrupted, or denied space environment. We need to think about new ways
to field our future satellite constellations in terms of higher
resiliency and increased assurance. Smaller satellites may be one
approach to the problem. There may be other creative ways to
disaggregate capabilities or distribute sensors and networks to provide
adequate space capabilities. Many applications, such as communications,
navigation, or missile warning, require a constellation of spacecraft
to provide persistent global coverage. In the future, a strategy of
greater distribution of spacecraft constellations, responsive launch
for critical capabilities and/or on-orbit spares may provide needed
resilience in a contested space environment.
11. Senator Nelson. General Formica, the Army has been putting a
lot of effort into small satellites, including a small satellite called
Kestrel Eye. What is driving this attention on small satellites?
General Formica. Space capabilities are required for the Army to
shoot, move, and communicate. Small satellites have the potential to
provide responsive and cost effective alternatives to augment existing
space capabilities. With the changing nature of ground warfare, this
added capability would provide the potential for persistent
communications and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to
warfighters at the tactical level, including those in remote locations.
export controls
12. Senator Nelson. Ambassador Schulte, the International Traffic
in Arms Regulations restrictions on the export of space-related
technologies, many of which are global commodities today, have had a
negative impact on the U.S. space industrial base--especially on lower-
tier suppliers. The new NSSS acknowledges this situation and states the
need for export control reform. What is the status of these export
control reforms?
Ambassador Schulte. On May 6, 2011, DOS and DOD transmitted a joint
interim report to Congress in response to section 1248 of the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2010. The ``Risk Assessment of United States Export Control
Policy'' report is a conservative starting point for transferring
satellites and related items from the United States Munitions List
(USML) to the Commerce Control List (CCL). It recommends that, under
certain conditions, commercial communications satellites, systems,
subsystems, and components be controlled on the CCL. In addition, the
report recommends that the President be provided with the authority to
determine the export licensing jurisdiction of satellites and related
components, which are currently required by statute to be on the USML.
A more comprehensive assessment of controls on satellites, related
items, and technology is currently underway, as part of the
administration's Export Control Reform (ECR) initiative. DOD, with its
interagency partners, is expected to complete this review of USML
Category XV, Spacecraft Systems and Associated Equipment, by July 2011.
The draft will include recommendations for what items should remain on
the USML and what items can be moved to the CCL. No items controlled on
the USML by statute will be moved off that list unless and until the
authority to do so is provided by Congress.
We expect to provide the final section 1248 report to Congress
later this year, based on the findings from the ECR initiative.
Implementation of the interim report's recommendations would represent
a significant step forward in export control reform for satellites,
which we hope will boost U.S. content in foreign satellites, increase
opportunities for partnering with foreign manufacturers, and help
energize the U.S. space industrial base.
space science and technology strategy
13. Senator Nelson. Dr. Zangardi and Admiral Titley, the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2010 directed the Secretary of Defense and the Director of
National Intelligence to develop a Space Science and Technology (S&T)
Strategy, which was recently delivered to Congress. Is the Space S&T
Strategy being used by the Navy to guide or inform investments in space
systems?
Dr. Zangardi and Admiral Titley. Yes, the Office of Naval
Research's and Naval Research Laboratory's current space capability
development efforts are focused on the following DOD Space S&T Strategy
goals: (1) Satellite Communications including communications-on-the-
move; dedicated/theater controlled, space-enabled tactical
communications; enhanced flexibility and resilience in challenged
environments; and support to ISR collection platforms (e.g., TACSAT-4
communications satellite (scheduled to launch 27 September 2011)); (2)
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) including
increased persistence of space-based ISR and improved cross-cueing for
space-based assets (e.g., Detection and Fusion of Remote Sensors Future
Naval Capabilities Initiative)); and (3) Space Environmental Monitoring
including improved understanding and awareness of the Earth-to-Sun
environment; improved space weather forecast capabilities and tools to
predict operational impacts; and improved space weather forecasting and
enabling real-time threat warning (e.g., a Space Weather Discovery and
Invention Initiative.) These efforts illustrate the Navy's application
of this strategy as a tool to guide its space S&T initiatives and
investments.
14. Senator Nelson. General Shelton and General Hyten, is the Space
S&T Strategy being used by the Air Force to guide or inform investments
in space systems?
General Shelton and General Hyten. The report was completed less
than 2 months ago and is still being reviewed by our organizations. Air
Force inputs were primarily provided by the Air Force Research
Laboratory and they were consistent with the outputs from yearly S&T
reviews conducted by the Air Force Space Command Commander, the Air
Force Research Laboratory Commander, and the Space and Missile Systems
Center Commander.
15. Senator Nelson. General Formica, is the Space S&T Strategy
being used by the Army to guide or inform investments in space systems?
General Formica. Yes, the Space S&T Strategy is being used by the
Army to guide our investments in space systems. The strategy captures
and reflects the guidance set forth to the Army outlined in the NSP and
the NSSS regarding priorities and investment strategies for space.
16. Senator Nelson. Ambassador Schulte, do you know who in DOD will
be responsible for oversight of the execution of the strategy?
Ambassador Schulte. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research
and Engineering is responsible for oversight of the execution on the
Space S&T Strategy.
space launch
17. Senator Nelson. General Hyten, what is the Air Force plan to
reduce launch costs, and rethink how launch vehicles are purchased,
particularly the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)?
General Hyten. The recently appointed Air Force PEO for Space
Launch is crafting a new EELV acquisition strategy that supports a
minimum production rate by implementing a lot-buy approach to procuring
launch vehicles. This strategy also includes a ``new entrant'' approach
to allow for near-term opportunities and future competition in all lot
buys. The Air Force, NRO, and NASA are working together to develop and
publish a coordinated strategy for certification of new entrants,
targeted to begin in fiscal year 2013. Key elements of the strategy are
an initial Atlas V and Delta IV lot buy of sufficient size to ensure
economic order quantity prices and a steady launch vehicle production
rate. An AF/NRO study team and the Broad Area Review 2010 recommended
an annual minimum production rate of eight launch vehicle cores plus
associated upper stage engines, payload fairings, and solid rockets to
sustain our spacelift industrial base. With lot buys, a steady
production rate, and a ``new entrant'' approach, we believe launch
costs can be controlled.
18. Senator Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, GAO has an ongoing review of the
development of the new EELV acquisition strategy. When will this review
be completed and do you have any preliminary thoughts on how to reduce
launch costs?
Ms. Chaplain. We plan to issue a report on the results of our EELV
review in July 2011. In this review we are examining whether DOD has
the knowledge and information technology needs to develop a new EELV
acquisition strategy and the extent to which there are important
factors that could affect launch acquisitions. Given concerns raised
through recent studies about visibility into costs and the industrial
base supporting EELV, information technology is important that this
strategy be supported with reliable and accurate data. Without such
data, efforts to manage launch costs may not be effective.
Additionally, deficiencies in the space acquisition workforce in
general and those in the Air Force's Launch and Range Systems
Directorate in particular, increase the challenge of implementing the
new strategy effectively.
19. Senator Nelson. General Shelton and General Helms, what do you
see as the advantages and disadvantages to having new launch providers?
General Shelton. There are two advantages: (1) new providers may be
able to bring innovative approaches that result in lower costs, and (2)
creating competition in space launch. The disadvantage we have
identified thus far is that the launch market may not be sufficiently
robust to support multiple providers at efficient production levels.
General Helms. The advantages of a new provider for space launch
are innovative approaches with lower costs. Additionally, competition
provides incentive for current providers to find ways to lower costs.
At any point in time, a more experienced provider will be perceived to
have a matured reliability advantage over a less experienced launch
provider. If a new launch provider experiences ``growing pains'' while
establishing its position in the launch business, it may expose the
government to unique schedule, cost, and performance risk.
20. Senator Nelson. General Shelton and General Helms, what are the
general performance objectives and goals that you would want to see
from an operational perspective to ensure that a new launch provider
can successfully launch a satellite?
General Shelton. Our current requirements documents state that a
launch provider must be able to meet the range of lift requirements to
launch national security payloads and demonstrate launch vehicle
reliability of 98 percent or better. The launch vehicle must adhere to
standard interface specifications to enable spacecraft to fly on the
new rocket without being redesigned, and it must be able to launch from
both the east coast and the west coast. We are evaluating new entrant
criteria to encourage competition and allow a path for new launch
providers to certify readiness for national security missions.
General Helms. Our requirements are specified in the EELV
operational requirements document. For example, a new provider must be
able to meet the variety of lift requirements to launch national
security payloads and demonstrate launch vehicle reliability of 98
percent or better. The launch vehicle must adhere to the EELV standard
interface specification to enable spacecraft to fly on the new rocket
without being redesigned and be able to launch from both coasts.
As a goal, the new provider should be able to deliver lower cost
launches and bring long-term stability to Air Force launch services.
defense weather satellite system
21. Senator Nelson. General Hyten, in February 2010, the President
restructured the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System (NPOESS) weather satellite program. This decision
directed the acquisition and development of separate military and civil
weather satellite programs for the Air Force and the National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), rather than the
joint NPOESS program. NPOESS had experienced technical problems that
had resulted in cost and schedule increases and had a management
structure that was not workable. The Air Force plans to acquire the
DWSS to satisfy military weather requirements, and the NOAA will
acquire the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS). Both NOAA and the Air
Force will continue to use a shared common ground system to address
weather and environmental requirements. The DWSS program is expected to
launch two satellites with the first launch in 2018. What is the status
of the DWSS effort?
General Hyten. The DWSS program is proceeding according to last
year's plan. The Air Force retained the NPOESS prime contractor,
Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems (NGAS) and modified the contract for
DWSS development. This restructured contract was awarded on 24 May
2011. The Air Force also transitioned the NPOESS climate sensors and
the common ground system from the NPOESS contract to NOAA/NASA to
support development on the JPSS contracts.
DWSS is the result of a presidentially-directed restructure, not an
NPOESS termination, and is consequently bound to the NPOESS acquisition
baseline for annual acquisition reports to Congress. As a result, the
restructure led to a significant Nunn-McCurdy breach of the NPOESS
Program Acquisition Unit Cost. This breach was detailed in the 15 April
2011 NPOESS Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) and a 29 April 2011
notification to Congress by the Secretary of the Air Force.
This year the Air Force and NGAS are focused on early development
of the two DWSS satellites, finalizing contract restructure efforts,
and completing the transition of non-DOD payloads to NOAA/NASA for
JPSS. DWSS development activities will ramp-up considerably over the
next year. Significant planned efforts in 2012 include continued
spacecraft redesign to a smaller and lighter bus, continued development
of the two primary sensors--the Visible/Infrared Imager Radiometer
Suite and Microwave Imager Sounder--and development of algorithms to
satisfy DOD-specific requirements in the common ground system.
Following Milestone-B approval by the Defense Acquisition Executive in
early 2012, the contractor will conduct the Preliminary Design Review
in late 2012.
The DWSS program is still on track to launch the first DWSS
spacecraft no earlier than 2018.
22. Senator Nelson. General Hyten, we have heard that a major
program review of DWSS has been postponed indefinitely because of
scheduling issues. What is the status of and schedule for the program
review?
General Hyten. The DWSS Program Review Defense Acquisition Board
(DAB) was replaced by a program update to the Defense Acquisition
Executive, Dr. Carter, which was held on 31 March. This update provided
Dr. Carter with a summary of the program's annual SAR delivered to
Congress on 15 April and also addressed acquisition schedule, contract
status, and sensor design.
23. Senator Nelson. Ambassador Schulte, Earth environmental
monitoring, weather sciences, and related technologies were not
included in the 2011 Space S&T Plan. Do you know why these technologies
were omitted?
Ambassador Schulte. Historically, the vast majority of DOD S&T
programs that address meteorological and atmospheric issues have not
been considered a part of the Space S&T domain. However, future Space
S&T strategies will more clearly identify significant space-specific
S&T goals in Earth environmental monitoring, weather sciences, and
related technologies.
The Space S&T Strategy's ISR core mission area incorporates DOD-
funded S&T for sensors, electronics, and modeling, including
terrestrial, atmospheric, and space weather. These S&T efforts support
development of future technology options that address military needs in
the ground, air, and space operational domains, including monitoring of
seismic activity, typhoons, and the coastal ocean environments.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
air force space acquisition proposal
24. Senator Sessions. General Shelton and Major General Hyten, the
Air Force has proposed an efficiency initiative to adopt a new method
for acquiring satellites called Evolutionary Acquisition for Space
Efficiency (EASE). We have recently heard that the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for AT&L does not believe that the use of multiyear
contracts to procure additional Advanced Extremely High Frequency
(AEHF) assets is appropriate at this time. We understand, however, that
AT&L is considering other, more conservative block buy approaches that
may be more appropriate for buying high technology-risk military
satellites. In pursuing this contracting strategy, what sort of
accountability does the Air Force intend to place on the prime
contractor of these satellite systems?
General Shelton and General Hyten. The best approach for
accountability under EASE is the fixed-price, incentive fee contract.
Once the contract is negotiated and put into action, the government's
obligation is limited. Government liability is constrained if the
contractor experiences problems directly related to the contractors'
responsibilities within the scope of the contract. Contract penalties
for unmet milestones or premature failure in on-orbit performance will
also apply. Along with these provisions we hope to bring improved
industrial base stability that will help avoid the conditions that have
contributed to past cost overruns.
In addition, designating block buys as Subprograms will provide
congressional insight into actual space vehicle block costs. The
resulting visibility ensures Air Force and DOD accountability to the
costs and funding requirements to which they committed at the block
Milestone Decision.
25. Senator Sessions. General Shelton and Major General Hyten,
given AEHF-1 has yet to reach its operational orbit and won't do so
until August, why should Congress write the check now for two more
until we know if the satellite works and can meet its intended
requirements?
General Shelton and General Hyten. The AEHF program requirements
are solid, the design is stable and mature, and the experienced
government and contractor team is in place. We are making great
progress on AEHF-1 orbit raising having reached the third of a four-
phase revised orbit raising strategy and expect to have a full 14-year
mission life. Once in the proper orbit, AEHF-1 checkout will commence
verifying that AEHF-1 can meet its intended requirements. In addition,
AEHF-2 is in storage awaiting launch, and AEHF-3 and -4 are in various
stages of production. The block buy of AEHF-5 and -6 will comprise a
smooth continuation of the production line. Design maturity and
stability lend well to a fixed-price contracting strategy for future
production. If, for some unexplained reason, we discover unforeseen
problems with AEHF-1, we believe they will be resolved before any final
decisions are made concerning the production of AEHF-5 and -6.
26. Senator Sessions. General Shelton and Major General Hyten,
shouldn't the Air Force be required to demonstrate the reliability of
these systems before asking Congress to authorize buying these assets
in bulk?
General Shelton and General Hyten. AEHF-1 is scheduled to reach GEO
by October 2011 and commence the 6-month on-orbit checkout process.
Barring any schedule changes, the Air Force will complete AEHF-1 on-
orbit checkout by April 2012 and will have proven satellite
reliability. The Air Force does not plan to award the AEHF-5 and -6
block buy contract before April 2012.
27. Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, has the GAO reviewed the Air
Force EASE strategy?
Ms. Chaplain. While we have not yet fully assessed the EASE
strategy, this new approach appears to offer various benefits, such as
ensuring technologies are mature and requirements are stable, accruing
cost savings from economic order quantities, supporting the industrial
base, and reducing the workload burden on government acquisition
program offices. However, the strategy also appears to pose several
challenges, including the potential to limit competition and
innovation, as well as developing accurate and reliable cost and
schedule estimates for acquiring state-of-the-art satellites so that a
fixed-price contracting strategy can be successfully employed. An
overarching architecture could help implement and ensure the EASE
strategy meets future needs. Additionally, a knowledgeable workforce
would be essential for effectively implementing the strategy and
developing adequate insight into costs and industrial base
capabilities.
28. Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, do you have any concerns,
particularly about the use of multiyear contracts, to buy high
technology-risk military satellites?
Ms. Chaplain. Spreading the high procurement costs of satellites
over several years should help to stabilize space system acquisition
funding needs. However, the use of advance appropriations in
conjunction with multi-year contracting would commit future budget
authority for these procurements and thus tend to limit flexibility in
future Congress' budget decisionmaking. For this reason, we remain more
concerned with the use of advance appropriation than the use of
multiyear contracts.
29. Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, what other acquisition
strategies should the Air Force consider that can both depressurize the
appropriated funding vis-a-vis increasingly expensive satellite
programs, but also allow the Air Force to procure high-risk space
assets responsibly and in a way that allows for robust and meaningful
congressional oversight?
Ms. Chaplain. Similar to major satellite acquisitions, the Navy's
major ship acquisitions are characterized by high cost items and low
quantities. In some instances, the Navy procures its high cost ships by
spreading procurement costs over multiple years without utilizing
advance appropriations. A similar approach may be beneficial and
applicable to procuring high cost satellites. Additionally, a strategy
that calls for constellations of smaller and less technically complex
satellites--such as single-mission satellites with shorter planned
lifespans--could help DOD meet cost goals, bolster the space industrial
base, allow capabilities to be fielded faster, and facilitate
constellation sustainment in case of a launch or unexpected on-orbit
failure. Finally, enterprise planning across the space acquisition
programs portfolio could also significantly help normalize the spikes
and valleys in space funding. Efforts under these scenarios would allow
for robust and meaningful congressional oversight.
space situational awareness: joint space operations center mission
system
30. Senator Sessions. General Shelton and Lieutenant General Helms,
one of your top priorities is the development of a modern SSA system
for analyzing and monitoring activity in space. I am concerned that the
traditional defense acquisition process is not optimal for the
development of software-based service-oriented architectures like the
one envisioned for the JSpOC management system. I understand that
recently you decided to reevaluate the acquisition strategy for this
program. What is the current status of the JSpOC management system?
General Shelton. In January 2011, OSD/AT&L directed an IPA of the
JMS program. Although the IPA found the operational needs and system
requirements compelling, it found the JMS acquisition had not
incorporated agile information technology acquisition practices.
The IPA recommended a revised acquisition strategy which included
the extension of a prototyping phase to reduce the risk. The Air Force
has now embarked on an approach that fully leverages multiple current
prototype development efforts while capitalizing on the initial JMS
service-oriented architecture capabilities. This approach will provide
early-use capability, utilize new data sources quicker, and allow
decommissioning of the legacy SSA systems soonest. Finally, it
establishes rigorous systems engineering, test and training processes
early, enabling successful rapid integration.
We are now in the process of transferring program responsibility to
the SMC to implement this prototyping approach for more rapid delivery
of mission capability to the warfighter.
General Helms. In January 2011, OSD/AT&L directed an IPA of the
program. Although the IPA found the operational needs and system
requirements compelling, it found the current DOD acquisition policy,
and therefore the JMS acquisition, has not properly incorporated agile
information technology acquisition practices. The IPA recommended DODI
5000.2 (Operation of the Defense Acquisition System) be amended to
reflect the Information Technology Box concept and incorporate DOD's
section 804 response to Congress for agile acquisition.
In addition, the IPA recommended a revised acquisition strategy
including the extension of the prototyping phase to reduce the risk for
an agile information technology strategy. To comply, the Air Force is
proposing an approach that fully leverages multiple prototype
development efforts while capitalizing on the initial JMS service-
oriented architecture and user-defined operational picture already at
the JSpOC. This approach will provide early-use capability, utilize new
data sources quicker and allow decommissioning of the legacy SSA
systems soonest. Finally, it establishes rigorous systems engineering
and test and training processes early, enabling successful rapid
integration.
AFSPC is now in the process of transferring program responsibility
to the SMC to implement this prototyping approach to more rapidly
deliver mission capability for the JSpOC.
31. Senator Sessions. General Shelton and Lieutenant General Helms,
what is the expected timeline and cost?
General Shelton. We will transition off of legacy SSA core
processing systems by the end of fiscal year 2014. The schedule for the
remaining JMS capabilities is now being developed.
The total cost of the new rapid prototyping approach is expected to
be less than the previous approach. We are finalizing the detailed
program baseline and acquisition strategy.
General Helms. We hope to transition off of legacy SSA core
processing systems by the end of fiscal year 2014. The schedule for the
remaining JMS capabilities is now being developed.
The new rapid prototyping approach, as informed by the OSD directed
IPA, is expected to cost significantly less than the previous approach.
At this time, detailed program baseline and acquisition strategy are
still being finalized.
32. Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, does GAO have any thoughts or
insights on the JMS acquisition strategy?
Ms. Chaplain. We have not reviewed the latest changes to the JMS
acquisition strategy resulting from the recently-conducted IPA.
However, in our review of the acquisition effort last year, we raised
several concerns about the then-current draft JMS acquisition strategy
including the following:
The potential for deferring requirements could be an
oversight consideration given the Air Force's history of
consistently deferring requirements in previous attempts to
upgrade information technology systems that support SSA.
The JMS acquisition was not adopting an incremental
approach--the effort instead consisted of a single increment
delivered in a series of releases--as exemplified by its plans
to proceed without knowledge of all critical technologies and
deferral of other planning activities. This lack of knowledge
could result in unanticipated costs and other programmatic
risks to the acquisition effort.
The program planned to award a contract for developing
a high accuracy catalog without first conducting limited
development or developing prototypes. The high accuracy catalog
is foundational for most JMS capabilities and is intended to be
a net-centric data repository of information about earth-
orbiting objects.
Support for use of a service-oriented architecture was
relatively new under DOD policy and the practice was not yet
widely used--although service-oriented architectures offer
significant benefits, they also pose integration and
information assurance challenges.
quality control
33. Senator Sessions. Ambassador Schulte, Dr. Zangardi, General
Shelton, Lieutenant General Helms, Lieutenant General Formica, Rear
Admiral Titley, Major General Hyten, and Ms. Chaplain, contractor
quality issues have had significant impacts on major defense space
programs over the years. In your opinion, what more can be done to
address quality control?
Ambassador Schulte. Energizing the space industrial base is one of
the three strategic objectives of the NSSS. This includes working with
the Intelligence Community and our industrial base partners to
revalidate current measures and implement new ones, where practicable,
to stabilize program acquisition more effectively, and to improve our
space acquisition processes. Stabilizing our acquisition programs will
allow prime contractors and suppliers to work over the long-term to
increase quality. Suppliers will tend to provide higher quality where
there is longevity to a production run.
DOD also needs to engage the supplier community more strategically
about far-reaching issues concerning the industrial base. The existing
Space Industrial Base Council is intended to serve this purpose and
will be used to address this and other supplier issues as needs arise.
Dr. Zangardi and Admiral Titley. Navy's primary space
responsibility is the procurement, sustainment, and operation of DOD's
Ultra-High Frequency (UHF) communications satellites. While fulfilling
this responsibility, it has been Navy's experience that a majority of
the systems that comprise the current UHF constellation have operated
well beyond their design lives. The satellites and their sub-systems
are well engineered, so the Navy can't comment on negative impacts from
quality control problems. Navy space programs leverage lessons learned
from other space programs and utilize numerous proven quality control
mechanisms that conform to industry standards. The Navy Communications
Satellite Program Office along with our contractors are fully engaged
in ensuring Navy space programs continue to produce high quality
systems.
General Shelton and General Hyten. The Air Force, as a whole,
continues to move away from the Total System Performance Responsibility
(TSPR) approach to acquisition embraced in the mid-1990s. The crux of
the TSPR approach was to transfer government tasks to the contractor in
order to gain efficiencies by taking full advantage of the contractor's
overall management approach and commercial best practices with minimal
government oversight. As a result of minimizing that government
oversight, critical acquisition and engineering skills within the Air
Force atrophied resulting in less and less ability to provide quality
oversight.
Today, the Air Force is aggressively improving its acquisition
corps, to include focus on the systems engineering discipline. Robust
up-front systems engineering, detailed design reviews, and continuous
risk analysis and mitigation will design quality into the system from
the beginning, rather than solely relying on quality control officials
to validate checklist compliance during final production and
integration. Robust systems engineering and acquisition oversight of
contractor performance during the engineering phase will lead to the
quality product we require for the warfighter.
We also believe stable production runs underwritten by stable
funding will benefit the industrial base and enhance quality.
General Helms. I believe there are a few ways we can improve
quality control. First, we can increase contractor financial
responsibility for poor quality control of subcontractor work. Second,
provide contractor greater predictability for orders and production
enabling the contractor to retain expertise. Third, we should make
award fees large enough to incentivize contractor behavior. Finally,
more block buy purchases with smaller steps in technologies will avoid
large technological leaps that are complex and costly.
General Formica For the government to achieve improved quality
control, we must focus our efforts on strong quality assurance programs
and enhanced contractor oversight. We must increase our collaborative
efforts with quality assurance specialists to ensure that appropriate
quality clauses and provisions are included in contracts. Additionally,
the government should assess and build its organic capability to
effectively measure and validate contractor quality and procure
essential technical data for effective contractor oversight.
Ms. Chaplain. Over the years, we have identified practices related
to technology transition, quality assurance, and other acquisition
program management approaches that could benefit space programs.
Approaches that could improve the quality of space systems acquisitions
include:
Improving quality systems engineering.
Holding suppliers accountable to deliver high-quality
parts for their products through such activities as regular
supplier audits and performance evaluations of quality and
delivery.
Providing effective oversight during the development
process.
Providing an adequate workforce capacity for the
front-end acquisition planning activities.
Capturing manufacturing knowledge in a timely manner.
DOD has developed policies that address the need for adopting
commercial quality standards, using good systems engineering practices,
and overseeing supplier quality. However, DOD still has difficulty
acquiring high-quality weapon systems in a cost-efficient and timely
manner. While many problems are caused by poor prime contractor
practices related to systems engineering, manufacturing, and supplier
quality, an underlying cause lies in the fact that DOD typically
assumes most of the financial risk associated with development of
complex systems. Moreover, risks associated with this situation are
exacerbated because DOD generally enters into development contracts
without demonstrated knowledge or firm assurance that requirements are
achievable, which too often result in inefficient programs and quality
problems.
34. Senator Sessions. Ms. Chaplain, I understand that GAO has
conducted comprehensive quality review on contractor quality. Could you
please share some of your findings and recommendations?
Ms. Chaplain. We were asked by the Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense
and Foreign Operations, to assess: (1) the extent to which parts
quality problems are affecting DOD and NASA space and missile defense
programs; (2) the causes behind these problems; and (3) initiatives to
prevent, detect, and mitigate parts quality problems. We reviewed 21
space and missile programs at DOD and NASA that were, as of October
2009, in development, projected to be high cost, and had demonstrated
through a critical design review that the maturity of the design was
appropriate to support proceeding with full scale fabrication,
assembly, integration, and test. Each program provided a list of the
top 5 to 10 parts, materials, or processes problems, as defined by that
program, affecting that program's cost, schedule, or performance. In
addition, they provided an explanation of the root cause and
contributing factors that may have led to each problem reported.
Through our discussions with agency officials, we were able to obtain
information on working groups and initiatives to prevent, detect, and
mitigate parts quality problems. At this time, we are unable to discuss
our specific findings and recommendations given that the report is in
draft and not final. We expected to issue the report in mid-June 2011,
at which time we will provide you with a copy.
[Whereupon, at 3:13 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
2012 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
FRIDAY, JUNE 3, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Bellevue, NE
U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:33 a.m. in
Bellevue Public Schools/Offutt Air Force Base, Welcome Center,
1600 Highway 370, Bellevue, NE, Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee member present: Senator Nelson.
Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel.
Staff assistant present: Hannah I. Lloyd.
Committee members' assistants present: Ann Premer,
assistant to Senator Nelson; and Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to
Senator Shaheen.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, CHAIRMAN
Senator Nelson. The Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on
Strategic Forces will come to order at this time.
General Kehler, welcome. It is a pleasure to be with you
here in Bellevue today, just up the road from Offutt Air Force
Base, the historic home of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and
today the home of the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and the
Fighting 55th.
I also want to acknowledge and welcome two retired military
leaders, Lieutenant General Bob Hinson and Vice Admiral Bob
Bell, who are close advisors to me and continue to serve this
community and the Nation. You may know that Vice Admiral Bell
retired after 37 years in the Navy and then was President and
CEO of the Greater Omaha Chamber of Commerce from 1988 until
2001. Lieutenant General Hinson, prior to his retirement, as
did Admiral Bell, served as Vice Commander of the Air Force
Space Command and also served as Deputy Commander of STRATCOM.
In 2001 they, along with other leaders in the community,
established the Military Support Coalition to champion Offutt
Air Force Base, the Fighting 55th, and STRATCOM. For many years
before that, however, they worked to improve and support
Offutt. We are certainly grateful that the military service
brought both of these officers to Omaha and the community kept
them.
The command has a proud history, dating back to its Cold
War roots. Since the creation of STRATCOM in 1992, the reach
and breadth of the command has continued to grow, particularly
following the merger of STRATCOM with U.S. Space Command
(SPACECOM) in 2002.
Today STRATCOM is truly a global command. Today its
missions include nuclear deterrence, protecting space,
thwarting cyber attacks, global strike, combating weapons of
mass destruction (WMD), overseeing missile defenses, providing
real-time battlefield intelligence, and more. It is probably
safe to say that STRATCOM plays one of the most important but
perhaps not one of the best known roles in America's national
security.
General Kehler, this is your second appearance before the
Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, but
your first opportunity to discuss the full scope of the command
and its activities. Although you assumed your responsibilities
of this command just a little over 4 months ago, you are not
new to these issues and most of your career has been involved
with strategic and space systems. You are not new to the
command, having previously served as Deputy Commander. Maybe I
should say welcome back and welcome home.
But before we begin today, I would also like to recognize
the men and women who serve around the world as members of the
military services in support of STRATCOM and their families as
they support and enable their loved ones to carry out the wide
range of important global missions.
The global strike responsibilities have been repeatedly
demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq. The B-2, the B-52, and
the B-1 bombers have all rotated through Iraq or Afghanistan,
providing large amounts of ordnance where and when needed. The
B-1 has been able to do double duty by providing both ordnance
and intelligence.
With the stand-up of the new U.S. Cyber Command, which is
part of STRATCOM, there is now a military force to protect and
defend military cyber assets and to respond to a cyber attack
on the United States when and if necessary. This is a
significant challenge. The Department of Defense (DOD) is
targeted for thousands of cyber attacks per month. Some
estimates range as high as 5,000 attacks per month.
STRATCOM also manages the unmanned aircraft such as Global
Hawks, Reapers, and Predators that help the forces in
Afghanistan gather intelligence and see over the next hill or
mountain. These unmanned aircraft stay in the air for hours and
constantly provide eyes in the sky and the fire power necessary
to track and, if needed, attack Taliban and others who are
attacking U.S. and NATO forces.
STRATCOM is also responsible for implementing the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia, the New
START treaty, which the Senate ratified this past December.
This new treaty will reduce the number of deployed strategic
nuclear weapons and non-deployed nuclear delivery systems that
each country has. We look forward to hearing your thoughts on
implementing this important new treaty.
The U.S. military remains a superior military force due in
large part to the advantages and capabilities that the military
and other national security space systems provide. This
advantage is not a secret, and others are constantly trying to
reduce that advantage. STRATCOM is responsible for protecting
those satellites and finding whoever it is that is trying to
interfere with those satellites.
Space is also full of space debris, junk that moves around
in space and that can damage our space satellites. STRATCOM is
responsible for keeping track of these objects and providing
advanced warning so the junk does not collide with the
satellites. In 2009, unfortunately a dead Russian satellite
collided with a U.S. commercial communications satellite. The
two satellites broke apart from the impact and, unfortunately,
created even more space debris. STRATCOM also provides warning
information to the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) to protect the astronauts on the Space
Station from space debris. Even the Space Station has had to
change its location on several occasions to avoid that space
debris.
The most important role of the STRATCOM is to maintain a
safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent. Maintaining the
nuclear deterrent is an everyday event at STRATCOM.
There is also another piece to deterrence for which
STRATCOM is also responsible, and that is preventing states and
non-state actors from acquiring nuclear weapons, materials, and
technologies. This equally important mission is one that is
often not well understood by the public or even Congress for
that matter, but one that is growing.
Finally, STRATCOM is the responsible command for ensuring
that missile defenses are militarily effective. As missile
capabilities of countries such as Iran and North Korea grow,
the threat to deployed U.S. forces and allies in these regions
also grows. The United States has begun, in cooperation with
NATO, a missile defense program that will protect our troops
and our allies from existing and anticipated regional missile
threats, including those from Iran.
So it is a pleasure for me to be here and to welcome all of
you to be able to listen to and discuss these issues and all of
the work of STRATCOM. General Kehler, your prepared remarks and
statement will be included for the record.
Before your opening remarks, I just wanted to thank Hannah
Lloyd, our subcommittee staff assistant, and your staff,
General Kehler, for all their hard work organizing the hearing
today. We do not get the chance to do many field hearings, as
they require a little extra preparation being outside of
Washington, but I do honestly believe they are important as
part of our transparent government and the opportunities that
we have to explain to the American public what, in fact,
STRATCOM in this case does for our national defense.
General Kehler, I welcome your opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF GEN. C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Kehler. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
on behalf of STRATCOM and the Offutt Air Force Base community.
We appreciate this opportunity to appear before the
subcommittee again and discuss STRATCOM's missions,
responsibilities, and requirements.
On a personal note, Marge and I are very happy to be back
in Omaha and Bellevue and part of the Offutt Team again. As you
say, we get tremendous support from the local communities here,
and I will say a word about that in just another minute.
There is a reason for that and that reason is that the
Bellevue and Omaha and Offutt communities share more than 143
years together, beginning with the establishment of what was
called Sherman Barracks back in 1868 which later became Fort
Omaha and continued with the building of Fort Crook in 1894. Of
course, I live in a set of quarters that were completed in
1896. It has been occupied by, I think at last count, 62
leaders that have been assigned here throughout those
intervening years. Those quarters have been continuously
occupied for all that time.
Of course, Fort Crook added Offutt Field to its purview in
1924 which eventually became Offutt Air Force Base.
Other important milestones include--we, of course, had
heavy bomber production for World War II which began in the
1939-1940 timeframe; SAC headquarters, which was established
here in 1948; the 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, which was
established here in 1966, which became the present day 55th
Wing in 1991; the stand-down of SAC and establishment of
STRATCOM as a joint command initially in 1992; transition of
Global Weather Central into the Air Force Weather Agency in
1997; and of course, the new STRATCOM after merging with
SPACECOM in 2002.
I would like to take just a minute to introduce some of
STRATCOM's Team Offutt partners whose leaders are with us
today. Brigadier General Don Bacon is here. He is the commander
of our host unit, the 55th Wing. He took command there in March
and leads the second largest wing in the United States Air
Force. As I said, the Fighting 55th is our host wing. It
operates 48 aircraft from locations around the world. They
conduct essential reconnaissance, command and control, treaty
verification, presidential support, and airlift missions.
Last March, Don's command passed 7,500 consecutive days
deployed in support of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
operations. That is a tremendous milestone. They did all of
this while providing great host unit support for all of Team
Offutt's people, our families, and the retirees that make Omaha
home.
Colonel Bob Russell is also with us this morning. He
commands the Air Force Weather Agency. That includes 1,400
Active Duty, Reserve, civilian, and contract people that are at
locations around the world. Through its groups in
observatories, the agency provides global weather products and
services, including space weather support to the Air Force,
Army, Special Operations, Intelligence Community, and other DOD
activities. Notably he claims no credit for the increased rain
that has fallen in Nebraska that are causing some worries as we
are thinking about the potential for flooding, and our
sympathies are with those that are having to deal with those
problems right now.
Of course, our three organizations are all successful and
these two commanders would say the same thing that I say about
this. We are successful because of the extraordinary men and
women we are privileged to lead.
So I would like to recognize four of STRATCOM's enlisted
members who represent the best of America's soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines. From the U.S. Army, Sergeant Ralph Pohlman
who was the 2010 STRATCOM Soldier of the Year; from the U.S.
Navy, Petty Officer 2nd Class, Erica Bushell, the STRATCOM 2010
Junior Sailor of the Year; Tech Sergeant Alicia Maharaj, the
STRATCOM Mid-Tier Enlisted Person of the Year; and from the
U.S. Marine Corps, Sergeant Kelly Nielson, STRATCOM's Joint
Functional Component Command for Global Strike Marine of the
Year.
Senator Nelson. Excuse me. Let us have them stand and let
us give them a round of applause.
General Kehler. Yes, please. [Applause.]
So together, Team Offutt's 35,000 Active Duty warriors,
civilians, reservists, contractors, dependents, and retirees
share deep bonds with Omaha, Bellevue, and the communities
throughout Eastern Nebraska and Western Iowa. As I said, for
well over 140 years, our heartland neighbors have opened their
arms to welcome our warriors, our families, and our children,
which is an interesting side note to where this hearing is
located today, one of the unique facilities in my experience in
36 years of military service now where a community has actually
dedicated its educational institutions to the support of our
military children and how welcome that is as our people
struggle with these often moves and the conflict that that
shows. I think that says something about Bellevue and the great
support that we get from the community here.
In addition, community support and care for our wounded
warriors has always been important, and today it has a new and
greater sense of emphasis and is an important resource for
commanders at every level. On behalf of Team Offutt, and
especially to anyone who ever hosted a young service member in
your home on a holiday, mowed the lawn of a deployed service
member, cared for our wounded warriors, reached out to a new
family on the block, or just visited with a deployed member's
spouse, I want to say we owe you a very deep and very heartfelt
thanks. This bond that we have with this community--as I say,
the roots are deep and they go back a very long time.
In this challenging era of protracted conflict, constant
change, and enormous complexity, the demands on our
servicemembers and their families are great. You may never know
how much your many acts of kindness means to those of us who
are blessed to receive them, but we are very grateful.
Indeed, today's Armed Forces face a significantly different
operating environment than in the past. This is a modern
operating environment that is characterized by extraordinary
technological advances, rapid changes in the number and type of
actors, and hybrid combinations of strategies, tactics, and
weapons. We operate in a complex, dynamic, and uncertain
environment that demands focused effort, flexible approaches,
and innovative responses. We must think strategically, plan
with flexibility, assess comprehensively, and share information
in unprecedented ways.
STRATCOM's mission is to detect, deter, and prevent attacks
against the United States and our allies and to join with the
other combatant commands to defend the Nation should deterrence
fail. At subordinate commands, task forces, and bases around
the globe, more than 54,000 Active Duty, Reserve, National
Guard, and civilian members of our team execute this mission
every day.
STRATCOM's mission priorities and responsibilities are
complex and far-reaching, and we have five priorities that
guide our work.
First, we are to deter nuclear attack with a safe, secure,
and effective deterrent force. Our men and women operate the
Nation's strategic deterrent forces 24 hours a day, 365 days a
year. They also produce the Nation's nuclear employment plans
that provide the President with credible response options to
deter attack and achieve national security objectives should
deterrence fail. Today we are working closely with the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Services,
as you said, Mr. Chairman, to implement both the Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) and the New START treaty. In particular,
we are working to implement the treaty's provisions safely,
securely, efficiently with the right resources and the right
timeline and with the right force structure.
The administration's 10-year plan for investment in our
nuclear capabilities, as reflected in the President's budget,
is absolutely essential. As affirmed by the 2010 NPR, we must
sustain and modernize the nuclear weapons complex, the triad of
nuclear forces, our human capital, and key supporting command/
control/communications and ISR capabilities. Mr. Chairman, we
appreciate Congress' strong support in fiscal year 2011 and we
urge full funding again as you consider the fiscal year 2012
President's budget proposal.
Our second priority is to partner with other combatant
commands to win today's fight. Ongoing operations demand our
full commitment, and in partnership with other combatant
commands, we are working to improve plans, procedures, and
capabilities to address regional problems, including the
development, proliferation, and delivery of WMD and to bring
unity of effort, especially where problems and capabilities
requirements cross geographic boundaries.
Our third priority is to respond to new challenges in
space. As you pointed out, sir, space is increasingly
contested, congested, and competitive, and its importance goes
far beyond national security. We must ensure uninterrupted
access to space and space-based capabilities, improve our
awareness of objects and activities in space, and enhance the
protection and resilience of our most important systems.
Our fourth priority is to build cyberspace capability and
capacity. In cyberspace, our greatest challenge is to improve
our ability to operate and defend DOD's networks at cyber
speed, to make sure our vital activities can continue even in
the face of attempts to deny or disrupt, something that happens
thousands of times every day.
With our subunified command, U.S. Cyber Command, we are
working hard to improve organizations and relationships,
enhance network situational awareness and protection, increase
technical capacity, and develop the human capital we need as we
look to the future.
Finally, fifth, we must prepare for uncertainty. Today's
adversaries and tomorrow's potential challengers closely watch
our actions, our plans, and our capabilities to understand our
values, our operations, and our vulnerabilities. These actors
are not static, and combined with environmental, economic, and
other factors, these potential adversaries could present
surprising and asymmetric conventional, digital, or WMD
challenges against which we must constantly be vigilant.
Tying together this range of truly global responsibilities
and associated capabilities must be a reliable and assured
national command, control, and communication capability from
the President to the nuclear forces and across the range of
military capabilities. Our current systems require investment
to ensure reliability and to address looming capability gaps. A
new STRATCOM and control complex and nuclear command and
control node at Offutt Air Force Base is the center of our
nuclear C3 plans for the future. STRATCOM operates a unique
national command and control capability, and today's complex
command center and IT systems lack the capability and capacity
to support our missions in the long term.
Sir, again, we appreciate your support and the
subcommittee's support for the President's request for funding
in fiscal year 2012 for this new nuclear and national command
and control node.
So in conclusion, sir, the Active Duty, Reserve, National
Guard, and civilian members of STRATCOM's team perform their
difficult mission with remarkable skill and dedication. I am
proud to be associated with them and look forward to working
with you and the subcommittee as we address these important
national security issues.
Again, we appreciate the opportunity to appear in front of
the subcommittee. We especially appreciate the opportunity to
do so right outside our gate in Bellevue. With that, sir, I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Kehler follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. C. Robert Kehler, USAF
Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, and members of the subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to present my views on U.S. Strategic
Command's (STRATCOM) missions and priorities. I am especially pleased
to have this hearing here in Nebraska, just down the road from
STRATCOM's headquarters and Offutt Air Force Base. We have a great team
here and throughout our distributed command. Today is an important
opportunity to showcase STRATCOM's Active Duty, Reserve, National
Guard, and civilian members, who are standing watch this very minute at
locations across the country and around the globe. They truly exemplify
the best of today's joint force. I look forward to discussing the
command's missions with you today, especially our role in the Nation's
nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) architecture and
essential NC3 capability requirements.
America's strategic forces proudly continue their longstanding role
as the foundation of our national security posture. The President of
the United States has assigned STRATCOM the responsibility to detect,
deter, prevent, and defeat attacks against the United States, its
territories, possessions and bases, and to employ appropriate force to
defend the Nation should deterrence fail. The Command's specific
mission responsibilities include planning, synchronizing, advocating,
and employing capabilities to meet the Nation's strategic deterrence,
space operations, cyberspace operations, information operations (IO),
global strike, missile defense, intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance (ISR), and combating weapons of mass destruction (CWMD)
objectives. We conduct these activities in close coordination with
other combatant commands around the world. Today, I would like to
describe the strategic context in which we operate and STRATCOM's
priorities for addressing our many challenges.
strategic context
The national security landscape continues to be marked by
protracted conflict, constant change, and enormous complexity. While
war remains a difficult struggle between human beings, today's
operating environment is significantly different than those we
experienced in the past. The number and type of actors (state, non-
state, terrorist, criminal) are rapidly changing, and the distinction
between combatants and non-combatants is less clear. Friend and foe
alike can span global distances in seconds through space and
cyberspace, and technological advances allow adversaries to cross
traditional geographic and military boundaries with ease. Adversaries
seek advantages by using asymmetric means to find and exploit our
vulnerabilities and to defeat our advanced capabilities in air, sea,
space, and cyberspace. At the same time, these adversaries wield hybrid
combinations of capabilities, strategies, and tactics and operate in
the shadows to present us with ambiguous indications and situations.
Rapid technological evolution and the wide civil availability of
formerly advanced military capabilities have also reduced .entry
costs,. making available completely new weapons and enabling actors to
access capabilities that would not have been available to them in the
past without significant investment. Indeed, surprise may be our
deadliest foe, because it can make our plans ineffective, our training
irrelevant, and, therefore, our organizations vulnerable.
The need to foster strategic stability and deter strategic
conflict, ensure uninterrupted capabilities from and access to space
and cyberspace, respond to traditional and non-traditional threats, and
deal with surprise in an era of rapid technological advances presents
STRATCOM with significant challenges. Of the threats we face, weapons
of mass destruction clearly represent the greatest threat to the
American people, particularly when pursued or possessed by violent
extremists or state proliferators. The potential of nuclear
uncertainties in unstable regions adds special significance to this
concern.
At the same time, today's fiscal environment will pose additional
challenges regarding the means and manner with which we address the
difficult global, strategic landscape. Last year, Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates challenged us to foster an efficient ``culture of saving''
throughout the Department of Defense (DOD). The resulting review
emphasized our responsibility to maximize both mission effectiveness
and taxpayer value. STRATCOM's exhaustive assessment of our missions
identified some functions that we could reduce, consolidate with other
DOD organizations, or eliminate in favor of higher priority operational
requirements. We are now evaluating these initiatives with the DOD
leadership and will realign resources as directed at the conclusion of
this assessment.
In summary, the challenges are great, the choices are hard, and
there is no textbook solution.
priorities
The 21st century security environment demands fast, comprehensive
awareness, strategic thinking, flexible planning, decentralized
execution, rapid innovation, and an unprecedented emphasis on sharing
information. In this environment, STRATCOM has been uniquely organized
and positioned to shape and employ global capabilities to deter,
enable, and, when needed, join with the other combatant commands to
fight and win the ever changing joint fight.
First and foremost, we must guarantee a safe, secure, effective,
and ready nuclear deterrent force. As affirmed by the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR), sustaining and modernizing the nuclear weapons
complex, the triad of nuclear forces, the human capital, and key
supporting command/control/communications (C3) and intelligence/
surveillance/reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities is essential to retain
confidence in the deterrent's long-term credibility, provide tools to
combat proliferation, and assure our scientific and innovation edge.
Next, in full partnership with the other combatant commands, we
must improve our plans, procedures, and capabilities to address trans-
regional problems. Ongoing operations demand our full commitment, and
STRATCOM's activities both enable and support joint operations around
the world. The Command's work to synchronize and advocate for missile
defense, ISR, electronic warfare, and combating WMD plans and
capabilities helps bring unity of effort and flexible capabilities to
trans-regional operations. Whether providing space-based communications
or position, navigation, and timing (PNT) information, rapidly
transmitting data around the world, or ensuring tested, capable missile
defenses or other globally significant capabilities are developed,
positioned, and optimally managed, STRATCOM is instrumental in winning
today's dynamic joint fight.
Finally, we must continue to improve our capabilities and operating
concepts in the important civil and national security areas of space
and cyberspace. Ensuring uninterrupted access to space and space-based
capabilities, improving our awareness of objects and activities in
space, integrating their effects with all operational phases, improving
space access, protection, and resilience, and expanding our planning
and implementation for partnership operations requires that we continue
our investment and that we demand acquisition results. For cyberspace,
we must enhance network protection and mature our organizations,
capabilities, workforce, and partnerships to ensure effective
operations.
strategic deterrence
In today's complex security environment, the concept of strategic
deterrence must encompass strategies to deter adversaries and dissuade
competitors across the full range of their capabilities. We must
consider actors and capabilities in aggregate, not in a vacuum, a need
that highlights the importance of a better understanding of
adversaries' values, motivators, capabilities, intentions, and
decisionmaking processes. Not every potential adversary has or seeks
nuclear weapons, and modern deterrence requires broad coordination,
tailored strategies, effective capabilities, international cooperation,
and focused capabilities like conventional prompt global strike.
Still, STRATCOM's first priority is to deter nuclear attack on the
United States, our allies, and our partners. Last year, the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR), the NPR, and the New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (New START) discussions produced an important national consensus
that affirmed the necessity of the United States' nuclear deterrent and
the funding required to sustain it. The president has pledged that the
United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. STRATCOM is now committed
to implementing New START and to advocating for planned investment in
the deterrent force. The updated ``1251 Report'' submitted in February
of this year outlines both DOD and Department of Energy nuclear funding
requirements through fiscal year 2021. While budget estimates will be
refined as major program baselines evolve, these important investments
must begin immediately. I very much appreciate Congress' strong fiscal
year 2011 support and urge you to fully fund the President's request in
fiscal year 2012.
Nuclear Enterprise
The fiscal year 2011 and 2012 budget requests reverse several years
of downward trend in nuclear enterprise funding. These budgets provide
investments in the facilities, equipment, and personnel dedicated to
sustaining and managing the Nation's nuclear weapons, as well as to
dismantling weapons no longer needed. To emphasize the importance of
this investment and to better understand the conditions, urgent needs,
and impending challenges across the complex. I made visiting each lab
and production facility a high priority upon taking command, and to
date I have visited all three nuclear weapons laboratories and most
other related facilities--with plans to complete these visits soon.
The men and women of America's nuclear weapons complex perform
uniquely difficult, highly technical, and demanding work. As our
stockpile ages well beyond each weapon's originally designed lifespan,
robust stockpile surveillance and assessment programs will enable
strategic deterrence and stability at New START force levels. Weapon
safety, reliability, and performance may change in ways we cannot fully
predict, and surveillance activities permit confidence and continued
stockpile certification without nuclear testing. Dedicated surveillance
and life extension studies constitute the best means of informing the
President and Congress of our nuclear weapons' health, status, and
requirements. The NPR's case-by-case approach to studying and selecting
from the full range of life extension options (refurbishment, reuse,
and, if needed, replacement) ensures the best future for our stockpile.
Today, a narrow window is available to synchronize weapon
sustainment efforts for the W76-1 and B61 (full scope) life extension
activities--cost-effectively introducing improved safety and security
features, avoiding a second B61 nuclear refurbishment in the 2020s, and
potentially reducing the stockpile by consolidating four legacy B61
variants into a single weapon. In addition, a Nuclear Weapons Council
study of W78 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and W88
submarine-launched ballistic missile life extension program options
will examine opportunities to use modular fuze components and develop a
possible common warhead, potentially reducing costs and supporting
long-term capability sustainment. These and future actions that
evaluate ways to reduce warhead numbers and types through stockpile
commonality and flexibility offer the opportunity to continue
accomplishing our strategic deterrence mission while also achieving the
goal of a smaller, more efficient stockpile.
Strategic Delivery Vehicles
The NPR also affirmed the continuing need for the nuclear triad,
which provides the President with multiple options for a variety of
scenarios. The value of the triad lies in its flexibility and
responsiveness to the changing world environment and in its ability to
hedge against technical failure, geopolitical change, or a breakthrough
in another nation's capabilities. America's strategic forces require
continued investment to ensure their future capability, and STRATCOM is
actively engaged with our Service partners to define and advocate for
necessary nuclear force modernization and recapitalization programs.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
The widely dispersed and responsive Minuteman III ICBM force
provides high readiness, low operating costs, and sovereign basing with
multiple aim points that complicate adversary targeting. The Air Force
is successfully concluding decade-long efforts to enhance safety and
security and to sustain the Minuteman force through 2020. The Air Force
is also evaluating requirements to sustain the force through 2030.
STRATCOM supports these programs and is working with the Air Force on a
Capabilities Based Assessment and pre-analysis of alternatives
activities that begin to define options for a follow-on land-based
strategic deterrent beyond 2030.
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles
Ohio-class SSBNs provide an assured and highly survivable response
capability, and the highly accurate Trident II D5 strategic weapon
system continues to exceed the demanding operational reliability
standards established almost 30 years ago. By the time they begin to
retire in 2027, the Ohio-class SSBNs will have served for more than 40
years. The Navy completed an Ohio-class follow on platform AoA and,
with STRATCOM, continues to refine specific replacement requirements.
STRATCOM fully supports Navy efforts to maintain the current fleet,
fund the necessary research and development for its replacement, and
sustain the Trident II D5 ballistic missile and associated
infrastructure to satisfy future deterrent requirements. For example,
current infrastructure at Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor, WA lacks sufficient
Explosive Handling Wharf (EHW) capacity to meet growing missile
handling requirements. A second Pacific EHW wharf at Naval Base Kitsap-
Bangor, WA, is essential to long-term SSBN readiness.
Bombers
America's B-2s and B-52s ensure that the President has visible and
flexible conventional and nuclear global strike and deterrence options.
Affirming their critical deterrent role, the nuclear-capable bomber
force transitioned to STRATCOM's day-to-day operational control in
2010. STRATCOM now has a far stronger voice in balancing this unique,
dual-capable nuclear and conventional bomber force's day-to-day
readiness, training, and operational employment. While the Air Force
continues to sustain mission-critical systems, it will also soon begin
developing a new long-range, dual-capable penetrating bomber. Coupled
with the development of a new bomber, two additional capabilities will
ensure the viability of the air-breathing leg of the Triad for decades
to come. Air Force investments will sustain the Air Launched Cruise
Missile through 2030 (or until a suitable replacement is fielded),
ensuring standoff capability for the long term. Further, the bomber
force must be supported by a fleet of new aerial refueling tankers to
extend their range and assure the bombers' strategic and extended
deterrence roles. STRATCOM supports Air Force progress toward ensuring
the long-term health of the airborne component of our strategic
capability.
Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications
A reliable, assured C3 capability from the President to the nuclear
forces is fundamental to an effective strategic deterrent. National
leaders, commanders, ISR assets, and strategic forces must share
assured linkages to confidently understand and effectively address
nuclear mission demands. Current systems require investments to ensure
reliability and address looming capability gaps in our National
Leadership Command Capability.
A new Strategic Command and Control Complex and Nuclear C3 node at
Offutt Air Force Base, NE, is at the center of our nuclear C3 plans.
The fiscal year 2012 budget seeks a first increment of $150 million to
begin replacing the aging and fragile Curtis E. LeMay building and
colocated facilities. Today's building, command center, and computer
systems took shape long before the IT revolution and now lack the
capacity to support current mission demands. The buildings' systems
strain to support numerous computer and communication systems, and the
spaces occasionally experience serious heating and cooling problems,
electrical failures, and other outages. For example, in December 2010
and January 2011, two water pipe ruptures caused significant system
outages and dislocated staff for several days, although the Command
remained capable of performing its missions due to extraordinary
workarounds and the remarkable efforts of the dedicated staff and a
small army of outside emergency help.
Prior to defining the current requirement, STRATCOM--in
consultation with the Army Corps of Engineers and the Air Force--
evaluated sustaining the status quo, renovating the existing facility,
or engaging in new construction. The evaluation concluded that new
construction offered the most operationally efficient solution to
support STRATCOM's missions, operations, and nuclear C3 needs. The new
facility will ensure an EMP-protected, flexible, sustainable, reliable,
and collaborative environment with an infrastructure that meets the
security challenges of today and tomorrow.
Conventional Prompt Global Strike
A limited, credible, conventional Prompt Global Strike (PGS)
capability would provide the President with an important deterrent
option in some strategic scenarios. Today, we still lack the ability to
rapidly deliver conventional effects against fleeting or geographically
isolated targets, allowing a potential adversary to establish a
sanctuary using mobility and strategic depth. Research, development,
test, and evaluation projects continue making progress, and I ask you
to continue supporting these PGS efforts.
International Engagement
Deterring and dissuading nuclear threats in today's national
security environment also requires careful attention to international
relationships. While the specter of global nuclear war may be more
remote than decades ago, the possibility for miscalculation between
nuclear-armed states remains a perilous threat to global security. As
noted in the NPR, ``Enduring alliances and broad-based political
relationships are the foundation of strategic stability and security.''
Indeed, many nuclear-armed states are important partners in combating
proliferation. New START lowers the maximum number of U.S. and Russian
strategic offensive arms, restores an important, confidence-building
verification regime, and provides opportunities to continue military-
to-military engagement. China's willingness to consider and study
Secretary Gates' proposal for a strategic security dialogue represents
an important avenue for growth between our two militaries in this area
as well. STRATCOM will continue to support DOD, Department of State,
and geographic combatant command activities to develop stable and
cooperative relations with other responsible nuclear powers and will be
prepared to provide advice on other arms control measures that could
encompass a greater range of weapons.
space
Throughout the 20th century, the United States and other countries
developed and exploited the space domain's extraordinary potential,
including changing how we navigate, communicate, and understand our
world. However, the domain is increasingly congested, contested, and
competitive. Guaranteeing mission assurance through adequate Space
Situational Awareness (SSA), resilience, and critical-asset protection
is essential. The new National Space Policy, signed by the President,
and the National Security Space Strategy (NSSS), co-signed by the
Secretary of Defense and Director of National Intelligence, emphasize
the need to continue developing resilient capabilities which will
improve our ability to satisfy combatant commanders' requirements for
uninterrupted ISR, expanded military satellite communications, and PNT
support. Implementing the NSSS will position the national security
space enterprise to shape and strengthen the space domain's safety,
stability, and security; to maintain and enhance U.S. advantages in
space; to energize the U.S. industrial base by engaging a broad range
of partners; to prevent and deter aggression; and to improve
sustainability, acquisition, and flexibility of U.S. space
capabilities.
Situational Awareness
SSA is central to mission assurance and increasingly important. As
part of its SSA mission, STRATCOM now tracks more than 22,000 orbiting
objects. Approximately 1,100 of these objects are active satellites,
but the remaining debris litter a variety of orbits and threatens both
critical systems and human spaceflight. While space surveillance is
improving, we do not yet have robust, assured, and real-time
situational awareness of the orbital domain. Current and future
investments should expand data integration, sharing, and exploitation;
improve object detection, identification, and tracking; and advance our
ability to characterize potential collisions (conjunctions). Notably,
the proposed Space Fence promises to expand detection capacity more
than tenfold from just two or three locations outside the continental
United States and to construct a more comprehensive orbital picture.
Increasing the number of objects tracked will be largely useless,
however, without corresponding improvements in data integration and
exploitation technologies. As part of its SSA mission, the Joint Space
Operations Center (JSpOC) must also be prepared to identify and
attribute purposeful space system interference and provide timely
recommendations to address the interference. Without space situational
awareness of the orbital domain, link segment, and supporting ground
infrastructure, any plans for resilience, mission assurance,
augmentation, and reconstitution will have a weak underpinning.
STRATCOM fully supports funding for both the JSpOC Mission System (JMS)
and planning and design work for a modern JSpOC facility that will
facilitate a generational leap from static displays to automated, real-
time visual conjunction analyses--improving our ability to protect
critical space-based assets and maintain our free access to and use of
space. In addition, technology will soon allow us to link multiple
sensors together in a single network that will meet the needs of many
users.
Cooperation
As a global domain, space and space-based capabilities operate
irrespective of geographic or military boundaries. As more nations join
the space-faring ranks each year and the number of objects in earth
orbit grows, the need to establish norms of behavior and to improve the
cooperation and collaboration among responsible space users grows as
well. Our objective is to sustain a safe, stable, and secure space
domain while maintaining the national security advantages space systems
provide. U.S. efforts to share SSA data represent an important step
toward greater international space cooperation, which should eventually
help to integrate sensors and data from allies and partners worldwide
and ultimately move towards a combined space operations center.
Today, the STRATCOM SSA sharing community includes more than 41,000
users in 141 countries. Our efforts promote the safe and responsible
use of space by providing satellite operators with highly accurate
predictions of close approaches between space objects for every
satellite operator. Since the Secretary of Defense delegated his
authority to enter into agreements with commercial entities to the
STRATCOM Commander last September, we have concluded 23 agreements and
are processing others. Each partner and each agreement signifies an
operational relationship that can yield important exchanges, perhaps
someday leading to a broad, international partnership for space
situational awareness. STRATCOM fully supports expanded planning and
implementation for space partnership operations among allies, coalition
partners, and commercial interests and will work with our partners in
the DOD and elsewhere to help review proposals to establish normalized
behavior.
Space-Based Capabilities
Enabling better situational awareness will improve the overall U.S.
space posture; however, long-term, uninterrupted capability from space
requires equal dedication to protection, resilience, augmentation, and
reconstitution of assets in space, supported by timely design and
development, cost-effective acquisition, and high-confidence space
launch. Today's operating forces rely on space capabilities throughout
the kill chain and beyond. Putting already stressed space capabilities
that allow the joint force to navigate, communicate, see the
battlefield, and strike under all conditions in the kill chain places
those same valuable capabilities on any potential adversary's target
list. STRATCOM fully supports DOD efforts to improve resilience and
increase the protection of key space assets.
Launch
Reliable space capabilities also require an assured ride to orbit.
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELVs) are the DOD's primary launch
vehicles and the sole U.S. vehicles for much of the national security
manifest. STRATCOM supports further Air Force investments in this and
other programs that will assure our access to space. Additionally,
improvements in manifest and scheduling processes and investments
designed to sustain and ensure national launch facilities' availability
for future demand will maximize synergies between launch management and
national priorities.
Industrial Base Concerns
Beneath our national security space requirements lies the need for
a stable, responsive, and innovative national industrial base. Since
the space age began, we have rarely been so reliant on so few
industrial suppliers. Many struggle to remain competitive as demand for
highly specialized components and existing export controls reduce their
customers to a niche government market. Careful interagency planning
that more tightly defines and oversees requirements, supported by
stable budgets and production rates will help sustain a national
industrial base essential to commercial users, military space, and the
strategic deterrent. The retirement of the Space Shuttle and other
changes at NASA also injected significant concern into the solid rocket
motor industrial base--an industry we cannot afford to lose.
Substantial weakening of this capability would impede current strategic
system sustainment and follow-on development. While industry
adjustments are inevitable, DOD, in consultation with NASA and other
agencies, is working to sustain the solid rocket motor industrial base
to ensure we retain right-sized, cost-efficient, and viable design,
development, and production capabilities. STRATCOM supports these
important DOD efforts to improve program stability, increase the
quantity and quality of the acquisition workforce, strengthen clarity
and articulation in the requirements process, and stimulate scientific
and technological advancements.
cyberspace
Last fall in Foreign Affairs, Deputy Secretary of Defense William
Lynn noted that, ``Every day, U.S. military and civilian networks are
probed thousands of times and scanned millions of times.'' Like space,
cyberspace capabilities have rapidly become critical but also
increasingly vulnerable. Cyberspace's pervasive presence, high
importance, difficulty of attribution, and low cost of entry highlight
some of our challenges. Combined with a growing, global reliance on
cyberspace and its hosted capabilities, this constant evolution
challenges mission assurance efforts--particularly as the threat moves
from exploitation to disruption. Ensuring reliable, sustainable
networks, freedom of access, and freedom of maneuver is not just a DOD
problem. This is a national security problem. Assuring access demands
sustained, resilient, and flexible approaches to maturing our defense
capabilities, our capacity, and our cooperative relationships within
and beyond the U.S. Government.
Capabilities
The most important asset any commander can have is robust, up-to-
date situational awareness. Cyberspace is dynamic, and specific threats
require specific countermeasures. The Maginot Line failed because it
was static and the defense failed to anticipate and address
technological and tactical changes. .After the fact. detection and
attribution don't work in cyberspace today either. The offense always
has a strong advantage, overwhelming, subverting, or defeating static
defenses. Continued advances in system and organization teamwork,
coupled with the development and deployment of information-based
capabilities and intelligence-driven sensors that .see. intrusions and
can respond at equivalent speed is essential. Driven by strong, capable
organizations, dynamic, agile, and informed capabilities that
comprehend the network and mitigate threats at the boundary will
significantly strengthen defense of DOD networks.
In response to the growing threat, last year the DOD established
U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) at Fort Meade, MD as a subunified command
to STRATCOM. STRATCOM delegated responsibilities to CYBERCOM to
coordinate, plan, synchronize, and execute cyberspace operations in
order to better defend DOD networks and to support other combatant
commanders. We must accelerate the acquisition of comprehensive, shared
cyber awareness tools to expand opportunities to secure critical
information, reduce points of vulnerability, and develop responses to
ensure warfighter access to essential information systems.
Capacity. Today, operators at CYBERCOM and its subordinate Service
components work to defend against and attribute numerous information
network intrusion attempts. The cyber workforce is growing, but our
organizations and capabilities must also grow to keep pace with ongoing
operations. STRATCOM is working with CYBERCOM to improve the cyber
awareness of every DOD member with access to an information system,
strengthen organizations, resolve roles/responsibilities, expand
partnerships, build technological and human capacity for full-spectrum
cyberspace operations, and integrate cyber capabilities into every
commander's plans and operations. Recruiting adequately trained and
equipped cyber warriors is challenging, but fortunately young Americans
grow up learning and adapting to new technological platforms from a
young age. Service cyber career paths are still being developed, and
these critical, technical skills need both time to develop and
sustained investment to prevent their atrophy. Sustained force
development emphasis and investment is essential. The U.S. is also home
to the world's premier educational and commercial information
technology entities. We must continue to capitalize on this capacity
and partner with these organizations on our requirements and to spur
domestic math and science interest. Doing so will help develop, expand,
and sustain a base of cyber expertise and adapt DOD personnel processes
to attract, develop, and retain the cyber professionals necessary to
protect critical DOD infrastructure and preserve U.S. freedom of action
in cyberspace.
Cooperation
Cyber defense must include a wide range of partners. After all,
this is truly a national security issue, making interagency and allied
partner engagement and information sharing essential to a robust
defense. Military operations depend on the broader U.S. information
technology infrastructure, and defending military networks will net
fewer benefits if the wider civilian infrastructure remains at much
greater risk. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is ultimately
responsible for coordinating the protection of the ``.gov'' and
domestic ``.com'' domains, but DOD has much to offer in terms of
intelligence and technical support. The DOD-DHS Memorandum of
Understanding signed last fall lays important groundwork for enhanced
cooperation, mutual support, and synchronized operations.
winning today's fight
In strategic deterrence, space, and cyberspace, STRATCOM both
operates forces and supports the full range of military operations. The
broad scope of our responsibilities and trans-regional capabilities is
clearly woven into the fabric of today's operations. Winning the fight,
whether we are either a supported command or are supporting the
geographic combatant commands, is something our team strives to do each
and every day. However, STRATCOM also has responsibilities to
integrate, synchronize, and advocate for other capabilities with trans-
regional impact, and we are dedicated to partnering with other
combatant commands to improve the warfighting effectiveness of these
capabilities.
Information Operations
Consistent with our mission to improve strategic joint
capabilities, STRATCOM participated in a 2010 Secretary of Defense
directed Strategic Communication (SC) and IO Front-End Assessment,
designed to evaluate and recommend improvements for DOD roles,
missions, definition, management, and resources for SC and IO. As a
result of the assessment, STRATCOM will reorganize the Joint
Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC) at Lackland AFB, TX.
Existing JIOWC resources and missions not specific to electronic
warfare will be realigned to the Joint Staff, and STRATCOM will remain
the DOD lead for Electronic Warfare (EW).
Electronic warfare
The electromagnetic spectrum spans almost every modern
technological convenience. While operational plans normally assume
unfettered spectrum access, this assumption is not assured. Changing
industry standards, global growth of civilian devices, military
bandwidth requirements, and disruptive or destructive adversary
electronic warfare capabilities all threaten to pinch or sever the
shrinking electromagnetic links between national security platforms and
the operating forces that rely on them.
Recognizing future threats, potential limitations, urgent
warfighter needs, and the need for unified DOD advocacy, JIOWC
completed several Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) tasks to
examine capability gaps and solutions for emerging electromagnetic
spectrum threats. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2010 required DOD to develop an EW strategy, submitted to Congress
last year. That EW strategy concluded that we must move beyond the
traditional understanding of EW by combining it with other kinetic or
non-kinetic capabilities to increase U.S. combat effectiveness and
achieve electromagnetic spectrum superiority. STRATCOM is planning to
establish a Joint Electronic Warfare Center to advocate for and support
DOD Joint EW capability requirements, resources, strategy, doctrine,
planning, training, and operational support.
Missile Defense
The Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) exists to meet
combatant commands' theater defense needs and to provide for the
limited defense of the United States. Working with geographic combatant
commands and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), our efforts focus on
building tailored, regional missile defense architectures using the
concept of a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) and on meeting urgent
warfighter capability needs. STRATCOM's work provides a comprehensive
assessment of the fielded BMDS's suitability and effectiveness and
combines warfighter needs for air, cruise missile, and ballistic
missile defense capabilities to inform programmatic actions and guide
future R&D investment priorities.
At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO
allies affirmed the PAA for missile defense as a means to address the
continued qualitative and quantitative growth of global ballistic
missile programs. The Allies also invited the Russian Federation to
participate in missile defense cooperation. As a strategy, PAA applies
to several geographic combatant commands, and STRATCOM's current
challenge is to make sound, analytically-based recommendations to
balance limited BMD assets worldwide. The European PAA's four phases of
increasing capability are designed to defend against existing and near-
term threats posed by short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and to
build up defenses against long-range ballistic threats over time as
those threats mature. As stated during the New START debate, the U.S.
will not agree to any ballistic missile defense limitations or
constraints and indeed intends to continue developing and deploying
systems consistent with U.S. interests. The U.S. missile defense
program is not designed to counter the strategic forces of Russia or
China, but rather to address limited ballistic missile threats such as
those posed by Iran and North Korea.
As various regional PAAs develop, STRATCOM will continually re-
evaluate the standing Global Integrated Missile Defense Concept of
Operations and other acquisition, deployment, basing, and employment
plans for missile defense capabilities between and across all areas of
responsibility. Our analysis will ensure that the joint warfighters'
requirements receive deliberate management and readiness structures to
ensure timely, flexible deployment, employment and redeployment of
tested, understood BMD capabilities during and after crises.
Consistent with the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, new
advancements and allied technologies must be made interoperable with
existing systems, including required improvements in discrimination
capabilities essential to the efficient employment of limited missile
defense resources.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Timely, useable situational awareness and intelligence analysis is
essential to all military operations. Airborne, submarine, and space-
based ISR capabilities all provide key indications and warning
information to commanders facing an array of traditional adversaries,
nontraditional threats, and challenging intelligence problems. For the
past decade, ISR efforts focused primarily on meeting the expanding
demand in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility. As
overseas contingency operations change, DOD must carefully examine
force requirements to ensure we organize, train, and equip a balanced
force across the range of requirements, including anti-access
environments and New START verification. An objective, multi-domain,
capabilities-based architecture that improves the ability to identify
requirements across geographic boundaries and the range of potential
threats is essential to appropriately balancing risk against necessary
programmatic, budgetary, and acquisition decision points.
STRATCOM's ISR efforts achieved significant resource efficiencies
and shaped ISR capability decisions through initiatives like the ISR
Force Sizing Construct project, the High Altitude Transition study, the
Synoptic Operational Area Reconnaissance Study, and the Mobile Nuclear
Air Sampling Study. STRATCOM also successfully advocated for a critical
CENTCOM ISR capability--designed and executed in approximately 30
months and at a lower cost than traditional acquisition processes. The
Services and Intelligence Community must continue to strive for better
integration in order to reach greater efficiencies--not only for the
collection platforms themselves but also across the still-limited
processing, exploitation, and dissemination architecture needed to
transform collections into actionable intelligence.
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
Another mission area requiring sustained attention is CWMD, since
the pursuit of WMD by violent extremists and their proliferation to
additional states remains the primary threat to the United States, our
allies, and our partners. STRATCOM received the responsibility to
synchronize DOD CWMD activities in 2005 and has made discouraging,
detecting, deterring, and, if necessary, defeating these threats a
priority for theater operations and strategic deterrence. Some actors
seek nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons to coerce their neighbors
or to deter U.S. intervention in regional conflicts. Others may seek
such weapons to use them in terrorist attacks or as weapons of war.
Diffuse networks of non-state entities, secretive state sponsors, shell
corporations, and terrorist-financed transactions challenge our
intelligence organizations to develop comprehensive, accurate, and
actionable assessments that enable global CWMD. STRATCOM continues to
pursue further national CWMD capability improvements with interagency
partners to coordinate CWMD objectives, plans, and activities.
Among current and future CWMD enhancements are technological
improvements to detect, analyze, and assess WMD developments. The 2010
QDR affirmed the need to enhance National Technical Nuclear Forensics
capabilities which, along with accurate intelligence and other
information, support nuclear threat attribution and may thereby deter
those considering the diversion, transfer, development, or use of
nuclear weapons, improvised nuclear devices, radiological dispersal
devices, and other nuclear or radiological threats. In the past year,
the STRATCOM Center for CWMD (SCC WMD) embedded Proliferation Security
Initiative activities within U.S. Africa Command, CENTCOM, and U.S.
Southern Command exercises and supported planning and funding efforts
to expand exercise participation and training synchronization across
geographic combatant commands. Finally, SCC WMD collaboratively
operates the Interagency Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Database
of Responsibilities, Authorities, and Capabilities (INDRAC) System with
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. INDRAC provides a strategic level
information reference resource to inform CWMD operations, planning,
advocacy, training, and exercises across the government.
In the 2010 QDR, the Secretary of Defense directed DOD to establish
a Joint Task Force Elimination Headquarters to ``better plan, train,
and execute WMD-elimination operations . . . with increased nuclear
disablement, exploitation, intelligence, and coordination
capabilities.'' Last December, Secretary Gates tasked STRATCOM to
execute this task and stand up a Standing Joint Force Headquarters for
Elimination of WMD with ``standing exploitation and intelligence cells
in order to plan, train for, and execute global WMD elimination
operations.'' STRATCOM is currently analyzing the requirements
necessary to implement the Secretary's direction.
conclusion
Great challenges lie ahead of the United States and STRATCOM, but
so too do great opportunities. The Command is dedicated to being an
effective steward of taxpayer resources while maintaining a strategic
force structure ready and able to deter aggression, preserve U.S.
freedom of action, and defeat adversaries when necessary. The
uncertainty inherent in today's complex, multi-domain security
environment requires that we summon our best efforts to develop and
deploy the plans, systems, and forces needed to sustain America's
deterrent, ensure unfettered access to and through space and
cyberspace, and win the dynamic joint fight. I look forward to working
with Congress as we pursue these priorities together, and I appreciate
your support and counsel in the months and years ahead. Thank you again
for the opportunity to be here today, and welcome back to Nebraska and
the Bellevue-Offutt community.
Senator Nelson. Thank you very much, General.
The advantage of being the only member here is I get to ask
all the questions. I do not have to share the time with anybody
else. So there is an advantage. It was not why I thought we
ought to do it here, but it is certainly an added benefit.
Thank you for your very thoughtful comments, and I do have
a couple of questions.
In your prepared statement, you described the mission of
STRATCOM and it includes the responsibility to foster strategic
stability and, as you have said, ensure uninterrupted
capabilities from and access to space and cyberspace, respond
to both traditional and nontraditional threats, and deal with
surprise in an era of rapid technological advances as we talked
about this morning, a very complex but related set of missions.
Now that you have been in your new responsibilities as
commander, what are the three most difficult challenges that
you see in being able to fulfill these missions?
General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, the first challenge that I
would continue to highlight is this dramatically different
operating environment that we find ourselves in today. I think
my colleagues in the other combatant commands would share my
assessment of this. I do not think we have ever seen an
operating environment like today's. When we look at the range
of activity that we are engaged in around the world today, when
we look at the complexity of the national security environment
that we find ourselves engaged with today, when we look at the
differences for us--for example, when we talk about space and
cyberspace, items that we have talked about in military
planning for years about distances and time do not mean the
same thing when you can span global distances through space and
cyberspace in milliseconds.
When we talk about boundaries--and typically we have
focused on geographic areas as areas of interest for our
military activities--those boundaries are not the same when we
talk about space and cyberspace.
When we talk about asymmetric challenges to us--and those
come frequently in space and cyberspace. This ambiguity--actors
can act in cyberspace and you never know who they are or you do
not know for quite some time until you do the forensics and
discover who someone was when they were actually doing some
criminal activity, for example, in cyberspace.
So the changed operating environment is one of the toughest
challenges that we face.
The second one with aging systems, in particular, is to
ensure the level of readiness that we need to meet those
challenges in this new operating environment. We find that
continued investment is required certainly across the nuclear
enterprise. We have testified to that before, as you well know.
The President's budget contains requests to continue our
investment in the existing forces that we have for strategic
deterrence, as well as the support and command and control, as
well as the weapons complex that underpins all of it.
In addition to that, I am equally concerned about aging
weapons systems today. We were very gratified with the
selection by the Air Force of a new tanker and the ability to
move forward there. We are very gratified that Congress has
given us approval to move forward with a replacement to the
Ohio-class submarine. We have been very encouraged by decisions
inside DOD in the proposal now to Congress to go forward with a
new bomber platform. In the meantime, we have to make sure that
we are sustaining those platforms that are out there to include
our space systems, to include the new area that we have for
cyberspace.
Finally, the third challenge that I have that I think about
every day is preparing for and responding to surprise. Surprise
can be particularly decisive when it involves things like space
and cyberspace potentially or the nuclear world, for example.
This is where our concern about combating WMD, not just
maintaining this strategic stability we have with Russia, for
example, but combating WMD and especially WMD in the hands of
violent extremists or state proliferators are things that we
must pay attention to.
I have other concerns but those are the top three that keep
me awake at night. Significantly, by the way, when people ask
if anything keeps me awake at night, nothing operational keeps
me awake at night because of the magnificent people that you
see here with me today. Once the missions are in their hands, I
stop worrying about it. It is all the things that I am supposed
to do to make sure that they have the tools that they need that
keep me awake.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
You made reference to the fact that the President's budget
request includes the money to start construction of a new
headquarters for STRATCOM. I think you gave us some indication
why this is an important investment as part of our national
security. Could you maybe expand on that just a little bit?
General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, STRATCOM performs a unique
mission among the Nation's military forces. We occupy a unique
place, not only a unique physical place, but we occupy a unique
operational place in our Nation's defense infrastructure. We
have a unique location here in terms of our abilities to
conduct planning, in terms of our capability to do national
level command and control of our strategic deterrent forces, in
the ability for us to pull together the pieces of our strategic
deterrent with our space activities, with our cyberspace
activities, with our national nuclear defense activities, to
pull all of those pieces together to perform a uniquely
important job.
The facilities that we perform that job from today were
designed in the early 1950s, constructed in the middle 1950s,
and are much like we were talking earlier this morning. The
multiple electronic devices that you bring into your house
today or have carting around, in my case in my car--I have a
lot of different things that I carry around with me. Those have
all come along pretty late, and yet none of my infrastructure
in my home supports any of that. I have more of those plug-in
power strips around my house, for example, than I do have
anything else. So that is one example of the facility that we
have here not supporting the mission demands any longer.
Power is an issue for us. Cooling air is an issue for us.
We have essentially cobbled together over the years a number of
systems on top of systems. We find ourselves in a position here
where, if we are not careful, we have created a very vulnerable
place from either a simple accidental problem with the
infrastructure to other more significant problems dealing with
cyber threats and other things.
Our assessment has been that for this unique mission we
need to go back and reconstruct a new command and control
facility, and while we tend to look at that as a building, the
building surrounds it. What is important here is what goes in
the building and the building that is built to support it. So
we have made a budget request that is working its way through
your committee and others to essentially bring the
infrastructure here to the point where it matches now the
mission responsibilities that we have been given.
Senator Nelson. If a terrorist, for example, were able to
obtain nuclear materials, plutonium or uranium, build an
improvised nuclear device, and blow that device up in a U.S.
city, obviously, the devastation would be significant. First,
what is STRATCOM's role in making sure that this does not
happen? Second, if it does happen, what is STRATCOM's role in
responding to that kind of an event?
General Kehler. Sir, one of the mission responsibilities
that STRATCOM has is what we would call collectively combating
WMD. As I said in my opening remarks, the current national
security strategy says very clearly that the most significant
threat that we are facing today is WMD in the hands of a
violent extremist or in the hands of a state proliferator,
which is why we are so concerned about North Korea and Iran,
for example.
STRATCOM has been given planning responsibilities to be the
synchronizer, if you will, for the global planning that goes on
in every one of our combatant commands, to include U.S. Special
Operations Command (SOCOM). We are given the responsibility to
sit, if you will, at the top of the pyramid and make sure that
all of the plans fit together. The problem is not unique to
STRATCOM. I think if you had the other combatant commanders
here, which you have done, I know, in your subcommittee at some
length and in front of the full committee, every one of the
geographic combatant commanders stated their concerns about
proliferation of WMD. It is a concern for all of the combatant
commanders today.
Our responsibility is to make sure that all the plans fit
together. And we host some planning conferences, which does not
sound as important as what it is, where we make sure that all
of the combatant commands have the appropriate plans in place
to both detect such activity, track it, if necessary, and then
offer the President alternatives for how to deal with that if
it should ever arise, all the way up to and including U.S.
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) which would have the responsibility
to assist civil authorities in dealing with the horrible
scenario that you laid out for us.
We also have responsibility to work with the Joint Staff
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
interagency to make sure that our activities are coordinated
along with those of law enforcement, the Intelligence
Community, and other parts of our Government to make sure that
we are all focused on this issue with the attention that it
deserves.
Had we been having a conversation here 20 years ago and you
said to me, ``point out to me the number one plan that is on
the top shelf in your office,'' I would have pulled out our
nuclear deterrence master plan, and I would have said, ``here
it is. This is the number one most important thing that we are
doing today.''
If you ask me today, I would say there are two plans up
there. One would be the nuclear deterrence plan, which always
has to be there in my view, but the other would be a plan
called ``combating WMD.'' It is our plan to pull these pieces
together to make sure that we are in the position, even though
we do not have a lot of the forces that would be used to deal
with such a problem, that we are in a position that we have the
appropriate plans in place and we have either deterred or
dissuaded or prevented that kind of thing from happening to
begin with.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
You have touched on this by mentioning North Korea, but let
us say countries like North Korea and Iran proliferate WMD, as
well as the delivery systems such as missiles. Is there
anything in particular that you do in connection with
proliferating countries as opposed to, let us say, a terrorist
or an effort at an attack?
General Kehler. For counterproliferation, sir, we are part
of a big team that is an intergovernmental team. In fact, that
team extends outside DOD into the rest of our U.S. Government
and from there through state and other means to our allies and
friends around the world as well.
To effectively counter the proliferation of either
ballistic missiles or WMD is a hierarchy of steps that we take.
Beginning with treaties, international legal arrangements,
norms of behavior, all of those things that would typically
fall in the Department of State's realm are complemented by
things that would fall within the Intelligence Community's
realm, within DOD's realm, and then ultimately at the combatant
commander level a series of plans that we could offer to the
President if he chose to take action in response to
proliferation.
The real objective here is to dissuade it or deter it or
prevent it. Those actions are underway through a variety of
means. Of course, you are well familiar with your former
colleagues, Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar, the actions that
have gone on there that have been counterproliferation to try
to secure WMD materials around the world, the treaty structure
that has surrounded some of these activities as well, and then
beyond that, ultimately the activities that would go on in the
regional combatant commands and then in STRATCOM, SOCOM, and
elsewhere to be supportive of whatever other steps might need
to be taken.
Senator Nelson. Maybe you could help us understand a little
bit about how the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) actually works
and how there would be coordination through STRATCOM and MDA to
protect against any kind of an attack, but in the event that
there were an attack, how that could work.
General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, first of all, our U.S.
missile defense system is a global system. The national part of
this is aimed at a small, very limited number of missiles that
would be launched against the United States from one of these
smaller state actors. Specifically, our orientation today is on
North Korea where they have both demonstrated that they have
the capability to produce a nuclear weapon and they have
demonstrated in a very aggressive way their ability to field
ballistic missiles that today are capable--they have not yet
put all the pieces together--of reaching our allies in the
western Pacific as well as ultimately the testing that they are
doing on longer-range missiles that eventually will have the
capability to reach the United States.
Our missile defense system today that is oriented for
national defense is intended to deal with that problem and,
hopefully, it is a part of our overall effort to dissuade that
kind of activity on the part of the North Koreans from having
them put all those pieces together eventually.
It also, though, is oriented toward those that are
considering going forward here, Iran, for example.
It is not oriented against Russia and China with larger,
far more sophisticated arsenals. The way we maintain stability
there, although we do not consider either Russia or China an
enemy, with their capabilities is through the arms control and
stability, confidence-building transparency measures that we
have going on elsewhere, and then ultimately through our
strategic deterrent force which is still there and sized and
shaped to be that stabilizing force and deterrent force, vis-a-
vis both Russia and China.
So we work very closely with the MDA. We set the
requirements for national missile defense. We do the assessment
of its military utility. We are working very carefully with
NORTHCOM that would have the responsibility to use that system
under the direction of the President and Secretary of Defense
if that were ever necessary, and we pull all of the combatant
commanders together to make sure that the needs of the
warfighters are being met, in particular, now that we have a
good start and an effective system in place for national
missile defense, to begin to orient that missile defense system
now on where the very large threat and real threat is to our
forces and our allies, and that is at the feeder level, which
is why we have begun to focus as intensely as we have on the
feeder-related pieces of this.
Senator Nelson. Our goal is, obviously, to make sure that
others know what we can do to prevent their being successful in
attacking us. If they understand that we can deter, we can
prevent, deflect any effort on their part, hopefully then that
dissuades them from trying to go forward and spend additional
time trying to find ways to further defeat our defensive
system.
Do you think that we have been successful in some respects
at least? I understand North Korea is controlled by a very
unusual person who does not seem to deal with reality the same
way the rest of us do. But apart from that, do you think that
we perhaps have been able to dissuade some of the other
countries from looking at trying to defeat our systems of
defense?
General Kehler. It is hard to say, Mr. Chairman. There are
two things I would say.
First, I believe in the assessment that we have done on our
limited defensive posture that we have for the Nation today, I
believe that is an effective system, and I believe that system
would work as advertised in response to a limited threat. So,
number one, the credibility of how others would view it, I
think, is linked to the assessments that we have made about its
potential effectiveness. I believe that it is to the point
where our assessment of this from a military standpoint is that
it is effective for the purpose that it is intended. That does
not mean that it would be capable of responding to some
overwhelming strike. It could not do that, and yet that is why
we also still retain offensive weapons to make this a package
of things that we would use for deterrence purposes.
The second point I would make is we do not see one-size-
fits-all deterrence any longer. We think that deterrence is a
combination of things. Missile defense is one piece of that.
Offensive forces is another piece of that. Our conventional
forward forces is another piece of that. Our ability to command
and control is another piece of that. So there are lots of
pieces that make up the deterrence equation.
I believe that any potential adversary, certainly nation
states, take those factors into account in their
decisionmaking. They wind up making their decisions based upon
lots of things. It is hard to tell why the North Korean
Government makes the decisions that it makes sometimes, but we
assume some amount of rationality to other actors out there at
the nation state level. My view is that all of them take this
into account. How effective it is depends on their own
assessment of benefit/risk/reward, and all the things that they
will go through and the behavior that we will see based upon
their own decision calculus. But I believe very firmly that
they all take all of these issues into account when they are
making those decisions.
Senator Nelson. As you indicated, STRATCOM is responsible
for implementing the New START treaty with Russia. Your
predecessor, General Chilton, was a strong advocate for the
treaty. The treaty has now been ratified by the Senate. It is
in place. Can you give us your thoughts on how effective you
think this treaty may be and what our objectives will be in
reducing mutually the arms race and hopefully stop the
proliferation in the world of the arms race?
General Kehler. Yes, sir. First of all, I too am a firm
supporter of the New START treaty. The Senate did ratify it. It
has entered into force in February. We have 7 years to
implement the provisions of the treaty. However, we are moving
out to implement those provisions. A number of things are
already underway. We have exchanged data with the Russians. We
have done other things. There have been some preliminary
inspections done. There have been some demonstrations and
expositions, if you will. So a number of steps are underway.
We have not yet made final decisions on what our force
structure will look like within the treaty limits. The treaty
does not require us to do anything other than meet its limits,
1,550 operational warheads, 700 deployed operational launchers,
up to 800 deployed and non-deployed. How we structure our force
remains to be seen, and that decision process is underway both
inside the combatant command here, inside the Joint Staff, as
the Chairman is working his way through all of this, ultimately
en route to discussion with the Secretary of Defense and
ultimately en route to a discussion with the White House over
how we should structure our forces.
So we are moving forward. I think the single, most valuable
thing about the treaty is that it does, in fact, place limits
on those weapons that threaten the United States of America
most significantly and most immediately. So that was a very
positive step.
A second very positive step is the fact that we have a
treaty with the Russians at all. I think that what that does is
it creates a dialogue with the Russians. We have found that to
be a useful dialogue from well before the end of the Cold War.
We have found that that is helpful for transparency reasons. It
forces us to deal with one another on all kinds of levels, and
it, in fact, allows us to continue this pathway that we have
been on with the Russians since before the end of the Cold War,
which is to reduce the overall number of weapons in a way that
promotes stability and yet continues to allow us to have the
strategic deterrent force that we think we need to meet our
deterrence objectives. I see all of those as positives, and we
see this as a positive way forward to work the implementation
details as we decide what that force structure should
ultimately look like.
Senator Nelson. I think there were a lot of questions
raised during the debate on the floor of the Senate about the
treaty, whether or not there would be enough nuclear weapons
for our offense and defense. So I guess the question is are
there enough for our mutually assured destruction given what
Russia will have and what we have, which is not our goal, but
there was some concern that we are getting down to maybe a
manageable level but an unsafe and insecure level.
General Kehler. Sir, I do not think we are unsafe or
insecure at all given the levels in the New START treaty. I
would not characterize this any longer as mutually assured
destruction. That means a lot of things.
Senator Nelson. It is still something to think about.
General Kehler. Yes, sir. That means a lot of things to a
lot of people.
What I would say is that at this force level that I am
confident that we can meet our deterrence objectives. The force
level that was agreed to and the assessments that were made
which were prior to my time but which I fully agree with--those
assessments were made based upon a series of deterrence
objectives that have been in place for quite some time. The
next step is to go back and look, and the NPR said that we
would do this. Once the New START treaty has been put into
force, now the question is, what is next. So we have begun to
work with the rest of DOD and others to think our way through
what is next.
Senator Nelson. There was also a question about whether or
not this would, in the words of President Reagan, permit us to
trust but verify, and being able to have a certain level of
verification was, in fact, part of what this treaty was about.
So are you comfortable with the ability that we have to verify
what Russia is doing as they would have the ability to verify
what we are doing, as I described it, looking under each
other's hood of the vehicle to see what is there?
General Kehler. Yes, sir. I am comfortable with this. I
believe that the verification mechanism that was put in place
for this treaty fits the treaty. There was some discussion
about whether this verification process would have fit the last
treaty, and the answer is it would not have but it does fit
this one and I am comfortable with it, with the provision, of
course, that we continue to source those verification methods
to include the national technical means that we use to help us
enforce the verification provisions of the treaty.
Senator Nelson. Turning to the area that I think a lot of
people are paying close attention to or beginning to learn
about, cyberspace, you referred to the Cyber Command as being a
subunified command under STRATCOM. Maybe you could help us
understand exactly what a subunified command is. We are all
trying to learn how to speak the military language. I do not
know that I have mastered it all, but I am trying to learn more
about it.
General Kehler. Sir, I can just say as an aside, the
military people in here have not mastered it all, I can
guarantee you. [Laughter.]
We stand up a subunified command when there is a specific
mission responsibility that requires focused attention is, I
think, the best way to say it. For example, U.S. Forces-Korea
is a subunified command to the U.S. Pacific Command. We stood
that up years ago because there is such a unique set of
challenges associated with what is still a standoff, of course,
on the Korean Peninsula that we felt it was necessary to put a
separate senior officer in charge of worrying about that every
day, 24 hours a day.
We did the same thing for U.S. Forces-Japan some years ago,
and we have done that from time to time over the years when a
specific issue was significant enough, required such detailed
activities and awareness and specific responses that it
required the full-time attention of a senior officer every day.
That is what we have done in this case with cyberspace. We
have stood up U.S. Cyber Command as a subunified command. It is
commanded by a four-star officer, General Keith Alexander, of
the U.S. Army. He wears another hat as well as the Director of
the National Security Agency. The headquarters is at Fort Mead.
That is a center of gravity for this kind of activity for the
Nation that we have charged him. In fact, we have delegated the
responsibilities that are given to STRATCOM to operate and
defend DOD's networks. We have delegated those responsibilities
to him, and what we find is the uniqueness of cyberspace
demands that kind of attention where we have made, I believe,
very good progress. Certainly we have a long way to go but we
have made very good progress.
The other thing this does is it gives a specific focal
point for the rest of the government to interact with when they
are talking about how do we do cyberspace business as a
complete government. It also gives a way to reach out to
commercial. As you well know, sir, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) retains responsibilities here for defending the
Nation's critical infrastructure, to include the cyberspace
critical infrastructure. What we are trying to work our way
through with Cyber Command is not how do we completely reinvent
the role of the U.S. military related to cyberspace, but how do
we apply our traditional military activities to cyberspace.
That is everything from defense support of civil authorities to
protecting our own DOD activities to conducting military
operations.
So Cyber Command is in the thick of all of that
conversation. We are, of course, working with them from
STRATCOM. In fact, yesterday we spent an entire day, both
staffs together, back at Cyber Command headquarters outside of
Washington. I think that putting a subunified command together
for this subject at this time has been exactly the right thing
to do.
Senator Nelson. Statistics are now showing that criminals
engaging in cyber crime make more money today in that cyber
crime than via the drug trade for the first time. Obviously, we
have to deal with criminal efforts in cyber or terrorist
activity that could be criminal but for a different purpose not
necessarily for profitability but to try to destroy our
networks to adversely impact us.
In working with DHS, how does this work? If you are not
reinventing the wheel, trying to work with DHS, which would be
concerned primarily, not entirely, with terrorists but with
cyber crime, how do you distinguish or how do you divide up
those responsibilities or follow up after they are discovered?
General Kehler. Sir, first of all, those relationships are
still being established. There has been a memorandum of
agreement signed between DHS and DOD that lays out an initial
relationship between the two departments. I think it is
important to note that the Department of Justice (DOJ), for
example, is a key player in all of this as well. There are
other Federal departments that are also key players in here,
and so the question is really one of relationships across the
entire Federal Government.
But let us take the DHS example for a second. Our friends
in NORTHCOM and Admiral Sandy Winnefeld who commands that
command today--we have worked through a series of relationships
that allow him to do what we would call defense support for
civil authorities. He supports DHS in the physical world in
many ways whether it is from wildland fire fighting, whether it
is flood activities, whatever it is where DHS turns to DOD and
says, ``I need help, you have unique capabilities, unique tools
that we need, unique manpower, unique training, whatever it
happens to be, and we need that to support civil authorities
and their activities.'' This is the same set of lanes in the
road, if you will, that we need to carve out with DHS for
cyber. It is different in that cyber is a different animal for
us to deal with, but I am confident--and I think we are all
confident--that we can establish those relationships.
You asked how would we respond. In some cases, those
relationships are in place today, and we have ways to respond.
In other cases, they are not. If you listen to the
conversations that go on from our Deputy Secretary of Defense
and others, I think we would all acknowledge today that there
is much more to do to position the Nation to be able to deal
with cyberspace in terms of the amount of activity that we see
from all different directions.
But I think the final point I would make here is very
significantly, in some cases things that happen in cyberspace,
while the press headlines might use the word ``attack,'' when
the word ``attack'' is used for people like us with uniforms
like these, that means something to us that is not always
necessarily the same thing we mean when we talk about attacks
in cyberspace. In some cases, as you pointed out, those are
criminal activities and best handled by our criminal activity
handlers, whether that is the Federal Bureau of Investigations
or whether that is local law enforcement or whether that is the
State patrol or whatever, whether it is DOJ. Those are the
kinds of questions that we are asking ourselves to make sure
that we are not wanting to pick up the phone and call DOD for
the wrong reasons.
Senator Nelson. This is sensitive because I am going to
make reference to China. There have been a lot of penetrations
of U.S. Government and industrial computer systems with data
theft that have been traced back to China, and while it is not
possible to determine with certainty that these attacks are
coming from or directly directed by the Chinese Government, the
evidence over a number of years might cause some people to draw
that conclusion. But at a minimum, if these attacks are not
sponsored or officially sanctioned by the Chinese Government,
it appears to most of us that the Chinese Government has done
little or nothing to stop them, almost reminiscent of
intellectual property theft as well.
Is this something that is being looked at? I know it is a
very delicate sort of a question, but is this something that is
being looked at right now militarily? If you can even answer
that in this environment.
General Kehler. Sir, what I would say is about a week and a
half ago, maybe 2 weeks ago, the White House released a
document. I may get the title a little bit wrong, but I think
it is called ``The International Strategy for Cyberspace.'' I
think that is what it was called. If it was not called that,
that is close.
One of the highlights of that document is the idea that
everyone will have to behave responsibly in cyberspace, that
there is some expectation that to get the benefit out of
cyberspace, that people will behave responsibly. I think that
gets to your point here, that there needs to be responsible
behavior at all levels.
I will not comment on the specifics of any country, et
cetera, because the other thing that you pointed out with your
question is how difficult it is to determine who is doing what
in cyberspace. Ambiguity is almost a hallmark of people's
behavior in cyberspace. That is not a bad thing because we all
want our privacy, of course. But it provides us with some
difficult problems in trying to attribute behavior to various
actors out there. So that is going to be a problem for us, I
think, to work our way through for quite some time to come.
Senator Nelson. Is that something that we could gather as a
group of countries who have this capability as governments? We
recognize there are private citizens located all around the
world that have the capabilities that sometimes astound us that
individuals would develop those levels of capability. But is
that something where you think we might, as we have with the
New START treaty, enter into some sort of an agreement with
other countries where it is actual signatories to try to police
that back home, wherever we possibly can, whether it is our
country or another country?
General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, I do not know what the
mechanism would be, nor would I suggest a mechanism to do it.
But I would say that the new national strategy suggests that we
need to band together in some way as some type of a community
of nations to make sure that our behavior is consistent with
what our objectives are for the Internet, which is free and
open activity for everybody.
The interesting thing here is going to be, I think, whether
by engaging nation states, you have everyone that you need in
such an agreement. If you think about some of the issues we
have seen in the last several years, there have been a couple
of cases where we have non-nation states accusing nation states
of bad behavior. So you have companies accusing nations;
nations accusing companies. This is going to be very
interesting, I think, for policymakers to sort out who you
include in these kinds of agreements, which is why I think the
strategy for cyberspace was pretty insistent on this idea that
everyone has to behave responsibly.
Senator Nelson. There is the distinction that we talked
about between that that is just criminal for profit type
efforts versus terrorists or nation state efforts that are the
equivalent of spying to try to access our secrets and inveigle
their way into our systems.
General Kehler. Yes, sir. Vandalism, criminal activity,
espionage, military activity, all of those things are happening
in there at some level, and sorting all that out is one of our
big challenges.
Senator Nelson. I mentioned and you mentioned as well space
debris. Can you give us some relative understanding of how much
stuff is up there? Obviously, we think of space as being
unlimited and we think about it as expanding the globe. How
congested and contested is space right now with all that
debris?
General Kehler. I think two things that I have seen that
have been really dramatic changes in my time on Active Duty,
one was, of course, the end of the Cold War and the reduction
of our nuclear forces. The other has been the change in space
from the start of the Space Age which, of course, I was not on
Active Duty for, but from the late 1950s to today, how much the
nature of our space activities has changed, how much our
reliance has changed on those space things, how much the
participants have changed, and how much the number of manmade
objects has changed.
So if I just focus on the objects for a second, I think in
1957 there was one manmade object on orbit. Today we are
sitting here in 2011 and there are well over 20,000 manmade
objects. About 1,000 of those are active satellites. So 19,000-
plus pieces of debris of one kind or another. That is those
things that we can see, some sized around a softball or so
larger. Our estimates are that there are probably 10 times that
amount of debris that is smaller than what we actually actively
would look at on a case-by-case basis. So pretty soon we are
talking about a lot of objects here.
You would say big space, little object theory, but you have
to think about this, that there are some places on orbit that
are more crowded than others, that are more desirable than
others, not unlike driving. There are a lot of cars that
transit Nebraska, but most of them are on the interstate, I
would hazard a guess, and a lot of them go through the
intersection out here of I-80 and 480. So that is the same
thing on orbit, that there is a lot of stuff up there but it is
channeled in certain places, and in some places it goes through
intersections.
So that in and of itself is a risk, first, to human space
flight, and we put a protective observation bubble, if you
will, around the Space Station and human space flight. Second,
we put an observation bubble, if you will, around our active
satellites, and then we are in agreements with others around
the world to provide that kind of service for them as well.
The final thing about this that makes it so potentially
damaging is the speed at which things are traveling on orbit.
Even though they are small objects, they are going at a very
high speed, and therefore impacts cause a tremendous amount of
damage. When you are talking about things moving at 17,000
miles an hour, for example, collisions that occur at those
speeds--that is faster than .30-06 round, by the way, that
would go down range. Those kinds of speeds are particularly
damaging if you talk about the unintended collision.
Senator Nelson. In addition to worrying about space debris,
we also have to be concerned about our adversaries perhaps
trying to bring down or jam our satellites. What are we doing
in a general sense to protect against having somebody, another
country or a bad operator, find a way to effectively render
inoperative one of our military satellites?
General Kehler. Sir, the threat to our space capabilities
is real. The threat that we are concerned about is
predominantly a ground-based jamming threat, for example, GPS.
GPS, as universally used as it is, is essentially in its
orbital component a radio transmitter. It does not transmit at
particularly high power, and so it is not a terribly difficult
signal to jam, if you have the right pieces of equipment in
place. So jamming is one of the issues.
We see the development of jammers in militaries around the
world. We know Sadaam Hussein in the early days of Operation
Iraqi Freedom actually operated GPS jammers. They were not
effective. He did not have many of them and they were not used
particularly well. They were not employed effectively, and
ultimately they were taken out.
But we see a proliferation of jammers. We see satellite
communications jamming. Sometimes we see that today in an
unintentional way because the frequency spectrum is getting
more crowded, but we have also seen it in an intentional way as
well.
Then, of course, we have seen the demonstration by the
Chinese and we had seen years ago the demonstration of anti-
satellite weapons by the Russians. So we know that those types
of capabilities exist out there in the world and we have to be
mindful of those. So we are taking a number of steps.
At some level, some of this is an engineering solution.
We have to design the satellites differently. In some
cases, they are pretty well protected today from a lot of
things, but they are not protected against everything. We get
into difficulty in determining what those other satellites that
are on orbit--what is their real purpose? They can all look
like communications satellites, but that may not be their
purpose. So we have a better job that we have to do in
situational awareness so we get advance warning of things that
could happen, and then we can take some additional protective
steps. In some cases, we have not put much in the way of
protective steps in place. Resilience in the capability will
come maybe from airborne platforms or elsewhere instead of
space.
Senator Nelson. There is a certain amount we can do to
protect. Whatever we do can in some way or another be defeated
if the other side develops the capacity to do that. We cannot
protect anything and everything.
General Kehler. No, we cannot. Resilience is the ultimate
way to take care of these vulnerabilities. That is true in
cyberspace as well. But ultimately mission assurance, which
means that you can operate through something even in the face
of duress of some kind, and then resilience, multiple ways to
get the job done, is really the way that we are ultimately
trying to get at these vulnerabilities.
Senator Nelson. This question is about our men and women in
uniform who are part of the STRATCOM. On any given day, how
does STRATCOM support our troops in, let us say, Afghanistan?
General Kehler. Sir, I tell my colleagues in the other
combatant commands--and I actually believe this firmly--that
there is no military operation that goes on out there that is
not being impacted by STRATCOM in some way. The number one
example is GPS. There is not a military activity that is going
on out there somewhere today that is not impacted or touched
somehow by GPS. Satellite communications is another one that
there is either voice traffic or data going over satellite
communications somewhere in the world right now in large
volumes that is supporting military activities. We are
providing the networks over which their data and communications
are flowing. We are providing a strategic umbrella, I believe,
a deterrent umbrella over top of them. We are ensuring that the
missile defensive capabilities that they need are in place and
effective. We are taking steps with them to combat WMD. We can
provide expertise forward when they need expertise. We can
provide other planners that go forward to conduct, for example,
global strike operations.
Let me use a couple of examples here. You asked about
Afghanistan. The reason I believe that we can operate the way
we do in Afghanistan is because of space and cyberspace. It
allows our troops to navigate with accuracy. It allows them to
communicate with certainty. It allows them to strike with
precision. It allows them to do those kinds of things that have
essentially become the American way of warfare in a place like
Afghanistan. It allows troops to operate in geographically
dispersed locations, which we do in Afghanistan. It allows us
to put forward operating locations in places where their only
communications might be through satellite communications means.
It allows us to fly remotely piloted aircraft using a
combination of cyberspace and space so that you do that half a
world away. All of those things are either provided by the
Service components of STRATCOM or somehow planned via a global
synchronization effort through STRATCOM.
Finally, in the early stages of the Libyan operations,
STRATCOM conducted, on behalf of U.S. Africa Command, global
strike operations as well.
I believe we have a supporting role that we live every
single day with those forward commanders that are out there. We
are touching them in ways that they do not really realize we
are touching them in. We are also helping to manage the global
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets that they
are relying on every minute of every day.
I feel very proud of the men and women of STRATCOM and what
they do not only when we are supported in our efforts to deter
the strategic end of the spectrum, but also in the supporting
activities that they put out to support what they would call
the warfighters. I think you would find that if you went around
and talked to any STRATCOM assigned people today in any of our
operating locations, they would say that they are there for
that. So I am very proud of them.
Senator Nelson. I think the American public is probably
fascinated with the unmanned aerial vehicles and the way in
which they operate. Could you give us maybe a little bit of an
overview of how you can operate a machine halfway around the
world with precision and that it does not have to be operated
like a model airplane with a local control right on the ground
close to the vehicle?
General Kehler. Yes, sir. Well, actually it does.
It is both.
Senator Nelson. Yes, it can be both ways, but it does not
have to be.
General Kehler. Right.
The way I think about it, sir, is I split it into two
pieces. One is actually flying the aircraft itself. The other
is operating the sensors or the systems that are on the
airplane.
So to do the airplane operations in the immediate vicinity
of the airfield, we do it a lot like a model airplane. There is
somebody there in the local vicinity to get it airborne and
bring it home when it is on final approach, if you will. But
the whole rest of that operation is being flown remotely. The
vehicle itself is being flown by a pilot who is remote, and
sitting next to that pilot is a sensor operator or a mission
operator of one kind or another. That is all being done through
cyberspace. It is all being done through a network. It is all
being done through a combination of things, by the way, which
is some military pieces, but mostly it is commercial pieces.
There is probably a commercial satellite link that is involved
in there somewhere. There may be some commercial fiber optic
that is involved in there somewhere which, by the way,
reinforces with us why the nature of cyberspace is largely in
the civil and commercial domain when we use it. We are talking
about protecting ourselves in cyberspace. A very interesting
point of contact between DOD and the other departments and
commercial industry is in just that kind of a thing for just
that kind of a purpose, for example, flying remotely piloted
aircraft.
That is the way it is done. It is done from places that are
relatively small rooms. I know you have seen some of them and
been with the crews that do that. What strikes me is if they
are flying over Afghanistan, if you enter a shelter with them
and close the door behind you, you do not know where you are.
After a while you forget that you are in the United States
somewhere. You are not in Afghanistan with them. You are not
where the vehicle is. After a while, I think the mindset that
the people have that do this is the same.
That goes all the way out to the tactical level. There are
some smaller vehicles that are flown at the tactical level.
There are some that are actually flown like model airplanes
from some person forward on the ground who is doing almost the
same thing that we did as kids, but they have sensor packages
on them that allow them to see and perceive things that are out
there that might be threats.
I think it is a remarkable testament to space and
cyberspace that we do those things today.
Senator Nelson. It is a little bit like science fiction.
There is no fiction to it but there is a lot of science
associated with it.
This question relates to the fact that STRATCOM is very
technically oriented and requires a lot of dependence on
scientists and engineers and other people with a high degree of
technical specialty. Are we seeing enough young people and
others in the educational system today who are taking that kind
of background coursework to fill the needs that we are going to
have tomorrow and the next day and the day after that for the
kind of capacity that STRATCOM has in the future that is not
that very far ahead?
General Kehler. No, sir, I do not think we are seeing
enough. It may very well be that if we were to visit the major
universities around the country--and certainly we have had a
little bit of this conversation with the University of
Nebraska--I think you would find that they are producing high
quality engineering students, and I think you would find that
every one of our major engineering schools around the country
are producing high quality engineering students and I think you
would find that they are producing maybe significant numbers of
them. I think you would find that of those numbers, the
percentage who stay in the United States and enter the national
security business is way too small. So there are interesting
issues here with recruiting, with retention, with making sure
that we have identified what skills we need, and making sure
that we have put in place the incentives, I think, for people
to enter the national security business and stay there when it
is a little more difficult to do that.
NASA is shifting its directions and is in a period where we
are coming to the end of the Space Shuttle. There is going to
be a period of time here as they are reorienting to go off and
do some other things.
I think it is going to be a challenge for us to attract and
retain the kinds of people that we need. Cyberspace is another
one of those areas and particularly when there is highly
competitive demand on people to go to industry as well. So I
think educating them, keeping them, going back to the secondary
education as well and then post-secondary is something that is
very concerning for us.
Senator Nelson. It is something that obviously we need to
work on because if we do not have the workforce coming into the
command, we are not going to be able to continue the command as
it is or we will have to structure it differently and that is
not in anybody's best interest. So I hope that we can keep
pushing to get that kind of effort and capacity growing.
Otherwise we will not have any seed corn and we definitely have
to have that.
General Kehler. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. STRATCOM is responsible for, as we talked
about, the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, or
as it is referred to in military terms, ISR. We know that ISR
played a role in the successful raid that took out Osama bin
Laden. Can you talk about any kind of support that STRATCOM
might have provided in that mission?
General Kehler. Sir, not really.
Senator Nelson. You can say that we had some involvement.
You just do not have to say what it is.
General Kehler. We did have some involvement. We provide
involvement across the board to the activities in CENTCOM all
the time. So most of what we do for ISR, anyway, in those
forward areas is planning and recommendations on what assets
they should get. How they use them and what they are using them
for is not always apparent to us.
Senator Nelson. That is my final question. Is there
anything that I did not ask that I should have asked?
General Kehler. No, sir. Thank you for the opportunity to
appear again.
I will say again in closing, on behalf of the men and women
of STRATCOM, we certainly appreciate the support of Congress.
We appreciate the support of the entire Senate Armed Services
Committee and your support and your subcommittee, in
particular. These are difficult issues and you know and I know
both that there will be fiscal pressures as the President's
budget works its way through.
I would just make one final advocacy comment about the need
to sustain the funding that is in the President's budget,
particularly for these critical items related to sustaining our
nuclear forces, the nuclear infrastructure that backs them up,
the command and control systems that we have in place, our need
to increase both our space and cyberspace situational awareness
and the investments that are there to do that, the investments
that we have in place to sustain our force.
Then finally, I would remind all of us again that those
steps that you all have taken to support the men and women who
actually are the heart and soul of what we do--the hardware is
one thing. But it is not the hardware that ultimately is
important. It is the men and women that are in STRATCOM and
throughout the rest of our military. So the support that we
have for them I would continue to advocate in the strongest
possible way.
Other than that, sir, thanks for the opportunity.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, General Kehler, for your very
candid remarks and responses to questions. Thank you and the
men and women of STRATCOM for their service to our country, to
wish you and all of them the very best and to thank the young
men and women who are here with us, as well as the Fighting
55th and the ``Weather Command'' as well.
The colonel was quick to point out that it is the Chaplain
who is responsible for the rain. [Laughter.]
So thank you so very much.
I also want to thank the staff here at this wonderful
facility, once again, for hosting one of our field hearings. We
thank you.
We thank all who are here and hope that you have perhaps
some idea, if not a better idea, of the role of STRATCOM which
we are all so proud is located here in this part of our
wonderful State. We hope that we will be able to continue to
have hearings of this kind for transparency and for
enlightenment to the men and women who are relying on this kind
of protection for our national defense and the taxpayers who
continue to support them. Thank you all.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]